## Kritik

#### **Disabled folk are always locked into ontological zones of exception – all behind the guise of disgust and psychogenesis – our unruly behavior and the literal disgust of our bodies causes a visceral reaction due to the able bodies vulnerability and fear of deviance.**

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Ableism and disgust: Psychogenesis and disability The stratifying binary of disability/non-disability and the antagonism of the latter towards the former is mediated and maintained, principally, by the emotion of disgust. Disgust is the bile carried in a discursive complex that Campbell (2008: 153) calls ‘ableism’: ‘a network of beliefs, processes and practices that produces a particular kind of self and body (the corporeal standard) that is projected as perfect, species-typical and therefore essential and fully human’. The body produced by ableism is equivalent to what Kristeva (1982: 71) calls the ‘clean and proper body’. It is the body of the ‘normate’, the name that Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (1997) gives to the body that thinks of itself as invulnerable and definitive. It is the hygienic, aspirational body of civilising modernity. It is cast from the increasingly stringent norms and rules about emotional behaviour and bodily display that mark mundane social relations in the lebenswelt (lifeworld). This curious non-disabled body/self has no empirical existence per se. On the contrary, the body of ableism is a normative construct, an invulnerable ideal of being manifest in the imaginary of ‘modernist ontology, epistemology and ethics’ as something ‘secure, distinct, closed and autonomous’ (Shildrick, 2002: 51). It embraces ‘human perfectibility as a normative physical or psychological standard’ and involves ‘a curious disavowal of variation and mortality’ (Kaplan, 2000: 303). It is what we are supposed to aspire to, to learn to be but can never become. It has no grounding in the material world. It is a ‘body schema, a psychic construction of wholeness that … belies its own precariousness and vulnerability’ (Shildrick, 2002: 79). It is a ‘body divorced from time and space; a thoroughly artificial affair’ (Mitchell and Snyder, 2000: 7), the epitome of civilisation, closed off from any connection with the animal side of humanity and from the ways in which our bodily nature wallows in its carnal improprieties. It is a body aghast at the messiness of existence. Disability is the opposite of this ideal body, its ‘inverse reflection’ (Deutsch and Nussbaum, 2000: 13). The disabled body is or has the propensity to be unruly. In the kingdom of the ‘clean and proper body’, disability is the epitome of ‘what not to be’. As a consequence the disabled body can be easily excluded from the mainstream ‘psychic habitus’ (Elias, 2000: 167). The ‘clean and proper’ – a normative body of delicacy, refinement and selfdiscipline – has powerful social consequences most manifest in its normalising dynamics. It is the standard of judgement against which disabled bodies are invalidated and transformed into repellent objects. It is the emblem of purity that by comparison creates existential unease. It apportions the shame and repugnance that underwrite the civilising process (Elias, 2000: 114–19, 414–21). Through ableism, modernity has been able to structure disability as uncivilised, outside or on the margins of humanity. One of the great books of the science of natural history published under the title Systema Naturae by Linnaeus in 1735 distinguishes between homo sapiens and homo monstrosus. In this classification impairment – at its extreme and highly visible end – is excluded from the human family. The distinction is, in itself, an act of violence and invalidation, an object lesson in transforming difference and ‘defect’ into the abominable. The distinction mobilises the aversive emotions of fear and disgust. Ableism is a cruel teacher. It embodies violence at many levels: ‘epistemic, psychic, ontological and physical’ (Campbell, 2008: 159). It is at its most bellicose when it is mediated by disgust: a mediation invoked mostly in the social fabrication of taboo and most compellingly in a context when the human/animal boundary is under threat. Ableism rests on the effort to eliminate from awareness, chaos, abjection, animality and death: all that civilisation seeks to repress. It encourages us to live in the false hope that we will not suffer and die, to adopt a perspective of invulnerability, to confuse morality with beauty and to see death, pain and disability as the repulsive woes of mortality rather than as the existential basis for community and communication. Kolnai (2004: 74) reminds us that, ‘in its full intention, it is death … that announces itself to us in the phenomenon of disgust’. Disability, in modernity, has been produced in the ontological household of the abject, as the antithesis of communication and community, in a place that we might on occasion peer into only to ‘choke’ on the unsavoury sights that greet us. Disability is put out, put away, hidden, segregated or transformed into its opposite, covered up by whatever medical or aesthetic techniques are available to achieve this end. Any opportunity that disability might have to take its place at the heart of communication and community is thwarted by the ablest sensibilities that push it back down among the disgusting, the sick, the dead and the dying. In fact, as Elias (2000) suggested, the making of ‘civilised’ community and communication in modernity proceeds by exclusion and interdiction, by cutting out and hiding away whatever causes or might come to inspire angar (choking) or anguista (tightness). It is important to understand ableist disgust as an emotion that attests to the failure of non-disabled people to fully recognise their own vulnerabilities and imperfections particularly as these relate to their mortal selves and to the death and decay that is the fate of all. Although it appears as an aversion to ‘the other’, it is a form of self-aversion or a means by which we hide from the bodily basis of our own humanity (Nussbaum, 2004). Indeed, disgust begins close to home and is derived from our discomfort with our own bodily functions, our oozy, sticky ‘leaky selves’ (Shildrick, 1997; Kolnai, 2004), the fact that we cannot contain ourselves within our own boundaries and the shame and embarrassment that the ‘civilising process’ brings to bear upon us if our leakiness is exposed to others. Because modernity is a charter for anal retentiveness, we cannot forgive ourselves for our physical impurities. We hold ourselves ransom to the myth of the ‘clean and proper’ body; the perfect body of ableist culture is a myth that we use to screen ourselves from the visceral realities of our own lives. The ableist body ‘helps’ non-disabled people cope with their fears about their own corporeal vulnerability. It does so by invoking its opposite, the disabled body, a foreign entity that is anomalous, chaotic and disgusting. Modern history helps to make this object of disgust more tangible. Civilising processes clarify stigma and make biological differences into socio-moral categories. Disgust provokes the civilising sensibilities. It warns them of the presence of possible contaminants (Miller, 1997). Consequently, psychological and social distance between disability and non-disability expands. Disgust in ‘it’s thought- content’ is ‘typically unreasonable, embodying magical ideas of contamination, and impossible aspirations to purity, immortality, and non-animality, that are just not in line with human life as we know it’ (Nussbaum, 2004: 12). Disgust is an emotion that has a central role in our everyday relationships with our bodies, our patterns of social interaction and – most pressingly from the perspective of this chapter – in processes of social exclusion. Disgust is the emotional fuel of ableism. The threat posed by ourselves to ourselves (and projected onto others), the threat of our ‘bodiliness’ and the shame and anxiety associated with it is a product of ableism, of the ‘tyranny of perfection’. Ableism makes the world alien to disabled bodies and, at the same time, produces impairment as an invalidating experience. It is manifest in our cultural inclination towards normalcy by way of correction, towards homogeneity by way of disparagement of difference. What this means for disabled people is that they are ‘expected to reject their own bodies’ and ‘adjust to the carnal norms of nondisabled people’ (Paterson and Hughes, 1999: 608). The ‘corporeality of the disabled body’ is, according to Campbell (2008: 157), ‘constantly in a state of deferral’ awaiting the affective response that will demean it or the travails of sociogenesis that will either do away with it or ‘make it better’.

#### The 1ACs placement in civil society is in opposition to the disgusting disabled child, their attempt at progress through policy requires the erausure of disability due to both civil society and the 1ACspsychogenesis tied desires.

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Elimination and/or correction have been the primary social response to disabled people in modernity. The primary form of experience (of disability), during the same period, has been one of invalidation. Invalidation carries a ‘dual meaning’ as both ‘confinement through incapacity’ and ‘deficit of credibility’ (Hughes, 2000: 558). This (latter and more crucial) claim is based on the view that in the non-disabled imaginary disability is an ‘ontological deficit’ – a reduction of ‘leib’ to ‘korpor’, human to animal, subjectivity to flesh, identity to excessive corporeal presence. It is this deficit of credibility that provides the spurious rationale for the disposal of disabled bodies by means of elimination (inter alia extermination or segregation) or correction (inter alia sterilisation or rehabilitation). These are the social practices that have been used to erase both the psychological aversion and the problematic social difference that disability has come to represent. In this chapter, I will argue – using Norbert Elias as a touchstone – that the treatment of disabled people in the modern period is a barbaric sideshow in the long march of the ‘civilising process’ (Elias, 2000). The ‘personality structure’ ableism (see Kumari Campbell (2001) and in this volume) in modernity transforms its own ontological precariousness into aversion for and disposal of disability. The negative response to biological and intellectual difference in modernity is strongly influenced by the tendency embedded in the ‘civilising process’ to incrementally deride the value of physical and intellectual difference and promote a sanitised norm of human behaviour and appearance (Elias, 2000). The social and social policy response to disability in the modern period cannot be separated from the emotional aversion to impairment characteristic of non-disabled hegemony. I will utilise Elias’s concepts of psychogenesis and sociogenesis1 to explain that the story of disability in modernity is one that develops towards the social and ontological invalidation of disabled people’s lives. The sociogenisis of disability is, in practice, twofold: it can be ‘anthropoemic’ or ‘anthropophagic’. The first refers to social processes that rootout and eliminate people: if error and imperfection are the anti-heroes of modernity, then one might expect to find examples in which the desire for truth and purity is exercised through the root and branch elimination of those who offend against this moral universe. Locking disabled people into a ‘zone of exception’ (Agamben, 2004) in which they are subjected to the eugenic gaze and categorised as inhuman or sub-human is one strategy for dealing with disability (Reave, 2008). ‘The real solution to heresy’ suggested George Canguilhem in his discussion of the normal and the pathological (1991: 280) ‘is extirpation’, meaning to destroy totally or exterminate. In modernity medical ideas and practices have been a fertile source of radical solutions to impairment. Medical solutions also embrace anthropophagic strategies. They deal in the correction and rehabilitation of ‘abnormal bodies’. Cure/rehabilitation stands at the heart of the medical doctrine of salvation (soteriology) and it is a prospect often held up to disabled people by optimists who fetishise scientific progress and promote biological solutions to impairment. Both strategies – to kill or to cure – transmit the same core cultural message: disabled people represent ‘what not to be’ and are, therefore, ontologically invalid or ‘uncivilised’. Social responses to impairment, in modernity, are underpinned by the processes that constitute the psychogenisis of disability. These include the emotional aversions and intolerances of impairment that derive from the civilising process. The ontological invalidation that disabled people experience in their everyday encounters is mediated primarily by the emotion of disgust (with fear and pity in tow). At an existential level the presence of the disabled body is unsettling for non-disabled people who are often in denial about their own vulnerability. This is the psychological and emotional component of what disability scholars call ableism. The standard resolution to this ‘problem’ of non-disability in modernity has been to have the object of discomfort – the disabled person – removed or corrected. The sociogenesis of anthropoemic and anthropophagic strategies for dealing with impairment are rooted in the emotional dispositions of non-disabled people as they develop their civilised protocols for behaviour and bodily comportment. In what follows, I will focus on the ways in which the ‘civilising process’ invalidates impairment and demonstrate how opportunities to escape this ontological dead-end usually require the erasure of disabled identity. In the first section that follows I will give some examples of the way in which one can read disability as a product of the civilising process. In the section, thereafter, I will examine the psychogenesis of disability relating it to the disgust response to impairment and to the development of ableism, the complex of processes that exclude disabled people from the ‘psychic habitus’ (Elias, 2000: 367) of modernity.

#### I affirm crip pessimsim – we embrace the deviancy and failure of the crip child that fails to cure – we lose hope in a society that is ontolocially antagonized against us.

Kolářová 14 (Kateřina Kolářová, Ph.D. Charles University, Prauge, “The Inarticulate Post-Socialist Crip On the Cruel Optimism of Neoliberal Transformations in the Czech Republic” Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies Volume 8, Issue 3, 2014 p.270-3)

The aspiration of post-socialism was progress, moral emancipation, and eventual happiness. I recall the quotation above that attempted to articulate the vision of the optimistic future as a moment when “every citizen of this country fe[els] content and happy” (Váchalová, 2). Yet, as Sara Ahmed cautions, happiness is a troubled notion. She asks, “What are we consenting to, when we consent to happiness?” and offers us a troubling answer: “perhaps the consensus that happiness is the consensus” (Promise, 1). Ahmed’s questioning of happiness as the normative horizon of our orientation resonates with the key issues that I address; the promise of happiness is a twin of “cruel optimism.” Most acutely, Ahmed’s critical discussion focuses on revealing how (the vision of and desire for) happiness participates in establishing structures of consensus, which are in fact structures of dominance. With (falsely) positive energy, recuperative logic said, “you should be happy communism is over”; the promise of happiness was used to justify the oppression of “the disabled” through ideologies of ableism constitutive to liberal individualism and liberal humanism. The impossibility of seeing and envisioning crip(topias) in the situation of (post-)shameful identity illustrates not only the harmful and utterly disabling work of certain affective attachments, it also and just as vividly illustrates the equally harmful impacts/effects of attachments to affects, in particular attachments to affects of positivity, affects seemingly necessary to foster self-embracing identity and subjectivity. In other words, the post-socialist crip challenges Western-developed theories of (disabled) identity that argue that positive affects are necessary to foster self-embracing and affirmative understandings of disability and disabled subjectivity. The symbolic violence embedded in recuperative positivity offers us the opportunity to think about crip failure and crip negativity. The violence also points toward conditions that (could) make (some forms of) failure useful for cripistemologies and that (could) map crip horizons. Cripness is already rich with failure; cripness is infused with negativity that sustains. The crip negativity I plead for is a critical strategy rupturing ideologies of cure, rehabilitation, and overcoming, ideologies that inflict hurt and violence (not only) on crips. I wish to initiate a discussion about crip negativity as a political practice working toward (if never reaching) crip utopian horizons. Still, the post-socialist crip opens other and new questions about what crip failure would mean if it were to foster and sustain life, what forms of crip negative energies would allow for crip utopias and make possible the desire for crip survival. J. Jack Halberstam’s theory of failure elucidates how the compulsory positive nature of optimism, hope, pride, and success precludes the realization that failure can be a form of sustenance and strategy of critique/survival. In failing the normative prescriptions of compulsory heterosexuality (and able-bodiedness), failure “imagines other goals for life, for love, for art, and for being” (88). Coming back to the image of the women failing/surviving with AIDS at the post-socialist Odessa hospice, failure also imagines signs of crip solidarity and sustenance where the visions of an optimistic future create spaces of abandonment for subjects who will never be offered a fantasy of the “good life.” Despite its lack of substantial attention to cripness that would surpass the level of metaphorics, The Queer Art of Failure does offer some lines along which to think also about crip failures. The most helpful to the current analysis of post-socialist affects would seem to be Halberstam’s discussion of the failure to remember. Forgetting, losing, and looping between past and future are the techniques of resistance to normative temporalities. Such failures at temporalities of progressive and curative futurity, I argue, could offer forms of sustenance (for the post-socialist crip). The failure to remember would produce a rupture in the dominant narratives of shame (of a failed socialism) and the futurity of “getting better.” It would forget visions of pride based on overcoming the failed socialist crip, and it would loosen/lose the compulsory vision of optimism of (neoliberal) humanism. It would forget the ideologies that we have seen hurt and violate crips and our futures. Cripping, disjointing, the normative forms of (linear) knowing about the past-presentfuture, could offer resistance to the cruel hope that directs our desires into (an evacuated) future while foreclosing the negotiation of difficult yet important relationships, past and present. The rejection of the curative and always already deferred future opens up a space for developing a more complicated relationship with failed pasts. Queer theorist Heather Love devises the politics of “feeling backwards/backwards feelings” as an affective strategy of resistance to liberal understandings of the “repressive hypothesis” and emancipation. Her concept is both a corrective to the deeply problematic progressivism of “gay pragmatism” with its compulsorily positive futurity of “getting better,” and an affective reaching backwards to legacies of difficult pasts. As she puts it, “[b]ackward feelings serve as an index to the ruined state of the social world; they indicate continuities between the bad gay past and the present; and they show up the inadequacy of queer narratives of progress” (27). I wish to add that they show up continuities between crip pasts and presents obscured by the undisputedly “good intentions” (McRuer, Crip, 110) of rehabilitation. Halberstam for his part appreciates the strategies of backward feeling as a way of recovering the past of queer and racially marked subjects erased in the tidy versions of the past: “[w]hile liberal histories build triumphant political narratives with progressive stories of improvement and success, radical histories must content with a less tidy past, one that passes on legacies of failure and loneliness as the consequence of [ableist] homophobia and racism and xenophobia” (98). To retrieve lives undone by ideologies of ableism, homophobia, racism and xenophobia, and practices of institutionalization, forced sterilization, ethnic segregation, and on and on, we need backward feelings. The project of “reformulated histories” feels backwards to past forms of crip survivals and past experiences that have been erased (see also Kafer’s discussion of Halberstam 42–44). Alongside this move, I also want to “feel backwards” to the hurt caused by the shame of the bad past itself. This is not a naïve reclamation of the idealized communist past ignorant of the violence committed by the communist regime (violence and hurt inflicted on disabled people still remains mostly undocumented, unspoken, and unanalysed). What I argue is that the notion of the bad and failed past is too comfortable and too tidy and serves only the ideology of capitalist recovery that prescribes only one version of futurity, a futurity—I argue—that is constructed upon the abjection of cripness. To open critical discussion I propose that we need to continue to produce untidy, crooked, queer, twisted, bent, crip versions of pasts. Only they will provide for more generous horizons of the present and future.

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best methodologically challenges ableism. - Assumptions of ableism is always already inherent in any system of knowledge production thus ableism is *always* a prior question. Evaluate the 1ACs scholarship and assumptions – anything else allows for ableist norms to be replicated - the 1ACs western philosophical outlook is simply an able body fantasy that reproduces crip violence

Campbell 13 (Fiona Kumari Campbell, Adjunct Professor in the Department of Disability Studies at Griffith University. Wednesday 27 November 2013. Problematizing Vulnerability: Engaging Studies in Ableism and Disability Jurisprudence. Keynote speech at Disability at the Margins: Vulnerability, Empowerment and the Criminal Law)

What is meant by the concept of ableism? The literature suggests that the term is often used fluidly with limited definitional or conceptual specificity. The work of Carlson (2001)5 and Campbell (2001) represented a turning point in bringing attention to this new site of subordination not just in terms of disablement but also ableism’s application to other devalued groups. **Ableism is deeply seeded at the level of knowledge systems of life, personhood and liveability.** Ableism is not just a matter of ignorance or negative attitudes towards disabled people; **it is a schema of perfection, a deep way of thinking about bodies, wholeness and permeability.**6 As such integrating ableism into social research and advocacy strategies represents a significant challenge to practice as ableism moves beyond the more familiar territory of social inclusion and usual indices of exclusion to the very divisions of life. Bringing together the study of existence and knowledge systems, ableism is difficult to pin down. Ableism is a set of processes and practices that arise and decline through sequences of causal convergences influenced by the elements of time, space, bodily inflections and circumstance. Ability and the corresponding notion of ableism are intertwined. **Compulsory ablebodiedness is implicated in the very foundations of social theory,** therapeutic jurisprudence, advocacy, **medicine and law; or in the mappings of human anatomy.** Summarised by Campbell (2001, 44) Ableism refers to; …A network of beliefs processes and practices that produces a particular kind of self and body (the bodily standard) that is projected as the perfect, speciestypical and therefore essential and fully human. Disability then is cast as a diminished state of being human. Writing today (2013) I add an addition to this definition: ‘The ableist bodily configuration is immutable, permanent and laden with qualities of perfectionism or the enhancement imperative orientated towards a self-contained improvability’. Sentiency applies to not just the human but the ‘animal’ world. As a category to differentiate the normal from the pathological, **the concept of abledness is predicated on some preexisting notion about the nature of typical species functioning that is beyond culture and historical context**. Ableism does not just stop at propagating what is typical for each species. An ableist imaginary tells us what a healthy body means – a normal mind, the pace, the tenor of thinking and the kinds of emotions and affect that are suitable to express. Of course these ‘fictional’ characteristics then are promoted as a natural ideal. **This abled imaginary relies upon the existence of an unacknowledged imagined shared community of able-bodied/minded people held together by a common ableist world view that asserts the preferability** and compulsoriness **of the norms of ableism.** Such ableist schemas erase differences in the ways humans express our emotions, use our thinking and bodies in different cultures and in different situations. This in turn enacts bodily Otherness rendered sometimes as the ‘disabled’, ‘perverted’ or ‘abnormal body’, clearly demarcating the boundaries of normal and pathological. A critical feature of an ableist orientation is a belief that impairment or disability is inherently negative and at its essence is a form of harm in need of improvement, cure or indeed eradication. **Studies in Ableism** (SiA)inverts traditional approaches, by shifting our concentration to what the study of disability **tells us about the production, operation and maintenance of ableism.** In not looking solely at disability,we can focus on how the abled able-bodied, non-disabled identity is maintained and privileged. Disability does not even need to be in the picture. SiA’s interest in abledness means that the theoretical foundations are readily applicable to the study of difference and the dividing practices of race, gender, location and sexual orientation. Reframing our focus from disability to ableism prompts different preoccupations: • What does the study of the politics of ‘vulnerability’ tells us about what it means to be ‘non-vulnerable’? • Indeed how is the very conceptualisation of ‘autonomy’ framed in the light of discourses of ‘vulnerability’? • In representing vulnerability as universal does this detract from the specificity of disability experiences? **SiA examines the ways that concepts of** wellbeing, **vulnerability and deficiency circulate throughout society and impact** upon economic, social, **legal and ethical choices**. Principally SiA focuses on the limits of tolerance and possessive individualism. Extending the theorization of disability, **studies in ableism can enrich our understanding of the production of vulnerability and the terms of engagement in civic life and the possibilities of social inclusion.** I now turn to unpacking the nuances and structure of a theory of ableism.

#### Disability studies in debate makes debate more accessible – it destabilizes assumptions and forces a hard conversation – making debate a safe space for disabled children.

Lanning 14 (Eric Lanning< Eric Lanning was a debater at the University of Houston and former National Debate Tournament Champion.> January 22, 2014, “What is Access?”, access debate, http://accessdebate.com/2014/01/22/what-is-access/ The website is now no longer working, but you can access an archive of the website through this link: https://web.archive.org/web/20151215072330/http://accessdebate.com/2014/01/22/what-is-access/ Brackets already in the article)

I’ve been thinking a lot lately about what “access” means in the context of the debate community. I don’t have all (or even a lot) of the answers to this question, but I’m beginning to think that might be the point. We can’t figure this out alone. We need each other. Disability Studies gives the means, motives and opportunity to reframe this “dependence” as inevitable, necessary and valuable. **What would it mean to universally design debate? What would it mean to ask and answer this question together? I believe that “access” is the process (not outcome) of answering that question over and over. It is the process of destabilizing our assumptions about what debaters “are” and “do”.** What assumptions do we make about debaters inherent “abilities” or natural “capabilities” when we debate in particular ways and in particular spaces? What changes should we make to debate practice and culture? These are questions that I am asking and answering in every negative debate – but the “pre-requisite” for me to asking and answering these questions in any debate was my own disability consciousness. The most portable skill debate ever gave me was consciousness. Debate gave me a vocabulary and audience to articulate what my lived experience with disability teaches me everyday. It gave me the experience and environment to develop and explain my own consciousness of disability. For me, that is the beginning of access. Before we can debate about what access means, it is worth thinking about the status quo – what does it mean for debate to be “inaccessible” to particular debaters and particular identities?  What is wrong with the status quo? For many years and for most debaters, “ableism” was nothing more than a list of words you should not use: blinded, silenced, paralyzed, crazy, lame, disabled, crippled, etc. To be clear, I think that ableist language is problematic and constitutes a micro-aggression against disabled people that we should all work to stop. But it is about SO much more than language. **Disability is an embodied experience.** In a poem I wrote called “Broken” – I explain this distinction as, “disability is not something you have, its something you are” (If you’re interested in hearing/reading the entire poem, I’ve included a link at the end). **This recognition of the lived experience of disability – of disability as a social and political fact – of disability as a category of human existence is missing from our current debates about ableism and access.** One of the most meaningful and empowering contributions of disability studies is expressed in the mantra, “nothing about us without us”. **It is a call to foreground and privilege the experience of disability.** This is not to say that TABS (temporarily abled bodies) can’t participate and contribute to the conversation about access, but instead it is a call to reverse the history of marginalization of disabled people experience in the academy and our society.  Obviously not every debater has a lived experience with disability, but we all do research. **In debate, this research is a reflection of our priorities – if you want to be part of the solution instead of part of the problem: read a book! Cut some cards!** Ask and answer (yourself) the question, “what is access”! In my negative debates this year, I’ve learned a lot about disability and access. **I’ve learned that the process of “debating it out” is powerful and revolutionary. I’ve learned that my opponent’s willingness to listen and engage with my arguments makes me a better advocate.** But even more than the potential of the debate round – I’ve been inspired by the potential of the debate community. I’ve had countless conversations, emails and chats with disabled and non-disabled debaters, coaches and judges that have fundamentally changed my answer to the question, why do you debate? Debate made me the person I am today. Everything I love about my self and my life is a result of my decision to debate. Why do I debate? For access. I debate because I believe in this activity and community. I believe we could and should make debate accessible to everyone, but we can’t do it alone. We need each other. **I’ll end with a quote: “[Access] is not a thing that can be delivered by politician, policymakers or educators, but a process of struggle that has to be joined”**

## Case

### Shell

#### The adoption of European humanism became the basis of “the disability drive” - the psychic force governing the subjectivities of both disabled and nondisabled folk. Disability drive is fear and fascination of the temporariness of one’s ability status.

Mollow 15 (The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015)

This is why I have proposed that the “death drive”—a force that has less to do with literal death than with a strange persistence of life in death, or of death in life (perhaps like the “life not worth living” of which disability is often supposed to consist)—would more accurately be termed the “disability drive.” Writing of the contingency of disability as an identity category, Michael Bérubé observes: Any of us who identify as “nondisabled” must know that our self-designation is inevitably temporary, and that a car crash, a virus, a degenerative genetic disease, or a precedent-setting legal decision could change our status in ways over which we have no control whatsoever. If it is obvious why most nondisabled people resist this line of thinking, it should be equally obvious why that resistance must somehow be overcome. (viii) Could part of this resistance be attributable to a fear that, in the car crash or other identityshattering event, it might be the driver‟s own hand that makes that disabling turn, that is, that the driver might be driven by an impulse, unwanted and unconscious, toward something beyond the principles of pleasure and health? Applying the name “the disability drive” to this “beyond” affords insight into the reasons that images of disability so powerfully excite and repel, becoming, as Tobin Siebers writes, “sources of fear and fascination for able-bodied people, who cannot bear to look at the unruly sight before them but also cannot bear not to look” (178). Later in this chapter, I will define the affect that Siebers references here as “primary pity.” For now, though, I simply want to point out that Siebers‟s important observation can be extended by noting that it is not only nondisabled people who react to images of disability with a mixture of aversion and attraction. Disabled people may also respond in this way, especially when contemplating impairments other than those that currently disable us.116 Building on Douglas Baynton‟s famous assertion that “disability is everywhere,…once you begin looking for it,” I suggest that the same may be true in regard to the disability drive: this ego-undoing psychic force shapes the subjectivities of disabled and nondisabled subjects alike (52). Manifestations of the disability drive may be present in Edelman‟s discussion of Tiny Tim. Take, for example, Edelman‟s contention that “the pleasurable fantasy of survival” in Dickens‟s story requires the survival of the fantasy that Tiny Tim “does not excite an ardent fear (or is it a fearful ardor?) to see him . . . at last cash in his chips” (45). It‟s a familiar cultural fantasy: cure ‟em (as Dickens might hope) or kill ‟em (as Edelman suggests readers must secretly wish).117 But in this unacknowledged wish, there may be more at stake than either killing or curing. In the chapter that follows his reading of A Christmas Carol, Edelman adduces Lacan‟s discussion of the legend of Saint Martin, who was said to have cut his own cloak in two in order to give half of it to a beggar. “Perhaps,” Lacan suggests, “over and above that need to be clothed, [the beggar] was begging for something else, namely that Saint Martin either kill him or fuck him” (qtd. in Edelman 83). Drawing upon this passage in his analysis of North by Northwest, Edelman proposes that as Leonard attempts to push Roger Thornhill to his death from atop Mount Rushmore, he “enacts . . . the one [killing] as displacement of the other [fucking]” (85). Killing as displacement of fucking: might a similar displacement be at work in Edelman‟s attribution, to Dickens‟s readers, of a “fearful ardor” to see Tiny Tim “at last cash in his chips” (45)? As evidence for this suggestion, take the mode by which Edelman introduces his discussion of A Christmas Carol: “Take Tiny Tim, please!,” “with a nod to the spirit of the late Henny Youngman” renders Tiny Tim wifelike—clearly undesirable in this context, but not wholly uneroticized (41). And then there is the word “take,” which, particularly when followed by the word “please,” has a meaning other than the ones Edelman seems deliberately to invoke: “take” means “fuck,” and so Edelman‟s directive to “take Tiny Tim, please!,” which echoes his earlier injunction to “fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net,” seems to authorize an additional imperative: fuck Tiny Tim. “Fuck” here means, of course, “remove” or “the hell with,” but it also means fuck.118 Arguably, these two ways in which No Future says “fuck Tiny Tim” coincide with what disability studies most ardently desires. “Fuck Tiny Tim, please!” disability scholars beg: rid us, please, of this most reviled textual creation. And also: if it is our cultural mandate to embody this pitiable, platitude-issuing, infantilized, and irritating figure—well, then fuck us, every one. Fuck us because figuratively, we are already “so fucked” by our culture‟s insistence, through this figure, that the disabled are not fuckable. This insistence must be understood as a form of reactive reinforcement: propelling every cultural representation of disability as undesirable, there may be a “fearful ardor,” an unacknowledged drive. Such representations include Edelman‟s abjection of Tiny Tim. And, I will argue, they also pertain to a similar abjection of Tiny Tim in the field of disability studies. As we shall soon see, the drive that infuses affective reactions to disability with ardor is often expressed through the emotion of pity. In taking account of the various forms that pity can take, we will be led to pose a question to disability studies and to queer antisocial theory together: are we sure that we want to take Tiny Tim out of the cultural text?

#### Disability drives invokes a two tiered affective response of pity between the non disabled subject and the disabled object. Primary pity removes the ego’s ability to distinguish itself from the disabled other by forcing the self to reconcile with the fact that ability status is temporary. The temporariness of ability status exists in opposition to the egos investment in healthiness and control invoking secondary pity - a distancing of the ego from disability by invoking emotions of superiority through sadness and a desire to eliminate disability from social consciousness through medicalization or institutionalization.

Mollow 15 (The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015)

A great deal of the pain and pleasure of primary pity center on questions about what, or who, this fallen self is. When most people think about pity, we refer to an affect in which, to adopt Edelman‟s phrase, we purport to “feel for the other.” But as with primary narcissism, in which the self has not yet been constituted, and therefore cannot be said to enter into intersubjective relations with an “other,” primary pity entails a mixing up of self and other such that the ego, in becoming permeable to pain that may properly belong to “someone else,” is profoundly threatened in its integrity. Primary pity is that intense pain-pleasure complex that is provoked by the image of a suffering other who, it seems momentarily, both is and is not one‟s self. This affective response can feel unbearable, as seen in Siebers‟s formulation: one “cannot bear to look…but also cannot bear not to look.” Primary pity is difficult to bear because it involves a drive toward disability (one cannot bear not to look), which menaces the ego‟s investments in health, pleasure, and control—because to contemplate another person‟s suffering is to confront the question, **“Could this happen to me?”** Such a prospect, although frightening, may also be compelling; in this way, primary pity replicates the self-rupturing aspects of sexuality. Indeed, the unbearability of primary pity reflects its coextensiveness with sexuality. Sex, or the Unbearable, a book coauthored by Edelman and by Lauren Berlant, argues that sex “unleashes unbearable contradictions that we nonetheless struggle to bear” (back cover). This claim accords with Freud‟s account of sexuality as a “pleasurable” “unpleasure” that the ego can never fully master or control (Three 49,75). As Leo Bersani puts it in his reading of Freud, “the pleasurable unpleasurable tension of sexual enjoyment occurs when the body‟s „normal‟ range of sensation is exceeded, and when the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed”; thus, “sexuality would be that which is intolerable to the structured self” (Freudian 38). Primary pity is also intolerable to the structured self, because it entails a fascination with the fantasy of a self in a state of disintegration or disablement. Secondary pity is something else, although it cannot wholly be differentiated from primary pity. Secondary pity attempts to heal primary pity‟s self-rupturing effects by converting primary pity into a feeling that is bearable. As with secondary narcissism, secondary pity involves both an attempt to get back to that ego-shattering state of painfully pleasurable primary pity, and at the same time to defend against that threat to the ego by aggrandizing oneself at someone else‟s expense. Secondary pity refers to all those ego-bolstering behaviors that most people think of when they talk about pity. Disabled people are all too familiar with these behaviors: the saccharin sympathy, the telethon rituals of “conspicuous contribution,” the insistence that “they” (i.e., nondisabled people) could never endure such suffering. More commonly known in our culture simply as “pity,” secondary pity encompasses our culture‟s most clichéd reactions to disability: charity, tears, and calls for a cure

### Dump

#### The 1ACs affective strategy of trans rage is anti crip - the appeal to an affective connection in excess of "rational" communication is exclusive – turns case

St. Pierre 13 (PhD Student at the University of Alberta; Department of Philosophy; M.A. in philosophy from the University of Alberta Canadian Disability Studies Association. Victoria, BC. June 2013.)

My talk investigates the means through which disability is constituted by affective labour and neoliberalism. Paralleling the shift from modernization to postmodernization of labor, the constitution of disability has likewise been changed. There are accordingly two questions that will structure my exploration: 1) how are disabled subjects marginalized within an information economy and 2) what kind of disabled subjectivity does informationalization produce? This is largely a new area of inquiry for me and as such I welcome ideas of how to further these questions. To start off, allow me to rehearse a simple truism: capitalism produces competition. Simon Clarke notes that “the intensiﬁcation of the demands of capital throws more and more people into the ranks of the unemployable. The accumulation of capital necessarily leads to the polarisation of overwork and unemployment, prosperity and destitution” (25). As has been well noted within disability studies, this competition notoriously privileges the able-bodied since those bodies which cannot move quickly or efficiently, unable to meet the demands of labour intensification, are the first to be cut from employment. If this resulting exclusion was true within industrial capitalism, then it is even more so within neoliberalism. Here, knowledge and education are translated as human capital to be exploited, and asetheticization gains centre stage. Here,the performance of competencies is a necessary trait since skill no longer determines competency; what is furteher needed for full-participation in the socio-economic system is to project the right sort of image as a marketable and desirable embodied subject. In this way, it is not uncommon for the compulsion to appear normal and able-bodied to overshadow one’s actual skills. The phenomenon of advertising and marketing the self trades upon communication. Unlike human knowledge and education, I suggest that communication is not capital per se, but serves a more basic function as the conductive medium through which human capital becomes salient and exploitable. Communicative disabilities are the most obvious examples of disabilities marginalized here, but the drive to perform competencies in normalized fashion allows all disabled bodies to be exploited in ways impossible within industrial capitalism. To explain this move, I turn to Michael Hardt and affective labour. In his ground-breaking piece “Affective Labor,” Hardt outlines the succession of economic paradigms since the middle ages: “a first paradigm, in which agriculture and the extraction of raw materials dominated the economy; a second, in which industry and the manufacture of durable goods occupied the privilege position; and the current paradigm in which providing services and manipulating information are at the heart of economic production” (90). The most recent shift of post-modernization, from the secondary sector to the tertiary, marks the overshadowing economic importance of knowledge, information, communication, and affect. It is not that industrial production and the extraction of raw materials cease to play an important role, but rather that their role has been redefined through the informational economy such that production has become informationalized. Hardt argues that within this economy, the quality and nature of labour has shifted from material—the production and selling of “stuff”—to immaterial labour—labour that produces immaterial goods. In particular, there are three types of immaterial labour: 1) industrial production that has been informationalized 2) labour of analytic and symbolic tasks 3) production and manipulation of affect (which requires actual or virtual human contact and proximity). This third category is the one that most interests both Hardt and myself, for while those with communicative disabilities are generally disadvantaged by the move to an informational economy and immaterial labour, affective labour significantly reshapes the terrain of disability. The first two forms of immaterial labour are directly concerned with the exchange of information and knowledge; affective labour produces affect: “a feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction, excitement, passion—even a sense of connectedness or community” (96). In the most obvious sense, affective labour describes the service industry—Disneyland is in the business of selling a particular experience—but affective labour has also reconstituted the socio-economic terrain such that material goods are not sold anymore; that is, Starbucks does not sell coffee, but Zen, wholeness, and friendship while Mazda sells not cars but a lifestyle of freedom and adventure. The creation and manipulation of affect is central. Affective labour collides economy and culture, insofar as “production has become communicative, affective, de-instrumentalized, and ‘elevated’ to the level of human relations” (96). Through affective labour the human is constituted as a node of informational conductivity in relation to systems of communication between the production and consumption of commodities. Since communication is that which holds the fluid socio-economic structure of post-modernization together, informational conductivity becomes key to competing and surviving. Existing as informational nodes, those with communicative disabilities distort and put stress on the mechanisms