## Framework

#### Ethics are divided between transcendence and facticity. Transcendence attempts to achieve a universal understanding of morality, and facticity tries to ground morality in the empirical world. Both understandings fail.

#### Facticity is dependent on applying external values to determine the validity moral actions, but these values are nonverifiable because they are external to beings and there exists no evaluative metric to determine their authenticity. De Beauvoir. Bracketed for gender.

[Simon de Beauvoir. “The Ethics of Ambiguity.” Lyle stuart Inc. 1948. Translated by Bernard Frechtman.]

The failure described in Being and Nothingness is definitive, but it is also ambiguous. **[Humans]** Man, Sartre tells us, is "a **being[s] who make**s **[themselves]**himself **a lack of being in order that there might be being.**" That means, first of all, that his **passion is not inflicted upon [humans]**him **from without**. He **[They] choose**s **it**. It is his **[One’s] very being and, as such, does not imply the idea of unhappiness**. If this choice is considered as useless, it is because **there exists no absolute value before the passion of [humans]** man, outside of it, **in relation to which one might distinguish the useless from the useful**. **The word "useful" has not** yet **received a meaning on the level of description where Being and Nothingness is situated**. **It can be defined only in the human world established by** **[human’s]** man's **projects and the ends [they]** he **set**s **up**. In the original helplessness from which man surges up, nothing is useful, nothing is useless. It must therefore be understood that **the passion to which [humans have]**man has **acquiesced finds no external justification**. No outside appeal, **no objective necessity permits of its being called useful**. It has no reason to will itself.

#### Transcendental theories fail because we cannot universalize actions without understanding the particular circumstance of every agent. Benhabib.

[Benhabib, Seyla. "The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory." Praxis International. 1986. Pg. 38-60.]

**It is no longer plausible to maintain that** such **a standpoint can[not] universalize adequately**. Kohlberg views the veil of ignorance not only as exemplifying reversibility but universalizability as well. This is the idea that “we must be willing to live with our judgment or decision when we trade places with others in the situation being judged” (Kohlberg, 1981: 197). But the question is, which situation? Can **moral situations [can’t] be individuated independently of our knowledge of the agents involved in these situations, of [and] their histories, attitudes, characters, and desires**? Can I describe a situation as one of arrogance or hurt pride without knowing something about you as a concrete other? Can I know how to distinguish between a breach of confidence and a harmless slip of the tongue, without knowing your history and your character? **Moral situations, like moral emotions and attitudes, can only be individuated if they are evaluated in light of our knowledge of the history of the agents involved in them**. While every procedure of universalizability presupposes that “like cases ought to be treated alike” or that I should act in such a way that I should also be willing that all others in a like situation act like me, **the most difficult aspect of any such procedure is to know what constitutes a “like” situation or what it would mean for another to be exactly in a situation like mine**. Such a process of reasoning, to be at all viable, must involve[s] the viewpoint of the concrete other, for situations, to paraphrase Stanley Cavell, do not come like “envelopes and golden finches,” ready for definition and description, “nor like apples ripe for grading.”29 When we morally disagree, for example, we do not only disagree about the principles involved; very often we disagree because what I see as a lack of generosity on your part you construe as your legitimate right not to do something; we disagree because what you see as jealousy on my part I view as my desire to have more of your attention. **Universalistic moral theory[ies] neglects such everyday, interactional morality and assumes that the public standpoint of justice, and our quasi-public personalities as right-bearing individuals, are the center of moral theory**. Kohlberg emphasizes the dimension of ideal role-taking or taking the viewpoint of the other in moral judgment. Because he defines the other as the generalized other, however, he perpetrates one of the fundamental errors of Kantian moral theory. **Kant’s error was to assume that** I, **as a pure rational agent reasoning for [themself]** myself, could reach a conclusion that would be **acceptable for all at all times and places**.31 In Kantian moral theory, moral agents are like geometricians in different rooms who, reasoning alone for themselves, all arrive at the same solution to a problem. Following Habermas, I want to name this the “monological” model of moral reasoning. Insofar as he interprets ideal role-taking in the light of Rawls’s concept of a “veil of ignorance,” Kohlberg as well sees the silent thought process of a single self who inaginatively puts himself in the position of the other as the most adequate form of moral judgment. I conclude that **a definition of the self that is restricted to the standpoint of the generalized other becomes incoherent and cannot individuate among selves**. Without assuming the standpoint of the concrete other, **no coherent universalizability test can be carried out, for we lack the necessary epistemic information to judge my moral situation to be “like” or “unlike” yours.**

#### Existence precedes essence – we can only verify our own existence in the world and actions we take are grounded in ourselves, not some external value or mandate. We ensure this by maximizing the amount of freedom each individual has to pursue their own ends. Thus, the standard and ROB is embracing an ethics of choice. Crowell 16.

 [Crowell, Steven. “Existentialism.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2016.]

Another term for the groundlessness of the world of meaning is “nothingness.” Heidegger introduced this term to indicate the kind of self- and world-understanding that emerges in anxiety: **because my practical identity is constituted by the practices I engage in, when these collapse I “am” not[hing]** anything. In a manner of speaking **I am** thus **brought** face-to-face **with** my own finitude, **my “death” as the possibility in which I am no longer able to be anything**. This experience of my own death, or “nothingness,” in anxiety can act as a spur to authenticity: I come to see that **I “am” not anything but must “make myself be” through my choice. In commiting myself in the face of death**—that is, aware of the nothingness of my identity if not supported by me right up to the end—**the roles that I have** hitherto thoughtlessly **engaged in** as one does now **become something that I myself own up to**, become responsible for. Heidegger termed this mode of self-awareness—**awareness of the ultimate nothingness of my practical identity [is] —“freedom**,” and Sartre developed this existential concept of freedom in rich detail. This is not to say that Heidegger's and Sartre's views on freedom are identical. Heidegger, for instance, will emphasize that freedom is always “thrown” into an historical situation from which it draws its possibilities, while Sartre (who is equally aware of the “facticity” of our choices) will emphasize that such “possibilities” nevertheless underdetermine choice. But **the theory of radical freedom** that Sartre develops **is** nevertheless **directly rooted in** Heidegger's account of **the nothingness of my practical identity**. Sartre (1992: 70) argues that anxiety provides a lucid experience of that freedom which, though often concealed, characterizes human existence as such. For him, **freedom is the dislocation of consciousness from its object**, the fundamental “nihilation” or negation by means of which consciousness can grasp its object without losing itself in it: **to be conscious of something is to be conscious of not being it**, a “not” that arises in the very structure of consciousness as being for-itself. Because “nothingness” (or nihilation) is just what consciousness is, there can be no objects inconsciousness, but only objects for consciousness.[[16](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/notes.html%22%20%5Cl%20%2216)] This means that **consciousness is radically free, since its structure precludes that it either contain or be acted on by things**. For instance, because it is not thing-like, consciousness is free with regard to its own prior states. **Motives, instincts, psychic forces**, and the like cannot be understood as inhabitants of consciousness that might infect freedom from within, inducing one to act in ways for which one is not responsible; rather, they can **exist only for consciousness as matters of choice**. I must either reject their claims or avow them. For Sartre, the ontological freedom of existence entails that **determinism is an excuse before it is a theory**: though through its structure of nihilation consciousness escapes that which would define it—including its own past choices and behavior—there are times when I may wish to deny my freedom. Thus I may attempt to constitute these aspects of my being as objective “forces” which hold sway over me in the manner of relations between things. This is to adopt the third-person stance on myself, in which what is originally structured in terms of freedom appears as a causal property of myself. I can try to look upon myself as the Other does, but as an excuse this flight from freedom is shown to fail, according to Sartre, in the experience of anguish. For instance, Sartre writes of a gambler who, after losing all and fearing for himself and his family, retreats to the reflective behavior of resolving never to gamble again. This motive thus enters into his facticity as a choice he has made; and, as long as he retains his fear, his living sense of himself as being threatened, it may appear to him that this resolve actually has causal force in keeping him from gambling. However, one evening he confronts the gaming tables and is overcome with anguish at the recognition that his resolve, while still “there,” retains none of its power: it is an object forconsciousness but is not (and never could have been) something in consciousness that was determining his actions. In order for it to influence his behavior he has to avow it afresh, but this is just what he cannot do; indeed, just this is what he hoped the original resolve would spare him from having to do. He will have to “remake” the self who was in the original situation of fear and threat. At this point, perhaps, he will try to relieve himself of freedom by giving in to the urge to gamble and chalking it up to “deeper” motives that overcame the initial resolve, problems from his childhood perhaps. But anguish can recur with regard to this strategy as well—for instance, if he needs a loan to continue gambling and must convince someone that he is “as good as his word.” The possibilities for self-deception in such cases are endless. As Sartre points out in great detail, anguish, as the consciousness of freedom, is not something that human beings welcome; rather, we seek stability, identity, and adopt the language of freedom only when it suits us: those acts are considered by me to be my free acts which exactly match the self I want others to take me to be. **We are “condemned to be free,”** which means that **we can never simply be who we are but are separated from ourselves by the nothingness of having perpetually to re-choose, or re-commit, ourselves to what we do**. Characteristic of the existentialist outlook is the idea that we spend much of lives devising strategies for denying or evading the anguish of freedom. One of these strategies is “bad faith.” Another is the appeal to values.

#### Impact Calculus: The standard is an ethic of choice. Normative truth is produced through individual choice itself, meaning ethics requires we ought to maintain individual choice. Pursuing subjective values must be considered a general good for all agents as a practical postulate for action – my framework proves universal values are impossible but not an over-arching commitment to allowing self-construction, meaning it is a question of preserving the right for free choice.

#### Prefer:

#### [1] Existentialism provides the best framework for overcoming domination, as social norms only carry the normative force we assign to them.

**Newman ‘06**, (Saul, Senior Lecturer in Politics @ U of London, “Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment,” Theory & Event - Volume 4, Issue 3, Muse, 2006 AD: 7/8/09)

**Rather than having an external enemy -- like the State -- in opposition to which one's political identity is formed, we must work on ourselves. As political subjects we must overcome ressentiment by transforming our relationship with power. One can only do this**, according to Nietzsche, **through** eternal return. To affirm eternal return is to **acknowledge and** indeed **positively affirm the continual 'return' of same life with its harsh realities. Because it is an active willing of nihilism, it is at the same time a transcendence of nihilism.** Perhaps in the same way, eternal return refers to power. We must acknowledge and affirm the 'return' of power, the fact that it will always be with us. To overcome ressentiment **we must, in other words, will power. We must affirm a will to power** -- **in the form of creative, life-affirming values**, according to Nietzsche.[56] This is to accept the notion of **'self-overcoming'**. To 'overcome' oneself in this sense, **would mean an overcoming of the essentialist identities and categories that limit us.** As Foucault has shown, **we are constructed as essential political subjects in ways that dominate us** -- this is what he calls subjectification. **We hide behind essentialist identities that deny power, and produce through this denial, a Manichean politics of absolute opposition that only reflects and reaffirms the very domination it claims to oppose.**

#### [2] Bindingness: Freedom is constitutive to human subjecthood and any moral theory. Sartre ‘48, Bracketed for gender.

Jean-Paul. "The Ethics of Ambiguity." The Ethics of Ambiguity. Philip Mairet, 1948.

On the contrary, it appears to us that **by turning toward** this **freedom we are going to discover a principle** of action **whose range will be universal**. The characteristic feature of all ethics is to consider human life as a game that can be won or lost and to teach man the means of winning. Now, we have seen that the original scheme of man is ambiguous: he wants to be, and to the extent that he coincides with this wish, he fails. All the plans in which this will to be is actualized are condemned; arid the ends circumscribed by these plans remain mirages. **Human transcendence is** vainly **engulfed in** those **miscarried attempts.** But man**[People]**  also **will**s **[themselves]** himself **to be a disclosure of being**, and if he coincides with this wish, he wins, for the fact is that the world becomes present by his presence in it. **But the disclosure implies a perpetual tension** to keep being at a certain distance, to tear one self from the world, and **to assert oneself as a freedom**. **To wish for** the **disclosure** of the world **and to assert oneself as freedom are one and the same** movement. **Freedom is the source from which all significations and all values spring**. **It is the** original **condition** of all justification **of existence**. The man **[People]** **who seek**s **to justify** his **life must want freedom** itself absolutely and **above everything else**. At the same time that it requires the realization of concrete ends, of particular projects, it requires itself universally. It is not a ready-made value which offers itself from the outside to my abstract adherence, but **it appears** (not on the plane of facility, but **on the moral plane**) **as a cause of itself**. It is necessarily summoned up by the values which it sets up and through which it sets itself up. **It can not establish a denial of itself, for in denying itself, it would deny the possibility of any foundation**. **To will oneself moral and to will oneself free are one and the same** decision.

#### [3] Individualization – Individualized ethics are necessary to get people to actually understand and follow them. Turns all other frameworks because even if they are technically abiding by an external ethic, they will not truly believe or understand them so they cannot be truly following that ethic. Sartre 3 Bracketed for gender.

Sartre 3, Jean-Paul. "The Ethics of Ambiguity." The Ethics of Ambiguity. Philip Mairet, 1948.

However, such salvation is only possible if, despite obstacles and failures, a man preserves the disposal of his future, if the situation opens up more possibilities to him. In case his transcendence is cut off from his goal or there is no longer any hold on objects which might give it a valid content, his spontaneity is dissipated without founding anything. Then he may not justify his existence positively and he feels its contingency with wretched disgust. **There is no more obnoxious way to punish a [person]** man **than to force** **[them]** him **to perform acts which make no sense to** **[them]** him**, as when one empties and fills the same ditch indefinitely**, when one makes soldiers who are being punished march up and down, or when one forces a schoolboy to copy lines. Revolts broke out in Italy in September 1946 because the unemployed were set to breaking pebbles which served no purpose whatever. As is well known, this was also the weakness which ruined the national workshops in 1848. **This mystification of useless effort is more intolerable than fatigue. Life imprisonment is the most horrible of punishments because it preserves existence in its pure facticity but forbids it all legitimation**. A **freedom** can not will itself without willing itself as an indefinite movement. It **must** absolutely **reject the constraints which arrest its drive toward itself**. This rejection takes on a positive aspect when the constraint is natural. One rejects the illness by curing it. But it again assumes the negative aspect of revolt when the oppressor is a human freedom. **One can not deny being**: the in-itself is, and negation has no hold over this being, this pure positivity; one does not escape this fullness: a destroyed house is a ruin; a broken chain is scrap iron: one attains only signification and, through it, the for-itself which is projected there; the for-itself carries nothingness in its heart and can be annihilated, whether in the very upsurge of its existence or through the world in which it exists. The prison is repudiated as such when the prisoner escapes. But revolt, insofar as it is pure negative movement, remains abstract. It is fulfilled as freedom only by returning to the positive, that is, by giving itself a content through action, escape, political struggle, revolution. **Human transcendence** then **seeks**, with the destruction of the given situation, **the whole future which will flow from its victory**. It resumes its indefinite rapport with itself. There are limited situations where this return to the positive is impossible, where the future is radically blocked off. Revolt can then be achieved only in the definitive rejection of the imposed situation, in suicide.

####  [4] Compatibility – All theories are compatible with and concede the validity of existentialism insofar as the choice to follow a theory is a commitment to radical freedom. Sartre 2 Bracketed for gender.

**Sartre 2**, Jean-Paul. "Existentialism Is a Humanism." Existentialism Is a Humanism. Philip Mairet, 1946. Web. 26 Jan. 2017.

Our point of departure is, indeed, the subjectivity of the individual, and that for strictly philosophic reasons. .... And at the point of departure **there cannot be any other truth than** this, **I think, therefore I am**, which is the absolute truth of consciousness as it attains to itself. **Every theory which begins with [the hu]man**, outside of this moment of self-attainment, **is a theory which thereby suppresses the truth**, **for outside of the Cartesian cogito**, **all objects are no more than probable**, and **any doctrine** of probabilities **which is not attached to a truth will crumble into nothing**. In order to define the probable one must possess the true. **Before there can be any truth** whatever, then, **there must be an absolute truth**, and there is such **a, truth which is simple**, easily attained and within the reach of everybody; **it consists in one’s immediate sense of one’s self**. In the second place**, this theory alone is compatible with the dignity of** **[persons]**man**, it is the only one which does not make [people]**man **into an object.** All kinds of materialism lead one to treat every man including oneself as an object – that is, as a set of pre- determined reactions, in no way different from the patterns of qualities and phenomena which constitute a table, or a chair or a stone. Our aim is precisely to establish the human kingdom as a pattern of values in distinction from the material world. .... .... What is **at the** very heart and **center of existentialism**, **is the absolute character of the free commitment**, by which every man realizes himself in realizing a type of humanity – a commitment **[that is] always understandable**, to no matter whom in no matter what epoch – and its bearing upon the relativity of the cultural pattern which may result from such absolute commitment.

#### [5] Linguistic inconsistency – it’s impossible to compare competing normative claims since they assume their own legitimacy, meaning it’s impossible to debate between objective frameworks.

Joyce 02 Joyce, Richard. Myth of Morality. Port Chester, NY,x USA: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p 45-47.

This distinction between what is accepted from within an institution, and “stepping out” of that institution and appraising it from an exterior perspective, is close to Carnap’s distinction between internal and external questions. 15 Certain **“linguistic frameworks”** (as Carnap calls them) **bring** with them **new** terms and **ways of talking**: accepting the language of “things” licenses making assertions like “The shirt is in the cupboard”; **accepting mathematics allows one to say “There is a prime number greater than one hundred”**; accepting the language of propositions permits saying “Chicago is large is a true proposition,” etc. Internal to the framework in question, confirming or disconfirming the truth of these propositions is a trivial matter. But traditionally **philosophers have interest**ed themselves **in** the external question – **the** issue of the adequacy of **the framework itself:** “Do objects exist?”, “Does the world exist?”, “**Are there numbers?**”, “Are the propositions?”, etc. Carnap’s argument is that **the** external **question,** as it has been typically construed, **does not make sense. From a perspective that accepts mathematics, the answer** to the question “Do numbers exist?” **is just** trivially **“Yes.”** From a perspective which has not accepted mathematics, Carnap thinks, the only sensible way of construing the question is not as a theoretical question, but as a practical one: “Shall I accept the framework of mathematics?”, and this pragmatic question is to be answered by consideration of the efficiency, the fruitfulness, the usefulness,etc., of the adoption. But the (traditional) **philosopher’s questions** – “But is mathematics true?”, “Are there really numbers?” – **are pseudo-questions.** By turning traditional philosophical questions into practical questions of the form “Shall I adopt...?”, Carnap is offering a noncognitive analysis of metaphysics. Since I am claiming that we can critically inspect morality from an external perspective – that we can ask whether there are any non-institutional reasons accompanying moral injunctions – and that such questioning would not amount to a “Shall we adopt...?” query, Carnap’s position represents a threat. What arguments does Carnap offer to his conclusion? He starts with the example of the “thing language,” which involves reference to objects that exist in time and space. **To** step out of the thing language and **ask “But does the world exist?” is a mistake,** Carnap thinks, **because the very notion of “existence”** is a term which belongs to the thing language, and **can be understood only within that framework**, “hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the system itself.” 16 Moving on to the external question “Do numbers exist?” Carnap cannot use the same argument – he cannot say that “existence” is internal to the number language and thus cannot be applied to the system as a whole. Instead he says that philosophers who ask the question do not mean material existence, but have no clear understanding of what other kind of existence might be involved, thus such questions have no cognitive content. It appears that this is the form of argument which he is willing to generalize to all further cases: **persons who dispute** whether propositions exist, **whether properties exist,** etc., do not know what they are arguing over, thus they **are not arguing over the truth of a proposition, but3 over the practical value of their** respective **positions.** Carnap adds that this is so because there is nothing that both parties would

#### Interpretation: If the affirmative reads a standard of embracing the ethics of choice, the negative must concede to the aff standard. The Violation is preemptive: You link if you respond to or contest the framework. The standard is time skew – otherwise the negative can moot all of my ground by reading a new framework in the NC then win off the 13-7 skew since my offense can’t be contextualized through other frameworks. Key to fairness otherwise I can’t win in my limited time.

## Offense

#### First, choice is good under the framework since it’s the method through which individuals confer value on the external world without external normative constraints interfering on their value construction. Standardized testing encourages an artificially narrow curricular spectrum that emphasizes “core” areas of study which closes off the possibility for free choice.

**Anderson 05** [Mark Alan Anderson is a multidisciplinary artmaker and visual art educator. Anderson is the Fine Arts Chair and the District Visual Art Coordinator for North Kansas City Schools. <https://markalananderson.wordpress.com/publications/an-existentialist-appraisal-of-standardized-testing/>] CL

In education, **Existentialism places** at its core **a focus on the individual**, **seeking out a personal understanding of the world**. Through this interpretation, **each individual characterizes for him or herself the concepts of reality**, truth, and goodness and “as a result, **schools exist to aid children in knowing themselves and their place in society**” (Kurtus, 2001). This world-view approach is at odds with **traditional educational philosophy attitudes** that **don’t** adequately **address the plight of each individual**: Existentialism rejects the existence of any source of objective, authoritative truth about metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. Instead, individuals are responsible for determining for themselves what is “true” or “false,” “right” or “wrong,” “beautiful” or “ugly.” For the existentialist**, there exists no universal form of human nature**; each of us has the free will to develop as we see fit (Hobbs, n.d.). Sprouting from John Paul Sartre’s blueprint – that “existence precedes essence” – the educational philosophy of **Existentialism views the student first as an individual, responsible for their own thoughts, beliefs, and ways of behaving**. **Understanding takes precedence over preordained subject matter or curricula; the role of teacher is to provide pathways for student exploration**: “**creating an environment in which they may freely choose their own preferred way…the existentialist demands the education of the whole person, not just the mind**” (Hobbs, n.d.). An Existentialist point-of-view. **Students immersed in an Existentialist curriculum are presented with diverse options from which to choose. Curricular structure tends to provide students with greater freedom and autonomy in their selection of subject matter**. In contrast, the phenomena of **standardized testing tends to result in the narrowing of the curricular spectrum**. By placing greater emphasis on specific areas of student assessment**, the advent of standardized testing has created a culture valuing knowledge of math, science, and language over other areas of study**. Even more troubling to Existentialist thought is the idea that the constriction of knowledge may also be applied to these so-called “core” areas of study: **Some** math, science, or language **skills are more highly prized than others, resulting in a further narrowing of the curricular focus**. Existentialists would argue that **a broader range of opportunity for acquisition of knowledge would afford students greater occasion for personal growth and expression**. Moreover, “in contrast to the humanities, math and the natural sciences may be de-emphasized, presumably because their subject matter would be considered ‘cold,’ ‘dry,’ ‘objective,’ and therefore less fruitful to self- awareness” (Hobbs, n.d.). With regard to Existentialism, Noddings (1998) writes,“what meaning there is in life, we must create.” While traditionalists might argue that standardized testing is one way of measuring student knowledge, one must recognize that **what is being measured is standardized areas of knowledge, i.e.**, formulated and pre-ordained areas of study are being addressed by such testing – **a minimum baseline framework is presumed for all students. Individual student choice is taken out of the equation**, to be replaced by rules of what all students should know. **The Existentialist ideal would be to provide models for students to consider for their own potential conduct**, to explore facets of their own potential rather than rote preparation for business, trade, or occupation.

#### Second, standardized testing takes away the ability for individuals to formulate knowledge that’s authentic to themselves. It purports a learning model that’s artificially encouraged to learn for a test rather than personal understanding.

**Anderson 2** [Mark Alan Anderson is a multidisciplinary artmaker and visual art educator. Anderson is the Fine Arts Chair and the District Visual Art Coordinator for North Kansas City Schools. <https://markalananderson.wordpress.com/publications/an-existentialist-appraisal-of-standardized-testing/>] CL

In an article published in Education Week, human behavioralist and educatorAlfie Kohn (2004) is critical of standardized testing, in the way that “**scores** often **measure superficial thinking**.” Because standardized tests have become so important to educational institutions, **educators are forced to “teach to the test**” – often **at the expense of broader curricular content**. Faced **with the prospect of losing funding or students** – or both – **with the publication of low test scores**, **educators have little choice but to focus on “high stakes” knowledge. The** unfortunate net **result is not the Existentialist ideal of a student who acquires relevant knowledge that is authentic to his or her world**. Rather than a nation of problem-solvers, interested for personal reasons in finding multiple best solutions, **standardized testing has fostered generations of learners interested only in finding a single right answer**. Existentialists might very well believe that students are not encouraged to acquire knowledge resulting in personal understanding but, rather, knowledge best applicable to game show trivia.

#### Third, leading a classroom without a focus on the standardized testing model reaffirms the educator’s personhood. Lieb 16. [[1]](#footnote-1)

To reiterate, **for the individual teacher to** consciously **choose a pedagogy of** personhood and **intellectual freedom in our current educational climate speaks to an existential attitude of confrontation with the unacceptability of working in a space of disorientation and dehumanization**. From the existential perspective, once a situation is deemed unacceptable, the necessity of moving through or beyond it becomes paramount. Consequently, the move from disorientation and acquiescence toward subjective clarity and intentional resistance is a necessary choice for today’s educator. “The existential attitude is not universal, and existential philosophy is not a truth about the human condition. As Camus says, for many of us it is simply necessary” (Solomon, 2005, p. xiv). **The existential attitude** is necessary because it **represents the educator’s choice of personhood over objectification**, **her choice of humanistic pedagogical values over educational values grounded in standardization and objectification**. **The choice to act**, in itself, **affirms the educator as a subject** – **in contrast to experiencing oneself as a manipulated object** - in the neoliberal educational realm. **Such self-empowered choosing**, I submit, **is what makes resistance** – selected acts of intransigence - **possible in the classroom**. In other, more extreme cases such as my own, choosing might even lead to defection from the oppressive arena of contemporary K-12 education. In the portrait that follows, I represent my stance against neoliberal education as a resistor *within* and defector *from* the K-12 public school system where I had worked as a teacher/librarian for thirteen years. Since my defection from that system, I became a doctoral student and instructor (Foundations of Education) of undergraduate students preparing to be future teachers, **continuing to position myself as a resistor by exposing my students to critical and philosophical** forms of **pedagogy** that could be adapted **[adds] to their own evolving teaching philosophies** **and future pedagogical practices**. Using excerpts from a semester’s worth of autobiographical field notes (spring 2013), I offer a portrait of pedagogical resistance against neoliberalism’s prescriptive teaching model whereby **I emphasize existential themes of freedom, subjectivity, choice, action, and responsibility** **within a** seminar-style, **classroom setting**. My purpose has consistently been to encourage students to develop their individual capacities for self-inquiry, personal expression (verbal and written), interactive dialogue, philosophical thinking, and relationship building. **Such traits**, I submit, **are not emphasized in the current**, **standardized model of public school education in which information is packaged**, **and curriculum is** instrumentally **designed around selected goals and objectives** requiring concrete answers to be applied to standardized tests. Neoliberal education’s data- based pedagogical model - designed around rote teaching strategies, memorization of predetermined information, and the use of technology as a primary teaching/learning/assessment/testing tool - does not require or engage individual subjectivity, intellectual curiosity, or the dynamics of interactive dialogue that constitute curriculum as a human conversation.

1. Lieb, Sheryl. **EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY AS ATTITUDE AND PEDAGOGY FOR SELF AND STUDENT LIBERATION . 2016.** [↑](#footnote-ref-1)