# K – Ontological Neoliberalism

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#### The aff’s shift to holistic, personalized academic evaluation in favor of standardized testing is complicit in the violence of neoliberal atomistic individualization – their pragmatic justifications merely serve to shroud the malevolence of their ideological commitment to technocratic managerialism and cartesian politics

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As the above quotations indicate, a key component of personalized learning was a strict focus on generating choice and voice in learning. A central claim of these writers is that education needs to support work-based and skills-focused learning in order to cultivate the necessary personal attributes and knowledges to enable children to work later in life. In this framing, personalized learning is promoted and legitimated on the basis that it structures the organization of schooling and learning in a way that makes it responsive to the demands for a more customized education, ostensibly precipitated by a burgeoning consumer culture. In this vision of education, personalized learning serves to build the character of schooling around the needs, interests and aspirations of individual pupils, with pupils incited to behave and look upon themselves as “educational shoppers in the market place…and creators of their own educational experience” (Miliband 2006, 29-30). What is being echoed here is something I touched on at the beginning of the paper, which is that difference becomes flattened as a result of neoliberalism with its insistence that welfare providers can and should improve their services through appealing to citizens as consumers with values and tastes which can be surveyed and provided for with rational detachment. Consistent with the character of early Anglophone liberalism (of the transcendental subject posited by Kant and the theory of self-originating sources of valid claims proposed by Rawls) what personalized learning does is champion the moral and ontological primacy of the subject and its supposed “rational centre”, namely the idea that children and young people share the ability (as consumers) to calibrate their behaviour on the basis of a set of narrow calculating, utilitarian norms which they all possess. The child in effect is positioned as a self-generating and self-actualizing agent, subject to the proper conditions. In other ways, it promotes the idea that children’s educational abilities are somehow genetically hard-wired or psychologized, that they have personal learning styles, personal competencies and skills, and personal curricular choices. Learning in effect is reduced to a commodity and the learner—constructed as a rational utility maximizer, someone who starts from a position of complete rational knowledge about his or her own wants and needs—is reduced to a consumer in a marketplace. Conclusion To insist that children are self-determining, self-authoring agents has enormous benefits for a consumer- and market-oriented conception of education. First, it reinforces the neoliberal drive towards atomistic individualization and attributes learning orientations to a private psychological propensity or “attitude” that is particular to each individual. As a result of this, education institutions are encouraged to respond through adjusting their provision on the basis of custom-made, tailored, consumer-focused services to reflect the idea that preferences reflect innate personal wants and needs. Subsequently, a field of educational choice and consumer voice is legitimated, both pedagogically and politically. Diversity in education can thus be understood to extending the reach and scope of market-based mechanisms of choice and consumer voice, as well as induce children and parents as productive sites for the mobilization of neoliberal governance. In other words, through their compliance, parents, teachers and children become modalities for the exercise of neoliberal rule, the vehicles for the articulation and strengthening of neoliberal frameworks, ethics and subjectivities. Second, the emphasis on persons as self-contained entities, free and autonomous, becomes strictly commensurate with its own de-politicization. This means that advocates of personalized learning can bypass accusations concerning the ideological content of their arguments and frame them instead in pragmatic terms. These observations also provide evidence for disputing the ostensible anti-state position which underpins much of neoliberal policy rhetoric, e.g. the idea that neoliberalism functions in the absence of state power and a regulated welfare state. In fact, neoliberalism and state power go hand-in-hand. We might consider, for example, how the importation of tasks, responsibilities and power to schools and parents under neoliberal governance necessitates the removal of certain forms of external control and authority at the very same time that it involves the spread of new forms of surveillance, regulation and intervention, forms which are typically enacted by voluntary and private organizations funded directly by the government. Take auditing, for example. Auditing refers to the practice of calculating the value and efficiency of an organization according to its output, and for a long time was conventionally associated with profit-making organizations. Now, public services are subject to the same rules and regulations. In schools, pedagogic decisions in the classroom are often manipulated by a remote auditor who evaluates the efficiency and flexibility of the school, usually in terms of economical utility and value for money. Similarly, in higher education institutions, lecturers must contend with the accountability measures being forced through by a scaled-back government which wishes to see less bureaucracy, but who are in fact producing more bureaucracy through demanding audits of teaching hours, transparency levels of work practices, peer teaching evaluation, teaching quality and research audits. In schools and colleges, this opens up spaces for stakeholder modes of governance, which refers to the inclusion of business, political and other interest groups to the running of schools. Additionally, it gives further weight and authority to the increasingly pervasive role of “experts” as arbiters of professionalism and efficiency in the realm of welfare. This suggests that diversity contributes to generating a field of relationships in which state power becomes greater even as it ostensibly appears to be rolled back. This is what Clarke and Newman (1997) refer to as the “managerial state”: a context of welfare governance in which processes of centralization and de-centralization combine with the reduction of central state power coupled with the expansion of non-state actors. In other words, what we are witnessing with the arrival of neoliberal governance is not so much the rolling back of the state (the state funds or gives generous tax breaks to non-state actors, namely voluntary, charity and private organizations, to intervene, monitor and sanction the governing of civil society, for example); rather, what we are witnessing is the rolling out of state power through non-state actors and the outsourcing of state responsibility and power to individuals and welfare institutions.

#### Ontological understandings of entities structure the intelligibility of all knowledge claims and self-perpetuate their own truth – their demand for access to the university merely reduces all entities to programmable info-blips without any value, optimized and ordered to serve the purely instrumental goals of neoliberalism

Thomson 5 – Iain, Professor of Philosophy University of New Mexico. “Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education.” Cambridge University Press, 2005 //KohlW

Put simply, Heidegger holds that our metaphysicians’ ontological understandings of what entities are ‘as such’ ground intelligibility from the inside-out (as it were), while their theological understandings of the way in which the ‘totality’ of beings exist simultaneously secure the intelligible order from the outside-in. Western history’s successive constellations of intelligibility are thus ‘doubly grounded’ in a series of ontotheologically structured understandings of ‘the being of beings’ (das Sein des Seienden), understandings, that is, of both what and how beings are, or of ‘the totality of beings as such’ (as Heidegger puts it above).8 This account answers our worry; for although none of these ontotheological grounds has served the history of intelligibility as an unshakeable ‘foundation’ (Grund), nor have any of the major ontotheologies instantly given way like a groundless ‘abyss’ (Abgrund). Rather, each ontotheology has served its historical constellation of intelligibility as an Ungrund, ‘a perhaps necessary appearance of ground’, that is, as that point at which ontological inquiry comes to a rest.9 Because each ontotheology serves for a time as the point where ‘the spade turns’ (as Wittgenstein put it), the history of intelligibility has taken the form of a series of relatively durable, overlapping historical ‘epochs’ rather than either a single monolithic understanding of what-is or a formless ontological  ux.10 Thus metaphysics, by repeatedly supplying intelligibility with dual ontotheological anchors, is able ‘to hold back’ (epoche) the  oodwaters of intelligibility for a time – the time of an Heidegger on Ontological Education 247 ‘epoch’. It is this ‘overlapping’ historical series of ontotheologically grounded epochs that Heidegger calls the history of being. 2. The History of Being as the Ground of Education With this philosophical background in place, we can now understand the reasoning behind Heidegger’s claim that our changing historical understanding of ‘education’ is grounded in the history of being.11 Heidegger defends a kind of ontological holism: By giving shape to our historical understanding of ‘what is’, metaphysics determines the most basic presuppositions of what anything is, including ‘education’. As he puts it: ‘Western humanity, in all its comportment toward beings, and even toward itself, is in every respect sustained and guided by metaphysics.’12 The ‘great metaphysicians’ focus and disseminate an ontotheological understanding of what and how beings are, thereby establishing the most basic conceptual parameters and ultimate standards of legitimacy for their historical epochs. These ontotheologies function historically like self-fulfilling prophecies, reshaping intelligibility from the ground up. For as a new ontotheological understanding of what and how beings are takes hold and spreads, it transforms our basic understanding of what all entities are.13 Our understanding of education is ‘made possible’ by the history of being, then, since when our understanding of what beings are changes historically, our understanding of what ‘education’ is transforms as well. This conclusion is crucial; not only does it answer the question that has guided us thus far, it positions us to understand what exactly Heidegger finds objectionable about our contemporary understanding of education (and the educational institutions which embody this understanding). For Heidegger, our changing historical understanding of what ‘education’ is has its place in an historical series of ontological ‘epochs’, holistic constellations of intelligibility which are themselves grounded in a series of ontotheological understandings of what and how beings are. In order fully to comprehend Heidegger’s critique of contemporary education, then, we need to answer three interrelated questions: First, what exactly is the nature of our own ontological epoch? Second, in which ontotheology is our constellation of intelligibility grounded? And third, how has this underlying ontotheology shaped our present understanding of education? I will take these questions in order. Heidegger’s name for our contemporary constellation of intelligibility is, of course, ‘enframing’ (das Gestell). Heidegger chooses this polysemic term because, by etymologically connoting a gathering together (‘Ge-’) of the myriad forms of stellen (‘to set, stand, regulate, secure, ready, establish’, and so on), it succinctly conveys his understanding of the way in which our present ‘mode of revealing’ – a ‘setting-upon that challenges forth’ – forces the ‘presencing’ (anwesen) of entities into its metaphysical ‘stamp or mold’ (Pra¨gung).14 Yet this is not simply to substitute etymology for argument, as detractors allege. Heidegger uses etymology in order to come up with an appropriate name for our contemporary ‘mode of revealing’, but the argumentative work in his account is done by his understanding of metaphysics. This means that to really understand why Heidegger characterizes our contemporary epoch as das Gestell, we must take the measure of his claim that ‘enframing’ is grounded in an ontotheology transmitted to us by Nietzsche. On Heidegger’s reading, Nietzsche’s staunch anti-metaphysical stance merely hides the fact that he actually philosophized on the basis of an ‘unthought’ metaphysics. Nietzsche’s Nachlab clearly demonstrates that he conceptualized ‘the totality of beings as such’ ontotheologically , as ‘eternally recurring will-to-power’, that is, as an unending disaggregation and reaggregation of forces without purpose or goal.15 This Nietzschean ontotheology not only inaugurates the ‘metaphysics of the atomic age’, it grounds enframing: Our unthinking reliance on Nietzsche’s ontotheology is leading us to transform all beings, ourselves included, into mere ‘resources’ (Bestand), entities lacking intrinsic meaning which are thus simply optimized and disposed of with maximal efficiency.16 Heidegger famously characterizes enframing as a technological understanding of being. As an historical ‘mode of revealing’ in which entities increasingly show up only as resources to be optimized, enframing generates a ‘calculative thinking’ which, like the mythic touch of King Midas, quantifies all qualitative relations. This ‘limitless “quantification”’ which absorbs all qualitative relations (until we come to treat ‘quantity as quality’) is rooted in enframing’s ontologically reductive mode of revealing, whereby ‘[o]nly what is calculable in advance counts as being’. Enframing thus tends to reduce all entities to bivalent, programmable ‘information’, digitized data, which increasingly enters into ‘a state of pure circulation’.17 Indeed, as Heidegger’s phenomenological meditation on a highway interchange revealed to him in the 1950s – and as our ‘information superhighway’, the Internet, now makes plain – we exhibit a growing tendency to relate to our world and ourselves merely as a ‘network of long distance traffic, paced as calculated for maximum yield’.18 Reading quotidian historical developments in terms of this ontohistorical logic, Heidegger believed our passage from Cartesian modernity to Nietzschean postmodernity was already visible in the transformation of employment agencies into ‘human resource’ departments. The technological move afoot to reduce teachers and scholars to ‘on-line content providers’ merely extends – and so clarifies – the logic whereby modern subjects transform themselves into postmodern resources by turning techniques developed for controlling nature back onto themselves.19 Unfortunately, as this historical transformation of subjects into resources becomes more pervasive, it further eludes our critical gaze; indeed, we come to treat ourselves in the very terms which underlie our technological refashioning of the world: no longer as conscious Cartesian subjects taking control of an objective world, but rather as one more resource to be optimized, ordered, and enhanced with maximal efficiency – whether cosmetically, psychopharmacologically, or educationally . Here, then, Heidegger believes he has uncovered the subterranean ontohistorical logic guiding the development of our educational institutions. But how does contemporary education redirect this nihilistic logic of enframing? In what sense are today’s educational institutions caught up in an unlimited quanti cation of qualitative relations which strips beings of their intrinsic meanings, transforming them into mere resources to be optimized with maximal ef ciency? 3. Education as Enframing Heidegger began developing his critique of higher education in 1911 and continued elaborating it well into the 1960s, but perhaps his most direct answer to this question comes in 1929.20 Having  finally been awarded a full professorship (on the basis of Being and Time), the 39-year-old Heidegger gives his of cial ‘Inaugural Lecture’ at Freiburg University, the famous ‘What is Metaphysics?’ He begins boldly, directing his critical attention to the university itself by emphasizing philosophy’s concrete ‘existential’ foundations (since ‘metaphysical questioning must be posed from the essential position of the existence [Dasein] that questions’). Within the lifeworld of the university, Heidegger observes, ‘existence’ (Dasein) is determined by Wissenschaft, the knowledge embodied in the humanities and natural sciences. ‘Our Dasein – in the community of researchers, teachers, and students – is determined by science or knowledge [durch die Wissenschaft bestimmt]’.21 Our very ‘being-in-the-world’ is shaped by the knowledge we pursue, uncover, and embody. When Heidegger claims that existence is fundamentally shaped by knowledge, he is not thinking of a professoriate shifting in the winds of academic trends, nor simply arguing for a kind of pedagogical or performative consistency, according to which we should practice what we know. His intent, rather, is to emphasize a troubling sense in which it seems that we cannot help practicing what we know, since we are ‘always already’ implicitly shaped by our guiding metaphysical presuppositions. Heidegger’s question thus becomes: What is the ontological impact of our unquestioned reliance on the particular metaphysical presuppositions which tacitly dominate the academy? ‘What happens to us essentially, in the ground of our existence’, when the Wissenschaft pursued in the contemporary university becomes our guiding ‘passion’, fundamentally shaping our view of the world and of ourselves? Heidegger’s dramatic answer introduces his radical critique of the hyperspecialization and consequent fragmentation of the modern university: 250 Iain Thomson The fields of science are widely separated. Their ways of handling the objects of their inquiries differ fundamentally. Today only the technical organization of universities and faculties consolidates this multiplicity of dispersed disciplines, only through practical and instrumental goals do they maintain any meaning. The rootedness of the sciences in their essential ground has dried up and died.2 2 Here in 1929 Heidegger accurately describes the predicament of that institution which, almost half a century later, Clark Kerr would satirically label the ‘Multi-versity’: an internally fragmented Uni-versity-in-name-only, where the sole communal unity stems from a common grievance about parking spaces.23 Historically, as the modern university loses sight of the shared goals which originally justifed the endeavors of the academic community as a whole (at first, the common pursuit of the unified ‘system’ of knowledge, then the communal dedication to the formation of cultivated individuals), its members begin to look outside the university for some purpose to give meaning to lives of research. Since only those disciplines (or, more often today, subdisciplines) able to produce instrumentally useful results regularly find such external support, all disciplines increasingly try to present themselves in terms of their use-value. Without a countervailing ideal, students, too, will tend to adopt this purely instrumental mentality, coming to see education merely as a means to an increased salary down the road. In this way, fragmentation leads to the professionalization of the university and, eventually, its deterioration into vocationalism. At the same time, moreover, the different disciplines, lacking any shared, substantive sense of a unifying purpose or common subject matter, tend by the logic of specialization to develop internal standards appropriate to their particular object-domains. As these domains become increasingly specialized, these internal standards become ever more disparate, if not simply incommensurable. In this way, disciplinary fragmentation leaves the university without common standards, other than the now ubiquitous but entirely empty and formal ideal of excellence. Following in Heidegger's footsteps, important critics of higher education such as Bill Readings and Timothy Clark show how our contemporary "university of excellence," owing to "the very emptiness of the idea of excellence," is "becoming an excellent bureaucratic corporation," "geared to no higher idea than its own maximized self-perpetuation according to optimal input/output ratios."9 Such diagnoses support Heidegger's argument that the development of our educational institutions continues to follow the underlying metaphysical logic of enframing, the progressive transformation of all entities into intrinsically meaningless resources to be optimized. Unfortunately, these critics fail to recognize the underlying ontotheology ultimately responsible for this empty optimization imperative, and so offer diagnoses without cures. Thus, although Readings calls for a recognizably left-Heideggerian refusal "to submit Thought to the exclusive rule of exchange-value," this is not a call he can justify in the materialist terms he adopts. Indeed, Readings's materialist explanation for the historical obsolescence of Bildung as the unifying ideal of the modern university (the result of an "implacable ... bourgeois economic revolution") leads him to succumb to a cynicism in which future denizens of the university can hope for nothing more than "pragmatic" situational responses in an environment increasingly transformed by "the logic of consumerism. "10 Although these important critics of the university convincingly extend and update aspects of Heidegger's analysis, they do not recognize these disturbing trends as interlocking symptoms of an underlying ontotheological problem, and, as a result, they are unable to provide a positive vision for the future of higher education. By understanding our educational crisis in terms of its ontotheological roots, Heidegger, in contrast, is able to suggest an alternative, ontological conception of education meant to help us bring about a renaissance of the university.

#### The alternative is to think ontologically – vote negative to interrupt pre-conceived hegemonic understandings of being in favor of that which exceeds technological mastery and the reductionist nihilism of modernity

Thomson 16 – Iain, associate professor of philosophy at the University of New Mexico, Rethinking education after Heidegger: Teaching learning as ontological response-ability, Educational Philosophy and Theory, msm

The later Heidegger abandons this misguided metaphysical quest for a fundamental ontology capable of unifying the University. Instead, he comes to recognize that all the different academic disciplines are already unified; they all implicitly derive their guiding understandings of the being of the classes of entities they study from the nihilistic ontotheology that underlies our late-modern age of technological ‘enframing’. In Heidegger’s later view, all the academic disciplines increasingly understand the being of the classes of entities they study in terms of ‘eternally recurring will-to-power’, that is, they understand the being of all entities as nothing but competing forces coming together and breaking apart with no end beyond the maximal perpetuation of force itself. (We can see this in biology’s guiding understanding of life as a self-replicating pattern of information interacting with an environment; in psychology’s guiding understanding of consciousness as a randomly emergent faculty that confers evolutionary advantages by coordinating the competing information from the earlier emergence of the various sensory modalities; in the understanding of literature as an arena for the struggle between competing voices and perspectives; in the historian’s understanding of history as a study of those clashes between forces which subsequently shaped us the most; and so on.) This nihilistic Nietzschean ontotheology, Heidegger insightfully sug- gests, increasingly leads all the academic domains, and all of us, to pre-understand entities technologically, as mere ‘resources’ or Bestand, intrinsically meaningless stuff on stand by for efficient optimization. As a result, Heidegger’s later goal for education in general and the university in particular becomes to teach the other disciplines to think ontologically in order to help them uncover other, non-nihilistic ways of understanding being at the frontiers of their own research.17 Heidegger’s hope is to uncover ways of thinking being that no longer reductively preconceive ‘it’ as a modern realm of objects to be mastered and controlled by a subject, nor as an undifferentiated late-modern domain of intrinsically meaningless resources standing by to be efficiently optimized. Heidegger hoped the other disci- plines could instead help us discover other, more meaningful ways of thinking being, just as he thought he had already found a genuinely postmodern understanding of being at work in the art of Van Gogh and the poetry of Ho ̈lderlin. Their artwork is postmodern avant la lettre, in Heidegger’s view, because it helps us understand ‘the being of entities’ neither in terms of modern objects to be mastered, nor as late-modern resources to be optimized, but, instead, as a phenomenologically dynamic source of intelligibility that both informs and also exceeds our every meaningful attempt to conceptualize or otherwise make sense of things.18 It is precisely here, in my view, that we should situate Shepperd’s insightful focus on the pedagogical significance of the ‘gap’, that is, the situational encounter with a profound breakdown, aporia, or interruption which exceeds our mastery and so frustrates our pre-existing plans and intentions. When we teachers of learning effectively ‘open up a space, a gap in the world’, we not only serve the important Socratic first step of disabusing (all of us) students of our ignorance about our own ignorance; by enduring such an initially humbling and anxiety-provoking confrontation with genuine aporia, we can learn to step beyond the limits of our current world into an unmastered space beyond. Doing so helps us see (in the Heideggerian terms Shepperd adduces) that learning is not primarily about acquiring ‘information’ but, rather, about ‘freeing vision’. Stepping into the open beyond what-is (I would emphasize), we can encounter that ‘noth-ing’ from which the not-yet comes to be. A positive encounter with this dynamic ‘noth-ing’—or this texture-rich ‘earth’, or this phe- nomenologically unstillable ‘presencing’—becomes the crucial pivot that helps us learn to respond ontologically and so ‘turn’ beyond our current technological under- standing of the being of entities as nothing but meaningless resources. By learning to creatively and responsibly respond to this initially inchoate ‘noth-ing’ as the ‘not yet’ of what is coming to be (and so not as nothing at all but instead as ‘the noth-ing’ of that which needs our disclosive efforts to help name and so bring it into being), we post-Heideggerian thinkers of ontological education can help serve a larger historical transformation from nihilism into a genuinely meaningful postmodernity. It is, in my considered judgement, this vision of spiritual revolution that makes Heidegger’s think- ing so dangerous and yet also so suggestive, important, and inspiring (Thomson, 2011, chapters seven and eight).

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#### This an ontologically violent worldview that enrolls all entities in the eternal nihilism of profit maximization – devalues human existence

Joronen 2013 – Mikko, Prof @ University of Turku, Finland, Department of Geography, Conceptualising New Modes of State Governmentality: Power, Violence and the Ontological Mono-politics of Neoliberalism, Geopolitics, 18:2, 356-370, taylor and francis, msm

A growing visibility given to neoliberalism among geographers over the last fifteen years has led to a wide-scale conceptual and empirical recognition of its variegations, from the institutional, city-regional and state-based policies to the new modes of government conducted at the level of body and everyday life.1 In spite of its tendency to infringe the territorially bound modes of national sovereignty, neoliberalisation has not merely operated as an extra-territorial power capable of violating the state sovereignty, but has become an essential part of the constitution of the new modes of state governance.2 In addition to the sovereign rule of the state, state governance is being established more and more through the production of de-politicised subjectivities, constituting citizenship as a reserve for the state to use in the global competition.3 Such ‘neoliberal governmentality’ of the self and the conducts of individuals has become a new mode of state power with new spatial formations prominently justified with regard to the survival struggle of the state in the whirlpool of global capital. This paper aims to scrutinise two central processes constitutive for the emergence of the neoliberal state: the neoliberal production of the self (‘selfcontrolling subjects’) and the rise of the new ontology of nature and social existence (‘ontological mono-politics’), upon which the former process is fundamentally based. As the paper argues below, this transformation of the state is based on the ontological enframing of entities and individual conducts. It shows how neoliberalisation is a process of ontological violence, which does not merely govern the conduct of individuals by encouraging a particular form of subjectivity, but also enframes all entities for the use of market forces. Instead of ideological or discursive turn grounded on new types of political practices, the rise of the neoliberal state is seen as an extending drive of the ontological setting of what Martin Heidegger calls the ‘enframing’ (das Gestell). Such ‘enframing’ works by de-politicising particular governmental rationalities, such as the efficient managerialism of entities and calculative constitution of the self, but also by globally unleashing its ‘drive to enframe’ entities. Hence, state is an essential constituent of the intersection between power, globalisation, and the production of subjectivities – of a process where market rationalities do not just aim to extend their power over all aspects of social existence, but also across the earth. As Simon Springer4 shows, geographers and geographical theorisation on spatial displacements of neoliberalism have been particularly sensitive to the hybrid forms and mutated outcomes of neoliberalisation. Accordingly, this paper does not aim to deprecate the importance of the process-based analyses on how and in what ways neoliberalism actually emerges and becomes problematised. After all, as Peck and Tickell write, “One of the most striking features of the recent history of neoliberalism is its quite remarkable transformative capacity”.5 Instead, the paper concentrates on explicating the flip side of neoliberalisation: the ontological logic through which multiplicity of ontic events and transformations are enframed and revealed. The aim here is not to systematise empiric facts, but to explore their ontological constitution. It is argued that the process of neoliberalisation is in itself essentially characterised by an ontological drive to reveal things as reserves for the calculative use based on market rationalities. Even though the focus on ontology has to meet certain risks involved in the writing genre orientated to “grand narratives”, “wider processes” or paradigmatic conditions, the discussion here does not hollow out the ontic heterogeneity and difference.6 At the ontic level, neoliberalisation is evidently related to ambiguous nuances, multiple outcomes and unpredictable events that are not identical to each other, but which arguably have ontological similarity and parallelism. Neoliberalisation incorporates monophonic politics only at the level of ontology: as a drive to reveal things in terms of calculable market value. The paper starts by showing how Michel Foucault’s work on the ‘neoliberal subjectification’, presented in the recent publication of his Lectures at the College de France, The Birth of Biopolitics, can be significantly enriched through Martin Heidegger’s writings on the historical emergence of the ontological mode of revealing he conceptualises as ‘enframing’ (Gestell) and ‘machination’ (Machenschaft).7 Geographers have paid some attention to the close relation between Foucault and Heidegger, yet the reception has either focused on the ontological issues8 or alternatively touched on the relation between enframing and governmentality,9 without reading these all together, in particular, with regard to the questions of neoliberalism and state government. Accordingly, the paper argues for an interpretation of neoliberalisation and its logic of government as epiphenomenal to the ontological ‘enframing’ (Gestell) of things and human capabilities into a usable array of constantly available ‘standing-reserves’ (Bestand). All in all, the first part of the paper expands the discussion of state government to the level of ontology, and hence, from the governmentality of subjects to ordering and enframing of the real as such. The second part of the paper continues by showing how the ontological violence of the neoliberal state and the economisation of everyday life are fundamentally based on the ontological concealment of life and its possibilities, the openness of being. The second part concludes, through the works of Agamben and Heidegger, by re-opening the ontological mono-politics of neoliberalism for proper critique. THE ONTOLOGY OF GOVERNANCE: ENFRAMING THE HOMO ECONOMICUS Even though the reception of neoliberalism in geographical literature has grown enormously during the last three decades,10 contradictions between mutable particularities and theoretical contributions still seem overwhelming for a conceptual consensus. Most of this comes back to ontological resiliencies between the approaches, in spite of the evident overlapping and possibilities for hybrid interpretations. While more policy-based approaches seem to focus on state reforms and transformations,11 others are more comfortable at framing neoliberalism as an ideological project entangled with the hegemony of the elites protecting their comparative advantage in the neoliberal redistribution of the wealth.12 Studies focusing on neoliberal govern-mentality in turn tend to emphasise, mainly by following the thoughts of Michel Foucault, the techniques and rationalities concerning the “mentality” of how our conducts are governed and rationalised as a neoliberal common sense.13 While within governmentality studies considerable focus has been directed to the art of governing the social body of the state – after all, Foucault’s original definition of governmentality referred to institutions, administrative practices and knowledge that, instead of the rule over territory, were aimed to govern the conducts of entire populations14 – recently more geographers have followed Foucault’s own passage to explore the ways through which individuals are governed, and further, how they govern themselves.15 As Foucault argues in the Birth of Biopolitics, neoliberal governmentality works by framing and encouraging a specific modality of self-repressive subjectivity: the economically calculating, benefit-maximising and efficiently productive ‘atom of self-interests’, the homo economicus. 16 While classic liberalism made homo economicus a partner of exchange, such exchange defining the anthropology of man and the societal space of the markets, in neoliberalism, Foucault writes, homo economicus becomes defined solely in terms of competition. Unlike in liberalism, where the process of exchange was defined as a natural action, in neoliberalism competition becomes an artificial space, which needs to be defended against the monopolies and interventions of the state. The central problem in neoliberalism, then, is how the existing political power can be organised on the basis of market principles: while the classic liberalism aimed to free up the natural space of market exchange, for the latter the question is more of a style, of how one acts, of how one’s conducts must be governed with a proper manner.17 Although Foucault’s discussion on the constitution of the self through the particular form of subjectivity covers a great deal of the process of making the neoliberal state, governmentality approaches seem to leave the question concerning the new ontology of human and non-human existence relatively untouched. As Braun suggests,18 governmentality does not merely rely on a rationality of self-control, but also denotes a material process of governing and measuring natural entities. Hence, it seems to subject both human and non-human entities to the trade of calculative profit-making, not just by reducing capabilities of citizens to the economically rational and productive conducts, but also by enframing all things to the assemblage of ‘standing reserves’ set available for the market-efficient use. As David Harvey reminds us,19 eventually neoliberalism can continue its process of accumulation only by disposing the commons, such as clean water, through the commodification and privatisation. The neoliberal governmentality, thus, does not lead into a mere encouragement of the economically rational conducts, but encloses all beings in terms of a uniform plane of existence: as a part of ‘enframing’ (Gestell), through which things are revealed as a usable and available set of ‘standing-reserve’ (Bestand). According to Heidegger, the emergence of the apparatus of ‘enframing’ (Gestell) is fundamentally rooted in the historical process where the modern techniques originally developed for controlling the nature became turned back to us.21 In the process, both the modern subject and the modern nature of paralysed objects were sucked up into standing-reserves and thus revealed as an enframed array available for the use of calculative machinations. Apparently such ontological shift has had massive consequences: enframing can take place through an unlimited number of guises, practices and material settings, since it works by creating certainty on the availability, usability and controllability of things and subjects. Through the apparatus of enframing, defined by Heidegger as the “gathering together of that setting-upon which sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as a standing-reserve”,22 subjects and objects are simply made available for the power to control, calculate and order them with predictable certainty. As a number of studies have pointed out, enframing is able to measure different sets of practices, discourses and material relations related, for instance, to creative industries,23 carbon economy,24 colonialism,25 forest conservation,26 globalisation,27 and science,28 and should be understood above all as a broader political order based on metaphysical positioning of entities. As a modality of enframing, the process of neoliberalisation has evidently created an entire array of governmental politics actualised through the different orders, possibilities, and positions of things. First of all, as Foucault writes, neoliberalism denotes an ethical order defining the proper constitution of the self. In neoliberalism, every action human subjects attempt to recognise as an end of their actions becomes assimilated to the economy of market rationality, to the robust calculations of costs against the benefits. Hence, human existence is solely caught up to serve the nihilist utility of maximum profit. Under such ethos, or better, under such inversion of ethos, human existence is reduced to a nihilist framework constituted by the arrangements efficiently implementing seemingly value neutral means. Enframing thus represents everything that is nihilist in a contemporary world-economy: planetary homelessness, calculative aimlessness, mischief of other forms of rationalities, and the constant devaluation of nature and human existence as mere stocks of profits.29 As Zizek writes, global capitalism is a “truth-without-meaning”, a worldless constellation capable of accommodating itself to any cultural and material setting.30 In ‘enframing’, a calculative regulation of all domains of life becomes a fundamental goal of its own. As Heidegger prudently wrote as early as 1939,31 the humanity seems to be producing itself in such a manner that the “absolute meaningless is valued as the one and only meaning”. The preservation of such nihilism appears not only as “a human domination of the globe”, but also as a mode of existence sucked up to the process where the ‘will to calculate’ fumbles its own strengthening. Hence, ‘enframing’ leads into a nihilist mode of subjectivity, where the human will is challenged to will more of the optimal calculations. Heidegger makes a great effort, in the four-book series of Nietzsche lectures in particular, in order to show how such production of the nihilist mode of revealing was inaugurated by Nietzsche’s notion of will to power. Through the ‘will to power’, beings are revealed as makeable, as something dragged under the strengthening power of human willing and machinations. Eventually, the will wills nothing but its own empowerment, its will to will more of itself. In the neoliberal modality of homo economicus this ‘will to will’ turns into a ‘will to profit’ evidently following the same ontological logic of self-increasing calculations. As a consequence, human beings turn into technical subjects self-controlling their conducts through the value-neutral calculation of the means for the maximum profit. In a neoliberal common sense, we are hence not only part of the value neutral and de-politicised economic nihilism, but also enframed, positioned, and tranquilised by the self-optimising drive of calculative arrangements.32 This leads us to the second point: even though human existence is enframed into usable reserve, our position in enframing still differs from the position of non-human entities. Foucault evidently refers to this when exploring the historical emergence of homo economicus, wherein the ‘worker’ of liberalism turns into a ‘human capital’ of neoliberalism.33 In neoliberalism, Foucault argues, the wage earner of liberalism, an individual who without the possession of capital is obligated to sell his/her labour power as a commodity, turns into a human capital, into a usable reserve of the individual’s acquired skills and genetic qualities. Accordingly, such a change signifies an ontological process where the modern subject becomes translated into a late-modern reserve: human beings are constantly optimised and ordered to flexibly serve the instrumental interests of profit-making.34 In neoliberal enframing, human beings eventually turn into what Foucault calls the ‘entrepreneur of himself’: an indivisible unit of calculating self-interests who “remains for himself his own capital”, “his own producer”, and “his own source of earnings”.35

#### The alternative is to think ontologically – vote negative to interrupt pre-conceived hegemonic understandings of being in favor of that which exceeds technological mastery and the reductionist nihilism of modernity

Thomson 16 – Iain, associate professor of philosophy at the University of New Mexico, Rethinking education after Heidegger: Teaching learning as ontological response-ability, Educational Philosophy and Theory, msm

The later Heidegger abandons this misguided metaphysical quest for a fundamental ontology capable of unifying the University. Instead, he comes to recognize that all the different academic disciplines are already unified; they all implicitly derive their guiding understandings of the being of the classes of entities they study from the nihilistic ontotheology that underlies our late-modern age of technological ‘enframing’. In Heidegger’s later view, all the academic disciplines increasingly understand the being of the classes of entities they study in terms of ‘eternally recurring will-to-power’, that is, they understand the being of all entities as nothing but competing forces coming together and breaking apart with no end beyond the maximal perpetuation of force itself. (We can see this in biology’s guiding understanding of life as a self-replicating pattern of information interacting with an environment; in psychology’s guiding understanding of consciousness as a randomly emergent faculty that confers evolutionary advantages by coordinating the competing information from the earlier emergence of the various sensory modalities; in the understanding of literature as an arena for the struggle between competing voices and perspectives; in the historian’s understanding of history as a study of those clashes between forces which subsequently shaped us the most; and so on.) This nihilistic Nietzschean ontotheology, Heidegger insightfully sug- gests, increasingly leads all the academic domains, and all of us, to pre-understand entities technologically, as mere ‘resources’ or Bestand, intrinsically meaningless stuff on stand by for efficient optimization. As a result, Heidegger’s later goal for education in general and the university in particular becomes to teach the other disciplines to think ontologically in order to help them uncover other, non-nihilistic ways of understanding being at the frontiers of their own research.17 Heidegger’s hope is to uncover ways of thinking being that no longer reductively preconceive ‘it’ as a modern realm of objects to be mastered and controlled by a subject, nor as an undifferentiated late-modern domain of intrinsically meaningless resources standing by to be efficiently optimized. Heidegger hoped the other disci- plines could instead help us discover other, more meaningful ways of thinking being, just as he thought he had already found a genuinely postmodern understanding of being at work in the art of Van Gogh and the poetry of Ho ̈lderlin. Their artwork is postmodern avant la lettre, in Heidegger’s view, because it helps us understand ‘the being of entities’ neither in terms of modern objects to be mastered, nor as late-modern resources to be optimized, but, instead, as a phenomenologically dynamic source of intelligibility that both informs and also exceeds our every meaningful attempt to conceptualize or otherwise make sense of things.18 It is precisely here, in my view, that we should situate Shepperd’s insightful focus on the pedagogical significance of the ‘gap’, that is, the situational encounter with a profound breakdown, aporia, or interruption which exceeds our mastery and so frustrates our pre-existing plans and intentions. When we teachers of learning effectively ‘open up a space, a gap in the world’, we not only serve the important Socratic first step of disabusing (all of us) students of our ignorance about our own ignorance; by enduring such an initially humbling and anxiety-provoking confrontation with genuine aporia, we can learn to step beyond the limits of our current world into an unmastered space beyond. Doing so helps us see (in the Heideggerian terms Shepperd adduces) that learning is not primarily about acquiring ‘information’ but, rather, about ‘freeing vision’. Stepping into the open beyond what-is (I would emphasize), we can encounter that ‘noth-ing’ from which the not-yet comes to be. A positive encounter with this dynamic ‘noth-ing’—or this texture-rich ‘earth’, or this phe- nomenologically unstillable ‘presencing’—becomes the crucial pivot that helps us learn to respond ontologically and so ‘turn’ beyond our current technological under- standing of the being of entities as nothing but meaningless resources. By learning to creatively and responsibly respond to this initially inchoate ‘noth-ing’ as the ‘not yet’ of what is coming to be (and so not as nothing at all but instead as ‘the noth-ing’ of that which needs our disclosive efforts to help name and so bring it into being), we post-Heideggerian thinkers of ontological education can help serve a larger historical transformation from nihilism into a genuinely meaningful postmodernity. It is, in my considered judgement, this vision of spiritual revolution that makes Heidegger’s think- ing so dangerous and yet also so suggestive, important, and inspiring (Thomson, 2011, chapters seven and eight).

### 1NC – 3

#### The aff’s shift to holistic, personalized academic evaluation in favor of standardized testing is complicit in the violence of neoliberal atomistic individualization – their pragmatic justifications merely serve to shroud the malevolence of their ideological commitment to technocratic managerialism and cartesian politics

Wilkins 12 – Andrew Wilkins is Senior Lecturer in Education Studies at the University of East London. He is a member of the ESRC Peer Review College (2012-2019), Fellow of the Higher Education Academy (HEA), co-convenor of the BERA SIG Social Theory and Education, and Associate of the Robert Owen Centre for Educational Change, University of Glasgow. COMMODIFYING DIVERSITY: EDUCATION AND GOVERNANCE IN THE ERA OF NEOLIBERALISM, HUMAN AFFAIRS 22, 122–130, 2012, msm

As the above quotations indicate, a key component of personalized learning was a strict focus on generating choice and voice in learning. A central claim of these writers is that education needs to support work-based and skills-focused learning in order to cultivate the necessary personal attributes and knowledges to enable children to work later in life. In this framing, personalized learning is promoted and legitimated on the basis that it structures the organization of schooling and learning in a way that makes it responsive to the demands for a more customized education, ostensibly precipitated by a burgeoning consumer culture. In this vision of education, personalized learning serves to build the character of schooling around the needs, interests and aspirations of individual pupils, with pupils incited to behave and look upon themselves as “educational shoppers in the market place…and creators of their own educational experience” (Miliband 2006, 29-30). What is being echoed here is something I touched on at the beginning of the paper, which is that difference becomes flattened as a result of neoliberalism with its insistence that welfare providers can and should improve their services through appealing to citizens as consumers with values and tastes which can be surveyed and provided for with rational detachment. Consistent with the character of early Anglophone liberalism (of the transcendental subject posited by Kant and the theory of self-originating sources of valid claims proposed by Rawls) what personalized learning does is champion the moral and ontological primacy of the subject and its supposed “rational centre”, namely the idea that children and young people share the ability (as consumers) to calibrate their behaviour on the basis of a set of narrow calculating, utilitarian norms which they all possess. The child in effect is positioned as a self-generating and self-actualizing agent, subject to the proper conditions. In other ways, it promotes the idea that children’s educational abilities are somehow genetically hard-wired or psychologized, that they have personal learning styles, personal competencies and skills, and personal curricular choices. Learning in effect is reduced to a commodity and the learner—constructed as a rational utility maximizer, someone who starts from a position of complete rational knowledge about his or her own wants and needs—is reduced to a consumer in a marketplace. Conclusion To insist that children are self-determining, self-authoring agents has enormous benefits for a consumer- and market-oriented conception of education. First, it reinforces the neoliberal drive towards atomistic individualization and attributes learning orientations to a private psychological propensity or “attitude” that is particular to each individual. As a result of this, education institutions are encouraged to respond through adjusting their provision on the basis of custom-made, tailored, consumer-focused services to reflect the idea that preferences reflect innate personal wants and needs. Subsequently, a field of educational choice and consumer voice is legitimated, both pedagogically and politically. Diversity in education can thus be understood to extending the reach and scope of market-based mechanisms of choice and consumer voice, as well as induce children and parents as productive sites for the mobilization of neoliberal governance. In other words, through their compliance, parents, teachers and children become modalities for the exercise of neoliberal rule, the vehicles for the articulation and strengthening of neoliberal frameworks, ethics and subjectivities. Second, the emphasis on persons as self-contained entities, free and autonomous, becomes strictly commensurate with its own de-politicization. This means that advocates of personalized learning can bypass accusations concerning the ideological content of their arguments and frame them instead in pragmatic terms. These observations also provide evidence for disputing the ostensible anti-state position which underpins much of neoliberal policy rhetoric, e.g. the idea that neoliberalism functions in the absence of state power and a regulated welfare state. In fact, neoliberalism and state power go hand-in-hand. We might consider, for example, how the importation of tasks, responsibilities and power to schools and parents under neoliberal governance necessitates the removal of certain forms of external control and authority at the very same time that it involves the spread of new forms of surveillance, regulation and intervention, forms which are typically enacted by voluntary and private organizations funded directly by the government. Take auditing, for example. Auditing refers to the practice of calculating the value and efficiency of an organization according to its output, and for a long time was conventionally associated with profit-making organizations. Now, public services are subject to the same rules and regulations. In schools, pedagogic decisions in the classroom are often manipulated by a remote auditor who evaluates the efficiency and flexibility of the school, usually in terms of economical utility and value for money. Similarly, in higher education institutions, lecturers must contend with the accountability measures being forced through by a scaled-back government which wishes to see less bureaucracy, but who are in fact producing more bureaucracy through demanding audits of teaching hours, transparency levels of work practices, peer teaching evaluation, teaching quality and research audits. In schools and colleges, this opens up spaces for stakeholder modes of governance, which refers to the inclusion of business, political and other interest groups to the running of schools. Additionally, it gives further weight and authority to the increasingly pervasive role of “experts” as arbiters of professionalism and efficiency in the realm of welfare. This suggests that diversity contributes to generating a field of relationships in which state power becomes greater even as it ostensibly appears to be rolled back. This is what Clarke and Newman (1997) refer to as the “managerial state”: a context of welfare governance in which processes of centralization and de-centralization combine with the reduction of central state power coupled with the expansion of non-state actors. In other words, what we are witnessing with the arrival of neoliberal governance is not so much the rolling back of the state (the state funds or gives generous tax breaks to non-state actors, namely voluntary, charity and private organizations, to intervene, monitor and sanction the governing of civil society, for example); rather, what we are witnessing is the rolling out of state power through non-state actors and the outsourcing of state responsibility and power to individuals and welfare institutions.

#### The alternative is to think ontologically – vote negative to interrupt pre-conceived hegemonic understandings of being in favor of that which exceeds technological mastery and the reductionist nihilism of modernity

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### Quotes to look for

**Personalized edu –**

Holistic admissions stuff

**University**

Poverty cards

University good for xyz cards

Decreasing equality cards

**Cheating**

Cards about why cheating is bad that aren’t about ableism

**Fiat**

Framing/method cards

## Overview

### 2NR – O/V – Thesis

#### [the 1ar is fundamentally defensive and it will cost them this debate]

#### They’ve conceded our thesis which is the world is a constant state of unmastered flux – their form of debate’s imposition of technological mastery over the world forces students to internalize the logic of efficient optimization of all entities, seeing the world as nothing more than the maximal perpetuation of force itself.

### 2NR – L – Personalized Edu

#### We’re going for the personalized education link – extend Wilkins – generating “choice” and “diversity” in education is fundamentally a neoliberal project of nihilistic enframing – when they call for expanding access to the university for disadvantaged students [in x card], they construct students as rational consumers, capable of choosing educational experiences as commodities, reinforcing a neoliberal atomistic individualization that prevents all forms of community and strengthens militarized subject/object distinctions. That enables a neoliberal enframing where all is accounted for through use-value, enforcing a form of nihilism where no value is possible outside of being a tool in the cogs of neoliberalism. This calculative aimlessness is terminal defense to the aff – in the end, it doesn’t matter whether or not you get into college, because all value is swept away as neoliberal power commodifies all entities in it’s path.

#### Independently, they presume that student needs can be accounted for in a rationally detached, cartesian manner and thereby responded to through careful calculation rather than changing educational institutions themselves – the aff is nothing but a band-aid, instead of solving the reason minority students are disadvantaged in education, it just gets rid of some of some evidence of that – standardized tests are nothing more than proof of the failure of modern education, but getting rid of that proof just makes the ultimate remedy harder to achieve. They need to answer this argument to win any risk of solvency on the case page!

#### Against this, the alternative is a form of ontological education that positions teachers and students together as explorers of pedagogies rather than providers and consumers of knowledge. Rather than understanding education through use-value, we should see it as an intrinsically complex source of values and intelligibility – recognize that all arguments have political motivation, be willing to step into new ways of thinking about the world, and embrace the inability to control the world instead of trying to find the best solutions – that allows us to see the world in ways other than use value and not constantly run from unintelligibility.

### 2NR – L – University

#### We’re going for the university link – that’s Thomson 5 – their vision of the university as an intrinsic good that will solve the inequalities of modernity as soon as we fix admissions does nothing but reify modern neoliberal metaphysics of use-value – the mentality of gaining admission for the purpose of a higher income cements nihilism, as there is no value left in life except for use-value – every aspect of education becomes a means to end, high school is for university admissions, university is for a salary – all actions and entities are understood as pure resources and data, to prove a university is diverse, to prove a major is useful, to resolve structural inequalities, to prove the bootstraps narrative of capitalism – in this way, the university becomes the self-perpetuating ideal of this ontological neoliberalism, where all who enter it exit devoid of all value except for their ability to generate a higher income

#### This is terminal impact defense to the aff – in the end, it doesn’t matter whether or not you get into college, because all value is swept away as neoliberal power commodifies all entities in it’s path – degree or not, you end up as nothing more than a cog in the machine of technological capitalism, with nihilism cemented into your everyday existence after being thoroughly rationalized by their model of debate, values and the university – even if the alt doesn’t solve, if we win this we win the debate because they haven’t won a reason why getting into university is valuable

#### It’s also offense – their vision of redeeming modern education so it’s no longer [racist/x/y/x] and can include as many different groups as possible simply allows it to grow stronger and perpetuate its image across all aspects of life and culture – they uniquely frame the university as the pinnacle of modern existence [as proven by x line/cx/when in the 1ac they don’t even read an impact besides university admissions]

#### In the context of the link, the alternative is to think ontologically about the university – rather than understanding it as the origin of all use-value, the ultimate means to an end, we should see it as a complex source of values and intelligibility – by recognizing that thought production and learning is always politically motivated, we can open ourselves up to new forms of education and alternative futures – acceptance of the complexity allows us to find value in our lives – but, the perm wrecks that – the demand that we understand the ideal policy to [do x] recreates the mindset of complete knowing and use-value, regardless of the inclusion of other forms of value

### 2NR – L – Fiat [don’t read thesis]

#### They’ve conceded our thesis level K of their model of debate which comes before every other layer of the debate because it is a direct impact turn to their framework arguments – existence is ultimately a complex source of information, flux and intelligibility that is both what determines our understanding of the world and exceeds it in every way – their model of fiated debate forces students to impose different means of technologically mastering the world in an attempt to achieve ideal optimization in the world through successive debates

#### There are two impacts

#### A. Managerial optimization – the drive for ultimate efficiency forces us to view the entire world as a resource to be optimized, categorized and used to make the world better – meaning is entirely dependent on use-value – that forces us to see ourselves as tools, making us complicit in the system of domination and preventing us from experiencing any value or happiness outside of the ultimate goal of getting a higher income/etc, cementing nihilism towards general existence

#### B. Passivity – Their model of debate forces us to continually run from or master all flux, chaos and imperfection in the world, whether through exclusionary arguments like framework or the utopian imagining of fiat. This results in living in constant fear of all outside our understanding of the world, and we can never find value in the unpredictable, precluding all celebration of that outside of our mastery

#### The alternative is to think ontologically about debate – instead of seeing it as a way of knowing the world and achieving skills to [become a better policy maker/more ethical], we should see it as an intrinsically complex source of values and intelligibility – recognize that all arguments have political motivation, be willing to step into new ways of thinking about the world, and embrace the inability to control the world instead of trying to find the best solutions – that allows us to see the world in ways other than use value and not constantly run from unintelligibility

#### This is all in the Thomson cards so don’t let the 2ar rant about how the 2nr is new explanation, plus, the entire point of the 2nr is contextualization of arguments

## Framework

### Top – CX Judge

#### Debate should be a site of critically analyzing our orientation towards and understanding of the world – their model of finding the best technical solutions to problems forces students to internalize a logic of nothing having any value except use-value and a logic of mastery over the world through the concept that we can achieve ultimate truth and understanding through successive debates over alternate realities – that

#### A. Creates nihilism – when we see everything as simply a means to a perfect world, we see ourselves as well as tools and can no longer find value in life, expressing itself students adopting passivity in the face of an increasingly competitive economy, overpopulation and other global problems – only our model of critically interrogating values allows us to find alternate ways of seeing the world that positions entities as an end to themselves

#### B. Causes ressentiment – as we constantly run from and try to master all flux in the world, we live in constant fear of it and can never find value in our lives – the unending pursuit of ultimate mastery precludes all celebration of that which is outside of our mastery – only a critical interrogation of mastery can allow for us to recognize meaning outside of their model

#### If I win this you can judge kick the alt and evaluate framework as an alternate model of debate that generates uniqueness for the K

#### Independently, it’s offense – the two impacts are disads to their models of debate that are critiques of their form of debate and thus precedes substance – all this is coming from our 1nc Thomson 16 card

### Top – LD Judge

#### Counterinterp – The aff has to defend the scholarship and thought that undergirds the affirmative and its implications on subjectivities before getting to weigh the affirmative itself – this a prerequisite question to fiat

#### All the impacts to the K are offense against this because they are reasons why just weighing the aff in all it’s assumptions is bad – the ballot will never come close to resulting in the plan, but, it can encourage or deter models of debate which means in round impacts come first – that means you weigh the K vs framework before you let them weigh the aff

#### There are some DAs to their model of debate

#### A. Optimization – their model of finding the best solutions to problems forces students to understand the world through use-value – that prevents them from seeing any value in life besides their ability to get a higher income or make the world materially better which cements nihilism – this is our thesis stuff at the top

#### B. Never critically interrogating scholarship means that they will never be held accountable for problematic understandings of the world or actions – taken to it’s logical extreme, it justifies arguments like racism good which is obviously bad

#### C. Dogmatism – their model encourages prevents students from ever thinking about the ideological starting points of their impacts which prevents critical interaction with power structures and just indoctrinates students into dominant modes of thinking

### AT: wE nEeD oUr AfF

#### If we win you shouldn’t have read the aff in the first place then it’s probably best that you don’t get to keep those 6 minutes – our standards clearly come first

#### You get infinite prep – you should be able to defend your scholarship

#### You can still use aspects of the aff to answer the K – links are to the 1ac – do a better job clashing and you can weigh aspects of the aff without necessarily getting the fiated implications – an aff that can’t justify it’s scholarship will lose debates to phil regardless

### AT: Clash

#### Clash obviously still happens – the 2nr is bound to 1ar responses

#### Focus on a ten second statement results in less clash than nuanced debates over how the entirety of the 1ac relates to the world

#### No one reads generic state bad/fiat bad affs every round because judges hate it – you can only win if you have nuanced links

### AT: Education About Policies/Scenario Planning

#### Education about what possibilities? The only thing you’ll learn about is university admissions on this topic, which we’ve impact turned

#### The drive to learn the best way to control the world just creates ressentiment and lash-out against difference when you can’t fiat the world after you leave debate

### AT: Predictability

#### Predictability is impossible, especially on this topic where every advantage has a thousand advantage counterplans that solve it way better – limiting out a certain approach to debate can never make debate more predictable – instead it just creates a fear of the unknown that a. causes lash-out against difference and b. results in nihilism and precludes value when debate is never a perfect game of reading the same blocks over and over

## Perm

### Top

#### It’s severance out of basically every part of the aff except the 1ac – [util, the framing/method page, their university good adv, their cheating bad adv] – that’s a voting issue – it makes the 1ar a moving target which makes clash impossible – voter for deterrence

#### Curricular integration DA – under the perm, the alt becomes an object to be studied in a class, something to be picked by those interested, and students will never think ontologically, they’ll just think about the concept of ontological thinking – it has to be how we think not what we think and you obviously can’t think in two different ways at the same time which means the perm is severance

#### Sequencing – the alt has to come before the aff – otherwise, the value-systems of modernity coopt it and make it undesirable because it seems useless – we have to teach students to think ontologically before they evaluate things through different value systems

#### Links are DAs to the perm

#### It’s impossible – the plan just redeems modern education

#### No net benefit – we’ve won a critique of evaluation of their impacts in the first place

### AT: 2X Bind

#### The perm is impossible – the severance argument

#### Infinitely regressive – taken to its logical extreme, this obviously justifies endorsing education in every instance

#### This debate should be a question of models

## Alt

### AT: Cede the Political

#### We don’t preclude engagement with the political – we just are an analysis of the values of modernity – our theorization probably leads to political engagement

### AT: Alt links to Personalized Edu

#### It doesn’t –

## AT: Cap Good

### Top

#### No link – the alt doesn’t end capitalism – it changes neolib so the system of values is different – this isn’t a cap k, we just critique certain parts of capitalism

#### No impact – we’ve won that modern capitalism forces universal nihilism because we can’t experience meaning outside of use-value – means death isn’t a net negative

#### Independently, their own cards in the 1ac explain that extinction doesn’t outweigh – [explain]

### AT: War

#### a. Cap fuels resource wars – empirics prove WWI over control of Arabian oil, gulf war also over oil, war in Vietnam over the expansion of markets, trade wars with China and the EU, water wars in Africa

#### b. Capitalism causes far more wars than it solves

Adams 02. Dr. David, former UNESCO Director of the Unit for the International Year for the Culture of Peace, former Professor of Psychology (for 23 years) at Wesleyan University, specialist on the brain mechanisms of aggressive behavior and the evolution of war, “Chapter 8: The Root Causes of War,” The American Peace Movements, p. 22-28, http://www. -of-peace.info/apm/chapter8-22.html

To take a scientific attitude about war and peace, we must carry the causal analysis a step further. If peace movements are caused by wars and war threats, then we must ask, what are the causes of these wars, both in the short term and in the long term? Before analyzing the causes of wars, it is necessary to dismiss a false analysis that has been popularized in recent years, the myth that war is caused by a "war instinct." The best biological and anthropological data indicate that there is no such thing as a war instinct despite the attempt of the mass media and educational systems to perpetuate this myth. Instead, "the same species that invented war is capable of inventing peace" (note 15). Since there are several kinds of war, it is likely that there are several different kinds of causes for war. There are two kinds of war in which the United States has not been engaged for over two centuries. The first are wars of national liberation such as the American Revolution or today's revolutions in Nicaragua and South Africa being waged by the Sandinistas and the African National Congress. The second are wars of revolution in which the previous ruling class is thrown out and replaced by another. In the British and French Revolutions of earlier eras the feudal land-owners were overthrown by the newly rising capitalist class. In the revolutions of this century in Russia, China, Cuba, etc. the capitalists, in turn, were overthrown by forces representing the working class and landless farmers. The six wars and threats of war that have caused American peace movements in this century have been wars of imperial conquest, inter-imperialist rivalry, and capitalist-socialist rivalry. What are the root causes of these wars in the short term? For the following analysis, I will rely upon some of America's best economic historians (note 16). The Spanish-American and Philippine Wars of 1898, according to historian Walter LaFeber, were inevitable military results of a new foreign policy devoted to obtaining markets overseas for American products. The new foreign policy was the response to a profound depression that began in 1893 with unemployment soaring to almost 20 percent. Farm and industrial output piled up without a market because American workers, being unemployed, had no money to buy them. Secretary of State Gresham "concluded that foreign markets would provide in large measure the cure for the depression." To obtain such markets, the U.S. went into competition with the other imperialist empires such as Britain and Spain. The U.S. intervened with a naval force to help overthrow the government of Hawaii in 1893, intervened diplomatically in Nicaragua in 1894, threatened war with England over Venezuela in 1895, and eventually went to war with Spain in 1898 and invaded the Philippines in 1898. To quote from the title of LaFeber's book, the U.S. established a "new empire." American intervention in World War I again rescued the economy from a depression. In 1914 and 1915, as war between the European imperialist powers broke out, American unemployment was rising towards ten percent and industrial goods were piling up without a market. One industrial market was expanding, however, the market for weapons in Europe. The historian Charles Tansill concludes that "it was the rapid growth of the munitions trade which rescued America from this serious economic situation." And since the sales went to Britain and France, it committed the U.S. to their side in the war. Finance capital was equally involved: "the large banking interests were deeply interested in the World War because of wide opportunities for large profits." When bank loans to Britain and France of half a billion dollars went through in 1915, "the business depression, that had so worried the Administration in the spring of 1915, suddenly vanished, and 'boom times' prevailed." Of course, German imperialism did not stand idly by while the U.S. profited from arms shipments and loans to their enemies in the war. German submarine warfare against these shipments finally provoked American involvement in the War. The rise of fascism in Europe was the direct result of still another cyclical depression, the Great Depression that gripped the entire capitalist world in the Thirties. In his recent book on the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the rise of fascism, David Abraham has documented how major capitalists turned to Hitler to fill the vacuum of political leadership when the economy collapsed. In part, the absence of political leadership "with the collapse of the export economy at the end of 1931...drove German industry to foster or accept a Bonapartist solution to the political crisis and an imperialist solution to the economic crisis. The "Bonapartist solution", as Abraham calls it, was found in Hitler's Nazi Party. As he says, "By mid-1932, the vast majority of industrialists wanted to see Nazi participation in the government." For these industrialists, "an anti-Marxist, imperialist program was the least common denominator on which they could all agree, and the Nazis seemed capable of providing the mass base for such a program." The appeasement of Hitler's promise to smash the communists and socialists at home and to destroy the Soviet Union abroad expressed a new cause of capitalist war. Up until that time, inter-imperialist wars were simply the response to economic contradictions at home and capitalist competition abroad. In part, World War II was yet another inter-imperialist war. But now a new cause of war was emerging alongside of the old. The rise of socialism was a direct threat to the entire capitalist world. In addition to glutted domestic markets and competition for foreign markets, the capitalists now had to face the additional problem that the overall foreign market itself was shrinking. Thus, they tended to support each other in the face of a common enemy. After World War II, there was a particularly sharp shrinkage in the "free world" for capitalist exploitation as socialism and national liberation triumphed through much of the world. The U.S. and its allies responded by demanding that the socialist countries open their doors to investment by capitalism. According to historian William Appleman Williams, "It was the decision of the United States to employ its new and awesome power in keeping with the traditional Open Door Policy which crystallized the cold war." As Williams explains, "the policy of the open door, like all imperial policies, created and spurred onward a dynamic opposition." Diplomatic and military confrontation between the U.S. and USSR were used to justify the Cold War and establishment of NATO, but the underlying issues were economic. As pointed out by historians Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, "The question of foreign economic policy was not the containment of Communism, but rather more directly the extension and expansion of American capitalism according to its new economic power and needs." In addition to the new problem of shrinking world markets, there remained the problem of cyclical depressions. Although unemployment was not bad in 1946 because industry was producing to meet the accumulated needs of the war-deprived American people, the specter of another depression was very much a factor in the Cold War. As the Kolkos point out, "The deeply etched memory of the decade-long depression of 1929 hung over all American plans for the postwar era....In extending its power throughout the globe the United States hoped to save itself as well from a return of the misery of prewar experience." The Vietnam War was a continuation of the Cold War, as the United States tried to prevent further shrinkage of the world capitalist economic system. The U.S. had already fought a similar war in Korea. In his chapter, "The U.S. in Vietnam, 1944-66: Origins and Objectives," Gabriel Kolko calls the intervention of the United States in Vietnam, "the most important single embodiment of the power and purposes of American foreign policy since the Second World War." Elsewhere in his book, Kolko goes into detail about the economic basis of American imperialism: access to raw materials, access to markets for American products, and investment opportunities for American capital. The Vietnam War, he explains, was not a conspiracy or simply a military decision. It was the natural result of "American power and interest in the modern world." Finally we come to the question of what has caused the massive escalation of the arms buildup under Presidents Carter and Reagan (and more recently under Bush, father and son). To some extent, it is a response to the old problem of cyclical depressions. Since World War II, each recession has been deeper than the last, until by 1981 unemployment reached double digits for the first time since the Thirties. Government spending was needed to put people back to work. Would the government spend the money for military weapons or for civilian needs? A long line of Presidential candidates, standing for the military solution, have been supported in their campaigns by the military-industrial complex against other candidates who were unable to wage a serious campaign for civilian spending instead of military spending. The growing power of the military-industrial complex is a new and especially dangerous addition to the economic causes of war. It reflects an economic crisis that goes even deeper than those of the past. In addition to the cyclical depressions and the shrinkage of foreign markets, there is a new imbalance in the entire structure of capitalism. There is an enormous increase in financial speculation and short-term profit schemes. The military-industrial complex has risen to become the dominant sector of the American economy because through the aid of state subsidies it generates the greatest short-term profits. Never mind if the U.S. government goes into debt to banks and other financial institutions in order to pay for military spending. The world of financial speculation does not worry about tomorrow. Not only does this "military spending solution" endanger the security of the planet, but it also increases the risk of a major financial collapse and subsequent depression. To summarize, we may point to the following causes of American wars over the past century: 1) cyclical crises of overproduction and unemployment, 2) exploitation of poor colonial and neo-colonial countries by rich imperialist countries, 3) economic rivalry for foreign markets and investment areas by imperialist powers, 4) the attempt to stop the shrinkage of the "free world" - i.e. the part of the world that is free for capitalist investment and exploitation, and 5) financial speculation and short-term profit making of the military-industrial complex. In the 1985 edition of this book the argument was made that the socialist countries were escaping from the economic causation of war. In comparison to the capitalist countries, they did not have the same dynamic of over-production and cyclical depression, with periods of enhanced structural unemployment. As for exploitation and imperialism, despite the frequent reference in the American media to "Soviet imperialism," the direction of the flow of wealth was the opposite of what holds true under capitalist imperialism. Instead of the rich nations extracting wealth from the poor ones, which is the case, for example between the U.S. and Latin America, the net flow of wealth proceeded from the Soviet Union towards the other socialist countries in order to bring them towards an eventually even level of development. According to an authoritative source associated with the U.S. military-industrial complex, the net outflow from the Soviet Union amounted to over forty billion dollars a year in the mid-1980's. In one crucial respect, however, the 1985 analysis was incorrect. It failed to take account of the military-industrial complex that had grown to be the most powerful force of the Soviet economy, a mirror image of its equivalent in the West. The importance of this was brought home to those of us who attended a briefing on economic conversion from military to civilian production that was held at the United Nations on November 1, 1990, a critical time for Gorbachev's program of Perestroika in the Soviet Union. The speaker, Ednan Ageev, was the head of the Division of International Security Issues at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was asked by the Gorbachev administration to find out the extent to which the Soviet economy was being used for military production. Naturally, he went to the Minister of Defense, where he was told that this information was secret. Secret even to Gorbachev. In conversation, Ageev estimated that 85-90% of Soviet scientific researchers were in the military sector. That seems high until you realize that the Soviet's were matching U.S. military research, development and production on the basis of a Gross National Product only half as large. Since about 40% of U.S. research and development was tied to the military at that time, it would make sense that the Soviets would have had to double the U.S. percentage in order to keep pace. How could the Gorbachev administration convert their economy from military to civilian production if they could not even get a list of defense industries? Keeping this in mind, along with the enormous militarization of the Soviet economy, it is not so surprising that the Soviet economy collapsed, and with it the entire political superstructure. The origins of the Soviet military-industrial complex can be traced back to the Russian revolution which instituted what Lenin, at one point, called "war communism". He warned that war communism could not succeed in the long run and that instead of a top-down militarized economy, a socialist economy needed to be structured as a "cooperative of cooperatives." But war communism was entrenched during the Stalin years, carried out of necessity to an extreme during the Second World War, and then perpetuated by the Cold War. The economic causation of the war system is not new. It originated long before capitalism and socialism. From its beginnings in ancient Mesopotamia, the state was always associated with war, both to capture slaves abroad and to keep them under control at home. As states grew more powerful, war became the means to build empires and to acquire and rule colonies. In fact, the economic causation of war probably extends back even further into ancient prehistory. From the best analysis I know, that of Mel and Carol Ember, using the methods of cross-cultural anthropology, it would seem that war functioned as a means to survive periodic but unpredictable food shortages caused by natural disasters. Apparently, tribes that could make war most effectively could survive natural disasters better than others by successfully raiding the food supplies of their neighbors. While particular wars can be analyzed, as we have done above, in terms of immediate, short-term causes, there is a need to understand the war system itself, which is as old as human history. Particular wars are the tip of a much deeper iceberg. Beneath war, there has developed a culture of war that is entwined with it in a complex web of causation. On the one hand, the culture of war is produced and reinforced by each war, and, on the other hand, the culture of war provides the basis on which succeeding wars are prepared and carried out. The culture of war is a set of beliefs, attitudes and behaviors that consists of enemy images, authoritarian social structure, training and arming for violence, exploitation of man and nature, secrecy and male domination. Without an enemy, without a social structure where people will follow orders, without the preparation of soldiers and weapons, without the control of information, both propaganda and secrecy, no war can be carried out. The culture of war has been so prevalent in history that we take it for granted, as if it were human nature. However, anthropologists point to cultures that are nowhere near as immersed in the culture of war, and it is the opinion of the best scientists that a culture of peace is possible. Peace movements have not given enough attention to the internal use of the culture of war. The culture of war has two faces, one facing outward and the other inward. Foreign wars are accompanied by authoritarian rule inside the warring countries. Even when there is no war threat, armies (or national guards) are kept ready not just for use against foreign enemies, but also against those defined as the enemy within: striking workers, movements of the unemployed, prisoners, indigenous peoples, just as in an earlier time they were used against slave rebellions. As documented in my 1995 article in the Journal of Peace Research (Internal Military Interventions in the United States) the U.S. Army and National Guard have been used an average of 18 times a year, involving an average of 12,000 troops for the past 120 years, mostly against actions and revolts by workers and the unemployed. During periods of external war, the internal wars are usually intensified and accompanied by large scale spying, deportations and witch hunts. It would appear that we have once again entered such a period in the U.S. We are hardly alone in this matter. Needless to say, the culture of war was highly developed to stifle dissent in the Soviet Union by Stalin and his successors of "war communism." The internal culture of war needs to be analyzed and resisted everywhere. For example, readers living in France should question the role of the CRS. The internal use of the culture of war is no less economically motivated than external wars. The socialists at the beginning of the 20th Century recognized it as "class war," carried out in order to maintain the domination of the rich and powerful over the poor and exploited. Not by accident, it has often been socialists and communists who are the first to be targeted by the internal culture of war in capitalist countries. And they, in turn, have often made the most powerful critique of the culture of war and have played a leading role in peace movements for that reason. Their historical role for peace was considerably compromised, however, by the "war communism" of the Soviet Union. With its demise, however, there is now an opportunity for socialists and communists to return to their earlier leadership against war, both internal and external, and to insist that a true socialism can only flourish on the basis of a culture of peace. In considering future prospects for the American Peace Movements, I shall begin with trends from the past and then consider different factors for the future? First, let us look back over the economic factors and movements of the previous century to see if the trends are likely to continue. 1. Wars are likely to continue because, for the most part, their economic causes remain as strong as ever: 1) cyclical crises of overproduction and unemployment, 2) exploitation of poor colonial and neo-colonial countries by rich imperialist countries, 3) economic rivalry for foreign markets and investment areas by imperialist powers, 4) the attempt to stop the shrinkage of the "free world" - i.e. the part of the world that is free for capitalist investment and exploitation, and 5) financial speculation and short-term profit making of the military-industrial complex. The fourth factor is not as prominent since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but there is still evidence of this factor at work: for example, the attempted overthrow of the government of Venezuela in spring, 2002, was apparently linked to its developing ties with socialist Cuba, especially in terms of its oil resources. Although the coup d'etat failed, there was a risk of plunging Venezuela into warfare, especially considering the increasingly internationalized war next door in Colombia. Although the "war against terrorism" in Afghanistan, Philippines, etc. and the associated military buildup is usually justified as revenge for the attacks of September 11, there seems little doubt that there are economic motives involved as well, including the control of oil resources from Central Asia as a supplement to those of the Middle East. At the same time, the massive expansion of the military-industrial complex in the U.S. appears at some level to be intended as an increase in government spending to hedge against declining non-military production, unemployment and financial crises in the stock markets. 2. The American peace movements have been reactive in the past, developing in response to specific wars or threats of war, and then disappearing when the war is over or the threat is perceived to have decreased. In fact, this observation at the macro level is mirrored by an observation that I have made previously at a micro level: participants in peace movements have been motivated to an important degree by anger against the injustice of war. This dynamic seems likely to continue. Governments, worried about the reactive potential of peace movements may attempt to engage in very brief wars, just as the U.S. government cut short the 1991 Gulf War after several weeks to avoid an escalating peace movement. In the future, peace movements need to be broadened by linkages to other issues and by international solidarity and unity; otherwise they risk being only temporary influences on the course of history, growing in response to particular wars and then disappearing again afterwards. The world needs a sustained opposition to the entire culture of war, not just to particular wars. To be fully successful, the future peace movement needs to be positive as well as negative. It needs to be for a culture of peace at the same time as it is against the culture of war. This requires that activists in the future peace movement develop a shared vision of the future towards which the movement can aspire. I have found evidence, presented in the recent revision of my book Psychology for Peace Activists (note 17), that such a shared, positive vision is now becoming possible, and, as a result, human consciousness can take on a new and powerful dimension in this particular moment of history.

### AT: Warming

#### a. Capitalism values profit over the environment – discourages transition to renewables – also causes un-ending pollution – NAFTA proves

#### b. Capitalism guarantees environmental destruction—eco-reforms are coopted by corporate interests who place their goals before societies guaranteeing continued eco-destruction

Smith 05. Richard, taught history at Rutgers University, Dec The Engine of Eco Collapse, Capitalism, Nature, Socialism Vol 16 Iss 4, Proquest

In the last part of the book, Diamond turns to our current crisis and lists a dozen critical environmental problems that, he says, will doom our own society unless we solve them. We all know what these problems are: global warming, fossil fuel consumption, natural habitat destruction, species extinction, fresh water consumption, industrial pollution, etc. And we also all know, at least in broad terms, what we must do to solve these problems: urgently wean ourselves off fossil fuels, stop deforestation, find alternative energy sources, stop overfishing and hunting species to extinction, stop dumping toxics in the environment, and so on. So if we all know what needs to be done and have the advantage of hindsight, why **aren't we doing it?** Why aren't we "choosing to succeed?" The short answer is that under capitalism, the choices we need to make are not up to "society," while the ruling classes are incapable of making sustainable choices. In Chapter 9, Diamond relates some success stories-mostly those of small Pacific Island societies-where economic and environmental decisions were up to "society." Unlike Easter Island or Mayan society, these were small tribal village democracies where there were no distinctions of rank or class and no elite/mass conflict. Diamond's favorite example is the highland society of New Guinea. Over thousands of years they built a mini-Switzerland of interrelated villages, terraced farms and tree plantations. The society was, and still is today, chiefless. Within each village diere are just individuals and so-called "big-men" with no special privileges, who by force of personality, intelligence and experience were more influential than other individuals but still lived in a hut and tilled a garden like everyone else's. "Decisions were (and often still are today) reached by means of everybody in the village sitting down together and talking, and talking, and talking. The big-men couldn't give orders, and they might or might not succeed in persuading others to adopt their proposals." Diamond remarks that "To outsiders today (including not just me but often New Guinea government officials themselves), that bottom-up approach to decision-making can be frustrating, because you can't get a quick answer to your request; you have to have the patience to endure talk-talk-talk for hours or days with every villager who has some opinion to offer." (pp. 284-85). But it works. By getting everyone's input and approval, New Guinea societies successfully ensured consensus, rationally managed their economy, society, and environment-and survived sustainably for more than 40,000 years. **But ours is not a "bottom-up" democratic society.** In our capitalist society, ownership and control of the economy are largely in the hands of private corporations who pursue their own ends and don't answer to society. And that's the problem. So it seems curious, even perverse, that when Diamond turns to address our contemporary environmental crisis, he inexplicably forgets his own lesson and presents no comparable exploration of contradictory (class) interests and (class) conflict in modern capitalist society. This is unfortunate because Diamond's reluctance to discard his own pro-market "core values" prevents him from applying the same critical analysis to our own society that he so effectively deploys to analyze pre-modern societies. The fact that he fails to do so makes his book weakest in its concluding "What-do-we-do-now?" chapters on big business and the environment. For after stressing the need for urgent radical change to avert collapse, Diamond then ignores the systemic problems of capitalism that stand in the way of that needed radical change and instead, falls back on the standard tried-and-failed strategy of lobbying, consumer boycotts, eco labeling, green marketing, asking corporations to adopt benign "best practices," and so on-the stock-in-trade strategy of the environmental lobbying industry that has proven so impotent to date against the global capitalist juggernaut of eco-destruction. Of course this is not at all to demean reforms. Lots of problems can be and have been significantly ameliorated and even solved without overturning the economic system. **But despite significant victories here and there**, the big problems-global warming, deforestation, overfishing, pollution, resource exhaustion, species extinction, and environmentally caused human health problems-are not getting better. They are getting worse. And they are getting worse because **environmental reforms are always and everywhere subordinated to profit and growth.**

### AT: Transition War

#### a. Elites lose power too quickly to wage war

#### b. No public backlash – they’re not buying into neoliberalism – 50 percent of the US said they would prefer socialism over capitalism and the recent successes of Corbyn and Meloncon which proves they would endorse the alt. That also checks back against elite backlash because they need the public in order for wealth generation to occur which makes genocide irrational as it would necessitate eliminating factory workers, service professionals and more

#### c. Collapse doesnt cause war

Clary 15. Christopher, Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT, Postdoctoral Fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” April 22, 2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2597712

Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from 109 distinct rival dyads since 1950, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from economic troubles. Defining and Measuring Rivalry and Rivalry Termination I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically. This definition draws on a growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson, J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant political-military threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further: The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3 Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from 1494 to 2010 that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry.5 Why Might Economic Crisis Cause Rivalry Termination? Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels. (1) Economic crises lead to austerity pressures, which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to cut defense expenditures. (2) Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment, so that leaders can argue to their peers and their publics that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to threat deflation, where elites attempt to downplay the seriousness of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple threats, economic crises provoke elites to consider threat prioritization, a process that is postponed during periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic crises increase the political and economic benefit from international economic cooperation. Leaders seek foreign aid, enhanced trade, and increased investment from abroad during periods of economic trouble. This search is made easier if tensions are reduced with historic rivals. (5) Finally, during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as capable of resolving economic difficulties, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold heterodox foreign policy views. Collectively, these mechanisms make it much more likely that a leader will prefer conciliatory policies compared to during periods of economic normalcy. This section reviews this causal logic in greater detail, while also providing historical examples that these mechanisms recur in practice.