### Framing

#### Prefer aff interps-

1. 2:1 rebuttal skew means the aff needs to be able to keep interps as leverage
2. Presence of neg side bias means it should be used as a compensation mechanism. We don’t know why the skew exists but we know it does so use it here absent neg alternative.
3. Aff goes into the round blind so they’re forced to make choices- shouldn’t be penalized for making a non-ideal choice when the neg can always adapt

#### If the neg gets interpretive re-evaluation in the 1NC, the neg must concede the aff parameter choice- this refers to paradigm question and the evaluative mechanism. For example, the aff would get to choose consequentialism but the neg can alter how we debate under that metric. This is preemptive.

1. Aff is the starting point of the debate- this isn’t possible if the neg can completely changes the terms.
2. Maximizes education- we spend more time discussing issues instead of establishing the basis for debate.
3. Temporal skew- resets in me in the 1AR because the 1AC becomes irrelevant.
4. Switch Side debate and re-evaluation solve- I allow them to choose the argument’s functionality to whatever suits them best. Aff will always get this right so it levels out.

#### Drop the arg and reevaluate my offense on T

1. Checks back no risk T. No risk T is bad since I have to overinvest to prevent a 6 min collapse
2. Forces a 1AR restart which rectifies any abuse created by the aff since they get 4-13 advantage on advocacy development.
3. There’s infinite T interps that the aff can be susceptible on reevaluation solves by cohering with the negs interpretational preference

#### No new 2NR responses

1. Resolvability- introducing new responses forces interpretive intervention because the judge has to determine the initial validity of the argument in relation to the response. Worst impact since it impairs judge adjudication
2. Depth- only allows one speech interaction, which kills argument development. Regardless of argument quality, more speeches allows for the possibility of a more refined discussion

#### Aff gets RVIs on multiple neg interps: Strat skew- multiple interps become functional NIBs skewing aff strat because I have to beat back all while they can win on one. Outweighs b/c it’s on the highest layer so 1AC becomes meaningless.

### Advocacy

#### Resolved: In the United States, private ownership of handguns ought to be banned. VPC 99

"Handgun Ban Background," Violence Policy Center, 1999, http://www.vpc.org/fact\_sht/hgbanfs.htm PH

Handgun Ban Backgrounder America's gun problem is a handgun problem. Handguns exact an inordinate toll on American lives. The vast majority of gun death and injury in homicides, suicides, and unintentional shootings is carried out with easily concealable pistols and revolvers. The public health model as well as the traditional approaches employed in protecting consumer health and safety lead to one inevitable conclusion: handguns should be banned. Firearms There are an estimated 192 million firearms in civilian hands.1 Yet, fewer and fewer Americans own more and more guns. Surprisingly, only 25 percent of adults own a firearm. Of these, three out of four own more than one gun.2 About 10 percent of the adult population owns 77 percent of the total stock of firearms.3 Handguns There are about 65 million handguns in the United States. Handguns make up 34 percent of all types of firearms.4 Of all firearm-related crime, 86 percent involved handguns.5 Only one in six Americans own [one] handguns.6 Unlike manufacturers of other consumer products, the industry that makes handguns is unregulated for health and safety. Overall Firearm-Related Deaths Since 1962, more than one million Americans have died in firearm homicides, suicides, and unintentional shootings. Handguns were used in more than 650,000 of these fatal shootings.7 In 1997ï¿½the most recent year availableï¿½there were 89 firearm deaths per day, or a firearm death every 16 minutes.8 In homes with guns, a member of the household is almost three times as likely to be the victim of a homicide compared to gun-free homes.9 Handguns and Homicide On the average, if someone gets shot and killed, four out of five times it will be with a handgun. In 1997, for example, handguns were used in 79.4 percent of all firearm homicides.10 From 1990 to 1997, handguns were used in a majority (55.6 percent) of all homicides; that is, they were used in murder more than all other weapons combined.11 From 1990 to 1997, there were 293,781 firearm deathsï¿½homicides, suicides, and unintentional shootings.12 From 1990 to 1997 in the United States there were more thanï¿½ 160,000 homicides 110,000 firearm homicides 89,000 handgun homicides13 Handgun homicides hit record highs in the early 1990s, peaking in 1993. That year there were 13,258 such killingsï¿½out of a total of 16,120 firearm homicides.14 As part of an overall drop in crime, in 1997 handgun homicides fell to 8,503.15 Suicide The largest category of firearms fatality is suicide, not homicide. In 1997, 54 percent of all gun deaths were suicides, and 42 percent were homicides.16 About six out of 10 suicides are committed with firearms.17 For firearm suicides, it is estimated that handguns are used twice as often (69 percent) as rifles and shotguns.18 For all suicides, it is estimated that more than four out of 10 were committed with handguns.19 From 1990 to 1997ï¿½ there were more than 147,000 suicides committed with a firearm an estimated 90,000 involved a handgun20 People living in a household with a gun are almost five times more likely to die by suicide than people living in a gun-free home.21 Self Defense For every time a gun in the home is used in a self-defense homicide, a gun will be used inï¿½ 1.3 unintentional deaths 4.6 criminal homicides 37 suicides22 In 1997 there were 15,690 homicides. Of these, 8,503 were committed with handguns. Among handgun homicides, only 193 (2.3 percent) were classified as justifiable homicides by civilians.23 For every time in 1997 that a civilian used a handgun to kill in self-defense, 43 people lost their lives in handgun homicides alone.24

#### Hardwood 02 explains the enforcement mechanism.

Harwood 02 [William S. "Gun Control: State Versus Federal Regulation of Firearms." Maine Policy Review 11.1 (2002): 58-73.] PH

**Given** this **relative equilibrium in the advantages of state versus federal regulation, it may be best not to view the problem as one requiring an “either/or”** **solution**. **It may not be useful to attempt to** determine whether the federal or state government is better positioned to regulate firearms and then **give “the winner” sole responsibility** for doing so. **Instead, gun violence may be better addressed by state and federal governments working together**. **Because the social problems** presented by firearms **range from suicide to child safety to domestic violence, it may be preferable to use** both federal and state regulation, in **a coordinated effort**, to reduce the number of victims of gun violence. Under a coordinated federal-state approach, the **federal government would set regulations which would serve as the minimum** or floor. Because these federal regulations would apply uniformly throughout the country, all dealers and gun owners would be required to comply with these federal laws. **However, states would be free to impose stricter regulations if they wished to do so**. For example, the federal government may prohibit gun dealers from selling to those convicted of a felony. But states could go further and prohibit sales to those convicted of either a felony or a misdemeanor. In essence, **the states could serve as laboratories for experimenting** with new regulations **while the federal government would take the more conservative approach** of only adopting regulations that enjoyed broad public support throughout the country. **If state regulations proved successful** at reducing gun violence, **they would then become candidates for inclusion in the federal regulations**. Once enough states—particularly those with large consumer markets—adopted similar regulations, gun dealers and owners would be more willing to accept those regulations being adopted by the federal government and thereby put into effect in all fifty states. **Under this scheme the federal government would allow individual states to aggressively address** the problem of **gun violence but would also provide a firm floor beneath each of the states’ programs**. In addition to the federal government providing the minimum floor and the states experimenting with tougher regulations, the federal government and states would cooperate on another level. Specifically, under a coordinated federal-state approach, the federal government would concentrate on regulating firearm manufacturers and commercial dealers, and the states would concentrate on private ownership and use of firearms. **Because of the need for uniformity in setting standards for the manufacturer of firearms, it would be preferable for the federal government to set those standards.** Conversely, when adopting regulations for the safe storage of firearms inside the home or transfers of guns between collectors or friends, there is much less need for uniformity and much greater opportunity for regulation to be tailored to reflect the specific values and customs of a particular state. **Finally, the coordinated federal-state approach would include a coordination of enforcement activities by the two levels of government. For example, if the federal government decided for reasons of fiscal prudence not to devote enough resources to properly enforce federal regulations, the states would step in.** If there were not enough ATF agents to inspect the records of the federally licensed gun dealers in a particular state to ensure compliance with federal regulations, the state police or some other state law enforcement agency would begin doing so

### Solvency

#### UK proves a handgun solves in the long run. Faiola 13:

Anthony Faiola. “After shooting tragedies, Britain went after guns.” Washington Post. February 1, 2013. JY.

After Britain’s sweeping handgun ban was imposed in 1997, for instance, tens of thousands of weapons were collected from legal owners in exchange for fair market value, cutting off supplies of stolen handguns that ended up in criminal hands and largely forbidding their sale by gun dealers in Britain. Nevertheless, statistics show that gun violence in Britain increased for the next several years. But starting in 2005 — and following years of anti-gun sweeps by police forces in British cities that made illegal guns far less accessible — gun violence began to ebb. In 2011, England and Wales recorded 7,024 offenses involving firearms, down 37 percent from their peak in 2005. Given that British crime statistics also count fake guns as “firearms,” criminologists say the number of violent crimes involving real guns is likely significantly lower. “One thing that is now certain is that it’s much more difficult to get a gun in this country,” said Jack Straw, Britain’s former cabinet minister in charge of home affairs and one of the chief architects of the 1997 Firearms Act.

#### Even if bans can’t be perfectly enforced, they’re still better than mere gun control. McMahan 12:

Jeff McMahan 12 [White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford, and taught previously at Rutgers University and the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign], "Why Gun 'Control' Is Not Enough," The New York Times, December 19, 2012, GU//MM

**They will next argue that even if there were a legal prohibition, it could not be enforced** with anything approaching complete effectiveness. This is true. As long as some people somewhere have guns, some people here can get them. Similarly, **the legal prohibition of murder cannot eliminate murder. But the prohibition of murder is more effective than** a policy of **“murder control”** would be.¶ **Guns are not like alcohol and drugs**, both of which we have tried unsuccessfully to prohibit. Many people have an intense desire for alcohol or drugs that is independent of what other people may do. But **the need for a gun for self-defense depends on whether other people have them** and how effective the protection and deterrence provided by the state are. Thus, **in** other Western **countries in which there are fewer guns, there are correspondingly fewer instances in which people need guns** for effective self-defense.

### Soft Power

#### US lags behind globally in gun control. Obama’s inability to pass a gun law makes America look weak; every additional massacre decreases US soft power. Freedland 13

[Jonathan Freedland is the Guardian's executive editor, Washington DC shootings: America's gun disease diminishes its soft power, The Guardian, 9-17-13 theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/17/washington-dc-shootings-america-gun-disease]

If this isn't a matter of national security, what is?When 13 people end up dead at a US military base, that surely crosses the threshold – putting **America's problem with guns** into the category reserved for **threat[en]s** to **the mortal safety of the nation**. At its narrowest, Monday's massacre at the Washington navy yard is a national security issue because it involved hostile entry into what was meant to be a secure military facility. Plenty will now focus on how a man twice arrested in gun-related incidents was able to gain such easy access to the nerve centre of the US navy. There will be inquiries into the entry-pass system, use of contractors and the like. But that would be to miss the wider point. America's gun sickness – which has turned massacres of this kind into a fairly regular, rather than exceptionally rare occurrence – endangers the USnot solely because it can lead military personnel to lose their lives, nor even because it can lead to the murder of schoolchildren, as it did at Sandy Hook elementary school last year, or the death of young movie-goers, as it did in Aurora, Colorado, also last year – dreadful though those losses are. The foreign policy experts who gather in the thinktanks and congressional offices not far from the navy yard often define national security to encompass anything that touches on America's standing in the world. **That ranges from its ability to project military force across the globe to its attractiveness, its "soft power". For decades, this latter quality has been seen as one of the US's primary assets, central to its ability to lead and persuade other nations**. But **America's gun disease diminishes its soft power. It makes the country seem less like a model and more like a basket case,** afflicted by a pathology other nations strive to avoid. When similar gun massacres have struck elsewhere – including in Britain – lawmakers have acted swiftly to tighten controls, watching as the gun crime statistics then fell. In the decade after the rules were toughened in Australia in 1996, for example, firearm-related homicides fell by 59%, while suicides involving guns fell by 65%. But the US stays stubbornly where it is, refusing to act. When President **Obama** last tried, following the deaths of 20 children and six staff at Sandy Hook at the end of 2012, his **bill fell at the first senate hurdle. He had not proposed banning a single weapon or bullet – merely expanding the background checks** required of someone wanting to buy a gun. But **even that was too much. The national security pundits who worry how a US president is perceived when he is incapable of protecting the lives of innocent Syrians abroad should think how it looks when he is incapable of protecting the lives of innocent Americans at home**. On guns, the US – so often the world leader in innovation and endeavour – is the laggard, stuck at the bottom of the global class. Bill Clinton perfectly distilled the essence of soft power when he said in 2008, "People the world over have always been more impressed by the power of our example than by the example of our power." He was right. But **every time a disturbed or angry individual is able to vent his rage with an assault weapon, killing innocents with ease, the power of America's example fades a little more**.

#### And, Gun control Specifically kills US-EU soft power

Nye 03 [Joseph S. The paradox of American power: Why the world's only superpower can't go it alone. Oxford University Press, 2003.]

**Government polices** at home and abroad **can enhance or curtail our soft power.** For example, in the 1950s, racial segregation at home undercut our soft power in Africa, and today, **our** practice of capital punishment and **weak gun control laws undercut our soft power in Europe**. Similarly, foreign policies strongly affect our soft power. Jimmy Carter's human rights policies are a case in point, but so also are government efforts to promote democracy during the Reagan and Clinton administrations. Conversely, foreign policies that appear arrogant and unilateral in the eyes of others diminish our soft power, as we will explore further in chapter 5. The soft power that is becoming more important in the information age is in part a social and economic by-product rather than solely a result of official government action. NGOs with soft power of their own can complicate and obstruct government efforts to obtain the outcomes it wants, and purveyors of popular culture sometimes hinder government agents in achieving their objectives. But the larger long-term trends are in our favor. To the extent that official policies at home and abroad are consistent with democracy, human rights, openness, and respect for the opinions of others, the United States will benefit from the trends of this global information age, even though pockets of reaction and fundamentalism will persist and react in some countries. But there is a danger that we may obscure the deeper message of our values through arrogance and unilateral- ism. Our culture, high and low, helps produce soft power in an information age, but government actions also matter—not only through programs such as the Voice of America and Fulbright scholarships but, even more important, when our policies avoid arrogance and stand for values that others admire. The trends of the information age are in our favor, but only if we avoid stepping on our own message.

#### EU relations solve multiple scenarios for extinction

Stivachtis 10, Dr. Yannis A. Director, International Studies Program, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, “THE IMPERATIVE FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION,” online: <http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/global-issues/transatlantic-studies/78.html>

There is no doubt that **US-European relations are in a period of transition**, and that the stresses and strains of globalization are increasing both the number and the seriousness of the challenges that confront transatlantic relations. The events of **9/11** and **the Iraq War** have added significantly to these stresses and strains. At the same time**, international terror**ism, **the nuclearization of North Korea** and especially Iran, **the proliferation** **of** weapons of mass destruction **(WMD),** the transformation of Russia into a stable and cooperative member of the international community, the **growing power of China**, the political and economic transformation and integration of the Caucasian and Central Asian states, theintegration and stabilization of the Balkan countries, the promotion of peace and stability in the Middle East, poverty, **[and]** **climate change**, AIDS and other emergent problems and situations **require** **further cooperation** among countries at the regional, global and institutional levels. **Therefore, cooperation between the U.S. and Europe is more imperative than ever to deal effectively with these problems**. It is fair to say that the challenges of crafting a new relationship between the U.S. and the EU as well as between the U.S. and NATO are more regional than global, but the implications of success or failure will be global. **The transatlantic relationship is still in crisis**, despite efforts to improve it since the Iraq War. This is not to say that differences between the two sides of the Atlantic did not exist before the war. Actually, post-1945 relations between Europe and the U.S. were fraught with disagreements and never free of crisis since the Suez crisis of 1956. Moreover, despite trans-Atlantic proclamations of solidarity in the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. and Europe parted ways on issues from global warming and biotechnology to peacekeeping and national missile defense. Questions such as, the future role of NATO and its relationship to the common European Security and Defense policy (ESDP), or what constitutes terrorism and what the rights of captured suspected terrorists are, have been added to the list of US-European disagreements. **There are two reasons for concern regarding** the transatlantic **[this] rift**. **First, if European leaders conclude that Europe must become counterweight to the U.S., rather than a partne**r, **it will be difficult to engage in the kind of** open **search for a common ground** than an elective **partnership requires**. **Second,** **there is a risk that** public **opinion in both the U.S. and Europe** **will make it difficult** even **for leaders** who want to forge a new relationship **to make the necessary accommodations**. If both sides would actively work to heal the breach, a new opportunity could be created. A vibrant transatlantic partnership remains a real possibility, but only if both sides make the necessary political commitment. There are strong reasons to believe that the security challenges facing the U.S. and Europe are more shared than divergent. The most dramatic case is terrorism. Closely related is the common interest in halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the nuclearization of Iran and North Korea. This commonality of threats is clearly perceived by publics on both sides of the Atlantic. Actually, Americans and Europeans see eye to eye on more issues than one would expect from reading newspapers and magazines. But while elites on both sides of the Atlantic bemoan a largely illusory gap over the use of military force, biotechnology, and global warming, surveys of American and European public opinion highlight sharp differences over global leadership, defense spending, and the Middle East that threaten the future of the last century’s most successful alliance. There are other important, shared interests as well. The transformation of Russia into a stable cooperative member of the international community is a priority both for the U.S. and Europe. They also have an interest in promoting a stable regime in Ukraine. It is necessary for the U.S. and EU to form a united front to meet these challenges because first, there is a risk that dangerous materials related to WMD will fall into the wrong hands; and second, the spread of conflict along those countries’ periphery could destabilize neighboring countries and provide safe havens for terrorists and other international criminal organizations. Likewise, in the Caucasus and Central Asia both sides share a stake in promoting political and economic transformation and integrating these states into larger communities such as the OSCE. This would also minimize the risk of instability spreading and prevent those countries of becoming havens for international terrorists and criminals. Similarly, there is a common interest in integrating the Balkans politically and economically. Dealing with Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as other political issues in the Middle East are also of a great concern for both sides although the U.S. plays a dominant role in the region. Finally, US-European cooperation will be more effective in dealing with the rising power of China through engagement but also containment. The post Iraq War realities have shown that it is no longer simply a question of adapting transatlantic institutions to new realities. The changing structure of relations between the U.S. and Europe implies that a new basis for the relationship must be found if transatlantic cooperation and partnership is to continue**. The future course of relations will be determined above all by U.S. policy towards Europe** and the Atlantic Alliance. Wise policy can help forge a new, more enduring strategic partnership, through which the two sides of the Atlantic cooperate in meeting the many major challenges and opportunities of the evolving world together. But a policy that takes Europe for granted and routinely ignores or even belittles European concerns, may force Europe to conclude that the costs of continued alliance outweigh its benefits.

### Domestic Domination

#### Accessibility of handguns is at the core of domestic domination. Zeoli et al 13

April M. Zeoli - PhD, MPH, is an assistant professor in the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University; Shannon Frattaroli - PhD, MPH, is an associate professor at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health: “Evidence for Optimism Policies to Limit Batterers’ Access to Guns” January 28, 2013IG 12/5/15

In 2010, at least 1,082 women and 267 men were killed by their intimate partners. Fifty-four percent of these victims were killed with guns (United States Department of Justice 2012). For at least the past twenty-five years, more intimate partner homicides (IPHs) have been committed with guns than with all other weapons combined (Fox and Zawitz 2009). Furthermore, women are more likely to be killed by an intimate partner than by any other offender group (Fox and Zawitz 2009; Moracco, Runyan, and Butts 1998). The evidence is clear: when a woman is killed, it is most likely to be at the hands of an intimate partner with a gun. In this essay, we focus on policies to limit batterers’ access to guns, the evidence that supports these policies, and evidence for improvement in their implementation and expansion. We begin with an overview of the evidence about gun usage in domestic violence and how batterers become known to the justice system. Second, we discuss existing legislation to remove guns from batterers. We then present promising evidence about policies to limit batterers’ access to guns and their relationship to IPH, and we discuss implementation and enforcement of those laws. We conclude with federal gun policy recommendations to prevent IPH. Domestic Violence and Guns: A Brief Overview Guns are the weapons of choice for IPH perpetrators. Domestic violence involving a gun is more likely to result in homicide than domestic violence that involves a knife, other weapon, or bodily force (Saltzman et al. 1992). Indeed, the risk of homicide increases when a violent intimate has access to a gun (Bailey et al. 1997; Kellerman et al. 1993), with one study estimating a fivefold increased risk (Campbell et al. 2003). Intimate partners are more likely to use guns to kill their female victims than are non-intimate partners who kill women (Arbuckle et al. 1996; Moracco et al. 1998). Moreover, there is growing evidence documenting the role of guns in nonfatal domestic violence perpetrated by men against women (Moracco et al. 2006; Rothman et al. 2005; Sorenson and Wiebe 2004; Tjaden and Thoennes 2000). These nonfatal uses of guns may warn of future fatal violence: batterers’ use of weapons to threaten has been as- sociated with a fourfold increased risk of homicide (Campbell et al. 2003).

#### Handguns are the choice of weapon for batterers. Sorenson et al 04

Susan B. Sorenson – U Penn Professor of Social Policy and of Health and Societies, Senior Fellow in Public Health, Director, PhD Program, Director, The Evelyn Jacobs Ortner Center on Family Violence; Douglas J. Wiebe – U Penn Associate Professor of Epidemiology in Biostatistics and Epidemiology: “Weapons in the Lives of Battered Women” American Journal of Public Health. 2004;94(8):1412-1417.IG 12/5/15

Against battered women. The first column of Table 1 ▶ lists objects that had ever been used as a weapon by an intimate partner to hurt, threaten, or scare the respondent. Almost all of the respondents had had words and hands or fists used against them. The majority had had a door (e.g., slammed against body or limb) or wall (e.g., they were shoved against a wall), feet, or some type of household object used against them. Household objects identified most often were telephones or telephone cords (19.9), pots/pans (9.8), and plates/dishes (9.4). Other objects used against the respondents included, but were not limited to, ashtrays, brooms, furniture, knives (nonkitchen), pillows, scissors, bottles, and irons. Among the 22.8 who reported that an intimate partner had used a tool against them, hammers and screwdrivers were most commonly reported (41.1 and 36.8, respectively). Wrenches, pliers, and axes were among the other tools specified. More than one third reported that an intimate partner had used a motor vehicle as a weapon against them. Among the 36.7 who reported that a firearm had been used against them, victimization by a handgun was reported twice as often as that by a long gun. Whether a firearm was used against the respondent was positively associated with the number of weapons used (t test = 17.1, P .001). Women who had been victimized with a firearm and those who had never been victimized with a firearm reported that an average of 8.1 and 4.6 types of weapons had been used against them, respectively. By battered women against an intimate partner. Battered women were substantially less likely to use a weapon against an intimate partner than to have it used against them (see the second column of Table 1). Words were the most common weapon used against a partner, followed by hands or fists, feet, and household objects. Few of the women had used a motor vehicle or a firearm against an intimate partner. By battered women in self-defense. Although few women had used objects as weapons to harm an intimate partner, it was common for them to have used objects in self-defense (see the third column of Table 1). The use of words, hands or fists, and feet was common. A substantial minority had used a door or wall, household object, or motor vehicle in self-defense. Few of the respondents reported having used a gun in self-defense. There was some overlap between using a gun in self-defense and using a gun in aggression. Of the 15 women who had used a firearm in self-defense, 5 had also used a firearm aggressively against a partner. Of the 6 who had used a gun aggressively against a partner, 5 also had used the gun in self-defense. Firearms in Most Recent Relationship Firearm ownership by the partner. Two fifths (39.1) of the respondents reported that their most recent partner owned a gun during the time of the relationship. (Few 3.8 said that they did not know whether their partner owned a gun.) Among the 163 respondents whose partner owned a firearm, 53.4 reported that he obtained a firearm during the time of the relationship. Most respondents (66.9) reported that the partner’s having a gun made them feel less safe; 11.7 reported feeling more safe, and 8.0 reported feeling safer at first but less safe later. One third (35.0) of the partners who had a gun had more than 1. Firearm presence in the home. About one third (36.7) of respondents reported that they had a gun in their home at some point during the time of the relationship with their most recent partner. Most reported that having a gun in the home made them feel less safe (79.2), but some said that they felt safer (11.7) or safer at first but less safe later (5.8). As shown in Table 2, only 2 of the measured respondent characteristics were associated with having a gun in the home. The odds of having a firearm in the home was higher for women with a college education than for those with a high school education (adjusted odds ratio = 2.16, P .006) and for US-born women than for immigrant women (adjusted odds ratio = 1.84, P .03). Adding the number of weapons used against the woman improved the fit of the model, and for every additional weapon ever used against the woman, the odds of having a gun in the home increased by 1.38. Handguns were more common than long guns. Among the 153 households containing a firearm, 54.3 had handguns only, 12.4 had long guns only, and 30.7 had both handguns and long guns. A few (4) respondents reported that they did not know what kind of gun was in the home.

#### Reinforces patriarchy. Tracy 07

Steven Tracy - professor of theology and ethics at Phoenix Seminary: “PATRIARCHY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: CHALLENGING COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS” JETS September 2007; http://www.etsjets.org/files/JETS-PDFs/50/50-3/JETS\_50-3\_573-594\_Tracy.pdfIG 12/15/15

So for many abusive men, in order to maintain their fragile sense of masculinity, they use physical force to keep their wives in their “proper place” and to squelch all threats to their limited male potency. This dynamic of insecure, powerless men using force to control their wives helps to ex- plain why assault and homicide rates are highest when a woman separates or threatens to separate from an abusive husband or boyfriend.53 In other words, abusive men must be in control, and threats to their control of the relationship must be dealt with by force if necessary. Physical abusers also tend to employ many other forms of control (verbal threats, control of the finances, control of her relationships, etc.) to dominate and subjugate their wives.54 So while patriarchy is not the sole explanation for violence against women, we would expect that male headship would be distorted by insecure, unhealthy men to justify their domination and abuse of women. Furthermore, we would expect that patriarchal views which define the male role primarily in terms of power and control would be most likely to contribute to domestic violence.

#### Domestic domination causes psychological trauma and societal harm. CDC 15

Center for Disease Control: “Intimate Partner Violence: Consequences” Last updated March 3, 2015 http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/intimatepartnerviolence /consequences.htmlIG 12/7/15

Costs of intimate partner violence (IPV) against women alone in 1995 exceeded an estimated $5.8 billion. These costs included nearly $4.1 billion in the direct costs of medical and mental health care and nearly $1.8 billion in the indirect costs of lost productivity.1 This is generally considered an underestimate because the costs associated with the criminal justice system were not included. When updated to 2003 dollars, IPV costs exceeded $8.3 billion, which included $460 million for rape, $6.2 billion for physical assault, $461 million for stalking, and $1.2 billion in the value of lost lives.2 The increased annual health care costs for victims of IPV can persist as much as 15 years after the cessation of abuse.3 Victims of severe IPV lose nearly 8 million days of paid work-the equivalent of more than 32,000 full-time jobs-and almost 5.6 million days of household productivity each year.1 Women who experience severe aggression by men (e.g., not being allowed to go to work or school, or having their lives or their children's lives threatened) are more likely to have been unemployed in the past, have health problems, and be receiving public assistance.4 Consequences Approximately 27.3 of women and 11.5 of men in the U.S. have experienced contact sexual violence, physical violence, or stalking by an intimate partner and reported at least one measured impact related to these or other forms of violence in that relationship.5 In general, victims of repeated violence over time experience more serious consequences than victims of one-time incidents.6 The following list describes some, but not all, of the consequences of IPV. Physical Nearly 1 in 4 women (22.3) and 1 in 7 men (14.0) aged 18 and older in the United States have been the victim of severe physical violence by an intimate partner in their lifetime. Nearly, 14 of women (13.4) and 3.54 of men have been injured as a result of IPV that included contact sexual violence, physical violence, or stalking by an intimate partner in their lifetime (Breiding et al., 2014).5 In 2010, 241 males and 1095 females were murdered by an intimate partner.7 Apart from deaths and injuries, physical violence by an intimate partner is associated with a number of adverse health outcomes.8,9 Several health conditions associated with intimate partner violence may be a direct result of the physical violence (for example, bruises, knife wounds, broken bones, traumatic brain injury, back or pelvic pain, headaches). Other conditions are the result of the impact of intimate partner violence on the cardiovascular, gastrointestinal, endocrine and immune systems through chronic stress or other mechanisms.8,10,11

#### Independently, causes extinction. Bem 93

Sandra Bem – director of women’s studies at Cornell – 1993 The Lenses of Gender, p 195

The essence of this moral argument is that by polarizing human values and human experiences into the masculine and the feminine, gender polarization not only helps to keep the culture in the grip of males themselves; it also keeps the culture in the grip of highly polarized masculine values. The moral problem here is that these highly polarized masculine values so emphasize making war over keeping the peace, taking risks over giving care, and even mastering nature over harmonizing with nature that when allowed to dominate societal and even global decision making, they creat[ing] the danger that humans will destroy not just each other in massive numbers, but the planet.

Turns case- worst violation of any standard b/c it prevents adherence to it.

### Framework

#### Morality must be universalizable. Only consequentialism can meet this constraint. Universalizing anything else results in a conflict in normative reasons. Pettit:

[Laurance S. Rockefeller University Professor of Politics and Human Values at Princeton University]. The Cost of Non-Consequentialism. February 5, 1999. <http://www.philo.umontreal.ca/documents/cahiers/Pettit\_Non-Consequentialism.pdf>

Every prescription as to what an agent ought to do should be capable of being universalised, so that it applies not just to that particular agent, and not just to that particular place or time or context or whatever. So at any rate we generally assume in our moral reasoning. If we think that it is right for one agent in one circumstance to act in a certain way, but wrong for another, then we commit ourselves to there being some further descriptive difference between the two cases, in particular a difference of a non-particular or universal kind. Thus, if we say that an agent A ought to choose option O in circumstances C — these may bear on the character of the agent, the behaviour of others, the sorts of consequences on offer, and the like — then we assumethat something similar would hold for any similarly placed agent. We do not think that the particular identity of agent A is relevant to what A ought to do, any more than we think that the particular location or date is relevant to that issue. In making an assumption about what holds for any agent in C-type circumstances, of course, we may not be committing ourselves to anything of very general import. It may be, for all the universalisability constraint requires, that C-type circumstances are highly specific: so specific, indeed, that no other agent is ever likely to confront them.There is no difficulty in seeing how the universalisability challenge is supposed to be met under consequentialist doctrine. **Suppose** that I accept**consequentialis[m]**t doctrine and believe of an agent that in their particular circumstances, C, he or she ought to choose an option O. For simplicity, suppose that I am myself that agent and that as a believer in consequentialism I think of myself that I ought to do O in C. If that option really **is right** by my consequentialist lights, **then that will be because of the neutral values that it promotes. But if those neutral values make O**the **right** option **for me** in those circumstances, **so they will make it** the **right** option**for any other agent** in such circumstances. Thus I can readily square the prescription to which my belief in consequentialism leads with my belief in universalisability. I can happily universalise my self-prescription to a prescription for any arbitrary agent in similar circumstances. In passing, a comment on the form of the prescription that the universalisability challenge will force me to endorse. I need not think that it is right that in the relevant circumstances every agent do O; that suggests a commitment to a collective pattern of behaviour. I will only be forced to think, in a person-by-person or distributive way, that for every agent it is right that in those circumstances he or she do O. Let doing O in C amount to swimming to the help of a child in trouble. Universalisability would not force me to think that everyone ought to swim to the help of a child in such a situation; undoubtedly they would frustrate one another’s efforts. It only requires me to think, as we colloquially put it, that anyone ought to swim to the help of the child; it only requires a person-by-person prescription, not a collective one.So much for the straightforward way in which consequentialism can make room for universalisability. But how is the universalisability challenge supposed to be met under non-consequentialist theories? According to **[Suppose a] non-consequentialist theory, [where] the right choice for any agent is to instantiate a certain pattern, P;** this may be the pattern of conforming to the categorical imperative, manifesting virtue, respecting rights, honouring their special obligations, or whatever. Suppose that I accept such a theory and that it leads me to say of an agent — again, let us suppose, myself — that I ought to choose O in these circumstances, C, or that O is the right choice for me in these circumstances. Can I straightforwardly say, as I could under consequentialist doctrine, that just for the reasons that O is the right choice for me — in this case, that it involves instantiating pattern, P — so it will be the right choice for any agent in C-type circumstances? I shall argue that there are difficulties in the path of such a straightforward response and that these raise a problem for non-consequentialism. The problem Suppose that I do say, in the straightforward way, **that** pattern P**requires, not just that I do O in C, but also**, for any agent whatsoever,**that [any] agent should do O in C as well.** Suppose I say, in effect, that it is right for me to do O in C only if it would be right for any agent X to do O in C. Whatever makes it right that I do O in C makes it right, so the response goes, that any agent do O in C. This response is going to lead me, as a non-consequentialist thinker, into trouble. Judging that something is right gives one a normative reason to prefer it; the judgment of rightness must provide such a reason if it is to have an action-guiding role. When I think that it is right that I do O in C, therefore, then I commit myself to there being a normative reason for me to prefer that I do O. And when I assert that it is right that anyone should do O in C-type circumstances, then I commit myself — again, because of the reason-giving force of the notion of rightness — to there being a normative reason for holding a broader preference. I commit myself to there being a normative reason for me to prefer, with any agent whatsoever, that in C-type circumstances that [any] agent do O. The problem with these reasons and these commitments, **however,** is that they may come apart. For it is often going to be possible**that**, perversely, **the best way** for me **to ensure** or increase the chance **that** for **any**arbitrary **agent**, X, that agent **does O in C**-type circumstances**, is to choose non-O myself in** those **C**ircumstances. The best way to satisfy the preference as to what the arbitrarily chosen agent should do may be to go against the preference as to what one should do oneself. The best way to get people to renounce violence may be to take it up oneself; the best way to get people to help their own children may be not to press for the advantage of one’s own; the best way to minimise murder may to commit a murder; and so on. More generally, the best way to promote the instantiation of pattern, P, where this is the basic pattern to which one swears non-consequentialist allegiance, may be to flout that pattern oneself. The best way to increase the chance that for any arbitrary agent, X, that agent instantiates P may be not to instantiate P oneself. How can I avoid the conclusion that in such a perverse situation I ought to promote the overall instantiation of my cherished pattern, even at the cost of not instantiating it myself? How, in other words, am I to keep faith with the non-consequentialist commitment to the rightness of instantiating P, even where this means that the overall realisation of the pattern falls short of what it might have been? It is hardly going to be plausible for me to say that normative reasons bearing on preferences over my own choices trump normative reasons bearing on preferences over how other people behave. Both sorts of reasons are supported in the common language of what is the right choice or of what ought to be done. And it would surely run against the spirit of universalisability — the spirit in which I deny that my own particular identity is important to the prescription defended — to say that a reasoned preference as to what I do myself should not be responsive to a similarly reasoned preference as to what people in general do — what arbitrary agent, X, does — in the sorts of circumstances in question. The upshot is that **if as a non-consequentialist** theorist**I** straightforwardly **universalise** the prescription that in a certain situation I should instantiate **a** favoured**pattern, P, then** the prescription to which I thereby commit myself — that in that situation any X ought to instantiate pattern, P — may force me to revise my original self-prescription. **I have equal reason to prefer both that I instantiate P and that any agent instantiate P** — this reason is expressed by the use of the word ‘right’ or ‘ought’ in each case — **and** the spirit of **universalizability blocks me from treating myself as** in any way **special**. **Thus,** if the preferences are inconsistent in a certain situation — if the choice is between my instantiating P alone, for example, or my acting so that many others instantiate P instead — then **I will have reason not to instantiate P myself.** As a would-be non-consequentialist thinker, my initial claim must have been that the point is to instantiate P in my own life, not promote it generally. But I countenance the general claims of the P-pattern **when I universalize** in the straightforward way: **I prescribe general conformity to that pattern, not just conformity in my own case. Thus** it now seems that what I must think is that this general conformity is to be promoted, even if that means not myself instantiating the pattern in my own behaviour or psychology or relationships. It seems that what **I must embrace**, in effect, is a**consequentialism** in which conformity to pattern P is the ultimate value to be promoted.

Implications:

A. I outweigh on coherence- most theories assume a form of equality by only the universalizability constraint ensures it by getting agents equal moral status.

B. No generic universalizability indicts because Petit is not talking about wiling a certain maxim but rather universalizing general conformity to the maxim of consequentialism.

C. Coopt appeals to practical rationality since we use decisive reason to analyze consequences.

The standard is consistency with consequentialism. General indicts of the standard modify consequentialist reasoning but do not defeat it.

Impact Calculus: I defend total utilitarianism, which mandates taking action that which will the result in the preservation in the most amounts of lives. This means

1. No Hedonic Indicts- I’m not concerned with how much pain or pleasure each individual feels but rather maximizing the amount of existence so they can have the potential for more pleasure.
2. Quantitative impacts come lexically prior- we have disparate experiences which make it impossible to compare forms of pain that are contingent on perspective- death is the only objective metric since we know 5 deaths is greater than 1.
3. No Death Good Arguments- My framework says death is bad because it reduces the total sum of well-being possible- there’s always a possibility of existence being better than a status of non-existence.
4. Turns deont since agents wouldn’t will a maxim that would preclude the maxim-willing process since that would render a contradiction.

Prefer it for actor specificity- collective action results in tradeoffs that only consequentialism can resolve. Side constraints paralyze state action; it's impossible to compare tradeoffs involving opportunity costs. States lack intentionality or internal motivation since they're composed of multiple individuals. This also means no act-omission distinction since they create permissions and prohibitions in terms of policies so authorizing action can’t be considered an omission since the state assumes culpability in regulating the public domain. Means aff burden is to prove the aff policy makes world 1% better. No permissibility or presumption since the state always has obligations. I’m the most germane to the resolution.