**Freedom is a byproduct of a united will. The united will is a representation of all for sovereign action.**

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In my [last piece](https://www.libertarianism.org/columns/kant-virtues-free-society) examining Kant’s discussion of the virtues central to a free society, I claimed that for **Kant what justifies sovereign authority is that the sovereign’s actions are supposed to represent the united will** of the people. Here, I want to expand on this topic and more carefully examine Kant’s justification for sovereign authority and the conditions under which he believes coercion is justified. This discussion should be of interest to anyone who believes that the justification for state authority (if it can be justified) is connected to its ability to best promote individual well‐​being by securing **each citizen’s freedom**. The relevant passage on sovereign authority comes from the Metaphysics of Morals at pages 313 and 314 of the Akademie text. There, Kant writes: The legislative authority can belong only to the united will of the people. For since all right is to proceed from it, it cannot do anyone wrong by its law. Now when someone makes arrangements about another, it is always possible for him to do the other wrong; but he can never do wrong in what he decides upon with regard to himself (for volenti non fit iniuria [no wrong is done to someone who consents]). Therefore only the concurring and united will of all, insofar as each decides the same thing for all and all for each, and so only the general united will of the people, can be legislative. This passage seems straightforward enough**: Legislative or sovereign authority is legitimate when it stems from the united will of the people. Whatever laws are implemented under those conditions are consistent with right because everyone has consented to them, and no wrong is done to an individual by an action that he consents to** (even if it harms him or otherwise makes him worse off).

# 1AC

### Underview on the bottom

## Part 1 is The Mirage

**Lorde, 1978** (Audre Lorde, 1978, accessed on 10-30-2020, Poetry Foundation, "A Litany for Survival by Audre Lorde | Poetry Foundation", https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/147275/a-litany-for-survival)[KDandu]

And when the sun rises we are afraid it might not remain when the sun sets we are afraid it might not rise in the morning when our stomachs are full we are afraid of indigestion when our stomachs are empty we are afraid we may never eat again when we are loved we are afraid love will vanish when we are alone we are afraid love will never return and **when we speak we are afraid our words will not be heard nor welcomed but when we are silent we are still afraid So it is better to speak Remembering** we were never meant to survive.[[1]](#footnote-1)

## Part 2 The Dust Settles

#### **Society assumes that intersections like race, gender, and sexuality can be separated – fixes the body into a timeless gridlock creating normative identities.**

Puar 07. Jasbir Puar, professor of women’s and gender studies at Rutgers University, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times Duke University Press: Durham, NC and London, UK, pg. 211(I can provide a pdf) [KDandu]

There is no entity, no identity, no queer subject or subject to queer, rather queerness coming forth at us from all directions, screaming its defiance, suggesting a move from intersectionality to assemblage, an affective conglomeration that recognizes other contingencies of belonging (melding, fusing, viscosity, bouncing) that might not fall so easily into what is sometimes denoted as reactive community formations-identity politics-by control theorists. The assemblage, a series of dispersed but mutually implicated and messy networks, draws together enunciation and dissolution, causality and effect, organic and nonorganic forces. For Deleuze and Guattari, assemblages are collections of multiplicities: There is no unity to serve as a pivot in the object, or to divide in the subject. There is not even the unity to abort in the object, or "return" in the subject. A multiplicity has neither subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature (the laws of combination therefore increase as the multiplicity grows ).... An assemblage is precisely this increase in the dimensions of a multiplicity that necessarily changes in nature as it expands its connections. There are no points or positions.... There are only lines.21 As opposed to an intersectional model of identity, which presumes that components-race, class, gender, sexuality, nation, age, religion-are separable analytics and can thus be disassembled, an assemblage is more attuned to interwoven forces that merge and dissipate time, space, and body against linearity, coherency, and permanency.22 Intersectionality demands the knowing, naming, and thus stabilizing of identity across space and time, relying on the logic of equivalence and analogy between various axes of identity and generating narratives of progress that deny the fictive and performative aspects of identification: you become an identity, yes, but also timelessness works to consolidate the fiction of a seamless stable identity in every space. Furthermore, the study of intersectional identities often involves taking imbricated identities apart one by one to see how they influence each other, a process that betrays the founding impulse of intersectionality, that identities cannot so easily be cleaved. We can think of intersectionality as a hermeneutic of positionality that seeks to account for locality, specificity, placement, junctions. As a tool of diversity management and a mantra of liberal multiculturalism, intersectionality colludes with the disciplinary apparatus of the state-census, demography, racial profiling, surveillance-in that "difference" is encased within a structural container that simply wishes the messiness of identity into a formulaic grid, producing analogies in its wake and engendering what Massumi names "gridlock": a "box[ing] into its site on the culture map." He elaborates: The idea of positionality begins by subtracting movement from the picture. This catches the body in cultural freeze-frame. The point of explanatory departure is a pin-pointing, a zero point of stasis. When positioning of any kind comes a determining first, movement comes a problematic second.... Of course, a body occupying one position on the grid might succeed in making a move to occupy another position.... But this doesn't change the fact that what defines the body is not the movement itself, only its beginnings and endpoints.... There is "displacement," but no transformation; it is as if the body simply leaps from one definition to the next.

#### Thus, in all democracies voting ought to be compulsory. I defend implementation, but I will defend any means of implementation for the neg to get offense.

#### CPs and PICs affirms because they do not disprove my general thesis

#### I can clarify any part of the framing mechanism in cross.

#### Neg interps that indict my advocacy must be checked in cross to deter meaningless theory debate and clarify confusion. Vote on legitimate abuse, potential abuse leads to a race to the bottom of what random interps could I violate that in some random round would be abusive.

#### Thus, we demand a queering of the resolution: In democracy, subjects ought to align themselves with queerness through a queer miscount. Affirm to queer the act of voting against itself.

Chambers ’09 [(Samuel A. Chambers, Professor and Chair of Political Science, John Hopkins University.) “A Queer Politics of the Democratic Miscount” in *borderlands* 8:2 (2009).] colton/fushi // http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=597414E6C44F3EF54D235D142A878C8A?doi=10.1.1.468.5450&rep=rep1&type=pdf

. If queer is that which resists normativity,[18] then getting used to it must mean not normalisation but a persistence of queerness. There is therefore something about the Queer Nation chant that does not add up. It introduces a new term into the equation, but without balancing out the equation; indeed, it establishes the new variable precisely so as to throw the equation out of balance. For Rancière, such ‘fuzzy math’ is the very stuff of democracy. Democracy, we might say, is the regime that can’t count properly. This is precisely what makes democracy a space or moment of impropriety, and it is also why democracy, in truth, is not a regime at all (Rancière, 2006: 69–73). Rancière describes the democratic subject (thus, the political subject par excellence) as ‘le compte des incomptés’ – the count of the unaccounted-for. Democracy is a miscount because democratic politics only comes about when those who have no part in the social order stake a claim, and take a part, within it. ‘There is politics’ argues Rancière, only ‘when there is a part of those who have no part, a part or party of the poor’ (Rancière, 1999: 11, with a different translation of le compte des incomptés). I have previously glossed this argument of Rancière’s by referring to ‘democratic politics as the taking-part of those who have no part’ (Chambers, 2005: par. 1). This translation has the benefit of expressing the point in its properly paradoxical form (those who have no part, take part), but it flirts with the danger of overstating the willed participation of a party prior to politics. In other words, it runs the risk of returning us to the liberal interest-group politics that I have been at pains throughout this essay to distinguish from Rancièrean politics. And as Rancière stresses, the ‘party of the poor’ that has a part only when ‘there is politics’ does not initiate political action but rather is brought about by political action. In other words it is only politics ‘that causes the poor to exist as an entity’ (Rancière, 1999: 11, emphasis added). And this paradoxical formulation can be elaborated (if never quite ‘explained’) when we see that unlike any other political system, democracy involves a form of rule in which there is no title to rule. It is not aristocracy, rule by the best; it is not oligarchy, rule by the rich; instead, democracy is rule by anyone at all. The title to rule in democracy is the lack of any title whatsoever (Rancière, 2006: 41; cf. Rancière, 1995: 94). But this is why democracy always involves a miscount, since it always amounts to ‘counting’ those who do not, who ought not, count – inscribing ‘the part of those who have no part’ (Rancière, 2007: 99). As Rancière stresses in the epigraph to this article, ‘the part that has no part’ must not be ‘misunderstood as the part of the excluded’ (2008: 15, emphasis added). To include the excluded would be merely to count differently; it would not amount to a ‘fundamental miscount’ (Rancière, 1999: 6). For this reason, Rancière describes the proletariat – the excluded, the poor – as ‘the class of the uncounted that only exists in the very declaration [account] in which they are counted as those of no account’ (Rancière, 1999: 38). This ‘miscount’ is therefore not a failure to count properly, and it surely is not that which calls for a recount. The miscount names an irreducible remainder; it points to a persistent unaccounted-for within any count.[19] Like Butler’s theory of unintelligibility, the miscount demands a more rigorous understanding of ‘the problems’ of democracy. Democracy cannot solve all problems merely through inclusion or recognition (cf. Deranty, 2003). The struggle against oppression will surely be an important one, but democratic politics both precedes and exceeds the problem of oppression. In line with the thinking of queer that I articulated in the opening section, Butler frames the issue in terms of norms. Norms, Butler shows, render some lives (some genders, some sexualities, some races, some nationalities) legible and intelligible. And certain norms create a zone of indiscernibility that goes beyond a question of recognition. Butler calls this ‘unintelligibility’. She writes: To be oppressed means that you already exist as a subject of some kind, you are there as a visible and oppressed other for the master subject ... To be oppressed you must first become intelligible. To find that you are fundamentally unintelligible (indeed, that the laws of culture and language find you to be an impossibility) is to find that you have not yet achieved access to the human, to find yourself speaking only and always as if you were human, but with the sense that you are not. (Butler, 2004: 30, emphasis added) And we can easily draw the connection that Butler leaves implicit here: to find yourself rendered unintelligible, is surely to find yourself in a queer relation to dominant norms. To be unintelligible means to exist in a zone of inaudible, invisible marginality, such that norms of gender and sexuality make one illegible. Butler’s own theory of unintelligibility emerges within the specific concept of theorising marginalised genders and sexualities, particularly trans-genderism. But it seems to me that Butler’s specific arguments here fit well with the broader and more abstract frame in which Rancière theorises politics, and Butler herself has recently expanded her theory to think about ‘rogue viewpoints’ that are rendered unthinkable and unspeakable by norms of legitimacy as well as by governmental policy (Butler, 2009: 795). When politics occurs – and Rancière consistently reminds his readers that such occurrences are infrequent – the conflictual conjunction of the logic of equality with the logic of domination serves, on the one hand, to render that order of domination visible and, on the other, to expose (as intelligible) the very subject of politics that had previously remained unintelligible (cf. Butler on dissent). But, put in the language of queer theory, this means that politics both exposes the norm and questions its dominance in the name of that which it would make queer. Thus, as Rancière says, politics occurs through the democratic miscount. We can add: politics occurs when the unintelligible make themselves intelligible. It is precisely his insistence on the miscount that makes Rancière’s a very queer thinking of politics. By refusing any conflation of le compte des incomptés with the excluded, the marginalised, or the victimised, Rancière consistently queers democracy. What I mean by this is that in maintaining a fidelity to dissensus, to the possibility of disagreement – a situation of conflict not over the object of speech but ‘over what speaking means’ (Rancière, 1999: xi) – Rancière also maintains a fidelity to queerness, to a marginality that cannot merely be included within the dominant frame of the current police order.[20] The democratic miscount is a queer form of counting and a queer form of politics. These claims can make sense, of course, only if we maintain the distinction for which I argued at the outset: between a lesbian and gay identity politics, and a queer theory of both relational identity, and – it would now seem, also – politics itself. But just as the argument for ‘queering’ Rancière’s arguments, for reading them with and through the lens of this queer understanding of norms and relational identity, just as this approach depends upon the distinction between LGBT and queer, so too does the reading offer further independent support for holding on to such a distinction. This is the case to exactly the extent that LGBT politics can and should, from Rancière’s perspective, be subsumed under the category of the police. And there can be no doubt that much of what travels today under the name of mainstream LGBT politics, especially in the USA through the institutions of Human Rights Campaign and Lambda Legal, fits Rancière’s definition of police perfectly. This serves as neither an explicit nor an implicit critique of these groups in particular, or of LGBT politics in general; instead it serves, again, to remind us of the importance of maintaining a space for a potential moment of politics that might disrupt and thereby rearrange the police order. Such is the promise, even if often (and necessarily so) unrealised, of queer politics.

#### The advocacy isn’t an end all be all solution, it is a symbolic act of solidarity with the queer body, not by pointing folx out but by queering freedom and forcing the state to act out of not conforming to heteronormativity. Even if I lose solvency vote aff.

## Part 3 is The Insurrection

#### The critical potential of policy making is only accessible in a world with historical metanarratives. The 1ac is solidarity in metanarratives through an act of solidarity in the form of cv for a superficial queering of freedom.

Brown 01, Wendy. “ONE. INTRODUCTION Politics Out of History.” Politics Out of History, 2001, pp. 3–17., doi:10.1515/9780691188058-002. (I can provide the pdf upon request)CW

Why have I insisted on pointing out, with the greatest care, the distinction between theory and practice, between the Croce here assists us in making an intriguing return to the problematic of morality whose trace I have argued we now experience painfully as the antilife, antipolitical, and anti-intellectual force of political moralism. Yet our return is not a simple recuperation, precisely because we are today forced to openly invent our political projects and their moral content, without relying on either teleological or redemptive history, without having recourse to moral or other ontological systems rooted in nature, fetishized reason, the dialectic, or the divine. We are confronted today with the fact of history-and so also with political futures and the actions that would produce and configure them-as a sheer problem of power. This is what is brought into view at the moment that historical metanarratives are fully exposed as fictions. Croce's argument for a literal and figural separation between political life and intellectual inquiry suggests possibilities both for the rejuvenation of a rich moral political vision and for an abatement of the moralizing by which contemporary intellectual and political formations currently infect each other. To imagine what this stance might look like for intellectual consider Foucault's response to an interviewer who asked whether he wrote *The Use of Pleasure and* Techniques of the Self “for the liberation movement.” “Not for,” replied Foucault steadily, “but in terms of, a contemporary situation.” 20 The difference between "for" and "in terms of" is critical: it indicates whether intellectual life will be submitted to existing political discourses and the formulation of immediate political needs those discourses articulate, or will be allowed the air of independence that it must have in order to be of value as intellectual work for political life. Foucault does not position his work with indifference to an existing political movement, nor does he argue that his thinking is unconditioned by it or irrelevant to its prospects. Rather, he distinguishes the value of critical thinking from policy formulation, or blueprints for action. Maurice Merleau-Ponty made a similar argument while quarreling with Jean-Paul Sartre about the relevant level of engagement with politics by philosophers. I have in no way renounced writing about politics ....With the Korean War, I made the decision-and this is something entirely different-to stop writing about events as they occur. ... In times of tension, taking a stand on each event ... becomes a system of "bad faith." ...That is why on several occasions I suggested in this journal [Les Temps Modernes] that we present comprehensive studies rather than hastily taken positions ....This method is closer to politics than your method of continuous engagement. That in itself makes it more philosophical, as it creates a distance between the event and our judgment of it, defusing the trap of the event.21 The trap of the event, to which we might today add the "trap of existing discourses," is precisely that which intellectuals who aim to be thoughtful and useful to political life need to spring open; Foucault (in a formulation elaborated in chapter 6) similarly calls for a critique of the political rationalities organizing existing events and political aims, a critique that can occur neither inside the terms of "the event" nor inside an existing array of political and subject positions. Yet both Foucault and Merleau-Ponty also insist that to argue for a separation between intellectual and political life is not to detach the two. The point instead is to cultivate among political intellectuals an appreciation of the productive, even agonistic, interlocution made possible between intellectual and political life when they maintain a dynamic distance and tension. By itself a political act at a time when universities are increasingly underwritten by "interested" corporate, private, and state funds, such cultivation is also quite possibly a route to freeing political life from its current moralizing despair and intellectual life from the grip of bad conscience. In the effort to revitalize left politics with rich genealogies, discerning institutional analyses, and compelling political visions, intellectuals who are deeply learned, imaginative, and independent can be of enormous value.

#### This means we solve all ks from the method stance, critiquing the aff means they have no solvency on the K

#### We are not trying to offer a perfect solution. An emphasis on genealogy is only accessible in a world where the voices of others are furthered not political agendas. Even if there is a negative consequence of the plan we should still take the risk of affirming since the deconstruction accessible in the aff world could solve better than the squo could.

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the best genealogical analyses. It’s a prerequisite to any link to the role of the judge since subjugated knowledges can’t be considered as methodological options until they have a seat at the table. To weigh the neg just needs to win that genealogy is more accessible in the squo pre queering freedom than in the aff post queering freedom.

Medina, 11 (Jose Medina, He graduated in Philosophy from the University of Sevilla. José Medina received his MA and Ph.D. from Northwestern University. He was Assistant Professor at Saint Louis University (1998-1999), then worked at Vanderbilt University in the position of Assistant Professor (1999-2004), Associate Professor (2004-2012) and Professor (2012-2017), before joining Northwestern University in 2017. He was also International Chair of Excellence in the Humanities, Charles III University of Madrid (2011-2012).10-1-2011, accessed on 8-29-2020, Pdfs.semanticscholar, "Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism", https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/34a3/2f8e494d4b165003be727c428258a875e6dc.pdf)[KDandu]

Subjugated knowledges remain invisible to mainstream perspectives; they have a precarious subterranean existence that renders them unnoticed by most people and impossible to detect by those whose perspective has already internalized certain epistemic exclusions. And with the invisibility of subjugated knowledges, certain possibilities for resistance and subversion go unnoticed. The critical and emancipatory potential of Foucaultian genealogy resides in challenging established practices of remembering and forgetting by excavating subjugated bodies of experiences and memories, bringing to the fore the perspectives that culturally hegemonic practices have foreclosed. The critical task of the scholar and the activist is to resurrect subjugated knowledges—that is, to revive hidden or forgotten bodies of experiences and memories—and to help produce insurrections of subjugated knowledges.4 In order to be critical and to have transformative effects, genealogical investigations should aim at these insurrections, which are critical interventions that disrupt and interrogate epistemic hegemonies and mainstream perspectives (e.g. official histories, standard interpretations, ossified exclusionary meanings, etc). Such insurrections involve the difficult labor of mobilizing scattered, marginalized publics and of tapping into the critical potential of their dejected experiences and memories. An epistemic insur- rection requires a collaborative relation between genealogical scholars/activists and the subjects whose experiences and memories have been subjugated: those subjects by themselves may not be able to destabilize the epistemic status quo until they are given a voice at the epistemic table (i.e. in the production of knowledge), that is, until room is made for their marginalized perspective to exert resistance, until past epistemic battles are reopened and established frameworks become open to con- testation. On the other hand, the scholars and activists aiming to produce insurrec- tionary interventions could not get their critical activity off the ground if they did not draw on past and ongoing contestations, and the lived experiences and memo- ries of those whose marginalized lives have become the silent scars of forgotten struggles.

## Underview

#### 1] The neg must concede to the aff paradigmatic approach in the round - this refers to a policy making paradigm where the judge signs her ballot to endorse the superior post fiat policy that best deconstructs militarism. To clarify, the neg may not read K’s that don’t have a policy alt or change the role of the ballot. Changing the role of the ballot moots 6 minutes of AC offense because I’m forced to either a) concede to the neg role of the ballot and lose the entirety of the 1AC or b) defend my role of the ballot through the rest of the debate in which case I still lose the AC- I have no coherent strategic options. Key to fairness, an effective strategy creates our road the ballot. This exacerbates Aff Time skew, which controls strongest link to fairness – time skew means I structurally can’t engage while other fairness claims can be solved with more prep or drills

#### 2] Neg abuse outweighs aff abuse because only a 4-minute 1AR means I can’t recover from any possible neg advocacy skew. You chose to shift in the NC making it extremely hard for the aff in the 1AR, because at least neg can react to aff abuse in the AC. Time skew prior question to all other claims because it constrains my ability to challenge the truth of those claims

#### 3] All neg interps are counter interps – coming into the round I take a stance on everything, so I show my interps through the method of the 1ac. They give a reverse to my interps which is a counter interp.

#### 4] Vote up narrative based strategies and give 30 speaks- it serves as a teachable moment to expose inequality.

Waren 11Warren Waren University of Central Florida, Orlando, Using Monopoly to Introduce Concepts of Race and Ethnic Relations The Journal of Effective Teaching, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2011, 28-35

Undergraduate students often enter our classrooms convinced that the battles of the Civil Rights Era solved the issue of race in America. They are generally unacquainted with the long history of race in the United States and almost universally underestimate the structural forces which carry racial disparities into their new century. As sociologists and teachers, it is our responsibility to tell that story and explain those forces. Our new challenge is: How do we teach students the extent of racism in America when, from their point of view, the problem of the color-line has been solved? One option is to use a game. Sociologists have used games or simulations to spark the sociological imagination (Dorn, 1989; Jessup, 2001; Fisher 2008), to stimulate critical thinking (Pence 2009), and to introduce social stratification (Ender, 2004; Waldner & Kinney, 1999). When students from relatively privileged backgrounds “experience” a temporary bout of unfairness in a simulated game, it creates the opportunity to change their perspective (Coghlan & Huggins, 2004; Haddad & Lieberman, 2002). The injustice of the situation, if directly connected to broader theory, can lessen a student’s social distance from marginalized groups. A game may help a student to understand some of the previously inexplicable attitudes and behaviors of actors on either side of a power rela- tionship. Also, as this paper demonstrates, a properly constructed simulation can give the student a sense of the structural nature and lasting legacy of racial discrimination—a fuller sense of the “history and biography” of race in the United States (Mills, 1959). The great advantage of a game is that it is a completely controlled environment—there are no unexplained variables. In fairness to all the players, all rules are explicitly stated at the outset of game play and apply to all players equally (Waldner & Kinney, 1999). Ordinarily, in a competitive game this assumption of fairness supports an ideology of individualism. However, a pedagogical game is concerned with learning, not winning. In order to disentangle a complicated issue, the instructor may purposefully introduce inequality into an otherwise “just” world. Again, because all rules are explicit (even unfair ones), the problem exists in the game without confounding effects. This simplification allows students to easily focus on the nature and development of the problem. By extension, it is hoped that the game encourages students to reassess similar problems in the real world. Use of Pedagogical Games Dorn (1989) identifies multiple criteria for games or simulations to be effective in the classroom as pedagogical tools. He argues the games must: reflect reality; motivate students through "experience"; develop awareness of personal values through moral and ethical implications of the game; connect abstract concepts with concrete experiences; create a shared experience from which the students can draw; offer a form of debriefing to both address emotional issues and to connect theory to experiences. In the technique I describe below, I try to incorporate these ideas with Straus’ (1986) emphasis on simplicity for in-class games. In teaching and learning, the goal of simulation is the “experience” itself. Jessup (2001) argues that simulation should be the “experiential anchor for the elaboration of conceptual tools” (p.108). Therefore, this game is created to offer a chance for relatively privileged students to experience the unfairness of structural inequality. After temporary exposure to an analog of racial discrimination, students with no prior familiarity of racial discrimination will have a deeper understanding of the effects of racism on many levels. Pedagogical games are used to challenge our assumptions about how the world works (Waldner & Kinney, 1999). For example, the basic assumption of competitive games is fairness. This assumes that the world is fair (i.e., a meritocracy) and that individual effort or talent is the main factor in success (i.e., an ideology of individualism akin to Ross’ (1977) fundamental attribution error). In competitive games therefore, groups are treated equally and the best players win. But a pedagogical game may challenge the assumption of fairness directly by having structural inequality built into the game. The experience of a good player losing an unfair game creates cognitive dissonance—that cognitive dissonance is our teaching moment. I assume that students as game players can easily identify games that are “unfair” based on unequal outcomes for equivalent behavior. As a peda gogical tool, I want it to be relatively easy for them to spot the explicit rules which cause the inequality.

#### 5] Debate should allow a multitude of models of engagement and shouldn’t be limited to one “constitutive” claim.

Koh and Niemi 15 Ben Koh & Rebar Niemi "How Do I Reach These Kids?: An Affirmation of Polyvocal Debate" September 15, 2015

For as long as there has been debate, there has been the debate about what debate is. We are not against a discussion of what constitutes debate. In fact we are absolutely for it. We argue that this is a crucial debate within debates. **The question should not be “what is debate?” The proper question is “what can debate do?”** **The constitutive feature of debate** that we are most abstractly interested in **is** the precise one that is so often banished by debate pundits – **the possibilities of what it can do**. We do not yet know what debate can do. All are welcome to accept the challenge of forcing debate into a linear and instrumental framework, but be warned it will certainly fail. Debate is a process and a field, not a mechanism. This is the case for polyvocal debate. Our current definition (which is open to redefinition) is that **debate should be** thought of as **a complex assemblage of voices** (the debaters, the judge, audiences, coaches, the authors quoted, and so on), and that **it** **is wrong to limit the possible voices** or the possible enunciations of those voices. Debate is always about multiple voices – multiple ways of sensing/expressing. Even non-sense and non-expression have their own voices. This is not a paradigm. It is a hypothesis about the system of relations that co-creates debate. The power and potential of polyvocal debate is not located in some far-off future. It is right here right now, and it is also capable of contact with the outsides of one perspective on time and space. To paraphrase June Tyson – Don’t you know? It’s after the end of the world. Within the system of relations composed by polyvocal debate, **we always have the ability to ask** “should we believe in something in the first place?” as well as “**if we believe it, what are its normative implications?**” These questions, in whatever form they take, are some of the most primal elements of debate. **Restricting the scope of debate to only some of these questions is a serious loss**. **More absurd is the justification for restriction based on the value of being able to ask and engage with these questions in the first** place. It is wrong to assume that chaos and doubt are bad. It is even worse to argue for a progressive fallacy that chaos and doubt can be removed from debate without debate ceasing to be debate at all. **Debate is not** soccer, or **chess**, or playing the trumpet. Perhaps it can do similar things to those activities, but if so it is because it does not feature the limits that define soccer or chess or playing the trumpet. It is apparently very easy to make assumptions about what education is. Most often this is accomplished without citing a single theorist on the subject of education OR a robust understanding of what education could be outside of “commonsensical” assumptions (which are less common and relatable that they initially seem). As we often like to tell our students – read the literature. We call the kind of education that is often assumed “banking-style education” after Paulo Friere. This is the notion that education is about accumulating knowledge. 100 facts are better than 99 facts. People devalue education because they think of it only in these calculated terms. To the banking conception, the end game of education would not be an increase in self-respect, a commitment to social justice, or a development of communication and empathetic powers. It would be the resume statement of “things I’ve learned.” We must not buy into this conception of education. In debate, the collaborative way voices intertwine builds a world of speech and frames it. No debate performance can be perfectly reproduced. The judge’s interpretation and voice are then added. The desire for absolutely objective or procedurally exact judging is a desire for an impossibility. We should not be afraid of the judge’s voice. We recognize it as one among many. Some judges speak loudly and have particular desires. We do not begrudge them this. What is important is that they acknowledge that theirs is only one voice among the many and one way of sensing among all sense and nonsense. It is not a question of excluding the chaos or even controlling it, but **understanding the value in** hearing **the** **clash of multiple voices**. For nowhere else in school are we given the vibrant opportunity to be as real in the academic space as is in debate; where we are able to read multiple arguments from multiple views from multiple bases. Wemust encourage debate to be an outlet for the chaotic and doubtful elements of our beliefs for it’s an opportunity to bridge debate’s separation from the real world into our own world. Our lives aren’t always smooth unwavering stories. They are often a chaos that is hard to grasp outside the lens of community. Polyvocal debate is inclusive and encouraging of this chaos, of the hard questions and life changing moments of realization. A form of debate that acts as if it can omit doubt is not a true form of debate at all. This isn’t just an argument for “unique educational value” in the banking-sense. Debate should not be thought of as an esoteric extracurricular designed to spice up the resume. Paradigms of debate that stop at the moment of rational justification treat the issue of what world we create for ourselves as an unnecessary step, but this conversation is what must happen in our lives and further what must happen in debate. Polyvocal debate allows for this discussion. **We should not just ask “is deontology true” but further “is it good for me to believe in deontology” or util or contractarianism, etc.** Rationality cannot be trusted to judge itself, but abandoning logic altogether isn’t necessary just yet. It is too easy to take up one side or the other (only truth matters or only the good matters). Debate is harder.The tenets of logic and justification can create questionable conclusions, and **a truly valuable form of debate must allow us to criticize and reevaluate** these **conclusions** to live our lives to the fullest. We must be able to ask if beliefs empower or disempower our lives. We always have the power to ask should we believe it or is it correct, and exercising this capacity is the practice of debate. There are two ways in which we can understand and consider what we ought to believe – what is rationally justifiable, and what is good for us to believe for ourselves. **In our lives we cannot just ask “what do I think is true.” We must always end up asking “is it good for me to believe in what I believe?”** This is how we must act in our own lives outside of just the debate space. When we are faced with a difficult situation be it in our personal lives, work, etc., we are inevitably going to be confronted with moments of seemingly undeniable hopelessness; where despite our best efforts and our thinking, we cannot justify or rationally see a way to be happy or push ourselves through to the other side. Is it good for me to believe that no matter what I will do, that I will get a bad grade in this class? Is it good for me to believe that I will fail in my work? Is it good for me to believe in hopelessness? Our answer is no. Our answer is that **debate helps you learn new questions** as well as new answers. Again and again we’ve heard the articles and arguments that collapse everything to the old questions: education versus fairness, the rules versus innovation and expansion, correct ways of being versus incorrect ones. Bizarrely there are some who like to play with the same questions forever, perpetually flipping bits between one and zero, never writing new code. We are tired of these questions. Perhaps they would be enlivened by new voices. **Polyvocality is the necessary and explosive generation of new questions**. The practice of debate is an educational activity because it is generative and interrogative of voices. Use it for what it’s used for. Education can be praxis – where the abstraction of theory becomes lived abstractness inside the fabric of everyday experience. Where a radical new way of thinking-feeling the world become possible. Where you don’t just learn about quantum physics, but cry at how beautiful the expression of quantum interactions can be and feel blessed to be a part of them, and then teach them to your friends and family. But this is only part of what education is. Education is a becoming that is necessarily political. Often times it is anti-reactionary or anti-conservative, not because it includes some biased political position, but because it is impossible to actually experience learning without it changing you – what you think is right and wrong, what you want to do, and who you think of yourself as. On our view, **this makes education necessarily anti-fascist** (where **fascism is defined as the tendency to over-represent** and prefer **certain ways of being to others** based on normative, intuitive, or ontological claims). No matter your petty political affiliations, **too many people in our world must attempt escape everyday**, live as targets, suffer, and experience domination. **If education is not a force to help us address this, it is not a properly empathetic education**. Even if the educational space of debate allows for slightly more opportunities to escape the everyday and find new connections and places to dwell, this is a greater benefit to everyone than any obedience to respectability politics, norms of conduct, or “correct ways of being” could ever achieve. This is how the world works. We should not abandon the cause of empathy just because we can have that elsewhere. It’s not as if we should not care about others at certain times because we do so in others Debate is foundationally about empathy. Arguments are only persuasive in the ability for their to be foster a shared experience of understanding. Judges vote for arguments that have a particular effect on them – the effect of “being convincing.” Arguments that win send the judge on a path of becoming-convinced. In order for this to happen, the debater must actually get through to the judge on some level, whether intuitively, emotively, via rhetoric, the flow, or explanation. The best debating promotes empathy. Not empathy defined by biased terms – empathy defined by actual contact with actual others, perspectives, and ways of expressing oneself. It is not that young people are in need of moral training or must be told what is right and wrong or that debate should erase and conquer disagreement. Rather, it is that we should strive to learn to live with disagreement. For it is too simple and brute to believe in a monovocal system of thought – that your language is the only Rosetta Stone to translate the world through. Debate must be a place to see how to live with ourselves and live among others. **If being the better debater means being the worse person, we should NOT endorse this conception of better debating**. There is no value to improving a debate related skillset that is not bracketed by being caring and affirming of the world. The argument against education, methodology, and performance debates is that these will somehow sacrifice an essential part of what makes debate debate. This perspective is entirely wrongheaded. What a polyvocal understanding of debate underscores is that what makes debate is multiple voices. Our belief is that it is possible to promote incredible skill, learning, and growth in students and be better debaters while at the same time being better people. Debate is a field where participants of all kinds create real experiences and real change. **Students have the ability to speak their individual truths and have real academic and personal conversation about what creates, sustains, and restricts their worlds** – and **if the current “rules of debate” do not allow for that, we advocate breaking those rules.**

#### This takes out T, unless they can prove that the narrative telling of the 1ac is still accessible under the TVA and that the TVA solves their interp is inherently bad.

#### 6] spec shells are a voter, they are infinitely regressive in what can be specced killing substantive clash – this turns all the standards and there is nothing to be shifty abt in the 1ac.

# 1AR

## OV

### Warren

### Foucault

## Frontlines

### A2 Cap k

### A2 Tfwk

### A2 Cruel ops/presumption

### A2 Disaster Porn

### A2 Affect Science

### A2 falsifiability

### A2 Utopian

1. Stanzas 3-4, "A Litany for Survival." Copyright © 1978 by Audre Lorde, from *The Collected Poems of Audre Lorde*by Audre Lorde.  Copyright © 1997 by the Audre Lorde Estate.  Used by permission of W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)