# Notes

This was my new LARP plan aff for TOC—we had both Butler and Util versions ready to go. Most frontlines have been omitted, but I kept the headers in to show how the aff was organized. It’s one of my favorite LARP positions I’ve ever written but I was only able to read it once :(

# 1AC

## Advantage

### 1AC – Adv. – Bait and Switch

#### **US military aid to Niger is used as political coverage for state repression and corruption – it’s perceived as support for the regime and justifies absolute focus on counter-terror.**

Corey-Boulet 18 [Robbie Corey-Boulet, (Robbie Corey-Boulet is the senior editor of World Politics Review.) "Support for Niger’s Military-First Spending Strategy Is Showing Signs of Strain" World Politics Review, 4-13-2018, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/24670/support-for-niger-s-military-first-spending-strategy-is-showing-signs-of-strain, DOA:3-9-2019 // WWBW]

But militant groups are not the only threat to Niger’s stability. While they address the security concerns around them, **authorities have also been trying to deal with a domestic challenge**: unrest sparked by anger over a finance law that has been blamed for hikes in taxes and the cost of basic services, including transportation. The law [led to rioting](http://www.jeuneafrique.com/522885/societe/niger-nouvelles-manifestations-contre-la-loi-de-finances-jugee-antisociale/) last October that injured more than 20 police officers, according to Niger’s Interior Ministry, as well as large-scale protests to ring in 2018. Since then, **the government** of President Mahamadou Issoufou **has restricted protesters’ ability to stage rallies**, but activists have continued to take to the streets, resulting in altercations with security forces and raids targeting civil society organizations that observers say are [becoming increasingly brazen](https://www.amnesty.org/fr/latest/news/2018/03/niger-les-autorites-doivent-liberer-les-activistes-arretes-et-cesser-les-attaques-contre-la-liberte-des-medias/). **The fact that the arrests have garnered little attention** outside Niger **underscores donor countries’ almost singular focus on regional security**—a dynamic that can also be seen [in places like Chad](https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/24236/donors-keep-quiet-as-chad-s-economic-woes-give-way-to-social-unrest), where the government is more repressive. The continued tensions, though, suggest that there are limits to how much of this military-first approach ordinary Nigeriens are willing to tolerate when their own economic situations remain precarious. The current dynamic may not pose an immediate threat to Issoufou’s hold on power, but a widespread perception that social issues are getting short shrift could have political implications down the line, especially when the president’s second—and presumably final—term comes to a close in 2021. Like other countries in the region, Niger has a decidedly opaque budget process. The International Budget Partnership gave it a score of [zero out of 100](https://www.internationalbudget.org/open-budget-survey/results-by-country/country-info/?country=ne) in its Open Budget Survey, noting that the government “provides the public with no budget information” and gives citizens no opportunity to engage. Nevertheless, Sebastian Elischer, a political scientist at the University of Florida who studies Niger, says local analysts and journalists believe defense spending has jumped from around 2 percent of the budget to around 10 percent as Issoufou’s government has tried to build up defenses against Boko Haram, which is based in Nigeria, and al-Qaida-affiliated groups and other militants based in Mali. In late February, Jeune Afrique reported that defense spending was [as high as 15 percent](http://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/531887/politique/le-niger-face-au-defi-du-cout-de-la-securite/) last year. **Issoufou has asked for the population to rally around the military effort**. “President Issoufou argues that Nigeriens need to stick together in the war against terror, and must not rely on foreign donors forever,” Elischer says. Yet this appeal has become less compelling in light of the finance law, which critics [have denounced](http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/03/12/au-niger-nouvelle-manifestation-contre-la-loi-de-finances-antisociale_5269532_3212.html) for imposing new taxes even as services like health and education remain underfunded. The changes are especially difficult to stomach given that Niger recorded economic growth of [around 5 percent](https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/west-africa/niger/niger-economic-outlook/) in 2017. There are also concerns that **corruption is on the rise**, says Lisa Mueller, a political scientist at Macalester College who also studies Niger. **The government abruptly fired the head of the national anti-corruption agency** last August, she says, adding that his replacement “was a veteran of the state’s judicial machine.” There is little reliable survey data from Niger, and none to speak of since the new finance law was adopted, so it’s impossible to assess the precise extent of public anger over government spending priorities and budget management. Moreover, there is reason to suspect public sentiment varies across the country. Ibrahim Maiga, a Mali-based researcher with the Institute for Security Studies, says that when he conducted fieldwork in Niger last year, he noticed that anxiety about security issues was relatively low in Niamey, the capital, which has been insulated from attacks by Islamist militants. By contrast, in the southeastern Diffa region, a frequent target of Boko Haram, Maiga says security was a top concern and the local population was eager to see more investment in military resources. For his part, Issoufou has said the finance law “meets the aspirations of the people” and that its critics represent “[a minority](https://www.voaafrique.com/a/la-loi-de-finances-contestee-par-une-minorite-selon-le-president-issoufou/4327447.html).” His finance minister, Hassoumi Massoudou, has stressed the government’s need to expand its tax base in line with requirements set out by the West African Economic and Monetary Union. He has referred to the current tensions as heralding a new relationship between taxpayers and the state. “This is an essential moment for a change of culture with respect to taxation because, in reality, those who are on the street today consider that paying taxes is illegitimate,” [he said in March](http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20180301-niger-loi-finances-2018-reponse-gouvernement-societe-civile). On these points at least, the government would appear to have the support of the international community. Raul Mateus Paula, head of the European Union delegation in Niger, has hailed the reforms as “[courageous](http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20180301-niger-loi-finances-2018-reponse-gouvernement-societe-civile).” **The crackdown on dissidents**, though, **is causing alarm among rights groups**. In late March, Amnesty International issued a statement condemning the arrest of 23 civil society activists, some of whom were detained at their organizations’ headquarters, and attacks on media outlets. “The wave of arrests of activists and the demonstrably brutal response of the security forces not only flout the rights of the demonstrators to the freedom of peaceful assembly, but also risk igniting an already tense situation in Niger,” Amnesty researcher Gaetan Mootoo [said](https://www.amnesty.org/fr/latest/news/2018/03/niger-les-autorites-doivent-liberer-les-activistes-arretes-et-cesser-les-attaques-contre-la-liberte-des-medias/). Three weeks after that statement was released, [three more activists were arrested](http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/04/16/au-niger-trois-militants-de-la-societe-civile-arretes-apres-une-manifestation-interdite_5286195_3212.html), and protests were still being broken up. Despite these obstacles, activists plan to maintain their pressure on the government in hopes, however remote, that the finance law will be repealed, says Mounkaila Halidou, a member of the Network of Organizations for Transparency and Budget Analysis, or ROTAB, in Niamey. “**The cries of the people don’t mean anything to the president because he thinks he has cover from the West**,” he says. “But this does not discourage us from continuing our combat.”

#### Counter-terror is used to justify human rights abuses and militarization.

Bailie 18 [Craig Bailie, (Lecturer in Political Science (Mil), Stellenbosch University) "Explainer: the role of foreign military forces in Niger" Conversation, 9-9-2018, https://theconversation.com/explainer-the-role-of-foreign-military-forces-in-niger-102503, DOA:3-9-2019 // WWBW]

Has the presence of **foreign forces** in Niger achieved the aims of combating terrorism and stemming migration? And at what cost? Have there been unintended and potentially dangerous consequences? There is certainly a view that their presence has **had a negative impact on domestic politics in Niger.** A [report](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/14/niger-suppresses-dissent-as-us-leads-influx-of-foreign-armies) published in the months following the deaths of US troops suggests an increasingly oppressive and undemocratic political culture in Niger. **Civil society and opposition political leaders** who offer their testimony in the report **argue that the building of** [**foreign military bases**](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/06/13/in-the-eye-of-the-storm-niger-and-its-unstable-neighbors/) **in Niger is** [**unconstitutional**](https://theintercept.com/2018/02/18/niger-air-base-201-africom-drones/)**. They view the foreign military presence in the country and the concurrent** [**securitisation**](https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/02/security-concerns-in-niger-polls/) **of Niger’s** political and civil **society arenas as a means to strengthen a government lacking in domestic support.** [**Niger’s 2016 elections**](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-niger-election/boycott-helps-niger-president-issoufou-win-re-election-idUSKCN0WO0ZN), which gave Issoufou a second term, **were reportedly** [**“plagued by serious irregularities”**](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/14/niger-suppresses-dissent-as-us-leads-influx-of-foreign-armies)**. Niger’s military build-up is also cause for concern in a country where the [Nigerien military]** [Forces Armées Nigeriennes](http://secgovcentre.org/2013/03/securing-the-sahel-from-mali-to-niger/) **is** “**an intensely politicised organisation” with “a distinct distaste for civilian oversight”. Such a force may prove valuable to a president who wishes to entrench his power beyond democratic means.** This year, **citizens took to the streets chanting** [**“French, American and German armies, go away!”**](https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-04-29-what-exactly-are-foreign-troops-protecting-in-the-sahel-2/)**. Issoufou responded by cracking down on further protests in March. He defended the move by saying it was important to have a “**[**democratic but strong**](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/05/foreign-troops-should-not-be-fighting-in-niger-says-countrys-president)**” state.**

### 1AC – Adv. – Terror

#### Aggressive counter-terror makes extremist groups look more attractive – increases terrorism.

Bailie 17 [Craig Bailie, (Lecturer in Political Science (Mil), Stellenbosch University) "Niger: a reminder of why the US military's presence in Africa needs constant scrutiny" Conversation, 11-13-2017, https://theconversation.com/niger-a-reminder-of-why-the-us-militarys-presence-in-africa-needs-constant-scrutiny-86964, DOA:3-9-2019 // WWBW]

The danger is that, in some instances, **citizens can bear the brunt of a US military presence** that involves training and equipping of African forces. This is particularly true in countries where **interventions**, inadvertently perhaps, [**strengthen repressive state apparatus**](http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/10/old-wounds-deep-scars-us-intervention-africa-20131010101130448232.html)**.** On the other hand [Africa’s gatekeepers](http://www.global-geneva.com/keeping-it-family-how-africas-corrupt-leaders-stay-in-power/) - self-interested, ruling elites - have the means to ensure their own security. They control the state, and its access to foreign partnerships and aid, whether military or otherwise. A [case in point](http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/18/is-the-us-military-propping-up-ugandas-elected-autocrat-museveni-elections/) is Uganda’s [Yoweri Museveni](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12421747) – a [key African ally](https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/06/03/uganda_on_the_brink_key_us_ally_for_african_security__109416.html) in the war on terror. And of the 16 African countries that [host US military presence](https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2017/02/15/updated-rough-guide-foreign-military-bases-africa), ten are [categorised](https://freedomhouse.org/report/fiw-2017-table-country-scores) by the US-based Freedom House as “not free”, four as “partly free” and only two as “free”. Various reports this year indicate that **armed forces in a number of countries that host a US military presence have abused civilians.** [Burkina Faso](https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/hrw-accuses-mali-burkina-troops-of-sweeping-rights-abuses-20170908), [Cameroon](https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/sep/27/tortured-abused-deported-cameroon-accused-of-driving-out-100000-nigerian-refugees-human-rights-watch), [Chad](https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/chad-blasts-un-report-on-troop-abuses-in-car-20170602), [Ethiopia](https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/09/us-stand-ethiopians-government-stifles-protests-jails-journalists), [Kenya](http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/Candidates-should-address-abuses-/440808-4037576-55swdez/index.html) and [Uganda](http://ewn.co.za/2017/05/15/ugandan-troops-committed-sexual-abuse-in-central-african-republic) are a few examples. **These sorts of situations have the potential to fuel fundamentalist backlash.** Is America’s strategy working? What is the [efficacy of the US’s military presence](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/25/world/africa/white-house-pushes-military-might-over-humanitarian-aid-in-africa.html) in Africa? [**Research**](https://issafrica.org/about-us/press-releases/lessons-from-africa-on-terrorism) by the Institute for Security Studies **suggests that** [**heavy-handed anti-terrorism strategies**](https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-01-18-collateral-death-more-civilians-killed-in-nigerias-war-on-terror/#.WgSSz2iCw2w) **breed insecurity by making fundamentalist organisations appear attractive to ordinary citizens. The exercise of what ordinary citizens perceive to be** [**illegitimate force**](https://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/problem/illegit_force.htm)**, on the part of state security institutions, increases the likelihood of those same citizens joining fundamentalist organisations.** But it seems these findings are being ignored. The danger is that **if** [**current patterns**](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/25/world/africa/white-house-pushes-military-might-over-humanitarian-aid-in-africa.html) **encouraged by the US military persist, countries are likely to experience an increase in extremism. This in turn is likely to perpetuate the heavy-handedness of already illiberal regimes and the** [**vicious cycle**](http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/10/old-wounds-deep-scars-us-intervention-africa-20131010101130448232.html) **of interventionism in Africa.**

#### Empirics flow aff – the US has provided counter-terror aid since the Bush era and conflict has gotten worse.

Shurkin 17 [Shurkin, Michael, (Michael Shurkin is a senior political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.) "U.S. Helping Niger Halt Spread of Terror in Region" The Hill, 10-25-2017, https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/10/us-helping-niger-halt-spread-of-terror-in-region.html, DOA:3-9-2019 // WWBW]

**U.S. policy in the region since President Trump took office has been more or less a continuation of policies that date to the George W. Bush's administration, which is when U.S. troops began the present training effort, with some tweaks by Obama.** Obama wanted more focus on things like governance alongside pure security assistance; **Trump puts greater emphasis on the security assistance, with the U.S. military playing a larger and more unfettered role.** The results of Bush's and Obama's policies are disputable, and there is good reason to think that **Trump's policies are no more likely to succeed.** Meanwhile, **the security situation in Niger since the beginning of the Bush-era programs to the present day has continued to decline.** Maybe the right thing to do is carry on, but if America owes the fallen soldiers anything, it is an open debate about the next best steps, about how best to help Niger in line with what the U.S. can do there and U.S. national interests.

### 1AC – Solvency

#### I affirm, “Resolved: The United States ought not provide military aid to Niger.” It’s T—Niger is authoritarian according to the EIU. Further specification is in the doc.

The US only provides IMET and NADR to Niger. (<https://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/Niger/>)

Military aid is defined as:

ICIJ 7 - The Int'l Consortium of Investigative Journalists, “A citizen’s guide to understanding U.S. foreign military aid,” <http://www.publicintegrity.org/2007/05/22/5772/citizen-s-guide-understanding-us-foreign-military-aid> WJ

For the “Collateral Damage” investigative study, the Center for Public Integrity created a database that tracks a subset of those financial flows: taxpayer-funded programs or assistance that contribute to a nation’s offensive military capabilities. The database does not include certain large nuclear non-proliferation programs or expenditures such as Foreign Military Sales or Direct Commercial Sales, which are not supported directly with taxpayer dollars. The database is also limited to tracking funds appropriated to either the Defense Department or the State Department. For this report, these are the criteria for “foreign military assistance” or “foreign military aid.”

#### Niger’s security problems do not require military aid – interventionism causes coups and link turns every disad.

Feldstein 18 “Do Terrorist Trends in Africa Justify the U.S. military’s expansion?”; Steven Feldstein; February 09, 2018 <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/09/do-terrorist-trends-in-africa-justify-u.s.-military-s-expansion-pub-75476> //WHS-RS

Despite data showing that terrorist attacks are only moderately increasing in Africa—and have decreased significantly since the 2014–2015 peak—U.S. military engagement remains on a sharp upward trajectory. There are several possible explanations for this divergence. One is that AFRICOM’s expansion has helped reduce terrorist threats and that continued investment is needed to maintain progress. Unfortunately, the data do not support this argument. **Boko Haram provides a useful example. A large reason for its reduction in violence is because of losses it suffered in 2015 and 2016.** **While the U**nited **S**tates has **played an important role in organizing a multinational force** and bolstering regional capabilities against the group, **it suffered a falling out with the Nigerian government during that same period**. At the low point, Nigeria suspended a planned U.S. training of an infantry battalion, the United States indicated it was hesitant to share intelligence with the Nigerians for fear of infiltration, and the Nigerian ambassador engaged in a war of words with the United States, accusing Washington of hindering the campaign against Boko Haram. **It was largely the Nigerian military and partner forces from Cameroon, Chad, and Niger** (along with major assistance from South African military contractors) **that turned the tide against Boko Haram**. At best, the U.S. military played a supporting role. Another explanation is that **public data regarding terrorist trends are incomplete**—that the U.S. military has access to clandestine threat information that requires a heightened presence on the continent. However, there are no indications that this scenario is true. **U.S. military commanders continue to speak in generalized terms about the broader threat from VEOs**. While they have detailed their concern that the Islamic State may gain a foothold on the continent, **no one claims that the Islamic State is rapidly mobilizing** or successfully recruiting scores of militants to take up their cause; **real-time 2018 data do not show a major uptick in violence** or casualties attributed to Islamic State affiliates in Africa. A third explanation is that the nature of terrorism in Africa is changing. **Groups that previously focused on domestic objectives**—such as AQIM, Boko Haram, al-Shabab, and ISGS—**are reorienting to launch external attacks in Europe and the U**nited **S**tates. Likewise, there is no indication that any of the major terrorist groups operating in Africa have decided to reorient their efforts and strike external targets. Boko Haram has never shown an interest or demonstrated a capability in operating outside the Lake Chad Basin. While policymakers continue to have legitimate concerns that al-Shabab could redirect strikes against the United States or Europe, thus far, it has only been linked to a single knife attack in Europe in 2010. The Islamic State affiliates are too small and diffuse to represent major threats to the United States at this point. **The primary justification that the military provides for continued U.S. expansion is that the gray zone environment is fraught and that threats from** large-scale unemployment and “disenfranchisement from **corrupt governments** and abusive security forces” **make** **African citizens** “prime **targets** for exploitation by criminal and terrorist organizations across the continent.” AFRICOM is not making a military argument; it is making a development argument. In fact, military leaders also acknowledge that the root cause of this fragility is weak governance—something that is “not a core mission of the Department of Defense.” Therein lies the crux of the issue. **It is not clear that the terrorist threat**, **or AFRICOM’s stated mission, requires a major military buildup**. If anything, **the U.S. military has made a strong case for a vigorous civilian investment in democracy** and governance programming. But rather than intensify investments in civilian programming, successive U.S. administrations, including Barack Obama’s administration, have slashed democracy and governance funding. The Trump administration has not been an outlier in this regard—though it has proposed even more drastic cuts to U.S. foreign aid programs despite that civilian agencies are ideally placed to complement the military mission and to lead longer-term programming to strengthen local institutions, tackle corruption, and empower citizens. The consequence is that the military sees a mission unfilled and takes it on, even if ill-suited to it. Paradoxically, many experts argue that **a large foreign military footprint would exacerbate the very governance vulnerabilities identified by AFRICOM**. For example, **regarding** the **increased** foreign **military presence in** the **Sahel**, Professor Yvan Guichaoua told the Washington Post: “**Targeting** these **groups is the best way to make their leaders heroes**, **foster unity in** jihadi **ranks**, **and inflame communal violence**.” He added, “All policymakers working in the area know well the highly inflammable nature of the situation.” Likewise, Alexis Arieff, from the Congressional Research Service, notes that **the enlarged foreign military footprint in Niger** “appears to have **fed local backlash against both the government and Western countries**.” A foreign military buildup can also help strengthen and entrench authoritarian regimes responsible for serious violations of human rights. Over time, these abuses may foment grievances that can lay the groundwork for violent insurgencies and terrorism. A quick look at some of the United States’ key partners in the Sahel is telling. In Mali, reports have emerged about security force abuses, which include “extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture, and arbitrary arrests against men accused of supporting Islamist armed groups.” In Cameroon, Amnesty International alleges that the U.S.-trained Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) committed systematic war crimes at two unofficial detention centers. One of the detention centers is located in the village Salak at BIR headquarters, which is a shared military facility with the United States. Finally, some scholars contend that sustained **U.S. military** **engagement with partner forces foments greater long-term instability**, **such as increasing the probability of a military coup**. Us**ing data from 189 countrie**s over a thirty-nine-year period, **one study found that** **training “alters the balance of power” between military and civilian authorities and increases the likelihood that security services will attempt a violent overthrow**. Examples abound of U.S.-trained officers—like Amadou Sanogo in Mali or deposed Gambian dictator Yahya Jammeh—who led coups against democratically elected governments. So why have successive U.S. administrations continued to invest inordinate resources in expanding AFRICOM? One major reason relates to what Rosa Brooks has coined the “Walmart-ization of the U.S. military.” As the roles and boundaries of what the military ought to be responsible for have become increasingly murky, **the U.S. military has become a “Super Walmart” that offers vast resources** and economies of scale to address any situation. Former U.S. ambassador to Nigeria John Campbell describes this phenomenon as the “securitization” of U.S. foreign policy, arguing that **since** the **September 11**, 2001, terrorist attacks, **huge increases in Pentagon resources** hav**e led successive U.S. administrations to entrust the military with solving a growing array of nonmilitary problems**. **The temptation to turn to the military whenever a crisis hits often proves irresistible to policymakers**. Instead of undertaking painstaking diplomacy or development work to help governments untangle deep-rooted grievances, it is far simpler to authorize additional ISR operations and target insurgent leaders for assassination. The Trump White House shows little awareness of the trade-offs between authorizing increased U.S. military involvement and pursuing a more vigorous civilian strategy. The White House has taken months to settle on a senior White House Africa adviser, let alone nominate a State Department assistant secretary for Africa policy. Sub-Saharan Africa has traditionally received fewer resources and less senior-level attention from the State Department than any other region. The department’s Africa bureau remains weak, attracting less talent from the Foreign Service despite deep challenges requiring comprehensive solutions backed by substantial resources. Rather than redress these issues, the Trump administration has made things worse, further stripping the State Department of personnel and resources.

## Framing

### 1AC – Util

#### Omitted

### 1AC – Util Add-On

#### Omitted

### 1AC – Butler

**Omitted**

## Underview

### Note

I’m omitting everything from the UV except for some cards from Bob that I read and were topic specific—you can find a lot of it in my speech docs if your curious what I usually read

### 1AC – T

#### [1] Subsets are topical—Nebel presumes a specific model of semantics without justifying it.

Overing 14 [(Bob, Director of Debate) “Topicality and Plans in LD: A Reply to Nebel by Bob Overing,” Premier Debate Today] WWBW
As Nebel has pointed out, it’s hard to come up with many plans that affirm LD topics on his view of topicality that “whether a plan is topical is whether its being a good idea entails the resolution” (“T in Policy,” para. 10). However, we have good reasons to reject that view of topicality as too stringent. **Nebel finds this definition from Lichtman**, Rohrer, and Corsi (1979) and leans on it heavily: [T1] affirmative teams are required to formulate proposals whose affirmation logically entails affirmation of the resolution (p. 375) The fact that Nebel bolds this definition does not grant it authority. It is not, in fact, the “only uniform test” (“T in Policy,” para. 10). **It’s also unclear that Lichtman et al. have a strong intent to define, given that their article is not about topicality whatsoever.** They do not discuss various alternative definitions. Why should we hold their idea of T above any of the following definitions? [T2] The plan and case ought to justify the conclusion the resolution asks to be drawn (Allen & Burrell, 1985, p. 857) [T3] The plan and case must provide evidence in favor of the resolution [T4] The plan and case must be an example or instance of the resolution [T5] The plan and case must fall within the bounds of the resolution [T6] All plan provisions must bear a rational relationship to a topical scheme of action (Unger, 1979 cited in Hingstman, 1985, p. 850) **Nebel omits the plethora of alternative views on topicality** he is no doubt aware of. In particular, definitions like T4 and T5 that stress the “bounds” of the topic are common in debate theory (Dolley, 1984; Hingstman, 1985; Parson, 1987; Bauschard, 2009). On these views, **the plan must only be an example or a subset of the topic, a smaller burden than defending the resolution as a whole.** Without defending any particular definition of topicality, **we can say that Nebel’s** T1 **is mistaken. It seems to be extremely difficult to meet with any plan, even on policy topics.** For instance, consider the 1993-94 NDT topic, “Resolved: That the Commander-in-Chief power of the President of the United States should be substantially curtailed.” A specific plan to substantially curtail the Commander-in-Chief power in a very specific way may not entail the truth of this proposition generally. For instance, it may be that the power to deploy armed forces should be curtailed, but every other Commander-in-Chief should be augmented! One might bite the bullet on examples such as these, but that would render many plans consistently deemed topical in NDT and NDT-CEDA debate non-topical, narrowing the potential breadth of these topics and stifling creativity. **Many such plans, especially on resolutions that are not disjunctions, are and should be allowed.** Reasons A) through E) above are additional justifications for this loosening of topicality from T1 to T2-T6 to allow more policy debate on quasi-policy topics.

#### Prefer: [A] Defending total abolition of aid is inconsistent with the lit and kills real world education.

Overing 18, Bob, 12-4-2018, "10 Things, Super Early Jan/Feb Edition (Bob Overing)," Premier Debate, http://www.premierdebate.com/10-things/10-things-super-early-jan-feb-edition-bob-overing/

As is often the case, **the generic reading kills much of what makes this topic literature great. Specific details about specific authoritarian regimes and their political climate can affect whether the U.S. ought to provide aid.** For this reason, **much of the literature** I’ve seen **using the resolution’s wording does not defend general or total abolition of military aid to authoritarian regimes.** I’d bet the percentage of literature on this type of aid that defends the general principle is fairly low.

#### [B] Functional and textual limits solve their offense.

Overing 2, Bob, 12-4-2018, "10 Things, Super Early Jan/Feb Edition (Bob Overing)," Premier Debate, http://www.premierdebate.com/10-things/10-things-super-early-jan-feb-edition-bob-overing/

Negs will argue there are many many **authoritarian regimes the aff could choose from**, i.e. limits. But those **are functionally and textually limited by (1) inherency (aid must exist or be imminent), (2) “military” since aid must go to a military purpose and can be narrowly defined, and (3) advantage areas since tiny affs will often lose to big generics like politics.** On top of that, plan debaters should argue that generics decimate consequentialist debate and force framework or k debate, which was already available at the same quality.

Rest was generic

### 1AC – Theory

#### Omitted

### 1AC – Method

#### Omitted

### 1AC – Tricks

Omitted

# 1AR – Case

## Ext – Case

### 1AR – Ext. Bait and Switch

The aff is a good idea—Niger uses American military aid as political cover to justify domestic human rights abuses, that’s **Bailie** and **Corey-Boulet**.

[Outweighs] Outweighs their offense: [a] Cyclicality—systems of state repression are self-perpetuating and guarantee more violence in the future [b] Probability—the impact is already happening so we know it’s real.

### 1AR – Ext. Terror

The aff is a good idea—military aid is perceived as illegitimate and drives citizens to terrorist groups, that’s **Bailie** and **Shulkin**.

[Outweighs] Outweighs their offense on probability—the impact is already happening so we know it’s real.

## F/L – Case

### 1AR – AT PMCs

[1] Durable fiat solves—PMCs are a form of aid since they enhance the power of the recipient government.

[2] US training to Niger is counter-terrorism training—PMCs are only used to replace troops on the ground.

[3] PMCs are used to skirt congressional mandates, not the executive branch – the joints chiefs wouldn’t circumvent their own policy.

### 1AR – AT Fill-in

[1] No impact to fill-in—Issoufou can only use Western support to justify his autocratic policies because they’re perceived as more democratic.

[2] French presence deter countries from filling in – and great power competition reduces colonialism.

Williams 18 [Katie Bo Williams, (Katie Bo Williams is the senior national security correspondent for Defense One, where she writes about defense, counterterror, NATO, nukes, and more.) "From Small Wars to Great Power, Trump’s Africa Reset Could Change US Military’s Role" Defense One, 12-12-2018, https://www.defenseone.com/politics/2018/12/small-wars-great-power-trumps-africa-reset-could-change-us-militarys-role/153485/, DOA:3-9-2019 // WWBW]

Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash., the incoming chairman on the House Armed Services Committee, suggested that **French troops in West Africa** could **mitigate the risk that a peer competitor could backfill U.S.** troop **withdrawals**. “In West Africa, the French have been helpful [and] we’re beginning to shore up some of the governments in that part of the world, [like] Mali and Niger,” Smith said, during a roundtable with defense reporters on Wednesday. “So if we’re reducing the number of troops in West Africa because we have partners that are able to meet our mission, that’s great.” **[She Continues]** Experts are quick to caution that just like in the United States, **Africa is not at the top of the priority list for China and Russia**. But for Africans, Devermont noted, the return of great **power competition isn’t** a **negative** thing. Nor, he says, are Russia and China the only game in town. The UAE, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, and other nations are engaging in Africa. “[Africans] don’t see this as zero-sum,” he said. “**It provides new resources, gives them new leverage, lessens dependence.** It’s very difficult for us to talk to the Africans about ‘you’re with us’ or ‘you’re with them’—that’s not the paradigm the Africans are going to subscribe to.

[3] No fill-in – logistically impossible.

Guay 18 Guay, Terrence. [Clinical Professor of International Business, Pennsylvania State University]. “Arms sales to Saudi Arabia give Trump all the leverage he needs in the Khashoggi affair.” The Conversation: Economy + Business. October 19, 2018. <https://theconversation.com/arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-give-trump-all-the-leverage-he-needs-in-khashoggi-affair-104998> TG

First, once a country is “locked in” to a specific kind of weapons system, such as planes, tanks or naval vessels, the cost to [switch](http://doi.org/10.1257/jep.8.4.65) to a different supplier can be huge. Military personnel must be retrained on new equipment, spare parts need to be replaced, and operational changes may be necessary. After being so reliant on U.S. weapons systems for decades, the [transition costs](http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a498941.pdf) to buy from another country could be prohibitive even for oil-rich Saudi Arabia. The second problem with Trump’s argument is that armaments from Russia, China or elsewhere are simply not as sophisticated as U.S. weapons, which is why they are usually cheaper – though the quality gap is quickly decreasing. To maintain its military superiority in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia has opted to purchase virtually all of its weapons from American and European companies. That is why the U.S. has significant leverage in this aspect of the relationship. Any [Saudi threat](http://fortune.com/2018/10/14/saudis-threaten-retaliation-jamal-khashoggi/) to retaliate against a ban on U.S. arms sales by buying weapons from countries that have not raised concerns about the Khashoggi disappearance would not be credible. And is probably why, despite worries in the White House, such a threat has not yet been made.

### 1AR – AT Circumvention

[1] Durable fiat solves—imagining the plan is actually implemented is key to engagement and aff ground.

[2] Triggers presumption since the plan wouldn’t change anything.

## Ext – Framing – Util

### 1AR – McCord

### 1AR – TJFs

### 1AR – Sinott-Armstrong

### 1AR – Conard

## Ext – Framing – Butler

### 1AR – O/V

### 1AR – Constructivism

### 1AR – The Other

### 1AR – Precarity

### 1AR – RTP – Epistemology

### 1AR – RTP – Sociality

## F/L – Framing – Util

### 1AR – AT Induction

## F/L – Framing – Butler

### 1AR – AT Consequentialist

# 1AR – T/Theory

## 1AR – Nebel T

### Note

This was stolen from the Matt Chen squad so I don’t really feel comfortable disclosing it

### Niemi

#### this is racist – voting issue for deterrence and its key to punish racism as a judge.

Niemi 15 Rebar. “Nebel T: I sip it.” Premier Debate. September 22, 2015.

Correctness is racism. Correctness is “you must be either a boy or a girl or you are wrong.” Correctness is “the ideal functioning body versus all others.” Correctness is one kind of person having access to The Truth and others lacking it. Correctness is “sit down and shut up.” Correctness is “your kind aren’t welcome here.” Any debater who runs so called “Nebel T” and any judge who votes for this argument must acknowledge that they are situationally and strategically embracing a perspective from which there is an implicit or explicit metric of what it means to be a competent english speaker. What is the logical conclusion of speaking competent english? The notion that “mongrel” forms of english are inferior, diminished, unpersuasive, and should not have access to the ballot. Quite possibly the notion that those who can’t live up to these standards should not be involved in debate. After all, their dialects are not what resolutions are written in – it is people like Mr. Nebel whose dialect prescribes correct resolutional meaning.

### CI

### AT Textuality

### AT Limits

### AT Ground

### 2AR PICs

## 1AR – T Plural

### CI

### AT Textuality

### AT Limits

### AT Ground

### 2AR PICs

## 1AR – Spikes on Top

### CI

### Flowability

### AT Norming

### AT Neg Strat

# 1AR – LARP

## 1AR – Agent CPs

### 1AR – Aff Secret

#### **The aff is classified so its kept secret—no link to the DA.**

Mehta 18 Aaron Mehta, is Deputy Editor and Senior Pentagon Correspondent for Defense News, covering policy, strategy and acquisition at the highest levels of the Department of Defense and its international partners. Defense News, 1-17-2018, ["National Military Strategy update in the works — most of which will again be classified", https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2018/01/16/national-military-strategy-update-in-the-works-most-of-which-will-again-be-classified/] bcr 9-21-2018 recut WWBW

BRUSSELS – Gen. Joe Dunford, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is prepping his team to update **the National Military Strategy – a classified document that will provide the framework for how the Pentagon can execute the goals of** Secretary of Defense Jim **Mattis**. Speaking to reporters Jan. 15, Dunford said the document will not require “a complete rewrite,” but that updates will be needed to reflect what has changed since the last National Military Strategy was released in 2016. “In the National Military Strategy that we wrote [in 2016], we wrote it during a time of political transition. So what we tried to do was make it policy agnostic, knowing that when a National Defense Strategy came out we’d have to kind of go back and provide a policy framework within which the strategy would be implemented,” Dunford explained. The Trump administration is in the midst of releasing a series of interconnected strategy documents. First came the National Security Strategy in December, a broad overview of the administration’s priorities. Then comes the National Defense Strategy, which outlines how the NSS will apply to the Pentagon, on Jan. 19. That will be followed by the Nuclear Posture Review and Ballistic Missile Defense Review, both expected in February. **The National Military Strategy is best thought of as the operational version of the National Defense Strategy, outlining how the military will execute the goals laid out in the NDS.** Hence, with a new National Defense Strategy must come changes to the National Military Strategy. So what might change under Dunford’s second crack at the NMS? The chairman made it sound like it will largely involve coloring in details that were already laid out in the previous document, particularly around the analysis of the “4+1” challenges to America – China, Russia, North Korea, Iran and violent extremism. There is good reason to keep big-picture strategy documents, where broad contexts and big ideas are presented – however lofty and inconsequential they may seem to the initiated – accessible for everyone. But those details may not make it to the public. As with the 2016 document, **Dunford will be keeping the military strategy classified, with only a partial version released to the public. That was the first time in two decades the NMS had been classified, but the chairman intends to follow that path again.** “It’s about plans. And so you want to classify those,” Dunford said. “We’ll come out certainly with an unclassified description of it, so that we’re transparent – as we were last time… The ‘how-to-deal-with-that’ in our campaign plans and operations plans is the part that needs to be classified.” As to timing, Dunford joked he would love to have the document done next week, but acknowledged it would likely take months before the document is finalized. “We’re going to work on that really hard. We’re going to work on that really hard. That is a main focus for 2018, is to get that thing done,” he said. “Look, I don’t want to put a date on the calendar, but it’s not February or March. “This will be a deliberative process, but we got a jumpstart on it. But it’s certainly months away from publishing.”

### 1AR – Solvency Deficit

#### AFRICOM is directly controlled by the joints chiefs—only the aff actor has jurisdiction to implement.

Williams 18 [Katie Bo Williams, (Katie Bo Williams is the senior national security correspondent for Defense One, where she writes about defense, counterterror, NATO, nukes, and more.) "From Small Wars to Great Power, Trump’s Africa Reset Could Change US Military’s Role" Defense One, 12-12-2018, https://www.defenseone.com/politics/2018/12/small-wars-great-power-trumps-africa-reset-could-change-us-militarys-role/153485/, DOA:3-9-2019 // WWBW]

“There’s this inherent tension in the [National Defense Strategy],” said Judd Devermont, who currently leads the Africa program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and who served as the national intelligence officer for Africa from 2015 to 2018. “**The overall NDS talks about great power competition as a new focus, but if you look at the Africa elements on the NDS, combatting the malign influence** — that’s the last piece of that entire paragraph. So I think **AFRICOM is still making this transition, trying to adjust the way it thinks about the prioritization of terrorism versus great power competition.**”

## 1AR – Conditions

### 1AR – Perm

Perm do both: The advocacy says authoritarian regimes in Niger—that means we can give them aid when they’re no longer authoritarian after they’ve met the condition.

Perm do both: The CP isn’t textually competitive because it’s just the aff but with a condition so it requires our advocacy. Prefer textual competition because functional competition causes infinite judge intervention and is subjective, whereas textuality is verifiable.

Perm do the CP: Should is not deliberate and allows consultation

Eddy, 15 - Berlin correspondent for The International New York Times, a position she has held since January 2012(“The Road to a Paris Climate Deal”, The New York Times, 14 December 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/climate/2015-paris-climate-talks/at-climate-talks-three-letters-almost-sunk-the-deal)//SL

PARIS — In the 11th hour before the landmark climate deal was approved on Saturday, a few letters threatened to derail years of calculated negotiations and two weeks of intense diplomacy — those that made “should” into “shall.” Those two words may seem disarmingly similar, but on the international stage, they are worlds apart in terms of the [diplomatic meaning](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/climate/2015-paris-climate-talks/a-leaner-climate-proposal-emerges-complete-with-big-questions) they carry. The legally binding “shall” stopped the United States cold when it showed up on Saturday in what was to be the final draft of the historic pact. Throughout the process, the longer and less binding “should” was a deliberate part of the international agreement, put there to establish that the richest countries, including the United States, felt obligated to pony up money to help poor countries adapt to climate change and make the transition to sustainable energy systems. “Shall” meant something altogether different, American officials said. When “shall” was spotted in the document on Saturday, Secretary of State John Kerry called his French counterpart and made it clear that unless a switch was made, France could not count on American support for the agreement.

### 1AR – Solvency Deficit

This was from Michael Ning’s Egypt Aff, who I shared prep with—I didn’t feel comfortable disclosing his cards.

### 1AR – Theory

## 1AR – Terror DA

### TL

#### It’s impossible to verify the effectiveness of US counter-terror – reject the DA. Err aff – the only empirics show increased militias.

O’Connell 17 [Aaron B. O’Connell, () "Does Trump Know What He Signed Up for in Niger?" Slate Magazine, 10-25-2017, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/10/does-the-u-s-know-what-it-signed-up-for-in-niger.html, DOA:3-9-2019 // WWBW]

Are any of these efforts working?Maybe—it depends on how one measures success. Today, Boko Haram can no longer slip as easily across national borders when facing a tough fight—an important change from 2015—and all five coalition nations credit the U.S. with helping in this success. However, in February, a report by the International Crisis Group [warned](https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/niger/245-niger-and-boko-haram-beyond-counter-insurgency) that overly **militarized tactics are also “sharpening local conflicts” and “strengthen[ing] the tendency to create militias” in Niger.** The report concluded that **the coalition must supplement counterterrorism with nonviolent approaches**—development and grievance resolution programs, in particular—**because “there is no military solution to this insurgency.”** It is equally hard to know whether the security sector assistance programs are bearing much fruit. **The U.S. government has spent** [**$160 million**](https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IN10797.pdf) **in the past decade to train and equip Nigerien forces, but** as the U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, **manning and equipping units gives little indication of whether they will stay and fight or desert with U.S.-provided weapons.** The human rights training and vetting requirements have a mixed record as well: As just one example, the U.S. provided millions in training and equipment to South Sudan when it gained independence from Sudan in 2011, but none of the associated vetting or human rights classes stopped President Salva Kiir’s Dinka-led government from slaughtering its ethnic enemies with U.S. weapons when the country descended into civil war in December 2013. **Even the special operators doing partnered counterterrorism operations have little proof that their efforts are working. U.S. proxies may be killing those that claim to be affiliated with al-Qaida or ISIS, but no one knows whether the American-funded violence—or even the mere presence of the U.S. military in Niger—is helping the extremists recruit more members than the Americans and their Nigerien counterparts are killing.** In 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld [noted with frustration](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-war-on-terrorism-the-big-picture/) that “we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror.” This criticism is even more trenchant today, because we’ve had 14 years to adjust.

#### Non-unique – Malian instability gives Boko Haram a home base that makes the impact inevitable.

Ahmed 18 [Ibrahim Ahmed, () "Official: Niger Is Facing Existential Threat" VOA, 7-19-2018, https://www.voanews.com/a/official-niger-is-facing-an-existential-threat-from-militants-/4490620.html, DOA:3-9-2019 // WWBW]

Although **Niger**, a landlocked country, **does not have a homegrown terror group within its territory**, several **militant groups operate** along its borders **with neighboring countries**, threatening its security. Some analysts suggest that **weaker and failing states sharing borders with Niger, particularly Mali, could be blamed for some of the insecurity in Niger as militants could easily cross into Niger. “Jihadist groups present since the 2012 crisis in Mali exploited local unrest and the weak presence of the state in northern Mali to launch cross-border attacks against the Nigerien army**,” Hannah Armstrong, a senior consultant on the Sahel region for the International Crisis Group, a global organization monitoring conflicts around the world, told VOA. Armstrong added that **Lake Chad is** particularly significant because it is **divided among four countries** — Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria — **and various terror groups**, including the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWAP), have made inroads in the area. “Despite direct support from Chadian troops since 2015 and closer collaboration with the Nigerian army, Nigerien forces have been unable to fully secure the border with Nigeria from attacks, including some linked to the Islamic State," Armstrong added, referring to the Boko Haram faction that now controls the Lake Chad area.

### 1AR – Radicalization

Cross-apply **Baillie 17**—aggressive counter-terror sparks civilian backlash against the government and increases terror recruitment.

### 1AR – Empirics

Cross-apply **Shulkin**—US aid has empirically done nothing for counter-terror; conflict has gotten worse.

## 1AR – Demining PIC

### TL

#### Perm do both—demining is provided though NADR, which is also the program the US uses to provide counter-terror. Just because we provide NADR, it doesn’t mean we also provide demining.

#### Niger is a bureaucratic nightmare – they refused demining aid from other organizations.

Mine Action Review 18 [Mine Action Review, (With a view to furthering full implementation of the clearance obligations of the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Mine Action Review gathers and analyses mine action data on landmine and cluster munition remnant contamination, survey, and clearance directly from operators, mine action centres, national authorities, and the United Nations for its publications and website (www.mineactionreview.org). Supported and published by Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), as an independent research project, Mine Action Review also serves as the primary source of information on mine action for the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, published by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines - Cluster Munition Coalition. The HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and NPA are on the project's Advisory Board.) “Clearing the Mines 2018 – Niger” 2018, http://www.mineactionreview.org/country/niger/anti-personnel-mines, DOA:3-9-2019 // WWBW]

Niger has made repeated appeals for international assistance for mine action and claimed receiving no external support for its activities, save for assistance from France for medical evacuation in the case of demining accidents.30 However, as noted above, following an assessment mission to Niger in May 2015, **NPA submitted an offer to provide Niger with assistance, including** provision of personal protective **equipment, so that more deminers could work** simultaneously, as well as a technical advisor to evaluate current methodology and trial equipment, which it believed could signifi cantly increase speed and productivity.31 **Danish Demining Group** (DDG) **also offered to help Niger** to complete clearance, **but Niger did not respond to either organisation’s offer.**32 In December 2017, NPA undertook a second monitoring mission to Niger as NPA was unable to access Madama during the fi rst mission. NPA planned to conduct a follow-up mission by the end of 2018 and supports the view that **Niger should develop a resource mobilisation plan that demonstrates their national commitment to demining.**33 At the Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2016, France announced that it would provide support to contribute to the clearance of the area around Madama fort, set to begin in 2017.34 In June 2017, Niger confi rmed that it had accepted France’s offer for technical support for an evaluation of the terrain around Madama, which it stated would better inform its planning and allow it to prepare an updated Article 7 transparency report.35 In its statement at the June 2018 Intersessional Meetings, Niger stated that it was still waiting on the offer of support from France to manifest.36

#### Niger has no plan for demining – aid uniquely won’t work.

Mine Action Review 2 [Mine Action Review, (With a view to furthering full implementation of the clearance obligations of the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Mine Action Review gathers and analyses mine action data on landmine and cluster munition remnant contamination, survey, and clearance directly from operators, mine action centres, national authorities, and the United Nations for its publications and website (www.mineactionreview.org). Supported and published by Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), as an independent research project, Mine Action Review also serves as the primary source of information on mine action for the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, published by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines - Cluster Munition Coalition. The HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and NPA are on the project's Advisory Board.) “Clearing the Mines 2018 – Niger” 2018, http://www.mineactionreview.org/country/niger/anti-personnel-mines, DOA:3-9-2019 // WWBW]

States parties decided to grant this second request while noting, as with its previous extension request, that **Niger had failed to provide a detailed annual workplan for clearance and benchmarks against which to assess progress.** As such, Niger was requested by states parties to provide a revised detailed workplan with a list of all areas known or suspected to contain anti-personnel mines, along with monthly and annual projections of which areas would be addressed during the extension period. The importance of submitting an updated Article 7 report on an annual basis was further emphasised.20 In April 2018, Niger submitted its fi rst Article 7 report since 2012. Unfortunately, much of the report is repetition of the same information from its 2015 and 2016 Article 5 deadline extension requests. **Niger did include a workplan for demining** a total of 196,253m2 in 2017–20. **However, the figures given in the table are inaccurate and some of the totals are illegible.**21

#### Symbolism DA – Niger uses any support to justify state repression – that’s Corey-Boulet. Aid is perceived as cover from the West.

### 1AR – Perm

Perm do the cp—if any military aid to Niger should be abolished, then that affirms because an instance of the res is still desirable.

Perm do the cp—demining isn’t military aid since it doesn’t enhance offensive military capabilities—that was the definition the aff defends in the doc.

Perm do both: The CP isn’t textually competitive because it’s just the aff but with an exception so it requires our advocacy. Prefer textual competition because functional competition causes infinite judge intervention and is subjective, whereas textuality is verifiable.

Perm do the aff and re-appropriate the net benefit to non-military aid—net benefit is that there’s no risk of circumvention.

### 1AR – Theory

## 1AR – IMET PIC

### TL

#### IMET causes coups – reforms don’t solve since it’s a question of who gains power.

Caverley and Savage 17 bracketed for acronyms [Jonathan D. Caverley (Strategic and Operational Research, College of Naval Warfare Studies, US Naval War College) and Jesse Dillon Savage (Department of Political Science, Trinity College Dublin). “When human capital threatens the Capitol: Foreign aid in the form of military training and coups” Journal of Peace Research, 2017. https://sci-hub.tw/10.1177/0022343317713557 //WWDH]

The effect on domestic politics of assistance in the form of foreign military training (FMT) is unlikely to be limited to respect for human rights and civilian control. Training imparts valuable resources to and increases the professional distance of a potentially dangerous section of a developing state’s polity. Increasing trainees’ human capital is likely to increase resource demands on the regime, and improve the military’s ability to remove the regime should its demands not be met. We find a robust relationship between US training of foreign militaries and military-backed coup attempts, despite limiting our analysis to the International Military Education and Training program (IMET), which explicitly focuses on promoting norms of civilian control. If the number of soldiers trained (or dollars spent) moves from the 25th percentile to the 75th, the predicted probability of a coup roughly doubles. We also find that FMT correlates to the likelihood of a successful military-backed coup. That training is positively associated with coups even when analysis is limited to democracies represents an especially profound challenge to the idea that the only political effect of training is to fundamentally alter militaries’ norms. Lack of evidence linking training and non-military-backed coups further undermines this mechanism. Finally, training’s effect on coup propensity differs significantly from other forms of military aid in both direction and magnitude, lending support to our theoretical argument about the non-fungibility of military human capital. Coups are extreme examples of military involvement in domestic politics. Our theory suggests more generally that trained military officers will grow more autonomous from the regime. This can increase inclination for coups but more broadly means that the military will be less invested in regime survival (Atkinson, 2006, 2010; Brooks, 2013). Providing the military with resources that are not vulnerable to redistribution may mean they are less inclined to repress to prevent regime change in general. In this case, normative and capital-based mechanisms make similar claims, and may reinforce each other. Figure 8. Simulated effects of IMET spending on non-militarybacked coups Points represent first differences of predicted probabilities moving from the 25th percentile of Spending or Spending (5-year sum) to the 75th percentile. 95% confidence intervals. 7 Table 9 depicts the results for unmatched observations, but results are almost identical in other models (see Online appendix). Savage & Caverley 553 What are the implications for our findings? Healthy civil-military relations is only one low-priority goal served by US training. From a US government perspective an increase in coups may be a small price to pay given its overall aims. Moreover, developing professional militaries in under-institutionalized states may remain a worthy goal, even if it does risk military participation in politics (Harkness, 2014). More detailed research on the other coup incentives that officers face in their home country is required. Given recent trends in development, considering military assistance in the wider context of foreign assistance also seems essential. Recent work has found evidence that targeted aid building up a number of robust groups within civil society can lead to increased democratization. This is not so much due to liberal norms adoption but to countervailing institutions achieving some independence from regimes. Our research suggests that the military should be considered in this context. Aid processes that do not consider this may be missing an opportunity. On the other hand, a security-oriented ‘development’ strategy that does not also target civilian groups may lead to increased military dominance. Understanding the risks seems essential to both good security and good development policy.

### 1AR – Perm

Perm do the cp—if any military aid to Niger should be abolished, then that affirms because an instance of the res is still desirable.

Perm do both: The CP isn’t textually competitive because it’s just the aff but with an exception so it requires our advocacy. Prefer textual competition because functional competition causes infinite judge intervention and is subjective, whereas textuality is verifiable.

### 1AR – Theory

# 1AR – K

## Toolbox

### 1AR – Framework

### 1AR – Perms

## 1AR – Reps

### TL – Reps Not a Voter

## 1AR – Afropess

### 1AR – Perm – Barlow

**This was also from Michael’s aff.**