# Falsifiability NC

#### All statements and moral theories are regulated by the falsifiability theory of meaning which prioritizes falsity over positive observation. This renders future knowledge in a state of indeterminacy and holds negative observations sufficient to disprove a theorem.

**Nickles**, Thomas. "Falsifiability." New Dictionary of the History of Ideas. **2005**. , <https://elearning.shisu.edu.cn/pluginfile.php/35320/mod_resource/content/1/Falsifiability%20%28Introduction%29.pdf> ///AHS PB

**Falsifiable contrasts with verifiable. A claim is empirically verifiable if possible observation statements logically imply the truth of the claim. If actual observation statements do imply the claim, then it is verified. "This raven is black" verifies "There are black ravens."** During the 1930s the logical empiricists of the Vienna Circle proposed verifiability both as a criterion of demarcation of science from nonscience and a criterion of meaning. Their idea was that a statement is meaningful if and only if it is verifiable in principle, and its meaning is given by its method of verification. For the logical empiricists, only empirically verifiable claims make genuine assertions about the world and are, in this broad sense, scientific. All other claims (metaphysical, religious, ethical, etc.) are cognitively meaningless. In his Logik der Forschung (1934; Logic of Scientific Discovery), Popper replied by rejecting the logical empiricists' concern with language and meaning and by noting that **verifiability as a criterion** of demarcation **excludes** scientific **law** claims and thus the core of science **itself. For** since **a law claim** is universal in scope (in simplest form, "All A's everywhere and everywhen are B's"), it **cannot possibly be verified: there are always actual or potential instances beyond those so far observed. Yet a** universal claim **can be falsified by a single negative instance. The first observed black swan refuted the claim "All swans are white."** (Law claims of statisticalprobabilistic forms are more problematic.) Based on this logical asymmetry of verification and falsification, Popper proposed falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation of science from nonscience, although not as a criterion of meaning. According to Popper, nonscience includes pseudoscience (e.g., Freudian psychology and Marxism) and metaphysics, the one fraudulent, the other sometimes providing a valuable heuristic for science. Many deep scientific problems have their roots in metaphysics, but to be scientific, a claim must take an empirical risk. Moreover, **falsifiability**, as the ongoing risk of falsification in our world, **is a permanent status** for Popper. **No amount of successful testing can establish a hypothesis as absolutely true or even probable: it forever remains conjectural. That all** scientific **theories remain falsifiable entails** fallibilism, the view that **our best epistemic efforts remain open to future revision. There can be no certain foundations to knowledge.**

#### Thus the reasonable aff burden is to deny the falsifiability of the resolution:

#### Prefer on Deontic Logic: a single falsity negates the entire truth principle.

**Luca**, Luca, Andrei. “LogicWarrior Demand Reason.” LogicWarrior, 9 Oct. **2017**, [www.logicwarrior.net/tag/law-of-non-contradiction/](http://www.logicwarrior.net/tag/law-of-non-contradiction/).

This law is another seemingly obvious point but in practice the Law of Non-Contradiction is the foundation of argumentative validity. The Law of Non-Contradiction makes logic truth preserving so that **you’ll never go from a true point and arrive at a false point. Contradiction negates logic**, and while true paradox may be something fun which to reflect unless you’re attempting to unite with the godhead by reaching nirvana, contradiction simply has no place in logic. This is not to say that something can’t appear to be self-contradictory and this idea is the basis of a lot of statements of reflection. In the course of debate another definition may become useful: **Both a claim and not that claim can’t be true. So, if a statement holds even a teensy weensy bit of falseness, it must be entirely false.**

#### And Permissibility and presumption flow neg: [A] Probability, there is one way for a statement to be true and an infinite amount of ways for it to be false [B] If I knew nothing about P I would presume both P and not P true, a contradiction [C} if every action is permissible then ought not statements like the resolution are incoherent [D] All moral truths require absolute certainty [1] Absent certainty we can always ask why should I, making our obligation unconstitutive [2] Uncertain truth statements are illogical

Unger, Peter (1975): Ignorance (Oxford: Oxford University Press). ///AHS PB

The very particular idea that knowing entails its being all right to be certain is suggested, further, by the fact that knowing entails, at least, that one is certain. As we saw in section 9 of the preceding chapter, that this is a fact is made quite plain by the inconsistency expressed by sentences like 'He really knew that it was raining, but he wasn't absolutely certain it was.' Such a sentence can express no truth: if he wasn't certain, then he didn't know.

# 2nr Moves

## Overview

#### Big Mistake you have [vastly undercovered/conceded] the NC burden, which endorses the Falsifiability theorem of truth. this is a game over issue for two reasons:

#### [1] You have conceded the warrant in Nickels 05 where he says maxims are always open to revision from future evidence, this means that statements like the resolution are never true but rather are in a state of not false because they haven’t been disproved yet. Two implications: [A] This justifies automatically voting negative insofar as you have not respond to the last argument in the presumption second which says we need absolute certainty to produce morally binding reasons for action and to prove statements true which is Unger 75. Insofar as we never are certain of theories, every truth statement is false. [B] Even if you respond to that and beat back every single negative argument on the flow, it is impossible for you to have offense because you have just proved the resolution to be not false in those instances, not that it is true overall. Insofar as you have conceded presumption negates because of [X] there is no way for you to win substance.

#### [2] You have conceded that a single instance of the resolution or the AC framework being false negates. There are two warrants for this. [First], is Nickles 05, who warrants that because truth statements are general states of affairs one false instance denies its validity and leaves room for infinite further exceptions, even if I have seen 100 white swans and 1 black swan “Swans are white” is still false [Second] is the Luca 17 evidence, insofar as a false claim never comes from a true claim, it is illogical for a statement to both true and not true at the same time. This means that 1% falsity makes the entire thing false. Thus if the negative is winning any argument on the flow as too why the Aff is semantically, substantively, or philosophically false, no matter how blippy or how much weighing the AC does, you are always going to be voting neg.