#### **Disabled folk are always locked into ontological zones of exception – all behind the guise of disgust and psychogenesis – our unruly behavior and the literal disgust of our bodies causes a visceral reaction due to the able bodies vulnerability and fear of deviance.**

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Ableism and disgust: Psychogenesis and disability The stratifying binary of disability/non-disability and the antagonism of the latter towards the former is mediated and maintained, principally, by the emotion of disgust. Disgust is the bile carried in a discursive complex that Campbell (2008: 153) calls ‘ableism’: ‘a network of beliefs, processes and practices that produces a particular kind of self and body (the corporeal standard) that is projected as perfect, species-typical and therefore essential and fully human’. The body produced by ableism is equivalent to what Kristeva (1982: 71) calls the ‘clean and proper body’. It is the body of the ‘normate’, the name that Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (1997) gives to the body that thinks of itself as invulnerable and definitive. It is the hygienic, aspirational body of civilising modernity. It is cast from the increasingly stringent norms and rules about emotional behaviour and bodily display that mark mundane social relations in the lebenswelt (lifeworld). This curious non-disabled body/self has no empirical existence per se. On the contrary, the body of ableism is a normative construct, an invulnerable ideal of being manifest in the imaginary of ‘modernist ontology, epistemology and ethics’ as something ‘secure, distinct, closed and autonomous’ (Shildrick, 2002: 51). It embraces ‘human perfectibility as a normative physical or psychological standard’ and involves ‘a curious disavowal of variation and mortality’ (Kaplan, 2000: 303). It is what we are supposed to aspire to, to learn to be but can never become. It has no grounding in the material world. It is a ‘body schema, a psychic construction of wholeness that … belies its own precariousness and vulnerability’ (Shildrick, 2002: 79). It is a ‘body divorced from time and space; a thoroughly artificial affair’ (Mitchell and Snyder, 2000: 7), the epitome of civilisation, closed off from any connection with the animal side of humanity and from the ways in which our bodily nature wallows in its carnal improprieties. It is a body aghast at the messiness of existence. Disability is the opposite of this ideal body, its ‘inverse reflection’ (Deutsch and Nussbaum, 2000: 13). The disabled body is or has the propensity to be unruly. In the kingdom of the ‘clean and proper body’, disability is the epitome of ‘what not to be’. As a consequence the disabled body can be easily excluded from the mainstream ‘psychic habitus’ (Elias, 2000: 167). The ‘clean and proper’ – a normative body of delicacy, refinement and selfdiscipline – has powerful social consequences most manifest in its normalising dynamics. It is the standard of judgement against which disabled bodies are invalidated and transformed into repellent objects. It is the emblem of purity that by comparison creates existential unease. It apportions the shame and repugnance that underwrite the civilising process (Elias, 2000: 114–19, 414–21). Through ableism, modernity has been able to structure disability as uncivilised, outside or on the margins of humanity. One of the great books of the science of natural history published under the title Systema Naturae by Linnaeus in 1735 distinguishes between homo sapiens and homo monstrosus. In this classification impairment – at its extreme and highly visible end – is excluded from the human family. The distinction is, in itself, an act of violence and invalidation, an object lesson in transforming difference and ‘defect’ into the abominable. The distinction mobilises the aversive emotions of fear and disgust. Ableism is a cruel teacher. It embodies violence at many levels: ‘epistemic, psychic, ontological and physical’ (Campbell, 2008: 159). It is at its most bellicose when it is mediated by disgust: a mediation invoked mostly in the social fabrication of taboo and most compellingly in a context when the human/animal boundary is under threat. Ableism rests on the effort to eliminate from awareness, chaos, abjection, animality and death: all that civilisation seeks to repress. It encourages us to live in the false hope that we will not suffer and die, to adopt a perspective of invulnerability, to confuse morality with beauty and to see death, pain and disability as the repulsive woes of mortality rather than as the existential basis for community and communication. Kolnai (2004: 74) reminds us that, ‘in its full intention, it is death … that announces itself to us in the phenomenon of disgust’. Disability, in modernity, has been produced in the ontological household of the abject, as the antithesis of communication and community, in a place that we might on occasion peer into only to ‘choke’ on the unsavoury sights that greet us. Disability is put out, put away, hidden, segregated or transformed into its opposite, covered up by whatever medical or aesthetic techniques are available to achieve this end. Any opportunity that disability might have to take its place at the heart of communication and community is thwarted by the ablest sensibilities that push it back down among the disgusting, the sick, the dead and the dying. In fact, as Elias (2000) suggested, the making of ‘civilised’ community and communication in modernity proceeds by exclusion and interdiction, by cutting out and hiding away whatever causes or might come to inspire angar (choking) or anguista (tightness). It is important to understand ableist disgust as an emotion that attests to the failure of non-disabled people to fully recognise their own vulnerabilities and imperfections particularly as these relate to their mortal selves and to the death and decay that is the fate of all. Although it appears as an aversion to ‘the other’, it is a form of self-aversion or a means by which we hide from the bodily basis of our own humanity (Nussbaum, 2004). Indeed, disgust begins close to home and is derived from our discomfort with our own bodily functions, our oozy, sticky ‘leaky selves’ (Shildrick, 1997; Kolnai, 2004), the fact that we cannot contain ourselves within our own boundaries and the shame and embarrassment that the ‘civilising process’ brings to bear upon us if our leakiness is exposed to others. Because modernity is a charter for anal retentiveness, we cannot forgive ourselves for our physical impurities. We hold ourselves ransom to the myth of the ‘clean and proper’ body; the perfect body of ableist culture is a myth that we use to screen ourselves from the visceral realities of our own lives. The ableist body ‘helps’ non-disabled people cope with their fears about their own corporeal vulnerability. It does so by invoking its opposite, the disabled body, a foreign entity that is anomalous, chaotic and disgusting. Modern history helps to make this object of disgust more tangible. Civilising processes clarify stigma and make biological differences into socio-moral categories. Disgust provokes the civilising sensibilities. It warns them of the presence of possible contaminants (Miller, 1997). Consequently, psychological and social distance between disability and non-disability expands. Disgust in ‘it’s thought- content’ is ‘typically unreasonable, embodying magical ideas of contamination, and impossible aspirations to purity, immortality, and non-animality, that are just not in line with human life as we know it’ (Nussbaum, 2004: 12). Disgust is an emotion that has a central role in our everyday relationships with our bodies, our patterns of social interaction and – most pressingly from the perspective of this chapter – in processes of social exclusion. Disgust is the emotional fuel of ableism. The threat posed by ourselves to ourselves (and projected onto others), the threat of our ‘bodiliness’ and the shame and anxiety associated with it is a product of ableism, of the ‘tyranny of perfection’. Ableism makes the world alien to disabled bodies and, at the same time, produces impairment as an invalidating experience. It is manifest in our cultural inclination towards normalcy by way of correction, towards homogeneity by way of disparagement of difference. What this means for disabled people is that they are ‘expected to reject their own bodies’ and ‘adjust to the carnal norms of nondisabled people’ (Paterson and Hughes, 1999: 608). The ‘corporeality of the disabled body’ is, according to Campbell (2008: 157), ‘constantly in a state of deferral’ awaiting the affective response that will demean it or the travails of sociogenesis that will either do away with it or ‘make it better’.

#### The 1ACs desire of the better future is in opposition to the disgusting disabled child, their attempt at progress through policy requires the erausure of disability due to their psychogenesis tied desires.

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Elimination and/or correction have been the primary social response to disabled people in modernity. The primary form of experience (of disability), during the same period, has been one of invalidation. Invalidation carries a ‘dual meaning’ as both ‘confinement through incapacity’ and ‘deficit of credibility’ (Hughes, 2000: 558). This (latter and more crucial) claim is based on the view that in the non-disabled imaginary disability is an ‘ontological deficit’ – a reduction of ‘leib’ to ‘korpor’, human to animal, subjectivity to flesh, identity to excessive corporeal presence. It is this deficit of credibility that provides the spurious rationale for the disposal of disabled bodies by means of elimination (inter alia extermination or segregation) or correction (inter alia sterilisation or rehabilitation). These are the social practices that have been used to erase both the psychological aversion and the problematic social difference that disability has come to represent. In this chapter, I will argue – using Norbert Elias as a touchstone – that the treatment of disabled people in the modern period is a barbaric sideshow in the long march of the ‘civilising process’ (Elias, 2000). The ‘personality structure’ ableism (see Kumari Campbell (2001) and in this volume) in modernity transforms its own ontological precariousness into aversion for and disposal of disability. The negative response to biological and intellectual difference in modernity is strongly influenced by the tendency embedded in the ‘civilising process’ to incrementally deride the value of physical and intellectual difference and promote a sanitised norm of human behaviour and appearance (Elias, 2000). The social and social policy response to disability in the modern period cannot be separated from the emotional aversion to impairment characteristic of non-disabled hegemony. I will utilise Elias’s concepts of psychogenesis and sociogenesis1 to explain that the story of disability in modernity is one that develops towards the social and ontological invalidation of disabled people’s lives. The sociogenisis of disability is, in practice, twofold: it can be ‘anthropoemic’ or ‘anthropophagic’. The first refers to social processes that rootout and eliminate people: if error and imperfection are the anti-heroes of modernity, then one might expect to find examples in which the desire for truth and purity is exercised through the root and branch elimination of those who offend against this moral universe. Locking disabled people into a ‘zone of exception’ (Agamben, 2004) in which they are subjected to the eugenic gaze and categorised as inhuman or sub-human is one strategy for dealing with disability (Reave, 2008). ‘The real solution to heresy’ suggested George Canguilhem in his discussion of the normal and the pathological (1991: 280) ‘is extirpation’, meaning to destroy totally or exterminate. In modernity medical ideas and practices have been a fertile source of radical solutions to impairment. Medical solutions also embrace anthropophagic strategies. They deal in the correction and rehabilitation of ‘abnormal bodies’. Cure/rehabilitation stands at the heart of the medical doctrine of salvation (soteriology) and it is a prospect often held up to disabled people by optimists who fetishise scientific progress and promote biological solutions to impairment. Both strategies – to kill or to cure – transmit the same core cultural message: disabled people represent ‘what not to be’ and are, therefore, ontologically invalid or ‘uncivilised’. Social responses to impairment, in modernity, are underpinned by the processes that constitute the psychogenisis of disability. These include the emotional aversions and intolerances of impairment that derive from the civilising process. The ontological invalidation that disabled people experience in their everyday encounters is mediated primarily by the emotion of disgust (with fear and pity in tow). At an existential level the presence of the disabled body is unsettling for non-disabled people who are often in denial about their own vulnerability. This is the psychological and emotional component of what disability scholars call ableism. The standard resolution to this ‘problem’ of non-disability in modernity has been to have the object of discomfort – the disabled person – removed or corrected. The sociogenesis of anthropoemic and anthropophagic strategies for dealing with impairment are rooted in the emotional dispositions of non-disabled people as they develop their civilised protocols for behaviour and bodily comportment. In what follows, I will focus on the ways in which the ‘civilising process’ invalidates impairment and demonstrate how opportunities to escape this ontological dead-end usually require the erasure of disabled identity. In the first section that follows I will give some examples of the way in which one can read disability as a product of the civilising process. In the section, thereafter, I will examine the psychogenesis of disability relating it to the disgust response to impairment and to the development of ableism, the complex of processes that exclude disabled people from the ‘psychic habitus’ (Elias, 2000: 367) of modernity.

#### We affirm crip pessimsim – we embrace deviancy and failure of disabled folk – I lose hope in a society that is based on my erasure.

Kolářová 14 (Kateřina Kolářová, Ph.D. Charles University, Prauge, “The Inarticulate Post-Socialist Crip On the Cruel Optimism of Neoliberal Transformations in the Czech Republic” Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies Volume 8, Issue 3, 2014 p.270-3)

The aspiration of post-socialism was progress, moral emancipation, and eventual happiness. I recall the quotation above that attempted to articulate the vision of the optimistic future as a moment when “every citizen of this country fe[els] content and happy” (Váchalová, 2). Yet, as Sara Ahmed cautions, happiness is a troubled notion. She asks, “What are we consenting to, when we consent to happiness?” and offers us a troubling answer: “perhaps the consensus that happiness is the consensus” (Promise, 1). Ahmed’s questioning of happiness as the normative horizon of our orientation resonates with the key issues that I address; the promise of happiness is a twin of “cruel optimism.” Most acutely, Ahmed’s critical discussion focuses on revealing how (the vision of and desire for) happiness participates in establishing structures of consensus, which are in fact structures of dominance. With (falsely) positive energy, recuperative logic said, “you should be happy communism is over”; the promise of happiness was used to justify the oppression of “the disabled” through ideologies of ableism constitutive to liberal individualism and liberal humanism. The impossibility of seeing and envisioning crip(topias) in the situation of (post-)shameful identity illustrates not only the harmful and utterly disabling work of certain affective attachments, it also and just as vividly illustrates the equally harmful impacts/effects of attachments to affects, in particular attachments to affects of positivity, affects seemingly necessary to foster self-embracing identity and subjectivity. In other words, the post-socialist crip challenges Western-developed theories of (disabled) identity that argue that positive affects are necessary to foster self-embracing and affirmative understandings of disability and disabled subjectivity. The symbolic violence embedded in recuperative positivity offers us the opportunity to think about crip failure and crip negativity. The violence also points toward conditions that (could) make (some forms of) failure useful for cripistemologies and that (could) map crip horizons. Cripness is already rich with failure; cripness is infused with negativity that sustains. The crip negativity I plead for is a critical strategy rupturing ideologies of cure, rehabilitation, and overcoming, ideologies that inflict hurt and violence (not only) on crips. I wish to initiate a discussion about crip negativity as a political practice working toward (if never reaching) crip utopian horizons. Still, the post-socialist crip opens other and new questions about what crip failure would mean if it were to foster and sustain life, what forms of crip negative energies would allow for crip utopias and make possible the desire for crip survival. J. Jack Halberstam’s theory of failure elucidates how the compulsory positive nature of optimism, hope, pride, and success precludes the realization that failure can be a form of sustenance and strategy of critique/survival. In failing the normative prescriptions of compulsory heterosexuality (and able-bodiedness), failure “imagines other goals for life, for love, for art, and for being” (88). Coming back to the image of the women failing/surviving with AIDS at the post-socialist Odessa hospice, failure also imagines signs of crip solidarity and sustenance where the visions of an optimistic future create spaces of abandonment for subjects who will never be offered a fantasy of the “good life.” Despite its lack of substantial attention to cripness that would surpass the level of metaphorics, The Queer Art of Failure does offer some lines along which to think also about crip failures. The most helpful to the current analysis of post-socialist affects would seem to be Halberstam’s discussion of the failure to remember. Forgetting, losing, and looping between past and future are the techniques of resistance to normative temporalities. Such failures at temporalities of progressive and curative futurity, I argue, could offer forms of sustenance (for the post-socialist crip). The failure to remember would produce a rupture in the dominant narratives of shame (of a failed socialism) and the futurity of “getting better.” It would forget visions of pride based on overcoming the failed socialist crip, and it would loosen/lose the compulsory vision of optimism of (neoliberal) humanism. It would forget the ideologies that we have seen hurt and violate crips and our futures. Cripping, disjointing, the normative forms of (linear) knowing about the past-presentfuture, could offer resistance to the cruel hope that directs our desires into (an evacuated) future while foreclosing the negotiation of difficult yet important relationships, past and present. The rejection of the curative and always already deferred future opens up a space for developing a more complicated relationship with failed pasts. Queer theorist Heather Love devises the politics of “feeling backwards/backwards feelings” as an affective strategy of resistance to liberal understandings of the “repressive hypothesis” and emancipation. Her concept is both a corrective to the deeply problematic progressivism of “gay pragmatism” with its compulsorily positive futurity of “getting better,” and an affective reaching backwards to legacies of difficult pasts. As she puts it, “[b]ackward feelings serve as an index to the ruined state of the social world; they indicate continuities between the bad gay past and the present; and they show up the inadequacy of queer narratives of progress” (27). I wish to add that they show up continuities between crip pasts and presents obscured by the undisputedly “good intentions” (McRuer, Crip, 110) of rehabilitation. Halberstam for his part appreciates the strategies of backward feeling as a way of recovering the past of queer and racially marked subjects erased in the tidy versions of the past: “[w]hile liberal histories build triumphant political narratives with progressive stories of improvement and success, radical histories must content with a less tidy past, one that passes on legacies of failure and loneliness as the consequence of [ableist] homophobia and racism and xenophobia” (98). To retrieve lives undone by ideologies of ableism, homophobia, racism and xenophobia, and practices of institutionalization, forced sterilization, ethnic segregation, and on and on, we need backward feelings. The project of “reformulated histories” feels backwards to past forms of crip survivals and past experiences that have been erased (see also Kafer’s discussion of Halberstam 42–44). Alongside this move, I also want to “feel backwards” to the hurt caused by the shame of the bad past itself. This is not a naïve reclamation of the idealized communist past ignorant of the violence committed by the communist regime (violence and hurt inflicted on disabled people still remains mostly undocumented, unspoken, and unanalysed). What I argue is that the notion of the bad and failed past is too comfortable and too tidy and serves only the ideology of capitalist recovery that prescribes only one version of futurity, a futurity—I argue—that is constructed upon the abjection of cripness. To open critical discussion I propose that we need to continue to produce untidy, crooked, queer, twisted, bent, crip versions of pasts. Only they will provide for more generous horizons of the present and future.

## FW

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best methodologically challenges ableism. Assumptions of ableism is always already inherent in any system of knowledge production thus ableism is *always* a prior question. Evaluate the 1ACs scholarship and assumptions – anything else allows for ableist norms to be replicated

Campbell 13 (Fiona Kumari Campbell, Adjunct Professor in the Department of Disability Studies at Griffith University. Wednesday 27 November 2013. Problematizing Vulnerability: Engaging Studies in Ableism and Disability Jurisprudence. Keynote speech at Disability at the Margins: Vulnerability, Empowerment and the Criminal Law)

What is meant by the concept of ableism? The literature suggests that the term is often used fluidly with limited definitional or conceptual specificity. The work of Carlson (2001)5 and Campbell (2001) represented a turning point in bringing attention to this new site of subordination not just in terms of disablement but also ableism’s application to other devalued groups. **Ableism is deeply seeded at the level of knowledge systems of life, personhood and liveability.** Ableism is not just a matter of ignorance or negative attitudes towards disabled people; **it is a schema of perfection, a deep way of thinking about bodies, wholeness and permeability.**6 As such integrating ableism into social research and advocacy strategies represents a significant challenge to practice as ableism moves beyond the more familiar territory of social inclusion and usual indices of exclusion to the very divisions of life. Bringing together the study of existence and knowledge systems, ableism is difficult to pin down. Ableism is a set of processes and practices that arise and decline through sequences of causal convergences influenced by the elements of time, space, bodily inflections and circumstance. Ability and the corresponding notion of ableism are intertwined. **Compulsory ablebodiedness is implicated in the very foundations of social theory,** therapeutic jurisprudence, advocacy, **medicine and law; or in the mappings of human anatomy.** Summarised by Campbell (2001, 44) Ableism refers to; …A network of beliefs processes and practices that produces a particular kind of self and body (the bodily standard) that is projected as the perfect, speciestypical and therefore essential and fully human. Disability then is cast as a diminished state of being human. Writing today (2013) I add an addition to this definition: ‘The ableist bodily configuration is immutable, permanent and laden with qualities of perfectionism or the enhancement imperative orientated towards a self-contained improvability’. Sentiency applies to not just the human but the ‘animal’ world. As a category to differentiate the normal from the pathological, **the concept of abledness is predicated on some preexisting notion about the nature of typical species functioning that is beyond culture and historical context**. Ableism does not just stop at propagating what is typical for each species. An ableist imaginary tells us what a healthy body means – a normal mind, the pace, the tenor of thinking and the kinds of emotions and affect that are suitable to express. Of course these ‘fictional’ characteristics then are promoted as a natural ideal. **This abled imaginary relies upon the existence of an unacknowledged imagined shared community of able-bodied/minded people held together by a common ableist world view that asserts the preferability** and compulsoriness **of the norms of ableism.** Such ableist schemas erase differences in the ways humans express our emotions, use our thinking and bodies in different cultures and in different situations. This in turn enacts bodily Otherness rendered sometimes as the ‘disabled’, ‘perverted’ or ‘abnormal body’, clearly demarcating the boundaries of normal and pathological. A critical feature of an ableist orientation is a belief that impairment or disability is inherently negative and at its essence is a form of harm in need of improvement, cure or indeed eradication. **Studies in Ableism** (SiA)inverts traditional approaches, by shifting our concentration to what the study of disability **tells us about the production, operation and maintenance of ableism.** In not looking solely at disability,we can focus on how the abled able-bodied, non-disabled identity is maintained and privileged. Disability does not even need to be in the picture. SiA’s interest in abledness means that the theoretical foundations are readily applicable to the study of difference and the dividing practices of race, gender, location and sexual orientation. Reframing our focus from disability to ableism prompts different preoccupations: • What does the study of the politics of ‘vulnerability’ tells us about what it means to be ‘non-vulnerable’? • Indeed how is the very conceptualisation of ‘autonomy’ framed in the light of discourses of ‘vulnerability’? • In representing vulnerability as universal does this detract from the specificity of disability experiences? **SiA examines the ways that concepts of** wellbeing, **vulnerability and deficiency circulate throughout society and impact** upon economic, social, **legal and ethical choices**. Principally SiA focuses on the limits of tolerance and possessive individualism. Extending the theorization of disability, **studies in ableism can enrich our understanding of the production of vulnerability and the terms of engagement in civic life and the possibilities of social inclusion.** I now turn to unpacking the nuances and structure of a theory of ableism.

#### Debates surrounding disability studies allow us to destabilizes notions about debaters and make us better advocates for our bodies.

Lanning 14 (Eric Lanning< Eric Lanning is a debater at the University of Houston and former National Debate Tournament Champion.> January 22, 2014, “What is Access?”, access debate, <http://accessdebate.com/2014/01/22/what-is-access/> Brackets already in article)

I’ve been thinking a lot lately about what “access” means in the context of the debate community. I don’t have all (or even a lot) of the answers to this question, but I’m beginning to think that might be the point. We can’t figure this out alone. We need each other. Disability Studies gives the means, motives and opportunity to reframe this “dependence” as inevitable, necessary and valuable. **What would it mean to universally design debate? What would it mean to ask and answer this question together? I believe that “access” is the process (not outcome) of answering that question over and over. It is the process of destabilizing our assumptions about what debaters “are” and “do”.** What assumptions do we make about debaters inherent “abilities” or natural “capabilities” when we debate in particular ways and in particular spaces? What changes should we make to debate practice and culture? These are questions that I am asking and answering in every negative debate – but the “pre-requisite” for me to asking and answering these questions in any debate was my own disability consciousness. The most portable skill debate ever gave me was consciousness. Debate gave me a vocabulary and audience to articulate what my lived experience with disability teaches me everyday. It gave me the experience and environment to develop and explain my own consciousness of disability. For me, that is the beginning of access. Before we can debate about what access means, it is worth thinking about the status quo – what does it mean for debate to be “inaccessible” to particular debaters and particular identities?  What is wrong with the status quo? For many years and for most debaters, “ableism” was nothing more than a list of words you should not use: blinded, silenced, paralyzed, crazy, lame, disabled, crippled, etc. To be clear, I think that ableist language is problematic and constitutes a micro-aggression against disabled people that we should all work to stop. But it is about SO much more than language. **Disability is an embodied experience.** In a poem I wrote called “Broken” – I explain this distinction as, “disability is not something you have, its something you are” (If you’re interested in hearing/reading the entire poem, I’ve included a link at the end). **This recognition of the lived experience of disability – of disability as a social and political fact – of disability as a category of human existence is missing from our current debates about ableism and access.** One of the most meaningful and empowering contributions of disability studies is expressed in the mantra, “nothing about us without us”. **It is a call to foreground and privilege the experience of disability.** This is not to say that TABS (temporarily abled bodies) can’t participate and contribute to the conversation about access, but instead it is a call to reverse the history of marginalization [of] disabled people[‘s] experience in the academy and our society.  Obviously not every debater has a lived experience with disability, but we all do research. **In debate, this research is a reflection of our priorities – if you want to be part of the solution instead of part of the problem: read a book! Cut some cards!** Ask and answer (yourself) the question, “what is access”! In my negative debates this year, I’ve learned a lot about disability and access. **I’ve learned that the process of “debating it out” is powerful and revolutionary. I’ve learned that my opponent’s willingness to listen and engage with my arguments makes me a better advocate.** But even more than the potential of the debate round – I’ve been inspired by the potential of the debate community. I’ve had countless conversations, emails and chats with disabled and non-disabled debaters, coaches and judges that have fundamentally changed my answer to the question, why do you debate? Debate made me the person I am today. Everything I love about my self and my life is a result of my decision to debate. Why do I debate? For access. I debate because I believe in this activity and community. I believe we could and should make debate accessible to everyone, but we can’t do it alone. We need each other. **I’ll end with a quote: “[Access] is not a thing that can be delivered by politician, policymakers or educators, but a process of struggle that has to be joined**

Vote for the most accessible framing mech – accessibility comes

Exclusive models of education that are innaccessible produce violent education

Our model of debate is most accessible focus on deconstructing flawed assumptions

## Case

Fiat is illusory

#### The 1ACs utilization of the media empirically proves our thesis claims – the visceral reaction of disgust has been transported to the media – portraying the disabled child as the lurking monster in the freak show supercharges all of our ontology warrants and prove the plan is active in the visceral disgust economy

Mitchell and Snyder 2000 (Mitchell, David T., and Sharon L. Snyder. “Representation and Its Discontents: The Uneasy Home of Disability in Literature and Film.” Narrative Prosthesis: Disability and the Dependencies of Discourse, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2000, pp. 15–46. JSTOR, [www.jstor.org/stable/10.3998/mpub.11523.5](http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3998/mpub.11523.5). Brackets already in the evidence)

The restrictive elements of stories about disability helped create an uncompromising public belief in the limited options for people with disabilities: “Disabled characters abound, but the ways in which they are portrayed and the development of narrative around them is relentlessly negative” (Pointon and Davies 1). From the outside, the meager nature of these disabled characters’ lives were depicted as inevitably leading toward bitterness and anger that made them objects of suspicion. In fact, Kriegel and Longmore argued in tandem that disability portrayals could be understood as a cathartic revenge by the stigmatizers, who punish the stigmatized to alleviate their own worries about bodily vulnerability and inhumane social conditions. What stands out in the analyses of the negative-image school is the importance of plots that emphasize individual isolation as the overriding component of a disabled life. The angst surrounding the status of people with disabilities surfaced in expressive discourses as a desire to seclude the offending party within a drama of his or her own making. Longmore first identified this element as the most pervasive and debilitating aspect of disability representation. By depicting disability as an isolated and individual affair, storytellers arti‹cially extracted the experience of disability from its necessary social contexts. The portraiture of disability in literature and electronic media “psychologized” the cultural understanding of disability. Disabled characters were either extolled or defeated according to their ability to adjust to or overcome their tragic situation. Longmore and others pointed out that “[social] prejudice and discrimination rarely enter into either fictional or nonfictional stories, and then only as a secondary issue” (74). Because representations of disability tend to reject the medicalized view that restricts disability to a static impairment entombed within an individual, the social navigation of debilitating attitudes fails to attain the status of a worthy element of plot or literary contemplation. The failure of a politicized interest to show itself in the disability plot could be evidenced in any number of ways within a variety of genres. Hafferty and Foster, for example, argue that the defining feature of disabled experience is “an awareness that issues when disabilities and handicaps are created through interactions between people with physical impairments and an unyielding and antagonistic environment” (189). Yet their analysis of disabled detectives in crime novels discovers that the reading public is encouraged to “view matters that are rightly located within social settings as residing in individual achievements and/or failures” (189). Literary techniques such as passive dialogue and readerly identifications with individual protagonists serve as stylistic conventions in the detective genre that help “shape the messages being delivered” (193). Hafferty and Foster’s focus upon negative representations was humanities-based “proof” that discrimination against disabled people not only existed but was fostered by the images consumed by readers and viewers. While the analysis of the negative image was carefully supported by a largely structuralist model that slotted disability types into generic classifications and representational modes, the unearthing of discriminatory images tended to collapse all representations into a sterile model of false consciousness. In The Cinema of Isolation, Martin Norden extended Longmore’s argument about isolating media portraits by drawing up all of film history into a net of conspiracy. The Hollywood filmmaker, according to Norden, participates in an exploitative scheme that capitalizes upon the visual spectacle that disabilities offer to the camera eye. Film has taken the place of the nineteenth-century freak show “in the name of maintaining patriarchal order” (6). In spite of the historical prevalence of disabled people in film, Norden condemned nearly every image as the product of ‹lmic castration anxiety and discriminatory beliefs. As Pointon and Davies point out, “It is too simplistic to talk about ‘negative’ compared with ‘positive’ images because although disabled people are in general fairly clear about what might constitute the former, the identi‹cation of ‘positive’ is fraught with dif‹culty” (1). Scholarship on the negative image strained beneath the weight of such wholesale condemnations of representational portraits. In spite of research that saw most artistic and popular representations of disability as debilitating to the social advance of disabled people the analysis of negative images helped to support the idea that disability was socially produced. Identifying common characterizations that reinforced audiences’ sense of alienation and distance from disability began an important process of scholarly attempts to rehabilitate public beliefs. Literature and film provided a needed archive of historical attitudes from which to assess ideologies pertaining to people with disabilities. While social scientists sought to understand contemporary beliefs about disabled populations, humanities scholars began to sift through expansive representational preserves. These materials solidified arguments in disability studies about disabled peoples’ position as historical scapegoats. In many ways this impulse still undergirds a humanities-based politics of critiquing the trite and superficial portraits churned out on a daily basis by the mainstream media. To change negative portrayals, a powerful commentary was needed to make authors more selfconscious of the conventions at work in their own media.

#### The media is a vehicle to hide disabled violence through ablenationalism to present disabled folk as part of a society that we will never be a part of all behind the guise of inaccessibility in an attempt to reveal progress that never comes.

Mitchell and Snyder 15 (David T. Mitchell and Sharon L Snyder 15 The Biopolitics of Disability: Neoliberalism, Ablenationalism, and Peripheral Embodiment (Corporealities: Discourses Of Disability) (Kindle Locations 548-551). University of Michigan Press. Kindle Edition.)

THE ABLE-DISABLED: NEOLIBERAL OVERCOMPENSATION STRATEGIES Whereas restrictions on the trafficking of hormones across the border between the United States and Mexico, surgical repairs of cleft palate in Africa, and the offloading of excess medical devices to disabled people in Haiti cultivate the appearance of a surplus provision of services in the United States, cultural images also serve to perpetuate a false sense of completed integration cultivated by ablenationalist standards. How do media images of disabled people materialize mainstream fantasies of a beneficent, evolving marketplace within neoliberal biopolitics? How does an increasingly visible transnational trafficking in technologically enabled disability images feed the moral culpabilities of postindustrial and industrializing economies alike? In one of the most rapacious zones of disability neoliberal market spaces— the popular sphere of product advertisements—disabled bodies are now ubiquitously referenced in commercials for myriad pharmaceuticals, prosthetically engineered bodies and minds, mutating organisms that may prove better adapted for a future world yet to come. Disabled people have become increasingly engendered by systems (and long, boring hours) of scientific observation, classification, and taxonomy, the predicative data, detail, and description amassed and leading to the micromanagement of increasingly informatic bodies. All of this data gathering attempts to render the nonnormative biological world a knowable object in the most Foucauldian sense. These particularly hyped-up, technologized, and fully rejuvenated bodies serve as cusp creatures hailing utopian worlds where access hasn’t changed but bodily alteration has accomplished the necessary sleight of hand to accomplish the trick for some fortunate few. Those of us who find ourselves living with significant levels of socially assigned aberrancy and, we might add, over extended periods of a lifespan (such as formerly informed debates over the significance of age of onset in definitional discussions of disability) have metamorphosed within this product-oriented world into the equivalent of something no longer directly kin to a giant Kafkaesque beetle. While the representational space headed by iconic disabled types such as the Elephant Man or Gregor Samsa provided the basis for late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century eugenic justifications for the imposition of social stigmas translated into internalized self-hatred, what we will call the able-disabled, serve as latter twentiethcentury champions of social normativity now held out to a select group of upstanding disabled citizens. For example, gracing a poster for the Emotion Pictures Disability Film Festival in 2006 in Athens, Greece, was a photograph of double-amputee turned hyperathlete, Aimee Mullins, speeding across a beach on one of her twelve pairs of artificial legs powered by resplendent coils (“My Twelve Pairs of Legs”). The image announced the arrival of yet another “new prosthetic age” originally hailed only in the 1970s fantasy space of serial television by the likes of the Bionic Man (Lee Majors) and the Bionic Woman (Lindsey Wagner). This new era of disabled athleticism—an era of buffed, muscular, yet technologically supplemented bodies—promises all of the transcendent capacity a hyperreal, medicalized culture could offer. We will unpack the creative alternative nuances of the workings and nonnormative politics of disability film festivals in chapters 4 and 5, but here we want to discuss the ablenationalist implications of hyperprostheticized bodies used as marketing ploy in this independent film festival market. Disability images circulate within neoliberal marketing networks by playing on rhetorical referencing strategies that grow increasingly common in the era of biopolitics as part of the coopting of geo-political space. Aimee Mullins’s high speed romp across the shifting sands of a southern European beach used a disabled version of the attainment of bodily prowess to rejuvenate a lower threshold of public expectation for what disabled people might accomplish. This process of normalization through the ruse of hypernormalization placed members of formerly marginalized communities in the service of modernity-seeking nations attempting to glitz up their worldwide images through a form of special inclusion (i.e., ablenationalism). The hypercapacitated body of Aimee Mullins spoke to audiences by promising that the United States did not take its minority community members for granted. They were provided with the most artful, technologized, prohibitively expensive athletic enhancements modern Western civilizations can offer; in the one case a fetishized high-tech sneaker and in the other twelve pairs of prosthetic legs that allowed her double amputee body to course smoothly over even the most unctuous of mediums such as a sandy beach with speed and dexterity. Like Mullins, the South African double amputee-turned-paralympic (and then Olympic) athlete, Oscar Pistorius, also found himself incorporated into a narrative of overcompensation. Pistorius’s prowess for running on prosthetic coils was matched only by the notoriety he gained after shooting his girlfriend, the model Reeva Steenkamp, through the door of their bathroom one night in eastern Pretoria. Like Mullins, Pistorius was commonly pictured as embodying the hypercapacity of a field-and-track machine, a postorganismic cyborg biology enabled to surpass the limits of even the most athletically capacitated among us (two-legged variety). Pistorius’s scientifically engineered body coupled the tragic truncated animacy of the disabled body with the self-governing automaton-like capacity of a machine. The tales of Mullins and Pistorius did not cohere to the traditional contours of a liberal overcoming story, one where a disabled person transcends the limitations of his tragic embodiment to attain a basic level of social participation (here the prostheticized body is hidden by a performative approximation of normalcy that can’t quite successfully accomplish the level of dissimulation desired). Instead the hyperprostheticized bodies of Pistorius and Mullins are placed fully on display; the engineering feat of machinic supplementation becomes the primary object of fascination, and the viewer is left with a fetishization of technological compensation itself—not bodies extraordinary in their rescue from a disability abject, but rather a surfeit degree of compensation that suggests a wealth of supports available only to a select few: “the able-disabled.” In the neoliberal narrative of overcompensation assistive technology is the hero and the supplemented bodies become mere vehicles for an ornate display of a conspicuous form of technological consumption. The fetishization of a machine-like capacity is both a marvel of scientific advancement and a story of ablenationalism’s promise of the arrival at a surfeit supplementation and support for vulnerable bodies now complete.

#### **The 1ACs politics are a strategical tool to make disabled folk more visible and subsequently governable also to systematically exclude certain forms of deviance. – this turns their deleuze and queerness evidence**

Campbell 2001 (Date is unclear on website, see last portion of the cite for earlier versions of the paper - PhD Candidate, Faculty of Creative Industries, Queensland University of Technology and Sessional Lecturer, School of Human Services, Griffith University. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Australian Law and Society Conference, Brisbane, December 2000 and 'Disability with Attitude: Critical Issues 20 years after IYDP' international conference, Sydney, February 2001.https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b065/3abd4718ac4dce9a21d0645d72a1886d3364.pdf)

Let us consider what this means for understandings of disability and the way those figurings are mediated in law. The working model of inclusion is really only successful to the extent that people with disabilities are able to 'opt in' or be assimilated. For those who don't, it is assumed they will developmentally progress towards autonomy over time. The governing of liberal unfreedom responds to the problem of what is to be done with 'governing the remainder, with those it identifies as being less than fully autonomous'. 24 Hindess suggests three approaches: (1) a clearing away; (2) the compulsion towards disciplinary techniques (eg Social Role Valorisation Theory); and (3) targeting external causes by creating welfare safety nets. Legal intersections/interventions assist in the activity of government by allocating and regulating populations into distinct ontological categories such as 'disability' so that they are visible, calculable and therefore governable. The management of disability is possible through the partitioning and ranking of disability (high, medium, low support needs), and by instituting guardianship and programmatic arrangements based on sets of competency standards. The fixity of disability within both legislative and case law not only establishes the boundaries of permissible inquiry, but also establishes the legal fiction of 'disability'. It is this hardening of disability - based more often than not on bio-medical technologies and ascriptions - that enforces the centrality of the ableist body and the terms of its negotiation. The formulations often engaged by disability activists and enshrined in disability-related law end up discursively entrenching and thus reinscribing, the very oppressive ontological figurings of disability many of us would like to escape.26 Alternative renderings of disability, if they are not able to 'fit' such prescribed 'fictions', are barred from entry. Consider the instructions in a recent staff survey produced by the Equity section of Queensland University of Technology and its banishment of certain 'kinds' of disability: You should answer 'yes' to question 2 only if you are a person with a disability which is likely to last, or has lasted two or more years. Please note that if you use spectacles, contact lenses or other aids to fully correct your vision or hearing, you do not need to indicate that you are a person with a disability, and would answer no,.27

#### The 1ACs attempt at controlling the future and attempting to reduce suffering reveals the 1ACs eugenic filled desire

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As such, Rapp’s son Ronan offers the most difficult and controversial case for disability conservation. Moreover, that Rapp had two screenings for the condition which did not indicate its presence complicates what is often taken to be a clear-cut case for genetic testing and selective termination. Rapp herself has said that had she known Ronan would have Tay-Sachs, she would have selectively aborted her pregnancy in order to prevent the suffering both her son and his parents have experienced. The prevention of suffering is one of the major eugenic arguments for eliminating disability and disabled people at all life stages. The Nazis, Peter Singer, supporters of physician assisted suicide, and the reproductive rights movement have all used it in some way.6 A wary Flannery O’Connor has even warned of the peril – rightly, I think – that sympathy for the suffering of others can lead to the gas chamber.7 But Emily Rapp and her son’s situation offer a consideration other than the well-worn conversation about suffering. While it would be wrong to reduce the complicated and contradictory understandings Emily Rapp offers about her son’s condition, one point that her story makes clear is that suffering expands our imagination about what we can endure. More than this, however, Rapp’s account of what Ronan’s disability imposes upon her clarifies a less-recognized aspect of disability’s distinctive work in the world that is worth conserving. Disability in general, and Ronan’s dramatic disability manifestation in particular, offers an experience-based counter narrative to the modern subject’s understanding of the present moment as an opportunity to shape the future. Living with her son’s disability compels Rapp to live “without a future,” to cultivate a primary self-defining interpersonal relationship in the lived present that presumes no future (Rapp, Still Point 11). Rapp’s forcible abandonment of the future stretches toward understandings and experiences that expand what she, and perhaps Ronan, might have had in an ordinary, nondisabled life together. The contribution of Ronan’s disability is rooted in the present and in presence. Disability speaks only of the present; the prodigious cannot be prepared for and it anticipates nothing in our control. Like Frank’s wound-telling stories, Rapp’s story of the “even blissful,” “magical world” of the mundane and its “terrible freedom” from expectations could not be restorative, in Frank’s sense, but may indeed be transformative (Rapp, “Notes” n. pag.). One might say that Rapp’s story could be just one more version of lessons from the disabled for the nondisabled. I want to suggest, instead, that the forcible abandonment of the future that Rapp explains constitutes something more complex and capacious: it is a modern counter-eugenic ethics. Eugenics is about controlling the future; it is the ideology and practice of controlling who reproduces, how they reproduce, and what they reproduce in the interest of controlling the composition of a particular citizenry. The very idea of shaping a community or a national citizenry through the technological and legislative practices that control reproduction is distinctly modern. This understanding of the relationship between present actions and future outcomes is expressed in many aspects of modern cultures and is one of the hallmarks of modernity, codified in modern nation states, modern culture, and modern subjectivity – even modern design. Zygmunt Bauman finds modern genocide, for example, rooted in rationality, efficiency, science, bureaucracy and its manifestation in the nation state – in short what Max Weber called “rationalization,” the hallmark of modernity. The interrelated concepts of evolution, progress, and improvement comprise a temporal aspiration for both individuals and societies that is crucial to modernity. The insistence on control in the present over the outcomes of the future – what James R. Beniger calls the “control revolution” and what Thomas Haskell shows to be the relationship between benevolence and capitalism – is perhaps the fundamental aspect of modernity and modern subjectivity. This impulse to control the future is the overreaching that Michael Sandel has so effectively decried in his case against perfection. Disability is, then, a conceptual category that represents something which goes beyond actual people with disabilities. It represents a problem with temporality as it is formulated in modernity. Disability and illness frustrate modernity’s investment in controlling the future. Douglas Baynton argues that the efficiency and increased pace in task performance in all aspects of daily living which became the dominant value and way of life during 19th century modernization shaped the cultural understanding of disability as representing inefficiency and intractability. Baynton’s historical account suggests that as the modern understanding of time as a commodity – of the present moment as an opportunity for investment in the future – developed, disability came to be seen not just as a misfortune, punishment, blessing, or omen from an either benevolent or angry God, but rather as intransigence embodied. Disability and people with disabilities are eugenic targets because we embody the unpredictable and intractable nature of temporality. We frustrate modernity’s fantasy that humans determine the arc of their own histories. 60 Rosemarie Garland-Thomson Rapp’s narrative confronts our collective investment in futurity, which I have suggested is distinctly modern and differs from traditional worldviews. Thus, disability becomes for modernity’s Promethean aspiration to control the future at once its greatest opportunity and its greatest repudiation. Curing cancer, sundering the conjoined into singletons, and flushing out the elusive gene for Tay-Sachs are challenges in the interest of controlling the future by shaping how human beings are and who we have among us. I object less to the idea of controlling outcomes in the future in general than I do to the problem of what outcomes we attempt to influence. In other words, it is not so much making a future we want that is the problem but, rather, the problem lies in how we go about deciding what that future might be. So, disability’s contribution – its work – is to sever the present from the future; more precisely, it is to be a narrative resource that does not mortgage the present on the future. Not simply an antidote to modernity’s overreaching, disability contributes a narrative of a genuinely open future, one not controlled by the objectives, expectations, and understandings of the present. Disability, then, rescripts modernity’s and the modern subject’s temporal practices and understandings. Ronan’s imminent and vivid mortality – indeed, people with disabilities and disability in general – present the difficult challenge for modern subjects not only to live in the moment but also to engage in a relationship not based on the premise of the future. Disability demands that we all might imagine a subject without a future life trajectory that is perpetually managed in the present moment. The important complexity of Rapp’s story of her son and family is to be able to hold the contradiction (the Keatsian negative capability) of the work disability does the world; for Rapp, it is suffering entangled with joy. Rapp’s navigation of this contradiction is her story of Frank’s woundedness, both hers and Ronan’s. This, I offer, is what Michael Sandel calls the “giftedness” of disability (Sandel 27 and 91)