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#### The routine killing of innocent Palestinians is sanctioned by US military assistance

**Kane 17** Alex Kane [New York-based freelance journalist who writes on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East], 5-12-2017, "Inside Sources Say the State Dept Refuses To Trace Whether Israel Is Using U.S. Military Aid Illegally," In These Times, <http://inthesetimes.com/features/israel-palestine-killings-us-aid-military-weapons.html> // ash

The young man’s name was Sabaa Obeid, a 22-year-old from Salfit, a town about 13 miles north. He, too, had been throwing stones. Shot by one of the Israeli soldiers, he was declared dead later that day.

Witnesses to the confrontation say the armed soldiers were never in life threatening danger from the stones, which were flung from hundreds of feet away. No Israeli soldier has been killed by a Palestinian stone-thrower at a protest in the past 18 years, according to statistics compiled by Israeli human rights group B’Tselem. (The Israeli military did not return requests for information.) “Stone-throwing poses little or no serious risk to Israeli soldiers, who are generally too far away for the stone-throwers to have any chance of hitting them,” wrote Amnesty International in a 2014 report. “Israeli forces frequently respond to such stone-throwing protests using grossly excessive force.”

The soldier who killed Obeid used a Ruger sniper rifle, a weapon manufactured by Sturm, Ruger & Co., the third biggest gun company in the United States. U.S. taxpayer dollars likely paid for it. Israel must spend roughly 75 percent of its annual military aid from the United States on U.S.-made weapons.

The shooting of Obeid with a U.S.-made weapon was not an isolated incident. Human rights groups have recorded dozens of incidents of the Israeli military using U.S.-made weapons in unlawful ways to injure and kill Palestinian civilians. During weekly demonstrations in Gaza last spring, for example, Amnesty International documented Israeli snipers injuring unarmed Palestinian protesters using weapons manufactured by Remington, the U.S.’s second largest gun corporation.

Taken together, witness testimony, video evidence and human-rights reports paint a picture of U.S. arms flowing to an Israeli army that recklessly uses live ammunition on civilians who pose little threat, in apparent violation of international law.

“Theoretically, you’re only allowed to use live ammunition in very extreme cases of grave danger to life,” says Sarit Michaeli, the international advocacy officer for B’Tselem. “The [Israeli] army has a much broader definition, [with] all of these specific descriptions—but none of them apply to a demonstration where some youth are throwing stones.”

Israel’s army has long deployed U.S. weapons to kill Palestinian civilians.

An In These Times survey of detailed reports published by the United Nations, Israeli human rights group B’Tselem, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reveals that, since 2009, at least 272 Palestinians appear to have been killed by U.S.-made weapons used by Israeli forces.

Fourteen of these killings occurred during law enforcement situations (outside of an active war zone), such as during demonstrations. Some of these incidents have been captured on video. In one video from 2016, for example, an Israeli soldier, armed with a U.S.-made M4 assault rifle, executed an injured Palestinian who was lying still on a Hebron street after he stabbed a soldier.

The full death toll of Palestinians killed by U.S. weapons is likely far higher, since many reports are not able to identify the weapon used.

It’s not supposed to be this way. U.S. arms exports to Israel (and other countries) are governed by laws placing restrictions on sales to nations that abuse human rights. Campaigns to cut U.S. military aid to Israel have latched onto a particular measure, known as the Leahy Law. The law prohibits U.S. assistance or training from flowing to foreign military units that have committed a gross violation of human rights, unless the foreign government has held that unit accountable.

But interviews with human rights advocates, congressional aides and former and current U.S. officials reveal that enforcement of the Leahy Law in Israel is lax, with no tracking of which army units receive U.S. weapons.

Human rights advocates say they have brought the State Department evidence of specific crimes committed by soldiers who clearly used U.S. weapons, only to have that evidence brushed off. A current U.S. official, who asked for anonymity because they are not authorized to speak to the press and could be fired as a result, told In These Times that they are not aware of any time when an Israeli unit was cut off from U.S. assistance under the Leahy Law.

This lack of enforcement allows Israel to get away with extrajudicial executions of Palestinians, human rights advocates say.

#### The U.S. is responsible for the bombs that decimate Palestinian populatiosn

- answers leveraging

**Johnson 18** Emma C. Johnson [A writer and artist from Midland, who recently described her Middle East delegation travels in a presentation at Creative 360], 2-5-2018, "We should stop military aid to Israel," Midland Daily News, [https://www.ourmidland.com/opinion/voices/article/We-should-stop-military-aid-to-Israel-12551246.php //](https://www.ourmidland.com/opinion/voices/article/We-should-stop-military-aid-to-Israel-12551246.php%20//) ash

Midland could have an extra $8.6 million in its budget but, instead, our city contributes $8,634,511 in aid to Israel every year. This $8.6 million pays for weapons to bomb Palestinian civilians, including women and children, and subsidizes new Israeli settlements that are illegal according to international law.

How was the $8.6 million figure calculated?

In 2007, the U.S. pledged $30 billion in military aid to Israel. Statistics from the IRS provide the data needed to calculate the percentage each state contributed toward federal taxes. To estimate each city's contribution, figures from the U.S. Census Bureau's 2006-2008 estimates were used. Multiplying the city's population by its per capita income in the past 12 months (in 2008 inflation-adjusted dollars) showed the percentage of each city's contribution to its state's share of federal taxes.

In May, I went on a delegation to Palestine/Israel and saw used tear gas canisters littering the ground. I saw how our money erected the wall and checkpoints that divide families, make it difficult for students to attend university, and render commerce nearly impossible for Palestinians. Our taxes pay for bulldozers to demolish Palestinian homes, leaving Palestinians homeless so Israeli settlers can move in. There I was 6,000 miles away and my tax money had arrived well before me.

While attending a meeting at the United Nations in East Jerusalem, I couldn't count the number of times the presenter said that Israel was in violation of international law. When asked what practical steps were being taken for reform, she said that the international community has not imposed any systems of accountability onto Israel, despite its repeated disregard for the Geneva Convention.

So, why do we send Israel so much money in aid?

Some argue that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East. However, granting citizens rights contingent on race and religion is not democracy. Others say it is for oil and natural gas; all the more reason to invest in green energy! Still others say we need to maintain our "special relationship" with Israel for stability. But are we safer when we increase income inequality and disenfranchise populations, in this case the Palestinians?

To find the real answer, follow the money and see where it goes.

Last year President Barack Obama pledged $38 billion to Israel over the next 10 years. Although this was contingent on stopping new settlement construction, a week later they resumed anyway. We didn't even admonish Israel and the settlements continue to be built.

Settlers are provided private security by the Israeli government for free, but it isn't the Israeli military that's protecting over 550,000 settlers. Instead, the Israeli government uses the private contractor Blackwater, while Hewlett-Packard provides the computer software and cards used at checkpoints to control flows in and out of the area. Magal constructs the wall on the West Bank. In fact, 75 percent of weapons Israel uses with our aid must be purchased from the U.S. (New legislation is phasing the requirement to 100 percent.)

Occupation is big business.

Lobbyists for the military-industrial complex, which President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned about, make large campaign contributions to the U.S. Congress to uphold the status quo. Israel perpetuates the myth that Arabs and Muslims are terrorists to justify the weapons contracts. And Israel has been good at upholding the narrative, in tandem with the U.S. media, which perpetuates the Eurocentric point of view that labels Middle Easterners as "other," and therefore not worthy of as many rights. This xenophobia serves to justify the unjustifiable.

#### American military support actively prolongs the conflict, prevents a two-state resolution, and ensures instability in the region

**Tolan 16** Sandy Tolan, 10-18-2016, "American Weapons Are Blocking True Peace Between Israel and Palestine," Nation, <https://www.thenation.com/article/american-weapons-are-blocking-true-peace-between-israel-and-palestine/> // ash

For two decades, Israeli leaders and their neoconservative backers in this country, hell-bent on building and expanding settlements on Palestinian land, have worked to undermine America’s stated efforts—and paid no price. Now, with that record weapons package, the United States has made it all too clear that they won’t have to. Ever.

The military alliance between the United States and Israel has long been at odds with the stated intentions of successive administrations in Washington to foster peace in the Holy Land. One White House after another has preferred the “solution” of having it both ways: supporting a two-state solution while richly rewarding, with lethal weaponry, an incorrigible client state that was working as fast as it could to undermine just such a solution.

This ongoing duality seemed at its most surreal in the last few weeks. First, President Obama announced the new military deal, with its promised delivery of fighter jets and other hardware, citing the “unshakable” American military alliance with Israel. The following week, at the United Nations, he declared, “Israel must recognize that it cannot permanently occupy and settle Palestinian land.” Next, he flew to Israel for the funeral of Shimon Peres, and in a tribute to the Nobel Prize–winning former Israeli president, spoke of a man who grasped that “the Jewish people weren’t born to rule another people” and brought up the “unfinished business” of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. (Peres is remembered quite differently by Palestinians as an early pioneer of settlement building and the author of the brutal Operation Grapes of Wrath assaults on Lebanon in 1996.) Not long after the funeral, the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu brazenly approved a new settlement deep in the West Bank, prompting the State Department to “strongly condemn” the action as “deeply troubling.”

Such scolding words, however, shrivel into nothingness in the face of a single number: 38 billion. With its latest promise of military aid, the United States has essentially sanctioned Israel’s impunity, its endless colonization of Palestinian land, its military occupation of the West Bank, and its periodic attacks by F-16 fighter jets and Apache helicopters using Hellfire missiles on the civilians of Gaza.

Yes, Hamas’s crude and occasionally deadly rockets sometimes help provoke Israeli fire, and human rights investigations have found that both sides have committed war crimes. But Israel’s explosive power in the 2014 Gaza war, fueled in large part by American military aid and political support, exceeded that of Hamas by an estimated 1,500-to-1. By one estimate, all of Hamas’s rockets, measured in explosive power, were equal to 12 of the one-ton bombs Israel dropped on Gaza. And it loosed hundreds of those, and fired tens of thousands of shells, rockets and mortars. In the process, nearly 250 times more Palestinian civilians died than civilians in Israel.

Now, with Gaza severed from the West Bank, and Palestinians facing new waves of settlers amid a half-century-long military occupation, the United States has chosen not to apply pressure to its out-of-control ally, but instead to resupply its armed forces in a massive way. This means that we’ve finally arrived at something of a historic (if hardly noticed) moment. After all these decades, the two-state solution, critically flawed as it was, should now officially be declared dead—and consider the United States an accomplice in its murder. In other words, the Obama administration has handed Israel’s leaders and the neoconservatives who have long championed this path the victory they’ve sought for more than two decades.

Twenty years ago, the pro-Israel hard right in America designed the core strategy that helped lead to this American capitulation. In 1996, a task force led by neocons Richard Perle (future chairman of the Defense Policy Board), David Wurmser (future senior Middle East adviser to Vice President Dick Cheney), Douglas Feith (future undersecretary of defense), and others issued a policy paper aimed at incoming Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm” advocated that Israel walk away from its embrace of the Oslo peace process and Oslo’s focus on territorial concessions. The paper’s essential ingredients included weakening Israel’s neighbors via regime change in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and “roll back” in Syria and Iran. The authors’ recommendations turned out to be anything but a wish list, given that a number of them would soon hold influential positions in the administration of George W. Bush.

As journalist Jim Lobe wrote in 2007:

[T]he task force, which was chaired by Perle, argued that regime change in Iraq—of which Feith was among the most ardent advocates within the Pentagon—would enable Israel and the U.S. to decisively shift the balance of power in the region so that Israel could make a “clean break” from the Oslo process (or any framework that would require it to give up “land for peace”) and, in so doing, “secure the realm” against Palestinian territorial claims.

In other words, as early as 1996, these neocons were already imagining what would become the disastrous invasion of Iraq in 2003. You could argue, of course, that neither the neocons nor Netanyahu could have foreseen the chaos that would follow, with Iraq nearly cracking open and Syria essentially collapsing into horrific civil war and violence, civilians stranded under relentless bombing, and the biggest refugee crisis since World War II gripping Europe and the world. But you would, at least in some sense, be wrong, for certain of the neocon advocates of regime change imagined chaos as an essential part of the process from early on.

“One can only hope that we turn the region into a caldron, and faster, please,” wrote Michael Ledeen of the American Enterprise Institute in National Review during the buildup to the invasion of Iraq. (In 1985, as a consultant to the National Security Council and to Oliver North, Ledeen had helped broker the illegal arms-for-hostages deal with Iran by setting up meetings between weapons dealers and Israel.) “The war won’t end in Baghdad,” Ledeen later wrote, in The Wall Street Journal. “We must also topple terror states in Tehran and Damascus.”

The neocons got so much more than they bargained for in Iraq, and so much less than they wanted in Syria and Iran. Their recent attempts—with Netanyahu as their chief spokesman—to block the Obama administration’s Iran nuclear deal, for example, went down in flames. Still, it’s stunning to think just how much their strategy of regime change and chaos helped transform our world and the Greater Middle East for the worse, and to be reminded that its ultimate goal, at least in those early days, was in large part to keep Israel from having to pursue a peace deal with the Palestinians. Of course, there were other benefits the neocons imagined back then as part of their historic attempt to redraw the map of the Middle East. Controlling some of the vast oil reserves of that region was one of them, but of course that didn’t exactly turn out to be a “mission accomplished” moment either. Only the Israeli part of the plan seemed to succeed as once imagined.

So here we are 20 years later. All around the Holy Land, states are collapsing or at least their foundations are crumbling, and Israel’s actions make clear that it isn’t about to help improve the situation in any way. It visibly intends to pursue a policy of colonization, permanent human rights violations, and absolute rule over the Palestinians. These are facts on the ground that former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Netanyahu, the Israeli right wing, and those American neocon visionaries fought so hard to establish. A succession of leaders in Washington—at least those who weren’t designing this policy themselves—have been played for fools.

In the two-plus decades since the 1993 Oslo Agreement, which some believed would put Israel and the Palestinians on the path to peace, and that “Clean Break” document which was written to undermine it, the West Bank settler population has grown from 109,000 to nearly 400,000 (an estimated 15% of whom are American). The would-be capital of a Palestinian state, East Jerusalem, is now surrounded by 17 Jewish settlements. Palestinians nominally control a mere 18% of the West Bank (also known as Area A), or 4 percent of the entire land base of Israel/Palestine.

The Palestinians’ would-be homeland is now checkered with military bases, settlements, settlers-only roads, and hundreds of checkpoints and barriers—all in a West Bank the size of Delaware, our second-smallest state. An estimated 40 percent of adult male Palestinians, and thousands of children, have seen the insides of Israeli jails and prisons; many of them languish there without charges.

Israel has, in essence, created a Jim Crow–like separate and unequal reality there: a one-state “solution” that it alone controls. The United States has done almost nothing about this (other than carefully couched, periodic State Department words of complaint), while its ally marched forward unchecked. Not since James Baker was secretary of state under the first President Bush before—notably enough—the signing of the Oslo accords has any US leader threatened to withhold funds unless Israel stops building settlements on Palestinian land. The phrase “friends don’t let friends drive drunk” no longer applies in US-Israeli relations. Rather, what we hear are regular pledges of “absolute, total, unvarnished commitment to Israel’s security.” Those were, in fact, the words of Vice President Joe Biden during a 2010 visit to Israel—a pledge offered, as it turned out, only a few hours before the Netanyahu government announced the construction of 1,600 new apartments in East Jerusalem.

### solvency

#### Plan: The United States Department of Defense should suspend military aid to Israel.

#### DoD is normal means

**McBride 18** James McBride, Deputy Editor at Council on Foreign Relations, a master’s degree from Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, “How Does the U.S. Spend Its Foreign Aid?” Council on Foreign Relations, October 1, 2018, [https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-does-us-spend-its-foreign-aid //](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-does-us-spend-its-foreign-aid%20//) JW

The **Department of Defense** **plays a major role** as the agency **primarily responsible** for implementing traditional **military aid**, though the State Department also funds and influences many security assistance programs. The Department of Health and Human Services implements many health-related programs, including the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). The Treasury Department helps manage funding of global financial institutions, as well as programs for debt relief and economic reforms in poor countries. There is also a plethora of other agencies and autonomous organizations, including the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Peace Corps, and the African Development Foundation, involved in aid work.

#### Lack of political willpower and corruption prevents cutting aid now – the plan increases Palestinian protections and holds the US accountable.

**Kane 17** Alex Kane [New York-based freelance journalist who writes on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East], 5-12-2017, "Inside Sources Say the State Dept Refuses To Trace Whether Israel Is Using U.S. Military Aid Illegally," In These Times, <http://inthesetimes.com/features/israel-palestine-killings-us-aid-military-weapons.html> // ash

Because the Leahy Law is narrow—it only bars assistance to particular military units that commit rights violations, rather than the entire foreign army—Palestinian rights advocates working in Washington see enforcement against Israel as an achievable goal that could curb civilian deaths.

“The Leahy Law being implemented would not end violations, but I think it would seriously constrain [them],” says Brad Parker, international advocacy officer and staff attorney at Defense for Children International-Palestine. “Israeli officials would have to scrutinize military decisions and the use of force in a way that would ultimately increase protection for Palestinian civilians.”

The State Department did not answer questions from In These Times about whether any Israeli army units have been barred from receiving U.S. weapons under the Leahy Law or whether the State Department has acted on specific evidence of Israeli soldiers misusing U.S. arms. A State Department official told In These Times in a statement that the department “continues to apply the Leahy Law across the board, including in Israel, as it has for years. … We take seriously any credible information of a gross violation of human rights, and we review alleged violations utilizing standardized criteria worldwide.”

This statement is disputed by Bill Harper, chief of staff to Rep. Betty McCollum (D-Minn.), who has emerged as the leading congressional critic of Israeli human rights abuses. “They cannot credibly make the claim that they enforce the law equally,” Harper says. “We enforce it where we want and ignore it where we don’t.”

In a February 2016 letter, Leahy wrote to Secretary of State John Kerry about his concerns that the State Department is not adequately monitoring the use of U.S. military aid to Israel, and asked for an investigation into whether Israel committed extrajudicial executions with U.S. weapons. “There have been a disturbing number of reports of possible gross violations of human rights by security forces in Israel or Egypt—incidents that may have involved recipients, or potential recipients, of U.S. military assistance,” Leahy wrote. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responded that Israeli soldiers “are not murderers” and act in a “moral manner.”

In meetings and conversations with the State Department from 2012 to 2015, Mike Coogan, then the legislative coordinator for the U.S. Campaign to End the Israeli Occupation, says he brought up a 2009 Human Rights Watch report on U.S.-supplied white phosphorus that killed Palestinians in Gaza. He also communicated with officials about a 2014 Amnesty International report documenting U.S.-made tear gas canisters killing Palestinian protesters.

“State said we’ll look into it and we’ll get back to you,” Coogan says. “But they never got back to us.”

Brad Parker told In These Times that, in meetings about the Leahy Law during the Obama administration’s second term, State Department officials said they do not track where weapons go once they are sent to Israeli units, making it difficult to assess whether the weapons are being misused.

One former U.S. official familiar with how the Leahy Law is implemented (who requested anonymity out of concern about losing their current job, which involves working with State Department officials), says that the State Department doesn’t “have much of a record of understanding where material assistance flows.”

The former official believes that an unwillingness to challenge Israel is one reason the broader lack of monitoring goes unaddressed. “Getting more fidelity on specific instances of assistance to, say, Nigeria or Kenya … raises the defenses of a number of different pockets of support for Israel, who are concerned that our support for Israel will be in question or at risk.”

Support for Israel on Capitol Hill is driven by a multi-pronged machine: the weapons industry, which makes money from U.S. military aid to Israel; donors, who give to pro-Israel politicians, both Democrats and Republicans; Christian evangelicals, who see support for Israel as part of biblical prophecy and make up a large part of the Republican base; and Israel’s lobbyists, who continually push Washington to ramp up support.

The current State Department official interviewed for this story also describes a general reluctance to confront allies: “We never want to deliver bad news to them. ... The implementation of the Leahy Law is where you see the downsides of that.”

UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION, which has fully thrown its support behind Israel’s right-wing government, resistance to enforcing the Leahy Law remains.

In leaked emails published by Politico in June 2018, U.S. Ambassador to Israel David Friedman (who, before his appointment, fundraised millions of dollars for Israeli settlements) pushed back against State Department efforts to improve how U.S. military aid to Israel is monitored. According to Politico, Friedman wrote in October 2017 that he did “not believe we should extend” these efforts, in the form of guidelines on how to better vet military aid, “to Israel at this time.” Friedman went on to say that “Israel is a democracy whose army does not engage in gross violations of human rights” and that limiting U.S. military aid to Israeli units would be “against national interests.”

While the rhetoric against enforcing the Leahy Law more strictly against Israel may have hardened under Trump, there has been no policy change from Obama to Trump, according to Raed Jarrar, an expert on the Leahy Law.

“The difference is the mask has fallen, like many other things with Trump,” Jarrar says. “When it comes to the policies on the ground … there’s no difference. There was no attempt to hold Israel accountable in the past, and there is no attempt to hold Israel accountable now, either.”

Meanwhile, as the Israeli occupation grinds on and Congress continues to sign off on U.S. aid to Israel, Palestinians are left to fume at the fact that U.S. weapons companies, purchased with U.S. taxpayer cash, are supplying Israel with the arms that are killing civilians.

“I hope they taste the same pain we feel for our children,” says Asmaa Shaheen, Sabaa Obeid’s mother. “They’re responsible for the blood that’s shed.”

#### Cutting off military aid is the only moral response and solves blowback in the region

**Morris 18** Brett Morris, 3-5-2018, "It’s Time for the United States to Stop Supporting Israel," Medium, [https://medium.com/s/just-world-order/its-time-for-the-united-states-to-stop-supporting-israel-1fc88a41492b //](https://medium.com/s/just-world-order/its-time-for-the-united-states-to-stop-supporting-israel-1fc88a41492b%20//) ash

The United States heavily arms Israel through foreign aid. In fact, “Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II,” according to a report from the Congressional Research Service, to the tune of $127 billion. In 2016, the Obama administration concluded a new $38 billion military aid package for Israel.

Washington’s military aid to Israel includes everything from fighter jets, helicopters, bombs, and missiles to tear gas canisters and white phosphorus munitions (which can burn skin to the bone).

Israel then uses these weapons to kill Palestinian civilians. During the 2014 conflict, Amnesty International called on the United States to “immediately end its ongoing deliveries of large quantities of arms to Israel, which are providing the tools to commit further serious violations of international law in Gaza.” The United States ignored this. (Actually, during the middle of the conflict, Congress voted to supply more aid to Israel.)

Even if we were to put aside the moral issue, the longstanding support for Israel makes the United States less safe. The oppression of Palestinians by Israel and the United States has long been one of the grievances driving recruitment to jihadist groups. Osama bin Laden cited U.S. support for Israel as one of Al Qaeda’s primary reasons for “fighting and opposing” the United States.

Beyond this basic self-interest, however, the main reason the United States should stop supporting Israel is because Israel’s treatment of Palestinians is a moral disgrace. It’s time for the United States to cease sending aid and weapons to Israel, and for the United States to join the rest of the world in supporting a two-state settlement.

### framing

#### Actively prioritize our scholarship – think tanks dominate academia and stifle criticism of Zionism in public debate

**Mearsheimer and Walt 06** John J. Mearsheimer [Dr. Mearsheimer is a professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago] and Stephen M. Walt [Dr. Walt is a professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University], 3-23-2006, "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy," Middle East Policy Council, [https://www.mepc.org/israel-lobby-and-us-foreign-policy-0 //](https://www.mepc.org/israel-lobby-and-us-foreign-policy-0%20//) ash

Manipulating the Media

In addition to influencing government policy directly, the lobby strives to shape public perceptions about Israel and the Middle East. It does not want an open debate on issues involving Israel, because an open debate might cause Americans to question the level of support that they currently provide. Accordingly, pro-Israel organizations work hard to influence the media, think tanks and academia, institutions that are critical in shaping popular opinion.

The lobby's perspective on Israel is widely reflected in the mainstream media, in good part because most American commentators are pro-Israel. The debate among Middle East pundits, journalist Eric Alterman writes, is "dominated by people who cannot imagine criticizing Israel."94 He lists 61 "columnists and commentators who can be counted upon to support Israel reflexively and without qualification." Conversely, Alterman found just five pundits who consistently criticize Israeli behavior or endorse pro-Arab positions. Newspapers occasionally publish guest op-eds challenging Israeli policy, but the balance of opinion clearly favors the other side.

This pro-Israel bias is reflected in the editorials of major newspapers. Robert Bartley, the late editor of the Wall Street Journal, once remarked, "Shamir, Sharon, Bibi — whatever those guys want is pretty much fine by me."95 Not surprisingly, the Journal, along with other prominent newspapers like The Chicago Sun-Times and The Washington Times, regularly run editorials that are strongly pro-Israel and rarely publish editorials that criticize it. Magazines like Commentary, The New Republic and The Weekly Standard also zealously defend Israel at every turn.

Editorial bias is also found in papers like The New York Times. The Times occasionally criticizes Israeli policies and sometimes acknowledges that the Palestinians have legitimate grievances, but it is not even-handed.96 In his memoirs, for example, former Times executive editor Max Frankel recounted the impact his own pro-Israel attitude had on his editorial choices: "I was much more deeply devoted to Israel than I dared to assert." He goes on, "Fortified by my knowledge of Israel and my friendships there, I myself wrote most of our Middle East commentaries. As more Arab than Jewish readers recognized, I wrote them from a pro-Israel perspective." 97

The media's reporting of news events involving Israel is somewhat more evenhanded than editorial commentary is, in part because reporters strive to be objective, but also because it is difficult to cover events in the Occupied Territories without acknowledging Israel's actual behavior. To discourage unfavorable reporting on Israel, the lobby organizes letter-writing campaigns, demonstrations and boycotts against news outlets whose content it considers anti-Israel. One CNN executive has said that he sometimes gets 6,000 e-mail messages in a single day complaining that a story is anti-Israel.98 Similarly, the pro-Israel Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America (CAMERA) organized demonstrations outside National Public Radio stations in 33 cities in May 2003. It also tried to convince contributors to withhold support from NPR until its Middle East coverage became more sympathetic to Israel.99 Boston's NPR station, WBUR, reportedly lost more than $1 million in contributions as a result of these efforts. Pressure on NPR has also come from Israel's friends in Congress, who have asked NPR for an internal audit as well as more oversight of its Middle East coverage.

These factors help explain why the American media offer few criticisms of Israeli policy, rarely question Washington's unconditional committment to Israel, and only occasionally discuss the lobby's influence on U.S. policy.

Think Tanks That Think One Way

Pro-Israel forces predominate in U.S. think tanks, which play an important role in shaping public debate as well as actual policy. The lobby created its own think tank in 1985, when Martin Indyk helped found WINEP.100Although WINEP plays down its links to Israel and claims instead that it provides a "balanced and realistic" perspective on Middle East issues, this is not the case.101 In fact, WINEP is funded and run by individuals who are deeply committed to advancing Israel's agenda.

The lobby's influence in the think-tank world extends well beyond WINEP. Over the past 25 years, pro-Israel forces have established a commanding presence at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the Brookings Institution, the Center for Security Policy, the Foreign Policy Research Insitute, the Heritage Foundation, the Hudson Institute, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA). These think tanks are decidedly pro-Israel and include few, if any, critics of U.S. support for the Jewish state.

A good indicator of the lobby's influence in the think-tank world is the evolution of the Brookings Institution. For many years, its senior expert on Middle East issues was William B. Quandt, a distinguished academic and former NSC official with a well-deserved reputation for evenhandedness regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. Today, however, work on these issues at Brookings is conducted through its Saban Center for Middle East Studies, which is financed by Haim Saban, a wealthy Israeli-American businessman and ardent Zionist.102 The director of the Saban Center is the ubiquitous Martin Indyk. Although it occasionally hosts Arab experts and tolerates some divergence of opinion, Saban Center publications never question U.S. support for Israel and rarely, if ever, offer significant criticisms of key Israeli policies. In sum, what was once a nonpartisan policy institute on Middle East matters has moved in a decidedly proIsrael direction over time.

Thus, the balance of power inside the Beltway strongly favors Israel. There are a few think tanks that are not reflexively pro-Israel (e.g., the New America Foundation, the CATO Institute, the Middle East Institute), but the largest and most visible think tanks usually take Israel's side and do not question the merits of unconditional U.S. support.

Policing Academia

The lobby has had the most difficulty stifling debate about Israel on college campuses, because academic freedom is a core value and because tenured professors are hard to threaten or silence. Even so, there was only mild criticism of Israel in the 1990s, when the Oslo peace process was underway. Criticism rose after that process collapsed and Ariel Sharon came to power in early 2001. It became especially intense when the IDF reoccupied the West Bank in spring 2002 and employed massive force against the second intifada.

The lobby moved aggressively to "take back the campuses." New groups sprang up, like the Caravan for Democracy, which brought Israeli speakers to U.S. colleges.103 Established groups such as the Jewish Council for Public Affairs and Hillel jumped into the fray, and a new entity — the Israel on Campus Coalition — was formed to coordinate the many groups that now sought to make Israel's case on campus. Finally, AIPAC more than tripled its spending for programs to monitor university activities and to train young advocates for Israel, in order to "vastly expand the number of students involved on campus . . . in the national pro-Israel effort."104

The lobby also monitors what professors write and teach. In September 2002, for example, Daniel Pipes, a passionately pro-Israel neoconservative, established a website (Campus Watch) that posted dossiers on suspect academics and encouraged students to report comments or behavior that might be considered hostile to Israel.105 This transparent attempt to blacklist and intimidate scholars prompted such a harsh reaction that Pipes later removed the dossiers, but the website still invites students to report alleged anti-Israel behavior at U.S. colleges.

Groups in the lobby also direct their fire at particular professors and the universities that hire them. Columbia University, which had the late Palestinian scholar Edward Said on its faculty, has been a frequent target of pro-Israel forces. Jonathan Cole, the former Columbia provost, reported, "One can be sure that any public statement in support of the Palestinian people by the preeminent literary critic Edward Said will elicit hundreds of e-mails, letters and journalistic accounts that call on us to denounce Said and to either sanction or fire him."106When Columbia recruited historian Rashid Khalidi from the University of Chicago, Cole says that "the complaints started flowing in from people who disagreed with the content of his political views." Princeton faced the same problem a few years later when it considered trying to woo Khalidi away from Columbia.107

A similar pattern occurred again in 2006, when the departments of History and Sociology at Yale University voted to appoint Professor Juan Cole, a distinguished historian at the University of Michigan. Cole is also the author of a prize-winning weblog ("Informed Comment") and has criticized a number of Israeli policies in recent years. His appointment was attacked by pro-Israel columnists in The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Times. The newspaper Jewish Week reported that several prominent Jewish donors called Yale officials in order to protest the appointment, which was subsequently overturned by the University's appointments committee. The impact of this alleged donor pressure is unknown, but the incident underscores the importance that Israel's supporters now attach to shaping discourse on campus.108

A classic illustration of the effort to police academia occurred in late 2004, when the "David Project" produced a propaganda film alleging that faculty in Columbia University's Middle East studies program were antisemitic and were intimidating Jewish students who defended Israel.109 Columbia was raked over the coals in pro-Israel circles, but a faculty committee assigned to investigate the charges found no evidence of antisemitism. The only incident worth noting was the possibility that one professor had "responded heatedly" to a student's question.110 The committee also discovered that the accused professors had been the target of an overt intimidation campaign.

Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this campaign to eliminate criticism of Israel from college campuses is the effort by Jewish groups to push Congress to establish mechanisms that monitor what professors say about Israel.111 Schools judged to have an anti-Israel bias would be denied federal funding. This effort to get the U.S. government to police campuses has not yet succeeded, but the attempt illustrates the importance pro-Israel groups place on controlling debate on these issues.

Finally, a number of Jewish philanthropists have established Israel studies programs (in addition to the roughly 130 Jewish Studies programs that already exist) so as to increase the number of Israel-friendly scholars on campus.112 NYU announced the establishment of the Taub Center for Israel Studies on May 1, 2003, and similar programs have been established at other universities like Berkeley, Brandeis and Emory. Academic administrators emphasize the pedagogical value of these programs, but they are intended in good part to promote Israel's image on campus. Fred Lafer, the head of the Taub Foundation, makes clear that his foundation funded the NYU center to help counter the "Arabic [sic] point of view" that he thinks is prevalent in NYU's Middle East programs.113

In sum, the lobby has gone to considerable lengths to protect Israel from criticism on college campuses. It has not been as successful in academia as it has been on Capitol Hill, but it has worked hard to stifle criticism of Israel by professors and students, and there is much less of it on campuses today.114

The Great Silencer

No discussion of how the lobby operates would be complete without examining one of its most powerful weapons: the charge of antisemitism. Anyone who criticizes Israeli actions or says that pro-Israel groups have significant influence over U.S. Middle East policy — an influence that AIPAC celebrates — stands a good chance of getting labeled an antisemite. In fact, anyone who says that there is an Israel lobby runs the risk of being charged with antisemitism, even though the Israeli media frequently refer to America's "Jewish lobby."115 In effect, the lobby boasts of its own power and then attacks anyone who calls attention to it. This tactic is very effective; antisemitism is loathsome, and no responsible person wants to be accused of it.

#### The future is unpredictable – the best way to preserve future value is to do good things now

Karnofsky 14 - Executive Director of the Open Philanthropy Project degree in Social Studies from Harvard University (Holden Karnofsky, 7/3/14, “The Moral Value of the Far Future” <https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/moral-value-far-future>)

I broadly accept the idea that the bulk of our impact may come from effects on future generations, and this view causes me to be more interested in scientific research funding, global catastrophic risk mitigation, and other causes outside of aid to the developing-world poor. (If not for this view, I would likely favor the latter and would likely be far more interested in animal welfare as well.) However, I place only limited weight on the specific argument given by Nick Bostrom in Astronomical Waste - that the potential future population is so massive as to clearly (in a probabilistic framework) dwarf all present-day considerations. More I reject the idea that placing high value on the far future - no matter how high the value - makes it clear that one should focus on reducing the risks of catastrophes such as extreme climate change, pandemics, misuse of advanced artificial intelligence, etc. Even one who fully accepts the conclusions of “Astronomical Waste” has good reason to consider focusing on shorter-term, more tangible, higher-certainty opportunities to do good - including donating to GiveWell’s current top charities and reaping the associated flow-through effects. More I consider “global catastrophic risk reduction” to be a promising area for a philanthropist. As discussed previously, we are investigating this area actively. More Those interested in related materials may wish to look at two transcripts of recorded conversations I had on these topics: a conversation on flow-through effects with Carl Shulman, Robert Wiblin, Paul Christiano, and Nick Beckstead and a conversation on existential risk with Eliezer Yudkowsky and Luke Muehlhauser. The importance of the far future As discussed previously, I believe that the general state of the world has improved dramatically over the past several hundred years. It seems reasonable to state that the people who made contributions (large or small) to this improvement have made a major difference to the lives of people living today, and that when all future generations are taken into account, their impact on generations following them could easily dwarf their impact in their own time. I believe it is reasonable to expect this basic dynamic to continue, and I believe that there remains huge room for further improvement (possibly dwarfing the improvements we’ve seen to date). I place some probability on global upside possibilities including breakthrough technology, space colonization, and widespread improvements in interconnectedness, empathy and altruism. Even if these don’t pan out, there remains a great deal of room for further reduction in poverty and in other causes of suffering. In Astronomical Waste, Nick Bostrom makes a more extreme and more specific claim: that the number of human lives possible under space colonization is so great that the mere possibility of a hugely populated future, when considered in an “expected value” framework, dwarfs all other moral considerations. I see no obvious analytical flaw in this claim, and give it some weight. However, because the argument relies heavily on specific predictions about a distant future, seemingly (as far as I can tell) backed by little other than speculation, I do not consider it “robust,” and so I do not consider it rational to let it play an overwhelming role in my belief system and actions. (More on my epistemology and method for handling non-robust arguments containing massive quantities here.) In addition, if I did fully accept the reasoning of “Astronomical Waste” and evaluate all actions by their far future consequences, it isn’t clear what implications this would have. As discussed below, given our uncertainty about the specifics of the far future and our reasons to believe that doing good in the present day can have substantial impacts on the future as well, it seems possible that “seeing a large amount of value in future generations” and “seeing an overwhelming amount of value in future generations” lead to similar consequences for our actions. Catastrophic risk reduction vs. doing tangible good Many people have cited “Astronomical Waste” to me as evidence that the greatest opportunities for doing good are in the form of reducing the risks of catastrophes such as extreme climate change, pandemics, problematic developments related to artificial intelligence, etc. Indeed, “Astronomical Waste” seems to argue something like this: For standard utilitarians, priority number one, two, three and four should consequently be to reduce existential risk. The utilitarian imperative “Maximize expected aggregate utility!” can be simplified to the maxim “Minimize existential risk!”. I have always found this inference flawed, and in my recent discussion with Eliezer Yudkowsky and Luke Muehlhauser, it was argued to me that the “Astronomical Waste” essay never meant to make this inference in the first place. The author’s definition of existential risk includes anything that stops humanity far short of realizing its full potential - including, presumably, stagnation in economic and technological progress leading to a long-lived but limited civilization. Under that definition, “Minimize existential risk!” would seem to potentially include any contribution to general human empowerment. I have often been challenged to explain how one could possibly reconcile (a) caring a great deal about the far future with (b) donating to one of GiveWell’s top charities. My general response is that in the face of sufficient uncertainty about one’s options, and lack of conviction that there are good (in the sense of high expected value) opportunities to make an enormous difference, it is rational to try to make a smaller but robustly positive difference, whether or not one can trace a specific causal pathway from doing this small amount of good to making a large impact on the far future. A few brief arguments in support of this position: I believe that the track record of “taking robustly strong opportunities to do ‘something good’ ” is far better than the track record of “taking actions whose value is contingent on high-uncertainty arguments about where the highest utility lies, and/or arguments about what is likely to happen in the far future.” This is true even when one evaluates track record only in terms of seeming impact on the far future. The developments that seem most positive in retrospect - from large ones like the development of the steam engine to small ones like the many economic contributions that facilitated strong overall growth - seem to have been driven by the former approach, and I’m not aware of many examples in which the latter approach has yielded great benefits. I see some sense in which the world’s overall civilizational ecosystem seems to have done a better job optimizing for the far future than any of the world’s individual minds. It’s often the case that people acting on relatively short-term, tangible considerations (especially when they did so with creativity, integrity, transparency, consensuality, and pursuit of gain via value creation rather than value transfer) have done good in ways they themselves wouldn’t have been able to foresee. If this is correct, it seems to imply that one should be focused on “playing one’s role as well as possible” - on finding opportunities to “beat the broad market” (to do more good than people with similar goals would be able to) rather than pouring one’s resources into the areas that non-robust estimates have indicated as most important to the far future. The process of trying to accomplish tangible good can lead to a great deal of learning and unexpected positive developments, more so (in my view) than the process of putting resources into a low-feedback endeavor based on one’s current best-guess theory. In my conversation with Luke and Eliezer, the two of them hypothesized that the greatest positive benefit of supporting GiveWell’s top charities may have been to raise the profile, influence, and learning abilities of GiveWell. If this were true, I don’t believe it would be an inexplicable stroke of luck for donors to top charities; rather, it would be the sort of development (facilitating feedback loops that lead to learning, organizational development, growing influence, etc.) that is often associated with “doing something well” as opposed to “doing the most worthwhile thing poorly.” I see multiple reasons to believe that contributing to general human empowerment mitigates global catastrophic risks. I laid some of these out in a blog post and discussed them further in my conversation with Luke and Eliezer. For one who accepts these considerations, it seems to me that: It is not clear whether placing enormous value on the far future ought to change one’s actions from what they would be if one simply placed large value on the far future. In both cases, attempts to reduce global catastrophic risks and otherwise plan for far-off events must be weighed against attempts to do tangible good, and the question of which has more potential to shape the far future will often be a difficult one to answer. If one sees few robustly good opportunities to “make a huge difference to the far future,” the best approach to making a positive far-future difference may be “make a small but robustly positive difference to the present.” One ought to be interested in “unusual, outstanding opportunities to do good” even if they don’t have a clear connection to improving the far future.

#### The world is complex – linear predictions are incoherent

Glover 12 (7/21/12, Robert W. Glover is the CLAS Honors Preceptor in Political Science at the University of Maine. “Compatibility or Incommensurability: IR Theory and Complex Systems Analysis” <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/21/compatibility-or-incommensurability-ir-theory-and-complex-systems-analysis/#_ftn1>)

A recent New York Times op-ed, written by a professor of political science no less, lambasted the discipline for consistently failing to predict both international and domestic political outcomes. It boldly proclaimed “…[c]himps throwing darts at possible outcomes would have done almost as well as the experts.”[1] To add insult to injury, the article featured a picture of a primate armed with darts taking aim at circular boards marked with regions of the world, possible outcomes, and likelihoods. The upshot of the article was that political science simply shouldn’t be in the business of prediction. Stevens quotes Karl Popper, stating “[l]ong term prophecies can be derived from scientific conditional predictions only if they apply to systems which can be described as well-isolated, stationary, and recurrent. These systems are very rare in nature; and modern society is not one of them.”[2] Though such indictments of our intellectual enterprise may be painful to hear, they are also correct in many senses. Political science, and by extension international relations (IR), has had difficulties in predicting future events with any accuracy or specificity. The guiding principles of “traditional” or “mainstream” approaches to IR have generally held that there is observable order in world affairs, from which we can offer explanations and make predictions. It is the great hope of our discipline that “there is an external world of which we can have knowledge…” and the notion that IR is “grounded in lawlike regularities that allow the possibility of making claims about how the ‘international’ operates.”[3] Yet if this were the case, surely we’d be doing a better job at forecasting international outcomes. The invocation of Popper reminds us why our best laid plans have gone awry. Social systems, from the most basic to the most intricate, almost invariably involve the complex interface of many variables, opaque interaction effects, and elements of chance and human variability. As Jervis states, “…[t]he result is that systems often display non-linear relationships, outcomes cannot be understood by the adding together of units or their relations and many of the results of actions are unintended. Complexities can appear in even what would seem to be simple and deterministic situations.”[4] Beyond prediction, even our attempts at post-hoc explanation tend to rely upon reductionism. That is to say we reduce the irreducibly complex to pithy “cause and effect” relationships. The 2008 war between Russia and Georgia was caused by a dispute over South Ossetia. The 1997 economic crisis was triggered by currency instability in Southeast Asia. The recent political upheaval in Egypt stemmed from technologically savvy young people angered with the corruption of Mubarak’s regime and a stagnant economy. These are the types of concise explanations we offer for events of enormous, systemic, complexity. However, IR theory has been grappling with a new set of tools which originate in the study of the natural world, specifically physics and biology. We call these tools “complex systems analysis” or in its more conceptual variant, “complexity theory.”[5] Complexity is not a unified theory as such, but rather an “emerging approach or framework” drawn from a variety of sources.[6] Proponents argue that IR can achieve better understanding of the world utilizing conceptual lenses attuned to the interaction of large numbers of variables and actors, interacting in a non-linear (and hence, less predictable) fashion. The remainder of this article will examine the rudiments of complexity theory, as well as its promise as a conceptual tool in understanding international relations. In particular, I will focus upon whether complexity theory constitutes a framework compatible with existing IR theories, or a fundamental and incommensurable challenge to the present theoretical landscape of IR.

### theory

#### 1] 1AR theory –

#### 2] Aff RVIs—

# Case

## XTs – Case

### 1AR – XT – Adv

#### US weapons slaughter Palestinian civilians and children – the plan significantly reduces their arms supply and forces them to reconsider their use of force

## XTs - Framing

### 1AR – XT - Karnofsky

### 1AR – XT - Glover

## XTs - Method

### 1AR – XT – Methodological Pluralism

## Case Frontlines

### AT: More Settlements (make more efficient)

#### 1] Non-unique

#### 2] Settlement building is restrained by the fact that they have to do a slow creep or else the Arab states around them will blast them for committing a genocide but US arms hold them off - the only reason that Israel had enough ammunition to hold off the Arabs was because the US let the Israelis have access to US weapons caches in occupied Palestine

### AT: They Can Produce Their Weapons

#### That conflates the few high-tech components they sell to the West that make up their economy with a large industrious economy

### AT: UK Fill-in

#### 1] We make up 75% of their defense

#### 2] UK will follow – they coordinate their security apparatus with the US (find Zeihan’s article on that)

# T

## T – Plural

## T – Nebel

### 1AR – Can’t Spec Regimes

### 1AR – Actual Nebel Definitions

## T – Authoritarian

### 1AR – T - EIU

#### C/I: your interp plus our aff – solves limits and net benefit is a critical interrogation of Israel

#### C/I: Authoritarian regimes do not provide structures of participation, fundamental rights, and fair competition.

**Hans-Joachim** **12** Lauth, Hans-Joachim. 2012. “Authoritharian Regimes.” InterAmerican Wiki: Terms - Concepts - Critical Perspectives. http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/cias/wiki/a\_Authoritarian%20Regimes.html.

The term 'authoritarian regimes' ('a.r.') in its broadest sense encompasses all forms of undemocratic rule. Compared to democracies, an a.r. does not maintain the institutions and procedures of participation and political competition, fundamental rights and control of power (separation of powers, parliaments, elections, plurality of parties, etc.) characteristic of a democracy, and thus does not possess democratic legitimacy. In a more narrow view of the term, a.r. represents a specific form of autocratic rule which has been especially distinguished from totalitarian regimes ('t.r.', also totalitarian states) (Arendt 1951, Friedrich/ Brzezinski 1956). Juan Linz's frequently applied definition (1975: 264) of a.r. names three characteristics through which a.r. can be differentiated both from democratic systems and from t.r.: (1) limited pluralism contrasted with the principally unlimited pluralism of democracies and monism of t.r.; (2) limited political participation (de-politicization) and (except for in limited phases) neither an extensive nor an intensive mobilization; (3) in contrast to totalitarianism there is no legitimation of the system through a common and dominating ideology, but rather through mentalities, psychological predispositions and values in general (patriotism, nationalism, modernization, order, etc.). Polity IV defines a.r. (without differentiating it from t.r.) through stronger restrictions on political participation, a completely exclusive restriction in the selection of the heads of the executive and very sparse limitations on the executive.

#### I meet – Israel denies Palestinian votes in the West Bank and Gaza, shuts down anti-Zionist protestors, and the government slaughters and arrests innocents

#### That o/ws – intent to define - they have no reason why Israel doesn’t meet the criteria of their interpretation besides a graph, which doesn’t prove anything

#### Our offense -

#### Topic lit – Israel receives the most amount of military aid and has large lit base - Rand Paul’s proposal proves

#### Our discourse is key - Mearsheimer and Walt – lobbyists shut down news and stifle public debates – our method forces a critical contestation of unconditional US support to Israel which spills over

#### Our defense -

#### EIU index has huge methodological flaws—it’s basically a public opinion poll

**Tasker 16** Peter Tasker, analyst with Tokyo-based Arcus Research, 2-25-2016, "Peter Tasker: The flawed 'science' behind democracy rankings," Nikkei Asian Review, <https://asia.nikkei.com/NAR/Articles/Peter-Tasker-The-flawed-science-behind-democracy-rankings> --ilake MW

How did the EIU come up with a scoring system that is supposedly accurate to two decimal places? What it did has the semblance of rigor. It asked various experts to answer 60 questions and assigned each reply a numerical value, with the weighted average deciding the ranking. Who are these experts? Nobody knows. Wikipedia dryly notes that the report does not reveal their number, nationality, credentials or even field of expertise. Some idea of where they are coming from can be gauged by the report's comments on individual countries. France, we learn, has been defenestrated because of a "deterioration in social cohesion." Those inveterate goodie-goodies, the Swedes, are on the naughty seat because of declining membership in political parties and more social discrimination. An important recent phenomenon, the growth in support for populist politicians, is not seen as a sign of democratic systems responding to shifts in public opinion. Rather, it is evidence of "discontent with democracy" itself and thus to be deplored. In other words, despite the appearance of scientific objectivity, the whole exercise of ranking a country's democratic credentials is as much riddled with biases, value judgments and hidden agendas as awarding Oscars to films or Michelin stars to restaurants -- which are also decided by groups of mysterious experts using criteria best known to themselves.

#### No limits explosion – they don’t have a caselist and a new one skews 1AR – there are limited amount of countries that commit a genocide– small affs lose to generics like politics and adv CPs

#### Disclosure solves

#### Reasonability—good is good enough—we’re close enough to their interpretation so the harm to substantive education outweighs

### 2AR – T - EIU

#### T is not neutral – their logic replicates whenever criticism of Israel is shut down because “they’re gay friendly” and “the only democracy in the Middle East.” Think tanks shut down editorials, quash down debates, and work to eliminate funding to anti-Zionist universities which proves our critical education is the only external impact

#### At the end of the debate ask yourself why a country that snipes protesters, denies million voting rights, has uncontested control over settlements, and passed a law excluding the right to self-determination to solely Jewish people would be a democracy. Their interp arbitrarily crowds out a core basis of the topic lit– Rand Paul’s proposal and the billions of dollars given annually proves a robust lit base that hones in on the nuances of one of the most controversial debates.

#### That outweighs

#### 1] lexically prior:

#### 2] controls the internal link—

#### Reject a 1% risk of offense model on competing interps since it encourages a proliferation of shells that detract from substance like font size and spec status – if we win our interpretation is close enough you should vote aff.

#### The EIU is horrible and our definition is no more arbitrary – couple reasons

#### A] Nobody knows who the hell scores them – the report is not obligated to release their names nor qualifications – anyone from a college student to a conservative pundit could have ranked Israel which proves it can’t reasonably dictate prep

#### B] Being on the index doesn’t solve pre-round prep – tons of countries like Laos and Burundi receive aid and meet their interp but have no basis in the literature

#### C] They can’t solve for limits – over 50 countries are classified as authoritarian

### 1AR - T – Pluralism

#### C/I: your interp plus our aff – net benefit is a critical interrogation of Israel

#### C/I: Authoritarian regimes do not provide structures of participation, fundamental rights, and fair competition.

**Hans-Joachim** **12** Lauth, Hans-Joachim. 2012. “Authoritharian Regimes.” InterAmerican Wiki: Terms - Concepts - Critical Perspectives. http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/cias/wiki/a\_Authoritarian%20Regimes.html.

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#### I meet – Israel denies Palestinian votes in the West Bank and Gaza, shuts down anti-Zionist protestors, and the government slaughters and arrests innocents – their interp is strictly from the perspective of Israeli, NOT Palestinian rights.

#### Our offense -

#### Topic lit – Israel receives the most amount of military aid and has large lit base - Rand Paul’s proposal proves

#### Our discourse is key - Mearsheimer and Walt – lobbyists shut down news and stifle public debates – our method forces a critical contestation of unconditional US support to Israel which spills over

#### Our defense –

#### No limits explosion – they don’t have a caselist and a new one skews 1AR – they can’t reasonably dictate neg prep since their definition is no more arbitrary than ours

#### Reasonability—good is good enough—we’re close enough to their interpretation so the harm to substantive education outweighs –

# DAs

### 1AR – Link Threshold Impact

### ----------------

### 1AR – Strikes

#### They’re striking Iranian bases now anyways

**News.com Staff Writers 1/22** Staff Writers, JANUARY 22, 2019 9:34PM, "Israel-Iran conflict escalates," NewsComAu, [https://www.news.com.au/world/middle-east/the-conflict-between-israel-and-iran-in-syria-has-just-escalated-dramatically/news-story/feca328a1d59d3fca6ab5c85d151655c //](https://www.news.com.au/world/middle-east/the-conflict-between-israel-and-iran-in-syria-has-just-escalated-dramatically/news-story/feca328a1d59d3fca6ab5c85d151655c%20//) ash

Israel has claimed responsibility for a series of attacks on Iranian military targets, in a rare move that risks escalating tensions between the two feuding countries.

Israel said the latest strikes were in retaliation to Iranian forces launching a surface-to-surface missile from the Damascun area toward the northern part of the Israeli-held Golan Heights, The New York Times reported.

The country made the unusual move of announcing its strike, marking an increasingly open confrontation with Iran after years of ambiguity.

ISRAEL LAUNCHES ATTACKS ON IRAN

Israel’s military targeted Iranian installations near Damascus overnight, just hours after intercepting a rocket fired from Syrian territory.

At least 11 people died in the raids, according to the Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

The Russian military said four Syrian troops were among those killed, but no further details were given on the casualties or their nationalities.

Iran’s Brigadier General Nasirzadeh issued a scathing response to the attack, saying: “The young people in the air force are fully ready and impatient to confront the Zionist regime and eliminate it from the Earth”.

Lieutenant General Jonathan Conricus, the Israeli military spokesman, said Iranian forces had struck Hermon ski resort prior to the attack, using a mid-range surface-to-surface missile fired from the outer border of Damascus.

He said the attack was “definitive proof” of Iran’s intentions to intensify war in Syria.

“That’s a civilian site and there were civilians there. We saw that as an unacceptable attack by Iranian troops, not proxies in Syria,” he said on Monday morning.

“In addition to that, the area from which the Iranians fired their missile is an area we have been promised that the Iranians would not be present in.

“We know it was not done in the spur of the moment, it was a premeditated attack,” he added.

### 1AR – Iran Prolif

#### Syria thumps

**Spivack 2/3** Eliyahu Spivack, 2-3-2019, "Trump’s “America First” Policy Puts Israel in Danger," Commentator, <https://yucommentator.org/2019/02/trumps-america-first-policy-puts-israel-danger/> // ash

The U.S. troops serve as both a physical and psychological deterrent against Iran. Currently deployed in northeast Syria, on the route between Iran and the Israeli border, the troops’ mere presence forces Iran to think twice before moving weapons and equipment in that direction. With the U.S.’s tacit support, Israel has the leeway to conduct airstrikes on Iranian bases and terrorist training camps near the Golan Heights. Now, however, Trump’s decision to withdraw from Syria essentially leaves a vacuum that will be filled by Iran. The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) reports in a strategic assessment that the U.S.’s departure “leaves Israel alone in the campaign against Iran’s military entrenchment in Syria,” and ensures that Israel will not be able to drive them out. To put it bluntly, Trump just gifted Iran, Hezbollah, and other Iranian-backed militias a free route to Israel.

#### US unconditional commitment to Israel encourages proliferation in the region

**Ahmar 2/22** Dr Moonis Ahmar, 2-22-2019, "Israel, not Iran, is a threat!," Express Tribune, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1915706/6-israel-not-iran-threat/> // ash

From any standpoint, it is Israel and not Iran which is a threat to the Arab and the Muslim world. Unlike Israel, which has annexed Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and occupied West Bank and besieged Gaza, Iran is not involved in acts of aggression.

Israel has refused to comply with the UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 which were passed after the June 1967 and the October 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, calling upon the Jewish state to withdraw from the occupied areas. Then why is it so that the focus of Arab Gulf countries, Egypt and Jordan is not to liberate Arab areas from the Israeli occupation but to confront Iran?

The bashing of Iran has caused enormous harm to Muslim unity and the Palestinian cause. Since the Islamic revolution of Iran in February 1979 till today, Iran has been consistent in its support to the Palestinian struggle for emancipation.

Instead of taking Iran along with them, majority of the Arab countries tend to fall into the trap of the US and Israel to isolate Iran and destabilise its regime.

Israel and not Iran is a major threat to the Arab-Muslim world because of three main reasons. First, Iranian support for the liberation of Palestine from the clutches of Jewish occupation is without any shadow of doubt.

Iran has practically supported anti-Israeli PLO, Islamic Jehad and Hezbollah whereas no other country has come to salvage millions of Palestinians who are a victim of Israeli aggression and occupation since the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

Before the Iranian revolution, Shah’s monarchial regime had cordial diplomatic relations with Israel but the first policy decision which was taken by the custodians of Iranian revolution was to cut off Tehran’s ties with Israel and provide practical support to the Palestinian struggle for emancipation.

Second, it is American bias, hostility and paranoia against the revolutionary regime of Iran which has led to consistent US policy to isolate Iran except during the second term of the then American president, Barack Obama, which paved the way for signing a nuclear deal with Iran in 2015 and the gradual lifting of US sanctions against Tehran in place since 1979.

The US-Israeli nexus has been instrumental in pushing Arab regimes turn against Iran and deviate from their prime responsibility to liberation of occupied areas of the Arabs and formation of an independent Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

Third, while the US is raising a hue and cry over Iran’s so-called nuclear ambitions and has asked European powers, particularly France and Germany, to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal, it has totally disregarded the fact that in the Middle East it is only Israel which is a nuclear state.

Washington’s uneven policy on nuclear proliferation is a cause of major conflicts in the Middle East. The 2015 nuclear deal had ensured Tehran’s commitment for capping and rolling back its nuclear programme as a quid pro quo for the lifting of US sanctions against Iran.

### 1AR – Terror - Topshelf

#### US support triggers blowback in the region and case solves

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Beginning in the 1990s, and especially after 9/11, U.S. support for Israel has been justified by the claim that both states are threatened by terrorist groups originating in the Arab or Muslim world, and by a set of "rogue states" that back these groups and seek WMD. For many, this rationale implies that Washington should give Israel a free hand in dealing with the Palestinians and with groups like Hezbollah, and not press Israel to make concessions until all Palestinian terrorists are imprisoned or dead. It also implies that the United States should go after countries like the Islamic Republic of Iran, Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Bashar al-Asad's Syria. Israel is thus seen as a crucial ally in the war on terror because its enemies are said to be America's enemies.

This new rationale seems persuasive, but Israel is, in fact, a liability in the war on terror and the broader effort to deal with rogue states.

To begin with, "terrorism" is a tactic employed by a wide array of political groups; it is not a single unified adversary. The terrorist organizations that threaten Israel (e.g., Hamas or Hezbollah) do not threaten the United States, except when it intervenes against them (as in Lebanon in 1982). Moreover, Palestinian terrorism is not random violence directed against Israel or "the West"; it is largely a response to Israel's prolonged campaign to colonize the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

More important, saying that Israel and the United States are united by a shared terrorist threat has the causal relationship backwards. Rather, the United States has a terrorism problem in good part because it is so closely allied with Israel, not the other way around. U.S. support for Israel is hardly the only source of anti-American terrorism, but it is an important one, and it makes winning the war on terror more difficult.15 There is no question, for example, that many al-Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden, are motivated in part by Israel's presence in Jerusalem and the plight of the Palestinians. According to the U.S. 9/11 Commission, Bin Laden explicitly sought to punish the United States for its policies in the Middle East, including its support for Israel. He even tried to time the attacks to highlight this issue.16

Equally important, unconditional U.S. support for Israel makes it easier for extremists like Bin Laden to rally popular support and to attract recruits. Public-opinion polls confirm that Arab populations are deeply hostile to American support for Israel, and the U.S. State Department's Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World found that "citizens in these countries are genuinely distressed at the plight of the Palestinians and at the role they perceive the United States to be playing."17

#### Overwhelming consensus that aid provides an incentive for states to avoid combatting terror

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Applying these insights to the problem of transnational terrorism, we might expect that military aid may minimize terrorism, but might also exacerbate the conditions that led to the formation of terrorist groups in the first place. For example, several empirical studies demonstrate that countries with poor state capacity, heavy corruption, and low per capita GDP scores are likely to experience violent insurgencies (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hegre & Sambanis, 2004). These studies suggest that military aid increases the corruption of hosts and creates disincentives for hosts to invest in their population, which in turn may negatively affect economic growth. Similarly, since we see an inverse relationship between democratic development and military aid, one might conclude that military aid stifles democratization. Additionally, numerous studies examining foreign aid more generally argue that external assistance worsens the problem of terrorism. Although foreign aid is intended to alleviate poverty, which is considered a cause of terrorism, studies at the individual level indicate that terrorists tend to be drawn from relatively wealthier individuals (Kruegar & Maleckova, 2003). Therefore, foreign aid may create an increased number of wealthier citizens while stifling democratic development, which may actually increase terrorist recruiting.

These observations raise the question: why do policymakers continue to use military aid if there is such an abundance of evidence that it is unlikely to reduce the problem of terrorism? One possibility may be that scholars have a relatively narrow definition of what constitutes success against terrorism. Typically, scholars view a policy as a successful antiterrorist instrument if it reduces the number of terrorist attacks, decreases the number of groups that are operational, or contributes to the collapse of a group (Azam & Thelen, 2010; Bandyopadhyay, Sandler & Younas, 2009). While these are certainly reasonable metrics, it is possible that an additional goal of military aid is simply to prevent terrorists from accomplishing their objectives. For example, military aid may not be successful in preventing terrorists from engaging in attacks, but may be successful in preventing a government from pursuing conciliatory policies toward these groups. Military aid might also increase the length of time that terrorists must fight in order to accomplish their strategic objectives. Since most groups collapse quickly, this increase in duration may make it impossible for terrorists to accomplish their goals (Bapat, 2005; Cronin, 2009; Jones & Libicki, 2008). If we therefore expand our definition of success so that it is not limited to just a reduction in terrorist attacks, we may see that military aid gives hosts the power to both resist the demands of terrorists and endure the cost of conflict.

To illustrate with an example, consider the case of the US/Yemeni relationship. In 2000, Al-Qaeda launched an attack against the USS Cole. This attack, while not particularly crippling, demonstrated that Al-Qaeda was becoming increasingly brazen in its activities. In response, the USA increased its military support for the Yemeni government.4 If we examine the effect of this policy after ten years, the fact that Al-Qaeda still appears to be operational within Yemen might lead to the conclusion that the military aid provided to the Yemeni government was a failure. However, if we consider that Yemen is not a particularly strong state, whereas Al-Qaeda and its affiliates continue to be a relatively stronger group, an alternative policy for Yemen might have been to negotiate a deal with Al-Qaeda in which it allowed the group to conduct anti-American attacks from its territory. However, with US military support, Yemen continues to profess its support for US policy objectives. In this case, even though Al-Qaeda has not been disarmed, one might consider the fact that Yemen remained loyal to the USA as a policy success.

These arguments raise the question: can military aid produce success in terms of (1) preventing hosts from deviating from US policy objectives, and (2) disarming operational terrorists. In the following section, I formally model the US decision to support various hosts from which transnational terrorists operate. The model develops specific hypotheses as to how military aid affects the prospects for US success against terrorists.

Model Figure 1 presents a stylized model of a transnational, anti-American terrorist campaign that occurs in a foreign host. The conflict is simplified to three players: the US government US, the host H, and the terrorists T that operate within H’s territory.5 H begins the game in complete control of his territory, which allows him to distribute the territory’s benefits to only his supporters. Additionally, H’s control of the territory provides some foreign policy benefit to US, perhaps in the form of trade benefits or a military alliance. On the other hand, T seeks to destabilize H’s government and assume sovereignty over the territory for itself, which would allow it to revise H’s foreign policy such that it no longer provides this benefit to the US: We can therefore normalize H’s utility function such that H receives a payoff of 1 for each round in which H survives, and a payoff of 0 if H is destabilized by T: Similarly, assume that T ’s utility function is normalized such that T receives a payoff of 0 for each round in which H survives, and receives a payoff of 1 if H destabilizes. In addition to facing opposition from H; T also faces opposition from US, which seeks to minimize T’s control over the territory. Since US benefits from keeping H in power, the primary objective of US is to keep T out of power.6 The game presented in Figure 1 represents a single round of an infinitely repeated game, which continues until one of three outcomes occurs. First, the game ends if both H and T engage in a direct military encounter that destabilizes H and causes him to fall from power. Substantively, the direct military encounter occurs if H engages in an offensive against T , or if T attempts to seize power at H’s center. However, if T is defeated following either an offensive or an attempt to seize power at the center, the game terminates with H disarming T and emerging victorious. A third possibility is that both H and T reach a negotiated settlement in which H accommodates the demands of T. In doing so, H re-orients his foreign policy away from US: If any of these three outcomes (T successfully destabilizes H at the center, H disarms T, or H and T reach a settlement) occurs, the game terminates. Assume that in each round, H survives a direct military encounter with T with probability plt 2 ½0; 1 and destabilizes in such an encounter with probability ð1 plt Þ; where t represents the number of rounds previously played and l 2 ½0; L represents a normalizing parameter. This function specifies an assumption that H’s probability of survival decreases over time, though the rate of decline slows as l ! L and accelerates as l ! 0: The assumption that H’s ability to survive declines with time is based on several studies that conclude that terrorists strengthen as the organization persists over time (Bapat, 2005; Cronin, 2009; Jones & Libicki, 2008). Moves Each round begins with US’s decision on whether or not to provide military aid to H to improve his chances of surviving T’s attempts at destabilization. US assistance is formally represented by x 2 ½0; 1, which is assumed to be a continuous and increasing level of assistance to H’s regime. US provides increasing military aid as x ! 1; and relatively less as x ! 0: This aid directly increases H’s probability of survival to plt 1x , where plt 1x > p so long as x > 0: This indicates that if x ¼ ð1 plt Þ, US effectively guarantees H’s survival in armed conflict against T . 7 On the other hand, if US sets x ¼ 0; H’s probability of survival is simply equal to plt 10 ¼ plt : We therefore see that US’s aid increases the probability that H will survive destabilization, but it is theoretically possible for H to survive without US’s support. Once US allocates military aid to H, H has three possible options. First, H may use the military aid provided by US to mount an offensive against T in an effort to disarm it. In this case, H actively attempts to destroy T’s organization. Second, H can choose to stay on the defensive against T and simply wait for T to make an attempt to seize power at the center. If H adopts the defensive posture, the game next moves to T, which decides whether or not to attack H at his center. If T attacks at H’s center, H disarms T with probability plt 1x and T destabilizes H with probability 1 plt 1x : On the other hand, if T does not challenge the center, the game moves to the next round, given that neither H nor T is disarmed. The final option for H is to negotiate with T in an effort to induce the group to cease its violence. Numerous studies in the bargaining and conflict literature indicate that negotiated settlements which reflect the balance of military power should be preferable to conflict (Fearon, 1995; Wagner, 2000). Therefore, T might prefer some negotiated settlement if H makes some offer that reflects the balance of military power between the two sides. With US’s military assistance, H could engage in coercive bargaining by threatening to mount an offensive if T does not accept an offer of 1 plt 1x , which reflects T’s probability of surviving a military encounter, given that US is supporting H: 8 We can see that as x ! 1, indicating greater support from US, the value of H’s offer to T declines. This indicates that H does not make an offer that reflects the actual balance of power between himself and T, but rather the balance of power created by US’s military assistance. The only case in which H makes an offer that does reflect the actual balance of power is if x ¼ 0, in which case, H offers 1 plt 10 ¼ 1 plt : Once H makes the offer, T either accepts or rejects it. If T rejects the offer, H engages in an offensive against T in an attempt to disarm the group. On the other hand, if T accepts, T agrees to cease its political violence in exchange for H’s concessions, which moves H politically away from US: US then decides whether or not to sustain military aid to H or whether to cut aid, given that H makes concessions to T that are unfavorable to US: Following US’s decision of whether or not to continue providing H with military aid, T decides whether or not to abide by the terms of its agreement with H, or whether to defect on the deal and attack H at his center. Should T resume fighting, H survives with probability plt if US does not sustain aid, and survives with probability plt 1x if US sustains her military aid. Payoffs H receives a payoff of 1 for each round in which he both survives as the sole sovereign over the territory and makes no concessions to T. If H negotiates with T, and T terminates its violence, H’s payoff reflects the negotiated distribution of benefits. Should H make an offer of 1 plt 1x to T, and should T accept, H’s payoff would be plt 1x : If H refuses to negotiate and engages in an offensive against T, H’s payoff is equal to his probability of disarming T minus the cost cH 2 ½0; 1 he must pay to engage in military conflict, and an additional cost r 2 ½0; 1 that H must pay to arm his forces for an offensive.9 H’s payoff for the offensive is therefore equal to plt 1x ð1Þþð1 plt 1x Þð0Þ cH ¼ plt 1x cH r: If H adopts defensive tactics, and T responds by attacking at the center, H receives a payoff of plt 1x cH since this outcome also involves a military conflict against T: However, since H does not have to arm his forces for an offensive against T, H does not pay r if he adopts a defensive posture. If T chooses not to attack H’s center, H receives a payoff of 1 and pays no cost, since there is no direct military conflict with T: Although both H and US derive utility from keeping T out of power, the utility functions of these players are slightly different. While H’s primary objective is to maintain power over the territory, US does not derive utility from keeping H in power, but rather from keeping T out of power. Let us therefore specify that US receives a payoff of 1 if and only if T is kept out of power. On the other hand, let us assume that if T is able to achieve any political gains within H’s territory, the US payoff reduces to 0, and US pays some political cost a 2 ½0; A: This indicates that if the results of the conflict between H and T end up being favorable to T , US will suffer some political punishment for failing to prevent T from achieving some power over the territory.10 Let us therefore assume that if T gains political power, either by destabilizing H or by negotiating with H, the payoff to the US is equal to a: Let us further represent the cost to US for supplying H with military aid as x: If conflict occurs between H and T, US’s utility for supporting H can therefore be represented by the following expression: plt 1x ð1Þ þ 1 plt 1x ðaÞ x: On the other hand, if US provides aid to H, but there is no conflict, the US payoff is equal to 1 x: Finally, if H negotiates with T, and T fulfills the terms of the agreement, the US payoff reduces to a, since H and T alter the status quo from US’s preferred position. Let us now consider T’s payoffs. T receives a payoff of 0 in each round if H survives, and receives a payoff of 1 if H destabilizes. If a negotiated settlement is reached, T’s payoff corresponds to the offer that H makes. Like H and US, T is also assumed to pay a cost cT 2 ½0; 1 if it fights, which represents the utility of the cost of conflict to T: However, since terrorist groups are typically non-transparent and have incentives to misrepresent their true resolve, let us assume that both US and H have incomplete information as to the value of cT , whereas T has complete and perfect information (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 2002). This ability to misrepresent is often characteristic of terrorist groups, which frequently engage in behaviors intended to signal intense resolve, such as suicide bombings (Arce & Sandler, 2007; Bloom, 2005; Kydd & Walter, 2006; Lapan & Sandler, 1993). Let us therefore assume that US and H are uncertain as to the value of cT , but are both aware that cT \* U[0,1], or distributed according to a standard uniform distribution ranging between 0 and 1. Solution Since the game is repeated infinitely and involves incomplete information, I solve the game using the Markov Perfect Bayesian Solution concept (MPBE). Stationary MPBE assume that in any subgame, the behavior of each of the players is dependent on only the current value of a particular state variable (Mailath & Samuelson, 2006; Maskin & Tirole, 2001). Let us characterize p as the state variable, or the current likelihood that H will survive a direct military encounter with T: This makes intuitive sense, as we would expect US, H, and T to base their decisions on H’s immediate probabilities of surviving. I therefore characterize the solution by the stationary MPBE. The solution can be divided into three categories based on H’s behavior. Case 1. Host negotiates x ¼ 1 plt 1x Let us first identify the set of conditions under which H chooses to negotiate. In this case, T’s final decision of whether or not to attack the center is contingent on whether or not US supports H after negotiation. If US sustains her military aid to H, T attacks at H’s center iff 1 plt 1x cT > 1 plt 1x : We see that due to the costly nature of conflict, this expression can never be true, even if x ¼ 0: We can therefore see that if US sustains aid to H following negotiation, T will never renege on the agreement and attack the center. On the other hand, if US cuts her military aid to H, T attacks H’s center if 1 plt cT > 1 plt 1x : Rearranging terms, this indicates that T is indifferent between maintaining the agreement and attacking at the center if cT ¼ plt 1x plt ; which simplifies to plt x 1x : We can therefore state that T will play Attack Center if cT < plt x 1x and will \*Attack Center if cT plt x 1x : Define H’s belief that T will attack at the center as c 0 T ¼ plt x 1x : We can see that x ! 1 as c 0 T ! 1; which demonstrates that T is more likely to attack the center as the level of aid that US provides increases. Substantively, this indicates that the greater the level of military aid provided by US, the more likely it is that T will defect from a negotiated settlement, assuming US cuts her aid in response to the negotiated settlement. However, notice that if x ¼ 0, the offer made by H is equal to 1 plt : If this is true, the probability that T defects is equal to plt 0 10 ¼ 0: In other words, if H makes an offer that reflects the balance of power between H and T without US’s military support, T can be considered perfectly credible. This reflects something interesting: the more aid US provides, the less credible any deal is with T , whereas T is perfectly credible if US provides no military aid to H: Intuition would tell us that since US can deter T’s attack at H’s center with certainty if she continues military aid, US would simply maintain its military aid if H negotiates. However, since US’s utility is solely based on keeping T out of power, US receives a payoff of a if H negotiates with T. Therefore, the payoff to US for continuing military aid to H following negotiation with T is equal to a x: On the other hand, if US cuts her aid to H, conflict erupts between H and T with probability plt x 1x :US therefore sustains military aid to H after negotiation if: a x > plt x 1 x plt ð Þþ 1 1 plt ð Þ a þ 1 plt x 1 x ðaÞ: ð1Þ This expression simplifies to: xð1 xÞ > p2lt ð1 þ aÞ: ð2Þ Since both x 2 ½0; 1, this condition cannot be fulfilled. This indicates that if H negotiates with T, US cannot credibly continue providing military aid to H: Both H and T know that US will revoke her aid if a negotiated settlement is reached. This establishes that if H negotiates, H is aware that US will cease its military aid, and T will play Attack Center with probability c 0 T : Given that both players are aware of this, how do H and T behave in negotiation? Interestingly enough, the model demonstrates that both T for which cT < plt x 1x and T for which cT plt x 1x always accept H’s offer to negotiate. In the latter case, T will not attack H’s center at the end of the game, even if US revokes her military aid. This T therefore accepts any deal if 1 plt 1x 1 plt 1x cT , which must always be true. In the former case, where T will attack H’s center once US revokes her aid, T accepts if 1 plt cT 1 plt 1x cT . Again, this condition is always fulfilled, which indicates that these T will accept and subsequently play Attack Center so long as x > 0: If x ¼ 0; these T accept and abide by the negotiated settlement. Therefore, H knows that if he plays Negotiate, T will always Accept and US will always \*Sustain Aid. Since H is unaware of what type of T he is facing, H’s payoff for negotiation can be defined as: plt x 1 x ðplt cH Þ þ 1 plt x 1 x ð1Þ: ð3Þ We therefore see that negotiation is a risky strategy for H: H is aware that making an offer to T guarantees that it will lose US’s military aid, since US is only interested in keeping T out of power. Negotiation therefore requires H to gamble that T is of the type for which cT plt x 1x : However, if the probability that Nature draws this type is equal to 1 plt x 1x , we see that it is increasingly unlikely as x ! 1: In other words, if H is heavily reliant onUS military aid, it is unlikely that negotiation will succeed, and highly likely that T will respond to US’s revoking of aid by re-igniting terrorist violence. Case 2. Host plays defensive If H adopts defensive tactics, H does not mount an offensive against T; but instead gambles that T will be deterred by US’s provision of military aid and its subsequent increase in military power. T chooses to attack if 1 plt 1x cT > 0: Re-arranging terms, T attacks if cT < 1 plt 1x : Let us therefore define the probability that T attacks given that H plays Defensive as c 00 T ¼ 1 plt 1x : H’s utility for this strategy is therefore equal to: 1 plt 1 x plt 1 x cH þ plt 1 x ð1Þ: ð4Þ If we compare H’s payoff for the defensive posture to H’s payoff for negotiation, we quickly see that if x > 0, H’s strategy of adopting the defensive posture dominates H’s strategy of negotiation. Lemma 1. H strictly prefers to play Defensive over Negotiate if x > 0: Proof. See appendix.11 If, on the other hand, US sets x ¼ 0, H plays Defensive over Negotiate if 1 plt 1 0 plt 1 0 cH þ plt 1 0 ð1Þ > plt 0 1 0 ðplt cH Þ þ 1 plt 0 1 0 ð1Þ; which simplifies to ð1 plt Þðplt cH Þ þ plt > plt : This expression is true if plt > cH , meaning that without military aid, only hosts that are likely to resist destabilization will refuse to negotiate, whereas weaker hosts will accommodate terrorists into their governments. Corollary 1. If x ¼ 0, H prefers Defensive iff plt > cH and prefers Negotiate otherwise. Proof. See appendix. This yields an interesting insight as to the effect of military aid on H’s behavior. If plt is relatively high, H refuses to negotiate with T, despite the lack of US military aid. However, if plt < cH ; H negotiates with T. H’s offer would reflect the balance of power between himself and T; thereby rendering the agreement between the two parties credible. If, on the other hand, US provided military aid, even weaker H for which plt < cH prefer to play Defensive. We therefore see that while military aid does not necessarily eliminate terrorists, military aid discourages hosts from negotiating with terrorists and altering the status quo favored by the United States. Case 3. Host attempts offensive We see that US’s provision of military aid appears to give H a disincentive to negotiate. Ideally, however, US should prefer that H engage in an offensive to eliminate T rather than adopting defensive postures. H’s payoff for engaging in an offensive is equal to plt 1 x ð1Þ þ 1 plt 1 x ð0Þ cH r ¼ plt 1 x cH r: Unfortunately for US, this payoff is also dominated by H’s strategy of adopting a defensive posture. Lemma 2. H strictly prefers playing Defensive over Offensive. Proof. See appendix. We therefore see a second consequence of military aid, in that it not only discourages H from negotiating, but also discourages H from actually disarming T : This is true because H guarantees himself military losses with the offensive, whereas he instead guarantees that T will be deterred from challenging at the center if H adopts the defensive posture. Empirically, this would suggest that military aid discourages negotiation, which accomplishes US’s objective, but discourages H from actually fighting terrorism, which is seemingly antithetical to the interests of US. To illustrate with an example, consider the case of Pakistan following 11 September 2001. During the tenure of Pervez Musharraf, the USA provided substantial military aid to the Pakistani regime. This aid continued despite reports that Musharraf was doing little to purge the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) of pro-Taliban sympathizers, and despite reports that much of the aid was being directed by Pakistan to bolster their defenses against India. However, given that the Taliban appeared to be gaining in power so rapidly, revoking Pakistan’s aid could allow the Taliban an incentive to directly challenge Pakistan’s center. Faced with this possibility, the USA was concerned that the Pakistani government would strike a deal with the Taliban that would allow the group free reign in the north to attack US forces in Afghanistan. Given this scenario, the USA continued to supply military aid to Pakistan, despite reports that Pakistan has been less than cooperative in fighting the Taliban. Although one could argue that this strategy appears to be a US policyfailure, defenders of military aid might suggest that simply keeping the Taliban out of power made the provision of military aid worthwhile, despite its costs. US strategy We can divide H into two types: one for which plt < cH and one for which plt > cH : In the former case, H responds to a lack of US military aid by reaching some negotiated settlement with T in order to avoid continued violence. However, if US provides military aid while plt < cH , H has a disincentive to negotiate. Since H knows that he is likely to survive conflict with T as a result of US’s support, H should prefer keeping T out of power and securing the benefits of sovereignty for himself. We therefore see two interesting features. First, military aid discourages hosts in the immediate term from negotiating with terrorists. Second, weaker H can use the threat of negotiating with T to compel US into sustaining military aid. If US were to set x ¼ 0; H would negotiate, producing a payoff to US of a: If we compare this outcome to any case in which US provides military aid, we see that US strictly prefers aiding H if plt < cH : To illustrate, consider a case where x ¼ e: In this case, H will play Defensive since x > 0; which produces a payoff to US of ð1 plt Þ ðplt þ ð1 plt Þ ðaÞÞ þ plt : Simplifying, we see that ð1 plt Þðplt þ ð1 plt ÞðaÞÞ þ plt > a if: plt ð2 plt Þð1 þ aÞ > 0: ð5Þ Since plt 2 ½0; 1; this statement is always true. On the other hand, if US sets x ¼ 1 plt , which is its maximum value, US payoff simplifies to plt : Since it also must be true that plt > a; we see that for all possible values of x, US prefers setting x > 0 if H will negotiate. Substantively, this indicates that if H threatens to negotiate with T, US will always respond with a level of military aid to effectively bribe H from reaching a negotiated settlement. We can identify the level of aid US provides by maximizing her utility for military aid 1 plt 1x plt 1x ð1Þ þ 1 plt 1x ð Þ a þ plt x 1x ð1Þ x with respect to x: q 1 plt 1x plt 1x ð1Þ þ 1 plt 1x ð Þ a þ plt 1x ð1Þ x qx ¼ 0 ð6Þ Using this expression, we can identify x, or the value of x that maximizes US utility: x¼ 1 18 ½18 123 1 3plt ð1 þ aÞ ð9p2ltð1 þ aÞ þ ffiffiffi 3 p ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi 8 þ 27plt 8a p Þð1 þ aÞ 1 3 63 1 3ð9p2lt ð1 þ aÞ þ ffiffiffi 3 p ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi 8 þ 27plt 8a q Þð1 þ aÞ 1 3Þ ð7Þ Although the analytical solution is difficult to interpret, Figure 2 graphically present some of the properties of x: First, we know that xhas a maximum value of 1 plt : 12 If x¼ 1 plt , T is perfectly deterred from challenging H at the center if H plays Defensive. The probability that T plays Attack Center is equal to 1 plt 1ð1pltÞ ¼ 0: This indicates that if x> 1 plt , US sets x ¼ 1 plt : Substantively, if the level of military aid that maximizes US utility exceeds the maximum allowable level of US military aid, US simply sets the level of military aid to the maximum allowable level. From Figure 2, we see that over time, the level of military aid that maximizes US utility monotonically increases. By playing Defensive, H allows T to survive, which enables the group to improve its internal organization, ties to the population, and general ability to survive. If this is true, and H becomes less able to forcibly disarm T, US will be required to pay an increasing level of military aid to deter T from directly challenging the center. As an example, we can consider the increasing burden presently placed on the USA in Afghanistan. While Hamid Karzai’s government was seemingly at its peak in terms of legitimacy and international support following the toppling of the Taliban, since that time it has steadily declined in power relative to the group. This requires an increasing burden on the USA to protect Kabul from a Taliban offensive. This pattern is visible in the optimum level of military aid xidentified by the model. If plt > cH , H is sufficiently likely to resist destabilization such that he will not negotiate with T, even if he does not receive military aid. In these cases, US can essentially free ride off the efforts of H, since H does not threaten to negotiate with T. However, in cases where a ! 1, it is possible that US will provide military aid even if H plays Defensive. While the full discussion is reserved for the appendix, consider where the US provides the maximum level of aid x ¼ 1 plt . In these cases, we see that US prefers to provide military aid if plt > ð1 plt Þðplt ð1Þþð1 plt ÞðaÞÞ þ plt : Simplifying, we see that this expression is true if a > plt 1 plt : Substantively, this result suggests that even in cases where H will refuse to negotiate with T, US will supply H with military aid if the political punishment associated with H’s destabilization is significantly high. Although this is valuable to H in that it keeps him in power, there is an interesting consequence to US military aid. Without military aid, T for which cT < 1 plt would attack the center, which would likely end with the disarmament of these groups. Since plt is relatively higher, H would have a better chance of disarming these groups and ending the game than in the previous case where plt < cH : However, because US supplies H with military aid, fewer T will directly challenge H: Instead, T will continue to engage in terrorist violence away from H’s center. And, because H profits from keeping T functional, H will do little to stop this activity. We therefore see a perverse effect: US supplies H with military aid if US suffers a substantial political punishment for allowing H to fall, but this act deters T from challenging the center and allows T to remain functional. However, since US risks a large political cost if H were to destabilize, it is preferable to US to supply the military aid and avoid the risk of a confrontation between T and H: This suggests that if even though supplying aid is likely to delay the demise of T, it is preferable for the US to supply the aid to insulate itself against the risk of H’s destabilization. We can now characterize the game’s equilibrium solution: Proposition 1. The following set of strategies constitute a stationary MPE: 1. T : If H plays Defensive, \*Attack Center if cT 1 plt 1x and Attack Center otherwise. If H plays Negotiate and US plays \*Sustain Aid, play Accept; Attack Center if cT < plt x1xand Accept, \*Attack Center otherwise. 2. H: If x > 0, play Defensive. If x ¼ 0, play Negotiate if plt < cH and Defensive otherwise. 3. US : If plt < cH , set x ¼ x, where x¼ 1 18 ½18 123 1 3plt ð1 þ aÞ 9p2ltð1 þ aÞ þ ffiffiffi 3 p ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi 8 þ 27plt 8a p ð1 þ aÞ 1 3 63 1 3 9p2lt ð1 þ aÞ þ ffiffiffi 3 p ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi 8 þ 27plt 8a q ð1 þ aÞ 1 3 if x< 1 plt , and set x ¼ 1 plt otherwise. If plt > cH , set x ¼ xiff x< 1 plt and a > p2lt ð2xÞ2plt ð1xÞð1xÞ 2 pltð2pltð2xÞ2xÞ , and set x ¼ 0 otherwise. If x> 1 plt , set x ¼ 1 plt if a > plt 1plt and x ¼ 0 otherwise. Proof. See appendix.

Analysis

The model suggests that although military aid appears intended to defeat terrorists, military aid may actually give hosts an incentive not to terminate their conflicts with terrorists. Terminating the conflict would result in a loss of aid, whereas simply using the aid as a deterrent decreases the risk that the terrorist group will directly challenge the center. This insight might explain why military aid appears ineffective against terrorism: it provides hosts with a disincentive to remove their terrorist problem. Relatively weaker hosts can leverage the threat to negotiate with the group to coerce the USA into continuing military aid. On the other hand, states that are relatively stronger, but politically valuable to the USA, may also compel the USA into subsidizing their own defense against terrorists. In both cases, having a terrorism problem benefits the host.

### 1AR – Terror – Hamas Nukes

### 1AR – Terror – Hamas Missiles

### 1AR – Terror - Hezbollah

### 1AR – Netanyahu Diversionary War

#### **Israel turning on him now**

**Economist 2/22** The Economist, Feb 22nd 2019, "A real challenge for Binyamin Netanyahu," Economist, <https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/02/22/a-real-challenge-for-binyamin-netanyahu> // ash

A last-minute merger of two centrist parties, ahead of the deadline to submit party lists on February 22nd, has blown the race wide open. In response, the prime minister is already resorting to desperate measures in order to rally his base.

Israel Resilience, a party formed only two months ago by Benny Gantz (pictured), a former army chief of staff, has joined forces with Yesh Atid, a centrist party founded in 2012 by Yair Lapid, a former television personality. Neither leader wanted to serve as number two. But Mr Gantz’s party has been soaring in the polls; Mr Lapid grudgingly agreed to take the second spot in return for a promise that, should they win the election, he will replace Mr Gantz as prime minister in two-and-a-half years.

The merged party will be called Blue and White after the colours of Israel’s flag. It has a distinctly militaristic air, with three former army chiefs among its candidates. The party hopes that will bolster its appeal to right-wing voters concerned about security. Other candidates on its list come from the left. Yet its policies are intentionally vague. It is less a coherent political party and more a vehicle aimed at preventing Mr Netanyahu from winning a fifth term.

Polls carried out since the two parties’ merger show Blue and White getting 30% of the vote, leading Mr Netanyahu’s Likud party by about five points. This is the first time that a party other than Likud has led the polls since 2015, during the campaign for the last general election. That said, Mr Netanyahu’s coalition of right-wing and religious parties still commands the support of a small majority of voters. As things stand Mr Gantz would struggle to form a centre-left coalition government even if he came out on top.

Much can change before election day on April 9th. Likud trailed behind Zionist Union, then the main opposition party, for much of the run-up to the last election. But in the final days of the campaign Mr Netanyahu sought to whip up hard-right voters; as Israelis cast their ballots, he warned that “Arab voters are heading to the polling stations in droves” and urged Jews to turn out. He won.

This time around Mr Netanyahu is playing the race card early in the campaign. He has accused the leaders of the the new centrist party of “relying on Arab parties who not only don't recognise the State of Israel, they want to destroy it.”

He has also shored up support for his coalition from the farthest extremes of the political system. Under intense pressure from Mr Netanyahu, Jewish Home, a religious-nationalist party allied with Likud, agreed to include in its candidates list representatives of the racist-supremacist Jewish Power party. This union helps to ensure that the two parties will reach the minimum threshold of 3.25% of the vote required to take seats in the Knesset, thus avoiding the risk of “wasting” right-wing votes.

Jewish Power calls for the annexation of the occupied territories and encouraging’ the emigration of all Arabs. It had until very recently been regarded as beyond the pale in Israeli politics. It is descended from the Kach Party, outlawed by the Israeli government as a terrorist organisation in 1994, after one of its members murdered 29 Muslims at prayer in Hebron. Kach’s American-born founder, Rabbi Meir Kahane, had been a Knesset member in the 1980s. He was assassinated in New York in 1990. Whenever he spoke in the Knesset, the entire plenum, including all Likud members, would leave in protest at his racist policies. Mr Netanyahu has, in effect, legitimised Rabbi Kahane’s followers to protect his majority.

Mr Netanyahu may not survive for long in any case. Israel’s attorney-general is expected to announce indictments against the prime minister within days. It is too early to predict whether such a move would cost him votes, or help him rally supporters who believe he is the victim of a witch-hunt orchestrated by a leftist “deep state”. Mr Netanyahu denies the charges and vows not to resign. But even if he wins the election, he will find it increasingly difficult to cling to power; with a trial looming his allies may soon abandon him.

# CPs

## Theory

### 1AR – Condo Bad

### 1AR – PICs Bad

## Conditions – Generic

### 1AR – Conditions – Perm

#### Perm do the CP – CP’s not functionally competitive, it’s just a way to do the aff.

#### Perm do the plan on the condition that: (insert neg’s condition). Intrinsicness is key to protecting the aff from abusive neg CPs. CP is only an opportunity cost if the other actor accepts the CP’s incentive.

### 1AR – Conditions - Theory

#### Conditions CPs are illegit: A) forces the aff to debate two different worlds where the other country says yes or no AND B) requires future fiat that the CP’s actor will follow through

### 1AR – Conditions – Topshelf

#### 1] Doesn’t solve – Johnson – Obama conditioned aid on stopping settlement construction but they resumed anyways

#### 2] No verification—Israel would just symbolically say they’re ending the war and Trump would rubber stamp it

#### 3] Perm do the CP - they won’t accept the conditions– Netanyahu has announced unconditional commitment to the occupation

### 1AR –– First Strike - Topshelf

#### 1] They’re striking Iranian bases now anyways

**News.com Staff Writers 1/22** Staff Writers, JANUARY 22, 2019 9:34PM, "Israel-Iran conflict escalates," NewsComAu, [https://www.news.com.au/world/middle-east/the-conflict-between-israel-and-iran-in-syria-has-just-escalated-dramatically/news-story/feca328a1d59d3fca6ab5c85d151655c //](https://www.news.com.au/world/middle-east/the-conflict-between-israel-and-iran-in-syria-has-just-escalated-dramatically/news-story/feca328a1d59d3fca6ab5c85d151655c%20//) ash

Israel has claimed responsibility for a series of attacks on Iranian military targets, in a rare move that risks escalating tensions between the two feuding countries.

Israel said the latest strikes were in retaliation to Iranian forces launching a surface-to-surface missile from the Damascun area toward the northern part of the Israeli-held Golan Heights, The New York Times reported.

The country made the unusual move of announcing its strike, marking an increasingly open confrontation with Iran after years of ambiguity.

ISRAEL LAUNCHES ATTACKS ON IRAN

Israel’s military targeted Iranian installations near Damascus overnight, just hours after intercepting a rocket fired from Syrian territory.

At least 11 people died in the raids, according to the Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

The Russian military said four Syrian troops were among those killed, but no further details were given on the casualties or their nationalities.

Iran’s Brigadier General Nasirzadeh issued a scathing response to the attack, saying: “The young people in the air force are fully ready and impatient to confront the Zionist regime and eliminate it from the Earth”.

Lieutenant General Jonathan Conricus, the Israeli military spokesman, said Iranian forces had struck Hermon ski resort prior to the attack, using a mid-range surface-to-surface missile fired from the outer border of Damascus.

He said the attack was “definitive proof” of Iran’s intentions to intensify war in Syria.

“That’s a civilian site and there were civilians there. We saw that as an unacceptable attack by Iranian troops, not proxies in Syria,” he said on Monday morning.

“In addition to that, the area from which the Iranians fired their missile is an area we have been promised that the Iranians would not be present in.

“We know it was not done in the spur of the moment, it was a premeditated attack,” he added.

#### 2] Can’t solve – Iran stores materials secretly underground

#### 3] Perm do the CP – CP’s not functionally competitive, it’s just a way to do the aff.

#### 4] Perm do the plan on the condition that Israel strikes Iran - Intrinsicness is key to protecting the aff from abusive neg CPs. CP is only an opportunity cost if the other actor accepts the CP’s incentive.

#### 5] Conditions CPs are illegit: A) forces the aff to debate two different worlds where the other country says yes or no AND B) requires future fiat that the CP’s actor will follow through

## Iron Dome PIC

### 1AR – O/V

#### 1] It’s no longer military aid – we flat own it now

**Starr 2/6** Barbara Starr, Cnn Pentagon Correspondent, 2-6-2019, "US Army plans to purchase Iron Dome weapons," CNN, [https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/06/politics/army-iron-dome/index.html //](https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/06/politics/army-iron-dome/index.html%20//) ash

(CNN)The United States Army announced Wednesday they plan to purchase the Iron Dome weapons system that Israel has been using since 2011.

"The Iron Dome will be assessed and experimented as a system that is currently available to protect deployed U.S. military service members against a wide variety of indirect fire threats and aerial threats," US Army Col. Patrick Seiber said in a statement.

#### 2] Perm do the counterplan—military aid has to strengthen military capability

Kanaan and Ghazzal 18(Salah Ziyad Ghazzal- DISEC Chair, Fadi Kanaan- Secretary General, DISEC BACKGROUND GUIDE, 2018, BEYMUN, JKS)

Definition of Foreign Military Aid The definition of the term ‘military’ is significant to understanding the concept of FMA as it signifies acts executed by an armed force i.e. with weaponry, on behalf of the government—or a rebel force in cases of unregulated or faulty military aid—to fight an opposition. While there is no universal definition for the term FMA, it is acknowledged as any transfer aiming to strengthen the military capability of a nation and contribute in maintaining national security.Military aid is, therefore, a type of foreign aid but in the military context. In fact, foreign military aid is often documented as a percentage of a country’s foreign aid budget. Usually, the country providing the aid is referred to as a ‘donor country’ and the one receiving the aid is referred to as a ‘recipient country’. Accordingly, military aid can be monetary (i.e. in the form of transferring money to a recipient country so it can purchase weapons or other military equipment) or materialistic, such as through the temporary transfer of army to logistically assist the recipient country.

#### 4] Case solves – opens up a gateway for conflict resolution – Hamas terrorism is not isolated but in retaliation to Israeli bombs

#### 5] Perm do the counterplan—it’s not textually competitive because it adds words to the plan which means the aff could be part of a larger bill—textuality is most objective and avoids arbitrary interpretations of functional competition

#### 6] The Iron Dome is a huge failure – expert consensus

**Talbot 14** David Talbot, MIT Technology Review, Jul 11, 2014, "Israel's Iron Dome Is a 'Total Failure' at Its Most Important Job, Experts Say," Mashable, <https://mashable.com/2014/07/11/israel-iron-dome-failure/#otLRGIytvPq4> // ash

Even though Israel’s U.S.-funded “Iron Dome” rocket-defense interceptors appear to be hitting Hamas rockets in recent days, they are almost certainly failing in the crucial job of detonating those rockets’ shrapnel-packed explosive warheads, expert analysts say.

As a result, rockets fired from Gaza are probably plunging to the ground with intact explosives. The fact that they aren’t causing injuries or deaths in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and other cities is mainly a matter of luck, the analysts add.

On July 10, the Israel Defense Forces said missiles from the system had intercepted 56 rockets fired out of Gaza, preventing strikes in several cities. Yet Richard Lloyd, a weapons expert and consultant who is a past Engineering Fellow at Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems, says that because these interceptions had almost certainly not detonated the rockets’ warheads, “it’s pretty much a total failure.”

The Iron Dome system — meant to hit rockets traveling tens of miles from launch to landing — is a smaller cousin to the Patriot system, which attempts to hit much longer-range, faster incoming missiles. Iron Dome fires interceptors six inches wide and 10 feet long and uses sensors and real-time guidance systems to try to zero in on the rockets.

When an Iron Dome interceptor gets close to an incoming rocket, a proximity fuse triggers the interceptor to detonate, spraying out metal rods that are intended to strike and detonate the warheads on the incoming rockets, neutralizing their ability to maim people and destroy things on the ground.

Ted Postol, the MIT physicist and missile-defense expert who aided Lloyd’s analysis and who in 1991 debunked claims by the U.S. Army that its Patriot missiles were successfully shooting down Iraqi Scud missiles during the first Gulf War (see “Postol vs. the Pentagon” and “Preventing Fratricide”), agrees that they were failing in this crucial warhead-detonation job.

Postol had been an admirer of Iron Dome after initial reports of its performance during previous rocket assaults in 2012 (see “Why Israel’s Iron Dome Missile Defense System Actually Works”). But later analyses of interceptor contrails showed that its guidance system was behaving erratically. Instead of smoothly rising to meet their targets, the interceptors were making sharp turns and engaging from the side or behind, he says.

Those problems appear to be continuing, he says. “We expected that after more than a year and a half of time, whatever problems there were in the system related to guidance and control would be mitigated, or somewhat mitigated,” he says. “As it turns out, this is not the case. As far as we can tell, it is behaving in the same erratic way as it did in November 2012.”

The Iron Dome interceptors need to hit an incoming rocket head-on to have much hope of detonating a warhead, Lloyd says. And initial visual analysis of the engagements in recent days shows that the interceptions that are occurring are from the side or behind, which provide “essentially a zero chance of destroying the warhead,” based on the basic physics of such engagements, he added.

### 1AR – AT: Oil Facilities

#### No threshold – do missile shards from an exploded warhead hitting a facility trigger a conflict? – proves their link chain is absurd and has tons of alt causes

### 1AR – Defensive Aggression (Greenhill)

#### Israel’s “defensive aggression” is a dangerous political paradigm that creates conflict – not stops it

**Litvin 11/29**/18 [Yoav Litvin, 11-29-2018, "Zionism: cycles of trauma and aggression in the service of settler colonialism," Mondoweiss, Yoav Litvin is a doctor of psychology, a photographer and writer. In his work, he investigates the intersections of science, the arts and politics and aims to promote creative and radical causes with a focus on urban culture, social movements and peoples. Litvin’s work has been featured in Truthout, Salon, Yes! Magazine, The Conversation, Counterpunch, Mother Jones, teleSur English, Mondoweiss, Eye Magazine, Print Magazine, Business Insider, Huffington Post, The Atlantic, Truthdig and The Palestine Chronicle, among other outlets. His book *Outdoor Gallery – New York City* won the Independent Publisher’s Book Award in the Regional Northeast category for 2015. His new book *2Create – Art Collaborations in New York City* was recently awarded the American Design Award and has been nominated for numerous publishing, photography and graphic design awards. <https://mondoweiss.net/2018/11/zionism-aggression-colonialism/> ghs-am]

The origins of Zionism are profoundly misunderstood by many. This is not coincidental and can be seen largely as the result of [propaganda](https://electronicintifada.net/content/anti-semitism-vs-anti-colonialism/25346), which opportunistically and erroneously asserts that Zionism is the natural expression of Judaism. In fact, Zionism gained traction among some Jews only in the late 19th century in response to antisemitism and romantic European nationalist movements. [Zionists syncretized](https://www.telesurenglish.net/opinion/The-Contemporary-Jewish-Dilemma-Adopt-or-Reject-Zionism-and-White-Supremacy-20171207-0010.html) many white supremacist, antisemitic, messianic and fascistic racialized dogmas and were thus overwhelmingly unpopular among most Jews, who viewed the ideals of the enlightenment–emancipation, equality and integration – as their target. Zionism first increased its influence in the small Jewish towns in Eastern Europe–the shtetls–at a time when many of their inhabitants became secular but not emancipated. Thus, their view of antisemitism and its accompanying violence and trauma was a modern one, not the traditional Jewish notion that deemed oppression and hardship as divine punishment for sins (for review see [here](https://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/yakov-rabkin-israel-russian-connection)). Zionism offered a seemingly empowering vision of a “new Jew”, who shed obsolete beliefs, which were viewed as passive and weak. Instead, Zionists reacted with force against oppression and adopted the antisemitic notion whereby Jews were the cause of their own oppression and should thus segregate themselves. In response to antisemitism, Zionists embraced their fear and contempt of their abusers to produce defensive aggression, reinventing identity in a reactionary attempt to ensure survival and restore pride. The reward of violence–power-quickly enticed Zionist leaders to morph what began as a defensive strategy into an offensive one that culminated with a [settler colonialist vision of a homeland in Palestine](https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=659&v=2A_vxpUgv3s) at the expense of its Indigenous population, the existing Palestinian people. It is instrumental to view this dynamic through a behavioral neuroscientific perspective, which affords a means of understanding underlying motivations of both persons and class structures, as well as informs on potential resolutions. Studies show that the emotions of fear and anxiety and their corresponding neural circuitries are highly conserved among all mammals, including humans. In response to threat, fear is expressed in the form of [defensive behaviors](https://yoavlitvin.com/defensive-behaviors-mechanisms-translatability/). These include flight if an escape route is available, freezing and avoidance if not (both techniques of choice in response to antisemitism prior to Zionism), and defensive threat and attack when confrontation is imminent. Defensive aggression and its corresponding violence can lead to the rewards of resource acquisition–whether it be the sparing of one’s own life or access to the many spoils of dominance: sexual partners, money, land, power etc. Hence, a process that begins with oppression leads to fear in the oppressed (expressed as defensive aggression) and morphs to offensive aggression directed towards resource acquisition, which ultimately results in the subjugation of others by those previously oppressed. The once powerless become “hooked” to the rewards of violence; an addiction which facilitates the transition from defense to offense. Thus, the everlasting and self-perpetuating dynamic of persecution often shifts the balance of power, yet always maintains an equal or growing level of violence. How do the hegemonic forces sustain subservience in their subject population while reaping the benefits of oppression? through fear mongering and ever-escalating violence. Fear memories are formed when otherwise neutral stimuli are paired with pain or danger and are extinguished when they are decoupled (see [here](https://www.counterpunch.org/2015/09/28/fear-trauma-and-healing-a-scientific-analysis-of-the-israeli-palestinian-relationship/)). Chronic, prolonged, generalized or an otherwise abnormal fear reaction to an ambiguous stimulus is viewed as maladaptive and linked to a range of psychopathologies, such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Fear conditioning is “reinstated” in a person or a populace ([“collective PTSD”](https://mondoweiss.net/2017/05/collective-traumatic-oppression/)) upon re-exposure to-or the recall of-the fear-inducing stimulus. In such a manner, reinstatement is a technique by which the political, religious, military and economic ruling classes manipulate their populace to gain support for their aggressive and expansionist policies, distract from their own corruptions, privileges and suppression of dissent. Fear is reinstated in traumatized collectives using several methods: (i) focusing on-and decontextualizing an act of violence or resistance (e.g. “terrorism”); (ii) reminding the public of some atrocity in the past (memorial days, sanctifying bereaved families); (iii) shifting attention to perceived threats (e.g. the Iranian nuclear program); (iv) appealing to past glory, nostalgia (romantic nationalism) and; (v) segregating communities (apartheid), which preserves a process of dehumanization of the “other” and renders re-exposure and reconciliation (i.e. extinction of fear) virtually impossible. Thus, fear [manifests in increasingly violent displays of aggression](http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.787835) promoting the interests of those in power. It is precisely these aggressive actions [which are rewarded](https://mondoweiss.net/2017/01/mainstreaming-palestinian-genocide/) by the hegemony and therefore become more prevalent in the general population. Privilege enables little risk of harm for the hegemonic forces and the reinstatement of perceived imminent threats constantly raises the bar for-and serves to justify permissible oppression. From an early age the population, through participation in violence in the army or elsewhere, are encouraged to transition from the defensive to the offensive expressions of aggression. As such, the population is made an accomplice to ruling class corruptions and crimes, and thus perceives, together with its leaders, any forms of dissent as treasonous existential threats (see [here](https://twitter.com/dannydanon/status/1053055362293817344)). The cycle of violence and inequality has been the backbone of all white supremacist, settler colonialist societies, past and present which engage in ethnic cleansing and genocide of Indigenous populations; e.g. the United States, Australia, Canada, South Africa, Israel and more. Yet the question arises–how can the cycle be broken? Victims of abuse can cope with trauma in two ways. They can either channel their rage toward weaker elements in their immediate society or outside of it and in so doing perpetuate the never ending cycle of abuse, or stand up to their abusers, who are stronger than them, resist the temptations of resource acquisition and break the cycle of violence and inequality. The first option of picking on the weak is easy and can be a solitary endeavor; victims become abusers and in so doing feel empowered; e.g. the Zionist example. The second option of fighting oppressors poses a greater challenge and requires courage, resolve and social skills, i.e. collectivism, as bullies are usually stronger and more formidable than their victims. For this purpose, it is advantageous for the oppressed to join forces and collaborate with fellow victims of white supremacy; women, immigrants, black and brown people, Indigenous, Muslim, Jews and others so that together they may form a winning strategy to overcome their oppressors. Notably, Zionist propaganda works against this sort of alliance building and resistance by fragmenting and isolating Palestinian society within historical Palestine and outside of it.

## Process

### 1AR – Topshelf

# Ks

## Topshelf

### 1AR – Weigh Case

## Specific

### 1AR – Antisemitism

#### 1] No link – criticizing Israeli policies doesn’t equate to insulting the religion as a whole

#### 2] Their conflation of anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism is ahistorical and fueled by a desire to suppress Palestinian dissent

**Peled 9/13** Miko Peled, 9-13-2018, "Conflating Anti-Zionism with Anti-Semitism," MintPress News, <https://www.mintpressnews.com/conflating-anti-zionism-with-anti-semitism-a-dangerous-and-useful-ploy/249293/> // ash

JERUSALEM — (Analysis) According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, anti-Semitism is defined as “hostility toward or discrimination against Jews as a religious, ethnic, or racial group.” This is also how anti-Semitism is understood by people in general. However, the state of Israel and Zionist organizations around the world do not want the term to be defined as only racism against Jewish people but also to include criticism and rejection of Zionism.

Jewish rejection of Zionism

The Zionist movement had no concern for God or Jewish law because the Zionist leaders were secular and their vision was to create a secular state. They claimed that Jews were a nation just like any other, even though clearly that is not the case. Jews in Yemen, in Iraq, in Poland or in the Holy Land itself had and continue to have their own distinct customs, clothing, culture and language. The only common thing that Jewish people around the world possess is their religion. This is true even today, when many Jewish people see themselves as secular. Jews in America have a distinct culture that is different from that of Jews in France or Iran or in occupied Palestine.

The Zionists secularized the Old Testament, treating it as though it was a historical document, which it very clearly is not; and, finally, the Zionists claimed that Palestine is the Land of Israel and that it is the land of the Jewish people and therefore they have a right to take it, even by force. They invented and spread the motto, “A Land without a People for a People without a Land,” even though clearly there were people on the land, the Palestinian Arabs. These people, in the eyes of Western colonizers, being non-European and not white, were just insignificant and invisible.

Jewish opposition to Zionism was swift and fierce and is well documented. The leading Rabbis of the Ultra-Orthodox community were very clear in their opposition and the points they made were as relevant in the early 20th century as they are today. According to Jewish law, the Jewish people are forbidden from claiming sovereignty in the Land of Israel. They were expelled by Divine decree as a result of their own rejection of God’s laws and are not permitted to return until such time as God sends His messenger to grant them permission to return. To claim, as many Zionist do, that God gave The Land of Israel to the Jewish people and therefore they are permitted to live there, and force another nation into exile in the process, contravenes the commands of the very God that they claim gave them the land.

God’s promise of the land to the Jewish people was conditioned upon their obedience to His laws. Having failed to so obey, they cannot simply claim it back. Furthermore, there is a prohibition on taking the land by force, dying for the land, or taking a life of another human being. Jewish law commands its followers to be loyal citizens in whatever country they happen to live.

Furthermore, in a book named Or Layesharim or Light for the Truthful, published in the year 1900, the rabbis of the early twentieth century warned of four major inevitable consequences should the Zionist movement be allowed to accomplish its goal of a so-called “Jewish state” in Palestine.

Unprecedented violence to the Holy Land;

Unprecedented tensions between Jews and the Palestinian Arabs;

Jeopardizing the relations between Jews and Muslims;

Casting doubt as to the loyalty of Jewish people in the countries in which they reside around the world.

Sadly, no one listened to the rabbis and, as things turned out, every one of their warnings became true.

Conflating anti-Semitism with rejection of Zionism

From early on, the Zionist movement and then the State of Israel have had a tense relationship with the Ultra-Orthodox community because of its clear anti-Zionist stance. Having grown up in Jerusalem I can recall how each year on particular days, including the Israeli Day of Independence, there would be processions at the Ultra-Orthodox neighborhoods where the Israeli flag would be burned.

The Anti-Defamation League, or ADL, which claims to be a civil-rights organization but is in reality a Zionist watchdog, maintains that “Anti-Zionism is a prejudice against the Jewish movement for self-determination and the right of the Jewish people to a homeland in the State of Israel.” This is an interesting twist on Zionism and what it means to oppose it.

To begin with it is not prejudice to oppose Zionism. The Zionist movement has been around for over a century and has a clear track record of racism and extreme violence. Nor is it prejudice against the right of Jewish people to live in Palestine. The creation of the state of Israel came at an enormous cost and included genocide, ethnic cleansing, and the establishment of an apartheid regime. That is enough reason to oppose any movement.

#### 3] They’re just wrong

**Herman 02** Edward S. Herman [Edward S. Herman is a Professor Emeritus of Finance at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, and a contributor to Z Magazine since its founding in 1988 and to ZNet. Herman is the author of numerous books, including a number of corporate and media studies. These include Corporate Control, Corporate Power (1981), the two-volume Political Economy of Human Rights (1979) and Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (1988), both of which he co-authored with Noam Chomsky, as well as The "Terrorism" Industry: The Experts and Institutions That Shape Our View of Terror (1989), which he co-authored with Gerry O'Sullivan. Herman occasionally contributes a column to Swans.], 11-18-2002, "Swans Commentary: "Antisemitism" As A Tool Of Israeli Ethnic Cleansing, by Edward S. Herman," Swans, [http://www.swans.com/library/art8/herman05.html //](http://www.swans.com/library/art8/herman05.html%20//) ash

Palestinians are "Semites," but the word antisemitism is never applied to prejudice against them, only to Jews. The restriction on the application to Jews, and failure to use it in reference to Palestinians, continues in the face of the fact that prejudice against Jews has sharply diminished in the West from the era of Hitler, and that the Arabs have displaced them as target of anti-"Semite" hostility. Thus the usage itself reflects power and deep-seated bias.

What is more, the use of "antisemitism" has long been an opportunistic ploy of supporters of Israel to counter criticism of Israel, with mentions of the Holocaust and allegations of prejudice against Jews used to elicit sympathy for Israel, supposedly once again being threatened by menacing enemies. But the fact is that Israel has created increasing numbers of enemies by refusing to leave the occupied territories, or to abide by the Geneva Conventions, or to halt the steady and increasingly brutal ethnic cleansing of the indigenous Palestinians in favor of Jewish settlers, many immigrants from abroad. By identifying opposition to Sharon and Israeli ethnic cleansing with "antisemitism," pro-ethnic cleansing activists have made "antisemitism" -- in their distorted and unacceptable sense -- a moral obligation for all decent human beings.

"Antisemitism" has been a complement of "terrorism" in the propaganda arsenal of the "friends of Israel," more properly designated the "supporters and underwriters of Israeli ethnic cleansing." The Palestinians have engaged in terror, but by any meaningful definition the Israelis have also, and the bias in treatment of the two has been staggering. The huge death rate differential over the years -- better than twenty Palestinian to one Israeli deaths -- and the steady racist bias in systematic house demolitions and removals, the seizure of water resources, and the rise to head of the Israeli state of a world class terrorist responsible for over a thousand Palestinian civilian deaths in a single episode, doesn't alter the deeply imbedded bias. Only the Palestinians terrorize; the Israelis retaliate and are the victims of terror.

Back in 1979, when world pressure on Israel to settle and end its "redemption of the land" by ethnic cleansing was severe, the Israel-based Jonathan Institute organized a meeting in Israel that brought together members of the Western elite -- George Bush, George Will, Senators Henry Jackson and John Danforth, Paul Johnson, Lord Chalfont, Jacques Soustelle, and many others -- to declare the PLO a terrorist organization linked to Moscow, and to declare Israel the victim. The organization met again in Washington in 1984 for another rousing session to make the same points, here with Secretary of State George Shultz, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Senator Moynihan, Daniel Schorr and Ted Koppel, among others present. This and many other Israeli-official U.S.-media efforts helped pin the terrorism label on the PLO and preserve Israel's right to ethnically cleanse by means of (unacknowledged) state terrorism.

For years in the United States, there was a tendency on the part of the hard-line supporters of Israel to conflate criticisms of Israel with "antisemitism." Such criticisms, and even criticism of policies that might not comport with Israeli interests, like a large military budget, were regarded -- in Stalinist lingo and mode -- as "objectively" antisemitic (most notoriously, in Nathan and Ruth Perlmutter's 1982 work on "the real antisemitism in America"). That tendency has become more marked in recent years, as the "friends" have become increasingly aggressive in attacking critics of Israel, and have even mounted attacks on blatantly pro-Israel media institutions like The Washington Post, The New York Times and CNN (all besieged with hostile messages and subjected to boycotts). The drive by the "friends" has been toward total closure; they are not satisfied that the NYT, WP and CNN are already hugely biased in favor of Israel (see the citations below), they want inconvenient facts suppressed and alternative viewpoints entirely blacked out.

The more aggressive campaign of the "friends" once again correlates with the demands of Israeli state policy. The open destruction of the institutions of Palestinian civil society, the more ruthless crackdown, use of firepower, curfews, and the open discussion of possible large-scale "transfer" -- meaning accelerated ethnic cleansing -- under the direction of terrorist commander Sharon, calls for parallel attempts to protect these ugly efforts from any Western constraint. The cries about a new "antisemitism" and a campaign to silence any criticism follows once again in the wake of this Israeli need. As Alexander Cockburn has noted, "there's a quick way of figuring just how badly Israel is behaving. There's a brisk uptick in the number of articles here by Jews accusing the left of antisemitism."

The aggression of the "friends" has been unique in its scope, intensity and effectiveness, and constitutes a form of low level terrorism that has cowed politicians, school administrators, and the media. Politicians had long been brought into line by the experiences of many who had crossed the pro-Israel lobby in the past; as far back as two decades ago, two Illinois Republicans, Senator Charles Percy and Rep. Paul Findley, were the target of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in 1984 and 1982 respectively, and both were defeated. In 1986, Senator Jesse Helms was targeted, and only narrowly escaped. Since then his voting pattern has been consistently and ardently pro-Israeli. The recent easy defeat of two black congresspersons with "safe" seats who had been put on the lobby hit list -- Earl Hilliard and Cynthia McKinney -- offered a fresh object lesson to those who might have been inclined to question a blank check to Sharon. Indeed, Congress and the Senate continue to rush at every opportunity with almost unanimous votes against Arafat and in support of anything Sharon, the man responsible for the massacres of Qibya and Sabra/Shatila, might want.

#### 4] Perm do both - our method uniquely hones our ability to confront anti-Semitism – their call-out culture destroys solidarity and is complicit in violence

**Pessah 18** Tom Pessah, 3-4-2018, "How the Palestine movement taught me to confront anti-Semitism," <https://972mag.com/how-the-sjp-taught-me-to-confront-anti-semitism/133572/> // ash

This misunderstanding was far from a coincidence. Coming from Israel meant coming from a place where endless state violence is completely normalized, while any form of resistance is pathologized as barbaric. Leila Khaled, who hijacked planes to raise awareness for her people’s plight, and who never killed anyone, was a feminist hero for many of my friends. I initially found that idea much more shocking than the fact that most Israelis I knew admired and voted for ex-generals who actually did have the blood of civilians on their hands. This urge to pathologize Palestinians as unusually violent came up again and again. It took me years to unlearn it.

Another reason for such sentiments was my own exposure to propaganda. It was only after I became active in Berkeley that I gradually became aware of the power of the hasbara (Israeli state-sponsored PR) machine that Israel and its supporters use against Palestinian and pro-Palestinian activists in the U.S. Once I did, I learned that it was highly useful for hasbara groups to label us as anti-Jewish; doing so enabled them to mobilize the wider Jewish community by playing on its fears. It captivated their donors’ attention, helped them build legal cases against our activities, and got them media coverage. This forced me to do proper research about potential speakers, to make sure that their words couldn’t be used to smear us.

In 2007, far-right Zionist students on campus formed their own club in response to our successes. At the core of this new club were students trained and paid by donors to defend the policies of the State of Israel. The university administration was always eager for “dialogue” to prevent what they saw as a potential PR disaster; they constantly lectured us about tolerance without fully understanding who we were or what we were fighting for. At their request, representatives from both groups held a meeting.

At the meeting, we were told that our actions were anti-Semitic and had made Jewish students on campus feel unsafe. I could see the surprise, even the anguish, on the faces of the people in my group. What had we done? First, said the pro-Israel students, we displayed a wooden map of Palestine with hooks representing destroyed villages and towns during one of our protests. The map was painted in the colors of the Palestinian flag. Didn’t this mean we wanted to expel Jews from Israel?

“No,” we responded. This was a map of historical Palestine, representing a past injustice we wanted to correct, without any wish to expel anyone in the future. However, in order to accommodate them, from now on we would put up a large sign reading “Historical Palestine” near our map, clarifying that it was not meant to threaten anyone.

What else? There was our chant, “From the River to the Sea, Palestine Will Be Free.” Didn’t we mean we wanted Palestine to be free of Jews, that is — a new Holocaust? Of course not. We meant freedom for everyone. But just to make sure we weren’t misunderstood, we promised to stop using this chant. Those were two big concessions we offered. Anything more?

Yes. Our speakers criticized the Israel lobby. This was also anti-Semitic. The Zionist students wanted us to have different speakers.

By the end of the meeting my friends were holding back tears. We had gone out of our way to be sensitive, taking the claim of Jewish safety seriously, while ignoring the politics these lobby groups were trained to promote. We realized, however, that what they wanted was not merely consideration or sensitivity. It was our very presence that offended them. Rather than relating to us as people, we were being treated as household appliances that had malfunctioned: we weren’t providing them with the expected level of comfort.

In 2010 our chapter campaigned for the student senate to back a bill calling on UC Berkeley to divest from American companies profiting from the occupation. The senate held three long debates on the bill, during which sobbing pro-Israel students repeatedly declared they would feel unwelcome on our campus if the resolution were passed.

After one of the debates, we found leaflets with talking points that had been left behind by pro-Israel organizers. Titled “Unifying Strategies for Our Jewish Community,” the document suggested that students “Make it personal, include personal experiences and emphasize feelings of personal attack. BE EMOTIONAL. Don’t be afraid to show how you feel (angry, sad, etc.)… DON’T try to deconstruct the bill. DON’T focus on addressing the fallacies/specifics of the bill. Instead, focus on how it is an attack on the Jewish community. AVOID a debate on the Middle East. Supporters of the bill would like to argue on this platform.” We had heard all those points in the Zionist students’ statements earlier in the evening.

During the debates, our opponents made sure to “translate” phrases we used into familiar anti-Semitic tropes in order to smear us (I later dubbed this “anti-Semitizing”). I spoke against air strikes by the Israeli Air Force on Gaza (using weapons produced by those same American companies), mentioning that many children had been killed. Opponents of the bill, however, pretended I had said, “the Jews killed children,” which was akin to a “medieval blood libel.” Just as the talking points recommended, the opponents avoided discussing the troubling information I had brought up, and reframed my words as “an attack on the Jewish community.” Several Jewish students that I knew began distancing themselves from me, saying they were offended by what I had supposedly said. Our divestment bill passed with a clear majority before being vetoed by the president of the student senate. A similar bill eventually passed in 2013.

For me, this was a turning point. I had never realized the depth of emotional manipulation the Israel lobby was willing to employ in order to achieve its aims. The reckless deployment of the anti-Semitism charge risked de-sensitizing anyone who opposed their politics. In other words, the lobby wanted to defend the Israeli government so badly that it was willing to sacrifice the fight against actual anti-Semitism.

One important lesson was for us to make Jewish solidarity with Palestinians visible and vocal (though, importantly, without overshadowing Palestinian testimonies). While pro-Israel lobbyists had attempted to portray the Jewish community as unified in opposition to the bill, numerous community members, as well as several brave students, spoke in favor of it, while many signed a petition in support. After three years in SJP I now had several Palestinian friends, and expressing full and unconditional solidarity with them became a powerful way of simultaneously advancing our cause while combating anti-Semitism. The two issues really were linked.

I now began to think of anti-Semitism independently, regardless of the lobby’s definitions. When one of our allies confused the terms “Jews” and “Zionists,” I wrote a long letter to my colleagues about the differences between the two. In general, most of the pro-Palestine activists were adept at making the distinction, unlike our opponents who always tried to blur it.

One day during the height of the Arab Spring protests, we heard that the Muslim Student Association intended to host a local preacher who had spoken up against state violence in Egypt. After years of following controversies in other student groups, I now had a working knowledge of questionable figures, and his name sounded familiar.

Google affirmed my suspicion – this was Amir Abdul Malik Ali, who had spoken at UC Irvine a few years earlier. In a secretly taped speech, he had claimed “Zionist Jews” were behind a series of violent incidents attributed to Muslims, including 9/11, and that these same Jews owned the media (he erroneously counted Rupert Murdoch as a Jew). I first watched the videos carefully and tried to ascertain he wasn’t being misquoted, and then my group contacted the Muslim students, who immediately canceled the talk. Since then, Abdul Malik Ali has never been invited back to speak, and we were taken seriously after demonstrating that we did not conflate anti-Semitism with opposition to Israel’s policies.

In a separate incident, after I found materials romanticizing the pogroms of Jews on pro-Palestine activist Alison Weir’s website, the Muslim Students Association also agreed not to host her. A few years later, in 2015, Weir was expelled from a leading BDS coalition for making and disseminating a series of anti-Semitic claims, including blaming Jews for anti-Semitism. The subsequent debate also exposed me to a lot of internalized antisemitism: older Jewish activists who insisted we cannot talk about her statements until the occupation ends.

The most celebrated call-out of an anti-Jewish figure in pro-Palestine circles was the 2012 statement on Gilad Atzmon. Atzmon, born an Israeli Jew, became a Holocaust denier and a supporter of “national socialism.” Yet through his obfuscating language and pseudo-intellectual rhetoric, he had managed to make inroads and win allies within the pro-Palestine movement (including Weir). Years of Zionists crying wolf had made too many Palestine activists insensitive to the presence of a real anti-Semite. While a few Jewish activists had been sounding the alarm for years, they were usually accused of being “Zionists” or “crypto-Zionists,” in an attempt to bully them into silence.

The tide turned after the publication of a landmark statement against him by dozens of Palestinian activists, many of them leading figures in the BDS movement, in which they wrote that “challenging Zionism, including the illegitimate power of institutions that support the oppression of Palestinians, and the illegitimate use of Jewish identities to protect and legitimize oppression, must never become an attack on Jewish identities.”

Despite their people’s suffering at the hands of Israeli Jews and bullying by pro-Israel groups in the U.S., the Palestinian organizers that I know are generous and open-minded, fully aware of the difference between Judaism and Zionism, and determined to stand up against genuine anti-Jewish bigotry without having to be prompted to do so. I often wondered why so few people outside the movement were aware of this deep kindness that exists against all odds.

This is true not only for Palestinians. In general, I have found that Arab and Muslim activists who have grown up in the U.S. become aware from an early age of what anti-Semitism is, and of the heavy price they pay by being accused of it. The real problem, in my experience, is privileged white activists like Weir and most of her defenders – those who have rarely faced consequences for their words, and who maintain social ties with white supremacists. Contrary to what Israel lobbyists claim, the BDS movement has been instrumental in decreasing the influence of these anti-Jewish white activists on the pro-Palestine Left.

### 1AR – Barber

### 1AR – Preempts Bad

### 1AR – Sanitization K

### 1AR – Schlag

# NCs

## Topshelf

### O/V

#### If their ethical theory can’t condemn Palestinian genocide you should reject it on face – their philosophy avoids a critical discussion of Israel and proves its abstraction and inapplicability to the real world

## 1AR - Hobbes

### 1AR – Topshelf

#### O/V – WHAT THE HELL?? Saying Israel and the US should continue to slaughter kids in Palestine and we shouldn’t do anything is morally repugnant, abstract, and complicit in genocide

#### LBL proper -

#### Contention debate –

#### Turn - the sovereign has no external obligation to provide military aid to other states