# TOC – IMET PIC

## 1NC

### 1NC Civilian Casualties – Short

#### CP Text: The United States ought to end its provision of military aid, except for the International Military Education and Training program, to \_\_\_\_\_ . The United States ought to

**---develop a system for tracking IMET alumni, including an IMET alumni association**

**---require screening of IMET enrollees**

**---employ instructors from other democracies**

**---increase IMET assistance**

**---rewrite the conditions for aid-suspension in response to coups by specifying the definition of a “coup” and establishing a no-tolerance policy for militaries that depose elected governments.**

#### IMET is military aid

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International Military Education and Training (IMET): educates foreign military personnel on issues ranging from democracy and human rights to technical military techniques and training on U.S. weapons systems.

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#### Our reform planks significantly improve the program

Kurlantzick 16. Joshua. Senior Fellow for Southeast Asia @ CFR. "Reforming the U.S. International Military Education and Training Program". June 08, 2016. <https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-international-military-education-and-training-program>. recut TG

Follow and support IMET alumni. The Department of Defense should develop a comprehensive system for tracking IMET alumni. Such a system would allow the U.S. government to track which graduates have been promoted and could help defense attachés at U.S. embassies cultivate relationships with foreign militaries. The Department of Defense also should provide three to five million dollars in seed funding to create an IMET alumni association. The association would sponsor events where IMET alumni could interact with U.S. diplomats and military attachés.

Make IMET more selective. Once a country is approved to receive IMET, defense attachés at U.S. embassies should play a more active role in prequalifying IMET enrollees. The Department of Defense should assign attachés overseas who have experience vetting IMET candidates. Better screening would actually defuse congressional and human rights criticisms of IMET for funding abusive officers, and make it less likely that Congress would suspend IMET funding for a particular country. This prequalification should include a thorough analysis of proposed participants’ records for apolitical professionalism. In nations where the military has a long record of rights abuses, it may be necessary to open IMET spaces only to those below a certain age.

Employ instructors from other democracies. To emphasize respect for human rights and a civilian chain of command, at least 5 percent of IMET’s funding should be earmarked for foreign instructors from the militaries of countries, such as Brazil, that recently made a successful transition to democracy.

Use IMET more as both a carrot and a stick. Although U.S. law already prohibits IMET funding for a country where a “duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup,” the legislation has many loopholes. Most obviously, a U.S. president can choose not to call a military takeover a coup, and maintain IMET funding. Congress should rewrite legislation to make it impossible to provide IMET funds to a military that deposes an elected government. To be sure, cutting off IMET could be counterproductive for short-term strategic relations with that nation. However, taking this risk is necessary. Suspending IMET allows the United States to send an important signal to citizens of that country that Washington does not tolerate coups. In these young democracies, cultivating public support for U.S. policy is critical to sustaining bilateral relations in the long-term. Moreover, in the post–Cold War era, military regimes from Egypt to Thailand have proven themselves highly incapable of handling modern, globalized economies and security challenges, from violence in Sinai to Thailand’s macroeconomic policy. A potential short-term chill in a bilateral relationship is worth the prospect of helping end regimes that undermine regional security and prosperity. In addition, when elected governments are quickly restored, as happened after the 2006 Thai coup, the United States resumes IMET funding; evidence suggests that military relations are then revived at the same level as before the coup.

#### Lowers civilian deaths and atrocities – best study

**KU 17** University of Kansas, 5-8-2017, "U.S. international military training programs tied to fewer civilian casualties," <https://news.ku.edu/2017/05/03/us-international-military-training-programs-tied-fewer-civilian-casualties-study-finds> // ash

LAWRENCE — U.S. grant programs that provided training to international military and civilian personnel since 1995 are tied to fewer conflict-related civilian casualties in foreign countries that were recipients of the U.S. security aid. However, arms-sales programs are ineffective at improving human rights in those countries that purchase U.S. weapons and services, according to a new University of Kansas study.

The researchers said the study, published in Political Science Quarterly, is particularly timely given the Trump administration's focus on cutting the federal government’s international aid, including overtures about reductions in programs that provide U.S.-funded foreign military training while either keeping or increasing foreign military sales.

"We precisely show that if the U.S. is truly interested in building a more peaceful world where the militaries of foreign states do not get involved in egregious human rights violations and abuses, then we need more of what the government apparently wants to eliminate," said Mariya Omelicheva, a KU associate professor of political science and the study's lead author.

Omelicheva's co-authors are Brittnee Carter, a doctoral student in the KU Department of Political Science, and KU alumnus Luke Campbell, assistant professor of political science at Northwest Missouri State University.

The study examined every U.S. security assistance program funded and administered by the U.S. departments of State and Defense between 1995 and 2012 by the number of dollars allocated and the total number of trained foreign military. This included Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing, the Professional Military Training, Security Assistance Training Program and many others.

The study also focused particularly on the International Military Education and Training, or IMET, program, which provides grant funding for a variety of education and training programs for foreign military personnel, including having foreign officers train on U.S. soil, such as at Fort Leavenworth.

"IMET is a deliberate effort to expose foreign military and civilian personnel to democratic institutions and values and internationally recognized human rights, whereas this objective takes a back seat when it comes to foreign military finance or foreign military sales," the researchers said.

For example, the U.S. Department of State allocated $3.3 billion in foreign arms sales that served 144,000 foreign military personnel over those years. It allocated $1 billion to train 101,000 foreign military students during that time through IMET.

The researchers compared that spending and number of military students trained or served with the number of atrocities committed in countries that either received U.S. military aid to train their soldiers or used their own money to buy U.S. weapons and training. They defined atrocities as deliberate use of lethal force against noncombatant civilians by state actors who were engaged in a wider political or military conflict. This is a broader definition of a traditional human rights abuse.

Omelicheva said the findings indicate that U.S. security assistance programs that provide substantive education, training and exchanges of ideas are important in shaping the human rights practices in foreign countries. The positive nature of these exchanges tends to have a more lasting effect as foreign military officers and students return home and put these ideas into practice.

"The socialization process is crucial in developing that kind of awareness that is necessary for developing the modern military we want to have in different parts of the world," she said, "one that is respectful of human rights and of law."

Omelicheva said she had a similar experience as a scholar from Russia who came to study in the United States, and when she returned she was motivated to try to change the political culture.

She said in these training programs, the foreign military officers likely learn more about specific tenets of democracy, such as protection of minority rights, due process and the rule of law, which are extremely important ideas in nascent democratic states or former authoritarian regimes.

"The idea is that you don't need to hold a stick and constantly use the sort of punishment, such as withholding further assistance, to compel the foreign officers to embrace the principles of humanitarian law and human rights," she said. "Once the middle range of officers reach the higher echelons of power in the military, we would like to see them not giving orders to go and shoot their own citizens or be complicit in whatever other brutalities a regime might wish to commit against possible political opponents."

#### There’s a strong statistically significant impact

**Omelicheva et al 17** Omelicheva, Mariya [MARIYA Y. OMELICHEVA is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Kansas. Her primary research interests are Eurasian security, Russia’s foreign policy, and international democratization], Carter, Brittnee [BRITTNEE CARTER is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the University of Kansas with particular interests in international security, terrorism and political violence] and Campbell, Luke B. [LUKE B. CAMPBELL is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at Northwest Missouri State University. His primary research interests include international relations theory, international ethics, and U.S. foreign policy[ (2017), Military Aid and Human Rights: Assessing the Impact of U.S. Security Assistance Programs. Political Science Quarterly, 132: 119-144. doi:10.1002/polq.12575 // ash

Supporting the assertions of its advocates, IMET is found to have a negative and statistically significant impact on civilian deaths, both in terms of the total dollars spent and the number of students participating in IMET. The latter finding suggests that the expected number of civilian deaths decreases by a ratio of 0.99 to 1 for every student participating in the IMET program. The INL and Counter-Drug Training Program produces statistically significant results on both the total dollars spent and the number of trainees, whereas two other individual programs—the Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) and the Joint Combined Exchange Training Program (EXG)—show statistically significant results on the total number of trainees. In all of these instances, the individual programs measured by dollars, students, or both, are found to be negatively associated with civilian casualties. The amounts spent on the Unified Command Engagement Activities Program (UCEA) and CTFP are found to be positively associated with the number of civilian deaths; these findings are also statistically significant. (See the Appendix for descriptions of these programs.)

### 1NC Democracy - Super short

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#### IMET’s key to spreading democracy – has lasting effects on political leaders

Mujkic et al 18. Edin Mujkic, Ph.D, Assistant Professor in the School of Public Affairs for University of Colorado Colorado Springs, Hugo D. Asencio, Assistant Professor of Public Administration in the Department of Public Administration at California State University Dominguez Hills, Ph.D. in Public Administration and Public Policy from Auburn University, Theodore Byrne, Associate Professor, Criminal Justice Administration. “International Military Education and Training: Promoting Democratic Values to Militaries and Countries throughout the World”. *Democracy and Security*. 2018. DOI: 10.1080/17419166.2018.1519802.

Based on the responses from the interviewees, one can suggest that the benefits of the IMET program may be greater and more significant than was originally envisioned by the Foreign Assistance Act. As Atkinson argues, hands-on experience by those who are coming from countries still struggling with democratic values and tenets is of importance.81 Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a push, especially since the scandal with the School of Americas, to offer democracy classes to foreign officers to expand their theoretical knowledge.82 The findings in the present study suggest that, while offering democracy classes to foreign officers coming from countries with poor democratic records is helpful, spending time in the United States is of much greater importance and results in a more significant benefit in developing a deeper understanding of functioning democracy.83 Responses from interviewees also reinforce the findings by Cope and Atkinson, as well as Stephen Rosenfeld, Frederick C. Barghoorn, and Sheila Fitzpatrick, suggesting that the presence of foreign officers or civilian students may have an impact on the internal political dynamics of the countries from which they come.84 This is especially valuable when it comes to foreign military officers, as those who come to the United States are part of an elite class and are typically educated in the United States to assume leadership roles in their respective militaries. It is likely that these officers may one day be in senior leadership positions or possibly part of the political elite in their respective countries. Cope addressed this by offering examples of two officers, one from Chile and another from Peru. Both officers were in the same classroom in one of the US military schools that they attended, and later both became chairmen of the joint chiefs of staff in their countries.85 The relationship between their two militaries was improved and brought to a level not previously experienced.86 While improving relationships between militaries is one of the goals of the IMET program, one should take into consideration that the military also plays a pivotal role in maintaining democratic values, defending them, or, alternatively, in undermining them or actively working to erode the democratic system within a country. When there is an opportunity to educate foreign military officers on the benefits of democratic values, it would seem to be a wise investment.

#### The alternative to democracy is violent civil wars, ethnic cleansing, and genocide---the best research confirms

Cortright 13, David Cortright is the director of Policy Studies at the Kroc Institute for Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, Chair of the Board of Directors of the Fourth Freedom Forum, and author of 17 books, Kristen Wall is a Researcher and Analyst at the Kroc Institute, Conor Seyle is Associate Director of One Earth Future, Governance, Democracy, and Peace How State Capacity and Regime Type Influence the Prospects of War and Peace, <http://oneearthfuture.org/sites/oneearthfuture.org/files//documents/publications/Cortright-Seyle-Wall-Paper.pdf>

The classic statement of Kantian peace theory applies to interstate conflict and focuses on dyadic relations between states. This leaves out the most common form of armed violence in the world today, civil conflicts and one-sided violence within states. In recent years, researchers have found evidence that the democratic peace phenomenon applies within states as well as between them. Regime type matters not only externally but internally. Mature democratic governments are not only less likely to wage war on each other, they also experience fewer armed uprisings and major civil wars and are more reluctant to use armed violence against their own citizens. As the studies below indicate, the evidence of a democratic peace phenomenon within states is strong and compelling. Walter observes a direct relationship between levels of democracy and the likelihood of internal armed conflict. In her examination of the problem of war recurrence, she finds that countries characterized by open political systems and economic well-being—i.e., developed democracies— have a much lower probability of renewed civil war than autocratic countries with low levels of economic development.91 Walter measures the degree of political openness and democratic ‘voice’ by using Polity and Freedom House indicators. High scores on these indices correlate directly with a reduced risk of civil war. She notes, as other scholars have observed, that major civil wars do not occur in mature democratic states. She concludes: It may be that liberal democracies are really the only types of regimes that can truly insulate themselves from violent internal challenges. This suggests that citizens who are able to express their preferences about alternative policies and leaders, who are guaranteed civil liberties in their daily lives and in acts of political participation, are less likely to become soldiers. Offering citizens a real outlet for their concerns and having a government that is open to democratic change considerably reduces the likelihood of a civil war.92 Civil conflicts within mature democracies are not only less frequent but also less lethal. Bethany Lacina assesses the severity of civil conflicts by measuring casualty levels according to several variables: regime type, state capacity, ethnic and religious diversity, and the impact of foreign military intervention. She finds that the political characteristics of a regime correlate significantly with differing casualty levels and are the strongest predictor of conflict severity. Democratic governments experience much lower casualty levels during civil conflict than autocratic states. Lacina’s analysis finds that civil wars occurring within democratic states have less than half the battle deaths of conflicts in non-democracies.93 State-sponsored violence against civilians is also less likely to occur in democracies than in autocracies. In his important book, Death by Government, Rudolph Rummel assembles mind numbing data and numerous examples demonstrating the myriad ways governments kill their citizens—directly through genocide and mass terror and indirectly through starvation and repression. He finds a stark contrast between the behavior of autocracies and democracies. Autocratic governments readily “slaughter their people by the tens of millions; in contrast, many democracies can barely bring themselves to execute even serial murderers.”94 Through statistical analysis, Rummel shows that genocidal killing is directly associated with the absence of democracy, holding constant other variables such as regime type, ethnic diversity, economic development level, population density, and culture.95 The lack of democracy is the most significant indicator of the likelihood of mass repression again the civilian population. As Rummel documents the appalling litany of governments murdering their own people, he is unequivocal about what he considers the necessary remedy—“The solution is democracy. The course of action is to foster freedom.”95 Barbara Harff’s research on genocidal violence comes to similar conclusions. She examines 126 cases of internal war and regime collapse between 1955 and 1997 to identify the factors that led to genocidal violence in 35 of these cases. Her results match the findings of other studies. Autocratic regimes facing state failure are three and a half times more likely to experience genocidal violence than democratic regimes facing such failure.97 She finds that genocidal violence is more likely in regimes that advocate exclusionary ideologies, an approach that is rare in mature democratic states. Harff observes that the lowest levels of mass killing occur in states with a high degree of economic interdependence, which is characteristic of mature democratic regimes.98 Her conclusion is that states are less likely to employ genocidal violence when they have inclusive democratic systems and trade extensively with other countries. As Steven Pinker notes, these findings fit well with the Kantian triad of democracy, cosmopolitanism and trade— “another trifecta” for liberal peace theory.99

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#### The CP doubles the success rate of democratic transitions

---data from 169 countries from 1972-2006, 5148 observations

Atkinson 17. Carol, PhD in international relations, post-doctoral research fellow at the Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California. “Lessons Learned from Military Exchange Programs at US War and Staff Colleges”. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43829-0_7>.

The fifth lesson relates to one of the explicit goals of the military exchange programs, which is to “increase the ability of foreign military and civilian personnel to instill and maintain democratic values and protect internationally recognized human rights in their own government and military” (United States Department of Defense and Department of State 2011, pp. II-1 thru II-2). Statistical evidence shows that over the longer term, countries that participated in the exchange programs at US military war and staff colleges were more than twice as likely to succeed in their efforts to transition to more liberal/democratic forms of governance than countries that did not participate (Atkinson 2014, pp. 143–147). During their year in the United States, participants from less-than-democratic countries are exposed to everyday life under democratic governance. As students and heads of their families, the foreign offi cers must navigate their local US communities in which their schools reside. And over the course of a year they are exposed to democratic governance, both good aspects and bad aspects, as it is experienced on a daily basis by citizens of the United States. While coursework might provide education on, for example, legal systems, the time spent off-duty living under a mature system of rule of law where policemen exercise authority in a system where all citizens are equal under the law exposes participants from less-than- democratic countries to real life functioning of rule of law. As an illustration, one exchange officer from a nondemocratic country remarked that one of the best aspects of the United States was that it was “a society that holds everyone accountable, responsible, but at the same time everyone has rights and privileges that he enjoys” (Atkinson 2014, pp. 123–124). Both book learning and experiential learning provide useful information for those seeking to build and consolidate democratic norms and institutions in their own countries.

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She examines 126 cases of internal war and regime collapse between 1955 and 1997 to identify the factors that led to genocidal violence in 35 of these cases. Her results match the findings of other studies. Autocratic regimes facing state failure are three and a half times more likely to experience genocidal violence than democratic regimes facing such failure.97 She finds that genocidal violence is more likely in regimes that advocate exclusionary ideologies, an approach that is rare in mature democratic states. Harff observes that the lowest levels of mass killing occur in states with a high degree of economic interdependence, which is characteristic of mature democratic regimes.98 Her conclusion is that states are less likely to employ genocidal violence when they have inclusive democratic systems and trade extensively with other countries. As Steven Pinker notes, these findings fit well with the Kantian triad of democracy, cosmopolitanism and trade— “another trifecta” for liberal peace theory.99

### 1NC Democracy – Long

#### CP Text: The United States ought to end its provision of military aid, except for the International Military Education and Training program, to \_\_\_\_\_ . The United States ought to

**---develop a system for tracking IMET alumni, including an IMET alumni association**

**---require screening of IMET enrollees**

**---employ instructors from other democracies**

**---increase IMET assistance**

**---rewrite the conditions for aid-suspension in response to coups by specifying the definition of a “coup” and establishing a no-tolerance policy for militaries that depose elected-governments.**

#### IMET is military aid

ICIJ 07 The International Consortium Of Investigative Journalist. "A Citizen’s Guide To Understanding U.S. Foreign Military Aid." Center for Public Integrity. May 22, 2007. <https://www.publicintegrity.org/2007/05/22/5772/citizen-s-guide-understanding-us-foreign-military-aid> TG

Funds appropriated to the State Department and Defense Department represent the vast majority of unclassified military aid and assistance. This report does not attempt to track smaller overseas programs where funding is appropriated to the Justice Department, Drug Enforcement Agency, or Department of Homeland Security. The public does not have any way of tracking classified programs administered by the U.S. intelligence community. These classified programs likely command large amounts of funding, especially after the 9/11 attacks, and oversight is limited to members of congressional intelligence committees.

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Department of Defense Counterdrug Funding: assists foreign militaries and security forces to combat drug trafficking around the world; also known as Section 1004 appropriations.

Economic Support Fund (ESF): provides grants to foreign governments to support economic stability. ESF is often used for non-military purposes, but the grants are commonly viewed as a way to help offset military expenditures. They have historically been earmarked for key security allies of the United States. Israel and Egypt are the two largest recipients of ESF.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF): finances foreign governments’ acquisition of U.S. military articles, services and training.

International Military Education and Training (IMET): educates foreign military personnel on issues ranging from democracy and human rights to technical military techniques and training on U.S. weapons systems.

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement/Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI): the primary State Department funding effort for countering drugs, including the large Colombian initiatives.

Military Assistance Program (MAP): provides military material and services to foreign countries; the U.S. government is not reimbursed. MAP includes “emergency drawdowns,” which are emergency transfers authorized by the president for weapons, ammunition, parts and military equipment to foreign governments.

Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-mining and Related Activities (NADR): supports de-mining, anti-terrorism, and nonproliferation training and assistance.

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO): supports programs that improve foreign militaries’ peacekeeping capabilities.

#### IMET’s key to spreading democracy – has lasting effects on political leaders

Mujkic et al 18. Edin Mujkic, Ph.D, Assistant Professor in the School of Public Affairs for University of Colorado Colorado Springs, Hugo D. Asencio, Assistant Professor of Public Administration in the Department of Public Administration at California State University Dominguez Hills, Ph.D. in Public Administration and Public Policy from Auburn University, Theodore Byrne, Associate Professor, Criminal Justice Administration. “International Military Education and Training: Promoting Democratic Values to Militaries and Countries throughout the World”. *Democracy and Security*. 2018. DOI: 10.1080/17419166.2018.1519802.

Based on the responses from the interviewees, one can suggest that the benefits of the IMET program may be greater and more significant than was originally envisioned by the Foreign Assistance Act. As Atkinson argues, hands-on experience by those who are coming from countries still struggling with democratic values and tenets is of importance.81 Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a push, especially since the scandal with the School of Americas, to offer democracy classes to foreign officers to expand their theoretical knowledge.82 The findings in the present study suggest that, while offering democracy classes to foreign officers coming from countries with poor democratic records is helpful, spending time in the United States is of much greater importance and results in a more significant benefit in developing a deeper understanding of functioning democracy.83 Responses from interviewees also reinforce the findings by Cope and Atkinson, as well as Stephen Rosenfeld, Frederick C. Barghoorn, and Sheila Fitzpatrick, suggesting that the presence of foreign officers or civilian students may have an impact on the internal political dynamics of the countries from which they come.84 This is especially valuable when it comes to foreign military officers, as those who come to the United States are part of an elite class and are typically educated in the United States to assume leadership roles in their respective militaries. It is likely that these officers may one day be in senior leadership positions or possibly part of the political elite in their respective countries. Cope addressed this by offering examples of two officers, one from Chile and another from Peru. Both officers were in the same classroom in one of the US military schools that they attended, and later both became chairmen of the joint chiefs of staff in their countries.85 The relationship between their two militaries was improved and brought to a level not previously experienced.86 While improving relationships between militaries is one of the goals of the IMET program, one should take into consideration that the military also plays a pivotal role in maintaining democratic values, defending them, or, alternatively, in undermining them or actively working to erode the democratic system within a country. When there is an opportunity to educate foreign military officers on the benefits of democratic values, it would seem to be a wise investment.

#### Our reform planks significantly improve the program

Kurlantzick 16. Joshua. Senior Fellow for Southeast Asia @ CFR. "Reforming the U.S. International Military Education and Training Program". June 08, 2016. <https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-international-military-education-and-training-program>. recut TG

Follow and support IMET alumni. The Department of Defense should develop a comprehensive system for tracking IMET alumni. Such a system would allow the U.S. government to track which graduates have been promoted and could help defense attachés at U.S. embassies cultivate relationships with foreign militaries. The Department of Defense also should provide three to five million dollars in seed funding to create an IMET alumni association. The association would sponsor events where IMET alumni could interact with U.S. diplomats and military attachés.

Make IMET more selective. Once a country is approved to receive IMET, defense attachés at U.S. embassies should play a more active role in prequalifying IMET enrollees. The Department of Defense should assign attachés overseas who have experience vetting IMET candidates. Better screening would actually defuse congressional and human rights criticisms of IMET for funding abusive officers, and make it less likely that Congress would suspend IMET funding for a particular country. This prequalification should include a thorough analysis of proposed participants’ records for apolitical professionalism. In nations where the military has a long record of rights abuses, it may be necessary to open IMET spaces only to those below a certain age.

Employ instructors from other democracies. To emphasize respect for human rights and a civilian chain of command, at least 5 percent of IMET’s funding should be earmarked for foreign instructors from the militaries of countries, such as Brazil, that recently made a successful transition to democracy.

Use IMET more as both a carrot and a stick. Although U.S. law already prohibits IMET funding for a country where a “duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup,” the legislation has many loopholes. Most obviously, a U.S. president can choose not to call a military takeover a coup, and maintain IMET funding. Congress should rewrite legislation to make it impossible to provide IMET funds to a military that deposes an elected government. To be sure, cutting off IMET could be counterproductive for short-term strategic relations with that nation. However, taking this risk is necessary. Suspending IMET allows the United States to send an important signal to citizens of that country that Washington does not tolerate coups. In these young democracies, cultivating public support for U.S. policy is critical to sustaining bilateral relations in the long-term. Moreover, in the post–Cold War era, military regimes from Egypt to Thailand have proven themselves highly incapable of handling modern, globalized economies and security challenges, from violence in Sinai to Thailand’s macroeconomic policy. A potential short-term chill in a bilateral relationship is worth the prospect of helping end regimes that undermine regional security and prosperity. In addition, when elected governments are quickly restored, as happened after the 2006 Thai coup, the United States resumes IMET funding; evidence suggests that military relations are then revived at the same level as before the coup.

#### The CP doubles the success rate of democratic transitions

---data from 169 countries from 1972-2006, 5148 observations

Atkinson 17. Carol, PhD in international relations, post-doctoral research fellow at the Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California. “Lessons Learned from Military Exchange Programs at US War and Staff Colleges”. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43829-0_7>.

The fifth lesson relates to one of the explicit goals of the military exchange programs, which is to “increase the ability of foreign military and civilian personnel to instill and maintain democratic values and protect internationally recognized human rights in their own government and military” (United States Department of Defense and Department of State 2011, pp. II-1 thru II-2). Statistical evidence shows that over the longer term, countries that participated in the exchange programs at US military war and staff colleges were more than twice as likely to succeed in their efforts to transition to more liberal/democratic forms of governance than countries that did not participate (Atkinson 2014, pp. 143–147). During their year in the United States, participants from less-than-democratic countries are exposed to everyday life under democratic governance. As students and heads of their families, the foreign offi cers must navigate their local US communities in which their schools reside. And over the course of a year they are exposed to democratic governance, both good aspects and bad aspects, as it is experienced on a daily basis by citizens of the United States. While coursework might provide education on, for example, legal systems, the time spent off-duty living under a mature system of rule of law where policemen exercise authority in a system where all citizens are equal under the law exposes participants from less-than- democratic countries to real life functioning of rule of law. As an illustration, one exchange officer from a nondemocratic country remarked that one of the best aspects of the United States was that it was “a society that holds everyone accountable, responsible, but at the same time everyone has rights and privileges that he enjoys” (Atkinson 2014, pp. 123–124). Both book learning and experiential learning provide useful information for those seeking to build and consolidate democratic norms and institutions in their own countries.

#### The alternative to democracy is violent civil wars, ethnic cleansing, and genocide---the best research confirms

Cortright 13, David Cortright is the director of Policy Studies at the Kroc Institute for Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, Chair of the Board of Directors of the Fourth Freedom Forum, and author of 17 books, Kristen Wall is a Researcher and Analyst at the Kroc Institute, Conor Seyle is Associate Director of One Earth Future, Governance, Democracy, and Peace How State Capacity and Regime Type Influence the Prospects of War and Peace, <http://oneearthfuture.org/sites/oneearthfuture.org/files//documents/publications/Cortright-Seyle-Wall-Paper.pdf>

The classic statement of Kantian peace theory applies to interstate conflict and focuses on dyadic relations between states. This leaves out the most common form of armed violence in the world today, civil conflicts and one-sided violence within states. In recent years, researchers have found evidence that the democratic peace phenomenon applies within states as well as between them. Regime type matters not only externally but internally. Mature democratic governments are not only less likely to wage war on each other, they also experience fewer armed uprisings and major civil wars and are more reluctant to use armed violence against their own citizens. As the studies below indicate, the evidence of a democratic peace phenomenon within states is strong and compelling. Walter observes a direct relationship between levels of democracy and the likelihood of internal armed conflict. In her examination of the problem of war recurrence, she finds that countries characterized by open political systems and economic well-being—i.e., developed democracies— have a much lower probability of renewed civil war than autocratic countries with low levels of economic development.91 Walter measures the degree of political openness and democratic ‘voice’ by using Polity and Freedom House indicators. High scores on these indices correlate directly with a reduced risk of civil war. She notes, as other scholars have observed, that major civil wars do not occur in mature democratic states. She concludes: It may be that liberal democracies are really the only types of regimes that can truly insulate themselves from violent internal challenges. This suggests that citizens who are able to express their preferences about alternative policies and leaders, who are guaranteed civil liberties in their daily lives and in acts of political participation, are less likely to become soldiers. Offering citizens a real outlet for their concerns and having a government that is open to democratic change considerably reduces the likelihood of a civil war.92 Civil conflicts within mature democracies are not only less frequent but also less lethal. Bethany Lacina assesses the severity of civil conflicts by measuring casualty levels according to several variables: regime type, state capacity, ethnic and religious diversity, and the impact of foreign military intervention. She finds that the political characteristics of a regime correlate significantly with differing casualty levels and are the strongest predictor of conflict severity. Democratic governments experience much lower casualty levels during civil conflict than autocratic states. Lacina’s analysis finds that civil wars occurring within democratic states have less than half the battle deaths of conflicts in non-democracies.93 State-sponsored violence against civilians is also less likely to occur in democracies than in autocracies. In his important book, Death by Government, Rudolph Rummel assembles mind numbing data and numerous examples demonstrating the myriad ways governments kill their citizens—directly through genocide and mass terror and indirectly through starvation and repression. He finds a stark contrast between the behavior of autocracies and democracies. 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#### \_\_ gets IMET \*chart\*

#### Our reform planks significantly improve the program

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#### IMET builds and maintains soft power – it’s a key socializing mechanism

Atkinson 17. Carol, PhD in international relations, post-doctoral research fellow at the Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California. “Lessons Learned from Military Exchange Programs at US War and Staff Colleges”. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43829-0_7>. // Highlighted RN

---data from 169 countries from 1972-2006, 5148 observations

The seventh lesson concerns how educational exchanges in general help to advance the interests and influence of the hosting country through soft power. Soft power is the ability to achieve goals by persuading or socializing others to adopt your own perspectives and preferences. This effect is particularly noteworthy in the case of the military educational exchanges because military organizations are usually associated with the exercise of hard power. The exchanges are one way that the US military extends its influence through ideas, beliefs, and norms. According to Joseph Nye ( 2011) in his classic work on the topic, soft power can be built through agentive strategies and structural effects. The military exchanges encompass both mechanisms. Agentive strategies are programs and actions of government agents. As discussed above, the military schools’ officials (instructors, program offi cers, US volunteers, and US sponsors) play a key role in shaping the perspectives of the foreign officers. Soft power can also be gained through what Nye ( 2011) called structural effects, meaning setting an example that others wish to emulate. Structural effects are gained, and soft power accrues to the entity whose culture is pleasing to others; whose values are attractive and consistently practiced; and whose policies are seen as inclusive and legitimate (Nye 2009, p. 161). The military exchanges are designed to show these aspects of life in the United States. It is expected that the military exchange participant, by living and interacting on a daily basis with US people, is likely to come away from his/her experience with a more positive view of the United States. This is indeed what happens in the case of the military exchanges. When asked to refl ect upon the most important thing they learned about the United States during their time at a US war or staff college, international participants identify aspects of how Americans think and act, how US democracy works, and different aspects about US lifestyles and culture as the most important things that they learned during their exchange (Atkinson 2014, pp. 114–119). While not all observations are positive, the overall impact is positive with both US and foreign graduates calling their year at the war or staff college “one of the best years of their lives” (Atkinson 2014, p. 131).

#### Soft power stops great power war and multiple scenarios for nuclear conflict

Miner 16 (Michael D. Miner specializes in government coursework at Harvard University where his research and teaching interests include twentieth century diplomatic history, international security, and area studies in East Asia and the Persian Gulf. He is a graduate of Dartmouth College and a member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations.Balanced Statecraft, <https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/08/12/balanced_statecraft_109698.html>, accessed 9/19/18, jmg)

With the presidential election in full swing, foreign policy has taken center stage as a major issue for voters evaluating the next commander-in-chief. There is no shortage of global headline events shaping the debate. Rising nationalist sentiment underpinned a vote for the Great Britain to leave the European Union, suggesting globalization is in retreat. Shifting energy dynamics and hostilities between Iran and Saudi Arabia hearken back to a 1980’s balance of power conflict in the Persian Gulf. Nuclear missile tests in North Korea bring waves of uncertainty to East Asian stability. Cyberattacks from state and nonstate actors underscore an evolving domain for international security policy. Increasingly aggressive Russian actions in Europe alongside heightened rhetoric in the South China Sea serve as reminders that great power rivalry is ever present. Islamic State affiliated shootings in the West have heightened a sense of homeland insecurity, all while religious and economic drivers compound a fracturing Middle East along sectarian lines that have existed far longer than the United States of America. Henry Kissinger (Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library) How these events impact electoral debates will play a significant role in the public discussion and policy orientation of the country in January 2017. For the next president, strategy remains essential to crafting a coherent foreign policy vision. Strategic coherence can sustain competitive advantages and marshal a unity of effort across government for efficient pursuit of national interests.[1] Furthermore, developing congruent policy options for distinct challenges should be at the center of any campaign for higher office, from the executive branch to the legislative whose committees are tasked to fund, support, and oversee the conduct of American foreign policy. For the next president, such an undertaking will require a flexible mind able to navigate geopolitical storms, remaining steadfast and consistent in pursuit of objectives, but open to adaptation as conditions warrant new ideas for a changing world. NATIONAL INTERESTS Individuals seeking office often speak of interests. Fundamentally, interests are whatever a state defines as a priority. Throughout history there has been a hierarchical ordering to what constitutes vital interests versus those which might be termed extremely important, less important, or secondary. In the realm of modern grand strategy, they serve as an underpinning for what matters most to a country in their conduct of foreign policy. This is generally understood by practitioners, advisors, and students of history, as many core interests are self evident to an engaged public from Main Street to Wall Street. For example, defending the homeland from attack constitutes a clear and vital interest, a maxim seldom in dispute. Preventing nuclear or great power war elsewhere in the world is an interest of the United States, as any such war would impact American security sooner or later. Finally, stable energy markets drive economic growth and constitute a core interest for Washington and partners around the world. To some degree most observers find accordance with these three general areas.[2] ...MANY CORE INTERESTS ARE SELF EVIDENT TO AN ENGAGED PUBLIC FROM MAIN STREET TO WALL STREET... There is far more debate on how to best secure such interests and what other interests merit a high level of prioritization for the United States. To the second notion, extremely important interests are often the focus of practitioners, academics, and campaign advisors. For instance, preventing nuclear proliferation and maintaining a lead in military and information technology underpins a strong foreign policy, as does supporting the rule of law. Suppressing terrorism abroad is extremely important alongside stability of the international system. The nature of relationships between allies is a contentious debate, though alliances are surely part of the equation. Balancing bilateral trade deficits, or spreading democracy everywhere for the sake of doing so may fall within the scope of American interests, but they are decidedly less important than immediate or existential threats. As is the case for human rights and global income inequality. Succinctly, there are a wide array of arguments, but some interests are more important than others in support of a stable coherent foreign policy facing limited resources. How to secure such interests requires the development of sound, pragmatic policy options. Policy options are developed to address specific challenges or goals impacting national interests, and these options in turn are implemented via an array of tools consisting of the core elements of statecraft. Whether there is an emphasis on diplomatic, information, military, or economic mechanisms of engagement, any candidate for higher office should first articulate and prioritize reasonable policies that which pursue clear objectives in alignment with national interests. THE TOOLBOX OF STATECRAFT The American experience is rife with contentious debate between those who sought vigorous engagement in foreign affairs, through unilateral or multilateral means, and those who opted for a more selective or restrained approach.[3] This has resulted in various strategies within two worldviews, differentiating in emphasis on what mechanisms or tools can best achieve core objectives.[4] Hard power, or military and economic instruments used to influence the behavior of states, define a stable of coercive tools for the executive that tangibly drives outcomes. Hard power emphasizes the military and use of force, relying on coercive diplomacy, war, alliances, deterrence, and protection of friends and allies in the pursuit of national interests. Foreign aid, bribes, and sanctions are tools that shape the behavior of states. Fundamentally, hard power represents instruments that can further interests of a state in a clear and direct way. Conversely, soft power refers to the mix of predominantly civilian led tools that play an even larger role in twenty-first century statecraft. They are more persuasive in nature, relying on an ability to attract or co-opt versus coercion or the use of force. Many of these tools focus on long-term diplomatic relations, education, strategic communication, civic action, and economic development. In the battle for hearts and minds, and a war of ideas, in some ways soft power can take a country much further than the use of force. One might argue they are more value-centric versus interest-dependent, but this mischaracterizes the impact of of well executed statecraft. Shaping the norms and conduct of international politics is just as important as clear, decisive action in pursuit of interests. For American foreign policy, if hard power represents a direct approach in pursuit of national interests, soft power might be termed the indirect approach, though no less effective when paired with the appropriate problem set. Neither approach is sufficient on their own, and if exercised in balance, each ebbs and flows with the other depending on timing, effectiveness, and level of risk. As is the case with smart power, or the skillful combination of both hard and soft power, a well articulated foreign policy not only finds a balance in the application of various instruments of statecraft, but stronger alignment of interests and options conveyed by strong leadership to underpin strategic coherence.[5]

#### Hard power without soft power just causes Trump to engage in never-ending conflict

Ashdown 18 (<https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2018-01-18/debates/84F77C90-FEBD-494D-A98F-C5A49B18E605/UnitedStatesForeignPolicy>, Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon, accessed 9/19/18, jmg)

Beyond President Trump, in this country we need to face up to a very uncertain future. The Defence Secretary on Monday in the Commons outlined the grave threats that we face, when he said there were “four principal threats” to our country and the fourth one is, “the erosion of the rules-based international order”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/1/18; col. 611.] I believe what he said; I agree with him. You might normally expect me to now advocate an increase in our defence budget, and I do, but I also want to make the case for diplomacy and an end to the vandalism of our national interest that is represented by the degrading of the Foreign Office and its budget. Our military is after all the last line of our nation’s defence, not the first. The military is there to reinforce and stiffen diplomacy and then robustly to act when diplomacy fails, but hard power without soft power is a recipe for constant conflict not enduring peace.

### 1NC – PICs Good

### Countries – IMET Provided

#### \_ gets IMET

Security Assistance Monitor 19. “International Military Education and Training.” <http://securityassistance.org/data/country/military/International%20Military%20Education%20and%20Training/2019/2019/all/Global//> TG

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| --- | --- |
| **Countries** | **$$ IMET** |
| Afghanistan | $800,000 |
| Albania | $900,000 |
| Algeria | $1,000,000 |
| Angola | $400,000 |
| Argentina | $400,000 |
| Armenia | $600,000 |
| Azerbaijan | $600,000 |
| Bahamas | $200,000 |
| Bahrain | $400,000 |
| Bangladesh | $1,500,000 |
| Barbados and Eastern Caribbean | $400,000 |
| Belize | $200,000 |
| Benin | $300,000 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | $900,000 |
| Botswana | $500,000 |
| Brazil | $575,000 |
| Bulgaria | $1,700,000 |
| Burkina Faso | $345,000 |
| Cameroon | $700,000 |
| Cape Verde | $125,000 |
| Central African Republic | $150,000 |
| Chad | $700,000 |
| Chile | $300,000 |
| Colombia | $1,400,000 |
| Comoros | $100,000 |
| Costa Rica | $400,000 |
| Cote d'Ivoire | $280,000 |
| Croatia | $850,000 |
| Czech Republic | $300,000 |
| Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa) | $375,000 |
| Djibouti | $500,000 |
| Dominican Republic | $500,000 |
| Egypt | $1,800,000 |
| El Salvador | $700,000 |
| Estonia | $1,000,000 |
| Ethiopia | $570,000 |
| Gabon | $200,000 |
| Georgia | $2,200,000 |
| Ghana | $670,000 |
| Global | $5,500,000 |
| Greece | $150,000 |
| Guatemala | $760,000 |
| Guinea | $300,000 |
| Guinea-Bissau | $150,000 |
| Guyana | $200,000 |
| Haiti | $255,000 |
| Honduras | $750,000 |
| Hungary | $800,000 |
| India | $1,300,000 |
| Indonesia | $2,400,000 |
| Iraq | $1,000,000 |
| Jamaica | $500,000 |
| Jordan | $3,800,000 |
| Kazakhstan | $700,000 |
| Kenya | $850,000 |
| Kosovo | $750,000 |
| Kyrgyzstan | $700,000 |
| Laos | $75,000 |
| Latvia | $1,000,000 |
| Lebanon | $2,750,000 |
| Liberia | $360,000 |
| Lithuania | $1,000,000 |
| Macedonia | $1,100,000 |
| Madagascar | $200,000 |
| Malawi | $300,000 |
| Malaysia | $950,000 |
| Maldives | $250,000 |
| Mali | $700,000 |
| Malta | $100,000 |
| Mauritania | $500,000 |
| Mauritius | $100,000 |
| Mexico | $1,500,000 |
| Moldova | $1,150,000 |
| Mongolia | $1,500,000 |
| Montenegro | $500,000 |
| Morocco | $1,900,000 |
| Mozambique | $340,000 |
| Namibia | $150,000 |
| Nepal | $900,000 |
| Niger | $700,000 |
| Nigeria | $800,000 |
| Oman | $500,000 |
| Pakistan | $3,500,000 |
| Panama | $700,000 |
| Papua New Guinea | $200,000 |
| Paraguay | $400,000 |
| Peru | $400,000 |
| Philippines | $2,000,000 |
| Poland | $1,350,000 |
| Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) | $150,000 |
| Romania | $1,500,000 |
| Rwanda | $450,000 |
| Samoa | $100,000 |
| Sao Tome and Principe | $100,000 |
| Senegal | $800,000 |
| Serbia | $1,050,000 |
| Seychelles | $100,000 |
| Sierra Leone | $400,000 |
| Slovakia | $575,000 |
| Somalia | $225,000 |
| South Africa | $570,000 |
| Sri Lanka | $500,000 |
| Suriname | $100,000 |
| Swaziland | $100,000 |
| Tajikistan | $450,000 |
| Tanzania | $600,000 |
| The Gambia | $150,000 |
| Timor-Leste | $400,000 |
| Togo | $300,000 |
| Tonga | $200,000 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | $150,000 |
| Tunisia | $1,900,000 |
| Turkey | $3,100,000 |
| Turkmenistan | $200,000 |
| Uganda | $700,000 |
| Ukraine | $2,900,000 |
| Uruguay | $300,000 |
| Uzbekistan | $300,000 |
| Vietnam | $1,600,000 |
| Zambia | $350,000 |
|  |  |

## Countries

### Saudi

#### Saudi IMETs good – it builds mutual understanding for long term cultural and institutional ties

US DoS 18. “US Relations with Saudi Arabia.” Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. August 7, 2018. <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3584.htm> TG

Additional assistance supports closer cultural, educational, and institutional ties between the United States and Saudi Arabia. The U.S.-Saudi partnership is rooted in more than seven decades of close friendship and cooperation, enriched by the exchange opportunities that are key to the promotion of mutual understanding and the long-term development of ties. Upon request, the United States provides technical support to ministries in the Kingdom, particularly in areas of education, trade, and good governance as newly articulated in its Vision 2030 program.

### Ukraine

#### Ukraine IMETs good – it ensures regional stability, nonprolif, and counters Russia, terror, and landmines

US DoS 18. “U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia: 2018 Foreign Operations Assistance.” Ukraine. <https://www.state.gov/p/eur/ace/factsheets/fy2017/index.htm>. <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/284978.pdf>. TG

The United States is committed to supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of Russian aggression, advancing its reform agenda, countering corruption, and encouraging the Western-oriented aspirations of its people. Ensuring a democratic, prosperous, and united Ukraine remains a critical foreign policy priority for the United States. A successful Ukraine is an attractive market for U.S. exports, a fertile destination for U.S. investment, a capable security partner, and a stabilizing force in the region. In the coming years, U.S. assistance will help Ukraine continue to solidify gains from the reforms begun after the Revolution of Dignity in 2014.

Peace and Security • Provide professional military education and training in areas such as civil-military relations, defense planning, logistics, and acquisitions to promote NATO interoperability and help Ukraine become a more capable security partner. • Improve security and continue support for the impartial observation mission fielded by Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission (SMM). Since March 2014, the SMM has served as the international community’s eyes and ears in the conflict zone. • Support nonproliferation by engaging Ukrainian scientists with WMD-applicable skills to facilitate technologically focused businesses and collaborative research. • Enhance customs and border security capabilities to detect and interdict illegal shipments of dangerous and illicit goods with inspection/detection equipment, anti-terrorism contraband enforcement units, and targeting and risk analysis tools. • Support non-governmental organizations to clear explosive hazards, including landmines, unexploded ordnance, destruction of unusable or excess munitions, ammunition, and/or weapons, and infrastructure upgrades and security enhancements at storage sites. • Fulfill commitments to the multilateral donor effort to ensure the safe and secure decommissioning of the Chornobyl nuclear power plant and safe storage of spent nuclear fuel. • Partner within various government of Ukraine entities to deter, detect, address, and counter crimes related to trafficking in persons. Work with police and community stakeholders to strengthen capacity to better identify and assist victims of trafficking. • Strengthen the rule of law and counter Russian pressure by supporting the professionalization of law enforcement agencies such as the Patrol Police, crowd control and Special Weapons and Tactics units, and the Border Security Guard Service. • Bolster Ukraine’s cybersecurity through strategic planning and capacity development that will enhance Ukraine’s ability to prevent, mitigate, and respond to cyberattacks from state and non-state actors.

## Regions

### South/Central Asia

#### IMETs good in Central Asia – increased participation builds ties and builds regional influence

Omelicheva 17. [MARIYA Y. OMELICHEVA is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Kansas]. “US Security Assistance to Central Asia: Examining Limits, Exploring Opportunities.” PONARS Eurasia. October 2017. <http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/us-security-assistance-central-asia> TG

One strategy that has been shown to be effective in producing a desirable and enduring institutional change involves the deeper and longer-term engagement of Central Asian officers in US-hosted educational, training, and social activities, which increase knowledge and appreciation for Western institutions. In Central Asia, the majority of security trainings have been short-term and focused on developing tactical counter-narcotics and anti-terrorism skills through exercises and courses. The number of students participating in the long-term International Military and Education Training (IMET) has been very low compared to those under other programs. The personal ties developed between mid-career U.S. and Central Asian military and security personnel during these exchanges are an important source of knowledge and influence in the region in the long run.

#### IMET key in Central Asia

US DoS 19. “Congressional Budget Justification FY2019: Department of State, Foreign operations, and Related Programs.” US Department of State, 2019. <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/FY_2019_CBJ.pdf> TG

South and Central Asia ($11.1 million): IMET programs in South and Central Asia focus on professionalizing the defense forces of regional partners, emphasizing professional military education, respect for the rule of law, human rights, and civilian control of the military and including English language training to improve the ability of partner services to work with the United States. Priority recipients include Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan.

### Africa

#### IMET key in Africa

US DoS 19. “Congressional Budget Justification FY2019: Department of State, Foreign operations, and Related Programs.” US Department of State, 2019. <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/FY_2019_CBJ.pdf> TG

Africa ($16.4 million): IMET programs for Africa focus on professionalizing defense forces in support of efforts to respond to regional crises and terrorist threats, and provide for long-term stability on the continent. IMET courses also support building partner maritime security capability and respect for the rule of law, human rights, and civilian control of the military. Priority recipients include Cameroon, Chad, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda.

### East Asia/Pacific

#### IMET key in East Asia and the Pacific

US DoS 19. “Congressional Budget Justification FY2019: Department of State, Foreign operations, and Related Programs.” US Department of State, 2019. <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/FY_2019_CBJ.pdf> TG

East Asia and Pacific ($9.8 million): IMET programs in East Asia and the Pacific focus on professionalization and English language training which enables not only interoperability with U.S. forces but also their participation in regional and international peacekeeping missions. IMET courses also support building partner maritime security capability and respect for the rule of law, human rights, and civilian control of the military. Priority recipients include Indonesia, Mongolia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

### Europe

#### IMET key in Europe

US DoS 19. “Congressional Budget Justification FY2019: Department of State, Foreign operations, and Related Programs.” US Department of State, 2019. <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/FY_2019_CBJ.pdf> TG

Europe and Eurasia ($26.1 million): IMET programs for Europe enhance regional security and interoperability among U.S., NATO, and European armed forces. Importantly, these programs help to ensure that those nations that operate alongside the United States have officers that understand and appreciate the doctrine and operational tactics of the U.S. military. Priority recipients include key strategic partners such as Bulgaria, Georgia, Poland, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine.

### Near East

#### IMET key in the Middle East

US DoS 19. “Congressional Budget Justification FY2019: Department of State, Foreign operations, and Related Programs.” US Department of State, 2019. <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/FY_2019_CBJ.pdf> TG

Near East ($15.1 million): IMET programs for the Near East focus on enhancing professionalism and increasing awareness of international norms of human rights and civilian control of the military, topics critical for the development of security forces in the region in a time of change. Priority recipients include countries, such as Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia. 119

### Americas

#### IMET key in Central and South America

US DoS 19. “Congressional Budget Justification FY2019: Department of State, Foreign operations, and Related Programs.” US Department of State, 2019. <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/FY_2019_CBJ.pdf> TG

Western Hemisphere ($11.1 million): IMET programs in the Western Hemisphere focus on professionalizing defense forces, institutionalizing respect for human rights and the rule of law, and enhancing the leadership and technical ability of partner nations to protect national territory and maritime borders against transnational threats. Priority recipients include Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, the Northern Triangle countries of Central America, and Uruguay.

# 2NR

## Frontlines

### 2NR O/V – Civilian Casualties

#### IMET educates foreign militaries on democracy and human rights while building alliances for joint operations – it brings over officers to US military schools for classes on the Law of Armed Conflict, human rights, disease prevention, and decisionmaking - that significantly lowers civilian casualties, reduces HR abuses, and strengthens the rule of law - best statistics flow neg

#### Significant portions of the 1AR aren’t responsive since they’ve conceded the reform planks – they resolve corruption by screening enrollees and tracking and meeting with them thru an alumni association. Employing other instructors and increasing aid ensures success and conditioning it on no autocratic coups means no revolts.

### 2NR O/V – Democracy

#### IMET educates foreign militaries on democracy and human rights while building alliances for joint operations – it does things like foreign training on tactics and counterterror, while bringing over officers to US military schools for classes on the Law of Armed Conflict, human rights, disease prevention, and decisionmaking – that significantly boosts democratic transitions and resolves military abuses

#### Significant portions of the 1AR aren’t responsive since they’ve conceded the reform planks – they resolve corruption by screening enrollees and tracking and meeting with them thru an alumni association. Employing other instructors and increasing aid ensures success and conditioning it on no autocratic coups means no revolts.

#### Couple framing issues

#### 1] The impact turns and o/w case

#### A] War – civil wars are frequent and occur on a large scale – civil liberties are a result of the CP which allows outlets for discontent, so people don’t become soldiers which reduces deaths – the Cortright ev looks at 126 cases and concludes that genocide is 3.5x more likely in authoritarian regimes – transition solves

#### B] Solves case – democracy checks dictatorial rule by enhancing respect for human rights and building alliances – resolves their militarization impacts since the CP encourages humanitarianism instead of solely a war focus

#### 2] No symbolic NB – IMET doesn’t cause their impacts but allows us to strategically reduce civilian deaths and encourage democratic tendencies while resolving \*their impacts\* - it also makes the US look good since it cuts everything except aid that has a clear benefit in terms of human rights and war crimes for the people of \*country\* which makes them like us

#### 3] Sufficiency framing on \*peace process/relations type thing\* - there’s no warrant for how much of a relation needs to be severed for it to be enough since we still maintain troop presence and development aid in the world of the aff so IMET isn’t that big of a difference

#### 4] The 1AR has no empirics or DA to IMET but there’s a huge NB to democratization – terror, humanitarian, and strategic effects prove – our Atkinson ev o/w on scope and cred – it’s data from 169 countries over 24 years studied by a PhD in international relations

### AT: Circumvention

### ---Topshelf

#### 1] That’s not how it works – a categorical grant to this specific program is used to buy and give training i.e. we pay ourselves and give the country aid like training, and then the country pays us back, but there’s no net money going to the country – we have ev that proves

Gillespie 15 – Teaching Fellow in International Politics/Placement and Exchange Coordinator @ University of Surrey, this card is his PhD thesis. (Ciaran, September 30, 2015, "Aid & the Ouroborus: US Foreign Military Assistance and Human Security in Pakistan", epubs.surrey.ac.uk/811560/1/Aid%20%20the%20Ouroborus-%20US%20Foreign%20Military%20Assistance%20and%20Human%20Security%20in%20Pakistan%20%28Resubmit%20Final%20with%20bib%29.pdf, JC)

Under the United States’ Foreign Military Sales Act (FMSA) foreign countries are eligible to procure defence equipment, services and training from the US government or private industry, as well as US guarantees for private loans, to purchase these goods and services (Brzoska, 1983, p. 272). Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the State Department was given the remit of overseeing the implementation of aid programs for foreign militaries (Serafino, 2008, p. 11). Most military aid comes in the form of grants rather than loans taking the form of either direct transfers of equipment, or transfers of cash with the specific function of helping purchase equipment (Tarnoff, C. & Lawson, M.L, 2011, p. 23). The three central mechanisms through which aid and grants are delivered are Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and the International Military Education and Training program (IMET) (Ibid). While the State Department oversees the implementation of these programs, they are carried out by the Department of Defense by one of its own sub agencies, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) (Serafino, 2008, p. 11)

#### 2] This makes no sense – IMET teaches English, diplomacy, and democratic values. Regimes can’t weaponize knowledge about avoiding civilian casualties or preventing disease to \_\_\_\_ because \_\_\_\_.

#### 3] It’s only a few hundred thousand bucks – worst case scenario what they say happens, but the half billion we still end definitely solves their advantage – if any dollar is enough to not solve, they prob can’t solve anyway cuz other countries will provide it, and they can reallocate from other areas

#### 4] Conditions solve – the US has checks on military aid and doesn’t just arbitrarily dole it out – things like the Leahy laws ensure aid is being used for its proper intent. This is true in the context of the PIC – if we’re only giving them one type of aid, it would be super easy to monitor it and look at things like results in human rights abuses or civilian casualties.

### ---AT: Use Training

#### 1] This makes no sense – IMET teaches English, diplomacy, and democratic values. Regimes can’t weaponize knowledge about avoiding civilian casualties or preventing disease to \_\_\_\_ because \_\_\_\_.

#### 2] Reform planks solve – a post-program tracking association and initial screening exam prevents corrupt puppets

### ---AT: Restores Other Programs – Etan

#### 1] No warrant – it cites one small program following after IMET in the 90s which obviously distinct from [arm sales/counterterror ops/etc], the cause of their impacts

#### 2] Missing internal link – their ev doesn’t explain why Congress would randomly resume aid – fiat solves since we explicitly only allow IMET

### AT: Competition

### ---2NR Competition Block

#### 1] Err neg – the CP does all of the aff except the IMET program – this debate is not a question of the aff vs the squo but a question of yes IMET or no IMET – there’s no DA to IMET which means any .1% chance the aff ends it means vote neg to be safe in preventing rights abuses and civilian casualties.

#### 2] Extend ICIJ – it says IMET is aid under its own program. Err neg – our ICIJ ev is a database of “U.S. taxpayer funded programs or assistance that contributes to a nation’s offensive military capabilities”—the offensive and military planks of our definition should bolster its weight since it’s contextual to the topic lit.

ICIJ 7 - The Int'l Consortium of Investigative Journalists, “A citizen’s guide to understanding U.S. foreign military aid,” <http://www.publicintegrity.org/2007/05/22/5772/citizen-s-guide-understanding-us-foreign-military-aid> WJ

For the “Collateral Damage” investigative study, the Center for Public Integrity created a database that tracks a subset of those financial flows: taxpayer-funded programs or assistance that contribute to a nation’s offensive military capabilities. The database does not include certain large nuclear non-proliferation programs or expenditures such as Foreign Military Sales or Direct Commercial Sales, which are not supported directly with taxpayer dollars. The database is also limited to tracking funds appropriated to either the Defense Department or the State Department. For this report, these are the criteria for “foreign military assistance” or “foreign military aid.”

#### 3] Military aid is also defined by

Bapat 11 [Bapat, Navin. (2011). Transnational Terrorism, US Military Aid, and the Incentive to Misrepresent. Journal of Peace Research. 48. 303-318. 10.1177/0022343310394472. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227574734\_Transnational\_Terrorism\_US\_Military\_Aid\_and\_the\_Incentive\_to\_Misrepresent]//LC

According to the US Greenbook, military aid consists of either loans or grants that are intended to purchase US weapons, direct military transfers, or training of the military personnel of the recipient country.2 From the period from 1946 to 2008, the US Greenbook identifies several types of aid granted to states under this program, including counter-narcotics assistance provided to Colombia and the provision of helicopters to Pakistan’s military.

#### IMET is training – the program literally stands for International Military Education and Training

#### 4] It’s one of the 3 largest programs – definitely aid

Gillespie 15 – Teaching Fellow in International Politics/Placement and Exchange Coordinator @ University of Surrey, this card is his PhD thesis. (Ciaran, September 30, 2015, "Aid & the Ouroborus: US Foreign Military Assistance and Human Security in Pakistan", epubs.surrey.ac.uk/811560/1/Aid%20%20the%20Ouroborus-%20US%20Foreign%20Military%20Assistance%20and%20Human%20Security%20in%20Pakistan%20%28Resubmit%20Final%20with%20bib%29.pdf, JC)

Under the United States’ Foreign Military Sales Act (FMSA) foreign countries are eligible to procure defence equipment, services and training from the US government or private industry, as well as US guarantees for private loans, to purchase these goods and services (Brzoska, 1983, p. 272). Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the State Department was given the remit of overseeing the implementation of aid programs for foreign militaries (Serafino, 2008, p. 11). Most military aid comes in the form of grants rather than loans taking the form of either direct transfers of equipment, or transfers of cash with the specific function of helping purchase equipment (Tarnoff, C. & Lawson, M.L, 2011, p. 23). The three central mechanisms through which aid and grants are delivered are Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and the International Military Education and Training program (IMET) (Ibid). While the State Department oversees the implementation of these programs, they are carried out by the Department of Defense by one of its own sub agencies, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) (Serafino, 2008, p. 11)

### ---AT: Only Squo Aid

#### The plan removes all aid – provide is

Merriam Webster

to supply or make available (something wanted or needed) provided new uniforms for the band also : AFFORD curtains provide privacy b : to make something available to provide the children with free balloons

#### 1] Common usage proves—if I say the United States ought not provide ice cream to its citizens, the United States conditioning provision of that ice cream on citizen’s credit scores would not prove the statement

#### 2] Generics—the resolution is a generic statement without qualifiers – i.e. there’s nothing conditioning the types of military aid.

Byrd [“Generic Meaning,” Georgia State University, Transcript of lecture given by Pat Byrd, Department of Applied Linguistics & ESL]

Here are some things that we do know about these generic noun phrase types when they are used in context:1. The + singular: The computer has changed modern life. This form is considered more formal than the others--and is not as likely to be used in conversation as the plural noun: Computers have changed modern life. Master (1987) found in the sample that he analyzed that this form with the was often used to introduce at topic--and came at the beginning of a paragraph and in introductions and conclusions.2. Zero + plural: Computers are machines. Computers have changed modern life. Probably the most common form for a generalization. It can be used in all contexts--including both conversation (Basketball players make too much money) and academic writing (Organisms as diverse as humans and squid share many biological processes). Perhaps used more in the hard sciences and social sciences than in the humanities. 3. A + singular: A computer is a machine. This generic structure is used to refer to individual instances of a whole group and is used to classify whatever is being discussed.The form is often used for definitions of terms. It is also often used to explain occupations. My sister is a newspaper reporter. I am a teacher. Use is limited to these "classifying" contexts. Notice that this form can't always be subtituted for the other: \*Life has been changed by a computer. \*A computer has changed modern life. 4. Zero + noncount: Life has been changed by the computer. The most basic meaning and use of noncount nouns is generic--they are fundamentally about a very abstract level of meaning. Thus, the most common use of noncount nouns is this use with no article for generic meaning. Zero Article and Generic Meaning: Most nouns without articles have generic meaning. Two types are involved.1. Zero + plural: Computers are machines. Computers have changed modern life.2. Zero + noncount: Life has been changed by the computer.

#### Prefer our definition for ground—all key neg ground is based on complete U.S. pullout of military aid—things like fill-in, stability, heg, terror, and more are all contingent on military aid completely ending—if the aff still allows other military aid to their authoritarian regimes, then it spikes the link to core neg ground since they’ll just say future aid checks

### AT: Perms

### ---AT: Textual Competition

### ---AT: Perm Other Countries - Topshelf

#### 1] Nonsensical and doesn’t solve our offense – the net benefit is specific to [reducing deaths/encouraging a democratic transition] in [their country]

#### 2] No spillover – a] only select military officials are trained and go on to hold positions in their own respective country b] it’s the squo, we give those countries IMET already!

#### 3] All intrinsicness is bad – there’s no brightline for what’s limited and it justifies shifty 1ARs that spike on infinite random planks that moot the entire 1NC which outweighs on magnitude

### -----AT: PoC – Saudi

### AT: Coups

#### 1] No impact – at worse, all that happens is that one authoritarian regime gets replaced by another authoritarian regime. BUT coups can lead to democratic transitions and IMET doubles that chance, which means risk calc goes neg – that’s Atkinson

They also haven’t impacted the coups turn – no new 2AR explanations since it skews 2NR strategy – means default neg since only we had an explanation of which way coups flows

#### 2] Conceded the coup reform plank – the CP forces an end aid to regimes with coups against elected governments which sends a signal to other potential coups that they’ll lose their aid if they revolt – checks back future coups and solves their offense

#### 3] The link goes the other way – it’s also only a 5% chance of a coup which proves the democratization NB o/ws

---US PME = United States Professional Military Education

Ruby & Gibler 10. Tomislav Z. Ruby and Douglas Gibler, Professor in the Department of Political Science and Leadership Board Fellow in the Arts and Sciences at the University of Alabama. “US professional military education and democratization abroad”. *European Journal of International Relations*, 16(3), 339–364. 2010. doi:10.1177/1354066109344659.

The presence of at least one US PME graduate decreases the likelihood of a coup attempt by 1.3 percent to a probability of 4.85 percent. For countries that send large numbers of their military to the United States, the effects of PME can therefore be quite substantial. Twenty officers trained over the course of five years is equivalent to a 20 percent reduction in the likelihood of a coup attempt. An interesting story emerges from these statistical results. First, the presence of an alliance with the United States generally increases the probability of instability due to coups d’etat, and this effect outweighs the effects of Cold War politics. Second, wealth and democracy both have pacifying effects on regime change attempts. Finally, and most important for our argument, the US PME graduates seem able to affect their governments positively by obstructing coup attempts. The relative effect of each graduate is small, but cumulatively, a large number of graduates can stabilize a regime, and these results are significant even after controlling for the confounding effects of other important explanatory variables. Leaders would also have a much easier time sending their graduates to US PME, especially compared to the other variables in the model. Substantially altering the overall wealth of a country, changes in wealth, or even overall alliance relationship with the United States would most likely prove much more difficult than sending a few top officers to US PME.

#### 4] Coups start locally – US support is irrelevant

Aslan 16. Ömer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University. December 2016. "U.S. Involvement In Military Coups D'état In Turkey And Pakistan During The Cold War: Between Conspiracy And Reality". dspace.bilkent.edu.tr/bitstream/handle/11693/32597/10133138.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Nevertheless, this thesis has made some important conclusions. To begin with, this research has shown that the triggers for all four coups were local. Source and nature of grievances may have differed in each case but the spark was local. Both Pakistani and Turkish armies were powerful enough in terms of resources (organizational cohesion, popular support, strict command-order chain) to conclude a successful coup d’état without organizational instructions or assistance from external actors. They needed neither U.S. operational support behind their coup attempts nor U.S. prodding to plan and start one.

#### 5] Even if they win the turn – IMET helps after the coup

Aslan 16. Ömer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University. December 2016. "U.S. Involvement In Military Coups D'état In Turkey And Pakistan During The Cold War: Between Conspiracy And Reality". dspace.bilkent.edu.tr/bitstream/handle/11693/32597/10133138.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

In turn, U.S. military training and education programs as part of U.S. Military Assistance Programs and continuous cooperation through NATO platform help cultivate bilateral relationships and nourish contacts with armed forces from other countries are highlighted in this research. Though military training and education programs such as IMET had several objectives, both civilian and military U.S. policy makers alike valued knowing promising military officers from other countries and having a lubricant in their bilateral relationship with Pakistan and Turkey. Knowing foreign officers, many of whom were poised to climb the rungs of power in their armed forces, rather than socializing them to democratic civil-military relations was the preponderant rationale behind U.S. military and education programs. This knowledge and familiarity then paid off during coup attempts by mid-ranking officers. The May 27 coup in Turkey provides a good illustration of how familiarity with at least some of the major figures within that military junta ameliorated mutual doubts and allowed for a smoother transition period. It is remarkable how, notwithstanding all the irritants in Pakistan-US relationship (nuclear program, Carter’s cold-shoulder towards Pakistan), Zia’s proximity to the West was attributed by the U.S. officials to his training and education in the United States.

#### 6] No causality – their study’s independent variable is amount of IMET aid given, but the US provides more aid to weak states, which are more likely to have coup attempts anyway.

### AT: Coups – Savage and Caverley

#### 1] No impact – at worse, all that happens is that one authoritarian regime gets replaced by another authoritarian regime. BUT coups can lead to democratic transitions and IMET doubles that chance, which means risk calc goes neg – that’s Atkinson. Their study only concludes a 1% increased risk of a coup and doesn’t deny IMET’s more important positive effects.

They also haven’t impacted the coups turn – no new 2AR explanations since it skews 2NR strategy – means default neg since only we had an explanation of which way coups flows

#### 2] Conceded the coup reform plank – the CP forces an end aid to regimes with coups against elected governments which sends a signal to other potential coups that they’ll lose their aid if they revolt – checks back future coups and solves their offense

#### 3] The link goes the other way – it’s also only a 5% chance of a coup which proves the democratization NB o/ws

---US PME = United States Professional Military Education

Ruby & Gibler 10. Tomislav Z. Ruby and Douglas Gibler, Professor in the Department of Political Science and Leadership Board Fellow in the Arts and Sciences at the University of Alabama. “US professional military education and democratization abroad”. *European Journal of International Relations*, 16(3), 339–364. 2010. doi:10.1177/1354066109344659.

The presence of at least one US PME graduate decreases the likelihood of a coup attempt by 1.3 percent to a probability of 4.85 percent. For countries that send large numbers of their military to the United States, the effects of PME can therefore be quite substantial. Twenty officers trained over the course of five years is equivalent to a 20 percent reduction in the likelihood of a coup attempt. An interesting story emerges from these statistical results. First, the presence of an alliance with the United States generally increases the probability of instability due to coups d’etat, and this effect outweighs the effects of Cold War politics. Second, wealth and democracy both have pacifying effects on regime change attempts. Finally, and most important for our argument, the US PME graduates seem able to affect their governments positively by obstructing coup attempts. The relative effect of each graduate is small, but cumulatively, a large number of graduates can stabilize a regime, and these results are significant even after controlling for the confounding effects of other important explanatory variables. Leaders would also have a much easier time sending their graduates to US PME, especially compared to the other variables in the model. Substantially altering the overall wealth of a country, changes in wealth, or even overall alliance relationship with the United States would most likely prove much more difficult than sending a few top officers to US PME.

#### 4] Reject their ev – it’s a bad study

#### A] Course variation – they don’t account for it – this study does and concludes no link to the coup turn

Watts et al 18. Stephen Watts, Trevor Johnston, Matthew Lane, Sean Mann, Michael J. McNerney, Andrew Brooks. RAND 2018. "A Deep Dive on Security Sector Assistance and Coups". <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2400/RR2447/RAND_RR2447z1.appendixes.pdf>.

Although Savage and Caverley’s results are particularly robust, their findings also seem to rely on data that might be problematic. We discuss these challenges in greater depth in the next section. But we focus here on one major challenge: conceptual validity and measurement. Despite measuring IMET participation in a variety of ways, Savage and Caverley did not consider the qualitative variation in IMET course curricula. For example, some classes teach special operatives training or strategic decisionmaking, which can certainly provide useful skills for staging a coup. Other courses, however, do not seem to have ready application for would-be coup plotters, such as optometrist training or disease prevention. Savage and Caverley’s series of measures for IMET participation cannot distinguish between these different kinds of courses. There is also significant variation in the length of IMET courses, with more than one-fifth of these courses lasting less than five days (a period likely too short to provide new skills or motivation to conduct a coup), while others can be several months long. Courses that last longer presumably have a much greater impact than short seminars. This variation is important to consider when evaluating the impact that IMET courses have on coup propensity. Although we cannot correct for the problem of course relevance, we can adjust our measure of IMET participation to better capture varying lengths. At least for Africa, Savage and Caverley’s results depend on IMET participation measured in terms of the number of students who participated and the dollars the United States expended. We instead multiply the number of students participating in IMET by the average length of IMET courses for those students to create a new measure called student-days, which seems to better capture the causal logic of Savage and Caverley’s argument.7 If we use the number of student-days per country as the main explanatory variable, instead of the number of students or dollars spent per year, the relationship between IMET participation and coup occurrence disappears in the Africa sample.

#### B] We average and scale, account for time lag, and measure data from a longer time period

Watts et al 18. Stephen Watts, Trevor Johnston, Matthew Lane, Sean Mann, Michael J. McNerney, Andrew Brooks. RAND 2018. "A Deep Dive on Security Sector Assistance and Coups". <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2400/RR2447/RAND_RR2447z1.appendixes.pdf>.

These results markedly deviate from those of Savage and Caverley. Although we do not reach the same conclusions as Savage and Caverley, we should note that there are several major differences between our analysis and theirs. First, our models are specific to Africa, while they included 189 countries in their analysis. Similarly, the time frame differs somewhat. Savage and Caverley drew on a shorter time period, beginning later (1970) and ending earlier (2009) than our study. Second, our measure of IMET, like that of aggregated SSA, is a moving average and scaled by numbers of military personnel, while their measure was neither averaged nor scaled. Generally, though, we do not find that our results qualitatively vary with different scaling choices, and this difference does not likely drive the conflicting results. Perhaps more importantly, Savage and Caverley did not use a four-year lag like we did with SSA. If IMET or other programs are to have any effect at all, whether positive or negative, we do not expect these effects to be immediate, especially if they depend on such slow-moving processes as norm diffusion, promotion to more-influential roles within the military, or recruiting and organizing coconspirators.

#### C] No causality – their study’s independent variable is amount of IMET aid given, but the US provides more aid to weak states, which are more likely to have coup attempts anyway.

#### 5] Even if they win the turn – IMET helps after the coup

Aslan 16. Ömer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University. December 2016. "U.S. Involvement In Military Coups D'état In Turkey And Pakistan During The Cold War: Between Conspiracy And Reality". dspace.bilkent.edu.tr/bitstream/handle/11693/32597/10133138.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

In turn, U.S. military training and education programs as part of U.S. Military Assistance Programs and continuous cooperation through NATO platform help cultivate bilateral relationships and nourish contacts with armed forces from other countries are highlighted in this research. Though military training and education programs such as IMET had several objectives, both civilian and military U.S. policy makers alike valued knowing promising military officers from other countries and having a lubricant in their bilateral relationship with Pakistan and Turkey. Knowing foreign officers, many of whom were poised to climb the rungs of power in their armed forces, rather than socializing them to democratic civil-military relations was the preponderant rationale behind U.S. military and education programs. This knowledge and familiarity then paid off during coup attempts by mid-ranking officers. The May 27 coup in Turkey provides a good illustration of how familiarity with at least some of the major figures within that military junta ameliorated mutual doubts and allowed for a smoother transition period. It is remarkable how, notwithstanding all the irritants in Pakistan-US relationship (nuclear program, Carter’s cold-shoulder towards Pakistan), Zia’s proximity to the West was attributed by the U.S. officials to his training and education in the United States.

#### 6] Coups start locally – US support is irrelevant

Aslan 16. Ömer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University. December 2016. "U.S. Involvement In Military Coups D'état In Turkey And Pakistan During The Cold War: Between Conspiracy And Reality". dspace.bilkent.edu.tr/bitstream/handle/11693/32597/10133138.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Nevertheless, this thesis has made some important conclusions. To begin with, this research has shown that the triggers for all four coups were local. Source and nature of grievances may have differed in each case but the spark was local. Both Pakistani and Turkish armies were powerful enough in terms of resources (organizational cohesion, popular support, strict command-order chain) to conclude a successful coup d’état without organizational instructions or assistance from external actors. They needed neither U.S. operational support behind their coup attempts nor U.S. prodding to plan and start one.

### AT: Increases Terror - Etan

#### 1] Our ev outweighs – a] recency – their ONE Indonesia example is from 1988 and can’t account for modern day US values and training programs b] scope – our study accounts for every single security program over a span of 17 years

#### 2] Their card talks about JCET, not IMET, and doesn’t explain why they’re similar – reject new 2AR expansion since there’s no 3NR recourse

#### 3] Reform solves – introduces screening for new officers to ensure professionalism

### AT: No Impact

#### IMET graduates become elites in their countries

Atkinson 17. Carol, PhD in international relations, post-doctoral research fellow at the Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California. “Lessons Learned from Military Exchange Programs at US War and Staff Colleges”. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43829-0\_7.

The US Army’s schools provide a useful illustration of the stature and influence of the international graduates of US war and staff colleges. The US Army’s Command and General Staff College (CGSC) has the longest running program, hosting international offi cers since 1894 (Reichley 1994). As of 2014, more than 7500 foreign military officers had graduated from CGSC. Of these, more than half had obtained the rank of general, and 253 officers from 70 different countries had become chief of their military, commander of a multinational force, or head of state. Notably, as of April 2014, 28 CGSC international graduates had achieved the highest position in their country as head of state (Leavenworth Times 2014). Former Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is an excellent example. Yudhoyono, a former military offi cer, was a 1991 graduate of CGSC. Yudhoyono was recognized internationally for his role in bringing peaceful democratic transition to Indonesia. At the senior-level school, the US Army War College graduated its fi rst international students in 1978, and approximately 10 percent of all its international alumni have become Army Chief or Defense Chief in their country (Burbank 2013). It is impressive to note that in spring 2013, 20 international alumni from this one school alone were serving as Army or Defense Chief in their countries—these countries included Germany, Korea, India, Canada, Denmark, Uganda, Norway, Egypt, Italy, Philippines, Lithuania, New Zealand, Oman, Australia, Hungary, Estonia, Georgia, and the Netherlands (Burbank 2013). The recent class of 2015— with 79 foreign offi cers representing 73 different countries—is the largest international class ever at the Army War College (United States Army War College Community Banner 2014). The above statistics on distinguished foreign graduates are consistent across all of the war and staff colleges with international graduates going on to hold very important political and military positions in their home countries. In fact, this is to be expected because both US and foreign students are chosen for attendance because they are the rising elite leaders in their countries.

#### That gives them *significant influence* over democratic transitions

Blair 13 Retired Adm. Dennis C. Blair, President Obama’s director of national intelligence, is a former commander of the U.S. Pacific Command with long military experience, *Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Transitions*, Volume 1, Brookings Institution Press, Mar 25, 2013

The Armed Forces Matter in Democratic transitions The armed forces are one of the most powerful institutions in any country. They have weapons and disciplined personnel, and are organized for taking action. To an extent that is hard for military officers and officials in mature democratic countries to understand, the military leaders of new countries and new governments believe they have both the right and the responsibility to play a decisive role in the political development of their countries. Their independence wars are more recent, military coups have been frequent and not long ago, and few other established institutions have their power and influence within the country. They will often assume or be thrust into a decisive role in a political crisis, and large sectors of society will look to them for leadership and action. Rarely will a country’s armed forces be in the vanguard of a popular movement for democratic reform. It is true that many military coups are proclaimed to have been made in the name of the people and that their leaders often announce that their goal is to restore or establish democracy. Once in power, however, they generally then announce that it will take a period of time to deal with the country’s immediate problems before power can be turned over to a democratic government. As that period of time becomes longer and longer, the rulers may exchange their uniforms for business suits, but they generally convince themselves they do not need an election to confirm their own conviction that they are the most qualified candidates to lead the country. This has been the pattern in many African countries when anticolonial military revolutionaries became longserving dictators. Often it takes another coup or a political crisis to force them from power. However, power has not always corrupted absolutely, and there have been examples of military governments voluntarily relinquishing power: the military regimes in Chile and Brazil in the 1980s sensed growing popular demands for democracy and led the transition process themselves.1 More recently, the Thai military government turned over power to the party led by the sister of the leader they had deposed months earlier. The armed forces can suppress most revolts against authoritarian regimes if they decide to support the dictator or party in power. In 1989 the People’s Liberation Army cleared Tiananmen Square. In 2009 armed forces of Iran obeyed orders to quell popular protests against the clerical regime, which continues in power to this day. At the time of this writing, the Syrian armed forces continue to follow orders from their dictator to suppress revolt, and President Assad remains in power. However, the armed forces do not always support their authoritarian leaders when their power is challenged, even authoritarian leaders who appointed and courted them. When there is a political crisis, military leaders make decisions on what they feel is best for their country, their services, and their personal interests. It is not rare for the armed forces to play a positive role in allowing popular movements to overthrow dictators, even if the latter have been in power for a long time and have assiduously courted and controlled their military leaders. In the Philippines in 1983, Indonesia in 1998, Serbia in 2000, and the Ukraine in 2004, the armed forces refused to suppress protesters, in some cases cooperating with them, and allowed the dictators to be overthrown.2 In 2011 the Tunisian and Egyptian army leaderships decided not to support the Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes against popular protests, and those dictators fell.3 The armed forces play an absolutely key role in fostering, allowing, or suppressing democratic movements in authoritarian states. Thus it is very much in the interests of the established democracies to help military leaders in authoritarian or transition countries make the right choices. Characteristics of armed Forces under Dictatorships Dramatic events, like the decisions of military leaders during the Arab Awakening to support their leaders or to turn on them, are the culmination of long-term, complex sets of developments. Military leaders, even in isolated dictatorships, understand that over the long run, a government must have the support of its people. They also understand that military dictatorship—direct military rule of the country—is neither practical nor sustainable in today’s world: Myanmar/Burma is only the latest example of a long line of military dictatorships that have tried to turn power over to another, more representative form of government. The only pure military dictatorship today is Fiji, scarcely a trendsetter. Most military officers—though there are plenty of exceptions—believe that the armed forces should act as the defenders of their people, not as the instrument of their repression. The ethos of armed forces and the creed of most of those who serve is patriotic defense of the nation and its people. They are at their best in honing their skills to defend their country against its enemies. Turning weapons against their own people contradicts the fundamental professional convictions of military people. Participation in the brutal political struggle for self-preservation that is the preoccupation of dictatorships is neither the preference nor the skill set of military officers. Many military officers, even in autocratic regimes, often have a general sentiment that some kind of a representative government is ultimately best for their nations. However, many other circumstances and beliefs cause military leaders and their troops to support autocratic governments as necessary for their countries for the time being—and “the time being” can stretch for decades. Some military leaders are simply thugs who joined for power. For others, self-interest, corruption, and fear play roles. Dictators take care of senior military leaders, especially in poorer countries. At lower ranks, soldiers are rewarded with scarce food in North Korea, and receive regular pay or opportunities for extortion in other impoverished dictatorships. Despots also check their generals’ loyalty through independent intelligence services and other informer networks, and they remove and punish harshly those considered unreliable. even as the overwhelmingly powerful American-led international military coalition was gathering on Iraq’s border in 2003, its generals were far more afraid of Saddam Hussein than they were of the military defeat they could see looming. Beyond these human motivations, however, are other beliefs and convictions. When a country is threatened by social turmoil, especially when supported, or suspected to be supported, from outside the country, a military leader may believe that his first duty is to maintain law and order, fight against foreigners or their surrogates, and support the current government in order to maintain social stability. This was certainly the case for many Latin American military officers who fought against Cuban- and Soviet-supported insurgencies in the 1970s and 1980s. While many of their actions were reprehensible, their basic motivation was understandable.4 It is easy to believe that reform must be postponed until a more stable time. Military leaders also are influenced or can be manipulated by ethnic and tribal divisions in those countries where identity politics play a major role. It is a rare military officer who will support democratic reform if he believes his ethnic group or tribe will be oppressed or disadvantaged under an unproven democratic system. These considerations play a role in many African countries today. There are sometimes other core beliefs that are dominant in the values of military leaders. Turkish military officers believe their duty is to safeguard the secular nature of their government. Thai officers believe the king must be respected. Finally, many military officers honestly believe that their countries are not yet ready for democracy. They feel that the necessary institutions for democracy do not yet exist in their countries: an informed citizenry that will elect competent political leaders, an honest and functional legal system that will protect minority rights and tame corruption, a capable civil service, and a responsible legislature. They believe that until these components of democracy are present, some form of authoritarian government that earns popular support is best for their countries. The military leaders serving under dictatorships are not automatons programmed to give absolute fealty to despots whom they will defend to the death. They each have a set of beliefs, self-interest, and fears that form their overall attitude to their government and that will govern their actions during political changes. It is important to understand the motivations and interests of officers in autocratic regimes in order to persuade them to support democratic reform and transition. Democratic transitions With all these circumstances and beliefs blocking democratic progress, how are advances made? The regional surveys and case studies in this handbook show that change comes through a combination of events and individuals. Time and again, democratic transitions have been moved forward by the decisions of individual military officers who understood that it was right for their countries and their military services. In the early years of the United States, George Washington declined to be a proconsul and supported a constitutional democratic form of government. A century and a half later in Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk used his enormous prestige as the military victor in a war of independence to support the establishment of a democratic form of government for his country.5 As described later in this handbook, other military leaders have played similar important roles in more recent years. In Senegal general Jean Alfred Diallo in the 1960s established a positive role for the armed forces in his newly independent country that has continued to the present. In Spain in the 1970s, General Gutierrez Mellado was the “irreplaceable initiator of reform” in Spain’s transition from the Franco dictatorship. In the 1980s, general Prem Tinsulanonda, as prime minister of Thailand, moved his country toward democracy and voluntarily left the premiership for an elected successor. General Fidel Ramos stepped down after a constitutionally mandated single term as president of the Philippines, declining to support an initiative to change the constitution or to declare martial law. In the 1990s, Staff general Ferenc Vegh, the Hungarian chief of defense, led the reform of the armed forces toward a new democratic role. General Juan Emilio Cheyre, one of the coauthors of the second volume of this handbook, brought the Pinochet era to a close in Chile in 2004 by promulgating a public manifesto committing the Chilean armed forces to service in a democratic society. In Tunisia in 2011, general rachid Ammar refused orders to use military force to suppress peaceful protests, leading to the end of President Ben Ali’s dictatorship. These individual acts of courage and leadership do not occur in a vacuum. They are based on the education, training, and experiences of individual officers. The generals and admirals in the top leadership positions both influence and are influenced by networks of other officers and military officials, some of whom are dedicated to positive change both in their military services and for their countries. As the case histories in this handbook demonstrate, these reform networks within military services come together and take action primarily based on internal factors. Officers serving authoritarian regimes are often dissatisfied with conditions within their military services— cronyism, corruption, slow promotions, military defeat, and low professionalism—and within the country—corruption, economic adversity, deteriorating security conditions, and succession crises. However, outside influences also play a role: it can be negative if democratic reform is not encouraged or positive if it promotes reform. The policies of outside countries and international organizations and the words and actions of individual foreigners count. Officers and defense officials from the mature democracies can make a difference when they encourage their counterparts to support transitions toward more representative government and assume a role for their forces that is less political and more professional. Persuading the guys with the guns The armed forces of almost all countries around the world— those of democracies, dictatorships, and transitional states—are in constant contact. A few countries, such as North Korea and Iran, effectively isolate their military officers from outside contact, but they are the exception.6 Military officers from both democracies and dictatorships participate in exchange programs, and military delegations visit other countries regularly and attend international conferences together. Military units from one country provide training to other countries, and military units train and work together in coalitions in disaster relief and peacekeeping operations around the world. These military points of contact offer to the armed forces of developed democracies opportunities to influence their counterparts in authoritarian countries. During education and training courses, through rewards and sanctions, and in professional and personal discussions, the military forces of democratic countries can convey by both example and persuasion the advantages that the armed forces of democracies enjoy and encourage their peers to support democratic transitions in their countries. Influence is most effectively exerted over time through a sustained program of conveying the essential elements and advantages of a democratic system to counterparts in autocratic regimes. Interactions with autocratic regimes—China, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zimbabwe— will differ from those with countries in transition—Cambodia, ecuador, egypt, el Salvador, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Serbia, Sri Lanka. The way in which messages are delivered is crucial, according to several of the coauthors of the second volume of this handbook who have been on the receiving end of efforts to convince them to promote democracy in their countries. If messages are delivered in an arrogant, condescending, insensitive manner, they will be counterproductive. If they are delivered in a way that is sensitive to the history, conditions, and aspirations of the officer serving in an autocratic or transitional country, then they can have impact. When political crises occur, advanced democracies must exert influence in a more intense and coordinated fashion. Different countries will have different types and degrees of influence. Personal contacts among military officials and officers in democratic countries and military leaders in the autocratic and transitional countries will be important. The officer or official in the democracy with the most knowledge, friendships, and influence within the country in transition may have to be called from another assignment to work on the transition. Timing will be crucial, as will be up-to-date knowledge about the situation within the country in transition, quick decisions within the democratic countries about their policies toward transitions, and a rapid exchange of information among the democracies so that all their efforts are mutually reinforcing.

### AT: Competent Officials Bad

#### They have it backwards – IMET improves them in specific democratic categories in programs designed by the US and pure statistics prove their effectiveness – propaganda isn’t a course! Their args are speculative, unwarranted, and one sentence arguments.

### AT: Symbolic

#### 1] Exclusively allowing IMET turns symbolism – it shows that the US is committed to only stand for democratic values and is willing to spread them abroad – [weapon supplies/failed counterterror ops/etc] sends a negative signal

#### 2] Independently, there’s no impact to signaling – [contextualize, most advantages don’t have a signaling internal link]

### AT: IMET = Western Knowledge

#### 1] Impact turn – it’s good to teach regimes that slaughter their own citizens valuable tenets of democracy and peace, regardless of who teaches it

#### 2] They’re just wrong– clear statistics prove IMET reduces civilian deaths and increases America’s reputation

## Theory

### Condo Good

### Condo PICs Good

### PICs Good

#### PICs out of a certain type of military aid are good. \_\_\_ net benefits:

**1] Ground – 50 plus authoritarian regimes make cutting specific case negs to every aff impossible – military aid PICs provide stable neg generics which is key to in-round clash and engagement**

**2] Topic lit – authors write about the specificities of military aid like arm sales, counter narcotics, and intel gathering – PICs are key to test the nuances of the pros and cons of aid – that outweighs – topic lit determines predictable offense**

**3] Real world education - policymakers regularly cut some types of military aid – proven by Congress shaving off only IMET to Saudi and ending military aid to only police in Guatemala**

**Our net benefits outweighs all other offense –**

**A] specificity – even if PICs in general are bad, this topic has a defined list of the types of military aid which limits the aff research burden while allowing for a check against spec affs**

**B] probability – the proliferation of PICs like demining and aff competition answers prove they’re just whining and that they should be prepped**

### Framing Issues

### ---Drop the Arg

### ---Reasonability

## Extra

### Builds Soft Power – Empirics

#### IMET facilitates cooperation with the US – that’s key to soft power

Jalili 15. Duraid, PhD student at the Defence Studies Department, King's College London. “The Use of Professional Military Education as a Soft-Power Asset in U.S. International Security Policy”. *Strife Journal*, Special Issue I, November/December 2015. strifejournal.org/images/strifedata/issues/Special%20I/STRIFE\_I\_8\_JALILI\_58\_67.pdf. Brackets in original // Highlighted RN

Within this framework, education provides a significant means of facilitating soft power. In outlining this, Nye highlights this through a 2001 statement by then Secretary of State Colin Powellregarding the U.S. State Department’s Fulbright Scholarship programme, in which he remarks: ‘I can think of no more valuable asset to our country than the friendship of future world leaders who have been educated here.’10 For Nye, the value of such an asset is self-evident, in that many ‘of these former students eventually wind up in positions where they can affect policy outcomes that are important to Americans.’11 This assessment, however, is not restricted to the civilian sphere, but finds tangible presence in military education. As stated by Eric D. Newsom, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs: I believe, for the most part, we do not fully appreciate how IMET and similar programs impart American values to the recipients in foreign militaries, both directly and indirectly. The stability we saw in military forces around the world during [the] recent radical decrease in defense budgets would have resulted in coups which today never materialized, in part because of the learned respect for civilian control of the military.12 Although it is difficult to quantitatively define the extent to which the policies and actions of foreign governments and militaries have been influenced by foreign military education, it is possible to gain significant qualitative data on individual cases. In John A. Cope’s 1995 study of the IMET programme, for example, we find evidence that foreign PME and shared educational experiences: enabled greater U.S. cooperation with Middle Eastern officers during the Persian Gulf War ‘because most of the high ranking [officers] had attended military training in the U.S. and understood how to work with us’13; reduced ‘emotional and uninformed reactions [...] against the U.S.’ by Brazilian military officials14; and even ‘produced at least two unauthorized channels of communication between senior Argentine and U.S. officer-classmates’ during the Malvinas/Falklands War in 198215. Perhaps the most interesting encapsulation of this, however, is found in the 1993 Congressional testimony of Lieutenant General (Ret) William E. Odom, former Director of the U.S. National Security Agency: Another kind of desirable influence through IMET is demonstrated by US-Pakistani relations immediately after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. General Zia, the President of Pakistan, was being urged by his foreign minister to scorn US offers of assistance in favor of coming to term [sic] with Moscow. Because Zia had attended two US Army schools, and because he had made extremely close friends with ordinary American citizens during those two years, he was subjectively inclined toward the US offer. As a party to the meeting with him in Pakistan when he made the decision to accept the US offer, tying his policy to US strategy for Afghanistan, I gained the impression that his IMET experience was a critical factor in his decision.16

### Human Rights

#### IMET has cultural effects – empirically cultivates human rights

Omelicheva et al 17. MARIYA Y. OMELICHEVA is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Kansas, BRITTNEE CARTER is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the University of Kansas, LUKE B. CAMPBELL is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at Northwest Missouri State University. “Military Aid and Human Rights: Assessing the Impact of U.S. Security Assistance Programs”. *Political Science* Quarterly, vol. 132 no. 1. 12 April 2017. https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12575.

There are, however, some positive and encouraging results. Broadly, as indicated in the Findings section, the programs, which are grant based and include elements of military training and exchange, are negatively associated with civilian deaths in situations of political conflict. The magnitude of these programs—that is, the total number of foreign officers brought for training in the U.S. military establishments or trained oversees or the dollar value of military equipment supplied to foreign governments— varies considerably from year to year and is contingent on annual budget appropriations in the United States. In other words, while some financial support from the states that are recipients of grant-based foreign military programs is expected, the programs are largely funded by the U.S. government. Beyond the funding mechanism, however, it is the deeper engagement of foreign officers in curricular and extracurricular activities that help them learn, appreciate, and internalize important values, including respect for human rights, as well as greater opportunity for socialization with representatives of the U.S. Army, that distinguishes them from the FMS and FMF programs. The results are closely tied to those of Atkinson’s 2014 study, which indicated that U.S.-hosted military educational exchange programs were linked to positive improvements in democratic institutions.47 The socialization model and the empirical analysis presented in Atkinson’s book demonstrate how military educational exchanges foster goodwill, friendships, and social networks, in this way serving as important sources of knowledge, influence, and power. Building on these results, our findings suggest that security assistance programs that feature military education, training, and exchange are effective at inducing positive human rights developments in states that are recipients of the U.S. military aid by reducing civilian deaths by the hands of the military in times of political conflict.