# T - curriculum

#### We are stucked in a simulation

**Full of craze and full of illusion**

**Fixated bodies and staged places**

**Our mind was like running through the paths of mazes**

**Was there a controller?..**

**Was there a joystick that make us move further?..**

**Our people doesn’t know about this kind of creation**

**Because we are just characters of this simulation**

**I wonder if we could be free**

**Like birds that are chirping on those trees**

**But I guess that was impossible**

**Because all of us…even me… aren’t plausible**

#### The university succumbs to neoliberal theories, techniques, and technologies that it itself has produced. A subscription to academia falls into the neoliberal economy of information production, which allows for the intensification and formation of violence predicated on outdated humanist ideals remobilized by neoliberalism. Debate parallels neoliberal communication strategies, in which we assign meaning and value to language and circulate it like commodities in the market. The debate space reduces people to numbers that only contain value based off of how much valuable information they produce.

Hoofd 17 [Ingrid, Assistant Professor Department of Media and Culture Studies, “Higher Education and Technological Acceleration”, <http://www.palgrave.com/it/book/9781137517517>, published 2017]

This book argues that what we see emerge in the above confusion between ‘true’ academic aspirations and ‘perverted’ economic incentives through what some may fi nd a muddled play on words that is marginal to the discussion on higher education is in fact essential to understanding how the seemingly oppositional narratives of the ‘demise’ or ‘revival’ of academic quality actually fi nd their origin in a conceptualisation of the ideals of the university and its role in society that neo-liberals as well as those resistant to neo-liberalisation share. The odd case is therefore that **the university ‘succumbs’ to those neo-liberal theories, techniques, and technologies that it itself has producedor brought forth**; the university today, one could say, suffers from a peculiar auto-immune disease.And I would suggest that this disease has been lingering in its core principles and aims for a long time now. This book claims by way of some prominent thinkers of such an auto-immunity or ‘self-deconstruction’ that the university has always suffered from this curious affl iction, but also that particularly today, **the technological acceleration of the neo-liberal economy brings such an auto-immunity ever more to the foreground**, **which in turn leads to an aggravation of fundamental tensions and blatant incompatibilities within its dominion**. So there is a historical continuity of auto-immunity in the university project all the way from its aspirational beginnings up until today that still persists, even if that continuous element has been slowly but steadily displaced towards the imperatives of productivity, ‘freemarket’ ideals, and effi ciency. This book then hopes to illustrate by way of combining a plethora of ‘auto-immune’ examples of academic practice with a perhaps unexpected theoretical perspective that this displacement is possible because the utopian goals of emancipation, truth, and freedom which express themselves in research and teaching, have themselves from the very beginning already been tainted by the demons of oppression, falsehood, and exclusion. Bizarrely then, the fact or the insistence that the university is not like any other industry will turn out to be precisely its problem. This is because the fundamental tension in its project—what Dittrich in “From Ivory Tower to Glass House” calls its “immanent contradiction” (in Dutch “ingebouwde tegenspraak,” 2014, 160)—that has historically led to (the illusion of) progress through the scientifi c and philosophical discussion and production of knowledge has indeed become ‘productive’ in the economic sense. Eventually, we will therefore fi nd that at the heart of the university lies a fundamental aporia that expresses itself exceedingly today, in a curious reversal of its humanist values and stakes, as a more obvious pretence or hypocrisy. **This leads so-called knowledge workers at many contemporary universities today to find themselves confronted with contradictory feelings and schizoid situations**: like, for instance, **teaching students the ills of social hierarchisation through education, while also sorting them in hierarchical** (alpha) **numerical slots according to academic performance**.**The university is therefore the one location in the current economy where the basic conflicting duplicity following the exacerbation of this aporia of Western Enlightenment thinking is most keenly felt**, though often suppressed or internalised by many such ‘workers’ and students as either personal failure or a general incompatibility with its institutional demands. So to reiterate, the radical proposition of this book is that the prime mission or ideals of the university—namely those of total emancipation, freedom, and the goals of knowledge accumulation—are precisely what currently produce exceedingly unjust practices ‘outside’ and ‘within’ academia. These unjust practices that it produces on its ‘outside’ concern those of the ongoing social stratifi cation via so-called meritocratic education and those of sociological, computational, and psychological objectifi cation of ever more cultures and groups, while the unjust practices on its ‘inside’ concern those of internal hierarchies, rankings, divisions, gatekeeping mechanisms, and exclusions of all kinds. And because the reproduction of its practices at base involve modern techniques and technologies of knowing, this book suggests that rather than arguing for a return to the supposedly ‘walled’ university, however sympathetic, gaining a better understanding of the intersection of this problematic with especially modern technologies of communication, visibility, or calculation is crucial to really thinking the modern university project differently. The book therefore argues that the central problem of the university today consists of the acceleration of academia’s unfi nishable ideals by way of an enmeshment with techniques and technologies of communication, calculation, and prediction. The quest for transcendence through technologically aided omniscience and universal connection—after all, the term ‘university’ comes from the Latin universitas or the ‘totality’ or ‘total community’—has resulted in the quest to render everything and everyone transparent and understandable. As I will discuss more in depth through the work of techno-pundit Paul Virilio, **the current university and its new forms of violence are therefore an outflow or intensification of ‘outdated’ humanist ideals and techniques, whose internal contradictions have become usurped and constantly remobilised by neo-liberal capitalism and its machinery of acceleration**. We see the auto-immune aspect returning here as well, since that contemporary machinery of the acceleration of omniscience in many of its aspects—one need only to think of early cybernetic research, innovations like the Arpanet, and engineeringoriented models of communication as noise cancellation—has again also been carried out at least in large part by universities (disturbingly often with the help of military monies and establishments, about the signifi cance of which more later). In other words, **the hopeful academic project of ‘exposing the world and humanity to the light of truth and emancipation,’ together with its damaging ‘evil twins’ of oppressive universalism, social submission, surveillance, and colonialism, has caved in onto themselves and become a near-pervasive technologically ‘exposing-itself’ of a fundamentally Janus-faced academia**. This is also to stress that the ways in which academic research has historically been part of Western imperialism should be considered more closely when critically examining the faux-nostalgic calls in many contemporary European universities for a ‘return’ to presumed ‘research autonomy,’ as well as when analysing the kinds of seemingly perverse ‘knowledge-as- capital’ arguments made by contemporary universities in the post-colonies. I will provide divergent examples from the Netherlands and Singapore of such tendencies in Chaps. 2 , 3 , and 4 . In light of the above, this book therefore also wants to discuss the relationship or interaction between academia and modern technology as consisting of a more fundamentally entangled apparatus than most critics of the neo-liberalisation of higher education, who see such technology as merely applied onto academia from the ‘outside’ or as mere tools for use on the ‘inside’ consider it to be. As an example, Ward in Neoliberalism and the Global Restructuring of Knowledge and Education certainly rightly claims that the digital knowledge economy, due to the translation of information into bits and bytes, has forced a quantifi cation of performance indicators in academia, leading to the erasure and transformation of certain kinds of knowledge in the ‘hard’ as well as the ‘soft’ sciences (2012, 126). Especially the humanities, says Ward, with their forms and media of knowledge (like the monograph) that cannot be reduced to sheer numbers, be disaggregated into sellable pieces, or be made to follow the impetus of fast-paced output, suffer from this quantifi cation (2012, 127). While I agree with Ward on this aspect of digitalisation, he does not seem to consider the fact that **the origins of these technologies as such, as I mentioned earlier, not only stem from university research**, **but also that the supposedly empowering qualities of technologies of communication and visualisation have in fact always been part of the university setup from its inception** in the late Medieval era and the early Enlightenment in Europe—one may here think, for example, of René Descartes’ mechanistic view of the material world, the crucial importance of inventions like the telescope and microscope, or the ways in which the dissemination of scientifi c ideas relied on book printing technology. It appears then that the basic imbrication of academia with media technologies is one of a continuous and ever-growing constitutional yet dialectical relationship, in which these technologies eventually turn out to be much more than simply a means through which research and teaching are carried out. Instead, due to their constitutive enmeshment with academia’s auto-immunity, they paradoxically expose themselves as facilitators as well as thwarters of the academic ideal of total knowledge. Rather, **the ideal of exposition and omniscience, and the ways it is today carried out through modern data-driven technologies and visual media aids, is, this book argues, itself just as ambiguous and finally ungraspable** (as their borders likewise cannot be pinned down) **as the nature of academia as such**.

#### To make the world mean something, the will to reality, is the generative point of violence. The attempt to enclose the globe within semiotic reality begets implosive violence against all singularities. The amassing of facts and evidence – and especially truth – only makes the world more unreal. Any politics which does not confront first the problem of language condemns us to global death, pain, and suffering of which terrorism is but the first banal symptom

Artrip and Debrix 14[Ryan Artrip, doctoral candidate in ASPECT at Virginia Tech, and François Debrix, Director of ASPECT and Professor of Political Science at Virginia Tech, “The Digital Fog of War: Baudrillard and the Violence of Representation” <http://www2.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol-11_2/v11-2-debrix.html>]

**It is in this always operative tendency of rendered appearances to yield meaning (even if their meaning is to be information-worthy), not in the image or event itself, that we situate the conditions of possibility and reproducibility for the ever-thickening representational fog and for the violence/virulence of images, or better yet, of appearances**. **To make war or**, as the case may be, **the terror event mean something—even in some of the most immediate reactions often designed to evoke injustice or**, indeed, **incomprehension**—**is thegenerative point of violence, the source of representation as a virulent/virtual code and mode of signification**. Baudrillard writes, “**Everywhere one seeks to produce meaning, to make the world signify, to render it visible**.” He adds, “**We are not, however, in danger of lacking meaning; […] we are gorged with meaning and it is killing us**” (Baudrillard, 1988: 63). Indeed, **the Western world—increasingly, the global—has found itself with a proliferation of meanings and significations** in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. **It is as if the so-called crisis of nihilism**(thought to be characteristic of much critique and philosophical suspicion throughout the 20th century) **later on produced something of the opposite order**. **The mass violence of the 20th century inaugurated not a complete void of despair or meaninglessness, but instead a flood of meaning, if not an overproduction of it**. **Baudrillard refers to this frantic explosion of meaning/signification as “a panic-stricken production of the real and the referential, above and parallel to the panic of material production** […]” (Baudrillard, 1983: 7). Here, Baudrillard describes a mode of production of a different kind, not motivated by class interests or exploitation of value, but by an automated, perhaps viral, abreaction to the empty core or disenchantment of things and the world: that is to say, **the degree to which things seem to lack a singular center of gravity or have lost a justifiable reference to the real world, and yet each thing that “matters” is also an attempt to get at reality as a question of accumulation (of meaning), circulation (of signs), and filling up of all interstitial spaces of communication and value**. **The end result is an over-abundance of signs and images of reality**, something **that culminates in** what Baudrillard calls **hyperreality**—**things appear more real than reality itself**. The story that needs to be told is thus not about the undoubtedly deplorable “truth” or fact of explosive and warlike violence, but about a violence of another sort. **In the radical digital transparency of the global scene, we (members of the demos) often have full or direct exposure to explosivity, as we saw above with the image of terror. But what still needs to be thought and problematized is** implosivityor what may be called **implosive violence**. **Implosive violence is a violence for which we do not, and perhaps will never, have much of a language** (Rancière, 2007: 123). Although, not having a language for it or, rather, as we saw above, **seeking to find a language to talk about it and, perhaps, to make sense of it is still sought after**. **This is**, perhaps, **what digital pictures of war/terror violence seek to capture or want to force through**. **Implosive violence**,often digitally rendered these days, **is in close contact with media technologies and representational devices and techniques because it seeks representation and meaning**. This is why**implosive violence insists on calling in wars (against terror**, for example) **and** on **mobilizing war machines (against terrorist others, against vague enemy figures), but wars and war machines that no longer have—to the extent that they ever had—a clearly identifiable object and subject, or a clear mission/purpose**. As such, **this implosive violence and its wars(the new Western/global way of war, perhaps) must remain uncertain, unclear, foggy, inwardly driven, representational, and indeed virulent**. **They must remain uncertain and confused even as they are digitally operative and desperately capture events/images to give the impression that meanings/significations can and will be found**. Yet, as we saw above, **it is not meanings exactly that must be found, but information and the endless guarantee of its immediate circulation**. **As information occupies the empty place of meaning, certainty, or truth, images must be instantaneously turned into appearances that search for meanings that will never be discovered because, instead, a proliferation of information-worthy facts and beliefs will take over** (**perhaps this is what US fake pundit and comedian Stephen Colbert famously referred to as “truthiness**”). Or, as Baudrillard puts it, “**free from its former enemies, humanity now has to create enemies from within, which in fact produces a wide variety of inhuman metastases**” (Baudrillard, 2003). Thus, **this implosive violence is destined to be a global violence since it "is the product of a system that tracks down any form of negativity and singularity, including of course death as the ultimate form of singularity**. […] **It is a violence that**, in a sense, **puts an end to violence itself and strives to establish a world where anything related to the natural must disappear** […] **Better than a global violence, we should call it a global virulence**. **This form of violence is indeed viral**. **It moves by contagion, produces by chain reaction, and little by little it destroys our immune systems and our capacities to resist**" (2003; our italics).In a way, **this global virulence is all-out and everyday war itself**. It is also the Global War on Terror, a war whose virulence and ever present (virtual, potential) violence mediatizes and hyper-realizes everyday life for a lot of human bodies in the West and beyond (is that not also something that the Boston Marathon bombing smart phone representations struggled to tell us?). For Baudrillard, this is how we should apprehend the mythos of globalization (since globalization is all about virulence).

#### Transparency is generated by algorithms – an ideological system that relies on total visibility. Debate solidifies the architectures of control to formulate a hegemonic visibility that tries to interpret everything. We must know all, it must be visible, it must be recorded. Systems of surveillance that are key to capitalism and warfare are calls to extend the global kill chains of the military. Missions to produce and circulate information try to eliminate mystery and supercharge network centric warfare.

Oberg 16(Dan Öberg (2016) War, transparency and control: the military architecture of operational warfare, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 29:3, 1132-1149, DOI: 10.1080/09557571.2016.1230733)

Already in the 1960s, French sociologist Jean Baudrillard warned of the way transparency works as an ideology of social control. In challenging transparency, Baudrillard has looked particularly at the way urban architecture combines mirroring and light with interconnected open spaces. He argues that these features stand in direct relation to what he calls “operational violence”: namely, that transparency is generated by operational modelling, algorithms, and the processing that occurs in networks and closed loops. This in turn gives rise to a type of alienation that violently circumscribes the subject from lived experience (Baudrillard 2005a, 43; 2005b, 25–38). Baudrillard spent considerable effort investigating the 1136 Dan Öberg way operational violence and transparency are generated by capitalist and techno-scientific structures of production and liberation. Such structures in turn create systemic effects in which lived experience works as an expression of an ideological system based on total visibility (Baudrillard 1975, 54–64; 1994a, 61–73; 2005b, 17, 146). Baudrillard draws upon these insights in a number of ways, claiming that transparency indicates a subtle form of censorship or even a ‘terror’ as it makes the global subject hostage to the fluid and systemic aspects of various architectures of control (Baudrillard 1994b, 58; Baudrillard and Nouvel 2002, 9, 64). Understood in this way, architectures of control help to generate a ‘hegemonic visibility’ which is best characterized as a world ‘where everything must be immediately visible and immediately interpretable’ (Baudrillard and Nouvel 2002, 9). Arguably, the problem of control through transparency centres on how to ‘invest mental and visual space’ (Baudrillard 2014, 11). Control is enabled through summoning banal appearances that are “already there”—repeating and modulating themselves to infinity, according to the nuances of a programmed operational code (Baudrillard and Nouvel 2002, 63; Baudrillard 2014, 22–23). Baudrillard aptly summarizes this ideology as construing a world in which ‘everything is to be legible’, ‘visible’, ‘measurable’, ‘said, accumulated, indexed and recorded’ (1990a, 34–35). In the wake of Baudrillard (and other thinkers like Foucault and Virilio), critical debate on the politics of transparency took off in the 1990s. Often situated as part of a critique of liberal governing, such research emphasizes three important points (see for comparison Mahmud 2012, 1196; Hansen and Flyverbom 2014, 875–876). Firstly, the notion of transparency is related to a modernist desire of democratic rationality. For example, it emphasizes displays and gives the illusion of choice, but works as an imperceptible limit which might trap subjectivity in particular organizational architectures (see Gabriel 2005; Schuman 2007; Nordin 2016). Secondly, transparency, regardless of its aims, tends to relate to surveillance, in turn making the notion strongly linked to social control. As Achille Mbembe has argued, both state and emancipatory violence has often been historically characterized by striving towards absolute transparency between the state and its people. Such a striving tends to be built on creating an open space in which ‘error’ is reduced, ‘truth’ enhanced and ‘aberrations’ eradicated (Mbembe 2003, 19). Thirdly, transparency is often considered to be a voluntary but necessary aspect of global capitalism. The insight that transparency works as a means of corporate control is evident in research which argues that media exposure and scientific progress often lead to less rather than more accountability in global capitalist structures. For example, exposure of certain issues tends to enable blind spots in other areas. Similarly, scientific discourse tends to remove ethical issues from the agenda by relying on a specialized language which is difficult for the layman to understand (Zyglidopoulos and Fleming 2011, 692–693). Arguably, these logics work as central dimensions in what we might call “an ideology of transparency” conflated with liberal core values. As Slavoj Zizek has illustrated, ‘ideology’ should not be taken to mean (as in the orthodox Marxist premise) a ‘false consciousness’. Rather it implies the formation of ‘a social reality whose very existence implies the non-knowledge of its participants as to its essence’ (Zizek 1989, 21). To outline and challenge transparency as an ideology is therefore not an attempt to unveil a “better” reality through theory. It is rather an attempt to understand, theoretically and empirically, what global liberal fantasies of making the world appear through techniques of total visibility do in terms of producing specific discourses as reality. As has been outlined, this ideology is War, transparency and control 1137 present, and indeed produced, in distinct spheres such as information technology, corporate culture or knowledge algorithms (Valentine 2000; Zyglidopoulos and Fleming 2011; Hansen and Flyverbom 2014). But it is also an inherent part of the gendered and racialized visual regimes that underlie surveillance activities and security practices in contemporary Europe, for example in the way the “colonial gaze” persists through exoticizing difference (see Vaughan-Williams 2008; Jones 2011). This is evident particularly in the way transparency helps to create an impetus for racialized othering in a world in which “all is uncovered”. Transparency and warfare As the previous parts established, the logic of global warfare is characterized by its interrelation to liberal discourses of interventionism. Moreover, transparency needs to be understood, not as “good governance” but as part of an ideology which strives to render the world visible, measurable, indexed and recorded, so as to invest it as a mental and visual space. How does this ideology of transparency relate to global warfare? One of the few thinkers who have connected warfare with transparency as a means to control a battlefield is Paul Virilio. He explicitly locates an ideology of transparency as part of the military imaginary waging war. In doing so, Virilio argues that social control over demarcated spaces has given way to global control of the environment dependent on various techniques of transparency (such as aerial imagery or radar), often enacted through military vision (Virilio 1989, 72; 2000a, 61). Tracing how the world gradually becomes more and more transparent as a result of the visualization of the battlefield, Virilio interprets historical events in warfare, such as the bombings of Belgrade by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1999, as part of an attempt to extend a ‘matchless transparency’ to the globe (Virilio 2000b, 23). His argument mirrors other critics of liberal warfare (often drawing upon Foucault) who state that when a population is targeted the consequences go beyond injury as it aims to pacify global subjectivity. For example, Vivianne Jabri has argued that technologies that target bodies and populations are not isolated occurrences but part of liberal governing (Jabri, 2006, 55). The argument that there is a politics that unfolds on the field of battle is also evident in Shane Brighton’s urging that the study of warfare should engage directly with ‘the killing mechanism on the battlefield’ so as to better grasp its politics (2013, 663–665). The point that warfare is about killing and violence is well taken. However, it might be a mistake to think of battlefield practices as the locus of the way warfare exerts control. Arguably, thinking warfare in this way indirectly helps to create a demand for more transparency on the field of battle. This is not to say that the “terror” Baudrillard identifies in the hegemonic visibility of modern life is any less relevant when it comes to the battlefield, but simply that it extends beyond it. The “matchless transparency” that Virilio found in the Kosovo war was enacted not merely through the Belgrade bombings but also as part of the whole operational machinery which supported this effort. In fact, there is a whole subset of “supportive functions” which occur beyond the field of battle. Much of the military supporting systems can be interpreted as a design aiming to efficiently orchestrate combat.3 This design is called “operational 3   The military doctrines are under no illusion here as they emphasize the way “supporting functions” (such as logistics, command and control, or intelligence and surveillance) are crucial for the military “kill chain” and for traditional lethal effects (AFDD 2013b, 3–5; AFDD 2011a, 6; AFDD 2012, 3–4). 1138 Dan Öberg warfare” and typically deals with planning, employment and the supportive functions of war (see Vego 2007; Olsen and Creveld 2011). The idea that warfare is operational underlies all US and NATO doctrine and can be exemplified by the way it is considered an “effects-based” process which is fought by being coordinated, modelled and planned (see AFDD 2007a, 1-2, 37-40). In fact, the military itself defines the art of operational warfare as the processes which ‘visualize how best to efficiently and effectively employ military capabilities ….’ (AFDD 2007b, 70). Let us, therefore, in order to better understand the relationship between warfare, transparency and control, consider the military architecture beyond the field of battle and the way it operationalizes warfare. As Antoine Bousquet has outlined, the military has been preoccupied for centuries with eradicating friction and uncertainty from warfare. In recent times, attempts to lift the ‘fog of war’ in order to get an omniscient, real-time view of the battlefield are often associated with ‘network centric warfare’ (Bousquet 2009, 215–234). While most authors emphasize the way network-centric warfare relates to information and communication, what concerns me here is not so much the alleged shift in warfare due to new technology. Rather, I find network-centric warfare interesting as part of an attempt to extend a “matchless transparency” to the global battlefield through a logic of operational violence. In fact, the core characteristics of network-centric warfare are part and parcel of operational warfare. As Steve Niva has shown, what today is called ‘shadow wars’ is to a large degree enabled as a result of organizational changes in American bureaucratic structures which stem out of network-centric warfare (Niva 2013, 197–198). It is therefore not far-fetched to examine military discourses in accordance with a logic that aims to create “hegemonic visibility” due to administrative and bureaucratic rituals. The historical attempt to lift the fog of war and create an omniscient view of the battlefield mesh well with the way modern life is characterized by hegemonic visibility, but with one important addition. As the following parts illustrate, the military fantasy to extend a “matchless transparency” by global war is directed towards its external surroundings—the deepened and widened global battlefield—but also towards itself as an organizational form. The self-referential repetitions and modulations according to programmed codes that Baudrillard claimed characterizes an ideology of transparency therefore need to be analysed as part of a military operational coding. The rest of the article examines this, by a reading of US military doctrine documents and manuals, in order to explore and investigate the implications of transparency as a technique of control.

**The university is nothing but a site of social death, the mass grave of culture. The imperative to “keep the system alive” plays into the hands of the project of modernity by denying the violence innate to the university system itself. The only ethical act is pure semiotic insurrection that makes claims neither towards coherency nor objectivity.**

Worker 10( “The University, Social Death, and the Inside Joke,” <http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20100220181610620>)

**Universities may serve as progressive sites of inquiry in some cases, yet this does not detract from the great deal of military and corporate research, economic planning and, perhaps most importantly, social conditioning occurring within their walls**. Furthermore, **they serve as intense machines for the concentration of privilege; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts, poorly treated maintenance and service staff**. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since **a hyper educated, stable society along Western lines can only exist by the intense exploitation of labor and resources in the third world**. **Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; liberal seminars only serve to obfuscate the fact that they are themselves complicit in the death and destruction waged on a daily basis**. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “**Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning.**”[43] **Our conception of the social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication, the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy**. Baudrillard writes that “**The cemetery no longer exists because modern cities have entirely taken over their function: they are ghost towns, cities of death. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, ours is a culture of death**.”[44] **By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are resigning ourselves to enrolling in** what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls a cemetery, **a necropolis to rival no other**. **Yet herein lies the punch line. We are studying in the cemeteries of a nation which has a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; an absolute fixation with zombies**. So perhaps **the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all**. Writes Baudrillard: “**The event itself is counter-offensive and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, it reintroduces negativity and death.**”[45] **The University, by totalizing itself and perfecting its critiques, has spontaneously generated its own antithesis**. **Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent**. According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “**zombies mark the dead end or zero degree of capitalism’s logic of endless consumption and ever expanding accumulation, precisely because they embody this logic so literally and to such excess**.”[46] In that sense, they are almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as the ideal form of resistance to the social: “**they know that there is no liberation, and that a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization**.”[47] **Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face**. Similarly, **students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed**. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations. **Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves**.”[49] Liberal student activists fear the incursions the most, as they are in many ways the most invested in the fate of the contemporary university; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. **Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom**. For they are insistent on saving the University,**on staying ‘alive’, even when their version of life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living, when it is as good as social death**. Shaviro notes that in many scenes in zombie films, our conceptions of protagonist and antagonist are reversed; in many scenes, human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise.[50] In reality, “**Zombie Politics are something to be championed, because they are the politics of a multitude, an inclusive mass of political subjects, seeking to consume brains. Yet brains must be seen as a metaphor for** what Marx calls “**the General Intellect**”; in his Fragment on Machines, he describes it as “**the power of knowledge, objectified**.”[51] Students and faculty have been alienated from their labor, and, angry and zombie-like, they seek to destroy the means of their alienation. Yet, for Shaviro, “**the hardest thing to acknowledge is that the living dead are not radically Other so much as they serve to awaken a passion for otherness and for vertiginous disidentification that is already latent within our own selves**.”[52] In other words, **we have a widespread problem with aspiring to be this other, this powerless mass**. **We seek a clear protagonist, we cannot avoid associating with those we perceive as ‘still alive’.** Yet for Baudrillard, this constitutes a fundamental flaw: "**at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death.**"[53] In Forget Foucault, **we learn the sad reality about biopower: that power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence**. **If we are to continue to use this conception, we risk failing to see that our very lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence**. Whereas socialized death is a starting point for Foucault, in Baudrillard and in recent actions from California, **we see a return to a reevaluation of society and of death; a possible return to zombie politics. Baudrillard distinguishes himself as a connoisseur of graffiti**; in Forget Foucault, **he quotes a piece that said “When Jesus arose from the dead, he became a zombie.**”[54] **Perhaps the reevaluation of zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates of hell, the cemetery-university**. According to the Berkeley kids, “when we move without return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.”[55] **Baudrillard’s** words about **semiotic insurrectionaries** might suffice: "**They blasted their way out however, so as to burst into reality like a scream, an interjection, an anti-discourse,**

#### The project of serious gaming is premised on the confusion of production and play via simulated government omnipotence with the end goal of the virtualization of all empathy.

Hoofd 7(Ingrid M. Hoofd, National University of Singapore, “The Neoliberal Consolidation of Play and Speed: Ethical Issues in Serious Gaming” in “CRITICAL LITERACY: Theories and Practices Volume 1: 2, December 2007,” p. 6-14, 2007)

**Serious games are a fascinating next stage in the continuous exploitation of digital media technologies over the last decades for training, learning, and education. As formal education and training always involves the transmission and repetition of certain culturally and socially specific sets of skills and moral values, it would be of paramount importance to ensure that developments within the serious gaming industry are in step with the effects of the good intentions of nurturing people within a social framework that emphasises a fair, culturally diverse, and blooming society. In this light, it is interesting that from the very advent of the information society, digital technologies have been depicted as central to the development of a more just and equal society by harbouring the promise of bridging gaps between classes, races, and genders locally as well as globally. Driven by the vision of this utopian potential of new technologies, the education industry and larger policy organisations have been exploring the pedagogical possibilities of these technologies both in- and outside the traditional classroom for the last twenty-five years. Indeed, the implementation of increasingly more sophisticatedand technologically mediated methods and tools for learning and education, takes as its starting point the techno-utopian assumption that (new) interactive technologies themselves are the primary harbingers of a fair and blooming society through facilitating (student) empowerment.**This paper takes issue with this widespread techno-utopian perspective by seeking to shed light on the larger ethical implications of serious gaming. It will do so through foregrounding the relationship between global injustices, and the aesthetic properties and discourses of serious gaming. So while reframing serious games themselves in a new ethical perspective constitutes the main objective of this paper, it is equally important to situate serious games within a larger political discourse on the teaching of new skills. Firstly then, **policy papers and academic studies on serious games all display an assumption of the inherent neutrality of gaming technologies, as if these technologies were mere tools equally suitable for all. What also becomes apparent in the language used in these studies and proposals, is how this instrumentalist vision of gaming technologies for learninggoes hand in hand with a particular neo-liberal assumption of what constitutes a fit individual, and by extension of what the hallmarks of a ‘healthy’ society may be. For instance,** in the European Union study “Serious Gaming – a fundamental building block to drive the knowledge work society” by Manuel Oliveira on the merits of serious games for education, justification runs along the lines of gaming ‘encouraging risk-taking and a winning attitude’ and creating a ‘performance-oriented individual.’ Similarly, Michael Guerena from **the US Orange County Department of Education proposes in one of the Department’s web-casts that serious games instil “twenty-first century skills” like risk-taking, adaptability, self-direction, interactive communication, and ‘planning and managing for results’ in the students through the “channelling of fun.”** Likewise, the UK-based Entertainment and Leisure Software Publishers Association last year published their white paper Unlimited learning - Computer and video games in the learning landscape, in which they argue that serious games will “create an engaged, knowledgeable, critical and enthusiastic citizenry” whose “work practices will be geared towards networked communication and distributed collaboration” (49). Concerns around the ethical implications of serious games regarding their entanglements with larger social (gendered, classed, and raced) inequalities have until now largely been coined in terms of game content or representation. In a recent case in Singapore, the government’s proposition of using the RPG Granado Espada in secondary school history classes was followed by an outcry from various local academics condemning the stereotypical characters and simplistic representation of medieval Europe in the game. Likewise, various authors have critiqued current serious games not only because of simplistic representation of characters and surroundings, but especially because simulations generally tend to oversimplify complex social problems and situations. Gibson, Aldrich, and Prensky’s Games and Simulations in Online Learning (vi - xiv) for instance discuss these demerits of serious games. While such a critical analysis of how game content contributes to the reproduction of dominant discourses is definitely helpful, I would argue that **the aesthetics of serious games involve much more than mere content.** Instead, this paper will argue that**the formal quest for instantaneity that research around digital media has displayed through the development of interactive technologies for education is already itself by no means a neutral affair. This is because the discourses that inform this quest and that accompany this search for instantaneity arguably enforce the hegemony of a militaristic, masculinist, humanist, and of what I will call a ‘speed-elitist’ individual.** Moreover, I suggest that the propensity of current games to have sexist or racist content, is merely symptomatic of gaming technology’s larger problematic in terms of the aesthetic of instantaneity. In short, (**serious**) computer**games have become archives of the discursive and actual violence carried out in the name of the utopia of technological progress and instantaneity under neo-liberal globalisation. This archival function is possible exactly because cybernetic technologies promise the containment and control of such supposedly accidental violence, while in fact exacerbating these forms of violence.**This leads me to conclude that such violence is in fact structural to new serious gaming technologies, rather than accidental. I will elaborate this hypothesis by looking at various theorists who seek to understand this structural imperative of new technologies, and their relationship to the neo-liberalisation of learning and education. In turn, I will look at how this problematic structural logic informs the two popular serious games Real Lives and Global Warming Interactive. **Secondly, the advent of serious gaming interestingly runs parallel with the contemporary dissemination and virtualisation of traditional learning institutions into cyberspace.**While the existence of learning tools in other areas of society besides actual learning institutions has been a fact since the advent of schools, **the shift of methods of learning into online and digital tools is symptomatic of the decentralisation of power from ‘old’ educational institutions and its usurpation into instantaneous neo-liberal modes of production.** I am summarising the work of Bill Readings on the university here, because it sheds light on the shift in education tout court towards virtualisation, and its relationship to the ‘new hegemony of instantaneity.’**In The University in Ruins, Readings argues that the shift from the state-run university of reason and culture to the present-day global knowledge enterprise must mean that the centre of power in effect has shifted elsewhere. More important, says Readings, is that the function of the new ‘university of excellence,’ one that successfully transforms it into yet another trans-national corporation, relies on the fantasy thatthe university is still that transcendental university of culture in service of the state and its citizens. So the invocation of the fantasy of an ‘originary’ university of reason and progress, that produces unbiased knowledge for the good of all, facilitates the doubling of the production of information into other spaces outside the university walls proper.**While Readings surely discusses only higher education institutions in The University in Ruins, I would argue that the logic of a shifting centre of power from the state into the technocratic networks and nodes of speed operates quite similarly in the case of primary, secondary, and other types of formal education. Indeed, **the current virtualisation of learning and the emphasis on lifelong learning marks a dispersal of traditional learning institutions into online spaces. This dispersal works increasingly in service of the ‘speed-elite’ rather than simply in service of the nation-state. The heralding of serious games for education can therefore be read as a symptom of the intensified reach of the imperatives of neo-liberal globalisation, in which consumption enters the lives of locally bound as well as more mobile cosmopolitan citizens of all ages through harping on the technological possibility of the confusion of production and play. Through the imperative of play then, production increasingly and diffusely colonises all niche times and -spaces of neo-liberal society. In other words, (the emphasis on) play allows not only a potential increase in production and consumption through the citizen-consumer after her or his formal education of ‘skills’, but starkly intensifies flows of production and consumption already at the very moment of learning.**While such an integration of play and production is generally understood within the framework of the neo-liberal demand for the circulation of pleasure, it is useful here to widen the scope from understanding the learner as a mere consumer of pleasure into the larger set of problematic interpellations that marks subjugation in contemporary society. Intriguingly, a host of research has emerged over the past years pointing towards the intricate relationship between subjugation, military research objectives, and videogame development. Such research suggests an intimate connection between the C3I logic and humanist militaristic utopias of transcendence, which incriminates interactive technologies as inherently favouring culturally particular notions of personhood. In the case of computer- and video-games for entertainment, researchers have argued that the aesthetic properties of gaming technologies give rise to so-called ‘militarised masculinity.’ In “Designing Militarized Masculinity,” Stephen Kline, Nick DyerWitheford, and Greig de Peuter argue for instance that **interactive games open up very specific subject positions that “mobilize fantasies ofinstrumental domination”** (255). **This specific mobilisation that video-games invoke, is not only due to the remediation of violent television- and film- content, but also due to the intimate connection between gaming- and military industries which grant these technologies their particular cybernetic aesthetic properties**(see also Herz 1997). This element of militarisation partly informs my concept of ‘speed-elitism.’ I extrapolate the idea of ‘speed-elitism’ largely from the works of John Armitage on the discursive and technocratic machinery underlying current neo-liberal capitalism. **In “Dromoeconomics: Towards a Political Economy of Speed,” Armitage and Phil Graham suggest that due to the capitalist need for the production of excess, there is a strong relationship between the forces of exchange and production, and the logic of speed. In line with Virilio’s argument in Speed and Politics, they argue that various formerly the less connected social areas of war, communication, entertainment, and trade, are now intimately though obliquely connected. This is because all these forces mutually enforce one another through the technological usurpation and control of spa**

#### The only option is a radical passivity, a mimicry of the forms of the system, one that accelerates them to the point of their obvious vacuity. Duality re-emerges; duality will out: every attempt at coherence, presence, life and the Good is met by a concomitant move towards incoherence, absence, and Evil. We affirm this dualistic ontology in a moment of semiotic rupture. “Nothing becomes wholly transparent without also becoming enigmatic.” Duality emerges as a fatal strategy, we embrace its complicity in a re-emergent dualistic mocking that maintains the possibility of mystery, Evil, and radical alterity. You should bet on a subtle mimicry of established communicative forms, accelerating and pushing them through to trigger their own symbolic collapse.

Pawlett 14. William Pawlett, senior lecturer in media, communications, and cultural studies at the University of Wolverhampton, UK, “Society At War With Itself,” International Journal of Baudrillard Studies, Volume 11, Number 2 (May, 2014)

**It all depends on** the ground we choose to fight on **… most often … we choose to fight on ground where we are** beaten before we begin (Baudrillard 2001: 119).

This paper examines Baudrillard’s assertion, made in later works includingImpossible Exchange (2001), The Intelligence of Evil (2005) and Pyres of Autumn(2006), that **individuals, society and indeed the global system, are internally and irreconcilably divided, that** modernity is ‘at odds with itself’ (Baudrillard 2006: 1). In his view dissent, rejection and insurrection emerge from within, not from external challenges such as alternative ideologies or competing worldviews, but from within bodies, within borders, inside programmes. For Baudrillard **much of the violence, hatred and discomfort visible around the globe can be understood as a** latent but fundamental ‘silent insurrection’ **against the** global integrating system **and its many pressures, demands and humiliations** (2001: 106). **This is anendogenic or intra-genic rejection, it emanates from within the system, from within individuals, even from within language, electronic systems and bodily cells, erupting as** abreaction, metastasis and sudden reversal.[2](http://www2.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol-11_2/v11-2-pawlett.html#ft-endnote2)

For Baudrillard then, **despite the many simulations of external threat and enmity – radical Islam currently being the best example –** the most dangerous threat lies within**:  ‘society faces a far harder test than any external threat: that of** its own absence, its loss of reality’ (2006: 1). **The global order, conventionally labelled “capitalist”, is** neutralising its values and structures, **its ideologies disappear, its principles are sacrificed**.  Even the sense of “reality” produced by the abstract sign and by simulation models begin to disappear (2005: 67-73; 2009: 10-15). **The goal is ‘integral reality’, a limitless operational project geared towards the total transcription of the world into virtuality:** ‘everything is realised and technically materialised without reference to any principle or final purpose’ (2005: 18). Yet **there is** an internal war or “backlash**” taking place between integralist violence which seeks ultimate control by eliminating all otherness, and**duality. Duality, for Baudrillard, is “indestructible” and is manifest as the inevitable or destined re-emergence of otherness: of death, Evil, ambivalence, the ghosts of symbolic exchange, the accursed share within the system. The integrating system then suffers a ‘dissent working away at it from inside. It is the global violence immanent in the world-system itself which, from within, sets the purest form of symbolic challenge against it’ (2005: 22). **This is a war or conflict that does not end, the outcome of which cannot be predicted or programmed.** It is a war that is quite different from the disappearance of war into simulated non-events, such as occurred with the Gulf wars (Baudrillard 1995). Indeed, Baudrillard suggests, the deterrence **of world wars, and of nuclear wars,** does not result in peace, but in a viral proliferation of conflicts, a fractalisation of war and conflict into everyday, local, and ubiquitous terror (1993b: 27).

This paper will examine Baudrillard’s position on internal rejection through two closely related themes: complicity and duality. **Complicity, and the closely related term collusion, are themselves dual** in Baudrillard’s sense. That is, **complicity or collusion express** an internal division or ‘duality’ **which is** not a simple opposition of terms. As is so often the case, Baudrillard’s position builds on his much earlier studies: Requiem For the Media (orig. 1972, in Baudrillard 1981: 164-184) had already argued that the dominance of the abstract sign and of simulation models meant that any critique of the system made through the channels of semiotic abstraction were automatically re-absorbed into the system.

Any meaningful challenge must invent its own, alternative medium – such as the silk-screen printings, hand-painted notices and graffiti of May 1968 – or it will lapse into an ineffectual complicity with the system it seeks to challenge (Baudrillard 1981: 176). In his later work, Baudrillard’s emphasis on duality and complicity is extended much further, taking on global, anthropological and even cosmological dimensions, and increasingly complicity and collusion are seen as dual, as encompassing both acceptance and a subtle defiance. This paper examines the dual nature of complicity and collusion. It considers the influence of La Boetie’s notorious Essay on Voluntary Servitude on Baudrillard, seeking to draw out what is distinctive in Baudrillard’s position. The second section turns to the notion of duality, examining Good and Evil and Baudrillard’s assertion that attempts to eliminate duality merely revive or re-active it.

**Complicity implies a complexity of relations, and, specifically,** the condition of being an accomplice to those in power. **To be an accomplice is to** assist in the committing of a crime. **If the crime is murder, the term accomplice implies one who plans, reflects, calculates – but does not strike the lethal blow. The crime which is of particular interest to Baudrillard is**, of course, the perfect crime: the elimination of otherness, of ambivalence, of duality, even of “reality” and of the abstract representational sign which enables a sense of “reality” (Baudrillard 1996). **The** global, integral, carnivalising and cannibalising system**, which might** loosely still be called capitalist**, is** at war against radical otherness or duality; yet, for Baudrillard**, as** duality lies at its heart**, locked within its foundations, it is** indestructible **and emerges through** attempts to eliminate it. If the system has been largely successful at eliminating external threats, it finds itself in an even worse situation: it is at war with itself.

II. Complicity

Complicity is a particularly slippery term. **In the 1980s Baudrillard’s thought**, mistakenly assumed to be “Postmodernist”, **was argued to be** complicit with capitalism**, largely because it** questioned **the ability of** dominant strands of Marxism and feminism **to significantly challenge the capitalist system** (Callinicos 1989; Norris 1992). At the same time, **Baudrillard was alleging that the work of supposedly radical theorists such as Deleuze and Guattari** (1984 orig. 1972) **and Lyotard** (1993 orig. 1974) **was, with their emphasis on desire as productive and liberatory force,** complicit with the mechanisms of advanced consumer capitalism (Baudrillard 1987: 17-20). So **which branch of contemporary theory is most complicit with capitalism? Liberals, humanists and environmentalists who see their clothes stolen by mainstream politicians? Marxists and Communists who by refusing to update their thinking provide a slow moving target for right-wing snipers? Post- Modernists and Post-Structuralists who attack Enlightenment thought but refuse to speak of the human subject and so have “thrown the baby out with the bath water”? Network and complexity theory which flattens all phenomena and experience to a position on a grid, producing a very complex simplification?** The list could go on but it is a question that cannot be answered because all critical theories are complicit with the system they critique. **They** fight on a terrain **already** demarcated **by their** opponents**, a terrain on which they are** beaten before they begin**, one where the most compelling argument can always be** dismissed as doom-mongering or irresponsible **intellectualism. This includes** Baudrillard’s own critical thinking**, as he** readily acknowledges (Baudrillard 2009a: 39). Further, and even more damaging to the project of critique**, in a hegemonic or integral order the system** solicits critique and it criticises itself**, so** displacing **and** making redundant the laborious attempts **at** academic critique**. The latter continue, even proliferate, but** with decreasing impact**.**

So, what does Baudrillard mean by complicity with the global order? **Baudrillard’s concern is primarily with** complicity at the level of the form **of the (capitalist) system, not at the level of belief, consent or allegiance to particular contents of capitalist life** (consumer products, plurality of ‘lifestyles’, a degree of ‘tolerance’ etc.). **Complicity is often seen, by critics of capitalism, as acceptance of consumerism and its myriad choices and lifestyles, but this is a reductive level of analysis from Baudrillard’s perspective**. **By complicity or collusion Baudrillard means**, on the one hand, the very widespread willingness to surrender or give up beliefs, passions and “symbolic defences” (2010: 24), **and on the other** – **as the dual form** – an equally widespread ability to find a space of defiance through the play of complicity, collusion, hyperconformity and indifference (1983: 41-8). That is, **while many of us (in the relatively affluent West) share in the profanating, denigrating and “carnivalising” of all values, embracing indifference, shrugging “whatever”, we do so with very little commitment to the system, rejoicing inwardly when it suffers reversals:** we operate in a dual mode.

**While such** attitudes of indifference **may seem to accept that there is no meaningful alternative to capitalism: an attitude that has been called** ‘capitalist nihilism’ (Davis in Milbank and Zizek, 2009) and ‘capitalist realism’ (Fisher 2008), **Baudrillard’s notions of** “integral reality”,duality **and** complicity **may have** significant advantages **over those approaches**. **Unlike thinkers who remain** anchored to critical thinking **defined by** determinate negation**, Baudrillard’s approach** emphasises ambivalence**,** reversal **and both** personal and collective modes of rejection **more** subtle **than those envisioned by the** increasingly exhausted mechanisms of critique. **The** critique of consumer capitalism – the consumption of junk food, junk entertainment and junk information – **is** now **integral to the system; the critique of finance capitalism – banker’s bonuses, corporate tax avoidance – is integral to the system, yet it fails to bring about meaningful or determinate social transformation**. Indeed, **such critiques may do** no more than provide the system **with a** fleeting sense of “reality**” –** real issues**,** real problems to deal with **– around which the system can** reproduce its simulacra**, perhaps to** reassure us that “something is being done”**,** “measures are being put into place” **etc**. “**Reality” cannot be dialectically negated by critical concepts when both ‘reality’ and the critical concept disappear together,** their fates clearly tied to each other (Baudrillard 2009b: 10-12).

There is a sense then in which the production of critique is in complicity with the system**, the unravel-able proliferation and excess of critical accounts of the system has the effect of protecting the system**. Complicity consists in a sharing of the denigration of all values, all institutions, all ideas, all beliefs: so long as we believe in nothing – at least not passionately – then the system has us, at least superficially. For example, in recent decades we have seen the denigration of religious faiths – or their reduction to ‘cultural identity’ and ‘world heritage’ objects; the denigration of public services and welfare provision accompanied by their marketisation; the denigration of the poor, the young, immigrants and the unemployed. Yet this is not only the denigration of the powerless or disenfranchised, there is also the widespread denigration of those seen as powerful: politicians, corporations, celebrities. For Baudrillard, **it is** quite inadequate **to focus only on** the power of global neo-liberal policies **such as marketisation in these processes of denigration. This is where Baudrillard’s position departs decisively from anti-globalists and from neo-Communists such as Negri, Zizek, and Badiou**. **Global power has**deliberately sacrificed its values and ideologies**, it** presents no position**, it** takes no stand**, it** undermines even the illusion that “free markets” function and has made “capital” virtual**; become orbital it is removed from a terrestrial, geo-political or subjective space. These are** protective measures enabling power to become (almost) hegemonic (Baudrillard 2009a: 33-56; 2010: 35-40).

**Baudrillard** often **emphasises** the fragility and the vulnerability **to** reversal of the “powerful” **and the distinction between powerful and powerless is** radically questioned in his work**. So what is this global power? Where is it? The answer, of course, is that** it is everywhere and it is in everyone. **We have not liberated ourselves from slavery, but**, Baudrillard contends, internalised the masters: **‘[e]verthing changes with** the emancipation of the slave **and the** internalisation of the master by the emancipated slave’ (2009a: 33). We tyrannise ourselves**, for example by demanding that we** maximise our opportunities, fulfill our potential**. This is** a deeper level of slavery **– and** complicity **– than** any previous historical system could inflict (Baudrillard 1975; 2009a: 33).

Yet duality always re-emerges, Baudrillard insists: **indifference is dual, complicity is dual**. Carnivalisation **and** cannibalisation **are themselves** dual**: the global system** absorbs all otherness **in a** ‘forced conversion to modernity’ (2010: 5), reproducing otherness **within the** carnival of marketable “difference**”, yet** cannibalisation emerges as a reversion **and** derailing of this process. The world adopts Western models: economic, cultural, religious – or it appears to. **Hidden within this complicity with the West, there is**, Baudrillard suggests, a deeper sense of derision and rejection. **The allegiance to Western models is** superficial**; it is** a form of mimicry or hyperconformity **that involves a** ritual-like exorcism of the hegemonic system. Further, **such** mimicry reveals the superficiality of Western cultural and economic models**: this is not only a superficial acceptance, but** an acceptance of superficiality. **Western values** are already parodic**, and, in being accepted, they are** subject to further parody **as they circulate around the globe** (2010: 4-11). **The West has** deregulated and devalued itself **and demands that the rest of the world follows: "It is** everything by which a human being retains some value **in his own eyes that we (the West) are** deliberately sacrificing **… [o]ur truth is always to be sought in** unveiling**,** de-sublimation, reductive analysis **…[n]othing is true if it is not** desacralised, objectivised, shorn of its aura, dragged **on to the stage**" (Baudrillard 2010: 23).

**Western desacrilisation amounts to a powerful challenge to the rest of the world, a potlatch: desacralise in return or perish! But who has the power? Who is the victor?** There isn’t one, according to Baudrillard. **Of the global order**, Baudrillard writes: ‘We are its hostages **–** victims and accomplices **at one and** the same time **– immersed in the** same global monopoly of the networks**.**

 **A monopoly which, moreover – and this is the supreme ruse of hegemony – no one holds any longer**’ (2010: 40). **There is** no Master**,** no sovereign **because** all the structures and dictates **of power have been** internalised**, this is** the complicity we all share with global order**, yet it is** a dual complicity**: an** over-eager acceptance **goes hand-in-hand with** a deep and growing rejection.

Baudrillard’s discussions of power, servitude and complicity make frequent reference to Estienne La Boetie’s essay on voluntary servitude, completed around 1554. The fundamental political question for La Boetie is: ‘how can it happen that a vast number of individuals, of towns, cities and nations can allow one man to tyrannise them, a man who has no power except the power they themselves give him, who could do them no harm were they not willing to suffer harm’ (La Boetie 1988: 38). It seems people do not want to be free, do not want to wield power or determine their own fates: ‘it is the people who enslave themselves’ (La Boetie 1988: 41). People in general are the accomplices of the powerful and the tyrannical, some profit directly through wealth, property, favour – ‘the little tyrants beneath the principal one’ (1988: 64), but many do not, why do they not rebel? Baudrillard takes up La Boetie’s emphasis on servitude being enforced and maintained from within, rather than from without. Yet, there are also major divergences. La Boetie deplores the “common people” for accepting the narcotising pleasures of drinking, gambling and sexual promiscuity, while Baudrillard rejects such elitism and celebrates the masses abilities to strategically defy those who would manipulate them through perverse but lethally effective practices such as silence, radical indifference, hyperconformity – dual modes of complicity and rejection (Baudrillard 1983: 1-61). Though La Boetie’s essay prefigures the development of the concept of hegemony, he never doubts that voluntary servitude is unnatural, a product of malign custom that is in contradiction with the true nature of human beings which is to enjoy a God-given freedom. Baudrillard, by contrast, examines voluntary servitude as a strategy of the refusal of power, a refusal of the snares of self and identity, as strategy of freedom from the tyranny of the will and the fiction of self-determination (Baudrillard 2001: 51-7). For Baudrillard the “declination” or refusal of will disarms those who seek to exert power through influencing or guiding peoples’ choices and feelings towards particular ends. It also allows for a symbolic space, a space of vital distance or removal, a space in which to act, or even act-out (of) a character (Baudrillard 2001: 72-3). This is a space where radical otherness may be encountered, a sense of shared destiny which is a manifestation of the dual form at the level of individual existence (Baudrillard 2001: 79).

It could certainly be argued that **modern subjects are confronted by a far more subtle and pervasive system of control** than were the subjects discussed in La Boetie’s analysis. In theorising the nature of modern controls Baudrillard develops suggestive themes from La Boetie’s work. **Speaking of slavery in the Assyrian empire, where, apparently, kings would not appear in public, La Boetie argues, ‘**the fact that they did not know who their master was, and hardly knew whether they had one at all, made them all the more willing to be slaves’ (1988: 60). Whatever its historical provenance, **this strategy of power is**, it seems, generalised in modernity; **particularly after the shift away from Fordist mass production it has become** increasingly hard to detect **who** the masters actually are. **While workers are persecuted by middle managers, supervisors, team leaders, project co-ordinators who are the masters of this universe? Who are the true beneficiaries? Rather than** trying to identify a global neo-liberal elite**, as do many proponents of anti-capitalist theory, Baudrillard suggests that the situation we confront is so grave because “we” (those in the West in relatively privileged positions) have usurped the position of masters;** we have become the slave masters of ourselves, tyrannising every detail of our own lives: trying to work harder, trying for promotion or simply trying to avoid redundanc**y**. **We are** all the accomplices of a trans-capitalist, trans-economic exploitation**.** We are all tyrants**: a billion tiny tyrants servicing a system of elimination**. But **this is** not **to say that** Baudrillard ignores power differentials altogether: ‘**it is**, indeed, **those who** submit themselves most mercilessly **to their own decisions who** fill the greater part of the authoritarian ranks**, alleging sacrifice on their parts to impose** even greater sacrifices **on others**’ (2001: 60-1). We all impose such violence on ourselves and on others as part of our daily routines, **hence Baudrillard’s injunction to refuse power:** ‘Power itself must be abolished – and not solely because of a refusal to be dominated, which is at the heart of all traditional struggles – but also, just as violently, in the refusal to dominate’ (2009a: 47).

Yet, **even on the theme of systemic violence and elimination, Baudrillard differs sharply from neo-communist theory, while retaining a position of defiance. Systemic eliminationism should not be conceived in individual or subjective terms**, despite good points made in recent studies of work and education under neo-liberalism, such as Cederström and Fleming’s Dead Man Working (2012). At a formal level, neo-liberal eliminationism **does not merely eliminate jobs and also lives (for example in the recent textile factory fires in Bangladesh), it** eliminates meaning, symbolic space and thought. And it eliminates not by termination but by “ex-termination”. That is**, by** transcribing the world into integral reality**, the system produces** a single, meaning-depleted, virtual space which encourages participation, engagement and campaigning**, on condition that these are produced as part and parcel of an integrated void where** “[t]he real no longer has any force as sign, and signs no longer have any force of meaning” (Baudrillard 2001: 4). **Most of the developed world has been** conferred the right to blog and to tweet **as they please and they are indebted to the system in a way which far exceeds the paying of a small tribute or rent to Microsoft or Apple**(Zizek 2010: 233). The symbolic debt imposed by the modern world and its technologies is of a metaphysical or cosmological order. Through it we take leave of this world Baudrillard suggests, we become extra-terrestrials. We will recognise no Other, no singularity, no debt to anyone because we attempt to cancel everything out in an integral, technological system that has no outsides because it was, in a sense, created from the outside.

In making this argument, Baudrillard takes up Hannah Arendt’s striking suggestion that modern science and technology, from Galileo’s invention of the telescope to the launch of the first space satellite in 1957, enacts a “fateful repudiation” of the Earth and of the terrestrial human condition. Human beings, Arendt argues, seek to eliminate their rootedness to Earth and their relationship to all other species on Earth (an ambition which also drives the science of genetics). There is for Arendt: "… a rebellion against human existence as it has been given, a free gift from nowhere (secularly speaking), which he wishes to exchange, as it were, for something he has made himself" (Arendt 1958: 2-3).

Economic alienation, as **theorised by Marx**, is an echo of a far more fundamental “world alienation” Arendt suggests. Baudrillard’s reading of Arendt’s work is surprisingly faithful, though he pushes a little further. What Arendt calls the invention of an ‘Archimedean point outside the world’, **when Galileo’s telescope hardened philosophical speculations that the Earth might not be the centre of the universe into demonstrable scientific fact, is**, for Baudrillard, the moment the “real world” began to exist: ‘**the moment when human beings, while setting about analysing and transforming the world, take their leave of it, while at the same time lending it force of reality …** the real world begins, paradoxically, to disappear at the very same time as it begins to exist’ (Baudrillard 2009b: 11). **Human beings do not, cannot, live in the “real world”, they live elsewhere in** a space of symbolic belonging**, and** the “real world” can only be posited on condition that human beings are removed from it**, removed to a vantage point from where they** can observe it. Hence the process of measuring, representation and conceptualisation produces a ‘real world’ subject to scientific knowledge and, at the same time, hastens the progressive disappearance of the real world. **Concepts “capture” things only as** things begin to disappear into concepts**: ‘**the real vanishes into the concept’ (Baudrillard 2009b: 12) **and human being, as products of nature, are** progressively eliminated **from the “real” they have fashioned**. Further, Baudrillard suggests, **human beings are complicit in this process, they are unique in inventing a “mode of disappearance”.** The alienating effects of modern science and technology are not only to be deplored, they can also be seen as a freeing of human intelligence to engage in useless, sovereign and radical thought (Baudrillard 2001: 119-121).

**The disappearance of the human being from nature, and then from “reality” has** dual, irreconcilable consequences. **We lead double lives, or we have a life but also** mere sur-vival**; a destiny but also** a biological, functionalperformative existence. **The latter terms appear to be dominant, and to denigrate all else as meaningless or whimsical**. Yet, Baudrillard suggests, life itself, with its destiny, radical otherness, singularity and duality is actually the more potent**. Performative existence, or integral servitude, can be diverted, annulled, suspended or even sacrificed in sudden,** radically escalated events**:** from 9/11 to cases such as that of Jean-Claude Romans who massacred his family**, eliminating his simulated sense of self and all those who, apparently, believed in his simulation** (Baudrillard 2001: 67-70). According to Baudrillard: **“[as] we break the symbolic pact and the cycle of metamorphoses, two kinds of violence ensue: a violence of liberation, and an opposite violence in reaction against the excess of freedom, safety, protection and integration, and hence against the loss of any dimension of fate, of destiny –** a violence directed against the emergence of the Ego, the Self, the Subject or the Individual, which takes its toll in the form of self-hatred and repentance” (2001: 46). Two forms of violence emerging from the same source: the breaking of symbolic obligation and the expulsion of otherness, the foundation upon which modern society is based (1993a: 1-5; 131-135).

# 2AC

## Case

### Generic 2AC OV

#### The university seeks to perpetuate neoliberal thought through social hierarchizing and education, this allows a flow of violence a remobilizes neoliberal structures on a day to day basis – this flow of information to descendants and the future generations- this is a force to expose itself to others in order to consume them within the system

#### This intervention of power is a will to reality – a point to make the “violence” mean something is really just a seek to produce meaning in their own existence- this flood of meaning is a explosion of the real and sharpens “reality” – this allows for sense of implosive violence that are perpetuated through means of information or more specifically media technologies – mobilizing war machines of technologies and information that seeks to conquer those who conform and destroy those who don’t – the will to transparency outweighs any other impacts in this round, not only does it operate on the pre fiat and discursive level but also seeks to reify the other in a form of wanton violence- this has historically led to violence such as slavery, slavery would not have been possible if European colonists had not seeks to know what was beyond their reach- thus they sail down to Africa and reify the slave as inferior to the white man

#### Rather we engage in a form of radical mimicry, this is a hyper conforming to the system from the inside, we adhere to debate rules so we can sneak in but fuck them norms, norms like topical action is parasitic and exclusive, we challenge the will to transparency within the debate space by doing exactly what the state in this case debate doesn’t want us to do, nothing but fuckery- like reading a poem, [insert random things I did], or literally saying we are doing nothing when the whole point in debate is to do something

## FW

### Top-Line

### AT: Fairness

### AT: Ground

### AT: SSD

### Limits

### Deliberation

### Clash

### Competitive Equity

### Topic Education

### Legal Precision

### AT: TVA

### AT Debate is a game