#### Moral antirealism says that there are no truths that hold independently of our evaluative attitudes.

#### Evaluative attitudes are attitudes we have about the states of affairs – they express preference or taste e.g. I like chocolate ice cream – they are true as long as I truly like ice cream, but they do not apply to others – you could dislike ice cream and that would not conflict with my truth.

#### Normative statements are simply expressions of evaluative attitudes – when I say murder is wrong, I’m simply expressing my opinion of murder, it imposes no obligations on you

#### [1] The Darwinian Dilemma – I’ll concede that evolution has shaped how we form our beliefs, but that means that moral truths are at best contingent– if we had just evolved differently, we would have different moral beliefs – our beliefs are not necessarily true but are conditioned on our circumstances. Evolutionary pressures favor survival, not moral correctness, meaning our aversion to pain is entirely biological. Don’t let them say evolution favored truth – the chance of us evolving to find the correct answer is incredibly low and we’re unlikely to find the source of morality.

#### [2] Argument of disagreement – in every disagreement, one party must be incorrect. Given that there is a lot of moral disagreement, many people hold incorrect moral beliefs. That there is such great error in our moral beliefs indicates that there is no reliable process of moral belief formation. If there is no reliable process for belief formation, we should give up those beliefs. Because there is no reliable process for moral belief formation, then we should give up all of our moral beliefs.

#### [3] Util negates – it doesn’t categorically condemn certain actions as bad – util may require that an action should be done to preserve justice in a particular instance, but it will never say a certain action is always going to be good because calculations are dependent on circumstances. Proving that governments have an obligation to do the plan now isn’t sufficient to prove that the resolution is true because the resolution is not indexed to this specific index.

#### Our interpretation is that the aff must prove that justice requires open borders – negate if we prove that a concept of justice is impossible.

#### Justice requires moral realism – if you believe in something just, it must be necessarily true. The moral realist will attempt to prove that moral statements can be independently true, so proving that they cannot be true also disproves justice.

#### Justice is a condition

Cambridge Dictionary <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/justice> TDI

the condition of being morally correct or fair:

#### Prefer it –

#### [1] Precision – the resolution says “justice,” not should – the resolution is the most predictable stasis point for debates, anything outside of that ruins prep and clash by allowing the affirmative to pick any grounds for debate

#### [2] Phil Ed – all of the debates that happen under their interp can still occur; we just also allow for debates about meta-ethics. Those debates are valuable -- saying “we have a moral obligation to do X” is useless if you can’t answer the argument that moral obligations don’t exist.

#### [3] Ground – anti-moral realism is a key negative generic, especially on a topic where there’s an aff about every state with borders, refugees, and types of migrants

#### [4] No offense –

#### [A] Stale debates are inevitable because of generics like plans bad, but generic meta ethics debates are better since they produce transferrable skills

#### [B] Our interp filters out bad arguments – a prioris and paradoxes don’t negate since they don’t disprove that states have a moral obligation to do the plan