#### Consequentialism collapses to particularism – we can never find an absolute norm because rules are indeterminate and always changing:

#### The practice of ethical life is complicated and multifaceted – different moral features are relevant in different moral cases. This isn’t deducing justifications for them but reflecting on the way we practice.

James Griffin 5, Rhodes Scholar, American-born philosopher, who was White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford from 1996 to 2000., Corpus Christi College, 2005, "Human Rights: Whose Duties?," Human Rights And The Moral Responsibilities Of Corporate And Public Sector Organisations Volume 20 Of The Series Issues In Business Ethics Pp 31-43, http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F1-4020-2361-8\_3

I said a moment ago that mere ability is one reason-generating consideration in cases of aid. But **moral life is more complicated** than that. **Many other considerations also shape moral norms,** for instance, the one I glanced at earlier: that **a good life is a life of deep commitments to particular persons, causes, careers, and institutions; that deep commitments limit our wills in major ways; and that our powers of large-scale calculation about what maximises good outcomes are also limited.** Unless one stresses these other reason-generating considerations, my proposal that ability can fix who should give aid might look odd. **A [Bill] Gates or a Getty has a great ability to help the needy. That ability, no doubt, means that they have above-average obligations to help. But the obligation upon them does not go on until their marginal loss equals the marginal gain of the needy; nor does it with us.** The ethical story is far more complicated than that. That Gateses and the Gettys - and **we - are allowed substantially to honour our own commitments and follow our own interests, and these permissions limit our obligations.** All that I wish to claim is that mere ability is one consideration in fixing where to place the duty to help. As with identifying the content of a human right, so also with identifying the related duty-ower: my remarks are only a start on the job. It is characteristic of the Work involved in identifying duty-owers that it too can be long, hard, and contentious. I think that sometimes **it will prove impossible to make a clearly successful case for holding anyone** in particular **the** appropriate **duty-ower.** Sometimes the **identification will have elements of arbitrariness and convention in it. Sometimes it will be subject to negotiation** in a particular place or time. We can know that there is a moral burden, without yet knowing who should shoulder it.

#### Precludes the aff:

#### Indeterminacy: rules can’t secure their own application – applying a norm to new situations is indeterminate. We only understand rules based on past applications but when presented with a new situation action freezes - i.e. the next number in 2, 4, 6, could be 8 or 10 based on different rules. You could try to use language to explain but that’s defined by social rules built on past usage – which is circular.

#### This applies to all norms including moral ones – applying it properly isn’t defined by the norm but by being attentive to the right set of unspecifiable moral considerations.

#### The problem is with the *application* of all moral principles, not the content of them – this means it takes out the aff even if their framework true, since it’s impossible to defend the application of the principle to any specific case, let alone all of them.

#### The AC collapses - you can only know if consequences are bad in reference to each other which means you need to take account of everything i.e. murdering 1 person compared to murdering none is bad but murdering 1 person compared to murdering 10 is good.

#### Negate - the AC is an absolute principle which is inconsistent with the call for particularity - it says that unconditional means all rights to strike -

Merriam Webster, (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unconditional)//st

: not conditional or limited : ABSOLUTE, UNQUALIFIED

#### unconditional rights are bad - it’s terrible for ethics bc it means that under no conditions can we question things, which doesn’t account for particular situations i.e. it may be bad to strike while blocking the entrance to the emergency room which proves there are bad conditions to strike on