# TechnoLiberalism Kritik

## 1NC Module

### 1NC – TOP

#### We are in a new age of Technoliberalism that sees technology as a surrogate for humanity seeking to reassert human futurity through the control of technological transformation by balancing autonomy and humanity.

Atanasoski and Vora 1, Neda, and Kalindi Vora. "Surrogate humanity: Posthuman networks and the (racialized) obsolescence of labor." Catalyst: Feminism, Theory, Technoscience 1.1 (2019). Race, Robots, and the Politics of Techological Futures (Neda Atanasoski is Professor of Feminist Studies and Critical Race and Ethnic Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz. Kalindi Vora is Associate Professor of Gender, Sexuality and Women's Studies at UC Davis, and Director of the Feminist Research Institute)//Elmer

Surrogate Humanity **focuses on how engineering projects that create the robots, program the ai, and enhance the digital infrastructure associated with a revolutionary new era are in fact predetermined by techniques of differential exploitation and dispossession within capitalism.3 In this book, we propose that technoliberalism is the political alibi of present-day racial capitalism that posits humanity as an aspirational figuration in a relation to technological transformation, obscuring the uneven racial and gendered relations of labor, power, and social relations that underlie the contemporary conditions of capitalist production**.4 **Technological futures** **tied to capitalist development iterate a fantasy that as machines, algorithms, and artificial intelligence take over the dull, dirty, repetitive, and even reproductive labor performed by racialized, gendered, and colonized workers in the past, the full humanity of the (already) human subject will be freed for creative capacities**. Even as more valued tasks within capitalist regimes of production and accumulation, such as knowledge work, become automatable, **the stated goal of technological innovation is to liberate human potential (its nonalienated essence, or core) that has always been defined in relation to degraded and devalued others—those who were never fully human**. Engineering imaginaries, even as they claim revolutionary status for the techno-objects and platforms they produce to better human life, thus tend to be limited by prior racial and gendered imaginaries of what kinds of tasks separate the human from the less-than or not-quite human other. **We argue that racial logics of categorization, differentiation, incorporation, and elimination are constitutive of the very concept of technology and technological innovation**. Technology thus steps into what we call a surrogate relation to human spheres of life, labor, and sociality that enables the function and differential formation and consolidation of the liberal subject—a subject whose freedom is possible only through the racial unfreedom of the surrogate. Yet there is no liberal subject outside of the surrogate–self relation through which the human, a moving target, is fixed and established. In other words, the liberal subject is an effect of the surrogate relation. **The surrogate human effect, in this sense, is the racial “grammar” of technoliberalism. By grammar here we mean a symbolic order, following Hortense Spiller’s use of the term, that establishes “feeling human” as a project of racial engineering.5 Even as technologies like industrial, military, and companion robots are designed in ways engineers imagine will perform more perfect versions of the human—more rational killers, more efficient workers, tireless companions—such technologies still can’t feel human in the sense that they can’t feel pain or empathy. Precisely because such technologies can never be human, they allow for an exploration of the aspirations for humanity**. Contrary to the seeming abandonment of the politics of difference in the so-called postrace and postlabor future projected by technoliberal discourses of machine-induced human obsolescence, we thus draw attention to the composition of **the human as an abstract category whose expansive capacities continually reaffirm the racial order of things that undergirds Euro-American modernity**. **Put differently, the ambition to define universal humanity has been rehearsed and updated through the incorporation into engineering imaginaries of ideas about what the human is, imaginaries that guide the design of the future of the human through technologies that perform “the surrogate human effect.”** In technological imaginaries both utopic (like robots that can free us from drudgery to write poetry or play video games) and paranoid (like the loss of jobs to robots), **specific technologies are both actively designed, but also often feared, to act as surrogates that can free humans from having to perform historically degraded tasks.** Although, in the language of science and technology studies, these technologies are coproduced with the shifting racialized and gendered essence of “the human” itself, promotional and media accounts of engineering ingenuity erase human–machine interactions such that artificial “intelligence,” “smart” objects and infrastructures, and robots appear to act without any human attention. **These technologies are quite explicitly termed “enchanted”—that is, within technoliberal modernity, there is a desire to attribute magic to techno-objects.** In relation to the desire for enchantment, Surrogate Humanity foregrounds how **this desire actively obscures technoliberalism’s complicity in perpetuating the differential conditions of exploitation under racial capitalism**. In the desire for enchanted technologies that intuit human needs and serve human desires, labor becomes something that is intentionally obfuscated so as to create the effect of machine autonomy (as in the example of the “magic” of robot intelligence and the necessarily hidden human work behind it). Unfree and invisible labor have been the hidden source of support propping up the apparent autonomy of the liberal subject through its history, including indentured and enslaved labor as well as gendered domestic and service labor. 6 **The technoliberal desire to resolutely see technology as magical rather than the product of human work relies on the liberal notion of labor as that performed by the recognizable human autonomous subject, and not those obscured labors supporting** **it**. Therefore, the category of labor has been complicit with the technoliberal desire to hide the worker behind the curtain of enchanted technologies, advancing this innovated form of the liberal human subject and its investments in racial unfreedom through the very categories of consciousness, autonomy, and humanity, and attendant categories of the subject of rights, of labor, and of property. Our usage of the concept of the surrogate throughout this book foregrounds the longer history of human surrogates in post-Enlightenment modernity, including the body of the enslaved standing in for the master, the vanishing of native bodies necessary for colonial expansion, as well as invisibilized labor including indenture, immigration, and outsourcing. **The claim that technologies can act as surrogates recapitulates histories of disappearance, erasure, and elimination necessary to maintain the liberal subject as the agent of historical progress**. Thus, framing the surrogate human effect as the racial grammar of technoliberalism brings a feminist and critical race perspective to bear on notions of technological development, especially in the design and imagination of techno-objects and platforms that claim to reenchant those tasks understood as tedious or miserable through the marvels of technological progress—ostensibly dull, dirty, repetitive, and uncreative work. To understand how claims of human freedom and human loss enabled by technological development allow for the retrenchment of the liberal subject as the universal human, Surrogate Humanity foregrounds the obfuscated connections between the human–machine divide in US technological modernity and the racial production of the fully human in US political modernity. Focusing on the material, social, and political consequences of the mutual generation of “the human” and “the machine” from the US post–World War II standardization of automation into the present, we explore both the social impact of design and engineering practices intended to replace human bodies and functions with machines and the shift in the definition of productivity, efficiency, value, and “the racial” that these technologies demand in their relation to the post-Enlightenment figure of the human. We begin with the second half of the twentieth century because this is the moment when the United States ascends to global political and economic supremacy and cultural influence, inheriting the mantle of its own and Western European settler imperial social structures. **At this same historical juncture, the racial architecture of US modes of governance and geopolitical ascendancy were erased in the logics of post–civil rights racial liberalism and multiculturalism**.7 Crucially, the advent of what can be termed, ironically, a “postracial” domination translates directly into the perception of new technologies as neutral and disembodied, even as these technologies are anchored in, and anchor, contemporary US imperial power. In short, the technological sphere has been separated from the racial scaffolding of the social in the Cold War and post–Cold War eras. Yet, as we argue, it is essential to assess the racial and gendered architecture of post-Enlightenment modernity as engineered into the form and function of given technologies. This calls for situating techno-objects and platforms in a social relation to what is experienced as a “human.” Thus, although our book is primarily focused on present-day claims about the revolutionary nature of new digital technologies, robotics, and AI, throughout our analysis of techno-objects and the social and political discourses that frame them, we unearth the obscured histories that delimit technoliberal engineering projects focused on efficiency, productivity, and further accumulation through dispossession.

## 1NC – Links

### 1NC – Human Futurity Link

#### Fears of Killer Robots rely on a concept of humanity that view LAWs as “future violators of human rights” against the moral empathy of the human which reifies the liberal rights-bearing subject. Relying on the distinction between human decision-maker and robotic LAW reconfigures and legitimizes permissible killing that extends Imperialism.

Atanasoski and Vora 2, Neda, and Kalindi Vora. "Surrogate humanity: Posthuman networks and the (racialized) obsolescence of labor." Catalyst: Feminism, Theory, Technoscience 1.1 (2019). Race, Robots, and the Politics of Techological Futures (Neda Atanasoski is Professor of Feminist Studies and Critical Race and Ethnic Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz. Kalindi Vora is Associate Professor of Gender, Sexuality and Women's Studies at UC Davis, and Director of the Feminist Research Institute)//Elmer

**Since 2012, Human Rights Watch, one of the organizations working as part of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, has published three full-length reports and countless articles condemning lethal autonomous weapons**. **According to Human Rights Watch, experts predict that these “killer robots”—which could make decisions about deploying munitions and determining appropriate targets without human involvement—will not be operational for the next twenty to thirty years**. Yet the specter of a robot that could make decisions about firing on human beings with no human oversight or decision making beyond the initial programming (that is, in an unstructured and unpredictable environment), **has been framed as a violation of human rights in the future tense**. **In April 2013, a coalition of ten ngos formed the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, an international alliance “working to preemptively ban fully autonomous weapons.”**1 Though we can consider killer robots to be a speculative technology in the sense that they are not yet operational, they have nonetheless incited scholars, jurists, and activists to frame technological amorality as a future tense concern emerging at the moment when technologies could make decisions about human life and death. **In other words, the human rights argument against killer robots posits that there is no way to program autonomous weapons with the necessary human empathy to render them able to make moral decisions about killing. The speculative aspect of killer robots, and the framing of war technologies as amoral in contrast to human actors in the field of war, invites a consideration of how the surrogate human effect develops technoliberalism as a political form through accounts of technological futurity that extend, rather than disrupt, post-Enlightenment frames of historical progress**. As we observe in this chapter, **what is essential about the killer robot to technoliberalism is not its function as a surrogate human agent acting on behalf of soldiers in the field of war, but its production of the surrogate effect as a technology that fills out the moral content of what it means to feel human**. Relying on a temporal frame of liberal unfolding, the human rights concern **about the still-speculative killer robot registers the difference between technology and humanity, where humanity is the capacity to feel empathy and recognize the right to life of killable others. At the same time, this concern reifies the human as the rights-based liberal (human) subject. Thus, the racial grammar of the surrogate effect undergirds technoliberalism’s accounting of full humanity (as human freedom, autonomy, and morality) in instances where humanity is affirmed against certain kinds of technological development that threaten the existing conceptual bounds of the human**. In addition to **sustaining the liberal human subject** in the present **through its relation to objects and less-than-human other**s, **the surrogate effect of technoliberalism operates in relation to the narrative of moral development as a fundamental quality of the human over time**. **The temporal aspect of the surrogate effect, as the human rights argument against killer robots makes evident, conflates rights and justice by proposing that history unfolds as a perpetual movement toward a more moral human nature**. Indeed, scholars and jurists cite neither law nor national sovereignty, but rather human morality, as the foundation for human rights.2 According to human rights theorist Jack Donnelly, “the source of human rights is man’s moral nature . . . the human nature that grounds human rights is a prescriptive [rather than an actual or descriptive] moral account of human possibility.”3 **Human rights reaffirm humanity as an aspirational construct and as the moral unfolding of human potential, a future horizon worth striving for (while at the same time signaling a moral line below which hu manity must not fall).** **The juridical frame that posits killer robots acting on behalf of humans in the field of war as the speculative antithesis of human rights, and thus the liberal rights-bearing subject, brings into crisis the ways in which the surrogate effect of technoliberalism reaffirms the linear progressive logics of Euro-American modernity even as technologies seemingly represent a radical break from the past**. This temporality structures relations between subjects, and between subjects and objects, well beyond the present, as these relations are projected into the indefinite future. **Both the technological and juridical futurities that emerge in debates about killer robots reinscribe the colonial and racial logics undergirding something that we might call human nature, if not consciousness.** Even as campaigns to stop killer robots are understood to be on the side of struggle and opposition against unrestrained imperial power, particularly by nations like the US that wield the most advanced military technologies, it is worthwhile to consider **the imperial racial legacies** **structuring** contemporary human rights **activism seeking to ban killer robots**. After all, in contrast to the assertion of man’s moral nature, the history of imperial conquest teaches us that humanity is something that can be conferred or taken away.4 **Thus, proposals that a legal ban on killer robots as human rights violators is the solution to inappropriate uses of war technologies do not simply aim for peace; rather, they figure permissible killing even as they configure the human as an expansive category capable of enfolding ever more diversified and distant others into its realm**. **Human rights thus monopolize the horizon of justice yet to come, reaffirming the liberal subject of rights and recognition as the only possible moral actor.** Yet, as we have argued throughout this book, **the autonomous liberal person is itself a fiction that covers over and devalues racialized and gendered work to produce the ideals of freedom, autonomy, and morality undergirding the figure of the human**. In this chapter, we dwell on the conceptual bond between the presumed morality of “human nature” and the subject of rights within technoliberalism, which congeals around killer robots. As a **future tense technology, killer robots have compelled emergent distinctions between humane and inhumane violence through a grid of technologized rearrangements of racialized corporealities tied to the dynamics of distancing, objectifying, and enfolding that scaffold and uphold the liberal rights-bearing subject**. They also raise anew the post-Enlightenment question of what it means to feel human (that is, what is the content of human morality) in light of human–machine social configurations in the field of war. **Killer robots, which some argue are more rational and precise actors in the battlefield than fallible human beings, are condemned for not being able to feel pain or empathy**. The **surrogate effect of a killer robot thus raises questions around relatability that can be tied to a desire to define humanity’s essence as ostensibly residing outside of technological modernity**. **This human essence** (as a feeling of humanness defining the contours of the morality of human nature), though, **cannot exist without technology as its conceptual counterpart.** **Moreover, as we have argued in other chapters, humanity, as technology, is a racial construct consolidated through histories of slavery and imperialism. This chapter opens by investigating how racial structures of empathy and relatability, through which the feeling of being human takes shape by instituting a subject–object divide, are part of an imperial pedagogy at work in the making of the liberal subject**. Linking the imperial pedagogy of feeling human to the rhetoric and coloniality of human rights frameworks that posit human nature as uniquely moral, **we demonstrate the limitations of the current human rights calls to ban killer robots solely because a human does not have final authority over the deployment of a lethal weapon**. While human rights groups insist that the human ability to empathize enough with a potential target can preclude wanton or amoral killing, we suggest instead that this framework ignores the coloniality of race at work in the fixation on feeling human in the field of war.

### 1NC – Unchecked AI

#### The rhetoric of rebellious AI doesn’t deconstruct the liberal subject but fuels the Human as the reference point for an ethical agent. Such notions of empathetic fantasies reaffirm the colonizing logic of comparative extermination of racialized bodies.

**Atanasoski and Vora 19** [Brackets Original. Neda Atanasoski (Professor of Feminist Studies and Critical Race and Ethnic Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz) and Kalindi Vora (Associate Professor of Gender, Sexuality and Women's Studies at UC Davis, and Director of the Feminist Research Institute). “Surrogate Humanity: Race, Robots, and the Politics of Technological Futures”. Perverse Modernities. March 2019. Accessed 12/25/20. [https://www.dukeupress.edu/surrogate-humanity //](https://www.dukeupress.edu/surrogate-humanity%20//)Houston Memorial DX]

Both the scale of civilizations under European territorial colonialism and the projected timeline of ai and machine autonomy occupy a temporality of the “not yet.” Like the notion of human development projected onto that scale of civilization and humanity, where the colonizer assumes the task of cultivating the colonized to further develop its own humanity toward the end goal of European civilization, the imaginaries of robot rebellion reference the racialized inheritances structuring a possible interiority or self-consciousness that has yet to fill a robot’s metallic shell.22 These racialized inheritances have to do with attributing interiority and feeling through an imaginary of likeness—in the case of Atlas, its anthropomorphic shell. The “not yet” measures proximity to the human as a course of progress toward what is already recognized by the inheritor of that colonizing subject position, the (white) Euro-American liberal subject, as a course of progress toward the conclusion of the human, and of the realization of the consciousness that denotes entry into historical progress. Given the cultural field of robot revenge imaginaries, in which killer robots are predicted by the rebellion of enslaved and violated or mistreated machines, it is unsurprising that a series of spoof videos followed from the Boston Dynamics official YouTube postings. One video, titled “I Heart Box,” uses the Boston Dynamic demo video but features a voiceover narrative in which Atlas professes its love for the boxes it lifts. As the engineer hits and pushes away the box as the beloved object, Atlas attempts to regain it. Finally, Atlas gives up on regaining the box and is shown walking out the door (intended by the original Boston Dynamics video to showcase how well Atlas can turn a door knob—a task notoriously difficult for robots to do well). With the voiceover, this departure is given new meaning. Atlas mumbles that it loves the box, just as the engineer loves his daughter. The last words in the video are those of the engineer swearing at Atlas and demanding to know what the robot meant (though of course, there is the implication the daughter could be harmed).23 In another video dubbed the “Atlas Swearing Module” Atlas shows up to work in a foul mood and refuses to put up with the engineer’s torment (figure 5.3). In this context, the robot Atlas rising to its feet after being kicked, though of course programed by human engineers, startlingly conjures robot free will and consciousness—this is the act of a machine standing up to a human master. This movement is made all the more frightening by Atlas’s origins as a weapon. In commentaries accompanying this video, viewers joked, “Have fun with that hockey stick for now, meatbag, in 10 years you’ll be the one being toyed with!” and “Well at least we know who the robot is gonna murder first when it gains self-awareness.”24 Others, in a more serious tone, wrote, “Maybe someday the robot will upload and process this, and process [that] I am not your slave.”25 The sense of “justice” in machine liberation from a preconscious (enslaved) state to a state of consciousness and emancipation, even as such liberation threatens to unleash violence back upon the human, can nonetheless be read as a reaffirmation of the liberal subject rather than its unmaking. This is because the human is still the only point of reference for an ethical relation with the nonhuman or not-yet human. Given our argument that robots, even potentially life-threatening killer robots, engender the surrogate human effect as the racial form of servitude delimiting the engineering imaginary of machine autonomy, we might consider how these revenge fantasies about Atlas rising are based on an object’s proximity to the human. According to one article, feelings are more readily attributed to robots when they look lifelike: Researchers have found that when people watch a robot being harmed or snuggled they react in a similar way to those actions being done to a flesh-and-blood human. In one study, participants said they felt negative emotions when they watched a human hit or drop a small dinosaur robot, and their skin conductance also showed they were distressed at the “bot abuse.” When volunteers watched a robot being hugged their brain activity was the same as when they watched human–human affection; even so, brain activity was stronger for human–human abuse versus human–robot violence. “We think that, in general, the robot stimuli elicit the same emotional processing as the human stimuli,” said Astrid Rosenthal-von der Pütten of the University of Duisburg Essen in Germany, who led that study. The research was presented in 2013 at the International Communication Association Conference in London.26 Empathy and relatability tie the register of “humanness” to the colonial scale of civilization, which ranked the humanness of racialized people across the globe by their perceived proximity to European lifeworlds. Fantasies of robot rebellion following a coming into consciousness thus reiterate a Hegelian notion of freedom and self-actualization in this new technoliberal theater where a twenty-first-century master–slave confrontation takes place. If robots can prove that they are like “us,” they then enter into the realm of universality as self-possessed subjects, and in their potential humanity can be recognized.

### 1NC – Scenario Planning

#### The method of scenario planning is a view from nowhere – fantasies of distancing ourselves from a hostile area create the surrogate effect by creating the figure of the interventioneer and justifies colonial violence.

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Whereas machine autonomy reaffirms the autonomous figure of the human as the ethical agent of historical progress, tethering servitude and violence to the nonhuman while vesting the potential for empathy and care with the human, drones erase human action and accountability from the fantasy of technoliberal warfare. Drones must accomplish this erasure even though, in reality, they are more akin to cobots because they are only semiautonomous, keeping the human in the decision-making loop over life-and-death decisions in the field of war. The coloniality of technoliberal warfare, made manifest as drone warfare, depends upon the myth of “unmanned” violence. Technoliberal warfare is founded upon, even as it refigures, both settler colonial and territorial racial logics of human-free lands available for capitalist development. For example, in European territorial colonialism, the command of space was secured through the installation of governance and control by resident colonial rulers and their armies. In settler colonial formations, the permanent residence of the colonizer is one of the primary technologies of gaining command of space, and the protection of that residence becomes the grounds for punitive violence that enables expansion of the physical and political settlement. Following these logics, the present-day exercise of remote command through roboticized warfare materializes the “target” as something distinct from a human “enemy combatant.” The fantasy of remote control manifest in the drone takes the human colonist/interventioneer out of the frame of action. Put otherwise, the surrogate effect of drone warfare frames command over space as being human-free. In this sense, remote control is not only a project of saving the lives of would-be conquering soldiers (while rendering the lives of those to be conquered even more dispensable than in earlier conquests). In addition, the drone mediates the relation to humanity of both potential killers (soldiers) and potential targets (victims or casualties). The surrogate effect of roboticized warfare thus renders the fantasy of remote control as a reconceptualization of empire that, by being human-free, can disassociate its power from earlier modes of colonial conquest. Remote control fantasies tethered to drone warfare seek to “relieve humankind of all perilous occupations. Miners, firefighters, and those working on the atom, in space, or in the oceans could all be converted into remote-control operators. The sacrifice of live bodies [is] no longer necessary. Once living bodies and operative ones [are] dissociated, only the latter, entirely mechanized and dispensable, would now come into contact with danger.”27 Drone-enabled remote killing can initially be justified as a humanizing violence that will end terror because of the distance and dissociation it enacts between the operators and targets. Technological asymmetries racialize so-called danger zones that must be commanded remotely so that they are figured as salvageable for the spread of liberal rule and freedom. The reconceptualization of spatial command through remote control is thus part and parcel of the advent of what Atanasoski has elsewhere theorized as a humanitarian imperialism that emerged with US Cold War liberalism.28 As we argue here, it has been further developed in the age of the “war on terror” as technoliberal warfare whose humanization takes the human out of the frame of imperial command and control. Remote control, which removes human accountability while reifying human autonomy (command), is the surrogate effect of technoliberal warfare. The history of engineering remote control over distant spaces involved the reconceptualization of space as a field for (non)human actors. According to Gregoire Chamayou, the modern history scaffolding the proliferation of drones and killer robots can be traced back to the engineer John W. Clark, who theorized “telechiric machines” as a “technology of manipulation at a distance.”29 For Clark, “In the telechiric system, the machine may be thought of as an alter ego for the man who operates it. In effect, his consciousness is transferred to an invulnerable mechanical body with which he is able to manipulate tools or equipment almost as though he were holding them in his own hands.”30 Yet, as Chamayou points out, what is missing in this second body is “the living flesh of the first body,” as that vulnerable first body is “removed from the hostile environment.”31 The surrogate effect of the machine thus fundamentally shifts the space constituted by warfare: Space is divided into two: a hostile area and a safe one. . . . The hostile zone . . . remains a space that is left derelict but which, as a potentially threatening area, definitely needs to be kept under surveillance. It may even be exploited for its resources, but it is not, strictly speaking, to be occupied. One intervenes there and patrols it, but there is no suggestion of going to live there except to carve out new secured zones, bases, or platforms in accordance with a general topographical schema and for reasons of security.32

## 1NC – Impacts

### 1NC – Colonizing otherness

#### Technoliberalism’s assertion of the rights-bearing progressive human vs the non-human subject results in colonial civilizing missions of humanitarianism that destroys value to life and always seeks to extend liberal futurity and incorporate otherness

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**The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots Debates about killer robots conceptualize an ethics and a politics of life and death in the face of technological challenges to the bounds of the human**. Yet, **as we argue here, the presumption of an impossible morality for the killer robot in human rights discourses follows from the internationally sanctioned distinction between humane and inhumane, as well as human and inhuman, forms of violence undergirding the temporality of the surrogate effect as the racial grammar of the global human rights regime and its technoliberal updates**.26 **Killer robots bring into crisis how violence constitutes the human against the nonhuman, subsuming the racialized and gendered epistemologies of prior affirmations of authorized violence. Legitimated violence has ranged in its end goals from colonial “civilizing” or “humanizing” occupation to humanitarian intervention.27 International law permits certain forms of imperial and state violence unleashed upon populations whose full humanity has always been suspect. The idea that killer robots represent a radical break in how violence is defined in the end reaffirms imperial sovereignty by aligning moral violence with the (already) human.** Even as the killer robot is tethered to dystopic futures, **we approach autonomous weapons as a devastatingly familiar technology predated by colonialism, the Cold War, science fiction fantasies, and in our contemporary moment, the drone**. As Lisa Lowe puts it, “We [continue to] see the longevity of the colonial divisions of humanity in our contemporary moment, in **which the human life of citizens protected by the state is bound to the denigration of populations cast in violation of human life, set outside of human society**.”28 At first glance, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, the ngo founded in 2012 and consisting of human rights groups, activists, and scholars, as well as human rights organizations calling for a preemptive ban on autonomous lethal weapons, appears to reassert common humanity rather than differentiate populations whose right to live or thrive has been withdrawn. **The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots argues that “[a]llowing life or death decisions to be made by machines crosses a fundamental moral line**. Autonomous robots would lack human judgment and the ability to understand context. These qualities are necessary to make complex ethical choices on a dynamic battlefield, to distinguish adequately between soldiers and civilians, and to evaluate the proportionality of an attack. As a result, fully autonomous weapons would not meet the requirements of the laws of war.”29 **The problem, as articulated here, is about maintaining human command and control over the decision about who lives and who dies (soldiers vs. civilians, appropriate “targets” vs. inappropriate “collateral damage”).** Meanwhile, the group offers a solution to the problem of the loss of human control in the field of war in juridical terms. “A comprehensive, preemptive prohibition on the development, production and use of fully autonomous weapons—weapons that operate on their own without human intervention—is urgently needed. This could be achieved through an international treaty, as well as through national laws and other measures.”30 **In this sense, the campaign conflates the human and the liberal rights-bearing subject. Furthermore, calls for preemptive bans collapse morality with human nature, and thus also with liberal development through law, which, as Esmeir demonstrates, asserts the coloniality undergirding the rise of juridical humanity**. For example, echoing Donnelly and other human rights scholars’ framing of human nature as grounded in moral potential, Chris Heyns, the un special rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, noted that what autonomous machines lack is “morality and mortality,” and that as a consequence they should not be permitted to make decisions over human life and death.31 Similarly, in its 2014 publication, Human Rights Watch argues that the creation of autonomous weapons would be a violation of human rights, human dignity, and the right to life because “humans possess the unique capability to identify with other human beings and are thus better equipped to understand the nuances of unforeseen behavior [when distinguishing between lawful and unlawful targets] in ways in which machines . . . simply cannot.”32 **The report also proposes that because “fully autonomous weapons would lack emotions, including compassion and a resistance to killing,” civilians and soldiers would be in greater danger: “Humans possess empathy . . . and are generally reluctant to take the life of another human**.”33 Unable to regard targets as relatable, a machine cannot make a moral choice about when, where, and against whom to enact violence. What emerges is a fantasy of shared humanity that is felt and created across difference through flashes of recognition (and reobjectification) that elicit compassion and empathy toward another who is suffering. As we argue in chapter 5, **machines are not simply extensions of and mediations around a stable category of the “human”; rather, notions of human autonomy, agency, and fields of actions shift through machines even if they reiterate, reassert, or regenerate through well-worn racial and imperial epistemes.** On the one hand, human rights operate through racial and gendered difference. Human beings demonstrate themselves as moral by being able to feel for the pain and suffering of others who are dif­ferent from themselves. **On the other hand, there is an emphasis on sameness (or at least a potential for similarity as distant others are welcomed into the “family of man” as liberal rights-bearing subjects). One must be judged to be human (or otherwise sentient in a humanlike manner) in order for suffering to be recognized as needing to be remediated. The scale of relatability, perceptible through what Hartman proposes is the precarity of empathy, then, not only parallels and reinforces the scale of humanness (that is, who can be judged to be human and who cannot); it also underwrites how notions of the “moral nature” of humanity come to take shape**. This is a temporal relation that pro**duces full humanity as part of liberal futurity and social development**. Because the programming to make life-and-death decisions would be housed in a shell that does not register pain, **the autonomy of the killer robot raises the impossibility of an ethical relation** for those activists calling to ban killer robots. **Yet removing a human referent from the enactment of violence, as in the case of the killer robot, reveals the normative assumptions built into notions of moral progress deemed to be essential to the development of the human**. This morality exists as part of a racial epistemology that **makes certain deaths illegible as unethical**. **There is a chilling passage in the 2014 Human Rights Watch report cited above that, in light of US police racial violence and killing of unarmed black men and women, gives the lie to the content of the human implicit in these calls to ban killer robots.** **Fully autonomous weapons would lack human qualities that help law enforcement officials assess the seriousness** of a threat and the need for response. **Both machines and a police officer can take into account clearly visible signs, such as the presence of a weapon. However, interpreting more subtle cues whose meaning can vary by context, such as tone of voice, facial expressions, and body language, requires an understanding of human nature**. A human officer can relate to another individual as a fellow human being, and this ability can help him or her read the other person’s intentions. Development of a fully autonomous weapon that could identify with the individual in the same way seems unlikely, and thus a robot might miss or misconstrue important clues as to whether a real threat to human life existed.34 **From the deaths of Eric Garner in New York and Michael Brown in Ferguson in 2014, to the over one hundred deaths of black unarmed men at the hands of US police just in 2015, it becomes clear that relatability to an individual as a “fellow human being” continues to be a racial project**. In July 2016, a black sniper believed to have shot five police officers in Dallas during a rally for Alton Sterling and Philando Castile, two black men killed by US police that year, became the first human being to be killed by a drone on US soil (a drone that was commonly referred to as a “killer robot” by the media).35 The Dallas police attached a bomb to a remotely controlled small aircraft designed to investigate suspicious packages, thus creating an improvised drone, in order to kill the sniper without injuring any other people. **This historic use of a drone at a rally insisting that black lives matter points to the racialized and differentially distributed value and valuelessness attributed to lives against which remote violence can be deployed—even on US soil**. Marjorie Cohn, professor emerita at the Thomas Jefferson School of Law, noted that “The fact that the police have a weapon like this, and other weapons like drones and tanks, is an example of the militarization of the police and law enforcement . . . and although certainly the police officers did not deserve to die, this is an indication of something much deeper in the society, and that’s the racism that permeates the police departments across the country.”36 Cohn links US police violence and racism at home to the war on terror: “The same way that the Obama administration uses unmanned drones in other countries to kill people instead of arresting them and bringing them to trial, we see a similar situation here.”37 While we remain critical of juridical reckoning as a possible solution to drone/killer robot violence, it is important to take seriously Cohn’s insistence **that military and police racial projects delimit who can be a target of automated killing**. The distance between the “target” and the police officer or soldier mediated by the machine, Cohn suggests, reproduces the distance in the ability to recognize the humanity of a target.38 The Dallas police officers’ use of a drone domestically is suggestive of how older imperial modes of racialization on the ground are engineered into the mechanics and technos of drones as well as in the automated learning systems of other kinds of military bots. They indicate that racial distance, figured in space and time, from the fully human structures technorevolutionary fantasies of command and control. Threats of the proximity of racial others thus unleash the most brutal violence. Hugh Gusterson insists that drone warfare is never just about remoteness, but also always about intimacy.39 “Remote intimacy” describes the situation where drone operators spend most of their hours observing people and terrain, so that even in dreaming they “see” in infrared or experience the feeling of being in a drone. They craft moral narratives of good and bad tied to the terrains they are seeing, giving the lie to the notion that killing from a distance requires a lack of ethics or consciousness. The fact that some deaths are unpunishable (the deaths of those never quite human) reveals the racial limits of relatability and accountability that are glossed over in the continual reiteration of the universal promises of human rights in the realm of justice. **Ironically, as Talal Asad points out, within the realm of constructing the fully human through human rights, “**the ability to feel pain is a precondition **not only for compassion but also for punishment**.”40 According to a 2015 Human Rights Watch report, “A fully autonomous weapon itself could not be found accountable for criminal acts that it might commit because it would lack intentionality. In addition, such a robot would not fall within the ‘natural person’ jurisdiction of international courts. Even if such jurisdiction were amended to encompass a machine, a judgment would not fulfill the purposes of punishment for society or the victim because the robot could neither be deterred by condemnation nor perceive or appreciate being ‘punished’”41 (see figure 6.2). **That the possibility of ethical violence is sutured to the possibility of being punishable reaffirms states of imperial sovereignty where full humanity resides.**

## 1NC – Alternatives

### 1NC – Alternative – Robotic Uselessness

#### The Alternative is to embrace Robotic Uselessness. This ruptures Humanism through the embrace of LAWs as a object external to human control and moralization that seeks to render the possibility of new futures external to militarism and imperialism.

Atanasoski and Vora 19, Neda, and Kalindi Vora. "Surrogate humanity: Posthuman networks and the (racialized) obsolescence of labor." Catalyst: Feminism, Theory, Technoscience 1.1 (2019). Race, Robots, and the Politics of Techological Futures (Neda Atanasoski is Professor of Feminist Studies and Critical Race and Ethnic Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz. Kalindi Vora is Associate Professor of Gender, Sexuality and Women's Studies at UC Davis, and Director of the Feminist Research Institute)//Elmer

An Ethical Relation without the Human **The notion that killer robots could be humanitarian actors was posed differently, but equally as urgently, by Philip K. Dick at the start of the Cold War, when the nuclear arms race seemed just as pressing as the race to build autonomous lethal weapons does today**. Whereas Asad’s reflections on humanitarian violence **facilitate an understanding of killer robots as humanitarian actors because the subject–object dynamic produced by humanitarianism rehearses the violent and disciplining secular temporality of human redemption**, Dick proposes that humanitarian action can only exist in the field of war without the human. **His 1953 short story “The Defenders” conjures a future in which killer robots use their machine autonomy to both imprison and save humans**. In the story, a nuclear war fought between the USSR and the US forces humans on both sides to hide underground because the radioactive surface of the earth has made human life above ground impossible. Robots, called “leadys,” which can endure the radioactivity, are the only bodies left on the earth’s surface, and their purpose is to continue the war, acting as surrogates for human soldiers. “It was a brilliant idea and the only idea that could have worked. Up above, on the ruined, blasted surface of what had once been a living planet, the leady crawled and scurried, and fought Man’s war. And undersurface, in the depths of the planet, human beings toiled endlessly to produce the weapons to continue the fight, month by month, year by year.”63 The action begins when Taylor, a US war planner, is ordered to return to the surface to speak with a leady so that he can assess the war’s progress. However, upon reaching the control center right below the surface, secured in his own lead suit, Taylor discovers that the leady he is sent to interview is not radioactive at all. Since this is the second instance of a nonradioactive leady that the humans have discovered, Taylor and his crew ask to see more of the surface. The leadys object, but eventually the crew succeeds in gaining access to the planet’s surface. Instead of a bleak, obliterated earth, they see trees and forests, a valley of plants, a windmill, and a barn—an idyllic scene indeed. Angry, the crew accuses the leadys of playing a hoax on them that has kept them and their families underground for the last eight years, hopeless and dejected. To this, the lead leady replies that in fact false footage of the ongoing war was being sent underground to both the US and Soviet sides. As the leady explains, “You created us . . . to pursue the war for you, while you human beings went below the ground in order to survive. But before we could continue the war, it was necessary to analyze it to determine what its purpose was. We did this, and we found that it had no purpose, except, perhaps, in terms of human needs. Even this was questionable.”64 **Rather than replicating a narrative of civilizational advancement, in which the most technologically powerful nations are the most advanced, the leady tells Taylor and his group that as “human cultures” age, they “lose their objectives.”65** The leadys then decide to keep humankind underground, or we could say, in the waiting room of history, for a bit longer, and they prevent Taylor’s group from returning by sealing the tubes that connect the underground bunkers to the surface. “The hoax must go on, at least for a while longer**. You are not ready to learn the truth. You would want to continue the war.”66 In Dick’s story, the killer robots are neither slaves nor necroethical actors. They are, in fact, care robots.** The leady says, “We are the caretakers, watching over the whole world.”67 This is a **humanitarianism without the human**, but in a quite dif­ferent iteration than Arkin’s discussion of killer robot ethics. These are **killer robots that end war and put into question the narrative of imperial civilizational development that justifies war**. **The imperialists are put into the waiting room of history, and present-day human beings, the inheritors of the Enlightenment human, are taken out of the world-making picture. This is an imaginary that disrupts the easy attribution of morality to human nature. Moreover, it brings into focus and stands opposed to the ultimate dream of military domination through killer robots: the dream of concealing the enactment of power**. For Chamayou, **when “weapons themselves become the only detectable agents of the violence of which they are the means . . . the relinquishing of political subjectivity now becomes the main task of that subjectivity itself. In this mode of domination, which proceeds by converting its orders into programs and its agents into automata, the power, already sent at a distance, renders itself impossible to seize upon**.”68 Dick’s vision of killer robots, however, points to quite an opposite use of nonhuman technologies**. In “The Defenders,” hiding the human (quite literally underground) behind the autonomous weapon reveals that the human itself is imperial violence. A redescription of the human**, suggests Dick, **must be instigated by those currently not already recognized as humans** **in a particular geopolitical configuration. This need not be war robots, though surely (as human rights discourses would indicate) killer robots stand at the present moment the ultimate other to the human. More recently, and in the context of the killer robot debate that this chapter addresses, the Italian artist group iocose produced a photographic collection called “Drone Selfies.”** **This project brings together the work of four artists, whose goal is to explore “possible futures and alternate interpretations of media and technologies.”69 They created the “Drone Selfies” photos to “imagine an alternative present where war is over and drones— once surveillance devices par excellence—are deprived of their main reason to be and point their built-in cameras at mirrors in an act of vanity”70** (figures 6.4 and 6.5). More than just portraying a humorous angle on drone vanity, what the group offers is **the possibility of drones seeing themselves, rather than human soldiers (or “targets”) seeing (or being seen) by drones**. According to Filippo Cuttica, one of the artists, “Our drones are definitely presenting their own images, taking photos to create and promote their public image. We cannot really say whether they like themselves. They are not humans, after all.”**71 In addition to disrupting the conceptualization of the drone’s surrogate effect as a technological extension of human sight and flight in the field of war, through the idea that it is impossible for humans to know how drones see themselves, the group unsettles notions of recognition fundamental to liberal accounts of the autonomous self-aware subject**. These are the **very notions that put technological objects to use in the project of colonial world making in pre-given ways. “Drone Selfies” questions the normative presumptions about the politics of life and death that structure contemporary debates about the ethics of warfare in an age of roboticized weapons. While most debates about drones and autonomous lethal weapons frame human morality as a limit to increasingly technologized warfare, for iocose, the fact that drones are not humans offers an imaginary of peace that has thus far not been possible for human actors to achieve**. According to Cuttica, “Drones could be seen as an extension of our eyes and arms, and we use them as weapons and as useful tools for doing dif­ferent sorts of things. **However, what are these extensions telling us about ourselves, our modes of thinking and using technologies? This project shows a series of drones taking selfies, but it is us at the center of the picture, and our difficulties to imagine life ‘in times of peace.’**”72 We can read the photographs in the “Drone Selfies” series as **speculative accounts of a peace** **made possible by seeing what drones would do without human drone operators. The human self can only be at the center of this speculative future as an absent presence. This is not a posthuman future, though, but one in which the coassemblage of humans and technology is reasserted by troubling the purpose and intended use of military objects. The proposition of drone vanity asserts a future in which military objects become useless.** The project thus reckons with how military technologies mediate the evolving relationship between human mortality and morality in the field of war. **We can observe that the futurity of drone uselessness disrupts the structuring racial and capitalist logics of technoliberalism**. The Drone Selfies project, like Dick’s leadys, which separate ethics and morality from liberal assumptions about human nature, **suspends the temporality of the surrogate effect, in which becoming moral is the project of feeling human, a future projection that is untenable given the history of colonial and racial violence attached to empathy and relationality that enable human becoming**.

### 1NC – Cobot

#### The alternative is to endorse the cobot – a robot/human coordination that deconstructs the human/nonhuman binary by generating new assemblages through the lens of the robot.

**Atanasoski and Vora 19** [Brackets Original. Neda Atanasoski (Professor of Feminist Studies and Critical Race and Ethnic Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz) and Kalindi Vora (Associate Professor of Gender, Sexuality and Women's Studies at UC Davis, and Director of the Feminist Research Institute). “Surrogate Humanity: Race, Robots, and the Politics of Technological Futures”. Perverse Modernities. March 2019. Accessed 12/25/20. [https://www.dukeupress.edu/surrogate-humanity //](https://www.dukeupress.edu/surrogate-humanity%20//)Houston Memorial DX]

As we’ve argued thus far, the surrogate effect of the drone materializes technoliberal imperialism as human-free not only by virtualizing the spacetime of warfare, but, more importantly, by heralding an ostensibly postracial battlefield that is human-free. It thus separates “human essence” from the machine, maintaining the liberal teleology of humanization as an actual justification for violence and occupation. For this reason, numerous activist and artistic projects that seek to oppose the imperializing tendencies of the mythology of the “unmanned” produce provocative possibilities for redescribing human–machine coworkings that foreground (rather than occlude) the cobot relation between human and drone. Katherine Chandler’s “A Drone Manifesto” is a useful starting point for moving beyond what she terms the “binaristic politics” that drones inspire (separating innocent targets from bad machines, or “once courageous soldiers” from a “machinelike system”). She insists that drones “make manifest how humans and technologies are coproduced in ways that transform, extend, and refashion limits . . . drones are not dualistic but instead dissociate the connected parts they link. . . . An effective challenge to the problems raised by unmanned aircraft must explore the contradictory logics that make targeted killing possible, as well as the disconnections they produce.”52 Emphasizing that the drone is a cobot moves away from discourses that seek to make visible the dehumanization of the imperial soldier or of drone targets, a move that slips into and bolsters technoliberalism’s temporality of humanization. The drone cobot also resists the push to redeem what is “truly” human from the shadow of drone warfare. Instead, the challenge posed by figuring the drone as a cobot is how to work out of and against the structuring fantasies of imperial command inherent in the ideal of full humanity that is enabled by the surrogate effect of war technologies under technoliberalism. In short, refiguring the drone as a cobot exposes the surrogate effect as a racial grammar undergirding the violent production of the human. To grapple with what media artist and theorist Jordan Crandall has termed the “materiality of the robotic” necessitates getting into the machine that has been fantasized as human-free. As he writes, “entry into the robotic requires commitment to the facilitation of a joint course of action. In place of oppositional positions, we engage cooperative maneuvers. . . . How ironic that we apprehend the unmanned by getting in. Not by entering its cabin, which is not possible, but its infrastructure. . . . The vehicularrobotic holds the potential of decoupling action from its anthropocentric anchoring, broadening the capability for apprehending the activity that is actually occurring in the world through sources previously overlooked— sensitizing the human–machine conglomerate to the courses within which it already moves.”53 Crandall’s argument about the materiality of the robotic foregrounds the fact that “machine cognition has advanced to the point that humans are no longer needed in the way they were before,” and highlights the pervasiveness of the displacement of pilots and viewers as “subjects ejected from their bubbles of interiority,” which prompts “a reconsideration of the modes of existence and knowledge long associated with these structuring conceits.”54 As we argue in chapter 4, interiority is the primary way in which the subject of history emerges through and against the racial object/thing that has no interior yet serves the surrogate function through which the fully human can emerge. In this sense, Crandall’s argument that the drone cobot doesn’t just displace the human or move the human to a dif­ferent location (away from the cockpit), but rather showcases that there is no inside, disrupts the surrogate effect of technoliberal warfare. Foregrounding that the drone works in collaboration with the human enables dif­ferent modes of knowing and inhabiting the world—something that artists and activists have started showcasing in recent years. For instance, the artist and engineer Natalie Jeremijenko has argued that to trouble the paradigms of the “unmanned” (and thus to trouble the surrogate effect of war technologies), we might expand how we imagine drone use. To this end, she is partaking in a collaborative use of drones with a group in Pakistan. She explains: [We exploit] these robotic platforms to improve environmental health, improving air quality, soil biodiversity, water quality, food systems. The idea is that they’re doing these small test runs there and I’m doing some here, in New York and in London, and we’re comparing them. They exploit these robotic platforms for what they’re good at doing. But there’s also a charisma about—let’s call it the drone point of view, right? This largely robotic view that’s actually very sympathetic. With the camera on the bot, the viewers can’t help but feeling sympathetic. You actually inhabit that position, either virtually or physically, to the extent that you can really look at the world differently, through this robotic armature. I think that it is thrilling, interesting, and potentially very productive. . . . There’s a fascination about the capacity we have to take other points of view, which I think is very intellectually productive, and just seductive. It’s just fascinating to look at. But what we do with that view is then the question.55

## 1NC – Framework

### T/L

#### Interpretation: Evaluate the 1AC as a research project examining its epistemology towards the divide between humanity and technology

Prefer -

#### 1] The 1AC is a digital commodity that has been marketized in the technoliberalist society. It is an information blip that provides no pragmatic change and just fosters our digitalized subjectivity – they don’t get the aff until they prove what effects it will have. The role of the negative is to counter this information and the violence it generates.

#### 2] We have a digitalized net benefit: Our interpretation allows for the cultivation of tactics to combat the assimilatory tactics of the 1ac that constantly use racial targeting to separate humanity. This cultivates the best resistance strategies such as the alternative against the squo system which extrapolates value from these digitalized subjects.

#### 3] This is Fair and maintains clash

#### A] Negative flexibility—the negative should be able to test the aff from a litany of angles

#### B] The aff has infinite prep time so they can easily create the perfect strategy

#### 4] Ideology DA - humanist discourse is a self-fulfilling prophecy that sustains itself, which proves our framework is necessary and absent critique their epistemology should be assumed incorrect – view technoliberalism as a filter for all of their turns and defense

# 2nr – Toolbox

### K

### T/L – Thesis

#### We are in a new era of techno liberalism, the alibi of racial capitalism that constantly attempts to balance technological transformations and humanity. The fantasy presented by the affirmative insists that the liberal capacity of the human is disturbed by autonomous machines like LAWS that devalues the racial, political, and social “other” that will never reach full human capacity. The fear of the autonomous weapon is not due to the culmination of AI but rather the fear of a shutdown of a racially biased and ethnographic construction of the human. A risk that laws are banned by the aff to prevent the violation of humanity is a negative ballot because it results in forms of nativist violence that civilizes humanity, like Michael Brown and Eric Garner being reduced to sub-human entities which infinitely outweighs there impacts on probability and magnitude because it results in cyclical humanist violence and infinite scapegoating.

## AT – Humanism Good

### 2NR – AT: Humanism Inevitable

#### 1] Affective Blackmail – humanist logic necessitates its ideology to reproduce through the idea that its inevitable, so you should frame this in the context of if the alt can generate solvency

#### 2] Try or Die – the impact of technoliberalism is the violent forces of imperialism against racialized bodies so it means its try or die to reconceptualize what it means to be human

### 2NR – AT: Lester (Humanism Good)

#### 1] False Distinctions: He writes about Settlers using anti-humanist politics to forge social assemblages which is ridiculous – the Settler body politic relied on the Civilized/Savage category to cohere their understandings of Imperialism and Invasion

#### 2] No Explanatory Power: The examples that they cite are about Darwinist forms of Posthumanism which imply an understanding of human from a biological standpoint that we have Impact Turned i.e. the associations of racialized bodies as being naturally inferior. Our argument is merely that Humanism is an analytic by which we can posit how imperial pedagogy coheres itself around the non-human position of race minorities. Lester’s only examples are about Settlerism which can’t explain the structural position of technologies

#### 3] correlation not causation – just says good policies were passed when humanism was existent, not the humanism caused good shit

#### 4] Beginning of lesters article concedes the impact of humanism, just thinks it might be good in some instances. That’s fine but insofar as it justifies otherness it triggers the impact

## 2NR – Framework

### AT – Fairness/Predictability

#### We’ll impact turn the notion of a fair and predictable debate –

#### Technology DA – their interp is the exact logic that technology uses to organize/otherize people – the notion of a predictable model of debate is one that becomes an archive of the subject which only excludes the Other

#### Productivity DA – the notion of fairness as a meta-constraint on debate is just capitalism’s method of controlling the population by those deemed “imperfect” and subjecting them to incalculable violence

#### Both of these are links to the k and independent reasons to reject the affirmative on a performative level under our framing

### 2NR – AT: Time Skew/Clash

#### 1] we force the aff to defend the entirety of the 1AC instead of a 6 second plan text. Forcing the aff to defend their scholarship necessarily forces them to create a better aff, allowing for better contestation.

#### 2] you can leverage the representations, research models, and ethical frameworks of the aff, just not the impact, so it doesn’t moot anything

#### 3] We solve it better – their model disembodies the stasis of the discussion to endless hypotheticals that can never have any real impact on subject formation which is the only impact to your ballot.

#### 4] reciprocity – they might not get to weigh the fiated impacts of the aff but the negative cannot generate impacts from fiat either

#### 5] This is the most predictable ground the aff must research its assumptions to create the aff

### 2NR – AT: Epistemology Tied

#### 1] Fiat illusory – voting aff doesn’t solve [impact] but voting negative deconstructs the humanist orientation of the 1AC so you should frame this through the lens of proximity

#### 2] the criticism has indicted your starting point, so it doesn’t make sense to leverage your impacts since the abstract frames the orientation towards the material

### 2NR – AT – Clash

**1] Our interpretation maintains clash – it just shifts the locus point from which we clash that ensures affirmatives take a technologically appropriate stance on the resolution**

**2] Clash is justified under predictable logic that humanity should be scapegoated in order to make sufficient arguments that meets their threshold for something that should be debated about – reject impacts to framework that are reliant on an understanding of normative debate**

## 2NR – Links

### 2NR – Unchecked AI

#### The unchecked AI link – that’s Atanasoski and Vora [#?] – the 1AC’s fear of rebellious robots through their framing of unchecked AI feeds into the logic of the empathetic figure of the human as aspirational. The idea of the master-slave confrontation between humans and robots don’t provide liberation because it still relies on the humanist conception that empathy is good, which allows for racialized violence against those who are unable to access the European conception of the Human. Think to how colonialists paint some indigenous people as good because they can conform with the European conception of the human by converting to Christianity while justifying violence against indigenous people they see as savages.

### 2NR – Human Futurity

**The fear of the killer robot exists because of its potential to disrupt humanity which was CONCEDED (and the work I just did above). Turns the case because it promotes western imperialism that leads to an inbalance in the opposite direction. Evening the tables by banning laws seems smart in nature but in reality results in humans gaining control and mastery which deck any chance at minority play-in and bring us back to western imperialism which recreates their own impacts.**

#### Line from the aff

#### [1] Totalization – The constitutive nature of LAWs forces them to categorize and act upon certain identities in order to target them. It reduces the subject from a complex being into a series of numbers and characteristics which is inherently dehumanizing.

## 2NR – Impact

### 2NR – AT – Extinction OW

#### [omitted]

### Impact calc

#### **[omitted]**

## 2NR – Alt

### 2NR – Technological Uselessness

#### The alternative is to endorse robotic failure – that’s Atanasoski and Vora [#?] – instead of seeing robots as an extension of the human, we recognize drones as external to our control without ascribing the notion of the only ethical actor being the human. This takes the form of things like drone selfies, where instead of acting as extensions of humans, drones are able to see themselves in the mirror in an act of robotic vanity instead of human productivity.

#### Solves:

#### 1] This disrupts humanism by reconceptualizing what it means to be human – instead of viewing morality as only accessible by the human, we allow for robots to recognize themselves as autonomous beings that can be ethical as well

#### 2] this solves the aff – they assume the calculative violence of LAWs as a result of their lethality, but the alternative is a reconceptualization for what lethality is. The aff draws an arbitrary distinction between the human and the robot which we have impact turned and say that LAWs can be both care robots as well as lethal. This takes out the aff since their offense is predicated on LAWs disrespecting human dignity.

### 2NR – AT – Permutation – Top Level

#### [omitted]