### AFF

Then I made my mistake  
and looked at a face,   
a kind of no-face with holes for eyes  
nose, mouth,   
legs missing from the knees down  
still stuck to all those bits   
somewhere, which banged her life apart.   
A little girl, bandaged  
in mummy, almost pretty.   
Some nurse had taken an age  
getting each lap perfect  
so proud that when we look  
we might still see a person,   
someone whole.

#### Ontology is taken from the body, the Western subject is constructed around the notion of the perfectly rational I, the white male superman, sovereign and invulnerable, the ideal being who constructs what it means to be a self. However, trying to achieve this is impossible, the subject is always vulnerable but aspiring to be perfect, infinitely close but never there. Our search for perfection is always haunted by its constitutive outside, the monster, the abject horrifyingly grotesque that disturbs our notions of what it means to exist. This culminates in a project of paradoxes where the disabled body is simultaneously fetishized and erased, used to construct the boundaries of the ideal self an outside, while being covered up, as society has constructed disability as that which must be destroyed.

Bill Hughes, Civilising Modernity and the Ontological Invalidation of Disabled People, published 2012, ///AHS PB

**The stratifying binary of disability/non-disability and the antagonism of the latter towards the former is mediated and maintained, principally, by the emotion of disgust**. Disgust is the bile carried in a discursive complex that Campbell (2008: 153) calls ‘ableism’: ‘a network of beliefs, processes and practices that produces a particular kind of self and body (the corporeal standard) that is projected as perfect, species-typical and therefore essential and fully human’. **The body produced by ableism is equivalent to what Kristeva (1982: 71) calls the ‘clean and proper body’. It is** the body of the ‘normate’, the name that Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (1997) gives to the body that thinks of itself as **invulnerable and definitive. It is the hygienic, aspirational body of civilising modernity**. It is cast from the increasingly stringent norms and rules about emotional behaviour and bodily display that mark mundane social relations in the lebenswelt (lifeworld). 22 Civilising Modernity and Disabled People **This curious non-disabled body/self has no empirical existence per se. On the contrary, the body of ableism is a normative construct, an invulnerable ideal of being manifest in the imaginary of ‘modernist ontology, epistemology and ethics’ as something ‘secure, distinct, closed and autonomous’** (Shildrick, 2002: 51). **It embraces ‘human perfectibility as a normative physical or psychological standard**’ and involves ‘a curious disavowal of variation and mortality’ (Kaplan, 2000: 303). **It is what we are supposed to aspire to, to learn to be but can never become**. It has no grounding in the material world. It is a ‘body schema, a psychic construction of wholeness that … belies its own precariousness and vulnerability’ (Shildrick, 2002: 79). **It is a ‘body divorced from time and space; a thoroughly artificial affair’** (Mitchell and Snyder, 2000: 7), the epitome of civilisation, **closed off from any connection with the animal side of humanity** and from the ways in which our bodily nature wallows in its carnal improprieties. It is a body aghast at the messiness of existence. **Disability is the opposite of this ideal body, its ‘inverse reflection’** (Deutsch and Nussbaum, 2000: 13). The disabled body is or has the propensity to be unruly. In the kingdom of the ‘clean and proper body’, **disability is the epitome of ‘what not to be’. As a consequence the disabled body can be easily excluded from the mainstream ‘psychic habitus’ (Elias, 2000: 167). The ‘clean and proper’ – a normative body of delicacy, refinement and selfdiscipline – has powerful social consequences most manifest in its normalising dynamics. It is the standard of judgement against which disabled bodies are invalidated and transformed into repellent objects. It is the emblem of purity that by comparison creates existential unease. It apportions the shame and repugnance that underwrite the civilising process** (Elias, 2000: 114–19, 414–21). Through ableism, **modernity has been able to structure disability as** uncivilised, **outside** or on the margins of **humanity**. One of the great books of the science of natural history published under the title Systema Naturae by Linnaeus in 1735 distinguishes between homo sapiens and homo monstrosus. In this classification impairment – at its extreme and highly visible end – is excluded from the human family. **The distinction is, in itself, an act of violence and invalidation, an object lesson in transforming difference and ‘defect’ into the abominable**. The distinction mobilises the aversive emotions of fear and disgust. **Ableism is a cruel teacher. It embodies violence at many levels: ‘epistemic, psychic, ontological and physical’** (Campbell, 2008: 159). It is at its most bellicose when it is mediated by disgust: a mediation invoked mostly in the social fabrication of taboo and most compellingly in a context when the human/animal boundary is under threat. **Ableism rests on the effort to eliminate from awareness, chaos, abjection, animality and death: all that civilisation seeks to repress. It encourages us to live in the false hope that we will not suffer and die, to adopt a perspective of invulnerability**, to confuse morality with beauty and to see death, pain Bill Hughes 23 and disability as the repulsive woes of mortality rather than as the existential basis for community and communication. Kolnai (2004: 74) reminds us that, ‘in its full intention, it is death … that announces itself to us in the phenomenon of disgust’. **Disability, in modernity, has been produced in the ontological household of the abject, as the antithesis of communication and community, in a place that we might on occasion peer into only to ‘choke’ on the unsavoury sights that greet us. Disability is put out, put away, hidden, segregated or transformed into its opposite, covered up by whatever medical or aesthetic techniques are available to achieve this end. Any opportunity that disability might have to take its place at the heart of communication and community is thwarted by the ablest sensibilities that push it back down among the disgusting, the sick, the dead and the dying**. In fact, as Elias (2000) suggested, **the making of ‘civilised’ community and communication in modernity proceeds by exclusion and interdiction, by cutting out and hiding away whatever causes or might come to inspire** angar (choking) or anguista (tightness). It is important to understand ableist **disgust** as an emotion that attests to the failure of non-disabled people to fully recognise their own vulnerabilities and imperfections particularly as these relate to their mortal selves and to the death and decay that is the fate of all. Although it appears as an aversion to ‘the other’, it is a form of self-aversion or a means by which we hide from the bodily basis of our own humanity (Nussbaum, 2004). Indeed, **disgust** begins close to home and **is derived from our discomfort with our own bodily functions, our oozy, sticky ‘leaky selves’ (Shildrick, 1997; Kolnai, 2004), the fact that we cannot contain ourselves within our own boundaries and the shame and embarrassment that the ‘civilising process’ brings to bear upon us if our leakiness is exposed to others**. Because modernity is a charter for anal retentiveness, we cannot forgive ourselves for our physical impurities. **We hold ourselves ransom to the myth of the ‘clean and proper’ body; the perfect body of ableist culture is a myth that we use to screen ourselves from the visceral realities of our own lives. The ableist body ‘helps’ non-disabled people cope with their fears about their own corporeal vulnerability. It does so by invoking its opposite, the disabled body, a foreign entity that is anomalous, chaotic and disgusting.** Modern history helps to make this object of disgust more tangible. Civilising processes clarify stigma and make biological differences into socio-moral categories. **Disgust provokes the civilising sensibilities. It warns them of the presence of possible contaminants** (Miller, 1997). Consequently, psychological and social distance between disability and non-disability expands. Disgust in ‘it’s thought- content’ is ‘typically unreasonable, embodying magical ideas of contamination, and impossible aspirations to purity, immortality, and non-animality, that are just not in line with human life as we know it’ (Nussbaum, 2004: 12). Disgust is an emotion that has a central role in our everyday relationships with our bodies, our patterns of social interaction and – most pressingly 24 Civilising Modernity and Disabled People from the perspective of this chapter – in processes of social exclusion. Disgust is the emotional fuel of ableism. **The threat posed by ourselves to ourselves (and projected onto others), the threat of our ‘bodiliness’ and the shame and anxiety associated with it is a product of ableism, of the ‘tyranny of perfection’. Ableism makes the world alien to disabled bodies and, at the same time, produces impairment as an invalidating experience.** It is manifest in our cultural inclination towards normalcy by way of correction, towards homogeneity by way of disparagement of difference. What this means for **disabled people is that they are ‘expected to reject their own bodies’ and ‘adjust to the carnal norms of nondisabled people’** (Paterson and Hughes, 1999: 608). The ‘corporeality of the disabled body’ is, according to Campbell (2008: 157), ‘constantly in a state of deferral’ awaiting the affective response that will demean it or the travails of sociogenesis that will either do away with it or ‘make it better’.

#### Multiple Impacts:

#### [1] Activism: Idealized narratives of counter resistance create a static notion of the protest informed by the ideal body that excludes disabled people--those who cannot engage are erased

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I listened to the sounds of the marches as they drifted up to my window. Attached to the bed, I rose up my sick woman fist, in solidarity. /// I started to think about **what modes of protest are afforded to sick people** – it seemed to me that many for whom **B**lack **L**ives **M**atter is especially in service, **might not be able to be present** for the marches because they were imprisoned by a job, the threat of **being fired** from their job if they marched, or literal **incarceration**, and of course the threat of violence and **police brutality** – but also because of **illness or disability**, or because they were caring for someone with an illness or disability. /// I thought of all the other invisible bodies, with their fists up, tucked away and out of sight. /// If we take Hannah Arendt’s definition of the political – which is still one of the most dominant in mainstream discourse – as being any action that is performed in public, we must contend with the implications of what that **excludes**. If being **present** in public is what is required to be political, then whole **swathes of the population can be deemed a-political** – simply because they are **not physically able** to get their bodies into the street. /// In my graduate program, Arendt was a kind of god, and so I was trained to think that her definition of the political was radically liberating. Of course, I can see that it was, in its own way, in its time (the late 1950s): in one fell swoop she got rid of the need for infrastructures of law, the democratic process of voting, the reliance on individuals who’ve accumulated the power to affect policy – she got rid of the need for policy at all. All of these had been required for an action to be considered political and visible as such. No, Arendt said, just get your body into the street, and bam: political. /// There are two failures here, though. The first is her **reliance on a “public”** – which requires a private, a binary between visible [transparent] and invisible [imperceptible] space. This meant that whatever takes place in private is not political. So, you can beat your wife in private and it doesn’t matter, for instance. You can send private emails containing racial slurs, but since they weren’t “meant for the public,” you are somehow not racist. Arendt was worried that if everything can be considered political, then nothing will be, which is why she divided the space into one that is political and one that is not. But for the sake of this anxiety, she chose to **sacrifice** whole **groups of people**, to continue to banish them to invisibility and **political irrelevance**. She chose to **keep them out of the public sphere**. I’m not the first to take Arendt to task for this. The failure of Arendt’s political was immediately exposed in the civil rights activism and feminism of the 1960s and 70s. “The personal is political” can also be read as saying “the private is political.” Because of course, everything you do in private is political: who you have sex with, how long your showers are, if you have access to clean water for a shower at all, and so on. /// There is another problem too. As Judith Butler put it in her 2015 lecture, “[Vulnerability and Resistance](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fbYOzbfGPmo" \t "_blank),” Arendt failed to account for who is allowed in to the public space, of who’s in charge of the public. Or, more specifically, **who’s in charge of who gets in**. Butler says that there is always one thing true about a public demonstration: the **police are already there**, or they are coming. This resonates with frightening force when considering the context of Black Lives Matter. The **inevitability of violence at a demonstration** – especially a demonstration that emerged to insist upon the importance of bodies who’ve been violently un-cared for – ensures that a certain amount of people won’t, because they **can’t, show up**. Couple this with **physical and mental illnesses and disabilities that keep people in bed** and at home, and we must contend with the fact that many whom these protests are for, are **not able to participate** in them – which means they are not able to be visible as political activists. /// There was a Tumblr post that came across my dash during these weeks of protest, that said something to the effect of: “shout out to all the disabled people, sick people, people with PTSD, anxiety, etc., who can’t protest in the streets with us tonight. Your voices are heard and valued, and with us.” Heart. Reblog. /// So, as I lay there, **unable to march, hold up a sign, shout a slogan** that would be heard, **or be** visible in any traditional capacity as a political being, the central question of Sick Woman Theory formed: How do you throw a brick through the window of a bank if you can’t get out of bed? ///

#### [2] Speech itself has become a weapon. Liberal humanism views language as an projection of the rational subject, creating ideal norms of communication through a Universal Speaker propped up by disabled suffering and punishing us for failing to conform.

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If to be truly human in liberal humanist discourse is to exercise autonomous reason, and if speaking realizes oneself as a rational and social agent within the public sphere, then having a voice has direct bearing on the universal citizen—so much so that I believe it possible to conceive of what might be termed a “universal speaker.” Because speech plays a pivotal role in the realization of the self as a rational agent, then if one is to speak, he/she must speak in a way that defends the universality of autonomous reason against embodied and historical particularity. Furthermore, the universal speaker, like the universal citizen, must be marked by impartiality. As stated by Young, “impartial reason aims to adopt a point of view outside concrete situations of action, a transcendental ‘view from nowhere’ that carries the perspective, attributes, character, and interests of no particular subject or set of subjects” (1990, p. 100). From this façade of impartiality, it is only a small step to judge who does and does not speak impartially and thereby qualifies as rational and human. To speak as a truly rational agent requires that one speak from nowhere and everywhere, becoming an invisible medium for communication. The universal speaker is a powerful homogenizing trope, for it defines what type of speech production is natural, who gets the right to speak, what speech needs to be taken seriously, and what speech gets to be heard at all. If one is to speak with agency or efficacy, one must speak in the right way; hence the burden within this tradition is to find and retain the “right voice.” In Better Than Well: American Medicine Meets the American Dream, for example, Carl Elliott (2004) notes an anxiety in the struggle of transgendered people to match gendered vocal norms, the accent-reduction clinics in the American south, and the difficult adjustment of disabled speakers to voice synthesizers. At the heart of liberal humanism’s claim to universality and equality, an ugly structure of exclusion of those who are not “universal” shows itself, an exclusion that I argue results from the tension between (a) the desire to conceive of oral communication as rational/universal and (b) the embodied particularity of speech that threatens to undermine its universality. For while speech is peddled as a rational, universal, and nonspatial medium within liberal humanism, the particularity of embodied speech casts a threatening shadow over this claim. Returning to the example of the stuttering voice, Marc Shell argues that having the “right voice” is a necessary sign of membership to a particular group of persons. If you cannot speak, he wryly explains, you are likely not human. If you can somewhat speak you may be human, and if you cannot speak in my particular way, you do not belong to my tribe (2005, p. 50). For the stutterer, however, “all words are test words, passwords, or catchphrases whereby one gains or loses social acceptance or credibility. . . . The concern is not his inability to pronounce some word or phrase fast enough; it is one’s ability to say any word fluently in any language” (2005, p. 51). Shell is quite clearly stating the boundary conditions of the universal speaker. However, just as the vocal markers of ethnic boundaries are contingent, historical, and laden with colonial power, so can the supposed universality of rational human speech be unraveled. Disability studies convincingly challenge the pathologization of individual bodies by articulating the sociocultural structures of ableism that normalize and exclude certain forms of human variation.2 “Disability” is no more self-evident, natural, or stable a concept than “able-bodiedness”: Both are understood through disability studies as a function of contingent sociocultural anxieties and oppressions. Disability circumscribes the human by negation. Following in this vein, we might likewise fray the boundaries of the universal speaker by deterritorializing disabled speech. Consider again Gunn’s claim that “within speech is always a tacit threat of the loss of control” (2010, p. 189). Ubiquitous stutters and vocalic gaffes occur to everyone on a daily basis precisely because communication is fundamentally unstable: the act of carving out meaning from indeterminacy and noise as opposed to a pure and rational articulation of Being. The so-called disabled speech permeates all speech. The delimitation of the disabled speaker is thus necessarily arbitrary: the construction of a deviant and pathologized Other to prop up the universal speaker. More specifically, pathologization individuates “nonrational” speech production and thereby maintains and polices the public/private divide. Disabled speech is conceived as a private affair marked by particularity and embodiedness, while the rational speech of the universal citizen belongs to the public realm. Yet, resituating disability as a distinctly public structure of oppression unmasks “universality” as simply the norms of unmarked and dominant groups. What counts as a particular and impartial voice is a function of conglomerate sexist, classist, racist, and ableist determinations obscured by their dominant positions within society. Vocally passing as universal is a stacked game favoring those who discursively control the boundaries of rationality and the human. To transgress norms of unmarked dominant groups is to risk great social punishment and exclusion. To speak “in the wrong way” not only reveals the speaker to be connected to his/her body, particularity, and context, but also risks blurting out that the emperor is naked— the emperor speaks from a body. In rupturing the mythos of speech, the disabled speaker thus throws darkness within the humanist circle, threatening the ostensibly stable conditions of a generalized and “universal” identity and provoking violence in attempts to shore up the boundaries of the human. Excluding “hyperembodied voices” is thus a dogged mechanism of deferring the tension inherent in liberal humanist speech between universality and particularity, rational autonomy, and embodiment. The (failed) movement to free communication as rational discourse from the body entirely is reapproached through the posthumanist shift to text as the principal mode of communication.

#### **[3] Psychological violence: Idealized ontology is configured through social practices which cause disabled people to internalize their disgust of the nonperfect body culminating in self hatred Psychological violence is voting issue and an internal link to debatability**

Campbell 08. Dr Fiona Kumari Campbellis a Senior Lecturer in the School of Health and Wellbeing at the University of South Queensland <http://www98.griffith.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/handle/10072/21024/50540_1.pdf> “Exploring Internalized Ableism using Critical Race Theory” Disability and Society, Vol. 23 (2), p. 151-162 NT 16

Internalized oppression is not the cause of our mistreatment; it is the result of our mistreatment. It would not exist without the real external oppression that forms the social climate in which we exist. Once oppression has been internalized, little force is needed to keep us submissive. We harbour inside ourselves the pain and the memories, the fears and the confusions, the negative self-images and the low expectations, turning them into weapons with which to re-injure ourselves, every day of our lives. (Mason, as cited Marks, 1999, p.25). Internalised ableism means that to assimilate into the norm the referentially disabled individual is required to embrace, indeed to assume an ‘identity’ other than one’s own – and this subject is repeatedly reminded by epistemological formations and individuals with hegemonic subjectifications of their provisional and (real) identity. I am not implying that subjects have a true or real essence. Indeed the subjects' formation is in a constant state of fluidity, multiplicity and (re)formation. However, disabled people often feel compelled to fabricate ‘who’ they are – to adopt postures and comportments that are additional to self. The formation of internalised ableism cannot be simply deduced by assessing the responses of individuals to Althusser’s famous interpolative hailing “Hey you, there” (Althusser & Balibar, 1979). Whilst a subject may respond to “Hey you there, crip!” – it is naïve to assume that an affirmative response to this hailing repressively inaugurates negative disabled subjectification. In fact the adoption of more positive or oppositional ontologies of disability by the subject in question may be unexpectedly enabling. As Susan Park (2000: 91) argues “what is at stake here is not so much the accuracy behind the hailing privilege, but the power of the hailing itself to instantly determine (or elide) that thing it is naming”. Nonetheless, censure and the cancellation of the legitimacy of oppositional subjectivities remains common place as Cherney reminds us with respect to Deaf culture: “If abnormal [sic] bodies must be fixed to fit within dominant cultural views of appropriateness then the Deaf celebration of their differences must be read as an illegitimate model of advocacy”. (Cherney, 1999, p. 33). Foucault’s (1976; 1980) theorisation of power as productive may provide some offerings from which to build a conversation about internalised ableism. I am not so much interested in the ‘external’ effects of that power, but for the moment wish to concentrate on what Judith Butler aptly refers to as the ‘psychic life’ of power. She describes this dimension: … an account of subjection, it seems, must be traced in the turns of psychic life. More specifically, it must be traced in the peculiar turning of a subject against itself that takes place in acts of self-reproach, conscience, and melancholia that work in tandem with processes of social regulation (Butler, 1997b, p.19). In other words, the processes of subject formation cannot be separated from the subject him/herself who is brought into being though those very subjectifying processes. The consequences of taking into oneself negative subjectivities not only regulate and continually form identity (the disabled citizen) but can transcend and surpass the strictures of ableist authorizations. Judith Butler describes this process of the “carrying of a mnemic trace”: One need only consider the way in which the history of having been called an injurious name is embodied, how the words enter the limbs, craft the gesture, bend the spine …how these slurs accumulate over time, dissimulating their history, taking on the semblance of the natural, configuring and restricting the doxa that counts as “reality”. (Butler, 1997b, p. 159) The work of Williams and Williams-Morris (2000) links racism experienced by AfricanAmericans to the effects of hurtful words and negative cultural symbols on mental health, especially when marginalized groups embrace negative societal beliefs about themselves. They cite an international study by Fischer et al (1996) which inter alia links poor academic performance with poor social status. Although using different disciplinary language Wolfensberger (1972) in his seven core themes of SRV, identified role circularity as a significant obstacle to be overcome by disabled people wanting socially valued roles. Philosopher Linda Purdy contends it is important to resist conflating disability with the disabled person. She writes My disability is not me, no matter how much it may affect my choices. With this point firmly in mind, it should be possible mentally to separate my existences from the existence of my disability. (Purdy, 1996, p. 68). The problem with Purdy’s conclusion is that it is psychically untenable, not only because it is posited around a type of Cartesian dualism that simply separates being-ness from embodiment, but also because this kind of reasoning disregards the dynamics of subjectivity formation to which Butler (1997a; 1997b) has referred. Whilst the ‘outputs’ of subjectivity are variable the experience of impairment within an ableist context can and does effect formation of self – in other words ‘disability is me’, but that ‘me’ does not need to be enfleshed with negative ontologies of subjectivity. Purdy’s bodily detachment appears locked into a loop that is filled with internalised ableism, a state with negative views of impairment, from which the only escape is disembodiment; the penalty of denial is a flight from her body. This finds agreement in the reasoning of Jean Baudrillard (1983) who posits that it is the simulation, the appearance (representation) that matters. The subject simulates what it is to be ‘disabled’ and by inference ‘abled’ and whilst morphing ableist imperatives, in effect performs a new hyper reality of be-ing disabled. By unwittingly performing ableism disabled people become complicit in their own demise – reinforcing impairment as an outlaw ontology.

#### **[4] Epistemology: Epistemology and education has been commodified Ableism and able bodied norms are always inherent in any system of knowledge production. Only by prioritizing an interrogation of this can we create systems free of violence. Thus** the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best performatively and methodologically challenges ableism.

Campbell 13 (Fiona Kumari Campbell, Adjunct Professor in the Department of Disability Studies at Griffith University. Wednesday 27 November 2013. Problematizing Vulnerability: Engaging Studies in Ableism and Disability Jurisprudence. Keynote speech at Disability at the Margins: Vulnerability, Empowerment and the Criminal Law)

What is meant by the concept of ableism? The literature suggests that the term is often used fluidly with limited definitional or conceptual specificity. The work of Carlson (2001)5 and Campbell (2001) represented a turning point in bringing attention to this new site of subordination not just in terms of disablement but also ableism’s application to other devalued groups.Ableism is deeply seeded at the level of knowledge systems of life, personhood and liveability**.** Ableism is not just a matter of ignorance or negative attitudes towards disabled people; it is a schema of perfection, a deep way of thinking about bodies, wholeness and permeability.6 As such integrating ableism into social research and advocacy strategies represents a significant challenge to practice as ableism moves beyond the more familiar territory of social inclusion and usual indices of exclusion to the very divisions of life. Bringing together the study of existence and knowledge systems, ableism is difficult to pin down. Ableism is a set of processes and practices that arise and decline through sequences of causal convergences influenced by the elements of time, space, bodily inflections and circumstance. Ability and the corresponding notion of ableism are intertwined. Compulsory ablebodiedness is implicated in the very foundations of social theory,therapeutic jurisprudence, advocacy,medicine and law; or in the mappings of human anatomy.Summarised by Campbell (2001, 44) Ableism refers to; …A network of beliefs processes and practices that produces a particular kind of self and body (the bodily standard) that is projected as the perfect, speciestypical and therefore essential and fully human. Disability then is cast as a diminished state of being human. Writing today (2013) I add an addition to this definition: ‘The ableist bodily configuration is immutable, permanent and laden with qualities of perfectionism or the enhancement imperative orientated towards a self-contained improvability’. Sentiency applies to not just the human but the ‘animal’ world. As a category to differentiate the normal from the pathological,the concept of abledness is predicated on some preexisting notion about the nature of typical species functioning that is beyond culture and historical context. Ableism does not just stop at propagating what is typical for each species. An ableist imaginary tells us what a healthy body means – a normal mind, the pace, the tenor of thinking and the kinds of emotions and affect that are suitable to express. Of course these ‘fictional’ characteristics then are promoted as a natural ideal.This abled imaginary relies upon the existence of an unacknowledged imagined shared community of able-bodied/minded people held together by a common ableist world view that asserts the preferabilityand compulsorinessof the norms of ableism.Such ableist schemas erase differences in the ways humans express our emotions, use our thinking and bodies in different cultures and in different situations. This in turn enacts bodily Otherness rendered sometimes as the ‘disabled’, ‘perverted’ or ‘abnormal body’, clearly demarcating the boundaries of normal and pathological. A critical feature of an ableist orientation is a belief that impairment or disability is inherently negative and at its essence is a form of harm in need of improvement, cure or indeed eradication.Studies in Ableism (SiA) inverts traditional approaches, by shifting our concentration to what the study of disability tells us about the production, operation and maintenance of ableism.In not looking solely at disability,we can focus on how the abled able-bodied, non-disabled identity is maintained and privileged. Disability does not even need to be in the picture. SiA’s interest in abledness means that the theoretical foundations are readily applicable to the study of difference and the dividing practices of race, gender, location and sexual orientation. Reframing our focus from disability to ableism prompts different preoccupations: • What does the study of the politics of ‘vulnerability’ tells us about what it means to be ‘non-vulnerable’? • Indeed how is the very conceptualisation of ‘autonomy’ framed in the light of discourses of ‘vulnerability’? • In representing vulnerability as universal does this detract from the specificity of disability experiences? SiA examines the ways that concepts of wellbeing, vulnerability and deficiency circulate throughout society and impact upon economic, social, legal and ethical choices. Principally SiA focuses on the limits of tolerance and possessive individualism. Extending the theorization of disability, studies in ableism can enrich our understanding of the production of vulnerability and the terms of engagement in civic life and the possibilities of social inclusion. I now turn to unpacking the nuances and structure of a theory of ableism.

#### Only abjection dissolves the fragile border of normality through an embrace of the vulnerable subject – when confronted with the monster, the subject is transported to the realm of the real where the social construct of disability becomes imaginary, forcing the ego to confront its worst nightmare and creating space for empathy and equality.

Dohmen, J. Professor of Philosophy at the University of West Georgia according to a random user from rate my professor he is “an excellent professor - engaging, thought-provoking, powerful. Armed with an arsenal of 'dad' jokes and a complete lack of understanding of any pop cultural phenomenon since 1999, Dr. Dohmen stimulates and bewilders the mind. The material is challenging, but Dr. Dohmen skillfully guides the class towards knowledge. Also, totes hot!” (2016). Disability as Abject: Kristeva, Disability, and Resistance. Hypatia, 31(4), 762–778. doi:10.1111/hypa.12266 ///AHS PB BRACKETS IN ORIGINAL CARD

Kristeva introduces the concept of abjection to offer a pre-Oedipal account of splitting that must occur before the formation of a stable subject and its stable objects.6 Whereas an object reveals the subject’s detachment and autonomy, “[t]he abject has only one quality of the object—that of being opposed to I” (Kristeva 1982, 1). The abject is a nonobject splitting from (but never completely split from) the subject-to-be. Developmentally, abjection is the “violent, clumsy breaking away” from the maternal upon which the not-yet-I depends for life, and yet from which it must separate to become a subject (15). That is, abjection is a transitional stage at the level of the imaginary, between the (real) nondifferentiation of the not-yet-subject and the not-yet-object (the maternal), and the (symbolic) differentiation of the subject and its objects. Importantly, having formed no coherent boundary, and struggling to form an inside and outside, it is unclear what is rejected in abjection, and it may be part of what will become the subject, as is the case for vomit and excrement. In other words, the abject is not clearly self or other. Thus, in abjection, imaginary boundaries are not clear or stable, especially the boundary between self and other. This is the central quality of the abject: it “disturbs identity, system, order,” and “does not respect borders, positions, rules” (4). Abjection is ambiguous, and it is not a process that ends once a subject emerges. It is present in the life of the subject wherever its boundaries are threatened, whenever “the object world collapses” (Beardsworth 2004, 84). Another way of understanding the abject is through its relation to narcissism. Kristeva develops an account of narcissism in Tales of Love. For her, the earliest attempts to emerge consist of a vacillation between abjection and identification with a third. The resulting triad (the maternal, the not-yet-subject, and the third) forms the “narcissistic structure” (Kristeva 1987, 48). The not-yet-subject must undergo abjection in order to become differentiated, and yet it also still depends upon, and is not yet separated from, the maternal. This establishes a vacillation between repulsion of and returning to the maternal. But this, for Kristeva, is insufficient to account for the development of the subject, especially the psychic space necessary to form an imagination, or an imaginary body (24). The opening of this psychic space requires that the mother-figure desire an other, the “imaginary father” (26). Through the maternal desire for this “not I” (41)—a desire that “assist[s] the infant in the process of individuation by fracturing its fantasy of autoeroticism” (DeArmitt 2014, 68)—the imaginary father becomes a site of identification for the not-yet-subject.7 To be clear, this imaginary father is not an individual person—after all, the not-yet-subject, without objects, could not recognize it as such. Rather, it is the “speech of the other— precisely a non-object, a pattern, a model,” speech that is not imitated by the notyet-subject (which would assume the ability to compare one’s speech with that of another), but repeated, echoed (Kristeva 1987, 26). In this way, the subject-to-be identifies with the imaginary father; it becomes like this figure, a “subject of enunciation” (26). This is the formative instance of transference, and it becomes the model for continual identification throughout life. It is important to remember that the abject continues to be present throughout life as that which threatens borders, namely the border between the subject and its objects and, as such, it serves as a threat to—and reveals the fragile nature of—the narcissistic enclosure of the subject. Whereas narcissism attempts to maintain the border of the subject against its objects, to open a space in which the imaginary (and eventually the ego) can develop, the abject reveals the permeability and instability of that border. Thus, abjection is a “narcissistic crisis” (Kristeva 1982, 14). It is precisely this threat of dissolution that abjection poses, even while abjection serves as the precondition for narcissism by enacting a first and incomplete differentiation. As a final point in this discussion of abjection, it should be noted that abjection is historically variable. Though Kristeva maintains that abjection is necessary for the formation of any subject, that which is abject depends upon the individual’s cultural location. In Powers of Horror, Kristeva traces a history of abjection through various religious formations of the West.8 The abject may not be abject in other times or places. Kristeva says as much in her discussion of the corpse: “The corpse, seen without God and outside of science, is the utmost of abjection” (Kristeva 1982, 4; emphasis mine). Certain religious faiths, for example, may understand the corpse to be a shell devoid of a soul such that the response to the corpse may be sublimated.9 It is thus conceivable that any number of relations to the corpse are possible, and its status as abject is contingent. Indeed, this variability is part of the promise (and risk) that Chanter finds in abjection. Recall that abjection occurs at the level of the imaginary, occurring before the Lacanian mirror stage or the Oedipal stages through which the child enters the symbolic, and that Kristeva’s account of abjection and narcissism are importantly multisensorial (incorporating sounds, touch, and other sensations), not scopophilic like the mirror stage. Thus, as Chanter notes, abjection “admits the significance of fantasies that do not always already adhere to the phallic contours of Oedipus,” and more broadly, the imaginary body formed through abjection need not conform to the demands of the symbolic (Chanter 2008, 38). In a revision of Kristeva’s theory, Chanter suggests that the “imaginary father” of identification be understood as “any ... socially sanctioned script endowed with the capacity to render some individuals inferior to others,” which script is always mediated by “social processes that construct who is likely to be nearby, and who is not, processes dictated by structural features of economic social life, infused with divisions of poverty, racialized hierarchy, and gender/sex taboos” (45–46). The abject, by dissolving imaginary boundaries, returns the subject to the level of imaginary identification, reveals the ambiguity of one’s borders, the incompleteness and contingency of one’s identifications, and can thus contest and even revise one’s identifications. The danger, though, is that in response to the abject one instead reconsolidates one’s imaginary boundaries, violently rejecting, and thus performatively recreating, that which is abject. Ahmed also finds resources in abjection. According to Ahmed, the “skin of the community” is constituted (and reconstituted) as “an effect of the alignment of the subject with some others and against other others” (Ahmed 2005, 104). To clarify, consider Ahmed’s example drawn from Audre Lorde. Lorde experienced a white woman’s disgust when she, a black girl, sat next to her on a train. The white woman first pulls her coat away from Lorde so that it does not touch her. When Lorde does not move, the white woman stands on the moving train rather than sitting close to her. This allows Lorde’s mother to sit next to her. Here, disgust results in a movement away, an expulsion; consideration or love for the mother results in a moving closer, a touching. In this scene, the skin of the white community is reconstituted as it recoils from black others, and the skin of the black community (and perhaps the family among other communities they share) is reconstituted as Lorde and her mother move closer. This is a microcosm of larger social phenomena in which white communities feel fear, anxiety, or disgust when persons of color “impress” upon their collective “skin.” Why then are some others objects of fear or rejection while other others are objects of love or attachment? Ahmed argues that “particular histories are reopened in each encounter, such that some bodies are already read as more hateful and disgusting than other bodies” (Ahmed 2005, 106). We inherit histories of our communities in which this skin is already in place. And this skin is constituted and maintained primarily by metonymy, the “contact and proximity between bodies and signs,” but also by metaphor, in which one “stand[s] for or stand[s] in for others” (106). So for example, although it may be the case that immigrants come to stand for some particularly threatening individual in the perception of a white community in the US, it is more common that the physical proximity of immigrants, the slippery associations of immigrants with strange languages, smells, and habits, constitutes and reconstitutes the movement of white bodies away from immigrant bodies that maintains the skin of the white community. This account, Ahmed writes, is inspired by Kristeva’s own writings on abjection. Recall that the primary instance of abjection is the not-yet-subject’s attempts to emerge from its maternal surroundings. As such, abjection constitutes a first and fragile boundary for the subject. What’s more, the feeling of disgust associated with abjection is the result of impressions upon that boundary by the abject (perhaps the smell of spoiled milk) that result in an expulsion (vomiting) or a movement away from this abject (fleeing). Important to note, however, is that in abjection it is never clear what is inside or outside, because inside and outside are (incompletely) constituted by abjection, by the attempt to form a “clean and proper” (Kristeva 1982, 71) body or community. How, then, does abjection revise Kristeva’s own account of disability? First, it is surprising that Kristeva does not use the terms abject or abjection in either of her articles on disability because her language in these essays resonates with Powers of Horror. She says, for example, that disability presents the other with “the anxiety of seeing the very borders of the human species explode” (Kristeva 2012, 29) and with the “mortality of life” (Kristeva 2013, 225). This threat to one’s boundaries and the boundaries of the species would seem to be clear indications of abjection. Indeed, if the corpse is abject as “death infecting life” (Kristeva 1982, 4), it seems that the disabled person who “inflicts a threat of psychical or physical death” (Kristeva 2012, 29) would also be abject. Second, recall that abjection occurs at the level of the imaginary. Thus, the exclusion to which disabled persons are subject is not (or at least not most immediately) the result of conscious, symbolic reflection; rather, it is an immediate (and affective) response intended to shore up the narcissistic boundaries of others in their interactions with disabled persons. For subjects who feel their narcissistic integrity threatened by disabled others, there is a visceral anxiety that calls forth avoidance, expulsion, and even violence. Third, because the figures of abjection are culturally contingent, this may be helpful in understanding the recommendations Kristeva makes at the level of culture to address the exclusion of disabled persons, especially in France. Underlying her history of disability is a “culture that ... continues to ... deny the lack of being essential to the human condition” (Kristeva 2012, 33). That is, disabled persons have presented and will continue to present a narcissistic threat to others, especially those who identify as nondisabled, as long as the narcissistic illusion of wholeness that our culture expects is maintained. Insofar as the nondisabled reject and exclude disabled others because of this narcissistic threat, they will lack the impetus to conceive of themselves as inherently vulnerable. Important to note is that persons with different disabilities may be narcissistically wounded by and therefore also exclude others identified as disabled. A person with a physical disability may reject a person with an intellectual disability, for example, especially if the physically disabled person’s intellectual prowess is central to her self-image. This is a possibility that Kristeva does not raise, a lacuna that lends credence to Grue’s concern about the distance Kristeva imposes between the disabled and the nondisabled. But given the fluidity of abjection (Who is inside? Who is out? Who is identified as disabled, who isn’t, and at what cost?), exclusion of those identified as disabled by others identified as disabled is not only possible but likely. Fourth, abjection, especially as Ahmed and Chanter develop it, suggests a way to resist disability exclusion. Nondisabled persons conceive themselves as such by excluding the disabled, and this conception can be challenged only by recognizing their own vulnerability, specifically through interactions with disabled persons. Thus, interaction with disabled others will require a double movement. First, nondisabled persons must encounter disabled persons and work through the resulting narcissistic threat to acknowledge themselves as vulnerable. Because one’s narcissistic self-image is always emotionally invested and exists at the level of the imaginary, this workingthrough (like all working-through) must be more than a conscious reflection or recognition. It will be a piecemeal work of thinking (especially with others), of feeling and responding to emotions with others, of dissolving old identifications and forming new ones. This process by which one may transform one’s “fear of castration, narcissistic injury, defect, and death” into “attention, patience, and solidarity” will contribute not only to allowing true interactions with disabled persons, but will also result in a greater understanding of oneself as inherently vulnerable (Kristeva 2012, 44). Second, the nondisabled must stop excluding disabled persons, move toward them (in the sense adopted from Ahmed), and thus open the boundaries of the community. This is to engage and transform disability as abject—in other words, as that which challenges the boundaries of the “nondisabled” community. The former will be possible only through an exposure to disabled persons brought about by the latter, and the latter will be possible only insofar as nondisabled individuals perform the work of the former. Thus, it is only through a vacillation between these two movements that Kristeva’s dream can be accomplished.10 Referring back to Chanter’s revisions to the theory of abjection permits further development of my account. The social scripts—which are mediated by social processes that largely have moved disabled persons away from the nondisabled, whether through institutionalization, built structures, or noninclusive public and private spaces—shift identifications, especially of the nondisabled, away from disabled persons or a disabled identity. These identifications lead to performative reenactments of these social processes. In other words, the threat to one’s nondisabled identity posed by others identified as disabled leads to a rejection of disability in an attempt to stabilize the nondisabled identity that has been exposed as porous and unstable. But more important, abjection reminds us that such an identity is always unstable. It is not at all clear what the abject is here. Is it the disabled other? The other’s vulnerability? One’s own vulnerability? Recall that in abjection, parts of what will become the subject are also expelled, especially that which is painful or unpleasant. So when Kristeva attributes isolation and awareness of mortality to disabled subjects, it is unclear whether this is her isolation and awareness of mortality or that of disabled others. Abjection in the face of disability renders any such determination unstable. Similarly, when Kristeva claims both that each subject has irremediable vulnerabilities, but specifies that disabled subjects are distinguished by their irremediable vulnerabilities, this may again be the work of abjection, the expulsion of that which is painful, brought about by the dissolution of her narcissistic boundaries. Moreover, because identifications take place at the level of the imaginary, and because they are always mediated by social scripts determined in part by the proximity of others, the abject is subject to metonymical slippages. That which is excluded is multiple, but imaginary associations may form between what one disidentifies with, between that which is expelled to form one’s identity. In this way, slippery associations between physical disability and mental disability, between speech disabilities and cognitive disabilities, or between women and “hysteria,” for example, are formed and preserved, largely because of social processes that have excluded persons identified as disabled and social scripts that have marked whiteness, ability, and maleness as normative. But abjection also opens up hope: abject encounters with others identified as disabled may also serve as opportunities to form new identifications. By opening up the imaginary space in which boundaries are blurred, the abject might provide the impetus for forming new boundaries, for identifying (oneself and others) differently, for problematizing the slippery associations between others with whom one disidentifies. Indeed, certain figures in disability studies scholarship, like the temporarily ablebodied (or TAB), hold out just such a promise. By rejecting vulnerability as formative of oneself, one disidentifies with disability, and forms an identity as able-bodied. But the figure of the TAB reminds us that vulnerability is common to all, and that it is expelled from some at the expense of rendering others abject. To be clear, simply acknowledging oneself as temporarily abled does not address the imaginary and affective responses one may have to this conscious awareness. Indeed, such awareness could lead to even more violent rejections, avoidance, endless efforts at maintaining one’s health, or even suicide.11 I do believe that there is power in the language of temporary ability, however, because it exposes the ambiguity and fragility of nondisabled identities and therefore opens the potential of new identifications if those changes also occur at the imaginary and affective levels.

#### Survival Strategy – Abjection can be a performance of the self for the self as a form of self reflexivity as a form self care and the deconstruction of the binary opposition that enforces modes of ableism which means if I win the aff is a good idea you vote aff on presumption – only abjection allows the actualization of the disabled flesh while violently stripping society ability to exclude and pin marginalized groups against each other. Sandoval-Sanchez, Alberto. “Politicizing Abjection: In the Manner of a Prologue for the Articulation of AIDS Latino Queer Identities.” American Literary History, Oxford University Press, www-jstor-org.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/stable/pdf/3567907.pdf?refreqid=search%3A65f310cecaaae277446c9633d2f17f6e BRACKETED FOR GENDERED LANGAUGE. Julia Kristeva defines abjection in Powers of Horror in terms of "what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules" (4) allows for the examination of the very special dynamics between self and other in queer male bodies in given relations of power that fuel the machinery of homophobia, racism, xenophobia, machismo, and AIDS phobia. Abject bodies are repulsive because they manifest and inflict a confusion of boundaries which punctures, fractures, and fragments the assumed unity, stability, and closure of the identity of the hegemonic subject and the body politic of the nation. Although abjection is "above all about ambiguity" (9), it still has the power to be felt somatically and symbolically; it infects/affects both the material body and the self. Elizabeth Grosz's theorization on the abject is applicable here to visualizing its existential dimension: "It is the underside of a stable subject identity, an abyss at the borders of the subject's existence, a hole into which the subject may fall when its identity is put into question." (72). For this reason, it must be kept in check, out of sight, always expurgated to avoid any erosion and/or traversal of borders. Threatening to contaminate the symbolic order, undoing cultural taboos around the body, and putting at risk all systems of cultural order and logic, people of color, homosexuals, people living with AIDS, and migrants in the US must be kept at bay and relegated to the margins, just as bodily fluids, secretions, and waste are repelled. Once expelled from the national body politic, the unclean and improper Other is translated as an alien, as a monster, an excess or lack that provokes disgust, anxiety, horror, and fear. I propose that the queer Latino abject subject located at the privileged site of boundaries can empower himself given his posi tionality between exclusion and incorporation. Abject Latin[x] queer bodies in liminal zones of abjection can transgress borders, allowing for the possibility of subversion and emancipation. In this way, abject Latino queer bodies are dangerous because they do challenge and menace the fragile limits of the order of things and social. The politics of abjection that I suggest is rooted in Latino queer bodies with AIDS-unos cuerpos marked by race, ethnicity, class, sexuality, AIDS, and migration, unoscuerpos that endanger and trouble the cohesion of the social order by destabilizing the borders between normal and deviant, insider and outsider, sameness and difference, health and illness, life and death. These bodies are the site where abjection operates to validate difference and alterity. It is through the condition of abjection-that continual struggle between the subject and the abject-that a subjectivity in process is articulated in all its performativity. By centering on how abjection is experienced en came y hueso, my approach allows for the notion of perceiving abjection as a performative act, "a doing and a thing done" (Diamond 1), always a becoming that has the potential to disrupt normality. It is through unending acts of performative abjection that the marginalized Other can gain agency, subvert, and resist. I want to inquire specifically how Latino queer bodies materialize and enact abjection as a strategic performance where identity is always in the making to manifest difference and display a new politics of identity in all its inconsistencies and paradoxes. I am interested in investigating what modalities of abjection operate in Latino/a queer cultural projects and how abjection molds new forms of cultural pro duction. Indeed, up to what point do Latino/a queer cultural performances materialize a discursive site of/for abjection that menaces the homogeneity and stability of official hegemonic culture and identity and its anxieties that keep the queer, the AIDS survivor, the Latino/a migrant, the racial and ethnic Other locked in place? Since abjection problematizes bodies and identities once boundaries are crossed, what is at stake is the dramatic construction of subjectivities in process and mutational identity formations always at risk of dis solution and further marginalization. By privileging and reclaiming abjection, the Other inhabits a liminal and interstitial space that rec ognizes the provisionality of identity and the processual nature of cultural practices, such as transculturation. In the words of Kristeva: "Where am I? instead of Who am I? For the space that engrosses the deject, the excluded, is never one, nor homogeneous, not totalizable, but essentially divisible, foldable, and catastrophic. A diviser of ter ritories, languages, works, the deject never stops demarcating his universe whose fluids confines.., constantly question his solidity and impel him to start afresh" (8). In doing so, to embrace abjection is to undo, in some part, racism, shame, homophobia, and the fear of death, allowing for a source of self-empowerment and a liberating counterhegemonic force of bodies in revolt that corporalize difference and heterogeneity with the potential to never cease "challeng[ing their] master" with a boundary crisis, the instability of meaning, and the disruption of order.

#### Evaluate the aff as an instance of abjection in debate. The AC is a resistance to the endless ability checks and imposed norms that reproduce violence against disabled bodies in this space any reason why the aff is disruptive or problematic is a reason to vote aff.

Maddy **Stevens**, assistant coach at Winston Churchill and a founding member of the Women’s Debate Support Group., Ableism, November 19, **2015**, <http://www.premierdebate.com/articles/ableism/> ///AHS PB BRACKETED FOR CLARITY

Vincent Van Gogh. Albert Einstein. Virginia Woolf. Thomas Jefferson. Abraham Lincoln. These are respected historical figures who happen to be neurodivergent, specifically autistic. Most people don’t know this, and never had reason to think these prominent and influential figures were disabled, because many refuse to entertain the idea that those who are disabled are capable and transformative personalities. **Most debaters are familiar enough with ableism to pick up on an obvious link for a discourse k somewhere in their backfiles, but fail to recognize that it’s just the tip of the iceberg. Ableism is not just a list of words, it’s a pervasive system of oppression that seeks to identify, isolate, institutionalize, and even erase disability. Language is one of the ways through which ableism solidifies its power over divergent existences**, however, the analysis of its influence and range of power is not completed merely by establishing what words we shouldn’t use (especially since many people don’t take the time to understand why that rhetoric is harmful, and because the list is ever expanding to accommodate new discursive additions). It is vital that we examine our understandings of disability and abandon monolithic and inaccurate constructions, that our analysis extends to an interrogation of norms which we often take for granted, both within debate and society at large, and that we work with disabled members of our community to reach solutions. There are many standards, expressions, and norms which seem innocuous, but which reveal an underlying harmful mentality upon inspection. Many of these things have become so far ingrained and accepted that to even challenge the appropriateness of them is to incur indignation and outrage against oneself. We operate under a paradigm of “able until proven otherwise”. Sometimes it’s easy to identify disability because the person matches the paradigm we have for being disabled, in other words, they have an identifying trait of disability which we cannot reason away. More often than not, disability is not easily ascertained. People who have so called “invisible disabilities” often fly under ablenormativity’s radar, so abled people accept us as one of them. Because we do not “look disabled”, people do not check themselves in conversations, and will have discussions about disabled existence as though it is an abstract concept, or will make jokes they would not say in front of someone they identify as disabled, and will voice opinions which they believe you, as an able individual, will share. I’ve debated rounds where, after reading an advocacy dealing with disabled empowerment, I was criticized for commodifying the ballot because I did not concede. This criticism [and] assumed that I was speaking for others, and demanded that I either disclose my identity in a potentially hostile space against my initial inclination or admit to taking advantage of oppression. In forums where I have disclosed and discussed my disability, I have been met with skepticism and scrutiny, because I do not live up to every criteria in The Able Person’s Check List: Disability Edition. Both of these instances represent a time when ablenormativity informed an audience that it was impossible for disability to exist among them, and that it was especially impossible for a disabled individual to compete, educate, or exist alongside, or as well as, them. The notions we have of disability have been informed by a mostly able academia, a mostly able media, and a mostly able society. In this way, we have come to know about disability through the lens of those who are accepted and thus are in control, rather than those who are affected and who are kept subdued by such constructions. Various institutions and groups continue to benefit from the misunderstanding leveled towards disability, as well as its otherization and criminalization. Employers in the United States may obtain an exemption from the Fair Labor Standards Act, allowing them to pay their disabled (read: unproductive, less important) employees below the minimum wage, the average being $2.15 an hour. The perpetuated myths of disabled persons being in a state of “arrested development” or “children in adult bodies” justify the segregation and poor treatment of disabled workers, who, it is asserted, should be grateful for any employment or compensation at all in light of their “defects”. Lawmakers routinely use disability as a scapegoat in order to preserve their own agendas (because the problem isn’t guns or racism, it’s crazy people!) despite the fact that having a disability increases the likelihood of being abused, not being an abuser. Historically, disability has been punishable by imprisonment and institutionalization, trends that we see continuing through the criminalization and abuse of homeless and lower income persons, who are disproportionately disabled, and thus disproportionately excluded. Legacies of disenfranchisement continue in all areas, but most egregiously (and for some reason, least acknowledged) in the 35 states in which it is illegal for developmentally disabled persons to vote. All of these connections stand to demonstrate that the idea and treatment of disability has been created by those who, in some way, benefit from the identification of and stigma towards disabled communities. Understanding that our approach to disability is produced by those who actively benefit from the identification and control of those populations is an important starting point for any discussion. The recognition that the assignment and treatment of disability is not neutral is at least enough to encourage us to keep an open mind when we engage in questions like “what role does ableism play?” and “how do we create a more inclusive community?” We must approach this subject with the concession that our knowledge is wrong, and we must be ready to accept the narratives and input of disabled people if we are to reach any true solution. This holds especially true within the debate space, particularly if we agree to any given author’s assertion that we are educators within this space. Because ableism is so particularly entwined with academia (whether it be through outright contempt or through subtle exclusion), it is incredibly important that we recognize the role we all may play in facilitating certain harmful norms. Debate is a space for advocacy, but we attach all sorts of conditions and stipulations for even just agreeing to hear something out. The speaker has to present a certain way, they can’t stutter or pause, as that shows a lack of preparation, and they should maintain eye contact or it shows a lack of conviction in their arguments. These are arbitrary standards rooted in ablenormativity, there is nothing natural about eye contact nor is it necessarily more persuasive. Having a harder time reading or pronouncing words is no reason to invalidate a performance and is no indication of lack of ability. We need to recognize that our process for validating some arguments over others may be rooted in either the politics of credibility (those mentioned above) or within our own biases. Ableism is insidious, and is often easy or convenient to ignore. Many of us will recognize surface issues, but fail to grasp the underlying motivations or how to correct the problem long term (for instance, most people will agree that it’s wrong to call someone ‘retrded’, but will continue to use the word ‘idot’, despite the fact that both have been used in an institutionalized, medical context, both have been a label of identifying disabled persons for institutionalization or for the forfeiture of rights, and that they’re literally synonymous). As a result, people often fail to recognize ableism in action and we reject the indications that would tell us otherwise. Ableism’s normalization comes through a consistent dehumanization of disabled persons and the persistent discrediting of our narratives. Because of this, it’s incredibly important for us to promote the outcry of the disabled. These discussions force us to acknowledge that there is a problem, they make us confront the impacts that we have so easily and for so long overlooked, and demand we reevaluate the understandings we once had. Every day, disabled people are killed, locked away, or stripped of our rights. Doctors and parents kill us out of “mercy”, school systems abandon us, governments deny us, society sweeps our unsightly or inconvenient lives under the rugs (The US literally had laws that prevented “grotesquely disabled” people from being in public until the 1970’s). Any educational forum has the obligation to take us seriously, to recognize us. As educators within a debate round, you do that by setting aside your biases, setting aside your outside inclinations of what oppresses disabled people or doesn’t, and listening to those who would tell that story. There’s still an unanswered question here, which is how do we include disabled members of our community? Obviously, opening up the space and suspending our disbelief in order to learn about ableism is a huge step in the right direction. Our job doesn’t end there. We need to stop treating disability as something that must be disclosed or proven. You do not have the right to ask someone how they are disabled if they have not offered that to you. Their hesitance to disclose that information should not be regarded as evidence that they are lying for ballots or sympathy, it should be respected as the understandable concern for how others will treat them and how this will impact their reputation or credibility. This also entails that we stop making assumptions about ability based off of little to no interaction. Just don’t go there. Stop privileging academia over the accounts of disabled people. Disabled persons are much better situated than outside, unaffected intellectuals to understand and explain some facet of their identity. Knowing whether you are on the right or most informed side of an issue isn’t a matter of having a billion scholars who back that up; the accuracy of a solution or the description of a phenomenon is determined by those who are affected by it. Want to know whether people first language is better or worse than the alternative? Read the testimony of the people who are affected by those discourses, go to the source, and credit disabled people (especially since academia won’t). Coaches need to make it clear that particular attitudes are unacceptable and unwelcome on their teams. The team should be a safe place where students have support and the resources they need to get better. It should not be a place where their intelligence and abilities are demeaned. If students don’t have a team, they don’t have a support group. If students don’t know if they can trust their coaches to help rather than dismiss them, they won’t come to them for help. Debate should be a site of empowerment, engagement, and education, not a place for aggressions (micro or otherwise) to be tolerated and normalized. Transforming the learning environment starts with a personal transformation. Coaches must realize that their narrative is not the only one, and must be willing to make concessions for student comfort. This means changing discursive patterns when they’ve been problematized, setting standards for the kids under your care to adhere to, and letting students find what they love and helping them understand it rather than shutting them down. Criticisms of ableism have the power to reclaim a history that has been stolen from disabled people; putting ableism at the forefront recognizes the existences that society has tried to eliminate and reclaims the spaces from which we have been erased. This conversation is essential to understanding the world as we know it, our interactions, our structures, our beliefs. Interrogating ableism demands that we recognize disability, demands that we include disabled persons; the emphasis on this discussion asserts disabled lives as important and vital, and forces the recognition that our inclusion is necessary for any solution. The population at large has a long way to go in accommodating and accepting the identities of everyone, and one article targeted towards debaters isn’t going to change that, but I think this community is a great place to start. As so many LARPers will tell you, debaters should act as, and may one day be, policymakers, so the precedents set here don’t stay here. Even if nothing ever spills over, making the debate space safer and more inclusive, and giving more people a space of advocacy, seems an admirable enough goal on its own.

#### And that outweighs, only a focus on the pre fiat implications of this space avoids the intellectual gymnastics of policy making and acts as prior question to addressing questions of US Government Action.

**Reid-Brinkley 2008[[1]](#footnote-1), So, within public discourse, how race is coded rhetorically in public deliberation is of critical importance. Mitchell observes that** the stance of the policymaker in debate comes with a “sense of detachment **associated with the spectator posture.”115 In other words,** its participants are able to engage in debates where they are able to distance themselves **from the events that are the subjects of debates. Debaters can** [and] throw around terms like torture, terrorism, genocide and nuclear war without blinking. Debate simulations can only serve to distance the debaters from real world participation in the political contexts they debate about. **As William Shanahan remarks: …**the topic established a relationship through interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the particular political affinities of the debaters were**. The relationship was both political and ethical, and needed to be debated as such.** When we **blithely** call for **United States Federal Government** policymaking, we are not immune to the colonialist legacy that establishes our place on this continent. We cannot wish away the horrific atrocities perpetrated everyday in our name simply by refusing to acknowledge these implications

### AT Poetry bad

Richardson ‘18(Chris, 5 ways to teach autistic children to create poems, Art of Autism, July 7, 2018, https://the-art-of-autism.com/5-ways-to-teach-autistic-children-to-create-poems/, 2-8-2019 NJW

It’s been proven that working with autistic students’ creativity and stimulating their imagination enhances the learning process, and helps them absorb information faster. Teaching your students how to create poems is a great way for them to start accumulating new information, and progress in an activity that can give them lifelong satisfaction. Here are some great tips on how to do that.

Martin 15(Chris, Why I Teach Poetry to My Autistic Students – BRIGHT Magazine, BRIGHT Magazine, 5-13-2015, https://brightthemag.com/why-i-teach-poetry-to-my-autistic-students-c3ceae509a1a, 2-8-2019 NJW

My students on the spectrum embrace poetry with unexpected joy. I funnel that to show them a world bigger than they know. ∂ No one has seen Jason write more than a short paragraph. He’s in sixth grade and he’s on the spectrum. I’ve heard him talk vast and ornate paragraphs about baseball, his enduring passion, but getting him to write even a single haiku about autumn leaves has been slightly disastrous.∂ Then Wallace Stevens comes along. In the after-school creative writing class I teach, we read his poem “Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird.” I challenge everyone in the class to identify the noun that means the most to them: person, place, or thing. Jason, quite predictably, picks a baseball. Three weeks later he’s finally reached his temporary goal, “One Hundred Ways of Looking at a Baseball,” and he seems poised for another hundred at least.∂ The popular emphasis on autism always seems to be the endless variations in which it is embodied: the spectrum. But autism is also characterized by the opposite of variety. A defining symptom of autism is the existence of “restricted patterns of interest that are abnormal in intensity or focus.” In other words, every autistic student has a devoted passion.∂ These restricted interests are often portrayed negatively, in that they limit the student’s ability to access a wider range of interests. A restricted interest is seen as an obstacle, or worse, a black hole, sucking everything into its churning vortex.∂ I’ve been teaching creative writing to students on the spectrum for over a decade now and I have a different take on restricted interests. You see, I’m a poet. I practice an art form that prioritizes focus and economy.∂ When I first began teaching, in an after-school program in the Bensonhurst neighborhood of South Brooklyn, my assumption was that I would be primarily working with talented writers and rappers. And I did, but I also found that poetry struck a nerve with the autistic students. And I found that they were similarly talented, with a catch: I had to funnel every writing exercise through their particular area of passion.∂ I had several of these students, in addition to Jason. One of the more challenged members of my class, a boy who was largely ignored by the other educators in his life, wrote an epic poem about his very specific passion: the original Planet of the Apes (1968). Not only was it epic, it featured in-depth descriptions of several characters and their shifting emotions, proving that he could understand some of the complex social emotions that others assumed he was oblivious to.∂ What he needed was a personalized filter, someone to help direct his deep study of a highly specific subject toward new possibilities.∂ As I began teaching elsewhere, I was challenged to expand my creative writing curriculum to include more traditional subjects like English, math, history, public speaking, and art appreciation. I found that what I’d learned about spectrum students as creative writers could gradually help them expand their purview in all areas. If a student’s restricted interest is honey badgers but has no interest in reading fictional stories about humans (i.e., most literature), you have to help her see how humans are just like honey badgers, and how in all great nature documentaries there are always protagonists and there are always villains and there are even neutral characters that help move the plot along. Soon enough — meaning, a couple of years later — she’ll be annotating A Wrinkle in Time. If a student’s restricted interest is foreign cars, but he struggles to connect with history, you can help him research and write a play about Ferruccio Lamborghini, the son of grape farmers who eventually redefined the look of modern automobiles.∂ My own passion, poetry, has helped me become a better educator. What these students need is someone who can take a particular concern and connect it to the world. Poetry’s obligation toward economic language helps me craft a focused vocabulary for each student: the thousand words that I know are going to enter one ear and not just fly out the other.∂ I use metaphors to describe how the bizarrely specific things one student knows about airplanes can help him understand algebra or contemporary art. A restricted interest, like a poem, has a vertical thrust. It explores an idea with great depth and devotion. But life is generally a horizontal undertaking. It’s an ongoing narrative that incorporates many different topics. The difficulty consists in learning to generalize particular experiences in an effort to adapt.∂ As a poet who must live in the real world, I can sympathize with the difficulty of moving from a vertical to a horizontal realm. It’s been a great consolation to find I can help autistic students traverse the chasm and turn their supposed restrictions into the means of exploration.

1. Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley, University of Pittsburgh Department of Communications, “THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE” 2008 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)