# JF21 – NC – Kant (2:20)

#### Permissibility negates:

#### [1] Semantics – Ought is defined as expressing obligation[[1]](#footnote-1) which means absent a proactive obligation you vote neg since there’s a trichotomy between prohibition, obligation, and permissibility and proving one disproves the other two. Semantics outweighs – A. it’s key to predictability since we prep based on the wording of the res B. It’s constitutive to the rules of debate since the judge is obligated to vote on the resolutional text.

#### [2] Safety – It’s ethically safer to presume the squo since we know what the squo is but we can’t know whether the aff will be good or not if ethics are incoherent.

#### [3] Logic – Propositions require positive justification before being accepted, otherwise one would be forced to accept the validity of logically contradictory propositions regarding subjects one knows nothing about, i.e. if one knew nothing about P one would have to presume that both the “P” and “~P” are true.

#### The metaethic is practical reason. Prefer:

#### [1] Regress – Ethical theories must have a basis. We can always ask why we should follow the basis of a theory, so they aren’t morally binding because they don’t have a starting point. Practical reason solves – When we ask why we should follow reason, we demand a reason, which concedes to the authority of reason itself, so it’s the only thing we can follow.

#### [2] Action Theory – Every action can be broken down to infinite amounts of movements, i.e. me moving my arm can be broken down to the infinite moments of every state my arm is in. Only reason can unify these movements because we use practical reason to achieve our goals, means all actions collapse to reason.

#### [3] Inescapability – Every agent intrinsically values practical reason when they go about setting and pursuing an end under a moral theory, as it presupposes that the end they are committing is an intrinsic good. That necessitates practical reason as a necessary means to follow through on any given end.

#### Now, practical reason means we all have a unified perspective: What can be justified to me can be justified to everyone who is a practical reasoner. If I can conclude that 2+2 is 4, then I understand not only that I know 2+2 is 4, but that everyone around me can arrive at the same conclusion. These things are temporally consistent: I know that me adding two numbers now and taking that sum will not result in me adding the same two numbers in the future and getting a different sum. Our unified perspective does not change but rather stays consistent.

#### But, willing an action that violates the freedom of others is a contradiction: If I decide to kill someone, that action is not universalizable because that would justify other people killing me too. If I die, I cannot exercise my freedom to kill someone else. This is a contradiction: I both justify extending my freedom to kill others and limiting my own freedom.

#### Thus, the standard is respecting freedom.

#### Prefer additionally:

#### [1] Performativity – Argumentation presupposes a priori truth in trying to prove claims as valid. Being able to objectively decide between arguments and evaluate them necessitates a higher framework that is a priori knowledge. Refuting this claim concedes to the authority of the argument, as you rely on an external framework to prove it false.

#### Negate:

#### [1] Lethal autonomous weapons don’t originate with states, but private manufacturers and companies.

**Rohrlich 19** Justin Rohrlich, 11-11-2019, "With no laws to stop them, defense firms are on track to make killer robots a reality," Quartz, <https://qz.com/1746154/lacking-regulation-firms-on-track-to-make-killer-robots-reality/> SJCP//JG

Weapons built by defense manufacturers that can think for themselves are getting smarter, which mean the much-feared killer robot could be a reality sooner than later. That’s the warning contained in a [new report from Pax](https://www.paxforpeace.nl/publications/all-publications/slippery-slope), a nonprofit based in the Netherlands that campaigns for peace around the world. Killer robots, or lethal autonomous weapons systems, are designed to make life-or-death decisions on their own, without human control. It’s a worrying leap that’s been called the “third revolution in warfare,” after gunpowder and the atomic bomb. Both activists and military leaders have called for international regulations to govern these weapons, or even ban them outright, but key governments—like the United States and Russia—have so far resisted. As far as anyone knows, militaries have yet to actually deploy killer robots on the battlefield, at least offensively. But Pax has identified at least 30 global arms manufacturers that don’t have policies against developing these kinds of weapons systems, and are reportedly doing so at a rate that is outpacing regulation. The companies include US defense firms Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Raytheon, the Chinese state-owned conglomerates AVIC and CASC, Israeli firms IAI, Elbit, and Rafael, Rostec of Russia, and Turkey’s STM. “As long as states haven’t agreed to collectively come up with some kind of regulatory regime, or ideally, a preemptive ban, the fear is very real that companies will be crossing this plane and will develop and produce and eventually field weapons that lack sufficient human control,” the report’s author, Frank Slijper, told Quartz. Activists don’t believe that military use of some degree of artificial intelligence is problematic in it itself. The US military is already employing full autonomy in some of its defensive weapons platforms, like the US Navy’s Aegis shipboard missile defense system, which is designed to intercept enemy fire on its own. The US Army is [developing an AI-capable cannon](https://www.newscientist.com/article/2212982-the-us-army-is-developing-ai-missiles-that-find-their-own-targets/), which would select and engage targets on its own, as well as AI-assisted tanks that, as [Quartz first reported](https://qz.com/1558841/us-army-developing-ai-powered-autonomous-weapons/), will be able to “acquire, identify, and engage targets” at least three times faster than any human. But these systems still all require a person to pull the trigger, so to speak. PAX is more concerned about the potential deployment of AI in offensive systems that would select and attack targets on their own without human oversight. The group questions how these weapons would distinguish between combatants and civilians, or judge proportional responses. Legal experts still don’t know who would be held responsible if an autonomous weapon broke international law. And without lives on the line, these weapons could make it easier to go to war, and for those wars to escalate more quickly. The report warns that such weapons would “violate fundamental legal and ethical principles and would destabilize international peace and security.” What they’re building Defense firms don’t produce weapons in a vacuum, Slijper said. Instead, he said, these weapons are developed because companies believe that’s what militaries want in their arsenals. And unlike Google or Amazon, which have both faced public and internal backlash for their work on military systems, companies like Lockheed Martin and Raytheon do almost all of their business with militaries, so they face little risk from the negative reaction of consumers. For its report, Pax sent questionnaires to 50 arms manufacturers that produce military systems, asking each if it had policies regarding autonomous weapons. Just eight firms said they had in place principals guiding their AI work. The rest did not reply.

#### That negates – banning LAWs inhibits the sale of LAWs to states’ arsenals. That’s a form of restricting the free economic choices of

**Richman 12**, Sheldon. “The free market doesn’t need government regulation.” Reason, August 5, 2012. // AHS RG

Order grows from market forces. But where do **market forces** come from? They **are the result of human action. Individuals select ends and act to achieve them by adopting suitable means.** Since means are scarce and ends are abundant, **individuals economize in order to accomplish more rather than less.** And they always seek to exchange lower values for higher values (as they see them) and never the other way around. In a world of scarcity, tradeoffs are unavoidable, so one aims to trade up rather than down. (One’s trading partner does the same.) **The result of this**, along with other **features of human action**, and the world at large **is what we call market forces. But really, it is just men and women acting rationally in the world.**

#### And, ownership doesn’t imply use – the intrinsic property of a LAW cannot make it bad because that isn’t a Kantian reason why we ought to eliminate it.

#### [2] Submitting to international limits on power is a contradiction in will – it weakens the republic and has no binding force.

Waltz ’62 (Waltz, Kenneth N. "Kant, Liberalism, and War." The American Political Science Review 56, no. 2 (1962): 331-40. doi:10.2307/1952369.)

**So long** at least **as the state "runs a danger of being** suddenly **swallowed up** by other States," **it must be powerful externally** as well as internally. In international relations the difficulties multiply. **The republican form is preferable**, partly because republics are more peacefully inclined; **but** despotisms are stronger-and **no one would** expect or **wish to bring** **the state into jeopardy by decreasing its strength**.15 Standing armies are dangerous, **arms races** themselves **[are]** being **a cause of war, but** **in the absence of** an outside agency affording **protection**, **each state must look to the effectiveness of its army**.'6 A freely flowing commerce is a means of promoting peace, but a state must control imports, in the interests of its subjects "and not for the advantage of strangers and the encouragement of the industry of others, because **the State without the prosperity of the people would not possess sufficient power to resist external enemies** or to maintain itself as a common- wealth."'7 Not only standing armies but also, indeed more so, the disparity of economic capacities may represent danger, occasion fear, and give rise to war. **Kant's concern with the strength and** thus the **safety of the state is part of** his perception of **the necessities of power politics.** Among states in the world, as among **individuals in the state of nature**, there **is** constantly **either violence or the threat of violence**. **States**, like "lawless savages," **are** with each other "**naturally in a nonjuridical condition**.'8 **There is no law above them**; there is no judge among them; there is **no legal process by which states can pursue their rights.** They can do so only by war, and, as Kant points out, neither war nor the treaty of peace following it, can settle the question of right. **A treaty of peace can end only a particular war**; a pretext for new hostilities can always be found. "Nor can such a pretext under these circumstances be regarded as un- just; for in this state of society every nation is the judge of its own cause."'19 More surely than those who extract and emphasize merely Kant's republican aspirations and peaceful hopes, Khrushchev speaks as though he had read Kant correctly. "**War**," in Khrushchev's peculiar yet apt phrase, "**is not fatalistically** **inevitable**." Kant does set forth the "shoulds" and "oughts" of state behavior.2' He does not expect them to be followed in a state of nature, for, as he says, "philosophically or **diplomatically composed codes have not**, nor could have, **the slightest legal force**, since the States as such stand under no common legal constraint.... 22 His intention clearly is that the "**oughts" be taken as the basis for the juridical order that must one day be established among states**, just as the rights of the individual, though not viable in a state of nature, provided the basis for the civil state.

#### [3] Only robots can be legitimately employed in self-defense – human standing armies intrinsically treat their soldiers as means to an end.

Lippert-Rasmussen 09 [Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, (Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen works at the Department of Political Science and Government, Aarhus University and at the Philosophy Department at University of Tromsø.) "Kant On The Asymmetry Between Standing Armies And Citizens' Militias" Annual Review Of Law And Ethics, 2009, https://www.jstor.org/stable/43593974, DOA:1-15-2021 // WWBW]

**Kant’s** non-contingent objection to standing armies is this. He **assumes that standing armies are made up of people who are paid to be soldiers and then claims that "being out hired out to kill or to be killed seems to constitute a use of human beings as mere machines** and tools in the hand of another (the state), a use which is incompatible with the rights of humanity in our own person".7 It would appear that Kant defines a standing army as an army of paid soldiers, so **standing armies are morally problematic, according to Kant, in virtue of their definitional properties.** While it is logically possible to imagine a world of nations with non-menacing, cost-constant standing armies, **it is not logically possible to imagine nations with standing armies that do not treat soldiers are mere machines and tools.** At least, this is what I take Kant to be claiming. On a natural reading, to treat someone as a mere machine is different from treat- ing him as a mere tool or means even if something that is treated as a machine is always treated as a mere means.8 To see the difference, consider a case where X wants Y's recognition so badly that he is willing to do anything that will enable him to achieve this aim, e.g. lie to Y, manipulate Y to irrationally change her views on what is admirable, or some such thing. Clearly, X does not treat Y as a mere machine - it makes no sense to want recognition from a machine - and yet X may well treat Y as a mere means in the sense that X uses and is disposed to use Y in whatever ways will serve X's ends regardless of how this affects Y's interests or conflicts with Y's moral claims. For present purposes, we can set aside this finer distinction. We can assume that **Kant's objection**, or at least part of it**, is based on the putative fact that soldiers are used as mere means.** If the state treated soldiers and machines in some way differently, e.g. because all soldiers receive training in acts of psychological warfare that can only be carried out by rational beings, and at the same time treated soldiers as mere means to win wars, Kant's objection to standing armies would still apply.

# 2NR

## Frontlines

### AT LAWs Dehumanize/Accountability

#### [1] Consequentialist – you’ve conceded that consequentialism fails, and this turn is reliant upon the consequences of LAWs, i.e. that they will actively kill people, but it’s not an intrinsic feature of a LAW, which means the NC offense outweighs.

#### [2] Ownership doesn’t imply use – just because States own LAWs doesn’t mean they will actively use them for targeting human dignity, e.g. they could use them for a deterrent threat against other states without ever implementing them in war.

#### [3] LAWs aren’t moral agents – so we cannot hold them culpable for extinguishing human dignity.

#### [4] Intrinsicness – LAWs do not intrinsically violate human freedom. We have defensive weapons like iron dome that don’t actively violate the dignity since they are meant to protect a population.

#### [5] Turn – Human soldiers would have signed up for war, which means that being killed in the process gives them more dignity through the bravery and valor that they would have achieved

#### [6] Turn – under the affirmative’s world human soldiers will be the ones extinguishing life and not respecting the dignity of other soldiers – which means there will be net less dignity. In the NC world as war turns completely robotic without human soldiers involved there will be no potential for violations of dignity

#### [7] You conceded the act-omission distinction which takes out this argument – we cannot hold a moral agent culpable for not being able to achieve an end like human dignity.

### AT Elimination is Contradiction in Conception

#### [1] Consequentialist – you’ve conceded that consequentialism fails and this turn is reliant upon the consequences of LAWs, i.e. that they will actively kill people, but it’s not an intrinsic feature of a LAW, which means the NC offense outweighs.

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#### [3] LAWs aren’t moral agents – so we cannot hold them culpable for extinguishing human dignity.

#### [4] Incoherent – Your universalizable statement makes no sense – the negative isn’t universalizing LAWs killing others, but merely the existence of LAWs, which clearly is permissible.

### AT LAWs Can’t Follow Kant

#### [1] Textuality – LAWs are not full reasoning and perfect agents – the technology still isn’t here yet. Danckwardt.

[Danckwardt, Petter. “Increasing De-personalization in Warfare.” Published 2015] SHS ZS

To get a grip on these debates, one must ask: what is autonomy? I believe that the defini- tion of autonomy–which also lacks a globally accepted definition, both in regards to computer theory and in a wider meaning–hinges on the context. And in the context of robotics, autono- 10 my seemingly comes in degrees. **Autonomy**, in the context of robotics, **could be said to be any activity that the weapon system is able to do unsupervised by humans**. 11 “Full autonomy”, however, is here understood when a system or a function of a system has an adaptive capacity to make contingent discretionary decisions, that is, it is able to learn and to adapt its function- ing in response to changing circumstances in the environment in which it is deployed. **Full autonomy** **does not mean**, however, **that a system can define its goals and actions freely**–**it** always **operates within the constraints or bounds of its human-designed programming and software** (Wallach and Allen 2012).

#### [2] Turn – even if you win that LAWs should be Kantian, that’s good – because LAWs are far better than human soldiers at following ethical outcomes and can be programmed to behave perfectly. Human soldiers will always commit atrocities and rights violations as empirically proven in the past.

#### [3] Cross apply all the arguments how LAWs aren’t intrinsically bad – this takes out the notion that they treat people as a mere means.

### AT Pacifism

#### [1] Cross apply Waltz 62 – the government has a responsibility of ensuring proper conditions for their citizens so that their citizens may pursue their rights – this outweighs, absent a strong state there could be infinite violations of the categorical imperative – which means being strong externally outweighs being a weak pacifist state

#### [2] No warrant why pacifism is important under Kant – we aren’t universalizing war, but rather, universalizing the existence of a particular type of weapon

#### [3] Hindering of a hinderance – Pacifism justifies never going to war against another state for a potential rights violation. Just as Kant would say you have the right to self-defend yourself if attacked, we don’t subscribe to a purely pacifist strategy where we never adopt an arms race – in fact, it is key to ensuring reciprocal relationships among countries which is important under Kant.

## AT Harvard-Westlake

### Framework

#### On Kancou – A. Cross apply why consequentialism fails B. There isn’t an intent to cause extinction, so it’s not relevant under the framework C. Fallacy of origin, just because we need to be alive to value reason doesn’t mean we intrinsically value being alive, I just assert that Kant is the best moral theory for those who are alive D. Value to life, simply being alive is nonsensical as if somebody was living a life of being tortured they would rather die, which means an end goal of simply maximizing life is incoherent E. Prefer the NC syllogism – if I win we are constitutively practical reasoners it means the ONLY intrinsic end we can do is to respect universalizability, and being alive doesn’t function under that maxim

#### On Sinnot-Armstrong – A. This conflates consequentialism with syllogisms. Clearly, we don’t need to be consequentialist to make the claim A leads to B leads to C – that is simply a facet of logic B. Action theory solves this argument – we use reason to link related actions to each other, that is, when I drop the timer from my ground, we use reason to relate the syllogism of the minute actions taking place into one unified whole C. At best, this doesn’t prove util, but is a reason why we need consequences, which means if I win any calc indict to their framework it simply triggers permissibility D. Under Kant, we have an obligation to take all actions necessary to achieve a given end which justifies following necessary enablers, irrespective of any consequentialist actions.

#### On Tradeoffs – A. Cross apply how aggregation fails – especially in the context of governments where it’s impossible to know the intrinsic desires of every single one of their citizens – preventing death doesn’t cut it because governments need an ethical calculus that does far more than simply preventing dying, their policy tradeoffs do matter B. Kant solves – governments weigh between different violations of the categorical imperative to determine right vs wrong C. Kant hijacks actor specificity – we need a State in a position of hindering a hindrance, that is, protecting the freedom of its own constitutions, which means only a moral entity which follows Kant can solve for this, whereas there’s no reason why governments have to use util, especially if I am winning the thesis claim that we are all practical agents.

#### On Prerequisite – A. This doesn’t justify a state-based utilitarian theory B. Different agent take different actions in emergency situations, which proves your framework triggers permissibility because there is no unified ethic

#### On Intent Foresight – A. If a pilot intends to bomb a weapons factory and foresees the bomb killing civilians, no IF-distinction would say the bomber intends to kill the civilians, BUT if the civilians end up surviving, the bomber clearly wouldn’t have made a mistake or failed to carry out their mission. B. If I give somebody CPR but still foresee them dying, I am not intending for them to die – I am still intending them to live. C. Calc-indicts take out this argument D. THIS IS KEY – your argument doesn’t justify util – that is a reason why consequences factor into our intentions under any ethical calculus including Kant, but insofar as you didn’t prove how the foreseen consequences of the aff are relevant under the NC framework anyway, it doesn’t matter, and you cannot allow for new 2AR extrapolations because it would be a NEW ARGUMENT

#### On Act-Omission – A. Doesn’t justify util – it just means ethics should operate without an act-omission distinction, which can be achieved under Kant too B. Ethics cannot hold agents accountable for an infinite number of untaken decisions, otherwise that would impair action because agents would simultaneously have an infinite number of obligations. C. Illogical – we wouldn’t hold an agent who chooses a morally repugnant act equally culpable as an agent who chooses not to prevent a morally repugnant act, like saving a drowning baby from a pool. D. Omissions aren’t intrinsic to the will because agents don’t proactively choose not to take certain actions, e.g. you don’t wake up and say, “Today is my day to not donate to charity!” – so we shouldn’t hold agents morally accountable for these omissions.

### Contention

#### OVERVIEW – None of their responses actually turn the NC – they are straight defense, which means if I win the NC still vote negative on a risk of offense.

#### [1] The NC isn’t consequentialist – A. My offense proves why the action of banning LAWs are intrinsically bad under the framework because it restricts the private manufacturing options of individuals and is an imposition on the State’s will B. Double bind, either A. Consequentialism fails in which both of our frameworks trigger permissibility, or B. You win consequentialism is good, so I get access to consequentialist offense under the NC

#### [2] On your Hobbes response A. I’m not reading Hobbes and it’s a conflation of two frameworks B. I’m not saying we cannot restrict the actions of the military, but rather, we cannot restrict the ability of a military to defend and protect the State itself – but clearly, if the State is engaging in morally reprehensible acts the NC would still condemn that action C. Hindering of a hinderance solves – if the State is engaging in a morally repugnant act then we wouldn’t be justified in strengthening the army, but insofar as you haven’t proven that, the offense still stands. Fiat DOES NOT SOLVE because the aff fiats a treaty, which definitionally means it is a restriction upon the States will because they are forced to follow this treaty or risk punishment.

#### [3] On your Waltz response – A. It doesn’t prove util – READ THE CARD ITSELF, it says “arms racing might be dangerous,” but that STILL justifies the State protecting the interests of its citizens out of self-interest – their answer is straw-manning B. Even if Waltz believes in consequentialism, that’s not what my framework justifies, that’s like saying one of the authors in your advantage is actually a Kantian in their daily life so it means Kant is true – that argument is just incoherent because the question is what moral theory am I winning in the round, and how does my offense function under that moral framework

1. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)