# CP – Bilateral Verification

### 1NC

#### Counterplan text: The Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan ought to eliminate their nuclear arsenals and verify compliance by establishing a bilateral inspection agency as explained below

Chotipatoomwan 16 Exploring an Unconventional Approach to Denuclearization Applying Lessons from the Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Cooperation to Curtail the Nuclear Arms Race in South Asia Jirawat Chotipatoomwan Journal of Political Inquiry | Fall 2016 | 1 At the Ministry of Defence of Thailand (MOD), I am working as a political affairs officer in the Office of Policy and Planning, which oversees defense cooperation with other countries. My main responsibility is to write talking points and briefing papers for senior defense officials’ bilateral meetings with foreign diplomats including defense attaches. I also provide English translation service for the MOD. TJHSSTAD

Though this study acknowledges the difficulty of achieving the same level of nuclear cooperation in India and Pakistan as has already been accomplished in South America, many useful lessons can be drawn from South America’s success and applied to the conflict in South Asia in order to relieve nuclear tensions. The following are the factors that contributed to nuclear cooperation in Latin America and the potential ways international policymakers can adapt these factors to build similar conditions in a nuclear South Asia: 1) Bilateral arms control and verification regime as an alternative to the NPT option – The success of the ABACC has drawn attention to the advantages of bilateral confidence-building measures for nonproliferation efforts. The most important measure of the potential success of a bilateral nuclear cooperation mechanism is the ability to accommodate both parties’ preferences and generate mutual trust. Argentina and Brazil in the 1980s and the early 1990s shared India and Pakistan’s current concerns regarding the NPT, particularly the concerns over discrimination and inadequacy. Such a concern drove the two Latin American countries to look elsewhere for a solution. Both Argentina and Brazil intended, from the start, that confidence-building should be the primary goal of bilateral nuclear cooperation, in contrast to the supposed discrimination that some non-nuclear weapons states see inherent to the NPT.49 In fact, the ABACC was intentionally created to assure one another (and the world more broadly) that their respective nuclear energy programs were intended for peaceful purposes. India and Pakistan could benefit from pursuing the same path. An exchange visit by two heads of state to nuclear facilities, like that of similar exchange visits carried out by Argentina and Brazil in the 1980s, could alleviate mistrust and demonstrate a bilateral commitment to transparency. Regular exchange visits by the Indian and Pakistani leadership to civil and military nuclear installations could prove to be a positive step towards nuclear arms control in the region. India and Pakistan have entered into a few nuclear-related confidence-building measures. One such agreement prevents India and Pakistan from attacking each other’s nuclear sites; another agreement makes information regarding nuclear installations available to both parties.50 While these represent progress, more could be done. No high-level exchange visits have ever taken place, for example. Ultimately, though, the long-term goal should be the creation of a bilateral inspection agency. When regional circumstances allow for a more concrete nonproliferation program, a bilateral nuclear inspection agency for India and Pakistan should be considered and modeled after the ABACC. There is no guarantee that a bilateral agency will lead to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons in South Asia. Nonetheless, subject to Indian-Pakistani approval, the agency could inter alia limit the number of nuclear warheads, prevent the creation of further fissile materials for weapons production, 46 Kanti Bajpai, “The BJP and the Bomb,” in Inside Nuclear South Asia, ed. Scott D. Sagan (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2009), 57. 47 Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate, 3 rd ed. (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2013), 138-140. 48 Scott D. Sagan, “The Evolution of Pakistani and Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” in Inside Nuclear South Asia, ed. Scott D. Sagan (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2009), 237. 49 Sharon Tanzer, “Rapporteur’s Summary,” in Averting a Latin American Nuclear Arms Race: New Prospects and Challenges for Argentine-Brazil Nuclear CoOperation, ed. Paul L. Leventhal and Sharon Tanzer (New York: St. Martin's Press and Nuclear Control Institute, 1992), 39-46. This is the view that the Brazilian and Argentine representatives and participants expressed during the Latin American Nuclear Cooperation Conference of October 1989 – See “Panel Six - Would A Bilateral Arrangement Between Argentina and Brazil Serve as a Useful Model For Other Regions? What Would Be the Implications for IAEA Safeguards and the Tlatelolco and NPT Treaties?” 50 For a comprehensive list of CBMs in South Asia see Umbreen Javaid, “Confidence Building Measures in Nuclear South Asia: Limitations and Prospect,” A Research Journal of South Asian Studies 25, no. 2 (July-December 2010): 348-350. http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/csas/PDF/10- Dr.%20Umbreen%20Javaid.pdf. Journal of Political Inquiry | Fall 2016 | 8 and monitor compliance, effectively imposing a legal limit on the regional arms race. The agency could also impose safeguards on nuclear facilities and materials. The scope of its work and authority would be determined by the two parties, though it could be strengthened over time. Because the United States and China are heavily involved in the region, their participation is critical in any attempt to establish a nuclear arms control regime. China, for example, should consider including negative security assurance into an agreement establishing a bilateral agency to address India’s fear of a Chinese nuclear attack.51 India and Pakistan could also consider making their bilateral nuclear agreement’s entry into force conditioned upon this criterion being met. Again this highlights the flexibility of a bilateral arms control system and the importance of tailoring it to suit the specific circumstances of the region. Following the ABACC’s joint inspection method, inspectors from both India and Pakistan should jointly conduct routine inspections under the auspices of the bilateral agency. Extending the scope of verification and safeguards to India’s military nuclear facilities could help to alleviate international concern, as these military facilities are, at present, out of the scope of the IAEA.52 India might be more receptive to this type of inspection than one carried out by international inspectors. Mutual inspection of India and Pakistan’s nuclear programs would also encourage both countries to be more responsible actors, as they would have to adopt and adhere to the internationally-recognized standards.

#### The counterplan is competitive – the aff defends the International Atomic Energy Agency as a verification mechanism for disarmament – the counterplan does the aff except creates a bilateral inspection agency to verify disarmament rather than using the IAEA. No perms – having multiple verification mechanisms is redundant and unrealistic.

#### Multiple Net Benefits to the CP:

#### 1] **The IAEA has zero authority over non-NPT states like India and Pakistan – lack of compliance is inevitable.**

Walsh 05 Learning from Past Success: The NPT and the Future of Non-proliferation JIM WALSH THE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION COMMISSION www.wmdcommission.org This paper has been commissioned by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. Its purpose is to function as food-for-thought for the work of the Commission. The Commission is not responsible for views expressed in this paper. Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC) The WMDC is an independent international commission initiated by the Swedish Government on a proposal from the United Nations. The commissioners serve in their personal capacity. The Commission is supported by a Secretariat based in Stockholm, Sweden Paper prepared for the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission Stockholm, Sweden October, 2005 <https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/wmdcno41.pdf> TJHSSTAD

Treaty Loopholes A final complaint about the NPT and an alleged reason for its failure relates to the treaty’s provisions—both what they include and what they do not include. There is, for example, no enforcement provision. Article X permits withdrawal. The treaty, by custom, also permits states to acquire enrichment and reprocessing technologies that could enable a short sprint to the bomb. The lack of enforcement provisions has been a topic of particular interest to American analysts, where it is often seen as a critical flaw—in the words of one study, an “Achilles heel.” Invariably, these critics want to see a more muscular regime and, in some cases, they want Lessons from Success: The NPT and the Future of Non-proliferation Jim Walsh, p. 21 enforcement mechanisms that approach automaticity. There are numerous reasons to doubt the wisdom of “automatic” solutions, and proponents of such systems fail to explain how such measures would be adopted by a sceptical international community. What is most relevant, however, is the fact that the NPT has achieved the success described above without an explicit enforcement clause. Have transgressors gone unpunished? Hardly. Iraq and North Korea have been subjected to political penalties, economic sanctions, and the threatened or actual use of force. (The case of Iran is comparatively recent and still in the making.) The absence of an explicit enforcement clause has meant that enforcement has fallen to the United Nations or bilateral responses by individual states. While lacking in uniformity, this structure has meant that different remedies have been tailored for different cases. Finally, even robust enforcement provisions would not enable the IAEA to act against states outside the treaty, e.g., the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs. The UN and individual states will continue to have to play an active role in enforcement even if the NPT had an enforcement provision. Indeed, as all students of international organizations recognize, the whole notion of IAEA enforcing rules independently of its member states is naïve. The agency is only as strong as the political will of its members, and it is those members who already possess the responsibility for enforcement. Another concern about the treaty is Article X, the withdrawal provision. North Korea’s withdrawal and the possibility of Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT have spurred questions about the adequacy of this provision. Some member states want to make it more difficult to withdraw. Others have suggested that withdrawal should carry certain obligations such as the return of nuclear technology acquired during NPT membership.

#### **Multiple key nuclear weapons facilities without IAEA safeguards – high risk of circumvention.**

Squassoni 05 Order Code RL31589 Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan Updated February 17, 2005 Sharon Squassoni Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan TJHSSTAD

Nuclear Material Safeguards: IAEA Safeguards Most of the material and facilities in India and Pakistan is not subject to international safeguards. In India, there are safeguards on 6 reactors (Tarapur 1 & 2, LEU-fueled power reactors; Rajasthan RAPS-1 and -2, which use natural uranium; CRS-9 14 See Cirincione, Joseph, with Wolfsthal, Jon B. and Rajkumar, Miriam, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment) 2002, pp. 201-205 for listings and maps of Indian nuclear facilities, both safeguarded and unsafeguarded. (Referred to hereafter as Deadly Arsenals) 15 See Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, pp. 217-219 for listings and maps of Pakistani nuclear facilities, both safeguarded and unsafeguarded. and Koodankulam-1 and -2, LEU-fueled power reactors). In addition, the Tarapur plutonium reprocessing facility (Prefre) is safeguarded when safeguarded fuel is used in the facility and the Tarapur MOX fuel fabrication plant has safeguards when it runs safeguarded material through it. The Hyderabad fuel fabrication plant has partial safeguards. Key nuclear weapons-related facilities in India that are not subject to IAEA inspections include the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) in Trombay, which houses the Cirus and Dhruva research reactors for plutonium production, plutonium reprocessing plants and a pilot-scale uranium enrichment plant.14 These sites, as well as storage sites for weapons-grade material or for weapons themselves could be highly attractive to terrorists because they may contain weapons-usable nuclear material. Pakistan has IAEA safeguards on a few facilities. The KANUPP power reactor, which uses natural uranium, Chasma-1, LEU-fueled power reactor, and two research reactors at Rawalpindi that have used HEU in the past are under international safeguards. The following facilities are not under safeguards: the Khan Research Laboratories at Kahuta, which include a uranium enrichment plant and facilities for fabricating HEU into weapons; centrifuge enrichment plants at Sihala, Golra and Wah/Gadwal, the Chasma reprocessing plant, and PINSTECH and SPINSTECH facilities related to reprocessing at Rawalpindi.15 These nuclear material production sites, as well as weaponization, storage and assembly sites (if separate facilities exist), could be high-value targets for terrorists.

#### Triggers rearmament and turns the aff

Schelling 09 [Thomas C. Schelling, “A world without nuclear weapons?” Dedalus (2009). Schelling is American economist and professor of foreign policy, national security, nuclear strategy, and arms control at the School of Public Policy at University of Maryland, College Park.] TJHSSTAD/CHSTM

But hardly any of the analyses or policy statements that I have come across question overtly the ultimate goal of total nuclear disarmament.1 Nearly all adduce the unequivocal language of The Wall Street Journal quadrumvirate. None explicitly addresses the question, why should we expect a world without nuclear weapons to be safer than one with (some) nuclear weapons? That drastic reductions make sense, and that some measures to reduce alert status do, too, may require no extensive analysis. But considering how much intellectual effort in the past half-century went into the study of the “stability” of a nuclear-deterrence world, it ought to be worthwhile to examine contingencies in a nuclear-free world to verify that it is superior to a world with (some) nuclear weapons. I have not come across any mention of what would happen in the event of a major war. One might hope that major war could not happen in a world without nuclear weapons, but it always did. One can propose that another war on the scale of the 1940s is less to worry about than anything nuclear. But it might give pause to reflect that the world of 1939 was utterly free of nuclear weapons, yet they were not only produced, they were invented, during war itself and used with devastating effect. Why not expect that they could be produced – they’ve already been invented – and possibly used in some fashion? In 1976, I published an article, “Who Will Have the Bomb?” in which I asked, “Does India have the bomb?”2 India had exploded a nuclear device a couple of years earlier. I pursued the question, what do we mean by “having the bomb?” I alleged that we didn’t mean, or perhaps didn’t even care, whether India actually possessed in inventory a nuclear explosive device, or an actual nuclear weapon. We meant, I argued, that India “had” the potential: it had the expertise, the personnel, the laboratories and equipment to produce a weapon if it decided to. (At the time, India pretended that its only interest was in “Peaceful Nuclear Explosives” [PNEs].) I proposed an analogy: does Switzerland have an army? I answered, not really, but it could have one tomorrow if it decided today. The answer to the relevant question about nuclear weapons must be a schedule showing how many weapons (of what yield) a government could mobilize on what time schedule. It took the United States about five years to build two weapons. It might take India – now that it has already produced nuclear weapons – a few weeks, or less, depending on how ready it kept its personnel and supplies for mobilization. If a “world without nuclear weapons” means no mobilization bases, there can be no such world. Even starting in 1940 the mobilization base was built. And would minimizing mobilization potential serve the purpose? To answer this requires working through various scenarios involving the expectation of war, the outbreak of war, and the conduct of war. That is the kind of analysis I haven’t seen. A crucial question is whether a government could hide weapons-grade fissile material from any possible inspection verification. Considering that enough plutonium to make a bomb could be hidden in the freezing compartment of my refrigerator, or to evade radiation detection could be hidden at the bottom of the water in a well, I think only the fear of a whistle-blower could possibly make success at all questionable. I believe that a “responsible” government would make sure that fissile material would be available in an international crisis or war itself. A responsible government must at least assume that other responsible governments will do so. We are so used to thinking in terms of thousands, or at least hundreds, of nuclear warheads that a few dozen may offer a sense of relief. But if, at the outset of what appears to be a major war, or the imminent possibility of major war, every responsible government must consider that other responsible governments will mobilize their nuclear weapons base as soon as war erupts, or as soon as war appears likely, there will be at least covert frantic efforts, or perhaps purposely conspicuous efforts, to acquire deliverable nuclear weapons as rapidly as possible. And what then? I see a few possibilities. One is that the first to acquire weapons will use them, as best it knows how, to disrupt its enemy’s or enemies’ nuclear mobilization bases, while itself continuing its frantic nuclear rearmament, along with a surrender demand backed up by its growing stockpile. Another possibility is to demand, under threat of nuclear attack, abandonment of any nuclear mobilization, with unopposed “inspectors” or “saboteurs” searching out the mobilization base of people, laboratories, fissile material stashes, or anything else threatening. A third possibility would be a “decapitation” nuclear attack along with the surrender demand. And I can think of worse. All of these, of course, would be in the interest of self-defense. Still another strategy might, just might, be to propose a crash “rearmament agreement,” by which both sides (all sides) would develop “minimum deterrent” arsenals, subject to all the inspection-verification procedures that had already been in place for “disarmament.” An interesting question is whether “former nuclear powers” – I use quotation marks because they will still be latent nuclear powers – would seek ways to make it known that, despite “disarmament,” they had the potential for a rapid buildup. It has been suggested that Saddam Hussein may have wanted it believed that he had nuclear weapons, and Israel has made its nuclear capability a publicized secret. “Mutual nuclear deterrence” could take the form of letting it be known that any evidence of nuclear rearmament would be promptly reciprocated. Reciprocation could take the form of hastening to have a weapon to use against the nuclear facilities of the “enemy.” But war is what I find most worrisome. In World War II there was some fear in the U.S. nuclear weapons community that Germany might acquire a nuclear capability and use it. There is still speculation whether, if Germany had not already surrendered, one of the bombs should have been used on Berlin, with a demand that inspection teams be admitted to locate and destroy the nuclear establishment. Would a government lose a war without resorting to nuclear weapons? Would a war include a race to produce weapons capable of coercing victory?

#### Independently outweighs their impact scenario: 1] Probability – rearmament triggers a massive arms race and throws all international treaties and norms aside – makes nuke war more likely 2] Reversibility – rearmament makes it impossible to disarm in the future because countries won’t trust each other

#### 2] The CP is a key confidence building measure, or CBM – it restores trust between India and Pakistan through greater transparency

Zulfqar 13 IPRIJournalX111, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 106-116 EFFICACY OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES (CBMs) IN INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS Saman Zulfqar Assistant Research Officer, Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI). TJHSSTAD

Military CBMs The formal military and nuclear related CBMs between India and Pakistan can be divided into three categories: Communication Measures; Transparency Measures; and Constraint Measures. Communication Measures Communication measures are the establishment of communication links among political decision-makers of rival states, and the most effective arrangements are the establishment of hotlines for crisis management purposes. Hotline between the Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMOs) of India and Pakistan was established in 1971 and after the 1990 crisis it was decided to use it on weekly basis.6 Hotlines are also in place between sector commanders. Following the composite dialogue, a meeting between the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan was held in New Delhi in June 2004 at which both sides announced their decision to upgrade the existing hotlines and to establish a new hotline between the Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan. The hotline arrangement remained functional during the 1999 Kargil conflict and the 2001-02 border confrontation while it was inoperative during the 1987 Brasstacks crisis. It has been seen that hotlines in South Asia function satisfactorily during peacetime but become dysfunctional during crises when most needed to avoid misinterpretation and misperceptions.7 Proposals have been made from time to time by India and Pakistan for establishing hotlines between their respective air forces and coastguards. 4 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “CBMs and South Asia,” in Confidence Building Measures in South Asia, ed. Dipankar Banerjee (Colombo: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, 1999), 32. 5 Michael Krepon, “Moving Beyond Atmospheric CBMs,” Dawn, August 20, 2012. 6 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “Assessing the Role of Confidence Building Measures in the India Pakistan Tangle,” IPRI Journal, vol. IV, no. 1 (Winter 2004): 21. 7 P.R. Chari, “Strategic Stability in South Asia: The Role of Confidence Building and Threat Reduction Measures,” Contemporary South Asia, vol. 14, no. 2 (June 2005): 213. Saman Zulfqar 109 Transparency Measures Transparency measures include exchange of information about military expenditures, strength of armed forces, arms production and arms transfers; prior notification of military maneuvers including their scope and extent; verification measures; presence of foreign observers at military exercises.8 An agreement on the prohibition of attack on nuclear installations and facilities was signed between India and Pakistan in 1988. It was ratified in 1991 and implemented in 1992. Under this agreement both states exchange lists of their nuclear installations and facilities irrespective of their state of relationship. An agreement on advance notice of military exercises, maneuvers and troops movements was reached in 1991 and an agreement on prevention of air space violations and permitting over flights and landing by military aircraft was signed in 1992.9 These advance notices have not removed fears as in May 2001 the Poorna Vijay military exercises despite prior notification raised concerns in Pakistan due to proximity to Pakistan’s border. Constraint Measures Constraint measures may include: abstaining from provocative military activities in border areas; establishment of demilitarized zones between states; and routine inspections to show compliance with agreements.10 Pakistan has all along been working to establish a nuclear restraint regime with India since even before the two countries’ overt nuclearization. Pakistan put forward many proposals such as the “creation of nuclear weapon free zone, mutual acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, simultaneous signing of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), joint declaration to renounce development of nuclear weapons, bilateral inspection of each other’s nuclear facilities and signing of regional test ban treaty” but none of these proposals could get India’s acceptance.11 To address the risk of nuclear war, Pakistan, on October 18, 1998, formally proposed the establishment of a Strategic Restraint Regime in South Asia which advanced the following measures:12 • A moratorium on nuclear testing; 8 Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements (London: Sage Publications, 2002), 10-11. 9 “Documents and Resources on Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia,” Stimson, http://www.stimson.org/southasia/?sn=sa2001112044 (accessed January 9, 2010). 10 Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements, 10-11. 11 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “Quest for Nuclear Restraint Regime in South Asia,” News, May 2, 2004. 12 Syed Rifaat Hussain, “Deterrence and Nuclear Use: Doctrines in South Asia,” in India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relationship¸ed. E. Sridharan (New Delhi: Rutledge, 2007), 161. 110 Efficacy of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) • conventional restraint and stabilization; • establishment of risk reduction centers; • non-induction of ABM (Anti Ballistic Missile) systems; • mutual and balanced reduction of force and armaments; and • prevention of a nuclear and ballistic missile race in South Asia.13 Pakistan renewed its initiative for the adoption of a Strategic Restraint Regime on January 25, 2001 during the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. These suggestions have not been formalized into treaty obligations and hence could not be implemented.

#### CBMs de-escalate Indopak tensions and prevent conflict – it’s the only feasible long term solution

Hussain 19 Yasir Hussain, 8-1-2019, "South Asia Needs CBMs More Than Ever – South Asian Voices," South Asian Voices, <https://southasianvoices.org/south-asia-needs-cbms-more-than-ever/> Yasir Hussain assessed opportunities to implement new bilateral confidence building measures (CBMs) to reduce nuclear risk between India and Pakistan. His words, republished below, remain timely in the context of continuing development of nuclear capabilities in South Asia in 2019. TJHSSTAD

In 2017, Yasir Hussain assessed opportunities to implement new bilateral confidence building measures (CBMs) to reduce nuclear risk between India and Pakistan. His words, republished below, remain timely in the context of continuing development of nuclear capabilities in South Asia in 2019. South Asia’s hostile neighbors, India and Pakistan, are locked in a nuclear arms race that has grown worse over the last several years. Apart from a few exceptions, there is little emphasis on identifying new ideas and confidence building measures (CBMs) to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in this conflict. As a starting point to overcoming the current deadlock, Pakistan and India should endeavor to take some symbolic steps to ease bilateral relations without compromising their respective military capabilities. This could primarily be achieved by making moderate adjustments to existing bilateral CBMs. Easing bilateral tensions by addressing mutual distrust can create a pragmatic environment conducive to deescalating the nuclear arms race in South Asia. Nuclear Tensions: Product of Poor Bilateral Ties and Disinterest The need for CBMs in India-Pakistan relations has grown increasingly dire due to the expansion of each countries’ nuclear programs, poor bilateral relations, and the disinterest of major powers in intervening in crisis situations. Since India and Pakistan proved their nuclear weapons capability in 1998, both countries have been expanding and modernizing their respective arsenals and missile delivery systems to meet their professed security needs. Indeed, both states have been said to possess the fastest growing nuclear programs in the world. As such, the potential for nuclear brinkmanship in South Asia remains a huge concern with the Kashmir dispute serving as the nuclear flashpoint. Over their independent histories, CBMs between India and Pakistan have largely been a reflection of the state of bilateral relations. The 1988 Nuclear Facility Non-Attack agreement and the 2007 bilateral agreement on reducing the risk of nuclear accidents are two such cases of positive cooperation during periods of relative stability in bilateral relations. Since 2007, however, there has been little progress towards identifying and advancing new CBMs. This trust deficit is due to a number of political and historical factors, in which leadership in both countries have nurtured an environment of mistrust that has made comprehensive dialogue nearly impossible. Third, the refusal of world powers and various multilateral organizations to mediate between India and Pakistan on critical issues has also further intensified antagonism in the bilateral relationship. This includes issues beyond Kashmir, which India has consistently claimed is off the table for international involvement, such as the Sir Creek and Siachen disputes. Robust, international involvement on these smaller disputes could pave the way for broader cooperation, but thus far their involvement is largely stagnant. Refusing to Pick the Low Hanging Fruit While the bilateral conditions supporting CBMs may be anemic at the moment, there is a general understanding in both countries that CBMs would contribute to a more stable South Asia. Yet, evolving geopolitical dynamics also threaten to undermine any progress towards CBMs in the future. For example, the strategic anxieties that propel India’s nuclear weapons program are not solely limited to Pakistan. China’s maritime activities in the Indian Ocean region and robust economic engagement in India’s neighborhood through the Belt and Road initiative have increased Indian fears of strategic encirclement. For its part, Pakistan is equally suspicious about growing strategic ties between India and United States and has consequently deepened its ties with China. These shifting geopolitical alignments have implications for both India and Pakistan’s willingness to engage in CBMs. For example, the United States’ perceived containment policy of China by partnering with India would appear to shift the regional equilibrium in favor of India. Likewise, Pakistan’s close ties to Beijing is a major strategic concern to India that may close minds to India-Pakistan cooperation. Already there is some evidence that the spirit of existing CBMs, like the 2012 agreement on pre-notification of ballistic missile tests, is being ignored. In November 2017, Pakistan objected when India failed to notify Pakistan of the test launch of India’s Nirbhay nuclear-capable cruise missile. While the pre-notification agreement only applies to ballistic missiles, extending the agreement to incorporate cruise missile tests would be an achievable and important step in advancing CBMs, as Frank O’Donnell of the U.S. Naval War College recently suggested in a Stimson Center Off Ramps proposal. In another foiled CBM attempt in 2016, Pakistan proposed that India and Pakistan sign a bilateral agreement to simultaneously adhere to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would end nuclear weapons testing in both countries. India rejected this proposal, stating that disarmament objectives “do not have regional solutions,” though one Indian commentator did support India’s unilateral ratification of the CTBT. However, Pakistan’s offer is worthy of reconsideration. Such a bilateral commitment will not just improve South Asia’s nuclear stability but also aid India and Pakistan in considering more comprehensive CBMs. There is a larger perception in Pakistan that India’s reluctance to accept a binding treaty like the CTBT is due to its intention to demonstrate its nuclear weapon capability in the future. While India says it is committed to its unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons testing, this has been little comfort to Pakistani strategic thinkers since India can revoke its decision at any time. As such, India’s refusal to consider these CBMs contributes to instability in the region. Conclusion Since the 1999 Kargil war, South Asia has fortunately not experienced a volatile nuclear crisis in 20 years. Given the present bitterness of bilateral relations and shifting geopolitical realities regarding China and the United States, the need for CBMs and institutionalized mechanisms to deescalate crises should be a top national security priority in both countries. While there are no immediate answers as to how to improve conditions to foster improved and new CBMs, the responsibility rests in the hands of policymakers, and their populations, to develop and support comprehensive mechanisms that stabilize South Asian deterrence.

### Add-ons

#### **IAEA safeguards only exist for a minority of Indian and Pakistani facilities – high risk of circumvention.**

Pregenzer 03 Securing Nuclear Capabilities in India and Pakistan: Reducing the Terrorist and Proliferation Risks ARIAN L. PREGENZER Arian L. Pregenzer is Senior Scientist in the Cooperative Monitoring Center at Sandia National Laboratories. The Nonproliferation Review Spring 2003 <https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/101prege.pdf> TJHSSTAD

INDIA AND PAKISTAN: OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION Nuclear Infrastructure Both India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons, weapon- useable nuclear material, and civilian and military nuclear infrastructure. India has far more extensive capabilities, especially on the civilian side. Its nuclear energy produc- tion is currently nearly ten times that of Pakistan and is comparable to that produced in China.4 Plans are under way to quintuple nuclear energy production over the next fifteen years, which, if realized, could put India in a position of global leadership in the field.5 On the military side, both countries have a nuclear weapon production complex, and both have produced sig- nificant quantities of weapon-useable material. Upper estimates range from 100—500 warhead equivalents for 6 India, and from 50—100 warhead equivalents for Pakistan. Neither India nor Pakistan is a member of the NPT, but both are members of the IAEA and parties to The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) .7 A minority of the facilities in each country is under voluntary IAEA safeguards, however. In the case of India, only 4 of 14 operating power reactors are under IAEA safeguards, and IAEA safeguards are intended for only 2 of 12 reactors in the planning or construction stage. None of the research reactors, breeder reactors, uranium enrichment facilities, reprocessing facilities, or uranium processing facilities is safeguarded by the IAEA. Both of Pakistan's operating power reactors are under IAEA safeguards, as are two of three research reactors; other facilities remain outside IAEA safeguards. 8 Relatively little is known about how either India or Pakistan secures weapons and material from unauthorized access. However, the nuclear oversight infrastructure in India appears to be well developed. The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) has overall responsibility for nuclear safety and regulation of civilian and military facilities. Security is provided by the Central Industrial Security Force, but little information is available about the details.9 India's recent announcement of a chain of command for decisions about the use of nuclear weapons could reduce the chances of inadvertent or accidental use, 10 In but its role in securing nuclear weapons is not clear. Pakistan, the National Command Authority (NCA) over- sees civilian nuclear operations; military nuclear facilities are under tight military control.ll Little information is available about security procedures. Although most facilities in the region are not under IAEA safeguards, membership in the IAEA has provided both countries with training in physical security for nuclear facilities. For example, in the last 15 years, 30 experts from India and Pakistan12 have participated in the IAEA-sponsored International Training Course on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materi- als (ITC) conducted by Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico.13

# K – Partition

### 1NC

#### The 1947 Partition of India cemented a pathological politics that has driven apart Hindus and Muslims, and subsequently, India and Pakistan. The aff views Indo-Pak relations in a vacuum – the prospect of nuclear war is a result of pathological politics rooted in the Partition. Focus on quick fixes like eliminating India and Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals obscures the root cause of the problem. Thus, the role of the ballot is to deconstruct pathological politics – this comes first – it renders policymaking ineffective and causes error replication.

Ahmed 02 Ishtiaq Ahmed (2002) The 1947 Partition of India: A Paradigm for Pathological Politics in India and Pakistan, Asian Ethnicity, 3:1, 9-28, DOI: 10.1080/14631360120095847 (University of Stockholm, Sweden) TJHSSTAD

This article seeks to shed light on the role a particular historical event can play in conferring legitimacy to the politics of communal and national animosities and hostilities. The Partition of India in 1947 was, on the one hand, a gory consummation of a long process of mutual demonizing and dehumanizing by Hindu and Muslim extremists. On the other, in the post-independence era, it became a model of violent conflict resolution invoked and emulated by ethnic and religious extremists and the hawkish establishments of India and Pakistan. The paper argues that the Partition of India epitomises the politics of identity in its most negative form: when trust and understanding have been undermined and instead fear and insecurity reign supreme, generating angst at various levels of state and society. In the process, a pathological socio-political system comes into being. I try to show how such a system functions within the domestic sphere as well as in India–Pakistan political interaction. Introduction The Partition of British India in 1947, which created the two independent states of India and Pakistan, was followed by one of the cruellest and bloodiest migrations and ethnic cleansings in history. The religious fury and violence that it unleashed caused the deaths of some 2 million Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. An estimated 12–15 million people were forcibly transferred between the two countries. At least 75,000 women were raped.1 The trauma incurred in the process has been profound. Consequently, relations between the two states, between them and some of their people, and between some of their groups have not normalised even after more than half a century; on the contrary they have consistently worsened with each passing year. Ethnic conflict currently pervades the domestic politics of the two states and the hawks in their defence establishments have been calling the shots for quite some time. The two states have been on the verge of a nuclear war since May 1998, when both demonstrated their ability to explode nuclear devices. Such a war would in all probability seriously jeopardise human existence and civilisation in this region. Currently, South Asia is undoubtedly the most dangerous nuclear  ash point in the world. My contention is that this potential for self-destruction derives from a paradigm for pathologically ethnicised politics that informs the behaviour of the involved actors. In this paper, I try to shed light on the way a pathological socio-political system comes into being. Such a system needs to be distinguished from the normal type of socio-political system 1 Urvashi Butalia, The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India (Hurst & Company, London, 2000), p. 3. ISSN 1463-1369 print; 1469-2953 online/02/010009-20 Ó 2002 Taylor & Francis Ltd DOI: 10.1080/1463136012009584 7 10 Ishtiaq Ahmed in which ethnic groups, besides voluntary associations such as class-based or ideology- oriented parties and organised pressure groups, serve as bases for peaceful competition for power over goods and services in society. Even in peaceful situations, ethnic groups maintain their boundaries and both insiders and outsiders are in some sense aware of them. Some degree of tension may also exist between them, but their leaders and spokespersons are usually able to resolve such problems peacefully.2 By contrast, pathological politics thrive on the logic of rejection, exclusion, subordination, and the threat or use of force and violence. The significance of ethnicity as a variable in social analysis is far from satisfactorily theorised, although the current period has seen an unusual hurry in the literature. This study seeks to advance the theoretical frontiers of current understanding of ethnicity in a special, though by no means unusual situation: that in which tension and conflict, involving organised and recurrent violence, have become endemic. The main argument set forth in this study is that, in the formation of a pathological socio-political system, a particular happening or event can sometimes be identified clearly and unambiguously as the determinant pivot. Its force or intensity is of such proportions that it sets in motion processes that in due course begin to liken a paradigm which, in a path-determinant manner, produces and reproduces pathological, ethnicised behaviour patterns. Rational ideas, policies and solutions, which may also be present, are set aside, rendered ineffective or eliminated by force. The pathological paradigm continues to inform and affect politics until such time that it ceases to be effacacious and useful for its practitioners, or it is undermined by a revolutionary new paradigm. The expression ‘pathological politics’ is used here to indicate that individuals not only prefer people of their own ethnic stock, culture, religion, language, nationality and so on, but dislike and despise those belonging to other groups. This derives not from some natural propensity, but because a host of negative historical, socio-economic and cultures facts converge to create a hostile milieu in which individuals and groups, embedded in thick social webs and networks, get trapped.3 Very often such situations give birth to the politics of reaction. Here, reaction is used in a double sense: as a mechanical action–reaction relationship as well as an unenlightened mode of thinking and behaving towards one another by two or more ethnic groups or states. It may result from conflicts within state boundaries or as reactions to happenings in another state. Typically minorities—ethnic, religious, sectarian or linguistic—become the main targets of state-tolerated or state-sanctioned discrimination and violence. In terms of relations between two or more hostile states, pathological politics manifests itself in state-sanctioned ultra-nationalism, promotion of terrorism across borders, and bellicose postures. The typical causes of ethnic tension and conflict are fear and anxiety, real or imaginary, that ethnic groups experience when confronted by an uncertain present and future, and concomitant perceived threats to survival posed by rival groups. During periods when state authority may be waning and the future framework for power sharing cannot be worked out, apprehensive groups become even more suspicious, thereby exacerbating the lack of mutual trust. Consequently, agreements, where they exist, are broken or ignored and violent conflict erupts.4 It is impossible to say whether all members of a group automatically feel such anxiety, or whether a band of ethnic activists in that group are particularly prone to such 2 Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, ‘Introduction’ in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (eds), Ethnicity: Theory and Practice (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1975), pp. 1–-26. 3 David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, ‘Spreading Fear: The Genesis of Transnational Ethnic Con ict’, in David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (eds), The International Spread of Ethnic Conict (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1998), p. 6. 4 Ibid., pp. 7–18. 1947 Partition of India 11 angst and play a pivotal role in expressing it on the group’s behalf, or whether ‘political entrepreneurs’—ambitious leaders and intellectuals who may not share the zeal of the activist—excel in articulating such feelings.5 Suf ce it to say that, without effective leadership, neither activists nor ordinary members can convert such fears and anxieties into activities and movements purporting to combat the perceived threats.

#### Their description of Indo-Pak relations as an unstable region ripe for conflict rests on problematic assumptions – their securitizing rhetoric serves to misleadingly demonize both nations and makes rivalry and ethnic tensions inevitable.

Mutti 9 (James, Contributing Editor to Demockracy journal Master’s degree in International Studies with a focus on South Asia, U Washington, 1/5, Mumbai Misperceptions: War is Not Imminent, <http://demockracy.com/four-reasons-why-the-mumbai-attacks-wont-result-in-a-nuclear-war/>) recut TJHSSTAD

Writer Amitav Ghosh divined a crucial connection between the two messages. “When commentators repeat the metaphor of 9/11, they are in effect pushing the Indian government to mount a comparable response.” Indeed, India’s opposition Hindu nationalist BJP has blustered, “Our response must be close to what the American response was.” Fearful of imminent war, the media has indulged in frantic hand wringing about Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals and renewed fears about the Indian subcontinent being “the most dangerous place on earth.” As an observer of the subcontinent for over a decade, I am optimistic that war will not be the end result of this event. As horrifying as the Mumbai attacks were, they are not likely to drive India and Pakistan into an armed international conflict. The media frenzy over an imminent nuclear war seems the result of the media being superficially knowledgeable about the history of Indian-Pakistani relations, of feeling compelled to follow the most sensationalistic story, and being recently brainwashed into thinking that the only way to respond to a major terrorist attack was the American way – a war.¶ Here are four reasons why the Mumbai attacks will not result in a war:¶ 1. For both countries, a war would be a disaster. India has been successfully building stronger relations with the rest of the world over the last decade. It has occasionally engaged in military muscle-flexing (abetted by a Bush administration eager to promote India as a counterweight to China and Pakistan), but it has much more aggressively promoted itself as an emerging economic powerhouse and a moral, democratic alternative to less savory authoritarian regimes. Attacking a fledgling democratic Pakistan would not improve India’s reputation in anybody’s eyes.¶ The restraint Manmohan Singh’s government has exercised following the attacks indicates a desire to avoid rash and potentially regrettable actions. It is also perhaps a recognition that military attacks will never end terrorism. Pakistan, on the other hand, couldn’t possibly win a war against India, and Pakistan’s military defeat would surely lead to the downfall of the new democratic government. The military would regain control, and Islamic militants would surely make a grab for power – an outcome neither India nor Pakistan want. Pakistani president Asif Ali Zardari has shown that this is not the path he wants his country to go down. He has forcefully spoken out against terrorist groups operating in Pakistan and has ordered military attacks against LeT camps. Key members of LeT and other terrorist groups have been arrested. One can hope that this is only the beginning, despite the unenviable military and political difficulties in doing so.¶ 2. Since the last major India-Pakistan clash in 1999, both countries have made concrete efforts to create people-to-people connections and to improve economic relations. Bus and train services between the countries have resumed for the first time in decades along with an easing of the issuing of visas to cross the border. India-Pakistan cricket matches have resumed, and India has granted Pakistan “most favored nation” trading status. The Mumbai attacks will undoubtedly strain relations, yet it is hard to believe that both sides would throw away this recent progress. With the removal of Pervez Musharraf and the election of a democratic government (though a shaky, relatively weak one), both the Indian government and the Pakistani government have political motivations to ease tensions and to proceed with efforts to improve relations. There are also growing efforts to recognize and build upon the many cultural ties between the populations of India and Pakistan and a decreasing sense of animosity between the countries.¶ 3. Both countries also face difficult internal problems that present more of a threat to their stability and security than does the opposite country. If they are wise, the governments of both countries will work more towards addressing these internal threats than the less dangerous external ones. The most significant problems facing Pakistan today do not revolve around the unresolved situation in Kashmir or a military threat posed by India. The more significant threat to Pakistan comes from within. While LeT has focused its firepower on India instead of the Pakistani state, other militant Islamic outfits have not.

#### The alternative is to move past the Partition – this manifests in activism and political movements to bridge the gap between India and Pakistan, relieve ethnic tensions on both sides, and create spaces for mutual acceptance. That solves case – a vicious cycle and appeal to insecurity has escalated conflicts and created the threat of nuclear war.

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Conclusion The main concern of this study has been the elaboration of a pathological socio-political system. My thesis has been that in the formation of such a system the Partition of India has played the primary or pivotal role. A socio-political system is not something that can simply be contrived at will by ethnic activists or political entrepreneurs. Nor is it intrinsic to human nature to exercise ethnic preference for one’s own group in the form of aggression against others. Rather individuals and social groups are embedded in historically determined circumstances that circumscribe their choices. In circumstances where uncertainty, anxiety and fear prevail—as when the colonial system terminated in India and power had to be handed over to the indigenous leaders, and the various groups could not agree on how to share it—upheavals such as Partition aggravate those original fears and anxieties. However, such situations become endemic if the original problems persist and no dramatic transform- ation takes place. In such circumstances, ethnic activists continue to appeal to the sense of insecurity of their group and political entrepreneurs make use of such a constituency in their power games. A vicious circle comes into being and is produced and re-produced over time. It is not dif cult to conclude that the Ghost of Partition stalks South Asia, haunting the minds and souls of many of its people. Its ideological fallout bene ted right wing forces in both India and Pakistan. It bequeathed a negative, aggressive and violent mode of thinking, behaving and realising a political objective. It also conferred, in a perverted sense, legitimacy on the ethnic or cultural model of nationalism, which currently pervades politics in both states. Driven to the extreme, it would mean the creation of ethnically ‘homoge- neous’ India and Pakistan in some bizarre sense and, consequently, a balkanisation of these states and/or genocide of unwanted minorities. However, at the time of Partition, even drastic measures of ethnic cleansing did not result in the complete elimination of diversity. Unwanted ethnic individuals and groups survived in both societies. Especially, India inherited large non-Hindu minorities and therefore a bigger problem of consolidating a cohesive and coherent nation. The western wing of Pakistan inherited minuscule religious minorities, but since its foundations were immanently confessional, not only were these minorities adversely affected but also sects considered deviant from ‘true’ Islam have also been on the receiving end of doctrinal fastidiousness. Overall, rejection of pluralism and diversity—the leitmotif of the Partition Syndrome—has been demonstrating increasingly pathological tendencies with the passing years. It has become the implicit or explicit reference for the subsequent anti-minority politics in the two countries. Ethnic activists were to be found on both sides before the actual division of India, but previously they were marginal to politics. After Partition they 66 Ibid., pp. 375–94. 1947 Partition of India 27 began to gain in uence and support on the levers of state power—quite early in Pakistan but in India from the 1990s onwards. Although one can reasonably argue that the founding fathers of modern India tried to institutionalise a universal, civic type of citizenship and a concomitant ideal of a composite nation, Indian secularism has been under considerable pressure from those forces that see Muslims and Pakistan as threats to Indian safety and national consolidation. Hindu fears of a non-Hindu conspiracy to subvert their culture and existence now include not only Muslims but also Christians and Sikhs. Thus, not in constitutional terms but in actual behaviour, the state has been exploiting the communal card in its politics, especially during elections. The BJP has actually come to power by exploiting such a theme. In the long run, constitutional guarantees may not suf ce to protect the secular, democratic character of the state. In the case of Pakistan, hostility to minorities is no longer con ned to the conventional Muslim/non-Muslim divide. Rather the perennial concern of Pakistan to distinguish itself from secular India has meant investing considerable time, energy and prestige in constructing a Muslim identity for itself. Islamic can easily be substituted for Muslim, since in the Islamic heritage the two have been understood as inextricable and indeed interchangeable. Consequently, the constitutions were based on Islamic principles, and a commitment to Islamise all existing laws unavoidably involved a search for an answer to the question: what is true Islam and who is a true Muslim? Given the legacy of bitter doctrinal and theological disputes present in the Islamic heritage, the logic of such a line of enquiry ultimately exposed the divisions amongst the various Muslim sects. Politicians more often than not found such divisions useful for scoring political points and governments for legitimating their rule. The exclusion and marginalisation of groups found holding beliefs contrary to strict orthodox standards has been the net result of such politics. The purgatorial thrust of ethnicised (sectarian, to be more correct) politics has inevitably enveloped women, since traditional Muslim society was always segregated on a gender basis. Thus, in contrast to the Indian state, which still offers constitutional and legal resistance to pathological politics, the Pakistani state has itself been the initiator of various types of discriminatory and exclusionary policies. That extremist parties do not secure an electoral majority should not be surprising because the state bases itself on a fundamentalist ideology, which is less extreme that the most rabid Jihadi groups. On the other hand, the Indian state continues to be grounded on liberal-secular values, but politicians in increasing measure deviate from such ideals in the interest of realpolitik. The Hindu ethno-nationalists, however, have begun to question it increasingly. One can even assert that the domestic politics of one country have been affected by the domestic politics of the other. Thus the politics of action–reaction have been gaining cumulative menacing affect. For example, Hindu ethno-nationalists have pointed out that Pakistan maintains discriminatory policies towards non-Muslims, including the Hindus, so in recent years they have questioned why India should not follow suit and disenfranchise Muslims. In Pakistan, a reaction to the attack on the Babri mosque in Ayodhya was immediately followed by attacks on the old Hindu temples. In an ideological sense, the extremism of the Hindu ethno-nationalists and Chowdhary Rahmat Ali has been vindicated. The self-ful lling prophecy of the forces of fear, hate and aggression has been con rmed at least  ve times (bloody division in 1947, wars in 1948, 1965 and 1971 and the nuclear blasts of 1998) in just over  fty years: that those on the Other Side are inveterate enemies who pose a lethal threat to the identity and survival of those on This Side and therefore have to be crushed before it is too late. At the bottom of the hectic and escalating efforts of the two states to acquire the capacity to hit  rst and hit hard is the fundamental problem of security. The security syndrome classically drives enemy states to spend more on acquiring 28 Ishtiaq Ahmed more and better arms. Each such step results in a reaction from the other side. As a consequence, instead of security being enhanced insecurity is accentuated. How far the ruling elites and the hawks in the two establishments will pursue confrontational politics is dif cult to say. It is possible that in the long run both sides may be fatigued by the high cost of such an undertaking, or one of them gives up such a path, realising that it cannot win the competition. A clear and strong message from the Security Council of the United Nations and major states outside it to India and Pakistan to abandon the path of conflict may also help. However, the chances that the paradigm of pathological politics will be abandoned because both or one side comes to a rational calculation that it is no longer effacacious seem remote at the moment. The leadership in both countries seems to believe that they can defy the major powers of the world, since both states possess nuclear weapons capability. There is also a belief that because both sides are armed with such weapons, no major war can take place between them. It has been noted that small-scale military showdowns along the Line of Control in Kashmir have increased, maybe as an alternative to major confrontation. It is quite possible that a nuclear war will break out in the region, perhaps accidentally. If some people survive the massive devastation it is likely to in ict, perhaps then an atmosphere conducive to building a lasting peace may  nally emerge. Western Europe could extricate itself from the grip of pathological politics only after two world wars and the holocaust had demonstrated the utter futility of pursuing ethno-nationalism, colonialism and racism. Perhaps societies do not learn to forgo a pathological socio-political paradigm unless they are forced to pay a heavy price in blood for their lack of foresight. Alternative paradigms offering a peaceful way out of the current predicament do not seem to be gaining support of the two establishments, although a vigorous peace movement has been evolving between Indian and Pakistani intellectuals in the region and in the diaspora. The world community seems content with giving conventional calls from time to time for restraint and dialogue. Perhaps a process of forgiveness for the crimes committed during Partition initiated by intellectuals from both sides can miraculously lead to reconciliation and mutual acceptance.

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