## 1AC vs. Kevin Si

### Case

#### Contention 1 is Competiveness

#### College academic performance is declining- kills international competitiveness. Jaschik 15

Jaschik, Scott. "Report Finds U.S. Millennial Generation Faring Poorly Educationally Compared to Those of OECD Nations | InsideHigherEd." Mediocre Millennials. Marymount University, 17 Feb. 2015. Web. 20 Apr. 2015. PH

Comparisons of the educational levels of Americans with those of other industrialized nations rarely reassure[s] those in the United States. And a new analysis released today by the Educational Testing Service is likely to be unsettling to many. The new study makes use of data collected by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development through a project called the Program for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (or PIAAC). The[y] data look at the capabilities of all adults (and of groups of adults) rather than comparing those at certain grade levels, as is the case with many international comparisons. In theory, an all-adult focus might benefit Americans, since much of the rest of the world has only more recently sought to provide a higher education (or higher levels of secondary education) to broad cross sections of their populations. But the results show the United States lagging most O.E.C.D. nations. The PIAAC focuses on three areas: literacy, numeracy and problem solving. The ETS study focuses on millennials (those 16 to 34), noting that they will be in the American workforce for many decades to come and reflect the current state of the American educational system. Here are some of the highlights: In literacy, millennials in the U.S. were better only than Spain and Italy among the 22 participating O.E.C.D. countries. In numeracy, millennials in the U.S. were tied for last with Italy and Spain. In problem solving, millennials in the U.S. again ranked last, this time tied with the Slovak Republic, Ireland and Poland. Countries that ranked high for millennial score levels (in order, across fields): Finland, Japan, Sweden, Netherlands and Norway. The U.S. millennial population of course includes both those with and without a college education. And the data show that a college degree is no guarantee of comparing well internationally. U.S. millennials with a four-year bachelor’s degree scored higher in numeracy than their counterparts in only two countries in the study: Poland and Spain. Further, the best-educated millennials -- those who have a master's or a research-oriented degree -- only outperformed across all fields their counterparts in Ireland, Poland and Spain. The ETS study also looked at various demographic groupings. For instance, the study found a strong correlation between the millennial skill levels and parental levels of educational attainment. But there was no country that scored lower than the United States across all levels of parental educational attainment. Another interesting finding relates to immigrant populations. In most of the countries studied, native-born millennials outperformed immigrant millennials, not surprising since the latter would have been uprooted at some point, perhaps interrupting their education. When the researchers isolated the scores of native-born U.S. millennials and compared them to those of other countries, the Americans did not perform higher than those in any other country.

#### And, the impact is supercharged since adjuncts teach people who need them the most. Hoff 14

Hoff, James. "Are Adjunct Professors the Fast-food Workers of the Academic World?" Theguardian. Guardian News and Media Limited, 24 Jan. 2014. Web. 19 Apr. 2015. PH

The students who frequently need the most help – poor and working class students, first generation college students, and students of color – are also the ones most likely to be taught by adjuncts. It is no accident that the increased use of adjuncts followed quickly on the heels of a massive shift in the demography of college attendance in the late sixties and early seventies. As more and more working class people and people of color began attending public universities in California and New York, state funding was quickly reduced. Rather than continue to offer the best to these students, universities decided instead to expand the use of adjuncts. Just as the doors of academia were opened to the most underprivileged students, the feast of knowledge that lay behind was quietly hidden from view, and the paper plates and frozen dinners brought out instead.

#### Better education ensures future competitiveness in the global economy- teachers are uniquely key. Hanushek 11

Hanushek, Eric A. "Valuing Teachers: How Much Is a Good Teacher Worth?" Valuing Teachers: How Much Is a Good Teacher Worth? Education Next, Summer 2011. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. PH

For some time, we have recognized that the academic achievement of schoolchildren in this country threatens, to borrow President Barack Obama’s words, “the U.S.’s role as an engine of scientific discovery” and ultimately its success in the global economy. The low achievement of American students, as reflected in the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) (see “Teaching Math to the Talented,” features, Winter 2011), will prevent them from accessing good, high-paying jobs. And, as demonstrated in another article in Education Next (see “Education and Economic Growth,” research, Spring 2008), lower achievement means slower growth in the economy. From studying the historical relationship, we can estimate that closing just half of the performance gap with Finland, one of the top international performers in terms of student achievement, could add more than $50 trillion to our gross domestic product between 2010 and 2090. By way of comparison, the drop in economic output over the course of the last recession is believed to be less than $3 trillion. Thus the achievement gap between the U.S. and the world’s top-performing countries can be said to be causing the equivalent of a permanent recession. According to the president in this year’s State of the Union address, this is “our generation’s Sputnik moment,” the time when we realize the urgent need to step up the performance of our education system. Only today, unlike in the 1950s, we have a clear idea of what it takes to improve achievement. The quality of the teachers in our schools is paramount: no other measured aspect of schools is nearly as important in determining student achievement. The initiatives we have emphasized in policy discussions—class-size reduction, curriculum revamping, reorganization of school schedule, investment in technology—all fall far short of the impact that good teachers can have in the classroom. Moreover, many of these interventions can be very costly. Indeed, the magnitude of variation in the quality of teachers, even within each school, is startling. Teachers who work in a given school, and therefore teach students with similar demographic characteristics, can be responsible for increases in math and reading levels that range from a low of one-half year to a high of one and a half years of learning each academic year. But while most parents are able to distinguish a good teacher from a bad one, few have any idea what difference it makes in the lives of their children. And researchers do not help, tending to talk in terms of standard deviations of achievement and effect sizes, phrases that simply have no meaning outside of the rarefied world of research. Here, I translate the researchers’ shorthand into concepts that might be more readily understood: the impact of teachers on the earnings of individuals and on the future of the economy as a whole.

#### Competitiveness prevents great power nuclear war. Khalilzad ‘11

Khalilzad, Zalmay. "The Economy and National Security." National Review Online. National Review, 8 Feb. 2011. Web. 26 Apr. 2015. PH

We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution of power. These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation. The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars. American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions. As rival powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition. Beijing’s economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China’s strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China’s expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression. Given the risks, the United States must focus on restoring its economic and fiscal condition while checking and managing the rise of potential adversarial regional powers such as China. While we face significant challenges, the U.S. economy still accounts for over 20 percent of the world’s GDP. American institutions — particularly those providing enforceable rule of law — set it apart from all the rising powers. Social cohesion underwrites political stability. U.S. demographic trends are healthier than those of any other developed country. A culture of innovation, excellent institutions of higher education, and a vital sector of small and medium-sized enterprises propel the U.S. economy in ways difficult to quantify. Historically, Americans have responded pragmatically, and sometimes through trial and error, to work our way through the kind of crisis that we face today.

#### War also causes species extinction. Robock and Slanina 09

Robock and Slanina 9 – Prof Climatology @ Rutgers, Alan, Head of Environmental Research @ Netherlands Energy Research Foundation, Sjaak, "Nuclear winter." In: Encyclopedia of Earth. Eds. Cutler J. Cleveland http://www.eoearth.org/article/Nuclear\_winter

Nuclear winter is a term that describes the climatic effects of nuclear war. In the 1980's, work conducted jointly by Western and Soviet scientists showed that for a full-scale nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union the climatic consequences, and indirect effects of the collapse of society, would be so severe that the ensuing nuclear winter would produce famine for billions of people far from the target zones. There are several wrong impressions that people have about nuclear winter. One is that there was a flaw in the theory and that the large climatic effects were disproven. Another is that the problem, even if it existed, has been solved by the end of the nuclear arms race. But these are both wrong. Furthermore, new nuclear states threaten global climate change even with arsenals that are much less than 1% of the current global arsenal. What's New Based on new work published in 2007 and 2008 by some of the pioneers of nuclear winter research who worked on the original studies, we now can say several things about this topic. New Science: \* A minor nuclear war (such as between India and Pakistan or in the Middle East), with each country using 50 Hiroshima-sized atom bombs as airbursts on urban areas, could produce climate change unprecedented in recorded human history. This is only 0.03% of the explosive power of the current global arsenal. \* This same scenario would produce global ozone depletion, because the heating of the stratosphere would enhance the chemical reactions that destroy ozone. \* A nuclear war between the United States and Russia today could produce nuclear winter, with temperatures plunging below freezing in the summer in major agricultural regions, threatening the food supply for most of the planet. \* The climatic effects of the smoke from burning cities and industrial areas would last for several years, much longer than we previously thought. New climate model simulations, that have the capability of including the entire atmosphere and oceans, show that the smoke would be lofted by solar heating to the upper stratosphere, where it would remain for years. New Policy Implications: \* The only way to eliminate the possibility of this climatic catastrophe is to eliminate the nuclear weapons. If they exist, they can be used. \* The spread of nuclear weapons to new emerging states threatens not only the people of those countries, but the entire planet. \* Rapid reduction of the American and Russian nuclear arsenals will set an example for the rest of the world that nuclear weapons cannot be used and are not needed. How Does Nuclear Winter Work? A nuclear explosion is like bringing a piece of the Sun to the Earth's surface for a fraction of a second. Like a giant match, it causes cities and industrial areas to burn. Megacities have developed in India and Pakistan and other developing countries, providing tremendous amounts of fuel for potential fires. The direct effects of the nuclear weapons, blast, radioactivity, fires, and extensive pollution, would kill millions of people, but only those near the targets. However, the fires would have another effect. The massive amounts of dark smoke from the fires would be lofted into the upper troposphere, 10-15 kilometers (6-9 miles) above the Earth's surface, and then absorption of sunlight would further heat the smoke, lifting it into the stratosphere, a layer where the smoke would persist for years, with no rain to wash it out. The climatic effects of smoke from fires started by nuclear war depend on the amount of smoke. Our new calculations show that for 50 nuclear weapons dropped on two countries, on the targets that would produce the maximum amount of smoke, about 5 megatons (Tg) of black smoke would be produced, accounting for the amount emitted from the fires and the amount immediately washed out in rain. As the smoke is lofted into the stratosphere, it would be transported around the world by the prevailing winds. We also did calculations for two scenarios of war between the two superpowers who still maintain large nuclear arsenals, the United States and Russia. In one scenario, 50 Tg of black smoke would be produced and in another, 150 Tg of black smoke would be produced. How many nuclear weapons would be required to produce this much smoke? It depends on the targets, but there are enough weapons in the current arsenals to produce either amount. In fact, there are only so many targets. Once they are all hit by weapons, additional weapons would not produce much more smoke at all. Even after the current nuclear weapons reduction treaty between these superpowers is played out in 2012, with each having about 2,000 weapons, 150 Tg of smoke could still be produced. Here are movies of the smoke transport from three different scenarios: These new results were made possible by the use of a state-of-the-art general circulation model of the climate. For the first time a complete calculation of not only atmospheric but also oceanic circulation was conducted, including the entire atmosphere from the surface up through the troposphere, stratosphere, and mesosphere, to an elevation of 80 kilometers (50 miles). Previous calculations had not been run for the 10 year simulations here, and had not allowed the smoke to be lofted into the upper stratosphere, where it would persist for many years. We calculated the climate response to the three scenarios illustrated above. Compared to the global warming observed for the past century, all three scenarios show massive cooling. Compared to the climate change for the Northern Hemisphere for the past 1,000 years, the famous hockey stick diagram, the climate change from any of these scenarios is unprecedented. Compared to climate change for the past millenium, even the 5 Tg case (a war between India and Pakistan) would plunge the planet into temperatures colder than the Little Ice Age (approximately 1600-1850). This would be essentially instantly, and agriculture would be severely threatened. Larger amounts of smoke would produce larger climate changes, and for the 150 Tg case produce a true nuclear winter, making agriculture impossible for years. In both cases, new climate model simulations show that the effects would last for more than a decade. Analogs Support the Theory Nuclear winter is a theory based on computer model calculations. Normally, scientists test theories by doing experiments, but we never want to do this experiment in the real world. Thus we look for analogs that can inform us of parts of the theory. And there are many such analogs that convince us that the theory is correct: \* Cities burning. Unfortunately, we have several examples of cities burning, firestorms created by the intense release of energy, and smoke being pumped into the upper atmosphere. These include San Francisco as a result of the earthquake in 1906, and cities bombed in World War II, including Tokyo, Dresden, Hamburg, Darmstadt, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki. \* The seasonal cycle. In the winter, the climate is cooler, because the days are shorter and sunlight is less intense. Again, this helps us quantify the effects of reduction of solar radiation. \* The diurnal cycle. At night the Sun sets and it gets cold at the surface. If the Sun did not rise tomorrow, we already have an intuitive feel for how much cooling would take place and how fast it would cool. \* Volcanic eruptions. Explosive volcanic eruptions, such as those of Tambora in 1815, Krakatau in 1883 and Pinatubo in 1991, provide several lessons. The resulting sulfate aerosol cloud in the stratosphere is transported around the world by winds, thus supporting the results from the animations above. The surface temperature plummets after each large eruption, in proportion to the thickness of the stratospheric cloud. In fact 1816, following Tambora, is known as the "Year Without a Summer," with global cooling and famine. Following the Pinatubo eruption, global precipitation, river flow, and soil moisture all reduced, since cooling the planet by blocking sunlight has a strong effect on reducing evaporation and weakening the hydrologic cycle. This is also what the nuclear winter simulations show. \* Forest fires. Smoke from large forest fires sometimes is injected into the lower stratosphere. And the smoke is transported around the world, also producing cooling under the smoke. \* Dust storms on Mars. Occasionally, dust storms start in one region of Mars, but the dust is heated by the Sun, lofted into the upper atmosphere, and transported around the planet to completely enshroud it in a dust blanket. This process takes a couple weeks, just like our computer simulations for the nuclear winter smoke. \* Extinction of the dinosaurs. 65,000,000 years ago an asteroid or comet smashed into the Earth in southern Mexico. The resulting dust cloud, mixed with smoke from fires, blocked out the Sun, killing the dinosaurs, and starting the age of mammals. This Cretaceous-Tertiary (K-T) extinction may have been exacerbated by massive volcanism in India at the same time. This teaches us that large amounts of aerosols in Earth's atmosphere have caused massive climate change and extinction of species. The difference with nuclear winter is that the K-T extinction could not have been prevented. Policy Implications The work on nuclear winter in the 1980's, and the realization that both direct and indirect effects of nuclear war would be a global catastrophe, led to the end of arms race and the end of the Cold War. In response to the comment "In the 1980s, you warned about the unprecedented dangers of nuclear weapons and took very daring steps to reverse the arms race," in an interview in 2000, Mikhail Gorbachev said "Models made by Russian and American scientists showed that a nuclear war would result in a nuclear winter that would be extremely destructive to all life on Earth; the knowledge of that was a great stimulus to us, to people of honor and morality, to act in that situation."[1] Since the 1980's, the number of nuclear weapons in the world has decreased to 1/3 of the peak number of more than 70,000. The consequences of regional-scale nuclear conflicts are unexpectedly large, with the potential to become global catastrophes. The combination of nuclear proliferation, political instability, and urban demographics may constitute one of the greatest dangers to the stability of society since the dawn of humans. The current and projected American and Russian nuclear arsenals can still produce nuclear winter. Only nuclear disarmament will prevent the possibility of a nuclear environmental catastrophe.

#### Living wage solves - also causes a spillover effect by creating transparency in the system, which provides a check against abuse. SEIU 2

"The Fight of Their Lives: Can Adjuncts Finally Win a Living Wage?" Alternet. Kause, 24 Mar. 2015. Web. 20 Apr. 2015. PH

Most observers agree that adjunct instructors deserve better pay, but what about $15,000 per course? The Service Employees International Union shocked even some adjunct activists last week when it announced that figure as a centerpiece of its new faculty advocacy campaign. But while union leaders admit the number is bold, those involved in the campaign say adjuncts might as well aim big, since they have little to lose. They also say they hope the $15,000 figure will force a national conversation about just how colleges spend their money, if not on middle-class salaries for instructors. “Clearly this is an aspirational goal, but it’s a realistic goal, as well,” said Tiffany Kraft, an adjunct instructor of English at four different institutions in the Portland, Ore., area, where she earns $2,700 to $3,400 per course -- about average, nationwide. “What I think needs to happen is a re-evaluation of how money is transmitted through universities -- there needs to be transparency there... Yes, that $15,000 number is bold, but it’ll [and] get people to wake up and start doing the math, about how many students are in a class and faculty pay, and [what percentage] of tuition dollars actually gets spent on instruction.” Kraft is not part of an SEIU union but has been active in the advocacy arm of the union’s Adjunct Action campaign to organize adjuncts on campuses nationally. She helped SEIU announce its new, national Faculty Forward campaign last week on a conference call with adjuncts and labor organizers. Distinct from Adjunct Action, which has focused mostly on organizing adjuncts across metro areas nationwide, with much success, Faculty Forward is what SEIU is calling a more “grassroots” awareness campaign about faculty working conditions and pay. Faculty Forward is also more inclusive than Adjunct Action, in that all faculty members -- part-time and full-time, non-tenure track and tenure line -- are encouraged to participate. That’s perhaps unsurprising, given that SEIU has begun organizing tenure-line faculty on at least one campus, the University of Minnesota. Faculty Forward has three mains goals so far: demand $15,000 per course, including benefits; target “bad actors” in for-profit higher education, including those with poor student debt records; and make quality higher education affordable and accessible for all students. The effort’s still getting off the ground, but SEIU says it’s planning awareness events on campuses this spring. SEIU says the $15,000 target won’t be used as bargaining efforts at this point. At the same time, the union says it’s not all that unrealistic, given that many Tufts University adjuncts -- the first group of adjuncts to win a contract as part of Adjunct Action -- got a significant raise under the agreement: by September 2016, all part-time Tufts faculty members will make at least $7,300 per course, and those with eight or more years of service will make at least $8,760. That doesn’t include benefits for all adjuncts, and non-classroom time, such as that spent meeting with students, also will be compensated. Still, it’s a big leap from $7,300 to $15,000, and Tufts is a relatively wealthy institution that likely can afford to pay its instructors more than, say, a public, regional institution or small, struggling private one, where even tenure-line instructors sometimes start at a salary equivalent to three courses under the SEIU target. According to the American Association of University Professors' most recent salary survey, average pay for assistant professors is about $62,500 to $76,900, depending on institution type. For associate professors, it's $75,220 to $91,200. Under the SEIU target, instructors teaching three courses each in the spring and fall would make $90,000 annually.

#### Contention 2 is Plan

#### Inherency: Living wage has yet to pass through the ivory tower of academia. Part-time laborers, adjunct professors, are still receiving ultra-low wages will other industries are adopting higher wages. Burns 15

Burns, Rebecca. [Chicago-based reporter covering labor, housing and higher education] "The Fight of Their Lives: Can Adjuncts Finally Win a Living Wage?" Alternet. Alternet, 24 Mar. 2015. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. PH

Seattle may have become one of the first cities to pass a $15 minimum wage last year, but the city’s adjunct instructors say that the dictum for fair pay has yet to penetrate the Ivory Tower. The median pay for adjuncts, who as professional workers are exempt from most minimum wage and overtime protections, is $2,700 per course nationwide, or just over $16,000 annually for a full teaching load. At Seattle University (SU), the city’s premier Jesuit college, they are paid as little as $2,200 per course, according to crowdsourced data from the Adjunct Project. When all the hours spent grading, meeting with students and preparing for class are factored in, the school’s instructors say that this likely amounts to less than minimum wage—a claim echoed by adjuncts instructors nationwide. As a result, the “Fight for 15” is now headed to college, as adjunct instructors at SU and a host of other schools press for union representation, a wage bump and expanded job protections for contingent faculty who often live course to course, with no long-term contract or track to tenure. Last month, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) announced a new nationwide “Faculty Forward” campaign that will push for a minimum compensation standard of $15,000 per college course taught, plus benefits. That figure would represent a dramatic increase over adjunct instructors’ current pay, but the same was true when SEIU-affiliated groups began demanding $15 for fast-food workers three years ago. Could the Fight for 15 gain traction in the academy?

#### Resolved: The United States ought to require university employers a living wage of $15,000/course indexed to inflation. I reserve the right to clarify. SEIU

"SEIU Faculty Forward." SEIU Faculty Forward. Kause, n.d. Web. 20 Apr. 2015. PH

The amount of $15,000/course reflects a fair and proportionate amount for non-tenure track faculty at four year institutions to receive. The dollar amount factors in the standard salary and benefit package of tenure track faculty and then takes into account the other non-instructional duties they also perform. Under this formula a part-time faculty member teaching a 3/2 course load each year would gross $75,000 total compensation per year. Considering their education, college and university faculty pay often lags behind other professionals. The average salary for post-secondary faculty with a PhD is 21 percent lower than the average for other workers with a doctorate degree.[13]

### FW

#### Morality must be universalizable. Only consequentialism can meet this constraint. Universalizing anything else results in a conflict in normative reasons. Pettit:

[Laurance S. Rockefeller University Professor of Politics and Human Values at Princeton University]. The Cost of Non-Consequentialism. February 5, 1999. <http://www.philo.umontreal.ca/documents/cahiers/Pettit\_Non-Consequentialism.pdf>

Every prescription as to what an agent ought to do should be capable of being universalised, so that it applies not just to that particular agent, and not just to that particular place or time or context or whatever. So at any rate we generally assume in our moral reasoning. If we think that it is right for one agent in one circumstance to act in a certain way, but wrong for another, then we commit ourselves to there being some further descriptive difference between the two cases, in particular a difference of a non-particular or universal kind. Thus, if we say that an agent A ought to choose option O in circumstances C — these may bear on the character of the agent, the behaviour of others, the sorts of consequences on offer, and the like — then we assumethat something similar would hold for any similarly placed agent. We do not think that the particular identity of agent A is relevant to what A ought to do, any more than we think that the particular location or date is relevant to that issue. In making an assumption about what holds for any agent in C-type circumstances, of course, we may not be committing ourselves to anything of very general import. It may be, for all the universalisability constraint requires, that C-type circumstances are highly specific: so specific, indeed, that no other agent is ever likely to confront them.There is no difficulty in seeing how the universalisability challenge is supposed to be met under consequentialist doctrine. **Suppose** that I accept**consequentialis[m]**t doctrine and believe of an agent that in their particular circumstances, C, he or she ought to choose an option O. For simplicity, suppose that I am myself that agent and that as a believer in consequentialism I think of myself that I ought to do O in C. If that option really **is right** by my consequentialist lights, **then that will be because of the neutral values that it promotes. But if those neutral values make O**the **right** option **for me** in those circumstances, so **they will make it** the **right** option **for any other agent** in such circumstances. Thus I can readily square the prescription to which my belief in consequentialism leads with my belief in universalisability. I can happily universalise my self-prescription to a prescription for any arbitrary agent in similar circumstances. In passing, a comment on the form of the prescription that the universalisability challenge will force me to endorse. I need not think that it is right that in the relevant circumstances every agent do O; that suggests a commitment to a collective pattern of behaviour. I will only be forced to think, in a person-by-person or distributive way, that for every agent it is right that in those circumstances he or she do O. Let doing O in C amount to swimming to the help of a child in trouble. Universalisability would not force me to think that everyone ought to swim to the help of a child in such a situation; undoubtedly they would frustrate one another’s efforts. It only requires me to think, as we colloquially put it, that anyone ought to swim to the help of the child; it only requires a person-by-person prescription, not a collective one.So much for the straightforward way in which consequentialism can make room for universalisability. But how is the universalisability challenge supposed to be met under non-consequentialist theories? According to **[Suppose a] non-consequentialist theory, [where] the right choice for any agent is to instantiate a certain pattern, P;** this may be the pattern of conforming to the categorical imperative, manifesting virtue, respecting rights, honouring their special obligations, or whatever. Suppose that I accept such a theory and that it leads me to say of an agent — again, let us suppose, myself — that I ought to choose O in these circumstances, C, or that O is the right choice for me in these circumstances. Can I straightforwardly say, as I could under consequentialist doctrine, that just for the reasons that O is the right choice for me — in this case, that it involves instantiating pattern, P — so it will be the right choice for any agent in C-type circumstances? I shall argue that there are difficulties in the path of such a straightforward response and that these raise a problem for non-consequentialism. The problem Suppose that I do say, in the straightforward way, **that** pattern P**requires, not just that I do O in C, but also**, for any agent whatsoever,**that [any] agent should do O in C as well.** Suppose I say, in effect, that it is right for me to do O in C only if it would be right for any agent X to do O in C. Whatever makes it right that I do O in C makes it right, so the response goes, that any agent do O in C. This response is going to lead me, as a non-consequentialist thinker, into trouble. Judging that something is right gives one a normative reason to prefer it; the judgment of rightness must provide such a reason if it is to have an action-guiding role. When I think that it is right that I do O in C, therefore, then I commit myself to there being a normative reason for me to prefer that I do O. And when I assert that it is right that anyone should do O in C-type circumstances, then I commit myself — again, because of the reason-giving force of the notion of rightness — to there being a normative reason for holding a broader preference. I commit myself to there being a normative reason for me to prefer, with any agent whatsoever, that in C-type circumstances that [any] agent do O. The problem with these reasons and these commitments, **however,** is that they may come apart. For it is often going to be possible**that**, perversely, **the best way** for me **to ensure** or increase the chance **that** for **any**arbitrary **agent**, X, that agent **does O in C**-type circumstances**, is to choose non-O myself in** those **C**ircumstances. The best way to satisfy the preference as to what the arbitrarily chosen agent should do may be to go against the preference as to what one should do oneself. The best way to get people to renounce violence may be to take it up oneself; the best way to get people to help their own children may be not to press for the advantage of one’s own; the best way to minimise murder may to commit a murder; and so on. More generally, the best way to promote the instantiation of pattern, P, where this is the basic pattern to which one swears non-consequentialist allegiance, may be to flout that pattern oneself. The best way to increase the chance that for any arbitrary agent, X, that agent instantiates P may be not to instantiate P oneself. How can I avoid the conclusion that in such a perverse situation I ought to promote the overall instantiation of my cherished pattern, even at the cost of not instantiating it myself? How, in other words, am I to keep faith with the non-consequentialist commitment to the rightness of instantiating P, even where this means that the overall realisation of the pattern falls short of what it might have been? It is hardly going to be plausible for me to say that normative reasons bearing on preferences over my own choices trump normative reasons bearing on preferences over how other people behave. Both sorts of reasons are supported in the common language of what is the right choice or of what ought to be done. And it would surely run against the spirit of universalisability — the spirit in which I deny that my own particular identity is important to the prescription defended — to say that a reasoned preference as to what I do myself should not be responsive to a similarly reasoned preference as to what people in general do — what arbitrary agent, X, does — in the sorts of circumstances in question. The upshot is that **if as a non-consequentialist** theorist**I** straightforwardly **universalise** the prescription that in a certain situation I should instantiate **a** favoured**pattern, P, then** the prescription to which I thereby commit myself — that in that situation any X ought to instantiate pattern, P — may force me to revise my original self-prescription. **I have equal reason to prefer both that I instantiate P and that any agent instantiate P** — this reason is expressed by the use of the word ‘right’ or ‘ought’ in each case — **and** the spirit of **universalizability blocks me from treating myself as** in any way **special**. **Thus,** if the preferences are inconsistent in a certain situation — if the choice is between my instantiating P alone, for example, or my acting so that many others instantiate P instead — then **I will have reason not to instantiate P myself.** As a would-be non-consequentialist thinker, my initial claim must have been that the point is to instantiate P in my own life, not promote it generally. But I countenance the general claims of the P-pattern **when I universalize** in the straightforward way: **I prescribe general conformity to that pattern, not just conformity in my own case. Thus** it now seems that what I must think is that this general conformity is to be promoted, even if that means not myself instantiating the pattern in my own behaviour or psychology or relationships. It seems that what **I must embrace**, in effect, is a**consequentialism** in which conformity to pattern P is the ultimate value to be promoted.

#### The standard is consistency with consequentialism. General indicts of the standard modify consequentialist reasoning but do not defeat it. For example, an infinite calculation argument implies we should stop calculating and prefer foreseen impacts, but not that no consequences matter. Impact Calc:

Extinction comes first under the standard

1. Uncertainty means we should default to preventing extinction to ensure the future has the possibility of more value. Indicts to the framework mandates it since we need as many perspectives as possible to resolve and act in accordance with the coherent ethical view. Framework contestation concedes the desire to escape uncertainty.
2. Risk analysis means preventing existential risk comes first. Bostrom 05

Bostrom, Nick. [Professor of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School, Director of Future of Humanity Institute Director of Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology, Professor of University of Oxford] "Transcript of "A Philosophical Quest for Our Biggest Problems"" TED. TED Conferences, July 2005. Web. 27 Dec. 2014. PH

Now, if we think about what just reducing the probability of human extinction by just one percentage point -- not very much -- so that's equivalent to 60 million lives saved, if we just count the currently living people, the current generation. Now one percent of six billion people is equivalent to 60 million. So that's a large number. If we were to take into account future generations that will never come into existence if we blow ourselves up, then the figure becomes astronomical. If we could eventually colonize a chunk of the universe -- the Virgo supercluster -- maybe it will take us 100 million years to get there, but if we go extinct we never will. Then, even a one percentage point reduction in the extinction risk could be equivalent to this astronomical number -- 10 to the power of 32. So if you take into account future generations as much as our own, every other moral imperative of philanthropic cost just becomes irrelevant. The only thing you should focus on would be to reduce existential risk because even the tiniest decrease in existential risk would just overwhelm any other benefit you could hope to achieve. And even if you just look at the current people, and ignore the potential that would be lost if we went extinct, it should still have a high priority. Now, let me spend the rest of my time on the third big problem, because it's more subtle and perhaps difficult to grasp. Think about some time in your life -- some people might never have experienced it -- but some people, there are just those moments that you have experienced where life was fantastic.

This means if there were a 1% chance of consequentialism being true, existential risk would be bad for the purpose of decision-making.

Prefer for additional reasons

1. Actor-specificity is a meta-framing issue. Governments ONLY have access to knowledge towards the general aggregate not specific individuals, which means they must use consequentialism to determine policy action. Epistemology comes first when examining ethics because it’s a study of how we acquire knowledge making it a prerequisite to the resolution. And, collective action results in trade-off, which means that side constraints paralyze state action. States lack intentionality and internal motivation, which means there can’t be a distinction between acts and omissions since policy-makers consider permissions and prohibition when regulating the public domain. Even when policy-makers question the distinction they are consciously making a choice about what to DO and NOT DO. This means NO permissibility or presumption since governments make reasonably reliable predictions.
2. There’s no stable conception of personal identity, which only leaves experience, mandating consequentialism. Shoemaker

The Journal of Value Inquiry 33: 183–199, 1999. UTILITARIANISM AND PERSONAL IDENTITY © 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. ￼183 Utilitarianism and Personal Identity DAVID W. SHOEMAKER Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, 327 Clement Hall, Memphis, TN 38152, USA

Doing so has a number of significant implications for rationality and morality. For one thing, the unity of our lives is no longer guaranteed. Our lives may be more or less unified, given the degree to which psychological connectedness holds. For instance, **I am** presently **strongly connected to** that stage of **myself** that existed **yesterday, but** I amfairly **weakly connected to that** long-ago existing **ten-year-old stage of myself**. Parfit suggeststhe language of successive selves to illuminate the different degrees to which this relation might hold. We might use the word “self,” then, to refer to a collection of person-stages united by strong psychological connectedness, such that my ten-year-old self could be viewed as a past self, while my eighty- year-old self would presumably be a future self. The parts of my life with which I am strongly psychologically connected are united as my present self.7 In this way, different selves occasionally resemble different persons, and Parfit indicates that, at certain times and places, selves might be thought of as the appropriate objects of moral concern.8 But this notion also implies that **our lives may not be unified** in certain important respects.Psychological connectedness is certainly not guaranteed to unify our entire lives, and **so the reductionist view** itself **implies** at least the partial **disintegration of persons**.93. Utilitarianism and Reductionism Utilitarianism is an ethical theory for ranking various outcomes from an impersonal standpoint. **Utilitarians hold that the best state of affairs** among relevant alternatives **contains** the greatest net balance of **aggregate** individual **welfare**. Utilitarianism is impersonal insofar as it involves a focus solely on the total amounts of utility at stake in various outcomes, and “[i]t makes no moral difference [not] how these amounts are distributed as between different people.”10 Many utilitarians claim that the impersonality of the theory is entailed by a close analogy that obtains between cases of intrapersonal and interpersonal maximization. As Parfit remarks: “Since their attitude to sets of lives is like ours to single lives, [u]tilitarians ignore the boundaries between lives.”11 Parfit further believes that utilitarians accept this analogy **because they accept a reductionis[m]**t view about personal identity. If a person’s life is less deeply integrated than it would be on a non-reductionist view, then while principles of distributive justice central to non-utilitarian views ought to be given greater scope, targeting past, present, and future selves, they nevertheless ought to be given less weight. After all, if a person’s life is less unified than we normally think, and this undermines the hard and fast boundaries between lives as well, then distributive **principles relying on the separateness of persons** and the individual unity of a person’s life as deep facts **will have far less moral importance** than they would on a non-reductionist view. Some critics have claimed that utilitarians ignore the boundaries between lives because they think of all people as together constituting a collective super-person, but this charge is false, according to Parfit. Because of the partial disintegration of persons suggested by reductionism,utilitarians “may be treating benefits and burdens, not as if they all came within the same life, but as if it made no moral difference where they came.”12 Thus, Parfit suggests that reductionism may lend significant support to utilitarianism, simply becauseutilitarians can claim to be treating sets of lives like single lives, given that single lives are not deeply unified and are, in fact, metaphysically like sets of lives.

Takes out reason-based frameworks and arguments that rely on static conception of agency because in the absence of personal identity people reduce to collective units of aggregation which can only entail a maximization calculus.

1. Moral truths are determined by what is most useful to believe. James

Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking - William James 1907. Print

The importance to human life of having true beliefs about matters of fact is a thing to notorious. We live in a world of realities that can be infinitely useful or infinitely harmful. Ideas that tell us which of them to expect count as the true ideas in all this primary sphere of verification, and the pursuit of such ideas is a primary human duty. **The possession of truth,** so far from being here an end in itself, **is only a preliminary means towards other vital satisfactions. If I am lost in the woods and starved, and find what looks like a** cow-**path, it is of the utmost importance that I should think of a human habitation at the end of it, for if I do so and follow it, I save myself. The true thought is useful here because the house** which **is** its**[the useful] object** is useful. **The practical value of true ideas is thus primarily derived from the practical importance of their objects to us.** Their objects are, indeed, not important at all times. **I may on another occasion have no use for the house; and then my idea of it, however verifiable, will be practically irrelevant, and had better remain latent.** Yet since almost any object may someday become temporarily important, the advantage of having a general stock of extra truths, of ideas that shall be true of merely possible situations, is obvious. We store such extra truths away in our memories, and with the overflow we fill our books of reference. Whenever such an extra truth becomes practically relevant to one of our emergencies, it passes from cold-storage to do work in the world and our belief in it grows active. **You can say** of it **then either that “it is useful because it is true” or that “it is true because it is useful**.” **Both these phrases mean exactly the same thing**, namely that here is an idea that gets fulfilled and can be verified. True is the name for whatever idea starts the verification-process useful is the name for its completed function in experience. **True ideas would never have been singled out as such, would never have acquired a class-name,** least of all a name **suggesting value, unless they had been useful from the outset in this way.**

Pragmatism implies consequentialism. To prove the resolution true, we have to show its general usefulness or practical value as a true statement. Consequentialism is the only theory that stems from taking into account the general pragmatic implications of our beliefs. Answers back deflationary arguments because when we generate an obligation, it is merely for the pragmatic nature of doing so.

### Interps

####  “Require” in the context of a governmental actor means implementation. DeBois 14

DeBois, Danny. [(Harvard ’18) Champion of TOC, NCFL Grand Nationals, assistant coach at Harvard-Westlake in California, and Instructor at VBI and NSD.] "2.2 Defining and Interpreting the Resolution." Victory Briefs. Victory Briefs, 15 Dec. 2014. Web. 22 Dec. 2014. PH

Webster’s defines “require” as “to impose a compulsion or command on”4 The resolution implies some type of governmental mandate on employers to pay a living wage, meaning that policy implementation is definitely an aspect of the topic. I predict that most topicality arguments in favor of plans will be based on the word “require,” as governments require agents act a certain way by passing laws. Note, however, that there is a distinction between specification and implementation: the aff can defend the action of mandating that employers pay a living wage and defend real world implications, but also choose not to narrow down the advocacy to a particular place.

This means we use a comparative worlds paradigm where the affirmative defends implementation and the negative defends a competing policy option. This is key to reciprocity since otherwise the negative can side step the affirmative to gain a 3-1 advantage. Also, means truth testing isn’t textual.

#### Err aff on T and theory and at worst, re-evalute AC offense on neg T

A. The affirmative speaks first so I’m forced to set the parameters- I can never know what interpretation they want, so reevaluation solves since it allows me to still engage while cohering with their interpretational preference.

B. There’s multiple legitimate interpretations so I always run the risk of losing on T, competing interps makes the problem worse on T since there’s always a risk of controversy in the lit from author conflating terms or using them synonymously with different terms.

#### The negative must do all weighing and impact framing in the 1NC- this key to aff strategy because otherwise they can expand in the 2NR to spread out the aff. Also, key to resolvability since if they introduce new weighing for arguments that were in the AC it requires interpretive intervention since there’s only 1-speech interaction.