# 1AC – ★ GangSTARs ★



Giorno Giovanna and the “GioBros” of Jojo's Bizarre Adventure Part 5: Golden Wind

### Part One: The Boy with a Dream

#### *We begin with a story written by Hirohiko Araki in 1995.*

#### Giorno Giovanna was born in Naples, Italy to a single mother in the year 2001. Tasked to survive in a world controlled by corrupt law enforcement and the Italian Mafia, he grew up poor, lonely, and in-fear. When his mother would occasionally leave him as a child for the vibrant Italian night scene, there was no one to tend to him. When the other children in school would treat him as scum, no one was there to administer justice. This was the bleak reality continually suffered by Giorno until he happened upon a friendly gangster who supervised him from the shadows, bringing him secret joys and gifts of security when those in positions of power wouldn’t. In a country where drug use runs rampant, violence is habitual, and crime is the norm, contacting law enforcement was the last thing anyone wanted to do. To be apprehended or detained in an ever-consuming prison system meant death for someone like Giorno. For the weak, the poor, and the ones whom society has neglected, the only chance at a healthy new-life lay within organizations composed of those very rejects: gangs. From the very moment he met the gangster to the moment he decided on his great “dream”, the end-goal of his life was always to become a gangSTAR!

#### Araki’s fabulation – or fictiontelling – of gang activity as a deviant force rather than a static identity marks the breakdown of subjecthood in favor of affective forces. Jojo’s Bizarre Adventure, a vessel for queer infiltration, utilizes mobster fiction to articulate new potentialities within the realm of drug use. The fact that society doesn't believe in Giorno and doesn't understand him becomes a new source of resistance – freed from the chains of a fixed identity, gangsters are fantastic weapons – machines that don't just fight the law but infect and seep through the cracks of legal control. We always fear what we don't understand – whether it's an argument we don't have blocks to or a body we can't organize. Fabulation takes advantage of the hatred and fear that the ideal human subject propagates as its source of power – the fear of displacement forces majoritarian identity formations to stare on in horror as the world takes itself back and decays queerly around them.

**Halberstam and Livingston** [Halberstam, Judith, and Ira Livingston. *Posthuman Bodies*. Ind., 1995.] // JG

When Aristotle described "man" as a "featherless biped," Diogenes confronted him with a plucked chicken. To assert, in the spirit of this vaudeville philosophy, that humanity (and the human body) is a catachresis-a term unable either to ground itself adequately in a referent or to assert a common logic to unite its various referents-is a good first step, but the imaginary closure of the category of the human, even or especially if perpetually deferred, has very real functions. **Unlike the human** subject-to-be (Lacan’s "1’hommelette"), **who sees** his own mirror image and **fixed** gender **identity discrete and sovereign** before him in a way that will forever exceed him, **the posthuman becoming-subject vibrates across** and among **an assemblage of** semi-autonomous **collectivities it knows it can never either be** coextensive **with nor** altogether **separate from.** **The posthuman** body is not driven, in the last instance, by a teleological desire for domination, death or stasis; or to become coherent and unitary; or even to explode into more disjointed multiplicities. **Driven instead by the** double impossibility and **prerequisite to become other and to become itself**, the posthuman body intrigues rather than desires; **it is intrigued** and intriguing **just as it is queer**: not as an identity **but because it queers.** **Queering makes a postmodern politics out of the modernist aesthetics of "defamiliarization."** **"What intrigues me,"** k.d. lang asserts, **"is being alternative and completely conformist at the same time"** (98). Queer David Wojnarowicz, in Close to the Knives: A Memoir of Disintegration, writes: Realizing that I have nothing left to lose in my actions, I let my hands become weapons, my feet become weapons, every bone and muscle and fiber and ounce of blood become weapons, and I feel prepared for the rest of my life. (8i) **The violence of a specifically queer posthumanity is** realized when what Foucault calls the "reverse discourse" becomes something else, something more than the "homosexual talking on his/her own behalf." The reverse discourse ceases to be simply "the reverse" **when it begins to challenge and disrupt the terms offered to it for self-definition.** **Coalition across** what we have called **the collectivity of someness creates a necessary space for queer articulations**. The AIDS body, for example, crumbles and disintegrates with the disease, but as Wojnarowicz shows, it also produces fear in those who do not have AIDS; it not only disintegrates, in other words, it produces disintegration at large. **Disintegration as a political strategy attacks the oppressive imaginary gulf between the eternalized and** "safe" body and the body at risk, **the provisional body**; it is this differential that constantly attempts to construct the Person-With-AIDS as "already dead," and beyond the human loop. Disintegration operates like a virus and infects people with fear of AIDS, exerting a weird kind of power, harnessed by ACT UP The PWA, the junky, the homeless person, **the queer in America also has power**: as Wojnarowicz puts it, we have the power to "wake you up and welcome you to your bad dream." **Queer tactics are** not pacifist, embracing instead the "by any means necessary" approach: self defense and more. This is not simply an agenda of physical intimidation but a Foucauldian tactic of "discipline and punish," inspiring fear without actually laying a finger on anyone. "Fear," Jenny Holzer writes, "Is the most Elegant weapon." Close to the Knives is really a manifesto for action, **a proposal designed to strike fear into right-wing hearts**; it is a call to arms, a call to live-to acknowledge that we live-close to the knives and close to the edge of violence. People who die of AIDS die violent deaths and Wojnarowicz proposes to make this violence visible. The frame of reference within Wojnarowicz’s personal holocaust is viral: the virus becomes an epistemology all its own, dividing the world into carriers and infected versus the possibly or potentially infected. The randomness of the disease means that everyone is affected by the infection of so many. This epistemology-knowing one’s identity by measuring one’s distance to or from the possibility of infection-opens up a window on other forms of knowing, on what he calls: "the unveiling of our order and disorder." **Being Queer** in America **is a posthuman agenda**. At one point in Wojnarowicz’s book, he describes videotaping the death of his friend in order to give the man a virtual existence beyond the grave. Of course, Wojnarowicz’s writing is also a technology that extends the body beyond death and beyond the disintegration of the body. **Technologies that remake the body also permeate and mediate our relations to the "real": the real is literally** unimaginable or **only imaginable within a technological society: technology makes the body queer, fragments** it, **frames** it, **cuts** it, **transforms desire; the age of the image creates desire as a screen: the TV screen is analogous to self, a screen that projects** and is projected onto **but only gives the illusion of depth.** The image of an AIDS-related death being captured on film returns us all too quickly to U2’S world of Zoo TV and its invitation to the reader to wonder which side of the lens she is on. While a connection between Uz, an international mega-band, and Wojnarowicz, a queer artist dying of AIDS, may be arbitrary and coincidental, an odd image binds the two together. On the ZOO TV tour, Ua sold T-shirts featuring a silk-screened photo by David Wojnarowicz that appears as the cover of Close to the Knives. The photo shows buffalo stampeding over a cliff, and on the Ua T-shirt the Wojnarowicz caption, "Smell the flowers while you can," is scrawled underneath. The buffalo jumping to their doom, slipping off the edge of the earth and leaving their prairie zoo, resembles the medical zoo produced by the AIDS pandemic. This zoo cages AIDS-infected bodies and then drives them over the cliff. Smelling the flowers while you can means not simply hedonistic abandon but staving off apocalypse with pleasure. And then making your apocalypse one that requires witnesses. "**I’m carrying this rage like a blood-filled egg** and there’s a thin line between the inside and the outside a thin line between thought and action and that line is simply made up of blood and muscle and bone" (Wojnarowicz i6i). Wojnarowicz trips over the line between inside and outside; he finds the meaning of his slow death in the anger that eats away at the human and the body and asks not for vengeance but for massive change and recognition that nothing is the same when you are dying a political death. The self disintegrates in this queer narrative into a posthuman rage for disorder and uncivil disobedience. **For the queer narrator, rage is the difference between being and having: it is a call to arms, a desire that the human be roughly shoved into the next century and the next body and that we become posthuman without nostalgia** and because we already are.

#### Jojo’s Bizarre Adventure is the first and last question of debate. The series is an assemblage – a constantly expanding and synthesis-producing, fluid structure of knowledge. Within the assemblage, queer bodies that defy normative associations of identity dominate the stage and normalize the relations that debate has continually excluded.

**Ferdinand** [Ferdinand, Ruben. “An Essay about JoJo's Bizarre Adventure and Queer Masculinities.” Medium, Medium, 9 Oct. 2017, medium.com/@urbanfriendden/an-essay-about-jojos-bizarre-adventure-and-queer-masculinities-5d3b5f25567b.] // JG

When I first watched JoJo’s Bizarre Adventure in 2012, I wasn’t out yet. I saw Jonathan Joestar, the diesel-jacked gentleman rip out of his clothes more than one time, changing into increasingly skimpier wardrobes every other two episodes. **I saw vampire extraordinaire Dio Brando** dress like an idiot steampunk wizard as he poisoned his foster dad before rejecting the prospect of upper-body clothing entirely (also he turned a dude into a dog at one point?). Despite the absurdity of it all, these two men weren’t afraid to **cry,** afraid to **show affection**, **or** even afraid to **feel afraid**. They were the most hyperbolised masculine pieces of meat I’d ever seen and they were emotional. Then Battle Tendency aired right after and Joseph and Caesar wore make-up and crop tops. That same year I came out as bi. Huh. I don’t think it’s an exaggeration to say that **the men** (and the women) **of JoJo carry** masculinity **in non-conforming ways**. **They defy the cis-heterosexual prisons of how** mascs are ought **to approach body** language, fashion style, **and presentation**. Instead, characters dress freely, move dramatically, and pose sensually! To me, a queer man, it feels like an incredibly queer show in a way I haven’t seen anywhere else. I want to investigate the possible causes of why it’s so different, and what kinds of implications it has. I assume that the reader: 1) is familiar or interested in JoJo’s Bizarre Adventure 2) has an open mind about the term ‘queer masculinities’ 3) doesn’t see this thesis as an obfuscation or obviation of other possible **critical considerations**. My specific question is: “What possible avenues **have led JoJo’s Bizarre Adventure to arrive at a queered configuration** of masculinity?” My goal here is to to try and establish a base discourse, meaning that deeper discussions of, for example, race, ethnicity, or women can feel somewhat sparse. In that light, I welcome any addendum, comment, and critique made for whatever reason! Disclaimer: I’m not making JJBA out to be in any way revolutionary. **Its ostensible queerness** is the corollary of on one hand the art direction and the other the silence around its own queer factors, **result**ing **in a paradoxical normalising effect**. There are a couple of explicitly gay or bi characters (DIO, Pucci, Sorbet & Gelato) in the show, but its approaches to masculinity and queerness are only accidentally instructive, maybe because it is a-categorical. It’s all subtext, baby! We all know the phrase ‘JoJo pose’ in reference to bombastic, fabulous, and near-anatomically impossible postures. A ‘JoJo pose’ is different than, say, a pose from more traditional masculine media like Fist of the North Star or even Rocky/Rambo. The posing in those media involves showcasing the body as a weapon: about to unleash gunfire, a knockout blow, a pressure point-press capable of exploding a skull. A JoJo pose, however, is almost never constructed as an intimidatory thing. Characters don’t move to induce fear in others or assert themselves as dominant — when they do, it’s a villain. Their posturing is weird or creepy, accompanied by the katakana for ‘menacing’. **A JoJo pose**, then, doesn’t instrumentalise masculinity as a weapon, despite all the musculature going around. The masc body **is disarmed**, contrasting conventional cinematic choreography. Rather than emanating an aggression that causes a Ripple effect, the pose is the result of narrative tension that culminates in character (re)action. For example, Caesar and Joseph’s pose, in the story, is actually an expression of grief and anger! Caesar’s best friend (a literal Nazi oops) was just killed by an Aztec gym god. Witnessing this, both men instantly pose up, like it’s a natural answer to such a scenario. In the classic buildup-climax-resolution structure of drama, the JoJo pose is not the climax. A crucial moment has already happened when characters assume their stances. That’s why I think it’s part of the resolution. **The message the body language sends out is a responsive one, a formulation of certain emotions that don’t cause but are caused. This** drama, **transposed onto the** masculine **body, becomes an expressive display and an** emotive **affect. It gets treated as a** passive **vessel**, embodying vulnerability or frustration **that only finds release as a stance**. In other words, JoJo men don’t do drama, they are drama. More important than the JoJo pose as narrative device is the JoJo pose as a sexual display. To put it plainly, what causes the men of JoJo to be so incredibly fucky? I think part of the answer can be found in the conception of the poses themselves. It’s no secret that Araki uses real model references as basis, which is fine, but the poses he selects have an incredible sexualising effect on the final bodies. Main example below, but here are two [other](http://68.media.tumblr.com/30498dc7879fa0891ecc980b25934364/tumblr_mq8jhkUq741r8savto6_1280.jpg) [ones](http://68.media.tumblr.com/70204c2f6e0d55ec09e5663330ff0113/tumblr_mq8jhkUq741r8savto8_500.jpg). The pose on the right can be considered feminine, the assumed stance one of temptation, sultriness, and mystery. With her fingers curled in beckon, it’s invitational. We can construe this as the visual desire object of a straight male gaze. The woman, if you look closely, is peering over her shoulder and back at the viewer, as if confronting the spectator. Looking at someone who is looking back at you, especially when you don’t expect them to (her back it turned, after all!), is a confrontational encounter and an assumption of control/agency. So what happens if you flip the pose to the series villain, **DIO**? In a sense, he **adopts femininity** as a choreographical principle **while retaining conventional masculinity as** an **anatomical** ideal (I mean, look at those muscles). The specific way of eroticisation is formulated through a lens of a dominant feminine sexuality. Traditional male idealisation is often nude (bare-chested), but just a bare chest a sexy man does not make. Here, we can talk about something across from that: explicit male sexualisation. **A masculine body is coded feminine, taking its place as the object** of a straight male gaze. **DIO becomes the desired, not the desiree.** It is extremely homoerotic. It also lacks vulnerability — his invitation is consensual and voluntary, nothing to take advantage of. There are no clear role division between who assumes an active role and whom the passive, who is the top and who the bottom. (A side-scribble to DIO’s sexual control is that it goes far beyond the boundaries of his own body and that of others, which, to a point, makes it regrettably predatory. Many of the minor villains working for him in Part 3: Stardust Crusaders are under his control because of an organic tentacle device imbedded in their brain, very much a coerced partaking in his sexuality. Thankfully, his hypnotic eroticism is the only example of this kind: an excess and, I think, an exception to the rule.) Another highly important factor in JJBA is its approach to fashion. Clothes are meant to be worn, so fashion designers have to project it onto a body during the drafting process. From the moment an idea is conceived, there is an assumption made about the gender and form of the body wearing it. Herein, **the pervasiveness of binary** gender norms **dictates** which bodies get to wear which clothes — or, formulated differently, **which parts of a** gendered **body should remain** covered up. Mainstream fashion is keen on sexualising feminine bodies, but doesn’t appeal much to (commercialise) the depth of masc sexuality. It only really offers suits, jeans, and navy blue shirts with prints like ‘Colorado Highway 1988 Big Stinky Burger’. Keep in mind that roughly 150 years ago, European and American upper-class men were wearing feathered coats and brightly-coloured tights with belts wrapped around their calves to show off they fine, thick legs. Though **this** fashion of the bourgeoisie **is rooted in** a classist **differentiation**, it seems that in modern market societies a gendered differentiation has replaced it. Indeed, since the concurrent invention of straightness, we live in a sad reality that doesn’t let mascs wear skirts or be slutty without being branded feminine, like it’s a bad thing. Cis men don’t get to access their femininity because of homophobia, and trans men/masc NB people don’t get to because of transphobia. Thankfully, JoJo provides us with both men that are plenty slutty and men wearing skirts (Anasui). Much like the poses, the clothes that certain characters wear are references to fashion shows, kink catalogues, and haute couture. There’s so much overlap, Araki actually collaborated with fashion house [Gucci](http://tokyotelephone.com/gucci-90th-anniversary-x-hirohiko-araki-30th-anniversary/)! The men have amazing hair and wear revealing clothes. Their materials, accessories, colours, and patterns suggest that a vibrant fetish culture has merged with mainstream fashion, that open sexuality has won over shame. Shame on this axis seems to be eradicated entirely: there is literally no instance in the 30+ years of JoJo’s Bizarre Adventure where a character makes a remark about another character’s style choices. Not as a quip or a gag, not even when schoolboys Josuke and Okuyasu adjust their school uniforms to their own personal preferences ([Josuke grafts golden hearts and chains to it](https://vignette.wikia.nocookie.net/jjba/images/f/f8/Josuke_Higashikata.png/revision/latest?cb=20170430080106) and [Okuyasu is covered in money symbols](https://vignette.wikia.nocookie.net/jjba/images/9/93/Okuyasu_anime_AV.png/revision/latest/scale-to-width-down/350?cb=20170322230537)).

### Part Two: Golden Wind

#### Thus, Giorno and I affirm the Resolution Resolved: The illegal use of drugs ought to be treated as a matter of public health, not criminal justice as the first step on our path to becoming *GangSTARs*. This Affirmation includes the recognition that public health responses are not institutional, but organizational. The TRUE public includes those who society has procedurally excluded: drug addicts, criminals, and gang members. Giorno’s quest to become his own mob boss solves the root cause of all problems as his response would stop the rival mob bosses who have facilitated the illegal use of drugs in Naples.

#### “To affirm is not to bear, carry, or harness oneself to that which exists, but on the contrary to unburden, unharness, and set free that which lives.”  Deleuze [Deleuze, Gilles, et al. Nietzsche and Philosophy. Columbia University Press, 2006.] // JG

**To affirm is** still to evaluate, but **to evaluate from the perspective of a will which enjoys its own difference in life** instead of suffering the pains of the opposition to this life that it has itself inspired. **To affirm is** not to take responsibility for, to take on the burden of what is, but **to release, to set free** what lives. **To affirm is to** unburden: not to load life with the weight of higher values, but to **create new values which are those of life**, which make life light and active. There is creation, properly speaking, only insofar as we make use of excess in order to invent new forms of life rather than separating life from what it can do. "And **you yourselves should create what you have hitherto called the World**: the World should be formed in your image by your reason, your will and your love!" (Z II "On the Blissful Islands" p. 110). But this task is not completed in man. Going as far as he can man raises negation to a power of affirming. But affirming in its full power, affirming affirmation itself — this is beyond man's strength. "To create new values — even the lion is incapable of that: but to create itself freedom for new creation — that the lion can do" (Z I "Of the Three Metamorphoses" p. 55). The sense of **affirmation can only emerge if** these three fundamental points in Nietzsche's philosophy are borne in mind: not the true nor the real but evaluation; not **affirmation as** acceptance but as **creation**; not man but the Overman as a new form of life. Nietzsche **attaches** so much **importance to art** because art realises the whole of this programme: the highest power of the false, Dionysian affirmation or the genius of the superhuman (VP IV 8/WP 853). Nietzsche's argument can be summarised as follows: the yes which does not know how to say no (the yes of the ass) is a caricature of affirmation. This is precisely because it says yes to everything which is no, because it puts up with nihilism it continues to serve the power of denying — which is like a demon whose every burden it carries. The Dionysian yes, on the contrary, knows how to say no: it is pure affirmation, it has conquered nihilism and divested negation of all autonomous powerBut it has done this because **it has placed the negative at the service of the powers of affirming. To affirm is to create**, not to bear, put up with or accept. A ridiculous image of thought is formed in the head of the ass. " 'Thinking' and 'taking something seriously', giving it 'weighty consideration' — to them these things go together: that is the only way they have 'experienced' it"

#### Giorno's imagining of gangs as weaponized against Italy’s corrupt law enforcement is not merely a fiction, but a manifestation of images of deviancy that produce a queer imaginary. Fabulation is a methodology for envisioning new discourses and images – embracing a world that already is but simultaneously cannot be. This methodology opens new potentialities via deviancy, reveals the violence of subject formation for what it is, and overturns the acceptance of the presumptive dominant historical narratives that condition our understanding. The fiction of fabulation uses the resolution to counter dominant narratives as a politics of becoming that skews dominant narratives and infects the resolution with impossible futures that exist outside of sentimental histories.

**Hjorth** [Hjorth, Daniel. “Imagination – Fabulation.” Professor at the Department of Management, Politics, and Philosophy at Copenhagen Business School, 2009. *Delivered as a key note presentation at the ESU Conference in Benevento, Italy.*] // JG

Mind, as well as matter, is an attribute of life and not some separate substance from which the world is thought. The brain connects with other parts of the body and with the world (other bodies and relationships to the world) and form images/perceptions. One of those images is that of the mind. Its foundational status is but an illusion. This answers to a relational ontology: something is (achieves being) only as response. **The mind ‘is’ the image that results from a response** – the brain’s to the world. “Before there are actual terms – ‘mind’ on the one hand, ‘world’ on the other – there is a potential for relation, and relations for Deleuze are best described as ‘images’” (Colebrook, 2006: 5). It follows that this kind of empiricism – centred on Deleuze – suggests that **fictiontelling, inventing of stories of futures, or** – our preferred term – **fabulation, is central to human nature.** **There would be no mind without the fantastic image of a mind, and this image is a product of life’s inventive powers.** **There is no primacy of either the faculty of understanding (as in Kant’s critique of pure reason), nor of the faculty of reason (as in Kant’s critique of practical reason). Nor is there the crisis of the disorder of the senses that Kant struggles with in his critique of judgement (where the sublime and imagination play a key role for the production of this crisis)**. Instead, **there is an affirmation of this disorder and a turn to life’s immanent creative/inventive powers.** Imagination, Deleuze suggests, is a synthesis of time and his reading of Hume resulted in the idea: based on the difference that the mind draws from repetition (the self is this drawing of difference), **imagination anticipates and creates the future.** Rather than starting from the image of the mind, Deleuze **thus** wants us to look at this **create force of life**, the force that creates Gods and Giants (as Bergson put it) – the force that has created also the image of the foundational mind, a force we here describe as fabulation. From this shifting of perspective, we can see how the image of mind, or subjectivity for that reason, becomes imprisonments of our power of becoming. Multiplicity is reduced via transcendence (the subject’s status as guaranteeing the consistency of the faculties) and totalisation (theory as informing or directing practice). **Fabulation would then be this narrative expression of life’s creative tendency to produce images and futures.** Moving images and people may be described as hinging on whether one can free them from investments in images and representations – that is, if decoding can take place. One example of a powerful image is of course Descartes’ cogito, always present in relationship to the conceptual persona of the lonely, doubting Descartes-on-travel (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994). **Fabulation**, to some extent already in Bergson but definitely in Deleuze’s appropriation of the concept and his adding to it a political dimension, **carries also the power to free us from the limits of the present.** **Imagination, we have noted above, is that mode of thought that represents a small crisis in Kant’s attempt to unite the faculties under common sense.** Imagination gives rise to a disjunctive theory of the faculties (Deleuze, 1997: 210; Smith, 1996: 33) as we have to deal with the power of thinking, not as a representational power of reason, but **as an inventive power presenting images of a world to come. Imagination** thus breaches the unity of reason in a leaping that spring from sensible experience. Imagination does **not organise our experience but** goes beyond it, **challenges its present limits** (cf. Colebrook, 2002: 81). It seems to me that **we can describe the role of imagination for Kant as a disturbing one, provoking him to minimise its role in discussing how it plays together with understanding (Crockett, 2001).** Deleuze instead finds imagination important precisely as it seems to point at a higher faculty (than knowledge, desire, and feeling) which is what makes us genuinely creative, moving beyond our present limits as we fabulate. **Affect** has this function in Deluze’s philosophy; it **produces suspense, a breaking-free from the continuity of reason**, as pause in which we are powered up in our receptivity so that our capacity to affect others increases. **We** will **call this** time the time of **passion**. **Imagination** then **plays a crucial role in provoking** these times of **passion.** Fabulation is described by Bergson as a creativity that “…fulfils its ends by creating hallucinatory fictions – vivid, haunting images that imitate perception and induce action, and thereby counteract the operations of judgement and reason. **Fabulation**, then **emerges** in the shock of an event, a vertiginous moment of disorientation in which images bypass reason and work directly on the senses to induce action.” (Bogue, 2006: 207) We can recognise how Bergson is trying to make space for his concept of fabulation vis-à-vis Kant’s faculty of imagination (they come close in Bergson’s description, although this is summarised here by Bogue). Deleuze, instead, contrasts fabulation with utopia and says the latter is too programmatic, simply not good enough **if we want to understand how a ‘minor people’ (politically** and not necessarily numerically ‘less’, **such as women** vis-à-vis men) **can resist and transform majorities (the dominant group) by fabulating a world-to-come for the missing people (Deleuze, 1998).** Bergson contrasted fabulation with élan vital and saved for the latter the true creative force that would result in an open society of love, whereas the former (as he discusses this in relationship to religion) would end in static societies of morality. Deleuze instead seems to move fabulation closer to the concept of élan vital as he conjoins the political force of the creative collective with the artistic force of inventing a missing people in his appropriation of fabulation: “For Deleuze, **the fabulative function is** the function proper to **art, which projects into the world images so intense that they take on a life of their own.**” (p. 218) Fabulation is sensed viscerally; we register intensity as we are moved into suspense, the pause created by falsifying received truths central in the re-production of dominant social orders. The receptivity of power’s ability to be affected and the spontaneity of power’s ability to affect (Deleuze, 1988: 71) play together in the relationship between the fabulator and the affected. **Imagination is crucial** in this relationship **as it** is what **creates the break with** the continuity of **reason**, **which** in turn **provides material for** the **fabulation**. Having falsified received truths there is a time of suspense to make use of. Here is where we could turn to entrepreneurship as figured on the idea of creating and making use of opportunities (Hjorth, 2003; Gartner, Carter, and Hills, 2003). The opportune act is what brings us towards the harbour (referring here to the Latin meaning of ob + portus, meaning toward, port/harbour). Harbour is a refuge, meaning an escape or to flee (from Latin refugere). Here is where ‘the entrepreneur’ shines through as a conceptual persona of social creation processes. **The** drama of **creating a ‘line of flight’** (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994) – of articulating and acting towards an opportunity – **is** one that makes the concept of ‘entrepreneurship’ necessary. **Crucial here** is **the fabulation’s articulation** or expression **of the flightline, of the imagined ‘nextness’**, that **provokes the world to become something it is not**. I have described this as fabulation, and we can connect this now to the concept of flightline with Smith (1998: xlv): “…**’fabulation’ is** a function that extracts from them [the dominant stories or discourses presently ordering the social, my comment] a pure speech act, **a creative storytelling** that is, as it were, **the obverse side of the dominant myths and fictions, an act of resistance whose political impact is immediate and inescapable, and that creates a line of flight on which a minority discourse and a people can be constituted**.” Let us now bring the above discussions into an investigation of subjectification, how becoming-entrepreneur happens in the opening/break/suspense that fabulation creates. We are interested, in particular, in how intensity is provided by this artistic-political force of fabulation, and how this ‘electrification’ of the social provides a passionate time where the power to be affected and the power to affect are important forces.

#### The role of the ballot is to endorse the debater who best methodologically and hermeneutically presents a minor style of resistance.

#### The resolution exists not as a static rational object of analysis, but as a malleable product of our attachments and sentiments. Debate is made of texts, and so examining the resolution with literary analysis is the key mechanism that allows argumentation to occur at all – we already engage with affect in debate but limiting our engagement to feelings we're familiar with dooms us to accept dominant explanations for what matters. Our affirmation marks a critical literary analysis of our attachments that bridges the gap between the theoretical and the material while avoiding a cruel optimism that forces a static attachment to already experienced history.

**Schaefer** [Schaefer, Donovan. “The Politics of the Event in Ahmed's The Promise of Happiness and Berlant's Cruel Optimism.” Vol. 16, no. 2, 2013. Haverford College's Hurford Center for the Arts and Humanities] // JG

Framing literary criticism (broadly construed) as a practice of tracing the connective tissue between bodies and situations is what lets Berlant speak to the political uses of affect. She suggests that affect theory is a “another phase in the history of ideology theory,” that it “brings us back to the encounter of what is sensed with what is known and what has impact in a new but also recognizable way.” (Berlant: 2011, 53) **Affect**—especially ordinary affect—**is the missing link between discursive regimes and bodies**, the arterial linkages **through which power is disseminated. “The present” is** not an assemblage of texts and knowledges, bloodless discursive inscriptions on the body, but **a** felt **sense out of which political circumstances emerge.** “We understand nothing about impasses of the political,” she writes, “without having an account of the production of the present.” (Berlant: 2011, 4) Cruel optimism as a byproduct of political situations colliding with bodies plays out in ongoing, semistable routines, in ordinariness. This focus on the ordinary frames Berlant’s conception of the political as a slow-motion reaction rather than a series of staccato punctuations. This comes out, for instance, in her exhortation to move away from trauma theory as a way of “describing what happens to persons and populations as an effect of catastrophic impacts.” (Berlant: 2011, 9) Rather, Berlant suggests that **trauma is only one facet of the ordinary, a precursory event that yields new historical trajectories** lived out in slow-motion. “Trauma,” she writes, “forces its subjects not into mere stuckness but into crisis mode, where they develop some broad, enduring intuitions about the way we live in a now that’s emerging without unfolding, and **imagining a historicism from within a discontinuous present and ways of being that were never sovereign**.” (Berlant: 2011, 93) Rather than the instantiating event, Berlant is interested in the fallout of politics, the longrunning reverberations. It is in these interwoven aftermaths following in the wake of bodies that Berlant locates the tropic of cruel optimism. **Optimism**, she is careful to point out, can “feel” any number of different ways, **can come clothed in any number of affective orientations**. “Because optimism is ambitious,” she writes, “at any moment it might not feel like anything, including nothing: dread, anxiety, hunger, curiosity, the whole gamut from the sly neutrality of browsing the aisles to excitement at the prospect of ‘the change that’s gonna come.’” (Berlant: 2011, 2) Rather than a singularly identifiable feeling, optimism takes the phenomenological form of a “knotty tethering to objects, scenes, and modes of life that generate so much overwhelming yet sustaining negation.” (Berlant: 2011, 52) **Optimism binds bodies to** “fantasies of the good life,” to **horizons of possibility** that may or may not be defeated by the conditions of their own emergence. Cruel optimism is the outcome of this circumstance of tethering confused by itself, of Möbiusstrip cycles of ambition and frustration. The ordinary, **precisely because of its complexity**, can contain the intransigent contradictions of cruel optimism. (Berlant: 2011, 53) It is the space of the rubble, the hovering dust, the shockwaves that follow the event rather than the piercing clarity of the punctum itself. Berlant is interested in the ways that habits form out of situations of impossibility—for instance, in her reading of Gregg Bordowitz’s documentary film Habit (2001), about the body rituals that structure the daily lives of a gay man living with AIDS and his partner in New York City in the 1990s. Bordowitz’s work maps a crisis that reflects Berlant’s delineation of the field of the political: with the new availability of anti-retroviral drugs in the 1990s, AIDS ceased to be “a death sentence,” and thus “turned fated life back into an ellipsis, a time marked by pill- and test-taking, and other things, the usual.” (Berlant: 2011, 58) For Berlant, the event is a rarity, and is only secondarily the zone of the political, **which is itself constituted by ongoing patterns of response and desire**—slow-motion echoes producing new forms as they cross-cut and interfere with one another. (Berlant: 2011, 6) In this sense, **Berlant** explains, her work **meshes with** Sedgwick’s **queer reading of affect as the histories that make us desire in unexpected**, perverse **ways**. “**The queer tendency of this method**,” Berlant writes, “**is to put one’s attachments back into play** and into **pleasure,** into **knowledge, into worlds.** **It is to admit that they matter.**” (Berlant: 2011, 123) Berlant sees the terrain of the political emerging out of this tissue of affectively-embroidered histories. Although both Ahmed and Berlant write about the uses of affect as a phenomenological bridge to the political, and the slipperiness of happiness or the good life—the way that pleasure can be wrapped up with a strain of unease—there is a distinction between their respective scopes of inquiry. Where Ahmed’s book is about frustration/promise/deferral, Berlant’s is about addiction. When I asked my students to come up with examples of cruel optimism, they brainstormed the following list: heroin, abusive relationships, candy, horcruxes. Each of these instances suggests a vital but destructive need, an ambivalent compulsion—an addiction, where the tectonic plates of the body’s affects shift in friction with one another. Cruel optimism indexes these moments where a body desires and needs an arrangement of the world that is also frustrating or corrosive. Politics is one of these zones of fractious attraction. Berlant writes, for instance, that “Intensely political seasons spawn reveries of a different immediacy. People imagine alternative environments where authenticity trumps ideology, truths cannot be concealed, and communication feels intimate, face-to-face.” (Berlant: 2011, 223) **Politics produces fantasies, tethers that draw us forward to particular attachments in the form of images, narratives, bodily practices. But these fantasies also contain the elements of their own frustration or refusal.** President George W. Bush, for example, is able to use the affective elements of statecraft (a practice which, Berlant assures us, is decidedly non-partisan (226)) to create a façade that diverts attention from his flailing foreign and economic policies. (Berlant: 2011, 226) Berlant’s focus in Cruel Optimism is on politics as a field of attachments, a skein of affectively pulsing tissues linking bodies together. “Pace Žižek,” she writes, “the energy that generates this sustaining commitment to the work of undoing a world while making one requires fantasy to motor programs of action, to distort the present on behalf of what the present can become. **It requires a surrealistic affectsphere to counter** the **one that already exists, enabling a confrontation with** the fact that **any action** of making a claim on the present involves bruising processes of detachment from anchors in the world, along with optimistic projections of a world that is worth our attachment to it.” (Berlant: 2011, 263) Berlant looks at how politics pulls on bodies using the ligaments of affect, how politics becomes irresistible, even when it is self-frustrating.

#### The affirmative's styling of affect is that of non-styling – a pushing to the limit that removes all exterior metaphor in favor of pure and raw intensity. This is a fantastic literalism where the sounds of words are themselves deviant. This style won't submit to organization of the body and won't submit to the intelligibility of fascist thought. Such a styling follows the lines of Hirohiko Araki in which writing obliterates metaphor and describes the world from Giorno’s minoritarian reality. The dominant subject position cannot accept this fiction as existing because it doesn't make sense according to them. You say an argument matters because it references some external authority, I say an argument matters because it creates itself.

**Flaxman** [Flaxman, Gregory. *Gilles Deleuze and the Fabulation of Philosophy*. University of Minnesota Press, 2012.] // JG

Inasmuch as this is the case, though, Deleuze is no sophist either. In its ancient form as much as its modern incarnation, the “idea-man” (le concepteur) contrives means of persuasion and deceit with which we might be tempted to confuse the powers of the false (WIP, 10). But these techniques rarely achieve **the creative** and genetic **powers of affirmation** that Deleuze discovers in literature and aspires to in philosophy. No false philosopher, Deleuze is a philosopher of the false. Hence, the fourth chapter **cashes out the question of fabulation in terms of Deleuze’s** means of **expression.** While previous chapters have revolved around **fabulation** to a greater or lesser degree—as a meditation on critique, as a creation of concepts, as a practice of commentary—the fourth chapter explicitly dwells on Deleuze’s style of thinking and writing in relation to literature. We have already suggested that Deleuze entertains a seemingly endless series of encounters with novelists, poets, and dramatists, who occupy his plane of immanence no less than philosophers. And we know that writers of all kinds become the provocateurs for Deleuze’s own constructivism. But what remains in some sense to be understood is that literature, more than inspiring the creation of philosophical concepts, **inspires Deleuze’s own style of thinking and writing.** For Deleuze, “philosophical concepts are also ‘sensibilia’” (WIP, 5), and it is this sensible sense of philosophy, or what we have called expression, that draws him to literature and, more precisely, to what we have called writing. Inasmuch as “**writing is becoming**,” Deleuze looks to literature to formulate the philosophical means with which to resist the metaphysical, moral, and institutional prerogatives of philosophy. As he and Guattari ask in Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, and as we will ask again here, “Is there a hope for philosophy, which for a long time has been an official, referential genre?” (K, 27). **The answer arrives in the concept of “minor literature” itself**: as much as it induces the question, minor literature also anticipates our response. Like the history of literature, especially in the formation of “great” national literatures, philosophy is traditionally determined by the state-form, which provides a bureaucratic image of thought and a correlative series of genres. In Kafka’s writing and elsewhere, then, Deleuze and Guattari extract the characteristics of a minor literature, but in this chapter we will endeavor to produce, or reproduce, the sense of a “minor philosophy.” Turning to Kafka’s literary machine—to his **deterritorialization of the dominant language**, his **creation of a collective assemblage** of enunciation, **and** his **production of an immanent politics**—we **pose these traits** mutatis mutandis, **as the** constituents of Deleuze’s writing machine and the **“hope for philosophy.”** “There is hope,” Kafka once wrote, “but not for us.” While this epigram seems to suggest the paradox of an even greater pessimism, we might instead understand it, in the context of Deleuze’s philosophy, as the paradox of a great impersonalism: **there is hope only when we cease to be ourselves and become something else.** This conceit is particularly critical in the fifth and final chapter, which considers Deleuze in light of the antagonism to philosophy that characterizes the present. The prospect of thinking and writing differently is liable to seem unlikely, even utopian, today when philosophy faces rivals and enemies that, as Deleuze and Guattari write, not even Plato could have imagined. The most recent rivals to philosophy, **the disciplines of communication** are potentially the most dangerous inasmuch as they unapologetically **transform the marketplace of ideas** into a marketable form of the idea, the concept as advertising. Today we confront two intimately related problems. On the one hand, as we have just said, philosophy is besieged by new rivals: advertisers, designers, programmers, and marketers now claim to be the true creators of concepts. But on the other hand, this climate is such that the critical power that Deleuze once attached to the simulacrum has been subsumed and colonized by those same disciplines of communication, which have reduced its creation to a “packet of noodles,” an exhibition, a slogan (WIP, 10). These remarks form the challenge that ultimately defines Deleuze’s late work and this last chapter. Toward the end of their lives, Deleuze and Guattari seem to find themselves in a Platonic bind, compelled to defend the privilege of philosophy and to define the philosopher apart from his or her rivals. But this momentary affinity quickly gives way in What Is Philosophy? to the affirmation of expression itself. In the face of what might otherwise be the source of overwhelming nihilism, Deleuze’s late work aspires to a remarkable vitalism, revisiting the problem of doxa and affirming, once more, the creation of a style of thinking and writing. Hence, in relation to their doxographic rivals, Deleuze reprises the analysis of common and good sense that he had already established as the two sides of Urdoxa and the two aspects of the image of thought. In Deleuze’s writings, especially in his meditations on the philosophy of science, common sense and good sense belong, respectively, to the mechanistic and the thermodynamic regimes, but as I argue here, his late work envisions the development of a new or imageless image of thought— namely, “chaos theory.” **From the nature of self-governing systems and dissipative structures**, Deleuze extracts **the sense of a becoming** that **renews the power of fabulation.** The chapter concludes, then, by cashing out chaos theory in terms of the unprecedented recourse to utopia, which Deleuze and Guattari elaborate in their last book to displace the promise of a future and better place (eutopos) in favor of the production of bifurcations within the present (outopos). To the suggestion that Deleuze’s “hope”—to think differently or otherwise— remains hopelessly romantic, even utopian, we respond by insisting on the transvaluation of utopia itself. Drawing on the science of chaos and complexity, Deleuze defines utopia according to the singular moments in history that raise themselves from the certainty of chronometric time (Chronos) to something like a virtual sphere (Aion): in such an untimely interval—and Deleuze is thinking of the events of 1968—we can divagate the present into other worlds or introduce unprecedented possibilities into our own. In this light, perhaps the book’s Coda describes **the framework in which to grasp this process.** The title “**Sci Phi**” **refers to Deleuze’s suggestion that** a book of **philosophy ought to be read as** “a kind of **science fiction**” (DR, xx), and this exhortation should be grasped with all due precision—not to imagine the future of philosophy but, rather, **to invent a philosophy of the future. The future is outside, unknown**, but Deleuze folds this problem into the interval of the present, such that the most interiorized and exteriorized of surfaces are **joined by** the supple crease of **a transversal line, a becoming, a flight.** We have called this line of flight, this singular becoming, “style” inasmuch as it traverses the entirety of Deleuze’s philosophy, **passing through countless expressions and situating them** all **on the** same **plane of immanence.** Hence, while the previous five chapters elaborate a sequence that carries us from Deleuze’s earliest writings to his last, from ancient philosophy to a “people to come,” **these** chapters **reflect so many autonomous worlds whose consistency remains a matter of style.** This is the “Deleuze problem,” the perverse consistency that accommodates the inconsistent, that induces the impossible and unthought, and that refuses to be assimilated. Deleuze is not the kind of problem that we labor to correct but a challenge to which we strive to be equal. Deleuze’s problem is finally ours as well: how can **we create a** style commensurate to the **power of the false**?

### Underview

1. **Roleplaying creates psychological violence and assumes an objective detachment from personal identity that causes imperialism – your “process” is bad too. [Reid-Brinkley 08]**

[Reid-Brinkley ‘8 (Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley, University of Pittsburgh Department of Communications, “THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE” 2008]

And participation does not result in the majority of the debate community engaging in activism around the issues they research. Mitchell observes that the stance of the policymaker in debate comes with a “sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture.”115 In other words, its participants are able to engage in debates where they are able to distance themselves from the events that are the subjects of debates. Debaters can throw around terms like torture, terrorism, genocide and nuclear war without blinking. Debate simulations can only serve to distance the debaters from real world participation in the political contexts they debate about. As William Shanahan remarks: …the topic established a relationship through interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the particular political affinities of the debaters were. The relationship was both political and ethical, and needed to be debated as such. When we blithely call for United States Federal Government policymaking, we are not immune to the colonialist legacy that establishes our place on this continent. We cannot wish away the horrific atrocities perpetrated everyday in our name simply by refusing to acknowledge these implications” (emphasis in original). The “objective” stance of the policymaker is an impersonal or imperialist.

#### Prefer my model of debate in which we debate real methods we can export now for…

#### Real world decision-making

* + 1. **Fiat ignores the complexities of policy making – we cannot assume some perfect world where the plan exists, when in reality there are different legal barriers, protests, and unique processes that happen – no major social movement was ever preceded by a policy action or plan. Fiat misses the reality of how social change occurs undermining grassroots pedagogy. As a result, we actually become worse policy-makers and worse activists**
  1. **Inclusion**

#### Fewer debaters will be internal to the state, but all could be in movement politics outside the state

#### Portability

#### We shouldn’t have to wait until we’re policymakers or until we’re in Congress to actualize benefits from debate – social movements don’t require policy change, they require political change – we’ll acknowledge the state exists and is an obstacle to change, but that doesn’t require we use the state – working to combat it is sufficient and preferable since we can engage in non-state politics in this round and outside of it NOW

#### Psychological Violence outweighs and is a prior question to policymaking for…

#### Disengagement—prevents marginalized folks from wanting to speak out and uncover the problems they experience because they cannot resolve internal struggles

#### Real world applicability—this is not some policymaking, decision making skills bullshit—real people need real life productive strategies that resolve issues they face every day, not when they become members of congress

#### Verifiability—no other impact that operates in the post-fiat world is something we can measure or see the impact of in a literal round, but the act of resolving psychological violence is a feeling we can understand and feel within ourselves

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<https://cg.ubiquitypress.com/article/10.16995/cg.95/>

https://thedailyfandom.com/who-are-the-jojos-jojos-bizarre-adventure-part-5-golden-wind-mid-point-overview/

Understand the way antiblackness is performed in the world without biases

# 1AR – Toolbox

## \*\*\*A/2 T/Theory\*\*\*

### Case First

1. Unfairness and uneducation will always exist to a small degree, but we are still here because of what we get out of the activity.
   1. The AC reconceptualizes societal ethics, changing what it means to be the better debater. This is the strongest link to education, for it holds a risk of solving in the real world. Because real world education has lasting impacts and fairness only lasts the round, the debate space should be a trading ground for that empowerment.
2. Critical education fixes skewed societal perceptions --before we can even conceive of what’s fair we must undermine oppressive practices in debate.
   1. Restrictions on critical argumentation undermine our ability to learn critically.
   2. It’s a constitutive feature of debate to democratically deliberate; therefore it mirrors democratic government and its obligations. Cross-apply this onto all their real world policymaking and governmental framing arguments. We mirror that process – means we still access the same sort of education, but in tandem with critical education to break down structures of normalcy.
3. If we don’t challenge oppression, we produce it, both in and out of round because we allow issues to be ignored.
4. The structural unfairness contextualized by the AC outweighs marginal in-round abuse. Normalcy of oppression is obviously a lot worse than a NIB--prefer the AC on magnitude and scope.

### K of T/Theory

Your shell is a method by which you seek to normalize the conception of what a good queer is – what a good queer debater is – by forcing me to meet standards and commit to debate as an activity built on a form of fairness and education always closed off to me – means you reproduce the aff impacts of homonormativity, which turns T

And your interp doesn’t solve:

1. There is no method of affirming queer epistemologies under your interpretation – forcing me to read a multiculturalism advantage about putting queer people on the frontlines so they can die while tauting some sort of communitarianism is a violent psychological trauma you enforce upon me – I shouldn’t be forced to lie about myself and forcing me to is a form of soul murder – your shell serves only to expand homonormativity and silence deviance through the model of debate you endorse – turns T
2. Fiat is illusory -- The USFG can’t hear what we say in this round, once we leave this round, no policy is going to be implemented and neither debater will even be able to change the way debate operates for queer bodies, means we must divorce ourselves from policy education to discuss underlying ethical concerns that preclude policy discussions – means aff outweighs on real world education

That means that any risk that the aff is good for debate means you vote aff because there is no topical version of the aff

Also you’ll get your politics debate in other rounds because, thankfully, Harvard-Westlake, Brentwood, and other big schools like that still have debate programs --- means that the model of debate they want is inevitable --- that doesn’t implicate the aff because you do you and we’ll do us.

Also, no reason you couldn’t engage the aff – you could’ve easily read the Kant NC, Virtue Ethics NC, a counter-method, any k that links to normalcy which is like every k, etc., or the Black Anarchism K, Satire CP, on your wiki from last year. I shouldn’t be punished for your choice not to engage. Also, that independently turns T because the abuse story is self-induced

Thus, the alt is to reject the Neg as a method of embracing the killjoy. Voting them down is a way to perform or engage in the killjoy methodology by voting for the K because we are a K of their consignment to debate “norms.”

AND, Judge intervention is in support of education -- the judge should intervene in support of creating safe spaces to prevent psychological damage to students. That’s Vaccaro 12 and Vincent 13

ADITIONALLY, tacking on the USFG lets them read the politics DA which 1) isn’t responsive to the aff and you’d probably lose anyway, but 2) it makes our discussion inauthentic because the debate transitions away from self affirmation to political discussions --- means the so-called T version of the aff doesn’t solve because it would allow the negative to sidestep and hijack the discussion and divorce me from my subject position. It’s necessary to work outside the bounds of traditional debate to challenge its exclusive civil ethics.

### Interps/Definitions

#### CI: On the 2019 March April LD Topic, the Affirmative debater may defend the resolution as a principle. To clarify, no implementation through a governmental body.

#### I meet, I treat the debate as a value statement. To totally affirm an actorless resolution fundamentally allows for micropolitical action to be relevant in a resolutional context.

### AT: Resolved = Policy Action

[Pezze 6] Resolved means we should remain open to the resolution and different ways of debating it. Pezze 6

[(Pezze, Barbara, PhD Philosophy at Honk Kong U, “Heidegger on Gelassenheit”, Minerva, vol .10, <http://www.ul.ie/~philos/vol10/Heidegger.html>) SK]

Let us pause for a moment to consider a possible misunderstanding. It could appear, from what we have been saying, that Gelassenheit “floats in the realm of unreality and so in nothingness, and, lacking all power of action, is a will-less letting in of everything and, basically, the denial of the will to live!” (1966a, p. 80). But this is not the case, for in the Gelassenheit we find something that recalls the “power of action,” but which is not a will. It is a “resolve” [Entschlossenheit] (ibid., p. 81), but not as an act of will that makes a decision and finds a solution to a problem or a situation. This “resolve,” as Heidegger himself suggests, must be thought as the one that is spoken of in Being and Time, that is, it is a “letting oneself be called forth” (1996, p. 283) to one’s ownmost possibility of being. “Resoluteness” — as Entschlossenheit is translated in Being and Time — is “authentic being a self” (1996, p. 274). It is quite difficult to think a resolve that is not a matter of will that moves to an action; we tend, in fact, to consider resoluteness as a strong determination to attain something. As we read in Heidegger’s Introduction To Metaphysics (2000), the essence of the resolve, as he intends it, is not an intention to act; it is not a ‘gathering of energy’ to be released into action. Resolve is the beginning, the inceptual beginning of any action moved. Here acting is not be taken as an action undertaken by Dasein in being resolute. Rather, acting refers to the existential and fundamental mode of being of Dasein, which is to be “care,” and which is the “primordial” being of Dasein. Resoluteness, in its essence, is the remaining open of Dasein for be-ing. In the context of the Conversation, this resolve should thus be understood as “the opening of man particularly undertaken by him for openness…” [als das eigens übernommene Sichöffnen des Daseins für das Offene…] (Heidegger 1966a, p. 81). It is a resolve to remain open to be-ing, and therefore to what is ownmost to man’s nature, which is disclosed in relation to be-ing. This resolve is what Heidegger, in the Conversation, indicates as “releasement to that-which-regions,” the resolve to release oneself to that-which-regions, to remain open towards the openness itself. Now, there is another element that pertains to Gelassenheit: there is, in fact, not only a resolve, but also a “steadfastness” [Ausdauer] (Heidegger 1966a, p.81) proper to Gelassenheit. Thinking, becoming more and more aware of its nature, and experiencing more clarity about it, remains firm and resolute. Thinking “stands within” and “rests” in this “composed steadfastness” (ibid., p. 81]). The “steadfastness” proper to Gelassenheit would be behavior which did not become a swaggering comportment, but which collected itself into and remained always the composure of releasement [Verhaltenheit der Gelassenheit]. (Heidegger 1966a, p. 81)

### Shell Proper

1. I-meet because we interpret national service as being an ally, which helps marginalized bodies in America – meets both definition
   1. Prefer our interpretation because this topic ground is shitty af – we should be allowed to use the debate space as a safe space and read positions about what it means to be queer and what it means for those who aren’t. If marginalized bodies should be allowed to self-identify in debate, then default aff on T.
2. Standards
   1. Ground/Engagement
      1. Prefer our interp on ground – no reason they can’t engage – means the T/theory is frivolous. They could’ve easily read the Kant NC, Virtue Ethics NC, a counter-method, any k that links to normalcy like the cap k Harker read against this aff three times, etc. I shouldn’t be punished for their choice not to engage. Also, that independently turns T because their abuse story is self-induced.
         1. ALSO, a 1% chance of engagement means it’s worth the discussion – my aff could easily be answered with policy backfiles, so even if you’re lazy you should have answers.
   2. AND, your interp doesn’t solve because…
      1. There is no method of affirming queer epistemologies under your interpretation – forcing me to read a multiculturalism advantage about putting queer people on the frontlines so they can die while tauting some sort of communitarianism is a violent psychological trauma you enforce upon me – I shouldn’t be forced to read positions related to my identity that I don’t want to affirm
      2. The USFG can’t hear what we say in this round, once we leave this round, no policy is going to be implemented and neither debater will even be able to change the way debate operates for queer bodies, means we must divorce ourselves from policy education to discuss underlying ethical concerns that preclude policy discussions
3. Voters
   1. Evaluate T under the ROTB
      1. Cross-apply all the offense coming out of the AC. At worst, it uniquely justifies an RVI on T to cause neg’s to think twice before disengaging with discussions that are imperative to identity and selfhood.
         1. Excluding queer perspectives bites our criticism – I cannot be a coherent body in the debate space because under your interpretation, I can no longer claim the debate space as a safe space for me – turn T on categorical exclusion of marginalized perspectives. You normalize a model of debate that is always already exclusive of affirming the debate as a safe space, which turns T on the ROTB.
      2. AND, ROB comes before theory – (a) it determines what we should read in ådebate which constrains things like theory and (b) controls the strongest internal link to inclusion – theory forces debate into abstract rules to escape hard conversations which creates an exclusionary debate space where only wealthy theory debaters can participate, and accessibility is a multiplier, your impacts don’t matter if they only apply to a privileged elite. And *(c) it determines what it means to be the better debater, which means it contextualizes what fairness is.*

#### [McGregory 14] ALSO, Turn education – force them to come to our side of the library. McGregory 14

[McGregory, Aileen. "Queer Killjoys: Individuality, Niceness, and the Failure of Current Ally Culture." CiteSeerX. Pennsylvania State University, Apr. 2014. Web. 21 Dec. 2016.]

Allies often expect that LGBT community spaces will be spaces in which they can safely ask their questions and be educated, allowing them to be corrected kindly and to express their own emotions. This expectation of inclusion relies on an understanding that ideal political spaces will be open to everyone, that all exclusions are politically distasteful, and that the proper response to ignorance is education. Some of the Tumblr sites I have been discussing are not inclusive spaces. LGBT Laughs specifically states that it is not a space meant for allies: this blog was not made for straight (cis) people, no matter how allied they are. straight people, you are guests in this space. if you can’t handle a member of an oppressed community being angry, snarky, teasing or mean about the oppressors (a group you are still part of even if you’re an “ally”), then leave. (LGBT Laughs, moderator) This warning is directed against the assumption that allies are or should be welcome everywhere, that LGBT-exclusive spaces have no political a value. Ally expectation of inclusion in spaces and conversations can encompass a demand to be educated: because they wish to become better allies through better understanding, allies often desire inclusion in order to participate in educational 83 discussions and become more informed. Although on the surface, such a process might seem helpful, there is an underlying understanding that it is the responsibility of LGBT people to educate their allies, and that the ignorance of allies is the fault of the education given to them by LGBT people (rather than their own lack of selfmotivated learning). White allies’ assumptions that they will be educated have been criticized in similar terms, such as in Suey Park’s article “Challenging Racism and the Problem with White Allies:” The push back against the expectation that “people of color educate white folks” is a rejection of centering white desire and need. The presumption here is that white people need/want to be educated about issues of racism, about inequality, or about differences in experience, and that this desire should compel people of color to act. This is all about white desire; it is about white agency and the expectation of Others helping white folk grow, learn, and be better people.10 Education is often seen as a cure for bad allyship when, in truth, it is already part of a process that recreates the dominance and centrality of the ally in LGBT spaces. Allies do not want to take the time to educate themselves or seek appropriate venues in which to ask questions. They want their answers immediately and without effort, and excuse this desire as a reasonable and necessary in order to sustain their allyship. This does not mean that I am against education; I want allies and other straight, cisgender people to improve their understandings of LGBT issues. However, when the demands for such education recenter ally needs and desires in LGBT spaces and discussions, ally “education” comes to seem more like LGBT erasure. The failure to center ally needs in LGBT spaces can produce sites, like the ally centric Tumblr Straight Voices, that do prioritize allies. This Tumblr claims in its heading 10 Available on the blog “Youngist”: http://youngist.org/challenging-racism-and-the-problem-withwhite-allies/#.U0W3hfldWa8/ 84 that “this is a safe space for straight allies of gay, lesbian, bi and transgendered people. we also post things from gay people supporting straight people and valuing them for the contributions they make to ending hate” (StraightVoices, heading). This tag line echoes the original idea of LGBT “safe spaces” that may include allies, yet Straight Voices instead was created for allies and may include what might be called allies of allies.

#### [McGregory 14] AND, Turn fairness – your fairness is just an exemplar of privilege that excludes queer perspectives like the aff. McGregory 14

[McGregory, Aileen. "Queer Killjoys: Individuality, Niceness, and the Failure of Current Ally Culture." CiteSeerX. Pennsylvania State University, Apr. 2014. Web. 21 Dec. 2016.]

However, the existence of an ally safe space implies that the majority of spaces are not safe for straight people, denying a systematic privilege that they have and contributing to a discourse that holds up ally safety and need to feel “valued” over potential critiques. This is the kind of safe space that values a lack of conflict and a feeling of comfort above the creation of alternative communities. On the one hand, the ally claim to safe space is an appropriation of the very real needs for safety that characterize LGBT safe spaces. On the other, as critics of “safe space” such as Christina Hanhardt (2013) note, the concept often entails the privileging of some (middle-class gay gentrifiers, for example) over others (poor queer youth of color). In this way, the ally use of “safe space,” like the charge of heterophobia, overextends discourses of safety, inclusion, and affirmation against threatening others (in this case, LGBT people). Such ally spaces paint everyone as equally in need of safe space and other concessions, and ally “exclusion” as discrimination. Abby Ferber points out this “reverse oppression” argument, like color-blind ideology, applies to discussions of gender; the argument similarly applies to sexuality and even cisgender/transgender on Tumblr: Just as the advocates of color-blind racism believe that racial inequality is a thing of the past, and that further attempts to remedy inequality lead to 85 “reverse discrimination” against Whites, we see similar arguments about gender. This rearticulation of the minimization of discrimination frame leads to reifying the values of “abstract liberalism,” where feminism is attacked for violating the values of individualism and equal opportunity. (Ferber 2012, 68) Arguments that depend on abstract liberal individualism understand people as fundamentally the same (at least in the eyes of the law), and therefore different treatment (such as affirmative action or safe space) are forms of discrimination. In this way, allies can make demands for inclusion, education, and support in part because of this assertion of both privilege and individualism, and these demands, in turn, serve to reaffirm their domination. Such a focus on ally inclusion can even mean exchanging inclusion of some LGBT people for inclusion of allies, as is the case when allies insist that the “A” in many extended acronyms stands for ally, not asexual. In these cases, the erasure of asexual people is often seen as a legitimate sacrifice to allow allies to feel involved and as if they are part of “the community.” why would you even think that the A in LGBTQA+ stands for ally though? like, they’re not part of the community they’re \*allies\* to it therefore not in the initialism y’know i mean if they think the A stands for ally instead of asexual they’re pretty shitty allies tbh [to be honest] (LGBTLaughs, confitureestmadrogue) To which they got the reply, "Allies were here first. That’s why" (asklovestrucktwilight). The consistent erasure of asexual people is used here as an excuse to continue doing so. In this way, the expectation of inclusion at the expense of marginalized groups goes directly against the ally mandate of support, discussed in Chapter One, since it dovetails with liberal ideologies of colorblindness and individualized equality that, in reality, serve to further benefit those who are already privileged.

### AT: Ground/Engagement

1. Empirically denied – critical arguments are becoming more common in LD, fostering strategies on how to engage Ks on a substantive level
2. There are plenty of ways to engage – queer nihilism, queer unintelligibility, any of a billion PIC’s, etc.
3. Reciprocity not key to engagement – unequal ground distribution is inevitable, as long as I provide them with ways to topically engage my aff then that mitigates the strength of link back to the voter
4. Name one debater who quit the activity SOLELY because of the existence of kritikal arguments. Go on, I’ll wait. That’s what I thought.

### AT: Fairness

1. Their conception of fairness is not broad enough – as long as their conception of fairness does not take into account the consistent exclusion of critical debaters then their conception will ALWAYS be flawed
2. Even if fairness matters, I link in best
   1. My aff is most predictable because it is not contingent on implementation. Given that the resolution lacks temporal context and a concrete state of affairs, aff cases could defend any state of affairs or implementation time. This is unpredictable and skews ground.
   2. Best topic lit because my case concerns an actual specific case in recent history that entirely altered how we view ally culture and how that contributes specifically to oppression and marginalization of queer people—best for topic lit because the lit is historical, normative, and also still has current event relevance. Means most pre round prep applicability so we can better equalize ground

#### K turns fairness

#### Their claims of how to best preserve debate beg the question. Why is the form of debate they defend one that deserves to be preferred—if I win that my methodology is productive for combatting oppressive knowledge, this is an external impact justifying my form of debate.

#### Extend Vaccaro et al 12 -- utilizing fairness as a factor in decision-making prioritizes self-interest over the educational value of the public sphere which coopts and destroys debate making flawed ideology replicate itself causing the violent norms. We’ve mechanized debate to the point that we’re stuck in the same repetitious cycle.

#### Fairness is not a voter—just an internal link to education, if I win I promote new forms of knowledge that outweighs fairness. Flipping a coin to decide a winner would be fair but would destroy debate, which proves that only education is constitutive of debate.

### AT: Education

1. Logic—lack of temporal context means there’s no reason to presume the rez is a present tense is statement—talking about implementation presumes the political systems/structures exist as they currently do, ignoring the fact that the rez gives no reason to use present state. My ROTB avoids this since it is not reliant on a hyperspecific political context of the US, rather speaks to centuries of ingrained ideologies. Logic is the most important form of education because it’s the most portable—specific facts we learn in debate will likely be irrelevant in the future but logic is portable to whatever field we choose to pursue
2. Best topic lit because my case concerns current allyship cultures on college campuses and how that reinforces the marginalization of queer students. Topic lit is the means to resolutional education. Most of the topic learning does not occur within the 45 minute rounds, but rather in the 4 months that we spend researching the topic. Means most pre-round prep applicability so we can better utilize our pre-round research.

### AT: Jurisdiction

1. My ROTB frames what the judge’s jurisdiction should be in the first place, which means my ROTB precludes jurisdiction
2. Independent of the K, my opponent’s jurisdiction claim is nonsensical: the judge has the de facto jurisdiction to vote on whatever they want. Thus jurisdiction is NOT a voter
3. All jurisdiction means is you can only vote on the topic but a—that begs the question of topicality which I’m ahead on b—my offense is topical, just because I’m not reading the stockest argument on the topic doesn’t mean I’m not making arguments within the topic and c—also begs question of how we should interpret the topic which I’m ahead on because only mine doesn’t literally exclude people from the debate space

### AT: Resolvability

1. My ROTB frames how the round should be resolved in the first place, which means my ROTB precludes resolvability.
2. The value of a debate round isn’t based in the ability to resolve—otherwise we’d just flip a coin every round because that’s the most resolvable. Given that we don’t do that, resolvability doesn’t matter
3. I control the internal link to resolvability because my ROTB provides a filter by which to evaluate impacts

### AT: Restrict means policy action

1. Double bind: either there are no topical affirmatives under their interp b/c fiat is illusory and none of us are legislators OR their interp forces us to engage in bad performance

### AT: Switch Side

1. Just because I can read it on the neg, doesn’t mean I shouldn’t read it on the aff. If we win the epistemic justification for the 1ac methodology, it means there is a necessity to continuously talk about it
2. Also it’s violent --- it attempts to order debate and force people to defend their something that is structurally built against their identity which causes shit like psychological warfare, because you’re being forced to compromise your radicalism for an hour of soft, sweet liberalism.

### AT: Decision Making

1. No internal link between stasis point and decisions --- queers are constantly forced to make decisions about their next action which could get them killed which is a decision that is much harder than your shit about liberal progressive politics.
2. No impact --- queerness is dead, their ontology remains subject to violent acts like overkill which attempts to kill off queer populations --- their social life doesn’t exist and their positionality exists on a separate level that wouldn’t even make your impact comparable.

### AT: Limits

Fuck your limits, liberalism --- we are naturally fluid and unknowable which means you don’t get uniqueness to your impact

Also limits are bad ---

1. They staticize identity and subject it to violent categorization based on its comparable relationship to the western ideal subject.
2. They kill creativity --- we’re forced to defend a plan text, which means when we do read the super creative 1ac with a plan text, that will be the last you see of the performance, because they’ll read the fucking politics DisAd.

### AT: Stasis/Ground

1. Not our burden --- you should come to a side of the library that is responsive to our shit --- it never was and will never be our burden to tell you what ground you have.
2. All of the limits arguments are impact turns to this argument. Predictability is a tool used to staticize identity which makes forms of violence inevitable, because queerness is then subject to violent dehumanization based on its subject position in civil society

### AT: State Good

1. Don't be fooled, straight people own the world and the only reason you have been spared is you're smart, lucky, or a fighter. Straight people have a privilege that allows them to do whatever they please and fuck without fear. But not only do they live a life free of fear; they flaunt their freedom in my face. Their images are on my TV, in the magazine I bought, in the restaurant I want to eat in, and on the street where I live. Until I can enjoy the same freedom of movement and sexuality, as straights, their privilege must stop and it must be given over to me and my queer sisters and brothers. Creating safe spaces is key 🡪 That’s Vaccaro, August, and Kennedy 12. Means the Aff shouldn’t need to make a demand on the state.
2. Also you’ll get your politics debate in other rounds because, thankfully, Harvard-Westlake, Valley, and other big schools like that still have debate programs --- means that the model of they want is inevitable --- that doesn’t implicate the aff because you do you and we’ll do us.
3. Also you deprioritize substantive epistemic interrogations in favor of recycled, shitty politics DA’s and process counterplans.
4. Additionally tacking on the USFG lets them read the politics DA which a) isn’t responsive to the aff and you’d probably lose anyway, but b) it makes our discussion inauthentic because the debate transitions away from self affirmation to political discussions --- means the T version of the aff doesn’t solve.

## T - Def

#### CI: Gang activity in a form of community activism to is a form of public health. It is fundamentally DIFFERENT FOR EVERY PERSON. Means I’m topical and the Aff outweighs because its conceded

**University of Pittsburgh** [“Careers in Public Health.” *Definition of Public Health | Graduate School of Public Health | University of Pittsburgh*, [www.publichealth.pitt.edu/careers/what-is-public-health](http://www.publichealth.pitt.edu/careers/what-is-public-health).]

**The definition of public health is different for every person.** Whether you like to crunch numbers, conduct laboratory or field research, formulate policy, or work directly with people to help improve their health, there is a place for you in the field of public health. **Being a public health professional enables you to work around the world, address health problems of communities as a whole, and influence** policies that affect **the health of societies.**

#### Prefer –

# \*\*\*A2 Ks\*\*\*

AT: K’s (General)

Perms

1. Perm – Do both
2. Perm – Do the aff, then the alt
3. Perm – Do the aff and all noncompetitive aspects of the alt
4. Perm – Double Bind
5. Perm – Do the aff, then the alt later
6. Perm – Do the aff and write the alt on the ballot
   1. People talking about k in the tabroom is solvency for the alt.
7. Perm – Do the aff on public colleges and universities and do the alt on private colleges and universities
8. Perm – Do the aff at [] and do the alt at []

\*\*Agamben\*\*

The case outweighs – we have identified a particular form of oppression as the structuring principle for all forms of violence. Even if they win that the sovereign has access to the state of exception in the status quo, that’s only true because of the overarching structures oppressing queers – also makes the Aff a prerequisite and the alt alone a disaster

No link – their evidence is about drawing lines and allowing the sovereign to exist and create Zoe – the 1AC doesn’t draw these lines

Link turn – If civil society is sutured to violence, we demand a queer attack on the social order. When borders and walls and cages are erected, we see only one solution: every nation and border reduced to rubble. Get with us or get the fuck out of the way. In short, this world has never been enough for us. We say to it, “we want everything gone, motherfucker, try to stop us!

All of their links are entirely non-unique, which means you vote Aff if there is a risk that we change the world for the better post 1AC

Perm – do the Aff and the alt – there’s no theoretical or substantive reason why we cannot combine struggles and coalescence around the destruction of civil society

Agamben’s eurocentric and ignores the whole corpus of decolonial thinking – this leads him to ignore the long history of europe’s willingness to make life disposable, and instead center his analysis on the forms of bare life that are deployed against privileged subjects

Mignolo 2005 (Walter, prof literature and and romance studies, Duke, “Epistemic Disobedience and the De-colonial Option: A Manifesto.” Paper presented at the conference “Mapping the De-colonial Turn,” UC Berkeley, April 2005. http://waltermignolo.com/txt/Epistemic\_Disobedience\_and\_the\_Decolonial\_Option.doc)

The transformation of human life into disposable material is something more than the “bare life“ that Giorgio Agamben discovered during the Holocaust. Cugoano contributed to the initiation of a critique that is reproduced today, for example, in the “necropolitics” of Achille Mbembe, who, departing from the “bio-politics” of Michel Foucault, displaces it to the epistemological space with the distancing and the opening of de-colonial thinking. The imperial/national divisions remain bare when they are observed from the consequences of the logic of coloniality: imperial conflicts over human goods. Agamben’s reflections are important, but they are late, regional, and limited. Starting off from the refugees of the Second World War and the Holocaust means to ignore four-hundred years of history of which the refugees and the Holocaust are certain moments in a much longer chain of the disposability of human life and the violation of human dignity (not only of human rights). This was precisely one of Cugoano’s strongest arguments, as we will see in a moment. The genealogy of de-colonial thinking is un-known in the genealogy of European thinking. As such, Agamben returns to Hannah Arendt in the first case; to Heidegger in the second, and by the way course ignores, is unaware of or simply does not touch his subjectivity, the thinking of Aimé Césaire, canonical in the genealogy of imperial thinking. In 1955, Césaire could see what perhaps few (if any) European thinkers could “see,” so dispossessed that they were and are in the archive constructed by the colonial would. Césaire observed:¶ Yes, it would be worth wile to study clinically, in detail, the steps taken by Hitler and Hitlerism and to reveal to the very distinguished, very humanistic, very Christian bourgeois of the twentieth century that without his being aware of it, he has a Hitler inside him, that Hitler inhabits him, that Hitler is his demon, that if he rails against him, he is being inconsistent and that, at bottom, what he cannot forgive Hitler for is not the crime in itself, the crime against man, it is not the humiliation of man as such, it is the crime against the white man, the humiliation of the white man, and the fact that he applied to Europe colonialist procedures which until then had bee reserved exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, the “coolies”of India, and the “niggers” of Africa (pp.36). Thus, the “bare life” that Agamben “discovered“ and enthused the White mentality of Occidental Europe and the United States, comes much later than what the Indians and the Blacks had already known since the 16th century: that the disposability of lives of White peoples was a novelty for Europe and Anglo-America. This novelty is also a part of the “White Man’s” blindness, a blindness within the discovery of the disposability of human life that now allows for the construction of critical arguments based on the humiliation of the White man. De-colonial thinking, which also pays attention to the horrors of the Holocaust, links them to their historical gestation in the 16th century in their parallel histories in Europe, to the exploitation of Indians and Blacks in America and Africa, and also to Asian populations.

Perm – do the Aff, then the alt – the 1AC is a prior ethical question toward destroying the sovereign because it changes the foundational question for how oppression operates in the first place

The Alt doesn’t solve the case –

A. Single issue focus – Mary Nardini Gang indicates that radical social movements become extremely pacified and sell out their comrades -- A group gains privilege and power within a movement, and shortly thereafter sell their comrades out. Within a couple years of stonewall, affluent-gay-white-males had thoroughly marginalized everyone that had made their movement possible and abandoned their revolution with them. It was once that to be queer was to be in direct conflict with the forces of control and domination. Now, we are faced with a condition of utter stagnation and sterility. As always, Capital recuperated brick-throwing street queens into suited politicians and activists.

B. Complacency -- a refusal to draw lines and embrace destituent power doesn’t change the way that the state operates, but rather strengthens its power because we feel like we’ve done something

C. Root cause – you fail to address the reason why power operates in the way that it does in favor of a discussion about how we change that power – this leads to myopia and no alt solvency because we never address underlying causalities

Perm – do the Aff as an instance of the alt

\*\*Anthro\*\*

The case outweighs – we have identified a particular form of oppression as the structuring principle for all forms of violence. Even if they win that anthropocentrism was at one time the cause of violence, they have conceded that normalizing structures creates violence on queer bodies in the status quo

No link – their evidence only describes how mainstream liberation movements don’t focus on the animal – this either links to the status quo or is a link of omission

AND, link of omission is bad for debate --– we only have 6 minutes which means we shouldn’t be punished for not discussing everything – the 1AC is an ongoing political project which means we’re constantly changing – also means we have a disingenunity DA to their alt because to include things outside our subjectivity would be disingenuous

All of their links are entirely non-unique, which means you vote Aff if there is a risk that we change the world for the better post 1AC

Also, it’s inaccurate and turns the critique

Lewis 92 [Martin W, Professor in the School of the Environment and the Center for International Studies at Duke University. Green Delusions, 1992, p17-18]

Nature for Nature’s Sake—And Humanity for Humanity’s It is widely accepted that environmental thinkers can be divided into two camps: those who favor the preservation of nature for nature’s sake, and those who wish only to maintain the environment as the necessary habitat of humankind (see Pepper 1989; O’Riordan 1989; W Fox 1990). In the first group stand the green radicals, while the second supposedly consists of environmental reformers, also labeled “shallow ecologists.” Radicals often pull no punches in assailing the members of the latter camp for their anthropocentrism, managerialism, and gutless accommo­dationism—to some, “shallow ecology” is “just a more efficient form of exploitation and oppression” (quoted in Nash 1989:202). While this dichotomy may accurately depict some of the major approaches of the past, it is remarkably unhelpful for devising the kind of framework required for a truly effective environmental movement. It incorrectly assumes that those who adopt an anti-anthropocentric view (that is, one that accords intrinsic worth to nonhuman beings) will also embrace the larger political programs of radical environmentalism. Sim­ilarly, it portrays those who favor reforms within the political and economic structures of representative democracies as thereby excluding all nonhumans from the realm of moral consideration. Yet no convincing reasons are ever provided to show why these beliefs should necessarily be aligned in such a manner. (For an instructive discussion of the pitfalls of the anthropocentric versus nonanthropocentric dichotomy, see Nor­ton 1987, chapter ir.)

Link turn – normalcy is the structuring principle for violence against the non-human – the straight cis male capitalist system prioritizes wealth and social mobility at the cost of the environment – the 1AC subversion of this overarching system is a reason to vote aff

Perm – do both – the 1AC and the 1NC are complimentary political strategies, not at odds with one another

Perm – you do you, and we’ll do us – rejecting anthropocentrism might good for them, however, queer rage politics is key to create a survival strategy to survive for queer people like me

Root cause claims are unproductive – ignore the overlapping forms of oppression – perm solves

Steven Their author Best, “Rethinking Revolution: Animal Liberation, Human Liberation, and the Future of the Left,” 2006, <http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/journal/vol2/vol2_no3_Best_rethinking_revolution.htm>

The best approach to theorizing hierarchy in its origins, development, and multifaceted, overlapping forms is through a multiperspectival, non-reductionist approach that sees what is unique to and common among various modes of domination. There are a plurality of modes and mechanisms of power that have evolved throughout history, and different accounts provide different insights into the workings of power and domination. According to feminist standpoint theory, each oppressed group has an important perspective or insight into the nature of society.[[21]](http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/journal/vol2/vol2_no3_Best_rethinking_revolution.htm" \l "_edn21) People of color, for instance, can illuminate colonialism and the pathology of racism, while women can reveal the logic of patriarchy that has buttressed so many different modes of social power throughout history. While animals cannot speak about their sufferings, it is only from the animal standpoint ―the standpoint of animal exploitation― that one can grasp the nature of speciesism, glean key facets of the pathology of human violence, and illuminate important aspects of misothery (hatred of nature) and the social and environmental crisis society now faces.

The alt doesn’t solve –

A. Anthropocentrism is inevitable – humans still have to weigh it as a value

Light 2002 [Andrew, George Mason University Center for Global Ethics director, Metaphilosophy, July 2002, Vol 33, No4, “Contemporary Environmental Ethics from Metaethics to Public Philosophy” Wiley, p.438, accessed 7-10-12, ]

First, the, perhaps, externalism of this approach (or motivational rationalism), entailed in the thought experiment that Katz and Oechsli propose whereby we first assume the existence of a justified moral theory in order to test its veracity in a policy setting, is both practically and theoretically unsound.10 How the mere justification of a nonanthropocentric theory would motivate dismissal of competing claims by humans for satisfaction of their needs is never made clear. Given that a nonanthropocentric theory would not eliminate the rational concern of moral agents about their own welfare, at the very least, some minimal model of moral psychology should be required of such a theory to make the thought experiment plausible. Human interests still exist even if a nonanthropocentric theory has been justified, and as with contemporary cases of moral dilemmas faced by agents even when they recognize competing moral claims of other humans on them, we can easily imagine that humans who had recognized the valid justification of nonanthropocentric natural value would still feel the reasonable tug of competing claims to protect human welfare and would conceivably decide contrary to the nonanthropocentric calculus. Additionally, in theoretical terms, no reason is offered here why the “interests” of nature recommending preservation of the rainforest would necessarily trump the interests of humans for development. This is simply assumed by Katz and Oechsli. After all, a nonanthropocentric theory does not necessarily reduce all human interests to a subservient position in relation to nature. Even if strong second-order principles were justified in this hypothesized nonanthropocentric theory that provided reasons for resolving conflicts of value, the application of those principles would not in this case ensure that natural welfare would trump considerations of human welfare. Every nonanthropocentrist who has taken seriously the question of conflicts of value in a nonanthropocentric approach acknowledges that in many cases human interests will still trump nonhuman interests where these interests directly come into conflict (see Eckersley 1998 for a helpful discussion). If this were not true, nonanthropocentrism would quickly degenerate into an absurd position (see Lynch and Wells 1998).

B. Single Issue Focus Fails --– Mary Nardini Gang indicates that radical social movements become extremely pacified and sell out their comrades -- A group gains privilege and power within a movement, and shortly thereafter sell their comrades out. Within a couple years of stonewall, affluent-gay-white-males had thoroughly marginalized everyone that had made their movement possible and abandoned their revolution with them. It was once that to be queer was to be in direct conflict with the forces of control and domination. Now, we are faced with a condition of utter stagnation and sterility. As always, Capital recuperated brick-throwing street queens into suited politicians and activists.

C. Doesn’t solve the aff – even if they win that their alt solves the bed rock for why violence against queer bodies happens, they won’t win that that changes civil society in any meaningful way. The AFF is a prerequisite to the alt because destroying power structures is a prior question

D. Cooption -- Their movement is uniquely coopted by academia – simply talking about it in a debate sphere reentrenches anthropocentric self-interest of elites – voting neg simply destroys its radical potential and turns it into a tool that is deployed against other liberating movements

Steven Their author Best, 2012“The Rise and Fall of Critical Animal Studies” <http://www.liberazioni.org/articoli/BestS-TheRise(and%20Fall)ofCriticalAnimalStudies.pdf>

In the last three decades, animal studies has grown exponentially in the global academy. The "animal turn" has moved throughout humanities, the fine arts, and social sciences; it has crossed into psychology, philosophy, anthropology, political science, and sociology; and it has made its mark in literature, history, cultural studies, geography, feminism, and queer theory. Alongside the explosion of articles, books, and conferences, there are hundreds of animal studies courses taught in dozens of universities and colleges worldwide, from the UK and Canada to the Germany and the US to Poland and Israel and New Zealand to Australia. Without question, animal studies will grow in popularity and evolve in dynamic ways. Within a few years, one can expect Animal Studies programs and departments to become as widespread as Women's Studies, African-American Studies, Chicano/a Studies, Disability Studies, and Queer Studies. The rapid surge in animal studies programs, moving it from the margins to the mainstream, is both laudable and lamentable. For as animal studies is a potential force of enlightenment and progressive change in public attitudes and policies toward nonhuman animals, its academic proponents can only advance it within tight institutional constraints and intensive normalizing regimes that frequently demand conformity, “neutrality,” disengaged detachment, and activism within narrowly accepted limits. The growth, acceptance, and success of animal studies in the sterile corporate environment of academia, in other words, typically demands pacifying the scholar-professor and gutting the subversive implications of anti-speciesism and challenging the human/animal dualism that underpins the violent tyranny of humans over other animals. The academy domesticates the systemic critical power of the “animal standpoint” which provides vital and unique critical insights into the origins of war, slavery, hierarchical domination, and a vast spectrum of psychological, moral, social, and ecological crises (see below); the stultifying structure of “higher education” defuses the potential volatility of critical knowledges in general, including those which might work to expose the true horror of the animal holocaust and international animal slave trade, which exploits, tortures, and murders burgeoning billions of victims, as the academic-industrial complex itself, in its highly profitable vivisection sectors, claims butchers over one hundred million animals a year for “medical research.” *Homo academicus – that typically competitive, cutthroat,* ambitious, vain, arrogant, pompous, one-dimensional, desiccated, apolitical, sycophantic, opportunist, narcissistic career-obsessed primate -- has rushed *en masse* from the staid paradigms, boring traditions, and mummified classics to chase the hot, trendy, fashionable novelty of animal studies in the hopes of jump-starting a new career or revivifying a moribund research life. Because animal studies is so broad, vague, open, and amorphous a field, it offers something for everyone. Yet the similarities of the animal studies paradigm with conventional humanist, positivist, or analytic frameworks are more significant than the differences. For in animal studies, as well, there are no expectations of coherence between research and ethics or theory and practice, such that personal and academic integrity in animal studies hardly demand normative and political commitments to veganism, animal liberation, and social transformation. Mainstream, animal studies (MAS) has been neutralized, stripped of political relevance, co-opted, and contained by the hegemonic norms of the academic-industrial complex. As a potentially subversive and radical discourse taking shape within the prisonhouse of dead scholars walking, animal studies has unavoidably succumbed to the fate of all other “critical” paradigms and identity politics “studies” programs by introjecting institutionalized discursive rules, bowing to peerpressure and bureaucratic surveillance, and conforming to the codes of detachment and abstraction; fecund with insight and potential, animal studies has become another specialized, technical, abstruse product and commodity of today’s knowledge factories that specialize in producing data pertinent to profit and social control imperatives but irrelevant to the crises of the day. Animal studies has been confined within the cage of theory-for-theory’s sake, severed from practical and activist concerns, and sundered from the pressing demands of global social and ecological crisis. The Faustian pact that academics sign with bureaucratic overlords demands fidelity to scholarship as its own end, pseudo-objectivity and drone-like detachment, existential and theoretical abstraction, inscrutable jargon, and the pompous profundity of the illuminati. The scholar-activist and engaged intellectual with “dirty hands,” is viewed with contempt, shunned as threatening, and ridiculed as a dilettante. Hardly showered with awards and accolades, those who violate this tacit terrorism and speak against the tacit codes of complicity incur endless slights, condescension, alienation, and penalties ranging from reduced pay to non-promotion or even termination. “Critical” academics deconstruct every boundary, dualism, and opposition except the bifurcation between theory and practice and the Ivy Curtain dividing universities from the communities. The recipe for the "success" of animal studies is also the formula for its failure. For in order to allay fears, disarm skepticism, establish the human-animal studies as a respectable and rigorous research paradigm, institutionalized power systems, and the obliging knowledgeproducing work force, process animal studies through the standard filters of positivism, scientism, statistics, quantification, methodologies, theorems, and philosophical obfuscation. The potential virtues and contributions of animal studies include challenges to humanist ideologies and speciesist philosophies; illuminating histories of the co-evolution of animals and humans; revelations’ of the complexity of animal consciousness, social life, behaviour, and agency; and stimulating insights into our own animality, and the genesis of dominator cultures, debilitating mindsets, and an array of dysfunctional relations and institutions generating social pathologies and crises. MAS can help spawn a new ethic of inclusiveness, interconnectedness, and community uniting human and nonhuman animals and the earth as a whole. But too often the critical potential of animal studies is thwarted by the complicity of academics in their own domestication, in the proclivity to posture as “serious” researchers, to cloak mundane observations and banal discoveries in pretentious jargon and execrable abstractions, and to entomb themselves in seminars and assiduously avoid the streets. The production and performance of the “scholarly self” whose professionalism would be tainted through involvement in social movements and struggles conveniently excuses academics from their overriding duties in the political sphere, for they are citizens before scholars, and social beings over private individuals. The professional mask, the insular nature of academia, and the reified language affords the professoriate a numb detachment from a world screaming in pain and dying system by system. The functionary’s “disinterested” demeanor pleases academic bureaucrats, as it the feigning of “neutrality” only serves the interests of social elites, corporate exploiters, environmental rapists, and the animal holocaust industry.

Perm – do the Aff as an instance of the alt – the 1AC questions the idea of humanity and reduces it to rubble – it also destroys the idea of the liberal human subject, which is the yard stick for measuring deviancy

AT: Kochi and Ordan

Perm solves the thought experiment

Kochi & Ordan 8

(Tarik & Noam, Queen’s University and Bar Ilan University, “An Argument for the Global Suicide of Humanity”, Borderlands VOLUME 7 NUMBER 3, arh)

While we are not interested in the discussion of the ‘method’ of the global suicide of humanity per se, one method that would be the least violent is that of humans choosing to no longer reproduce. [10] The case at point here is that the global suicide of humanity would be a moral act; it would take humanity out of the equation of life on this earth and remake the calculation for the benefit of everything nonhuman. While suicide in certain forms of religious thinking is normally condemned as something which is selfish and inflicts harm upon loved ones, the global suicide of humanity would be the highest act of altruism. That is, global suicide would involve the taking of responsibility for the destructive actions of the human species. By eradicating ourselves we end the long process of inflicting harm upon other species and offer a human-free world. If there is a form of divine intelligence then surely the human act of global suicide will be seen for what it is: a profound moral gesture aimed at redeeming humanity. Such an act is an offer of sacrifice to pay for past wrongs that would usher in a new future. Through the death of our species we will give the gift of life to others. It should be noted nonetheless that our proposal for the global suicide of humanity is based upon the notion that such a radical action needs to be voluntary and not forced. In this sense, and given the likelihood of such an action not being agreed upon, it operates as a thought experiment which may help humans to radically rethink what it means to participate in modern, moral life within the natural world. In other words, whether or not the act of global suicide takes place might well be irrelevant. What is more important is the form of critical reflection that an individual needs to go through before coming to the conclusion that the global suicide of humanity is an action that would be worthwhile. The point then of a thought experiment that considers the argument for the global suicide of humanity is the attempt to outline an anti-humanist, or non-human-centric ethics. Such an ethics attempts to take into account both sides of the human heritage: the capacity to carry out violence and inflict harm and the capacity to use moral reflection and creative social organisation to minimise violence and harm. Through the idea of global suicide such an ethics reintroduces a central question to the heart of moral reflection: To what extent is the value of the continuation of human life worth the total harm inflicted upon the life of all others? Regardless of whether an individual finds the idea of global suicide abhorrent or ridiculous, this question remains valid and relevant and will not go away, no matter how hard we try to forget, suppress or repress it.

AT: OOO

Their movement just re-entrenches the capitalist system

Galloway 13 (Alexander Galloway, University of Chicago Press, “The Poverty of Philosophy: Realism and Post-Fordism”)

So the larger question still remains to be answered: Do movements like object-oriented philosophy and speculative realism have a politics and, if so, what is it? And, even more important, Malabou's opening challenge, slightly rephrased: What should we do so that thinking does not purely and simply coincide with the spirit of capitalism? Left unchecked, there is little to differentiate the new philosophical realism from the most austere forms of capitalist realism.29 What kind of world is it in which humans are on equal footing with garbage?30 What kind of world is it in which the landscape is a chaotic nothing-world, unfounded at its core and motivated by no necessary logic (Meillassoux) or by the logic of the market (Latour)? What kind of world is it in which the only absolute law remaining is the absolute law of a barren, totalizing nihilism? There are two basic options when it comes to the task of the political. One is an aligned politics and the other an unaligned politics. An aligned politics is a politics tethered to a moral yardstick and equipped with an ethical mechanic able to pursue it. The moral sphere refers to a law or goal that must be attained, while the ethical sphere refers to a set of practices governing action that, when observed and put into play, may tend toward certain ends (moral or not). One may inhabit an ethos, therefore, without having a morality; likewise one may be linked to a morality, but fail in ethical practice. Thus, an aligned politics is the name given when the vectors of ethical action aim directly at a specific moral outcome. By contrast, an unaligned politics is the name given to those projects unencumbered by the moral law. Guided solely by the force vectors of the ethical sphere, unaligned political projects may still gain formidable inertia, territorializing and deterritorializing entire domains. Unaligned, they exist as mercenaries, often jumping the gap between friend and enemy. If Badiou's project is the quintessential aligned political project, his moral truths scaffolded by a precise ethical mechanic, then Deleuze's is the quintessential unaligned political project, an absent moral superstructure overshadowed by a massive vector field of physical forces.31 Realism is an unaligned politics. The issue thus is not that realism is good or bad but that realism is dangerous. In its very unalignment, realism ultimately lacks a true relationship with the absolute because it abdicates the political decision.32 By contrast, materialism is an aligned politics because it identifies something like an absolute moral sphere (history, the social totality), and buttresses such an absolute with the necessary tactics governing practice (demystification of the commodity, ideology critique, the dialectic, and so on). What does materialism ultimately espouse? That everything should be rooted in material life and history, not in abstraction, logical necessity, universality, essence, pure form, spirit, or idea. Thus the true poverty of the new realism is not so much its naïve trust in mathematical reasoning and object-oriented architectures but its inability to recognize that the highest order of the absolute, the totality itself, is found in the material history of mankind. To touch the absolute is precisely to think this correlation, not so much to explain it away, but to show that thought itself is the correlation as such, and thus to think the material is to spread one's thoughts across the mind of history.

Separation of ontology from politics causes pure passivity.

Galloway 13 Phd in Literature, Associate professor in the Department of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University (Alexander, Source: Critical Inquiry, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Winter 2013), pp. 347-366, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/668529, The Poverty of Philosophy: Realism and Post-Fordism)

In order to address these important questions I will expand the field of view and make some observations about philosophical realism.9 In this context, realism means quite simply that an external world exists independent of ourselves and our languages, thoughts, and beliefs—although it is often also taken to entail the less simple epistemological thesis that we have direct and verifiable access to knowledge about that external world. In the wake of Kantianism and subsequent to phenomenology and structuralism, realism had essentially gone extinct in the continental tradition, despite having healthy offshoots in Anglo-American analytic philosophy, especially philosophy of science. But things began to change around 2002. In that year Manual De Landa published a book on Gilles Deleuze, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, stating in no uncertain terms “I am a realist”; in the same year Harman published his first book, which proposed a realism around a so-called object-oriented philosophy Perhaps the most influential of the recent realist texts has been Meillassoux’s book After Finitude, which advocates that one move beyond what Meillassoux calls correlationism and reconcile thought with the absolute. For Meillassoux correlationism means that knowledge of the world is always the result of a correlation between subject and object. “By ‘correlation’ we mean the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other,” Meillassoux writes.11 Under the system of correlationism, subjectivity and objectivity are forever bound together. Thus, one might naturally put figures like Immanuel Kant in this camp with his highly mediated model of subject and object. Phenomenology is also a key entry in the history of correlationism, as well as much of the French philosophical movements of the 1960s and 1970s, obsessed as they were with the inability for man to move beyond the prison house of language. Postmodernism is considered to be a high water mark for correlationism, particularly the notion, often attributed rightly or wrongly to postmodern thinkers, that the subject is ultimately at the mercy of ideology and spectacle, behind which there exists no absolute truth or reality. For correlationism human subjectivity always has a crucial role to play; the real world doesn’t exist, or if it does we cannot have direct access to it. Meillassoux pits himself firmly against the long tradition of correlationism in continental philosophy. For Meillassoux the real world exists, and it can be known. He endorses a so-called Copernican revolution wherein the anthropocentrism of correlationism is displaced in favor of a system in which reality is at the center, and the human is but one element in the network of the real. Levi Bryant and others have called this a flat ontology comprising a single plane, the real, within which exists human In the opening chapter of After Finitude, titled “Ancestrality,” Meillassoux lays out the basic stakes of what a noncorrelationist position might look like by making reference to the Kantian trap that has gripped Western philosophy for some time: “Thought cannot get outside itself in order to compare the world as it is ‘in itself’ to the world as it is ‘for us’. . . . We cannot represent the ‘in itself’ without it becoming ‘for us’, or as Hegel amusingly put it, we cannot ‘creep up on’ the object ‘from behind’ so as to find out what it is in itself” (AF, pp. 3–4). Meillassoux does not so much creep up on the object but posit a historical time scale outside the cognition of the human, a historical time prior to humanity altogether. Thus he speaks of the “ancestral realm” and the “arche-fossil”: “ancestral” claims are claims about things before the existence of man and therefore prior to what the phenomenologists call the “givenness” of human experience; the “arche-fossil” is the trace that allows someone to make ancestral claims. For example, radiological decay is an “arche-fossil” that allows a scientist to date prehistoric fossils. Meillassoux culminates these provocations by asking what if anything correlationism can say about such “ancestral” claims; the facts in question technically would fall prior to the subjectobject relation as such and hence prior to the model proposed by correlationism. If human thought had a beginning, what to think of history prior to human thought? Science emerges as something of a trump card, as Meillassoux poses the following question to his correlationist opponents: “how are we to conceive of the empirical sciences’ capacity to yield knowledge of the ancestral realm?” (AF, p. 26; emphasis removed). The opening section of the book also stresses the importance of mathematics. He describes an enigma in which mathematics is granted the ability to speak about the historical past in which humanity was absent: “how is mathematical discourse able to describe a world where humanity is absent. . . . This is the enigma which we must confront: mathematics’ ability to discourse about the great outdoors; to discourse about a past where both humanity and life are absent” (AF, p. 26); but also earlier Meillassoux brings in mathematics during his discussion of primary qualities: “all those aspects of the object that can be formulated in mathematical terms can be meaningfully conceived as properties of the object in itself” (AF, p. 3; emphasis removed). (I will return to the question of mathematics in a moment, but it is worth identifying it explicitly here.) Meillassoux’s use of the “ancestral realm” thus allows him to open up a space for a purely real world, a world that has never had a human eye gaze upon it or a human mind think about it. “To think ancestrality is to think a world without thought,” he writes, “a world without the givenness of the world” (AF, p. 28). The phrase “givenness of the world” is a reference to how phenomenology talks about presence. It refers to the way in which the world is given into perception by a thinking being. “Our task, by way of contrast,” writes Meillassoux, “consists in trying to understand how thought is able to access the uncorrelated, which is to say, a world capable of subsisting without being given.” The holy grail for Meillassoux is therefore existence without givenness. He understands the absolute as something “capable of existing whether we exist or not” (AF, p. 28). How should we evaluate Meillassoux and his intervention into contemporary philosophy?13Afew issues spring to mind, all concerning Meillassoux’s relationship to politics and history. I will address two criticisms first in relatively vague terms, then move to a third, more pointed critique. First is the question of metaphysical necessity itself, be it in the form of essentialism, the absolute, a natural reality, or universal truths. All of these things were at some time or another the antagonist of what one calls critical theory in the broadest sense, that is to say the practice of sociocultural critique invented by Karl Marx in the middle of the nineteenth century and practiced in various ways by the Frankfurt school, structuralism and poststructuralism, semiotics, cultural studies, and certain kinds of queer theory, feminism, and critical race theory up through the end of the twentieth century. In much of this work, essence and truth themselves are the antagonists, to be replaced by constructed identities and contingent worlds. (Recall how Marx and Friedrich Engels, in part two of the Communist Manifesto, promised to do away with truth!) With the new speculative realism, and perhaps also in a different way with Harman’s object-oriented philosophy, one risks switching from a system of subjective essentialism (patriarchy, logocentrism, ideological apparatuses) to a system of “objective” essentialism (an unmediated real, infinity, being as mathematics, the absolute, the bubbling of chaos). Is it time to trot out the old antiessentialist arguments from our Marxist, feminist, and postcolonial forebears? Isn’t Meillassoux’s metaphysical essentialism—his support of the universality of contingency (which in its impotent universality becomes meaningless), his pursuit of the absolute, his endorsement of a pure real—just as repugnant as other brands of metaphysical essentialism? Thus we must confront directly the fundamental provocation of the new philosophical realism. For, contra the tradition of materialist critical theory since Marx, much of today’s realism claims that ontologies should not be political; it claims that ontological speculations must be separated from political ones. Such choruses are being heard more and more frequently today. I have no doubt that many of the figures associated with today’s philosophical realism would view themselves as politicized souls of some caliber. And the argument is often heard that the uncoupling of the ontological from the political is a neutral act in and of itself and in so doing casts no aspersion as such on the political project. One simply can do metaphysics over here, while doing politics over there. Furthermore, promulgators of such arguments often laud the uncoupling as a feature of realism, not a liability, because it allows the political to persist inside its own autonomous sphere, unsullied by the nitty-gritty questions of Being and appearing. Yet the uncoupling of the ontological realm from the political realm is not entirely neutral, for it arrives less as an innocuous attempt to tidy up the cluttered landscape of philosophical discourse (so that one’s talk of Being will not be tainted by one’s talk of politics) than as an ideological strategy bent unwittingly or not on the elimination of competing discourses. Recall what must be discarded when overturning correlationism. One must discard phenomenology certainly, but one must also throw out social constructivism and the various fields that rely on a socialconstructivist methodology including much of second- and third-wave feminism, certain kinds of critical race theory, the project of identity politics in general, theories of postmodernity, and much of cultural studies. Phenomenology has a politics, to be sure: beyond the ravages of modern life, the return to a more poetic state of being guided by care and solicitude. Social constructivism has one too: throw out the violence of patriarchy, logocentrism, and all the rest. Have no illusions, this is what is at stake with the recent return to the absolute evident in theoretical discourse from Meillassoux to Badiou, and even evident in other authors such as Žižek and Susan Buck-Morss.14 To be sure, certain of these theorists understand the stakes and therefore scaffold their newfound universalism with a robust and often militant political theory—Badiou and Žižek, one shall re- member, are in no uncertain terms advocating communism, and Buck- Morss herself has a robust political consciousness. Fading violets they are not. The question becomes more pressing however when a philosopher uncouples Being from politics in order to withdraw from the project of political critique altogether.

Leads to inaction and is neoliberal – we can’t learn how to change the world

David M. Berry, Co-Director (Centre for Material Digital Culture), May 12th 2012, “The Uses of Object-Oriented Ontology,” http://stunlaw.blogspot.com/2012/05/uses-of-object-oriented-ontology.html

To draw back to the original question: what are the uses of object-oriented ontology? It seems to me that object-oriented ontology and speculative realism together reflect a worrying spirit of conservatism within philosophy. They discount the work of human activity and place it alongside a soporific litany of naturalised objects – a method that points less at the interconnected nature of things, and gestures more towards the infinity of sameness, the gigantic of objects, the relentless distanceless of a total confusion of beings (see Harman 2009a for a discussion of things and objects). In short, experience as passive, disoriented and overwhelming, what Heidegger described as the “terror” of pure unmitigated flatness. And with that, philosophy becomes ‘cold’ philosophy, instead of understanding, we have lists and litanies of objects. Not so much philosophy asphilosography, where rather than understanding the world, there is an attempt to describeit, and a worrying tendency towards the administration of things through a cataloguing operation. These litanies – cascades and tumbling threads of polythetic classification – are linked merely by sequence, in which each item has no need to bear any resemblance to the ones before or after. They posit no relationships, and offers no narrative connections, and are therefore “essentially uncontrollable: at the limit so indeterminable that anything can be connected with anything” (Anderson 2012). But of course there is a connection, a link, a thread, performed by the philosographer who chooses consciously or unconsciously the elements that make up the chain, and which are inscribed in books and articles. The use of object-oriented ontology, then, is bound up in its apparent conservatism which rallies at the temerity of human-beings to believe in themselves, their politics, and their specialness. Instead of World, object-oriented ontology posits universe, its founding principle is the[Gigantic](http://stunlaw.blogspot.co.uk/2011/12/gigantic-inc.html). As Heidegger explained: 1. The gigantism of the slowing down of history (from the staying away of essential decisions all the way to lack of history) in the semblance of speed and steer ability of "historical" [historisch] development and its anticipation. 2. The gigantism of the publicness as summation of everything homogeneous in favour of concealing the destruction and undermining of any passion for essential gathering. 3. The gigantism of the claim to naturalness in the semblance of what is self-evident and "logical"; the question-worthiness of being is placed totally outside questioning. 4. The gigantism of the diminution of beings in the whole in favour of the semblance of boundless extending of the same by virtue of unconditioned controllability. The single thing that is impossible is the word and representation of "impossible" (Heidegger 1999: 311). To see what "shows up" to the philosographer one is unsurprised to see lists that are often contaminated by the products of neoliberal capitalism, objects which could not just appear of themselves, but required actual concrete labour of human beings to mediate their existence. For some reason, object-oriented ontology is attracted to the ephemerality of certain objects, as if by listing them they doubly affirm their commitment to realism, or that the longer the list the more ‘real’ it is. There is also the tendency to attempt to shock the reader by the juxtaposition of objects that would normally be thought to be categorically different – see Bogost (2009) for a discussion of whether including Harry Potter, blinis, and humans in a list was a striking enough example. These rhetorical strategies are interesting in thermselves, but I do not see them as replacements for philosophy. This demonstrates that the speculative realists have not escaped the so-called ‘correlationist circle’ (Harman 2009b), nor provided a model for thinking about the anti-correlationist paradox which remains present in their own work. We should therefore ask object-oriented ontologist to move beyond merely staring at the objects they see around them and catch sight of what is being listed in their descriptive litanies. That is, examining the lists they produce, we can see what kind of objects they see as near, and which they see as far, and therefore question their claims to see objectsall the way down (see Bogost 2012: 83-84). Yet as we examine these lists there appears to be a profound forgetting of Being, as it were, as they write both for and as subjects of Late Capitalism – a fact which remains hidden from them – and a seemingly major aporia in their work.

Your argument makes no sense –is a perf con and leads to nihilim

David M. Berry, Co-Director (Centre for Material Digital Culture), May 12th 2012, “The Uses of Object-Oriented Ontology,” http://stunlaw.blogspot.com/2012/05/uses-of-object-oriented-ontology.html

Indeed, if we were to take this claim seriously then one would be driven to wonder why Bogost is writing his book at all, but of course, “musket buckshot and gypsum and space shuttles” cannot be the addressees of this text as patently they do not read. So object-oriented ontology (OOO) is trying to do two things here, on the one hand deny the specialness of humans’ existence in relation to other objects, whilst simultaneously having to write for them and to make arguments supporting their claims – thereby acknowledging the very special existence that humans possess, namely qualities of understanding, taking a stand on their own being, etc. This is a classic performative contradiction. Whilst it would be perfectly legitimate to outline a formalist theory or methodological position that, for the sake of the approach, limits the requirement to treat human actors as particular or special in relation to others (this is the methodological innovation within Actor-Network Theory), it is quite another to then extend this claim into a philosophical system which is part of a special order of discourse particular to human beings, that is, philosophy. This so-called philosophical non-human turn, is interesting for its nihilistic and conservative implications, something we now turn to in detail.

\*\*Baidou\*\*

The case outweighs – we have identified a particular form of oppression as the structuring principle for this particular form of violence. Even if they win that having a totalizing ethic is bad, in this particular instance our ethic is necessary and good to solve for the foundation of how violence occurs. The kritik doesn’t answer the question of *why* but only *how –* the aff is a crucial starting point for understanding violence

No link – the 1AC doesn’t call for a totalizing ethic – we say it’s necessary in this particular instance

Link turn –

A. The totalizing ethic that they critique is what we’ve already identifies as the totality – liberalism and modern subject building is the basis for violent expansion abroad

B. We change the victim rhetoric that justifies expansion abroad – the 1AC questions narratives of power and literally reduces the state to rubble. That destroys any “empathetic identification with the other” – means that the AFF solves the impact comparatively better than the critique

A few DA’s to the alt –

A. Passivity DA

Lotta 2009 [Raymond, Marxist scholar, “Alain Badiou’s “‘Politics of Emancipation’ A Communism Locked Within the Confines of the Bourgeois World” Demarcations 1 Summer-Fall Pg. 115-116]

Upsurges like those defined as events by Badiou can hold within them potentially constitutive elements of a revolutionary situation. But the task of revolutionaries is not to passively await—but rather to "hasten while awaiting"—the emergence of such a revolutionary situation, which comes about "as a result of the unfolding of the contradictions of the system itself, as well as the political and ideological work of the revolutionaries."138 This includes raising the ideological and political consciousness of masses of people through a whole ensemble of forms, including consistent ideological work, as well as identifying key faultlines around which mass political resistance to the state can open up questions of legitimacy; it includes strengthening the party in its understanding, its influence, and its numbers (a crucial task, as the strength of the party going into a potential revolutionary situation has everything to do with whether such an opening will be seized, or even recognized); and it includes as well bringing forward a significant section of people from different strata, but including a critical mass within the proletariat, who think and act as "emancipators of humanity," people imbued with a basic understanding of the long-term goals and outlook of communism. All this is part of "working on" the objective situation, of hastening. Alain Badiou's philosophical approach, with its lack of defining relations between different elements and levels of reality, does not actually reflect reality. Badiou's theory stands as an obstacle to being able to identify particular and various channels and pathways through which it becomes possible to wrench freedom out of necessity—and on that basis to transform the objective situation, especially the ideological and political consciousness of people. For all his rhapsodizing of the subject, Badiou objectively writes off the dynamic role of the subjective factor, or consciousness. In doing so, Badiou's philosophy and theory of the event succumbs to the relative stability that prevails in the imperialist countries. Passivity in the face of unfavorable objective situations has a deeply corrosive ideological effect. Over time, and almost inevitably, this passivity and determinism ideologically begets the "tolerability of the status quo," as one learns to accept what one cannot fundamentally change...while waiting for the miracle.

B. Exclusivity DA-- Our confrontation with the paradox of queer exclusion is a vital destruction of the capitalist social order—your alt is inaccessible to people who aren’t rich country club kids.

Lotta 2009 [Raymond, Marxist scholar, “Alain Badiou’s “‘Politics of Emancipation’ A Communism Locked Within the Confines of the Bourgeois World” Demarcations 1 Summer-Fall Pg. 14-15]

The kind of egalitarian politics advanced by Alain Badiou can resonate among sections of democratic intellectuals and radicalized youth. We are living in a period of extreme and unprecedented polarization in the world, of vast and howling differences in wealth, security, and human welfare. There is a thirst for justice towards others and reciprocity on an equal footing in the times in which we live. But the grotesque inequalities that mark, and mar, the world are a product and manifestation of the division of society into classes, and of the exploitative production relations on which this rests. They are an expression, on a world scale, of the fundamental contradiction of capitalist society, between socialized production and private appropriation by the capitalist class. Polarization may, to some degree, in some circumstances, be reduced with redistribution and reform, but it is impossible to overcome the profound inequalities of the “late imperialist” economic and social order without resolving this fundamental contradiction of capitalism, its exploitative core. These profound inequalities cannot be overcome without making revolution to transform the economic base and superstructure of society. Alain Badiou is outraged by the state of the world but recoils from the scale and scope of the struggle and transformations required to bring a radically new world into being: proletarian revolution whose first great step is the seizure of state power. His claim that “the age of revolutions is over”22 and his rejection of the revolutionary seizure of power is reinforced by incorrect verdicts on the first wave of socialist revolution. He offers a political project of “pure equality” to be applied in a society divided into classes and in coexistence with bourgeois state power. He heralds this as a new politics of emancipation and declares that it embodies the interests of a “generic humanity” transcending class. But Badiou’s “generic” is in fact quite “particular.” Alain Badiou is driven to a framework of understanding of the “problem” confronting humanity and its “solution” that corresponds to the class position and class outlook of a very definite segment of society, the radicalized petite bourgeoisie. He sees the problem of vast inequalities, but does not follow through to the taproots of exploitation in the economic base of society; he sees the solution as a “pure Idea of equality” in the political realm, not in achieving the “4 Alls.” Alain Badiou wants “equality” but shrinks from the complex process of making a revolution that not only overcomes social inequality but also achieves something far higher than equality.

C. Deterrence DA—your attempt at the “event” has no short term implications. The status quo is pervaded by suffering and you deter its alleviation. That’s morally evasive and turns your political strategy. Case is a disadvantage to the alt.

D. Ivory Tower DA -- Emphasis on the randomness of the event negates all possibility for change and trades off with efforts at revolution.

Lotta 2009 [Raymond, Marxist scholar, “Alain Badiou’s “‘Politics of Emancipation’ A Communism Locked Within the Confines of the Bourgeois World” Demarcations 1 Summer-Fall Pg. 115-116]

Alain Badiou presents the event as "pure chance, which cannot be inferred from the situation"129—"absolute contingency,"130 as Oliver Feltham, a Badiou scholar, describes it. In other words, the event is something absolutely new and "beyond" what can be explained as an outcome of prior conditions and contradictions. For this reason, the event is also unexpected. Badiou has stated: "it is the essence of the event not to be preceded by any sign, and to surprise us by its grace, however vigilant we may be...."The day of the Lord will come like a thief in the night."131 Alain Badiou is theorizing, and celebrating, an aspect of the dynamics of "the objective" situation—the fact that deep and profound social contradictions of the system often result in intense, spontaneous, and unexpected eruptions. The "immediate triggers" and subsequent dynamics of such eruptions are often not foreseeable and may not be directly related to the major, underlying contradictions. And even when underlying causes and triggers can be recognized, the intensity of these situations often cannot be anticipated, much less precisely predicted. For example, May '68 in France, the student uprising in Mexico at the time of the 1968 Olympics, or the Los Angeles rebellion in 1992—all had triggering elements and dynamics reflecting and giving expression to major concentrations of social contradictions; yet what happened was nevertheless unexpected, both in its ferocity and in the novel forms of struggle, organization, and consciousness which emerged from these conjunctures. Few would dispute the elements of suddenness and surprise of these situations; and these qualities cannot be mechanically reduced to underlying material causes. This is important. The communist movement has been marked, and blinkered, historically by a tendency to linearly project the future out of whatever set of contradictions presents itself at any given time, to fail to see the possibility of leaps and ruptures in development, and to be unable to imagine the fact that new possibilities can very suddenly and "without warning" open up. Forging a better understanding of the dialectical link between causality and accident is a very important philosophical challenge. But Alain Badiou seeks to completely detach the event from these causes, casting this event in the ethereal glow of "pure chance." This might seem, on first glance, to "liberate" the subjective; in fact, as we shall see, it ends by fastening the chains of determinism still tighter on those who would act to bring about fundamental change. Everything in nature, and society, is a product of causality and contingency (chance), of necessity and accident. In treating these events as "pure chance," Alain Badiou negates the element of causality—the historical, material, and social antecedents of these events. This stands in opposition to a scientific conception of and approach to society and the possibility of its transformation, rooted in a scientific analysis and synthesis of the underlying structures and dynamics of development. The 17th century philosopher Spinoza defined a miracle as "an event of which the causes cannot be explained."132. But what appears as a "miracle"—including the "miracle" of the event—has both material determinants and antecedents at many levels, along with, and interacting with, the role of accident. And there are the event's human actors who are part of historically specific class and social forces, responding to and acting on the event, and its antecedent conditions, towards different outcomes. There are many examples of sharp turns in history and contemporary society where the deep contradictions of the system erupt in unexpected and seismic ways. But if society cannot be reduced to a linear and mechanical unfolding of cause and effect, neither can it be reduced to a random series of events. An observation by Lenin made at the time of the 1917 February Revolution in Russia is quite relevant: There are no miracles in nature or history, but every abrupt turn in history, and this applies to every revolution, presents such a wealth of content, unfolds such unexpected and specific combinations of forms of struggle and alignment of forces of the contestants, that to the lay mind there is much that must appear miraculous.133 There are strong elements of chance and contingency in that "hot mix" of factors that result in the event, especially in how these elements mutually interact and come together and how new things come into being. But reality is not all accident: there is also relative stability and unity; and forms and patterns of particular forms of matter in motion, including in human society, can be identified and understood. There are also underlying social contradictions, including but not limited to key economic developments, changes in class relations, emergent political, social, and cultural phenomena, etc., that shape the development of a social formation and the overall situation. There is much that can and should be understood, anticipated, and worked on by conscious revolutionary forces, exactly in order to maximize advances for the revolutionary struggle, including towards the seizure of power—if the conditions come into being that can enable revolutionary forces to "wrench" a revolutionary opening out of situations of great upheaval. And, in regard to the many things that happen that are unanticipated—well, revolutionary forces have to be, as Bob Avakian has put it, "constantly tense to that possibility while consistently working to transform necessity into freedom."134 This is the correct dialectical materialist understanding of reality—and an active, transformative, revolutionary orientation based on that.

Perm – do the AFF and then the alt – the 1AC is a prior question

Perm – you do you, and we’ll do us – rejecting totalizing ethics might good for them, however, queer rage politics is key to create a survival strategy to survive for queer people like me

Alt doesn’t solve the K—all your evidence gives examples like Paris 1968—which failed. The event is never going to come and if it does it will fail.

Perm do both – the 1AC and 1NC are not mutually exclusive strategies – we agree that violence is particularized and must be evaluated situationally – the 1AC’s intersectional approach reverses this process

\*\*Ballot\*\*

2ac frontline

No link – nowhere in the 1AC do we call for the ballot

We will impact turn –

1. Elim Presence – people only start to research an understand ideas when they are forced to see them. Us getting farther in the tournament allows for that
2. Rewards Better debating – don’t take the ballot away if we did the better debating by coming up with a good method that’s hard to answer – its not our fault we worked hard
3. Wins force debaters to confront oppressive aspects about the community. When Sarah Holbrook started reading the gendered language k and won rounds, that confrontation with male privilege changed practices so that people did things like erasure
4. Justifies not making a decision – the alt is self-serving and links to itself because we could read a ballot k out of voting neg and devolve into madness
5. Credibility -- Voting affirmative is key to credibility – ballots are the currency of the debate community – they privilege certain arguments and discredit others – two impacts

1. Critiques that never win gain the reputation of being “bad arguments” – this disincentivizes others from affirming a similar strategy and is the same kind of otherizing logic that traps the homeless in urban spaces.

2. Precludes substantive discussion and research – voting for this argument reinforces the notion that teams can just call for the ballot and provide token ideological agreements with any argument that contests the function of the debate community in the status quo

[insert specific answers to the net benefit]

\*\*Bataille\*\*

The case outweighs – we have identified a particular form of oppression as the structuring principle for this particular form of violence. Even if they win that utility is why violence occurs, the kritik doesn’t answer the question of *how –* the aff is a crucial starting point for understanding violence and combatting violence

No ballot link because that’s a double turn – the kritik uses the ballot as some form of reward-based politics – that recreates utility

No Action link – our argument is that action is necessary to resolve the impacts of the kritik. Otherwise the right can fill in and continue to dominate – the 1AC is a radical act against capital accumulation and utility ethics.

Link turn – we destroy the notion of utility. Modern capitalism coalesces around the extermination of deviant and less productive subjectivities and disempowers queerness – the 1AC gives the capitalist system the finger

Halberstam ’11 (Judith Halberstam, “The Queer Art of Failure” Duke University Press, Professor of English and Director of the Center for Feminist Research at University of Southern California)

If at first you don’t succeed, failure may be your style. —Quentin Crisp, The Naked Civil Servant The value of some aspects of historical gay identity—deeply ideological though they may be—have been diminished or dismissed with succes- sive waves of liberation. Central among these is the association between homosexual love and loss—a link that, historically, has given queers insight into love’s failures and impossibilities (as well as, of course, wild hopes for its future). Claiming such an association rather than disavow- ing it, I see the art of losing as a particularly queer art. —Heather Love, Feeling Backwards: Loss and the Politics of Queer History Queer failure . . . is more nearly about escape and a certain virtuosity. —José E. Muñoz, Cruising Utopia: The There and Then of Queer Utopia Toward the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, as the United States slipped into one of the worst financial crises since the Great Depression and as economists everywhere threw up their hands and said that they had not seen the financial col- lapse coming, as working people lost their homes due to bad mortgages and the middle class watched their retirement ac- counts dwindle to nothing because of bad investments, as rich people pocketed ever bigger bailouts and sought shelters for their wealth, as casino capitalism showed its true face as a game played by banks with someone else’s money, it was clearly time to talk about failure. Failure Failure, of course, goes hand in hand with capitalism. A market econ- omy must have winners and losers, gamblers and risk takers, con men and dupes; capitalism, as Scott Sandage argues in his book Born Losers: A History of Failure in America (2005), requires that everyone live in a system that equates success with profit and links failure to the inability to accu- mulate wealth even as profit for some means certain losses for others. As Sandage narrates in his compelling study, losers leave no records, while winners cannot stop talking about it, and so the record of failure is “a hidden history of pessimism in a culture of optimism” (9). This hidden history of pessimism, a history moreover that lies quietly behind every story of success, can be told in a number of different ways; while Sandage tells it as a shadow history of U.S. capitalism, I tell it here as a tale of anticapitalist, queer struggle. I tell it also as a narrative about anticolo- nial struggle, the refusal of legibility, and an art of unbecoming. This is a story of art without markets, drama without a script, narrative without progress. The queer art of failure turns on the impossible, the improb- able, the unlikely, and the unremarkable. It quietly loses, and in losing it imagines other goals for life, for love, for art, and for being.

No link and turn --- Modern subjectivity makes sacrifice redundant and their obsession with combining secular society with premodern material violence is the foundation for Nazism.

Zizek 1996 [Slavoj, The indivisible remainder: an essay on Schelling and related matters, pg 124-125]

This notion of the modern, Cartesian subject qua the radical negativity of the double (self-relating) sacrifice also enables us to demarcate the paradoxical place of the theories of Georges Bataille, that is, of Bataille’s fascination with the ‘real,’ material sacrifice, with the different forms of holocaust and of the excessive destruction of (economic, social, etc.) reality. On the one hand, of course, Bataille’s topic is modern subjectivity, the radical negativity implied in the position of the pure transcendental subject. On the other hand, Bataille’s universe remains the pre-Newtonian universe of balanced circular movement or – to put it in a different way – his notion of subjectivity is definitely pre-Kantian: Bataille’s ‘subject’ is not yet the pure void (the transcendental point of self-relating negativity), but remains an inner-worldly, positive force. Within these co-ordinates, the negativity which characterizes the modern subject can express itself only in the guise of a violent destruction which throws the entire circuit of nature off the rails. It is as if, in a kind of unique short circuit, Bataille projects the negativity of the modern subject backwards, into the ‘closed’ pre modern Aristotelian universe of balanced circular movement, within which this negativity can materialize itself only as an ‘irrational’, excessive, non-economical expenditure. In short, what Bataille fails to take note of is that the modern (Cartesian) subject no longer needs to sacrifice goat’s intestines, his children, and so on, since his [their] very existence already entails the most radical (redoubled, self-relating) sacrifice, the sacrifice of the very kernel of his [their] being. Incidentally, this failure of Bataille also throws a new light on the sacrificial violence, the obsession with the ultimate twilight of the universe, at work in Nazism: in it, we also encounter the reinscription of the radical negativity characteristic of the modern subject into the closed ‘pagan’ universe in which the stability of the social order is guaranteed by some kind of repeated sacrificial gesture – what we encounter in the libidinal economy of Nazism is the modern subjectivity perceived from the standpoint of the pre-modern ‘pagan’ universe.

The AFF solves the impact to the critique –

A. Gender Binaries – killjoy is key to breaking down gender binaries

B. Queer is not a binary that you are in and out of, but a spectrum of deviancy from the liberal subject – that makes the 1AC a prerequisite to the Alt

Perm – do both – the 1AC and the 1NC are mutually exclusive political strategies

If they win the entirety of the critique, vote affirmative to vote negative – creates a rupture in their ethic and also in the logic of utility – the ballot makes the 1NC a performative double turn

Perm – you do you, and we’ll do us – rejecting the notion of utility might good for them, however, queer rage politics is key to create a survival strategy to survive for queer bodies like me

Bataille’s starting point is so-obsessed with finding meaning through death that he becomes death-obsessed. Bataille’s not “no value to life”, he’s “no value to living”

Johnson ‘3 [David, DPhil. in English and Related Literature (York University), an MA (Distinction) in Continental Philosophy (Warwick University) and a BA (Hons) in Literature and Philosophy (Middlesex Polytechnic). Time & Society, 2003 available via SAGE database]

For Bataille, the full engagement with the truth of transience generates a form of wild abandon (which unfetters forces that would otherwise be invested in conservative projects), but if we see pro-transience as an end game, as a pointless act of looking through the wrong end of a telescope, this view of time is shown to be about as exuberant as nostalgia TV. Pro-transience is in fact less audacious than a priest’s remorse, a slave’s regret. Conclusion Time must no longer be treated merely as a form of fiction, to be used in a fast and loose manner by storytellers in order to mould moral and political beliefs. Instead, time must be treated as a raw phenomenon, being itself the stake over which moral and political forces fight. Time must no longer be seen as a pristine phenomenon that could receive its essence from a single instance (in Bataille’s view, this instance is death). Rather, time must be seen as a vulgar plenitude that encompasses everything that happens. Time must no longer be seen as an existential option that can be authentically transcended in an instant to its end, but rather as something that is experienced by living beings as unavoidable and irreducible in its flow. To see all life from life’s end is to see all life with the eyes of the dead. To think all time from time’s end is to think with the mind of the dead. It is time to quietly drop this pro-transience philosophy of time, which is hardly a philosophy at all. Instead we must begin to observe what time looks like from the only real vantage point that there is: the vantage point of the living. There is no way to experience the world except through time. Time may be transient, but it is all there is. By dropping the perspective that sees all time from time’s end, one has time. And the pleasures and pains of time are revealed to be excessive stakes.

The alt doesn’t solve the Aff

A. Empirics – we’ve already been sacrificed. The analysis of ally culture and homonormativity the 1AC presents is intrinsically linked to how queerness is presented in the status quo.

B. Sacrificing queerness doesn’t change how we are derelict within civil society and probably only reinforces the status quo– only a mutiny on the social order has the capacity to change modern politics – that’s the Mary Nardini Gang

\*\*Batman\*\*

The case outweighs – we have identified a particular form of oppression as the structuring principle for this particular form of violence. Even if they win that utility is why violence occurs, the kritik doesn’t answer the question of *how –* the Aff is a crucial starting point for understanding violence and combatting violence

No link --

Link turn -- Some appropriations are good --- don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good --- the alt risks silence, which is infinitely worse. –

Kleinman and Kleinman 97 [Arthur, Maude and Lillian Presley Professor of Medical Anthropology, and Joan, sinologist, Research Associate, Medical Anthropology Program at Harvard, “The appeal of experience; the dismay of images: Cultural appropriations of suffering in our times,” Social Suffering, pg. 16-18, google books]

It is necessary to balance the account of the globalization of commercial and professional images with a vastly different and even more dangerous cultural process of appropriation: the totalitarian state's erasure of social experiences of suffering through the suppression of images. Here the possibility of moral appeal through images of human misery is prevented, and it is their absence that is the source of existential dismay. Such is the case with the massive starvation in China from 1959 to 1961. This story was not reported at the time even though more than thirty million Chinese died in the aftermath of the ruinous policies of the Great Leap Forward, the perverse effect of Mao's impossible dream of forcing immediate industrialization on peasants. Accounts of this, the world's most devastating famine, were totally suppressed; no stories or pictures of the starving or the dead were published. An internal report on the famine was made by an investigating team for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It was based on a detailed survey of an extremely poor region of Anwei Province that was particularly brutally affected. The report includes this numbing statement by Wei Wu-ji, a local peasant leader from Anwei: Originally there were 5,000 people in our commune, now only 3,200 remain. When the Japanese invaded we did not lose this many: we at least could save ourselves by running away! This year there's no escape. We die shut up in our own houses. Of my 6 family members, 5 are already dead, and I am left to starve, and I'll not be able to stave off death for long.(30) Wei Wu-ji continued: Wang Jia-feng from West Springs County reported that cases of eating human meat were discovered. Zhang Sheng-jiu said, "Only an evil man could do such a thing!" Wang Jia-feng said, "In 1960, there were 20 in our household, ten of them died last year. My son told his mother 'I'll die of hunger in a few days.'" And indeed he did.(31) The report also includes a graphic image by Li Qin-ming, from Wudian County, Shanwang Brigade: In 1959, we were prescheduled to deliver 58,000 jin of grain to the State, but only 35,000 jin were harvested, hence we only turned over 33,000 jin, which left 2,000 jin for the commune. We really have nothing to eat. The peasants eat hemp leaves, anything they can possibly eat. In my last report after I wrote, "We have nothing to eat," the Party told me they wanted to remove my name from the Party Roster. Out of a population of 280, 170 died. In our family of five, four of us have died leaving only myself. Should I say that I'm not broken hearted?(32) Chen Zhang-yu, from Guanyu County, offered the investigators this terrible image: Last spring the phenomenon of cannibalism appeared. Since Comrade Chao Wu-chu could not come up with any good ways of prohibiting it, he put out the order to secretly imprison those who seemed to be at death's door to combat the rumors. He secretly imprisoned 63 people from the entire country. Thirty-three died in prison.(33) The official report is thorough and detailed. It is classified neibu, restricted use only. To distribute it is to reveal state secrets. Presented publicly it would have been, especially if it had been published in the 1960s, a fundamental critique of the Great Leap, and a moral and political delegitimation of the Chinese Communist Party's claim to have improved the life of poor peasants. Even today the authorities regard it as dangerous. The official silence is another form of appropriation. It prevents public witnessing. It forges a secret history, an act of political resistance through keeping alive the memory of things denied.34 The totalitarian state rules by collective forgetting, by denying the collective experience of suffering, and thus creates a culture of terror. The absent image is also a form of political appropriation; public silence is perhaps more terrifying than being overwhelmed by public images of atrocity. Taken together the two modes of appropriation delimit the extremes in this cultural process.(35) Our critique of appropriations of suffering that do harm does not mean that no appropriations are valid. To conclude that would be to undermine any attempt to respond to human misery. It would be much more destructive than the problem we have identified; it would ~~paralyze~~halt social action. We must draw upon the images of human suffering in order to identify human needs and to craft humane responses.

All of their links are entirely non-unique, which means you vote aff if there is a risk that we change the world for the better post 1AC

Perm – affirm the pure ethics of the Aff and the need for a mask of evil. BUT, let the negative be the Batman who represents the heroic exception – let the negative have their reputation besmirched, so that our ethics can remain pure in the public eye and so that the aff can solve. This is what McGowan actually calls for; two separate bodies, so double bind 🡪 either 1.) Dent, or the Aff, is the pure ethics that needs to be preserved for society to function, or 2.) Batman, or the Neg, is the true good masked in evil that allows for the preservation of the former.

Perm – do the alt. Cross-apply the analysis of the alt from above, the alt effectively calls for an act of damning the neg to allow for the purity of the Aff ethics – no Neg vote is required.

The neg mistakes the Dark Knight’s preservation of the status quo for heroism, while it actually represents the stagnating forces of American imperialism – that turns the kritik – their interpretation stifles the possibility for revolutionary change

Lewis No Date [Randolph, Rapp Foundation Presidential Professor of American Studies at the University of Oklahoma, “The Dark Knight of American Empire,” Jump Cut: a review of contemporary media, http://www.ejumpcut.org/archive/jc51.2009/DarkKnightBloch/]

Hidden inside the childhood fable of The Dark Knight, the newest installment in the Batman franchise, is something very adult. Beneath its glistening surface of latex and metal, asphalt and blood, the film offers an unusually insightful and poetically phrased cultural critique. Along with the Iron Man, another blockbuster that subtly explores the price of empire, the new Batman is not simply "a paean of praise to the fortitude and moral courage that has been shown by George W. Bush in this time of terror and war," as The Wall Street Journal has suggested."[1][open endnotes in new window]¶ Some viewers might settle for the macho fantasy that warmed the heart of The Wall Street Journal, but I would argue that the new Batman film offers something more interesting: it critically explores the "end of empire," as The Wire creator David Simon described the recent U.S. conundrum in which our levees cannot hold, wars cannot be won, and children cannot be protected in an allegedly wealthy, advanced nation.[2]¶ Buffeted by a weak economy, spiraling levels of national debt, interminable chaos in Iraq and Afghanistan, and political scandals too numerous to mention, Americans are understandably yearning, perhaps unconsciously, for an assault on the status quo. "No one knows any longer how dark the night is," the German philosopher Ernst Bloch once wrote.[3] The Dark Knight shows us this message with surprising insight. Since its release in the summer of 2008, the film has expressed a secret longing for radical change that goes beyond the normal boundaries of our political culture. Along with its teenage fantasy of bulging biceps and smoke-belching cars, the new Batman invites a second fantasy of rupture and revolution, mostly in the form of a leering sadist in faded clown make-up.¶ Much ink has been spilled on the splendor of Heath Ledger's final performance as the Joker, but it tends to trivialize his real accomplishment. His intense method acting did not result in a performance that is simply well crafted. Rather, his Joker has a raw political force of the sort rarely seen in U.S. cinema. This new Joker is an anti-capitalist culture jammer who weds sadism and anarchy in a grotesque synergy. The revolution will be televised after all, with the Joker hosting the final reality program of a culture in extremis. In fact, in the film, we see snippets of him in this role, almost literally, as he tortures wannabe Batmen for a TV audience.¶ While we should deplore the violence of the Joker, we can still celebrate his secret promise of rebirth. It is no accident that the Joker attacks our core institutions — banks, law enforcement, city government, and hospitals — rather than looking for quick cash. "It's not about money," he reminds us. "It's about sending a message." The Joker has mastered the spectacle of violence, and he provides a jolt of "shock and awe" in the heartland, as we see the real Chicago repeatedly seeping through the fictional Gotham. "I just do things," he explains, "I'm a wrench in the gears. I hate plans." Far from a terrorist with specific demands, the Joker demands nothing except mayhem. He is a grinning vanguardist for the coming anarchy: "See, I'm not a monster," he explains helpfully, "I'm just ahead of the curve."¶ For most of The Dark Knight, Batman seems baffled by his grinning nemesis. Yet his faithful butler, Alfred, relates the Joker to his own experiences at the end of empire. In Cockney cadences, Alfred recalls being sent with English mercenaries to catch a jewel thief in the forests of Burma. After failing for six months, the mercenaries discovered that the thief was simply tossing away the jewels. Confronted with a criminal who doesn’t play by the rules, the system lashes out with indiscriminate violence — by burning down the whole forest. Why? "Because some men aren't looking for anything logical, like money," Alfred tells his young master. "They can't be bought, bullied, reasoned or negotiated with. Some men just want to watch the world burn."¶ The implication for Batman is that his "victory" over the Joker would require the destruction of Gotham, a scenario that would suit the Joker quite well: "Everything burns," the criminal mastermind says as he immolates a billion dollars or so. He is a rupture artist, eager to see the aesthetics of directionless chaos (which, interestingly, he imagines as an egalitarian playing field). "Introduce a little anarchy, you upset the established order, and everything becomes chaos," he tells the district attorney, Harvey Dent. "I am an agent of chaos! And you know the thing about chaos, Harvey? It's fair."¶ Throughout The Dark Knight, the Joker’s greatest contempt is reserved for "the rules" of bourgeois society: "I am not a schemer," he says, adding: "I show schemers how pathetic their attempts to control things really are." Cross-dressed in a white nurse's uniform, he complains, quite humanely, that "the rules" allow for a busload of soldiers to die but not for one local politician. "Nobody panics when things go according to plan, even if the Affs are horrifying," he says in disgust. In the spirit of Bakhtin’s medieval carnival, this exceedingly angry clown wants to reverse the normal order of things. By targeting politicians, cops, and civilians alike, the new Joker is bringing the war home, and soon the people of Gotham are chanting a new version of an old antiwar protest: "No more dead cops!"¶ Weary and uncertain after years behind the mask, Batman expresses little enthusiasm for protecting Gotham. If anything, this grim master of machines seems less human than the scarred maniac he opposes. Entombed in his expensive and deadly technologies, including a robotic car set on "intimidation," he is burned-out hero looking for an exit. The Dark Knight’s unsmiling Batman doesn’t "get the girl" (quite the contrary). And other than the company of his aged butler, he is alone in the shadowy urban space of Gotham. Even in his vast modernist armory or his glittering billionaire's penthouse, the new Batman seems sadly aware of this fact. In these moments, he is a lonely symbol of the United States' imperial isolation, a point that conservatives have overlooked in their reading of the film. Michael Caine, the actor who plays Batman’s butler, has explained it succinctly: "Superman is the way America sees itself, but Batman is the way the world sees America."[4] (Is it any accident that the film hinges on the appropriate use of privacy-crushing surveillance technologies that even Batman cannot trust himself to deploy?)¶ For those who are willing to listen, The Dark Knight has a great deal to say about the perils of U.S. empire, but because of its commercial status, the film eventually tries to contain its own radicalism. Director Christopher Nolan might retain some of his "indy cred," but he is neither Dziga Vertov nor Jean-Luc Godard. The radical genie is unloosed to mesmerize the audience with its explosive force, but it is ultimately thrust back into the bottle before the closing credits. In the final reel of The Dark Knight, the film veers toward sentimentalism and comforting closure, as the Joker loses his bet against human nature and ends up lassoed by the caped crusader. Warner Brothers has action figures to sell, not revolutions to foment, and so the Joker must be defeated and the good people of Gotham must move forward with the status quo intact. Yet, no one celebrates, and Batman rushes into the darkness, scorned and unappreciated, where he can contemplate his Pyrrhic victory.¶ Boring old Batman might win the day, but ultimately he is Gotham’s real villain because his joyless victory brings nothing but another day of the unsatisfying status quo. Just as Milton scholars have complained that the God of Paradise Lost was never as compelling as Milton’s vision of Satan, The Dark Knight suffers the same fate. Grim-faced Batman is a snooze compared to the wild-haired Joker, who seems keenly aware of this fact. "Why so serious?" he taunts his self-righteous opponent.¶ In his armored suit and explosive armaments, Batman is a high-tech warrior who seems designed for Iraqi deployment. Meanwhile, the Joker is a vivid hybrid of Sex Pistol, Situationist, and Insane Clown Posse — all with the constricted voice of a Burn-era Marlon Brando. Not surprisingly, we miss the Joker when he is not on-screen: he is so terrifyingly alive, despite (because of?) his luridly theatrical violence. Schumpeter’s fans may wince, but it's exhilarating to watch the Joker’s creative destruction in our age of surreptitious self-loathing. The path to utopia goes through the Joker's dystopic rampage.¶ Like some punk-rock philosopher, the Joker provides the "revolutionary spirit" that can bring us to what Ernst Bloch calls a "radical disenchantment of mythological appearances," a state in which heroes are no longer heroic (that's the point of The Dark Knight's ending), a state in which we have "a total lack of illusions."[5] The Joker’s real enemy is not the robotic-voiced Batman, for whom he has some sympathy and even warmth — it is belief itself. His assault on Gotham, and in particular his corruption of District Attorney Harvey Dent, is designed to undermine any faith in the system, its rules, or its heroes. In the theology of The Dark Knight, the Joker functions as a devil who despises faith more than the faithful, even explaining to his victims that his brutal temptations are more academic (to prove a point) than a reflection of personal animus.

Perm – do the alt in all other instances of recognizable pure ethics. We have to legitimately affirm the resolution in today’s debate to avoid the immediate harms present in the 1AC that apply to the debate space, and can look to less pressing issues to address the existential threats presented by the kritik.

The alt doesn’t solve the case—

Academy DA – you don’t present a material strategy for social change, which means your method get squandered in the misery of the ivory tower.

The Dark Knight’s heroism is mired in the ideology of patriarchy – he is a power fantasy in protecting the social order from anti-patriarchal forces

Powell 12 [Christopher, blogger at The Practical Theorist, “An ongoing effort to figure out my own contribution to egalitarian social change,” “The Dark Knight and the Anxieties of Patriarchy,” 7/27/2012, http://practicaltheorist.wordpress.com/2012/07/17/the-dark-knight-and-the-anxieties-of-patriarchy/]

It came to me while I was playing Batman: Arkham Asylum, that Batman is all about the anxieties of the patriarchal order.¶ One can critically analyze the enduring appeal of Batman from a variety of angles. ‘Criticism’, by the way, doesn’t mean just trying to denigrate something. Criticism helps us show how a piece of culture does its work. Criticism might increase our appreciation of something, or decrease it, or just change the way we view it. At its best, criticism brings out an interesting aspect of something in a way that helps us reflect on what that piece of culture means to ourselves — and, in so doing, helps us understand ourselves better.¶ One can criticize Batman’s appeal in terms of his power and versatility as a fantasy-identification figure. Batman gets to inflict revenge, but he remains morally in the right. He breaks society’s rules, but is celebrated and idolized by that same society. He is strong, nigh-invulnerable, but still a human being without the magic powers of Superman or Wonder Woman. He is muscular, but also intelligent. And so on. Overall, a great, versatile masculine identification-figure.¶ (And of course, all the feminist criticisms of this kind of figure apply to him in spades.)¶ One can also criticize him in class terms. As Bruce Wayne, Batman is the billionaire heir of a corporate empire, but he spends his energies protecting ordinary people from muggers and gangsters as well as fighting global threats to humanity. He expresses the hero-fantasy that those with great power are also great and good people who care about us and protect us.¶ (And of course this fantasy reveals its own contradictions as soon as we start asking a few basic questions. Such as: why doesn’t Bruce Wayne use his vast fortune and power to improve social welfare, preventing crime while improving the standards of living for the working poor, instead of spending millions building weapons for his private paramilitary assault on individual criminals?)¶ But for me personally the most interesting line of criticism focuses on Batman’s role as an enforcer of patriarchal power, because this line of criticism also explains the villains Batman faces, which have usually been the most interesting thing about Batman.¶ Batman’s most interesting villains are not ordinary criminals or mobsters. They do not operate from ordinary motives of rational self-interest. They are sociopaths, fanatics, and madmen. Their motives are perverse, inexplicable. Scarecrow, the Riddler, Zsasz, and especially the Joker spread terror and destruction for their own sake. They do evil because they are evil. They must be stopped by force because it is categorically impossible to incorporate them into the social order.¶ And they must be stopped by Batman because the ordinary forces of social order are powerless against them. Only Batman can catch them because he himself is partially outside the social order. Frank Miller brought this to the forefront in Batman The Dark Knight, back in 1986: Batman is technically a vigilante and a criminal. Only his own personal moral code prevents him from being a force for evil (and this is part of the heroic fantasy: that those with power over us will use this power for our benefit instead of their own).¶ In this way Batman functions as a savior. One the one hand, we have the forces of social order, embodied by the police and Commissioner Gordon. On the other hand, we have villains like the Joker who cannot be defeated by ordinary legal means. To defeat the Joker, the police would have to adopt illegal tactics, invalidating their own status as guardians of law and order. Thus, even in defeat the Joker would win, bringing chaos into ordered society. Batman rescues the police and society from this diabolical dilemma. He does this by doing what law cannot. Like Arjuna in the Mahabarata, he violates the law in order to protect the law, thereby protecting the very existence of social order as such. But as a supplement to the social order, he reveals its inherent incompleteness.¶ The social order that Batman protects is emphatically patriarchal. You can see it visually in Arkham Asylum, Arkham City, and in Batman: The Animated Series, in which both Batman and Commissioner Gordon are hyper-masculine figures with broad shoulders, square jaws, deep voices, and unquestioned social and moral authority.¶ But these are superficialities: you could change these details without changing the patriarchal nature of social authority in the Batman mythos, which reveals itself, again, in the villains.¶ Patriarchy is, literally, the rule of the father and, more broadly, the rule of social life by a select class of men who rule over women, children, and other (non-patriarchal) men. In the late Roman patriarchal household, the male head of the household ruled over the women, children, and servants of the household, all of whom were to varying degrees his personal property. This structure persisted as the structure of the household of the feudal knight, out of which the modern state gradually emerged. Today patriarchy manifests not only as the personal authority of men but in laws and social norms that perpetuate the subordination of women and non-normative men, and more subtly in values that celebrate a certain form of masculinity: martial, invulnerable, dominant.¶ Patriarchy has an ideology that justifies it. The ideology goes like this: human beings are inherently prone to antisocial, evil behaviour. We need social authority to make us good. So authority, if properly constituted and properly exercise, is a positive good; authority makes it possible for us to live in peace, without fear of violence or theft or personal violation, and to construct good lives for ourselves. But there are always those who refuse to recognize this. Such people are either immoral (because they set their personal advantage over the general good) or irrational (because they mistake personal disadvantage for a general evil and so misunderstand the nature of authority). Thus, in the end, social order always requires the exercise of force for its own maintenance.¶ In principle, the force that protects social order must embody the values of society in its own operation. Force must be just. And ordinarily this is enough (or so the patriarchal thinker believes). The police and the courts can apprehend and dispense justice to ordinary criminals and ordinary rebels. But confidence in patriarchal authority is always open to doubt. For if that authority really is what it claims to be, then why are the police and the continually courts necessary? Why do people keep rebelling? Either the patriarchal authority is not as beneficial as it claims to be – which cannot be contemplated – or there is some force at work beyond ordinary immorality and ordinary irrationality, driving people to resist that authority.¶ Batman’s villains embody this anti-patriarchal force. Because they appear within a patriarchal imaginary, they appear without real motives, as pure essential evil. Batman rescues society from this evil. But it always returns: the Joker breaks out of Arkham Asylum, Harvey Dent reverts to his Two-Face persona, Ra’s al Ghul rises from the dead. Always one fears that even Batman won’t be able to stop them. The cultural meme of Batman’s hyper-competence, his infallibility, is a mantra chanted against the anxious thought that nothing is really enough, that sooner or later the patriarchal order will fall.

\*\*Baudrillard\*\*

The case outweighs – we have identified a particular form of oppression as the structuring principle for this particular form of violence. Even if they win that utility is why violence occurs, the kritik doesn’t answer the question of *how –* the aff is a crucial starting point for understanding violence and combatting violence

No link – we aren’t a political simulation, but a discussion about the way that politics interacts with our own subjectivities

No link -- We don't confuse simulation with reality

Žižek 2000 [Slavoj, University of Ljubljana, March/April “The Cyberspace Real,” [http://www.egs.edu/faculty/Žižek/Žižek-the-cyberspace-real.html](http://www.egs.edu/faculty/zizek/zizek-the-cyberspace-real.html)]

Are the pessimistic cultural criticists (from Jean Baudrillard to Paul Virilio) justified in their claim that cyberspace ultimately generates a kind of proto-psychotic immersion into an imaginary universe of hallucinations, unconstrained by any symbolic Law or by any impossibility of some Real? If not, how are we to detect in cyberspace the contours of the other two dimensions of the Lacanian triad ISR, the Symbolic and the Real? As to the symbolic dimension, the solution seems easy — it suffices to focus on the notion of authorship that fits the emerging domain of cyberspace narratives, that of the "procedural authorship": the author (say, of the interactive immersive environment in which we actively participate by role-playing) no longer writes detailed story-line, s/he merely provides the basic set of rules (the coordinates of the fictional universe in which we immerse ourselves, the limited set of actions we are allowed to accomplish within this virtual space, etc.), which serves as the basis for the interactor's active engagement (intervention, improvisation). This notion of "procedural authorship" demonstrates the need for a kind of equivalent to the Lacanian "big Other": in order for the interactor to become engaged in cyberspace, s/he has to operate within a minimal set of externally imposed accepted symbolic rules/coordinates. Without these rules, the subject/interactor would effectively become immersed in a psychotic experience of an universe in which "we do whatever we want" and are, paradoxically, for that very reason deprived of our freedom, caught in a demoniac compulsion. It is thus crucial to establish the rules that engage us, that led us in our immersion into the cyberspace, while allowing us to maintain the distance towards the enacted universe. The point is not simply to maintain "the right measure" between the two extremes (total psychotic immersion versus non-engaged external distance towards the artificial universe of the cyber-fiction): distance is rather a positive condition of immersion. If we are to surrender to the enticements of the virtual environment, we have to "mark the border," to rely on a set of marks which clearly designate that we are dealing with a fiction, in the same way in which, in order to let ourselves go and enjoy a violent war movie, we somehow have to know that what we are seeing is a staged fiction, not real-life killing (imagine our horrible surprise if, while watching a war scene, we would suddenly see that we are watching a snuff, that the actor engaged in face-to-face combat is effectively cutting the throat of his "enemy"…). Against the theorists who fear that cyberspace involves the regression to a kind of psychotic incestuous immersion, one should thus discern in today's often clumsy and ambiguous improvisations about "cyberspace rules" precisely the effort to establish clearly the contours of a new space of symbolic fictions in which we fully participate in the mode disavowal, i.e. being aware that "this is not real life."

Link turn – the 1AC is a mutiny against the symbolic structures of capitalism and neoliberalism

All of their links are entirely non-unique, which means you vote Aff if there is a risk that we change the world for the better post 1AC

Perm do both—the 1AC always was a symbolic challenge to power.

Ressentiment is a net benefit.

Baudrillard 93 [Jean, “The Transparency of Evil”, p. 164-168]

We live in a culture which strives to return to each of us full responsibility for his own life. The moral responsibility inherited from the Christian tradition has thus been augmented, with the help of the whole modern apparatus of information and communication, by the requirement that everyone should be answerable for every aspect of their lives. What this amounts to is an expulsion of the other, who has indeed become perfectly useless in the context of a programmed management of life, a regimen where everything conspires to buttress the autarky of the individual cell. This, however, is an absurdity: no one can be expected to be entirely responsible for his own life. This Christian-cum-modern idea is futile and arrogant. It is also a utopian notion with no justification whatsoever. It requires that the individual should transform himself into a slave to his identity, his will, his responsibilities, his desire; and that he should start exercising control of all his own circuitry, as well as all the worldwide circuits that happen to cross paths within his genes, nerves or thought: a truly unheard-of servitude.

Perm – do the Aff, then the alt — intrinsic-ness is key to critical thinking and skill prioritization.

The AFF is comparatively better - A combination of praxis and practice is essential – a revolution subsumes your intellectual meandering

Robinson 12 [Andrew, Political theorist who writes about the Baud-Man, Deleuze, and other people I care about less. “An A to Z of Theory | Jean Baudrillard and Activism: A critique”]

Baudrillard’s theory of deterrence needs to be reconsidered in light of recent events. We have seen in 2011 that it is still possible to create events: the London unrest, the student protests, Occupy, the Wikileaks saga… The system does not actually have the power on the ground to prevent revolts, occupations, movements. Even the system’s vice-like grip on future significations is being partially broken through movements like Occupy, which conveys different future images in its own rhetoric. Anonymous turns the anonymity of statistical indifference into a source of strength, using tactics based on the very vulnerability to excess the system creates – such as distributed denial of service attacks (using an excess of web connections) and leaking of documents (relying on the obscene overexposure of information in the Internet). The difficulty, rather, is in sustaining events and expanding new frames of meaning. The system monopolises and determines the effects of events, and kettles them in time and space. Firstly the system controls the ways in which events are signified to non-participants. Secondly the system, having once faced an event, will prepare in detail to prevent it “next time” – so it is hard for events to become waves. And thirdly, the system unleashes a dreadful wave of repression after each event, attempting to foreclose its irruptive force and restore the pervasiveness of terror. Resultant feelings of futility, anxiety and vulnerability are corrosive of movement-building and of repeated cycles of similar events. The movement of revolt towards a terrain of refusal of meaning is also partly an effect of the system’s move towards coding. The apparent lack of demands in recent waves of social unrest (e.g. the Mark Duggan uprising, the banlieue revolt, the Greek insurrection of 2008, the Occupy movement, summit protests), and even many of today’s “terrorists”, is perhaps a result of the prevalence of the code. The presentation of demands risks reinscription as simply a militant version of a position already encoded within the system. People respond with actions which counterpose their own expressiveness to the code. This is also perhaps why theorising the conditions of possibility for an Event has become such a popular theme in contemporary radical theory. Another possibility could here be added. It is possible, in open-ended surveys, to give responses deemed too complex to be codable. In principle, a more heterogeneous humanity would escape the code through each individual’s irreducibility to prior categories. There are also certain texts, such as Cabal, Argot and Barbarians, which argue for incommunicability as a necessary part of radicalism. The system demands that everything communicate in its terms. Therefore, esoteric language is an effective resistance.

We’re controlling the root cause—The Puar evidence answers the thesis level of the critique -- the drive to secure life shapes the way security simulations operate—only we propose real inroads to social change through directly attacking that mindset

Additionally, the squo is Disneyland—the whole world is shaped by anti-queer utopian simulation. Our reunderstanding of those politics strips away the veneer of the simulation and exposes the real.

The AFF solves the alt but the alt doesn’t solve the aff -- Even Baudrillard concedes these impacts aren’t real and we solve your impact better. Chan 8

[Melanie, School of Cultural Studies, Leeds Metropolitan University, Leeds, UK, “Virtually Real and Really Virtual: Baudrillard’s Procession of Simulacrum and The Matrix” Page 12]

Reality can be explained through different symbolic “formulas”, through scientific analysis, experimental testing and debate however the totality of this realm remains elusive. In other words, whilst description and analysis allows the construction of knowledge about reality there are still limits to this process. A close reading of Baudrillard’s work shows that hyperreality has not been perfected, the simulacrum is not quite equivalent to reality. Furthermore computer viruses, breakdowns and system anomalies prevent the symbolic system that generates hyperreality from becoming totalized. In other words there is still a space for reality to be perceived. There is still a gap between the image and what it represents. If there were no difference between simulacra and reality, if the hyperreal was perfected then there would not be a critical space for such debates about simulation and reality. It seems that Baudrillard’s notion of system anomalies can be read in a positive light because it does provide the space for meaningful debates about reality to take place. So whilst The Matrix trilogy represents the allure of simulation and Cypher’s choice to remain in the illusory world of the matrix, Baudrillard’s later work shows that there are important differences between the symbolic domain of signification and ontological reality. As Baudrillard remarks: If life is precious, it is because it has no exchange value – because exchanging it for some ultimate value is impossible. The world is that which cannot be traded as currency for any other world above all for a virtual world.39

Perm do the alt -- The 1AC IS radical- any small thing can rupture the symbolic system

Robinson 13 [Andrew, a political theorist and activist based in the UK, Jean Baudrillard and Activism: A critique, Feb 7, http://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-baudrillard-14/]

These are challenges which can be met. Baudrillard’s analysis suggests that the system is vulnerable to any act which disregards consequences or is irreducible to the existing frame of possibilities, which is not a “rational action”. This is why the loss of fear has been so central in understanding revolts, from Tahrir Square to Tottenham. In addition, the system remains vulnerable, both to new tactics which it hasn’t thought of yet, and to any event on such a scale that it overwhelms available resources. Just-in-time production has reduced redundancy within systems. The result is that they don’t have the resources to spare, to cope with any events beyond the usual. This is suggested by Baudrillard’s view that the police simply simulate repression. As long as people are broadly conforming, the simulation works. The moment the unexpected happens, the police become unable to repress effectively. If Baudrillard is right, then the slightest thing escaping the system’s rationality is enough to pose a challenge to it. The idea of involution suggests that the system is beginning to fray around the edges. As control is tightened, peripheral areas slip out of control. This phenomenon is widely discussed in relation to the global South. But fraying can also be seen in the system’s apparent incapacity to respond to emergent events, because of just-in-time production and the maintenance of systems lacking redundancy. Something like the August insurrection can spread on the basis of unexpectedness, rapidity and limited police resources. Baudrillard’s theory of deterrence needs to be reconsidered in light of recent events. We have seen in 2011 that it is still possible to create events: the London unrest, the student protests, Occupy, the Wikileaks saga… The system does not actually have the power on the ground to prevent revolts, occupations, movements. Even the system’s vice-like grip on future significations is being partially broken through movements like Occupy, which conveys different future images in its own rhetoric. Anonymous turns the anonymity of statistical indifference into a source of strength, using tactics based on the very vulnerability to excess the system creates – such as distributed denial of service attacks (using an excess of web connections) and leaking of documents (relying on the obscene overexposure of information in the Internet).

Floating PIK’s are bad – they’re a moving target, which makes it impossible to test competition and attack their advocacy – kills education

The alt is vague—there is no explanation of how it works. Leave room for news answers anytime later on to compensate for block spin and vote negative on fairness. They incentivize no-clash debates.

Alt doesn’t solve the Aff — only embracing queerness as a pathogen and mutiny on the social order is able to deepen the exist conflict and make it spread – we demand a complete demolition of the world.

Transphobia DA -- Baudrillard’s analysis of reality polices the boundaries of actuality, enacting violent authenticity tests on trans bodies to determine their legitimacy - any discussion of knowledge production requires the reproduction of this exclusion. Sares 14

[James, completed his AB degree from Harvard University in 2012, “Postmodernism,” 2014.]

For Jean Baudrillard, transsexuality symbolizes alienating postmodern transformations across economics, aesthetics, and politics. ‘‘We are all transsexuals symbolically,’’ he argues, as the body is reduced to a mere canvas on which the traffic of gendered signs is grafted or torn in antipolitical play (2009: 23). Baudrillard understands the postmodern body as the extended site of integration into networks and circuits of superficial political action and cybernetic capitalist complicity. Similarly to Fredric Jameson, he employs the spatial metaphors of depthlessness and flattening to emphasize the subject’s reduction to artifice. These metaphors reveal postmodern cultural production as underpinned by the disruption of mere appearance from identity or inner desire. The disruptive element of postmodern aesthetics underlies the denaturalization of sign from referent, such that the technologies of gendered and sexed transformation reveal the symbolic systems through which categories of gender and sex gain meaning. Thus the modernist aesthetic is put into crisis when the body, moving through time and space, is no longer the site of a stable, natural, and objective referential truth of gender or sex, despite the search for new relationalities constructed out of that very ontological denaturalization (Stryker 1999: 170–71). Baudrillard’s analysis falls into unsubstantiated fatalism because he emphasizes meaning’s liquidation, while postmodern aesthetics shifts the grounds for understanding meaning through subjective rupture itself. The technologies and discourses of transsexuality reveal the tensions of transforming the body and its adornments across, between, or outside the policed confines of a gender/sex binary while also being reinscribed intomultiple discourses of fractured referentiality. Some discourses appeal to an unchanging sense of gender identity and relocate a ‘‘truth’’ of gender to be revealed from within the body, while others emphasize dialectical movements of identity and embodiment or otherwise challenge the ontologized terms of gender identity and desire. Tensions among these multiple narratives are salient in the uneven ethical-material topographies of corporeal transformation across which conflicts of late capitalist modernity play out, including state and medical apparatuses and other trans community spaces. In these spaces, the boundaries of authentic transness are often policed by appeals to deep relationality between materiality and inner desire or identity, regardless of its stasis or dynamism, against merely superficial drag or the unfettered play of gendered signs. Yet all of these references to corporeal mutability emerge from particular conceptual constellations that reveal sex/gender as regimes of coding and producing bodies. These possibilities appear with the production of the subject as a form of rupture. The postmodern aesthetic must be itself denaturalized as a particular regime of meaning-production rather than as meaning’s mere liquidation or as the revelation of meaning’s true form. The multiple articulations of subjective rupture become myth when concepts are ontologically essentialized rather than revealed as historical and social productions and abstractions that mediate each other. The denaturalization of both sex and gender as social constructions offers possibilities to refigure embodiment, but the conceptual disjunctures between materiality and symbolism, being and thinking, or body and desire threaten to ontologize and reinscribe authenticity through rupture itself. The conceptual mediation and latent unfolding of such categories denaturalizes rupture as a tenuously policed construction between concepts: sex’s referent as body meets the body’s materiality as symbolic, aesthetic, and interpersonal; gender’s referent as social action, role, or symbolism meets the materiality of these processes produced out of and on to the body; identity’s referent as inner desire or mind meets these terms as interpersonal and corporeal. Appeals to trans authenticity through statically constructed bounds of sex, gender identity, and gender performance thus encounter the body as site and product of deep relationality and that relationality’s own latent unraveling. The deployments and subversions of these ontological layerings reveal tensions in ascribing through them authenticity of corporeality and embodiment. The production and unraveling of this relationality constitutes the dialectic between nonconceptual materiality and its signification into concepts. Baudrillard’s reduction of transsexuality to the symbolic realm presumes appearance as domineering the essence of the subject, such that the subject is hollowed of authentic content. Yet Baudrillard produces the very meaninglessness he critiques by hypostatizing the concept of the subject as form of rupture without reflexive critique of its historical and social construction. He thus ignores, as Theodor Adorno emphasizes throughout Negative Dialectics, the inadequacy of concepts in fully capturing the nonconceptual experiences and materiality to which they refer. The referents of concepts are irreducible to their conceptual signification, as concepts are abstracted moments of the dialectic of meaning-production; in selfcritique, the very concepts of concept and nonconceptual materiality pass into each other rather than reduce to each other. Thus rather than being objective descriptions or symbolic reflections of reality, concepts of gender, sex, and subjective rupture are deployed as power-laced abstractions constituted through various discourses and technologies. The struggle to produce meaning in the face of meaning’s own conceptual inadequacy and consequent mediated liquidation engenders political confrontation around life as somatic/technological structure and life as ethical question. Contrary to Baudrillard’s lamentations, the ‘‘deep’’ political questions about meaning thrive through these tensions:What is the very nature of being gendered/sexed? Should sex and gender remain categories through which to classify and produce bodies? How do uneven conditions of meaningproduction open possibilities for resistance, change, or integration into various political and economic apparatuses? In imagining queered forms of labor, value, and materiality, it is necessary to confront spatial metaphors of superficiality that continue to haunt analyses of postmodernism. Thus far critical queer responses to the projects of Jameson and Baudrillard have left these metaphors unchallenged, perhaps in fear of slipping back into modernist aesthetics of authenticity based on the ‘‘mimetic reproduction for subjectivity of a stable, material objectivity that lies outside the subject’’ (Stryker 1999: 164). The tension between critique and appropriation of postmodernism synthesizes, in Jack Halberstam’s work, as the reclamation of superficiality, which he claims ‘‘may not be a symptom of a diseased political culture but a marvelously flat and uninhibited repudiation of the normativity inherent in ‘deep’ political projects’’ (Halberstam 2005: 124). Halberstam explores two-dimensional transgender art as anticapitalist resistance but, in assuming the unidirectional gaze of the surgeon or the artist, flattens the body to a mere mimetic canvas on which technologies operate. He thus objectifies and alienates representations of the body from the shifting acts of embodiment and performance that catalyze conflict over the very terms and alignments of identity, aesthetics, and politics. Against such static analysis, it is necessary to reveal the competing metaphysics of desire, ontological layering, and appeals to authenticity that enable dynamic conflict over trans subjectivities. Moving forward, we do not need to ‘‘reclaim’’ superficiality from such analysis as much as recognize that depth has never left these struggles in the first place, manifesting instead in the debate over superficiality itself.

We’ll impact turn -- Instead of dealing with problems, they retreat to the masturbatory sanctuary of word games. Action is key to abate the consequences of atrocity. Balsas 06

[Balsas, an interdisciplinary journal on media culture. Interview with Art Group BBM, “on first cyborgs, aliens and other sides of new technologies,” translated from lithiuanian <http://www.balsas.cc/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=151>]

Valentinas: We all know that Jean Baudrillard did not believe that the Gulf War did take place, as it was over-mediated and over-simulated. In fact, the Gulf War II is still not over, and Iraq became much more than just a Frankenstein laboratory for the new media, technology and “democracy” games. What can we learn from wars that do not take place, even though they cannot be finished? Are they becoming a symptom of our times as a confrontation between multiple time-lines, ideologies and technologies in a single place? Lars: Actually, it has always been the same: new wars have been better test-beds for the state of art technologies and the latest computer-controlled firearms. The World War I already was a fully mechanized war where pre-robots were fighting each other and gassing the troops. And afterwards, the winners shape the new world order. Olaf: Who on hell is Baudrillard? The one who earns money by publishing his prognoses after the things happen? What a fuck, French philosophy deals too much with luxury problems and elegantly ignores the problem itself. It’s no wonder, this is the colonizer’s mentality, you can hear it roaring in their words: they use phrases made to camouflage genocide. I went to see that Virilio’s exhibition "Ce qui arrive" at Foundation Cartier in 2003. I was smashed by that banal presentation of the evil of all kinds: again, natural catastrophes and evil done by man were exposed on the same wall, glued together with a piece of "theory". There you find it all, filed up in one row: the pure luxury of the Cartier-funded Jean Nouvel building, an artwork without any blood in its veins, and that late Christian philosophy about the techno-cataclysm being the revenge of God. Pure shit, turned into gold in the holy cellars of the modern alchemists’ museums. The artist-made video "documents" of the Manhattan towers opposed to Iraqian war pictures: that’s not Armageddon, that’s man-invented war technology to be used to subdue others. And there is always somebody who pushes the buttons, even when the button is a computer mouse some ten thousand kilometers away from the place where people die, or even if it is a civil airplanes redirected by Islamists. Everybody knows that. War technology has always been made to make killing easier. And to produce martyrs as well. Janneke: Compare Baudrillard with Henry Dunant, the founder of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Dunant was no philosopher, he was just an intelligent rich man in the late 19th century. But his ideas went far more in the direction where you should hope to find philosophers as well. He experienced war as a "randonneur": he passed by, he saw the suffering and the inhumanity of war. And he felt obliged to act. Apart from the maybe 10 days he spent on the battlefield, on the beautiful meadows in the Europeans Alps, helping wounded people to survive, as a complete medical layman he decided to do something more sustainable against these odds. He knew that his efforts couldn’t prevent war in general, but he felt that he could alter the cruelty of reality. And he succeeded in doing it. No wonder that in our days we find the most engaged people to support the TROIA projects intention in Geneva, where they are still based. And they are not only doing their necessary surgeon’s work in the field: they are as well fighting with the same energy on the diplomatic battlefield.

\*\*Bifo\*\*

The case outweighs – we have identified a particular form of oppression as the structuring principle for this particular form of violence. Even if they win the thesis of the Kritik, they fail to answer the question of *why*, not *how –* the aff is a crucial starting point for understanding violence, which makes it a prior question to the alt

No link – the 1AC was an epistemological interrogation of systems of power and the way that identities are created and categorized as a result, not an instance of the capitalism they critique

No link and link turn – we don’t breathe life into the system – we plant dynamite and ALLOW THAT SHIT TO COME CRASHING DOWN – this is the discursive strategy of killjoy

All of their links are entirely non-unique, which means you vote Aff if there is a risk that we change the world for the better post 1AC

Perm – do both – the strategies are complimentary – this card wrecks

It solves best—our analysis of material capitalism is best paired with a discussion of symbolic exchange. Your alt needs us—bad. Norris 6

[Trevor. doctorate in philosophy of education at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at the University of Toronto. His research focuses on the intersection of education, politics and philosophy. “HANNAH ARENDT & JEAN BAUDRILLARD: PEDAGOGY IN THE CONSUMER SOCIETY” Page 4]

Some have argued that Karl Marx, engaged with problems associated with the process of industrialization in the early nineteenth century, focused primarily on human labor and the material conditions of production as the primary determinants of human consciousness. Thus, that Marx did not adequately address consumption or the communication of symbolic meaning through the process of cultural signiﬁcation, and therefore was unable to consider the extent to which signs and symbols could become commodities themselves, just as much as the use-object (Ewen, 1976; Bocock, 1993; Aldridge, 2003). Consumerism has been portrayed as a process by which the energies for political resistance are drained and diverted into individual material gratiﬁcation, and oppressive class structures and endemic alienation thereby obscured. For example, in tracing the origin of advertising Stewart Ewen suggests that ‘‘the factory had not been an eﬀective arena for forging a predictable and reliable workforce’’ (Ewen, 1976, p. 46). Thus, rather than labor and production constituting the site of discipline and control, advertising emerged because other forms of social control failed. Traditional Marxist analysis has therefore suﬀered from a ‘‘productivist bias’’. Yet power dynamics and social control are just as important in the development and regulation of signs; the control of the mode of signiﬁcation is as important as the mode of production.

Perm – do the Aff and then the alt

Perm – do the alt – the 1AC also exhausts the system

Bifo’s call for retreat into communes abandons all hope of challenging the system or any emancipatory politics, are only accessible to the already privileged, and allows for a predatory capital and zombie politics to fill in – get rekt

Lear 12 [Ben, underemployed researcher living in Manchester, UK, Viewpoint Magazine, May 18, <http://viewpointmag.com/2012/05/18/lifeboat-communism-a-review-of-franco-bifo-berardis-after-the-future/>, ]

Bifo’s pol­i­tics could be described as a kind of “lifeboat com­mu­nism.” As the cri­sis rip­ples, mutates, and deep­ens, Bifo sees the role of com­mu­nism as the cre­ation of spaces of sol­i­dar­ity to blunt the worst effects of the cri­sis of social repro­duc­tion. Gone is the demand for a bet­ter world for all, the lib­er­a­tion of our col­lec­tive social wealth, or the unlock­ing of the social poten­tials of tech­nol­ogy. Rather, Bifo’s pol­i­tics are based around insu­lat­ing a nec­es­sar­ily small por­tion of soci­ety from the dic­tates of cap­i­tal. By with­draw­ing from the polit­i­cal sphere, we accept the like­li­hood of los­ing the final scraps of the wel­fare state and con­cede the ter­rain of the polit­i­cal to zom­bie pol­i­tics and preda­tory cap­i­tal. Rather than seek­ing new forms of orga­ni­za­tion to re-enter the polit­i­cal stage, Bifo seems to sug­gest that we seek shel­ter beneath it as best we can. This shy­ing away from the polit­i­cal stage is the weak­ness at the heart of the book. Recent erup­tions of polit­i­cal strug­gle have cap­tured the col­lec­tive imag­i­na­tion because they demon­strate that polit­i­cal con­tes­ta­tion is still pos­si­ble today, in spite of the obsta­cles Bifo has described. The Occupy move­ment and the upris­ings in the Mid­dle East and North Africa have res­onated with all those who still have hope in col­lec­tive strug­gle. Although these move­ments have encoun­tered vary­ing prob­lems, to which we must develop solu­tions, they dis­pel the idea of an unchange­able present. The cur­rent block­ages to suc­cess­ful organ­is­ing have been shown to be strate­gic and tac­ti­cal, not ter­mi­nal. Mis­di­ag­nos­ing the cur­rent iner­tia of post-political pub­lic life as a ter­mi­nal con­di­tion leads the left towards an evac­u­a­tion of the polit­i­cal, while we should instead reassert its pri­macy. If we aban­don any hope of fight­ing in, against, and beyond the exist­ing archi­tec­ture of the state and cap­i­tal, and instead seek refuge in small com­munes, and go-slow prac­tices, we aban­don all real hope of a gen­er­al­ized, or gen­er­al­iz­able, eman­ci­pa­tory pol­i­tics. Although Bifo’s analy­sis of the dif­fi­cul­ties of col­lec­tive action res­onates with all of us who have attempted to orga­nize strug­gles in the past few decades, the pro­posal for a sim­ple with­drawal from cap­i­tal­ism is a bleak pol­i­tics indeed – which, at its most opti­mistic, calls for an orderly default by por­tions of the pro­le­tariat. The hori­zons of com­mu­nist pol­i­tics appear much nar­rower when cap­i­tal­ism is no longer seen as the repos­i­tory of a vast store of social wealth await­ing col­lec­tive redis­tri­b­u­tion, but rather rede­fined as an unas­sail­able site of uni­ver­sal and per­ma­nent aus­ter­ity com­bined with widen­ing social redundancy.

Perm – you do you, and we’ll do us – rejecting semiocapitalism might good for them, however, queer rage politics is key to create a survival strategy to survive for queer bodies like me

Self-Fulfilling Prophesy DA -- Bifo’s politics fail – we must reorganize instead of retreating. Lear 12

[Ben, underemployed researcher living in Manchester, UK, Viewpoint Magazine, May 18, <http://viewpointmag.com/2012/05/18/lifeboat-communism-a-review-of-franco-bifo-berardis-after-the-future/>]

A retreat to lifeboat pol­i­tics is both pre­ma­ture and a self-fulfilling prophecy. While Bifo cor­rectly analy­ses the cur­rent con­junc­ture – clearly iden­ti­fy­ing the post-political state, the weak­ness of the Left, the cri­sis of prof­itabil­ity and new forms of labour, and their impact on the sub­ject – his polit­i­cal pre­scrip­tions lead us in the wrong direc­tion. Just as Bifo does, we place the strug­gle against work at the cen­ter; but we can also seek to lib­er­ate social wealth, rather than insu­late a lucky few from the rav­ages of cap­i­tal. Rather than “No Future,” we must raise a dif­fer­ent ban­ner: “The future’s here, it just needs reorganizing.”

Alt doesn’t solve the Aff

1. Passivity -- adopting an ethos of passivity is great when you can afford to hang out in debate rounds. The destitute are crushed by the very ethos you endorse. Case is a DA to the alt.
2. The Straight/Cis world LIVES on critiques like bifo’s – the ability to disoccupy systems of power ALLOW THEM TO CONTINUE – make them prove a causal UNIQUENESS QUESTION about the state of collapse of the system of symbolic capitalism
3. Single issue focus – Mary Nardini Gang indicates that radical social movements become extremely pacified and sell out their comrades -- A group gains privilege and power within a movement, and shortly thereafter sell their comrades out. Within a couple years of stonewall, affluent-gay-white-males had thoroughly marginalized everyone that had made their movement possible and abandoned their revolution with them. It was once that to be queer was to be in direct conflict with the forces of control and domination. Now, we are faced with a condition of utter stagnation and sterility. As always, Capital recuperated brick-throwing street queens into suited politicians and activists.

Additionally the Alt doesn’t solve the K—the homeless have been passive for years, and tons kill themselves. None of that counts as a symbolic demand on power. Proves your spectacle just gets ignored or swept under the rug.

Vague alts are a voting issue – I can’t generate offense against them and the alt turns into a floating PIK — Utopian fiat is also a voter because it allows them to wish away impacts

Floating PIC/Ks are bad – steals all of our offense preventing effective engagement – alt’s that do not result in the AFF solve their offense

\*\*Buddhism\*\*

The case outweighs – we have identified a particular form of oppression as the structuring principle for this particular form of violence, and created a methodology for combatting that violence. Even if they win the thesis of the Kritik, they fail to answer the question of *how*, not *why –* the aff is a crucial starting point for understanding violence, which makes it a prior question to the alt

No link – their link evidence is in the context of responding to anxiety, particularly in the context of national security concerns.

Link turn – the 1AC is the reorientation of inner disorder that allows for inner peace – Inner peace is impossible in a world where you are derelict without hope of positive change. That makes the 1AC a prior question.

Link turn – the 1AC is a meditative process that focuses on rethinking and reconceptualizing our own knowledge production – solves their offense because there’s no more spiritual rift – that’s Mary Nardini Gang

All of their links are entirely non-unique, which means you vote aff if there is a risk that we change the world for the better post 1AC

Social Hierarchy DA -- Links to all of our offense -- Buddhism fails to question social hierarchy and empirically meshes well with domination

Snyder ‘85 [Gary, poet, essayist, lecturer, and environmental activist, described as the "poet laureate of Deep Ecology". “Buddhism and the Possibilities of a Planetary Culture,” Deep Ecology, eds. Devall and Sessions, 1985, ]

Buddhism holds that the universe and all creatures in it are intrinsically in a state of complete wisdom, love, and compassion, acting in natural response and mutual interdependence. The personal realization of this from-the­-beginning state cannot be had for and by one “self”-because it is not fully realized unless one has given the self up and away. In the Buddhist view, that which obstructs the effortless manifestation of this is Ignorance, which projects into fear and needless craving. Historically Buddhist philosophers have failed to analyze the degree to which ignor­ance and suffering are caused or encouraged by social factors, considering fear and desire to a given facts of the human condition. Consequently, the major concern of Buddhist philosophy is epistemology and “psychology” with no attention paid to historical or sociological problems. Although Mahayana Buddhism has a grand vision of universal salvation, the actual achievement of Buddhism has been the development of practical systems of meditation toward the end of liberating a few dedicated individuals from psychological hangups and cultural conditionings. Institutional Buddhism has been conspic­uously ready to accept or ignore the ineoualities and tyrannies of whatever political system it found itself under. This can be death to Buddhism. because it is death to any meaningful compassion. Wisdom without com­passion feels no pain.

Perm – do both – the 1AC and 1NC are complimentary political strategies

Perm – do the AFF and then the ALT – the 1AC is a prerequisite to the alt’s utopian vision of achieving inner peace

Intellectual Myopia DA -- Buddhism alone cannot solve—we need social action to solve – perm is best. Snyder 85

[Gary, poet, essayist, lecturer, and environmental activist, described as the "poet laureate of Deep Ecology". “Buddhism and the Possibilities of a Planetary Culture,” Deep Ecology, eds. Devall and Sessions, 1985]

The mercy of the West has been social revolution; the mercy of the East has been individual insight into the basic self/void. We need both. They are both contained in the traditional three aspects of the Dharma path: wisdom (prajna), meditation (dhyana), and morality (sila). Wisdom is intuitive knowledge of the mind of love and clarity that lies beneath one's ego-driven anxieties and aggressions. Meditation is going into the mind to see this for yourself-over and over again, until it becomes the mind you live in. Moral­ity is bringing it back out in the way you live, through personal example and responsible action, ultimately toward the true community (sangha) of "all beings." This last aspect means, for me, supporting any cultural and economic revolution that moves clearly toward a truly free world. It means using such means as civil disobedience, outspoken criticism, protest, pacifism, voluntary poverty and even gentle violence if it comes to a matter of restraining some impetuous crazy. It means affirming the widest possible spectrum of nonharm­ful individual behavior-defending the right of individuals to smoke hemp, eat peyote, be polygamous, polyandrous or homosexual. Worlds of behavior and custom long banned by the Judaeo-Capitalist-Marxist West. It means respecting intelligence and learning, but not as greed or means to personal power. Working on one's own responsibility, but willing to work with a group. "Forming the new society within the shell of the old"-the I.W.W. slogan of seventy years ago.

Perm – you do you, and we’ll do us – meditative politics might good for them, however, queer rage politics is key to create a survival strategy to survive for queer bodies like me

The alt is silence and inaction, which reinforces oppression and turns the critique. Blomley 94

[Nicholas K. Blomley – Professor of Geography at Simon Fraser University, 1994, “Activism and the Academy”, <http://www.praxis-epress.org/CGR/CG_Whole.pdf>]

So why the silence? Several reasons spring to mind. One likely option is that, for many, it is not an issue, given that many progressive academics seem to think that “activist” work is not really “intellectual” work. If people engage in “external” struggle, they do so “on their own time,” as citizens. Certainly this is something that tenure committees seem to believe. For example, my university carefully codes it as “community service” and weighs it as some small percentage of my total academic worth. That uncoupling of the categories “academic” and “activist” seems, for me, difficult to sustain. I was struck by the view of one friend, who noted that she did not see herself as an academic occasionally engaged in activism, but thought of herself as an activist who happens to be an academic. It could also be said that such a distancing evades a special charge – what Noam Chomsky once termed the political “responsibility of intellectuals.” Intellectuals in the academy enjoy a special privilege that comes from political liberty, access to information, and freedom of expression. “For a privileged minority”, Chomsky (1969, 324) insists, “Western democracy provides the leisure, the facilities, and the training to seek the truth behind the veil of misrepresentation, ideology and class interest through which the events of current history are presented to us.” To neglect that responsibility is, at the very best, to acquiesce to oppression. There are more recent reasons for this self-silencing, perhaps, as we come to embrace a postmodern humility, and caution against speaking for the Other. Although such a prudence is laudable, it can also all too easily become a self-serving excuse for inaction. We certainly need to be alert to the perils of the academic colonization of community life, but we should also avoid any romantic assumptions of some authentically ‘pure’ field of activism. The activists I have encountered have all had complex, and occasionally self-serving, agendas. As we all occupy multiple subject positions, so activism is a field of contradiction and diversity.

The alt cannot resolve the affirmative –

1. Inaction -- there is no way that meditation and restaining from action can solve the impacts of the status quo in an effective matter which means the case is a DisAd to the Alt and a net benefit to the perm
2. Empirics prove – queers are silenced CONSTANTLY in the status quo – the paradox of queerness means that they are visible to spectrality but invisible to the political

Vague alts are a voting issue:

1. Ground: they don’t allow the aff to make perms, because it allows them to claim that it is severance or intrinsic with no real bright line.
2. Not reciprocal: topicality and spec arguments check plan text vagueness, we need theory to check vague alt texts.

Floating PIK’s are bad – they’re a moving target which makes it impossible to test competition and attack their advocacy – kills education

\*\*Cap\*\*

Overview

The case outweighs – we have identified a particular form of oppression as the structuring principle for this particular form of violence, and created a methodology for combatting that violence. Even if they win the thesis of the Kritik, they fail to answer the question of how, not why – the aff is a crucial starting point for understanding violence, which makes it a prior question to the alt.

The AFF solves the K but the K can never solve the AFF -- When we speak of social war, we do so because purist class analysis is not enough for us. What does a Marxist economic worldview mean to a survivor of bashing? To a sex worker? To a homeless, teenage runaway? How can class analysis, alone as paradigm for a revolution, promise liberation to those of us journeying beyond our assigned genders and sexualities? The Proletariat as revolutionary subject marginalizes all whose lives don’t fit in the model of heterosexual-worker. Lenin and Marx have never fucked the ways we have. We need something a bit more thorough - something equipped to come with teeth gnashing to all the intricacies of our misery. Simply put, we want to make ruins of domination in all of its varied and interlacing forms. This struggle inhabiting every social relationship is what we know as social war. It is both the process and the condition of a conflict with this totality.

Link Debate

NO link – put away your queer theory indicts – they’re about models of how Edelman came to his theory of reproductive futurism – we don’t defend that, and their essentialism of our scholarship is an independent reason to vote affirmative – FORCE THEM TO COME TO OUR SIDE OF THE LIBRARY

No link – the discussions that we have are not zero sum – blaming the totality for the interlocking forms of oppression that represent heteronormativity does not foreclose discussions of how capitalism contributes to said oppression

All of their links are entirely non-unique, which means you vote aff if there is a risk that we change the world and/or debate space for the better post 1AC

Link turn and disad to the alt -- Homonationalism fuels neoliberalism through “gay friendly” products- the alt alone can’t account for this unique form of materialism

Mcauliffe ‘14

[Robert Mcauliffe, "On pinkwashing and homonationalism ", Daily Mississippian, 11-17-2014, < http://thedmonline.com/on-pinkwashing-and-homonationalism/ >]

As acceptance of the LGBT community has advanced in society, we’ve witnessed a sort of bizarre turn of events. Instead of queer-friendly being used as a pejorative, it is now being used within certain progressive circles as a kind of multi-purpose advertising label: “Now 20 percent more queer-friendly!” Indeed, this label can even be applied to institutions and policies that otherwise society would see as inherently unjust. Politicians, CEOs and even military leaders are now using their support of LGBT rights as a way to desensitize people to their other negative actions and as a cudgel with which to bludgeon their political opponents. They are like wolves with flashy new wool makeovers from their friendly gay beauticians down the street. Israel and America are two powerful purveyors of this phenomenon. Both countries have incorporated queer-friendliness into their political agendas (for the most part) and now, use this progressive stance as a means of “pinkwashing” (a term that originated within breast cancer activists for companies using anti-breast cancer branding as PR while harming society in other ways). Israel has, of course, come under fire internationally for its discrimination against Arab Palestinians within its borders, as well as its colonialist expansion into the West Bank and violent shelling of the Gaza Strip. Despite this, the country sells itself as a Mecca for the LGBT community. As of 2010, the Israeli government has spent more than $90 million on its “Brand Israel” campaign, marketing the country as an attractive tourist destination, specifically for the gay community. Tel Aviv has come to be known for its gay clubs and nightlife, and this image has been advertised to the world as the face of Israel. More attractive than having dead Palestinian children as the face of Israel, no? The inherently cynical and exclusive nature of this advertising campaign is evident in the fact that the many queer Palestinian people being shelled in the Gaza Strip and whose homes are being taken away in the West Bank would hardly be able to have fun in Tel Aviv’s gay clubs. As in the film “The Invisible Men,” the Israeli state often uses this gay-friendliness to malign Palestine, depicting queer Palestinians as suffering and needing to be rescued from repressive Islam by the state of Israel. Queer Palestinian groups such as al-Qaws, Queers Against Israeli Apartheid and Palestinian Queers for BDS are actively trying to fight this effort, exposing the inherent cynicism of Israel using queer people as scapegoats to justify their oppression of Palestinians. The American government, as well as many American corporations, is an offender here as well. Since the demise of the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell policy, the American military has been recruiting using their gay-friendliness as a means of attracting more of America’s youth to serve. Does it really count as progress that I, too, can now participate in the violent subjugation of the third world? Instead of privileging their queer identity and standing in solidarity with queer people around the world, those who choose to serve in the military privilege their American identity and perpetuate the imperialism the American military fosters. LGBT support has also been used as leverage for international relations. Hillary Clinton, among others, has held America up as a shining light of progressive guidance in the face of the Middle East and Africa, whom she characterizes as “backwards” due to certain oppressive religious practices. While it is true that many Middle Eastern and African countries are institutionally anti-gay, this Islamophobic stance simultaneously ignores the faults of America (which is certainly not the most progressive country in the world on LGBT issues) and imposes a homogenous Western understanding of queer identity onto the rest of the world. It also ignores the role American fundamentalists have played in the advent of African anti-gay laws and the role American foreign policy played in the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, which is largely anti-queer. Instead of imperialistically imposing Western standards on the rest of the world, queer people deserve the right to define their own identity in terms of their own culture. The Western narrative of “gay rights” does not apply to all societies and all contexts. Scholars have termed this American use of LGBT issues to push the neoliberal party line in the international field and inaccurately portray America and the West as superior living spaces for queer people as “homonationalism.” American corporations use “homonationalism” domestically to promote their products and profits. At the Pride Festival in my hometown of Saint Louis, one of the biggest sponsors was Monsanto, one of the most notorious corporate pushers of injustice around, and very few people I talked to seemed to have a problem with this. Google, through its Legalize Love campaign, has entered into the realm of promoting LGBT rights internationally, again neglecting the cultural differences in the international queer community. The problem here is that corporations are not non-profits. Anything they are doing has a profit-motivated end, including promoting LGBT equality. So, given that, I reject the use of my identity by corporations to perpetuate the inequality-inducing conditions of capitalism. Homonationalism in action is seen in the celebration of LGBT “visibility” within the realms of corporate and military America, as the recent celebration of Tim Cook’s coming out has shown. Just as I will not be clamoring for queer representation among serial killers and human traffickers, I refuse to celebrate the proliferation of queer CEOs and the ability of people like me to serve in the military. To the corporations and oppressive governments of the world, take this as a message: don’t use my identity to gloss over your perpetration of oppression. There can be no liberation unless there is liberation for all, so if your liberation involves perpetuating capitalism, sexism, racism or imperialism, then it must be bullshit.

Alt

Perm do the aff as an instance of the alt -- The 1AC was a conscious analysis of the way that capitalism has constructed queerness in the squo – we critique the way that capitalism radically passifies us and juxtaposes itself within the matrix of heteronormativity to create systems of subjugation – the 1AC mutiny on the social order reverses that process of capital expenditure

Perm – you do you, and we’ll do us – historical materialism might good for them, however, queer rage politics is key to create a survival strategy to survive for Queer Bodies like me

The root cause debate is something THEY WILL NOT WIN – before you vote negative, force yourself to answer: Where does the queer body fit in Marx’s economic model? Why was Kandis Capri killed? Was it because of SOLELY class conflict, or the interlocking forms of oppression we have designated as the totality?

The alt doesn’t solve the aff –

1. Single issue focus DA – Mary Nardini Gang indicates that radical social movements become extremely pacified and sell out their comrades when they focus on a single achievement -- A group gains privilege and power within a movement, and shortly thereafter sell their comrades out. Within a couple years of stonewall, affluent-gay-white-males had thoroughly marginalized everyone that had made their movement possible and abandoned their revolution with them. It was once that to be queer was to be in direct conflict with the forces of control and domination. Now, we are faced with a condition of utter stagnation and sterility. As always, Capital recuperated brick-throwing street queens into suited politicians and activists.
2. Passivity DA-- adopting an ethos of passivity and remaining within a historical materialist ethic is great when you can afford to hang out in debate rounds. The destitute are crushed by the very ethos you endorse. Case is a DA to the alt. The Straight/Cis world LIVES on critiques like Marx’s – the ability to disoccupy systems of power ALLOW THEM TO CONTINUE – make them prove a causal UNIQUENESS QUESTION about the state of collapse of the system of symbolic capitalism
3. Intersectionality DA – their failure to come to grips with the way that violence occurs in an intersectional nature is wildly essentialist and universalizing. This whitewashes the nature of queer oppression, and makes it so that their understanding of violence is only understood at the level of the cis white gay male – reject the alt for this totalizing perspective on violence

\*\*Chow\*\*

The case outweighs – we have identified a particular form of oppression as the structuring principle for this particular form of violence, and created a methodology for combatting that violence. Even if they win the thesis of the Kritik, they fail to answer the question of *how*, not *why –* the aff is a crucial starting point for understanding violence, which makes it a prior question to the alt

No link – Chow writes in the context of spectacularizing suffering and that getting lost in the academy – that doesn’t happen – two reasons

1. We provide an alt – even if they’re winning the uniqueness question that the academy is parasitic, that’s not a reason to give up and reject the 1AC. All of their links are entirely non-unique, which means you vote aff if there is a risk that we change the world for the better post 1AC
2. It’s actualizable – the Aff avoids the question of cooption by revolting against oppressive structures and refusing to suture the gap of queer assimilation and inclusion – their kritik links harder and creates an intellectual myopia DA because their ivory tower vocabulary ensures that their alt never transcends academia

No ballot link – we didn’t call for it, but you did

Link turn -- Some appropriations are good --- don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good --- the alt risks silence, which is infinitely worse. –

Kleinman and Kleinman 97 [Arthur, Maude and Lillian Presley Professor of Medical Anthropology, and Joan, sinologist, Research Associate, Medical Anthropology Program at Harvard, “The appeal of experience; the dismay of images: Cultural appropriations of suffering in our times,” Social Suffering, pg. 16-18, google books] \*\*we do not endorse the ableist rhetoric of this card\*\*

It is necessary to balance the account of the globalization of commercial and professional images with a vastly different and even more dangerous cultural process of appropriation: the totalitarian state's erasure of social experiences of suffering through the suppression of images. Here the possibility of moral appeal through images of human misery is prevented, and it is their absence that is the source of existential dismay. Such is the case with the massive starvation in China from 1959 to 1961. This story was not reported at the time even though more than thirty million Chinese died in the aftermath of the ruinous policies of the Great Leap Forward, the perverse effect of Mao's impossible dream of forcing immediate industrialization on peasants. Accounts of this, the world's most devastating famine, were totally suppressed; no stories or pictures of the starving or the dead were published. An internal report on the famine was made by an investigating team for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It was based on a detailed survey of an extremely poor region of Anwei Province that was particularly brutally affected. The report includes this numbing statement by Wei Wu-ji, a local peasant leader from Anwei: Originally there were 5,000 people in our commune, now only 3,200 remain. When the Japanese invaded we did not lose this many: we at least could save ourselves by running away! This year there's no escape. We die shut up in our own houses. Of my 6 family members, 5 are already dead, and I am left to starve, and I'll not be able to stave off death for long.(30) Wei Wu-ji continued: Wang Jia-feng from West Springs County reported that cases of eating human meat were discovered. Zhang Sheng-jiu said, "Only an evil man could do such a thing!" Wang Jia-feng said, "In 1960, there were 20 in our household, ten of them died last year. My son told his mother 'I'll die of hunger in a few days.'" And indeed he did.(31) The report also includes a graphic image by Li Qin-ming, from Wudian County, Shanwang Brigade: In 1959, we were prescheduled to deliver 58,000 jin of grain to the State, but only 35,000 jin were harvested, hence we only turned over 33,000 jin, which left 2,000 jin for the commune. We really have nothing to eat. The peasants eat hemp leaves, anything they can possibly eat. In my last report after I wrote, "We have nothing to eat," the Party told me they wanted to remove my name from the Party Roster. Out of a population of 280, 170 died. In our family of five, four of us have died leaving only myself. Should I say that I'm not broken hearted?(32) Chen Zhang-yu, from Guanyu County, offered the investigators this terrible image: Last spring the phenomenon of cannibalism appeared. Since Comrade Chao Wu-chu could not come up with any good ways of prohibiting it, he put out the order to secretly imprison those who seemed to be at death's door to combat the rumors. He secretly imprisoned 63 people from the entire country. Thirty-three died in prison.(33) The official report is thorough and detailed. It is classified neibu, restricted use only. To distribute it is to reveal state secrets. Presented publicly it would have been, especially if it had been published in the 1960s, a fundamental critique of the Great Leap, and a moral and political delegitimation of the Chinese Communist Party's claim to have improved the life of poor peasants. Even today the authorities regard it as dangerous. The official silence is another form of appropriation. It prevents public witnessing. It forges a secret history, an act of political resistance through keeping alive the memory of things denied.34 The totalitarian state rules by collective forgetting, by denying the collective experience of suffering, and thus creates a culture of terror. The absent image is also a form of political appropriation; public silence is perhaps more terrifying than being overwhelmed by public images of atrocity. Taken together the two modes of appropriation delimit the extremes in this cultural process.(35) Our critique of appropriations of suffering that do harm does not mean that no appropriations are valid. To conclude that would be to undermine any attempt to respond to human misery. It would be much more destructive than the problem we have identified; it would ~~paralyze~~halt social action. We must draw upon the images of human suffering in order to identify human needs and to craft humane responses.

Link turn – Liberalism -- Additionally liberal subjectivity defines subaltern status. The binaries of inclusion and exclusion that shape western subject formations define inclusion—breaking down those structures makes cannibalistic consumptions of suffering impossible by abolishing otherization.

The AFF solves the K but the k cant solve the AFF –

1. We destroy the academy? We probably solve your impacts better than you do?
2. Queer Rage solves your critique better — understanding the way social and political positionalities shape our understandings of subjectivity is paramount to interpreting privilege and academic orientations towards politics.
3. Rejecting Maoist positionalities doesn’t do anything for queer bodies dying on the streets – your academic vocabulary ensures that your politics are lost In the academic myopia that is the ivory tower which turns the alt
4. Pain descriptions necessary – there’s no way to know if there is action to take absent recognition of a problem?

Perm - do both

Perm – you do you and we’ll do us -- rejecting Maoist Academia might good for them, however, queer rage politics is key to create a survival strategy to survive for queer bodies like me

Our critique of structural injustice turns vampirism. Contextualizing vulnerability, and the background of injustice balances emphasizing with material suffering and avoiding sentimentality—the alt is narcissism.

Michalinos Zembylas 13, Education @ Open (Cyprus), “The ‘Crisis of Pity” and the Radicalization of Solidarity: Toward Critical Pedagogies of Compassion”, *Educational Studies* 49, p. 512-516

First of all, a politics of compassion that takes into consideration the possible dangers of compassion fatigue, desensitization, and self-victimization has to begin from acknowledging common human vulnerability and its influence in inspiring meaningful actions that avoid presumptuous paternalism (Porter 2006; Whitebrook 2002). The recognition of one’s own vulnerability can constitute a powerful point of departure for developing compassion and solidarity with the other’s vulnerability (Butler 2004). As Butler asserts: “Each of us is constituted politically in part by virtue of the social vulnerability of our bodies. ... We cannot ... will away this vulnerability. We must attend to it” (2004, p. 29). Butler’s description of the vulnerable body and self refers to the way we perform and are performed upon, and part of what we fear in the other is a projection of our own selves. Hence, Butler suggests that recognition of our own vulnerability opens up the potential for recognition of all humanity as vulnerable. Vulnerability may, therefore, be a more appropriate term than suffering to ground the political applications of compassion, because the focus is not merely on the alleviation of material suffering and hence a slide from compassion to benevolence and sentimentality (Porter 2006; Whitebrook 2002). Suggesting this epistemological shift of focus does not imply, however, that a narrative that focuses on the alleviation of material suffering will necessarily result in a slide into sentimentality. Undoubtedly, the political applications of compassion cannot be completely separated from questions of material suffering. Thus, it needs to be acknowledged that although the move away from suffering may be theoretically useful, the shift to a narrative of common human vulnerability is not completely unproblematic. 8 The idea of common vulnerability enables us—teachers and students in the classroom, for instance—to explore how we might move beyond dichotomies that single out the self or the other as victims, and therefore as deserving someone else’s pity. That is, the idea of common vulnerability puts in perspective the notion of all of us as vulnerable, rather than the individual-other who needs our compassion. This notion addresses the concerns of students, for example, who seem to be stuck in self-victimization claims and refuse to acknowledge that others also suffer. Although the idea of common vulnerability does not guarantee any departure from such claims, it opens some space to problematize moralistic positioning. In addition, the notion of common vulnerability attacks a major emotional ideology grounded in the view that it is natural or normal to be fearful of the other, especially if it involves racial differences. This is one of the most common and pernicious emotional ideologies underlying resistance (especially among White, middle-class students) to identifying with the other. However, if vulnerability concerns everyone and yet compassion is assigned differently (i.e., students think that some deserve compassion but others do not), then it is important to explore what it would take for students to begin imagining themselves as objects of lesser compassion in an unsuspected vulnerable moment. Through addressing this issue in ways that do not reify stereotypes or promote essentialism, it is possible to respond to some of the desensitization concerns outlined earlier, because the dichotomies between we and they will become meaningless and unproductive. Second, compassion serves to reinforce a strong connection between the personal and the political and accentuates the interpersonal and the interrelational (Whitebrook 2002). Empathetic identification with the plight of others, then, is not a sentimental recognition of potential sameness—you are in pain and so am I, so we both suffer the same—but a realization of our own common humanity, while acknowledging asymmetries of suffering, inequality, and injustice. A discourse of vulnerability neither eschews questions of material suffering nor obscures issues of inequality and injustice; on the contrary, it highlights both the symmetries and the asymmetries of vulnerability. That is, although the experience of vulnerability may be more or less universal, the discourse of common vulnerability raises important critical questions such as “vulnerable to what? to whom?” to dismiss the possibility of sliding into a sentimental recognition of potential sameness—which is exactly what a politics of compassion ardently seeks to avoid. Without this double realization—that is, we are all vulnerable but not in the same manner—our actions run the danger of being a form of charity and condescension toward those who are systematically and institutionally oppressed (Bunch 2002). If properly recognized in schools, this double realization can potentially address both the concern about the desensitization of students and that of their self-victimization, because the distance between spectator and sufferer will not be taken for granted any more, but rather its multiple complexities will be acknowledged and interrogated. In a sense then, the kind of compassion that is explored here requires a simultaneous identification and disidentification with the suffering of the other. The simultaneous recognition of symmetry and asymmetry with the other removes the arrogance of claiming that we know and feel their pain and suffering. This emotional ambivalence of simultaneous identification and disidentification is needed to focus attention on the other’s suffering, but not becoming too identified with it—a point raised earlier in Nelson’s (2004) reading of Arendt’s reporting on Eichmann’s trial. Students who already endure forms of suffering, of course, do not need a pedagogy to enlighten them how to disidentify with their own suffering. This does not imply, however, that pedagogies that interrogate pity and encourage critical compassion are not for them; on the contrary, the critical awareness that others are vulnerable, too, is important in the struggle for action-oriented solidarity and the avoidance of egocentricity and cultural narcissism. Finally, the third element of a politics of compassion is attentiveness to how the ethics of compassion questions injustice and inequality. 9 In particular, an important component of a politics of compassion that is critical and justice-oriented is how it deals with anger at injustice (Hoggett 2006). A politics of compassion does not intentionally seek to cause anger, however, but rather encourages students and teachers to develop a critical analysis of anger, as it is likely that they will experience such feelings, when they begin questioning long-held assumptions and beliefs about other people and social events (Zembylas 2007). Anger may call attention to demands for recognition, but also emphasize inequalities (Holmes 2004) and injustices at the civic level (Silber 2011). Anger at injustice can be a positive and powerful source of personal and political insight in education (Lorde 1984), because it helps to move teachers and students out of a cycle of self-pity, blame, or guilt into a mode of action that somehow responds to injustice. For example, civic anger can be promoted in the classroom as a form of cultivating individual and collective political consciousness and social resistance to injustices in the students’ community, although anger is not inevitably emancipatory. However, recognizing the positive power of anger and its link to the struggle against injustice in one’s own community is valuable, if teachers want to promote options for action that may change the conditions of others’ vulnerability. The pedagogical challenge for critical pedagogues is how to encourage students to become active participants with a nuanced understanding of the emotional complexities involved in histories of injustice and oppression.

Passivity DA -- The alt is silence and inaction which reinforces oppression and turns the critique

Blomley 94 [Nicholas K. Blomley – Professor of Geography at Simon Fraser University, 1994, “Activism and the Academy”, <http://www.praxis-epress.org/CGR/CG_Whole.pdf>, ]

So why the silence? Several reasons spring to mind. One likely option is that, for many, it is not an issue, given that many progressive academics seem to think that “activist” work is not really “intellectual” work. If people engage in “external” struggle, they do so “on their own time,” as citizens. Certainly this is something that tenure committees seem to believe. For example, my university carefully codes it as “community service” and weighs it as some small percentage of my total academic worth. That uncoupling of the categories “academic” and “activist” seems, for me, difficult to sustain. I was struck by the view of one friend, who noted that she did not see herself as an academic occasionally engaged in activism, but thought of herself as an activist who happens to be an academic. It could also be said that such a distancing evades a special charge – what Noam Chomsky once termed the political “responsibility of intellectuals.” Intellectuals in the academy enjoy a special privilege that comes from political liberty, access to information, and freedom of expression. “For a privileged minority”, Chomsky (1969, 324) insists, “Western democracy provides the leisure, the facilities, and the training to seek the truth behind the veil of misrepresentation, ideology and class interest through which the events of current history are presented to us.” To neglect that responsibility is, at the very best, to acquiesce to oppression. There are more recent reasons for this self-silencing, perhaps, as we come to embrace a postmodern humility, and caution against speaking for the Other. Although such a prudence is laudable, it can also all too easily become a self-serving excuse for inaction. We certainly need to be alert to the perils of the academic colonization of community life, but we should also avoid any romantic assumptions of some authentically ‘pure’ field of activism. The activists I have encountered have all had complex, and occasionally self-serving, agendas. As we all occupy multiple subject positions, so activism is a field of contradiction and diversity.

\*\*Decoloniality\*\*

The case outweighs – we have identified a particular form of oppression as the structuring principle for all forms of violence. Even if they win that the sovereign has access to the state of exception in the status quo, that’s only true because of the overarching structures of normalcy which they have conceded makes all oppression possible – also makes the aff a prerequisite and the alt alone a disaster

Link of omission is bad for debate --– we only have 6 minutes which means we shouldn’t be punished for not discussing everything – the 1AC is an ongoing political project which means we’re constantly changing – also means we have a disingenunity DA to their alt because to include things outside our subjectivity would be disingenuous

Link turn –

1. Mutiny -- If civil society is sutured to violence, we demand a queer attack on the social order. When borders and walls and cages are erected, we see only one solution: every nation and border reduced to rubble. Get with us or get the fuck out of the way. In short, this world has never been enough for us. We say to it, “we want everything gone, motherfucker, try to stop us!
2. Liberalism -- Additionally liberal subjectivity defines subaltern status. The binaries of inclusion and exclusion that shape western subject formations define inclusion—breaking down those structures makes cannibalistic consumptions of suffering impossible by abolishing otherization.
3. Security -- Deconstructing the security apparatus that shapes liberalized subjectivities is key to resolving colonial tendencies from the bottom up.

Robinson and Karatzogianni 13, Andrew and Athina. Andrew is an independent researcher and Athina is a professor of Communications at Hull University. “Schizorevolutions vs. Microfascisms: A Deleuzo-Nietzschean Perspective on State, Security, and Active/Reactive Networks” Page 16-17 (NKF)

The passage from state terror to reactive network terror occurs through the graded stratifications, whereby majoritarian categories enter everyday life (Wallerstein 2004: 37-9). These stratifications, constructed around marked and unmarked terms, discursive exclusions and hierarchies, are products of the field of ‘ideology’ or ‘fantasy’ surrounding the state. Status-groups, or ‘neoarchaisms’ as Deleuze and Guattari call them (1983: 257-8), occur at the intersection of states and networks and can attract either emancipatory or reactive forces. For instance, Pieterse argues that rigid ethnic identities arise from authoritarian institutions and political cultures, and are an effect rather than a cause of conflicts based on ‘the politics of hard sovereignty’ (Pieterse, 1998). Outside such contexts, communities are neither denumerable nor exhaustive of identity (Chatterjee 1993: 223). Fear bridges the gap between segmentary identities and predatory social action. Arjun Appadurai analyses reactive networks as emerging from fear (2006: 1). Asking why groups which are often small and weak are subjected to such vicious fear and rage, Appadurai answers that such groups are targets of anxiety, because of their problematic position in nation-state discourse (ibid. 49). Assigning minorities as a grey area between citizen and humanity-in-general, states displace fear of their own marginalisation onto minorities (ibid. 43). The underlying reason for such acting-out is the insecurity produced by neoliberal capitalism and a rapidly-changing world (ibid. 83-4). ‘[M]inorities are the flash point for a series of uncertainties that mediate between everyday life and its fast-shifting global backdrop’ (ibid. 44). Hence, violence is not simply a consequence of, but a means to produce antagonistic identities, which ward off uncertainty (ibid. 7). In this context, the narcissism of minor differences has gained a new importance. Difference itself is the target of narcissism, and the impossibility of its elimination leads to an excess of violence (ibid. 11). Networks acting on such fear reproduce the terroristic tendencies of the state, directing them against other groups using network means.

Perm – do both – the 1AC and the 1NC are mutually complimentary political strategies

Perm – you do you and we’ll do us -- rejecting settlerism might good for them, however, queer rage politics is key to create a survival strategy to survive for queer bodies like me – if their links don’t disprove the thesis of the aff, you vote aff

The root cause debate is going to become inherently muddled but here’s two reasons they won’t win it –

1. There is no singular root cause because no oppression is monolithic and can explain violence in its entirety
2. Make them prove a causal link between the murders of people and coloniality. How does the indigenous woman fit into their model? What about genderqueer persyns? How does the alt explain violence that happens within communities of color? If you cannot answer these questions confidently at the end of the debate you cannot sign a negative ballot

The alt’s pursuit for anti-colonial conscious raising reinscribes lines of exclusion and employs new modalities of humanism that only reify Eurocentric structures. Laure 11

[Robert, M.A. in English from UT-Arlington, “MOVING BEYOND THIS MOMENT: EMPLOYING DELEUZE AND GUATARRI‟S RHIZOME IN POSTCOLONIALISM,” August, Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Arlington in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Masters of Arts in English, https://dspace.uta.edu/handle/10106/6148‎/]

Fanon was reminded that his “blackness was only a minor term” (138). Through language, it has been possible to evaluate and set the parameters on what it means to exist. European based understandings of existence has found themselves caught in systems of binary oppositions (a system of “I am because I am not;” it is because it is not) which allow language to categorize things so that they can be understood in a neat order. In similar ways, Sartre and Lacan also come from an understanding of these systems of binaries, and these binaries weigh heavily in their theories. For Sartre notes that “to choose to be this or that is to affirm at the same time the value of what we choose . . . Thus, our responsibility is much greater than we might have supposed, because it involves all mankind” (Existentialism 17). The binary system of language comes, as Ingram notes, from “capacity to represent, giving the subject a means by which to articulate desire” (5). Representation, then, “enables the subject to substitute for the insatiable Other” (5). In other words, language allows for one to replace the thing being called with a version (a representation) of that thing, thus pushing the “Other” into a sort of non-existence. Because the representation comes with its meaning attached, the actual “Other” that is being called loses its ability to “speak” for itself. As Heidegger understands this relationship between representational language and things, “no representation of what is present, in the sense of what stands forth and of what stands over against as an object, ever reaches to the thing qua thing” (“The Thing” 166) since the true “nature of the thing never comes to light, that is, it never gets a hearing” (168). Because he refuses Fanon‟s attempt to find his origins in Negritude, or black consciousness, Sartre remains an “Other” to Fanon. Here, it is not simply that Fanon’s black consciousness has failed to free him from this system of “Us” versus “Them.” Fanon’s black consciousness has failed him because Fanon has never left his European ideals of humanity behind, Sartre‟s recognition of black consciousness as “a transition and not a conclusion, a means and not an ultimate end” (qtd in Black Skin 133) further destroys the black man‟s ontology. Yet, Fanon is comforted by Sartre‟s appropriation of the Cartesian cogito as being “the absolute truth of being” (Sartre 36). For Sartre, which is also something Fanon clings to, the cogito “is the only [theory] which gives man dignity, the only one which does not reduce him to an object” (37). However, as Ingram explains, “because the Cartesian model requires a self-knowing subject . . . Being is dependent on a prior system of representation” (xix). When Sartre insists that “man is what he conceives himself to be” after his “thrust toward existence” (15), he ignores the fact that the cogito necessitates a “being present to itself” (Ingram xix). Fanon‟s reliance on the cogito is seen when he remarks that he was “walled in” as “no exception was made for [his] refined manners, or [his] knowledge of literature, or [his] understanding of the quantum theory” (Black Skin 117). While he thought himself as above the stereotypes of blackness, the colonial situation showed him he was in fact not recognized as what he thought himself to be. There was a discrepancy between his thinking and his reality; and it was this discrepancy which caused his state of alienation. When in contact with the colonizing language, colonized individuals are met with the absence of self because in colonial language “there are two camps: the white and the black” (Black Skin 8) which, as Fanon puts it, leaves the black with “only one destination. And it is white” (10). While “black men want to prove to white men the richness of their thought, the equal value of their intellect” (10), colonial language prevents this because, according to its very structure of negation, requires the black to be without both intellect and real value.5 In relation to Fanon‟s desire to “forg[e] political as well as psychological bonds among African-heritage persons throughout the diaspora” (31) from the basis of experiences with colonization, trouble is seen as Fanon‟s humanism begins to create ripples in his stance on black unity, creating a tension that he was never able to work through (Hall 34). Speaking is more than an instantaneous act; rather, it carries with it a history of “speakings.” For Gayatri Spivak, this concept of speaking, as it relates to the colonial Other, has been troubled because every “speaking” of the Other occurs as a form of violence as it forces the colonized to constantly adjust new “speakings” (or narratives) onto previous, “failed” narratives (280-81). Even as Fanon encounters this problem, as evidenced when he discusses how he “found that [he] was an object in the midst of other objects” that had been “put together again by another self” (Black Skin 109), finding the realization that “it is not [he] who make[s] a meaning for [himself], but it is the meaning that was already there, pre-existing, waiting for [him]” (134). As a colonized subject, Fanon understands that he has never made his own history, has never given validity to his Self, and, as a psychiatrist, he understands that all knowledge of who, and what, he is has been cast and recast on him time and again through the discursive practice of colonization. Since language names things, each speaking attempts to retrieve (if only mentally) that thing which is spoken so that “the calling,” done through and by language, “calls into a nearness” that is never really near (“Language” 196). In other words, in the colonial situation language—because it is encoded with stereotypes and preconceptions—is dangerous for colonized individuals because the language with which they have been given to reference themselves (to summon an understanding of themselves in their new categorically structured lives) constantly forces them to be present yet keeps them at a distance. Fanon, in his chapter “The Negro and Language,” highlights this tension—this “inner landscape”—within the colonial system, showing how the origins of colonial differences directly stem from the contact between the language of the colonizer and the language of the colonized. This is both the trap of colonization and the trap of postcoloniality because, due to the contact, the two systems of language become welded together, creating a new Creole/pigeon language. (Even if the two languages remain syntactically and grammatically distinct, psychological overlaps that affect the perception of colonized individuals are still present.) Still, language maintains an interesting place within colonization; it operates through leisure and necessity. The colonizer is able to view the language of the colonized as exotic and to acquire it as an exercise of leisure, all the while never having to rely upon it. When colonists come to invade it is they who look at the natives as if they are bumbling fools. No faculty of reason is granted to this new cultural context because, after all, it is the colonizer who brings “reason” with the colonial mission. The colonized, however, find themselves in a different position. From the first moment of “contact” their language is handed back to them and they gain the ability to experience language in this way. They become reliant upon it for survival and this is problematic for colonized individuals because the language with which they come into contact constantly attempts to deny them “humanness.” While Fanon attempts to “unpack [the] inner landscapes” of colonization’s racism and to “consider the conditions for the production of a new kind of subject and the decolonization of the mind” (Hall 19) the new subject which he attempts to create seems destined to be a return to its point of departure. Fanon seeks “nothing short of the liberation of the man of color from himself” (Black Skin 8), but his end result is, “quite simply the substitution of one “species‟ of mankind by another” (Wretched 1). The tension between Fanon‟s desire for a consciousness (a complete humanity) and Sartre‟s view that Fanon‟s newly found consciousness was simply a “means to an end” can be seen in Fanon‟s claim that “for once, that born Hegelian had forgotten that consciousness has to lose itself in the night of the absolute, the only condition to attain consciousness of self” and “in his work, [he] has destroyed black zeal” (Black Skin 133-35). Fanon claims that Sartre “had forgotten that the Negro suffers in his body quite differently from the white man” (Black Skin 138). While, in a footnote, Fanon acknowledges that “though Sartre‟s speculations on the existence of The Other may be correct (to the extent, we must remember, to which Being and Nothingness describes an alienated consciousness),” he finds that “their application to a black consciousness proves fallacious . . . because the white man is not only The Other but also the master, whether real or imaginary” (138). Here two things occur: Fanon seeks to raise the black man to the (Hegelian) universal humanity of Sartre‟s existentialism, while simultaneously seeking recognition of a difference between the experiences of “men.” In other words, Fanon wants to “be a man, nothing but a man” (113) but he wants to be understood as being different. In and of itself, Fanon‟s claim of difference is not problematic; however, what becomes problematic about it is his that his concept of man is grounded in a European concept of man. Fanon cannot “be a man” because he is preoccupied with looking for man—with looking for meaning outside of himself. By allowing himself, as Ingram argues, to signify his own meanings, acknowledging that his “ego is a psychic projection of lived bodily experiences” not a tablet of dictated meanings (44).It seems that Fanon‟s desire to “be a man” comes because he finds that he is not recognized as a man. In other words, being a man—being human—is not something that one is; it is something that one is recognized as—which is direct reflection of European humanism‟s binary structure (I am because I am not). More importantly, the fact that Fanon remains entangled in his European ideologies of man can be seen in the trajectory between Black Skin and Wretched. At the end of Black Skin Fanon has concluded that “it is through the lasting tension of their freedom that men will be able to create the ideal conditions of existence for a human world . . . why not the quite simple attempt to touch the other, to feel the other, to explain the other to myself?” (231). However, by the time he arrives at Wretched, he has finally decided that “if we want humanity to take one step forward, if we want to take it to another level than the one where Europe has placed it, then . . . we must look elsewhere besides Europe” (239). But Fanon has left himself nowhere else to look. Africa has rejected those who forgot their “Africanness,” only to find it later (“West Indian” 25), and he has now overturned European consciousness, which from the start had rejected all non-Europeans. The very same feeling of being “without responsibility, straddling Nothingness and Infinity” which left him “weeping” in the theater (Black Skin 140) has carried itself into the claims of Wretched. ives) productive. In this regard, along with the right to maim, Israel is exercising a sovereign “right to repair.”

The AFF solves the entirety of the K but the alt doesn’t solve the aff

1. We destroy the structures that perpetuate settlerism – we reduce the state and totality to rubble
2. Intersectionality DA – NO OPPRESSION IS MONOLITHIC - their failure to come to grips with the way that violence occurs in an intersectional nature is wildly essentialist and universalizing. This whitewashes the nature of queer oppression, and makes it so that their understanding of violence is only understood at the level of the cis white gay male – reject the alt for this totalizing perspective on violence
3. Single issue focus DA – Mary Nardini Gang indicates that radical social movements become extremely pacified and sell out their comrades when they focus on a single achievement -- A group gains privilege and power within a movement, and shortly thereafter sell their comrades out. Within a couple years of stonewall, affluent-gay-white-males had thoroughly marginalized everyone that had made their movement possible and abandoned their revolution with them. It was once that to be queer was to be in direct conflict with the forces of control and domination. Now, we are faced with a condition of utter stagnation and sterility. As always, Capital recuperated brick-throwing street queens into suited politicians and activists.

\*\*The 1NC should have came with a trigger warning- Vote Neg

Louise McCudden, 3- ’12 (“Trigger warnings are nothing to do with censorship. They give people more choice, not less.”, The F word Blog)

It's a small but important win in terms of awareness for the causes of both feminism and mental health that "trigger warnings" are now reasonably common online. Yet they're not used by the majority of bloggers, and show no real signs of moving beyond the blogosphere. Not only that, but they are often met with curious levels of resistance, even derision, from entirely sensible, compassionate people. It matters a great deal, and we should say so, because trigger warnings are invaluable. They allow a little bit of control over what you choose to look at; enough to make all the difference between participating in communities, discussions, blogs, and other life-changing support networks, or avoiding them. Support networks are lost to victims, and important voices of experience are lost to the support networks.¶ "Triggering", of course, usually happens as a symptom of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Anyone suffering from PTSD - whether they've been officially diagnosed with it or not - will understand what "triggering" is immediately, but the more painful the trigger, the worse it is to explain, so we're often left with a vague argument about "offensive topics" versus "freedom of speech" which is, although interesting, almost entirely irrelevant to trigger warnings.¶ A call for trigger warnings is not indicative of moral outrage, humour failure, or a plea for censorship. Triggering is more like a chemical reaction, or a phobia, than personal distaste. It's not moral, or emotional. It's medical.¶ Sometimes it's explained like this. If there's a trauma you've had trouble processing, vivid depictions of similar traumas can remind you of it. Well, yes, they can. But this, while horrible, isn't quite what triggering is. When something triggers repressed memories, they stream into your consciousness without your consent. It doesn't just remind of you what happened; it actually makes you re-live it. You feel like you're experiencing the incident again, in real life - until it stops.¶ It's nothing to do with being offended, or having hurt feelings. If you suffer from PTSD, you probably handle being extraordinarily "upset" most days without so much as a sneeze. But the impact of being hit with an unexpected trigger is much worse than being "upset." You might feel sick. You might get a migraine. You might shut down emotionally, you not be able to stay in control of your temper, or your tears. You might black out momentarily, or even forget who, or where, you are. When that happens in a controlled environment or in a safe place with people you trust it's bad enough but if it's happening in the middle of the street, or in a meeting, or when you're standing on the tube with strangers in your personal space, or on a date, or in a job interview, or when you're babysitting, or when you're driving, or...?¶ Identifying something as a potential likely trigger is not the same as passing a moral judgment, and nor is it a call for the item to be censored. Writers who handle an issue like rape sympathetically and intelligently still often choose to carry trigger warnings, because they know that acknowledging a potential trigger is not a value judgment on the content. You can absolutely love something, but still find it triggers for you.¶ And content warnings aren't a radical concept. Films, video games, even music albums carry advisory labels; news readers tell you if the report coming up might distress you, so it's not like we don't already understand and accept the idea anyway. ¶ All trigger warnings do is acknowledge that there are different sorts of horror, and they're not all measurable by things like age. If a record label is going to warn me that Eminem will use a swear word, why not warn me that he's going to depict a rape scene? If Facebook is going to protect people from breastfeeding images in case we find those offensive, surely they could warn us if we're about to click on a page with vivid rape stories, in case that makes us unwell? ¶ So trigger warnings are nothing to do with censorship. If anything, they're the opposite of censorship. If you're interested in free choice and free speech, then trigger warnings are a way to protect those principles. Giving people a trigger warning is simply giving them information. Not giving one because you didn't think of it or didn't know about them is different - I've done that myself. But knowing about them, and choosing not to use them, because you have an idea in your head about censorship and freedom? That's just deliberately denying people information that might help them make an important choice. And there are loads of reasons why people might do that, of course. But none of them have anything to do with freedom.

\*\*Deleuze\*\*

The case outweighs – we have identified a particular form of oppression as the structuring principle for all forms of violence. Even if they win that the sovereign has access to the state of exception in the status quo, that’s only true because of the overarching structures of normalcy which they have conceded makes all oppression possible – also makes the aff a prerequisite and the alt alone a disaster

Link turn –

1. Mutiny -- If civil society is sutured to violence, we demand a queer attack on the social order. When borders and walls and cages are erected, we see only one solution: every nation and border reduced to rubble. Get with us or get the fuck out of the way. In short, this world has never been enough for us. We say to it, “we want everything gone, motherfucker, try to stop us!
2. Liberalism -- Additionally liberal subjectivity defines subaltern status. The binaries of inclusion and exclusion that shape western subject formations define inclusion—breaking down those structures makes cannibalistic consumptions of suffering impossible by abolishing otherization.

The link is entirely non-unique – means that if we win a risk that the Aff changes the squo you vote aff

Even if you believe the entirety of the 1NC, Vote AFF. You don’t solve your own kritik—the negative’s call for the ballot as an affirmation of desire still creates libidinal investments in the sovereignty of the judge. Only a risk voting affirmative ruptures those politics.

Perm – do both

Perm – do the aff and then the alt – the 1AC is a prior question to unfettered non-arborescent thought, because we destroy the structuring principal behind that thought in the first place

The AFF solves the impact to the K but the alt can never solve the AFF

1. Academia -- their ivory tower vocabulary ensures that their alt never transcends academia -- Embracing the rhizome doesn’t do anything for people dying on the streets – we need to combine praxis with practice your ivory tower abstraction alienates supporters because of lack of a strategy, breeds elitist anti-empathetic politics, and reinforces the status quo. Only the perm solves the K. Woodward and Jones 12

[Keith Woodward and John Paul Jones III. Keith is the assistant professor of Geography at the University of Madison, and John is the Professor of Geography and Development and Dean of the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences at the University of Arizona. “B/ordering Space Chapter 15: On the Border with Deleuze and Guattari” Pages 236-237. <http://geography.arizona.edu/sites/geography.arizona.edu/files/u122/On%20the%20Border%20with%20Deleuze%20and%20Guattari.pdf>]

From our perspective, Deleuze and Guattari's work bears directly on the theoretical status of borders - parts of `everything' that are both signs and lines: `constraining enclosures' produced by border words (e.g., woman, straight, white: see Kirby, 1996, p. 13) and stubbornly `real' boundaries that `refuse to melt in the heat of a post-modern world' (Valins, 2003, p. 160). This paper is thus an effort to rethink the border outside of the ideational/material preoccupations, a rethinking that should be welcome in the interdisciplinary field of `border studies' (e.g., Arreola, 2002; Fox, 1999; Hicks, 1991; Jay, 1998; Johnson and Michaelson, 1997; Saldivar, 1997; van Houtum and van Naerssen, 2002; Welchman, 1996). For, on the one hand, there are those theorists who draw on Derrida, Butler, Foucault, and Bhabha, among others, in stressing the theoretical, abstract, metaphoric, and discursive aspects of social and spatial categorization. For example, John Welchman, in affirming Ernesto Laclau's theory of the border, asserts that: `No longer a mere threshold or instrument of demarcation, the border is a crucial zone through which contemporary (political, social, cultural) formations negotiate with received knowledge and reconstitute the "horizon" of discursive identity' (Welchman, 1996, pp. 177-178). While, on the other hand, there are those who remind us not to neglect the material effects of specific borders, such as the fence separating the U.S. and Mexico: `I am not critical of the philosophical formulations of such postmodern - theorists ... I am saying that the level of abstraction that seems to be the nature of such formulations sometimes distances the reader from the lived reality ... of the U.S.-Mexican border. As we negotiate the intellectual twists and turns of such musings it is easy to forget the border on which millions of people live and the border that is traversed daily – both legally and illegally – by thousands of women and men’ (Tatum, 2000, pp. 96-97). A premise of this paper is that border researchers should address these sorts of divisions with theories that are both open to new ways of thinking about sociospatial demarcations and sufficiently capable of addressing the violence of everyday life on the border. As Neil Smith and Cindi Katz note regarding spatial concepts more generally: ‘if a new spatialized politics is to be both coherent and effective, it will be necessary to comprehend the interconnectedness of material and metaphoric [i.e., ideational] space’ (1993, p. 68). Our discussion of Deleuze and Guattari’s border theory goes directly to the mediations called for by Smith and Katz. We begin by discussing Deleuze and Guattari’s dismissal of metaphor – the conveyor belt par excellence of representation – placing it in relation to their productive materialism of ‘becoming’. We then theorize the becoming-border through their concept of (de)territorialization. A brief empirical discussion concludes the main body of the paper. In it we describe the deterritorializing activism of L a Resistencia, an anti-border group with offices throughout the U.S. southwest. The Limits of Metaphor: Becoming as Materiality The collaborative works of Deleuze and Guattari, particularly A Thousand Plateaus (1987) and What is Philosophy? (1994), are replete with the language of borders (for introductions to their work, see Boundas and Olkowski, 1994; Delanda, 2002; Hardt, 1993; Massumi, 1992; Patton, 2000). In these and other works, border terms are accompanied by references to a host of other geographic concepts, such as plateaus and milieus, zones and landscapes, latitudes and longitudes, and tracings and mappings. So infused is their writing with the language of space that at one point they invent the term ‘geophilosophy’ to announce their investment in geography (see Bonta and Protevi, forthcoming). Yet, as we noted at the outset, when critics and theoreticians turn to the concept of borders as an apparatus for articulating various lines of difference and subjectivity in social and cultural studies (e.g., Anzaldúa, 1999; Kirby, 1996; Welchman, 1996), the term may slide into metaphoric usage. According to Smith and Katz, this maneuver can introduce absolutist and Euclidean versions of spatial thinking that may de-materialize and therefore de-politicize social space, as if borders did their work solely within the nether-land of abstract neutrality (1993, also Tatum, 2000). As thinkers who invoke the language of borders to understand all manner of topics, Deleuze and Guattari risk inviting similar accusations. Take, for example, their popular concept, ‘lines of flight’, a phrase that signals an escape from an institutionalized apparatus of capture. The term has been invoked as an experimental resistance to the ‘order words’ of linguistic systems that limit alt conceptualizations – just the sort of spatialization that might hover over material borderlands. For us, however, Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptual spaces – and their political leverage – are anchored in a resolutely materialist understanding of spatiality.

1. Embracing a rhizomatic politic doesn’t change the way that the state and civil society are structured in opposition to queerness – only combining praxis with practice can lead to real change

\*\*Fem rage\*\*

The case outweighs – we have identified a particular form of oppression as the structuring principle for all forms of violence. Even if they win that the sovereign has access to the state of exception in the status quo, that’s only true because of the overarching structures of normalcy which they have conceded makes all oppression possible – also makes the aff a prerequisite and the Alt alone a disaster

No link – the 1AC didn’t inhibit your expression of female rage. It is invited.

Link of omission is bad for debate – we only have 6 minutes which means we shouldn’t be punished for not discussing everything – the 1AC is an ongoing political project which means we’re constantly changing

Link turn –

1. Liberalism -- The 1AC is the biggest link turn possible. Normative ideas about gender, sexuality, and decency are all shaped by liberalized notions of subjectivity. Internalized desires for control determine how we relate to one another and shape our push to control and stratify identity. Queer rage and investigation of the totality inverts those security politics and makes room for new modalities of expression.
2. Civil Society – their impacts can only happen when civil society continues to exist – the 1AC embraces an ethic of anarchism that reverses the ability of civil society to code certain bodies as feminine and forgiving in the first place

Exclusion DA -- Their performance of rage is itself a privilege – women of color are always already interpolated as angry black feminists. The anger of black women always gets blocked in white society. Ahmed 10

[Sara, "Feminist Killjoys (And Other Willful Subjects),” Barnard Center for Research on Women, Summer 2010, http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed\_04.htm]

A feminist call might be a call to anger, to develop a sense of rage about collective wrongs. And yet, it is important that we do not make feminist emotion into a site of truth: as if it is always clear or self-evident that our anger is right. When anger becomes righteous it can be oppressive; to assume anger makes us right can be a wrong. We know how easily a politics of happiness can be displaced into a politics of anger: the assumption of a right to happiness can convert very swiftly into anger toward others (immigrants, aliens, strangers) who have taken the happiness assumed to be "by right" to be ours. It is precisely that we cannot defend ourselves against such defensive use of emotion that would be my point. Emotions are not always just, even those that seem to acquire their force in or from an experience of injustice. Feminist emotions are mediated and opaque; they are sites of struggle, and we must persist in struggling with them.[[8](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm" \l "end8)]¶ After all, feminist spaces are emotional spaces, in which the experience of solidarity is hardly exhaustive. As feminists we have our own tables. If we are unseated by the family table, it does not necessarily follow that we are seated together. We can place the figure of the feminist killjoy alongside the figure of the angry Black woman, explored so well by Black feminist writers such as Audre Lorde[[9](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm" \l "end9)] and bell hooks[[10](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm" \l "end10)]. The angry black woman can be described as a killjoy; she may even kill feminist joy, for example, by pointing out forms of racism within feminist politics. She might not even have to make any such point to kill joy. Listen to the following description from bell hooks: "a group of white feminist activists who do not know one another may be present at a meeting to discuss feminist theory. They may feel bonded on the basis of shared womanhood, but the atmosphere will noticeably change when a woman of color enters the room. The white woman will become tense, no longer relaxed, no longer celebratory."[[11](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm" \l "end11)]¶ It is not just that feelings are "in tension," but that the tension is located somewhere: in being felt by some bodies, it is attributed as caused by another body, who comes to be felt as apart from the group, as getting in the way of its enjoyment and solidarity. The body of color is attributed as the cause of becoming tense, which is also the loss of a shared atmosphere. As a feminist of color you do not even have to say anything to cause tension! The mere proximity of some bodies involves an affective conversion. We learn from this example how histories are condensed in the very intangibility of an atmosphere, or in the tangibility of the bodies that seem to get in the way. Atmospheres might become shared if there is agreement in where we locate the points of tension.¶ A history can be preserved in the very stickiness of a situation. To speak out of anger as a woman of color is then to confirm your position as the cause of tension; your anger is what threatens the social bond. As Audre Lorde describes: "When women of Color speak out of the anger that laces so many of our contacts with white women, we are often told that we are 'creating a mood of helplessness,' 'preventing white women from getting past guilt,' or 'standing in the way of trusting communication and action.'"[[12](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm" \l "end12)] The exposure of violence becomes the origin of violence. The woman of color must let go of her anger for the white woman to move on. The figure of the angry black woman is a fantasy figure that produces its own effects. Reasonable, thoughtful arguments are dismissed as anger (which of course empties anger of its own reason), which makes you angry, such that your response becomes read as the confirmation of evidence that you are not only angry but also unreasonable! To make this point in another way, the anger of feminists of color is attributed. You might be angry about how racism and sexism diminish life choices for women of color. Your anger is a judgment that something is wrong. But then in being heard as angry, your speech is read as motivated by anger. Your anger is read as unattributed, as if you are against x because you are angry rather than being angry because you are against x. You become angry at the injustice of being heard as motivated by anger, which makes it harder to separate yourself from the object of your anger. You become entangled with what you are angry about because you are angry about how they have entangled you in your anger. In becoming angry about that entanglement, you confirm their commitment to your anger as the truth "behind" your speech, which is what blocks your anger, stops it from getting through. You are blocked by not getting through. Some bodies become blockage points, points where smooth communication stops. Consider Ama Ata Aidoo's wonderful prose poem, Our Sister Killjoy, where the narrator Sissie, as a black woman, has to work to sustain the comfort of others. On a plane, a white hostess invites her to sit at the back with "her friends," two black people she does not know. She is about to say that she does not know them, and hesitates. "But to have refused to join them would have created an awkward situation, wouldn't it? Considering too that apart from the air hostess's obviously civilized upbringing, she had been trained to see the comfort of all her passengers."[[13](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm" \l "end13)]

Perm – do both -- The alt’s single issue focus approach to oppression is incorrect – patriarchy and heteronormativity are interlocking forms of oppression that rely on the structuralist supremacy of the cis white able-bodied heterosexual male – the Perms recognition of this politic is necessary to resolve both forms of oppression

Perm – do the Aff and then the alt

Perm – do the Aff as an instance of the Alt – we too are killing the joy of the white male elite

\*\*Foucault\*\*

The case outweighs – we have identified a particular form of oppression as the structuring principle for all forms of violence. Even if they win that the sovereign has access to the state of exception in the status quo, that’s only true because of the overarching structures of normalcy which they have conceded makes all oppression possible – also makes the aff a prerequisite and the alt alone a disaster

No link – their evidence is about understanding how power operates as diffuse networks – we agree!

Link turn – The aff solves the impact to the kritik better than the alt ever could -- If civil society is sutured to violence, we demand a queer attack on the social order. When borders and walls and cages are erected, we see only one solution: every nation and border reduced to rubble. Get with us or get the fuck out of the way. In short, this world has never been enough for us.

All of their links are entirely non-unique, which means you vote aff if there is a risk that we change the world for the better post 1AC

Perm – do the Aff and the alt – there’s no theoretical or substantive reason why we cannot combine struggles and coalescence around the destruction of civil society

Passivity DA -- The alt is silence and inaction, which reinforces oppression and turns the critique. Blomley 94

[Nicholas K. Blomley – Professor of Geography at Simon Fraser University, 1994, “Activism and the Academy”, <http://www.praxis-epress.org/CGR/CG_Whole.pdf>]

So why the silence? Several reasons spring to mind. One likely option is that, for many, it is not an issue, given that many progressive academics seem to think that “activist” work is not really “intellectual” work. If people engage in “external” struggle, they do so “on their own time,” as citizens. Certainly this is something that tenure committees seem to believe. For example, my university carefully codes it as “community service” and weighs it as some small percentage of my total academic worth. That uncoupling of the categories “academic” and “activist” seems, for me, difficult to sustain. I was struck by the view of one friend, who noted that she did not see herself as an academic occasionally engaged in activism, but thought of herself as an activist who happens to be an academic. It could also be said that such a distancing evades a special charge – what Noam Chomsky once termed the political “responsibility of intellectuals.” Intellectuals in the academy enjoy a special privilege that comes from political liberty, access to information, and freedom of expression. “For a privileged minority”, Chomsky (1969, 324) insists, “Western democracy provides the leisure, the facilities, and the training to seek the truth behind the veil of misrepresentation, ideology and class interest through which the events of current history are presented to us.” To neglect that responsibility is, at the very best, to acquiesce to oppression. There are more recent reasons for this self-silencing, perhaps, as we come to embrace a postmodern humility, and caution against speaking for the Other. Although such a prudence is laudable, it can also all too easily become a self-serving excuse for inaction. We certainly need to be alert to the perils of the academic colonization of community life, but we should also avoid any romantic assumptions of some authentically ‘pure’ field of activism. The activists I have encountered have all had complex, and occasionally self-serving, agendas. As we all occupy multiple subject positions, so activism is a field of contradiction and diversity.

Perm – do the Aff and then the alt – the 1AC is a prior ethical question toward destroying the sovereign because it changes the foundational question for how oppression operates in the first place

The alt doesn’t solve the case –

A. Single issue focus – Mary Nardini Gang indicates that radical social movements become extremely pacified and sell out their comrades -- A group gains privilege and power within a movement, and shortly thereafter sell their comrades out. Within a couple years of stonewall, affluent-gay-white-males had thoroughly marginalized everyone that had made their movement possible and abandoned their revolution with them. It was once that to be queer was to be in direct conflict with the forces of control and domination. Now, we are faced with a condition of utter stagnation and sterility. As always, Capital recuperated brick-throwing street queens into suited politicians and activists.

B. Complacency – embracing destituent power doesn’t change the way that the state operates, but rather strengthens its power because we feel like we’ve done something

C. Root cause – you fail to address the reason why power operates in the way that it does in favor of a discussion about how we change that power – this leads to myopia and no alt solvency because we never address underlying causalities

Perm do the Aff as an instance of the alt

\*\*Images of Suffering\*\*

The case outweighs – we have identified a particular form of oppression as the structuring principle for all forms of violence. Even if they win that the sovereign has access to the state of exception in the status quo, that’s only true because of the overarching structures of normalcy which they have conceded makes all oppression possible – also makes the aff a prerequisite and the alt alone a disaster

All of their links are super super non-unique – a risk that the aff changes the academy or the debate space is a reason why you an vote affirmative

We solve the net benefit –

1. Even if they’re winning a uniqueness question about the state of the academy or civil society writ large, the 1AC’s introduction of new forms of knowledge via genealogy is a reason why we meaningfully change the academy
2. Cooption can only happen in a world where civil society continues to exist – the 1AC’s methodology of queer insurrection is a reason why we change the world for the better

Recognition of horrors and suffering stimulate action

Santilli 3 [Paul C., Professor of Philosophy @ Siena College, “Radical Evil, Subjection, and Alain Badiou’s Ethic of the Truth Event” – World Congress of the International Society for Universal Dialogue,” 5/22/2003, http://www.isud.org/papers/pdfs/Santilli.pdf]

What, then, is the ground of moral duty with respect to suffering? The response to horrible suffering should not be empathetic feeling but a rational decision to do one’s duty. Kant is right about this. For Kant that decision springs spontaneously from the subject’s pure practical reason. But unless there is recognition of the horror in the first place, unless one recognizes a call to action in the phenomenon of evil perceived, then the formal procedures for deliberation would not even be set in motion. One needs an imperative from the other, some signal that says, “This is worth your attention. This is cruel. This is worth the exercise of practical reason.” There is a non-spontaneous, passive moment in the exercise of moral reason binding it to suffering or the collapse of happiness and joy in human beings. Although we cannot know what is going on with the person in and for itself, we have to recognize the signs of the void in the tears, the broken bodies, the cries, and all the other symptoms of that void. Kant rejects the pathology of suffering as a condition for moral judgment because, being pathological, it will be dependent on feelings and sensibilities and, therefore, disqualified for universal and autonomous judgments. Only a moral law, purified of all content and material substance, withdrawn from the circuit of natural bodies, desires, and contingencies, could have the force of a standard to which all rational beings are subjected. Nevertheless, even Kant recognizes that to apply the moral law practically one needs to think of it typologically or imagine it as regulating nature and natural bodies.17 The subject in other words has to be reinscribed into the world of suffering and into a circuit of exchanges from which the moral law was abstracted. If the logical intent of the categorical imperative is that I substitute myself as a rational being for any other rational being, then it equally requires a more concrete exchange of bodies in which, for example, a moral prohibition of torture must recognize torture as an offense against the person. How would reason know, for example, that it would be madness to torture someone in order to assist his or her well being, if there was not from the beginning an understanding of the universal condition of the human being’s natural needs and vulnerabilities. The susceptibility of the subject18 or its subjected, passive nature is then an ineradicable condition of moral understanding, even one that seeks to suspend particular, lawless contingencies in favor of pure reason. Built into the very articulation of pure practical reason is an imperative that one ought a priori to care for the needs of others like oneself, is a circuit of fleshly need and dependence. I would not know my duties to angels. This Kant recognizes when he says, “Man is a being of needs, so far as he belongs to the world of sense…his reason certainly has an inescapable responsibility from the side of his sensuous nature to attend to his interests and form practical maxims with a view to the happiness of this and, where possible, of a future life.”19 Suffering calls for a response; it is a stimulus to judgment and action. Without it, the operation of universalizing reason would not kick in. This condition of suffering I call subjection to indicate its position in the concept of a subject. It is the other side of pure spontaneity with which the dignity of man has been identified, by Kant, by Badiou, and so many others. This praise of spontaneous freedom in modern moral philosophy has obscured the truth about our passivity and our vulnerability. After all, if it is in ethics that we achieve some of our dignity, then let us recall that without our vulnerability there would be no ethics. The dignity of angelic figures, no matter how good and free they are, could not be ours.

Our critique of structural injustice turns vampirism. Contextualizing vulnerability, and the background of injustice balances emphasizing with material suffering and avoiding sentimentality—the alt is narcissism.

Zembylas 13 [Michalinos, Education @ Open (Cyprus), “The ‘Crisis of Pity” and the Radicalization of Solidarity: Toward Critical Pedagogies of Compassion”, Educational Studies 49, p. 512-516]

First of all, a politics of compassion that takes into consideration the possible dangers of compassion fatigue, desensitization, and self-victimization has to begin from acknowledging common human vulnerability and its influence in inspiring meaningful actions that avoid presumptuous paternalism (Porter 2006; Whitebrook 2002). The recognition of one’s own vulnerability can constitute a powerful point of departure for developing compassion and solidarity with the other’s vulnerability (Butler 2004). As Butler asserts: “Each of us is constituted politically in part by virtue of the social vulnerability of our bodies. ... We cannot ... will away this vulnerability. We must attend to it” (2004, p. 29). Butler’s description of the vulnerable body and self refers to the way we perform and are performed upon, and part of what we fear in the other is a projection of our own selves. Hence, Butler suggests that recognition of our own vulnerability opens up the potential for recognition of all humanity as vulnerable. Vulnerability may, therefore, be a more appropriate term than suffering to ground the political applications of compassion, because the focus is not merely on the alleviation of material suffering and hence a slide from compassion to benevolence and sentimentality (Porter 2006; Whitebrook 2002). Suggesting this epistemological shift of focus does not imply, however, that a narrative that focuses on the alleviation of material suffering will necessarily result in a slide into sentimentality. Undoubtedly, the political applications of compassion cannot be completely separated from questions of material suffering. Thus, it needs to be acknowledged that although the move away from suffering may be theoretically useful, the shift to a narrative of common human vulnerability is not completely unproblematic. 8 The idea of common vulnerability enables us—teachers and students in the classroom, for instance—to explore how we might move beyond dichotomies that single out the self or the other as victims, and therefore as deserving someone else’s pity. That is, the idea of common vulnerability puts in perspective the notion of all of us as vulnerable, rather than the individual-other who needs our compassion. This notion addresses the concerns of students, for example, who seem to be stuck in self-victimization claims and refuse to acknowledge that others also suffer. Although the idea of common vulnerability does not guarantee any departure from such claims, it opens some space to problematize moralistic positioning. In addition, the notion of common vulnerability attacks a major emotional ideology grounded in the view that it is natural or normal to be fearful of the other, especially if it involves racial differences. This is one of the most common and pernicious emotional ideologies underlying resistance (especially among White, middle-class students) to identifying with the other. However, if vulnerability concerns everyone and yet compassion is assigned differently (i.e., students think that some deserve compassion but others do not), then it is important to explore what it would take for students to begin imagining themselves as objects of lesser compassion in an unsuspected vulnerable moment. Through addressing this issue in ways that do not reify stereotypes or promote essentialism, it is possible to respond to some of the desensitization concerns outlined earlier, because the dichotomies between we and they will become meaningless and unproductive. Second, compassion serves to reinforce a strong connection between the personal and the political and accentuates the interpersonal and the interrelational (Whitebrook 2002). Empathetic identification with the plight of others, then, is not a sentimental recognition of potential sameness—you are in pain and so am I, so we both suffer the same—but a realization of our own common humanity, while acknowledging asymmetries of suffering, inequality, and injustice. A discourse of vulnerability neither eschews questions of material suffering nor obscures issues of inequality and injustice; on the contrary, it highlights both the symmetries and the asymmetries of vulnerability. That is, although the experience of vulnerability may be more or less universal, the discourse of common vulnerability raises important critical questions such as “vulnerable to what? to whom?” to dismiss the possibility of sliding into a sentimental recognition of potential sameness—which is exactly what a politics of compassion ardently seeks to avoid. Without this double realization—that is, we are all vulnerable but not in the same manner—our actions run the danger of being a form of charity and condescension toward those who are systematically and institutionally oppressed (Bunch 2002). If properly recognized in schools, this double realization can potentially address both the concern about the desensitization of students and that of their self-victimization, because the distance between spectator and sufferer will not be taken for granted any more, but rather its multiple complexities will be acknowledged and interrogated. In a sense then, the kind of compassion that is explored here requires a simultaneous identification and disidentification with the suffering of the other. The simultaneous recognition of symmetry and asymmetry with the other removes the arrogance of claiming that we know and feel their pain and suffering. This emotional ambivalence of simultaneous identification and disidentification is needed to focus attention on the other’s suffering, but not becoming too identified with it—a point raised earlier in Nelson’s (2004) reading of Arendt’s reporting on Eichmann’s trial. Students who already endure forms of suffering, of course, do not need a pedagogy to enlighten them how to disidentify with their own suffering. This does not imply, however, that pedagogies that interrogate pity and encourage critical compassion are not for them; on the contrary, the critical awareness that others are vulnerable, too, is important in the struggle for action-oriented solidarity and the avoidance of egocentricity and cultural narcissism. Finally, the third element of a politics of compassion is attentiveness to how the ethics of compassion questions injustice and inequality. 9 In particular, an important component of a politics of compassion that is critical and justice-oriented is how it deals with anger at injustice (Hoggett 2006). A politics of compassion does not intentionally seek to cause anger, however, but rather encourages students and teachers to develop a critical analysis of anger, as it is likely that they will experience such feelings, when they begin questioning long-held assumptions and beliefs about other people and social events (Zembylas 2007). Anger may call attention to demands for recognition, but also emphasize inequalities (Holmes 2004) and injustices at the civic level (Silber 2011). Anger at injustice can be a positive and powerful source of personal and political insight in education (Lorde 1984), because it helps to move teachers and students out of a cycle of self-pity, blame, or guilt into a mode of action that somehow responds to injustice. For example, civic anger can be promoted in the classroom as a form of cultivating individual and collective political consciousness and social resistance to injustices in the students’ community, although anger is not inevitably emancipatory. However, recognizing the positive power of anger and its link to the struggle against injustice in one’s own community is valuable, if teachers want to promote options for action that may change the conditions of others’ vulnerability. The pedagogical challenge for critical pedagogues is how to encourage students to become active participants with a nuanced understanding of the emotional complexities involved in histories of injustice and oppression.

In this instance, academic work is key to liberation of the oppressed

Gordon 2004 [Lewis R., The Laura Carnell University Professor of Philosophy, Temple University, ‘4 “Fanon and Development: A Philosophical Look” Africa Development, Vol. XXIX, No. 1,. pp. 71-93, ]

There is, of course, the continued, resounding question from a century ago: What is to be done? That the context of this discussion is philosophical presents the role of the intellectual. Given the nature of the problems at hand, it would be folly to presume a single role for intellectuals to take. The Africana intellectual tradition has, for instance, been guided by a healthy tension between concerns of identity and liberation – between questions of being and becoming (cf. Gordon 2000:chapters 1–4). It is the task of some intellectuals to work out questions of being, questions of ‘what’ and ‘how’. And then there are those who focus on ‘why’ and other questions of purpose. Some do both. All should consider their work, I here submit, with the following considerations in mind. Each epoch is a living reality. This is so because they are functions of living human communities, which, too, are functions of the social world. As living realities, they come into being and will go out of being. What this means is that societies go through processes of birth and decay. An erroneous feature of most civilisations that achieve imperial status is the silly belief that such an achievement would assure their immortality. But we know that no living community lasts forever, save, perhaps, through historical memory of other communities. Decay comes. The task faced by each subordinated community, however, is how prepared it is for the moment in which conditions for its liberation are ripe. When the people are ready, the crucial question will be of how many ideas are available for the reorganization of social life. The ideas, many of which will unfold through years of engaged political work, need not be perfect, for in the end, it will be the hard, creative work of the communities that take them on. That work is the concrete manifestation of political imagination. Fanon described this goal as setting afoot a new humanity. He knew how terrifying such an effort is, for we do live in times where such a radical break appears as no less than the end of the world. In the meantime, the task of building infrastructures for something new must be planned, and where there is some room, attempted, as we all no doubt already know, because given the sociogenic dimension of the problem, we have no other option but to build the options on which the future of our species rest.

Double Bind—Either

1. Empathetic politics produces psychic images of pain and your impacts are inevitable

Or

1. The totality components are an X factor in your impact scenario and you err affirmative on the link turn debate.

\*\*Irigaray\*\*

The case outweighs – we have identified a particular form of oppression as the structuring principle for all forms of violence. Even if they win that the sovereign has access to the state of exception in the status quo, that’s only true because of the overarching structures of normalcy which they have conceded makes all oppression possible – also makes the aff a prerequisite and the alt alone a disaster

No link –

A. The masculine economy of the present describes the status quo. We link turn this argument by shifting dominant modes of power – sexual difference and heteronormativity are interlocking forms of oppression that rely on the structuralist supremacy of the cis white male – the Perms recognition of this politic is necessary to resolve both forms of oppression and a DA to the alt

B. Put away your queer theory indicts -- they’re about models of how Edelman came to his theory of reproductive futurism – we don’t defend that, and their essentialism of our scholarship is an independent reason to vote affirmative – FORCE THEM TO COME TO OUR SIDE OF THE LIBRARY

Link turn –

1. Liberalism -- The 1AC is the biggest link turn possible. Normative ideas about gender, sexuality, and decency are all shaped by liberalized notions of subjectivity. Internalized desires for control determine how we relate to one another and shape our push to control and stratify identity. Queer rage and investigation of the totality inverts those security politics and makes room for new modalities of expression.
2. Civil Society – their impacts can only happen when civil society continues to exist – the 1AC embraces an ethic of anarchism that reverses the ability of civil society to code certain bodies as feminine and forgiving in the first place

Link of omission is bad for debate --– we only have 6 minutes which means we shouldn’t be punished for not discussing everything – the 1AC is an ongoing political project which means we’re constantly changing – also means we have a disingenunity DA to their alt because to include things outside our subjectivity would be disingenuous

Perm do both – the 1AC’s performance of rage and the 1NC’s performance of rage are not mutually exclusive but rather mutually reinforcing

Three reasons the alt doesn’t solve the case --

1. Alt is non-accessible – they generalize feminism into one category which is inherently exclusionary to anybody who does not fit nicely into that category
2. Erasure DisAd – the alt erases the identity of bodies who do not fit into their model of the feminine – means the alt *does not allow for an all-inclusive discussion of how the patriarchy is problematic towards all women –* turns case
3. Silencing DisAd: Feminism’s inherent commitment to dividing the world into the privileged, masculine bodies who inhabit the patriarchy and the non-privileged, feminine bodies who face the oppression of the patriarchy. This silences bodies who do not fit into either of these categories such as the androgynous body. This constant silencing leads to self-policing.

These violent forms of essentialism turn the K

Cosgrove 3 (Lisa Cosgrove, Assistant Professor in the Department of Counseling and School Psychology at the University of Massachusetts-Boston, Fellow in the William Joiner Center for the Study of War and its Social Consequences, “Feminism, Postmodernism, and Psychological Research,”)

The challenge to essentialism evidenced in Butler's and Kristeva's work also provides an important challenge to the assumption of a normative woman, an assumption deeply entrenched within psychology. We must remember that "[a] feminism that privileges sex over other determinants of difference inevitably and inadvertently participates in other forms of oppression (Poovey 1992, 51). If we fail to challenge the essentialist beliefs that uphold normativity we will continue to posit a normative woman—one who continues to guarantee heterosexual, race, and class privilege. For example, Butler maintains that insofar as we recognize the symbolic as a register of regulating norms/ideality, we must also recognize it as a *racial* industry: "The symbolic is not only organized by phallic power but by a phallicism that is culturally sustained by racial anxiety and sexualized rituals of racial purification . . . masculine and feminine positions are constituted not only through a heterosexualizing symbolic with its taboo on homosexuality but also through a complex set of racial injunctions" (1993, 167, 184). Butler is demonstrating why it is epistemologically as well as politically problematic to assume that all other forms of difference are derivative of sexual difference. Indeed, race and class, like gender, are also socially constructed dichotomies (Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Lorber 1994). It is always risky business to use the term "women" because its function as a signifier depends as [End Page 97] much on who is *excluded* as it does on who is *included* in that identity category (Butler 1993). Unfortunately, however, insofar as both feminist empiricists and standpoint theorists are wedded to the belief that gender is a dichotomous and stable variable, they conclude that other forms of domination (race, class) are also best understood as discrete variables. This assumption leads to the unhelpful conclusion that issues of race and class—just like gender—are foundational categories of analysis ready for easy inclusion in our empirical research projects. As many racialized and marginalized women have emphasized, this conclusion has left intact heterosexist, racist, and classist beliefs. It has also led to the commodification of diversity (Landrine 1996). By stressing the idea that the symbolic is a racial and not just a sexual industry, and that femininity is best conceptualized as a marginalized subject position, Butler and Kristeva provide an alt to essentialist epistemology in which "difference reduces to sameness" (Kimball 1995) and women means white middle-class heterosexual women.

Perm – you do you, and we’ll do us – feminist rage might good for them, however, queer rage politics is key to create a survival strategy to survive for queer bodies like me

Irigaray’s monolithic theory of sexual difference glosses over the reality of intersectional identity politics, replicating the totalizing logic of the masculinist, colonial oppressor – that turns the case

Butler 90 (Judith, philosopher and gender theorist, Hannah Arendt Chair at the European Graduate School, “Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity,” Routledge, 1990) \*\*we do not endorse the usage of the word “woman” in this card

Beauvoir and Irigaray clearly differ over the fundamental¶ structures by which gender asymmetry is reproduced; Beauvoir¶ turns to the failed reciprocity of an asymmetrical dialectic, while¶ Irigaray suggests that the dialectic itself is the monologic¶ elaboration of a masculinist signifying economy. Although lrigaray clearly broadens the scope of feminist critique by¶ exposing the epistemological, ontological, and logical structures of¶ a masculinist signifying economy, the power of her analysis is undercut precisely by its globalizing reach. Is it possible to identify a monolithic as well as a monologic masculinist economy that traverses the array of cultural and historical contexts in which sexual difference takes place? Is the failure to acknowledge the specific cultural operations of gender oppression itself a kind of¶ epistemological imperialism, one which is not ameliorated by the¶ simple elaboration of cultural differences as "examples" of the¶ selfsame phallogocentrism? The effort to include “Other" cultures as variegated ampliﬁcations of a global phallogocentrism¶ constitutes an appropriative act that risks a repetition of the self-¶ aggrandizing gesture of phallogocentrism, colonizing under the¶ sign of the same those differences that might otherwise call that¶ totalizing concept into question.”¶ Feminist critique ought to explore the totalizing claims of a masculinist signifying economy, but also remain self-critical with respect to the totalizing gestures of feminism. The effort to identify¶ the enemy as singular in form is a reverse-discourse that¶ uncritically mimics the strategy of the oppressor instead of¶ offering a different set of terms. That the tactic can operate in¶ feminist and antifeminist contexts alike suggests that the¶ colonizing gesture is not primarily or irreducibly masculinist. It¶ can operate to effect other relations of racial, class, and¶ heterosexist subordination, to name but a few. And clearly, listing¶ the varieties of oppression, as I began to do. assumes their discrete.¶ sequential coexistence along a horizontal axis that does not¶ describe their convergences within the social ﬁeld. A vertical¶ model is similarly insufficient; oppressions cannot be summarily¶ ranked, causally related, distributed among planes of “originality”¶ and “derivativeness.”“ Indeed, the field of power structured in part¶ by the imperializing gesture of dialectical appropriation exceeds¶ and encompasses the axis of sexual difference, offering a mapping¶ of intersecting differentials which cannot be summarily¶ hierarchized either within the terms of phallogocentrism or any¶ other candidate for the position of “primary condition of¶ oppression.” Rather than an exclusive tactic of masculinist¶ signifying economies, dialectical appropriation and suppression of¶ the Other is one tactic among many, deployed centrally but not¶ exclusively in the service of expanding and rationalizing the¶ masculinist domain.¶ The contemporary feminist debates over essentialism raise the¶ question of the universality of female identity and masculinist¶ oppression in other ways. Universalistic claims are based on a¶ common or shared epistemological standpoint, understood as the¶ articulated consciousness or shared structures of oppression or in¶ the ostensibly transcultural structures of femininity, maternity,¶ sexuality, and/or écriture feminine. The opening discussion in this¶ chapter argued that this globalizing gesture has spawned a number¶ of criticisms from women who claim that the category of “women”¶ is normative and exclusionary and is invoked with the unmarked¶ dimensions of class and racial privilege intact. In other words, the¶ insistence upon the coherence and unity of the category of women¶ has effectively refused the multiplicity of cultural, social, and¶ political intersections in which the concrete array of “women” are¶ constructed.

Irigaray’s essentialism ignores the difference of race – at best she’s complicit – this makes exclusion inevitable and necessitates intervention into the whitefeminist realm

Armour 99 (Ellen T., associate professor of religious studies at Rhodes College, “Deconstruction, Feminist Theology, and the Problem of Difference: SUBVERTING THE RACE/GENDER DIVIDE,” University of Chicago Press, 1999) \*\*we do not endorse the usage of the word “woman” in this card

I also turn to Irigaray as Derrida's supplement because of her relationship to the problematics in whitefeminist theory and theology dis-cussed in chapter 1. Irigaray's work came onto the Anglophone feminist scene in the early 1980s, the decade of the so-called problem of essentialism. As Tina Chanter and Kelly Oliver have both argued, the issues dominating the American scene definitively shaped early Anglo-American readings of Irigaray's work. For many, Irigaray came to epitomize the evils of biological essentialism. Others have come to see Irigaray's insistence on woman's multiplicity as laying the theoretical groundwork for dealing more adequately with differences between women, an assumption Patricia Huntington has recently called into question.' Either way, Irigaray is clearly implicated in the dynamics of whitefeminism's dealings with race as analyzed in chapter 1. In fact it may appear at first that turning to Irigaray would carry my project astray. If Irigaray is an essentialist, then she offers my project virtually nothing. If she is not an essentialist but rather a theorist of woman-as-multiple, she may still offer my project next to nothing. Indeed, given the career of multiplicity in recent whitefeminist theory, she may offer my project false hope. Huntington argues that Irigaray ends up "reinstating the very 'white authorial presence' that some U.S. feminists believe French psychoanalytic feminism can help them avoid" (187). It is precisely this situation that constitutes Irigaray's value for my project of deconstructing the divide between race and gender in whitefeminism. As I have noted throughout, my project is deconstructive in that it takes its mark from the lines of force in whitefeminist theory and theology. Essentialism and multiplicity constitute significant lines of force within whitefeminist theory and theology and their dealings with woman and race. Reading Irigaray, then, will repeat whitefeminism's gestures toward dealing with race, even to the point of repeating its exclusion of race. It will revisit the question of essentialism and carry it to its end in Irigaray's concern with sexual difference. Sexual difference, in turn, comes to its end in Irigaray's insistence on differences within and between women. This multiple woman / women comes to her/their end, in turn, in Irigaray's failure to think through the specific difference race makes for woman. Reading Irigaray also takes us to the point where the exclusion of race from white-feminism's woman reaches its end. Its inability to keep race at bay also leads whitefeminism into the terrain of race. Significantly, its closure within Irigaray's oeuvre takes place in a theological scene. Thus, its closure also constitutes a call for whitefeminist theology as a necessary site of intervention if whitefeminism is to move beyond its exclusionary tendencies.

\*\*Nietzsche\*\*

Perm – do both --- the material strategy of the 1ac is a necessary prior question to their epistemic interrogation of moralism, which doesn’t translate into material action toward an affirmation of queerness

We should be able to weigh the material implication of the Aff against the method of the alt --- if we have a better explanation of that form of violence, then vote aff. You also have to justify your scholarship --- Nietzsche was a European thinker than never exposed his understanding of moralism to queerness.

Perm - affirm a politics of queer rage toward civil society --- our argument is a criticism of the current modes by which knowability and liberalism encode queer existence with moralism --- our response is to rage against the world to change it

Doesn’t solve the aff

1. The ROTB is for the judge to vote for the debater that best disrupts normalcy --- Implicates the judge as an intellectual, since it forces them to detach from liberal politics that serve to assimilate queerness
2. Intelligibility --- our argument is a criticism of the liberal conception of inclusion via a process of knowability --- your alt only problematizes the underlying moralism behind that, but doesn’t efface the material violence that exists.

Trying to stop suffering is good – it affirms life and allows people the choice of how they want to find meaning in life. Smolkin 89

[Mitchell, Understanding Pain, 1989, p75-79]

For Camus, the absurdity of the human condition consists in the incongruity between what humans naturally desire, and the reality of the world. Humans naturally desire not to be injured and killed. They desire to understand life and to find meaning in living. They desire to feel at home in the universe. Despite these natural needs, [humanity] man is confronted with a silent universe that does not answer human questions about meaning. He is surrounded by irrational destructiveness, and by the spectre of suffering and pain hurtling out of the void capriciously at human recipients with no regard for their relative merits. Man is estranged from a universe which seems so antagonistic to his natural needs. He feels homeless, in exile, a stranger in his own land. He [Humanity] hears his “nights and days filled always, everywhere with the eternal cry of human pain.”56 Man has been “sentenced, for an unknown crime to an indeterminate period of punishment. And while a good many people adapted themselves to confinement and carried out their humdrum lives as before, there were others who rebelled, and whose one idea was to break loose from the prison house.” Like Ivan Karamozov (Bk V, Chap 4), Camus refuses to accept the idea that future goods such as Divine salvation or eternal happiness “can compensate for a single moment of human suffering,”57 or a child’s tears. Both Ivan Karamozov and Camus believe that “if evil is essential to Divine creation, then creation is unacceptable.” They wish to replace “the reign of grace by the reign of justice.”58 They both assert that no good man would accept salvation on these terms. “There is no possible salvation for the man who feels real compassion,” because he would side with the damned and for their sake reject eternity.59 What is to be gained by rebellion, what are its dangers, and how does one avoid merely “beating the sea with rods” in a nihilistic orgy? With great perceptiveness, Camus discusses these issues in The Rebel. He begins by outlining the entire history of nihilistic rebellion. He admits that once God is declared dead and life meaningless, there is the tendency to rebel in anger by engaging in irrational acts of violence and destruction. Andre Breton has written that the simplest surrealistic act consists “in going out in the Street, revolver in hand, and shooting at random into the crowd.”6° Camus cites “the struggle between the will to be and the desire for annihilation, between the yes and the no, which we have discovered again and again at every stage of rebellion.”61 Citing numerous historical examples, he continually warns against this degeneration of rebellion into crime and murder. Another danger of rebellion which Camus discusses is the sub- stitution of human gods and concepts of salvation for the dead God. This error is more subtle than shooting at random into the crowd, but leads to much more killing and human suffering than the nihilist sniper. Camus criticizes “Nietzsche, at least in his theory of super-humanity, and Marx before him, with his classless society, [who] both replace The Beyond by the Later On.”62 In this respect, these thinkers have not abandoned the notion that history marches toward redemption in which some messianic goal will be realized. Camus urges moderation in the quest for distant goals. He writes, “the absolute is not attained nor, above all, created through history. Politics is not religion, or if it is, then it is nothing but the inquisition.”63 He contrasts rebellion, which he applauds with revolution which leads to murder in the name of vague future goals. “Revolution consists in loving[those] a man who does not yet exist,” and in murdering [those] men who do exist.64 “He who dedicates himself to this history, dedicates himself to nothing, and in his turn is nothing.”65 In The Plague, the character Tarrou renounces his revolutionary past. He states, For many years I’ve been ashamed, mortally ashamed of having been, even with the best intentions, even at many removes, a murderer in my turn. . . All I maintain is that on this earth there are pestilences and there are victims, and its up to us, so far as possible, not to join forces with the pestil- ences.66 Though obviously attuned to the dangers of rebellion, he insists that “these consequences are in no way due to rebellion itself, or at least they occur to the extent that the rebel forgets his original purpose.”67 What is the original purpose that has been forgotten? Rebellion begins because the rebel denounces the lack of justice in the world. He denounces the idea that the end, whether it be the coming of the messianic age, or the revo- lution, or eternal bliss, justifies means which involve so much suffering. Once injustice and suffering are denounced, [people] man needs to exert all his effort against injustice and in solidarity with the sufferers in the world. Killing existing men for a ques- tionable future good, would not be a rational method of exhibi ting solidarity with the sufferers. Nor would solidarity be shown by stoical acceptance of the status quo. Camus urges his rebels to renounce murder completely and work for justice and for a decrease in suffering. Like Dr. Rieux in The Plague, one should take the victim’s side and “share with his fellow citizens the only certitude they have in common—love, exile, suffering.”68 What can be accomplished through rebellion? Camus’ goals are modest. He realizes that the rebel is doomed to “a never ending defeat,”69 in that death, finitude and suffering will always conquer him. He realizes that after [humanity] man has mastered everything in creation that can be mastered and rectified everything that can be rectified, children will still die unjustly even in a perfect society. Even by his greatest effort man can only purpose to diminish arithmetically the sufferings of the world. But the injustice and the suffering will remain and, no matter how limited they are, they will not cease to be an outrage.7° However, there are ephemeral victories and rewards for the rebel. He [One] who dedicates [oneself] himself for the duration of his life to the house he builds, to the dignity of [hu]mankind, dedicates himself the earth and reaps from it the harvest that sows its seed and sustains the world again and again. Those whose desires are limited to man and his humble yet formidable love, should enter, if only now and then, into their reward. They know that if there is one thing one can always yearn for and sometimes attain, it is human love. Society must be arranged to limit injustice and suffering as much as possible so that each individual has the leisure and freedom to pursue his own search for meaning. Future utopias must be renounced, and “history can no longer be presented as an object of worship.”74 “It is time to forsake our age and its adolescent furies,” and to aim for what is possible—more justice, solidarity, and love among [people] men. The rebel must “reject divinity in order to share in the struggles and destiny of all men.”75 Redemption is impossible. Human dignity and love can inter mittently be achieved with struggle and constant vigilance against the plague bacillus that “never dies or disappears for good. .. [but can] rouse up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy city.”76

Framing issue: Bye Felicia—you don’t get to make the choice to condemn people to lives of suffering. The intense pain felt by the desolately poor is not the same as the shit Nietzsche is talking about.

Specificity is key --- their overarching judgments about the 1acs moralism aren’t enough --- you have to win why our specific material action is problematic, not just a generalized claim.

Link turn ---

1. Liberalism --- that allows for forms of moral encoding to occur, because politics get defined by a good/bad binary -- our refusal to accept those western modalities of the world is in the direction of the alt
2. Queer Exile --- your arguments assume a current mode of existence in civil society --- agency are articulations of the world are unknowable, but very much different from the squo. We need strategies that give queer people agency. That’s what queer rage does. 🡪 That’s Mary Nardini Gang 09 and Copenhaver 14

Ressentiment creates energy against oppression—Nietzsche’s argument is both ableist and obstructed by personal bias. Solomon 94

[Robert C., Quincy Lee Centennial Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin, Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals, ed. Richard Schacht, pg. 111-112]

Consider, then, the so-called slaves—those who are group-oriented, mu­tually dependent, ambitious, but frustrated by obstacles not of their own making. The slave has an ideal image of the world—perhaps even an ide­ology—which (not surprisingly) emphasizes some of one’s own (perceived) virtues and raises general (rather than merely personal) narcissism. They have legitimate, justified complaints about the state of the world and their own position in it—complaints that include systematic features (if not uni­versal principles) encompassing others who may be much worse off than themselves. Consequently, they become envious, rebellious, and resentful. They react against a world that they did not make, which is not just, which is ruled by people who—even by the standards they themselves espouse— do not deserve their advantages. Like Camus’s Sisyphus, they may continue in their duties, made tolerable by “scorn and defiance.” Yet they recognize not the absurdity but the injustice of their situation. This is the crux of my doubts about Nietzsche’s thesis—his refusal to acknowledge resentment as an essential ingredient in our sense of justice (and his corresponding restriction of ‘justice” to a virtue of the powerful and privileged). (More on this in the final section.) There are, to be sure, certain moralities that drain or squander our energies with needless inhi­bitions, moralities that distract us or demean our bodily needs and delights; and much of Nietzsche’s attack—especially his well-focused critique of as­ceticism in the Third Essay of the Genealogy—is (like the work of a corporate time-study man) designed to lay their inefficiencies bare. But the sense of oppression and injustice—no matter how “reactive”—can be a powerful source of energy and well-directed vitality; and thus at least one form of slave morality and resentment would seem to escape his harsh and one-sided critique. The metaphors Nietzsche most often uses in talking about strength are medical metaphors, health and sickliness, “physiological” images. Master morality is healthy; slave morality is sickly. Strength as health is clearly a personal and not a competitive virtue. It has much to do with one’s meta­bolic fund of energy, expressed in a spontaneity that is not so much thoughtless or carefree as robust. Weakness as sickliness is above all a lack of energy, a lethargy caused by exhaustion. But Nietzsche’s vision here is often of a very different kind; and it is not health as such but the response to ill-health that is the measure of strength. His famous (but clearly false) comment that “what does not overcome me makes me stronger” is em­blematic of a certain way of thinking about strength and heroism, mani­fested recently in all of those made-for-television movies about brave souls with AIDS or cancer, or a child tragically ill with leukemia. One need not speculate or search very far for the personal origins of Nietzsche’s concern about health and his rather complex conceptions of the proper response to illness. Having sampled the gamut of such reactions ourselves during a week-long bout with a virulent flu, most of us can easily understand how such mixed and obsessive feelings are possible. But they don’t add up to a philosophy, much less a consistent criterion of strength. That which does not overcome me typically leaves me weaker, no matter how noble and stalwart my resistance has been. It is all well and good to desire good health; but, as Aristotle noted, health is a presupposition of virtue and not itself a virtue that deserves admiration. It is certainly admi­rable that Nietzsche defied ill-health and insomnia and wrote ten brilliant pages a day; but this is hardly the mark of the spontaneously healthy “mas­ter” that emerges in those pages. The medical metaphor, accordingly, is a rather bewildering place to look for his conceptions of strength and weak­ness.

[Edelglass 06] Intense suffering is not inevitable—case is a DA to the alt. Edelglass 06

[William, Department of Philosophy, Colby College in Maine, “Levinas on Suffering and Compassion,” Sophia, Volume 45, Issue 2, October 2006, pg. 43-59, SpringerLink, pdf]

According to Levinas's phenomenology, mild discomfort can be mastered by consciousness. But, as suffering increases and overwhelms the subject, it becomes a pure passivity, meaningless and evil. Suffering that leaves the subject without resources, Levinas consistently emphasizes, is characterized by an excessive passivity. It is a submission without a synthesizing act of consciousness. Our senses in their receptivity to the world, phenomenologists insist, are still acting, constituting meaning, forming the material content of sensation. As a content of consciousness, suffering lends itself to phenomenological description, not unlike other sensations of vision, hearing, or touch. And yet, according to Levinas's phenomenology, suffering cannot be grasped, it is 'unassumable,' and this elusiveness is its 'content' (US91). Suffering is outside the intending capacity of consciousness or the apperceptive synthesizing activity of the Kantian 'I think.' Levinas thus speaks of the ambiguity of suffering as a consciousness of the refusal of order and this refusal itself. In suffering, Levinas argues, the refusal of meaning is itself a sensible quality: 'In the guise of "experienced" content, the way in which, with a consciousness, the unbearable is precisely not borne, the manner of this not-being-borne; which, paradoxically, is itself a sensation or a datum' (US92). Beyond the ambiguity of patience - the hope and activity of passivity that masters itself- Levinas insists, there is suffering in which even the exertion of the will as hope is no longer possible. Such suffering is an undergoing without initiative, a bearing of the world, a pure passivity not associated with an activity that senses pain as an object. Thus, the very content of suffering is passivity: 'passivity - that is, a modality - signifies as a quiddity' (US92). The passivity of suffering does not derive simply from a great intensity; the essence of suffering isdisproportionate to our senses, an excess beyond the measure of our faculties. Because suffering is a pure passivity, lived as the breach of the totality we constitute through intending acts, Levinas argues, even suffering that is chosen cannot be meaningfully systematized within a coherent whole. Suffering is a rupture and disturbance of meaning because it suffocates the subject and destroys the capacity for systematically assimilating the world. 9 Pain isolates itself in consciousness, overwhelming consciousness with its insistence. Suffering, then, is an absurdity, 'an absurdity breaking out on the ground of signification.'1~ This absurdity is the eidetic character of suffering Levinas seeks to draw out in his phenomenology. Suffering often appears justified, from the biological need for sensibility to pain, to the various ways in which suffering is employed in character formation, the concerns of practical life, a community's desire for justice, and the needs of the state. Implicit in Levinas's texts is the insistence that the analysis of these sufferings calls for a distinction between the use of pain as a tool, a practice performed on the Other's body for a particular end, and the acknowledgement of the Other's lived pain. A consequence of Levinas's phenomenology is the idea that instrumental justifications ofextreme suffering necessarily are insensible to the unbearable pain they seek to legitimize. Strictly speaking, then, suffering is meaningless and cannot be comprehended or justified by rational argument. Meaningless, and therefore unjustifiable, Levinas insists, suffering is evil. Suffering, according to Levinas's phenomenology, is an exception to the subject's mastery of being; in suffering the subject endures the overwhelming of freedom by alterity. The will that revels in the autonomous grasping of the world, in suffering finds itself grasped by the world. The in-itself of the will loses its capacity to exert itself and submits to the will of what is beyond its grasp. Contrary to Heidegger, it is not the anxiety before my own death which threatens the will and the self. For, Levinas argues, death, announced in suffering, is in a future always beyond the present. Instead of death, it is the pure passivity of suffering that menaces the freedom of the will. The will endures pain 'as a tyranny,' the work of a 'You,' a malicious other who perpetrates violence (TI239). This tyranny, Levinas argues, 'is more radical than sin, for it threatens the will in its very structure as a will, in its dignity as origin and identity' (TI237). Because suffering is unjustifiable, it is a tyranny breaking open my world of totality and meaning 'for nothing.' The gratuitous and extreme suffering that destroys the capacity for flourishing human activity is generally addressed by thinkers in European traditions in the context of metaphysical questions of evil (is evil a positive substance or deviation from the Good?), or problems of philosophical anthropology (is evil chosen or is it a result of ignorance?). For these traditions it is evil, not suffering, that is the great scandal, for they consider suffering to be evil only when it is bothsevere and unjustified.

[Hartwig 2k] Now I’m assuming the 2nc is going to make some argument about your moralism being different from ours. Even if that is true, general morality is the touch-stone for interpersonal relationships that both give life meaning and stop atrocities. Hartwig 2k

[Dr. Mark managing editor for the Foundation for Thought and Ethics and PhD in psychology from UC Santa Barbara, (http://www.boundless.org/2000/features/a0000386.html]

Nietzsche regarded Judeo-Christian morality—with its emphasis on compassion, self-denial and self-sacrifice—as a sham, invented by the weak to tame the powerful ruling classes ("the nobles"). This "slave morality" condemned the "life affirming" values of boldness, pride, self will, health, beauty and happiness, and replaced them with the enfeebling values of meekness, humility, love of suffering and so on. The death of Judeo-Christian morality, Nietzsche believed, would open the door for deliberate "self-creation." Without the moral law, people could decide for themselves what they want to be, and then create themselves in that image: "We, however, would seek to become what we are—the new, the unique, the incomparable, making laws for ourselves and creating ourselves!" Although this resonates with many people today, Nietzsche’s brave new world is horrific. Glover notes: The man Nietzsche admires will overcome bad conscience, which is the mark of slave morality, and will want to dominate others. He believed that egoism is essential to the noble soul, and he defines "egoism" as the faith that "other beings have to be subordinate by nature, and sacrifice themselves to us." This attitude is the sign of a healthy aristocracy, which "accepts with good conscience the sacrifice of innumerable men who for its sake have to be suppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments." In place of sympathy, Glover says, Nietzsche advocates hardness—hardness toward oneself and hardness toward others: His version of hardness, with its rejection of unmanly compassion, supports the domination, even the cruel domination of others: "To see others suffer does one good, to make others suffer even more. This is a hard saying but an ancient, mighty, human, all-too-human principle …. Without cruelty there is no festival." The Nietzschean world, then, is a nightmare. But in the absence of the moral law, is such a world inevitable? Ground for Hope? Glover’s portrayal of humanity’s cruel side, though dark, is a welcome contrast to the "evolutionary psychology" now in vogue. Though he sees this cruelty as rooted in our evolutionary past, he doesn’t try to stuff it into a Darwinian straitjacket and persuade us that it conferred some kind of survival value (as do Randy Thornhill and Craig Palmer, for example, in their recent book, *A Natural History of Rape: Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion).* Glover’s conception is remarkably similar to this — only Glover psychologizes it and views it as a collection of "moral resources." He defines these resources as "certain human needs and psychological tendencies which work against narrowly selfish behavior. These tendencies make it natural for people to display self-restraint and respect and care for others. They make it unlikely that ‘morality’ in a broad sense will perish, despite the fading of belief in a moral law." These moral resources are "distinctive psychological responses to different things people do: Acts of cruelty may arouse our revulsion; we may respond to some mean swindle with contempt; courage or generosity may win our respect or admiration. These responses to others are linked to our sense of our own ‘moral identity.’ … We have a conception of what we are like, and of the kind of person we want to be, which may limit what we are prepared to do to others." Two of the most important moral resources are what he terms the "human responses." "One is the tendency to respond to people with certain kinds of respect. This may be bound up with ideas about their dignity or about their having certain status, either as members of our community or just as fellow humans. The other human response is sympathy: caring about the miseries and the happiness of others, and perhaps feeling a degree of identification with them." Perhaps not, Glover says. In fact, the major burden of his book is to defend the hope that we can live humanely without believing in a divinely inspired moral law. Nevertheless, the fading of that law is a towering obstacle to living humanely: "Those of us who do not believe in a religious moral law should still be troubled by its fading. The evils of religious intolerance, religious persecution and religious wars are well known, but it is striking how many protests against and acts of resistance to atrocity have also come from principled religious commitment. … The decline of this commitment would be a huge loss." That being said, however, Glover’s book drives home an important point: No matter what we might think of an objective moral law, there is something remarkably like it engraved on our hearts. We may dismiss it, resent it or claim it doesn’t exist. But it’s there all the same. And even in the worst of people, it can provide at least some small point of contact — some faint understanding — to which we can appeal.

\*\*Psychoanalysis\*\*

Psychoanalysis doesn’t solve the aff

1. Material Action --- we forefront the question of civil society which is dismissed by the alt in favor of a psychological interrogation of the 1ac ---
2. Intelligibility --- even if desire is the forefronted question of intelligibility, that doesn’t explain how that desire originated or how the alt dismisses the liberal attempt to make queerness knowable and then categorize it.

We’re in the direction of the alt — the liberal democratic order attempts to unify subjects under a communally unified social. The lack takes the role of queerness and deviance, which fractures those fantasies and lays the groundwork for political violence --- the 1ac is a fracture in the squo orientation toward desire – That’s Mary Nardini Gang 09.

Perm do both --- your generic criticism of capitalism or changing the squo isn’t specific to the demands of the 1ac, this means y’all should be forced to contextualize the link arguments --- also even if you do, you can’t win a link to our queer politics which you can’t, because staticizing queerness is problematic and makes them subject to violence based on their knowability.

[Robinson and Tormey 3] Attempting to “traverse the fantasy” ends in a calcification of conservativism. Robinson and Tormey 3

[Andrew and Simon, School of Politics at the University of Nottingham, 2003 "Zizek is not a Radical," <http://homepage.ntlworld.com/simon.tormey/articles/Zizeknotradical.pdf>]

The Act thus reproduces in the socio-political field the Lacanian concept of traversing the fantasy. Traversing the fantasy involves ‘accepting’ that there is no way one can be satisfied, and therefore a ‘full acceptance of the pain ... as inherent to the excess of pleasure which is jouissance’, as well as a rejection of every conception of radical difference.68 It means, *contra* Nietzsche, ‘an acceptance of the fact that *there is no secret treasure in me*’,69 and a transition from being the ‘nothing’ we are today to being ‘a Nothing humbly aware of itself, a Nothing paradoxically made rich through the very awareness of its lack’.70 It involves being reduced to a zero-point or ‘ultimate level’ similar to that seen in the most broken concentration- camp inmates,71 so the role of analysis is ‘to throw out the baby... in order to confront the patient with his ‘dirty bathwater’,72 inducing, not an improvement, but a transition ‘from Bad to Worse’, which is ‘inherently ‘terroristic’.73 It is also not freedom in the usual sense, but prostration before the call of the truth-event,74 ‘something violently *imposed* on me from the Outside through a traumatic encounter that shatters the very foundation of my being’.75 In true Orwellian fashion, Zizek claims that in the Act, freedom equals slavery; the Act involves ‘the highest freedom and also the utmost passivity with a reduction to a lifeless automaton who blindly performs its gestures’.76 So the Act is a rebirth - but a rebirth as what? The parallel with Lacan’s concept of ‘traversing the fantasy’ is crucial, because, for Lacan, there is no escape from the symbolic order or the Law of the Master. We are trapped in the existing world, complete with its dislocation, lack, alienation and antagonism, and no transcendence can overcome the deep structure of this world, which is fixed at the level of subject-formation; the most we can hope for is to go from incapable neurosis to mere alienated subjectivity. In Zizek’s politics, therefore, a fundamental social transformation is impossible. After the break initiated by an Act, a system similar to the present one is restored; the subject undergoes identification with a Cause,77 leading to a new ‘proper symbolic Prohibition’ revitalised by the process of rebirth,78 enabling one ‘effectively to realize the necessary pragmatic measures’,79 which may be the same ones as today, e.g. structural adjustment policies.80 It is possible to start a new life by replacing one symbolic fiction with another.81 As a Lacanian, Zizek is opposed to any idea of realising utopian fullness. Any change in the basic structure of existence, whereby one may overcome dislocation and disorientation, is out of the question. However, he also rejects practical solutions to problems as a mere displacement.82 So an Act neither solves concrete problems nor achieves drastic improvements; it merely removes blockages to existing modes of thought and action. It transforms the ‘constellation which generates social symptoms’,83 shifting exclusion from one group to another, but it does not achieve either drastic or moderate concrete changes. It ‘means that we accept the vicious circle of revolving around the object [the Real] and find jouissance in it, renouncing the myth that jouissance is amassed somewhere else’.84 It also offers those who take part in it a ‘dimension of Otherness, that moment when the absolute appears in all its fragility’, a ‘brief apparition of a future utopian Otherness to which every authentic revolutionary stance should cling’.85 This absolute, however, can only be glimpsed. The leader, Act and Cause must be betrayed so the social order can be refounded. The leader, or ‘mediator’, ‘must erase himself [sic] from the picture’,86 retreating to the horizon of the social to haunt history as spectre or phantasy.87 Every Great Man must be betrayed so he can assume his fame and thereby become compatible with the status quo;88 once one glimpses the sublime Universal, therefore, one must commit suicide - as Zizek claims the Bolshevik Party did, via the Stalinist purges (‘When the Party Commits Suicide’). Furthermore, despite Zizek’s emphasis on politics, his discussion of the Act remains resolutely individualist - as befits its clinical origins. Zizek’s examples of Acts are nearly all isolated actions by individuals, such as Mary Kay Letourneau’s defiance of juridical pressure to end a relationship with a youth,89 a soldier in *Full Metal Jacket* killing his drill sergeant and himself,90 and the acts of Stalinist bureaucrats who rewrote history knowing they would later be purged.91 This is problematic as a basis for understanding previous social transformations, and even more so as a recommendation for the future. The new subject Zizek envisages is an authoritarian leader, someone capable of the ‘inherently terroristic’ action of ‘redefining the rules of the game’.92 This is a conservative, if not reactionary, position. As Donald Rooum’s cartoon character Wildcat so astutely puts it, ‘I don’t just want freedom from the capitalists. I also want freedom from people fit to take over’.93

The alt presumes a normality, or universality in the structure of consciousness and drives – our aff is a specific critique of such manufactured analytics [EXPLAIN WHY]. Any attempt they make to justify the employment of such a way of understanding subjectivity is an explicit in-round manifestation of the violence our aff describes; it is a way of making subjectivity stable, the problem isn’t the way they make the conscious subject understandable, but rather the fact that they make it understandable in the first place. This should frame any attempt they make to justify their way of knowing; appealing to truth claims only makes it worse; we become shaped to fit within their analytic; the debate is now one of whether or not you endorse their violent act. They may offer esoteric critiques of ethics and otherness, but it is really a question of physical violence being done right here in this round; this means that if their method holds any validity whatsoever, perm is the only way to solve.

Their statement of their method being key to formulate political praxis is a façade, articulated from a point of privilege; the proving-true of a particular way of understanding is not a scholastic question, it is a material question; it is *not* a question of interrogation, we are already outside, we are already the other, we cannot sit back to interrogate our unconscious drives because we are not in the position of privilege necessary to do so. Their attempt to abstract away meaning from the ballot is an attempt to keep this violent civil structure alive; this is material question of breaking structure, not an academic one of psychoanalytically dissecting it.

AND, No link ---

1. Desire is based on the politics to know and make identity static --- our argument forefronts this question as the basis for our queer politics which means either there isn’t a link or the perm resolves it.
2. Our criticism is of anti-queer politics ---

Perm --- juxtapose the alt with the aff --- Staring with the wrong choice is key --- creates the conditions for future change --- the juxtaposition of the aff and alt is uniquely important

Rée 12 --- writer, philosopher and historian (Jonathan, “Less Than Nothing by Slavoj Žižek – review”, http://www.theguardian.com/books/2012/jun/27/less-than-nothing-slavoj-zizek-review?newsfeed=true)//trepka

Of course he relies on a formula: to be Žižekian is to hold that Freudian psychoanalysis is essentially correct, and that its implications are absolutely revolutionary. But Žižek's Freud is not everyone's. Old-fashioned Freudians believe that we have masses of juicy secrets locked up inside us, unacknowledged by our well-ordered rational consciousness and clamouring to be set free. For Žižek, however, as for Lacan before him, Freud's great insight was that everything about us – our vaunted rationality as much as our unavowable impulses – is soaked with craziness and ambivalence all the way through. "The first choice has to be the wrong choice," as Žižek says in his monumental new book, because "the wrong choice creates the conditions for the right choice". There is no such thing as being wholly in the right, or wholly in the wrong; and this principle applies to politics as much as to personal life. Politics, as Žižek understands it, is a rare and splendid thing: no actions are genuinely political unless they are revolutionary, and revolution is not revolution unless it institutes "true change" – the kind of comprehensive makeover that "sets its own standards" and "can only be measured by criteria that result from it". Genuine revolutionaries are not interested in operating on "the enemy's turf", haggling over various strategies for satisfying pre-existing needs or securing pre-existing rights: they want to break completely with the past and create "an opening for the truly New". Authentic revolutions have often been betrayed, but as far as Žižek is concerned, they are never misconceived.

\*\*Overload\*\*

The case outweighs – we have identified a particular form of oppression as the structuring principle for all forms of violence. Even if they win that the sovereign has access to the state of exception in the status quo, that’s only true because of the overarching structures of normalcy which they have conceded makes all oppression possible – also makes the aff a prerequisite and the alt alone a disaster

Framing issue: the alt doesn’t solve the epistemic shift the 1AC demands is necessary – it doesn’t end stigmatization of the queerness, it merely means that surveillance fails. That means the accompanying new knowledges are never actualized

No link or internal link – their evidence is all in the context of the NSA and how it perceives threats on telephone calls which means you should hold them to a high threshold of explanation about how a reduction of the totality and a queer mutiny on the heteronormative world is mutually exclusive with jamming the system

Perm – do both – the 1AC and the 1NC were complimentary political strategies

Perm – do the AFF – the 1AC is an instance of jamming the system – the threat of queer mutiny and anarchism causes the system to backlash

Perm – you do you, and we’ll do us – overloading the system might good for them, however, queer rage politics is key to create a survival strategy to survive for queer bodies like me

[Bawden and Robinson 8] Overload is inevitable – multiple warrants. Bawden and Robinson 8

[David Bawden; Lyn Robinson, Department of Information Science City University London, Department of Information Science, City University London, “The dark side of information:¶ overload, anxiety and other¶ paradoxes and pathologies” 9/19/2008 http://www.bollettinoadapt.it/old/files/document/21976david\_b-2008.pdf]

While it is true to say that overload has been recognised most clearly in the business and commercial¶ sectors, and in specialist areas such as science and healthcare, it has been a matter of¶ concern to information specialists in all environments, including academic and public libraries. It may be argued that information overload is the natural and inevitable condition of the human species. There has been a consistent viewpoint suggesting that the issue is exaggerated, or even imagined: see, for example, Savolainen [23]. Our senses, particularly the visual sense, are able to handle a huge amount of input, and to identify significant patterns within it. The modern information environment, however, presents us with information in forms with which our senses, and prior experiences, are ill-equipped to deal .The causes of overload, in this sense, are multiple and complex; hence the difficulty in providing any single “quick fix” solution. It is tempting, and usual, to assume that a major contributing factor, if not the only significant factor, in information overload is the TMI effect: “too much information”. This is readily supported¶ by statistics of the sort often quoted [17]: • a weekly edition of the New York Times contains more information than the average person was¶ likely to come across in a lifetime in seventeenth-century England¶ • the English language of the late 20th century contains about 50,000 words, five times more than¶ in Shakespeare’s lifetime¶ • the collections of the large US research libraries doubled between 1876 and 1990¶ • over one thousand books were published each day across the world during 1990 • more information has been created in the past 30 years than in the previous 5,000 years¶ • the number of records in publicly available online databases increased from 52 million in 1975¶ to 6.3 thousand million in 1994¶ • the number of documents on the Internet doubled from 400 million to 800 million from 1998 to 2000¶ • it would take over 200,000 years to ‘read all the Internet’, allowing 30 minutes per document. Increasing diversity of information can also lead to overload, partly by virtue of a consequent increase in the volume of information on a given topic, which may come from varying perspectives,¶ but also because of an intellectual difficulty in fitting it within a cognitive framework appropriate¶ for the use and the user. Diversity may occur both in the nature of the information itself, and in the¶ format in which it appears, with a typical business user having to deal with paper, e-mail, voicemail,¶ traditional websites, and so on, to which the newer blogs, wikis and the like must be added.¶ New information and communication technologies, aimed at providing rapid and convenient access¶ to information, are themselves responsible for a high proportion of the overload effect: see, for example,¶ Allen and Shoard [24]. Certain kinds of technology are generally highlighted in this respect, particularly¶ “push” systems, which actively deliver information to the user without any request for it. While the volume of information available for search and retrieve at the user’s discretion—“pull”—may be so large¶ as to be daunting, there is not the same sense of information constantly arriving without being under¶ the user’s control as with the active delivery systems. E-mail is usually regarded as the worst offender, particularly with overuse of “blanket” e-mail or needless “cc-ing” of messages.

The alt is the status quo – the HMIS is the system that collects meaningless metadata about the homeless and prevents effective engagement and fosters criminalization – that means you should vote aff to disrupt the status quo

Perm – do the aff and then the alt

Their Finkel evidence is worse than MSU – just says that Jews during the Holocaust learned about the state in order to keep dodging the Holocaust – I’ll answer a card with an accurate tag that makes an argument

Their Angwin evidence is in the context of metadata collection and information from drones – nice try though

Floating PIK’s are bad – they’re a moving target, which makes it impossible to test competition and attack their advocacy – kills education

The alt is vague—there is no explanation of how it works. Leave room for news answers anytime later on to compensate for block spin and vote negative on fairness. They incentivize no-clash debates.

\*\*Queer Optimism\*\*

The case outweighs – we have identified a particular form of oppression as the structuring principle for all forms of violence. Even if they win that the sovereign has access to the state of exception in the status quo, that’s only true because of the overarching structures of normalcy which they have conceded makes all oppression possible – also makes the Aff a prerequisite and the alt alone a disaster

No link – the entirety of the Kritik is an INDICT OF JACK HALBERSTAM – their ASSUMPTION that the aff is the QUEER ART OF FAILURE is violently essentialist – vote Aff to force them to COME TO OUR SIDE OF THE LIBRARY

The alt fails – hope is impossible --

1. We have introduced an ontology question – the queer is derelict within civil society which means reformism fails
2. The alt is comparatively worse -- FUCK LIBERAL INCLUSION AND FUCK REFORMISM -- assimiliationists don’t critique marriage, military or the state. Rather they have campaigns for queer assimilation into each. Their politics is advocacy for such grievous institutions, rather than the annihilation of them all. “Gays can kill poor people around the world as well as straight people!” “Gays can hold the reigns of the state and capital as well straight people!” “We are just like you”. Assimilationists want nothing less than to construct the homosexual as normal - white, monogamous, wealthy, 2.5 children, SUVs with a white picket fence. This construction, of course, reproduces the stability of heterosexuality, whiteness, patriarchy, the gender binary, and capitalism itself. If we genuinely want to make ruins of this totality, we need to make a break. We don’t need inclusion into marriage, the military and the state. We need to end them. No more gay politicians, CEOs and cops. We need to swiftly and immediately articulate a wide gulf between the politics of assimilation and the struggle for liberation. We need to rediscover our riotous inheritance as queer anarchists. We need to destroy constructions of normalcy, and create instead a position based in our alienation from this normalcy, and one capable of dismantling it. We must use these positions to instigate breaks, not just from the assimilationist mainstream, but from capitalism itself. These positions can become tools of a social force ready to create a complete rupture with this world. Our bodies have been born into conflict with this social order. We need to deepen that conflict and make it spread.

Perm – do both

Perm – you do you, and we’ll do us – queer crip feminist eco-futures might good for them, however, queer rage politics is key to create a survival strategy to survive for queer bodies like me

Perm – do the aff and then the alt – the 1AC is a prerequisite to effective environmental strategies

[Ridley 14] Impacts are improbable hyperbole and innovation checks. Ridley 14

[Matt Ridley, Author of The Rational Optimist & member of the House of Lords, “Junk Science Week: IPCC commissioned models to see if global warming would reach dangerous levels this century. Consensus is ‘no’, Special to Financial Post, 6-19-2014 http://business.financialpost.com/2014/06/19/ipcc-climate-change-warming/]

The debate over climate change is horribly polarized. From the way it is conducted, you would think that only two positions are possible: that the whole thing is a hoax or that catastrophe is inevitable. In fact there is room for lots of intermediate positions, including the view I hold, which is that man-made climate change is real but not likely to do much harm, let alone prove to be the greatest crisis facing humankind this century. After more than 25 years reporting and commenting on this topic for various media organizations, and having started out alarmed, that’s where I have ended up. But it is not just I that hold this view. I share it with a very large international organization, sponsored by the United Nations and supported by virtually all the world’s governments: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) itself. The IPCC commissioned four different models of what might happen to the world economy, society and technology in the 21st century and what each would mean for the climate, given a certain assumption about the atmosphere’s “sensitivity” to carbon dioxide. Three of the models show a moderate, slow and mild warming, the hottest of which leaves the planet just 2 degrees Centigrade warmer than today in 2081-2100. The coolest comes out just 0.8 degrees warmer. Now two degrees [above pre-indistrial levels] is the threshold at which warming starts to turn dangerous, according to the scientific consensus. That is to say, in three of the four scenarios considered by the IPCC, by the time my children’s children are elderly, the earth will still not have experienced any harmful warming, let alone catastrophe. But what about the fourth scenario? This is known as RCP8.5, and it produces 3.5 degrees of warming in 2081-2100 [or 4.3 degrees above pre-industrial levels]. Curious to know what assumptions lay behind this model, I decided to look up the original paper describing the creation of this scenario. Frankly, I was gobsmacked. It is a world that is very, very implausible. For a start, this is a world of “continuously increasing global population” so that there are 12 billion on the planet. This is more than a billion more than the United Nations expects, and flies in the face of the fact that the world population growth rate has been falling for 50 years and is on course to reach zero – i.e., stable population – in around 2070. More people mean more emissions. Second, the world is assumed in the RCP8.5 scenario to be burning an astonishing 10 times as much coal as today, producing 50% of its primary energy from coal, compared with about 30% today. Indeed, because oil is assumed to have become scarce, a lot of liquid fuel would then be derived from coal. Nuclear and renewable technologies contribute little, because of a “slow pace of innovation” and hence “fossil fuel technologies continue to dominate the primary energy portfolio over the entire time horizon of the RCP8.5 scenario.” Energy efficiency has improved very little. These are highly unlikely assumptions. With abundant natural gas displacing coal on a huge scale in the United States today, with the price of solar power plummeting, with nuclear power experiencing a revival, with gigantic methane-hydrate gas resources being discovered on the seabed, with energy efficiency rocketing upwards, and with population growth rates continuing to fall fast in virtually every country in the world, the one thing we can say about RCP8.5 is that it is very, very implausible. Notice, however, that even so, it is not a world of catastrophic pain. The per capita income of the average human being in 2100 is three times what it is now. Poverty would be history. So it’s hardly Armageddon. But there’s an even more startling fact. We now have many different studies of climate sensitivity based on observational data and they all converge on the conclusion that it is much lower than assumed by the IPCC in these models. It has to be, otherwise global temperatures would have risen much faster than they have over the past 50 years. As Ross McKitrick noted on this page earlier this week, temperatures have not risen at all now for more than 17 years. With these much more realistic estimates of sensitivity (known as “transient climate response”), even RCP8.5 cannot produce dangerous warming. It manages just 2.1C of warming by 2081-2100 [see table 3 in the report by Lewis and Crok here] That is to say, even if you pile crazy assumption upon crazy assumption till you have an edifice of vanishingly small probability, you cannot even manage to make climate change cause minor damage in the time of our grandchildren, let alone catastrophe. That’s not me saying this – it’s the IPCC itself. But what strikes me as truly fascinating about these scenarios is that they tell us that globalization, innovation and economic growth are unambiguously good for the environment. At the other end of the scale from RCP8.5 is a much more cheerful scenario called RCP2.6. In this happy world, climate change is not a problem at all in 2100, because carbon dioxide emissions have plummeted thanks to the rapid development of cheap nuclear and solar, plus a surge in energy efficiency. The RCP2.6 world is much, much richer. The average person has an income about 16 times today’s in real terms, so that most people are far richer than Americans are today. And it achieves this by free trade, massive globalization, and lots of investment in new technology. All the things the green movement keeps saying it opposes because they will wreck the planet. The answer to climate change is, and always has been, innovation. To worry now in 2014 about a very small, highly implausible set of circumstances in 2100 that just might, if climate sensitivity is much higher than the evidence suggests, produce a marginal damage to the world economy, makes no sense. Think of all the innovation that happened between 1914 and 2000. Do we really think there will be less in this century? As for how to deal with that small risk, well there are several possible options. You could encourage innovation and trade. You could put a modest but growing tax on carbon to nudge innovators in the right direction. You could offer prizes for low-carbon technologies. All of these might make a little sense. But the one thing you should not do is pour public subsidy into supporting old-fashioned existing technologies that produce more carbon dioxide per unit of energy even than coal (bio-energy), or into ones that produce expensive energy (existing solar), or that have very low energy density and so require huge areas of land (wind).

[Sandilands 99] Attempts to preserve the environment occur against the backdrop of heteronormativity--in the status quo, deviance is policed through the imposition of limits and frugality, and the population is managed through a biopolitical regulation of its relationship to a fantasized purity of nature. Sandilands 99

[Carolina, Professor, Canada Research Chair in Sustainability and Culture BA Hons (Sociology) – Victoria, MA, PhD (Sociology) – York, “Sex at the Limits”, Discourses of the Environment, ed. Eric Darrier, pg. (79-80)]

As Andrew Ross so pithily put it in The Chicago Gangster Theory ¶ of Life, 'unlike other social movements, ecology is commonly ¶ perceived as the one that says no, the anti-pleasure voice that says ¶ you're never gonna get it, so get used to doing without' (Ross ¶ 1994: 268). Think of the three R's: reduce, reuse, recycle. Think ¶ of the austerity and earnestness of waste-talk, toxics-talk, ozone talk. It is not only that abundant pleasure is virtually absent in ¶ (most) ecological discourse, but that it is often understood as ¶ downright opposed to ecological principles; frugality and simplicity appear to act as antithetical principles to enjoyment or generosity. The message seems quite clear: we (whoever 'we' might be) ¶ have had too much, and that 'having' has depleted the natural ¶ world (and, on some accounts, our ecological selves, too); we ¶ must now limit our 'having', even our 'being', so that nature can ¶ be restored. ¶ Ah, limits: the backbone of environmental discourse. The ecological idea of limits is that they come from nature itself; it then ¶ follows that nature, if we know how to assess its warning signs ¶ (or listen to it, depending on your shade of green), is telling us ¶ that we are (or are nearly) at the limits of growth, of affluence, of ¶ consumption. Transgress, and face the consequences. Ross goes on: In certain environmentalist circles, you do not have to look far ¶ to see the principle of scarcity being regarded as a rudimentary ¶ circumstance of nature. This applies as much to resource-minded ¶ environmentalists (heirs of the conservatism of the Progressive era), whose apocalyptic prognoses about 'limits to growth' are pragmatically addressed to the managers of industry, as to biocentric ¶ nature activists (heirs of preservationism), morally moved to conserve and redeem sacrosanct areas of wilderness from human ¶ contamination .... [I]ndeed ... limitation is the cardinal principle ¶ of ecological thought. (Ibid. 261, 264) As I have argued elsewhere (Sandilands 1995), the 'limits' that ¶ appear in ecology have far more to do with (particular) human, ¶ social ideas of the real, the good and the possible than they do ¶ with some inherent dividing line in nature beyond which we (again, ¶ whoever 'we' might be) cannot go if the planet is to survive. ¶ Understood as such, they lose a great deal of their normative ¶ power; made visible, they can be negotiated. In this mode, as Ross ¶ notes, they may hold a legitimate place in environmental discourse. But the fact remains that 'there are reasons to be careful about the widespread popular deference to [the] criterion of ¶ limitation, especially when it is advanced as a reason for regulation ¶ of social and cultural life' (Ross 1994: 264 ). ¶ In environmentalism, calls for limitation can be crude or subtle, ¶ physically violent or juridico-political, coercive or normative. ¶ Although it is quite clear that other modes of ensuring deference to a notion of limits are in operation in contemporary environmental struggles (economic coercion is common unfortunately), it ¶ is normativity that especially concerns me in this chapter. For while ¶ some (unfortunately not all) environmentalists see social justice as ¶ a critical aspect of ecological politics, and thus tend to rail against ¶ obviously coercive strategies of compliance, few speak of the ways ¶ in which environmentalism is itself a normalizing discourse, and ¶ thus produces specific power relations, rather than eliminates them, ¶ in a (supposedly) transparent, common quest for natural harmony. ¶ In particular, the organization of environmentalism around a central notion of limitation, as if these limits were given in nature, tends ¶ to produce a form of 'environmentality' that is entirely consistent ¶ with the perpetuation of highly exploitative social relations. ¶ Specifically, much contemporary environmentalism relies on a ¶ discourse of self-limitation and self-denial. This discourse is omnipresent; it is apparent in everything from the 'voluntary simplicity' of deep ecologists to industrialized nations' (hypocritical) calls, ¶ via the normative prescriptions of international eco-regimes, for ¶ 'Third World' governments to exercise self-restraint in their ¶ 'unruly', ecologically destructive aspirations. The point, it seems, is to produce both individuals and nations as responsible eco-subjects, ¶ not by overt repression or regulation, but by the invocation of a ¶ notion of 'the common good' in which 'limit' is the primary discursive term around which people are to organize their ecological ¶ practices, self-concepts and pleasures. To the usual list of particular limits in this general constellation (growth, consumption, affluence, etc.), I would like to add ¶ 'limits to sex'. In my view, one of the most disturbing sites of 'self-limiting' ecological wisdom lies in discourses around population. ¶ That discipline is inherent in population-talk is neither new nor ¶ surprising; as Foucault wrote, 'one of the great innovations in ¶ techniques of power in the eighteenth century was the emergence ¶ of "population" as an economic and political problem: population as wealth, population as manpower [sic] or labor capacity, ¶ population balanced between its own growth and the resources it ¶ commanded' (Foucault 1976: 25). While the ecological invocation ¶ of population discourse rests on a long tradition of regulatory ¶ practice - there are few differences between Thomas Malthus and ¶ Paul Ehrlich- its contemporary imbrication in North/South, gendered, racialized and heterosexualized power dynamics suggests ¶ a particular series of inflections. Population discourse was, and continues to be, a mode of regulation, a series of practices of science in which sex is managed, ¶ organized, aggregated and graphically compared across nation states. Of course, the new 'science' of population did not appear ¶ simply as a statistical tool to predict and control the sexual behaviour of individual persons; it appeared as a series of truth-claims ¶ about optimal health and well-being to which rational individuals ¶ could be expected to orient themselves, and toward which the ¶ developing institutions of social welfare (and social purity) were ¶ oriented. Population discourse was thus an archetypical expression ¶ of modernity; the effective management of people, and especially ¶ sex, signaled efficiency, progress, control over nature and enlightenment. It was also, according to Foucault, 'without question an ¶ indispensable element in the development of capitalism; the latter ¶ would not have been possible without the controlled insertion of ¶ bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the ¶ phenomenon of population to economic processes' (ibid. 140-1). ¶ Think of 'family planning', think of the progressive intrusion of a ¶ sort of sexual Taylorism into the previously (supposedly) chaotic ¶ and irrational desires of individual prospective parents. As early as 1798, with the publication of Malthus's Essay on the Principles of Population, a crucial component of this discourse ¶ has been the possibility that there are, will be, or could be too many ¶ people than is good for us. Part of population management thus ¶ consists in limitation, and the achievement of modernity seems ¶ to rest upon this practice. Indeed, there is a strong relationship ¶ between the modern emergence of discourses of population limitation and the centrality of an idea of scarcity to capitalism. As Linda ¶ Singer writes, 'The notion of scarcity is crucial to capitalism both as its justification (there's not enough, especially now, of what ¶ we need to survive; therefore, let's control it so that the maximum ¶ number of people benefit from it ... and sometimes, at least, as ¶ that for which capitalism is the remedy' (Singer 1993: 35). While ¶ there are many facets to this relationship, what is important to note ¶ here is that population, rationality and scarcity are inextricably ¶ interwoven in the fabric of capitalism. ¶ In this context, the very logic of population management is that ¶ its goals cannot be reached merely through the external imposition of codes of appropriate behaviour. While optimal levels and ¶ standards may be the terrain of expert negotiation and statistical ¶ analysis, efficient management (of reproduction, of eroticism) is ¶ really a question of normativity or, more precisely, the mobilization of individual pleasure to the goals of rationality and limitation. ¶ As Singer puts it, 'capitalism works not by opposing itself to the ¶ pleasure principle, but by finding strategic ways to mobilize it, a ¶ form of control by incitement, not by ... repression but by the ¶ perpetual promise of pleasure' (1993: 36). Population discourse ¶ thus involves questions of organizing pleasure in particular ways. ¶ As a form of biopower, producing and controlling the sexuality ¶ of collective and individual human subject-bodies, it operates by ¶ enticement, not just by repression; in the case of population limitation, voices whisper a common articulatory thread: 'You will enjoy ¶ your small(er) family; you will enjoy your new-found economic ¶ prosperity; you will enjoy the process of controlling your fertility.' ¶ This is not to say that population management efforts have ¶ never been, or do not continue to be, repressive or coercive. Far ¶ from it: one could speak of not-long-past trades of transistor ¶ radios for vasectomies among Indian men; one could speak of ¶ instances in which poor pregnant women in the USA have been ¶ refused hospital obstetric treatment unless they give 'consent' for ¶ post-partum sterilization; one could speak of countries in which ¶ women are currently lured into trying Depo-Provera, and are refused treatment to have the implants removed when side-effects ¶ arise (Trombley 1988, 1996). Early population discourses, including family planning, were overtly tied to eugenic strategies, which ¶ resulted in the elimination of reproductive rights for many poor ¶ women, women of colour, and women with disabilities (Davis 1981, ¶ Mies and Shiva 1993 ). These and other gross injustices remain, and ¶ are soundly condemned by many feminist and social justice activists, and even by some of the more enlightened environmentalists. But what is perhaps more disturbing is the fact that population ¶ management itself remains significantly unchallenged as a goal, a ¶ discourse or a disciplinary practice. While some authors are critical of the attribution of singular or even primary causality to ¶ population as a source of environmental degradation, even some ¶ of the most militant critics of coercive population control measures seem relatively content with family planning education, despite the fact that such normative 'planning' remains a significant ¶ instrument of control, and bears the hallmarks of profoundly ¶ gendered, racialized and heterosexualized normativity. In many ¶ ways, contemporary family planning measures- education, health ¶ promotion, access to birth control technologies, etc. - are much ¶ more efficient bearers of specifically modern, rational and capitalist relations of reproduction than any bribery or threat could be, at least in part because the power relations involved are largely invisible. One of the most significant features of contemporary population ¶ discourse is its intersection with particular ideas of 'nature'. While ¶ for many environmentalists the link between population growth ¶ and environmental degradation seems so obvious as to be a truism, ¶ it must be remembered that the relationship between these two ¶ terms is both historically recent and discursively specific. Indeed, ¶ the population-environment nexus involves a form of what Timothy Luke (1995) calls 'environmentality'. Of this general historical ¶ creation, Luke suggests that '[a]s biological existence was [increasingly] refracted through economic, political, and technological ¶ existence, "the facts of life" passed into fields of control ... and ¶ spheres of intervention' (1995: 67). 'The environment' emerged as ¶ a significant arena for the play of biopolitics, as constructions of ¶ the natural world became deeply imbricated in the globalizing ¶ spread of capitalist productive (and reproductive) relations and ¶ the regimes of truth/knowledge/power that generate and support ¶ them. Luke writes, following Foucault, that in this context the ¶ environment emerges as a historical artifact that is openly constructed, not an ¶ occluded reality that is difficult to comprehend. In this great network, the simulation of spaces, the intensification of resources, the ¶ incitement of discoveries, the formation of special knowledges, the ¶ strengthening of controls, and the provocation of resistances can ¶ all be linked to one another. (Ibid.) Especially with the 1968 publication of Paul Ehrlich's The Population Bomb, so-called overpopulation became a question not just ¶ of people but of the planet. Wrote Ehrlich: 'the causal chain of ¶ [environmental] deterioration ... is easily followed to its source ... ¶ too many people' (ibid.). The erotic and reproductive bodies of ¶ individuals became inserted not only into the discursive terrain of ¶ human welfare (as had been the case in the commonly posited relationship between population and poverty), but into environmentality. 'Too many people' became a problem for nature. Deforestation, ¶ energy shortages, pollution and other problems were caused by ¶ too many human, consuming bodies. 'Too many people' became an aberration of nature, as we were going beyond our bounds. ¶ Nature, via environmental science, must be harnessed to the task ¶ of defining a more appropriate number of people for the planet, ¶ for the good of both human and non-human life. As the following excerpt from the 1986 UNFPA report shows ¶ dramatically, population discourse posits that contemporary ¶ human beings have, presumably with the aid of technology, come ¶ perilously close to (or gone beyond) nature's limits. The narrative ¶ reads like an epic (it occurs under the subtitle 'the march of the ¶ billions', so that is probably not surprising). It is a grand tale ¶ about humanity conquering nature but then finding that nature is ¶ not to be toyed with lightly. ¶ There have been many ups and downs in [population] growth ¶ rates ... [that] by themselves have never guaranteed the means to ¶ cope with their consequences. The margin of safety has always ¶ been thin, and human groups were under constant threat. If they ¶ succeeded in escaping famine and disease, their populations might ¶ grow faster than their precarious resources and swiftly fall once ¶ more .... It is only in this century that humans as a group have ¶ effectively won control of their demographic fate. But the victory is ¶ not final, and one of the factors may be the very weight of numbers ¶ which their success has brought into being. (UNFPA 1986: 7-8) ¶ Read: humans must manage themselves more effectively - that is, ¶ in respect for nature's limits - if modernity is to be genuinely ¶ achieved. It is not that nature should not be managed, but that ¶ the management of human nature is now intimately tied to that of ¶ resources. And the appropriate guide-lines for the measure of ¶ both are to be found in ecological science, demography and, even ¶ better, the emerging fields of risk and impact assessment. ¶ Recent commentators are, as a whole, somewhat less essentialist, ¶ somewhat less determined to posit overpopulation as the singular ¶ cause of environmental degradation than the likes of Paul Ehrlich. ¶ In general, there is a tacit recognition of complexity, and some suggestion that poverty, consumption levels, and/or technology may ¶ have a role to play in 'excessive' resource usage (few writers in ¶ this vein speak about nature in any way other than as 'resources', ¶ thus suggesting the strong, continuing influence of capitalist notions ¶ of scarcity and management). But what seems to be moderation ¶ actually serves to mystify the role that population does play in ¶ environmental degradation. The above-quoted UNFPA report typically qualifies the contribution of population to environmental degradation. '[P]opulation growth is not', it states, 'the only culprit ¶ and no figures can be put on its contribution' (ibid. 19). But the ¶ possibility that population has nothing to do with environmental ¶ degradation (let alone the possibility that there are particular ideas ¶ of nature involved in the definition of the problem in the first ¶ place) is never considered. The line linking numbers of bodies, ¶ numbers of mouths to feed, and numbers of acres of land deforested ¶ for marginal agriculture is so firmly drawn through discursive ¶ space that its impact is seldom questioned at all. UNFPA's argument? 'To demonstrate the threat in general terms, it is only ¶ necessary to invoke the principle of entropy' (ibid. 18-19). ¶ Leaving aside (for the moment only) some of the glaring conclusions that can be drawn about social inequality, there seem to ¶ be a number of specific assumptions about human/nature relations going on in recent population-environment discourse. One ¶ is that the only possible relationship between humans and non-human nature is antagonistic, as nature exists only as a 'resource' ¶ for human use; more people inevitably means more degradation. ¶ Following from this, there are only two courses of action to 'save' ¶ nature: reduce the number of people or reduce their consumption. ¶ Either option signals the necessity of intervention; both imply the ¶ invocation of specific notions of natural limits (carrying capacity, ¶ etc.) as ways of drawing a line beyond which humans cannot go. ¶ A second, related assumption is that nature's primary appearance in human life is as a limit to human excess, including, potentially, an excess of human freedom (especially in the context of a ¶ crisis). In the context of the fact that population discourse is also ¶ concerned with the achievement of rationality and progress (both ¶ of which are discursively opposed to nature in modernity), this ¶ seems somewhat paradoxical. But the paradox is easily explained: ¶ where the 'ideal' subject of population discourse is rational and ¶ has proved capable of subordinating desire to the common good ¶ of population control (normative self-limitation), it seems that ¶ there are 'other' subjects not so willing or capable. In other words, ¶ population discourse at this historical conjuncture relies on the ¶ bifurcation of the world into two: 'good' ecological citizens, who ¶ have listened to and understood the call for limits and do not ¶ require (further) regulatory intervention, and unruly bodies, who ¶ have not, might not, and/or do. Numerous commentators have pointed to the fact that population management strategies differ according to who it is that is ¶ being managed. The discrepancy between white, middle-class North American women, who are encouraged to utilize highly invasive ¶ new reproductive technologies to conceive, and poor rural women ¶ of countries such as Bangladesh, who are often sterilized without ¶ their consent, is too glaring to ignore. The point is not only that ¶ racism is a strong feature of population management (unsurprisingly, given the early linkages of family planning to eugenics). ¶ The point is also, as authors such as Mies and Shiva allude to ¶ (1993: 277-95), that all people (especially women) are in some way ¶ or another accountable to the discourse, subject to its prescriptions and prohibitions, made subjects through its normative inspirations in the context of economic and political relations that ¶ discriminate considerably among different kinds of subjects. ¶ It is my contention that environmentalist discourse often works ¶ to amplify both the normativity and the discrimination, by emphasizing the 'natural requirement' of population limitation - the ¶ 'natural requirement' of the subordination of human needs to an ¶ abstract notion of 'carrying capacity' that passes as an ecological ¶ common good. Combined with the fact that so much is absent ¶ from population discourse, the patina of scientific legitimacy gives ¶ the managerial imperative all the more power. And in so far as ¶ environmental discourse understands itself to be a continuation of ¶ rationalization and modernity, management plus risk science plus ¶ nature equals a very powerful normative imperative indeed.

\*\*Schmitt\*\*

The case outweighs – we have identified a particular form of oppression as the structuring principle for all forms of violence. Even if they win that the sovereign has access to the state of exception in the status quo, that’s only true because of the overarching structures of normalcy which they have conceded makes all oppression possible – also makes the aff a prerequisite and the alt alone a disaster

No link – the 1AC doesn’t eliminate a distinction between self and other, but rather that a binary identification for queer identities as presented within the totality is bad.

The AFF is the only starting point for some point of pragmatic change -- the 1AC’s desertion of our roles as policymakers and intellectuals allows for us to create a new community that is necessary to eradicate difference and allow for all identities to coalesce and become as they are forever in a state of flux

Johnson is wrong -- The political is not inevitable -- The state only came to exist after the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen and people realized that a central government was possible and necessary -- because of indoctrination by the sovereign

Their author concludes neg -- “To refuse the sovereign’s choice of enemy is one step away from the sovereign act of choosing one’s own enemies” -- we refuse that choice, but instead choose not to continue to create enemies and its not endemic to human nature -- hunter gather society proves

Perm – you do you, and we’ll do us – drawing lines in the sand might good for them, however, queer rage politics is key to create a survival strategy to survive for queer bodies like me

Impact turn -- One does not need to actually fight one’s enemy, but the potential must always be there -- creating these distinctions is exactly what the sovereign does when it uses the State of Exception to justify massive violence

We solve the root cause of their impacts -- the friend/foe distinction is the reason why violence exists -- that’s the Mary Nardini Gang evidence

[Aitken 11] Prediction markets replace reality with an ordered, controlled simulation of it – this impulse to restrain chaos is the root cause of modern violence – state actors will ignore results and translate knowledge of the future into increasingly violent interventionism. Aitken 11

[Rob Aitken, University of Alberta, Canada, “Financializing security: Political prediction markets and the commodification of uncertainty,” Security Dialogue April 2011 vol. 42 no. 2 123-141]

It is perhaps most baldly articulated by Abramowicz, who, as we noted above, was not too bothered about the superiority of information markets' predictions, so long, it transpires, as they could still “help discipline” those who would seek to exercise freedom, either in their own name or that of others, since “the predictions of well‐functioning information markets are objective” (2003, Executive Summary). The objective here has a curious relation to the real, a revealing problematic which perhaps indicates much of what is fundamentally at stake here. For the objective is not so much the actually existing, rather it is that which can be ascertained without objection. Consider as particular exemplification of this point the following. Abramowizc, in suggesting ever more arcane ways to ensure that only fundamental traders hold sway in the final analysis of a market's arbitration, posits the possibility of a two stage information market. In the first players effectively bet on the outcome of a second, with the second open only briefly, after the close of the first, with only the payouts of the second dependent upon the verification (or not) of some future event. For Abramowizc one virtue of such a device is that “there will no longer be risk associated with real world randomness”(note 156)! It is thus not reality itself ‐ and the randomness it entails ‐ that concerns those that seek solace in prediction markets but rather certainty and reduction; a reality perhaps, but like the freedom we encountered above, only that reality which has been suitably reformulated. Made single, indisputable, and dead; not manifold, contestable and lived. Such a singular representation of reality can only be a simulation, in the most pejorative of senses, that which will “always be by‐passed, confounded and exceeded by practical experience” (Baudrillard, 1990, p. 155). For there is always “irruption of that minimum of reversibility which exists in every irreversible process” (Baudrillard, 1990, p. 161), requiring our endless human intervention to secure it, to keep its mask in place and to maintain the illusion that it is outside of us and that we are not required for its maintenance. Indeed, one could go further. Our endless defence, our securing of our simulated worlds, against the ceaseless encroachment of the entropy from which they are formed is, according to Baudrillard, that which gives them their purchase upon us. They are only made interesting by this interminable maintenance requirement. The attractiveness of ordered production and prediction (see also, Cooper, 2005) is thus ironically provided by its potential to fall back into disorder, which “secretly” ruins and dismantles it “while simultaneously ensuring that a minimal continuity of pleasure traverses it, without which it would be nothing” (Baudrillard, 1990, p. 161). And for Baudrillard this means that the seduction through which all our attempts to stabilize the real world are undone “doesn't belong to the order of the real” but rather surrounds it, providing the background against which our small victories over chaos are able to shine, just as derivatives markets surround those in their underlying assets. “[S]eduction envelops the whole real process of power, as well as the whole real order of production, with endless reversibility and disaccumulation – without which neither power nor production [nor indeed prediction] would exist” (Baudrillard, 1990, p. 159, original emphases). This continual disintegration of order and manufactured form is the very ground that production, prediction and power require for their perpetuation. It is what makes these latter processes seductive. The lack of real prediction associated with PAM and similar systems is made abundantly clear by Mason Richey (2005). Here PAM is indicted not for the reasons we have encountered above in the media furore surrounding its announcement but rather on more philosophical terms, entirely consonant with the line of argument we have been developing. Richey follows the logic of PAM to its self‐defeating terminal conclusion. Traders purchase a contract on PAM if they think its underlying event is more likely than its current price would suggest. En masse such trading will raise the price of that contract. But PAM is an information and prediction market. Its raison d'être is to provide a signal to those who are interested in the occurrence, or rather the prevention, of the events that underlie traded contracts. Thus a rise in prices is likely to instigate a response from those for whom the market was created as signalling mechanism. In turn this thus reduces the likelihood of the occurrence of the event. I bet, you see I bet, you act, I lose. Or as Richey (2005, p. 10) puts it: “The idea that government authorities employ the market to foresee events that they will prevent would, a priori, mute the signal”. But this is not the most fundamental of the flaws. It merely reflects one of a deeper level. And it is precisely why Hanson seems so misguided in his rendering of existing instruments as being in need of supplementation if they are to deliver prediction of a precise enough nature. For in the act of specification of the possible future, the job that the signalling market of derivatives is intended to achieve is already done. In the case of PAM, again in Richey's (2005, p. 10) words: [T]he derivatives of maximal predictive interest, the impetus for the system's design, terrorism derivatives, must be explicitly articulated in order to be offered. But if the market designers can list a specific terrorist event, then they have already defined, determined, and predicted the very event that the market is designed to identify. If the market designers know which terrorist derivatives to offer, then they have already done the work of the market. For Richey (2005, p. 10) then: “The system does both too little and too much”. This combination of inadequacy and excess is intimately tied to PAM's curious relation to a simulated future of an ordered, pre‐dicted, singular real. Our reading of Dillon (2004, 2006, forthcoming) suggests that such fetishization of fixation is increasingly anathema to key strands of, themselves increasingly dominant, thinking within the strategic centres of our Western security apparatus. As he pithily puts it, “‘the contingent’ has become a new order of the real.” This contingent is the strategic thinking that both we, and any securing agency, actually need to engender in a world in which “human being is increasingly relativised in space and time through technologies of communication and information” (Cooper, 2005, p. 10); a world exemplified by PAM and its derivatives. What we, and they, certainly do not need to engage in is ever‐greater emplacement. For in a world ever more clearly revealed by the congenitally failing securing action of such technologies as “an inexhaustible informational remainder which, strangely, appears only to disappear” (Cooper, 2005, p. 22), such yearning for the objective, for a singular real in which to find and found ourselves is futile in the extreme. Indeed, one could go further – it is in the desire for and the violent imposition of a singular truth that most contemporary conflict is rooted. It is only a manifold real that has sufficient play of space and space of play to prevent the horrors attendant upon crusades for the truth. So where do we end up? We began by invoking the range of different readings of PAM's demise and worked through the differences and similarities between them. At the same time we considered the differences and similarities between PAM and other markets. What was revealed by both of these comparisons was the tension between instrumental representation and the prior simulation upon which it depends, a tension embodied perhaps most quintessentially by markets themselves. Markets are able to reconcile the reversible imminence of simulation through endless deferral – both between different markets and their derivatives and indeed between the present and the future, so long as the latter always remains deferred and can never definitively be reached. In doing so they encompass both effect‐cause and cause‐effect. As such they are able to sustain manifold reality so long as the world keeps turning and money keeps making it go round. But what they cannot do, except in naïve and impoverished accounts, such as those of many of the protagonists we considered, is be simply resolved to one, singular reality that would arbitrate the truth, particularly the truth of a prediction. PAM's attempt to capture effect in order to enable intervention at the level of cause is forever undone by the ways in which such effect is both overly pre‐figured and by the ways in which such prefiguring, when coupled with the informative role the market is intended to perform for interventionists, acts to ensure that its signals are suppressed. Despite their myriad other disagreements, the extraction of a singular reality from the manifold is what most of our commentators seem desperate to achieve. However the divergence in their views does not thus reveal some underlying neutral core of truth from which each raps out a different line. Rather, we witness the opposite. A manifold, polyphonous world that endlessly resists and undoes any singular articulation of its nature or trajectory. Such a world allows each to tell a different story of its benefits and costs. We thus happily join in celebrating the cessation of PAM's singular call. But we would equally revel in the silencing, or rather the drowning out via cacophony, of those other monologues that brought about its end.

\*\*Spivak\*\*

The case outweighs – we have identified a particular form of oppression as the structuring principle for all forms of violence. Even if they win that the sovereign has access to the state of exception in the status quo, that’s only true because of the overarching structures of normalcy which they have conceded makes all oppression possible – also makes the aff a prerequisite and the alt alone a disaster

Framing Issue: No link differential between the 1AC and the 1NC—our description of some bad part of reality is no different from your impacts

Academy DA—absent a material strategy you exclude the people you are trying to help and cede politics to the right. Only a risk our skills unite people.

[Wanzo 09] Perm – do both — Sentimentality is politically affective when recognized in larger context. Wanzo 09

[Rebecca Wanzo, Associate Professor, Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies Program, Washington U in St. Louis. The Suffering Will Not Be Televised, p. 9]

However, sentimentality cannot easily be understood as progressive or conservative. When theorists criticize producers of sentimentality for conservative politics, they sometimes attack a rhetoric that is reactionary or designed to serve the status quo. At other times, such critics express disappointment at a text’s possibly radical revolutionary or otherwise progressive potential having been short-circuited in favor of feel-good closure offered by the sentimental narrative. World Trade Center provoked exactly this response from movie critic David Edelstein, who wanted the fi lm about the event of 9/11 to be “more political,” because the “heartwarming conclusion” to the fi lm is “unrepresentative—to the point where it almost seems like a denial of the deeper and more enduring horror.”22 Sentimental texts present themselves frequently as progressive about social justice issues while they eventually preserve the status quo. Indeed, that is an overlying tendency of most sentimental texts. However, the binaries of good and bad, Left and Right are insufficient to categorize sentimentality as it does, by its nature, have a progressive political thrust. It addresses the suffering of the politically disadvantaged but utilizes conventional narratives and practices that will not fundamentally disrupt power. Rather than characterizing U.S. sentimentality as “good” or “bad” politics, a more precise characterization, albeit more of a mouthful and less dramatic—is to call it a politically effective but insufficient means of political change.

Perm – do the aff, then the alt — intrinsic-ness is key to critical thinking and skill prioritization.

Perm – you do you, and we’ll do us – \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ might good for them, however, queer rage politics is key to create a survival strategy to survive for queer bodies like me

[Zembylas 13] Our critique of structural injustice turns vampirism. Contextualizing vulnerability, and the background of injustice balances emphasizing with material suffering and avoiding sentimentality—the alt is narcissism. Zembylas 13

[Michalinos Zembylas, Education @ Open (Cyprus), “The ‘Crisis of Pity” and the Radicalization of Solidarity: Toward Critical Pedagogies of Compassion”, Educational Studies 49, p. 512-516]

First of all, a politics of compassion that takes into consideration the possible dangers of compassion fatigue, desensitization, and self-victimization has to begin from acknowledging common human vulnerability and its influence in inspiring meaningful actions that avoid presumptuous paternalism (Porter 2006; Whitebrook 2002). The recognition of one’s own vulnerability can constitute a powerful point of departure for developing compassion and solidarity with the other’s vulnerability (Butler 2004). As Butler asserts: “Each of us is constituted politically in part by virtue of the social vulnerability of our bodies. ... We cannot ... will away this vulnerability. We must attend to it” (2004, p. 29). Butler’s description of the vulnerable body and self refers to the way we perform and are performed upon, and part of what we fear in the other is a projection of our own selves. Hence, Butler suggests that recognition of our own vulnerability opens up the potential for recognition of all humanity as vulnerable. Vulnerability may, therefore, be a more appropriate term than suffering to ground the political applications of compassion, because the focus is not merely on the alleviation of material suffering and hence a slide from compassion to benevolence and sentimentality (Porter 2006; Whitebrook 2002). Suggesting this epistemological shift of focus does not imply, however, that a narrative that focuses on the alleviation of material suffering will necessarily result in a slide into sentimentality. Undoubtedly, the political applications of compassion cannot be completely separated from questions of material suffering. Thus, it needs to be acknowledged that although the move away from suffering may be theoretically useful, the shift to a narrative of common human vulnerability is not completely unproblematic. 8 The idea of common vulnerability enables us—teachers and students in the classroom, for instance—to explore how we might move beyond dichotomies that single out the self or the other as victims, and therefore as deserving someone else’s pity. That is, the idea of common vulnerability puts in perspective the notion of all of us as vulnerable, rather than the individual-other who needs our compassion. This notion addresses the concerns of students, for example, who seem to be stuck in self-victimization claims and refuse to acknowledge that others also suffer. Although the idea of common vulnerability does not guarantee any departure from such claims, it opens some space to problematize moralistic positioning. In addition, the notion of common vulnerability attacks a major emotional ideology grounded in the view that it is natural or normal to be fearful of the other, especially if it involves racial differences. This is one of the most common and pernicious emotional ideologies underlying resistance (especially among White, middle-class students) to identifying with the other. However, if vulnerability concerns everyone and yet compassion is assigned differently (i.e., students think that some deserve compassion but others do not), then it is important to explore what it would take for students to begin imagining themselves as objects of lesser compassion in an unsuspected vulnerable moment. Through addressing this issue in ways that do not reify stereotypes or promote essentialism, it is possible to respond to some of the desensitization concerns outlined earlier, because the dichotomies between we and they will become meaningless and unproductive. Second, compassion serves to reinforce a strong connection between the personal and the political and accentuates the interpersonal and the interrelational (Whitebrook 2002). Empathetic identification with the plight of others, then, is not a sentimental recognition of potential sameness—you are in pain and so am I, so we both suffer the same—but a realization of our own common humanity, while acknowledging asymmetries of suffering, inequality, and injustice. A discourse of vulnerability neither eschews questions of material suffering nor obscures issues of inequality and injustice; on the contrary, it highlights both the symmetries and the asymmetries of vulnerability. That is, although the experience of vulnerability may be more or less universal, the discourse of common vulnerability raises important critical questions such as “vulnerable to what? to whom?” to dismiss the possibility of sliding into a sentimental recognition of potential sameness—which is exactly what a politics of compassion ardently seeks to avoid. Without this double realization—that is, we are all vulnerable but not in the same manner—our actions run the danger of being a form of charity and condescension toward those who are systematically and institutionally oppressed (Bunch 2002). If properly recognized in schools, this double realization can potentially address both the concern about the desensitization of students and that of their self-victimization, because the distance between spectator and sufferer will not be taken for granted any more, but rather its multiple complexities will be acknowledged and interrogated. In a sense then, the kind of compassion that is explored here requires a simultaneous identification and disidentification with the suffering of the other. The simultaneous recognition of symmetry and asymmetry with the other removes the arrogance of claiming that we know and feel their pain and suffering. This emotional ambivalence of simultaneous identification and disidentification is needed to focus attention on the other’s suffering, but not becoming too identified with it—a point raised earlier in Nelson’s (2004) reading of Arendt’s reporting on Eichmann’s trial. Students who already endure forms of suffering, of course, do not need a pedagogy to enlighten them how to disidentify with their own suffering. This does not imply, however, that pedagogies that interrogate pity and encourage critical compassion are not for them; on the contrary, the critical awareness that others are vulnerable, too, is important in the struggle for action-oriented solidarity and the avoidance of egocentricity and cultural narcissism. Finally, the third element of a politics of compassion is attentiveness to how the ethics of compassion questions injustice and inequality. 9 In particular, an important component of a politics of compassion that is critical and justice-oriented is how it deals with anger at injustice (Hoggett 2006). A politics of compassion does not intentionally seek to cause anger, however, but rather encourages students and teachers to develop a critical analysis of anger, as it is likely that they will experience such feelings, when they begin questioning long-held assumptions and beliefs about other people and social events (Zembylas 2007). Anger may call attention to demands for recognition, but also emphasize inequalities (Holmes 2004) and injustices at the civic level (Silber 2011). Anger at injustice can be a positive and powerful source of personal and political insight in education (Lorde 1984), because it helps to move teachers and students out of a cycle of self-pity, blame, or guilt into a mode of action that somehow responds to injustice. For example, civic anger can be promoted in the classroom as a form of cultivating individual and collective political consciousness and social resistance to injustices in the students’ community, although anger is not inevitably emancipatory. However, recognizing the positive power of anger and its link to the struggle against injustice in one’s own community is valuable, if teachers want to promote options for action that may change the conditions of others’ vulnerability. The pedagogical challenge for critical pedagogues is how to encourage students to become active participants with a nuanced understanding of the emotional complexities involved in histories of injustice and oppression.

Perm – do the Aff then the alt—descriptions of the status quo can have their meaning clarified after the fact.

Alt doesn’t solve the aff—constantly attempting to reconstitute ourselves creates elitist dogmatism and ignores those whose subjectivities have already been defined.

[Braidotti 06] No political vampiricism and only our combination of methodologies solves your impacts. Braidotti 06

[Rosi Braidotti, contemporary philosopher and feminist theoretician, Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics, 76]

I beg to differ from Spivak's assessment. The charge of vampiristic or consumerist consumption of others is an ill-informed way of approaching the issue, in that it ignores the rigorous anti-humanistic, cartographic and materialistic roots of poststructuralism. It specifically rests on a misreading of what is involved in the poststructuralist critique of representation and on what is at stake in the task of redefining alt subject positions. Spivak attempts to rescue Derrida, whom she credits with far more self-reflexivity and political integrity than she is prepared to grant to Foucault and Deleuze. The grounds for this preferential treatment are highly debatable. Nomadic thinking challenges the semiotic approach that is crucial to the 'linguistic turn' and also to deconstruction. Both Deleuze and Foucault engage in a critical dialogue with it and work towards an alt model of political and ethical practice. It seems paradoxical that thinkers who are committed to an analytics of contemporary subject-positions get accused of actually having caused the events which they account for; as if they were single-handedly responsible for, or even profiting from, the accounts they offer as cartographies. Naming the networks of power-relations in late postmodernity, however, is not as simple as metaphorizing and therefore consuming them. In my view there is no vampiristic approach towards 'otherness' on the part of the poststructuralists. Moreover, I find that approach compatible with the emerging subjectivities of the former 'others' of Western reason. Late postmodernity has seen the proliferation of many and potentially contradictory discourses and practices of difference, which have dislocated the classical axis of distinction between Self or Same/Other or Different. The point of coalition between different critical voices and the poststructuralists is the process of elaborating the spaces in-between self and other, which means the practice of the Relation. They stress the need to elaborate forms of social and political implementation of non-pejorative and nondualistic notions of 'others'.

You don’t solve the K—all our framework arguments mean your passive politics collapse back on themselves.

Floating PIK’s are bad – they’re a moving target, which makes it impossible to test competition and attack their advocacy – kills education

The alt is vague—there is no explanation of how it works. Leave room for news answers anytime later on to compensate for block spin and vote negative on fairness. They incentivize no-clash debates.

\*\*Surveillance\*\*

The case outweighs – we have identified a particular form of oppression as the structuring principle for this particular form of violence, and created a methodology for combatting that violence. Even if they win the thesis of the Kritik, they fail to answer the question of *how*, not *why –* the aff is a crucial starting point for understanding violence, which makes it a prior question to the alt

Link of omission is bad for debate – we only have 8 minutes which means we shouldn’t be punished for not discussing everything – the 1AC’s whatever community is an ongoing political project which means we’re constantly changing

No Link – their evidence assumes that we use the term “surveillance” to fill in for all forms of oppression – all we did was use it to explain a vector through which white male bourgeoise elite operates

Link turn – the aff destroys the hierarchies that their k takes issue with – white male bourgeoise is the structuring principal behind their violent hierarchies in the first place

No internal link—assumes that we talk about surveillance without action behind it – we destroy hierarchies their impact evidence describes

We’re a Pre-Req - the 1AC creation of a coalescence of identities is a necessary prerequisite to the alt – the only way we can coalesce around a common flag is when we have a community designated toward eviscerating hierarchies – that’s Yep

Perm - do both – the very existence of the plantation can be explained by sovereign racist values that shaped the middle passage

Alt Doesn’t Solve – the recognition of hierarchies is necessary to create social change because we must identify the problem to find a solution

We’ll impact turn -- Framing politics in terms of surveillance is good – the alt elides the focus of the conversation, resulting in blackmail, coercion, and discrimination. Richard 13

[Neil M., Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law, “THE DANGERS OF SURVEILLANCE. Harvard Law Review Vol. 126:1934, pp. 1935-1936, 2013]

At a practical level, I propose a set of four principles that should guide the future development of surveillance law, allowing for a more appropriate balance between the costs and benefits of government surveillance. First, we must recognize that surveillance transcends the public/private divide. Public and private surveillance are simply related parts of the same problem, rather than wholly discrete. Even if we are ultimately more concerned with government surveillance, any solution must grapple with the complex relationships between government and corporate watchers. Second, we must recognize that secret surveillance is illegitimate and prohibit the creation of any domestic-surveillance programs whose existence is secret. Third, we should recognize that total surveillance is illegitimate and reject the idea that it is acceptable for the government to record all Internet activity without authorization. Government surveillance of the Internet is a power with the potential for massive abuse. Like its precursor of telephone wiretapping, it must be subjected to meaningful judicial process be-fore it is authorized. We should carefully scrutinize any surveillance that threatens our intellectual privacy. Fourth, we must recognize that surveillance is harmful. Surveillance menaces intellectual privacy and increases the risk of blackmail, coercion, and discrimination; accordingly, we must recognize surveillance as a harm in constitutional standing doctrine. Explaining the harms of surveillance in a doctrinally sensitive way is essential if we want to avoid sacrificing our vital civil liberties. I develop this argument in four steps. In Part I, I show the scope of the problem of modern “surveillance societies,” in which individuals are increasingly monitored by an overlapping and entangled assemblage of government and corporate watchers. I then develop an account of why this kind of watching is problematic. Part II shows how surveillance menaces our intellectual privacy and threatens the development of individual beliefs in ways that are inconsistent with the basic commitments of democratic societies. Part III explores how surveillance distorts the power relationships between the watcher and the watched, enhancing the watcher’s ability to blackmail, coerce, and discriminate against the people under its scrutiny. Part IV explores the four principles that I argue should guide the development of surveillance law, to protect us from the substantial harms of surveillance.

\*\*Tuck and Yang\*\*

The case outweighs – we have identified a particular form of oppression as the structuring principle for this particular form of violence, and created a methodology for combatting that violence. Even if they win the thesis of the Kritik, they fail to answer the question of *how*, not *why –* the aff is a crucial starting point for understanding violence, which makes it a prior question to the alt.

No link – their evidence is in the context of exposing indigenous pain narratives to the academy – make them prove a link to specific queer bodies like me

All of their links are super super non-unique – a risk that the aff changes the academy or the debate space is a reason why you an vote affirmative

We solve the net benefit –

1. Even if they’re winning a uniqueness question about the state of the academy or civil society writ large, the 1AC’s introduction of new forms of knowledge is a reason why we meaningfully change the academy
2. Cooption can only happen in a world where civil society continues to exist – the 1AC’s methodology of queer insurrection is a reason why we change the world for the better

[Santilli 3] Recognition of horrors and suffering stimulate action. Santilli 3

[Paul C., Professor of Philosophy @ Siena College, “Radical Evil, Subjection, and Alain Badiou’s Ethic of the Truth Event” – World Congress of the International Society for Universal Dialogue,” 5/22/2003, http://www.isud.org/papers/pdfs/Santilli.pdf]

What, then, is the ground of moral duty with respect to suffering? The response to horrible suffering should not be empathetic feeling but a rational decision to do one’s duty. Kant is right about this. For Kant that decision springs spontaneously from the subject’s pure practical reason. But unless there is recognition of the horror in the first place, unless one recognizes a call to action in the phenomenon of evil perceived, then the formal procedures for deliberation would not even be set in motion. One needs an imperative from the other, some signal that says, “This is worth your attention. This is cruel. This is worth the exercise of practical reason.” There is a non-spontaneous, passive moment in the exercise of moral reason binding it to suffering or the collapse of happiness and joy in human beings. Although we cannot know what is going on with the person in and for itself, we have to recognize the signs of the void in the tears, the broken bodies, the cries, and all the other symptoms of that void, Kant rejects the pathology of suffering as a condition for moral judgment because, being pathological, it will be dependent on feelings and sensibilities and, therefore, disqualified for universal and autonomous judgments. Only a moral law, purified of all content and material substance, withdrawn from the circuit of natural bodies, desires, and contingencies, could have the force of a standard to which all rational beings are subjected. Nevertheless, even Kant recognizes that to apply the moral law practically one needs to think of it typologically or imagine it as regulating nature and natural bodies.17 The subject in other words has to be reinscribed into the world of suffering and into a circuit of exchanges from which the moral law was abstracted. If the logical intent of the categorical imperative is that I substitute myself as a rational being for any other rational being, then it equally requires a more concrete exchange of bodies in which, for example, a moral prohibition of torture must recognize torture as an offense against the person. How would reason know, for example, that it would be madness to torture someone in order to assist his or her well being, if there was not from the beginning an understanding of the universal condition of the human being’s natural needs and vulnerabilities. The susceptibility of the subject18 or its subjected, passive nature is then an ineradicable condition of moral understanding, even one that seeks to suspend particular, lawless contingencies in favor of pure reason. Built into the very articulation of pure practical reason is an imperative that one ought a priori to care for the needs of others like oneself, is a circuit of fleshly need and dependence. I would not know my duties to angels. This Kant recognizes when he says, “Man is a being of needs, so far as he belongs to the world of sense…his reason certainly has an inescapable responsibility from the side of his sensuous nature to attend to his interests and form practical maxims with a view to the happiness of this and, where possible, of a future life.”19 Suffering calls for a response; it is a stimulus to judgment and action. Without it, the operation of universalizing reason would not kick in. This condition of suffering I call subjection to indicate its position in the concept of a subject. It is the other side of pure spontaneity with which the dignity of man has been identified, by Kant, by Badiou, and so many others. This praise of spontaneous freedom in modern moral philosophy has obscured the truth about our passivity and our vulnerability. After all, if it is in ethics that we achieve some of our dignity, then let us recall that without our vulnerability there would be no ethics. The dignity of angelic figures, no matter how good and free they are, could not be ours.

Perm – do both

Perm – do the Aff and then the alt – the 1AC is a prior question to rejection of pain narratives

[Zembylas 13] Our critique of structural injustice turns vampirism. Contextualizing vulnerability, and the background of injustice balances emphasizing with material suffering and avoiding sentimentality—the alt is narcissism. Zembylas 13

[Michalinos Zembylas, Education @ Open (Cyprus), “The ‘Crisis of Pity” and the Radicalization of Solidarity: Toward Critical Pedagogies of Compassion”, Educational Studies 49, p. 512-516]

First of all, a politics of compassion that takes into consideration the possible dangers of compassion fatigue, desensitization, and self-victimization has to begin from acknowledging common human vulnerability and its influence in inspiring meaningful actions that avoid presumptuous paternalism (Porter 2006; Whitebrook 2002). The recognition of one’s own vulnerability can constitute a powerful point of departure for developing compassion and solidarity with the other’s vulnerability (Butler 2004). As Butler asserts: “Each of us is constituted politically in part by virtue of the social vulnerability of our bodies. ... We cannot ... will away this vulnerability. We must attend to it” (2004, p. 29). Butler’s description of the vulnerable body and self refers to the way we perform and are performed upon, and part of what we fear in the other is a projection of our own selves. Hence, Butler suggests that recognition of our own vulnerability opens up the potential for recognition of all humanity as vulnerable. Vulnerability may, therefore, be a more appropriate term than suffering to ground the political applications of compassion, because the focus is not merely on the alleviation of material suffering and hence a slide from compassion to benevolence and sentimentality (Porter 2006; Whitebrook 2002). Suggesting this epistemological shift of focus does not imply, however, that a narrative that focuses on the alleviation of material suffering will necessarily result in a slide into sentimentality. Undoubtedly, the political applications of compassion cannot be completely separated from questions of material suffering. Thus, it needs to be acknowledged that although the move away from suffering may be theoretically useful, the shift to a narrative of common human vulnerability is not completely unproblematic. 8 The idea of common vulnerability enables us—teachers and students in the classroom, for instance—to explore how we might move beyond dichotomies that single out the self or the other as victims, and therefore as deserving someone else’s pity. That is, the idea of common vulnerability puts in perspective the notion of all of us as vulnerable, rather than the individual-other who needs our compassion. This notion addresses the concerns of students, for example, who seem to be stuck in self-victimization claims and refuse to acknowledge that others also suffer. Although the idea of common vulnerability does not guarantee any departure from such claims, it opens some space to problematize moralistic positioning. In addition, the notion of common vulnerability attacks a major emotional ideology grounded in the view that it is natural or normal to be fearful of the other, especially if it involves racial differences. This is one of the most common and pernicious emotional ideologies underlying resistance (especially among White, middle-class students) to identifying with the other. However, if vulnerability concerns everyone and yet compassion is assigned differently (i.e., students think that some deserve compassion but others do not), then it is important to explore what it would take for students to begin imagining themselves as objects of lesser compassion in an unsuspected vulnerable moment. Through addressing this issue in ways that do not reify stereotypes or promote essentialism, it is possible to respond to some of the desensitization concerns outlined earlier, because the dichotomies between we and they will become meaningless and unproductive. Second, compassion serves to reinforce a strong connection between the personal and the political and accentuates the interpersonal and the interrelational (Whitebrook 2002). Empathetic identification with the plight of others, then, is not a sentimental recognition of potential sameness—you are in pain and so am I, so we both suffer the same—but a realization of our own common humanity, while acknowledging asymmetries of suffering, inequality, and injustice. A discourse of vulnerability neither eschews questions of material suffering nor obscures issues of inequality and injustice; on the contrary, it highlights both the symmetries and the asymmetries of vulnerability. That is, although the experience of vulnerability may be more or less universal, the discourse of common vulnerability raises important critical questions such as “vulnerable to what? to whom?” to dismiss the possibility of sliding into a sentimental recognition of potential sameness—which is exactly what a politics of compassion ardently seeks to avoid. Without this double realization—that is, we are all vulnerable but not in the same manner—our actions run the danger of being a form of charity and condescension toward those who are systematically and institutionally oppressed (Bunch 2002). If properly recognized in schools, this double realization can potentially address both the concern about the desensitization of students and that of their self-victimization, because the distance between spectator and sufferer will not be taken for granted any more, but rather its multiple complexities will be acknowledged and interrogated. In a sense then, the kind of compassion that is explored here requires a simultaneous identification and disidentification with the suffering of the other. The simultaneous recognition of symmetry and asymmetry with the other removes the arrogance of claiming that we know and feel their pain and suffering. This emotional ambivalence of simultaneous identification and disidentification is needed to focus attention on the other’s suffering, but not becoming too identified with it—a point raised earlier in Nelson’s (2004) reading of Arendt’s reporting on Eichmann’s trial. Students who already endure forms of suffering, of course, do not need a pedagogy to enlighten them how to disidentify with their own suffering. This does not imply, however, that pedagogies that interrogate pity and encourage critical compassion are not for them; on the contrary, the critical awareness that others are vulnerable, too, is important in the struggle for action-oriented solidarity and the avoidance of egocentricity and cultural narcissism. Finally, the third element of a politics of compassion is attentiveness to how the ethics of compassion questions injustice and inequality. 9 In particular, an important component of a politics of compassion that is critical and justice-oriented is how it deals with anger at injustice (Hoggett 2006). A politics of compassion does not intentionally seek to cause anger, however, but rather encourages students and teachers to develop a critical analysis of anger, as it is likely that they will experience such feelings, when they begin questioning long-held assumptions and beliefs about other people and social events (Zembylas 2007). Anger may call attention to demands for recognition, but also emphasize inequalities (Holmes 2004) and injustices at the civic level (Silber 2011). Anger at injustice can be a positive and powerful source of personal and political insight in education (Lorde 1984), because it helps to move teachers and students out of a cycle of self-pity, blame, or guilt into a mode of action that somehow responds to injustice. For example, civic anger can be promoted in the classroom as a form of cultivating individual and collective political consciousness and social resistance to injustices in the students’ community, although anger is not inevitably emancipatory. However, recognizing the positive power of anger and its link to the struggle against injustice in one’s own community is valuable, if teachers want to promote options for action that may change the conditions of others’ vulnerability. The pedagogical challenge for critical pedagogues is how to encourage students to become active participants with a nuanced understanding of the emotional complexities involved in histories of injustice and oppression.

[Gordon 04] In this instance, academic work is key to liberation of the oppressed. Gordon 04

[Lewis R., The Laura Carnell University Professor of Philosophy, Temple University, ‘4 “Fanon and Development: A Philosophical Look” Africa Development, Vol. XXIX, No. 1,. pp. 71-93, tony]

There is, of course, the continued, resounding question from a century ago: What is to be done? That the context of this discussion is philosophical presents the role of the intellectual. Given the nature of the problems at hand, it would be folly to presume a single role for intellectuals to take. The Africana intellectual tradition has, for instance, been guided by a healthy tension between concerns of identity and liberation – between questions of being and becoming (cf. Gordon 2000:chapters 1–4). It is the task of some intellectuals to work out questions of being, questions of ‘what’ and ‘how’. And then there are those who focus on ‘why’ and other questions of purpose. Some do both. All should consider their work, I here submit, with the following considerations in mind. Each epoch is a living reality. This is so because they are functions of living human communities, which, too, are functions of the social world. As living realities, they come into being and will go out of being. What this means is that societies go through processes of birth and decay. An erroneous feature of most civilisations that achieve imperial status is the silly belief that such an achievement would assure their immortality. But we know that no living community lasts forever, save, perhaps, through historical memory of other communities. Decay comes. The task faced by each subordinated community, however, is how prepared it is for the moment in which conditions for its liberation are ripe. When the people are ready, the crucial question will be of how many ideas are available for the reorganization of social life. The ideas, many of which will unfold through years of engaged political work, need not be perfect, for in the end, it will be the hard, creative work of the communities that take them on. That work is the concrete manifestation of political imagination. Fanon described this goal as setting afoot a new humanity. He knew how terrifying such an effort is, for we do live in times where such a radical break appears as no less than the end of the world. In the meantime, the task of building infrastructures for something new must be planned, and where there is some room, attempted, as we all no doubt already know, because given the sociogenic dimension of the problem, we have no other option but to build the options on which the future of our species rest.

Double Bind—Either

1. Empathetic politics produces psychic images of pain and your impacts are inevitable

Or

1. The totality components are an X factor in your impact scenario and you err affirmative on the link turn debate.

The alt fails – hope is impossible --

1. We have introduced an ontology question – the queer is derelict within civil society which means reformism fails
2. The alt is comparatively worse -- FUCK LIBERAL INCLUSION AND FUCK REFORMISM -- assimiliationists don’t critique marriage, military or the state. Rather they have campaigns for queer assimilation into each. Their politics is advocacy for such grievous institutions, rather than the annihilation of them all. “Gays can kill poor people around the world as well as straight people!” “Gays can hold the reigns of the state and capital as well straight people!” “We are just like you”. Assimilationists want nothing less than to construct the homosexual as normal - white, monogamous, wealthy, 2.5 children, SUVs with a white picket fence. This construction, of course, reproduces the stability of heterosexuality, whiteness, patriarchy, the gender binary, and capitalism itself. If we genuinely want to make ruins of this totality, we need to make a break. We don’t need inclusion into marriage, the military and the state. We need to end them. No more gay politicians, CEOs and cops. We need to swiftly and immediately articulate a wide gulf between the politics of assimilation and the struggle for liberation. We need to rediscover our riotous inheritance as queer anarchists. We need to destroy constructions of normalcy, and create instead a position based in our alienation from this normalcy, and one capable of dismantling it. We must use these positions to instigate breaks, not just from the assimilationist mainstream, but from capitalism itself. These positions can become tools of a social force ready to create a complete rupture with this world. Our bodies have been born into conflict with this social order. We need to deepen that conflict and make it spread.

\*\*University\*\*

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Framing issue: there is no strong definition for what constitutes an image. All signs are tied to signifiers and thus emblematic of an image—make them establish a distinction between our impacts and theirs.

All of their links are super super non-unique – a risk that the aff changes the academy or the debate space is a reason why you an vote Aff

We solve the net benefit –

1. Even if they’re winning a uniqueness question about the state of the academy or civil society writ large, the 1AC’s introduction of new forms of knowledge via genealogy is a reason why we meaningfully change the academy
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[Spade 10] You must resist structural violence against the most vulnerable before you can consider any alt: only this concrete orientation toward trans and queer survival is able to present the impossible demands that will resist assimilation or extermination. This physical and psychic space is the only way to solve the aff. Spade 10

[Dean Spade, “KEYNOTE ADDRESS,” 19 Colum. J. Gender & L. 1086, 2010, lexis]

Trans resistance is developing in a context of neoliberal politics where the choice to struggle for nothing more than [\*1109] incorporation in the neoliberal order is the most obvious option. We are continually invited to participate in building and growing the systems of control that shorten trans lives. The inclusion and recognition offered by these invitations is not just disappointingly symbolic, it also legitimates and expands conditions of subjection and harm. We can translate the pain of having community members murdered every month into a demand for more punishing power for the criminal system that targets us. We can fight to have the state declare us equal through anti-discrimination laws, yet watch as the majority of trans people remain unemployed, incapable of getting ID, kept out of social services and health care, and consigned to prisons that guarantee sexual assault and medical neglect. Structured abandonment and imprisonment remain the offers of neoliberalism for all but a few trans people, yet law reform strategies beckon us to join the neoliberal order. The paths to equality laid out by the "successful" lesbian and gay rights model to which we are assumed to aspire have little to offer us in terms of concrete change to our life chances, and our inclusion in that model legitimizes systems that harm us and further obscures the causes and consequences of that harm. The political and economic conditions we are experiencing both shorten trans lives and threaten to subsume trans resistance. Trans people are told by legal systems, state agencies, employers, schools, and our families that we are impossible people who are not who we say we are, cannot exist, cannot be classified, and cannot fit anywhere. We have been told by lesbian and gay rights organizations, as they continually opt to leave us aside, that we are not politically viable and our lives are not a political possibility that can be conceived. At the same time, the norms of non-profit governance dictate that we must run our organizations like businesses, that more participatory or collective models of governance are inefficient and unfeasible, that we need to tailor our messages to what the media can understand, that our demands need to fit within the existing goals of the institutions on which we seek to intervene. The demands that are emerging from vulnerable trans communities for prison abolition, an end to immigration enforcement, full trans-inclusive health care, and economic justice are the kinds of demands that are incomprehensible to rights-claims-focused reform movements. These are demands that cannot be won in [\*1110] courts. These demands are emerging from those for whom narrow legal reform demands have little to offer. The perceived impossibility of the very lives of trans people, especially those who experience multiple vectors of subjection of which trans identity is only a part, and the perceived impossibility of the demands and methods of resistance emerging from those populations are symptomatic of the inherent conflicts and divides produced (and often hidden) by neoliberalism. Many activists and organizations are working to address conditions faced by trans and gender non-conforming people in ways that are part of a broad politics of racial and economic justice and that recognizes the central role of criminalization, immigration enforcement and poverty in trans subjection. This work prioritizes building leadership and membership on a "most vulnerable first" basis. At the same time that these projects are emerging, many are doing work to challenge the structures of LGBT rights frameworks and formations that are reproducing harmful conditions. Many are challenging the prioritization of and resource concentration in marriage reform work. Many are questioning the hate crimes law strategy as a way to address violence and opposing hate crimes laws "inclusion" campaigns. Organizations like the Sylvia Rivera Law Project and the Peter Cicchino Youth Project have challenged the lawyers-only, behind-closed-doors agenda setting and decisionmaking that has been typical of lesbian and gay rights and is being emulated in emerging transgender legal circles. n39 Additionally, around the US and the world, people are innovating models of mobilizing about trans politics that are deeply rooted in and connected to social movements for racial and gender justice, wealth redistribution, and opposition to imperialism. In a moment in which trans identity is called to become a location for reproducing the exile logic of neoliberal fervor for criminalization and the "equal opportunity" logic that legitimates market-based distribution of life chances, the fruitlessness of those developments for most trans people opens [\*1111] key strategy questions. The call to formal legal equality through hate crimes laws and employment-focused anti-discrimination laws beckons trans populations to claim and embrace a kind of recognition that not only fails to offer respite from the brutalities of poverty and criminalization but also lends our struggle to the "inclusiveness" framework that justifies and expands the structures that produce those conditions. We are invited to demand that trans people are "human" when "human" is still defined through norms of race, ability, and immigration status that actually limit the invitation to a very small part of the trans population. n40 A growing dissent from this politics of recognition and inclusion is articulating a trans politics that refuses the invitation and articulates demands that conflict with the abandonment and imprisonment regimes that neoliberalism centers. These other trans politics, that appear impossible, incomprehensible, unviable in the context of recognition and inclusion-focused non-profitized social movements, include a critical engagement with the infrastructure of social change. Rejecting elite strategies centering law reform and mainstream media messaging, these locations of resistance offer models of participatory mass-based struggle led by those working at the intersections of multiple vectors of subjection. Such politics is unrecognizable as "LGBT" politics in the current moment in which formal legal equality and single-issue framing have claimed this realm for an agenda that centers "family" and "law and order" in conservative terms. The existence of critical practices that resist the beckoning of recognition despite the enormous pressures of neoliberal framing and nonprofitization suggests the fierce desire for trans political practices that actually address trans survival. It is that space, where questions of survival and distribution are centered, where the well-being of the most vulnerable will not be compromised for a promise of legal or media recognition, and where the difficult work of building participatory, de-professionalized resistance is taken up, where we can seek the emergence of deeply transformative trans resistance.

\*\*Wilderson\*\*

[Wright 10] Your understanding of race is wildly essentialist and denies the multiplicitous nature of identity. Wright 10

[Kristopher Thomas, B.A., “Queering Race”, p. 15-16]

Race means \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_. We expect a coherent and concise answer to fill that blank. Not only do we expect that such a thing is possible but also that our answer should actualize that possibility. After all, race plays such a pervasive and significant role in our lives that we suppose our experience should allow us to speak with competence and sophistication. I will contend, however, that we often end up giving nothing but confused replies. Our confusions about the racial dimensions of our social lives are tied to the unreasonable notion that one can accurately define the complex concepts of race in succinct and final terms. Or, at least that is part of what I aim to show—good accounts of race cannot fit under the constraints we tend to impose on them. My project in this and the subsequent chapter is to consider what several influential scholars have written about the meaning of race, and along the way provide my own answer. First I will frame how to develop an answer to the questions of what race and racial identities mean. I argue that we should investigate how the concepts are used, not in technical, specialized, scientific discourses, but rather in ordinary language. That is, I will consider how people use these concepts in a range of ordinary contexts. With that as the framework, I turn to investigate one of the many pictures of our racial identities that have held us captive: the notion that our racial categories demarcate in a biologically significant way. Once a dominant theme in the meaning of race, it still remains a salient though less prevalent feature of its current meaning. Princeton Professor of Philosophy Kwame Anthony Appiah has a well-crafted criticism of this explanation; for our purposes, I will mostly focus on his claim that race is essentially a biological notion as it plays a central role in motivating his ethical objections to racial identities. 8 I argue that Appiah's argument insightfully dispels the delusion that our racial categories are biologically significant and illuminates how deeply rooted that assumption is in our lives. But I reject his central claim that race is essentially a biological notion. Instead, I urge that race is a much more complicated concept, whose meaning is far too oversimplified if reduced to any one of its past or present features, like biology. Though my attention for now will focus on race as a biological notion, in the subsequent chapter I will pursue the specter of essentialism into the views that embrace a more varied and fluid understanding of race and racial identities.

[Wright 2] Queerness acts as an identity of flux that complicates traditional dichotomies and reorienting how we view race – only queering race allows us to comprehend the complexity of oppression and transcend hierarchy. Wright 2

[Kristopher Thomas, B.A., “Queering Race”, p. 1-3]

Queering race borrows on a notion developed in the theories and practices of sexual politics referred to as Queer Theory. Though the term “queer” was once, and in some contexts still is, used degradingly, the word has been taken on as a positive selfidentity in resistance to gender and sexual oppression. “Queer” refers to a sexual and gender identity that defies the rigid boundaries of heterosexual/homosexual and male/female boundaries, where everyone must fit into those categories. In opposition to that, a queer identification is used to criticize those identity options—that is, gender and sexual binaries are not desirable options to choose from and are far from an exhaustive list of identity options. “Queer” affirms the contingency and fluidity of our sexual and gender identities. As such, queer theory argues for the possibility of creatively constructing one’s sexuality and gender. I aim to queer race in the sense that I will argue that race is not pre-given, that our current racial classifications do not exhaust our options, and that our current ways of inhabiting racial identities are not desirable. In these essays, I investigate our racial identities. I consider several aspects of how we commonly conceptualize race—namely, that race is essentially about biology, that everyone possesses exactly one racial identity, and that the identity does not change. The conceptual features I discuss are more often implicit assumptions than explicit premises, so it is sometimes difficult to locate these components in the wide-ranging discussions of race. Nevertheless, I believe that most people will grant that my characterization fairly describes their own understanding of race. As such, I claim that this picture has captivated us and limited our theoretical and revolutionary visions. In response, I contend that the prevalent notion of a fixed, unified racial identity is wrong. It misrepresents the meaning of racial identities by capturing only a fraction of the ways that racial concepts are used in the process of identification. A negative result of our captivation with the notion of a fixed, unified racial identity has been that we neglect to explore how our racial concepts can be used to racially identify in alt ways. I believe that my analysis will reveal that we actually inhabit multiple racial identities and, to some degree, have a choice in whether to retain or alter the ways we currently understand and inhabit them. Given my focus on race, one might ask a rather pressing question regarding this thesis: why does a philosophical investigation of racial identities fall within the domain of Women's and Gender Studies? A defense of this topic area should begin with a discussion of the interpenetration of race and gender. Gender norms prescribe meanings and treatment based on a complicated interaction between gender and other identities. That is because identities intersect, rather than exist as discretely differentiated from one another. For instance, the gendered meanings attached to particular bodies are interpenetrated with racial meanings, and vice versa. This means, for one thing, that if we were to think of identities as consisting of many features or meanings that a body takes on when ascribed an identity, we go wrong to think that we are simply the sum of those individual features. In other words, our lived experiences are misrepresented if we describe them as just the sum of the discrete racial and gendered meanings. For instance, a black woman will often be oppressed in ways that cannot be described as entirely gendered or racial. Instead, she may find that being a woman affects how her blackness is treated, and vice versa. And, of course, the picture is complicated further when we consider all the other relevant identities she may possess— lesbian, sister, mother, wife, student, business executive, laborer, citizen, non-citizen, and many others. To overlook the complicated and intersectional nature of identities is, according to Alcoff, a failure to fully understand others. She argues that In a climate in which one cannot invoke history, culture, race, or gender for fear of being accused of playing, for example, 'the race card,' or identity politics, or 'victim feminism,' our real commonalities and shared interests cannot even begin to be correctly identified. When I refuse to listen to how you are different from me, I am refusing to know who you are. But without understanding fully who you are, I will never be able to appreciate precisely how we are more alike than I might have originally supposed.

# \*\*\*A2 FW/Phil\*\*\*

### General O/V

I control the internal link to epistemology — subject positions will always influence knowledge production. Only by deconstructing systems of normalcy can we reject the biases implicitly assumed by the NC framework – that’s the Wool card and the Foucault and Deleuze evidence.

[Povinelli 13] Traditional ethical analysis is always drawn along lines of disposability – positing deviant bodies as less important and in need of input within calculations – a focus on the way streams of power operate on bodies is crucial in decision-making. Povinelli 13

[Elizabeth A. Povinelli, 2013 (Povinelli is Franz Boas Professor of Anthropology and Gender Studies, Director of the Institute for Research on Womxn and Gender and the Co-Director of the Centre for the Study of Law and Culture at Columbia University.) “Necropolitics”; The Anthropology of Biopolitics; February 23, 2013; (<https://anthrobiopolitics.wordpress.com/2013/02/23/necropolitics/>”) SK]

In what might be seen as biopolitical ‘social disposability’ rather than ‘social death’, the work of critical educational theorist Henry Giroux, in “Reading Hurricane Katrina” (2006), makes an assumption about biopower similar to Mbembe’s regarding the late-modern era of perpetual terror and insecurity. However, in focusing on the United States, he is drawn more to what he sees as the ‘politics of disposability’ as the particular form of necropower, rather than emphasizing the power of death in relation to projects of sovereignty. For Giroux, the hyper-neoliberal racial state, since Reagan, has silently governed in the interests of Corporate America at the expense of human lives, by utilizing the repressive power of color-blind ideology to implement policy reforms which increasingly silently neglect disadvantaged populations further into the margins, thereby permitting their disposability (letting them die). To demonstrate that the governmentality of the racial state has changed in form from prior eras, Giroux compares the 1955 murder of Emmett Till (which helped spark civil rights movement activity) with the deaths of over one thousand racial minorities caused (superficially, he would argue) by hurricane Katrina in 2005, to show the difference in what these cases revealed about the racial state: “Till’s body allowed the racism that destroyed it to be made visible, to speak to the systemic character of American racial injustice. The bodies of the Katrina victims could not speak with the same directness to the state of American racist violence but they did reveal and shatter the conservative fiction of living in a color-blind society” (p.174). Of course, I have to wonder whether Giroux would still maintain his belief expressed here, that Katrina shattered the imaginary reality of U.S. color-blindness- to which an abundance of evidence to support this ideology’s heightening continuation today continues to surface at an ongoing rate. Nevertheless, the importance of the Katrina example, for Giroux, is to highlight how the informed decision-making of the Bush administration’s actions leading up to and after Katrina hit reveal the racial state’s knowing involvement in an anti-democratic project of sustaining insecurity in a particular fashion. That is, by knowingly rendering already-marginalized groups vulnerable to natural disasters like Katrina, which were expected to hit and devastate the gulf region of the U.S., the neoliberal state proved its complicity in the biopolitical project of not only letting die, but of actively disposing what it had redlined as value-less portions of the U.S. population. In effect, by implementing a politics of disposability in the era of neoliberal insecurity, the U.S. government was reducing its populace to a politics of “bare life”.

### AT: Kant/Lib

### O/V

#### Your ideal subject formation is a form of endorsing homonormativity – you force us into definite modes of being that are always already exclusive of certain forms of queerness – either we strive for your conception of freedom or die because we are not your idealized subject – means your model of ethics is always inaccessible to queer people like me who cannot fit into your frame of what is deemed worthy of subjecthood – turns the NC

1. Queer bodies are seen as irrationally deviant – that’s one of the bases of antiqueerness – the drive to eradicate the existence of the irrational queers who fuck and exist in ways that heterosexual people can’t understand is founded on the idea that everything has to be rational – means you perpetuate antiqueerness by basing ethical action on a rationality that can never be accessible to queer people like me – turns the NC

### AT: Farr

Double bind – either a.) Kant follows embodied politics meeting the Farr warrant, which means universality fails because it failed to account for every single particular instance/embodied experience or b.) Kant is abstract which means it bites our abstraction bad arguments

### K of Universalizability

1. [Soble 03] Kantian moral philosophy is antiqueer – he believes homosexuality is non universalizable. Soble 03

[Alan Soble, The Monist 86:1 (Jan. 2003), pp. 55-89. Kant and Sexual Perversion]

Kant immediately continues by completing his sparse inventory of three objectionable, sexually unnatural, practices [quote begins here] “A second crimen carnis contra naturam is intercourse between sexus homogenii, in which the object of sexual impulse is a human being but there is homogeneity instead of heterogeneity of sex. . . . This practice too is contrary to the ends of humanity; for the end of humanity in respect of sexuality is to preserve the species without debasing the person; but in this instance the species is not being preserved (as it can be by a crimen carnis secundum naturam), but the person is set aside, the self is degraded below the level of the animals, and humanity is dishonoured. The third crimen carnis contra naturam occurs when the object of the desire is in fact of the opposite sex but is not human. Such is sodomy, or intercourse with animals. This, too, is contrary to the ends of humanity and against our natural instinct. It degrades mankind below the level of animals, for no animal turns in this way from its own species.75

1. [Soble 2] Kantian theories force gay people in academic settings to be complicit in oppression – turns case and outweighs. Soble 2

[Alan Soble, The Monist 86:1 (Jan. 2003), pp. 55-89. Kant and Sexual Perversion.]

What was it like to listen to the distinguished Kant lecture on sexual perversion, to sit in Kant's classroom in 1780, hearing his emotional, weakly-argued condemnation of masturbation and homosexuality, and copying it into a notebook?96 Did his students titter? Was tittering tolerated in the German classroom? Did they at least roll their eyes? Were they disgusted, along with Kant, at homosexuality, or were they disgusted by his disgust? (Are my students disgusted, along with me, by homophobia, or are they disgusted by my being disgusted?) And those in his classes who masturbated or were homosexual, how did they respond? Consider the pain of hearing oneself accused in the strongest terms of being lower than a beast, and being accused by no less an authority than Professor Kant. His diatribe against homosexuality is little more than intellectual gay-bashing. Thus I imagine the profound fear felt by his targets who attended his lectures. I wonder if I would have had the courage to confront Kant in class, if I would have had the manly balls of my rational autonomy to do what the lesbian sadomasochist Pat Califia does: If I am going to be called all those bad names anyway, I might as well be the first one to spread the good news. When you come out, you make yourself vulnerable to disapproval, criticism, and discrimination. But you also get to define your own terms. You get to go first and be the one to say who you are and what that means. And after you've already admitted in public that you're a hopelessly twisted slut, what are your detractors going to do?97 I don't know if I would have been able to confess my own 'pervy' sexuality in Kant's auditorium. Maybe it is only from the comfortable, far away position of the early 21st-century that I feel safe calling Kant's account of sexual perversion a clunker concocted by a kisöreg.

[Vincent 13] Independent reason to drop them -- discourse in round matters – educators must take a stance against oppression in the activity – we can’t divorce the flow from our performance. Vincent 13

[Re-Conceptualizing our Performances: Accountability in Lincoln Douglas Debate. Christopher J. Vincent. 10/26/13. <http://victorybriefs.com/vbd/2013/10/re-conceptualizing-our-performances-accountability-in-lincoln-douglas-debate>). SK]

It is becoming increasingly more apparent in Lincoln Douglas debate that students of color are being held to a higher threshold of proving why racism is bad, than white students are in being forced to justify their actions and in round discourse. The abstractness of philosophical texts being used in LD and the willingness of judges and coaches alike to endorse that abstractness has fostered a climate in which students are allowed to be divorced from the discourse they are producing. Debate should first and foremost be viewed as a performance. Every action taken, every word said, and every speech given reflects a performance of the body. Yet in an age where debate is about how many arguments a student can get on the flow, white students’ performances are consistently allowed to be detached from their bodies, performance by the body, while students of color must always embody their discourse. As a result universal theories are allowed to be viewed as detached from any meaning outside of being just an argument. My argument is three-fold. First, debaters have adopted a “universal principle,” which has allowed them to be detached from the practical implications of what they said. Second, is that we must re-conceptualize the role of speech and the speech act to account for the in round performances of the body. The final part is that judges must begin to view their roles as educators and must be accountable for the discourse they endorse with their ballot. In his chapter on “Non Cartesian Sums,” in Blackness Visible, Charles Mills argues that “white experience is embedded as normative, and the embedding is so deep that its normativity is not even identified as such.” Historically, universal theories never intended to include black bodies into the cannon. Mills argues that in philosophy: "A reconceptualization is necessary because the structuring logic is different. The peculiar features of the African American experience—racial slavery, which linked biological phenotype to social subordination, and which is chronologically located in the modern epoch, ironically coincident with the emergence of liberalism’s proclamation of universal human equality—are not part of the experience represented in the abstractions of European and Euro-American philosophers." We generate universal theories and assume they can be applied to anyone. These abstractions assume a conception of universality that never intended to account for the African American experience. This drowns out the perspectives of students of color that are historically excluded from the conversation. Normativity becomes a privilege that historically students of color do not get to access because of the way we discuss things. These same philosophical texts have served as a cornerstone in Lincoln Douglas and in turn have been used to justify exclusion. That is why it is easy for a white student to make claims that we do not know whether racism is bad, or even question whether oppression is bad, since after all it is just another argument on the flow. They never have to deal with the practical implications of their discourse. These become manifestations of privilege in the debate space because for many students of color, who have to go back to their communities, they still have to deal with the daily acts of racism and violence inflicted upon their homes, communities, and cultures. To question or even make a starting point question for the debate to be about justifying why racism is bad ignores the reality of the bodies present in the room. Our justification of western philosophy has allowed us to remain disconnected from reality. Philosophy, as Mills argues, justifies particular way of knowing under free and rational thought, through a universal way of knowing, believing, and discussing. We have embedded white ways of knowing as normative without ever challenging how it replicates oppressive structures. The question then becomes how does our discourse justify what we believe? For many debaters it is the gaming aspect of debate that allows us to assume that our speech can be disconnected from the speech act. The speech can be defined as the arguments that are placed on the flow, and is evaluated in the context of what is the most logical and rational argument to win the round. The critical distinction is the speech act, which is the performance of that discourse. It’s not what you say, but what you justify. Understanding the speech act requires critically assessing the ramifications of the debaters discourse. Debate is in and of itself a performance. To claim that it is not is to be divorced from the reality of what we do. We must evaluate what a debaters performance does and justifies. For white debaters it is easy to view the discourse as detached from the body. For those with privilege in debate, they are never forced to have their performance attached to them but instead their arguments are viewed as words on paper. They are taught to separate themselves from any ideologies and beliefs, and feel that there is no consequence to what they say. It becomes the way in which they justify what is deemed as “rational” and “logical” thought. The argument sounds like it will be competitive so it is read but it is deemed as just an argument. Judges evaluate this as just a speech. This becomes what I deem as a performance by the body, rather than a performance of the body. Performances by the body allow debaters to not be held accountable to the words they say. Words are seen as divorced from any meaning outside of the flow, versus the performance of the body where the words are attached to the body itself. Debaters often insert the performance by the body, when they make arguments that they claim that they do not believe, but think it is the best strategy for the round. This is a false assumption, since for black debaters meaning is always connected to their bodies. The best strategy should never be one that at the same time justifies acts of racism. Charles Mills argues that “the moral concerns of African Americans have centered on the assertion of their personhood, a personhood that could generally be taken for granted by whites, so that blacks have had to see these theories from a location outside their purview.” For example, I witnessed a round at a tournament this season where a debater ran a utilitarianism disadvantage. His opponent argued that this discourse was racist because it ignores the way in which a utilitarian calculus has distorted communities of color by ignoring the wars and violence already occurring in those communities. In the next speech, the debater stood up, conceded it was racist, and argued that it was the reason he was not going for it and moved on, and still won the debate. This is problematic because it demonstrates exactly what Mill’s argument is. For the black debater this argument is a question of his or her personhood within the debate space and the white debater was not held accountable for the words that are said. Again for debaters of color, their performance is always attached to their body which is why it is important that the performance be viewed in relation to the speech act. Whites are allowed to take for granted the impact their words have on the bodies in the space. They take for granted this notion of personhood and ignore the concerns of those who do not matter divorced from the flow. It is never a question of “should we make arguments divorced from our ideologies,” it is a question of is it even possible. It is my argument that our performances, regardless of what justification we provide, are always a reflection of the ideologies we hold. Why should a black debater have to use a utilitarian calculus just to win a round, when that same discourse justifies violence in the community they go back home to? Our performances and our decisions in the round, reflect the beliefs that we hold when we go back to our communities. As a community we must re-conceptualize this distinction the performance by the body and of the body by re-evaluating the role of the speech and the speech act. It is no longer enough for judges to vote off of the flow anymore. Students of color are being held to a higher threshold to better articulate why racism is bad, which is the problem in a space that we deem to be educational. It is here where I shift my focus to a solution

### AT: Virtue Ethics

#### Your subject formation is a form of endorsing homonormativity – you force us into definite modes of being that are always already exclusive of certain forms of queerness – either we strive for your conception of freedom or die because we are not the so-called “virtuous queer” who follows all the rules you set to tell us how to live – means your model of ethics is always inaccessible to queer people like me who cannot fit into your frame of what is deemed worthy of subjecthood – turns the NC

#### The character traits you value are exactly the fucking problem – the McGregory 14 card at the top of the 1AC contextualizes how false allies have developed their own understandings of what qualifies them to be an ally, such as being honesty and brave and whatever other bullshit your virtue ethics paradigm preaches, but allies fail to be consistent with the character traits that qualify them as legitimate allies who actually help queer people – means the aff comes prior to the NC because our methodology of killjoy and rage that affectively reorients the definition of what it means to be an ally determines the character traits that qualify an actual “ally”

AT: Pragmatism

1. The aff is a method of magic and kweer witchcraft in particular instances – i.e., legal trials and social spaces in which we experience violence, in every situation – means that the aff is a form of particularism that pragmatically reconceptualizes the way we perform our bodily identities – thus, we outweigh under the ROTB and your standard
2. No brightline to when practical experimentation ends – means your framework never actually reaches a solution
3. Practical experimentation is violent – you let society experiment with violence on marginalized bodies to see if there’s some end – means your framework is a link to the aff criticism and you don’t get to weigh against case
4. Double-bind – either a.) Particularism is either impossible because we can’t analyze every single individual person’s situation since they’re always changing and there’s far too many, or b.) No brightline to how particularist we have to be to reach solutions – means the NC is not particularist enough or is too particular
5. Turn – challenging homonormativity is key to make pragmatism and particularism possible – you can’t analyze people before they can be themselves – means the aff precludes the NC actually being able to comprehend the particularities of what it means to be kweer

AT: Util (Card Dump)

1. Util kills identity. Odell 04

[Odell 2004 (Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois (Jack, “On Consequentialist Ethics,” Wadsworth, Thomson Learning, Inc., pp. 98-103)]

This objection can, as Samuel Scheffler has pointed out, be integrated with objection . Remember that Rawls claimed that utilitarianism fails to ''take seriously the distinction between persons." One person can be forced by utilitarianism to give up far too much, including the life plan that he or she has formulated for himself or herself. Rational agents who are fully aware of what they would be putting on the line if they were to agree to a utilitarian society would never adopt utilitarianism. They would perceive that such a society could require them to sacrifice their individual projects, their freedom, and even their lives for the sake of the aggregate or total satisfaction of the group. To agree to such a collective approach would be to degrade their autonomy, and this is a matter of integrity. As Scheffler observes regarding the integration of (H) and (J), "the two objections focus on two different ways of making the same supposed mistake: two different ways of failing to take sufficient account of the separateness and nature of persons."

1. Util justifies massive atrocities — things like rape can be considered the absolute moral action. Armstrong 13

[Undergraduate in biology (Armstrong, Reeve. "Transhumanity where Strange Brilliant Ideas for the Future Intermingle and Breed..." Utilitarianism Is Immoral and Inconsistent with Transhumanism. N.p., 25 Apr. 2013. Web. 09 July 2013. <http://transhumanity.net/articles/entry/utilitarianism-is-immoral-and-inconsistent-with-transhumanism>.)]

Suppose there is a doctor about to perform an operation on a femaxe patient. The patient is unconscious; under general anaesthetic. Suppose that the doctor is considering raping the womxn. And the doctor is assured that he can: make sure he does it without physically harming her and that no one will ever find out about it, apart from him, not even the womxn. Suppose he also knows that both he and the womxn are healthy; they do not have any sexually transmitted infections and the doctors knows that the womxn is infertile, so she will not be able to become pregnant. In this situation the doctor is considering the moral status of the act of raping this womxn. What does utilitarianism tell him? Clearly, no one is going to ever suffer. That is assured. And he, the doctor, will derive pleasure from the act. Therefore, not only does utilitarianism tells us that the act of raping the patient is not immoral, it tells us that, in fact, the act is positively moral because it increases the happiness of the doctor. The doctor, under utilitarianism, would actually be morally obligated to rape this womxn. Take a few moments to think about that. No thinking person with any modicum of human decency can base their morality off of such a disgusting, abominable system of thought that can allow for situations where rape is a moral obligation.

1. Their mentality to sacrifice anything and everything to avoid war causes ontological damnation—the impact is hell on earth. Zimmerman 94

[(Professor of Philosophy at Tulane), 1994 (Michael, Contesting the Earth’s Future, p. 104)]

Heidegger asserted that human self-assertion, combined with the eclipse of being, threatens the relation between being and human Dasein. Loss of this relation would be even more dangerous than a nuclear war that might "bring about the complete annihilation of humanity and the destruction of the earth."54This controversial claim is comparable to the Christian teaching that it is better to forfeit the world than to lose one's soul by losing one's relation to God. Heidegger apparently thought along these lines: it is possible that after a nuclear war, life might once again emerge, but it is far less likely that there will ever again occur an ontological clearing through which such life could manifest itself. Further, since modernity's one-dimensional disclosure of entities virtually denies them any "being" at all, the loss of humanity's openness for being is already occurring. Modernity's background mood is horror in the face of nihilism, which is consistent with the aim of providing material "happiness" for everyone by reducing nature to pure energy.56The unleashing of vast quantities of energy in nuclear war would be equivalent to modernity's slow-motion destruction of nature: unbounded destruction would equal limitless consumption. If humanity avoided nuclear war only to survive as contented clever animals, Heidegger believed we would exist in a state of ontological damnation: hell on earth, masquerading as material paradise. Deep ecologists might agree that a world of material human comfort purchased at the price of everything wild would not be a world worth living in, for in killing wild nature, people would be as good as dead. But most of them could not agree that the loss of humanity's relation to being would be worse than nuclear omnicide, for it is wrong to suppose that the lives of millions of extinct and unknown species are somehow lessened because they were never "disclosed" by humanity.

1. Util is self-effacing and illogical. Wilkinson 11

[Will. Former research fellow with the Cato institute. He’s citing a study done by Daniel Bartels from Columbia University and David Pizarro from Cornell. “The wicked souls of utilitarians” Full Date: September 27, 2011]

Dr. Bartels and Dr. Pizarro then correlated the results from the trolleyology with those from the personality tests. They found a strong link between utilitarian answers to moral dilemmas (push the fat guy off the bridge) and personalities that were psychopathic, Machiavellian or tended to view life as meaningless. Utilitarians, this suggests, may add to the sum of human happiness, but they are not very happy people themselves. If you think utilitarianism is the correct theory, you might infer, as does Roger McShane, my colleague at Democracy in America that "If we really want the greatest happiness of the greatest number, we should be electing psychopathic, Machiavellian misanthropes." Set aside the truth or falsity of utilitarianism. This is a mistake. Utilitarianism is a theory of the good (happiness, pleasure, what have you) and of the right (do that which brings about the most good). So, according to utilitarianism, one should accept utilitarianism only if accepting utilitarianism leads one to do more good than accepting one of the many alts to utilitarianism. As one of philosophy's greatest utilitarian theorists (and an early president of the Cambridge Moral Sciences Club) taught: [A] Utilitarian may reasonably desire, on Utilitarian principles, that some of his conclusions should be rejected by mankind generally; or even that the vulgar should keep aloof from his system as a whole, in so far as the inevitable indefiniteness and complexity of its calculations render it likely to lead to bad results in their hands. Henry Sidgwick here is holding on to the possibility that the influence of utilitarianism may be benign if limited to a technocratic elite, a convenient opinion for the colonial overseers of the British Empire, who knew they had to break a few eggs to bring civilized omelets to the savage races. But Sidgwick's point is general: a utilitarian may desire, on utilitarian principles, that all of his conclusions should be rejected by mankind entirely. That utilitarianism as a creed leads to good utilitarian results is an empirical matter impossible to settle through philosophical argument. Since it seems implausible that we are best off governed by Machiavellian psychopaths, I take the findings of Bartels and Pizarro--that those attracted to utilitarianism tend toward the psychopathic and Machiavellian--as prima facie evidence that utilitarianism is "self-effacing," that it recommends its own rejection. This is a study about how, if you are a utilitarian, you should probably do the world some good and shut up about what you really think is best.

1. Util inevitably results in social paralysis. Hurford 12

[Political science and psychology undergraduate at Denison university (Hurford, Peter. "How a Utilitarian Crosses the Street - Greatplay.net." Greatplaynet RSS. N.p., 16 Nov. 2012. Web. 09 July 2013. <http://www.greatplay.net/essays/how-a-utilitarian-crosses-the-street>.)]

We’ll always have a shortage of time to make the calculations before we have to act, we’ll have a shortage of relevant information, we’ll be biased by our own interests and [cognitive errors](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_bias), we’ll have [weakness of will](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Akrasia), we’ll never know how our actions might influence things in the long-run (especially as precedents), and it just generally will always be too hard to accomplish, so as to be useless. Maybe that cold, careless, calculating robot could implement the utilitarian software directly, but the human brain certainly can’t; especially not for the thousands of choices that need to be made daily. It would be utterly paralyzing, and almost always go badly.

1. Stop being pessimistic—Humanity is extraordinarily resilient. Total extinction is laughable. Naam 13

[Ramez Naam was the [CEO](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CEO) of Apex Nanotechnologies. He currently holds a seat on the advisory board of the Institute for Accelerating Change, is a member of the World Future Society, a Senior Associate of the [Foresight Institute](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foresight_Institute), and a fellow of the [Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Institute_for_Ethics_and_Emerging_Technologies). (Naam, Ramez. "Can Humans Survive Mass Extinction? | Guest Blog, Scientific American Blog Network." Can Humans Survive Mass Extinction? | Guest Blog, Scientific American Blog Network. N.p., 31 May 2013. Web. 03 June 2013. <http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/2013/05/31/can-humans-survive-mass-extinction/>.)]

Threats that could wipe out the bulk of life on earth abound. Planetary catastrophe could come in the form of a killer asteroid impact, the eruption of massive supervolcanoes, a nearby gamma ray burst that sterilizes the earth, or by human-driven environmental collapse. Yet life will endure, says Annalee Newitz, and so will humanity. In her new book, [Scatter, Adapt, and Remember: How Humans Will Survive a Mass Extinction](http://amzn.to/112IuZ7), Newitz surveys billions of years of history and five previous mass extinctions to draw lessons about how catastrophe comes and how – and why –life abides. The breadth of the book is truly astounding, ranging from the Affet’s first mass extinction – as cyanobacteria exhaled massive amounts of oxygen into the Earth’s atmosphere, poisoning most other life even as they paved the way for the ecosystem we see today – to the techniques that grey whales, Jewish communities, and plague survivors have used to ensure their survival. In between we see the Earth freeze over then thaw again. We watch as dinosaurs rise and fall, mammals come to dominate the world, and primates evolve into hominids and eventually modern humanity with all its varied challenges. The scale starts at billions of years, then zooms down to millions, then thousands, and then into the present day, before zipping ahead into the future.¶ Newitz came to this topic with a pessimistic outlook, she writes, believing that humanity was doomed, and intent on producing a book with that slant. Yet her research convinced her that the opposite is true – that while global risks abound, and while we humans ourselves are potentially the greatest threat to both our own species and other life on Earth – we will nevertheless (probably) find ways to survive and bounce back from even the worse catastrophes. In the introduction she tells us that disaster, whether human created or not, is inevitable – but doom is not. How can she believe this? In her words:¶ Because the world has been almost completely destroyed half a dozen times. Earth has been shattered by asteroid impacts, choked by extreme greenhouse gases, locked up in ice, bombarded with cosmic radiation, and ripped open by megavolcanoes so massive they are almost unimaginable. Each of these disasters caused mass extinctions, during which more than 75% of the species on Earth died out. And yet every single time, living creatures carried on, adapting to survive under the harshest of conditions. Humans, Newitz says, have also adapted: to past episodes of climate change, to new locales, to new diets, and to persecution at the hands of other humans. That repeated pattern of survival and adaptation – of life as a whole and of humanity in particular – convinces Newitz that we can do it again.

## A2 Gang Activity Bad