# 1AC – MMM

### Part 1 is the Empire

#### **Nuclear weapons proliferation and the modern academic-military-industrial complex necessitates a labor force to carry out the Empire’s demands – the Model Minority Myth serves to siphon Asian-Americans into high paying research work that facilitates nuclear militarism and endless imperialism abroad.**

Bui 16 <https://faculty.sites.uci.edu/longbui/files/2019/01/Bui-A-Better-Life.pdf> CRITICAL ETHNIC STUDIES PROJECTS MEET THE NEOLIBERAL UNIVERSITY A Better Life? Asian Americans and the Necropolitics of Higher Education Long t. Bui Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/books/chapter-pdf/490459/9780822374367-008.pdf by UC SAN DIEGO LIBRARY May 2016 TJHSSTAD

It is no coincidence that the reinvigorated militarization of the country and necropoliticalization of higher education occurred at a time when the number of foreign-born scientists working in the United States had doubled and college students from militarizing countries like China, Japan, India, and South Korea soared. (International students account for 40 percent of all doctoral degrees in science and engineering granted in the country.)16 Almost 70 percent of Asian PhDs in the United States earn their degrees in the life sciences, physical sciences, and engineering, an upward trend as the hard sciences receive heavier promotion and funding to bolster the number of potential workers able to directly enhance America’s global standing as the most powerful nation. In the so-called post-American Asian Century, when Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/books/chapter-pdf/490459/9780822374367-008.pdf by UC SAN DIEGO LIBRARY user on 18 January 2019 166 • long t. bui scientific know-how gives industrializing Asian nations a comparative advantage in their bidding for world power against the United States, skilled Asian workers are valuable players in leveraging a new world order. In light of all this, it behooves scholars to move away from discussing the Asian model minority myth as a false stereotype or fixating on the “bamboo ceiling” faced by Asian professionals in their lucrative careers and begin initiating tough conversations about the lethal costs of their labor productivity. The Rise of the Model Majority: Asians as a New (Post)Racial Preference During the late 1960s and  1970s student-led antiwar movements exposed the collusion of state-funded universities and the  U.S. military state.17 The radicalism of the Yellow Power movement built around what Yen Le Espiritu calls panethnic “reactive solidarity” to societal racism has been greatly anaesthetized,18 co-opted by the university in its quest to reduce racial turmoil on campus. The Asian American scholar Glen Omatsu maintains that there has been a steady decline in progressive Asian American politics, which were initially not “centered on the aura of racial identity but embraced fundamental questions of oppression and power . . . not of seeking legitimacy and representation within American society.” For Omatsu there has been an enlarging of the Asian American presence in American society and colleges but not “a corresponding growth in consciousness—of what it means to be Asian American.” This absence of radical thinking is due to an ideological-political vacuum as the community now finds itself stuck between the goals of “empowerment solely in terms of individual advancement for a few, or as the collective liberation for all peoples.”19 The historical push for more public accountability from the university has failed to disrupt positivist ideas of public education and illuminate its origins as an engine of war. The fast evolution of the University of California into an Asian-serving institution (seven of its ten campuses are majority Asian) owes much to the history of U.S. colonialism and military wars in Asia that set the precedence for the government’s preference for skilled Asian labor in the post-1965 period and liberal immigration policies that favored the kinds of professional college-educated immigrant families from which many Asian American students originate. The meteoric rise of the University of California to become an internationally renowned brand owes much to the establishment of new labor, migration, and consumer markets, technological transfers, and global trade between the Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/books/chapter-pdf/490459/9780822374367-008.pdf by UC SAN DIEGO LIBRARY user on 18 January 2019 A Better Life? • 167 United States and Asian nations. After World War II the federal government awarded millions of dollars to support research for military weapons manufacturing, recruiting high-tech workers from Asia but also poor Asian and Latino workers to form a segmented labor force, buttressing the alliance between the military establishment and universities like uc Berkeley to build an invincible war industry.20 Geopolitical realignments and economic restructuring allowed the American research university to establish close ties with state entities in Japan, Singapore, China, and South Korea to create a professionalized global economy built not on political neutrality, as the sociologist Manuel Castells finds, but on a field of networks.21 Under the U.S. pivot toward Asia, research universities will continue to grow exponentially, just as they did during the cold war to expand the academic-military-industrial complex. The dream of higher education and the American Dream pursued by so many Asian youths today reflects what Jodi Kim calls the “protracted afterlife” of U.S. imperialism in Asia, a fact of historical reality that prompts an Asian American politics that does not solely look toward a better future but also looks back at how things came to be.22

#### **The Model Minority Myth is an imperial strategy used by the Empire in order to extract labor from Asian Americans depending on its contextual needs. Asian Americans conform to the fluid needs and norms defined by the Empire silenced in the process.**

Kim and Taylor 17 2017 The Model Minority Stereotype as a Prescribed Guideline of Empire: Situating the Model Minority Research in the Postcolonial Context Eun Hee Kim Kansas State University, eunheek@ksu.edu Kay Ann Taylor Kansas State University, [ktaylor@ksu.edu](mailto:ktaylor@ksu.edu) TJHSSTAD

* MMS = model minority stereotype

Model Minority Stereotype: Serving the Interests of Empire How does the MMS integrate, differentiate, and manage, in other words, welcome all within its boundaries, take away any possibility that leads to “real” political resistance and conflicts, and make all minorities, including Asian Americans, serve the interests of Empire? By accepting criticism and even promoting more criticism as evidence of its flexibility and acknowledgement of differences. The criticism should not possess any capability or intention to organize an opinion 7 Kim and Taylor: The Model Minority Stereotype as a Prescribed Guideline of Empire Published by Purdue e-Pubs, 2017 that can lead to mass movement, staying safely within the territory where it is supposed to be, which is the realm of “discourse” with other topics whether in media or academia. This is why Asian Americans’ advancement in politics in the discourse of the 1980s should not be understood as if they are making “real” political advancement, because it is not the only topic, but one of the diverse topics of Asian Americans that are allowed to be discussed before Empire’s all-welcoming gaze. Again, Empire acknowledges multiplicity and diversity, but does not want criticism to develop into political resistance and conflicts. Osajima’s (2005) finding that the tendency of the discourse of the 1980s became less political using non-racial terms is additional evidence the MMS discourse has settled down for “peace” or has been led to that direction. In this way, the purpose Empire has placed on the MMS has been successfully accomplished, giving false thought to Asian American intellectuals and activists that their rights are being achieved or improvements are on the way, particularly as related to their economic conditions and welfare. In addition, the MMS shows the managerial moment of Empire for its economic expansion as exemplified by Hardt and Negri (2000) in how the labor of the plantation and mine workers was managed. The MMS, as a divide-and-conquer strategy, is specifically applied for this managerial moment of Empire as Chae (2008) stated that the MMS is a strategy devised and used by capitalists. Hard work as a signifier of success of Asian Americans in both the 1960s and the 1980s indicates that the MMS is used for the managerial or hierarchical moment of imperial control. It was a method devised for Asian Americans out of the varied methods used for different ethnicities and cultures. As the economic face of Empire, this strategy makes people competitively serve the economic interest of the imperial society like the plantation workers on the banana plantation in Central America. In this sense, the MMS carries a strong degree of exploitation among the varied methods because it requires arduous work that spans generations, which incessantly tells them to aim for higher education and higher paying jobs. The tendency to work hard and be obedient to authority is culturally embedded in Asian Americans’ nature; however, it is not in fact and this will be explained later. The MMS is a successful example of an imperial strategy ethnically and culturally improved and reinforced in the process of the strategical development for more effective control. Because the MMS sends out the message hard work equals success not only to the ethnic group it was intended for, but to other minorities as well, then all yearn for the same success through hard work competing with Asian Americans. The MMS, therefore, carries the triple imperative of Empire: inclusion, differentiation, and management. Its divide-and-conquer facet is specially designed for the economic order of Empire. The Changing Form of the Model Minority Stereotype In previous research, the MMS has been studied as a divide-and-conquer strategy as if it is an innate attribute. To introduce Osajima’s (2005) article in his edited book, Ono (2005) wrote, “while it appears to be a compliment, in fact it implies that Asian Americans can never be on equal footing with Whites, even as it simultaneously creates a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy to win over Asian Americans and pit Asian Americans against Blacks and Latinas/os” (p. 8). As indicated in this quote, the MMS was devised to present Asian Americans as a triumphant case against other minorities. It also shows that Asian Americans were intentionally selected as a model minority by the U.S. government to shift away negative international attention from itself (Hartlep, 2013a). However, these identified purposes, for which Empire created the MMS, require scrutiny through the changing form of the stereotype. 8 Journal of Southeast Asian American Education and Advancement, Vol. 12 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 4 https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/jsaaea/vol12/iss2/4 DOI: 10.7771/2153-8999.1156 The pattern of the imperial control changes continuously regardless of regions and cultures, but continuously modifies itself fitting diverse regions and cultures (Hardt & Negri, 2000). It suggests imperial strategies can always change according to the contextual needs, and the MMS is one of the “variety of always incomplete but nonetheless effective solutions” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 199). Therefore, the MMS should not be understood as a notion with fixed attributes because the imperial society of control works on “circuits of movement and mixture” creating multiple strategies (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 199). We can see how the notion of model minority emerged and how long it has lasted. Its precedent historical form was the “yellow peril” that lasted from the late 19th century untill 1966 when the MMS appeared. It has lasted 50 years. Its longevity indicates that the model minority, like the “yellow peril,” is a contextual representation, or manifest Orientalism of latent Orientalism, which can take a different shape at any time according to Empire’s hierarchical need and interest. Therefore, caution must be exercised when assigning a definition that characterizes the MMS concretely as seen in its current form. It has the potential to fixate inquisitive minds on given features and attributes of the notion, blinding them from identifying what form or shape it will take in the future and how the transformation will occur. This is the reason, as Hartlep (2013b) noted, the MMS discourse should not revisit what has been already researched, but instead generate new paradigms. Through the new paradigms, the MMS can be further studied and analyzed in the new historical context on a continuum of the past. The new historical context requires MMS research expand its scope beyond the United States where it originated because Empire does not limit its expansion within regions and its strategies work globally. Hartlep (2014) also highlighted the need to turn to the globe, by saying that the MMS is not limited to Asian Americans in the United States, but applied to Asians in Asian countries. It can be seen in the transnational network of highly skilled and educated Asian workers and their efforts to conform to the norm imposed on them. For example, Kaibara (2014) found Japanese elites in Japan and the United States collaborated to improve the image of Japanese immigrants in the United States by organizing reform campaigns to present Japanese immigrants as a good model conforming to the social and cultural norms in the United States. These activities serve Empire’s interest well.

#### Traditional interpretations of the resolution are a wrong starting point – the Empire defines transnational networks of capitalism and militarism that undergird nuclear disarmament meaning it will always fail. The Model Minority Myth is a key stereotype that defines how modern militarism operates – the Empire defines the Model Minority based on its shifting needs to retain power within the international sphere. Discussion about nuclear weapons and international entanglements obscures the everyday ongoing violence of the Model Minority Myth.

### Part 2 is the Method

#### Thus, I affirm the resolution through a methodology of “Asianfail”. “Asianfail” entails a refusal of the Empire’s neoliberal expectations of the Model Minority and necessitates an individual redefinition of success.

Streamas 19 Streamas, John. "Asia-Pessimism: Modeling a Revolution in Failure." The Comparatist, vol. 43, 2019, p. 112-124. Project MUSE, October 2019 doi:10.1353/com.2019.0006. TJHSSTAD

Whether conservatives know of these investments is irrelevant. Success—more financial than educational, more private than public—is the goal regardless. And success is as likely to be fiercely anti-intellectual as deeply intellectual and disciplinary. Here Ty needs to bolster Halberstam’s argument for failure, especially if Asian Americans, the perceived model minority, are to embrace it. For even if rejecting mastery and adopting the naïve and stupid only seem to be the default position of anti-intellectual conservatives, this is certainly a position inimical to an assimilated racial model. Why would Asian Americans reject mastery? Even when an anomalous Asian American success emerges—Jeremy Lin, for example, in his brief time as a basketball star—racists jeer partly because of a grudging recognition of that success. Asian American students who joke about getting only a B+ on a physics test— which is the example given by Urban Dictionary of “Asian fail”—are not embracing failure as much as they are struggling with parents’ expectations. This is especially true of children of the hyperassimilated “tiger mother,” who pressures her children toward perfection.3 These students and children want not to fail but to succeed on their own terms—and not on their mothers’ terms. In this way, then, “Asian fail” as Urban Dictionary defines it is not real failure in mainstream culture but is merely a diminished success. And this is not the “Asianfail” Eleanor Ty advocates. After discussing social media jokes on Asian failures, Ty offers the obligatory debunking of the “model minority” stereotype, arguing that “model minority discourse assumes that individuals can transcend specific historical and material conditions in order to achieve happiness” (3). She also invokes Rey Chow’s argument for an “ethnicization of labor,” by which perceived Asian American success is programmed into the racial agenda of neoliberal whiteness (Ty 7). Then, drawing on the work of Susan Koshy, she charges that the success model of the “tiger mother” type assumes private solutions to public problems (Ty 9). She ends her preliminary remarks on failure by observing that recent Asian American works of film and literature challenge success narratives by “chronicling the unhappy or failed life”: [P]rotagonists of these works feel disenchanted with their daily lives. Many are depressed, and some are haunted by memories of their childhood, including experiences of war, trauma, or refugee camps. Instead of aiming for professional success and economic capital, they look for other ways of achieving satisfaction, emphasizing affective bonds and personal and cultural success. Their disavowal of the work ethic and values of their parents signals a rejection of the narrowly defined road to success . . . and consequently a rejection, in many cases, of neoliberal capitalism. (Ty 10) Ty argues too vehemently for the currentness of such cultural productions, for after all, Marxist and labor-centered Asian American writers such as Carlos Bulosan, H. T. Tsiang, and Ronyoung Kim exposed the lies of success narratives in their work several decades ago.4 Also, Ty overlooks the fact that many protagonists in contemporary Asian American books and films, regardless of their personal struggles, take for granted their middle-class comforts, and that these comforts were probably an outcome—or a reward?—of their immigrant parents’ more public struggles.5 Still, just as Halberstam’s argument for failure knows that practitioners must occupy a position in which they are considered successes before they may choose failure as a strategy of resistance, so too does Ty’s argument know that Asian Americans positioned as model minorities may choose failure, and that, making this choice, they not only fight stereotypes but also, more important, aim to dismantle an economic order that alone defines success and failure.

#### There are multiple net benefits to my method:

#### 1] Survival Strategy – my methodology offers support for Asian-Americans dealing with mental health crises and the psychological impacts of the Model Minority Myth on a regular basis. Ethnic studies privileges structural theories of the world that claim explanatory power, but this obscures focus on the individual – only my method can help individuals survive within macro-structures of power.

Streamas 2 Streamas, John. "Asia-Pessimism: Modeling a Revolution in Failure." The Comparatist, vol. 43, 2019, p. 112-124. Project MUSE, October 2019 doi:10.1353/com.2019.0006. TJHSSTAD

Of course the project of social justice depends partly on choices to resist made by those who have privilege on behalf of those who lack it—that is, to the extent that the privileged may claim such a right. Ty reads social media “Asianfail” self-disclosures “as ambivalent articulations of contemporary Asian North American youthful subjectivity—not of a sense of a mortifying failure to belong, but of a vacillation between embarrassment and pride in not conforming to or belonging to anything imagined as ‘Asian’” (23). Troublingly, though, while Ty claims these young Asian Americans reject “tiger mother” professionalism, she also observes “their failure to comply with normative expectations of being Asian” (23)—but a “failure to comply” is not the same as a refusal to comply. Before “Asianfailure” can work, it must originate in refusal, in protest. And for many Asian Americans, that refusal is imbricated into their Asian identities. The other manifestation of “Asianfailure” that bears notice is not strategic but is rather a mark of a difference between real whiteness and “yellow whiteness,” a difference that makes Asian Americans targets of a subtle and near-invisible racism borne of the “model minority” stereotype. People of color generally suffer their depressions silently—among the many memoirs of depression topping best-seller lists, almost none are by writers of color—but Asian Americans have been particularly quiet in mental health discourse. Here Ty’s argument is most valuable for its observation of recent cultural works that construct failure as emotional trauma and suicidal depression. Of course no “model” citizen would confess to feeling depressed. A recent study by the organization Mental Health America found that “Asian Americans are least likely to have a history of diagnosis [of mental illness] even though 57% of those who completed a mental health screen scored moderately to severely depressed. Asian Americans are also three times less likely to seek mental health services” (Cheang). One source of such reluctance should be obvious: “The ‘Model Minority’ myth is a constant stressor. When your community embraces the idea that you are destined to succeed due to your racial background, failure comes as a devastating hit to your mental health” (Cheang). This is true for Asian Americans victimized by a stereotype in which they believe, or at least the rewards of which they dream of attaining. For those others who may embrace Halberstam-like failure, however, rewards may be elusive. When editors of The Asian American Literary Review published their DSM: Asian American Edition, they spotlighted the rage in an essay by Kai Cheng Thom, a family therapist who survived multiple suicide attempts: “Mental health is the language of power—the power to exist within, and sometimes define, the conventions of sanity, normalcy, the status quo, capitalism, white heteropatriarchy” (11). Thom realizes that mental illness is real, that it has a biological component, and that it causes great suffering, but she insists that cure comes not from institutional solutions but from a political engagement with its sources and its meanings (11). Like Halberstam and Ty, Thom urges resistance, but as an artist invested in individuation she finds it in madness, myth, and magic: “Witches, weirdoes, crazies, all: take up your spells. We are going to war” (12). The language of war may be disagreeable, but the attribution of depression to racism, misogyny, capitalism, and other forms of oppression is too often dodged even by writer-sufferers who should know better. In a recent best-selling depression memoir, Daphne Merkin remarks on a gendered difference in constructions of illness: While men may blame their depressions on fate or genetics, women write about theirs as if its source is a moral failing, “a yawning inner lack—some elusive craving for wholeness or well-being” (13). What Merkin fails to note is that such cravings fuel popular memoirs and creative nonfiction, and that women are thus rewarded for them, even if differently from men. She also fails to note that the field of depression memoirs is dominated by white middle-class constructions of illness. Her own memoir, while it may not wallow in excesses of “feminized” grieving, is nevertheless an individuated narrative, not a story that would seek sources of illness in economic and racial structures.6 Perhaps the best study of race and depression is Anne Anlin Cheng’s The Melancholy of Race: Psychoanalysis, Assimilation, and Hidden Grief, which provides ample social and historical context for the emotional sufferings of people of color. Cheng argues that a demand of racism and the institutions profiting from it imposes a willful turning away, often by people of color themselves, from emotional suffering. This turning away extends even to the present, as presumably supportive disciplines such as Ethnic Studies (in which I work) largely ignore depression, assuming it to be too individuating, or else too submerged under larger social causes that recommend themselves more readily to quantifiable social scientific research. Cheng charges race scholarship with an unwillingness “to confront the psychic implications of the haunting negativity that has not only been attached to but has also helped to constitute the very category of ‘the racialized’” (25). She charges, further, that theories of multiplicity, hybridity, and strategic essentialism “cannot address the complexity of identification as a psychical process” (26). Halberstam and Ty might applaud this critique of disciplines, except that Cheng seems to find some explanatory power in the discipline of psychoanalysis. Cheng realizes that merely talking about depression among people of color “seems to reinscribe a whole history of affliction or run the risk of naturalizing that pain,” but she also realizes that ignoring it runs equal or greater risks, since the implications of discussing it “are on the one hand inconvenient to a racist culture and on the other potentially threatening to the project of advocacy” (14).

#### 2] Unproductivity – redefining failure and success ruptures capitalist notions of productivity – battling the MMM means rejecting the notion of a “model” capitalist worker and rather embracing individuality as a means of discarding neoliberal expectations of the Asian-American.

#### 3] Masking – the Model Minority Myth is used to downplay and mask violence against other minority groups by reifying the myth of meritocracy i.e. that if one works hard enough, they can finally be recognized by whiteness as humans. The notion of a Model Minority implies that other minority groups like Black and Queer individuals can self-determine their futures and denies the existence of ongoing structural barriers and violence. I do not claim that the oppression of Asian Americans is the root cause or worst form of oppression, but rather that that the MMM is an essential tool wielded by whiteness in order to mask structural barriers and staticize violence against other groups.

### Part 3 is Framework

#### Debate systematically ignores oppression in favor of imaginary impacts, breeding disconnected technocrats. Thus, the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater with the best liberation strategy for the oppressed – learning survival strategies is key.

Fine 13Todd; Founder of project Khalid and coaches the debate team at Washington Latin Public Charter School in Washington, D.C. and is Vice President of the High School D.C. Urban Debate League and writes for the huff post; “Qatar Conference on Scholastic Debate Examines Activity's Role in Empowerment”; Huffington Post; 3/10/13 @ 5:12 am; Accessed 2/17/15 @ 12:43 pm; [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/todd-fine/qatar-conference-on-schol\_b\_2429645.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/todd-fine/qatar-conference-on-schol_b_2429645.html%7dAvP) TJHSSTAD

Meanwhile, the National Association of Urban Debate Leagues (NAUDL), a nonprofit headquartered in Chicago, has supported the expansion of this policy format into urban school districts across the country, with large nonprofit leagues in Atlanta, Chicago, Baltimore, Boston, and other cites. Because the sponsors are mostly college debaters, many of them now accomplished lawyers, who believe in the "policy debate" format and itstransformativepower as an intense, total experience, the association has largely focused on the establishment of leagues based exclusively on this policy format. These developments, combined, have created an inverse bell curve of wealth in the policy debate community, with a handful of elite schools and a growing cohort of extremely poor schools being all that remains. Middle class suburban schools and rural schools, overwhelmed by the rising costs of travel to far-away tournaments as the total numbers in policy debate dwindle, are hard to find at all. This unusual socioeconomic makeup has prompted more than just a culture shock, but a highly-contested and ongoing ideological war in the debate rounds themselves. Poorer schools, largely black and other **minority**, now often **argue that debate itself reflects the racism and inequalities of** the broader **society. The year-long national topics**, which **serve the highly-specific technical needs of the elite national circuit, are often "critiqued" as symptomatic of a training system that forms cynical technocrats who will tolerate injustice as part of a never-ending, brutal game where real consequences are always "debatable."** As the American economy continues to flounder and urban schools face heavy challenges and criticisms, **these violent communication collisions in** debate **rounds are causing some** young **participants to question the possibility of ever addressing racism or structural inequality** in America. Yet, without some direct link between Urban Debate Leagues and activism itself, **even these** potent and uncomfortable **challenges** float without resolution and **are reduced to a win/loss statement** written by a judge on a ballot. In exasperation, many of the urban league debaters, and their coaches, now argue that **policy** debate can only have **value as a** fierce **training ground for blacks to gain survival skills to engage a hopelessly irredeemable America.**

#### The aff’s rejection of academic professionalization and disciplined hierarchies of knowledge injects minority viewpoints and new forms of knowledge into the debate space, forcing us to move past the comforts of academia and civil society – the attempt to define and enforce disciplinary structures upon the debate space footnotes such knowledge and is inherently violent.

Streamas 3 Streamas, John. "Asia-Pessimism: Modeling a Revolution in Failure." The Comparatist, vol. 43, 2019, p. 112-124. Project MUSE, October 2019 doi:10.1353/com.2019.0006. TJHSSTAD

In her book Asianfail, Eleanor Ty argues that Asian Americans can appropriate failure as a strategy for subverting norms. Her sense of failure derives from the work of queer theorists such as Judith/Jack Halberstam, for whom failure exists not as the paired opposite of mainstream success but rather as a family of evolving strategies for resisting governing structures. For Asian Americans, the stereotypical “model minority,” strategic failure would therefore be especially appropriate as a rebuke to those structures. Here I propose to show that in narratives of depression, especially recent novels by women, Asian Americans subvert perceptions of the failure that causes depression and suicide by portraying themselves honestly as people who suffer, and occasionally even rise above, institutional injustices. That these books are mostly by women serves both to acknowledge the falsehood of the striving “tiger mother” stereotype and to distance these stories from the inner-directed anguish of depression memoirs by white women. This leads to a corollary argument, for an approach I will call “Asia-Pessimism,” borrowing from recent critical constructions of “Afro-Pessimism.” As Jared Sexton, one of its leading thinkers, discusses it, Afro-Pessimism aims to train the focus of scholars and activists on black suffering, “toward an apprehension of the world-historical transformation entailed in the emergence of racial slavery.” It analyzes “how anti-black fantasies obtain objective value in the political and economic life of society and in the psychic life of culture as well” (Sexton). A similar “Asia-Pessimism” is in order, subverting stereotypes of “model minority” success with an emphasis on suffering, resistance, and justice. Halberstam’s argument in The Queer Art of Failure rests on three theses, the first two of which pertain particularly well to Asian America. The first—the need to resist mastery—seems to concern only academic professionalization, as it originates in a rejection of disciplinarity’s inherent conservatism: “We may, ultimately, want more undisciplined knowledge, more questions and fewer answers” (Halberstam 10). Halberstam argues that disciplinarity suppresses minoritized and indigenous knowledges—the examples of indigenous peoples’ long-standing disputes with Western anthropology are pertinent here—and the pursuit of those knowledges necessarily moves inquiry outside the comforts of academia. This is almost, but not quite, an argument for a kind of reverse ethnography—inquiry of colonizers from within colonized communities—that scholars are not trained to practice. The second thesis—the need to privilege whatever is stupid, naïve, nonsensical (Halberstam 12)—seems almost to invite failure, if not to defend strident antiintellectualism.

#### Policymaking education is useless – the government only listens to the affluent, economically advantaged and millions of average citizens are left behind.

Gilens and Page 14. Martin, Professor of Politics at Princeton University, and Benjamin, Gordon S. Fulcher Professor of Decision Making at Northwestern University, "Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens", American Political Science Association, Perspectives on Politics, September 2014 | Vol. 12/No. 3, p. 575-577

Abstract Each of four theoretical traditions in the study of American politics—which can be characterized as theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, Economic-Elite Domination, and two types of interest-group pluralism, Majoritarian Pluralism and Biased Pluralism—offers different predictions about which sets of actors have how much influence over public policy: average citizens; economic elites; and organized interest groups, mass-based or business-oriented. A great deal of empirical research speaks to the policy influence of one or another set of actors, but until recently it has not been possible to test these contrasting theoretical predictions against each other within a single statistical model. We report on an effort to do so, using a unique data set that includes measures of the key variables for 1,779 policy issues. Multivariate analysis indicates that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence. The results provide substantial support for theories of Economic-Elite Domination and for theories of Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism. Who governs? Who really rules? To what extent is the broad body of U.S. citizens sovereign, semi-sovereign, or largely powerless? These questions have animated much important work in the study of American politics. While this body of research is rich and variegated, it can loosely be divided into four families of theories: Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, Economic-Elite Domination, and two types of interest-group pluralism—Majoritarian Pluralism, in which the interests of all citizens are more or less equally represented, and Biased Pluralism, in which corporations, business associations, and professional groups predominate. Each of these perspectives makes different predictions about the independent influence upon U.S. policy making of four sets of actors: the Average Citizen or “median voter,” Economic Elites, and Mass-based or Business-oriented Interest Groups or industries. Each of these theoretical traditions has given rise to a large body of literature. Each is supported by a great deal of empirical evidence—some of it quantitative, some historical, some observational—concerning the importance of various sets of actors (or, all too often, a single set of actors) in U.S. policy making. This literature has made important contributions to our understanding of how American politics works and has helped illuminate how democratic or undeSmocratic (in various senses) our policy making process actually is. Until very recently, however, it has been impossible to test the differing predictions of these theories against each other within a single statistical model that permits one to analyze the independent effects of each set of actors upon policy outcomes. Here—in a tentative and preliminary way—we offer such a test, bringing a unique data set to bear on the problem. Our measures are far from perfect, but we hope that this first step will help inspire further research into what we see as some of the most fundamental questions about American politics. The central point that emerges from our research is that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while mass-based interest groups and average citizens have little or no independent influence. Our results provide substantial support for theories of Economic-Elite Domination and for theories of Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism. In what follows, we briefly review the four theoretical traditions that form the framework for our analyses and highlight some of the most prominent empirical research associated with each. We then describe our data and measures and present our results. We conclude by discussing the implications of our work for understanding American democracy and by identifying some of the directions for future research that our findings suggest. Four Theoretical Traditions Each of the four theoretical traditions we are addressing has produced a body of literature much too vast to review in detail here. We can only allude to a few central pieces of work in each tradition. And we must acknowledge that a particular scholar’s work does not always fall neatly into a single category. Some scholars work across—or independently of—our theoretical categories, embracing multiple influences and complex processes of policy making. Here we focus on ideal types of theory, for the purpose of outlining certain distinctive predictions that those types of theory tend to make. Given the nature of our data, we focus on the societal sources of influence that these theories posit, rather than on the mechanisms of influence that they discuss. Majoritarian Electoral Democracy Theories of majoritarian electoral democracy, as positive or empirical theories, attribute U.S. government policies chiefly to the collective will of average citizens, who are seen as empowered by democratic elections. Such thinking goes back at least to Tocqueville, who (during the Jacksonian era) saw American majorities as “omnipotent”—particularly at the state level—and worried about “tyranny of the majority.” 1 It is encapsulated in Abraham Lincoln’s reference to government “of the people, by the people, for the people,” and was labeled by Robert Dahl “populistic democracy.” 2 An important modern incarnation of this tradition is found in rational choice theories of electoral democracy, in which vote-seeking parties or candidates in a two-party system tend to converge at the mid-point of citizens’ policy preferences. If preferences are jointly single-peaked so that they can be arrayed along a single dimension, the “median voter theorem”—posited verbally by Harold Hotelling, proved by Duncan Black, and popularized by Anthony Downs in his Economic Theory of Democracy—states that two vote-seeking parties will both take the same position, at the center of the distribution of voters’ most-preferred positions. Under the relevant assumptions, public policy that fits the preferences of the median voter is not only the empirically-predicted equilibrium result of two-party electoral competition; as the “Condorcet winner” it also has the normative property of being the “most democratic” policy, in the sense that it would be preferred to any alternative policy in head-to-head majority-rule voting by all citizens. 3 Subsequent “chaos” results by social choice theorists, starting with Kenneth Arrow, have indicated that the median voter prediction follows logically only for unidimensional politics. If citizens’ preference orderings are not unidimensional and are sufficiently diverse, majority rule—hence also two-party electoral competition—might not lead to any equilibrium outcome at all. 4 It is important to note, however, that what might theoretically happen will not necessarily ever happen in practice. Real-world outcomes depend upon how institutions are organized and how preferences are actually configured. Despite the “chaos” results, and despite many criticisms of the median-voter theorem as simplistic and empirically inapplicable or wrong, 5 a good many scholars—probably more economists than political scientists among them—still cling to the idea that the policy preferences of the median voter tend to drive policy outputs from the U.S. political system. A fair amount of empirical evidence has been adduced—by Alan Monroe; Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro; Robert Erikson, Michael MacKuen, and James Stimson (authors of the very influential Macro Polity); and others—that seems to support the notion that the median voter determines the results of much or most policy making. This evidence indicates that U.S. federal government policy is consistent with majority preferences roughly two-thirds of the time; that public policy changes in the same direction as collective preferences a similar two-thirds of the time; that the liberalism or conservatism of citizens is closely associated with the liberalism or conservatism of policy across states; and that fluctuations in the liberal or conservative “mood” of the public are strongly associated with changes in the liberalism or conservatism of policy in all three branches of government. 6 The fly in the ointment is that none of this evidence allows for, or explicitly assesses, the impact of such variables as the preferences of wealthy individuals, or the preferences and actions of organized interest groups, which may independently influence public policy while perhaps being positively associated with public opinion—thereby producing a spurious statistical relationship between opinion and policy. Recent research by Larry Bartels and by one of the present authors (Gilens), which explicitly brings the preferences of “affluent” Americans into the analysis along with the preferences of those lower in the income distribution, indicates that the apparent connection between public policy and the preferences of the average citizen may indeed be largely or entirely spurious. 7 The “electoral reward and punishment” version of democratic control through elections—in which voters retrospectively judge how well the results of government policy have satisfied their basic interests and values, and politicians enact policies in anticipation of judgments that they expect will later be made by what V.O. Key, Jr., called “latent” public opinion—might be thought to offer a different prediction: that policy will tend to satisfy citizens’ underlying needs and values, rather than corresponding with their current policy preferences. 8 We cannot test this prediction because we do not have—and cannot easily imagine how to obtain—good data on individuals’ deep, underlying interests or values, as opposed to their expressed policy preferences. But the evidence that collective policy preferences are generally rather stable over time suggests that expressed collective policy preferences may not often diverge markedly from subsequently manifested “latent” preferences. They may do so only under special circumstances, such as economic recessions or disastrous wars. 9 If so, the electoral-reward-and-punishment type of democratic theory, too, predicts that most of the time public policy will respond to the current policy preferences of the average citizen. Economic-Elite Domination A quite different theoretical tradition argues that U.S. policy making is dominated by individuals who have substantial economic resources, i.e., high levels of income or wealth—including, but not limited to, ownership of business firms. Not all “elite theories” share this focus. Some emphasize social status or institutional position—such as the occupancy of key managerial roles in corporations, or top-level positions in political parties, in the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of government, or in the highest ranks of the military. Some elite theories postulate an amalgam of elites, defined by combinations of social status, economic resources, and institutional positions, who achieve a degree of unity through common backgrounds, coinciding interests, and social interactions. For example, C. Wright Mills’ important book, The Power Elite, offers a rather nuanced account of how U.S. social, economic, political, and military elites have historically alternated in different configurations of dominance. Mills noted that his elites derived in substantial proportions from the upper classes, including the very rich and corporate executives, but their elite status was not defined by their wealth. 10 Our focus here is on theories that emphasize the policy-making importance of economic elites. Analyses of U.S. politics centered on economic elites go back at least to Charles Beard, who maintained that a chief aim of the framers of the U.S. Constitution was to protect private property, favoring the economic interests of wealthy merchants and plantation owners rather than the interests of the then-majority small farmers, laborers, and craft workers. A landmark work in this tradition is G. William Domhoff’s detailed account of how elites (working through foundations, think-tanks, and an “opinion-shaping apparatus,” as well as through the lobbyists and politicians they finance) may dominate key issues in U.S. policy making despite the existence of democratic elections. Philip A. Burch has exhaustively chronicled the economic backgrounds of federal government officials through American history. Thomas Ferguson’s analysis of the political importance of “major investors” might be seen as a theory of economic elites. Most recently, Jeffrey Winters has posited a comparative theory of “Oligarchy,” in which the wealthiest citizens—even in a “civil oligarchy” like the United States—dominate policy concerning crucial issues of wealth and income protection. 11 Our third and fourth theoretical traditions posit that public policy generally reflects the outcome of struggle among organized interest groups and business firms. 12 Majoritarian Pluralism The roots of what we can characterize as theories of “majoritarian” interest-group pluralism go back to James Madison’s Federalist Paper No. 10, which analyzed politics in terms of “factions”—a somewhat fuzzy concept that apparently encompassed political parties and even popular majorities, as well as what we would today consider organized interest groups, business firms, and industrial sectors. Madison argued that struggles among the diverse factions that would be found in an extensive republic would lead to policies more or less representative of the needs and interests of the citizenry as a whole—or at least would tend to defeat “tyrannical” policies, including the much-feared issuance of inflationary paper money that might cater to local majority factions of farmer-debtors but would be costly to merchant creditors. 13 In the twentieth century, Arthur Bentley’s The Process of Government and then David Truman’s monumental The Governmental Process put groups at the center of political analysis, laying out a detailed picture of how organized interest groups might get their way. Truman offered a comprehensive and still-interesting catalogue of lobbying techniques and other methods of group influence. He also added an ingenious gloss to Madison that tends to increase both the plausibility and the normative appeal of majoritarian interest-group pluralism: the assertion that all interests have at least a minimum of influence in group-dominated policy making, because policy makers must (in order to avoid subsequent punishment) heed all “potential” groups that would form if their interests were trampled upon. 14 Robert Dahl’s analysis of New Haven city politics was Madisonian or Truman-like in its insistence that many (all?) diverse interests were represented, though Dahl focused as much on active members of the general public as on organized groups. Dahl’s analyses of American politics in terms of “polyarchy” or “pluralist democracy” also come close to our ideal type of majoritarian pluralist theory, since they imply that the wants or needs of the average citizen tend to be reasonably well served by the outcomes of interest-group struggle. Several contemporary analysts of interest-group politics likewise appear to accept (at least implicitly) a picture of group struggle that results in more or less majoritarian results. 15 A major challenge to majoritarian pluralist theories, however, is posed by Mancur Olson’s argument that collective action by large, dispersed sets of individuals with individually small but collectively large interests tends to be prevented by the “free rider” problem. Barring special circumstances (selective incentives, byproducts, coercion), individuals who would benefit from collective action may have no incentive to personally form or join an organized group. If everyone thinks this way and lets George do it, the job is not likely to get done. This reasoning suggests that Truman’s “potential groups” may in fact be unlikely to form, even if millions of peoples’ interests are neglected or harmed by government. Aware of the collective action problem, officials may feel free to ignore much of the population and act against the interests of the average citizen. 16 Biased Pluralism Olson’s argument points toward an important variant line of thinking within the pluralist tradition: theories of “biased” pluralism, which posit struggles among an unrepresentative universe of interest groups—characterized by E.E. Schattschneider as a heavenly chorus with an “upper-class accent,” and more recently dubbed by Kay Lehman Schlozman, Sidney Verba, and Henry Brady an “unheavenly chorus.” Theories of biased pluralism generally argue that both the thrust of interest-group conflict and the public policies that result tend to tilt toward the wishes of corporations and business and professional associations. 17 Schattschneider suggested that policy outcomes vary with the “scope of conflict”: for example, that business-oriented interest groups tend to prevail over ordinary citizens when the scope is narrow and visibility is low. Grant McConnell added the idea that the actual “constituencies” of policy implementers can consist of powerful groups. George Stigler (articulating what some economists have scorned as “Chicago Marxism”) analyzed the politics of regulation in terms of biased pluralism: the capture of regulators by the regulated. Charles Lindblom outlined a number of ways—including the “privileged position” of business—in which business firms and their associations influence public policy. Thomas Ferguson has posited an “investment theory” of politics in which “major investors”—especially representatives of particular industrial sectors—fund political parties in order to get policies that suit their economic interests. Fred Block’s “neo-Polanyian” analysis emphasizes groups. Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson’s analysis of “winner-take-all-politics,” which emphasizes the power of the finance industry, can be seen as a recent contribution to the literature of biased pluralism. 18 Marxist and neo-Marxist theories of the capitalist state hold that economic classes—and particularly the bourgeoisie, the owners of the means of production—dominate policy making and cause the state to serve their material interests. As the Communist Manifesto put it, “The bourgeoisie has . . . conquered for itself, in the modern representative State, exclusive political sway. The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.” 19 We cannot precisely test the predictions of such theories, because we lack good measures of policy preferences by economic class. (In Marxist theory, neither income nor wealth accurately signals class position.) We can note, however, that certain “instrumentalist” Marxist theories, including the important version put forth by Ralph Miliband, make predictions resembling those of theories of Biased Pluralism: that interest groups and corporations representing “large scale business” tend to prevail. 20 As to empirical evidence concerning interest groups, it is well established that organized groups regularly lobby and fraternize with public officials, move through revolving doors between public and private employment, provide self-serving information to officials, draft legislation, and spend a great deal of money on election campaigns. 21 Moreover, in harmony with theories of biased pluralism, the evidence clearly indicates that most interest groups and lobbyists represent business firms or professionals. Relatively few represent the poor or even the economic interests of ordinary workers, particularly now that the U.S. labor movement has become so weak. 22 But do interest groups actually influence policy? Numerous case studies have detailed instances in which all but the most dedicated skeptic is likely to perceive interest-group influence at work. A leading classic remains Schattschneider’s analysis of the 1928 enactment of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, an astounding orgy of pork-barrel politics. 23 Still, many quantitatively-oriented political scientists seem to ignore or dismiss such non-quantitative evidence. There have also been some efforts (particularly during the Cold War era, when unflattering depictions of U.S. politics may have been thought unpatriotic) to demonstrate that interest groups have no influence on policy at all. Raymond Bauer, Ithiel Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter argued that business had little or no effect on the renewal of reciprocal trade authority. Lester Milbrath, having conducted interviews with lobbyists and members of Congress, rated lobbyists’ influence as very low. More recently, Fred McChesney has made the ingenious argument that campaign contributions from interest groups may not represent quid pro quo bribery attempts by groups, but instead result from extortion by politicians who threaten to harm the groups’ interests. 24 Very few studies have offered quantitative evidence concerning the impact of interest groups based on a number of different public policies. Important exceptions include the work of Mark Smith and that of Frank Baumgartner, Jeffrey Berry, Marie Hojnacki, David Kimball, and Beth Leech. 25 Mark Smith examined 2,364 “business unity” issues—over a period of four decades—on which the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (arguably a reasonable proxy for business groups as a whole, on this particular set of issues where most businesses agreed) took a public stand for or against. He then calculated six measures of the Chamber’s annual rate of “success” at getting the action or inaction it favored from Congress. 26 The Chamber’s average success rate in terms of proportion of bills enacted or defeated appears to have been fairly high, 27 but Smith did not argue that such success necessarily demonstrates influence. (A batting-average approach to influence would have to assume that stand-taking is unrelated to expectations of success. Further, in order to gauge business’s independent impact and avoid spurious results, data on stands taken by other actors would need to be included as well.) Instead, Smith devoted most of his effort to analyzing the over-time correlates of high or low success, such as variations in the public “mood” and in the partisan composition of Congress. Frank Baumgartner and his colleagues, in their meticulous examination of 98 cases of congressional policy making in which interest groups were active, investigated whether the magnitude of group resources that were deployed was related to outcomes across those cases. In their multivariate analyses, Baumgartner et al. found a modest tendency for policy outcomes to favor the side that enjoyed greater resources (PAC contributions, lobbying expenditures, membership size, etc.). 28 Prior to the availability of the data set that we analyze here, no one we are aware of has succeeded at assessing interest-group influence over a comprehensive set of issues, while taking into account the impact of either the public at large or economic elites—let alone analyzing all three types of potential influences simultaneously. Testing Theoretical Predictions What makes possible an empirical effort of this sort is the existence of a unique data set, compiled over many years by one of us (Gilens) for a different but related purpose: for estimating the influence upon public policy of “affluent” citizens, poor citizens, and those in the middle of the income distribution. Gilens and a small army of research assistants 29 gathered data on a large, diverse set of policy cases: 1,779 instances between 1981 and 2002 in which a national survey of the general public asked a favor/oppose question about a proposed policy change. A total of 1,923 cases met four criteria: dichotomous pro/con responses, specificity about policy, relevance to federal government decisions, and categorical rather than conditional phrasing. Of those 1,923 original cases, 1,779 cases also met the criteria of providing income breakdowns for respondents, not involving a Constitutional amendment or a Supreme Court ruling (which might entail a quite different policy-making process), and involving a clear, as opposed to partial or ambiguous, actual presence or absence of policy change. These 1,779 cases do not constitute a sample from the universe of all possible policy alternatives (this is hardly conceivable), but we see them as particularly relevant to assessing the public’s influence on policy. The included policies are not restricted to the narrow Washington “policy agenda.” At the same time—since they were seen as worth asking poll questions about—they tend to concern matters of relatively high salience, about which it is plausible that average citizens may have real opinions and may exert some political influence. 30 For each case, Gilens used the original survey data to assess responses by income level. In order to cope with varying income categories across surveys, he employed a quadratic logistic regression technique to estimate the opinions of respondents at the tenth income percentile (quite poor), the fiftieth percentile (median), and the ninetieth percentile (fairly affluent). 31 Here we use these policy preference data to measure—imperfectly, but, we believe, satisfactorily—two independent variables posited as major influences upon policy making in the theoretical traditions discussed above. Policy preferences at the fiftieth income percentile—that is, the preferences of the median-income survey respondent—work quite well as measures of the preferences of the average citizen (or, more precisely, the median non-institutionalized adult American), which are central to theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy. 32 In all cases in which the relationship between income and preferences is monotonic, and in all cases in which there is no systematic relationship at all between the two, the preferences of the median-income respondent are identical to those of the median-preference respondent. In the remaining cases the two are very close to each other. 33 We believe that the preferences of “affluent” Americans at the ninetieth income percentile can usefully be taken as proxies for the opinions of wealthy or very-high-income Americans, and can be used to test the central predictions of Economic-Elite theories. To be sure, people at the ninetieth income percentile are neither very rich nor very elite; in 2012 dollars, Gilens’ “affluent” respondents received only about $146,000 in annual household income. To the extent that their policy preferences differ from those of average-income citizens, however, we would argue that there are likely to be similar but bigger differences between average-income citizens and the truly wealthy. Some evidence for this proposition comes from the 2011 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. 34 Based on 13 policy-preference questions asked on this survey, the preferences of the top 2 percent of income earners (a group that might be thought “truly wealthy”) are much more highly correlated with the preferences of the top 10 percent of earners than with the preferences of the average survey respondent (r=.91 versus .69). 35 Thus, the views of our moderately high-income “affluent” respondents appear to capture useful information about the views of the truly wealthy. In any case, the imprecision that results from use of our “affluent” proxy is likely to produce underestimates of the impact of economic elites on policy making. If we find substantial effects upon policy even when using this imperfect measure, therefore, it will be reasonable to infer that the impact upon policy of truly wealthy citizens is still greater. 36 In order to measure interest-group preferences and actions, we would ideally like to use an index of the sort that Baumgartner and his colleagues developed for their ninety-eight policy issues: an index assessing the total resources brought to bear by all major interest groups that took one side or the other on each of our 1,779 issues. But it is not feasible to construct such an index for all our cases; this would require roughly twenty times as much work as did the major effort made by the Baumgartner research team on their cases. Fortunately, however, Baumgartner et al. found that a simple proxy for their index—the number of reputedly “powerful” interest groups (from among groups appearing over the years in Fortune magazine’s “Power 25” lists) that favored a given policy change, minus the number that opposed it—correlated quite substantially in their cases with the full interest-group index (r=0.73). 37 Gilens, using a modified version of this simple count of the number of “powerful” interest groups favoring (minus those opposing) each proposed policy change, developed a measure of Net Interest Group Alignment. To the set of groups on the “Power 25” lists (which seemed to neglect certain major business interests) he added ten key industries that had reported the highest lobbying expenditures. (For the final list of included industries and interest groups, refer to Appendix 1.) For each of the 1,779 instances of proposed policy change, Gilens and his assistants drew upon multiple sources to code all engaged interest groups as “strongly favorable,” “somewhat favorable,” “somewhat unfavorable,” or “strongly unfavorable” to the change. He then combined the numbers of groups on each side of a given issue, weighting “somewhat” favorable or somewhat unfavorable positions at half the magnitude of “strongly” favorable or strongly unfavorable positions. In order to allow for the likelihood of diminishing returns as the net number of groups on a given side increases (an increase from 10 to 11 groups likely matters less than a jump from 1 to 2 does), he took the logarithms of the number of pro groups and the number of con groups before subtracting. Thus, Net Interest-Group Alignment = ln(# Strongly Favor + [0.5 \* # Somewhat Favor] + 1) - ln(# Strongly Oppose + [0.5 \* # Somewhat Oppose] + 1). 38 We also report here results for comparable group alignment indices that were computed separately for the mass-based and for the business-oriented sets of groups listed in Appendix 1. Our dependent variable is a measure of whether or not the policy change proposed in each survey question was actually adopted within four years after the question was asked. (It turns out that most of the action occurred within two years). Of course there was nothing easy about measuring the presence or absence of policy change for each of 1,779 different cases; Gilens and his research assistants spent many hours poring over news accounts, government data, Congressional Quarterly publications, academic papers and the like. 39 In order to test among our theoretical traditions, we begin by considering all organized interest groups together, not distinguishing between mass-based and business-oriented groups. Within a single statistical model, we estimate the independent impact upon our dependent variable (policy change) of each of three independent variables: the average citizen’s policy preferences (preferences at the fiftieth income percentile); the policy preferences of economic elites (measured by policy preferences at the ninetieth income percentile); and the stands of interest groups (the Net Interest-Group Alignment Index). Later, in order to distinguish clearly between Majoritarian Pluralism and Biased Pluralism, we will use two separate measures of net interest-group alignment, one involving only mass-based interest groups and the other limited to business and professional groups. The main hypotheses of interest, summarized in table 1, follow fairly straightforwardly from our discussion of our four ideal types of theory. Table 1 Theoretical predictions concerning the independent influence of sets of actors upon policy outcomes n = little or no independent influence y = some independent influence Y = substantial independent influence In their pure form, theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy (for example, rational models of electoral competition that include no societal actors other than average citizens), predict that the influence upon policy of average citizens is positive, significant, and substantial, while the influence of other actors is not. Theories of Economic-Elite Domination predict positive, significant, and substantial influence upon policy by economic elites. Most such theories allow for some (though not much) independent influence by average citizens, e.g., on non-economic social issues. Many also allow for some independent influence by business interest groups—and therefore probably by interest groups taken as a whole—though their emphasis is on wealthy individuals. In general, theories of interest-group pluralism predict that only organized interest groups will have positive, significant, and substantial effects upon public policy. Influence proceeds from groups, not from wealthy (or other) individuals. Depending upon the type of pluralist theory, average citizens may or may not be well represented through organized groups, but they do not have a great deal of independent influence on their own. Theories of Majoritarian Pluralism predict that the stands of organized interest groups, all taken together, rather faithfully represent (that is, are positively and substantially correlated with) the preferences of average citizens. But since most political influence proceeds through groups, a multivariate analysis that includes both interest-group alignments and citizens’ preferences should show far more independent influence by the groups than the citizens. Truman’s idea of “potential groups” does, however, leave room for some direct influence by average citizens. Theories of Biased Pluralism, too, see organized interest groups as having much more influence than average citizens or individual economic elites. But they predict that business-oriented groups play the major role. Recognizing the complexity of the political world, we must also acknowledge the possibility that more than one of these theoretical traditions has some truth to it: that several—even all—of our sets of actors may have substantial, positive, independent influence on public policy. And we must consider the null hypothesis that none of these theoretical traditions correctly describes even part of what goes on in American politics. Influence upon Policy of Average Citizens, Economic Elites, and Interest Groups Before we proceed further, it is important to note that even if one of our predictor variables is found (when controlling for the others) to have no independent impact on policy at all, it does not follow that the actors whose preferences are reflected by that variable—average citizens, economic elites, or organized interest groups of one sort or another—always “lose” in policy decisions. Policy making is not necessarily a zero-sum game among these actors. When one set of actors wins, others may win as well, if their preferences are positively correlated with each other. It turns out, in fact, that the preferences of average citizens are positively and fairly highly correlated, across issues, with the preferences of economic elites (refer to table 2). Rather often, average citizens and affluent citizens (our proxy for economic elites) want the same things from government. This bivariate correlation affects how we should interpret our later multivariate findings in terms of “winners” and “losers.” It also suggests a reason why serious scholars might keep adhering to both the Majoritarian Electoral Democracy and the Economic-Elite Domination theoretical traditions, even if one of them may be dead wrong in terms of causal impact. Ordinary citizens, for example, might often be observed to “win” (that is, to get their preferred policy outcomes) even if they had no independent effect whatsoever on policy making, if elites (with whom they often agree) actually prevail. Table 2 Correlations among independent variables \*\*\* p<.001; n=1779. Note: Entries are correlation coefficients corrected for measurement error as explained in Appendix 2. But net interest-group stands are not substantially correlated with the preferences of average citizens. Taking all interest groups together, the index of net interest-group alignment correlates only a non-significant .04 with average citizens’ preferences! (Refer to table 2.) This casts grave doubt on David Truman’s and others’ argument that organized interest groups tend to do a good job of representing the population as a whole. Indeed, as table 2 indicates, even the net alignments of the groups we have categorized as “mass-based” correlate with average citizens’ preferences only at the very modest (though statistically significant) level of .12. Some particular U.S. membership organizations—especially the AARP and labor unions—do tend to favor the same policies as average citizens. But other membership groups take stands that are unrelated (pro-life and pro-choice groups) or negatively related (gun owners) to what the average American wants. 40 Some membership groups may reflect the views of corporate backers or their most affluent constituents. Others focus on issues on which the public is fairly evenly divided. Whatever the reasons, all mass-based groups taken together simply do not add up, in aggregate, to good representatives of the citizenry as a whole. Business-oriented groups do even worse, with a modest negative over-all correlation of -.10. Nor do we find an association between the preferences of economic elites and the alignments of either mass-based or business-oriented groups. The latter finding, which surprised us, may reflect profit-making motives among businesses as contrasted with broader ideological views among elite individuals. For example, economic elites tend to prefer lower levels of government spending on practically everything, while business groups and specific industries frequently lobby for spending in areas from which they stand to gain. Thus pharmaceutical, hospital, insurance, and medical organizations have lobbied for more spending on health care; defense contractors for weapons systems; the American Farm Bureau for agricultural subsidies, and so on. Initial Tests of Influences on Policy Making The first three columns of table 3 report bivariate results, in which each of three independent variables (taking all interest groups together, for now) is modeled separately as the sole predictor of policy change. Just as previous literature suggests, each of three broad theoretical traditions—Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, Economic-Elite Domination, and interest-group pluralism—seems to gain support. When taken separately, each independent variable—the preferences of average citizens, the preferences of economic elites, and the net alignments of organized interest groups—is strongly, positively, and quite significantly related to policy change. Little wonder that each theoretical tradition has its strong adherents. Table 3 Policy outcomes and the policy preferences of average citizens, economic elites, and interest groups \*\*\*p<.001 Note: All predictors are scaled to range from 0 to 1. The dependent variable is the policy outcome, coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date and 0 if it did not. Predictors are the logits of the imputed percent of respondents at the fiftieth (“average citizens”) or ninetieth (“economic elites”) income percentile that favor the proposed policy change, and the Net Interest-Group Alignment Index described in the text. Standard errors are asymptotically distribution-free, and all analyses reflect estimated measurement error in the predictors, as described in Appendix 2. The standardized coefficients for model 4 in this table are .01, .21, and .16 for average citizens, economic elites, and interest groups, respectively. N=1,779. But the picture changes markedly when all three independent variables are included in the multivariate Model 4 and are tested against each other. The estimated impact of average citizens’ preferences drops precipitously, to a non-significant, near-zero level. Clearly the median citizen or “median voter” at the heart of theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy does not do well when put up against economic elites and organized interest groups. The chief predictions of pure theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy can be decisively rejected. Not only do ordinary citizens not have uniquely substantial power over policy decisions; they have little or no independent influence on policy at all. By contrast, economic elites are estimated to have a quite substantial, highly significant, independent impact on policy. This does not mean that theories of Economic-Elite Domination are wholly upheld, since our results indicate that individual elites must share their policy influence with organized interest groups. Still, economic elites stand out as quite influential—more so than any other set of actors studied here—in the making of U.S. public policy. Similarly, organized interest groups (all taken together, for now) are found to have substantial independent influence on policy. Again, the predictions of pure theories of interest-group pluralism are not wholly upheld, since organized interest groups must share influence with economically-elite individuals. But interest-group alignments are estimated to have a large, positive, highly significant impact upon public policy. These results suggest that reality is best captured by mixed theories in which both individual economic elites and organized interest groups (including corporations, largely owned and controlled by wealthy elites) play a substantial part in affecting public policy, but the general public has little or no independent influence. The rather low explanatory power of all three independent variables taken together (with an R-squared of just .074 in Model 4) may partly result from the limitations of our proxy measures, particularly with respect to economic elites (since our “affluent” proxy is admittedly imperfect) and perhaps with respect to interest groups (since only a small fraction of politically-active groups are included in our measure). Again, the implication of these limitations in our data is that interest groups and economic elites actually wield more policy influence than our estimates indicate. But it is also possible that there may exist important explanatory factors outside the three theoretical traditions addressed in this analysis. Or there may be a great deal of idiosyncrasy in policy outputs, or variation across kinds of issues, that would be difficult for any general model to capture. With our present data we cannot tell. The magnitudes of the coefficients reported in table 3 are difficult to interpret because of our transformations of the independent variables. A helpful way to assess the relative influence of each set of actors is to compare how the predicted probability of policy change alters when moving from one point to another on their distributions of policy dispositions, while holding other actors’ preferences constant at their neutral points (50 percent favorable for average citizens and for economic elites, and a net interest-group alignment score of 0). These changing probabilities, based on the coefficients in model 4 of table 3, are line-graphed in figure 1 along with bar graphs of the underlying preference distributions. Figure 1 Predicted probability of policy adoption (dark lines, left axes) by policy disposition; the distribution of preferences (gray columns, right axes) Clearly, when one holds constant net interest-group alignments and the preferences of affluent Americans, it makes very little difference what the general public thinks. The probability of policy change is nearly the same (around 0.3) whether a tiny minority or a large majority of average citizens favor a proposed policy change (refer to the top panel of figure 1).

# 1AC – Add-ons

### Underview [General]

#### 1] Evaluate T and theory as a question of reasonability with a bright-line of disclosure and link and impact turn ground. To clarify, link turns are reasons why my performance is bad and impact turns are reasons my method is bad. Prefer the bright-line because it ensures that when clash is possible, then debaters engage on the substantive layer instead of being lazy – justifying the brightline solves their arbitrariness argument. Prefer reasonability:

#### A] Substantive education – reasonability allows a quick refocus on substance by resolving the theory debate and incentivizes clash by preventing theory debaters from always reading frivolous shells. Outweighs because it’s the constitutive impact of debate – nobody cares about theory in the real world, but sub ed is the only skill we take from debate

#### B] Race to the top – debaters can always find a marginal net benefit under competing interps and make the counter-interp impossible to respond to – outweighs race to the bottom because by me meeting this brightline there was some way you could have engaged with the aff, whereas I wouldn’t be able to engage with the counterinterp at all.

#### 2] Forcing debate to be about competing policy options is inherently neoliberal – it breeds complacency within the current economic order

**Curtis 13** Neal, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Film, Television and Media Studies at the University of Auckland, “Thought Bubble: Neoliberalism and the Politics of Knowledge,” new formations: a journal of culture/theory/politics, Volume 80-81, 2013, Project MUSE

to bend our knee to ‘the Darwinian force of the market’, one suspects that analysis and interpretation is of a kind with that found in the pages of the Financial Times and will be limited to debates over best policy within a given system, rather than any ontological engagement with the character and shape of the world itself. The Google model is, however, exemplary of the problem faced by the post-historical university and the nature of its democratic role. Leaving aside the rather obvious point that in the pursuit of profit Google have quite happily aided the Chinese government in their restriction of the democracy movement in that country, the Google model is significant because its success is based on successfully attending to and facilitating the personalisation that has come to define both democracy and knowledge in neoliberal consumer cultures. Google’s success has primarily come from its ability to provide a highly individualised service, partly due to the capacity of its search engine to learn what the user likes and to display results that are closely aligned to preferences indicated through earlier ‘click signals’; but this has also been a path to monetisation as the company is able to claim that it can deliver customers to companies with impressive precision. In an economy increasingly based on information, attention becomes a very rare commodity,34 so the ability to deliver attention to advertisers becomes a highly profitable capability. The capacity for Google to archive click signals affords increasingly successful searches without additional work from the user and provides a profile that companies can attach themselves to in their search for consumers. [End Page 84] While this mode of information retrieval sits well with all the neoliberal markers of value - individuality, preference, choice, competition, immediacy - it gives rise to significant concerns for both knowledge and democracy that must not be ignored. In a fascinating book entitled The Filter Bubble, Eli Pariser sets out the implications of the Google algorithm. Initially, while the idea that what is best for one person may not be best for someone else is hardly revolutionary, the idea that a search engine is ‘biased to share our own views’35 has far-reaching consequences. In short, ‘your computer monitor is a kind of one-way mirror, reflecting your own interests while algorithmic observers watch what you click’ (Filter Bubble, p3). Here, access is instant and individualised, but Pariser is concerned that where ‘democracy requires a reliance on shared facts […] we’re being offered parallel but separate universes’ (Filter Bubble, p5). While it is important to argue that “facts” are not enough, shared or not, the problem is accentuated because the search engine, which is now a ‘prediction engine’ (Filter Bubble, p9), has a tendency to search out ‘facts’ you have already indicated a preference for through click signals. Ultimately the cookies and bots that aid personalised web-browsing begin to produce a filter bubble: ‘a unique universe of information for each of us’, but more importantly one that ‘fundamentally alters the way we encounter ideas and information’ (Filter Bubble, p9). In other words, the Google model is one in which we continually receive more of what we already know and have indicated a preference for. Ultimately, the filter bubble is ‘a cozy place, populated by our favourite people and things and ideas’ (Filter Bubble, p12). Pariser notes that while this personalisation flatters users who believe they are in a position of control because the prediction engine appears to be giving them what they want, it increasingly subjects users ‘to a kind of informational determinism in which what you clicked on in the past determines what you see next’ (Filter Bubble, p16). This mode of personalised access means that Google does have great significance for the post-historical university, but that significance does not lie in the claim that Google University is the future as Ernst & Young would have us believe. Rather, the Google model is significant because the two forces of impact and customer service suggest that the post-historical university will increasingly take on the character of a filter bubble. As research is increasingly directed towards what are described to be the needs of the current system, and teaching is tailored to satisfying the existing desires and preferences of students refigured as customers, the university’s role in the global knowledge economy will be to offer more of the same. The university has always had a major role to play in maintaining the cultural status quo and policing knowledge, but it has also historically been a major site for the social production of dissensus which is irreducible to the promotional language of ‘innovation’ and ‘entrepreneurialism’ (or any historical equivalent thereof). Ultimately the sole purpose of the Ernst & Young report is to ensure that the university of the future plays an integral part in the production of an ‘identity loop’ (Filter Bubble, p127), or what we might call a thought bubble that reproduces the truth of market logic. In the face of this doctrinal onslaught the future of the university as a social institution looks bleak, but despite the heavy-handed ideological work that the Ernst & Young report epitomises, the future cannot be closed off in the way they hope. As was noted in the introduction, the rationality of markets was shown to be a pseudo-science by the persistence and the effects of what Besley and Hennessey called the ‘psychology of herding’. First of all this produced the hysterical delusion that the business cycle had been overcome, which was then counteracted by the global loss of confidence that brought about the greatest economic crisis in living memory. [End Page 85] The evident role played by these ‘animal spirits’ testifies to the importance of a non-theoretical, non-rational relation to the world, but also to a more profound ontological state of mind that Heidegger refers to as ‘attunement’ or ‘mood’.36 Ordinarily that attunement is an unremarkable and comfortable familiarity, but one that might become a concerted defence in times of crisis. Fluctuations in mood are usually accompanied by stories that tell us something about the world we live in. With regards to the world of economics these are stories that precipitate trust, confidence, euphoria, frenzy, fear, and anxiety.37 These spirits and the stories that shape them are evidence of the continuing hermeneutic condition set out above. Stories make a world of sense, but they are only ever interpretations and remain subject to the vagaries of mood. The narrative of neoliberal post-history can claim to be the rightful representation of human relations only because it is underwritten by gigantic economic, political and social power that supports and distributes its stories, not because it has discovered the truth. In such an environment, academics regularly articulate concern about the utilitarian if not instrumental mood, of managers and students alike. While the discourses of impact and customer service further support such instrumentality and suggest that the university of the future will increasingly help lock down the narrative of post-history, there is still hope. In keeping with Heidegger’s (in)famous use of Hölderlin’s words: ‘But where danger is, grows/The saving power also’,38 the pressures on students to achieve a certain GPA or class of degree and the demands on them to be socially compliant, still does not eradicate their sense that the world is contestable. In many cases the mood of students remains one of scepticism and doubt towards the supposed common sense, coupled with a desire for change. They remain interested in the big questions and readily support courses that make great theoretical demands on them. Students tend to be of an age when the sedimented world they have inherited has not yet ossified and all kinds of malformations and reformations remain possible. This means that an important role can still be played by the university; not one that is reduced to increasing access to what is already given, but one that opens up spaces for this contestation and challenging of the world, for offering up radically alternative ways

#### 3] Allow me to cross apply cards from case against topicality and theory:

#### A] structural skew – their model of debate allows them to read 7 minutes of theory and makes the 1ar functionally impossible because it moots all 6 minutes of the aff and restarts the debate

#### B] depth of education – debating case vs. T forces us to explore nuances of different types of literature and how it interacts with strategies in debate

#### C] arbitrary – if I had read the cards in the 1ac as cards in the 1ar then their argument wouldn’t make any sense – all of the arguments in the aff are just pieces of evidence they can respond to

### Underview [T / Theory]

#### Shutting down the affirmative’s discourse about the Model Minority Myth by uplayering is a method of silencing and reinforces stereotypes of obedience that force us to internalize oppression.

Osajima [Osajima, Keith. "Internalized Oppression and the Culture of Silence: Rethinking the Stereotype of the Quiet Asian American Student" Race and Racism in the United States (n.d.): 152-55. Web.]

the internalizing of student and racial oppression that makes Asian students feel that the best way to get through is to be quiet or makes them believe that they can be nothing other than the quiet student. The key implication here is that Asian students should not be blamed nor chastised if they exhibit this behavior. It is not their fault that societal structures and oppression conveyed messages that this is the way to behave. As teachers, the notion of internalized oppression should help us to see how the pressures of being an Asian-American student can often be limiting and constraining. Our job is to create a learning environment that contradicts those pressures and constraints; that encourages and makes it safe for Asian students to take some risks and to critically examine their lives in relation to societal oppressions. I tried to structure these contra- dictions into the class I just completed. I) To move away from the banking system. I tried to limit the amount of time I lectured. In a 2- hour meeting, I never talked for more than half the period. I also tried to lecture in a way that elicit[s]ed as much interactive thinking as possible. 2) To encourag each student to take some risks and think about issues, I had them regularly do "dyads" where I would have students pair off and each take a few minutes to think, for themselves, about a question or issue that was being presented. These dyads usually preceded the general discussion, and helped students to prepare and organize their thoughts belore presenting them in the larger group. 3) I made it clear that each stu- dent's contribution w[sh]ould be listened to respectfully, and that each student would get a chance to participate. To accomplish this, I made sure that no one, including myself, could "trash," ridicule, or harshly criticize another student's viewpoint. I also did not allow any one or two students to dominate discussions. I made it clear to them that I wanted to give other people a chance to talk before they got another chance. All of these techniques seemed to work well. Students participated in discussions, and began to grap- ple with questions that they had rarely been asked before. The expe- rience provided me with hope that the educational process can do more than reproduce a compliant work force, but can be a vehicle for liberation. I invite you to join the struggle.

#### Theory and T are forms of intellectual gymnastics that abstract away from the conversations we need to be having

Elijah Smith, 9-4-2013, "A Conversation in Ruins: Race and Black Participation in Lincoln Douglas Debate," Briefly, <http://www.vbriefly.com/2013/09/06/20139a-conversation-in-ruins-race-and-black-participation-in-lincoln-douglas-debate/> HSLA//TR –

It will be uncomfortable, it will be hard, and it will require continued effort but the necessary step in fixing this problem, like all problems, is the community as a whole admitting that such a problem with many “socially acceptable” choices exists in the first place. Like all systems of social control, the reality of racism in debate is constituted by the singular choices that institutions, coaches, and students make on a weekly basis. I have watched countless rounds where competitors attempt to win by rushing to abstractions to distance the conversation from the material reality that black debaters are forced to deal with every day. One of the students I coached, who has since graduated after leaving debate, had an adult judge write out a ballot that concluded by “hypothetically” defending my student being lynched at the tournament. Another debate concluded with a young man defending that we can kill animals humanely, “just like we did that guy Troy Davis”. Community norms would have competitors do intellectual gymnastics or make up rules to accuse black debaters of breaking to escape hard conversations but as someone who understands that experience, the only constructive strategy is to acknowledge the reality of the oppressed, engage the discussion from the perspective of authors who are black and brown, and then find strategies to deal with the issues at hand. It hurts to see competitive seasons come and go and have high school students and judges spew the same hateful things you expect to hear at a Klan rally. A student should not, when presenting an advocacy that aligns them with the oppressed, have to justify why oppression is bad. Debate is not just a game, but a learning environment with liberatory potential. Even if the form debate gives to a conversation is not the same you would use to discuss race in general conversation with Bayard Rustin or Fannie Lou Hamer, that is not a reason we have to strip that conversation of its connection to a reality that black students cannot escape.

#### Fairness dump: 1] Fairness is irresolvable – it’s impossible to weigh between two competing fairness violations 2] Fairness is impossible – we would never know when we’ve reached the fairest possible model of debate 3] Unfairness is inevitable – some debaters have better prep and better coaches

### Underview [K]

#### **Intersectional pluralism is valuable – analyzing how different identities interact is key to understanding specific manifestations of institutionalized oppression. Attempting to explain the world from a single perspective marginalizes minoritized perspectives – that’s why anti-capitalist movements are led by white middle class males and Black nationalism movements exclude black women.**

Chang 17 Asian Americans and Education Benjamin Chang Subject: Curriculum and Pedagogy, Education, Cultures, and Ethnicities, Educational Politics and Policy, Languages and Literacies Online Publication Date: Feb 2017 DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190264093.013.102 <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED577104.pdf> TJHSSTAD Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Education TJHSSTAD

Intersectionality and Transnationalism Despite the shortcomings of the “Model” and “Oppressed” frames that largely focus on issues of race and sometimes class, both continue to be employed in popular and scholarly discourse. However, continuing changes within communities under the Asian American umbrella, and broader international changes (e.g. migrations, communications, popular media, social movements), have pushed theory and practice to be more nuanced and dynamic. Two generative concepts in better understanding these changes and their educational effects are intersectionality and transnationalism. Intersectionality was coined by legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989), within the context of naming and addressing institutionalized oppression in its multiple forms as they may occur simultaneously. Crenshaw initially focused on racism and sexism from a black feminist standpoint, but intersectionality was soon applied to other issues such as heteronormativity, classism, and ableism, in an effort to recognize and disrupt what Patricia Hill Collins has referred to as “interlocking systems of oppression” (Collins, 1991; Fujino, 1998). While many of the ideas behind it are not new (Boggs, 1998; Combahee River Collective, 1977; Du Bois, 2002; Ladson-Billings, 1996), intersectionality has been a generative construct across diverse areas of social sciences, humanities, and activism. Previous social justice efforts in the United States tended to prioritize just one oppression, often at the expense of others, due in part to gaps within the then-dominant approaches of Marxism-Leninism, Black nationalism, and white-stream feminism (Grande, 2003; Ling, 1989). This led to the marginalization of many communities, such as indigenous peoples and black women, whose positions and experiences were commonly relegated to the background of racial justice movements by black men, and feminist movements by white women. Like with other racialized communities, intersectionality has afforded more nuanced approaches to the multifaceted problems faced under the Asian American umbrella, which, as has been shown, require more than a race analysis to move toward equity in schools and society. Utilizing intersectionality has allowed researchers and teachers with Asian American communities to tease out different overlapping elements of inequity, including the aforementioned contexts of ethnicity, gender, class, and sexual orientation, which may have been masked in previous approaches with a static focus on just race, language, or nationality (S. J. Lee, 2006; Narui, 2011). When used as a lead-off point to engage social issues in classrooms or scholarship, intersectionality can help facilitate a Asian Americans and Education Page 19 of 39  PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, EDUCATION (education.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy). date: 27 May 2017 more dynamic praxis through its multilayered analysis that does not “force” subjects to choose one part of themselves to identify and address, which can artificially isolate problems and subsequent interventions.

### Underview [Truth Testing]

#### 1] Nothing in the aff triggers presumption or permissibility, but they both affirm:

**A] Affirming is harder**

Shah 19 Sachin Shah, "A Statistical Analysis of Side-Bias on the 2019 January-February Lincoln-Douglas Debate Topic," NSD Update, <http://nsdupdate.com/2019/a-statistical-analysis-of-side-bias-on-the-2019-january-february-lincoln-douglas-debate-topic/> // xicx

As a final note, it is also interesting to look at the trend over multiple topics. In the rounds from 93 TOC bid distributing tournaments (2017 – 2019 YTD), the negative won 52.99% of ballots (p-value < 0.0001) and 54.63% of upset rounds (p-value < 0.0001). This suggests the bias might be structural, and not topic specific, as this data spans six different topics.

#### Empirics o/w – they take into account all their analytic responses and conform to what actually happens in the real world.

#### B] If I tell you what my name is you presume that to be true absent any other information

#### 2] Debate is polyvocal and should allow a multitude of models of engagement rather than be limited to a single “constitutive” claim

Koh and Niemi 15 Ben Koh & Rebar Niemi "How Do I Reach These Kids?: An Affirmation of Polyvocal Debate" September 15, 2015 recut TJHSSTAD

For as long as there has been debate, there has been the debate about what debate is. We are not against a discussion of what constitutes debate. In fact we are absolutely for it. We argue that this is a crucial debate within debates. **The question should not be “what is debate?” The proper question is “what can debate do?”** **The constitutive feature of debate** that we are most abstractly interested in **is** the precise one that is so often banished by debate pundits – **the possibilities of what it can do**. We do not yet know what debate can do. All are welcome to accept the challenge of forcing debate into a linear and instrumental framework, but be warned it will certainly fail. Debate is a process and a field, not a mechanism. This is the case for polyvocal debate. Our current definition (which is open to redefinition) is that **debate should be** thought of as **a complex assemblage of voices** (the debaters, the judge, audiences, coaches, the authors quoted, and so on), and that **it** **is wrong to limit the possible voices** or the possible enunciations of those voices. Debate is always about multiple voices – multiple ways of sensing/expressing. Even non-sense and non-expression have their own voices. This is not a paradigm. It is a hypothesis about the system of relations that co-creates debate. The power and potential of polyvocal debate is not located in some far-off future. It is right here right now, and it is also capable of contact with the outsides of one perspective on time and space. To paraphrase June Tyson – Don’t you know? It’s after the end of the world. Within the system of relations composed by polyvocal debate, **we always have the ability to ask** “should we believe in something in the first place?” as well as “**if we believe it, what are its normative implications?**” These questions, in whatever form they take, are some of the most primal elements of debate. **Restricting the scope of debate to only some of these questions is a serious loss**. **More absurd is the justification for restriction based on the value of being able to ask and engage with these questions in the first** place. It is wrong to assume that chaos and doubt are bad. It is even worse to argue for a progressive fallacy that chaos and doubt can be removed from debate without debate ceasing to be debate at all. **Debate is not** soccer, or **chess**, or playing the trumpet. Perhaps it can do similar things to those activities, but if so it is because it does not feature the limits that define soccer or chess or playing the trumpet. It is apparently very easy to make assumptions about what education is. Most often this is accomplished without citing a single theorist on the subject of education OR a robust understanding of what education could be outside of “commonsensical” assumptions (which are less common and relatable that they initially seem). As we often like to tell our students – read the literature. We call the kind of education that is often assumed “banking-style education” after Paulo Friere. This is the notion that education is about accumulating knowledge. 100 facts are better than 99 facts. People devalue education because they think of it only in these calculated terms. To the banking conception, the end game of education would not be an increase in self-respect, a commitment to social justice, or a development of communication and empathetic powers. It would be the resume statement of “things I’ve learned.” We must not buy into this conception of education. In debate, the collaborative way voices intertwine builds a world of speech and frames it. No debate performance can be perfectly reproduced. The judge’s interpretation and voice are then added. The desire for absolutely objective or procedurally exact judging is a desire for an impossibility. We should not be afraid of the judge’s voice. We recognize it as one among many. Some judges speak loudly and have particular desires. We do not begrudge them this. What is important is that they acknowledge that theirs is only one voice among the many and one way of sensing among all sense and nonsense. It is not a question of excluding the chaos or even controlling it, but **understanding the value in** hearing **the** **clash of multiple voices**. For nowhere else in school are we given the vibrant opportunity to be as real in the academic space as is in debate; where we are able to read multiple arguments from multiple views from multiple bases. Wemust encourage debate to be an outlet for the chaotic and doubtful elements of our beliefs for it’s an opportunity to bridge debate’s separation from the real world into our own world. Our lives aren’t always smooth unwavering stories. They are often a chaos that is hard to grasp outside the lens of community. Polyvocal debate is inclusive and encouraging of this chaos, of the hard questions and life changing moments of realization. A form of debate that acts as if it can omit doubt is not a true form of debate at all. This isn’t just an argument for “unique educational value” in the banking-sense. Debate should not be thought of as an esoteric extracurricular designed to spice up the resume. Paradigms of debate that stop at the moment of rational justification treat the issue of what world we create for ourselves as an unnecessary step, but this conversation is what must happen in our lives and further what must happen in debate. Polyvocal debate allows for this discussion. **We should not just ask “is deontology true” but further “is it good for me to believe in deontology” or util or contractarianism, etc.** Rationality cannot be trusted to judge itself, but abandoning logic altogether isn’t necessary just yet. It is too easy to take up one side or the other (only truth matters or only the good matters). Debate is harder.The tenets of logic and justification can create questionable conclusions, and **a truly valuable form of debate must allow us to criticize and reevaluate** these **conclusions** to live our lives to the fullest. We must be able to ask if beliefs empower or disempower our lives. We always have the power to ask should we believe it or is it correct, and exercising this capacity is the practice of debate. There are two ways in which we can understand and consider what we ought to believe – what is rationally justifiable, and what is good for us to believe for ourselves. **In our lives we cannot just ask “what do I think is true.” We must always end up asking “is it good for me to believe in what I believe?”** This is how we must act in our own lives outside of just the debate space. When we are faced with a difficult situation be it in our personal lives, work, etc., we are inevitably going to be confronted with moments of seemingly undeniable hopelessness; where despite our best efforts and our thinking, we cannot justify or rationally see a way to be happy or push ourselves through to the other side. Is it good for me to believe that no matter what I will do, that I will get a bad grade in this class? Is it good for me to believe that I will fail in my work? Is it good for me to believe in hopelessness? Our answer is no. Our answer is that **debate helps you learn new questions** as well as new answers. Again and again we’ve heard the articles and arguments that collapse everything to the old questions: education versus fairness, the rules versus innovation and expansion, correct ways of being versus incorrect ones. Bizarrely there are some who like to play with the same questions forever, perpetually flipping bits between one and zero, never writing new code. We are tired of these questions. Perhaps they would be enlivened by new voices. **Polyvocality is the necessary and explosive generation of new questions**. The practice of debate is an educational activity because it is generative and interrogative of voices. Use it for what it’s used for. Education can be praxis – where the abstraction of theory becomes lived abstractness inside the fabric of everyday experience. Where a radical new way of thinking-feeling the world become possible. Where you don’t just learn about quantum physics, but cry at how beautiful the expression of quantum interactions can be and feel blessed to be a part of them, and then teach them to your friends and family. But this is only part of what education is. Education is a becoming that is necessarily political. Often times it is anti-reactionary or anti-conservative, not because it includes some biased political position, but because it is impossible to actually experience learning without it changing you – what you think is right and wrong, what you want to do, and who you think of yourself as. On our view, **this makes education necessarily anti-fascist** (where **fascism is defined as the tendency to over-represent** and prefer **certain ways of being to others** based on normative, intuitive, or ontological claims). No matter your petty political affiliations, **too many people in our world must attempt escape everyday**, live as targets, suffer, and experience domination. **If education is not a force to help us address this, it is not a properly empathetic education**. Even if the educational space of debate allows for slightly more opportunities to escape the everyday and find new connections and places to dwell, this is a greater benefit to everyone than any obedience to respectability politics, norms of conduct, or “correct ways of being” could ever achieve. This is how the world works. We should not abandon the cause of empathy just because we can have that elsewhere. It’s not as if we should not care about others at certain times because we do so in others Debate is foundationally about empathy. Arguments are only persuasive in the ability for their to be foster a shared experience of understanding. Judges vote for arguments that have a particular effect on them – the effect of “being convincing.” Arguments that win send the judge on a path of becoming-convinced. In order for this to happen, the debater must actually get through to the judge on some level, whether intuitively, emotively, via rhetoric, the flow, or explanation. The best debating promotes empathy. Not empathy defined by biased terms – empathy defined by actual contact with actual others, perspectives, and ways of expressing oneself. It is not that young people are in need of moral training or must be told what is right and wrong or that debate should erase and conquer disagreement. Rather, it is that we should strive to learn to live with disagreement. For it is too simple and brute to believe in a monovocal system of thought – that your language is the only Rosetta Stone to translate the world through. Debate must be a place to see how to live with ourselves and live among others. **If being the better debater means being the worse person, we should NOT endorse this conception of better debating**. There is no value to improving a debate related skillset that is not bracketed by being caring and affirming of the world. The argument against education, methodology, and performance debates is that these will somehow sacrifice an essential part of what makes debate debate. This perspective is entirely wrongheaded. What a polyvocal understanding of debate underscores is that what makes debate is multiple voices. Our belief is that it is possible to promote incredible skill, learning, and growth in students and be better debaters while at the same time being better people. Debate is a field where participants of all kinds create real experiences and real change. **Students have the ability to speak their individual truths and have real academic and personal conversation about what creates, sustains, and restricts their worlds** – and **if the current “rules of debate” do not allow for that, we advocate breaking those rules.**

#### 3] Every round is a reconceptualization of debate – there are no constitutive rules

Enoch 11 David Enoch 11 [studied law and philosophy in Tel Aviv University, where he earned his B.A. and LL.B. in 1993. After completing his military service and clerking for Justice Dorit Beinisch at the Supreme Court, David turned to graduate studies in philosophy, first in Tel Aviv University, and then at the NYU Philosophy Department, where he earned his Ph.D. in May, 2003], “Shmagency revisited”, In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan (2011), BE

If it can be defended, then, constitutivism promises to yield significant payoffs3. But constitutivism seems to be subject to a powerful objection. For agents need not care about their qualifications as agents, or whether some of their bodily movements count as actions. They can, it seems, be perfectly happy being shmagents – non-agent things that lack the thing purportedly constitutive of agency, but that are as similar to agents as is otherwise possible – or perhaps being something else altogether. If so, constitutivism cannot make good on its promises: For when Korsgaard replies to the agent who asks, say, "Why should I care about the hypothetical and categorical imperatives?" with "Well, otherwise you wouldn't even count as an agent, you wouldn't even be in the game of performing actions.", the skeptic can discard this reply with a simple "So-what?". What is it to her, as it were, if she qualifies as an agent or not? She would be analogous not to the chess-player who asks why she should play according to the rules, but to someone who enjoys the aesthetic qualities of (what we call) the chess board and pieces. If we tell this person that he must not move his king to a certain position because it's against the rules, and if he breaks them he won't count as playing chess, he can shrug us off with a simple "So-what?". [S]He doesn’t care whether his manipulation of the chess pieces qualifies as chess-playing. And at this point the objectivity Velleman hopes for also collapses, because the practical reasons whose objectivity Velleman wants to secure will not reach the person who is happy being a shamgent-rather-than-an-agent, or perhaps something else entirely. The general point here is that the status of being constitutive of agency does not suffice for a normatively non-arbitrary status. Of course, if there were some independent reason to be an agent (for instance, rather than a shmagent), or to perform actions, this objection would go away. But the price would be too high, for such an independent reason – one not accounted for by the constitutivist story, but rather presupposed by it – would make it impossible for constitutivism to be the whole, or the most foundational, account of normativity, or to deliver on its promised payoffs.

#### 4] **Ideal theory is bad – three warrants, drop one and lose**

Mills 05 Mills, Charles. W, Professor of Moral and Intellectual philosophy at Northwestern University, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology. Hypatia, Volume 20, Number 3, Summer 2005, pp. 165-184. <http://www.nsdupdate.com/assets/2017/02/Ideal-theory-as-ideology.pdf> TJHSSTAD

Three objections:

1. Legitimacy: ideal theory presumes the normative concept in question is legitimate, when in fact it might be ideological – example of purity
2. Application: applying ideal theory will be affected by oppressive relations in society – example of autonomy – some groups excluded
3. Absence: ideal theory makes lived experiences irrelevant and fails to recognize how social position effects the development of concepts

Ideal theory might at least seem to be unproblematic in the realm of the ideals themselves: normative concepts. Here if nowhere else, it might be felt, idealization is completely legitimate. But even here the adequacy of ideal theory can be challenged on at least three dimensions: the legitimacy of the normative concept in the first place; the particular way that the normative concept is applied, or operationalized; and the absence of other normative concepts. Consider purity as an ideal. In abstraction, it sounds innocent enough—surely purity is good, as against impurity. Who could object to that? But consider its historic use in connection with race. For many decades in the United States and elsewhere, racial purity was an ideal, and part of the point of antimiscegenation law was to preserve the “purity” of the white race. Since blackness was def ned by the “one-drop rule”—any black ancestry makes you black (Davis 1991)—the idea of black purity would have been a contradiction in terms. So there was a fundamental asymmetry in the way “purity” was applied, and in practice both the law and social custom was primarily on the alert for black male/white female “miscegenation,” not white male/black female “miscegenation,” which was widely winked at. Apart from what we would now, in a more enlightened age, see as its fundamental incoherence—that since races have no biological existence, they are not the kinds of entities that can be either pure or impure—the ideal of purity served to buttress white supremacy. So here a normative concept once accepted by millions was actually totally illegitimate (Alcoff 1995). (Similarly, think of the historic role of “purity” as an invidious Charles W. Mills 177 standard for evaluating female sexuality, and the corresponding entrenchment of the double standard.) Or consider a (today) far more respectable ideal, that of autonomy. This notion has been central to ethical theory for hundreds of years, and is, of course, famously most developed in Kant’s writings. But recent work in feminist theory has raised questions as to whether it is an attractive ideal at all, or just a reflection of male privilege. Human beings are dependent upon others for a long time before they can become adult, and if they live to old age, are likely to be dependent upon others for many of their latter years. But traditionally, this work has been done by women, and so it has been invisible or taken for granted, not theorized. Some feminist ethicists have argued for the simple abandonment of autonomy as an attractive value, but others have suggested that it can be redeemed once it is reconceptualized to take account of this necessarily interrelational aspect (MacKenzie and Stoljar, 2000). So the point is that idealization here obfuscates the reality of care giving that makes any achievement of autonomy possible in the first place, and only through nonideal theory are we sensitized to the need to balance this value against other values, and rethink it. Somewhat similarly, think of the traditional left critique of a liberal concept of freedom that focuses simply on the absence of juridical barriers, and ignores the many ways in which economic constraints can make working-class liberties largely nominal rather than substantive. Finally, it may be that the nonideal perspective of the socially subordinated is necessary to generate certain critical evaluative concepts in the first place, since the experience of social reality of the privileged provides no phenomenological basis for them: Marxist concepts of class alienation and labor exploitation; feminist concepts of sexual alienation and affective exploitation; critical race theory concepts of whiteness as oppressive and “colorblindness” as actually whiteness in disguise. Insofar as concepts crystallize in part from experience, rather than being a priori, and insofar as capturing the perspective of subordination requires advertence to its reality, an ideal theory that ignores these realities will necessarily be handicapped in principle.

#### 5] New 2AR responses to blippy 1NC tricks and shells – their model of debate is one in which if I accidentally concede a single argument I lose – that’s terrible for education and ableist because debates become based on flowing ability rather than content

### Vincent [1AC Reps Add-on]

#### Debate is first and foremost a question of performance – hold them accountable for their speech act and in-round discourse

**Vincent 13** [Re-Conceptualizing our Performances: Accountability in Lincoln Douglas Debate. Christopher J. Vincent. 10/26/13. <http://victorybriefs.com/vbd/2013/10/re-conceptualizing-our-performances-accountability-in-lincoln-douglas-debate>)] TJHSSTAD

It is becoming increasingly more apparent in Lincoln Douglas debate that students of color are being held to a higher threshold of proving why racism is bad, than white students are in being forced to justify their actions and in round discourse. The abstractness of philosophical texts being used in LD and the willingness of judges and coaches alike to endorse that abstractness has fostered a climate in which students are allowed to be divorced from the discourse they are producing. Debate should first and foremost be viewed as a performance. Every action taken, every word said, and every speech given reflects a performance of the body. Yet in an age where debate is about how many arguments a student can get on the flow, white students’ performances are consistently allowed to be detached from their bodies, performance by the body, while students of color must always embody their discourse. As a result universal theories are allowed to be viewed as detached from any meaning outside of being just an argument. My argument is three-fold. First, debaters have adopted a “universal principle,” which has allowed them to be detached from the practical implications of what they said. Second, is that we must re-conceptualize the role of speech and the speech act to account for the in round performances of the body. The final part is that judges must begin to view their roles as educators and must be accountable for the discourse they endorse with their ballot

### Ahmed [Framework Add-on]

#### Institutions become normalized by the repetition of actions by the bodies that inhabit them – whiteness coheres spaces like debate into certain molds so that bodies fit within them without noticing tension, eventually becoming invisible.

Ahmed 07 A phenomenology of whiteness FT Sara Ahmed Goldsmiths College, University of London Feminist Theory Copyright © 2007 SAGE Publications (London, Los Angeles, New Delhi, and Singapore) vol. 8(2): 149–168. 1464–7001 DOI: 10.1177/1464700107078139 <http://fty.sagepub.com> TJHSSTAD

But how does whiteness hold its place? In this section I explore how whiteness ‘holds’ through habits. Public spaces take shape through the habitual actions of bodies, such that the contours of space could be described as habitual. I turn to the concept of habits to theorize not so much how bodies acquire their shape, but how spaces acquire the shape of the bodies that ‘inhabit’ them. We could think about the ‘habit’ in the ‘in-habit’. We need to examine not only how bodies become white, or fail to do so, but also how spaces can take on the very ‘qualities’ that are given to such bodies. In a way, we can think about the habitual as a form of inheritance. It is not so much that we inherit habits, although we can do so: rather the habitual can be thought of as a bodily and spatial form of inheritance. As Pierre Bourdieu (1977) shows us, we can link habits to what is unconscious, and routine, or what becomes ‘second nature’.3 To describe whiteness as a habit, as second nature, is to suggest that whiteness is what bodies do, where the body takes the shape of the action. Habits are not ‘exterior’ to bodies, as things that can be ‘put on’ or ‘taken off’. If habits are about what bodies do, in ways that are repeated, then they might also shape what bodies can do. For Merleau-Ponty, the habitual body is a body that acts in the world, where actions bring other things near. As he puts it: my body appears to me as an attitude directed towards a certain existing or possible task. And indeed its spatiality is not, like that of external objects or like that of ‘spatial sensations’, a spatiality of position, but a spatiality of situation. If I stand in front of my desk and lean on it with both hands, only my hands are stressed and the whole of the body trails behind them like the tail of a comet. It is not that I am unaware of the whereabouts of my shoulder or back, but these are simply swallowed up in the position of my hands, and my whole posture can be read so to speak in the pressure they exert on the table. (2002: 114–5, emphasis in original) Here, the directedness of the body towards an action (which we have discovered also means an orientation towards certain kinds of objects) is how the body ‘appears’.4 The body is ‘habitual’ not only in the sense that it performs actions repeatedly, but in the sense that when it performs such actions, it does not command attention, apart from at the ‘surface’ where it ‘encounters’ an external object (such as the hands that lean on the desk or table, which feel the ‘stress’ of the action). In other words, the body is habitual insofar as it ‘trails behind’ in the performing of action, insofar as it does not pose ‘a problem’ or an obstacle to the action, or is not ‘stressed’ by ‘what’ the action encounters. For Merleau-Ponty, the habitual body does not get in the way of an action: it is behind the action. I want to suggest here that whiteness could be understood as ‘the behind’. White bodies are habitual insofar as they ‘trail behind’ actions: they do not get ‘stressed’ in their encounters with objects or others, as their whiteness ‘goes unnoticed’. Whiteness would be what lags behind; white bodies do not have to face their whiteness; they are not orientated ‘towards’ it, and this ‘not’ is what allows whiteness to cohere, as that which bodies are orientated around. When bodies ‘lag behind’, then they extend their reach. It becomes possible to talk about the whiteness of space given the very accumulation of such ‘points’ of extension. Spaces acquire the ‘skin’ of the bodies that inhabit them. What is important to note here is that it is not just bodies that are orientated. Spaces also take shape by being orientated around some bodies, more than others. We can also consider ‘institutions’ as orientation devices, which take the shape of ‘what’ resides within them. After all, institutions provide collective or public spaces. When we describe institutions as ‘being’ white (institutional whiteness), we are pointing to how institutional spaces are shaped by the proximity of some bodies and not others: white bodies gather, and cohere to form the edges of such spaces. When I walk into university meetings that is just what I encounter. Sometimes I get used to it. At one conference we organize, four black feminists arrive. They all happen to walk into the room at the same time. Yes, we do notice such arrivals. The fact that we notice such arrivals tells us more about what is already in place than it does about ‘who’ arrives. Someone says: ‘it is like walking into a sea of whiteness’. This phrase comes up, and it hangs in the air. The speech act becomes an object, which gathers us around. So yes they walk into the room, and I notice that they were not there before, as a retrospective reoccupation of a space that I already inhabited. I look around, and re-encounter the sea of whiteness. As many have argued, whiteness is invisible and unmarked, as the absent centre against which others appear only as deviants, or points of deviation (Dyer, 1997; Frankenberg, 1993). Whiteness is only invisible for those who inhabit it, or those who get so used to its inhabitance that they learn not to see it, even when they are not it (see Ahmed, 2004b). Spaces are orientated ‘around’ whiteness, insofar as whiteness is not seen. We do not face whiteness; it ‘trails behind’ bodies, as what is assumed to be given. The effect of this ‘around whiteness’ is the institutionalization of a certain ‘likeness’, which makes non-white bodies feel uncomfortable, exposed, visible, different, when they take up this space. The institutionalization of whiteness involves work: the institution comes to have a body as an effect of this work. It is important that we do not reify institutions, by presuming they are simply given and that they decide what we do. Rather, institutions become given, as an effect of the repetition of decisions made over time, which shapes the surface of institutional spaces.

### ROB Spec [1AC Add-on]

#### Under my model of debate, the 1AC affirms the resolution through a discursive method to resist oppression. The negative can read a counter-method to resist oppression and read reasons why my method is bad. Fiat is illusory which means only pre-fiat impacts matter under my role of the ballot. The debate is determined by the flow and the ROB comes on a higher layer than theory or topicality.

# 1AR – Extensions

## 1AR O/V Short

## 1AR O/V vs T and Cap

## 1AR O/V vs T FW

## 1AR O/V vs Cap

## 1AR O/V vs Pessimism

## 1AR O/V vs Truth Testing

# 1AR – A2 Substance

## A2 Essentialism

## A2 Cede the Political

## A2 Ballot Commodification

## A2 Cooption

## A2 Decadence

## A2 Rickert

## A2 State Good Dump

### XT Gilens and Page

# 1AR – A2 T Framework

## Reps Framing O/V

## Counterinterps

### CI – Method

### CI – Aff or Neg

### CI – Direction of the topic

## A2 Limits

### O/V

## A2 Fairness First

### Structural Fairness O/V [Short]

### Structural Fairness O/V [Long]

### A2 Testing

### A2 Pre-fiat post-fiat distinction

## 1AR – Reasonability

### Reasonability > CI

### A2 Arbitrariness

### A2 R2B

### A2 Collapses

### A2 Norm-setting

### A2 Logic

### Fairness Hijacks

# 1AR – A2 K

## 1AR – Microptx O/V

## A2 Cap

### A2 Cap [General]

### A2 Identity Politics Link

### A2 Individualism Link

### A2 Protest / Disruption Link

### A2 Dean [Melancholia]

## A2 Afropessimism

### Evans DA

### A2 Afropessimism [General]

### A2 Asians = Racist

### A2 Identity Politics Link

## A2 Baudrillard / Semiocapitalism

### A2 Baudrillard

## A2 Settler Colonialism

## A2 Queer-pessimism

## A2 Quare-pessimism

## A2 Ableism

## A2 Tuck and Yang

# 1AR – A2 Theory

## A2 ROB Spec

### A2 General

## A2 Spikes on Top

# 1AR – A2 PICs

## O/V

## A2 Underview PIC

## A2 Plagiarism PIC

## A2 Unintelligibility PIC

# 1AR – Truth Testing

### O/V

### Impact Turn – Mignolo

# 1AR – Phil

## A2 Kant

### Psychological Violence O/V

### Kant Ableist

### Framing O/V

## A2 Skep

# 1AR – A2 LARP

## O/V

## A2 Extinction