#### We cannot account for ethics in any terms but the ethical, so we cannot derive them logically as a set of rules. To do so would either force you to just reflect the way the world is or presuppose the proper way to make the derivation which smuggles in a hidden moral premise or the value of particular modes of inquiry.

Reader, Soran. "New directions in ethics: Naturalisms, reasons and virtue." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3.4 (2000): 341-364.

What is the alternative? To understand ethics in its own terms. This deprives us of explanatory naturalism. **We can't without error expect to understand ethics in any terms but ethical.** This has seemed to many philosophers to be unduly restrictive, and to threaten relativism.8 But in fact it does not lead to these difficulties - or, more accurately, it doesn't exacerbate them. The problem of **displaying the rationality of ethics in a compelling way is real.** But it is also general. **It is the same as the problem of displaying the rationality of all** the **other things we do** - playing games, conducting scientific enquiry, writing philosophy papers. **We might be able to make connections between activities** - using an analogy with another game, say, to illuminate the game of chess for someone. **But all we will ever be able to lay our hands on in the activity of explaining, is more of the same: parts of our life. The idea of our being able to use 'the world as it is in itself to explain any of our activities is practically contradictory.** And **the idea that rationality** - supernature, rather than first nature - **can be used to explain ethics in this way, involves a similar error. The way we think - acquire beliefs, deliberate, justify ourselves - is also part of our life. It is as 'fundamental' in that life as ethics is,** but no more so - no more knowable 'in itself’, as Aristotle, in the grip of a similar error to our own, would have put it, than it is 'to us', here and now, living as we live. So **explanatory accounts of ethics, whether they invoke first-nature or super natural reason, are mistaken.** Explicatory naturalism is as far as we can go. And as far as we need to go.

#### The practice of ethical life is complicated and multifaceted – different moral features are relevant in different moral cases. This isn’t deducing justifications for them but reflecting on the way we practice.

James Griffin 5, Rhodes Scholar, American-born philosopher, who was White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford from 1996 to 2000., Corpus Christi College, 2005, "Human Rights: Whose Duties?," Human Rights And The Moral Responsibilities Of Corporate And Public Sector Organisations Volume 20 Of The Series Issues In Business Ethics Pp 31-43, http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F1-4020-2361-8\_3

I said a moment ago that mere ability is one reason-generating consideration in cases of aid. But **moral life is more complicated** than that. **Many other considerations also shape moral norms,** for instance, the one I glanced at earlier: that **a good life is a life of deep commitments** to particular persons, causes, careers, and institutions; **that deep commitments limit our wills in major ways; and that our powers of large-scale calculation about what maximises good outcomes are also limited.** Unless one stresses these other reason-generating considerations, my proposal that ability can fix who should give aid might look odd. **A [Bill] Gates or a Getty has a great ability to help the needy. That ability, no doubt, means that they have above-average obligations to help. But the obligation upon them does not go on until their marginal loss equals the marginal gain of the needy; nor does it with us.** The ethical story is far more complicated than that. That Gateses and the Gettys - and **we - are allowed substantially to honour our own commitments and follow our own interests, and these permissions limit our obligations.** All that I wish to claim is that mere ability is one consideration in fixing where to place the duty to help. As with identifying the content of a human right, so also with identifying the related duty-ower: my remarks are only a start on the job. It is characteristic of the Work involved in identifying duty-owers that it too can be long, hard, and contentious. I think that sometimes **it will prove impossible to make a clearly successful case for holding anyone** in particular **the** appropriate **duty-ower.** Sometimes the **identification will have elements of arbitrariness and convention in it. Sometimes it will be subject to negotiation** in a particular place or time. We can know that there is a moral burden, without yet knowing who should shoulder it.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the particularity of moral judgments.

#### Comes first –

#### 1. Indeterminacy: rules can’t secure their own application – applying a norm to new situations is indeterminate e.g. a pattern for 2, 4, 6 could have 8 or 10 for the last entry. Definitions don’t solve – they’re built on past social norms which also change. Util collapses – whether a consequence is good can only be relative to its alternatives e.g. murder is bad but it’s good if the alt is extinction

#### 2. Humility: demanding the reductive criteria of knowledge to make universal judgments is epistemic arrogance that’s bad for functioning in the world. Humans naturally have limitations so presuming we can deductively arrive at all ethical truths paralyzes action because we will never be able to fully be certain.  This outweighs the aff’s framework warrants – the question of what we should center inquiry around is prior to arguments from within a particular tradition.

#### Now negate:

#### 1] The AC is an absolute principle, which is inconsistent with the call for particularity – it says there cannot be any instance in which we prioritize economic growth over environmental protection which ignores the possibility of some strange circumstance that we can’t think of until we respond ad hoc.

#### 2] A universal statement like the resolution can’t have a universal truth value – its value is contextual which means you cannot universally affirm the resolution.

**To prove truth of a statement like the resolution implies you are certain and that all instances have been accounted for, so any falsity is enough to negate**

 **Unger**, Peter K. (19**75**). \_Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism\_. Oxford University Press. URL = <<https://ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzacecgrsltnaxv6e3nf4aftmucxyxty43zlt665a4e6w6psi3kfex73m?filename=%28Clarendon%20Library%20of%20Logic%20%26%20Philosophy%29%20Peter%20Unger%20-%20Ignorance_%20A%20Case%20for%20Scepticism%20%28Clarendon%20Library%20of%20Logic%20%26%20Philosophy%29-Oxford%20University%20Press%2C%20USA%20%281979%29.pdf>> AHS PB

The very particular idea that **knowing entails** its being all right to be certain is suggested, further, by the fact that knowing entails, at least, **that one is certain.** As we saw in section 9 of the preceding chapter, that **this is a fact is made quite plain by** the inconsistency expressed by **sentences like “He really knew that it was raining, but he wasn’t absolutely certain it was” Such a sentence can express no truth: if he wasn’t certain, then he didn’t know.**