# K – My Solvency is a plant

# Core

## Links

### 1NC – Health Policy

#### Ask not what a body is but what it can do. The 1AC stratifies individuals through systems of public health there they must be a user. Be an addict. This reduces the complex assemblage of an individual to an individual process hindering it’s capacity to form new connections.

**Malins ’04**, Machinic Assemblages: Deleuze, Guattari and an Ethico-Aesthetics of Drug Use, (<http://www.janushead.org/7-1/malins.pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist

Bodies that fall prey to transcendence are reduced to what seems to persist across their alterations. Their very corporeality is stripped from them, in favor of a supposed substrate–soul, subjectivity, personality, identity–which in fact is no foundation at all, but an end effect, the infolding of a forcibly regularized outside. (Massumi, 1992: 112) For Deleuze and Guattari a body (human, animal, social, chemical) has no interior truth or meaning; it exists only through its external connections and affects. They write: We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words, what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the affects of another body. (ATP5 : 257) So where does this leave the subject? And identity? If we are to talk only of the drug using body and its multiplicities–where does the ‘drug user’ or ‘addict’ disappear to? For Deleuze and Guattari the subject is nothing more (and nothing less) than a particular way in which bodies have become organised and stratified in the post-Enlightenment social world. In order to comprehend the ‘human’ body, the social world (or socius) reduces the complexity and chaos of an ever-changing multiplicity of bodily flux to discrete categories of meaning and constancy. Bodies become ordered and delimited according to hierarchical binary presuppositions: human/animal, man/woman, healthy/unhealthy, lawful/criminal, hetero/gay, clean/junkie. Binaries that bodies never fully correspond to: No real body ever entirely coincides with either category. A body only approaches its assigned category as a limit: it becomes more or less “feminine” or more or less “masculine” depending on the degree to which it conforms to the connections and trajectories laid out for it by society… “Man” and “Woman” as such have no reality other than that of logical abstraction. (Massumi, 1992: 86) Yet when bodies fall outside these binaries, or try to claim a different identity, they are rarely granted anything outside a third term (‘bi-sexual’, ‘reformedsmoker’) that remains reliant upon, and limited to, those binary relations. Multiplicities reduced to binaries and trinities. Manifold potential reduced to a discrete set of bodily possibilities. You will be a boy or a girl; a smoker or a non-smoker; a civilized human being (with all bodily parts fulfilling civilized ‘human’ functions)’ or an animal. Your choice. You will subscribe to modern selfhood (and all its bodily and linguistic demands) or you’ll be rejected: You will be organized, you will be an organism, you will articulate your body–otherwise you’re just depraved. You will be signifier and signified, interpreter and interpreted–otherwise you’re just a deviant. You will be a subject, nailed down as one, a subject of the enunciation recoiled into a subject of the statement–otherwise you’re just a tramp. (ATP: 159) The pressure to stratify and organise as a subject is strong. Yet the socius, particularly under capitalist democracies, rarely forces bodies to comply (Massumi 1999). It hardly needs to. Bodies tend to desire their own order and organisation: they make their own movements toward stratification and limitation, and toward the reassuring constancy it provides. I know who I am. I am a female, student, non-smoker. Stratification is the way in which bodies actively and strategically put themselves together in order to have a political social voice and to say “I”. A body becomes a subject (selfsame) in order to interact successfully in the social world. It must accept an identity (male/female, hetero/gay/bi) and a particular way of organising itself (mouth for eating, arms for lifting, nose for smelling, eyes for seeing, lungs for breathing); otherwise it will be incomprehensible. It must reduce its own fluid complexities (I am female and sometimes like to look male and am mostly hetero but sometimes gay but only on Tuesdays and I occasionally use drugs but only when the moon is full . . .) to discrete categories (androgynous, bi, drug user). Languages, institutions and systems of thought all demand it, and bodies rarely fail to accede. A body that smokes once becomes a smoker. A body that injects twice becomes an addict. A complex rhizomatic flow of multiplicities reduced to a single grid of social strata. A grid of organization and predetermination (male, hetero, alcoholic) that limits the connections a body can make with other bodies; and reduces its potential for difference. Its potential for becoming-other. However, while bodies are themselves drawn to these reassuring modes of (organ)isation, they also simultaneously repel them. Cracks appear in the strata. For no identity category is ever entirely stable; no subject totally unified and consistent; and no mode of organisation fully sedimented except in death). The body retains its own impetus–an impetus for forming assemblages which allow desire to flow in different directions, producing new possibilities and potentials. Revolutionary becomings. Becomings that can transform a single body or a whole social system. Brief lines of movement that move away from organisation and stratification and toward a Body without Organs (BwO); in other words, toward a disarticulated body whose organs (and their movements and potentials) are no longer structured in the same way, or structured at all. The human body: My breasts are for whipping (masochism); my mouth is for emptying my stomach (anorexia); my arm is a blank canvass (tattooing); my tongue is for dissolving a trip (raving); my veins are for transporting the drug (injecting). A particular becoming is only ever transitional. A body-in-becoming soon re-stratifies: either captured by, or lured by, the socius. Most often **a drug using body is connected back up to the social machines of public health** or medicine or morality **through which it becomes stratified** **as a ‘drug user’** or ‘addict’ or ‘deviant’ respectively. **Or the machine of law, through which it becomes stratified as a ‘criminal’** (or now, through diversionary programs: a ‘recovering addict’!). Or it might, if we allow it, connect up to a multitude of other machines and become something else entirely (a student, an architect, a mother, a surfer, a masochist, a gardener, a knitter . . .). It will likely be many at once. And although restratification usually occurs according to preexisting categories (masochist, deviate, drug user, junkie), it can also–at least in liberal democracies (and even then only very occasionally)–allow bodies to create their own entirely new (but most often abjected) categories (Massumi, 1992). I am a trisexual. I am a coffee-eater; a full-moon heroin-injector. And these territorialisations are also never fully complete: a living, desiring body will always form new assemblages that have the potential to transform it and its territories. I would like, therefore, to dispose of the idea that there is such thing as a ‘drug user’ (existing over time) or an ‘addict’ (once an alcoholic always an alcoholic), and begin to rethink the drug using body as an ephemeral entity: a machine that exists only in the event, in its moment of connection with the drug and the specific affects it enables. Categories such as ‘drug user’ and ‘addict’ can be thought instead, as stratifications of bodies both imposed by institutions (of law, medicine, public health, etc.) and undertaken by bodies for strategic (though not necessarily positive) purposes. This is not to say that a body cannot form assemblages which move toward an addictive tendency; but addictiveness is a tendency not tied to a body or a drug–it is a specific potential, judged according to how much a relation or assemblage tends toward this limit. And the limit is never fully attainable; the body can never be fully ‘addicted,’ only in a process of addiction. Addiction as a verb: a doing word, not a descriptive noun. Each drug use assemblage should be mapped out in terms of its particular relations and specific affects–and not reduced a priori to a single process. For each drug assemblage enables different flows of desire and produces different bodily affects.

### \*\*\*2NR – Malins 04

### 1NC – Historical blackness

#### The 1AC’s historical account of oppression gridlocks Blackness into a linear narrative of oppression where whiteness retains agency and radical Black politics and doomed to become reactive and ineffective

**Wright 15**, *Black physics: Beyond the middle passage epistemology,* (<https://aaaaarg.fail/upload/michelle-m-wright-physics-of-blackness-beyond-the-middle-passage-epistemology.pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist

When a linear spacetime epistemology begins, as many Black diasporic epistemologies do, with object status—being enslaved, colonized, 116 · Quantum Baldwin relocated, and so on—the laws of cause and effect make it difficult to reverse the binary that is set in place, because oppression is asserted as the cause of all historical events (effects) in the timeline, excepting those events that are caused by a Black (resistant) reaction to an oppressor’s action. Yet because it is a reaction to an action, we are again returned to a weird and dismally fixed race-ing of this Black physics, in which whiteness always retains the originary agency and, because origins dominate a linear narrative, white racism is always the central actor in Black lives now condemned to the status of reactors. If, however, we add Epiphenomenal time to our interpellation here, the “now” is foregrounded by agency because Blackness begins as its own interpellation in the moment. At the same time, this moment is nuanced because it involves a potentially endless set of negotiations. Instead of the Black Subject being moved down a line through cause and effect as in a strictly linear interpellation, the Subject in the moment is variously informed by a variety of external and internal stimuli (what is witnessed and what happens; what is thought and felt) that also can intersect with one another. For example, I might watch an episode of a television show in one moment and laugh uproariously at what I find to be a daring but insightful joke about racism; in another moment, watching the same show and hearing the same joke, I might well have forgotten my previous reaction (or remember it, in whatever valence) and find myself ambivalent about or offended by the joke. In other words, I do not move through the world reacting in the same way to the same stimuli all the time—and perhaps this is because the stimuli are never the same because if not the space then the time has shifted (even if I am watching from my same place on the couch, I am doing so on different days). This is both liberating and problematic to our lives, in which intellectual and behavioral consistency is more highly valued than its less predictable performances. It means that one does not always behave as one wishes, and for the Black Subject who seeks to adhere to a Middle Passage interpellation, the clarity of this linear timeline is often belied by the familiar complexity of lived moments. Similarly, the last paragraph of “Everybody’s Protest Novel” asserts agency as an ambivalent possession, but a possession nonetheless: “Our humanity is our burden, our life; we need not battle for it; we need only to do what is infinitely more difficult—that is, accept it.”8

### \*\*\*2NR – Wright 15

### 1NC – State-Thought

#### The State-form is more than just an institution – it’s a series of relations that re-direct desire to conform to the political subject that it idealizes. Only by abolishing established organs of power can we hope to think of a new political future.

Newman 09 [Saul, Professor of Political Theory at the University of London at Goldsmiths. 02/18/2009. “War on the State: Stirner and Deleuze’s Anarchism.” <https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/saul-newman-war-on-the-state-stirner-and-deleuze-s-anarchism>] Lifeguard-PF

Deleuze also unmasks forms and structures of thought that affirm State power. Like Stirner, Deleuze believes that thought has complicity in State domination, providing it with a legitimate ground and consensus: “Only thought is capable of inventing the fiction of a State that it is universal by right, of elevating the State to de jure universality” (Deleuze and Guattari 1988:375). Rationality is an example of State thought. Deleuze goes one step further than Stirner: rather than seeing certain forms of thought as simply lending rational and moral authority to the State, he contends that rational and moral discourses actually form part of the assemblage of the State. The State is not only a series of political institutions and practices, but also comprises a multiplicity of norms, technologies, discourses, practices, forms of thought, and linguistic structures. It is not just that these discourses provide a justification for the State — they are themselves manifestations of the State form in thought. The State is immanent in thought, giving it ground, logos — providing it with a model that defines its “goal, paths, conduits, channels, organs...” (Deleuze and Guattari 1988:434). The State has penetrated and coded thought, in particular rational thought. It both depends on rational discourses for its legitimisation and functioning while in turn making these discourses possible. Rational thought is State philosophy: “Common sense, the unity of all the faculties at the centre of the Cogito, is the State consensus raised to the absolute” (Deleuze and Guattari 1988:376). It is only by freeing thought from this moral and rational authoritarianism that we can free ourselves from the State (Deleuze 1987:23). For Deleuze the model of State thought is what he calls aborescent logic (Deleuze 1987:25). Aborescent logic is a conceptual model or “image” of which predetermines thought on a rational basis. It is based on the root and tree system: there is a central unity, truth or essence — like Rationality — which is the root, and which determines the growth of its “branches”. Deleuze says: ...trees are not a metaphor at all but an image of thought, a functioning, a whole apparatus that is planted in thought to make it go in a straight line and produce famous correct ideas. There are all kinds of characteristics in the tree: there is a point of origin, seed or centre; it is a binary machine or principle of dichotomy, which is perpetually divided and reproduced branchings, its points of aborescence;’ (Deleuze 1987:25) Thought is trapped in binary identities such as black/white, male/female, hetero/homosexual. Thought must always unfold according to a dialectical logic and is thus trapped within binary divisions that deny difference and plurality (Deleuze 1987:128). For Deleuze this model of thought is also the model for political power — the authoritarianism of one is inextricably linked with the authoritarianism of the other: “Power is always arborescent” (Deleuze 1987:25). So instead of this authoritarian model of thought, Deleuze proposes a rhizomatic model which eschews essences, unities and binary logic, and seeks out multiplicities, pluralities and becomings. The rhizome is an alternate, non-authoritarian ‘image’ of thought, based on the metaphor of grass, which grows haphazardly and imperceptibly, as opposed to the orderly growth of the aborescent tree system. The purpose of the rhizome is to allow thought “to shake off its model, make its grass grow — even locally at the margins” (Deleuze and Guattari 1988:24). The rhizome, in this sense, defies the very idea of a model: it is an endless, haphazard multiplicity of connections, which is not dominated by a single centre or place, but is decentralised and plural. It embraces four characteristics: connection, heterogeneity, multiplicity, and rupture (Deleuze and Guattari 1988:7). It rejects binary divisions and hierarchies, and is not governed by an unfolding, dialectical logic. It thus interrogates the abstractions that govern thought, which form the basis of various discourses of knowledge and rationality. In other words, rhizomatic thought is thought which defies Power, refusing to be limited by it — rhizomatics “would not leave it to anyone, to any Power, to ‘pose’ questions or to ‘set’ problems” (Deleuze and Guattari 1988:24). One could argue here that Stirner’s attack on abstractions, essences and fixed ideas, is an example of rhizomatic thought. Like Deleuze, Stirner looks for multiplicities and individual differences, rather than abstractions and unities. Abstractions, like truth, rationality, human essence, are images which, for these thinkers, deny plurality and deform difference into sameness. Koch comments on Stirner’s disdain for transcendental fixed ideas. However I would argue that Stirner here invents a new form of thought which emphasises multiplicity, plurality and individuality over universalism and transcendentalism. This anti-essentialist, anti-universal thinking anticipates Deleuze’s approach. Moreover this anti-essentialist, anti-foundationalist style of thinking has radical implications for political philosophy. The political arena can no longer be drawn up according to the old battle lines of the State and the autonomous, rational subject that resists it. This is because a revolution is capable of forming multiple connections, including connections with the very power it is presumed to oppose: ‘These lines tie back to one another. That is why one can never posit a dualism or a dichotomy, even in the rudimentary form of the good and the bad’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988:9).’ So according to their critique of rational and moral discourses, both Stirner and Deleuze would see political theories based on a rational critique of the State, to be forms of thinking which actually reaffirm, rather than resist, State power. Such theories, because they do not question the essentialist distinction between rationality and irrationality, and because they see the State as fundamentally irrational, neglect the fact that the State has already captured rational discourse itself. In other words, to question the rational basis of the State, to say that State power is “irrational” or “immoral”, is not necessarily a subversion of the State, but may instead be an affirmation of its power. It leaves State power intact by subjecting revolutionary action to rational and moral injunctions that channel it into State forms. If the State is to be overcome one must invent new forms of politics which do not allow themselves to be captured by rationality: “politics is active experimentation since we do not know in advance which way a line is going to turn” (Deleuze 1987:137). I shall address this question of resistance later.

### 2NR – Newman 09

#### Newman 09 – The state is not just an institution it is an assemblage of organs of power. Organs of power ensure that any political energy will flow in a certain way through the system. Think of the May 68 student protest, the political energy almost shut down the entirety of Paris but once desire and energy was capitalized by political leaders (left and right) all that revolutionary energy only served to replicate the same authoritarian structures they we’re protesting.

#### Only the alt solves back by diffusing networks of power through a smooth space that allows energy and desire to create new connections instead of replicating old ones

### 1NC – Yo wtf is a reporter?

#### Who is a reporter? The AC is based on a false certainty that they know what it means to be a reporter rather than conceiving of the citizenry as always already becoming journalists through a constant process of deterritorialization

Johnston and Wallace 16 (Jane, University of Queensland, and Anne, Edith Cowan University, “Who is a journalist?” <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21670811.2016.1196592>) BS 8-17-2018

Journalism, Blogging, Citizen-journalism and Contested Territory The blurred and changing boundaries between journalists, bloggers and citizen journalists have received a great deal of attention during the past decade (see e.g. Alonzo 2006; Johnson and Kaye 2004; Lowrey 2006; Ugland and Henderson 2007; Singer 2007; Reese et al. 2007; Niles 2009; de Zuniga et al. 2011; Johnston and Graham 2013; Kristensen and Mortensen 2013; Franklin 2013; West 2014; Mortensen, Tara, and Weir 2016). This proliferation of literature has examined the topic from a wide range of perspectives, including differences in training and education, engagement with audiences, the co-production of content, adaptation to new technology, the role of professionalism and employment status, and issues surrounding free speech. With so many elements in the mix, it comes as no surprise that scholars are divided over just what distinguishes a journalist from a blogger or a citizen journalist and how distinctions can or should be drawn. In this paper, we examine the way courts and legislatures are applying protections and privileges to journalists and bloggers in the legal environment and how this might contribute to the ongoing and developing debate over contemporary definitions. In her analysis of the coverage of the Occupy movement in the United States, legal commentator Sonja West (2014, 2438) argued that journalists should be set apart from others who were “occasional public commentators”, those who might act in a “press like” way. She noted that the press possesses distinct qualities, including how it: 2 J. JOHNSTON AND A. WALLACE Digital Journalism [has] specialized knowledge about the subject matter at issue … serves a gatekeeping function by making editorial decisions regarding what is or is not newsworthy … places news stories in context locally, nationally, or over time … strives to convey important information in a timely manner … has accountability to its audience and gives attention to professional standards or ethics … devotes time and money to investigating … expends significant resources defending itself against legal attacks as well as advocating for legal changes. (West 2014, 2444) West (2014) argues that the press constitutes speakers who fulfil a valuable and unique role in a democracy and it should be defined in a way so as to exclude occasional commentators (2456–2462) and embrace “press exceptionalism”; a pathway that is neither “elitist” nor “discriminatory” (2462). Yet others see the idea of “A-list” bloggers (Singer 2007, 80) as in keeping up with the professionalised role of the media, observing that for “salient topics in global affairs, the blogosphere functions as a rare combination of distributed expertise, real-time collective response to breaking news and public-opinion barometer” (Drezner and Farrell, in Singer 2007, 80). Indeed, there can be no question that some “A-list bloggers” bear all the hallmarks of the best of legacy news media, as outlined by West. As Singer rightly observes: “Ultimately, as traditional distinctions between professional and popular communicators become less clear in this open, participatory, interconnected media environment, ‘professional’ journalists will not be distinguished by the products they produce nor the processes through which they do so” (90). Others, such as Ugland and Henderson (2007), draw a clear distinction between “egalitarian” and “expert” models of journalism. The egalitarian model rests on the idea that all citizens are equally equipped and free to act as newsgatherers, while the expert model sees legacy or traditional journalists uniquely qualified to serve as agents of news procurement and dissemination through education, training and the adoption of a code of ethics. In a very real sense, the critical place of citizen journalism, blogging and journalism has moved through a Deleuzian process of de-territorialisation. The idea of de-territorialisation focuses on the movement or process by which something departs from a given territory—where a territory can be a system of any kind: conceptual, linguistic, cultural, social or physical (Patton 2007). By contrast, re-territorialisation refers to the ways in which de-territorialised elements recombine and enter into new relations in the constitution of a “new assemblage or the modification of the old” (Patton 2007, 4). This concept, outlined by post-structuralists Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987), envisages the emergence of new forms of cultural, social and political life through the re-territorialisation process (Patton 2007). Communication scholar Ros Petelin (2005) used this transformational approach in relation to the knowledge that emerges within a growing academic discipline, such as public relations; however, it might just as easily be applied to critique the media and the supplanting of traditional journalism by blogs and other alternate spheres of knowledge. Where critical scholars (Malpas and Wake 2006, 260) note the change as emerging in “new systems”, we follow Petelin’s lead in applying de-territorialisation to industry or professional practice and, indeed, to how journalistic systems are in a state of change. An analysis using this conceptual framework thus illuminates the development of an alternative approach to the hegemonies that have previously dominated the media sphere. In such instances, the role of news production and dissemination is de-territorialised from its traditional source to be re-territorialised by blogs and the citizenry generally, effecting what Deleuze and Guattari call “becoming democratic” (Patton 2007). While this theory shares common ground with the idea of egalitarianism, questions remain unanswered as to where the line between traditional journalism and these new commentators may be drawn. Shennan (2011, 135) points out that the gradual accumulation of legal rights by journalists as well as other non-traditional media has “left unanswered the question of who can call himself or herself a journalist”. As a result, this issue has become a central focus not only for journalists and media producers, but also for judges, politicians, legislators and policy makers. Courts, the Legal Environment and Reframing “Who is a Journalist” Arguably, the most detailed recent investigation into the questions of “who is a journalist?” and “what is journalism?” for the purposes of the law, was undertaken by the NZLC. The Commission examined at great length, first in an issues paper (NZLC 2011) and subsequently in the extensive report The News Media Meets the “New Media” (NZLC 2013). A principal objective of the review was to identify who should be subject to the system of rights and responsibilities that have traditionally applied to legacy or traditional media, and the adequacy of that system in the current media environment (NZLC 2011, 3). The issues paper argued that, on one hand, non-traditional sources provide “the potential to strengthen democracy by increasing participation in public affairs, widening sources of information…; providing a greater diversity of opinion and strengthening the levels of scrutiny and public accountability” (NZLC 2011, 5). On the other hand, it observed that: it also creates a set of policy and legal challenges including … the lack of clarity in law as to which types of publishers should qualify for the statutory privileges and exemptions which at the moment apply to the “news media” [and] a lack of regulatory parity, both between different types of traditional media … and between traditional news media and the new digital publishers. (NZLC 2011, 5) Moreover, the Law Commission observed, while bloggers are not accountable to any regulator or complaints system, neither do they have the advantages that accrue from recognition as bona fide members of the news media (NZLC 2011, 6). Questions of bona fides and accreditation were among the issues canvassed in distinguishing who should be considered in the new definition. The issues paper expressed a preliminary conclusion that: it is in the public interest to extend the legal privileges and exemptions which currently apply to traditional news media to some new publishers … providing these privileges are matched by acceptance of the countervailing standards and accountabilities which have traditionally applied to the mainstream news media. (NZLC 2011, 7) The subsequent 2013 report tightened this finding to provide for specific accountability to a new independent standards body proposed by the NZLC, the New Media Standards Body (NZLC 2013). The New Zealand report is one of several recent examinations in a number of countries into the regulatory environment of contemporary media; others include the 4 J. JOHNSTON AND A. WALLACE Digital Journalism Leveson Report in the United Kingdom (Leveson 2012) and the Finkelstein Report in Australia (Finkelstein and Ricketson 2012). However, a distinguishing feature of the NZLC report was its focus on defining what constituted and defined the news media. Elsewhere, in the United States, the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, the largest Federal Appeals Court, has recently moved to expand the definitions of the news media and journalist, observing that “With the advent of the Internet and the decline of print and broadcast media … the line between the media and others who wish to comment on political and social issues becomes far more blurred” (Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox 2014, 12). In Canada, Chief Justice of Canada, Beverley McLachlin, expressly recognised and endorsed the complimentary role of new media in the case of Grant v. Torstar, noting: “These new disseminators of news and information should, absent good reasons for exclusion, be subject to the same laws as established media outlets” (NZLC 2011, 7). In a subsequent extra-curial observation, Her Honour also showed her preference for extending the definition, arguing: “Anyone with a keyboard and access to a blog can now be a reporter. And who is to say they are not?” (McLachlin 2013, 33). However the approach taken in these decisions and the work of the Law Commission has yet to be fully reflected in the laws that govern the regulation of the media in all jurisdictions. Behind an apparent reluctance to broaden the definition of “journalist” or “news media” there often lurks a concern about the consequences; the nature of which vary, depending on the purpose for which recognition is sought and the nature of the role being performed by the media. Journalist as Participant—Shield Laws As noted earlier, journalists—and increasingly bloggers and citizen journalists— come into contact with the legal process in two key contexts. The first type of contact occurs when they are part of the process, most commonly as a defendant or some other actor in a legal case; the second type of contact occurs when they are observing or reporting on the process, often associated with the court-reporting role. A principal way in which the first of these contexts—journalists as part of the legal process—is played out, occurs when actors seek shield law protection for confidential sources. These laws give the courts discretion to excuse journalists from identifying a confidential source or informant, with the privilege shielding journalists from contempt sanctions and other punishments should they refuse to reveal their sources (Alonzo 2006). Central to this issue are courts’ interpretations of who is a journalist and what is a media organisation; a field of law that has become highly contested in recent years. In the United States, it has been said that shield laws provide “almost absolute protection” from prosecution for contempt in situations where an individual refuses to disclose their confidential sources, documents or other information that could identify those sources (Shennan 2011, 133). In fact, the degree of the protection varies; some states confer an absolute privilege, in some it is qualified and other shield laws contain exceptions that enable it to be overcome in certain circumstances (Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, n. d.). In September 2015, 49 US states had shield laws in place or operated under rulings that grant journalists and sources privilege in local and state (but not federal) cases (Tatum 2015). Importantly, of those states with shield laws WHO IS A JOURNALIST? 5 Digital Journalism in place, some distinguish between the type of media platform a work is published on, or whether the journalist is employed by a media organisation, while a smaller number of states do not employ such distinctions, drawing broad definitions that are neither platform nor organisationally dependent (Shennan 2011, 133). Though individual states have adopted shield laws, the lack of federal shield laws in the United States is widely lamented (Greene 2013). Greene (2013) argues: “There is no question that a federal shield law is needed. However, as with all shield laws, the law must define which persons can claim its protections”. It is at the definitional stage that the legislation has stalled; in seeking to address the lack of federal protection through its Free Flow of Information legislation, the legislature cannot reach agreement on who should be called a journalist (Durity 2006; Greene 2013).

### \*\*\*2NR – Johnston & Wallace 18

## Impacts

### 1NC - Microfascism

#### The only question of this round is “why do the masses desire their own repression?” The segmentation and striation of individuals creates a desire for order and intelligibility. Individuals moments of fear and insecurity allow the state-form to capitalize on segmentation to impose destructive and violent regimes without any form of resistance.

**D&G ’80** (Deleuze and Guattari, France’s hottest hip hop duo) *A thousand Plateaus: MicroPolitics and Segmentarity*, p214-216 (<https://libcom.org/files/A%20Thousand%20Plateaus.pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist

If Kafka is the greatest theorist of bureaucracy, it is because he shows how, at a certain level (but which one? it is not localizable), the barriers between offices cease to be "a definite dividing line" and are immersed in a molecular medium (milieu) that dissolves them and simultaneously makes the office manager proliferate into microfigures impossible to recognize or identify, discernible only when they are centralizable: another regime, coexistent with the separation and totalization of the rigid segments.I0 We would even say that fascism implies a molecular regime that is distinct both from molar segments and their centralization. Doubtless, fascism invented the concept of the totalitarian State, but there is no reason to define fascism by a concept of its own devising: there are totalitarian States, of the Stalinist or military dictatorship type, that are not fascist. The concept of the totalitarian State applies only at the macropolitical level, to a rigid segmentarity and a particular mode of totalization and centralization. But fascism is inseparable from a proliferation of molecular focuses in interaction, which skip from point to point, before beginning to resonate together in the National Socialist State. Rural fascism and city or neighborhood fascism, youth fascism and war veteran's fascism, fascism of the Left and fascism of the Right, fascism of the couple, family, school, and office: every fascism is defined by a micro-black hole that stands on its own and communicates with the others, before resonating in a great, generalized central black hole.1 ' There is fascism when a war machine is installed in each hole, in every niche. Even after the National Socialist State had been established, microfascisms persisted that gave it unequaled ability to act upon the "masses." Daniel Guerin is correct to say that if Hitler took power, rather then taking over the German State administration, it was because from the beginning he had at his disposal microorganizations giving him "an unequaled, irreplaceable ability to penetrate every cell of society," in other words, a molecular and supple segmentarity, flows capable of suffusing every kind of cell. Conversely, if capitalism came to consider the fascist experience as catastrophic, if it preferred to ally itself with Stalinist totalitarianism, which from its point of view was much more sensible and manageable, it was because the segmentarity and centralization of the latter was more classical and less fluid. What makes fascism dangerous is its molecular or micropolitical power, for it is a mass movement: a cancerous body rather than a totalitarian organism. American film has often depicted these molecular focal points; band, gang, sect, family, town, neighborhood, vehicle fascisms spare no one. Only microfascism provides an answer to the global question: Why does desire desire its own repression, how can it desire its own repression? The masses certainly do not passively submit to power; nor do they "want" to be repressed, in a kind of masochistic hysteria; nor are they tricked by an ideological lure. Desire is never separable from complex assemblages that necessarily tie into molecular levels, from microforma-tions already shaping postures, attitudes, perceptions, expectations, semiotic systems, etc. Desire is never an undifferentiated instinctual energy, but itself results from a highly developed, engineered setup rich in interactions: a whole supple segmentarity that processes molecular energies and potentially gives desire a fascist determination. Leftist organizations will not be the last to secrete microfascisms. It's too easy to be antifascist on the molar level, and not even see the fascist inside you, the fascist you yourself sustain and nourish and cherish with molecules both personal and collective. Four errors concerning this molecular and supple segmentarity are to be avoided. The first is axiological and consists in believing that a little suppleness is enough to make things "better." But microfascisms are what make fascism so dangerous, and fine segmentations are as harmful as the most rigid of segments. The second is psychological, as if the molecular were in the realm of the imagination and applied only to the individual and interindividual. But there is just as much social-Real on one line as on the other. Third, the two forms are not simply distinguished by size, as a small form and a large form; although it is true that the molecular works in detail and operates in small groups, this does not mean that it is any less coextensive with the entire social field than molar organization. Finally, the qualitative difference between the two lines does not preclude their boosting or cutting into each other; there is always a proportional relation between the two, directly or inversely proportional. In the first case, the stronger the molar organization is, the more it induces a molecularization of its own elements, relations, and elementary apparatuses. When the machine becomes planetary or cosmic, there is an increasing tendency for assemblages to miniaturize, to become micro-assemblages. Following Andre Gorz's formula, the only remaining element of work left under world capitalism is the molecular, or molecularized, individual, in other words, the "mass" individual. The administration of a great organized molar security has as its correlate a whole micro- management of petty fears, a permanent molecular insecurity, to the point that the motto of domestic policymakers might be: a macropolitics of society by and for a micropolitics of insecurity.12

### \*\*\*2NR – D&G 80

### 1NC – Microfascism v2

#### Something about Trump being emblematic of micro-fascism

**Genosko ’17**, *Black Holes of Politics: Resonances of Microfascism,* (<http://www.ladeleuziana.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/04-en-Genosko-Resonance_MicroFascism.pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist

The analysis of desire’s microfascism sounds a bit science fictional, Guattari admits, but he is not deterred, because fascism is for him a dangerous, cancerous molecular phenomenon: “what makes fascism dangerous is its molecular or micropolitical power, for it is a mass movement: a cancerous body rather than a totalitarian organism.” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 215) It is not a question of going small for the sake of minutae, or for that of a Pascalian view of how different things would have been if Cleopatra’s nose had been a bit longer. (Guattari 1995: 237) Adopting the language of mutation, proliferation, and molecularity allows Guattari to think through the capacity of fascism to spread throughout the social body. And eventually try to overwhelm it, or ‘win’ it electorally. This “potentially” gives to desire a fascist inclination since desire is not undifferentiated and instinctual, but results from highly complex and supple micro-formations and refined interactions (like so-called The Great Meme War of 2015-16), the kind we see on Internet Relay Chat on 4chan but just as well on Breitbart News. For Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus, what makes fascism so frighteningly catastrophic for capitalism is that, unlike totalitarianism, especially of the Stalinist type, it liberated the desire of the masses for their own deaths, in spite of themselves. They were neither tricked nor desirous of their own masochistic repression. They were not driven internally to suicide by a death drive. Rather, fascism constructs a totalitarian State that is suicidal. National Socialism was focused on destruction, of everyone, including all Germans, as a project that would resonate throughout Europe and beyond. Suicide of the State and the end of its own people would be a “crowning glory.” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 231) When there were no means to subdue mass desire to fulfill its own destruction (Guattari calls it a “deadly form of libidinal metabolism”), no deals can be brokered. The only option was an alliance for the United States and United Kingdom with Stalinism, because its brand of terror was acceptable, a more stable and efficient system for controlling mass turbulence (by the working class, colonials and minorities), and it too was threatened by National Socialism. For Guattari, “the last World War will thus have been the opportunity to select the most efficient totalitarian machines, those best adapted to the period. (Guattari 1995: 242) Yet microfacisms have managed to seep into capitalism as Stalinism failed to molecularize its economy and labour force. Capitalism searches for new models of totalitarianism inside itself, and finds all kinds of “new forms of molecular fascism.” (Guattari 1995: 244) These find an environment conducive to infestation in infocapitalism’s forms of affective and communicational labour that are directly productive of value. Conclusion New microfascisms find fertile ground in the fast circulating redundancies of Internet memes and other post-media artifacts like the use of echo quotations as anti-semitic signifiers. Extremely involutive black holes draw processes of subjectivation into themselves as their power increases with every iteration of them. Caught up in the pleasures of empty promises, Pepe memes, 4chan rants and actions, combover and spray tan jokes, comedic mimesis and alt-right semiotics, and staging policy by spectacle, with so many supercharges of nothingness to go around, desire cannot extract itself from the echo chamber of emptiness that modulates its existence, making it lose its bearings, finding solace in distress, that travels surprisingly well along the bubbling resonances of social media. For Guattari, “fascism, like desire, is scattered everywhere, in separate bits and pieces, within the whole social realm; it crystallizes in one place or another, depending on the relationships of force.” (Guattari 1995: 245) The Trump presidency is a kind of black hole into which the swirling phenomena of emptiness is drawn, simultaneously providing an attachment that allows belonging and forgetting to coexist, as it emits forged lines of alterity: alternative facts, courtesy of Kellyanne Conway (Counselor to President Trump), and bottomless post-truths that deflect and distract sober investigation and resist analysis. Guattari reminds us that it incumbent upon theorists of microfascism to search in the most “’incomprehensible’ revolutionary transformations” (Guattari 1995: 248) for investments of desire. In the transition from classical types of fascism to molecularized microfascisms, desire is at once liberated and subjected to repressive attributions tailored to new modes of production. This is why the Trump and 4chan hypothesis is so compelling as it directs us to epic fails, perhaps beginning with the inauguration: the more it breaks down the better it works, which is the credo of Deleuze and Guattari with regard not only to capitalism, but to America as well.

### \*\*\*2NR – Genosko 17

### 1NC – Normalization

#### Statist normalization is the root cause of war, violence and oppression – it’s try-or-die for the alt to prevent a laundry list of short-term existential crises including environmental destruction, nuclear war, disease, resource crises, novel forms of biopower, and expanding genocidal neo-imperialism.

Noble 14 (Scott, documentary filmmaker and wage slave “Anarchy and Near Term Extinction,” <https://dissidentvoice.org/2014/06/anarchy-and-near-term-extinction/>) //Lifeguard-BS 2-23-2018 \*\*brackets in original

According to the theory of Near Term Extinction (NTE) the human race is about to go the way of the Dinosaurs. Though polls on the subject are scarce, it is safe to assume that the majority of humanity disagrees. Most of us remain at least cautiously optimistic about our long term survival prospects. Notable exceptions can be found amongst various apocalyptic cults, whose followers anticipate near term divine intervention, as well as trans-humanists, who anticipate the rise of post-humans due to exotic new technologies. In contrast to these worldviews, NTE is not rooted in religion or science-fiction but a pessimistic reading of the environmental sciences, probability theory and the law of unintended consequences. Nor is NTE limited to the fringe. A growing number of scholars, including highly visible figures like Stephen Hawking and Richard Dawkins, have suggested that near term extinction is plausible, though certainly not inevitable (predictions range from years to decades to centuries). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, environmental crises such as climate change have supplanted global thermonuclear war in the pessimist’s hierarchy of doom. Yet these threats are not mutually exclusive. A leaked 2004 report by the Pentagon on global warming anticipates increased risk of “Nuclear conflict, mega-droughts, famine and widespread rioting…Once again, warfare [will] define human life.”1 Though such predictions are self-serving – environmental crises are deemed yet another threat that can only be contained by militarism – they are also rational. Under state capitalism, competition for diminishing resources may exacerbate violent conflict, creating a feedback loop not unlike global warming itself. This essay will argue that if the human race is to survive, anarchic systems based on participatory democracy must replace top down models of state rule. Realpolitik In his book The McDonaldization of Society, sociologist George Ritzer portrays rationalism as a paradox: highly rational models frequently produce highly irrational outcomes.2 The modern workplace, where we spend most of our waking hours, provides a familiar illustration: rationalist modes of production based on efficiency, calculability, predictability and control have reduced large swathes of humanity to human resources, disposable entities afforded little in the way of self-determination and dignity. In Charlie Chaplin’s Modern Times (1936), the Little Tramp himself becomes part of the assembly line, compelled forward by gears and pulleys, sliding through the bowels of the machine. When it comes to international affairs, rationalist models generally fall under the heading realpolitik, a term used to denote both cynical amorality and unflinching “realism” by political leaders acting for a perceived greater good. Unlike idealist interpretations of the state, which focus extensively on ethics, realpolitik is primarily concerned with power. The Italian philosopher and diplomat Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) wrote, “How we live is so far removed from how we ought to live, that [the ruler] who abandons what is done for what ought to be done, will rather bring about his own ruin rather than his preservation.”3 Since the ruler’s primary objective is to maintain power, immoral behaviour is not only acceptable but necessary. Machiavelli did not usher in in a new political philosophy; he merely articulated what had always been understood by rulers anywhere and everywhere. In 1934, British historian A.J.P. Taylor suggested that the principles we associate with realpolitik are “a series of assumptions, with which statesmen have lived since their earliest years and which they regard as so axiomatic as hardly to be worth stating.”4 Nevertheless, Machiavelli remains scandalous to this day. His brutal practicality is summed up in Chapter 18 of The Prince – people ought either to be “well treated or crushed.”3 The 19th Century anarchist Mikhail Bakunin agreed with Machiavelli’s cynical understanding of power but came to very different conclusions about how humanity should proceed. He bitterly praised the Italian philosopher for exposing the state with “terrible frankness,” and demonstrating that “crime… is the sine qua non of political intelligence and true patriotism,” yet rejected the notion that such crime was inevitable. “We are the sons of the revolution… We believe in the rights of man, in the dignity and necessary emancipation of the human species.”5 The state – as well capitalism – should be abolished. Up until the mid-twentieth century, and with the exception of a few rogue philosophers who advocated world government, self-government or no government at all, near-constant warfare between competing states has been viewed as an unfortunate but necessary byproduct of international relations. The invention of the nuclear bomb changed that – or would have, if the idealists were correct. American military strategist Bernard Brodie was overly optimistic when, in 1946, he wrote, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.”6 The military establishment, soon to be termed the military industrial complex by President Eisenhower, did in fact have another purpose, namely to expand American power through imperialism. Tolstoy was proven correct: not even the creation of the most “terrible weapons of war” would put an end to the state’s quest for dominance. Few people who consider themselves rational would advocate for the disarmament of the state apparatus in which they live. Yet in the age of nuclear weapons, it is precisely this insistence on “national security” through state power that is most likely to kill us. If, as Bakunin argued, “small states are virtuous only because of their weakness,”5 powerful states demonstrate an ineluctable tendency toward dominating others. The result is militarism. MAD The history of civilization is sufficiently blood-soaked that many modern intellectuals, including Albert Einstein, have argued that competitive state frameworks must be abandoned if the human race is to survive. Following the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Einstein implored: A world government must be created which is able to solve conflicts between nations by judicial decision. This government must be based on a clear-cut constitution which is approved by the governments and nations and which gives it the sole disposition of offensive weapons.7 It is doubtful that a world government such as envisioned by Einstein – which allowed for the centralization of “offensive weapons” – would have eliminated the nuclear threat, let alone war, if for no other reason than secessionist movements and other power struggles would have remained a constant concern (we will return to this subject at the essay’s closing). In any case, Churchill, Truman and Stalin would carve up most of Europe at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, creating the foundation for the Cold War. As if to underscore the improbability of world government, the three leaders had an argument over who would enter the Potsdam conference room first; they eventually decided that they would enter at precisely the same time through three separate doors.8 The new paradigm was MAD – Mutually Assured Destruction. Because man is a rational being, he would not risk annihilation by attacking his foe. Game theorists at the Rand Corporation, a Pentagon think tank, provided the theoretical basis. According to the prisoner’s dilemma, both players had to assume the other was rational. While most nuclear strategists took it for granted that the point of the game was to maintain peace between the super-powers, others believed, quite logically, that the point of the game was to win it. Among those who embraced the “winner takes all” view was General Curtis Lemay, purported model for the character “Jack the Ripper” in Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove. Best known for masterminding the massive bombing campaign against Japan during WWII (which resulted in half-a-million dead and about five million homeless), Lemay headed up the Strategic Air Command and served as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force from 1961 to 1965. Lemay drew up a war plan which involved dropping “the entire stockpile of atomic bombs in a single massive attack” on the Soviet Union. The Washington Post later quoted the General as stating, “Every major American city – Washington, New York, Philadelphia, Detroit, Chicago, Los Angeles – will be reduced to rubble. Similarly, the principal cities of the Soviet Union will be destroyed.”9 According to then Defence Secretary Robert McNamara, Lemay was “absolutely certain” that “the US was going to have to fight a nuclear war with the Soviet Union” and that “we should fight it sooner rather than later.”9 Equally disturbing as the super-hawks at the Pentagon were the numerous academics – people who considered themselves highly rational – who advocated a similar strategy. Most found their home at the Rand Corporation. One of Rand’s most notorious strategists was Herman Kahn. He believed that the US atomic arsenal was a wasting resource. So long as the Soviet Union continued to build its own arsenal, America’s would decrease in value. For Kahn, nuclear weapons were like a precious commodity in danger of depreciation on the global marketplace. Though he did not explicitly advocate a first strike, Kahn believed that a nuclear war was “winnable.”10 Breaking the Chain of Command MAD is widely regarded as a triumph of both rationalism and hard-nosed realpolitik. The missiles stayed in their silos. We didn’t go extinct. Starry-eyed idealists who rejected Ronald Reagan’s belligerence and exorbitant military spending were proven wrong. What few realize is that we escaped destruction primarily due to a handful of individuals who rejected the chain of command – and even the logic of their computer screens – in order to embrace the better angels of their being. In my documentary film The Power Principle, I explore several of the biggest “close calls” during the Cold War. The most serious event occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the midst of the conflict, a group of United States Navy Destroyers began dropping practice-depth charges on a Soviet submarine positioned near Cuba in order to force it to the surface. The sub commanders believed WWIII was underway. According to Soviet military protocol, the commanders had previous permission to launch missiles if all three reached consensus. Two said yes – one said no. Then “an argument broke out among the three, in which only Vasili Arkhipov was against the launch.” Thomas Blanton, a director of the National Security Archive, later remarked, “A guy called Vasili Arkhipov saved the world.”11 In 1983, a computer malfunction at a nuclear warning facility near Moscow falsely indicated a nuclear attack by the United States. The probability indicator was at level 1. The man in charge, Stanislav Petrov, did not have the ability to launch a retaliatory strike. However, were he to pass on the information to the top command, the Soviet leadership would have only had a few minutes to decide on whether to launch a counter-attack. According to Bruce Blair, a Cold War nuclear strategist, “the top leadership, given only a couple of minutes to decide, told that an attack had been launched, would [have made] a decision to retaliate.” Petrov broke military protocol, and waited. It turned out that the computer malfunction was caused by “a rare alignment of sunlight on high-altitude clouds and satellites.”12 The third biggest close call occurred in the same year when NATO began a war exercise; the scenario – an all out nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. It was codenamed Able Archer.  When the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union during WWII, they did so under the guise of a war game. Alarmed by Ronald Reagan’s “evil empire” rhetoric, as well as America’s deployment of Pershing II strategic missiles in Europe, hard-liners in the Kremlin became convinced that history was about to repeat itself. In the run up to the exercise, the Soviets secretly mobilized all key components of their military forces, including nuclear submarines. One mistake by either side and a holocaust would have resulted. There are other examples, though not quite as hair-raising. A report by the Nuclear Files Foundation lists over 20 “close calls” during the Cold War.13 The greatest danger has never been a rogue commander in the vein of “Jack the Ripper” – though that threat is real enough – but accidental nuclear war caused by incompetence and/or technical malfunction.14 Former Defence Sectary Robert McNamara, who was present in the Oval Office during the Cuban Missile Crisis, eventually came to a stark conclusion: “It can be confidently predicted that the combination of human fallibility and nuclear arms will inevitably lead to nuclear destruction.”15 Unlike most of the public, US military leaders are well aware of the numerous close calls of the Cold War. The same is presumably true of most men and women who (along with military leaders) formulate current US policy. If their goal was the survival, let alone health, of the human race, the United States would have long since abandoned aggressive war. A fraction of the US military budget could eliminate poverty worldwide,16 and in doing so drain the swamp of resentment and rage that provides the lifeblood of the “terrorist threat.” For critics of American foreign policy, the failure of US leaders to pursue a peaceful path following the collapse of the Soviet Union is often attributed to a uniquely American belligerence or depravity. Yet a cursory glance through the history books shows that the American empire, while exceptional in terms of global reach and technology, is anything but exceptional in terms of base motivation; it is behaving in a remarkably similar fashion to every empire that preceded it. We can only conclude that powerful states – and the people to tend to wield great power within them – share peculiar forms of logic that are alien to most of their citizenry. The Power Principle The dominant view amongst anthropologists is that we have lived in relatively peaceful, cooperative, egalitarian societies for 99% of our history. In the words of anthropologist Christopher Boehm, “Humans were egalitarian for thousands of generations before hierarchical societies began to appear.”17 Many of the behaviours we now celebrate – “success” through the hoarding of wealth, for example – were traditionally considered socially deviant. Ethnographies of extant nomadic foragers reveal that they are “all but obsessively concerned with being free from the authority of others. That is the basic thrust of their political ethos.”18 The Utku in the Canadian Arctic have an extreme intolerance for “displays of anger, aggression, or dominance.”19 The Pintupi Aborigines insist that “One should assert one’s autonomy only in ways that do not threaten the equality and autonomy of others” (Myers).20 Among the Wape tribe in New Guinea, “A man will not tolerate a situation where a neighbour has more than he has. A man should not possess either goods or power to the disadvantage of others” (Mitchell).21 In both egalitarian and hierarchical societies, power is jealously guarded. For egalitarians, the goal is to maximize freedom through group solidarity; for despots, the goal is to maximize the “freedom” of rulers to oppress the majority. Among political philosophers, only anarchists have seriously considered the threat posed by hierarchy in human affairs. For this reason they have been labeled “utopian.” Yet it may be that idealized notions of benevolent hierarchies are not only unrealistic but wildly implausible. Just as systems of domestic law have proven incapable of preventing tyranny, so too have international laws utterly failed to prevent war. For anarchists, the reason for this is self-evident: the logic of power is power. There is no law or principle so compelling that it will not be tossed aside at the first sign that those who hold power are in danger of losing it. Hunter-gatherers are able to prevent social dominance hierarchies because they act in a group wide coalition; under the state apparatus, with its entrenched hierarchies, this ability is severely curtailed. Nevertheless, for the vast majority of political philosophers, the idea that a select minority should rule over the mass is taken for granted. James Madison, the “father of the American constitution,” argued that a primary purpose of government was to “protect the minority of the opulent against the majority.” His great fear was “levelling tendencies,” in other words, real democracy.22 If nation states existed in a vacuum, incapable of waging war against other states, minority rule would perhaps be tolerable, depending on the disposition of the men and women who happen to rule over the majority at a given time. The problem is that states are not content to rest on their laurels. Schopenhauer’s famous quote about wealth – that it is “like sea-water; the more we drink, the thirstier we get” – applies equally to power itself. The anthropologist Gregory Bateson explained the phenomenon in terms of “optima” and “maxima”: “the ethics of optima and the ethics of maxima are totally different ethical systems. The ethics of maxima knows only one rule: more.”23 Egalitarian societies are able to maintain optima due to a low center of gravity. In large hierarchical societies, wherein power becomes centralized, leaders or entire social classes can easily become despotic. Lord Acton’s famous quote that “power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely” was more vividly expressed by the great American novelist Kurt Vonnegut: “Human beings are chimpanzees who become crazy drunk on power.” Austrian political scientist Leopold Kohr, who described himself as a “philosophical anarchist,” regarded powerful states as the most dangerous expression of the maxima principle: There could be no gentler peoples on earth today than the Portuguese, the Swedes, the Norwegians, or the Danes. Yet, when they found themselves in possession of power, they lashed out against any and all comers with such fury that they conquered the world from horizon to horizon. This was not because, at the period of their national expansion, they were more aggressive than others. They were more powerful.24 Great powers may temporarily “check” one another, to the point where – depending on the global power configuration – some powerful states may seem positively benign; nevertheless, by their very nature, states must exist in an environment of perpetual conflict; when a “critical quantity of power” is reached by one state in relation to others, war is a likely result. For these and other reasons, Bakunin believed that international law is always destined to fail. There is no common right, no social contract of any kind between them; otherwise they would cease to be independent states and become the federated members of one great state. But unless this great state were to embrace all of humanity, it would be confronted with other great states, each federated within, each maintaining the same posture of inevitable hostility. War would still remain the supreme law, an unavoidable condition of human survival. Every state, federated or not, would therefore seek to become the most powerful. It must devour lest it be devoured, conquer lest it be conquered, enslave lest it be enslaved, since two powers, similar and yet alien to each other, could not coexist without mutual destruction.5 Universal Hostility When NATO was created in 1949, its ostensible purpose was to protect Europe from the Soviet Union. Yet when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, NATO did not; in fact, it expanded. Speaking in 2005, American military geostrategist Thomas Barnett boasted that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, “demand for our services has increased 4-5 times.”14 Instead of the “peace dividend” promised by Bill Clinton, aggressive war by the United States actually escalated. Twenty years after Perestroika, Gorbachev lamented that his concessions – rather than creating more peace and harmony – had produced a “winner’s complex” among the American political elite.25 Gorbachev had envisioned for post-Soviet Russia a social democracy similar to the Scandinavian nations. What actually followed were a series of brutal “free market” reforms engineered by technocrats from the Chicago school of economics. It took decades for Russia to regain some semblance of stability. Now that it has – and despite the vanished pretext of an ideological battle between capitalism and communism – the Cold War is back with a vengeance. When Gorbachev allowed for the peaceful dismantling of the Soviet Union, he was promised by George H.W. Bush that NATO would not expand “one inch to the east.”14 Instead, NATO has expanded to much of the world – including Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, the Baltic and Central Asia. Coinciding with these aggressive policies of expansion and encirclement, the US has insisted on establishing anti-missile systems in Poland designed to eliminate Russia’s nuclear deterrent. The theoretical basis behind America’s treatment of post-Soviet Russia crosses party lines. Paul Wolfowitz, who served as Deputy Secretary of Defence under George W. Bush, wrote in Defence Planning Guidance (1992): “Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere.”26 Similarly, Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski argued in his 1997 book The Grand Chessboard that control of Eurasia – to the exclusion of Russia – is the key factor in ensuring American primacy: Failure to widen NATO… would shatter the concept of an expanding Europe… Worse, it could reignite dormant Russian political aspirations in Central Europe… Europe is America’s essential geopolitical bridgehead in Eurasia… A wider Europe and an enlarged NATO will serve the short-term and longer-term interests of U.S. policy.27 In February 2014 the democratically elected albeit corrupt government of Ukraine was overthrown in a right-wing putsch supported by the United States, prompting Vladimir Putin to engineer a referendum in Crimea allowing for its annexation into Russia. Long before the crisis, and in response to previous provocations on Russia’s borders, Putin delivered a speech to the Kremlin in which he stated: Their [U.S.] defence budget in absolute figures is almost 25 times bigger than Russia’s. This is what in defence is referred to as ‘their home — their fortress’. Clever… Very clever. But this means that we also need to build our home and make it strong and well protected. We see, after all, what is going on in the world. Comrade Wolf knows whom to eat, as the saying goes. It knows whom to eat and is not about to listen to anyone, it seems.14 In Putin’s portrayal of America as a ravenous wolf we see an echo of Bakunin’s maxim that states must “devour lest [they] be devoured.” The desire by Russian leaders to retain control of their Black Sea port in Crimea and to project power into neighbouring (NATO-affiliated) states is a classic expression of the cordon sanitaire or “quarantine line.” In state-craft, the term is defined as a protective barrier against a potentially aggressive nation or dangerous influence. Putin has not been without his own forays into military violence, such as the brutal subjugation of Chechnya in the mid-90’s (during which the capital, Grozny, was largely reduced to rubble). Nevertheless, the Russian leader has focussed most of his attention on building economic alliances, most notably that of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). Following the first BRICS summit in 2009, member nations called for a new global reserve currency (rather than the US dollar) that would be “diversified, stable and predictable.”28 Apart from the small matter of nuclear weapons, it is in the economic realm that Russia is considered most dangerous. Russia provides the European Union with about a third of its gas, remains one of Germany’s largest trading partners, and has arranged a massive natural gas supply deal with China. In the same way that NATO has attempted to encircle Russia, the Pentagon’s “Asia pivot” seeks to quarantine China militarily. China has responded by announcing a new Air Defence Identification Zone in the East China Sea, overlapping disputed territories with Japan. In April, the US established a new “Defence” pact with the Philippines. Russia and China have repeatedly vetoed US-sponsored Security Council Resolutions that would have allowed for the legal bombing of Syria (which houses one of Russia’s last foreign military bases outside of the former Soviet Union). Yet this has not prevented the United States from attempting to subvert the Syrian government through semi-covert means. The CIA, the British SAS, Saudi Arabia, and NATO member Turkey have been training and supplying Syrian rebels in Jordan and elsewhere since the beginning of the insurgency against Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.29 Syria, in turn, has a mutual defence pact with Iran. As always in the recent history of the Middle East, the wild card is Israel. The destruction of Iran remains Israel’s primary foreign policy objective. Although Hezbollah has sensibly warned that an attack against Iran would “set the entire middle east ablaze.”30 Israeli leaders perceive Iran as a potential counter-check to Zionist power. In addition to geopolitical concerns, Israeli leaders embrace a peculiar military strategy known as the “Mad Dog” doctrine. First articulated by Israeli military leader and politician Moshe Dayan, it calls for Israel to behave “like a mad dog, too dangerous to bother.”31 North Korea seems to have embraced a similar strategy, though to considerably less effect. The most disturbing manifestation of this strategy is the so-called “Samson option.” Named after the biblical character Samson, who pushed apart the pillars of a Philistine temple, thereby killing both himself and his captors, the Samson option calls for destroying much of the world in response to an existential threat to the Jewish state. Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld explains: “We possess several hundred atomic warheads and rockets and can launch them at targets in all directions… We have the capability to take the world down with us.”32 The Samson option, and Israel’s behaviour in general, has led the American political scientist Norman Finkelstein to describe the country as a “lunatic state.”33 In his article “Marching as to War,” American paleoconservative author Pat Buchanan expresses incredulity over American Vice President Joe Biden’s post-Ukraine-coup trip through the former Soviet bloc countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. During the junket, Biden reiterated America’s commitment to “protect” these nations: “our word” is “solemn” and “iron clad.” According to Buchanan, Biden was “affirming war guarantees General Eisenhower would have regarded as insane.”34 Here we may say that while Biden’s actions may have been insane during the Eisenhower administration, they are perfectly logical under the Obama administration. In keeping with the theory of the Power Principle, or Kohr’s notion of “critical quantities of power,” the collapse of the Soviet Union eliminated the primary check to the American empire. The dogs of war could be fully unleashed. Now that Russia is resurgent, and the US declining economically, there is a great deal of barking going on. On April Fool’s Day, 2014, NATO Sectary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated: NATO’s greatest responsibility is to protect and defend our territory and our people. And make no mistake, this is what we will do. We will make sure we have updated military plans, enhanced exercises and appropriate deployments.35 Rasmussen is nothing if not worldly, considering that “his” people evidently include populations from countries as varied as Albania, Croatia, Canada, France, Iceland, Italy, Romania, the UK and the USA. The illegal bombing of Serbia by the Clinton administration may be regarded as the starting point in the New Cold War, for it was during the assault that NATO began its eastward shift. The destruction of Yugoslavia was “rational,” argues historian Michael Parenti, because “Yugoslavia was the one country in Eastern Europe that would not voluntarily overthrow what remained of its socialist system and install a free-market economic order… Yugoslavs were proud of their postwar economic development and of their independence from both the Warsaw pact and NATO.”36 Considerably less rational was the behaviour of US General Wesley Clark during the conflict. According to British pop singer James Blunt (best known for his song “You’re beautiful”), who commanded 30,000 NATO troops in Bosnia, he was instructed by the US General to attack a squadron of Russian soldiers at the Pristina Air Base. The direct command [that] came in from Gen Wesley Clark was to overpower them. Various words were used that seemed unusual to us. Words such as ‘destroy’ came down the radio.37 Like Vasili Arkhipov during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Stanislav Petrov during the 1983 nuclear-warning “computer glitch,” James Blunt disobeyed orders. He was backed up by British General Sir Mike Jackson. Said Jackson: “I’m not going to have my soldiers be responsible for starting World War III.”38 In contravention of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which demands “good-faith” efforts to work toward nuclear disarmament, the United States is projected to spend 1 trillion maintaining and expanding its nuclear weapons systems over the next 30 years39 – assuming we survive that long. Rationalizing War No state, no matter how powerful or totalitarian, is capable of engaging in aggressive war absent ideological justification. These justifications typically take on two forms: a noble cause that the public can relate to and a cause that – though it would seem brutal and even immoral to the public – is deemed rational by members of a particular ruling class. The celebrated American political philosopher Rienhold Neibuhr claimed that “rationality belongs to the cool observers.” Elites should recognize “the stupidity of the average man,” who must be ideologically manipulated via “emotionally potent oversimplifications.”40 Walter Lippmann, the “Father of modern journalism,” agreed, arguing that the “masses” are a “bewildered herd” who should be “spectators” in the affairs of state but not “participants.”40 Very often, a casus belli (or war pretext) will be manufactured by leaders to coerce a peaceful population into accepting war, though intensive propaganda is often sufficient. In the modern age, covert agencies like the CIA have allowed for a more cost-effective and PR-friendly alternative to transparent military aggression. Black operations are especially useful for the United States because the over-arching propaganda narrative (“freedom,” “democracy,” “human rights”) is diametrically opposed to the brutal realities of American foreign policy. Eisenhower’s concept of the Military Industrial Complex is better described as the Military Industrial Intelligence Complex. The vast gulf between propaganda and realpolitik can be seen in various internal memos by figures like US Cold Warrior and State Department official George Kennan. While American leaders publicly warned of an existential threat to democracy posed by the Soviet Union, Kennan’s 1948 memo to the Secretary of State cooly observes: We should cease to talk about vague and unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of living standards, and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts.41 Kennan helped to establish the Office of Policy Coordination inside CIA.42 Despite its intentionally bland title, the OPC specialized in black operations: assassinations, torture, coups, false flags. Its officers did in the dark “what would have never stood the light of day”43 in a self-proclaimed democracy committed to freedom and human rights. After the attacks of 9/11, these tactics were brought out into the open – a dangerous gambit that has undermined America’s moral legitimacy both at home and abroad. According to former CIA analyst Ray McGovern, the “neoconservatives” who would come to dominate the George W. Bush and Obama administrations were described by fellow analysts – in the 1970’s/80’s – as “The Crazies.”44 The neocons openly argued for war as a way of life, and for the projection of American power into every corner of the globe. “Ideas do not succeed in history by virtue of their truth,” writes sociologist Peter Berger, “but by virtue of their relationship to specific social processes.”45 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and coinciding with the increasing power of the Israeli Lobby, the neocon philosophy suddenly became not so crazy after all. It now had utility, and was widely accepted. The philosophical “Godfather” of the neoconservative movement was the philosopher Leo Strauss. Born in Germany of Jewish parents, he emigrated to the United States and took up a teaching political science at the University of Chicago. Despite his lineage, Strauss’ teachings bear a disturbing similarity to those of the Nazis. Shadia Drury, a political scientist at the University of Calgary, writes that Strauss believed in “perpetual war” and “an aggressive, belligerent foreign policy… Following Machiavelli, [Strauss] maintained that if no external threat exists then one has to be manufactured.”46 For liberals and progressives, neoconservatism is the current Bete noir of American politics. In alleged contrast to the realist school, neoconservative are deemed idealistic, irrational, even insane, yet also uniquely ruthless and cunning. In his book Reclaiming Conservatism, Mickey Edwards of the Aspen Institute argues that “Neoconservatives are driven by theoretical objectives, and by a moral or ethical compass that fails to take into account the complexities of world politics, [whereas] adherents to a Realpolitik foreign policy often seem to have no moral compass at all.”47 Apart from different propaganda narratives, the reader can be forgiven for failing to notice a significant difference between the neocons and their alleged ideological opponents in the American power structure. In terms of real world outcomes, what we actually find is a remarkable degree of uniformity between “realists” and “neoconservatives,” Democrats and Republicans, with foreign policy differences amounting to a friendly disagreement over exactly how to go about maintaining and expanding US hegemony. Increasingly, Democratic politicians such as Hillary Clinton are being described as “neocons” despite having no historical attachments to Strauss or his philosophy. This indicates a certain level of cognitive dissonance amongst the party faithful; unable to come to terms with the failure of the state capitalist model, they attribute the American empire not to structural factors but a diabolical clique that has usurped American power from its proper guardians. A much more compelling and historically consistent explanation for the remarkable continuity between Democrat and Republican regimes has already been provided: the logic of power is power. For the half-a-million Iraqi children who perished under the sanctions program of Democrat Bill Clinton, or the similar number who perished under the Republican George W. Bush, the distinctions between philosophies of empire are meaningless. The ideological framework for imperialism may change, but the game remains the same. In Love with Death The Power Principle demands that the class that holds power attempts to retain and expand that power. Therefore, ruling classes within one nation find themselves in conflict not only with domestic populations but other nation states. The greatest fear of those who hold power is Anarchy – the loss of control by those who exercise it. For neoconservatives like Irving Kristol, the 60’s counter-culture was an outbreak of “moral anarchy,” which, if it had been allowed to continue, would have led to the collapse of “ordered liberty.”48 Externally the same principles apply. “Realist” Zbigniew Brzezinski argues: “America’s withdrawal from the world… would produce massive international instability. It would prompt global anarchy.”49 When I asked the late historian Howard Zinn what he thought of the word “anarchy” being used as a synonym for chaos, he suggested that anarchic systems are actually much more stable than hierarchical systems. Anarchism is based on horizontal principles of free association and mutual aid, whereas hierarchical systems demand coercion and violence. “Our political systems are in chaos,” Zinn stated. “International relations are in chaos.”14 In the desire to dominate others in order to prevent chaos, chaos is the result. It is by no means certain that chaos is considered undesirable by military strategists, provided it serves to weaken the opposition. In his “Strategy for Israel in the 1980’s,” Israeli strategic planner Oded Yinon advocated the fomenting of civil war throughout the entire middle east. Arabs would be turned against one another on the basis of nation, religion and ethnicity in order to increase Israel’s relative power.50 In countries like Iraq, Syria and Libya (or indeed Guatemala, El Salvador, Indonesia and Vietnam) we see the fruits of such strategies. Genocidal violence is not merely an unfortunate byproduct of well-intentioned plans for regime change but a goal in and of itself. It weakens competitors, and is therefore deemed justified. Human life has neither a positive nor a negative value, it is simply irrelevant – another number in the calculus of power. Former Defence Secretary Robert McNamara, the so-called “architect of the Vietnam war,” was obsessed with mathematics. “He was so impressed by the logic of statistics that he tried to calculate how many deaths it would take to bring North Vietnam to the bargaining table.”51 Millions of Vietnamese people were slaughtered by bullets and bombs, burnt with napalm, poisoned by Agent Orange; yet for the man who helped design the war, they were little more but numbers on a chalkboard. McNamara argued that US violence in Vietnam was preferable to the “complete anarchy” that might otherwise result.14 The psychologist Eric Fromm suggested that the desire to control and dominate may produce a necrophilous orientation. Such people are “cold, distant, devotees of ‘law and order’”52 who are excited not by love but death. The necrophilous person is driven by the desire to transform the organic into the inorganic, to approach life mechanically, as if all living persons were things… He is deeply afraid of life, because it is disorderly and uncontrollable by its very nature. To the necrophilous person justice means correct division, and they are willing to kill or die for the sake of what they call justice. ‘Law and order’ for them are idols, and everything that threatens law and order is felt as a satanic attack against their supreme values. …People are aware of the possibility of nuclear war; they are aware of the destruction such a war could bring with it – and yet they seemingly make no effort to avoid it. Most of us are puzzled by this behaviour because we start out from the premise that people love life and fear death. Perhaps we should be less puzzled if we questioned this premise. Maybe there are many people who are indifferent to life and many others who do not love life but who do love death.52 That many of our most beloved military figures had or have a necrophilous orientation is plainly evident. Observing the corpses and ruined architecture following a battle during WWII, George Patton remarked, “I love it. God help me I do love it so. I love it more than my life.”53 The actor Richard Burton, who played Sir Winston Churchill in a television drama, became repulsed by the figure: In the course of preparing myself… I realized afresh that I hate Churchill and all of his kind. I hate them virulently. They have stalked down the corridors of endless power all through history… What man of sanity would say on hearing of the atrocities committed by the Japanese against British and Anzac prisoners of war, ‘We shall wipe them out, everyone of them, men, women, and children. There shall not be a Japanese left on the face of earth’? Such simple-minded cravings for revenge leave me with a horrified but reluctant awe for such single-minded and merciless ferocity.54 In Churchill’s desire to “wipe out” the “Japanese race” we sense a sort of mania bordering on sadistic perversion. Indeed, on the other side of the conflict, Imperial Japan took sadistic perversion in warfare to horrifying extremes. Hitler brought sado-masochism into his bedroom; a coprophiliac, he was sexually aroused by having young ladies defecate on his face. In so doing he became, in the words of historian Robert Waite, “the personification of [his own] depraved self, as the persecutor who attacks a part of himself in his victims.”55 Hitler believed that it was in doom that art reached its highest expression. Consumed by sado-masochism and narcissism, hiding at last in his bunker, he devoutly wished for all of Germany to die with him. Afforded the opportunity, Western military leaders may well opt for global conflagration rather than conceding a diminution in their power. The Tyranny of Borders For Cold War General Curtis Lemay and nuclear strategist Herman Khan, it seemed perfectly logical to risk the annihilation of the human race in order to “win” the game against the Soviet Union. Missing in their analysis was that the game itself was insane. The U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change recently concluded that climate change could pose an irreversible, existential threat to civilization.56 Among the few American military strategists who commented on the report was retired Army Brig. Gen Chris King. Echoing the conclusions of the Pentagon’s leaked 2004 report on global warming, King emphasized that increased military conflict would seem to be the inevitable outcome of environmental collapse: “This is like getting embroiled in a war that lasts 100 years… You can see in military history, when they don’t have fixed durations, that’s when you’re most likely to not win.”56 Another American military figure, retired Navy Rear Adm. David Titley, commented on the report: You could imagine a scenario in which both Russia and China have prolonged droughts. China decides to exert rights on foreign contracts and gets assertive in Africa. If you start getting instability in large powers with nuclear weapons, that’s not a good day.56 I began this essay by noting that under the rules of state capitalism, it is rational to regard climate change and other environmental crises as probable force multipliers for interstate conflict. At the same time, militarists make a fundamental error in assuming that current forms of hierarchical organization will continue on indefinitely. Institutional hierarchy has only existed for about 1% of our time on Planet Earth. There is every reason to believe that hierarchical organization, far from being inevitable, is actually unnatural for human beings insofar as it creates massive social dysfunction. In The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better, Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett demonstrate statistically that more equal societies “enjoy better physical and mental health, lower homicide rates, fewer drug problems, fewer teenage births, higher math and literacy scores, higher stands of child wellbeing, less bullying in schools, lower obesity rates, and few people in prison.”57 Equally interesting, the psychological malaise caused by hierarchy extends to the men and women at the top of society’s pyramid. In The Good Life: Wellbeing and the New Science of Altruism, Selfishness and Immorality, psychotherapist Graham Music notes that “The higher up the social-class ranking people are, the less pro-social, charitable and empathetically they behave… Those with more materialistic values consistently have worse relationships, with more conflict.”58 If the assumptions inherent to state capitalism continue to be shared by majorities or large minorities, environmental collapse will likely entail an increase in intra-species violence, exactly as the militarists predict; however, as our rulers are quick to point out in their internal literature, in crisis there is opportunity. Environmental degradation may also force people to examine alternative ways of living, including those currently deemed “utopian.” War, poverty, environmental collapse and other catastrophes of modern existence are inextricably linked. “The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist,” states capitalist ideologue Thomas Friedman. “McDonald’s cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas, the designer of the F-15.”59 “Globalization” has entailed a dual tendency: increased border militarization combined with the growth of powerful supranational institutions. While capital is increasingly liquid – penetrating borders with the mere click of a mouse – 99% of humanity remains confined within nation states. The dominant media has portrayed this process as one of increased border erasure, yet the reality is that borders have never been more militarized. The logic of increased “border security” in the era of elite globalization is explained by the anthropologist David Graeber: If it were not possible to effectively imprison the majority of people in the world in impoverished enclaves, there would be no incentive for Nike or The Gap to move production there to begin with. Given a free movement of people, the whole neoliberal project would collapse. This is another thing to bear in mind when people talk about the decline of ‘sovereignty’ in the contemporary world: the main achievement of the nation-state in the last century has been the establishment of a uniform grid of heavily policed barriers across the world. It is precisely this international system of control that we are fighting against, in the name of genuine globalization.60 Though David Rockefeller is often accused of conspiring to engineer a “world government,” he remarked in a 2007 interview with Benjamin Fulford that be believed states are necessary, and that he does not view World Government as likely nor desirable.61 Nevertheless, in his memoirs, Rockefeller clearly states that he is a proud “internationalist.” Rockefeller’s brand of internationalism is consistent with the rise of supranational institutions like the EU, the IMF and World Bank. The goal is not the elimination of borders but the elimination of any semblance of democratic control over elites. The state has come to function as the ultimate divide and conquer mechanism, reducing the human species to a series of artificial, warring tribes serving a decidedly unpatriotic transnational ruling class. Government as Constant Reconquest Thus far I have conceived of warfare primarily in terms of external competition. But internal competition is at least as important. The American dissident philosopher Randolph Bourne believed that war is not only a primary function of the state but the health of the state. At the outbreak of WWI he wrote: The nation in wartime attains a uniformity of feeling, a hierarchy of values culminating at the undisputed apex of the State ideal, which could not possibly be produced through any other agency than war. Loyalty – or mystic devotion to the State – becomes the major imagined human value. Other values, such as artistic creation, knowledge, reason, beauty, the enhancement of life, are instantly and almost unanimously sacrificed, and the significant classes who have constituted themselves the amateur agents of the State are engaged not only in sacrificing these values for themselves but in coercing all other persons into sacrificing them.62 The domestic repercussions of war are typically regarded as an unintended consequence or happy accident for the ruling class; in the process of engaging in imperialism, or defending a population against imperialism, the state must neutralize subversive elements. Neoconservative philosopher Leo Strauss believed the opposite: domestic control is the imperative, war the effect: Because mankind is intrinsically wicked, he has to be governed… Such governance can only be established, however, when men are united – and they can only be united against other people.46 In 1984, Orwell also conceived of war in terms of domestic utility: In some ways she was far more acute than Winston, and far less susceptible to Party propaganda. Once when he happened in some connection to mention the war against Eurasia, she startled him by saying casually that in her opinion the war was not happening. The rocket bombs which fell daily on London were probably fired by the Government of Oceania itself, ‘just to keep the people frightened.’63 Viewed through a macroscopic lens, the perceived separation between “domestic” and “foreign” is an illusion. There is no race except the human race, no nation except the world. Does this mean we should embrace a world state? Before examining the question, we should ask ourselves exactly what the state is. In contrast to coercion theories of state formation, which argue that the first states were only beneficial to a privileged minority, and were achieved through a process of violence, conservative theories argue that the state was brought about through a process of “mutual benefit” and “consent of the governed.” Though understandably popular amongst apologists for state violence, conservative models are easily dismissed. As noted by the anthropologist James C. Scott: …all ancient states without exception were slave states. The proportion of slaves seldom dropped below 30 per cent of the population in early states, reaching 50 per cent in early South-East Asia (and in Athens and Sparta as much as 70 and 86 per cent)…slaving was at the very centre of state-making.64 The state is a new phenomenon in the human experience. But what of warfare itself? In his book A Terrible Love of War, American psychologist James Hillman argues that war “is the father of all things,” “the first of all norms” and “the ultimate truth of the cosmos.”53 For militarists, this view is a comfortable one: war is inevitable, it has always existed and always will. Another prominent psychologist, Harvard Professor Steven Pinker, has also advanced a “Constant warfare” theory of human evolution, suggesting that civilization and the state have actually diminished war, pacifying our instinctually savage, warlike ways. Like conservative theories of state formation, Pinker’s theories are easily debunked.65 In Archaeology, Cultural Anthropology, and the Origins and Intensification of War, Ferguson analyzes worldwide evidence of violence before 10,000 years ago. He finds that while violence certainly existed, it was comparatively rare, and in no way indicative of war. Thus, a study of all skeletons available from 100,000-10,000 in southwestern France finds that only 2.5% show any signs of fractures – and even these could have been caused by accidental injury. In the Middle East, amongst 370 skeletons from the Natufian (10,800-8,500 BC), only 2 showed signs of trauma.66 Similar patterns are evident throughout the world: Warfare is largely a development of the past 10,000 years. The multiple archaeological indicators of war are absent until the development of a more sedentary existence and/or increasing sociopolitical complexity, usually in combination with some form of ecological crisis and/or steep ecological gradients.67 Ethnographies of extant nomadic hunter-gatherers help to explain why war would have made little sense to our forebears. Anthropologist Douglas P. Fry writes: The very nature of nomadic-band social organization makes warfare, slavery, or despotic rule well-nigh impossible.

### \*\*\*2NR – Nobel 14

## Alts

### 1NC – Look for a weapon

#### Vote negative to create new lines of flight that view Blackness as an ontology of becoming not trapped within historical causality, this creates the possibility for a new radical politics that accounts for both the fluid and ridged nature of systems and uses each to create new assemblages of freedom.

**Koerner ’11**, *Line of Escape: Gilles Deleuze’s Encounter with George Jackson,* (<https://read.dukeupress.edu/genre/article-abstract/44/2/157/5631/Line-of-Escape-Gilles-Deleuze-s-Encounter-with>) //GrouchoMarxist

In “The Case of Blackness” Moten (2008b: 187) perceptively remarks, “What is inadequate to blackness is already given ontologies.” What if we were to think of blackness as a name for an ontology of becoming? How might such a thinking transform our understanding of the relation of blackness to history and its specific capacity to “think [its] way out of the exclusionary constructions” of history and the thinking of history (Moten 2008a: 1744)? Existing ontologies tend to reduce blackness to a historical condition, a “lived experience,” and in doing so effectively eradicate its unruly character as a transformative force. Deleuze and Guattari, I think, offer a compelling way to think of this unruliness when they write, “What History grasps of the event is its effectuation in states of affairs or in lived experience, but the event in its becoming, in its specific consistency, in its selfpositing as concept, escapes History” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 110). To bring this relation between blackness and becoming further into the open—toward an affirmation of the unexpected insinuation of blackness signaled by the use of Jackson’s line as an “event in its becoming”—a few more words need be said about Deleuze’s method. The use of Jackson’s writing is just one instance of a procedure that we find repeated throughout Capitalism and Schizophrenia, where we constantly encounter unexpected injections of quotations, names, and ideas lifted from other texts, lines that appear all of sudden as though propelled by their own force. One might say they are deployed rather than explained or interpreted; as such, they produce textual events that readers may choose to ignore or pick up and run with. Many names are proposed for this method—“schizoanalysis, micropolitics, pragmatics, diagrammatism, rhizomatics, cartography” (Deleuze and Parnet [1977] 2006: 94)—but the crucial issue is to affirm an experimental practice that opposes itself to the interpretation of texts, proposing instead that we think of a book as “a little machine” and ask “what it functions with, in connection with what other things does it or does it not transmit intensities?” (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987: 4).8 Studying how Soledad Brother functions in Deleuze’s books, connecting Jackson’s line to questions and historical issues that are not always explicitly addressed in those books, involves one in this action. And further, it opens new lines where the intensities transmitted in Jackson’s book make a claim on our own practice This method can be seen as an effort to disrupt the hierarchical opposition between theory and practice and to challenge some of the major assumptions of Western Marxism. In an interview with Antonio Negri in the 1990s, Deleuze (1997: 171) clarifies that he and Guattari have “remained Marxists” in their concern to analyze the ways capitalism has developed but that their political philosophy makes three crucial distinctions with respect to more traditional theoretical approaches: first, a thinking of “war machines” as opposed to state theory; second, a “consideration of minorities rather than classes”; and finally, the study of social “lines of flight” rather than the interpretation and critique of social contradictions. Each of these distinctions, as we will see, resonates with Jackson’s political philosophy, but as the passage from Anti-Oedipus demonstrates, the concept of the “line of flight” emerges directly in connection to Deleuze and Guattari’s encounter with Soledad Brother. The concept affirms those social constructions that would neither be determined by preexisting structures nor caught in a dialectical contradiction. It names a force that is radically autonomous from existing ontologies, structures, and historical accounts. It is above all for this reason that Deleuze and Guattari insist that society be thought of not as a “structure” but as a “machine,” because such a concept enables the thinking of the movements, energies, and intensities (i.e., the lines of flight) that such machines transmit. The thinking of machines forces us not only to consider the social and historical labor involved in producing society but also the ongoing potentials of constructing new types of assemblages (agencement). One of the key adversaries of this machinic approach is “interpretation” and more specifically structuralist interpretations of society in terms of contradictions. According to Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 1987: 293), structuralism persisted in the “submission of the line to the point” and as a result produced a theory of subjectivity, and also an account of language and the unconscious, that could not think in terms of movement and construction. Defining lines only in relation to finite points (the subject, the signifier) produces a calculable grid, a structure that then appears as the hidden intelligibility of the system and of society generally. Louis Althusser’s account of the “ideological State apparatus” as the determining structure of subjectivity is perhaps the extreme expression of this gridlocked position (an example we will come back to in a later section). Opposed to this theoretical approach, diagrammatism (to invoke one of the terms given for this method) maps vectors that generate an open space and the potentials for giving consistency to the latter.9 In other words, rather than tracing the hidden structures of an intolerable system, Deleuze and Guattari’s method aims to map the ways out of it.

### \*\*\*Koerner 11

### 1NC – War Machines

#### The alternative is to liberate the war machine. Stratified spaces allow the state to capture the war machine and direct desire towards meaningless destruction. Only freeing desire from the

**Robinson 10** *“Why Deleuze (still) matters: States, war-machines and radical transformation.”* (https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-deleuze-war-machine/) //GrouchoMarxist

So what, in Deleuzian theory, is the alternative to the state? Deleuze and Guattari argue for a type of assemblage (social group or cluster of relations) which they refer to as the ‘war-machine’, though with the proviso that certain kinds of ‘war-machines’ can also be captured and used by states. This should not be considered a militarist theory, and the term ‘war-machine’ is in many respects misleading. It is used because Deleuze and Guattari derive their theory from Pierre Clastres’ theory of the role of ritualised (often non-lethal) warfare among indigenous groups. Paul Patton has suggested that the war-machine would be better called a metamorphosis-machine, others have used the term ‘difference engine’, a machine of differentiation, and there is a lot of overlap with the idea of autonomous groups or movements in how the war-machine is theorised. We should also remember that ‘machine’ in Deleuze and Guattari simply refers to a combination of forces or elements; it does not have overtones of instrumentalism or of mindless mechanisms – a social group, an ecosystem, a knight on horseback are all ‘machines’. The term ‘war-machine’ has the unfortunate connotations of brutal military machinery and of uncontrollable militarist apparatuses such as NATO, which operate with a machine-like rigidity and inhumanity (c.f. the phrase ‘military-industrial complex’). For Deleuze and Guattari, these kinds of statist war-machines are also war-machines of a sort, because they descend from a historical process through which states ‘captured’ or incorporated autonomous social movements (particularly those of nomadic indigenous societies) and made them part of the state so as to contain their subversive power. Early states learned to capture war-machines because they were previously vulnerable to being destroyed by the war-machines of nomadic stateless societies, having no similar means of response. Hence, armies are a kind of hybrid social form, containing some of the power of autonomous war-machines but contained in such a way as to harness it to state instrumentalism and inhumanity. Captured in this way, war-machines lose their affirmative force, becoming simply machines of purposeless destruction – having lost the purpose of deterritorialisation (see below), they take on the purpose of pure war as a goal in itself. Deleuze and Guattari argue that state-captured war-machines are regaining their autonomy in a dangerous way, tending to replace limited war in the service of a state’s goals with a drive to total war. This drive is expressed for instance in the ‘war on terror’ as permanent state of emergency. There was a recent controversy about Israeli strategists adopting Deleuzian ideas, which reflects the continuities between state war-machines and autonomous war-machines, but depends on a selective conceptual misreading in which the drive to total war denounced by Deleuze and Guattari is explicitly valorised. The Israeli army is a captured war-machine in the worst possible sense, pursuing the destruction of others’ existential territories in order to accumulate destructive power for a state. For Deleuze and Guattari, it is not the Israeli army but the Palestinian resistance which is a war-machine in the full sense. The autonomous war-machine, as opposed to the state-captured war-machine, is a form of social assemblage directed against the state, and against the coalescence of sovereignty. The way such machines undermine the state is by exercising diffuse power to break down concentrated power, and through the replacement of ‘striated’ (regulated, marked) space with ‘smooth’ space (although the war-machine is the ‘constituent element of smooth space’, I shall save discussion of smooth space for some other time). In Clastres’ account of Amazonian societies, on which Deleuze and Guattari’s theory is based, this is done by means of each band defending its own autonomy, and reacting to any potential accumulation of power by other bands. One could similarly think of how neighbourhood gangs resist subordination by rival gangs, or how autonomous social movements resist concentrations of political power. Autonomous social movements, such as the European squatters’ movement, the Zapatistas, and networks of protest against summits, are the principal example Deleuze and Guattari have in mind of war-machines in the global North, though they also use the concept in relation to Southern guerrilla and popular movements such as the Palestinian intifada and the Vietnamese resistance to American occupation, and also in relation to everyday practices of indigenous groups resisting state control. One could also argue that the ‘war-machine’ is implicit in practices of everyday resistance of the kind studies by James Scott. Marginal groups, termed ‘minorities’ in Deleuzian theory, often coalesce as war-machines because the state-form is inappropriate for them. According to Deleuze and Guattari, war is not the aim of the war-machine (except when it is captured by the state); rather, war-machines tend to end up in a situation of war with states because of the incommensurability of the war-machine with the state and with striated space. War-machines end up in conflict with states because their goal is the ‘deterritorialisation’ of the rigid fixities of state space, often to create space for difference or for particular ways of life. Think for instance of squatters’ movements: in themselves they do not aim for conflict, but rather, seek different kinds of arrangements of space by forming new combinations of unused geographical spaces with otherwise ‘spaceless’ social groups. Yet such movements are often forced into conflict with the machinery of state repression because the state ignores, or refuses to recognise these new articulations. As I write this, the JB Spray squat in Nottingham is continuing a campaign of resistance to reoccupation by state forces acting on behalf of capitalist owners who have no intent of putting the space to use. This is a struggle I would very much encourage readers to support (see this article and related links for details; contact 07817493824 or email jbspray[at]hotmail.co.uk). It is also a clear, local example of how autonomous social movements are forced into conflict by the state’s drive to repress difference. War-machines are also associated with the formation of special types of groups which are variously termed ‘bands’, ‘packs’ and ‘multiplicities’. These groups are seen as operating as dense local clusters of emotionally-intense connections, strongly differentiated from the ‘mass’, which is a type of group based on large scale, lack of intensity and vertical integration. ‘Packs’ or ‘bands’ instead form as unstable groups, avoiding fixed hierarchies (any leaders emerging are subject to rapid succession), usually with small numbers, and dispersed through space rather than concentrated in particular sites. Their diffusion is enabled by a multiplicity of objectives which resonate through horizontal, molecular connections rather than being represented in overarching structures. They tend to detach materials from the connections in which they are inserted in the dominant system, instead reconstructing different ‘universes’ or perspectives around other ways of seeing and relating. One can think for instance of the way groups of children reconstruct urban spaces as spaces of play, finding new, dissident uses for objects such as shopping trollies. For Deleuze and Guattari, the process of forming ‘bands’ or ‘packs’ is necessarily dangerous, risking the self-destructive implosion of small groups, but also offering hopeful possibilities of forming ways of relating which are more open to difference than those prevalent in the dominant system. Deleuze and Guattari’s usefulness for radical activism is by no means limited to this particular pair of concepts, but this way of thinking about social transformation raises useful questions and provides insights into how autonomous groups differ from dominant hierarchical forms of social collectivity. For instance, this theory points towards the need to avoid duplicating statist ways of relating within autonomous spaces, and to avoid coalescing in formal organisations which ultimately lead back into the state-form (albeit usually through the addition of axioms). It also suggests the inevitability of antagonism between radical movements and the state, even when the goal of a radical movement is simply to defend or express its own difference. Strategically, therefore, autonomous activists need to be prepared to ‘ward off’ the state, both within movements (by challenging statist ways of thinking and acting) and in relation to the wider context (by resisting state repression). According to Deleuze and Guattari, there is a basic incompatibility between state ‘antiproduction’ and the flourishing of difference, and this requires overcoming the former. This requires attention to the creation and defence of autonomous spaces, in full awareness of their underlying transformative potential.

### \*\*\*2NR – Robinson 10

## Framing

### 1NC – Auto-correct

#### Your “framing issues” are nothing more than an overzealous autocorrect with a fascist desire to reproduce dominant discourses and squash attempts at resistance.

**Genosko ’17**, *Black Holes of Politics: Resonances of Microfascism,* (<http://www.ladeleuziana.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/04-en-Genosko-Resonance_MicroFascism.pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist

**[Ableism is bad and we don’t endorse it]**

Nevertheless, Guattari claims mediators must be bypassed in the relationship between social objectives and praxis. Desire tends to wander and to get off topic and away from readymade encodings. A micropolitical analysis of desire doesn’t represent what is already formed, but contributes to the formation and thus is “immediately political.” What does Guattari mean when he claims that “when saying is doing” micropolitics is immediately political? No more specialists either of saying or of doing. Collective assemblages (rather than individual idiolects) within the mass find their own means of expression, perhaps combining fragments of archaic discourses, recontextualized images, slang, and recycled codes. A rehearsal of the correct slogans is not required. It is theoretically messy to give permission to the masses to speak. There are no guarantees. The crystallization of situational collective desires in utterances and other semiotic materials always struggle with the influence of dominant overcodings, and are directly linked into machinic processes of all kinds, like ~~mangling~~ auto-correct functions, that underlines the distorting a-signifying elements of contemporary communication. Theorists of digital disobedience, especially distributed denial of service attacks, note that the asignifying dimension of ~~disabling~~ and “disrupting” servers is closely tied to the imperative to communicate in contemporary capitalism, and with the focus on circulation over meaning, breaking the “reproducible signal value” of messages, that texting and social media have perfected, acquires a powerful effect of redirecting attention away from the usual suspects of the sending and receiving estates in the name of new stakeholders.

### \*\*\*2NR – Genosko 17

### 1NC – P L A S T I C I T Y

#### Subject formation is the first and last question of this debate. The state form has a hold over our cognition and reforms our thought processes to striate every space into a location of control. Therefore the role of the ballot the to vote for the debate that best liberates cognition from the state form.

**Szymanski ’17**, *The Neuroplastic paradox,* (<http://www.inflexions.org/exhaustion/PDFs/06_Szymanski.pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist

One of neoliberal power’s most enduring strategies for maintaining its dominance amidst the deterritorializing effects of a plastic reality that incessantly expresses, creates and modulates is to reterritorialize onto the site of the individual. If there is a historical through-line linking the disciplinary society to the control society, which should be taken as evidence that one type of society does not replace the other but that it emerges over and on top of the other, like an archaeological site or palimpsest, it is the enduring and unwavering presence of the individual. This individualized subject is not a natural given, though neoliberal ideology often presents it as such. It is the result of a highly abstract form of subjectivity production that parses the individual from the machinic assemblages in which it is immersed as a component part. Nevertheless, this parsing of the individual from the “dividual” is a fundamental aspect of the capitalist production of subjectivity that Maurizio Lazzarato calls “social subjection.” Found in regimes of power based both on disciplinarity and control, the apparatus of social subjection assigns “subjectivity, an identity, sex, profession, nationality, and so forth” to produce “an ‘individuated subject’ whose paradigmatic form in neoliberalism has been that of ‘human capital’ and the ‘entrepreneur of the self’ “ (2014: 24). Though really inseparable from the creativity and novelty of the dynamic plastic assemblages in which it takes part, power parses an individual who is made “guilty and responsible for his fate” (24). In an undulatory reality of endless modulations, characterized as “infinitely plastic,” the individual and its lingering mould incessantly returns as a dominant refrain, confirming power’s vested interest in an ontology that separates self from world and makes the former unduly responsible for all that happens in the latter. **If the individual is the product of power, and if power subjects the individual in such a way as to encourage its performance as modulatory “human” capital, then there is no reason to believe that the individual’s ability to creatively shape the plastics of its world would somehow mark power’s undoing.** Nor is there reason to believe that therapeutic methods which encourage brain plasticity to move more in sync with the economic demands of life under neoliberalism would somehow lead to wellness or flourishing, even if they may lead to being “symptom-free.” Plasticity, as much as flexibility, can constitute a total submission to the status quo, without us even being cognizant of it—hence the plastic paradox. After all, there is nothing unusual about desiring “the very thing that dominates and exploits us,” and thus producing its (and by extension, our) very existence. Given neoliberal power’s immanence to neuroplasticity as well as its immanence to the dominant therapeutic methods which justify themselves with recourse to the concept, the lofty hopes that have been invested in neuroplasticity beg to be critically tempered. Yet I would like to conclude on a pragmatic note, which also happens to be a positive one, and suggest that by reintroducing the question of subjectivity—of how the brain becomes subject—into the plastic dynamics of the event, we may ride the quantum of potential that neuroplasticity does offer: the potential for transversal social practices constitutive of therapeutic activism to usher in novel subjectivities whose processual composition amounts to nothing less than well-becoming—a collectively animated well-being whose therapeutic and political value lies in the how of its making

### 2NR - Szymanski ’17

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the debate that best liberates cognition from the state form – The subject is not a pregiven entity but instead is plastic to it’s environment. Our neural connections can literally be rewired through our discourse and the environments we inhabit. Neoliberalism and the state form capitalize on plasticity to cement their power within our own minds. The only way to fight against large scale regimes is to reform our individual subjectivity into a smooth space where we can imagine new possibilities without relying on neoliberal domination.

#### That precludes the aff at the highest layer you can’t be an anarchist one day and wake up a Stalinist the next, even heuristic notions of the state will limit our vision of the world, eer on the side of the alt to counteract statist brainwashing