# Ban All White People CP

#### O/V: We can’t trust that the white folk will actually do the aff, even with the Eurocentric framing of the topic by 1AC- proves major reasons why the US needs to back the fuck up.

White people are settlers that brought with them a presumption of sovereign prerogative, an unshakeable belief in their right to establish a state over which they exercised absolute control and makes all the impacts of aff inevitable.

The Affirmative’s politics of who should be deemed authoritarian and not given military aid is directly related to the establishment and maintenance of the American settler state: ignoring that they (the settlers) are the problem; conceptualizing other nations as authoritarian while ignoring that America itself is authoritarian both historically, today, and in spaces like this reinforces a culture of silence.

### Thus, the plan text:

#### Ban all White people from the policy process until we figure this out.

The Affirmative represents a status quo in which racial hierarchy is deeply, structurally embedded. White American settlers, like their European colonial counterparts, have consistently invoked their ‘civilizing mission’ to justify the colonization of peoples of color; a ‘grand project’ that has justified colonialism as a means of redeeming the backward, violent, oppressed, undeveloped people of the non-European world by incorporating them into the universal civilization of America.

#### The historical patterns of indefinite detention are better explained by recognizing the United States as a settler colonial state whose claimed prerogative to expand its territorial reach and contain/control populations over which it exercises jurisdiction has inevitably resulted in the involuntary inclusion and concomitant exclusion of peoples of color.

Saito 18 ( Natsu Taylor. "Indefinite Detention, Colonialism, and Settler Prerogative in the United States." Social & Legal Studies (2018): 0964663918769362. Indefinite Detention, Colonialism, and Settler Prerogative in the United States Natsu Taylor Saito Abstract Social & Legal Studies 1–34 a The Author(s) 2018 Reprints and permission: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0964663918769362 journals.sagepub.com/home/sls The primacy accorded individual civil and political rights is often touted as one of the United States’ greatest achievements. However, mass incarcerations of indefinite duration have occurred consistently throughout US history and have primarily targeted people of color. The dominant narrative insists that the United States is a political democracy and portrays each instance of indefinite detention in exceptionalist terms. This essay argues that the historical patterns of indefinite detention are better explained by recognizing the United States as a settler colonial state whose claimed prerogative to expand its territorial reach and contain/control populations over which it exercises jurisdiction has inevitably resulted in the involuntary inclusion and concomitant exclusion of peoples of color. Keywords Colonialism, carceral state, immigration detention, inclusive exclusion, indefinite detention, internment, mass incarceration, plenary power, settler colonialism, slavery. Indefinite detention is a national trope, sourced in the violence of colonialism. —Penny Pether (2012: 2550) The United States has long engaged in officially sanctioned incarceration outside the rule of law, leaving people(s) indefinitely imprisoned without the benefit of due process or other protections articulated in its Constitution and in international human rights law. Such indefinite detentions are generally characterized as ‘exceptional’ measures Corresponding author: Natsu Taylor Saito, Georgia State University, P.O. Box 4037, Atlanta, Georgia 30303-4037, USA. Email: nsaito@gsu.edu 2 Social & Legal Studies XX(X) necessary to protect the public from imminent threats to the national security (Van Bergen and Valentine, 2006: 452),1 and oft-discussed examples include the internment of almost 120,000 Japanese Americans during World War II, and the detention of some 800 people at the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay beginning in 2002.2 Such incarcerations conform to Giorgio Agamben’s characterization of the concentration camp as a place in which sovereign power operates directly upon ‘bare life’, unmediated by law, and through which the ‘state of exception begins to become the rule’ (Agamben, 1998: 168–169). Portraying these indefinite detentions as exceptional implies the existence of a norm in which the rule of law prevails. This, in turn, encourages those contesting particular instances of indefinite detention to frame their efforts in terms of bringing the exception into the realm of the ‘normal’. Thus, for example, in the wake of the attacks of Septem- ber 11, 2001, many civil libertarians in the United States urged that those suspected of terrorist activity be processed through the criminal justice system rather than detained at Guanta ́namo. If, however, large-scale indefinite detentions are routinely utilized by the state to maintain the status quo, they can only be understood and, therefore, effectively challenged, as structurally embedded rather than exceptional practices. In the United States, indefinite detentions may be exceptional in the sense that the formalities of legal process have been abandoned, but they are not aberrational. Adam Klein and Benjamin Wittes observe: Preventive detention is not prohibited by U.S. law or especially frowned upon in tradition or practice. The circumstances in which it arises are not isolated exceptions to a strong rule against it; rather, they are relatively frequent. The federal government and all 50 states together possess a wise range of statutory preventive detention regimes that are frequently used, many of which provoke little social or legal controversy. (Klein and Wittes, 2011: 86–87) We cannot identify a point in United States history where ‘the state of exception begins to become the rule’; it has always been the rule. Mass internments were integral to the establishment of the state and have been consistently utilized to maintain its hegemony, domestically and globally. They constitute a condition of colonialism, as Penny Pether observed, regularly and predictably used to facilitate settler appropriation of land and natural resources, to ensure a readily available and easily disposable labor force and to exercise a claimed sovereign prerogative to maintain social ‘order’.3 This order, in turn, represents a status quo in which racial hierarchy is deeply, structurally embedded. Anglo-American settlers, like their European colonial counterparts, have consistently invoked their ‘civilizing mission’ to justify the colonization of peoples of color; a ‘grand project’, to quote Antony Anghie, ‘that has justified colonialism as a means of redeeming the backward, aberrant, violent, oppressed, undeveloped people of the non-European world by incorporating them into the universal civilization of Europe’ (Anghie, 2005: 3; Osterhammel, 2005: 17). Ongoing colonial subjugation, however, requires the colonized to be perpetually constructed as Other (Veracini, 2010: 22; Osterhammel, 2005: 108). The result is a ‘dynamic of difference’ that perpetually ‘creat[es] a gap between two cultures . . . and seek[s] to bridge the gap by developing techniques to normalize the aberrant society’ (Anghie, 2005: 4). While ‘normalize’ Saito 3 generally connotes assimilation, in a colonial context, it encompasses whatever is required to render life ‘normal’ for the colonizers. Incarceration unconstrained by otherwise applicable law is one such technique that has been utilized regularly toward that end in the United States as well as in other colonial contexts.4

### Solvency:

#### Can’t trust White people. Empirics are on our side, the United States entered into numerous treaties with Indigenous nations, thereby acknowledging American Indian sovereignty in the process of legitimating colonial land claims. The explicit purpose of the state and policymaking was to ‘clear’ the land for White Settlers.

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Although the British and, subsequently, the United States had entered into numerous treaties with Indigenous nations, thereby acknowledging American Indian sovereignty in the process of legitimating colonial land claims, by the 1830s the US Supreme Court was proclaiming that American Indian nations would no longer be recognized as either independent or fully sovereign. As Chief Justice John Marshall announced in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, ‘[t]hey may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations’, nations that ‘occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will’ (Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S., 1831: 17). This characterization of Indigenous peoples as internal colonies laid the groundwork for the federal government’s subsequent assertion of absolute – ‘plenary’ – power over Indian affairs (Church- ill, 2002: 673–679; Newton, 1984). In other words, the unilateral extension of US jurisdiction to encompass – that is, forcibly include – Native peoples simultaneously resulted in their exclusion from all otherwise applicable legal protections. It also laid the groundwork for the forced removal of the so-called Five Civilized Tribes (the Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole nations) and some 30 smaller peoples from their homelands and their relocation to reservations west of the Mississippi River (Foreman, 1953; Jahoda, 1975). The nature of the process has been masked by the pervasive use of innocuous terms such as ‘relocation’, ‘removal’, and ‘reservations’, but the reality was that Indigenous peoples across the continent were reduced to the conditions of bare life Agamben describes as characterizing the concentration camp, a setting in ‘which human beings could be so completely deprived of their rights and prerogatives that no act committed against them could appear any longer as a crime’ (Agamben, 1998: 171). For the Indian nations of the Southeast, ‘removal’ meant families taken at gunpoint from their homes (which were often then ransacked and burned), imprisoned in stock- ades, and then force-marched some 1200 miles across the country in mid-winter, with a resulting death rate of up to 50% (Thornton, 1984: 293).7 These conditions were inflicted on civilians, by the US military, during a period in which no hostilities were occurring. The survivors who made it to ‘Indian country’ in Oklahoma were then assigned to ‘agencies’, that is, reservations. ‘Reserved lands’ sounds relatively benign but, as the following examples illustrate, the reservations to which some 400 American Indian nations were eventually consigned were, in fact, prison camps (Harring, 1994: 204–206). Saito 7 In 1862, in the aftermath of what is known as Little Crow’s War in Minnesota, almost all of the Santee Sioux were interned at Fort Snelling, where conditions were so miser- able that one-quarter of the population died within several months. In addition to the threat of military pursuit, escape was deterred by a US$200 scalp bounty proclaimed on all Santees found outside the fort (Brown, 1970: 60, 63–64; Schultz, 1992: 279–283). In 1863, following the army’s Kit Carson ‘campaign’, the Navajos were first imprisoned at Fort Defiance, Arizona, and then force-marched some 300 miles to the Bosque Redondo near Fort Sumner, New Mexico, where they were held for 4 years. Lodged in crude shelters (sometimes literally holes in the ground), provided grossly inadequate rations and wracked by disease, half of the detainees perished before they were moved to another reservation in 1868 (Bailey, 1988, 1998; Thompson, 1982). Thus trapped on inhospitable lands with inadequate food or shelter, survival seemed unlikely, prompting many interned peoples to try to escape. But they were prisoners, allowed to leave their assigned agencies only with the permission of the military or a federal Indian agent (Frederickson, 1981: 242–243). The military was frequently deployed to track down and capture or kill those attempting to escape. In 1877, the Northern Cheyennes were relocated from their traditional Montana territory and imprisoned on the Cheyenne–Arapaho reservation in Oklahoma. As malaria, dysentery, and other illnesses spread rapidly among them, in the fall of 1878, some 300 Cheyennes fled in a desperate attempt to go home (Berthrong, 1976: 27–47; Sandoz, 1964: 27–31). Some 15,000 troops pursued the small group of escapees and incarcerated them at Camp Robinson, Nebraska, where they were denied food and fire- wood in the dead of winter in an attempt to coerce them to return to Oklahoma. In January 1879, the Cheyennes tried once more to escape but were quickly tracked down and about half of them, children included, were killed (Andrist, 1964: 321–329; Sandoz, 1964: 245–290). Similarly, the infamous Wounded Knee massacre of 1890 was perpetrated by troops pursuing Minneconjou Lakotas whose sole ‘offense’ was to have fled their assigned agency during a period of starvation and severe repression, to seek refuge among their Oglala relatives at the Pine Ridge Agency, about 150 miles away (Andrist, 1964: 350–352; Brown, 1970: 401–402; Sutton, 1985: 122–123; McGregor, 1940). The message was clear: American Indians had no alternative but to stay in their assigned locations, under whatever conditions the government cared to impose. The explicit purpose of the policy was to ‘clear’ the land for White settlers and, by 1890, when the federal government declared the ‘frontier’ to be closed, those Indigenous peoples who had survived what David Stannard terms the ‘American holocaust’ were confined to less than 3% of their original land base (Churchill, 2003: 12; Stannard, 1992). As in all colonial ventures, the dynamic of difference had been employed to render them less than human – to construct them quite literally as bare life – as reflected in the fact that it was 1879 before the Ponca leader Standing Bear became the first American Indian legally recognized as a ‘person’ capable of suing for habeas corpus (Standing Bear v Crook, 1879; Dando-Collins, 2004). Another 30 years passed before an American court ruled in 1909 that Indigenous people could not be classified – or treated – as ‘prisoners of war’ merely because they were Indians, a practice that persisted even after that time and has never been renounced by the government (United States v. By-a-lil-le [1909]; Harring, 1994: 198–203). The 8 Social & Legal Studies XX(X) most egregious example is that of the Chiricahua Apaches. Harsh conditions at the San Carlos reservation had precipitated the escape and protracted military resistance mounted by Geronimo’s band during the 1870s and 1880s. In retaliation, after Geroni- mo’s surrender in 1886, the government shipped the entire Chiricahua population – children, elders, women, and even those men who had fought for the United States against their ‘renegade’ relatives – to military prisons in Florida and then Alabama. During their first 8 years of incarceration, some 40% of the imprisoned Chiricahuas died, and it was not until the winter of 1913–1914 that the survivors were finally transferred to the Kiowa–Comanche reservation in Oklahoma (Lieder and Page, 1997: 28–38; Roberts, 1984). The purpose of incarcerating the Chiricahua Apaches for an entire generation was to ensure that their spirit was broken, to assimilate them to the ‘American’ way of life, with all that implies. Oversight of this project was entrusted to an army captain, Richard Henry Pratt, the Chiricahuas’ warden at the military prison in Florida. This, in turn, qualified Pratt to inaugurate the American Indian ‘boarding school’ system whose aim, as he stated in 1895, was to ‘kill the Indian, save the man’ in each student (Churchill, 2004: 13–14). These schools represent a massive program of indefinite detention. They operated for the better part of a century and, for generations children were forcibly removed from their families, often by the military. Parents who resisted were imprisoned. The children were very literally held captive, often for 10 years or longer, sexually abused, and tortured (Churchill, 2004). But sadism was not the purpose of their incarceration, as sadistic as their captors may have been. The purpose of the schools was to eliminate all vestiges of Indigenous culture in these children, to strip them of their identity and replace it with the settlers’ vision of what compliant people of color should look and act like. In 1946, the US government established an Indian Claims Commission (ICC) in attempt to distinguish its record of territorial acquisition from that of the Germans it was then prosecuting at Nuremberg (Churchill, 2003: 125–152; Rosenthal, 1990). The following year, the Chiricahuas filed a claim for damages accruing from the expropria- tion of their lands and from their lengthy imprisonment in Florida and Alabama. In 1971, the ICC finally awarded them token payment for their lost lands but not for their imprisonment (Fort Sill Apache Tribe v. United States, 26 Ind. Cl. Comm. 281, 1971). On appeal, the Court of Claims held that while ‘the Apache Tribe did not prosper from the injuries suffered by its constituent members’ during their 27 years of imprisonment, these were claims over which the Commission had no jurisdiction (Fort Sill Apache Tribe of Oklahoma v United States, 477 F.2d 1360, 1365 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974); Lieder and Page, 1997: 222). By refusing to review this decision, the Supreme Court effectively legitimated the settler state’s prerogative to intern entire peoples in order to consolidate control over its claimed land base. This prerogative has been exercised on numerous occasions, both within the claimed boundaries of the United States and in its colonial and imperial ventures across the globe. The Japanese American internment provides one internal example. While it was justified on the grounds of ‘military necessity’ (Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 1944: 233), upon closer examination it becomes evident that the removal of persons of Japa- nese descent from the West Coast, and their indefinite incarceration, was largely Saito 9 motivated by White settler resistance to their very presence. Despite reports from all relevant intelligence agencies that Japanese Americans posed no security threat, President Franklin D. Roosevelt ceded to pressure brought by organizations of prominent landowners and busi- nessmen including, notably, the future Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren (US Con- gress, Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC), 1982: 54– 55).8 One such group was the Native Sons of the Golden West, explicitly dedicated to preserving California ‘as it has always been and as God himself intended it shall always be – the White Man’s Paradise’ (CWRIC, 1982: 364n41; tenBroek et al., 1970: 32–57; Daniels, 1968: 85–87). As the California Joint Immigration Committee (formerly known as the Asiatic Exclusion League) stated bluntly in early February 1942, ‘This is our time to get things done that we have been trying to get done for a quarter of a century’ (tenBroek et al., 1970: 79). California, of course, had not ‘always been...the White Man’s Paradise’. White settler claims had been realized only by the mass extermination of Indian nations (Churchill, 1997; Stannard, 1992) and the utilization and subsequent removal of Asian, particularly Chinese, and Mexican labor (Johnson, 2004: 661–667; Saito, 2003: 14–16). The Japanese American ‘evacuation’ and ‘relocation’ was entirely consistent with this history. Indian reservations served as ‘prototypes’ for the camps in which Japanese Americans were interned (Drinnon, 1987: xxiv, 265) and Poston, one of the ten major Japanese American concentration camps, was actually located on the Colorado River Indian reservation in Arizona and administered by John Collier, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs (Byrd, 2011: 185). Poston’s history illustrated the integral – and distinctly colonial – relationship between the American Indian and Japanese American internments. In 1940, Collier had proposed to ‘colonize 10,000 American Indians to the [Colorado River] reservation’ (Byrd, 2011: 185), and Japanese American prisoners were utilized to develop the irrigation system Collier believed would allow the reservation to be self-sustaining. As Jodi Byrd observes: By naming the relocation centers and internment camps ‘colonies’ within their internal documents, the United States revealed the deeper logics of removals and reservations, and Collier, who saw in Poston an opportunity to develop a social experiment that might innovate future management strategies within the Office of Indian Affairs, had already laid the ground- work so that Hopi and Navajo families might join those relocation colonies after the war ended to continue the work started by the Japanese American internees. (Byrd, 2011: 187) American Indian internments would continue until the mid-1950s, when the govern- ment decided that its interests were better served by ‘terminating’ its relationship with Native nations, abruptly pushing them off the reservations and dispersing them in cities (Fixico, 1986; Orfield, 1966). This attempt to once again remove Indigenous peoples from their land base became the responsibility of Dillon S. Myer, the new Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). Myer, instructively, had been the Director of the War Relocation Authority (WRA), the agency responsible for managing the Japanese American internment. According to Richard Drinnon: An accident of chronology has masked the underlying meaning of Myer’s termination policy. Had he been commissioner of the BIA before he became director of the WRA, then 10 Social & Legal Studies XX(X) the continuities stretching from the reservations to the camps could hardly have been missed and the fundamental sameness of his treatment of Native Americans and Japanese Americans would have elicited close analysis long ago. (Drinnon, 1987: 265)

### And judge, don’t worry, this isn’t a Wilderson double bind where voting neg delegitimizes the resistance of white hegemony unless endorsed by a Native.

Voting Neg actually contextualizes three net benefits in addition to like, banning the white folk☺

#### 1] First and foremost decolonizing mindsets is an important role for you as settlers in our indigenous movements.

We need allies in our struggles.

#### 2] The CP strategically works to unsettle the settler psyche by understanding your own relationship to colonialism and the processes of decolonization.

It is critical to engage in things that explore multiple positionalities, contradictions, and limitations that are brought to the fore through serious engagement with practices by settlers. You apply this method when you vote neg; you make the CP take on a self-reflexive strategy, something vital in the development in self-determining relationships of solidarity.

#### 3] A universal understanding of a “settler” retains possessive investments in whiteness that relieves culpability for other forms of racialized violence – understanding your position in a broader colonial and racial hierarchy is necessary to confront white supremacy

### Sorry though Aff, it’s a little late for you:

#### 1] Counterplan is competitive with the affirmative. The 1ACs political imagination naturalizes the participation of white people in the political process while the CP denies their participation.

* Any permutation severs the 1ACs inclusion of white people and destroys clash.
* Whether white people can participate in anti-racist struggle is a valuable debate—the permutation kills this necessary discussion.
* 1AC reclarification is bad—moots 1NC strategy based on 1AC concessions

#### 2] Any attempt of the Aff being topical or reducing military aid means they automatically link because their endorsement of the res in integrally linked to settler colonialism.

### Go to the Aff

#### O/V: The 1AC framing of debate is bad

1. There is no truth or reality in your claims to power - the state is not an object to be controlled and manipulated by imagining a better tomorrow. The very notion of fiat is devoid of education. A government class solves your policy education. We would never want a policy maker to not take those classes, and debate should be a forum to discuss things that would not otherwise be introduced in those classes means we are the only ones to access a unique education.

2. There is no connection to solvency - normative legal thought like the 1AC prescribes a perfect plan of action with absolutely no means of achieving it. There is no proof their advocacy causes government action or that their specific role playing was good.

3. Delusions of power are bad - the mode of questioning of the 1AC leaves us trapped in bureaucracy unable to take actions on the personal level because we believe our levers of power are only operational through the hands of the state.

4. You force me to roleplay my oppressor – this just recreates subjugation because I am forced to “respect” those who oppress me while they keep their power because of arguments like this which prioritize their method of engagement

#### On framing:

Cross apply Reid-Brinkley 08; they never give a prefiat reason to prefer their method of debating, so you default to my rejection of eurcentrism paradigm. That means my method of resisting white hegemony in the debate space is uniquely a good thing because it has implications in the real world. Extend that the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best resists white hegemony – debate is uniquely key to challenging these norms. Prefer this evidence

* + a. Context – The evidence is making a claim about this specific educational sphere which means it’s the most applicable to the activity that we are in – that’s the most important justification because even if something is good in abstract, that doesn’t mean it should be the topic of debate
	+ b. Portable skills – The goal of debate is to teach us to be better people, our model of debate teaches us skills that allows us to fight oppression when we leave debate which outweighs on duration.

#### Case: (overview of advantages, etc.)

#### 1] The affirmative posits themselves as a moral actor, but their form of politics leads to interpassivity-turning case

Adorno 72(Theodor,Leading member of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory-specializing in sociology and philosophy, The Culture Industry, Published 2001, p 198-203)

We older representatives of that for which the name Frankfurt School has established itself have recently had the reproach of resignation leveled against us. We had, it is stated, developed elements of a critical theory of society, but we were not prepared to draw the practical consequences from this theory. We neither designed programmes for action nor did we support the actions of those who felt themselves inspired by critical theory. I shall sidestep the question whether this demand can be made at all upon theoretical thinkers who always remain to a certain degree sensitive and by no means unshakable instruments. The task assigned such individuals within a society characterized by the division of labour might indeed by questionable; they themselves might well be deformed by it. But they have also been formed by it. And there is no way in which they can repeal that which they have become merely through an act of their own will. I should not want to deny the impulse of subjective weakness inherent in the confinement to theory. The objection raised against us can be stated approximately in these words; a person who is in the present hour doubts the possibility of radical change in society and who for that reason neither takes part in nor recommends spectacular, violent action is guilty of resignation. He does not consider the vision of change which he once held capable of realization; indeed, he actually had no true desire to see it realized in the first place. In leaving conditions as they are, he offers his tacit approval of them. Distance from praxis is disreputable in the eyes of everyone. Anyone who does not take immediate action and who is not willing to get his hands dirty is the subject of suspicion; it is felt that his antipathy toward such action was not legitimate, and further that his view has even been distorted by the privileges he enjoys. Distrust of those who distrust praxis extends from those on the opposite side, who repeat the old slogan, ‘We’ve had enough of talking’ all the way to the objective spirit of advertising, which propagates the picture – it’s called Leitbild or ‘image as motif’ – of the actively involved human being, no matter whether his activity lies in the realm of economics or athletics. One should take part. Whoever restricts himself to thinking but does not get involved is weak, cowardly and virtually a traitor. This hostile cliché on the intellectual is to be encountered with deep roots within that branch of the opposition that is in turn reviled as intellectual without any awareness thereof on their part. Thinking activists answer; among the things to be changed is that very separation of theory and praxis. Praxis is essential if we are ever to be liberated from the domination of practical people and practical ideals. The trouble with this view is that it results in the prohibition of thinking. Very little is needed to turn the resistance against repression repressively against those who – little as they might wish to glorify their state of being – do not desert the standpoint that they have come to occupy. The often-evoked unity of theory and praxis has a tendency to give way to the predominance of praxis. Numerous views define theory itself as a form of repression – as though praxis did not stand in a far more direct relationship to repression. For Marx, the dogma of this unity was animated by the immanent possibility of action which even then was not to be realized. Today it is rather the opposite situation that prevails. One clings to action because of the impossibility of action. But Marx himself reveals a concealed wound in this regard. He no doubt delivered the eleventh thesis on Feuerbach in such an authoritarian fashion because he was not at all sure of it himself. In his youth he had demanded the ‘ruthless criticism of everything that exists’. Now he mocked criticism. But his famous joke about the Young Hegelians, his coinage “critical criticism’, was a dud and went up in smoke as nothing but a tautology. The forced precedence of praxis brought the criticism which Marx himself practiced to an irrational halt. In Russia and in the orthodoxy of other countries, the malicious mockery of critical criticism became the instrument that permitted the status quo to establish itself in such horrifying fashion. The only meaning that praxis retained was this: increased production of the means of production. The only criticism still tolerated was that people were not working hard enough. This demonstrates how easily the subordination of theory to praxis results in the support of renewed repression. Repressive intolerance toward a thought not immediately accompanied by instructions for action is founded in fear. Unmanipulated thought and the position that allows nothing to be deduced from this thought must be feared because that which cannot be admitted is perfectly clear: this thought is right. An aged bourgeois mechanism with which the men of the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century were very familiar displays itself anew but unchanged: suffering caused by a negative condition – in this case by obstructed reality – turns into anger toward the person who expresses it. Thought, enlightenment conscious of itself, threatens to disenchant pseudo-reality within which, according to Habermas’ formulation, activism moves. This activism is tolerated only because it is viewed as pseudo-activity. Pseudo-activity is allied with pseudo-reality in the design of a subjective position; an activity that overplays itself and fires itself up for the sake of its own publicity without admitting to what degree it serves as a substitute for satisfaction, thus elevating itself to an end in itself. All those behind bars are despondent in their desire to be released. In such situations one no longer thinks or thinks only in fictive postulates. Within absolutized praxis, only reaction is possible and for this reason the reaction is false. Only thinking could offer an escape, and then only that thinking , the results of which are not prescribed – as is so frequently the case in those discussions in which it is predetermined who is right and which therefore do not advance the cause – but rather degenerate without fail into tactics. When the doors are barricaded, it is doubly important that thought not be interrupted. It is rather the task of thought to analyse the reasons behind this situation and to draw the consequences from these reasons. It is the responsibility of thought not to accept the situation as finite. If there is any chance of changing the situation, it is only through undiminished insight. The leap into praxis will not cure thought from resignation as long as it is paid for with the secret knowledge that this course is simply not the right one. Generally speaking, pseudo-activity is the attempt to preserve enclaves of immediacy in the midst of a thoroughly mediated and obdurate society. This process is rationalized through the acceptance of any small change as one step on the long way toward total change. The unfortunate model for pseudo-activity is the ‘do-it-yourself’ syndrome – activities that do that which has long been done better through the means of industrial production and which arouse in unfree individuals, hampered in their spontaneity, the confident feeling that they are of central concern. The nonsense of the ‘do-it-yourself’ approach to the production of material goods and in the making of many repairs is equally obvious. However, it is not total. In view of the reduction of so-called services – sometimes superfluous in terms of technical standards – measures taken by a private person fulfill a semi-rational purpose. In politics, however, the ‘do-it-yourself’ attitude is not of quite the same character. The society that confronts human beings in such an impenetrable manner is these humans themselves. Confidence in the limited action of small groups is reminiscent of the spontaneity which atrophies beneath the encrusted totality and without which this totality cannot be transformed into something different. The administered world has a tendency to strangle all spontaneity or at least to channel it into pseudo-activity. This, however, is not achieved so totally without difficulty as the agents of the administered world would like to imagine. Nonetheless, spontaneity is not to be absolutized – just as little as it is to be separated from the objective situation and idolized in the same manner as is the administered world itself. Otherwise the axe will break down the next door in the house – a process which never spares the carpenter – and the riot squad will appear on the spot. Political acts of violence can also sink to the level of pseudo-activity, resulting in mere theatre. It is hardly a wonder that the ideal of direct action and propaganda glorifying the deed have been resurrected, upon the heels of the willing integration of formerly progressive organizations that, in all lands of the earth, manifest the character of that against which they were once directed. This process, however, has not weakened the criticism of anarchism, the return of which is the return of the ghost. The impatience toward theory manifested in this return does nothing to advance thought beyond itself. Theory falls behind the thought which it forgets. For the individual, life is made easier through capitulation to the collective with which he identifies. He is spared the cognition of his impotence; within the circle of their own company, the few become many. It is this act – not unconfused thinking – which is resignation. No transparent relation prevails between the interests of the ego and the collective to which it assigns itself. The ego must abrogate itself, if it is to share in the predestination of the collective. Explicitly a remnant of the Kantian categorical imperative manifests itself: your signature is required. The feeling of a new security is purchased with the sacrifice of autonomous thinking. The consolation that thought within the context of collective action is an improvement proves deceptive: thinking, employed only as the instrument of action, is blunted in the same manner as all instrumental reason. At the present moment, no higher form of society is concretely visible: for that reason, anything that seems in easy reach is regressive. According to Freud, however, whoever regresses has not achieved the goal of his drives. Objectively viewed, reformation is renunciation, even if it considers itself the opposite and innocently propagates the pleasure principle. In contrast, the uncompromisingly critical thinker, who neither superscribes his conscience nor permits himself to be terrorized into action, is in truth the one who does not give up. Furthermore, thinking is not the spiritual reproduction of that which exists. As long as thinking is not interrupted, it has a firm grasp upon possibility. Its insatiable quality, the resistance against petty satiety, rejects the foolish wisdom of resignation. The Utopian impulse in thinking is all the stronger, the less it objectifies itself as Utopia – a further form of regression – whereby it sabotages its own realization. Open thinking points beyond itself. For its part, such thinking takes a position as a figuation of praxis which is more closely related to a praxis truly involved in change than in a position of mere obedience for the sake of praxis. Beyond all specialized and particular content, thinking is actually and above all the force of resistance, alienated from resistance only with great effort. This emphatic concept of thinking is by no means secure; no security is granted it by existing conditions nor by the ends yet to be attained nor by any type of organized force. Whatever was once thought, however, can be suppressed; it can be forgotten and can even vanish. But it cannot be denied that something of it survives. For thinking has the momentum of the general. What has been cogently thought must be thought in some other place and by other people. This confidence accompanies even the loneliest and most impotent thought. Whoever thinks is without anger in all criticism: 1 thinking sublimates anger. Because the thinking person does not have to inflict anger upon himself, he furthermore has no desire to inflict it upon others. The happiness visible to the eye of a thinker is the happiness of mankind. The universal tendency toward suppression goes against thought as such. Such thought is happiness, even where unhappiness prevails; thought achieves happiness in the expression of unhappiness. Whoever refuses to permit this thought to be taken from him has not resigned.

#### 2] The aff is a manifestation of the magnetic attraction to cruel optimism: The object of optimism (the advocacy of the 1AC) promises to guarantee the endurance of something, the survival of something, the flourishing of something, and above all the protection of the desire that made this object or scene powerful enough to have magnetized an attachment to it.

Berlant 11, Lauren Gail. *Cruel Optimism*. Duke University Press, 2011. KJ

All attachments are optimistic. When we talk about an object of desire, we are really talking about a cluster of promises we want someone or something to make to us and make possible for us. This cluster of promises could seem embedded in a person, a thing, an institution, a text, a norm, a bunch of cells, smells, a good idea—whatever. To phrase “the object of desire” as a cluster of promises is to allow us to encounter what’s incoherent or enigmatic in our attachments, not as confirmation of our irrationality but as an explanation of our sense of our endurance in the object, insofar as proximity to the object means proximity to the cluster of things that the object promises, some of which may be clear to us and good for us while others, not so much. Thus attachments do not all feel optimistic: one might dread, for example, returning to a scene of hunger, or longing, or the slapstick reiteration of a lover’s or parent’s predictable distortions. But being drawn to return to the scene where the object hovers in its potentialities is the operation of optimism as an affective form. In optimism, the subject leans toward promises contained within the present moment of the encounter with her object.1 In the introduction I described “cruel optimism” as a relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility whose realization is discovered either to be impossible, sheer fantasy, or too possible, and toxic. What’s cruel about these attachments, and not merely inconvenient or tragic, is that the subjects who have x in their lives might not well endure the loss of their object/scene of desire, even though its presence threatens their well- being, because whatever the content of the attachment is, the continuity of its form provides something of the continuity of the subject’s sense of what it means to keep on living on and to look forward to being in the world. This phrase points to a condition different from that of melancholia, which is enacted in the subject’s desire to temporize an experience of the loss of an object/ scene with which she has invested her ego continuity. **Cruel optimism is the condition of maintaining an attachment to a significantly problematic object**. One more thing: sometimes, the cruelty of an optimistic attachment is more easily perceived by an analyst who observes the cost of someone’s or some group’s attachment to x, since often persons and communities focus on some aspects of their relation to an object/world while disregarding others.2 But if the cruelty of an attachment is experienced by someone/some group, even in a subtle fashion, the fear is that the loss of the promising object/scene itself will defeat the capacity to have any hope about anything. Often this fear of loss of a scene of optimism as such is unstated and only experienced in a sudden incapacity to manage startling situations, as we will see throughout this book. One might point out that all objects/scenes of desire are problematic, in that investments in them and projections onto them are less about them than about what cluster of desires and affects we can manage to keep magnetized to them. I have indeed wondered whether all optimism is cruel, because the experience of loss of the conditions of its reproduction can be so breathtakingly bad, just as the threat of the loss of x in the scope of one’s attachment drives can feel like a threat to living on itself. But some scenes of optimism are clearly crueler than others: where cruel optimism operates, the very vitalizing or animating potency of an object/scene of desire contributes to the attrition of the very thriving that is supposed to be made possible in the work of attachment in the first place. This might point to something as banal as a scouring love, but it also opens out to obsessive appetites, working for a living, patriotism, all kinds of things. One makes affective bargains about the costliness of one’s attachments, usually unconscious ones, most of which keep one in proximity to the scene of desire/attrition. This means that a poetics of attachment always involves some splitting off of the story I can tell about wanting to be near x (as though x has autonomous qualities) from the activity of the emotional habitus I have constructed, as a function of having x in my life, in order to be able to project out my endurance in proximity to the complex of what x seems to offer and proffer. To understand cruel optimism, therefore, one must embark on an analysis of indirection, which provides a way to think about the strange temporalities of projection into an enabling object that is also disabling. I learned how to do this from reading Barbara Johnson’s work on apostrophe and free indirect discourse. In her poetics of indirection, each of these two rhetorical modes is shaped by the ways a writing subjectivity conjures other ones so that, in a performance of fantasmatic intersubjectivity, the writer gains superhuman observational authority, enabling a performance of being that is made possible by the proximity of the object. Because this aesthetic process is something like what I am describing in the optimism of attachment, I’ll describe a bit the shape of my transference with her thought.

#### This turns the entirety of the 1AC case, we are critiquing the very foundation of thought the 1AC attempts to work on top of. It’s an independent solvency takeout, and serves as a trauma DA—their frame posits revolutionary hope that debate and society might change but ultimately reinstitutes the same system that solidifies and naturalizes divisions within the world.

Berlant 06 Lauren, professor of Literature at the University of Chicago. “Cruel Optimism” in Differences, 17.3. 2006

It is striking that these moments of optimism, which mark a possibility that the habits of a history might not be reproduced, release an overwhelmingly negative force: one predicts such effects in traumatic scenes, but it is not usual to think about an optimistic event as having the same potential consequences. The conventional fantasy that a revolutionary lifting of being might happen in proximity to a new object/scene would predict otherwise than that a person or a group might prefer, after all, to surf from episode to episode while leaning toward a cluster of vaguely phrased prospects. And yet: at a certain degree of abstraction both from trauma and optimism, the experience of self-dissolution, radically reshaped consciousness, new sensoria, and narrative rupture can look similar; the emotional flooding in proximity to a new object can also produce a similar grasping toward stabilizing form, a reanchoring in the symptom’s predictability.¶ I have suggested that the particular ways in which identity and desire are articulated and lived sensually within capitalist culture produce such counterintuitive overlaps. But it would be reductive to read the preceding as a claim that anyone’s subjective transaction with the optimistic structure of value in capital produces the knotty entailments of cruel optimism as such. This essay focuses on artworks that explicitly remediate singularities into cases of nonuniversal but general abstraction, providing narrative scenarios of how people learn to identify, manage, and maintain the hazy luminosity of their attachment to being x and having x, given that their attachments were promises and not possessions after all. Geoff Ryman’s historical novel Was provides a different kind of limit case of cruel optimism. Linking agrarian labor, the culture industries, and therapy culture through four encounters with The Wizard of Oz, its pursuit of the affective continuity of trauma and optimism in self-unfold- ing excitement is neither comic, tragic, nor melodramatic, but metaformal: it absorbs all of these into a literary mode that validates fantasy (from absorption in pretty things to crazy delusion) as a life-affirming defense against the attritions of ordinary history. [Continues] In Was, Baum goes on to write The Wizard of Oz as a gift of alternativity to the person who can’t say or do anything to change her life materially and who has taken in so much that one moment of relief from herself produces a permanent crack in the available genres of her survival. In “What Is a Minor Literature?” Deleuze and Guattari exhort people to become minor in exactly that way, to deterritorialize from the normal by digging a hole in sense, like a dog or a mole. Creating an impasse, a space of internal displacement, in this view, shatters the normal hierar- chies, clarities, tyrannies, and confusions of compliance with autonomous individuality. This strategy looks promising in the Ashbery poem. But in “Exchange Value,” a moment of relief produces a psychotic defense against the risk of loss in optimism. For Dorothy Gael, in Was, the optimism of attachment to another living being is itself the cruelest slap of all.¶ From this cluster we can understand a bit more of the magnetic attraction to cruel optimism, with its suppression of the risks of attach- ment. A change of heart, a sensorial shift, intersubjectivity, or transference with a promising object cannot generate on its own the better good life: nor can the collaboration of a couple, brothers, or pedagogy. The vague futurities of normative optimism produce small self-interruptions as the utopias of structural inequality. The texts we have looked at here stage moments when it could become otherwise, but shifts in affective atmosphere are not equal to changing the world. They are, here, only pieces of an argument about the centrality of optimistic fantasy to reproducing and surviving in zones of compromised ordinariness. And that is one way to take the measure of the impasse of living in the overwhelmingly present moment.