# USMCA DA

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# Uniqueness

### Will Pass

#### USMCA passes now but dependent on cooperation between Pelosi and Trump.

Keith Laing, 10-17-2019, "Auto industry's D.C. agenda hinges on Trump-Pelosi relationship," [Keith Laing Washington correspondent Keith covers auto regulation and lobbying and other news out of Washington affecting Michigan] Detroit News, <https://www.detroitnews.com/story/business/autos/2019/10/17/auto-industrys-washington-agenda-hinges-trump-pelosi-relationship/3975733002/> Accessed 19 October 2019 LHSLA LH

Washington — Automakers' hopes for congressional approval of President Donald Trump's proposed replacement for the North American Free Trade Agreement are resting on a Capitol gripped by a looming impeachment fight setting aside partisan bickering long enough to compromise on a trade pact.

Democratic leaders have suggested that they can work with Trump on the trade pact, known as the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA, even as they attempt to impeach him. But labor leaders have attempted to pump the brakes and most observers are skeptical that Democrats, who control the U.S. House of Representatives, will want to give the president a win heading into an election year.

House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's often-fraught relationship with President Donald Trump is considered critical to passage of a replacement to the North American Free Trade Agreement.

 “I can honestly say that I think every day we're becoming closer,” Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., said during her weekly news conference on Thursday, referencing meetings on Wednesday and Thursday between Democratic negotiators and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer.

"The people who are saying it don't know what they're talking about or have a different agenda that they want to present," Pelosi continued. "But we feel very good about being on a path to yes. We're not there yet because we don't have the enforceability assurance that we need to have. While we have some good things in the bill, it's only a list of good things unless it can be enforced."

#### Passes before Thanksgiving.

Erik Wasson, 10-17-2019, "White House, Democrats Upbeat on USMCA Despite Impeachment," [capitol hill reporter] Bloomberg, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-17/white-house-democrats-upbeat-on-usmca-despite-impeachment> Accessed 19 October 2019 LHSLA LH

The White House and House Democrats are increasingly upbeat that the stalled U.S.-Mexico-Canada trade agreement can be amended and approved in Congress, despite the rancorous impeachment inquiry into President Donald Trump.

“I think it will pass before Thanksgiving,” top Trump economic adviser Larry Kudlow said on CNBC Thursday morning. He told reporters afterward that “there is a sense among both parties that this is an historic trade deal.”

“It is quite true that President Trump and Speaker Pelosi have some significant political differences,” Kudlow said. “On the other hand, down through the many recent months, Speaker Pelosi has been cooperative, accessible, accommodative and helpful in setting up meetings and discussions with our team led by Bob Lighthizer with her key committee chairmen and subcommittee chairmen.”

U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer has intensified his meetings with a House Democratic working group to reach a USMCA deal. Approving the pact, which would replace the Clinton-era North American Free Trade Agreement, is a key goal for Trump as his re-election campaign nears. It also could help Democratic House members elected in swing districts demonstrate that impeachment hasn’t made legislating impossible.

Lighthizer met Wednesday and Thursday with Democrats and plans to meet again Friday morning.

House Speaker Nancy Pelosi said at a news conference Thursday that she’s “optimistic” about finishing work on the accord, but “we are not there yet.” House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer separately told a Bloomberg Government audience on Thursday that Democrats are “working hard to get to yes.”

# Links/Internals

### Generic

#### Fossil fuel industry policy is divisive.

Ari Natter, 8-7-2019, "2020 Democrats Step Up Pressure on Fossil-Fuel Industry in Climate Fight," Bloomberg, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-07/big-oil-targeted-by-2020-democrats-eager-to-demonize-industry>. Accessed 19 Oct. 2019, LHSLA LH

Bernie Sanders says the industry is a criminal enterprise. Joe Biden is vowing to take action against it. Other candidates are competing to say who will wean America from its products the soonest.

The fossil fuel industry is squarely in the cross hairs of Democrats running for the White House as they move sharply to the left on climate change, evoking growing alarm from a sector that’s found a cheerleader in the Trump administration. It has moved to rescind regulations on oil drilling and proposed extraordinary measures to aid coal mining.

“We are made to be just some kind of evil force,” said Kathleen Sgamma, president of Western Energy Alliance, which represents oil and gas producers. “They are doubling down on it and adding very hostile rhetoric.”

Big oil and its Republican allies say the Democrats’ swing to the left on the issue will backfire with voters, especially in states such as Ohio that Trump won in part with an appeal to aggrieved coal miners. These critics have commissioned studies asserting that the Democratic polices would cost millions of jobs while increasing pump prices for gasoline.

But that hasn’t deterred candidates, such as Sanders, a Vermont senator.

“We’ve got to ask ourselves a simple question: What do you do with an industry that knowingly, for billions of dollars in short-term profits, is destroying this planet?” Sanders said during the most recent Democratic candidate debate. “I say that is criminal activity that cannot be allowed to continue.”

The party’s eagerness to demonize the industry is a marked shift from the 2016 election cycle when Hillary Clinton embraced natural gas as a “bridge fuel” to cleaner power sources and declined to endorse a ban on the controversial drilling technique known as fracking.

Since then, polls have shown voters increasingly concerned about climate change as its effects become more apparent in the form of catastrophic hurricanes, floods, droughts and wildfires. And the progressive Green New Deal, which calls for a “10-year-mobilization” to confront climate change by essentially ending the use of fossil fuels and achieving net-zero carbon emissions, has changed the political calculus of the issue.

#### Trump uses the aff to capitalize on re-election and rallies against the dems.

Susan Crabtree [RCP staff], 8-1-2019, "Trump Campaign Spotlights Biden's Vow to Ban Fossil Fuels," No Publication, <https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2019/08/01/trump_campaign_spotlights_bidens_vow_to_ban_fossil_fuels__140916.html>. Accessed 19 October 2019, LHSLA LH

The Trump reelection campaign likely never imagined that a potential 2020 opponent would practically gift-wrap a made-for-TV negative ad on climate change during a Democratic primary debate -- much less one held in the fossil fuel-reliant Motor City.

But the morning after the second Democratic debate in Detroit, top Trump strategists were celebrating, declaring early victory in Michigan, Pennsylvania and other areas in the Midwest even though the campaign finish line is still 15 months down the road.

Democratic front-runner Joe Biden’s blanket statement that he would end Americans’ use of fossil fuels if elected president amounted to political suicide in parts of the Rust Belt where coal remains king when it comes to jobs and workers’ economic security, the Trump campaign argued.

“If you want to be the Democrat nominee, you have to swear by the radical Green New Deal, which Joe Biden has done,” Trump Communications Director Tim Murtaugh told RealClearPolitics. “He’s ruled out fossil fuels, which would devastate coal-producing states like Pennsylvania and kill countless jobs across the country, not to mention job losses for workers in natural gas and oil.”

Murtaugh accused Biden of displaying an “appalling lack of concern for auto and manufacturing industries” and related energy enterprises by signing on to the far left’s answer to climate change so early in the campaign.

“The economic catastrophe that would result from Biden’s radical position is hard to overstate,” he said. “We don’t know who President Trump’s opponent will be, but Joe Biden just said goodbye to auto and manufacturing workers, Pennsylvania and the Midwest.”

Trump Campaign Manager Brad Parscale was downright gleeful as he seized on the moment to taunt Team Biden during the debate Wednesday night.

“Bye bye coal, Democrats & @JoeBiden just said they are done with you. How do you feel about that Pennsylvania?”

Biden’s commitment to ending Americans’ use of fossil fuels in cars, planes and rapid transit came during a clash with Washington Gov. Jay Inslee, who lambasted him for only offering “middle-ground” solutions to global warming.

Biden responded by touting sweeping aspects of his own environmental plan.

To clarify, CNN’s Dana Bash followed up: “Would there be any place for fossil fuels, including coal and fracking, in a Biden administration?”

Perhaps Biden, who has billed himself as the blue-collar anti-Trump, answered too swiftly, because Twitter lit up following this reply: “No. We would work it out. We would make sure it’s eliminated, and no more subsidies for either one of those, period.”

The Trump war room quickly tweeted out a video clip of that answer, arguing it amounted to an unqualified death knell for fossil-fuel jobs that will haunt Biden if he makes it to the general election.

### Floor Time

#### USMCA passes now but plan delays it – election kills the bill

Shalal 10/23 [Shalal, Andrea (Reporter), 10/23/19, “U.S. trade envoy meets lawmakers on U.S.-Mexico-Canada deal as time runs short”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-usmca/u-s-trade-envoy-meets-lawmakers-on-u-s-mexico-canada-deal-as-time-runs-short-idUSKBN1X22VG LHS AP]

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer met this week with Democratic lawmakers to try to resolve their concerns about the U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) trade agreement as Republicans increased pressure to get the deal passed by the end of 2019. Democrats said they were making progress every day, rejecting criticism from U.S. President Donald Trump and some Republicans who have accused them of stalling a vote on the deal that replaces the 1990s-era North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Lighthizer and other U.S. trade officials met on Wednesday with a working group of Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives, according to three sources familiar with the matter. Lighthizer also met with Republicans on the House Ways and Means Committee, said one of the sources. In addition, his staff met with congressional staff on Monday and Tuesday, according to two of the sources. The U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) office did not immediately comment. Despite the positive signals, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley, a Republican, said in a speech on the Senate floor that he feared the Democratic-controlled House was “increasingly less likely to act this year on USMCA.” He said Democrats appeared to be stalling to avert handing any victory to Republican Trump, but added that failure to act could cost them votes in the 2020 elections. Delaying a vote on the deal could ultimately derail it since little legislation is likely to be finalized in a presidential election year. Republicans argue the trade pact would create hundreds of thousands of jobs, protect U.S. industries, and boost investment in the United States. Democrats have said they are committed to working toward approval, but need their concerns over labor, climate and enforcement to be addressed first. The Democratic working group and staff were working constantly with USTR to resolve outstanding difference, said Erin Hatch, spokeswoman for the House Ways and Means committee. “This is an honest, diligent effort to reach an agreement that meets Democrats’ standards, and every day we are making progress,” she said. Separately, a bipartisan group of 130 members of Congress urged Lighthizer to cut a footnote in the trade agreement that suggests Washington could drop its $800 de minimis threshold - the value below which imported goods are free of both sales tax and duties - to match those of Canada and Mexico. As part of the USMCA, Canada and Mexico both raised their de minimis thresholds, aiding consumers and small businesses in the United States, but those levels will remain well below the U.S. level of $800, the highest in the world. U.S. technology groups have said that lowering the U.S. threshold would undermine the broader gains of the deal.

#### USMCA must pass now – only 20 days left

Johnson 10/23 [Johnson, Kieth (senior staff writer), 10/23/19, “Why Trump Still Can’t Get USMCA Through Congress”, Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/23/usmca-trump-congress-nafta-pelosi-impeachment/> LHS AP]

Ironically, the fight over impeachment could finally ease the way for NAFTA’s successor. But time is running out. With the impeachment inquiry gaining momentum seemingly every day, U.S. President Donald Trump is desperate for some sort of victory. That’s why the administration has stepped up pressure on the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives to pass the revised North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which the United States, Mexico, and Canada negotiated last year. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has repeatedly said she’s hoping to pass the agreement—but only after core, long-standing Democratic concerns are addressed. With just a few weeks left in this year’s congressional calendar, prospects for passage of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) seem to be dimming by the day. Is the impeachment probe holding up the trade deal? Trump has attacked Democrats by arguing that the impeachment probe shuts down legislative deliberation, and he took to Twitter on Tuesday to prod Pelosi into getting a vote on the trade deal—the only partial victory Trump has achieved in almost three years of trade policy turmoil. “Can’t believe that Nervous Nancy Pelosi isn’t moving faster on USMCA,” Trump tweeted. “Taking too long!” But the impeachment inquiry isn’t what’s holding up passage of USMCA, even though many Democrats were (and still are) leery of giving Trump a political victory. First, the White House has yet to send any actual implementing legislation to Congress to turn the deal from an agreement into law. But Pelosi has made clear from the beginning of the impeachment probe that the House deliberation of USMCA would move ahead, and last week she stressed her willingness to push harder to pass the trade deal despite the bad blood with the White House over impeachment. In a way, impeachment could make an eventual USMCA deal even likelier, as Trump needs a win and Democrats are eager to show they can still deliver important legislation while investigating the president. Then why is it taking so long? Mexico ratified the agreement last summer. Since Trump’s trade negotiators wrapped up their revisions to the 25-year-old NAFTA in 2018, Democrats have been clear about the concerns they wanted addressed before they could vote yes: They want greater enforcement provisions, stronger labor and environmental protections, and a change to pharmaceutical protections. Those are pretty much the same criticisms many Democrats had about the original NAFTA. Lately, another hot-button issue has elbowed into the debate over the trade agreement: Whether technology companies will be held liable or not for the content they publish. Tech firms are shielded under U.S. law, and those protections would be extended internationally in the agreement—and that worries both Democratic and Republican lawmakers. Enshrining the decades-old tech liability shield in an international agreement would make it almost impossible for Congress to take any future action to regulate big tech firms’ role in spreading misinformation and disinformation—a huge issue heading into an election year already marred by information warfare. From the beginning, Trump’s trade team, led by Robert Lighthizer, has been meeting with Congress to assuage lawmakers’ concerns and try to make just enough tweaks to ensure passage of the agreement; Lighthizer met again Wednesday with key Democrats. The problem is that many of the Democratic concerns, which are shared by environmentalists and labor groups, seem hard to address without going back and making changes to the USMCA text, which neither Mexico nor Canada wants. (Passage in Canada’s new parliament is all but a “foregone conclusion” but only after the U.S. Congress moves on the agreement.) “I don’t know how you fix the pharmaceutical issue or digital or the question of enforcement without reopening the text,” said Kimberly Ann Elliott, a trade expert at the Center for Global Development. “My impression is that Pelosi does want to do it—but I don’t have a strong sense of how Lighthizer can square the circle on the things the Democrats want to see.” Why are House Democrats hung up on labor issues? Trump says unions love the deal. Not quite. While some unions, such as the Teamsters, have praised the USMCA as an improvement over its predecessor, most of Big Labor has voiced the same concerns about USMCA as it did about the original NAFTA and about the doomed Trans-Pacific Partnership. The AFL-CIO, in particular, has barnstormed around the country’s manufacturing belt to raise awareness of the need for the new trade pact to genuinely address concerns about unfair competition. And AFL-CIO boss Richard Trumka warned flat out this month that any effort to rush a congressional vote to suit a desperate White House would be a “colossal mistake.” The new trade pact does address many of the concerns about labor rights—especially in Mexico. That includes greater union protection and higher minimum wages, a way to hopefully limit the offshoring of U.S. manufacturing jobs. And the labor provisions, in theory, are among the easiest to address. The new Mexican government overhauled its labor laws and raised wages. But Democratic lawmakers still worry about the staying power of Mexico’s labor reforms—especially after the latest Mexican budget slashed money dedicated to labor enforcement. That’s why Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador sent a letter last week to the powerful head of the House Ways and Means Committee trying to show that Mexico was on the path to deep-seated and genuine labor reform, even if he explained that it would take several years to fully complete. So what are the prospects for getting USMCA through Congress? It’s starting to look difficult this year, with just over 20 days left in the congressional calendar, Democratic concerns still not fully addressed, and no implementing bill for Congress to work on. Iowa Sen. Chuck Grassley, the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and a powerful Republican voice on trade, said Tuesday that he is worried for the first time about the trade deal passing. “I think it’s fair to say that the clock is ticking and time is running out,” he told reporters. The problem is that if House Democrats can’t get their concerns addressed, and Big Labor stays on the sidelines, there’s no way Pelosi can advance the legislation this session. And after this year, the 2020 election kicks into full gear. And almost nobody thinks that Congress can pass contentious trade legislation in the middle of a heated presidential election. Which would push back congressional consideration of Trump’s one big trade win until after the election—if even then.

### Carbon Tax PC

#### Carbon tax requires massive PC.

Columbia Center On Sustainable Investment, 2-26-2019, "To Fight Climate Change, Think Politics First and Often," State of the Planet, <https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2019/02/26/fight-climate-change-politics-first/>. Accessed 19 Oct. 2019. LHSLA LH

Some recent carbon pricing proposals seem to recognize this, trying to provide visible benefits in policy design, either by returning revenues directly to citizens or investing revenues in communities. However, the high costs associated with carbon taxes have left these proposals nevertheless struggling to gain political traction.

Given this reality, Justin Gillis of the New York Times has argued that climate advocates should “Forget the Carbon Tax for Now.” Without criticizing carbon pricing on policy grounds, Gillis worries that “the climate movement has… turned this potentially useful tool into a fetish,” with non-trivial opportunity costs. “Invariably,” he writes, wherever carbon prices have been adopted, “huge political capital was spent to push through a carbon price too low to spur the rapid reductions in emissions that we need.”

In other words, even when carbon pricing has overcome the political hurdles to adoption, it has been in such a watered down form that it no longer delivers the anticipated benefits that made it the preferred policy in the first place.

Thus, embedded in political realities, the seemingly first-best option can become at best insufficient to achieve its original policy objectives, and at worst a costly distraction from other more viable alternatives.

A more robust real-world approach to evaluating policy options

Assessing proposed climate policies with respect to both economic and political efficiency, in contrast, might yield some valuable and surprising insights. Take the conservative Climate Leadership Council’s proposed climate policy (spearheaded by former Secretary James Baker, noted above). Its carbon price package would: impose a $40/ton fee on emissions and return revenues to American families; roll back EPA climate regulations; and provide fossil fuel companies immunity from liability over their knowing contributions to climate change.

An economic cost-benefit analysis might find that such a policy would effectively reduce emissions at minimal overall economic cost. But a politically savvy observer would notice that it seems to trade relatively politically easy and popular emissions reduction tools, in the form of EPA regulations and civil liability, for politically costly carbon taxes. Even if this policy were to be adopted, it could hamstring our ability to implement other complementary policies needed to reach full decarbonization.

Instead, climate advocates should re-center proven and popular policies that deliver present-day benefit with less visible cost, like clean air regulations, clean energy mandates, and investments in green jobs and infrastructure.

New York Congresswoman Ocasio-Cortez and Massachusetts Senator Ed Markey have included these elements in their Green New Deal, which promises to leverage public investments and regulations to decarbonize the American economy, create millions of jobs, upgrade our infrastructure systems, and bridge historic economic and racial inequalities. Whatever you think of the policy, it would certainly represent the type of “unprecedented” transformation that the IPCC prescribes.

Notably, the Green New Deal’s proponents do not tie the policy to specific revenue generation tools. Instead, many suggest that it would be financed through congressionally authorized discretionary spending in the same way that schools, wars, and climate-related disaster relief are funded, though some suggest raising taxes on the extremely wealthy to ensure funding for all public goods (while others have waved off concern about how to pay for the policy altogether).

In doing so, the Green New Deal foregrounds visible benefits in the form of good jobs, renewable energy, and infrastructure improvements, while downplaying costs. This strategy seems to be working: the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication has found exceptional bipartisan support for the policy (although many voters still know little about it).

chart shows support of green new deal by democrats republicans and independents

There is strong bipartisan support for the Green New Deal. Image: Yale Program on Climate Change Communication

That popularity has also begun to trickle into political support. As of February 26th, 89 representatives and 11 senators had co-sponsored Ocasio-Cortez and Markey’s Green New Deal resolution, including at least five declared presidential candidates.

Conclusion

Comparing the potential costs and anticipated benefits across a range of policy options—economic or technical—will (and should) remain an important factor in crafting policy agendas and making policy recommendations. But theoretically smart policies are worth little without the political will and wherewithal to adopt and implement them effectively. When policymakers or advisors fail to consider political factors, they risk inefficient expenditure of political capital by advancing policy options that are unlikely to be adopted or implemented as intended.

Especially in cases where costs of inaction are catastrophically high, as for climate, they should instead advocate policies that have the greatest chance of achieving actual progress: those that maximize a combination of political savvy and economic efficiency, even if those policies might not appear optimal when evaluated on purely economic grounds.

Failing to do so can impede the achievement of critical policy objectives. On climate and so many other pressing policy challenges, we don’t have time to waste.

#### Passing carbon tax which requires huge PC trades off with other more effective climate policies.

Matt Bruenig, 9-24-2019, "It’s Time to Abandon Carbon Pricing," No Publication, https://jacobinmag.com/2019/09/carbon-pricing-green-new-deal-fossil-fuel-environment

But politically, it’s done more harm than good. Carbon pricing has contributed to the extreme polarization of the climate issue. It’s stoked class divisions, reinforcing the myth that climate policy necessarily penalizes the poor and working class, and sparking revolts like the Yellow Vests in France. That myth, in turn, has slowed progress on decarbonization — all while convincing politicians and the public that we’re making real headway on climate change. (We’re not.)

These political costs just aren’t worth the incremental environmental improvements they produce. We need to abandon carbon pricing, at least for the time being, and instead focus on investments that build broad coalitions for aggressive climate policy, like rapidly expanding clean energy and green housing. Only after generating political and policy momentum to support these investments should we return to carbon pricing to help complete the energy transition.

What’s in a Number?

Carbon prices largely reflect the “known knowns” of the social and environmental damages of emissions — what economists refer as “the social cost of carbon” (SCC). But, of course, there’s no reliable way to predict the future — or the cost of future damages. In practice, the SCC is a political number that varies widely, depending on a variety of normative assumptions like how much people value the present versus the future.

As it happens, the vast majority of carbon pricing schemes are lower than even conservative estimates of the SCC. Fully half of all priced emissions worldwide are priced below $10 a ton. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that in order to keep warming below 1.5°C, carbon prices would have to range from $135 to $6,050 per ton by 2030.

Cap and trade, the other main carbon-pricing tool, is also riddled with problems. In cap and trade, the government sets a ceiling, or a cap, on the total amount of emissions that can be pumped into the air. Companies purchase allowances and then trade with each other to meet their targets.

The problems here are different, but just as fatal. Too many allowances can create a glut, driving down prices and generating “hot air,” a situation where compliance occurs on paper but fails to shrink emissions. Many cap-and-trade systems also permit carbon offsets, allowing market players to outsource carbon reduction to other places. In addition to being morally dubious, offsets have come under criticism for weakening carbon pricing schemes.

Finally, even these lackluster efforts to price carbon are undercut by subsidizing fossil fuels. A recent working paper from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that fossil fuel subsidies totaled $5.2 trillion in 2017 (though, admittedly, this depends on how subsidies are defined). These subsidies are directly at odds with carbon-pricing policies, since they reduce the cost of fossil fuels artificially.

In short, the very mechanism that makes carbon-pricing politically palatable — a modest price — renders it ineffective at drastically reducing emissions. Sure, a low carbon price would raise some revenue and change behavior at the margins. But it will barely make a dent in the climate crisis.

A Zombie Policy

Given its spotty track record, why are policymakers so keen on carbon pricing? In the United States in particular, it’s the climate policy that won’t die. Bill Clinton proposed a carbon tax in the early 1990s (the BTU tax) that failed in the Senate and contributed to Democrats losing control of the House in the 1994 midterm elections. In 2009, Democrats tried a new tack with cap and trade, which again failed in the Senate (though narrowly this time). Obama then resurrected carbon pricing as an optional approach for states in the Clean Power Plan (which the Trump administration has since repealed).

The obsession with carbon pricing is the result of three main factors.

First, it’s a simple policy. In his book Can We Price Carbon?, Barry Rabe notes that some see it as a “public policy silver bullet” — a quick fix to a very complex problem. Putting a price on carbon, whether through emissions trading or a carbon tax, is much more straightforward than, say, figuring out how to expand public transportation networks through public planning.

Second, mainstream economists tend to dominate climate policy discussions. Take Project 88. A group of economists, Project 88 pushed for emissions trading of acid rain–causing sulfur dioxide in the United States in the late 1980s. The success of the program led the group to advocate exporting the model to greenhouse gases — never mind that most European countries decreased their emissions through traditional government regulation. In early international climate negotiations, Project 88 made carbon pricing a critical feature of global climate policy and the political linchpin of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the most important global climate agreement until the 2015 Paris Agreement. That pattern continues to the present. The IPCC Working Group on policy is filled with mainstream economists, who are naturally biased toward market solutions.

Finally, carbon pricing is consistent with “liberal environmentalism” — the widely accepted notion that capitalism and environmental protection can happily coexist through things like eco-labeling and pollution markets. Liberal environmentalism emphasizes voluntary approaches, public-private partnerships, and, of course, markets, in lieu of government regulations. After all, markets maximize choice and efficiency – at least in theory.

Big Fights Over Small Effects

All over the world, carbon pricing has become a political litmus test of climate commitment — with damaging political effects.

The federal carbon price in Canada has prompted several provinces to challenge the legality of the tax (thus far, unsuccessfully), despite the fact that 48 percent of Canadians favor a federal climate policy (only 30 percent favor a province-first approach). In Australia, Julia Gillard was replaced by Tony Abbott because he vowed to “axe the tax” (i.e., the carbon tax) that she had proposed. Carbon pricing generates massive battles over the deck chairs on the Titanic, rather than the looming iceberg.

This polarization also translates to inconsistent policies, which shift with elections. The possibility of interstate carbon trading in the United States disappeared with the repeal of the Clean Power Plan. Similarly, the right-wing populist premier of Ontario, Doug Ford, canceled the province’s participation in a cap-and-trade market with California and Quebec, which will cost the province over CAN$3 billion. The lack of stability further undermines the efficacy of carbon pricing, since changing policies cannot establish a consistent market signal.

And, finally, since carbon pricing emphasizes costs over benefits, it fails to build a broad coalition of support. Most people are understandably concerned more about what they will pay immediately than the future climate benefits. This applies both to the average resident, who may face higher fuel and energy costs, as well as workers in emissions-intensive industries, who justifiably worry about the economic impacts on their job security. At a time when we need to broaden support for climate policy as quickly as possible, carbon pricing does just the opposite.

Supply-Side Regulations, Not Carbon Pricing

Instead of expending huge amounts of political capital on incremental policies, we should be pushing transformative measures that provide up-front benefits to the broadest possible swath of workers. The Green New Deal (GND) has this potential — but only if it omits a price on carbon, at least for the time being.

### Tax Breaks

#### Eliminating tax breaks is democrat proposal.

Merrill Matthews,, 6-16-2019, "Debunking Democrats' claims about fossil fuel tax breaks," [political analyst] TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/448794-debunking-democrats-claims-about-fossil-fuel-tax-breaks

Democratic presidential frontrunner Joe Biden hopes to pay for his version of the Green New Deal by eliminating the subsidies and tax breaks given to the fossil fuel producing industry.

His proposal states, “he will lead by example, with the United States cutting fossil fuel subsidies at home in his first year and redirecting these resources to the historic investment in clean energy infrastructure.”

Biden’s not alone. Former Texas Rep. Beto O’Rourke says, “we finally end the tens of billions of dollars of tax breaks currently given to fossil fuel companies.” And Washington Gov. Jay Inslee told National Public Radio he would “remove the giant subsidies from the oil and gas companies.”

In fact, the oil and gas “subsidies” they refer to are small compared to the renewable energy industry. In addition, most of them are widely claimed tax deductions available to many other industries.

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) released an updated report in March estimating the cost, or “lost revenue,” of the tax breaks available to all types of energy production.

According to CRS, “In 2017, the value of federal tax-related support for the energy sector was estimated to be $17.8 billion. Of this, $4.6 billion (25.8%) can be attributed to tax incentives supporting fossil fuels. Tax-related support for renewables was an estimated $11.6 billion in 2017 (or 65.2% of total tax-related support for energy). The remaining tax-related support went toward nuclear energy, efficiency measures, and alternative technology vehicles.”

But there’s more to the story, because fossil fuels deliver vastly more energy return than renewables. “In 2017, fossil fuels accounted for 77.7% of U.S. primary energy production. The remaining primary energy production is attributable to renewable energy and nuclear electric resources, with shares of 12.8% and 9.5%, respectively,” according to CRS. Wind and solar power only accounted for 3.6 percentage points of total energy production.

In other words, fossil fuels provide more than three-quarters of U.S. energy generation for one-quarter of the identified tax spending. Renewables provide about 13 percent of energy production but absorb two-thirds of the tax spending.

CRS refers to these tax breaks as lost revenue, an important point that may have been lost on some Democrats. It certainly seemed to be lost on Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-N.Y.) when she criticized New York City for “giving away” billions of dollars to Amazon.

A tax break is simply income a company (or a household) doesn’t have to pay taxes on. Oil and gas companies are not receiving a government check that can be diverted to subsidize renewable energy production.

If renewable energy sources were to replace fossil fuels, which is most Green New Dealers’ stated goal, the current tax deductions the fossil fuel producing companies now receive would largely vanish.

### Warming

#### Warming politics are partisan and ensure a fight.

Bill Blancato Guest Columnist, 10-18-2019, "Bill Blancato: Is climate change partisan?," Winston-Salem Journal, https://www.journalnow.com/opinion/columnists/bill-blancato-is-climate-change-partisan/article\_c9196ebd-780b-5363-ac5a-d52373b9a838.html

Years ago, Republicans and Democrats both spoke about the need to address climate change. Climate change plans were in each parties’ platforms in 2008. The same year, Newt Gingrich and Nancy Pelosi were filmed sitting together on a love seat, with the Capitol in the background, discussing climate change. Gingrich says “we do agree our country must take action to address climate change.” Gingrich now says he regrets having made the commercial.

Today, someone’s party affiliation is the best predictor of whether they believe climate change is a problem. A large majority of Democrats are concerned. About 25% of Republicans say they are concerned.

### AT Repubs Care about change

#### Repubs say they care about sustainability but they don’t in practice.

Reints 9/24 (Renae Reints (political journalist) “Sustainability Is Bipartisan—Until It Comes to Oil, Survey Finds” 9/24/19. <https://fortune.com/2019/09/24/climate-change-sustainability-survey/>. Accessed 19 Oct. 2019. LHSLA LH

The current White House has made every effort to rollback Obama-era environmental protections and rebuff calls to action around climate change, but such moves may not be the will of the administration's entire Republican base.

A new survey—conducted by Genomatica, an environmentally conscious bioengineering firm—found sustainability is valued on both sides of the aisle, with 70% of Republicans and 80% of Democrats saying sustainability is important. Just more than 60% of Republicans also said burning fossil fuels is a major contributor to climate change, a belief held by 93% of Democrats.

When it came to addressing the use of such fuels in everyday life, however, the divide between the parties widened. Nearly half of Republicans (48%) denied using crude oil to make products is a major contributor to climate change, compared to 22% of Democrats who held this belief.

Part of living sustainably—aside from the usual calls for less energy waste and more public transportation—is being a conscious consumer. Many people, however, don't know that the 8.3 billion metric tons of plastic humans have produced over the years are sourced partially from the distillation of crude oil, a process that can release harmful pollutants into the air and water.

Genomatica's survey found 34% of the U.S. adults surveyed this summer didn’t know that plastic bags are made from crude oil-based ingredients. More than 40% didn't realize such ingredients are in face moisturizer, too.

Despite both parties strongly supporting sustainability, the study found Democrats are more likely than Republicans to be bothered by oil-based ingredients in their products. Democrats were also more than twice as likely as Republicans to say it's extremely important for the U.S. to reduce its oil consumption (41% versus 20%).

Democrats, however, are no more likely to have reduced their oil consumption over the past year, a point likely related to the fact 42% say the responsibility to reduce consumption lies with the government. Just 26% of Republicans held this stance.

# Impact

# Aff Answers

## Links/Internals

### No PC

#### No PC cost to carbon tax.

Umair Irfan, 5-17-2019, "Fossil fuels are underpriced by a whopping $5.2 trillion," Vox, https://www.vox.com/2019/5/17/18624740/fossil-fuel-subsidies-climate-imf

And so far, no country has achieved what Coady and other economists would consider an optimal price on fossil fuels. The emissions that are priced are often given a value far below their impact on the world.∂ That said, pricing carbon dioxide is one of the easier fixes in combating climate change. It’s a matter of policy, not inventing a whole new energy system. And in terms of expending political capital, ending handouts to a sector that’s harming the planet might be an easier sell.

### Not Divisive

#### We control link uniqueness—fossil fuel policy isn’t divisive among voters.

Bad card b/c about voters not congress

Jeff Turrentine, 2-22-2019, "The Political Divide on Coal vs. Renewables Is Fake News," NRDC, <https://www.nrdc.org/onearth/political-divide-coal-vs-renewables-fake-news>. Accessed 19 Oct. 2019. LHSLA LH

But this last line of defense—“Renewables may be all the rage in San Francisco or Seattle or wherever, but where I come from, the people still love coal and always will”—may not be effective for much longer. Two recently released reports show how public sentiment regarding coal and renewables has shifted dramatically in recent years. One of them looks at attitudes at the national level; the other explores them in the historically coal-friendly state of Ohio. Both spell trouble for the future of an industry that’s already, by nearly all accounts, on its last legs.

Support/opposition for phasing out all coal-fueled power plants, fall 2017

NSEE/University of Michigan and Muhlenberg College

The University of Michigan’s National Surveys on Energy and Environment (NSEE) is a biannual survey of public opinion surrounding issues of climate and energy policy, providing perhaps the best snapshot we could ever hope for in regard to how Americans stand on subjects like coal, renewables, climate science, geoengineering, a carbon tax, and a host of other climate-related topics. Late last year, to commemorate its 10th anniversary of publication, NSEE released a trove of reports that illustrate just how much public opinion has changed on these matters over the past decade.

One of them in particular should strike fear into the hearts of the coal industry’s dead-enders and spark joy in the hearts of the rest of us. It shows that between 2016 and 2017, the number of Americans who strongly support a coal phaseout increased 11 percentage points, from 18 percent to 29 percent. In that same one-year period, the number of Americans who oppose a phaseout fell by the same amount. Remarkably, in states with active coal mines, strong support for a phaseout rose even more: by 13 points. Just as remarkably, this trend seemed to cut across political lines, rising among Democrats, independents, and Republicans. Among the last group, strong support for a phaseout actually increased by 5 percentage points, whereas the number of Republicans who strongly oppose it fell by 14 points.

Agree/disagree on various potential benefits of renewable energy

NSEE/University of Michigan and Muhlenberg College

Another NSEE report provides a perfect complement. As more Americans announce their willingness to say goodbye to coal, they’re also saying hello to the opportunity presented by renewables. This report reveals that 88 percent of Americans are in favor of increasing the use of solar energy in their state, and 82 percent feel the same about wind energy. Here, too, there’s real bipartisan buy-in, with 79 percent of self-identified Republicans getting behind solar and 72 percent getting behind wind. What’s more, the numbers show that a sizable majority of Republican, Democratic, and independent respondents support requiring and/or subsidizing renewable energy production at the state level. Nearly two-thirds of Republicans surveyed—64 percent—said they like the idea of a state renewable energy requirement; even more amazingly, 65 percent of them said they have no problem with boosting the nascent renewables sector through subsidies.

But an even more eye-opening poll is making news too. An organization with a somewhat eyebrow-raising name, the Ohio Conservative Energy Forum, released the results of a survey last week suggesting that support for renewables is no longer a politically exploitable issue. In a survey of 400 Ohioans who self-identify as conservative, two-thirds of respondents said they believe their state needs to diversify its energy portfolio by having at least half of its energy come from renewable sources. Nearly the same percentage of respondents said they were more—not less—likely to support a politician who voted for or otherwise expressed support for renewable energy or energy efficiency legislation. Ohio, just as a reminder, currently ranks 11th in coal production among U.S. states, and its coal industry directly or indirectly supports about 33,000 jobs. It also ranks fourth among states in coal consumption.

For too long, it’s been too easy for lawmakers and administration officials to claim that by kowtowing to the coal industry’s wishes, they were simply doing right by voters. It’s getting harder. The gap between the interests of average Americans and the interests of coal-company executives is getting wider every day. And solar and wind are wedging their way in.

#### Republican congressmen support green energy.

Nichola Groom, 5-2-2018, "Clean energy sector swings Republican with U.S. campaign donations," U.S., <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-solar/clean-energy-sector-swings-republican-with-u-s-campaign-donations-idUSKBN1I31DZ>. Accessed 19 Oct. 2019. LHSLA LH

(Reuters) - U.S. solar and wind energy companies have donated far more money to Republicans than Democrats in congressional races this election cycle, according to a Reuters analysis of campaign finance data, an unprecedented tilt to the right for an industry long associated with the environmental left.

FILE PHOTO - U.S. President Donald Trump applauds in front of U.S. Vice President Mike Pence (L) and Speaker of the House U.S. Rep. Paul Ryan (R-WI) during his first State of the Union address to a joint session of Congress inside the House Chamber on Capitol Hill in Washington, U.S., January 30, 2018. REUTERS/Win McNamee/Pool

While the money is modest compared with that donated by fossil fuel interests, the support provides GOP candidates with added credibility on clean energy, an issue polling shows swing voters care about.

Renewable energy has typically depended on government subsidies and policies to help fuel its growth, and the donations come at a time when Republicans control both houses of Congress as well as a majority of state houses across the country. Republicans have so far left subsidies for the industry largely intact.

ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT

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“We support those leaders who share our vision,” said Arthur Haubenstock, vice president of policy and strategy at 8minutenergy Renewables LLC, a California-based solar project developer, and treasurer of a newly formed employee-funded political action committee that shares the company’s name. So far, the PAC has donated only to Republicans.

Overall, political action committees representing solar and wind companies have donated nearly $400,000 to candidates and PACs in the 2018 election cycle, including $247,000 to Republicans, $139,300 to Democrats, and $7,500 to independents, according to the Reuters analysis.

That marks a record. During the 2016 presidential elections, the first cycle during which the clean energy industry gave more to the GOP than to Democrats, Republicans received just over half of the combined $695,470 in political contributions from major wind and solar PACs.

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Before that, solar and wind companies mainly donated to Democrats, who were broadly seen as more supportive of policies that could help the nascent sector grow. In 2014, 70 percent of the contributions from seven major wind and solar PACs went to Democrats.

The U.S. solar and wind industries have expanded greatly over the last decade and now employ some 300,000 workers nationwide, nearly six times more than coal mining. The hottest growth has been in states that voted heavily for President Donald Trump in 2016.

That has helped strengthen the industry’s appeal to Republican lawmakers, allowing it to rebrand as a jobs engine for the heartland, instead of as a tool for combating global warming, an issue that played better with Democrats.

“Solar is creating economic activity in so many districts,” said Abigail Ross Hopper, head of the Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA), whose donations have tilted heavily toward the GOP. Global warming “is certainly not our lead talking point,” she said.

SEIA has contributed more than twice as much to Republicans as to Democrats this cycle, $56,500 versus $26,700.

Prior to 2016, SEIA’s contributions to Democrats were reliably double what the group gave to Republicans. The American Wind Energy Association’s PAC, too, has shifted its giving. In 2014 it gave Democrats twice as much money as Republicans, while in the current cycle it has given $87,500 to Republicans compared to $67,500 for Democrats.

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SUPPORT FOR CLEAN ENERGY

Polls have found widespread support for renewable energy among voters, including among Republicans. Most recently, a Gallup poll from early March found 73 percent of adults favor an emphasis on alternatives like wind and solar over traditional fossil fuels. Just over half of Republicans - 51 percent - favored alternatives, compared with 88 percent of Democrats, Gallup said.

Among moderate Republicans and voters who lean Republican, there is even wider support for renewable energy. A poll conducted by Pew Research Center in early 2017 found that nearly two-thirds of that group favored alternative energy sources over fossil fuels.

The polls also found that attitudes toward clean energy are not necessarily linked to those about climate change. The Gallup poll, for instance, found just 35 percent of Republicans think climate change is caused by human activities, and 69 percent think the seriousness of global warming is exaggerated.

“Clean energy works every time and it doesn’t alienate the base,” said Jay Faison, Chief Executive of ClearPath, a group that aims to help elect Republicans supporting clean power. Independent-minded voters view support for alternative energy as a signal that a candidate is “not an errand boy for the party leadership,” he added.

Nevada incumbent Senator Dean Heller is among the chief Republican beneficiaries of support from the clean energy industry. His re-election effort has drawn more than $15,000 in backing from solar and wind this election cycle.

Nevada ranks fourth in the nation in solar installations and generates more than 11 percent of its electricity from the sun. One in every 203 people is employed by the solar industry in Nevada, putting it second only to ultra-green California.

Heller told Reuters he supports clean energy because of the jobs it has brought to his state. Nevada has been able to attract employers like Tesla, he said, in part because its abundant sunshine can produce renewable power for factories and other business operations.

#### All voters oppose subsidies—republicans won’t make the aff a big deal.

Yale Program on Climate Change Communication, 2-14-2012, "Do Americans Support or Oppose Subsidies For Fossil Fuels?," <https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/publications/do-americans-support-or-oppose-subsidies-for-fossil-fuels/LHSLA> LH

As of November 2011, a large majority of Americans (70%) also opposed federal subsidies for the fossil fuel industry (coal, oil, and natural gas), including majorities of Republicans, Democrats, and Independents:



#### Framing climate change as a human issue, not a political one solves divide.

Bill Blancato Guest Columnist, 10-18-2019, "Bill Blancato: Is climate change partisan?," Winston-Salem Journal, https://www.journalnow.com/opinion/columnists/bill-blancato-is-climate-change-partisan/article\_c9196ebd-780b-5363-ac5a-d52373b9a838.html

The good news is that there’s a place where this partisan divide doesn’t exist, where climate change is discussed as a human issue, not a political one. On Oct. 23 and 24, Winston-Salem conservatives, climate change skeptics and everyone else have a rare opportunity to hear a nonpartisan overview of the science behind climate change, how it affects us personally and its impacts on the economy, jobs, national security and our health. And, you can have your climate change questions answered without judgment.

But first, some history to underscore just how curious this partisan divide really is. Carbon dioxide was discovered to be a greenhouse gas by American Eunice Foote in 1856 and confirmed by Irishman John Tyndall in 1859. In 1896, Swedish scientist and Nobel laureate Svante Arrhenius predicted burning fossil fuels would increase CO2 levels in the atmosphere and cause global warming. Arrhenius also determined the atmosphere acts like a blanket, trapping heat from the sun. (If the atmosphere did not trap heat, our planet would be about 60° F cooler than it is.) There is no record of whether Eunice Foote was a Republican or Democrat. She was just trying to advance scientific knowledge, as were Tyndall and Arrhenius.

In 2006, Kathleen Biggins started looking at climate change with the same nonpartisan curiosity that led Eunice Foote to do her experiments. To better understand this complex subject, instead of going to typical “green” sources, she sought out business people and members of the military, as well as scientists. She also looked at the opportunities that addressing climate change presents and spoke with conservatives about their concerns.

Then Kathleen founded C-Change Conversations, a nonprofit dedicated to promoting nonpartisan discussion about climate change. With climate change communications experts she developed the C-Change Primer, a presentation that focuses on answering five questions: (1) how do we know climate change is real, (2) how do we know humans are causing it, (3) what do scientists think, (4) is it dangerous, and (5) is there hope?

The primer has been enthusiastically received by audiences across the political spectrum and throughout the country. Kathleen will present the primer at 5:30 p.m. on Oct. 23 at the Central Library downtown and at 12:15 p.m. on Oct. 24 at St. Paul’s Episcopal Church. The events are free and open to the public.

Why attend? Nonpartisan presentations and dialogue like the primer are critical to solving problems. Effective, lasting solutions are developed when people with diverse knowledge, skills and concerns collaborate. Solutions to climate change depend on a sound understanding of the relevant factors which, for climate change, means science, economics and an understanding of the risks.

The partisan divide on climate science is bad, but not hopeless. Rep. Virginia Foxx (R-NC) has said, “We must ensure clean air, clean water, and a healthy, safe environment based on science.” A basic understanding of climate science, including potential impacts on the economy and national security, is critical for policymakers and those who think we should or should not take measures to address the perceived threat. Making good policy is difficult if there is disagreement about whether or not there is a problem.

We live in a republican democracy. The First Amendment guarantees our right “to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” Our rights to vote and to tell our elected officials what we think are what has made America the most powerful nation in history, because they promote collaboration to solve critical problems. Just as our elected officials need to be knowledgeable, we also need sound information to inform our votes and how we petition our representatives.

If you are interested in learning about climate change, its risks and how conservative principles can be applied to address it, I encourage you to attend the C-Change Primer events. You can learn more at c-changeconversations.org.

# Stolen Stuff

# USMCA Politics

## Neg

### --A/T: Mexico/Canada Block

#### Mexico passed it---and Canada is expected to as well---it’s all up to the US.

Lopez 6-19 --- Miguel Angel Lopez, Reuters ("Mexico first to ratify USMCA trade deal, Trump presses U.S....," 6-19-2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-mexico-usmca/mexico-first-to-ratify-usmca-trade-deal-trump-presses-us-congress-to-do-same-idUSKCN1TK2U3, accessed 6-20-2019)

MEXICO CITY (Reuters) - Mexico on Wednesday became the first country to ratify the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) agreed late last year to replace the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) at the behest of U.S. President Donald Trump. By a vote of 114 in favor to 4 against, Mexico’s Senate backed the deal tortuously negotiated between 2017 and 2018 after Trump repeatedly threatened to withdraw from NAFTA if he could not get a better trade agreement for the United States. Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador had already anticipated ratification this week in the Senate, where his leftist National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) and its allies have a comfortable majority in the 128-member chamber. There has been little parliamentary opposition in Mexico to trying to safeguard market access to United States, by far Mexico’s top export destination, and the trade deal was approved with overwhelming cross-party support in the Senate. Mexico sends around 80% of its exports to the United States, and Trump last month vowed to impose tariffs on all Mexican goods if Lopez Obrador does not reduce the flow of U.S.-bound illegal immigration from Central America. Lopez Obrador says he wants to avoid conflict with Trump, but noted at the weekend that the tariff dispute showed Mexico needed to become more economically self-sufficient. Trump congratulated Lopez Obrador on Twitter for Mexico’s approval. “Time for Congress to do the same here!” he wrote. Lopez Obrador, meanwhile, posted a video on Twitter in which he called the Senate’s approval “very good news” and said it augured well for Mexico’s relations with the United States. Canada, which has also fought with Trump over trade, is pressing ahead to ratify the deal. The main question mark hanging over its ratification is in the United States, where Democratic lawmakers have threatened to block the process.

#### Trump admin is pushing and Mexico & Canada on board.

Cassella & Restuccia 5-30 --- Megan Cassella and Andrew Restuccia, ("Trump administration makes major push for Congress to pass new NAFTA," 5-30-2019, POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/30/trump-administration-nafta-congress-1348431, accessed 6-16-2019)

Vice President Mike Pence told reporters earlier Thursday during a trip to Ottawa that the administration is "working earnestly" to wrap the process up before the fall. "I can assure you that the president and I are working with members of the United States Congress to pass the USMCA — and to pass the USMCA this summer," Pence said during a news conference after a meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. The White House's move also backs up actions that its North American trading partners have taken this week to move the deal toward approval in their respective countries. Mexico took the first steps to ratify the new North American pact in its Senate on Thursday, while Canada introduced a bill earlier this week to implement the deal.

### PC Key

#### Political Capital is key to getting Dems on board with USMCA

McLARTY ASSOCIATES ’18 (Consulting Firm Specializing in International Trade, “How a Divided Congress Could Affect Trade,” 11/7, https://maglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/midterms-impact-on-trade-memo-nov-7-2018.pdf)ww

Trump and Lighthizer believe that the USMCA’s labor and environmental provisions, the inclusion of wage-levels as a component of Rules of Origin, and the limitation of ISDS should contribute to Democratic support of the agreement, expected to move forward under TPA rules for congressional approval in March 2019. Certainly, Democrats and Republicans began to grasp the downside of walking away from the integrated North American market during the 13 months of NAFTA renegotiations. However, trade votes are always difficult for Democrats, to say nothing of a Trump-branded agreement. Hard-to-ignore labor unions and environmental groups are already agitating for additional concessions. Both to pressure for passage and to show strength, it is possible that President Trump would withdraw from the agreement next year under NAFTA Article 2205, starting a 6- month clock after which the United States may exit the deal. The stark choice between blowing up intertwined North American supply chains and taking a hard trade vote should push Congress to approve USMCA, though with some drama attached. House Democrats are already foreshadowing an effort to revive/reinforce the types of commitments made in the bipartisan “May 10th Agreement” from 2007, which gave Democrats cover to vote on Bush-era FTAs. Representative Levin (R-MI), an original May 10 co-author, has stated, “The challenge became to take the clear language in May 10, which was a breakthrough, and make it real.” This will take time and political capital. But as US farmers and ranchers continue to suffer under 232 and 301 retaliatory tariffs, preserving free trade in North America should be a (reluctant) priority of most lawmakers, despite intense political pressure. Republican control of the Senate should help.

#### Political Capital key to getting a vote

ARNOLD & PORTER ’18 (Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP; “Trade Policy in Congress After the 2018 Election,” 11/5, https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2018/11/preelection-trade-analysis?utm\_source=Mondaq&utm\_medium=syndication&utm\_campaign=View-Original)ww

Writing before the mid-term election results are in, we anticipate that President Donald J. Trump will continue to aggressively pursue his original campaign pledge to rebalance relationships with key US trading partners. Whichever party controls either chamber of Congress, President Trump will likely continue pushing the boundaries of Executive authority to pursue policy objectives unilaterally. The President will not, however, be able to ignore Congress entirely. President Trump will quickly need the new Congress for legislation to implement the US – Mexico – Canada (USMCA) trade agreement. This is a key policy objective for President Trump, and was a leading campaign promise in 2016. Yet, Congressional approval of the deal is far from certain, regardless of which party controls the House and Senate. The President and his team will have to expend significant political capital to move the USMCA through Congress. Similarly, President Trump will need Congressional support to implement any bilateral trade agreements the Administration negotiates with the United Kingdom (UK), the European Union (EU), and other sovereign nations in the next two years. But, because trade does not cut along party lines, President Trump's disruptive trade policies could find allies and opponents on both sides of the aisle.

#### Trump’s political capital is key to passage

ADAIR ’18 (Andrew C.; J.D., “The Week in Washington — Trump Delivers on Trade, Supreme Court, Amid Collateral Damage,” 10/8, http://www.dc-berlin.com/the-week-in-washington-trump-delivers-on-trade-supreme-court-amid-collateral-damage/)ww

The business community, members of Congress, and America’s trading partners spent last week digesting the 1,800-page text of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) — drafted to replace the existing North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States, Mexico, and Canada. Although the USMCA preserves NAFTA’s tariff-free trade on a wide range of items, it also includes substantial changes to key areas for German business — most notably to the rules for automotive goods. The parties also created new rules for industries that have substantially matured since 1994 (e.g. biologic drugs, and digital commerce). And the agreement sends important signals to China, by restricting currency manipulation, and discouraging the parties from forming free-trade agreements with non-market countries. In order to come into force, Congress, as well as the legislatures of both Canada and Mexico, must approve it. Of primary importance to German automakers and suppliers, the deal will change the rules of origin for automotive goods. To qualify for duty-free treatment, cars must contain 75 percent regional content, and 40 percent of the labor must come from workers earning a wage of at least $16 per hour (these requirements would be phased in over a five-year period). Car makers must also source 70 percent of their steel and aluminum from the USMCA bloc. The agreement also strengthens labor standards. The Trump Administration extracted these concessions — primarily from Mexico — through the threat of tariffs on cars and auto parts; in fact the final deal includes side letters to both Canada and Mexico, in which the U.S. promises to exempt from punitive automotive tariffs the first 2.6 million passenger cars from each country annually. The new rules of origin and quotas would almost definitely impact the global German automakers with production facilities in Mexico (principally BMW, Daimler, and VW) as well as the suppliers (Continental and Bosch). John Bozzella of the Association of Global Automakers predicted that USMCA would cause “adjustments in the supply chain, and adjustments in the manufacturing footprint,” but it’s “too early to tell” exactly how. He added that the USMCA is “more complex than the [agreement] that it would replace.” BDI head Joachim Lang agreed that it is too soon to tell exactly what the impact will be on German industry. Trump held a White House press conference on Monday, October 1, where he and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer both described the USMCA — and particularly the new American strategy of using tariffs as leverage to extract concessions — as a preview of what Europe and other trading partners should expect. Lighthizer called the deal a “paradigm shifting model” that will “serve as a template for our trade agreements under the Trump Administration in the future.” Trump said openly that “without tariffs, we wouldn’t be talking about a deal.” During the press event, Trump highlighted the ongoing dialogue between the E.U. and U.S. with a mixture of both praise and provocation. He brought up the new talks as an example of a “successful negotiation,” but one that never would have begun without his threat to levy “a tax of 20 percent on the millions of Mercedes and BMWs.” He also described President Jean-Claude Juncker as a “great businessperson.” The European Union likely expects Trump to propose similar upper limits on imports of cars and auto parts during the current transatlantic negotiation, just as he did with Mexico and Canada — which it may be willing to accept, if set high enough. U.S. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross said that Trump may also push the E.U. and others to swallow other USMCA provisions — for example language discouraging it from forming a free-trade deal with China. This may be a bigger challenge. Notably, the USMCA does not resolve the fate of Trump’s worldwide steel and aluminum tariffs on Canada and Mexico (imposed on May 31 and which prompted Canada to retaliate with tariffs on $12.8 billion in U.S. exports, and Mexico to retaliate with tariffs on $3 billion in American exports). Lighthizer told a Senate panel in July that a revised NAFTA would include lifting the tariffs on metals from both nations, but on Monday he said that it would occur in a later phase of negotiations. For many American industries, the future benefit of USMCA will not make up for the ongoing burden of Canadian and Mexican retaliation. We continue to believe that the USMCA faces a steep climb in Congress. Senator John Cornyn (R-Texas), the second ranking Senate Republican, spoke positively about the agreement on the Senate floor, but said on Wednesday that passing legislation to implement the deal would be “an uphill fight.” Other key lawmakers have reacted with a mix of guarded optimism and skepticism. Republicans such as Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) are suggesting that Congress push to approve an implementing bill during the “lame duck” window between the midterm election and January 3, 2019. This would mean that Congress would have to pass the bill in December — after the deal is signed on November 30, but likely before the required economic impact statement of the deal is finished. This would be an unprecedented move and would likely mean that the bill would pass on a partisan vote. Ultimately, we believe that Trump will need to expend significant time and political capital with Democrats in order for the agreement to ever pass Congress.

#### PC is key to navigate difficult terrain.

Leonard 18—Jenny, Bloomberg, “Trump’s combative side poses risk as Democrats hold key to USMCA” December 6, 2018 <https://www.farmprogress.com/farm-policy/trump-s-combative-side-poses-risk-democrats-hold-key-usmca>

At stake for the president and American lawmakers is the fate of a trading bloc with about $1 trillion in annual shipments that’s lifted some industries while decimating the workers in others. For Democrats in particular, the deal provides an opening to demand concessions that favor unions and include a possible infrastructure investment package. “There’s no question that there is a path to passage,” said Edward Alden, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “The key for Democrats is whether the labor unions are prepared at least not to oppose the USMCA. Without active labor opposition, there will be a significant group of Democrats prepared to vote for this.” Fractious Politics Signed in Buenos Aires on Nov. 30 after more than a year of intense negotiations, USMCA is the biggest achievement in Trump’s trade agenda and its survival depends on whether the president can steer the agreement through fractious domestic politics. Even though it’s been signed by all three countries, it still must be ratified by each nation’s legislature -- and particularly in the U.S., that’s where it can go sideways. U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer has the tough task of convincing his boss that he needs to exercise patience with lawmakers who eventually must approve his deal but are requiring changes. Lighthizer doesn’t have much wiggle room to satisfy a wide range of concerns. He says he’s willing to address demands through the implementing bill that Congress will vote on, though he ruled out reopening the deal for negotiations.

### --A/T: No Trump PC

#### PC makes sense in the context of USMCA---Trump’s strategy is a by-the-book negotiation, which is working and demonstrates a political learning curve.

Rodriguez 19—3-7-2019 – Sabrina, “White House tries to charm Democrats on new NAFTA,” Politico, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/07/trump-nafta-democrats-1247064

The White House is engineering an unusually by-the-book approach for selling Congress on the replacement deal for NAFTA — with the hope of persuading Speaker Nancy Pelosi to hold a vote for the new trade agreement. Administration officials have been organizing dozens of meetings with rank-and-file lawmakers to try to build bipartisan support for the deal, which restructures trade terms with Canada and Mexico. They’re hoping to recapture the success of criminal justice reform legislation, which marked a rare high-point for White House-Hill relations and passed Congress last year following a monthslong behind-the-scenes campaign led by Jared Kushner. Their goal is to get a vote on the pact by late summer. But their efforts still may come to nothing: While Pelosi hasn’t yet staked out a definitive position on the agreement, factions of Democrats are already saying they’re not going to vote for it unless there are changes to key provisions, possibly requiring new negotiations with the two U.S. trading partners. Plus, Democrats and GOP lawmakers alike are telling the president they won’t consider the deal until he lifts lingering tariffs on steel and aluminum from Mexico and Canada. “Look, it’s going to be very hard to do this,” said Rep. Richard Neal, chairman of the influential House Ways and Means Committee. With few legislative options on the horizon, passing the new pact has taken an outsize importance for the administration, especially as Trump hones his reelection message. White House aides said they are aware that the divisive politics of the upcoming election could give Democrats incentive to reject it. In recent weeks, senior officials from the White House and the U.S. Trade Representative’s office have met with Ways and Means Committee members, the House GOP whip team, the Problem Solvers caucus, the Tuesday Group, the Hispanic Caucus and the Blue Dogs. Administration officials are planning to soon meet with the New Democrats, who are widely seen as a key coalition that will ultimately deliver Democratic votes for the deal. Kushner, the president’s son-in-law and senior adviser, is taking the lead in the White House and Deputy U.S. Trade Representative C.J. Mahoney is the point person at USTR, with Robert Lighthizer, the administration’s lead trade negotiator, regularly meeting with lawmakers about the issue. The strategy stands in stark contrast with many of the administration’s previous dealings with Capitol Hill, from the failed effort to repeal Obamacare to the tense negotiations over last year’s $1.3 trillion spending bill. Lawmakers and senior aides have long complained that the White House lacks a strategy for working with Congress and hasn't done enough to communicate with members, aside from a select group of Republicans who have won the president’s admiration.

### --Link Turns Case

#### The link takes out solvency.

Pierpont 10 – Senior Articles Editor, St. John's Law Review, J.D. Candidate, 2010, St. John's University School of Law (John, “CHECKING EXECUTIVE DISREGARD,” 84 St. John's L. Rev. 329, Lexis)---gender edited

Further, limited executive disregard raises entirely new policy arguments. Specifically, if after a President has had [their] veto overridden and [they] can still decline to enforce the statute, the role of the congressional override is greatly diminished. Congress simply has no recourse if a President objected to a bill on constitutional grounds and vetoed it. Even if Congress overrides [their] veto, the outcome would be the same - the President would decline to enforce the statute. Proponents of executive disregard hasten to point out that this duty to disregard is only triggered when the President truly feels a statute is unconstitutional, 159 but this provides little recourse for Congress, which can do nothing but hope a third party will challenge the President's nonenforcement. 160

### --floor time finite

#### Issues trade off---floor time is limited and congress must prioritize.

Heitshusen 13 – Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process (Valerie, 3/18/13, ‘The Legislative Process on the Senate Floor: An Introduction”, [http://www.senate.gov/CRSReports/crs-publish.cfm?pid=%26\*2D4Q%5CK3%0A](http://www.senate.gov/CRSReports/crs-publish.cfm?pid=%26*2D4Q%5CK3%0A))

The legislative process is laborious and time-consuming, and the time available for Senate floor action each year is limited. Every day devoted to one bill is a day denied for consideration of other legislation, and there are not enough days to act on all the bills that Senators and Senate committees wish to see enacted. Naturally, the time pressures become even greater with the approach of deadlines such as the date for adjournment and the end of the fiscal year. So, for all but the most important bills, even the threat of a filibuster can be a potent weapon. Before a bill reaches the floor or while it is being debated, its supporters often seek ways to accommodate the concerns of opponents, preferring an amended bill that can be passed without protracted debate to the time, effort, and risks involved in confronting a filibuster or the threat of one.

### 2NC Surprises Link

#### And, the plan sets off a series of issues – congress can’t focus on multiple issues, and *new*, *unexpected legislation* sets-off partisan fights that de-rail legislation.

Madonna et al 12 Anthony, Assistant Professor University of Georgia, et al Richard L. Vining Jr. Assistant Professor University of Georgia and James E. Monogan III Assistant Professor University of Georgia “Confirmation Wars and Collateral Damage: Assessing the Impact of Supreme Court Nominations on Presidential Success in the U.S. Senate,” pg online @ http://spia.uga.edu/faculty\_pages/ajmadonn/Presidential%20Capital.pdf

It is “often overlooked” that presidents “operate in a world they do not control” (Beckmann 2010, 13). Supreme Court vacancies yield important (and often unexpected) additions to the president’s “to do” list. Despite the president’s power to influence the legislative agenda and achieve confirmation for his judicial nominees, unanticipated exogenous shocks can distract from these priorities. These events divert lawmakers’ efforts to new concerns at the expense of preexisting agenda items. Exogenous shocks cost president’s time, resources, and attention previously devoted to other endeavors. We theorize that Supreme Court vacancies and the nominations that follow function as exogenous shocks to the presidential agenda and influence success in both the legislative arena and the lower court confirmation process.8 Political scientists have established that exogenous events influence presidential success, but their interest has been devoted primarily to major domestic or national security crises (Beckmann 2010; Lebo and Cassino 2007). Those events often, but not always, demand immediate and ongoing attention. Despite the substantive differences between Supreme Court nominations and other types of exogenous events, we argue that they share many of their characteristics. Once a Supreme Court justice leaves office or declares her intention to do so, the president is responsible for selecting her successor. The vetting and confirmation processes require presidents’ attention and time, both of which are scarce goods for political elites (Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Oppenheimer 1985). The amount of time and political capital spent on a Supreme Court nominee is largely dependent on the ideology of the president and key legislators (Johnson and Roberts 2004, 2005). Presidents want to select nominees in line with their own ideological preferences, but must take into account the preferences of key senators (Moraski and Shipan 1999). The statement by Senator Reid suggests that Supreme Court nominations can distract legislators despite rational selection behavior by presidents. As a result, Supreme Court nominees can occupy time that would be allocated to different priorities. Time is a valuable commodity in the Senate. Its value has increased as the number of bills introduced has grown, obstruction has become commonplace, and party polarization has increased. In other words, senatorial time has been filled by two major sources: the sheer volume of bills (many of which are trivial but must be considered) and more extensive time spent debating the bills that are controversial. Eventually, these increased demands on the time of Congress have policy consequences because sessions expire before important legislation can be considered and passed (Oppenheimer 1985). Majority party leadership in the Senate lacks the ability to issue restrictive floor rules and small groups or individuals from either party can obstruct the legislative process. Despite the presence of a cloture rule allowing three-fifths of the chamber to end debate, incidents of obstruction have increased fairly dramatically in the latter half of the twentieth century (Binder 1997; Koger 2010; Wawro and Schickler 2004, 2006). Even when the Senate majority can muster a supermajority for cloture, the process is still fairly time consuming. The vote on a cloture petition can occur only after it lies over for two calendar days. Then, an additional 30 hours of debate and amending activity can occur before a final vote is taken on the measure. Given the large number of judicial nominations, moving cloture on all or many of them is untenable. As Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) noted in 2010, “there isn’t enough time in the world – the Senate world, at least – to move cloture on every one of these [judicial nominations]” (Wilson and Murray 2010).

### Key to Econ Ext

#### USMCA is key to the economy – trade boosts multiple critical sectors

Cox 19 --- Phil Cox, cochair of the Trade Works for America Coalition and a former executive director of the Republican Governors Association, ("Opinion: Trump's trade deal with Canada and Mexico is a huge win for Americans, and it's time for Congress to pass it," 5-31-2019, Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/opinion-congress-trump-usmca-canada-mexico-trade-deal-2019-5, accessed 6-16-2019)

Free trade is at the heart of the US economy. Each year, our companies sell more than $2.5 trillion worth of goods and services to customers around the world. Of those exports, nearly $300 billion worth of exports go to Mexico and another $360 billion worth go to Canada, two key markets for US enterprise. The importance of these markets is the reason the US entered into a trade agreement with our North American neighbors 25 years ago and why President Donald Trump and his administration signed a new deal, a better deal — the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA. And now it's time for Congress to reaffirm how important trade with Mexico and Canada is for the US economy and pass the USMCA. Our country recognizes the importance of these markets. A quarter of a century ago, the US entered into a trade agreement with our North American neighbors that helped to level the playing field and reduce barriers to trade for American job creators. But 25 years later, that trade agreement is no longer the best agreement for US businesses. That's why Trump and his administration signed the USMCA. As it goes in Washington, there are lawmakers on both sides of the aisle who are not 100% pleased with the agreement. To me, that means the Trump administration negotiated a balanced agreement that deserves support from all members of Congress. The USMCA updates the old agreement and ensures that American workers and families are put first. This is also a welcome agreement for industries that depend on free, fair, rules-based trade with Canada and Mexico. America's farmers, ranchers, auto manufacturers, and small businesses are set to gain once the USMCA is signed into law. According to the US International Trade Commission, the USMCA will create 176,000 US jobs and add over $68 billion to the US economy — that is, in addition to the 12 million jobs already in the US that are supported by trade with Canada and Mexico. This positive report suggests that pro-growth policies promoting free, fair, and enforceable trade are a win for American workers and job creators alike. Supporters of the USMCA recognize that this agreement contains provisions that will help make American job creators more competitive. For agriculture, those provisions provide increased access to Canadian dairy markets. For manufacturing, the USMCA establishes requirements that promote American-made cars and machinery as well as new worker protections to ensure American factory jobs do not get shipped overseas. The economic boost comes from a number of provisions in the USMCA that will help American businesses and consumers, including increased access to Canadian dairy markets for farmers and requirements that promote American-made cars and machinery for manufacturers. The USMCA also established new rules around e-commerce, making it easier for American small businesses to connect and sell to customers in Mexico and Canada. The USMCA is also a winning proposition for American innovators because it strengthens intellectual-property protections, alleviating worries about a competitor gaining access to their trade secrets.

#### USMCA key to the economy – IP protections

KERINS 6/12 (Raymond F., Jr.; chairman of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's Global Innovation Policy Center, “Mexico tariffs averted, USMCA back in bullseye,” https://www.foxbusiness.com/economy/mexico-tariffs-usmca-trade)ww

Congress will soon decide whether to ratify the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, the trade deal that would update NAFTA in several ways. Most importantly, the new pact would significantly strengthen intellectual property rights. It's hard to overstate the value of IP rights to America's economy. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office reports that IP-intensive industries account for 45.5 million U.S. jobs and more than $6 trillion in GDP. Without strong IP rights, the industries that enhance our lives would cease to function. Congress can set the stage for years of job creation and economic growth by ratifying the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). Innovation isn't cheap or easy. This is especially true in my industry of biopharmaceuticals. It costs an average of $2.6 billion and often takes more than a decade to develop just one new medicine. By patenting their drug designs, biopharmaceutical firms can prevent rivals from creating knockoff medicines for a limited time. That enables innovative firms to earn a return on investment and plow the revenues into new lines of research, leading to yet more innovation. Today, the biopharmaceutical sector supports 4.7 million American jobs and contributes more than $1.3 trillion a year to the economy -- none of which would be possible without our nation's strong IP protections. Other IP-intensive sectors have similarly impressive statistics. Copyright industries support 5.7 million jobs, while the tech industry employs 6.7 million. Importantly, these creative industries produce the majority of American exports, which help reduce the trade deficit. These sectors account for about $840 billion in merchandise exports and another $80 billion in service exports annually. The USMCA contains numerous intellectual property provisions. For instance, the deal would create a Committee on Intellectual Property Rights. Representatives from each country would work together to boost enforcement of IP rights and improve transparency in issues concerning trade secrets. That's a necessary reform to prevent IP theft. By one estimate, the sale of counterfeit American goods costs our economy $29 billion a year. Stolen trade secrets, meanwhile, cost businesses and workers $180 billion. The USMCA also includes critical protections for sophisticated drugs known as "biologics," which represent some of the most promising cures of the future. Policies like these will preserve the incentive for American individuals and companies to innovate and protect them from IP theft. American, Canadian, and Mexican leaders already finalized the terms of the USMCA back in November, but Congress hasn't yet approved the deal. There's little reason to wait. The USMCA would give the nation's most innovative and creative industries the security they need to create jobs and grow our economy. Passing it is a no-brainer.

#### Certainty and access to new markets.

Brilliant 19 --- Myron Brilliant, executive vice president and head of international affairs at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, (“US Chamber of Commerce executive: Why Approving USMCA is an urgent priority,” 6-14-2019, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/14/why-approving-usmca-is-an-urgent-priority-us-chamber-of-commerce-exec.html, accessed 6-16-2019)

Certainty. An early vote for USMCA will provide U.S. businesses from every sector—from agriculture to manufacturing and services—the certainty that their exports to Canada and Mexico will enter those markets duty-free. This certainty is invaluable because these two markets are invaluable to American business. U.S. trade with Canada and Mexico: Reached nearly [$1.4 trillion](https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/current_press_release/ft900.pdf) last year, or $3.8 billion daily; Supports [12 million American jobs](https://www.businessroundtable.org/policy-perspectives/trade-international/trade-with-canada-and-mexico) spread across every state in the union; Is vital for U.S. manufacturers, who [export more made-in-America manufactured goods to Canada and Mexico](https://www.uschamber.com/series/all-about-baseline-how-interpret-the-international-trade-commission-report-usmca) than they do to the next 11 largest export markets combined; Accounts for nearly [one-third of U.S. agricultural exports](https://www.usmcacoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/023607_INTL-USMCA-Coalition_Onepager_final.pdf); and Powered growth in U.S. services exports from $27 billion in 1993 to $91 billion in 2017. Certainty is what American job-creators require if they are to make brick-and-mortar investments and create more jobs for the long haul. Growth. USMCA isn’t just about holding on to what you’ve got. USMCA will boost economic growth by improving the market access guaranteed for U.S. businesses. For example, the agreement further opens the Canadian market to U.S. agricultural exports such as dairy products, poultry, and wine. U.S. farmers and ranchers have faced five years of declining commodity prices, so USMCA’s improved market access is more than welcome. And make no mistake: These are growth markets. U.S. exports to Mexico and Canada have grown more over the past decade than sales to any other country. In each case, exports have expanded by more than $100 billion annually. No other market comes close. In fact, Mexico and Canada accounted for about 40% of the growth in U.S. goods exports in dollar terms over the past decade. In particular, USMCA promises growth for America’s small and midsized exporters. Canada and Mexico are the top two export destinations for U.S. small and medium-size enterprises, more than 120,000 of which sell their goods and services in our two North American neighbors. When an American small business starts exporting, it’s almost always to Canada or Mexico.

#### Key to the economy---digital trade.

Holding 19 --- George Holding, represents North Carolina’s 2nd District. Mr. Holding serves on the Ways and Means Subcommittees on Trade and Health, ("Delay of new trade deal harms America's digital advantage," 6-10-2019, TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/448711-oberlin-college-case-shows-how-universities-are-losing-their-way, accessed 6-16-2019)

Today, nearly six out of 10 American jobs created by exports of digital services are jobs outside the tech industry. Sectors like agriculture, health care, and manufacturing make up a large part of the 5 million total jobs and $1.35 trillion in annual productivity of the digital economy, according to the Internet Association. As a result, it is now more important than ever to ensure the rules of the road on the digital highway are modernized and clear. That’s why [President Trump](https://thehill.com/people/donald-trump) and U.S. Trade Ambassador [Robert Lighthizer](https://thehill.com/people/robert-bob-lighthizer) spent countless hours negotiating the creation of a new “digital chapter” in the updated proposed trade agreement with Mexico and Canada – the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (USMCA). The USMCA includes a host of new benefits for American workers, families, and the economy. And the changes impacting the digital economy are among the most important. It will, for the first time, prohibit the imposition of customs duties, fees, or other charges on digital products traded electronically. It will also safeguard cross-border data flows. USMCA is the first trade agreement to ensure the free flow of data for all sectors. Businesses of all sizes, across all sectors, will benefit from the free and safe flow of information. The trade pact prohibits data localization requirements that force businesses to use or locate computing facilities in a specific country or territory as a condition for conducting business. Additionally, USMCA streamlines customs processes to support e-commerce. As the digital economy continues to evolve and grow, modernizing the mechanics of how goods flow between countries in North America is critical. The new agreement will help speed the growth of e-commerce. Finally, as this sector continues to evolve and expand, enhanced data protection becomes even more important. The proposed agreement encourages, for the first time, data privacy and cybersecurity collaboration. USMCA requires all three countries to adopt measures to comply with each other’s data privacy laws. USMCA also promotes a collaborative, risk-based approach and adoption of industry best practices to keep networks and services secure. These new digital provisions and protections are both timely and important. A lot has changed in the 25 years since NAFTA was signed into law. Back then, folks didn’t have cell phones, internet access required a dial-up connection, and movies had to be rented in VHS format. Today, we live in an interconnected world driven by rapidly evolving digital technologies and capabilities. We do our work on lightning-fast computers, interact through mobile phones, and buy goods with a single click. These changes have benefited workers and consumers across every sector. It has created countless jobs and grown wages, all while improving Americans’ day-to-day lives. It has made it easier for farmers to find customers, leading to increased revenue and production. It has overhauled logistics entirely, empowering manufacturers across the country to be able to expand and grow, and it is even forcing health care providers to adapt to new standards. Imagine the potential if we can make our digital economy even more competitive on a global scale – making our products more affordable while simultaneously expanding markets for our local job creators. That is what USMCA sets out to achieve. And that’s why the agreement’s new digital provisions are so important. Yet, unfortunately, USMCA is currently being held hostage by the partisan political circus in Washington. Delaying approval of the trade pact hits the pocketbooks of the workers and families in North Carolina and across the nation. Folks across all sectors – from farmers and factory floor workers to programmers and engineers – are losing out. Far too much hangs in the balance. USMCA will lead to more jobs, larger paychecks, and cheaper prices for American consumers. It provides a much-needed foundation for the expansion of free and fair digital trade and investment in innovative products and services. And it creates a framework for a cutting edge, 21st-century economy. It’s time for Washington to buck up and get this agreement over the finish line. We have before us a once in a generation opportunity to define a new global standard in digital trade, one that positions the United States as the world leader in the digital economy. We can’t afford to let it slip away.

### Econ Impact Ext

#### Slow growth encourages revisionism---great power war.

Drezner 16 (Daniel, Professor of International Politics, Tufts; Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings, May 2016, “Five Known Unknowns about the Next Generation Global Political Economy”, Project on International Order and Strategy at Brookings, <http://www.anamnesis.info/sites/default/files/D_Drezner_2016.pdf>)

Geopolitical ambitions could reduce economic interdependence even further.120 Russia and China have territorial and quasi-territorial ambitions beyond their recognized borders, and the United States has attempted to counter what it sees as revisionist behavior by both countries. In a low-growth world, it is possible that leaders of either country would choose to prioritize their nationalist ambitions over economic growth. More generally, it could be that the expectation of future gains from interdependence—rather than existing levels of interdependence—constrains great power bellicosity.121 If great powers expect that the future benefits of international trade and investment will wane, then commercial constraints on revisionist behavior will lessen. All else equal, this increases the likelihood of great power conflict going forward.

#### Trump is a unique risk---psychology proves.

Foster 16—Professor of international studies and political science at the Virginia Military Institute [Dennis, “Would President Trump go to war to divert attention from problems at home?” The Washington Post, 19 Dec, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/19/yes-trump-might-well-go-to-war-to-divert-attention-from-problems-at-home/?utm_term=.fd514cf55315>, accessed 28 Feb 2017]

If the U.S. economy tanks, should we expect Donald Trump to engage in a diversionary war? Since the age of Machiavelli, analysts have expected world leaders to launch international conflicts to deflect popular attention away from problems at home. By stirring up feelings of patriotism, leaders might escape the political costs of scandal, unpopularity — or a poorly performing economy. One often-cited example of diversionary war in modern times is Argentina’s 1982 invasion of the Falklands, which several (though not all) political scientists attribute to the junta’s desire to divert the people’s attention from a disastrous economy. In a 2014 article, Jonathan Keller and I argued that whether U.S. presidents engage in diversionary conflicts depends in part on their psychological traits — how they frame the world, process information and develop plans of action. Certain traits predispose leaders to more belligerent behavior. Do words translate into foreign policy action? One way to identify these traits is content analyses of leaders’ rhetoric. The more leaders use certain types of verbal constructs, the more likely they are to possess traits that lead them to use military force. For one, conceptually simplistic leaders view the world in “black and white” terms; they develop unsophisticated solutions to problems and are largely insensitive to risks. Similarly, distrustful leaders tend to exaggerate threats and rely on aggression to deal with threats. Distrustful leaders typically favor military action and are confident in their ability to wield it effectively. Thus, when faced with politically damaging problems that are hard to solve — such as a faltering economy — leaders who are both distrustful and simplistic are less likely to put together complex, direct responses. Instead, they develop simplistic but risky “solutions” that divert popular attention from the problem, utilizing the tools with which they are most comfortable and confident (military force). Based on our analysis of the rhetoric of previous U.S. presidents, we found that presidents whose language appeared more simplistic and distrustful, such as Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower and George W. Bush, were more likely to use force abroad in times of rising inflation and unemployment. By contrast, John F. Kennedy and Bill Clinton, whose rhetoric pegged them as more complex and trusting, were less likely to do so. What about Donald Trump? Since Donald Trump’s election, many commentators have expressed concern about how he will react to new challenges and whether he might make quick recourse to military action. For example, the Guardian’s George Monbiot has argued that political realities will stymie Trump’s agenda, especially his promises regarding the economy. Then, rather than risk disappointing his base, Trump might try to rally public opinion to his side via military action. I sampled Trump’s campaign rhetoric, analyzing 71,446 words across 24 events from January 2015 to December 2016. Using a program for measuring leadership traits in rhetoric, I estimated what Trump’s words may tell us about his level of distrust and conceptual complexity. The graph below shows Trump’s level of distrust compared to previous presidents. These results are startling. Nearly 35 percent of Trump’s references to outside groups paint them as harmful to himself, his allies and friends, and causes that are important to him — a percentage almost twice the previous high. The data suggest that Americans have elected a leader who, if his campaign rhetoric is any indication, will be historically unparalleled among modern presidents in his active suspicion of those unlike himself and his inner circle, and those who disagree with his goals. As a candidate, Trump also scored second-lowest among presidents in conceptual complexity. Compared to earlier presidents, he used more words and phrases that indicate less willingness to see multiple dimensions or ambiguities in the decision-making environment. These include words and phrases like “absolutely,” “greatest” and “without a doubt.” A possible implication for military action I took these data on Trump and plugged them into the statistical model that we developed to predict major uses of force by the United States from 1953 to 2000. For a president of average distrust and conceptual complexity, an economic downturn only weakly predicts an increase in the use of force. But the model would predict that a president with Trump’s numbers would respond to even a minor economic downturn with an increase in the use of force. For example, were the misery index (aggregate inflation and unemployment) equal to 12 — about where it stood in October 2011 — the model predicts a president with Trump’s psychological traits would initiate more than one major conflict per quarter.

#### It’s an impact filter---US competitiveness underwrites global stability.

Daniel Bessner 17. \*Assistant Professor in American Foreign Policy, University of Washington. \*\* Jim MCDERMOTT, Representative for Washington’s 7th District. \*\*\* Francis WILSON, BA, International Studies, University of Washington. “Redefining American Leadership for an Internationalized Era.” The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington. Task Force Report. <https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/38693/TaskForceC-Bessner.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

America’s status as the world’s most vital nation is as **dependent on its prosperity** as it is on its military might and ability to project power worldwide. The federal **government’s capacity** to allocate resources to our armed forces, the **private sector’s** ability to develop beneficial products and technologies, and the satisfaction of the domestic public are all **closely tied** to the continued growth of American wealth at home and abroad. This has been proven repeatedly during periods where the United States has faced its greatest **existential threats**: Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan were unable to keep up with the sheer industrial output of the American heartland, while the Soviet Empire lost control of its satellites in great part due to their desire to benefit from the Western free market system.¶ Therefore, the formulation of a **long-term strategy** that anticipates the potential disruptions and opportunities of the new global economy is as important as questions of diplomacy and military strategy. As the United States evaluates how it will face the rapidly changing and increasingly interconnected world of the 21st century, it **must** take into account its **economic interests** as well as the potential economic costs associated with achieving its political objectives.¶ Since the beginning of the Cold War, America’s **unparalleled** ability to influence countries through nonviolent means has been critical to the **preservation of global stability**. The most relevant example of this in our history is the Marshall Plan, which leveraged American capital to provide a devastated post-War Europe with almost 120 billion dollars (adjusted for inflation) in aid. This aid was critical to preventing the spread of Soviet influence into Western Europe, and laid the foundation for an economically strong region stretching from Portugal to Austria that has been free from inter-state conflict since 1945. Because of the pragmatic exercise of economic influence, the European Union is now our strongest ally as well as our largest trading partner.¶ Worldwide, the liberal economic system that the United States has promoted through international trade organizations like the WTO has contributed to unprecedented economic cohesion between states. When countries are tied together in the mutually beneficial exchange of goods, the opportunity cost of war goes up significantly, making political leaders much more likely to de-escalate and rely on nonviolent means to resolve conflicts.¶ Our **economy** also plays a key role in helping the United States deal with states that threaten stability. The American ability to impose **sanctions** has been a **formidable tool** for discouraging **nuclear prolif**eration and punishing violators of international norms. When more direct means of coercion are required, a powerful industrial and technological base enables the maintenance of a well-funded and technologically advanced military.¶ America’s advanced 17 trillion-dollar economy has allowed it to exert the influence that it does in the world today. However, our economic strength and the skill of our workforce, which have always underwritten our international influence, **should not be taken for granted**. Rapid growth in the developing world means that American companies and workers must now contend in an increasingly crowded global marketplace. In the new “knowledge economy,” educating America’s workers and ensuring that the United States **retains its role as an innovation capital must take the highest priority**. On the business side, reforming America’s institutions and removing barriers to expansion and innovation will encourage the companies of the future to make their start here.

#### Economic dominance prevents global nuclear war.

Henricksen 17 --- Thomas H. Henricksen, emeritus senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Post-American World Order, 23 March 2017, https://www.hoover.org/research/post-american-world-order

The emergent world, divided between the United States, China, and Russia, points to the new global order. Particularly worrisome are the warming relations between Beijing and Moscow, despite Chinese designs on Siberian lands and resources. Overcoming a centuries-old rivalry, the recent Sino-Russian rapprochement compounds Washington’s difficulties. Separating Russia from China, as Kissinger and Nixon did, would be a sensible goal for President Trump. It has always been a wise recourse to divide one’s adversaries. Besides, the United States and Russia have worked together in the past. During the World War II, they collaborated against the Third Reich. And during the Cold War, they cooperated in nuclear arms treaties and wheat deals, while mutually trying to skirt a flashpoint that could end in a nuclear war. Washington can work to steer the Kremlin, as it has done before, toward acceptable conduct with its neighbors before Russia can be more than a tactical ally in the great game with China. In the immediate future, the United States can adopt international and domestic approaches to cope with Russian and Chinese territorial expansionism. The tensions stoked by the assertive regimes in the Kremlin or Tiananmen Square could spark a political or military incident that might set off a chain reaction leading to a large-scale war. Historically, powerful rivalries nearly always lead to at least skirmishes, if not a full-blown war. The anomalous Cold War era spared the United States and Soviet Russia a direct conflict, largely from concerns that one would trigger a nuclear exchange destroying both states and much of the world. Such a repetition might reoccur in the unfolding three-cornered geopolitical world. It seems safe to acknowledge that an ascendant China and a resurgent Russia will persist in their geo-strategic ambitions. What Is To Be Done? The first marching order is to dodge any kind of perpetual war of the sort that George Orwell outlined in “1984,” which engulfed the three super states of Eastasia, Eurasia, and Oceania, and made possible the totalitarian Big Brother regime. A long-running Cold War-type confrontation would almost certainly take another form than the one that ran from 1945 until the downfall of the Soviet Union. What prescriptions can be offered in the face of the escalating competition among the three global powers? First, by staying militarily and economically strong, the United States will have the resources to deter its peers’ hawkish behavior that might otherwise trigger a major conflict. Judging by the history of the Cold War, the coming strategic chess match with Russia and China will prove tense and demanding—since all the countries boast nuclear arms and long-range ballistic missiles. Next, the United States should widen and sustain willing coalitions of partners, something at which America excels, and at which China and Russia fail conspicuously. There can be little room for error in fraught crises among nuclear-weaponized and hostile powers. Short- and long-term standoffs are likely, as they were during the Cold War. Thus, the playbook, in part, involves a waiting game in which each power looks to its rivals to suffer grievous internal problems which could entail a collapse, as happened to the Soviet Union. Some Chinese and Russian experts predict grave domestic problems for each other. They also entertain similar thoughts about the United States, which they view as terminally decadent and catastrophically polarized over politics, ethnicity, and the future direction of the country. So, the brewing three-way struggle also involves a systemic contest, which will test the competitors’ economic and political institutions. At this juncture, the world is entering a standoff among the three great and several not-so-great powers. Averting war, while defending our interests, will prove a challenge, calling for deft policy, political endurance, and economic growth, as well as sufficient military force to keep at bay aggressive states or prevail over them if ever a war breaks out.

#### Global nuclear war.

Tønnesson 15—Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University [Stein, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, 2015, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311]

Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context: it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

### 2NC Trade Impact

#### Ratifying USMCA is critical to overall trade.

Brilliant 19 --- Myron Brilliant, executive vice president and head of international affairs at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, (“US Chamber of Commerce executive: Why Approving USMCA is an urgent priority,” 6-14-2019, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/14/why-approving-usmca-is-an-urgent-priority-us-chamber-of-commerce-exec.html, accessed 6-16-2019)

Precedent. USMCA’s path-breaking provisions will serve as a precedent for future trade agreements and provide benefits that will multiply in the years ahead—but only if Congress approves USMCA. For example, USMCA prohibits “behind the border” barriers against U.S. exports. Too often, foreign governments deploy regulations or standards in an arbitrary way to block imports. USMCA halts this kind of protectionism in disguise. USMCA also raises the bar with binding enforcement for all chapters. This includes labor and the environment, which were not subject to state-to-state dispute settlement under the NAFTA. The U.S. is beginning trade negotiations with Japan, the EU, and potentially other countries. Approving USMCA will allow these breakthroughs to serve as a precedent that will shape these agreements. The Trump administration negotiated a good deal with Canada and Mexico and it deserves to be approved without delay. Approving USMCA will provide job creators with the certainty they need to invest and hire, and the improved market access it promises will spur economic growth. It will modernize North American trade in ways that set a positive precedent for future trade talks. Each day that passes without approving USMCA is a day that these benefits are deferred. Let’s build on our momentum and seize these benefits.

#### US trade leadership solves global nuclear war.

Nouriel Roubini 17, professor at NYU’s Stern School of Business and Chairman of Roubini Macro Associates, was Senior Economist for International Affairs in the White House's Council of Economic Advisers during the Clinton Administration, 1/2/17, ““America First” and Global Conflict Next,” <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/trump-isolationism-undermines-peace-worldwide-by-nouriel-roubini-2017-01>

Trump, however, may pursue populist, anti-globalization, and protectionist policies that hinder trade and restrict the movement of labor and capital. And he has cast doubt on existing US security guarantees by suggesting that he will force America’s allies to pay for more of their own defense. If Trump is serious about putting “America first,” his administration will shift US geopolitical strategy toward isolationism and unilateralism, pursuing only the national interests of the homeland. When the US pursued similar policies in the 1920s and 1930s, it helped sow the seeds of World War II. Protectionism – starting with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, which affected thousands of imported goods – triggered retaliatory trade and currency wars that worsened the Great Depression. More important, American isolationism – based on a false belief that the US was safely protected by two oceans – allowed Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan to wage aggressive war and threaten the entire world. With the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the US was finally forced to take its head out of the sand. Today, too, a US turn to isolationism and the pursuit of strictly US national interests may eventually lead to a global conflict. Even without the prospect of American disengagement from Europe, the European Union and the eurozone already appear to be disintegrating, particularly in the wake of the United Kingdom’s June Brexit vote and Italy’s failed referendum on constitutional reforms in December. Moreover, in 2017, extreme anti-Europe left- or right-wing populist parties could come to power in France and Italy, and possibly in other parts of Europe. Without active US engagement in Europe, an aggressively revanchist Russia will step in. Russia is already challenging the US and the EU in Ukraine, Syria, the Baltics, and the Balkans, and it may capitalize on the EU’s looming collapse by reasserting its influence in the former Soviet bloc countries, and supporting pro-Russia movements within Europe. If Europe gradually loses its US security umbrella, no one stands to benefit more than Russian President Vladimir Putin. Trump’s proposals also threaten to exacerbate the situation in the Middle East. He has said that he will make America energy independent, which entails abandoning US interests in the region and becoming more reliant on domestically produced greenhouse-gas-emitting fossil fuels. And he has maintained his position that Islam itself, rather than just radical militant Islam, is dangerous. This view, shared by Trump’s incoming National Security Adviser, General Michael Flynn, plays directly into Islamist militants’ own narrative of a clash of civilizations. Meanwhile, an “America first” approach under Trump will likely worsen the longstanding Sunni-Shia proxy wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran. And if the US no longer guarantees its Sunni allies’ security, all regional powers – including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt – might decide that they can defend themselves only by acquiring nuclear weapons, and even more deadly conflict will ensue. In Asia, US economic and military primacy has provided decades of stability; but a rising China is now challenging the status quo. US President Barack Obama’s strategic “pivot” to Asia depended primarily on enacting the 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership, which Trump has promised to scrap on his first day in office. Meanwhile, China is quickly strengthening its own economic ties in Asia, the Pacific, and Latin America through its “one belt, one road” policy, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank (formerly known as the BRICS bank), and its own regional free-trade proposal to rival the TPP. If the US gives up on its Asian allies such as the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan, those countries may have no choice but to prostrate themselves before China; and other US allies, such as Japan and India, may be forced to militarize and challenge China openly. Thus, an American withdrawal from the region could very well eventually precipitate a military conflict there. As in the 1930s, when protectionist and isolationist US policies hampered global economic growth and trade, and created the conditions for rising revisionist powers to start a world war, similar policy impulses could set the stage for new powers to challenge and undermine the American-led international order. An isolationist Trump administration may see the wide oceans to its east and west, and think that increasingly ambitious powers such as Russia, China, and Iran pose no direct threat to the homeland. But the US is still a global economic and financial power in a deeply interconnected world. If left unchecked, these countries will eventually be able to threaten core US economic and security interests – at home and abroad – especially if they expand their nuclear and cyberwarfare capacities. The historical record is clear: protectionism, isolationism, and “America first” policies are a recipe for economic and military disaster.

### --Key to Trade Ext

#### Ensures the US is viewed as a reliable partner in future negotiations.

Gordon 19 --- Feedstuffs.com, quoting Randy Gordon, president and CEO of the National Grain and Feed Assn, ("Ag groups push for USMCA approval," 6-11-2019, https://www.feedstuffs.com/news/ag-groups-push-usmca-approval, accessed 6-16-2019)

The International Trade Commission’s recent report on USMCA confirmed that the agreement will improve market access for U.S. farmers, ranchers and food producers, as well as positively impact both the U.S. agriculture sector and the broader national economy. Gordon also noted that USMCA’s speedy ratification is “absolutely essential if the United States is to be viewed as a reliable partner in negotiating much-needed future trade agreements with Japan and other countries that are so important to U.S. agriculture and our nation’s economic growth and job creation.”

#### USMCA is critical to the rest of Trump’s trade agenda.

Fatka 19 --- Jacqui Fatka, Policy Editor at Feedstuffs/Farm Futures ("Trump trade agenda hinges on USMCA passage," 6-11-2019, Feedstuffs, https://www.feedstuffs.com/news/trump-trade-agenda-hinges-usmca-passage, accessed 6-16-2019)

Both U.S. Department of Agriculture trade undersecretary Ted McKinney and chief agricultural trade negotiator Gregg Doud said passage of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) is an absolute necessity for agriculture, as the duo testified before a House Agricultural subcommittee on Tuesday morning. “The President has a robust trade agenda that includes many potential economic opportunities for farmers, ranchers, workers, and agribusinesses, including negotiations for trade agreements with Japan, the European Union, and the United Kingdom upon its exit from the European Union,” Doud said. “To advance the rest of the trade agenda, however, passage of USMCA is critical.” In response to questioning, Doud added that with the plans to move forward in many different places around the world, inaction on USMCA “halts the entire trade agenda of this administration.” “No passage is simply not an option,” McKinney added in his comments to the House Agriculture Committee members. McKinney said in terms of the importance of USMCA is must get done as it sends a message to the world and those many countries we do want some kind of an agreement that we’re willing to negotiate. He said many aspects of USMCA, especially those chapters on the sanitary and phytosanitary issues, offer a template to model in other agreement. McKinney said SPS issues are often an important topic when visiting other countries. In future agreements USMCA’s chapter on SPS is “not as easy as cut and paste,” but it offers a great start.

### --Trade Impact Ext

#### Best theoretical studies prove.

Jackson 14 (Matthew O. Jackson, William D. Eberle Professor of Economics at Stanford and Stephen M. Nei, PhD Student in Economics at Stanford, “Networks of Military Alliances, Wars, and International Trade”, October 2014, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2389300>)

This instability provides insights into the constantly shifting structures and recurring wars that occurred throughout the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries.6 Wars, however, have greatly subsided in parallel with the huge increase of trade (partly coincidental with the introduction of containerized shipping in the 1960s): between 1820 and 1959 each pair of countries averaged .00056 wars per year, while from 1960 to 2000 the average was .00005 wars per year, less than one tenth as much. We see this pattern quite clearly in Figure 1.7 These changes also follow the advent of nuclear weapons, which impacted the technology of war. Indeed, we show how nuclear weapons can lead to some changes in stability, but does not generate peace on its own. Indeed, in order to capture the actual patterns that have emerged one must add other considerations - such as trade considerations - since the base model shows that networks of alliances would not be stable with nuclear weapons but without trade.8¶ Thus, the second part of our analysis is to enrich the base model to include international trade. Indeed, there has been a rapid increase in global trade since World War II (partly coincident with the growth of container shipping among other stimuli). The empirical relationship between war and trade is an active area of research, with strong suggestions (e.g., Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008)) that network concerns may be important. So, we introduce a concept of a network of alliances being war and trade stable, which allows countries to form alliances for either economic or military considerations. In this richer model, an alliance allows countries to trade with each other and to coordinate military activities, and so can be formed for either reason. This restores existence of networks of alliances that are stable against the addition or deletion of alliances. Trade provides two helpful incentives: first it provides economic motivations to maintain alliances, and the resulting denser network of alliances then has a deterrent effect; and second, it can reduce the incentives of a country to attack another since trade will be disrupted. This reduces the potential set of conflicts and, together with the denser networks, allows for a rich family of stable networks that can exhibit structures similar to networks we see currently.¶ We provide some results on the existence and structure of war and trade stable networks of alliances, showing that structures similar to those observed over the past few decades are economically stable under apparently reasonable parameters. It is important to note that another dramatic change during the post-war period was the introduction of nuclear weapons, which changes the technology of war and is generally thought to have greatly increased the defensive advantage to those with such weapons.9 Our model suggests that although world-wide adoption of nuclear weapons could stabilize things in the absence of trade, it would result in an empty network of alliances as the stable network. To explain the much denser and more stable networks in the modern age along with the paucity of war in a world where nuclear weapons are limited to a small percentage of countries, our model points to the enormous growth in trade as a big part of the answer. We close the paper with some discussion of this potential role that the growth in trade has played in reducing wars over the past half century, and how this relates to the advent of the nuclear age.¶ Before proceeding, let us say a few words about how this paper contributes to the study of war. The literature on war provides many rationales for why wars occur. Our analysis here fits firmly into what has become a “rationalist” tradition based on cost and benefit analyses by rational actors, with roots seen in writings such as Hobbes (1651) Leviathan, and has become the foundation for much of the recent international relations literature.10¶ To our knowledge, there are no previous models of conflict that game-theoretically model networks of alliances between multiple agents/countries based on costs and benefits of wars. 11 There are previous models of coalitions in conflict settings (e.g., see Bloch (2012) for a survey). Here, network structures add several things to the picture. Our model is very much in a similar rationalist perspective of the literature that examines group conflict (e.g., Esteban and Ray (1999, 2001); Esteban and Sakovicz (2003)), but enriching it to admit network structures of alliances and of international trade. This allows us to admit patterns that are consistent with the networks of alliances that are actually observed, which are far from being partitions (e.g., the U.S. is currently allied with both Israel and Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and India, just to mention a couple of many prominent examples). More importantly, our Theorem 3 provides a first model in which such non-partitional such structures are stable and provide insight into peace. Moreover, as we already mentioned above, the observed patterns of wars and of alliances are not partitional, and so this provides an important advance in moving the models towards matching observed patterns of wars, trade and alliances.¶ Our model thus serves as a foundation upon which one can eventually build more elaborate analyses of multilateral interstate alliances, trade, and wars. It is also important to emphasize that the network of international trade is complex and can in fact be stable (and prevent conflict) precisely because it cuts across coalitions. This is in contrast to coalitional models that generally predict only the grand coalition can be stable or that very exact balances are possible (e.g., see Bloch, Sanchez-Pages, and Soubeyran (2006)). Again, this is something illustrated in our Theorem 3, and which does not exist in the previous literature. Finally, our model illuminates the relationships between international trade, stable network structures, and peace, something not appearing in the previous literature - as the previous literature that involves international trade and conflict generally revolves around bilateral reasoning or focuses on instability and armament (e.g., Garfinkel, Skaperdas, and Syropoulos (2014)) and does not address the questions that we address here.¶ The complex relationship between trade and conflict is the subject of a growing empirical literature (e.g., Barbieri (1996); Mansfield and Bronson (1997); Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008); Glick and Taylor (2010); Hegre, Oneal, and Russett (2010)). The literature not only has to face challenges of endogeneity and causation, but also of substantial heterogeneity in relationships, as well as geography, and the level of conflict. The various correlations between conflict and trade are complex and quite difficult to interpret, and a model such as ours that combines military and economic incentives, and others that may follow, can provide some structure with which to interpret some of the empirical observations, as we discuss in the concluding remarks.

#### Protectionism causes nuclear war.

Panzner 8 (Michael Panzner, Faculty, New York Institute of Finance, MA Columbia, “Financial Armageddon”, p. 137-138)

Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster. But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or tryiTradeng to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. Therise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations overshared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, suchtensions will give rise to full scale military encounters**,** oftenwith minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution,terrorist groups willlikely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmeringresentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employingbiological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up confl icts between

### 2NC Agriculture Impact

#### USMCA is necessary to prevent the collapse of US agriculture.

Duvall 19 --- Vincent “Zippy” Duvall, president of the American Farm Bureau Federation, ("U.S. Ag Gets a Great Deal with USMCA," 4-3-2019, AFBF, https://www.fb.org/viewpoints/u.s.-ag-gets-a-great-deal-with-usmca, accessed 6-16-2019)

At the same time, we always have our eye on the latest technology and tools that will make our farms and ranches more productive and more efficient. I don’t know a farmer or rancher who would pass up a good deal that could make their business better. The same is true when it comes to trade deals. When NAFTA was signed more than 25 years ago, it was the best trade deal U.S. agriculture had ever seen. But now there’s a new deal on offer—the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement or USMCA. We have a chance to trade in a great agreement for an even better one. Since NAFTA went into effect in 1994, U.S. ag exports to Canada and Mexico have more than quadrupled, making these our number 1 and number 2 markets respectively. In 2018 alone, we exported $20.7 billion in ag products to Canada and $19 billion to Mexico. These markets have only grown in value for U.S. farmers and ranchers. Over the last decade, ag exports have increased 27 percent to Canada and 23 percent to Mexico. But as good as NAFTA has been, it’s time for an upgrade: it’s time for Congress to approve USMCA. Without USMCA, our most critical markets hang in the balance. Both Canada and Mexico have already signed another deal that does not include the United States. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership replaces the TPP agreement that the U.S. agreed to but then backed out of in 2017. The CPTPP gives Canada and Mexico preferential trade terms with nine other countries and gives those countries better access to Canada’s and Mexico’s markets―all while the ongoing trade war hangs overhead, with tariffs hurting U.S. agricultural exports. Just this week, Japan is following through on its promises under the CPTPP and reducing its tariffs and raising its quotas for ag products from CPTPP partners. This is all the more reason why we must bring the USMCA across the finish line and secure our valuable trade partnership with our nearest neighbors. The USMCA is also important in setting the stage for other modern trade agreements for U.S. agriculture. NAFTA needed to be modernized, and the USMCA has bells and whistles that we don’t have under our existing trade agreements. Let’s look under the hood. For the U.S., it’s the first trade agreement to deal with approval of and trade in products of biotechnology. This groundwork will be critical in agreements we pursue with other countries, especially in the EU, the UK and Japan. The new agreement broadens access for U.S. dairy and finally brings an end to Canada’s unfair class 7 pricing scheme. These are wins we didn’t see even under TPP. Finally, USMCA will bring greater access for poultry, improve wheat grading standards, and make much-needed improvements to animal and plant health protection standards. Finally, ratifying the USMCA will show our top trading partners and other countries that the United States and the trade negotiators who represent us mean business. It would prove that our word and handshake can be trusted when we strike a deal. Right now, it’s important for each of us to call on our lawmakers in Washington and tell them how important the USMCA is to agriculture. Farmers and ranchers are resilient, but our businesses—not to mention the jobs and rural communities that depend on us—cannot survive without our top markets. Let’s get this deal done, so we can move forward with opening and expanding more markets around the globe.

#### Great power war.

**Castellaw 17** (John – 36-year veteran of the U.S. Marine Corps and the Founder and CEO of Farmspace Systems LLC, “Opinion: Food Security Strategy Is Essential to Our National Security,” 5/1/17, https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/9203-opinion-food-security-strategy-is-essential-to-our-national-security)

The **U**nited **S**tates faces many threats to our National Security. These threats include continuing wars with extremist elements such as **ISIS** and potential wars with rogue state **North Korea** or regional nuclear power **Iran.** The heated economic and diplomatic competition with **Russia** and a surging **China** could **spiral out of control**. Concurrently, we face threats to our future security posed by growing civil strife, famine, and refugee and migration challenges which create incubators for extremist and anti-American government factions. Our response cannot be one dimensional but instead must be a nuanced and comprehensive National Security Strategy combining all elements of National Power including a Food Security Strategy. An **American Food Security Strategy** is an imperative factor in **reducing the multiple threats impacting our National wellbeing.** Recent history has shown that **reliable food supplies and stable prices produce more stable and secure countries.** Conversely, food insecurity, particularly in poorer countries, can lead to instability, unrest, and violence. **Food insecurity** drives **mass migration** around the world from the Middle East, to Africa, to Southeast Asia, destabilizing neighboring populations, **generating conflicts**, and threatening our own security by **disrupting** our **economic, military, and diplomatic relationships**. Food system shocks from extreme food-price volatility can be correlated with protests and riots. Food price related protests toppled governments in Haiti and Madagascar in 2007 and 2008. In 2010 and in 2011, food prices and grievances related to food policy were one of the major drivers of the Arab Spring uprisings. Repeatedly, history has taught us that **a strong agricultural sector** is **an unquestionable requirement** for inclusive and sustainable growth, broad-based development progress, and **long-term stability**. The impact can be remarkable and far reaching. **Rising income**, in addition to reducing the opportunities for an upsurge in extremism, leads to changes in diet, producing **demand** for more diverse and nutritious foods provided, in many cases, from **American farmers** and ranchers. **Emerging markets** currently purchase **20 percent of U.S. agriculture** exports and that figure is **expected to grow** as populations boom. Moving early to ensure stability in strategically significant regions requires long term planning and a disciplined, thoughtful strategy. To combat current threats and work to prevent future ones, our national leadership must employ the entire spectrum of our power including diplomatic, economic, and cultural elements. The best means to prevent future chaos and the resulting instability is positive engagement addressing the causes of instability before it occurs. This is not rocket science. We know where the instability is most likely to occur. The world population will grow by 2.5 billion people by 2050. Unfortunately, this massive population boom is projected to occur primarily in the most fragile and food insecure countries. This alarming math is not just about total numbers. Projections show that the greatest increase is in the age groups most vulnerable to extremism. There are currently 200 million people in Africa between the ages of 15 and 24, with that number expected to double in the next 30 years. Already, 60% of the unemployed in Africa are young people. Too often **these situations deteriorate into shooting wars** requiring the deployment of our military forces. We should be continually mindful that the price we pay for committing military forces is measured in our most precious national resource, the blood of those who serve. For those who live in **rural America**, this has a disproportionate impact. Fully 40% of those who serve in our military come from the farms, ranches, and non-urban communities that make up only 16% of our population. Actions taken now to increase agricultural sector jobs can provide economic opportunity and stability for those unemployed youths while helping to feed people. A recent report by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs identifies agriculture development as the core essential for providing greater food security, economic growth, and population well-being. Our active support for **food security**, including agriculture development, has helped **stabilize key regions** over the past 60 years. A robust food security strategy, as a part of our overall security strategy, can mitigate the growth of terrorism, build important relationships, and support continued American economic and agricultural prosperity while materially contributing to our Nation’s and the world’s security.

### --Key to Ag Ext

#### Solves uncertainty for ag---that’s uniquely key now.

Shruti Singh 18. "New Nafta Has American Corn Farmers Breathing Easier". Bloomberg. 10-1-2018. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-01/corn-pops-as-nafta-deal-can-keep-top-buyer-mexico-from-straying

U.S. corn farmers such as Aron Carlson in northern Illinois can breathe easier thanks to the renegotiated North American Free Trade Agreement. “I am happy they are getting something done,” Carlson said from a semi-truck on Monday as he was delivering corn to a local buyer. “It does give me some reassurance. It’s been a struggle.” Growers have watched prices tumble this year, with December futures dropping 13 percent since May 1, partly amid trade concerns. The U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement secured Sunday is expected to allow leaders from the three countries to sign an accord by late November. The accord alleviates the risk that Mexico, the biggest importer of U.S. corn, will turn to competing exporters such as [Argentina](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/terminal/PCQFQH6JIJUU). [Trump Clinches New Nafta as Canada Joins Pact With Mexico](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-01/u-s-canada-agree-to-nafta-replacement-that-will-include-mexico) For American producers, the trade deal comes at a crucial time as farmers including Carlson begin harvesting a massive crop. He’s gathered about 20 percent of this season’s output. Having an agreement to replace the 24-year-old Nafta also helps ease concerns over the long-term relationships built with U.S. grain handlers. The original pact has been seen as a success for U.S. agriculture, and many farming groups had pushed the Trump administration to “do no harm” as it renegotiated the deal. Last year, the U.S. exported $3.2 billion of corn and corn products to Mexico and Canada, according to the National Corn Growers Association. “The settlement of Nafta is beneficial to corn,” Greg Grow, the director of agribusiness at Archer Financial Services in Chicago, said Monday in a telephone interview. “It takes away some of the uncertainty.” Corn futures for December delivery rose as much as 2.9 percent to $3.665 a bushel, the biggest intraday gain since Sept. 20. Prices also climbed Monday as rain delayed harvesting in parts of the U.S. Midwest, while gains for crude oil signaled support for ethanol demand, Grow said. Soybean futures also advanced on optimism that the Nafta negotiation could herald more U.S. trade deals, especially with China, the world’s biggest buyer of the oilseed. China has shunned U.S. shipments amid the trade war and has increased purchases from Brazil and other countries.

#### It prevents countries from levying new tariffs.

Daniel Bennett 18. "How could the ‘new NAFTA’ help farmers?". Farm Progress. 10-9-2018. https://www.farmprogress.com/marketing/how-could-new-nafta-help-farmers

On the “new NAFTA” trade deal just struck… “There are two major changes for dairy in the new agreement. First, there’s additional access for U.S. dairy products into the Canadian market. That’s a very good thing for U.S. producers. It’s important to keep it in context, remembering we’re talking about a couple of additional percentage points worth of access to the Canadian market, which is about a ninth the size of the market in the United States. But every little bit helps, obviously. “The second change is harder to understand fully. It means Canada will have to give up on their existing ‘Class 7’ pricing scheme. Under that scheme, they’ve been able to make certain products from Canada competitive that normally wouldn’t be. “We’d been exporting a product called ‘ultra-filtered, high-protein milk’ — a product that hadn’t been envisioned when the first trade agreement was struck 30 years ago. Since there were no limitations on that product we were selling quite a bit of it to Canada for use as a starting point to make cheeses and other things. The Canadians said, ‘Wait a minute, that’s undercutting our existing programs here. So, we need to find a way to stop those imports from happening.’ And they created the pricing scheme to make them no longer attractive. “I understand they’ve agreed to change that program. Until I understand better how it’s to be changed I don’t feel confident saying exactly what will happen. “All of this is a positive for U.S. dairy producers. The question is how big a positive it’ll be.” On other commodities… “The other big change that wasn’t in previous agreements is additional access to Canadian poultry markets. So, we’ll be able to export more chicken and eggs. “Beyond that, my understanding is the main things we’ve done is kept existing agreements in place. So, we won’t have to worry about Mexico wanting to reinstate high tariffs on U.S. corn. That won’t be allowed and we’ll go back to where things were before the past year, or so.

#### The alternative is no deal and a reversion to MFN tariffs---those are catastrophic.

Chepeliev 18 --- Maksym Chepeliev, Wallace E. Tyner and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University (“How U.S. Agriculture Will Fare Under the USMCA and Retaliatory Tariffs” Commissioned by Farm Foundation,1 October 2018, [https://www.farmfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Trade-Analysis-10-31-18-Final.pdf accessed 6-16-2019](https://www.farmfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Trade-Analysis-10-31-18-Final.pdf%20accessed%206-16-2019))

It could be worse. The USMCA may fail to be ratified. One plausible outcome of a failure to ratify the new agreement would be for the United States to withdraw from the original agreement, in which case all three countries could revert tariff rates to the so-called most favored nation (MFN) status, granted to all countries that are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). MFN tariff levels would hit U.S. agricultural exports particularly hard. One study estimates that U.S. agricultural exports would decline by more than $9 billion, and lead to higher consumer prices for food.

### --Ag Impact Ext

#### Food shortages are the largest proximate cause of conflict --- new studies

Koren 16—Koren PhD Candidate in Political Science at U Minnesota and Bagozzi Assistant Professor of Political Science & International Relations at U Delaware 9-15-16 (Ore and Benjamin, “From global to local, food insecurity is associated with contemporary armed conflicts,” Food Security, DOI 10.1007/s12571-016-0610-x, Available online at http://www.benjaminbagozzi.com/uploads/1/2/5/7/12579534/koren-bagozzi-fs.pdf, Stadt)

A growing number of studies of environmental stressors and social conflict posit that future wars will be fought over diminishing resources (Miguel et al. 2004; Burke et al. 2009;O ’ Loughlin et al. 2012; Scheffran et al. 2012 ). Building on insights from these studies, as well as other suggestive accounts (e.g. Brinkman and Hendrix 2011 ;Hendrix and Brinkman 2013 ; Messer and Cohen 2006 ;Prunier 2008 ), the present study demonstrates empirically, for the first time, the existence of a systemic relationship between conflict on the one hand, and food (in) security on the other, both globally and locally. Specifically, highly disaggregated cropland-based measures of food insecurity are shown to produce a significant effect on the incidence of inter and intra-state armed conflict worldwide. Unlike the majority of previous studies, which rely primarily on country-level indicators (Miguel et al. 2004 ; Burke et al. 2009 ; Scheffran et al. 2012 ;Buhaug 2010 ) or focus specifically on sub-Saharan Africa (Miguel et al. 2004 ; Burke et al. 2009;O ’ Loughlin et al. 2012;Buhaug 2010; Fjelde and Hultman 2014 ), the present approach uses geographic factors to estimate the regional sub-state distribution of conflict globally. Two agricultural output measures, the percent of cropland in a given region and the amount of cropland per capita within agricultural regions, are used to proxy for the demand and supply aspects of food security, respectively (Barrett 2010 ). Using logistic regression (i.e., logit) models, these measures are then paired with a large number of political, economic, and climatic indicators in order to estimate the direct effects of food security on violent conflict. Evidence suggests that conflict occurs in areas with higher access to, but lower availability of, food resources. Together these findings imply that food insecurity produces an independent effect on contemporary social and political conflict. While relatively little research directly addresses the relationship between food insecurity and conflict specifically, numerous studies have implied that such a relationship exists. For instance, in their analysis of the relationship between climate variability and conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, Burke et al. found that B [t]emperature variables are strongly related to conflict incidence over our historical panel ^ (2009 , 20,670. See also Miguel et al. 2004 ; Koubi et al. 2012 ). They further hypothesize that, B [t]emperature can affect agricultural yields both through increases in crop evapotranspiration (and hence heightened water stress in the absence of irrigation) and through accelerated crop development...reducing African sta- ple crop yields by 10 % – 30 % per °C of warming ^ (ibid. 20,672). Somewhat more cautiously, O ’ Loughlin et al. conclude that, B [o]ur study and other studies question the evidence that climatic variability is uniformly driving up the risk of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa, ^ while also noting that B the positive association between instability and temperature may result from the harmful effects of high temperatures on food products such as maize ^ (2012, 18,347). While these conclusions were supported by subsequent studies (Raleigh and Kniveton 2012; Hendrix and Salehyan 2012 ;Hsiangand Meng 2014 ), other scholars question the validity of these findings and show that the incidence of conflict is primarily related to political and economic conditions (e.g. Buhaug 2010 ). In common with all these studies, however, is the insight that a major mechanism by which climate change increases the likelihood of conflict is through its effects on food supplies.

#### Goes nuclear---unique stressor---turns their impacts but they can’t turn ours.

Lehane 17 [Sinéad Lehane is research manager for Future Directions International’s Global Food and Water Crises Research program. Her current research projects include Australia’s food system and water security in the Tibetan Plateau region. Shaping Conflict in the 21st Century—The Future of Food and Water Security. February 2, 2017. www.hidropolitikakademi.org/shaping-conflict-in-the-21st-century-the-future-of-food-and-water-security.html]

In his book, The Coming Famine, Julian Cribb writes that the wars of the 21st century will involve failed states, rebellions, civil conflict, insurgencies and terrorism. All of these elements will be triggered by competition over dwindling resources, rather than global conflicts with clearly defined sides. More than 40 countries experienced civil unrest following the food price crisis in 2008. The rapid increase in grain prices and prevailing food insecurity in many states is linked to the outbreak of protests, food riots and the breakdown of governance. Widespread food insecurity is a driving factor in creating a disaffected population ripe for rebellion. Given the interconnectivity of food security and political stability, it is likely food will continue to act as a political stressor on regimes in the Middle East and elsewhere. Addressing Insecurity Improving food and water security and encouraging resource sharing is critical to creating a stable and secure global environment. While food and water shortages contribute to a rising cycle of violence, improving food and water security outcomes can trigger the opposite and reduce the potential for conflict. With the global population expected to reach 9 billion by 2040, the likelihood of conflict exacerbated by scarcity over the next century is growing. Conflict is likely to be driven by a number of factors and difficult to address through diplomacy or military force. Population pressures, changing weather, urbanization, migration, a loss of arable land and freshwater resources are just some of the multi-layered stressors present in many states. Future inter-state conflict will move further away from the traditional, clear lines of military conflict and more towards economic control and influence.

### --Turns Ethics

#### We meet them on framing --- preventing hunger is a D-rule.

LaFollette 3 (Hugh LaFolette is the Cole Chair in Ethics at the University of South Florida St. Petersburg, “World Hunger,” Chapter in “A Companion to Applied Ethics” edited by R. G. Frey, Christopher Heath Wellman, <http://www.hughlafollette.com/papers/World.Hunger.htm>)

Those who claim the relatively affluent have this strong obligation must, among other things, show why Hardin's projections are either morally irrelevant or mistaken. A hearty few take the former tack: they claim we have a strong obligation to aid the starving even if we would eventually become malnourished. On this view, to survive on lifeboat earth, knowing that others were tossed overboard into the sea of starvation, would signify an indignity and callousness worse than extinction (Watson 1977). It would be morally preferable to die struggling to create a decent life for all than to continue to live at the expense of the starving.

## AFF

### Tariff Thumper

#### Tariff Threats Thump

LEVY 6/8 (Phil; Senior Fellow on the Global Economy – Chicago Council on Global Affairs and Professor of International Business – Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of Management, “Who Won The Mexican Trade War Of 2019?” https://www.forbes.com/sites/phillevy/2019/06/08/who-won-the-mexican-trade-war-of-2019/#3c9dcf6c1c1c)ww

The Mexican Trade War began with a Tweet and concluded with a Tweet. As it happened, no actual tariffs were applied, but there were still consequences. The President and his supporters have claimed the result as a victory, although most politicians do not hold their victories for public announcement on a Friday evening. Applying the same approach we did to the launch of hostilities, here are five thoughts about the sudden cessation of hostilities: What was in the deal? President Trump announced that the United States and Mexico had signed an agreement which removed the need for the tariffs. The joint declaration put out by the State Department described Mexican deployment of its National Guard on its southern border as well as moves against human trafficking networks. It also references the distinction between illegal immigration and asylum seekers, with Mexico referencing international obligations for dealing with asylum applicants. President Trump also said Mexico had agreed to “BEGIN BUYING LARGE QUANTITIES OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT FROM OUR GREAT PATRIOT FARMERS!” While agriculture was an issue in the NAFTA talks, there was no diplomatic release describing any new agricultural agreements reached this past week. Will it fix the problems President Trump identified? Almost certainly not. On migratory flows and human trafficking from Central America, the problems seem to run substantially deeper than just a lack of Mexican willpower. Few countries have ever had the ability to control their borders completely. Further, President Trump did not limit his aspirations to controlling immigration. He also called for Mexico to stop the flow of drugs and claimed, “They can do it if they want!” Mexico has had many of the problems common to developing countries – difficulty maintaining control of a vast territory with limited resources. In fact, the United States has its own issues with law enforcement – homicide and narcotics use are illegal, yet they persist. And this continues despite the fact that the United States is vastly richer – per capita income of almost $60k per year as compared to almost $9k per year in Mexico. This all suggests that the problems run deeper than a lack of willpower. Where does this leave U.S. trade with Mexico? In trouble. It’s tempting to think that, without the coming imposition on tariffs on Monday, all is well. Now it just remains for Mexico, Canada, and the United States to pass the USMCA, as they were planning before this interruption. The problem is that the tariff threat entirely undercut the rationale of the USMCA. Such trade agreements are heavily premised on the idea that trade is linked to investment and that industries need a degree of certainty to take full advantage of the trade relationship. This was the reason there was such strong pushback against the Trump administration’s proposal to introduce a “sunset clause” that would create an expiration date for the deal. When President Trump made his tariff threat, he demonstrated that the USMCA offered no guarantees of certainty. He could and would ignore it with just over a week’s notice. Trade uncertainty would reign supreme. Ironically, the only reason the USMCA won a positive rating from the U.S. International Trade Commission last month was because that body assumed the deal would reduce trade policy uncertainty. In the absence of such a presumption, the USMCA was predicted to actually reduce U.S. GDP. And the basic argument about the costliness of trade policy uncertainty shows exactly why the mere threat of Mexican tariffs can have negative effects, even if the President never slaps them on. So it now looks like a loser for the United States. What about for Mexico? Mexico is being asked to make changes to its economic policy as part of its USMCA commitments. What does it get for those concessions? The old answer was that it got a guarantee of trade peace. It’s now clear that, at least from the Trump administration, such a guarantee is worthless. NAFTA and USMCA were valuable if they prevented the member countries from arbitrarily applying tariffs. President Trump has called the whole rationale into question. Where does this leave Trump administration trade policy? This problem extends well beyond Mexico. Consider the rest of the Trump trade agenda. In the Asia-Pacific, the Trump administration opened by denying U.S. farmers and businesses the market access they would have gotten from agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The U.S. absence from the TPP’s successor agreement has meant, for example, that Canadian and Australian ranchers can ship their beef into Japan on better terms than U.S. ranchers. President Trump promised to remedy this by striking new bilateral deals with Japan, Europe, the UK, and more. All of those countries will have watched the Mexican episode closely. All will now be exceedingly wary about trading anything of value for Trump administration promises of trade peace. Is it over? There are at least two clues that the threat to U.S.-Mexico trade has not gone away. First, President Trump’s Friday night announcement was of an “indefinite suspension.” The language strongly suggests the threat could return. Second, the joint declaration put out by the State Department says: Both parties also agree that, in the event the measures adopted do not have the expected results, they will take further actions. Therefore, the United States and Mexico will continue their discussions on the terms of additional understandings to address irregular migrant flows and asylum issues, to be completed and announced within 90 days, if necessary.” Thus, there will be two conflicting forces at work. On the one hand, predictable disappointment will restoke pressures to lift the tariff suspension – it is exceedingly likely that the measures adopted in the joint declaration will not have the expected results. On the other hand, pushing against new imposition of tariffs will still be the strong resistance from markets, businesses, and political leaders that stymied the push for tariffs this past week. The President’s devotion to tariffs and his refusal to forswear them will mean that, even without actual imposition of duties, some adverse effects are likely to remain.

### No Trump PC

#### Trump lacks the ability to use political capital effectively

AZARI ’17 (Julia; associate professor of political science at Marquette University, “Trump Came In As A Weak President, And He’s Made Himself Weaker,” 8/1, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/trump-weak-president/)ww

In the last week, the Republicans’ Obamacare repeal effort failed on the Senate floor despite President Trump urging GOP senators to vote yes. The White House underwent rapid and chaotic staff changes. And Congress expressly went against the wishes of a president of its own party by overwhelmingly approving more sanctions against Russia in response to its meddling in the 2016 election. So, are we looking at a weak presidency? Much gets written and said about presidential power, but it’s tricky to nail down what the concept really means. Presidents have lots of powers they can use on their own, including executive orders and other unilateral tools. And they can use these tools under any conditions — Trump’s ability to sign an executive order, for instance, remains undiminished. But when people talk about a president’s power, what they really tend to mean is his ability to influence other political actors, particularly Congress. And political science research has a few things to say about when and how presidents exert that influence. The circumstances under which Trump came into office were always likely to limit his ability to sway Congress, but the administration’s actions since the inauguration haven’t helped. The classic insight about presidential power came from the late Richard Neustadt in a book first published in 1960, in which he argued that “presidential power is the power to persuade” (an idea he attributed to Harry Truman) and identified the president’s professional reputation among Washington elites and, to a lesser extent, his standing in the public eye, as key sources of the president’s ability to influence others. Presidential power, according to Neustadt, is a process of bargaining. Successful negotiations would make subsequent successes more likely by enhancing the president’s prestige both in public and in legislative circles. Bargaining also requires understanding legislators’ incentives and being able to read public opinion, Neustadt wrote. Under Neustadt’s definition of power, it can be hard to observe the exercise of presidential power while it’s happening, but last week’s debacle over transgender individuals serving in the military provides a pretty good illustration of how it works — and doesn’t. Trump appeared to enact the ban as part of a deal to get Congress to fund part of a border wall. But the tactic was ineffective because it drew significant backlash — some of it from military leaders, who hadn’t been consulted. Congressional reaction to the ban, even among Republicans, was tepid. The outcome of this battle is still uncertain — the House approved the funding Trump is looking for, but the bill still has to clear the Senate. In the meantime, Trump frustrated members of his own Cabinet and party with an announcement that may never lead to real policy change. It remains to be seen whether the tradeoff will be worth it in the long term. More contemporary political science research has focused on political conditions in general, rather than the individual officeholder’s skills and traits, as the main determinant of a president’s influence on Congress. A president’s popularity does matter — research suggests that it can help him influence Congress, depending on the issue — but even the most popular and charismatic president can’t fundamentally alter the political environment, and members of Congress will generally respond to their own political incentives. What do we mean by the political environment? Although it’s somewhat difficult to disentangle the various factors, electoral strength and party backing matter to some degree. While presidential “mandates” are more myth than reality, there is some evidence that Congress is more amenable to the president’s agenda if they think the election was understood as a mandate for it. In other words, a president who won the White House in a rout after campaigning on a clear platform — think Lyndon Johnson running on Great Society policies in 1964 — is likely to have an easier time getting Congress to do what he wants than a president who campaigned on generalities and limped into office with only a plurality of the vote — think Bill Clinton in 1992, when he won 43 percent of the popular vote with a compelling personal story and a vague-ish message about improving the economy. And while presidents’ parties don’t always march in step with the White House agenda, partisanship can count for a lot. Even within Jimmy Carter’s White House, which was notorious for clashing with Congressional Democrats, party loyalty guaranteed a certain amount of support. This means that Trump came into the White House at a disadvantage. Although his victory has sparked a lot of interest in why he won, the fact remains that he won fewer votes than Hillary Clinton and a below-average share of the Electoral College for a winning candidate. He also won with much less support from his own party than most newly elected presidents have received. Moreover, he articulated plenty of positions that were at odds with the GOP’s usual stances (and sometimes at odds with his own previous statements). This is especially true on health care: During his campaign, Trump promised to cover more people for less money, but that’s not what the House and Senate bills did, according to Congressional Budget Office estimates of their impacts. Finally, while the political conditions go a long way toward determining how “strong” a president is, the White House needs a certain amount of organization to take full advantage of them. First, when it comes to policy, the main advantage that the president has over Congress is coordination. While Congress has to balance the ideas and opinions of 535 people, the executive branch can theoretically speak with one voice. Here the problems within Trump’s White House are about more than optics. A disorganized White House will have trouble developing a clear policy agenda, setting priorities and coming up with ideas about how to achieve them. A troubled communications apparatus — like, for example, one where the communications director goes on an expletive-filled tirade to a reporter and gets fired after less than two weeks on the job — will have a hard time selling the president’s agenda to Congress and the public. While we see the end product — speeches, press conferences and, more recently, social media — presidential communication involves hundreds of people and requires focused coordination. Direct communication with the public is a major asset for presidents, but without effective organization, they forfeit this advantage. Trump, like all presidents, doesn’t have control over most of the levers that affect his ability to influence Congress. Presidents can only shape political conditions so much. But the levers he does have direct control over — his message, his organization — are being pushed in the wrong direction. And the levers on which he has a more indirect effect — public support, party backing — are also going the wrong way. Trump, in other words, has made a difficult situation worse. A strong presidency is built on more than just tough talk. Good organization may not get people chanting at a campaign rally, but it’s a big part of what makes a presidency effective.

#### Trump doesn’t know how to president

BRYAN ’17 (Bob; Business Insider, “'Trump doesn't bring us any votes': Trump appears to be losing influence on healthcare,” https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-healthcare-senate-brca-2017-6)ww

President Donald Trump made the pledge to repeal and replace Obamacare one of the key issues of his 2016 election campaign. But as Republicans try in earnest to make good on that promise, Trump appears to be losing influence. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell said Tuesday that GOP leadership would delay a vote on its healthcare bill, the Better Care Reconciliation Act, until after the weeklong July 4 recess because of a lack of support among Republican lawmakers. Nine members of the party have publicly said they would not vote for the bill in its current form. McConnell can lose only two votes for the BCRA to pass, as all Democrats are expected to oppose it. But Trump apparently isn't helping GOP members get to "yes." In contrast to his hard sell on the House healthcare bill, The Washington Post and The New York Times published reports late Tuesday saying Trump had done little to get the reluctant GOP senators to come to an agreement. According to The Times' Glenn Thrush and Jonathan Martin, Trump has been "on the sidelines" during the Senate negotiations. In fact, one Republican senator in favor of the BCRA told The Times that the president "did not have a grasp of some basic elements of the Senate plan" during a meeting with all of the GOP members on Tuesday. The senator also said Trump was confused when a moderate expressed concern that the bill would be seen as a tax break for the rich. A Tax Policy Center analysis showed that the top 0.1% of earners in America would receive, on average, a $207,390 tax break from the BCRA. The Times also reported that Republican senators, including McConnell, expressed frustration with ads from a pro-Trump nonprofit group attacking GOP Sen. Dean Heller for going against the BCRA. Heller is up for reelection in Nevada come 2018 and faces an uphill battle in a state Democrat Hillary Clinton won in last year's presidential election. A senior Republican close to both the Senate and the White House also told The Post that Republican lawmakers thought Trump was a "paper tiger" and did not mind going "their own way." The lack of deference, according to The Post, comes from a feeling among lawmakers that Trump lacks an understanding of policy and that his low approval numbers do not give him much political capital. "Trump doesn't bring us any votes. He just doesn't," a source close to McConnell told Politico. President Donald Trump in the Rose Garden of the White House on Monday. AP Photo/Evan Vucci Sen. Susan Collins, a moderate GOP holdout on the Senate legislation, also criticized Trump's approach to the process while talking with reporters on Tuesday after the delay was announced. "This president is the first president in our history who has had neither political nor military experience," Collins said. "Thus, it has been a challenge to him to learn how to interact with Congress and how to push his agenda forward. I also believe it would have been better had the president started with infrastructure, which has bipartisan support, rather than tackling a political divisive and technically complicated issue like healthcare." Lawmakers were already wary of Trump's turnaround on the House bill. In just a few weeks, the president went from a White House Rose Garden ceremony celebrating the bill's passage to calling the bill "mean" during a private meeting with senators. Trump last weekend confirmed in a national TV interview that he called the bill "mean." Trump's comments have become a rallying point for Democrats' attacks on the GOP healthcare effort and have already appeared in political ads. Trump used Twitter on Wednesday morning to push back on the Times and Post reports. "The failing @nytimes writes false story after false story about me. They don't even call to verify the facts of a story. A Fake News Joke!" Trump tweeted. "Some of the Fake News Media likes to say that I am not totally engaged in healthcare. Wrong, I know the subject well & want victory for U.S." Trump also attacked The Post as "the guardian of Amazon not paying internet taxes" and "FAKE NEWS." Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos owns The Post privately, and the two entities do not have a business connection. Tax experts have debunked Trump's suggestion that The Post helps Amazon avoid taxes.

### A/T: NAFTA Pullout

#### No Impact – failure will just lead to re-negotiation

SEN ’18 (Ashish Kumar; deputy director of communications at the Atlantic Council “Why it Will Be Hard to Kill NAFTA if Congress Does Not Approve Trump’s Trade Deal With Mexico and Canada,” 12/14, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/why-it-will-be-hard-to-kill-nafta-if-congress-does-not-approve-trump-s-trade-deal-with-mexico-and-canada)ww

Despite US President Donald J. Trump’s threat to pull the United States out of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), it will be much harder to kill NAFTA if the US Congress does not approve a revised trade deal, said Jesús Seade, who served as then Mexican President-elect Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s chief NAFTA negotiator in recently concluded, and often contentious, negotiations. Trump has threatened action as a way to force members of Congress—Democrats as well as Republicans—to ratify the recently concluded US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). “If the new treaty doesn’t pass, NAFTA will be more resilient and more difficult to kill,” Seade said at the Atlantic Council’s Annual Forum in Washington on December 14. In such an event, Seade said he “wouldn’t see a lot of political capital [expended] in also dumping NAFTA.” The Mexican and US governments would instead “probably resume negotiations to have something smaller and less contentious,” he said. Seade is undersecretary-designate for North America in Mexico’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He participated in a discussion moderated by Sabrina Rodríguez, a trade reporter with Politico.

### A/T: Economy Impact

#### USMCA not key to the economy – Multiple Studies

LYNCH 4/18 (David J.; Washington Post, “Trump’s USMCA trade agreement would have a limited but positive impact on U.S. economy, report finds,” https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trumps-usmca-trade-agreement-would-have-a-limited-but-positive-impact-on-us-economy-report-finds/2019/04/18/b8ccb48c-6200-11e9-9ff2-abc984dc9eec\_story.html)ww

President Trump’s new North American trade deal will have a marginal effect on the nearly $21 trillion U.S. economy, boosting output by just 0.35 percent and delivering an even smaller gain to the labor market, according to an independent analysis by the International Trade Commission. In a 379-page report released Thursday, the ITC said the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement would “have a positive impact” on both manufacturing and services industries. The largest gains would arise from eliminating “uncertainty” by preventing future barriers to cross-border e-commerce, services and investments. “There can be no doubt that the USMCA is a big win for America’s economy,” said Robert E. Lighthizer, the president’s chief trade negotiator. Notably, the deal would increase auto parts production and employment, key administration goals. But the narrow benefits for the auto sector would come at the expense of the broader economy, making overall U.S. production more expensive, reducing exports, and denting wages and employment, the report said. Congress required the assessment, which was delayed five weeks by the partial government shutdown, before lawmakers hold an up-or-down vote on the agreement. “I don’t see it as providing much ammunition to either side. The skeptics will still be skeptical, and the advocates will still be advocating,” said William Reinsch, a trade expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Administration officials are pushing for quick congressional action, but most trade analysts expect the process to drag on for months. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) has said tougher enforcement measures need to be written into the deal to make sure that Mexico complies with promised labor reforms. Several prominent lawmakers, including Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa), chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, say the president must remove tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from Mexico and Canada before a vote. Both countries have imposed retaliatory measures that have damaged U.S. exports, especially from farm states. Administration officials said last year that the tariffs would be eliminated once the three countries reached a new trade deal. But instead, they have remained in place while the United States tries to get Mexico and Canada to accept quotas on their shipments of industrial metals. “This report confirms what has been clear since this deal was announced — Donald Trump’s NAFTA represents at best a minor update to NAFTA, which will offer only limited benefits to U.S. workers,” said Sen. Ron Wyden, (D-Ore.), the committee’s ranking member. The USMCA provides for the free flow of data among the three trading partners, an important step for banks, airlines, online retailers and entertainment companies. It limits an existing procedure for companies to settle disputes with the three governments, which the report says will discourage U.S. investment in Mexico and boost capital spending in U.S. manufacturing and mining. An overhaul of the 25-year-old North American Free Trade Agreement, the changes in the USMCA are less sweeping than the broad elimination of virtually all trade barriers in the earlier accord, economists say. NAFTA was expected to increase the size of the U.S. economy by just 0.5 percent and boost employment by less than 1 percent, according to the ITC’s 1993 study. Those effects exceeded what’s likely from the new deal, including an employment gain of just 176,000 jobs, or 0.12 percent, according to the ITC. “Most trade deals don’t have an outsized effect on growth over the long term,” said David Page, senior economist for AXA Investment Managers in London. “It does tend to be a little bit peripheral.” While its top-line effects are modest, the deal would reshape North American auto production by requiring more American content and mandating that 40 percent of each vehicle be produced by workers earning $16 per hour — aimed at steering jobs away from lower-wage Mexican workers. The administration sought to preempt the report, releasing an assessment that concluded the deal would create 76,000 auto jobs over the next five years and trigger $34 billion in new auto plant investments and $23 billion in added auto parts purchases. Current auto industry employment is about 999,000, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The ITC study comes after a recent International Monetary Fund study cast doubt on USMCA’s effectiveness, saying the agreement would reduce trade among the three North American neighbors, have a “negligible” effect on economic output and fail to bring auto jobs back to the United States. “The new rules lead to a decline in the production of vehicles and parts in all three North American countries, with shifts toward greater sourcing of both vehicles and parts from outside of the region,” the IMF paper said. The deal also would have no impact on inflation-adjusted wages in the United States or Canada while resulting in a slight decline for Mexican workers. Consumers also would face higher prices and thus buyer fewer vehicles, the study said. A senior official in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative denigrated the IMF study as reflecting the “opinions” of its authors. The more favorable USTR conclusions were derived from confidential business plans that major automakers submitted to the government and that were more reliable than economic modeling, the official said. “We have unique insights,” said the official, who insisted on anonymity to brief reporters. Changing North American trade rules is especially important as the auto industry gears up for major investments in autonomous and electric vehicle production, the official said. The new deal should result in more next-generation plants in the United States rather than in Mexico, the official said.

#### The benefits are small and likely overstated

SCOTT 4/23 (Robert E.; Senior Economist and Director of Trade and Manufacturing Policy Research – Economic Policy Institute, “And if you believe this, I’ve got a great deal to sell you,” https://www.epi.org/blog/and-if-you-believe-this-ive-got-a-great-deal-to-sell-you-the-economic-impacts-of-the-revised-nafta-usmca-agreement/)ww

The North American Free Trade Agreement resulted in growing trade deficits with Mexico and steep U.S. job losses after it was implemented in 1994, increasing the bilateral trade gap by at least $97.2 billion and costing at least 682,900 jobs through 2010. Can NAFTA 2.0 do any better? The U.S. International Trade Commission’s (ITC) new report on the economic impact of the U.S.—Mexico–Canada Trade Agreement, released last week, projects that the revised NAFTA (USMCA) will have tiny impacts on the economy. The ITC estimates the deal will increase GDP by 0.35% when it is fully implemented (six years after it takes effect), or roughly 10 weeks of growth. Similarly, it projects that 175,000 jobs will be added in the domestic economy, a 0.1 percent increase in total employment (based on CBO projections for the economy in 2025), or roughly as many jobs as the economy adds in a normal month, over the next six years. And it claims real wages will rise about one-quarter of a percentage point (0.27 percent), roughly 4 percent of what workers are expected to gain, in real terms, over the next six years, if promised gains in output and employment are realized. But there are strong reasons to doubt that these gains will be achieved. The ITC results show that the deal will yield remarkably small gains, and those gains rest on questionable assumptions about how the deal will help workers and the economy. Perhaps the most problematic finding in the ITC study (p. 25) was that labor provisions in the USMCA “would increase Mexico union wages by 17.2 percent, assuming that these provisions are enforced.” Given that unionization rates in the durable goods sectors of Mexican manufacturing are reported to be 20.2 percent (Table F.4), these would be massive impacts, indeed. Yet Mexican workers will not benefit unless there are mechanisms to ensure that labor rights enforcement does improve, but those provisions do not yet exist in the agreement. Thus, it is not surprising to find that the AFL-CIO, other labor unions, and many members of Congress are demanding that “swift [and] certain enforcement tools” are included in the deal before it is submitted to Congress. These concerns also apply to segments of the agreement that pertain to the environment, access to medicines. Furthermore, the assumption that Mexican union wages will increase 17.2 percent seems especially heroic, within the 6-year adjustment period in the ITC model (p 23.), in light of the struggles that will be required to unionize such a large share of the labor force. The ITC’s economic impact projections are built on a series of heroic assumptions that are built into its “computable general equilibrium (CGE) model.” The ITC model assumes the economy is always at full employment; that trade deals do not cause trade imbalances, job losses, growing income inequality, or downward pressure on the wages of most workers, and environmental damages;, and that the more expensive drugs, movies and software don’t otherwise harm consumers or the economy. In particular, the ITC study assumes that the overall U.S. trade balance is unchanged by the deal (despite its significant changes in the rules of governing, trade, labor and the environment). Peter Dorman pointed out the problems with CGE models nearly two decades ago, as have many others, and yet the ITC staff, and other economists keep using them anyway. ITC studies of the impacts of trade and investment deals have a particularly poor track record of projecting the actual pattern of trade following recent trade deals. In addition to being wrong about the overall size and direction of trade flows, the ITC also failed to “correctly identify the winning and losing industries in trade with Mexico and Korea.” The ITC claimed (Table 2.2) the US-Korea KORUS deal would improve that trade balance, but the trade deficit increased, costing more than 95,000 American jobs. And the most infamous, 1999, ITC estimate (Tbl. ES-4) was that China’s entry into the WTO would increase the bilateral trade deficit by about $2 billion after the deal is fully implemented. At last count, that deficit is up $272 billion, costing 3.4 million U.S. jobs. The ITC’s claims about supposed (net) benefits of the NAFTA-2 (USMCA) deal stand in contrast to those of several other studies. Researchers from the International Monetary Fund recently used their own CGE model to estimate the economic impacts of the trade deal. They found that the USMCA, alone, would result in slight increases in welfare for Mexico and Canada and a small net welfare loss of $794 million for the United States. Some of the most important, and controversial, changes to the NAFTA agreement, embodied in the USMCA, involve new rules of origin (ROO) that raise the level of regional content for motor vehicles, parts and some other products (including steel and aluminum in vehicles) which must be achieved in order to qualify for special, duty-free treatment under the agreement. New standards were also developed for labor value content (LVC) that require certain minimum shares (40 to 45 percent) of cars and trucks must be produced with labor earning at least US$16 per hour. [1] The ITC report estimates that the USMCA’s ROO and LVC requirements would increase net employment in U.S. auto and parts production by more than 28,000 jobs, and that U.S. investment will increase by “$683 million per year to meet new demand for U.S. produced engines and transmissions. (ITC report 19).” But these findings are certainly controversial. In their recent IMF working paper, Burfisher, Lambert and Matheson, found that the USMCA agreement (alone) would result in a small ($275 million) increase in the U.S. trade deficit, and that the negative sectoral impacts would be more significant. In particular, they found the agreement would reduce output of motor vehicles and parts in all three countries by an average of 0.8 percent ($7.6 billion), and by 0.2 percent in the United States alone. Higher vehicle costs (due in part to tariffs) will reduce vehicle demand, and some auto and parts production is likely to shift to lower wage locations such as China, Vietnam or Malaysia. This finding stands in contrast to the ITC assumption that the USMCA will increase motor vehicle production in the United States.. It is time for a new approach to analyzing trade deals. The CGE models are built to analyze the impacts of reducing tariffs on trade. But deals such as the USMCA are about much more than trade in goods and increased efficiency in the economy. They are trade and investment deals, and their most important, negative effect on U.S. workers is that they make it attractive for multinational companies to offshore production to low wage countries such as Mexico. The CGE models make gross, simplifying assumptions about how non-trade issues affect workers and the economy, and yet provide an unearned degree of perceived rigor about these effects, when, in fact, they are assuming answers rather than carefully exploring their impacts. The USMCA nibbles at the edges of the USITC trade model, and the basic approach to negotiating trade deals, but doesn’t appear to change its basic tenets.. The USMCA will continue to encourage firms to offshore production. The locations may change, from Mexico and Canada to China, Vietnam or Malaysia, but the results will remain the same. These negotiations, and the models used to assess their impacts, aren’t getting the job done for working Americans. It’s time to go back to the drawing board, for all of us.

### A/T: Trade Impact

#### Trump has damaged US trade too much – USMCA can’t overcome

DIAZ 6/18 (Hugo; deputy director of international law at the Centre for International Governance Innovation, “Think trade agreements will mend relationships with the U.S.? Think again,” https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-think-trade-agreements-will-mend-relationships-with-the-us-think/)ww

The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) – which will replace the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) – has largely been received with enthusiasm. U.S. President Donald Trump called it a “very, very good deal.” Former Mexican secretary of economy Ildefonso Guajardo said that Mr. Trump’s trade threats had "practically been defused” thanks to the agreement. Jesus Seade, who then-president-elect Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador appointed as his chief NAFTA negotiator, added that the agreement would bring certainty and stability to trade in North America.

The agreement was reason for Canada to celebrate, too, and it elicited at least a sigh of relief from other countries around the world, particularly those engaged in trade negotiations with the United States. There has been some sense of renewed hope that deals will bring the superpower back to our decades-long global trajectory toward an international system of trade rules, and rein in the worst protectionist impulses of Mr. Trump, whose zero-sum approach assumes that one country’s gain is another country’s loss.

But the USMCA does little to modernize or upgrade the 25-year-old NAFTA beyond what had been achieved in the Obama administration’s negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement; in fact, it actually backtracks in important areas, such as in the automobile sector, where stricter rules of origin will reduce the competitiveness of North American industry. And with trade escalation with China, and the imposition of tariffs on Mexico (which, if Mr. Trump is to be believed, resulted in action on migration on the southern border), it is evident that, regardless of any trade agreements, new or old, Mr. Trump will continue to use the U.S.'s economic might and tariffs to push his policy objectives. And rather than being a pursuit of policy goals, it is far more likely that the reason is Mr. Trump’s hardened instinct for electoral gains.

The USMCA features plenty of other hints of Mr. Trump’s enduring anti-trade sentiment. Although many dismissed the change of name as innocuous, it is no coincidence that the word “free” was dropped from the title. But more importantly, in an exchange of side letters attached to the deal, Mexico and Canada recognized that the U.S. can impose tariffs on any products imported from Mexico or Canada for alleged national-security reasons. Although they also recognize both countries’ right to retaliate if the U.S. were to impose such tariffs, these letters clearly reflect a move in the opposite direction from free trade.

Signing the USMCA didn’t even really help Ottawa or Mexico City. The U.S. didn’t remove the 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum products that it had imposed on Mexico and Canada in May 2018 until a year later – after Mr. Trump had further escalated his trade war with China – in exchange for both countries removing the tariffs that each of them had imposed on U.S. goods in retaliation. And then it took only a few days for Mr. Trump to threaten, yet again, to levy tariffs not only on steel and aluminum products from Mexico, but on all goods imported from there, for reasons unconnected to trade: Mexico’s performance on stemming the northward flow of migrants. Mr. Trump appears to be pursuing his immigration-policy objectives to cater to his political base as the 2020 presidential elections draw nearer.

Even the migration deal that has since been struck between the U.S. and Mexico is no reason to celebrate, as Mr. Lopez Obrador did last week after claiming victory in the three-day long negotiations that prompted what Mr. Trump calls an “indefinite" suspension of the tariffs on all Mexican goods. Despite the optimism being expressed around the power of trade deals to nudge the U.S. back toward certain norms, we can be sure this will not be the end of Mr. Trump’s deployment of trade weaponry. Mexico, Canada and the rest of the world should heed the writing on the wall.

### A/T: Agriculture Impact

#### Retaliatory Tariffs swamp any benefit to agriculture from USMCA

van der MENSBRUGGHE et al ’18 (Dominique; Professor of Agricultural Economics – Purdue University, “How U.S. Agriculture Will Fare Under the USMCA and Retaliatory Tariffs,” October, https://www.farmfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Trade-Analysis-10-31-18-Final.pdf)ww

The modest market access improvements in the USMCA will lead to an expansion of U.S. agricultural exports by $450 million, mostly in the dairy and poultry sectors. However, the retaliatory measures taken by Canada and Mexico, in reaction to the U.S. decision to raise tariffs on their exports of steel and aluminum, will cause U.S. agricultural exports to decline by $1.8 billion, and by $1.9 billion to these key trading partners. In today’s broader context of reactive trade retaliation from countries around the world, the United States would see a decline in agricultural exports of $7.9 billion, thus overwhelming the small positive gains from USMCA.

#### USMCA undermines US ag

DORFMAN, WORLEY and KANE ’19 (Jeffrey H., Julian M. AND Sharon P.; Agriculture and Applied Economics – University of Georgia, “Policy Brief: The Impact of the USMCA on Georgia’s Small Fruit and Vegetable Industries,” https://www.wabe.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/USMCA\_Economic\_Impact\_Brief.pdf)ww

The Trump Administration has renegotiated NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement, to reach a new trade deal with Canada and Mexico, the U.S. Mexico Canada Agreement or USMCA. While the deal may be an overall positive for the United States, it exposes U.S. fruit and vegetable growers to a high risk of substantial harm through unfair competition from Mexican imports. This policy brief explains the economic damage Georgia fruit and vegetable growers are likely to suffer unless some provisions of the USMCA are renegotiated. In recent years Mexico has greatly expanded the weeks during which their imports compete directly with Georgia fruits and vegetables. Georgia blueberries are ripe and hit the market before blueberries grown in Northern states and Georgia’s climate is also well-suited to fall vegetables such as tomatoes, peppers, squash, cucumbers, and eggplants. Georgia’s natural seasonal advantage has been diminished by Mexican imports arriving during Georgia’s selling season at prices well below Georgia’s production costs. Mexico has accomplished this expansion of import supply over a longer season by a government-subsidized surge in protected growing acres (greenhouses and high tunnels). Administered by SAGARPA, Mexico’s equivalent to the USDA, this policy of subsidies, started in 2009 and known as the Strategic Project for Protected Agriculture, has led the acreage planted to blueberries and vegetables grown in Mexico to increase greatly and has lengthened the weeks each year when Mexico can bring its crops to market at the same time as Georgia. Since 2009 Mexico’s protected production area has grown from 25,000 acres to over 100,000 acres.1 Worse still, thanks to the government subsidies and the lower labor costs (about one tenth of U.S. labor costs) the costs of the Mexican imports is often less than one half the price American growers were receiving before the Mexican imports arrived. Crucially, the new USMCA as currently constituted contains no provision to protect American producers from seasonal damage or government subsidies, providing no remedy or relief mechanism to preserve the ability of American growers to compete fairly with Mexican imports. Thus, unless the current deal is amended, these Mexican imports can cause extensive economic damage to Georgia (and American) fruit and vegetable growers with no remedy available to American growers. The impact of Mexico’s policy of subsidizing the expansion of protected acreage for small fruit and vegetable production can be seen quite clearly in Figures 1 and 2 which show the relative trends in production of blueberries and major vegetable crops in both Mexico and Georgia. Modeling the Economic Losses To model the potential damage from the USMCA as it currently stands, this policy brief presents three scenarios compared to the status quo and evaluates the possible loss of jobs, income, and economic output under those different scenarios. All scenarios and dollar figures below focus only on the most affected crops so far: blueberries, bell peppers, cucumbers, eggplants, squash, and tomatoes. Based on other reporting of Mexican acreage expansion and the observed drops in prices the past few years when Mexican imports entered the U.S. market, the three scenarios were constructed as follows. The estimated economic damage from government-subsidized Mexican producers is confined to blueberries and the vegetables listed above; although other crops may be at risk, these were deemed the crops most at risk for Georgia’s fruit and vegetable growers. If Mexico expands production in a similar manner into other vegetables, Georgia vegetable growers could face even greater economic difficulties. Further, the baseline production values are based on the three-year average over the period of 2015-2017; this included some smaller blueberry crops due to weather. These combined modeling choices mean the estimates of potential economic damage below are likely on the conservative side with the possibility that reality will be even worse. The baseline scenario of no further damage to the Georgia blueberry and vegetable industries is based on average production of the last three years, $590.1 million. Three alternative scenarios were then hypothesized: one of mild additional damage, one of medium additional damage, and one of catastrophic damage to Georgia’s blueberry and vegetable growers. These scenarios are detailed in Table 1 below, with decreases in Georgia production of these crops specified in production value (quantity times price) capturing the reality that losses will occur as a combination of reductions in prices (from competing with subsidized Mexican imports) and decreases in production (due to lower profitability). Losses are anticipated to be higher in crops Mexican growers have already moved strongly into and somewhat smaller in crops for which they currently have fewer acres. One way to think about the three scenarios, based on the current trends of protected acreage expansion in Mexico is the mild damage scenario is what is forecast to occur within the next one to two years, the medium damage scenario would be expected within three to four years, and the catastrophic damage scenarios should become reality within five to eight years. The baseline and each of these three scenarios were then run through IMPLAN, an economic impact modeling software package, to estimate the total economic value of each of the four levels of economic activity in the combined Georgia blueberry and vegetable industries within the state of Georgia. IMPLAN calculates the jobs supported by economic activity, the labor income earned, state and local taxes paid, and the total economic output generated by the original activity being modeled plus all the multiplier effects of that money circulating through the Georgia economy. That is, a grower earns money and spends it at the local chemical and fertilizer company, the supermarket, the car dealer, a local mall, eating out at restaurants, etc. All that spending helps support other jobs and the money that those workers earn also gets recirculated, creating another round of spending. Each round of spending gets smaller as some money “leaks” out of the Georgia economy when we buy products produced outside the state of Georgia. IMPLAN sums up all these rounds to compute the total economic activity created by that original activity. In our case, the original activity is the growing and selling of blueberries and vegetables in Georgia. The impact of Mexico’s subsidies for protected small fruit and vegetable production and the inability of Georgia growers to defend against that under the currently negotiated USMCA are presented below in Table 2. The results above make clear that Georgia’s economy would suffer a significant blow unless the new trade agreement is amended. The potential job losses represent an increase in state unemployment of 0.2%, which is a 5% increase from the current level of 3.9%. The damage will be felt much more severely in Georgia’s rural communities and by Georgia’s agricultural sector. To make the regional impacts clearer, IMPLAN was also used to calculate the impact of each scenario on the ten counties in Georgia that currently have the highest dollar value of blueberry and vegetable production. Table 3 below summarizes the results in the case of catastrophic damage, highlighting the potential income loss in these key production counties and the income loss as a percentage of total county income. What Table 3 shows quite clearly is that in three Georgia counties (Bacon, Clinch, and Echols), a continuation of the current trend for Mexican imports of blueberries and vegetables without some ability to offset that damage would lead to truly breathtaking income losses. For a county to lose over 40% of its income, as Clinch and Echols are forecast to experience, is economic damage on the scale of the Great Depression. In four additional counties (Appling, Brooks, Colquitt, and Decatur), the percentage drop in incomes is in the range of 2 to 5% equivalent to what is commonly experienced during an economic recession. Thus, while the state of Georgia could withstand the economic damage forecast here, a number of counties would be particularly hard hit, with damage similar to past recessions or even the Great Depression for the three counties hardest hit. Conclusions The conclusion of this modeling exercise is that if the new USMCA is approved as currently negotiated, without any recourse for American farmers to seasonal damage from Mexican government-subsidized production, the economic losses to the Georgia blueberry and vegetable industries will be considerable. The state is on track to lose nearly one billion dollars in annual economic output and over 8,000 jobs unless something occurs to slow down the increase in lowpriced Mexican imports of blueberries and vegetables. On a county-by-county basis, the losses in a few cases will likely reach economic damage rarely seen since the Great Depression.

# SDI 2019

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### AG

#### Failing to pass USMCA kills agriculture.

Duvall 19 — Zippy Duvall, President of the American Farm Bureau Federation, former president of the Georgia Farm Bureau, 2019 (“U.S. Ag Gets a Great Deal with USMCA,” *American Farm Bureau Federation*, April 3rd, Available Online at https://www.fb.org/viewpoints/u.s.-ag-gets-a-great-deal-with-usmca, Accessed 07-22-2019) PRK

Farmers know a good deal when we see one. We watch every penny and stretch every dollar as far as it can go. We fix up our tractors and repair our old pickup trucks year after year, hoping to get yet another season out of them.

At the same time, we always have our eye on the latest technology and tools that will make our farms and ranches more productive and more efficient. I don’t know a farmer or rancher who would pass up a good deal that could make their business better. The same is true when it comes to trade deals. When NAFTA was signed more than 25 years ago, it was the best trade deal U.S. agriculture had ever seen. But now there’s a new deal on offer—the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement or USMCA. We have a chance to trade in a great agreement for an even better one.

Since NAFTA went into effect in 1994, U.S. ag exports to Canada and Mexico have more than quadrupled, making these our number 1 and number 2 markets respectively. In 2018 alone, we exported $20.7 billion in ag products to Canada and $19 billion to Mexico.

These markets have only grown in value for U.S. farmers and ranchers. Over the last decade, ag exports have increased 27 percent to Canada and 23 percent to Mexico.

But as good as NAFTA has been, it’s time for an upgrade: it’s time for Congress to approve USMCA.

Without USMCA, our most critical markets hang in the balance. Both Canada and Mexico have already signed another deal that does not include the United States. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership replaces the TPP agreement that the U.S. agreed to but then backed out of in 2017. The CPTPP gives Canada and Mexico preferential trade terms with nine other countries and gives those countries better access to Canada’s and Mexico’s markets―all while the ongoing trade war hangs overhead, with tariffs hurting U.S. agricultural exports. Just this week, Japan is following through on its promises under the CPTPP and reducing its tariffs and raising its quotas for ag products from CPTPP partners. This is all the more reason why we must bring the USMCA across the finish line and secure our valuable trade partnership with our nearest neighbors.

The USMCA is also important in setting the stage for other modern trade agreements for U.S. agriculture. NAFTA needed to be modernized, and the USMCA has bells and whistles that we don’t have under our existing trade agreements. Let’s look under the hood. For the U.S., it’s the first trade agreement to deal with approval of and trade in products of biotechnology. This groundwork will be critical in agreements we pursue with other countries, especially in the EU, the UK and Japan. The new agreement broadens access for U.S. dairy and finally brings an end to Canada’s unfair class 7 pricing scheme. These are wins we didn’t see even under TPP. Finally, USMCA will bring greater access for poultry, improve wheat grading standards, and make much-needed improvements to animal and plant health protection standards.

Finally, ratifying the USMCA will show our top trading partners and other countries that the United States and the trade negotiators who represent us mean business. It would prove that our word and handshake can be trusted when we strike a deal.

Right now, it’s important for each of us to call on our lawmakers in Washington and tell them how important the USMCA is to agriculture. Farmers and ranchers are resilient, but our businesses—not to mention the jobs and rural communities that depend on us—cannot survive without our top markets. Let’s get this deal done, so we can move forward with opening and expanding more markets around the globe.

#### Collapse of the food industry paves the way for failings states that cause a litany of impacts- extinction

Lester R. Brown,( in the words of the Washington Post, is "one of the world's most influential thinkers." The Telegraph of Calcutta has called him "the guru of the environmental movement." Brown is founder of both the Worldwatch Institute (1974) and the Earth Policy Institute (2001), which he heads today. He has authored or co- authored 50 books; his most recent is Plan B 3.0: Mobilizing to Save Civilization. Brown is the recipient of many prizes and awards, including 24 honorary degrees and a MacArthur Fellowship. , 5-1-2009, "Could Food Shortages Bring Down Civilization?," Scientific American, <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/civilization-food-shortages/>) vik

As demand for food rises faster than supplies are growing, the resulting food-price inflation puts severe stress on the governments of countries already teetering on the edge of chaos. Unable to buy grain or grow their own, hungry people take to the streets. Indeed, even before the steep climb in grain prices in 2008, the number of failing states was expanding [Purchase the digital edition to see related sidebar]. Many of their problems stem from a failure to slow the growth of their populations. But if the food situation continues to deteriorate, entire nations will break down at an ever increasing rate. We have entered a new era in geopolitics. In the 20th century the main threat to international security was superpower conflict; today it is failing states. It is not the concentration of power but its absence that puts us at risk.

States fail when national governments can no longer provide personal security, food security and basic social services such as education and health care. They often lose control of part or all of their territory. When governments lose their monopoly on power, law and order begin to disintegrate. After a point, countries can become so dangerous that food relief workers are no longer safe and their programs are halted; in Somalia and Afghanistan, deteriorating conditions have already put such programs in jeopardy.

Failing states are of international concern because they are a source of terrorists, drugs, weapons and refugees, threatening political stability everywhere. Somalia, number one on the 2008 list of failing states, has become a base for piracy. Iraq, number five, is a hotbed for terrorist training. Afghanistan, number seven, is the world’s leading supplier of heroin. Following the massive genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, refugees from that troubled state, thousands of armed soldiers among them, helped to destabilize neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (number six).

Our global civilization depends on a functioning network of politically healthy nation-states to control the spread of infectious disease, to manage the international monetary system, to control international terrorism and to reach scores of other common goals. If the system for controlling infectious diseases—such as polio, SARS or avian flu—breaks down, humanity will be in trouble. Once states fail, no one assumes responsibility for their debt to outside lenders. If enough states disintegrate, their fall will threaten the stability of global civilization itself.

## internal link

### a2: pc theory incorrect

#### Consensus of studies prove PC true

Madonna, 16 – Anthony J. Madonna, James E. Monogan III, and Richard L. Vining Jr, Associate Professors of Political Science at University of Georgia, 2-09-2016, “Confirmation Wars, Legislative Time, and Collateral Damage: Assessing the Impact of Supreme Court Nominations on Presidential Success in the U.S. Senate”, <http://spia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/mlynch/Monogan.pdf>

Time Management and the President’s Agenda

Presidents use a wide range of tactics to set policy, including their ability to influence the legislative agenda and staff vacancies to lower level federal courts. In terms of influencing the legislative agenda, modern presidents introduce legislation and define policy alternatives (Covington, Wrighton and Kinney 1995; Eshbaugh-Soha 2005, 2010). While not unconditional, presidents can use their time and effort to secure the passage of key policy proposals (Edwards and Wood 1999; Light 1999; Neustadt 1960). Importantly, though, presidents’ ability to persuade the public is limited. To be successful in enacting desired policies presidents have to time their proposals to align with favorable conditions in public opinion and legislative makeup (Edwards 2009).

#### It tips the scales, through agenda-setting, signaling, and political cover

Gelman, 15 – Jeremy Gelman, University of Michigan; Gilad Wilkenfeld and E. Scott Adler, University of Colorado; “The Opportunistic President: How US Presidents Determine Their Legislative Programs”, August 2015, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 40:3

The president’s legislative program,1 which is the set of proposals sent from the president to the legislative branch, is viewed as pivotal in presidential-congressional relations. We see evidence of the privileged place these requests have in three ways. First, they shape Congress’s lawmaking agenda. Over 70% of the president’s issue priorities get congressional consideration, and significant legislation sent by the administration is almost always debated (Edwards and Barrett 2000; Peterson 1990). Second, these policy proposals are traditionally viewed as a tool the president can use to open policy windows and create more accommodating lawmaking environments. Kingdon reports that “no other single actor in the political system has quite the capability of the president to set agendas in given policy areas...” (1984, 23). Third, these proposals provide cues to legislators about which issues they can successfully politicize by opposing or supporting the president’s policy ideas (Lee 2009).

As the president’s program heavily influences legislative attention and the level of partisanship within Congress, it is also crucial to understanding the broader policymaking process. To that end, we examine why presidents select some issues to promote in their legislative agenda and not others.

#### Trump PC shapes agenda through public pressure and the news cycle

Catanese, 16 – David Catanese, Senior Politics Writer for U.S. News & World Report, 12-8-2016, “With Rallies and Tweets, Trump Reshaping the Bully Pulpit”, http://www.usnews.com/news/the-run-2016/articles/2016-12-08/donald-trump-builds-a-new-bully-pulpit-with-rallies-tweets

Donald Trump is still six weeks from his Inauguration Day, and yet he's already signaling he'll expand the presidential bully pulpit to bounds not seen before. This week alone, the president-elect is holding rallies in three battleground states – North Carolina, Iowa and Michigan – as part of his "Thank you" tour.

But these rallies – which look, sound and feel indistinguishable from his campaign events – are about much more than simply offering thanks. They appear purposefully designed to portray Trump as a perpetual victor. He's placed squarely inside a reaffirming venue that's used as a vehicle to champion even the smallest of successes, and to push and press forward his unconventional ideas before adoring fans.

To the members of Congress watching from their television screens and Twitter feeds on Capitol Hill, it's a constant and powerful reminder that the masses are with him. And these events are more likely than not to remain a permanent fixture of his presidency.

"What it does is assist him with communicating and laying out his agenda. It helps build momentum for that agenda. People are just loving these. He didn't win and go into hiding," says Rep. Marsha Blackburn of Tennessee, who serves on Trump's transition team. "It will help to put some pressure on Congress to move swiftly. 2017 is not going to be a usual, standard-operating-procedure year in Washington, D.C."

Take Trump's Tuesday night event in Fayetteville, North Carolina, home of Fort Bragg, the largest military base in the U.S. by population. Trump used it to formally unveil his selection for secretary of defense, retired Marine Gen. James "Mad Dog" Mattis.

"Mad Dog plays no games, right?" Trump crowed.

Because he's only been retired for three years, Mattis will need a special waiver from Congress in order to bypass a law that prohibits recent active officers from serving as secretary of defense.

Before thousands of supporters still waving campaign placards, Trump applied his case.

"If he didn't get that waiver, there'd be a lot of angry people," Trump said. "Such a popular choice."

It's just one example of how Trump is transferring the energy from his campaign to governance.

"He's a performance artist. That's what he does for a living. Performers must perform. He feeds off the crowds, he gathers his strength and momentum from them. I doubt he'll suddenly switch that light off, because he may feel unalive," says Douglas Brinkley, a presidential historian and professor at Rice University. "He won't make a differentiation between campaigning and governing – it's still all the Donald Trump show. He has a winning formula right now.

"Why change courses in midstream because people say other presidents haven't done that?"

What may get in the way of Trump's perpetual roadshow is the responsibilities of governing. A foreign policy crisis. A heightened national security threat. A budget battle. These are all nearly inevitable instances that require a president to huddle and strategize in person with his advisers.

But this is where Trump's second specialized weapon comes into play: his Twitter account.

While Obama became the first president to tweet in 2015, his miniature missives generally have been formal, banal and forgettable. Trump's tweets are the exact opposite, and there's no mistake about who's drafting them. They're spontaneous, humorous and often substantive, though the veracity of their substance has been called into question on multiple occasions.

Trump's tweets already are driving cable news coverage, molding policy and placing opponents on notice. For instance, just this week he's used his account to attack China's currency devaluation and activity in the South China Sea, propose canceling a plan for Boeing to produce a new Air Force One, and attack the head of a United Steelworkers branch.

The ability to singularly drive a news cycle from the palm of his hand is going to be a new phenomenon that will test the traditional roles of policymaking and journalism.

Yet there are some who believe the novelty of Trump's tweets eventually will wear off.

"He's got tremendous political capital now, but he's burning through it with tweets. You use these tweets too frequently and they're going to lose all force. It becomes entertainment, not persuasion," says Paul Light, a professor of public service at New York University.

That wasn't true of the campaign, however, when Trump's tweets were often the dominant topic of conversation, for better or for worse.

With Trump reducing the number of interviews he grants and not having held a press conference in months, his tweets have become the prime conduit to the president-elect's mind. News organizations have little choice but to track them.

"The new reality is Donald Trump's tweets are going to be running the news cycle. It's not going to stop," Brinkley says. "It's a new form of governing. Some people will find it tacky and crass. Others will say it's a clever way to go over Washington, D.C., officialdom and speak directly to the American people. It's going to make the press conference and pool reporters antiquated."

He adds, "It's almost like Confucius spreading strange wisdom. Every day he's pumping verbage into our news cycle and he's able to control – with the number of characters, using choice words – to goad people, get under people's skin, seek revenge and move policy forward in his direction."

Taken together, Trump's megarallies and tweetstorms are already ushering in a reimagined presidential pulpit, one that plays to his strength of pithy performance art laced with dashes of suspense.

#### PC real and ensures passage---it’s key to both the left and right

---GOP reps can only buck Trump so many times, or they’ll lose primaries

---Trump PC effective with red/purple state Dems

Cusack, 16 – Bob Cusack, The Hill, 11-23-2016, “Trump’s new weapon? The bully pulpit”, http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/307194-trumps-new-weapon-the-bully-pulpit

Trump showed he isn't shy in going after members of his own party throughout the 2016 presidential cycle. And that probably won't change in 2017 and 2018.

The conservative-leaning House Freedom Caucus and outside right-wing groups are wary of Trump's $1 trillion infrastructure proposal and want the 45th president to focus on reducing the nation's record debt levels. The Freedom Caucus was instrumental in pushing former Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) out the door, but picking a fight with Trump is another thing entirely. Most Republicans in the House don't worry about their November election — they worry about their primaries. And crossing Trump could risk a challenge from the right in the 2018 cycle.

Speaker Paul Ryan (R-Wis.) and Trump feuded in 2016, but in the name of party unity and policy, they have put aside their differences. And in a related development, Ryan's approval rating just hit an all-time high earlier this month.

After the election, Ryan said it's time for the Republican Party to “go big” and “bold.” Trump wouldn't have it any other way, though there are inherent risks with an aggressive strategy without a supermajority in the Senate.

Republicans who publicly ripped Trump are now getting in line, so muscling big-ticket items through the upper chamber using budget reconciliation shouldn't be that challenging. Those bills, such as ObamaCare repeal, would only need 51 Senate votes to pass. But replacing ObamaCare, building a wall along the southern border and clearing a Supreme Court nominee will necessitate 60 votes.

That’s where Trump's bully pulpit will come in, calling out Democrats from both red and purple states that he won on Election Day.

While Trump may not be up to speed on the nuances of the legislative process, those mechanics will be handled by Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and Ryan.

Still, the fate of pending bills isn't decided by tactics. It comes down to marketing and political muscle, which play to Trump's strengths.

Trump will surely have a slew of critics of anything he wants to do. They will throw everything they have to kill his agenda.

Trump's likely response: “This bill will help make America great again. It should be passed as soon as possible.”

Democrats will need to step up their messaging game to thwart Trump's agenda. Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.), who will be minority leader next year, had pledged to work with Trump on areas of common ground. He has also vowed to battle Trump when warranted, most notably on attempts to eradicate Obama's legacy laws.

### a2: no spillover

#### Plan spills over – Congressional backlash affects the broader agenda

Milligan 13 ---- Susan, Adjunct professor (Boston University), contributing editor for US News and World Report, former Resident Fellow at the Institute of Politics (Harvard University), B.A. in political science (University at Albany), “The Not All Powerful Presidency,” 5/17, [http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/susan-milligan/2013/05/17/obama-going-bulworth-wouldnt-give-him-power-over-republicans](http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/susan-milligan/2013/05/17/obama-going-bulworth-wouldnt-give-him-power-over-republicans#THUR) \*\*Evidence is modified for gendered language

Congress can -- and recently, has -- stop pretty much anything the president wants to do, and the courts have the authority to undo things as well (though hopefully not on political or partisan grounds, as is the case with the legislative branch no matter who is in control of it). The only way a president can just declare something done is to issue an executive order, and even there, ~~he is~~ [they are] limited. The other way is to do something illegal or of questionable legal basis (Nixon may be more infamous for Watergate, but it was the secret bombings of Cambodia that really go to the issue of abuse of executive power).¶ Congress is meant to be a check and balance on the executive branch, and has exercised that power to its legal limit during the Obama presidency. They have threatened filibusters on even inconsequential bills and nominations, making even more laughable the idea that Obama should have been able to get his agenda through Congress in the early part of his administration because his party "controlled" the Senate. Neither party controls the Senate, and if you had to pick one, it is probably the minority party which has more power.

### a2: trump pc fails

#### Trump knows how to use PC - he’s got key leverage and effective bargaining skills

Delamaide, 17 --- Darrell, Politics Columnist @ MarketWatch, 1/3, <http://www.marketwatch.com/story/trump-will-play-congress-like-a-fiddle-2017-01-03>

Trump will play Congress like a fiddle New president will bargain, not rubber-stamp Republican agenda The full scope of Hillary Clinton’s loss and Donald Trump’s victory will become apparent this week as the newly elected Congress convenes. We all know the Republicans swept the elections, winning the White House and retaining control of both houses of Congress. But it is where these victories came from and how they were made that tells us what will happen in the two years this 115th Congress will have until midterm elections in 2018. There is obviously a great deal of overlap between Trump’s campaign pledges and the standing agenda of congressional Republicans under House Speaker Paul Ryan and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell. But there are also some significant differences — in the approach to trade issues and deficit spending, to name just two. Trump’s pledge to maintain and defend Medicare and Social Security is another important difference. Congressional Republicans may think they are about to reach the Promised Land, and Washington Post reporter David Weigel this week neatly summed up the various bills they have vetted on issues from deregulation to repealing Obamacare that are just waiting for a president to sign into law. But if Trump has proven anything in his idiosyncratic campaign, it is that he is hardly just “a Republican with enough working digits to handle a pen” — the ideal president once dreamed of by tax reform activist Grover Norquist. In other words, it’s not likely Trump will simply rubber-stamp legislation that a Republican Congress churns out. Why would someone who trumpets his expertise in negotiation simply give Congress what it wants? He will hold back on those signatures as leverage to get what he wants, especially when it runs counter to or simply beyond the lawmakers’ agenda. Salena Zito, a pro-Trump commentator who catapulted to prominence for her insights into the Trump campaign, reminds us that the key to understanding the incoming president is his 1987 book, “The Art of the Deal.” Trump voters understood what mainstream media commentators still haven’t grasped — many of his statements are not ex cathedra pronouncements on policies but negotiating ploys. And, yes, many of them are not completely true. “Throughout the book, he is always negotiating, no matter if he was coming from a full truth or not, didn’t matter,” Zito writes of the 1987 book in the Washington Examiner. “It is always about the value of what is at stake. In that type of barter, truthfulness becomes irrelevant, it only has actuality if the deal is struck and the facts come out.” Which brings us back to Congress and how Trump will deal with it. Even though Republicans retained control of both houses, Democrats trimmed those majorities even as Clinton won a commanding plurality in the popular vote for president. The Republican majority in the Senate went to 52 from 54, out of 100, and to 241 from 247, out of 435 in the House. The electoral upsets that enabled Republicans to maintain the Senate majority were the victories of Ron Johnson in Wisconsin and Pat Toomey in Pennsylvania, two Republican incumbents most pollsters predicted would lose to Democratic challengers, Russ Feingold and Kathleen McGinty. But Trump’s surprising win in those swing states also lifted the two incumbents to an unexpected victory. Had Clinton’s campaign in those states been slightly more effective she might be the president-elect with Democratic control of the Senate. Democrats were bound to recapture the Senate seat in Illinois, but they also won a closely fought battle in New Hampshire, where the popular governor, Maggie Hassan, defeated Republican incumbent Kelly Ayotte. It may well have been Ayotte’s disavowal of Trump that cost her the margin of victory. The lesson here, as with unsuccessful Nevada Senate candidate Joe Heck, who lost ground after distancing himself from Trump, is that Republican lawmakers need Trump’s support to gain voter favor more than he needs them. The picture from the House results is a little less clear-cut. Although every member is up for re-election every two years, the rate of incumbency victories is very high. In 2016, 380 of the 393 incumbents seeking re-election won, for an incumbency rate of 96.7%. According to Ballotpedia, Democrats tend to gain seats in presidential election years with their higher voter turnout, while Republicans tend to gain in the midterm elections. For instance, Democrats gained eight sets in 2012 and 24 in 2008, which make the net gain of six in 2016 seem relatively small. So Republicans are likely to make gains in the House in 2018. In the Senate, Republicans will be defending only eight seats, while Democrats will be defending 25 — 10 of which are in states that Trump won. Those 10 Democratic senators will be very careful about thwarting Trump, which makes his leverage in the Senate considerably larger than the 52 Republicans. Trump may be a political novice, but if he’s half as skillful at negotiation as he claims to be, he will quickly grasp how to play the legislature like a fiddle.

#### Trump knows how to use PC effectively, but its finite and drained by major fights over external policies

Collinson, 17---Stephen, political columnist at CNN, 1/4, <http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/03/politics/donald-trump-republicans-congress/>

Trump throws weight around Washington Donald Trump isn't even in Washington yet, but he's already throwing his weight around. The President-elect prevailed Tuesday in the first exchange of what could turn out to be an awkward, sometimes turbulent relationship with fellow Republicans on Capitol Hill. A full-blown PR disaster threatened to derail the first day of the new Congress as House Republicans prepared to move forward with a measure that would have gutted an independent ethics office. As the scope of the controversy became clear by mid-morning, Trump threw cold water on the plan, calling the ethics watchdog "unfair," but suggesting there were bigger priorities for lawmakers to tackle. "With all that Congress has to work on, do they really have to make the weakening of the Independent Ethics Watchdog, as unfair as it ... may be, their number one act and priority," Trump said in consecutive tweets. "Focus on tax reform, healthcare and so many other things of far greater importance!" Within hours, House GOP lawmakers met in an emergency session and decided unanimously to remove the ethics provisions from a broader package slated for a vote later in the day. The episode was the first test of Trump's ability to exert influence over his party in Congress. It's unclear whether Trump's tweets were the sole deciding factor in the GOP's flip or whether lawmakers were responding to intense pressure from constituents. A brief history of the House GOP's failed ethics ploy Either way, it's certain the blowback intensified to a new level once Trump turned to Twitter. Rep. Steve King of Iowa, who backed the attempt to gut the ethics panel that many lawmakers believe overreaches, said Trump's comment "animated the press" and created pressure on GOP lawmakers to change course. "I'm concerned that now we have Republicans criticizing Republicans," King said. "We need to stay away from that." Some lawmakers said they decided independently their move was unwise and didn't need Trump to tell them. Perception in Washington But in a sense, it does not matter. The perception quickly jelled in Washington that Trump put himself at the center of the storm and changed the weather. Such actions tend to enhance a President's perceived power, especially in the crucial early months of his administration. The GOP wrangle was not Trump's only win on Tuesday. Ford announced it would nix a plan to build a factory in Mexico and would spend $700 million to bring 700 jobs to Michigan, crediting Trump's policies for the move. Democrats will argue that such interventions pale into comparison to the millions of jobs created by President Barack Obama. But Trump faces the likely impossible challenge of returning US manufacturing jobs from low-wage economies abroad. So in the case of Ford, as with the spat on Capitol Hill, the symbolism and media coverage is far more important than context. In the meantime, Tuesday's drama offered a preview of how Trump will govern. The Twitter president appears unlikely to be content with working congressional back channels and using conventional levers of power to get his way. The day's events also showed that while Trump may be a Washington newbie, he knows how to score an easy political win. Trump hotel lawsuit at impasse, headed to trial For much of his transition, Trump has been hounded by ethics questions of his own, centering on potential huge conflicts of interests posed by his global business interests. His wealthy cabinet picks -- such as Rex Tillerson for secretary of state and Steve Mnuchin for Treasury -- are being accused by Democrats of failing to provide sufficient financial data and other information ahead of their confirmation hearings. But Trump can now present himself as a champion of ethical standards on Capitol Hill and argue that he has already taken a step to honor his vow of draining Washington's political swamp. The exchange also appeared to hint at the Republican hierarchy in Washington after the inauguration and the incoming president's relationship with Speaker Paul Ryan. Ryan, a Wisconsin Republican, initially opposed the change to ethics rules. But once he was defied by his troops, he fell into line, issuing a statement defending the move -- only for GOP lawmakers to reverse themselves later. Sway with the GOP The way the confrontation ended left an impression that Trump, basking in the political capital that new presidents enjoy, may have as much sway with the restive Republican caucus as Ryan himself, who was re-elected speaker on Tuesday. Of course, life is going to get a lot tougher for the President-elect. Despite their common political aims -- repealing Obamacare, passing big tax cuts and beginning a new era of conservative rule -- Trump and the GOP will not always see eye to eye. And Ryan's new GOP conference looks as likely to be as unruly as his last one.

## ag impact

### block – ag impact ext

#### Destroys U.S. ag---certainty is key

Chrisp 19 (Lynn - President of National Corn Growers Association, 3-15-2019, “Farmers need USMCA to preserve and build upon a successful trading relationship,” https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/434239-farmers-need-usmca-to-preserve-and-build-upon-a-successful)

America’s corn farmers are bracing for another year of uncertainty. Farmers in the South have already started planting, while others are anxiously awaiting a spring thaw to get into the field. They’re making decisions that will create a ripple effect for their families, communities and the U.S. economy amid depressed farm incomes and market instability. Reaffirming U.S. trading relationships with our North American partners is an important step toward stabilizing a struggling farm economy and the No. 1 legislative priority for corn farmers this year. This is why corn farmers from across the country are taking to Capitol Hill this week. They’re laying the groundwork for a concerted effort by U.S. agriculture producers to ratify the new U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA). USMCA will solidify a $3.2 billion export market for corn farmers and provide some certainty as farmers begin the hard work of planting and harvesting their crop. Ratifying USMCA will also instill confidence in other nations with whom we want to enter into future trade agreements. Opening new markets will ensure U.S. agriculture remains competitive for generations to come. The existing North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has been an unequivocal success for American agriculture. Over the past 20 years, U.S. agricultural exports to Canada have tripled and quintupled to Mexico. Exports of feed grains in all forms, which includes corn, sorghum, and barley, increased an astounding 329 percent since NAFTA went into effect in 1994. President Trump followed through on his campaign promise to renegotiate the existing North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), announcing the renamed USMCA with leaders from Mexico and Canada this past November. Now, farmers are taking an active role to get it across the finish line. Cementing these markets and reaffirming our trading relationships with our North American partners is why leaders of commodity organizations representing corn, soybeans, wheat and sorghum stood together before more than 9,000 attendees at last month’s Commodity Classic and pledged to work together to see USMCA ratified this year. For corn farmers, USMCA preserves and builds upon our successful trading relationship with Mexico and Canada. USMCA maintains zero tariffs on U.S. corn and corn products while also setting a high standard for future trade agreements in areas critical to U.S. agriculture such as biotechnology and the creation of a rapid-response mechanism to address trade challenges. But it’s not just farmers who benefit from North American trade. In 2014, 17.3 million American jobs were related to agriculture, more than 9 percent of total U.S. employment. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimates that NAFTA supports 14 million U.S. jobs. We can’t afford to lose this market. The president has threatened to withdraw from NAFTA if Congress does not approve USMCA. We take this threat seriously and recognize that without USMCA, American agriculture and rural communities would be devastated. A Purdue University and Farm Foundation study found that this action would amount to a $9.4 billion loss in agricultural exports annually.

#### **USMCA key to food and agriculture industry**

Bechtel 6-11 ---Wyatt Bechtel, 6-11-2019, "USMCA Passage Encouraged by 960+ Ag, Food Associations and Companies," Drovers, https://www.drovers.com/article/usmca-passage-encouraged-960-ag-food-associations-and-companies

A collation of U.S. food and agriculture associations and companies addressed a letter to Congress seeking quick ratification of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). The letter was sent on June 11 by more than 960 groups representing the U.S. food and agriculture value chain at the national, state and local.

An excerpt of the letter says:

“Over the last 25 years, U.S. food and agricultural exports to Canada and Mexico have more than quadrupled under NAFTA – growing from $9 billion in 1993 to nearly $40 billion in 2018. NAFTA has significantly helped create a reliable, high-quality supply of food products for U.S. consumers, while supporting more than 900,000 American jobs in food and agriculture and related sectors of the economy. USMCA builds on the success of the NAFTA agreement, and will ultimately lead to freer markets and fairer trade. This modernized trade agreement makes improvements to further enhance U.S. food and agricultural exports to our neighbors and would deliver an additional $2.2 billion in U.S. economic activity.”

The letter was signed by a number of national groups representing farmers and ranchers, including:

American Farm Bureau Federation

American Soybean Association

National Cattlemen’s Beef Association

National Council of Farmer Cooperatives

National Cotton Council

National Corn Growers Association

National Milk Producers Federation

National Pork Producers Council

National Sorghum Producers

Also signing the letter were food processing companies, along with state and local agriculture associations.

Discussions in Congress

A hearing was held by the House Agriculture Livestock and Foreign Agriculture Subcommittee the same day the letter was sent. The subcommittee was reviewing the state of U.S. agricultural products in international markets and following the hearing Subcommittee Ranking Member David Rouzer (R-NC) and Committee Ranking Member K. Michael Conaway (R-TX) both expressed the importance of getting USMCA passed.

“USMCA is a no-brainer for American agriculture. If the International Trade Commission’s (ITC) estimated $2.2 billion increase in ag exports doesn’t convince my colleagues, then all they need to do is talk to a local farmer or rancher. American producers have made it clear: the best thing we can do for our lagging agriculture economy is get this deal done. I urge my colleagues on the committee to join me in calling for Speaker Pelosi to bring USMCA to a vote in the House as soon as possible,” says Rep. Rouzer.

“Rather than spew platitudes about the importance of free trade to American agriculture, it’s time for the House Democratic Leadership to get serious about the clear win that sits before them – the USMCA agreement. Today’s hearing further underscored that ratifying USMCA is critically important to America’s farmers, ranchers, and dairymen. With the ITC report in hand, Speaker Pelosi should bring USMCA up for a vote as quickly as possible,” says Rep. Conaway.

Dairy Voicing Concerns

The dairy industry had already pushed for swift passage of USMCA just a day prior, on June 10, when three national dairy groups, including the International Dairy Foods Association (IDFA), sent a similar letter to members of the House of Representatives. IDFA released a statement regarding the latest letter expressing the importance of USMCA because of fixes to current trade policies with Canada and Mexico.

“USMCA meets the U.S. dairy industry’s top priorities to ensure a more level playing field, including preserving duty-free market access to Mexico, eliminating the unfair Canadian Class 7 pricing program and increasing market access to the Canadian market,” says Michael Dykes, DVM, president and CEO of IDFA. “The U.S. dairy industry, which supports more than 3 million jobs in the United States and pumps $620 billion into the U.S. economy, is making a strong appeal to Congress to vote to ratify this important trade deal. USMCA will ensure that our dairy industry grows valuable market share and continues to be viewed by our North American customers as a reliable supplier.”

USMCA is currently awaiting ratification from both the House and Senate. Rep. Ron Estes (R-KS) tells Farm Journal that ideally Congress will be wrapped up by August with USMCA

#### USMCA is key for agriculture.

LaHood 19 — Darin LaHood, United States Representative for Illinois's 18th congressional district, former member of the Illinois Senate, holds a JD from John Marshall Law School at the University of Chicago, 2019 (“Delaying USMCA harms American agriculture,” *Washington Examiner*, June 18th, Available Online at https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/delaying-usmca-harms-american-agriculture, Accessed 07-22-2019) PRK

For the farmers that I represent in central and west-central Illinois, access to markets in Canada and Mexico is vital to their success.

When harvest comes and farmers take their products to market, they rely upon the open-market free-trade system with our neighbors to the north and south to remain competitive in the global economy.

Over the last 25 years, free trade with Mexico and Canada has supported over 900,000 jobs in the food and agricultural sector and quadrupled exports from $9 billion to almost $40 billion. In the heartland of America, we have some of the richest farmland in the world, and thanks to free trade, our farmers have been able to feed and fuel not only our country, but the world.

As we look ahead toward the next 25 years, updating our trade policies will enable our farmers and ranchers to continue leading the way in the agriculture economy. That is why President Trump and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer worked tirelessly to negotiate the United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement, which builds upon the success our agricultural sector has seen through free trade with our neighbors.

Not only does USMCA maintain the duty-free access for American farmers to Mexico and Canada, it will deliver an additional $2.2 billion in economic activity. Passage of USMCA will also open the Canadian market for American dairy, wheat, chicken, egg, and turkey products. It will also increase real GDP by $68.2 billion and create 176,000 U.S. jobs, according to the U.S. International Trade Commission, helping manufacturers and small business, as well.

Getting USMCA done will strengthen our food and agricultural economy and give certainty to farmers, so they can make new investments to grow their operations.

I often remind my friends in Chicago and in Washington, that in Illinois, agriculture is our number one industry in terms of economic impact. It’s no secret that the agriculture community has endured a tough spring with low commodity prices, flooding, and ongoing trade disputes, but Congress can take a significant step by delivering certainty through passage of USMCA.

However, as things stand, USMCA is being held hostage by career politicians in Washington who are hell-bent on preventing President Trump from getting a win. A delay in approval of this agreement will hit the wallets of family farms in Illinois and across the country. The agriculture community is losing out because political gamesmanship is being placed in front of their interests.

There’s too much at stake for our farmers to let this opportunity pass by. USMCA will expand economic opportunity in the heartland. It will provide the framework for the next 25 years of free trade in North America. And it will ensure agriculture remains competitive in our ever-evolving global economy.

USMCA is a win for America, a win for the Midwest, a win for Illinois, and a win for the family farmer. Congress must come together and get this done. Delaying it further will only hurt American agriculture.

#### The trade war is destabilizing agriculture – USMCA key to stability.

Childress and Clark 19 — Rick Childress, journalist at the McClatchy DC Bureau, Lesley Clark, Washington Correspondent at McClatchy, White House Correspondent at McClatchy, 2019 (“Texas farmers worry that tariffs against Mexico endanger a critical trade deal,” *McClatchy DC Bureau*, June 4th, Available Online at https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-government/congress/article231170663.html, Accessed 07-22-2019) PRK

An ongoing trade war with China has made it unprofitable for farmers to send their products overseas, leaving many farmers looking for relief in the possible passage of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada agreement, which would look to normalize a long-time trading relationship with Mexico.

For Boening, tariffs against Mexico puts the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement in jeopardy.

According to Luis Ribera, a professor and director of North American studies at Texas A&M University, said the previous North American Free Trade Agreement, an agreement for tariff-free trade across the continent, was very lucrative for Texas. NAFTA is still in effect, but the threat of tariffs and the possibility of a new deal has made the market unstable.

In 2018, Mexico was by far Texas’ biggest trading partner, as 37 percent of the state’s exports—about $109.7 billion—went to Mexico. The USMCA agreement would undoubtedly be a boon to Texas farmers, Ribera said.

“(Texas farmers) need the new USMCA,” Boening said. “It’s good for agriculture, it’s good for other industries. I think it’s a very legitimate concern that this new round of tariffs can jeopardize moving the new USMCA forward.”

## pharma impact module

#### Passing USMCA is key to ensuring the intellectual property rights that allow for pharma innovation

Spiegel 7/21 (Andrew Spiegel is the executive director of the Global Colon Cancer Association, 7-21-2019, "Your View: To find tomorrow’s cures pass trade deal today," The Morning Call, <https://www.mcall.com/opinion/mc-opi-north-american-trade-deal-cancer-treatments-20190721-h2q24pk4efgwfhf4266ryz5alu-story.html>) cliv

Congress will soon consider the new North American trade deal, dubbed the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement. When U.S. government officials negotiated the deal, they asked their Mexican and Canadian counterparts to lift their nations’ intellectual property standards for certain advanced drugs.

But now, some U.S. lawmakers are taking issue with this provision, claiming it will adversely impact U.S. drug prices. They’re wrong. USMCA’s intellectual property rules will catalyze further investment in medical research without affecting prices. If Congress wants to help patients here and abroad, they’ll pass the trade deal assigned by the three countries last fall.

The United States leads the world in medical innovation. American labs are responsible for more than half of all drugs currently being developed worldwide. This includes more than 1,000 cancer treatments, 85 drugs to fight Alzheimer’s disease, and another 550 that combat rare diseases.

There’s a reason America leads in innovation. Our nation’s robust intellectual property protections encourage researchers to develop their products here. Thanks to our patent protections, firms pour billions of dollars into research and development projects in America each year — $90 billion in 2016 alone.

In particular, U.S. patent law has encouraged the development of biologics — complex drugs made using living organisms. Biologics have proven successful in treating a number of conditions, including multiple sclerosis and cancer. Since 2004, the FDA has approved five biologics to treat colon cancer. Treatment options are one key to advancing patient health. Good public policies drives private industry investment and competition.

The United States offers 12 years of “regulatory data protection” for biologics. For the duration of that window, rival companies can’t manufacturer copycat versions of these drugs, called biosimilars. That gives innovators a chance to recoup their sky-high investment costs.

Many other countries recognize the value of strong intellectual property protections. The entire European Union, for example, provides 10 years of regulatory data protection for biologics. Existing Canadian law only provides eight years. Mexico doesn’t offer anything. USMCA would require both countries to offer at least 10 years of protection, bringing them closer to the U.S. standard.

That’s great news for patients. With scientific discoveries protected at home and abroad, more investors would be spurred to pour money into the next generation of biologics. Unfortunately, a handful of lawmakers want to eliminate USMCA’s section on biologics. This doesn’t make sense. There’s no evidence to suggest that reducing intellectual property protections would cut costs. In fact, a report from the Geneva Network found that USMCA would have zero effect on drug prices and total drug spending within overall health care systems.

The Geneva Network report examined the effects of increasing regulatory data protection in Canada and Japan. More than a decade ago, both nations extended an eight-year window to all medicines, not just biologics. The report concludes that increasing the protection had no impact on drug spending in Japan or Canada. In fact, drug spending declined as a percentage of both countries’ health spending after they increased regulatory data protection.

#### USMCA is key to ensuring IP protections for life-science companies- key to innovation

Ezell et al 6/6 (Stephen Ezell is Vice President for Global Innovation Policy at the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) in Washington, D.C.; Richard C. Owens is a Munk Senior Fellow with the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and adjunct professor at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law; and Alberto Saracho is Executive Director of Fundacion Idea in Mexico City, Mexico.6-6-2019, "US must stand up for life-sciences innovation provisions in the USMCA," TheHill, <https://thehill.com/opinion/international/447247-us-must-stand-up-for-life-sciences-innovation-provisions-in-the-usmca>) cliv

The revised NAFTA agreement — now the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) — has been making progress, and Canada is now proceeding with ratification of the deal. However, a challenge standing in the way of full ratification is objections to some of the life-sciences, copyright, and other intellectual property (IP) provisions established in USMCA’s Chapter 20.

One provision under consideration addresses data protection for biologics. A “biologic” is a large molecule drug made from complex biological processes — much more complex than the simple chemical compounds used for more common drugs we take as pills. Their complexity means these drugs tend to be newer and more advanced, but also more difficult and expensive to develop. Extended protection of the clinical trial data demonstrating the safety and efficacy of biologic drugs, which the USMCA obliges member nations to provide at a 10-year minimum term, helps facilitate biologic drugs’ development, offering additional protection for a biologic beyond patents on the molecular compound or biofabrication process alone. It works by delaying the ability of a knock-off drug to use the innovator’s clinical trial and related data to qualify for sale.

Ten years may seem like a long time, but research indicates that drugs commonly take more than 12 years to recoup the investment in research that makes them possible. The United States already exceeds the ten-year minimum requirement by offering data protection for 12 years. However, Canada and Mexico fall below this standard; Canada offers data protection for only eight years, and Mexico offers no biologic-specific data protection. Establishing this 10-year requirement would level the playing field for innovation in all countries, help attract additional life-sciences research and development into Canada and Mexico, and spur more life-sciences investment in the United States.

While the United States already observes stronger data protection than would be required under Chapter 20, the provision has drawn some criticism. Some unions, medical, and faith-based groups, as well as civil society organizations, recently sent a letter to Congress opposing additional market exclusivity for biologics. They argue that the USMCA would “entrench and expand prescription drug monopoly protections, thwart competition and thus undermine efforts to expand access to affordable medicines.”

This argument is deeply misguided, and it threatens future life-sciences innovation. The market for biosimilars (essentially a generic of a biotech drug) is not the same as for generic versions of simpler, old-style drugs. It costs far more to develop and seek approval for a biosimilar, and cost reductions will be around 30 percent (estimates range from 8 to 43 percent) — not the steep discounts we see with generic pharmaceutical drugs. And while competition between biologics and “biosimilars” is indeed useful, what matters most is competition between proprietary biologics. Such competition is far more beneficial than competition with knock-off drugs because it is driven by innovation, creating new-to-the-world medicines and bringing more effective and patient-friendly delivery mechanisms to the fore. Reasonable data protection rules give companies developing new biotech drugs the right incentives to keep making these highly risky, yet beneficial, investments. Thanks to IP protections and a vibrant American life-sciences innovation ecosystem, competition among proprietary biologics is robust.

America’s robust IP protections for biologic drugs are one key reason why the United States leads the world in life-sciences innovation. IP protections ensure continued innovation that leads to important medical advances and cures. These also create good jobs and support U.S. competitiveness and exports. And as part of the USMCA, they facilitate commerce between two of our most important trading partners.

The United States must stand up for innovation in the debate over the USMCA. It must make the case that Chapter 20 is beneficial not just for the United States, but for Canada and Mexico as well. Without U.S. leadership, American, and by extension, global life-sciences innovation could diminish, taking medical advances, economic growth, and good jobs with it. The U.S. must stand up for life-sciences innovation throughout North America and forge ahead with USMCA ratification now.

#### Pharma industry innovation prevents extinction – allows innovation to check new diseases

Engelhardt 8 (H. Tristram, doctorate in philosophy (University of Texas at Austin), M.D. (Tulane University), professor of philosophy (Rice University), and professor emeritus at Baylor College of Medicine, “Innovation and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Critical Reflections on the Virtues of Profit,” <https://www.amazon.com/Innovation-Pharmaceutical-Industry-Reflections-Conflicts/dp/0980209447>) (Taiwan)

Many are suspicious of, or indeed jealous of, the good fortune of others. Even when profit is gained in the market without fraud and with the consent of all buying and selling goods and services, there is a sense on the part of some that something is wrong if considerable profit is secured. There is even a sense that good fortune in the market, especially if it is very good fortune, is unfair. One might think of such rhetorically disparaging terms as "wind-fall profits". There is also a suspicion of the pursuit of profit because it is often embraced not just because of the material benefits it sought, but because of the hierarchical satisfaction of being more affluent than others. The pursuit of profit in the pharmaceutical and medical-device industries is tor many in particular morally dubious because it is acquired from those who have the bad fortune to be diseased or disabled. Although the suspicion of profit is not well-founded, this suspicion is a major moral and public-policy challenge. Profit in the market for the pharmaceutical and medical-device industries is to be celebrated. This is the case, in that if one is of the view (1) that the presence of additional resources for research and development spurs innovation in the development of pharmaceuticals and med-ical devices (i.e., if one is of the view that the allure of profit is one of the most effective ways not only to acquire resources but productively to direct human energies in their use), (2) that given the limits of altruism and of the willingness of persons to be taxed, the possibility of profits is necessary to secure such resources, (3) that the allure of profits also tends to enhance the creative use of available resources in the pursuit of phar-maceutical and medical-device innovation, and (4) if one judges it to be the case that such innovation is both necessary to maintain the human species in an ever-changing and always dangerous environment in which new microbial and other threats may at any time emerge to threaten human well-being, if not survival (i.e., that such innovation is necessary to prevent increases in morbidity and mortality risks), as well as (5) in order generally to decrease morbidity and mortality risks in the future, it then follows (6) that one should be concerned regarding any policies that decrease the amount of resources and energies available to encourage such innovation. One should indeed be of the view that the possibilities for profit, all things being equal, should be highest in the pharmaceutical and medical-device industries. Yet, there is a suspicion regarding the pursuit of profit in medicine and especially in the pharmaceutical and medical-device industries.

### pharma module ext

#### The 10-year provision of the USMCA protects pharma innovation which key to new medicines

Kilbride 19 (Patrick Kilbride is vice president of international intellectual property for the Global Intellectual Property Center (GIPC) at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. , 2-26-2019, "A Vote for the USMCA Will Secure the Innovation of Tomorrow," IPWatchdog, [https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/02/26/vote-usmca-will-secure-innovation-tomorrow/id=106807](https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/02/26/vote-usmca-will-secure-innovation-tomorrow/id%3D106807)) cliv

Promoting public health has always been a bipartisan priority in Washington, D.C. Under the previous administration, lawmakers passed the 21st Century Cures Act and launched the cancer moonshot, two initiatives that aimed to transform health outcomes through greater investment in the next generation of medical treatments.

In his State of the Union address last month, President Trump announced an ambitious plan to end HIV/AIDS by 2030 and increase funding for often-neglected childhood cancers.

For each of these initiatives to be successful, lawmakers must recognize that investing in the cures of tomorrow requires continued bipartisan cooperation. This rings true for passing the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), as well.

The next generation of medical innovation depends on significant private sector investments. The intellectual property (IP) provisions of USMCA help to lay the foundation for continued investment into the research and development (R&D) of innovative cures across North America. In particular, the 10-year term of regulatory data protection for biologics will help ensure that North America continues to lead the world in developing life-saving technologies.

For most of the relatively short history of modern medicine—aspirin was the pioneer in 1899—drugs prescribed to patients were small-molecule chemical products. For generations, innovative pharmaceutical companies have made high-risk, high-capital R&D investments to produce treatments on the basis of patent rights that provide a limited period of exclusivity to recoup front-end investment. While the U.S., Mexico, and Canada all offer a 20-year term of patent protection, innovators must file for patent protection long before a medicine enters the market. So, in practice, the effective period of market exclusivity is much shorter.

Today, 40% of the U.S. prescription drug market is comprised not of small molecule pharmaceuticals but of biologics. These are complex (or “large molecule”) medicines derived from living cells. Biologic medicines have enabled the emerging bio-pharmaceutical community to treat conditions—ranging from infectious diseases to rare genetic disorders to cancers—for which there had been no viable treatment options. Comprising nearly 70% of today’s innovation pipeline, biologics are the medicine of the future.

To make the most of the vast potential that biologics hold, a strong framework of legal rights is needed to make possible the enormous investment these medical innovations represent. Biologics are derived from living organisms, an area of considerable ambiguity in domestic and global patent law. Given the degree of legal uncertainty surrounding biologics patents, bio-pharmaceutical companies rely on governments to instead provide a period of exclusivity for the proprietary information they must submit to prove the safety and efficacy of a new biologic medicine.

The exclusive right to the data that companies produce at their own expense through R&D and clinical trials is known as regulatory data protection or RDP. The USMCA will guarantee a 10-year minimum term of RDP for biologics innovators throughout North America, which stands as a significant advancement of Canada’s and Mexico’s current laws. This will help ensure that innovators across North America can continue to invest in life-saving biologics.

Critics claim that RDP will increase the cost of medicines, but research from the Geneva Network illustrates that when Canada and Japan extended the term of RDP in the past, it had no significant impact on pharmaceutical expenditure. In fact, when Canada introduced an eight-year term of RDP in 2006, pharmaceutical expenditure as a percentage of total health spending actually decreased in the years that followed.

Others have argued that RDP will delay the entry of less expensive follow-on medicines. Unlike small-molecule pharmaceuticals, where the manufacture of a “generic” version is a relatively straightforward—if complex—process, the living organism that comprises a biologic medicine cannot be exactly replicated. Instead, follow-on producers generate a highly comparable product, known as a biosimilar. Though these drugs are not identical to the innovator’s, biosimilar manufacturers rely on the original innovator’s test data to warrant the safety, purity, and efficacy of their own treatment, and meanwhile, they bear none of the cost of producing that data.

Given the complexity of and time required to manufacture biosimilars, studies have shown that a 10-year term of RDP for the innovative biologic does not delay the introduction of the biosimilar in the marketplace. Thus, concerns that RDP will undermine the availability of cheaper, follow-on products are unfounded.

The dual objectives of continued medical innovation and enhanced public health across North America require effective legal protections that guarantee the rights of innovators and provide a pathway for cheaper generics and biosimilars to follow. The 10-year term of RDP included in the USMCA will ensure that innovative companies across the region can invest in the next generation of medical technology, while preserving the pathway for lower cost follow-ons.

Improving public health by enabling medical innovation should be a bipartisan priority, and congressional approval of the USMCA will ensure that North American innovators can continue to invest in the cures of tomorrow.

#### The USMCA contains IP provisions key to protecting pharma innovation

Guerreiro et al 18 (Christopher Guerreiro practises contentious intellectual property dispute resolution and litigation, with an emphasis on patents and issues affecting the life sciences, healthcare, and other high-technology industries, Kristin Wall practises in intellectual property law as a barrister and solicitor. She has particular experience with matters involving the innovative pharmaceutical industry, including litigation proceedings under the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations and Food and Drug Regulations as well as patent impeachment, infringement and damages actions and Judith Robinson is national practice head of our intellectual property practice in Canada and practises as a barrister, solicitor and trademark agent in all areas of intellectual property law, with a particular emphasis on intellectual property litigation before the courts and alternative dispute resolution. 10-16-2018, "New Protections For Biologics And Other Pharmaceuticals Under The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)," Mondaq [http://www.mondaq.com/canada/x/745934/Patent/New+Protections+For+Biologics+And+Other](http://www.mondaq.com/canada/x/745934/Patent/New%2BProtections%2BFor%2BBiologics%2BAnd%2BOther)+ Pharmaceuticals+Under+The+United+StatesMexicoCanada+Agreement+USMCA) cliv

 As we reported, Canada has joined a new trilateral trade deal called the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). The USMCA contains important new protections for biologic and other pharmaceutical innovation. Chief among them, Canada will introduce an extended ten-year period of data protection for biologics and patent-term restoration (PTR) for delays in the patent office.

The USMCA, which replaces the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), will come into force after it has been signed and ratified by the member states. It is anticipated that the USMCA will be signed before the end of 2018, but dates for its ratification and the NAFTA's expiry have yet to be determined.

Extended data protection for biologics

Ten years of protection... Article 20.F.14 of the USMCA requires parties to provide new biologics with a minimum of ten years' data protection from the date of first marketing authorisation. This period is greater than the eight years currently provided by Canada for biologics (together with all other pharmaceuticals), but less than the twelve years already provided for biologics by the U.S. under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act.

...for new biologics. The USMCA obligations regarding extended data protection apply to new pharmaceutical products that are or contain biologics. The scope of this obligation is defined by the following:

New pharmaceutical products are defined to be those that do not contain a chemical entity that has been previously approved in that party.

The USMCA does not include a definition of "biologic" per se, but provides that each Party shall apply this Article to, at a minimum, a product that is produced using biotechnology processes and that is, or, alternatively, contains, a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, protein, or analogous product, for use in human beings for the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition.

Parties are not required to apply this provision to biosimilars.

#### Stronger IP protections for biologics are critical.

O'Brien 18 --- Kevin M. O'Brien, Kamleh J. Nicola and Dr. Christian Alejandro Lopez-Silva, ("USMCA: Provisions and Potential Impact to the Healthcare Industry," 9-30-2018, Baker Mckenzie, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c75f002f-4f85-47a2-be1c-ba7664c421f8, accessed 6-17-2019)

In the United States, the law currently includes a 12-year data protection term for biologics. Pharmaceutical companies previously lobbied for a data protection term of 14 to 16 years, while the Obama administration sought a 7-year protection term in an attempt to reduce drug prices. The 12- year term was ultimately agreed upon to obtain congressional approval for the Affordable Care Act. Critics of longer data protection terms, such as the US-based Association for Accessible Medicine, have voiced concerns that longer protection terms create “a windfall for brand-name drug manufacturers and raise prescription drug prices for patients in the United States.” On the other hand, proponents of longer data protection terms argue that biologics are among the most promising medications but also the most costly to produce; thus the increased protection term incentivizes pharmaceutical companies to innovate and allows them to recover the costs associated with bringing a biologic to market. Although public policy debate surrounding data exclusivity remains, the USMCA provision could create a barrier against future legislative attempts to reduce the data protection term for biologics in the U.S.

#### Pharma key to new drugs – no fill-in

Mossinghoff 96 ---- Gerald J., Professorial Lecturer in Law (George Washington University Law School), Senior Counsel to Oblon, McClelland, Maier and Neustadt, which focuses on IP law, former Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, former Chairman of the General Assembly of the United Nations World Intellectual Property Organization, and former Deputy General Counsel of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Intellectual Property Protection And The Pharmaceutical Industry,” Oblon Publications, http://www.oblon.com/publications/intellectual-property-protection-and-the-pharmaceutical-industry/ (Taiwan)

Although the process is risky, the private sector is still the preeminent source of new pharmaceuticals. Of the 100 most prescribed patented drugs in the United States in 1995, 99% were patented by private industry. A broader measure of all new chemical entities brought to the market between 1981 and 1990 shows equally impressive results -- 92% of all these new drugs were discovered and developed by private industry. Although the U.S. government, principally the National Institutes of Health, also conducts a vigorous basic biomedical research program, only the private sector is capable of turning biomedial research into life-saving new therapies.

#### US vital – our pharma is a leader AND they’re key to biotech

Mossinghoff 96 ---- Gerald J., Professorial Lecturer in Law (George Washington University Law School), Senior Counsel to Oblon, McClelland, Maier and Neustadt, which focuses on IP law, former Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, former Chairman of the General Assembly of the United Nations World Intellectual Property Organization, and former Deputy General Counsel of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Intellectual Property Protection And The Pharmaceutical Industry,” Oblon Publications, <http://www.oblon.com/publications/intellectual-property-protection-and-the-pharmaceutical-industry/> (Taiwan)

U.S. firms developed almost 50% of the important new drugs -- those sold in all major markets around the worldthat were introduced between 1970 and 1992 (5). And in the relatively new field of biotechnology, the United States's lead in biotechnology development is almost insurmountable: More than 100 of the 140 patents granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office last year in biotechnology health care inventions were granted to U.S. inventors.

### a2: no disease extinction

#### Pharma key to combat bioterror

Margaret A. Hamburg, vice president for biological programs at the Nuclear Threat Initiative in Washington, D.C. She was assistant secretary for planning and evaluation in the Department of Health and Human Services during the Clinton administration and before that New York City commissioner of health. , Winter 2002, "Preparing for and Preventing Bioterrorism," no. 2 , Issues in Science and Technology, <https://issues.org/p_hamburg/> VIK

Federal health leadership will be important in this effort to define needs and provide model guidelines and standards; federal resources may also be essential to support planning efforts and to create the incentives necessary to bring the voluntary and private health care sector fully on board. However, the final planning process must be undertaken on the local or regional level, engaging all the essential community partners and capabilities. It is critical to remember that the front line of response, even in a national crisis, is always local. Thus, across all these domains of activity, we must make sure that we have adequate capacity locally and regionally, which can then be supplemented as needed.

Another important example of this involves access to essential drugs and vaccines. A large-scale release of a biological weapon may require rapid access to quantities of antibiotics, vaccines, or antidotes that would not be routinely available in the locations affected. Given that such an attack is a low probability and unpredictable event in any given place, it would hardly be sensible or cost effective to stockpile supplies at the local level.

The first step in blocking the proliferation and use of biological weapons is to significantly bolster our intelligence.

As we ramp up our public health and medical capacity to respond to bioterrorism, we should continue to strengthen our national pharmaceutical stockpile so that vital drugs and equipment can be rapidly mobilized as needed. The federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has the responsibility to maintain and oversee use of this stockpile, which currently represents a cache of supplies located in strategic locations across the country that can be delivered within 12 hours to any place in the nation. Current concerns make it clear that the nature and quantities of materials maintained in the stockpile must be enhanced, and the stockpile contents should be periodically reviewed and adjusted in response to intelligence about credible threats. New investments in the stockpile should also include contractual agreements with pharmaceutical manufacturer’s to ensure extra production capability for drugs and vaccines in a crisis as well as heightened security at the various storage and dispersal sites.

Beyond simply having the drugs and vaccines available, we must develop plans for how those critical supplies will be distributed to those who need them. CDC needs to provide strong leadership and support for state and local health departments to undertake contingency planning for distribution. We must also think about the broader mobilization of essential drugs, vaccines, or other materials in the event that they are needed outside the United States. Although this may raise complex diplomatic issues, especially when the necessary pharmaceutical is in short supply, addressing potential global need is essential for political and disease-control reasons.

To make sure that the United States can remain strategically poised, further investments must be made in biomedical research to develop new drugs, vaccines, rapid diagnostic tests, and other medical weapons to add to the arsenal against bioterrorism. We must learn more about the fundamental questions of how these organisms cause disease and how the human immune system responds so that we can develop better treatments and disease-containment strategies. It is also essential that we improve technologies to rapidly detect biological agents from environmental samples and develop new strategies and technologies to protect the health of the public.

Scientists will need the full support and encouragement of the public and the government confront this threat. Success will entail research endeavors and collaboration involving numerous government agencies, universities, and private companies. Looking to the future, an effective, well-funded research agenda may give us the tools to render the threat of biological weapons obsolete.

#### Extinction---defense is wrong

Piers Millett 17, Consultant for the World Health Organization, PhD in International Relations and Affairs, University of Bradford, Andrew Snyder-Beattie, “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity”, Health Security, Vol 15(4), <http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/hs.2017.0028>

Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world’s population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization.

A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity’s favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6

While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and theWestern Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).

In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-2

#### Pandemics risk extinction

Benson 17 – Richard Benson, English Biographer, Journalist and Critic, Writer for Wired, “Apocalypse, Now? The 10 Biggest Threats Facing Civilisation, From Asteroids to Tyrannical Leaders”, Wired, 2-12, <http://www.wired.co.uk/article/10-threats-civilisation-ai-asteroid-tyrannical-leader>

2. Pandemic diseases threaten humanity

One possibility is the disgruntled individual who might create or steal a virus and travel around the world releasing it

Natural and engineered pandemic disease is one of the most-studied global risks. It is an area given new urgency by the controversy over "gain of function" experiments. These involve taking a known pathogen and adding extra, risky functionality. For example, in 2011, virologists Ron Fouchier and Yoshihiro Kawaoka created a strain of the bird flu virus that could be transmitted between ferrets. This was done in order to better understand the conditions in which the virus might develop transmitability in the wild. Such experiments can head off certain risks but create an arguably greater one, in that the modified organism might escape the lab and cause a global pandemic.

The risk here is particularly great because it is self-replicating. Whereas a nuclear explosion is localised, in our highly connected world a synthetic, incurable virus could spread around the planet in days. In the past, natural pandemics such as the black death have killed millions and effected wholesale social changes. In the 21st century, advanced biotechnology could create something that makes the black death look like a nasty cold.

#### Diseases cause extinction

Dhillon 17 – Ranu Dhillon**,** instructor at Harvard Medical School and a physician at Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston. He works on building health systems in developing countries and served as an advisor to the president of Guinea during the Ebola epidemic instructor at Harvard Medical School and a physician at Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston. He works on building health systems in developing countries and served as an advisor to the president of Guinea during the Ebola epidemic, Harvard Business Review, 3-15-17, “The World Is Completely Unprepared for a Global Pandemic”, <https://hbr.org/2017/03/the-world-is-completely-unprepared-for-a-global-pandemic>

We fear it is only a matter of time before we face a deadlier and more contagious pathogen, yet the threat of a deadly pandemic remains dangerously overlooked. Pandemics now occur with greater frequency, due to factors such as climate change, urbanization, and international travel. Other factors, such as a weak World Health Organization and potentially massive cuts to funding for U.S. scientific research and foreign aid, including funding for the United Nations, stand to deepen our vulnerability. We also face the specter of novel and mutated pathogens that could spread and kill faster than diseases we have seen before. With the advent of genome-editing technologies, bioterrorists could artificially engineer new plagues, a threat that Ashton Carter, the former U.S. secretary of defense, thinks could rival nuclear weapons in deadliness. The two of us have advised the president of Guinea on stopping Ebola. In addition, we have worked on ways to contain the spread of Zika and have informally advised U.S. and international organizations on the matter. Our experiences tell us that the world is unprepared for these threats. We urgently need to change this trajectory. We can start by learning four lessons from the gaps exposed by the Ebola and Zika pandemics. Faster Vaccine Development The most effective way to stop pandemics is with vaccines. However, with Ebola there was no vaccine, and only now, years later, has one proven effective. This has been the case with Zika, too. Though there has been rapid progress in developing and getting a vaccine to market, it is not fast enough, and Zika has already spread worldwide. Many other diseases do not have vaccines, and developing them takes too long when a pandemic is already under way. We need faster pipelines, such as the one that the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations is trying to create, to preemptively develop vaccines for diseases predicted to cause outbreaks in the near future. Point-of-Care Diagnostics Even with such efforts, vaccines will not be ready for many diseases and would not even be an option for novel or artificially engineered pathogens. With no vaccine for Ebola, our next best strategy was to identify who was infected as quickly as possible and isolate them before they infected others. Because Ebola’s symptoms were identical to common illnesses like malaria, diagnosis required laboratory testing that could not be easily scaled. As a result, many patients were only tested after several days of being contagious and infecting others. Some were never tested at all, and about 40% of patients in Ebola treatment centers did not actually have Ebola. Many dangerous pathogens similarly require laboratory testing that is difficult to scale. Florida, for example, has not been able to expand testing for Zika, so pregnant women wait weeks to know if their babies might be affected. What’s needed are point-of-care diagnostics that, like pregnancy tests, can be used by frontline responders or patients themselves to detect infection right away, where they live. These tests already exist for many diseases, and the technology behind them is well-established. However, the process for their validation is slow and messy. Point-of-care diagnostics for Ebola, for example, were available but never used because of such bottlenecks. Greater Global Coordination We need stronger global coordination. The responsibility for controlling pandemics is fragmented, spread across too many players with no unifying authority. In Guinea we forged a response out of an amalgam of over 30 organizations, each of which had its own priorities. In Ebola’s aftermath, there have been calls for a mechanism for responding to pandemics similar to the advance planning and training that NATO has in place for its numerous members to respond to military threats in a quick, coordinated fashion. This is the right thinking, but we are far from seeing it happen. The errors that allowed Ebola to become a crisis replayed with Zika, and the WHO, which should anchor global action, continues to suffer from a lack of credibility. Stronger Local Health Systems International actors are essential but cannot parachute into countries and navigate local dynamics quickly enough to contain outbreaks. In Guinea it took months to establish the ground game needed to stop the pandemic, with Ebola continuing to spread in the meantime. We need to help developing countries establish health systems that can provide routine care and, when needed, coordinate with international responders to contain new outbreaks. Local health systems could be established for about half of the $3.6 billion ultimately spent on creating an Ebola response from scratch. Access to routine care is also essential for knowing when an outbreak is taking root and establishing trust. For months, Ebola spread before anyone knew it was happening, and then lingered because communities who had never had basic health care doubted the intentions of foreigners flooding into their villages. The turning point in the pandemic came when they began to trust what they were hearing about Ebola and understood what they needed to do to halt its spread: identify those exposed and safely bury the dead. With Ebola and Zika, we lacked these four things — vaccines, diagnostics, global coordination, and local health systems — which are still urgently needed. However, prevailing political headwinds in the United States, which has played a key role in combatting pandemics around the world, threaten to make things worse. The Trump administration is seeking drastic budget cuts in funding for foreign aid and scientific research. The U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development may lose over one-third of their budgets, including half of the funding the U.S. usually provides to the UN. The National Institutes of Health, which has been on the vanguard of vaccines and diagnostics research, may also face cuts. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which has been at the forefront of responding to outbreaks, remains without a director, and, if the Affordable Care Act is repealed, would lose $891 million, 12% of its overall budget, provided to it for immunization programs, monitoring and responding to outbreaks, and other public health initiatives. Investing in our ability to prevent and contain pandemics through revitalized national and international institutions should be our shared goal. However, if U.S. agencies become less able to respond to pandemics, leading institutions from other nations, such as Institut Pasteur and the National Institute of Health and Medical Research in France, the Wellcome Trust and London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine in the UK, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs have done instrumental research and response work in previous pandemics), would need to step in to fill the void. There is no border wall against disease. Pandemics are an existential threat on par with climate change and nuclear conflict. We are at a critical crossroads, where we must either take the steps needed to prepare for this threat or become even more vulnerable. It is only a matter of time before we are hit by a deadlier, more contagious pandemic. Will we be ready?

#### Extinction

Bar-Yam 16 – Yaneer Bar-Yam, Founding President of the New England Complex Systems Institute, “Transition to Extinction: Pandemics in a Connected World,” NECSI (July 3, 2016), <http://necsi.edu/research/social/pandemics/transition>

Watch as one of the more aggressive—brighter red — strains rapidly expands. After a time it goes extinct leaving a black region. Why does it go extinct? The answer is that it spreads so rapidly that it kills the hosts around it. Without new hosts to infect it then dies out itself. That the rapidly spreading pathogens die out has important implications for evolutionary research which we have talked about elsewhere [1–7].

In the research I want to discuss here, what we were interested in is the effect of adding long range transportation [8]. This includes natural means of dispersal as well as unintentional dispersal by humans, like adding airplane routes, which is being done by real world airlines (Figure 2).

When we introduce long range transportation into the model, the success of more aggressive strains changes. They can use the long range transportation to find new hosts and escape local extinction. Figure 3 shows that the more transportation routes introduced into the model, the more higher aggressive pathogens are able to survive and spread.

As we add more long range transportation, there is a critical point at which pathogens become so aggressive that the entire host population dies. The pathogens die at the same time, but that is not exactly a consolation to the hosts. We call this the phase transition to extinction (Figure 4). With increasing levels of global transportation, human civilization may be approaching such a critical threshold.

In the paper we wrote in 2006 about the dangers of global transportation for pathogen evolution and pandemics [8], we mentioned the risk from Ebola. Ebola is a horrendous disease that was present only in isolated villages in Africa. It was far away from the rest of the world only because of that isolation. Since Africa was developing, it was only a matter of time before it reached population centers and airports. While the model is about evolution, it is really about which pathogens will be found in a system that is highly connected, and Ebola can spread in a highly connected world.

The traditional approach to public health uses historical evidence analyzed statistically to assess the potential impacts of a disease. As a result, many were surprised by the spread of Ebola through West Africa in 2014. As the connectivity of the world increases, past experience is not a good guide to future events.¶ A key point about the phase transition to extinction is its suddenness. Even a system that seems stable, can be destabilized by a few more long-range connections, and connectivity is continuing to increase.

So how close are we to the tipping point? We don’t know but it would be good to find out before it happens.¶ While Ebola ravaged three countries in West Africa, it only resulted in a handful of cases outside that region. One possible reason is that many of the airlines that fly to west Africa stopped or reduced flights during the epidemic [9]. In the absence of a clear connection, public health authorities who downplayed the dangers of the epidemic spreading to the West might seem to be vindicated.¶ As with the choice of airlines to stop flying to west Africa, our analysis didn’t take into consideration how people respond to epidemics. It does tell us what the outcome will be unless we respond fast enough and well enough to stop the spread of future diseases, which may not be the same as the ones we saw in the past. As the world becomes more connected, the dangers increase.¶ Are people in western countries safe because of higher quality health systems? Countries like the U.S. have highly skewed networks of social interactions with some very highly connected individuals that can be “superspreaders.” The chances of such an individual becoming infected may be low but events like a mass outbreak pose a much greater risk if they do happen. If a sick food service worker in an airport infects 100 passengers, or a contagion event happens in mass transportation, an outbreak could very well prove unstoppable.

### a2: no extinction – burnout

#### Burnout wrong because of mutations and transfer – independent, huge ABR crisis looming

Tyson 12 ---- Greg, syndicated science columnist, PhD student in microbiology (Northwestern), “Tipping Point: The Threat of Antibiotic Resistance,” Helix, 8/17, <http://helix.northwestern.edu/article/tipping-point-threat-antibiotic-resistance>

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), nearly 90,000 people die each year in the United States from antibiotic-resistant bacterial infections. That is more deaths than breast and prostate cancer combined. While MRSA (methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus) is the most publicized of the antibiotic-resistant bacteria, it is just one of many. In fact, other bacteria that kill thousands of people each year include Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Klebsiella pneumoniae, and Acinetobacter baumannii. These bacteria are all resistant to at least some antibiotics, giving them the name “superbugs”, and the number of infections resistant even to antibiotics of last resort is increasing. How did this happen? We did it to ourselves. Antibiotics are omnipresent in the Western world, overprescribed for patients who demand them even when they have viral infections. Then these same patients fail to take the prescription to completion, allowing some bacteria to survive. As a result, bacterial resistance can develop by mutations of genes that antibiotics target, or even from transfer of antibiotic-resistant genes between bacteria. This makes bacterial infections difficult to treat. Resistant bacteria multiply and spread, since they are able to survive the constant antibiotic onslaught. When a serious bacterial infection develops, it is likely that the infection is due to antibiotic-resistant bacteria, which limits treatment options. This is especially a problem in hospitals, which are breeding grounds for resistant organisms. Hospitals have a large number of susceptible people with compromised immune systems, making a haven for sick people into a dangerous place. Similarly, antibiotics are overused on cattle, often using them as prophylaxis, preventative medicine, on animals that are not sick, instead of only treating infected animals. All of these situations select for the bacteria that are resistant to antibiotics. We’ve reached a tipping point. For a while we had many antibiotics in our arsenal to treat bacterial infections, so even if treatment with one antibiotic failed, there were other options. Unfortunately that is often no longer true, with resistance emerging faster than new therapies. The problem is that drug companies prefer to make medication for chronic conditions, such as cancer or heart disease, since their long-term treatment is much more profitable. In fact, according to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 21 new drugs have been approved for cancer treatment since the beginning of last year. In the same time frame, just one new bacterial treatment has been approved. As a result, we are left with too few antibiotic options and patients have to be put on antibiotics of last resort. These have worse side effects and require long-term treatments. And even these drugs sometimes fail. This leaves us unable to treat infections we once were able to cure.

### a2: no extinction – containment

#### Disease spread guaranteed – globalization, population density

Walsh 14 ---- Bryan, syndicated columnist on environmental affairs, “MERS Shows That the Next Pandemic Is Only a Plane Flight Away,” Time, 5/5, <http://time.com/87767/mers-shows-that-the-next-pandemic-is-only-a-plane-flight-away/>

On Feb. 21, 2003, a 64-year-old Chinese physician named Dr. Liu Jianlun traveled to Hong Kong to attend a wedding. He stayed in room 911 on the ninth floor of the Metropole Hotel. Liu, who had been treating cases of a mysterious respiratory disease in the neighboring Chinese province of Guangdong, was already sick when he arrived in Hong Kong, and the next day he checked into the city’s Kwong Wah hospital. Liu died on Mar. 4 of the disease doctors soon named Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, or SARS. But before he died, he inadvertently infected at least 16 people who spent time on the ninth floor of that Hotel. It’s that chain of events that must have been on American officials’ minds last week when news broke that the U.S. had its first case of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS). A male health care provider had been in Saudi Arabia, the epicenter for the ongoing MERS outbreaks, before flying to Chicago via London on Apr. 24. After arriving in Chicago, he took a bus to the Indiana town of Munster, where on Apr. 28 he was admitted to the hospital and was eventually diagnosed with MERS. A deadly respiratory disease that has already infected hundreds, almost all in Saudi Arabia, and killed over 100 people had come to the U.S. CDC officials played down the larger threat of the first U.S. MERS case. “In this interconnected world we live in, we expected MERS to make its way to the U.S.,” Dr. Anne Schuchat, director of the CDC’s National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, told reporters on May 2. “We have been preparing for this.” CDC officials will contact and track individuals who might have been close to the patient — including health workers who treated him and fellow travelers on his international flights and his bus ride to Munster — just in case any developed MERS symptoms. That’s not likely. So far MERS hasn’t shown much ability to spread easily from person to person, so the threat to the larger U.S. public is probably very small. But if that Indiana case remains isolated — and MERS itself never becomes the global health threat that SARS was — it only means we were lucky. As Schuchat put it, exotic, emerging diseases are now “just a plane’s ride away.” In the past, before international air travel became common, emerging pathogens could begin infecting people but remain geographically isolated for decades. Scientists now think that HIV was active among people in Central Africa for decades before it really began spreading globally in the 1970s, again thanks largely to international air travel. Today there’s almost no spot on the planet — from the rainforests of Cameroon to the hinterland of China — so remote that someone couldn’t make it to a heavily populated city like New York or Hong Kong in less than 24 hours, potentially carrying a new infectious disease with them.

## econ impact module

### new econ module

#### USMCA key to economic growth

Higgins 19 (Sean Higgins a senior writer for the Washington Examiner covering labor. He was previously a Washington correspondent for Investor's Business Daily., 4-18-2019, "Trump USMCA would add $68B to GDP and 176,000 jobs, independent report says," Washington Examiner, <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/economy/trump-usmca-would-add-68b-to-gdp-and-176-000-jobs-independent-report-says>) cliv

The Trump administration's proposed U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement on trade would boost the U.S. economy by $68.2 billion and add 176,000 jobs, according to a report released Thursday by the U.S. International Trade Commission, an independent federal agency.

The analysis should aid passage of the deal, which would replace the 1993 North American Free Trade Agreement but is currently stalled in Congress.

The commission nevertheless said that the deal's impact would be "moderate" in light of the trade agreements already in place with Canada and Mexico. "Because NAFTA has already eliminated duties on most qualifying goods and significantly reduced nontariff measures, USMCA’s emphasis is on reducing remaining nontariff measures on trade and the U.S. economy," the report said.

The deal would strengthen labor standards and rights, especially those in Mexico, increase intellectual property rights protections enjoyed by U.S. firms, and reduce the scope of the system for settling disputes between investors and individual countries, likely leading to less U.S. investment in Mexico — and freeing up capital for domestic manufacturing and mining, according to the report. The projected positive effect would be small, though.

The Trump administration is trying to booster support the deal's approval by Congress and get it passed by this summer. It released a report Thursday touting the deal as adding 76,000 jobs to the domestic auto industry.

U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer said the report's findings "validate" the administration's decision to renegotiate NAFTA. "This report is an important step forward in gaining congressional approval of the USMCA ... There can be no doubt that the USMCA is a big win for America’s economy," he said.

#### Economic decline causes nuclear war

Eric Mann, Master of Arts in Global Security Studies Johns Hopkin, “AUSTERITY, ECONOMIC DECLINE, AND FINANCIAL WEAPONS OF WAR: A NEW PARADIGM FOR GLOBAL SECURITY,” May 2014, <https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/37262/MANN-THESIS-2014.pdf>

The conclusions reached in this thesis demonstrate how economic considerations within states can figure prominently into the calculus for future conflicts. The findings also suggest that security issues with economic or financial underpinnings will transcend classical determinants of war and conflict, and change the manner by which rival states engage in hostile acts toward one another. The research shows that security concerns emanating from economic uncertainty and the inherent vulnerabilities within global financial markets will present new challenges for national security, and provide developing states new asymmetric options for balancing against stronger states. The security areas, identified in the proceeding chapters, are likely to mature into global security threats in the immediate future. As the case study on South Korea suggest, the overlapping security issues associated with economic decline and reduced military spending by the United States will affect allied confidence in America’s security guarantees. The study shows that this outcome could cause regional instability or realignments of strategic partnerships in the Asia-pacific region with ramifications for U.S. national security. Rival states and non-state groups may also become emboldened to challenge America’s status in the unipolar international system. The potential risks associated with stolen or loose WMD, resulting from poor security, can also pose a threat to U.S. national security. The case study on Pakistan, Syria and North Korea show how financial constraints affect weapons security making weapons vulnerable to theft, and how financial factors can influence WMD proliferation by contributing to the motivating factors behind a trusted insider’s decision to sell weapons technology. The inherent vulnerabilities within the global financial markets will provide terrorists’ organizations and other non-state groups, who object to the current international system or distribution of power, with opportunities to disrupt global finance and perhaps weaken America’s status. A more ominous threat originates from states intent on increasing diversification of foreign currency holdings, establishing alternatives to the dollar for international trade, or engaging financial warfare against the United States.

### econ module ext

#### Passing USMCA prevents a recession- now is key

Andrea Shalal, 7/25/2019 (Andrea Shalal writes for Reuters and has their masters from University of Maryland, and Jonas Ekblom journalist at reuters who graduated top of his class at Columbia, 7-25-2019, "U.S.-Mexico-Canada trade deal will help stave off U.S. recession: U.S. Chamber CEO," NewsTalk 610 AM & 103.9 FM KDAL, <https://kdal610.com/news/articles/2019/jul/25/us-mexico-canada-trade-deal-will-help-stave-off-us-recession-us-chamber-ceo/921502/>) cliv

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Approval and implementation of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) trade agreement will provide a major boost to the U.S. economy and help stave off a recession, Thomas Donohue, chief executive of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, said on Thursday.

Donohue, whose organization is spearheading a major campaign to win passage of the trade agreement, said moving ahead with the USMCA would also help pave the way for trade agreements with China, the European Union, Japan and other countries.

"It is a major component in keeping us out of a recession," Donohue told Reuters after a news conference with other trade associations pushing the U.S. Congress to ratify the replacement for the current North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

He said the timing was critical given other drags on the U.S. economy, including troubles at top U.S. exporter Boeing Co , which this week reported its biggest-ever quarterly loss due to the spiraling cost of resolving issues with its 737 MAX.

#### Passing the USMCA would have massive benefits on the US economy

Williams 4/18 (Joe Williams covers the financial markets and corporate America for Fox Business., 4-18-2019, "USMCA to add $68.2B to US economy, spur 176k jobs says key independent review panel," Fox Business, <https://www.foxbusiness.com/industrials/usmca-to-add-68-2-billion-to-us-economy-spur-176000-jobs-says-key-independent-review-panel>) cliv

A new trade agreement between the U.S., Mexico and Canada would add $68.2 billion to the U.S. economy and create 176,000 new jobs, according to a study from the International Trade Commission released on Thursday.

While the 0.35 percent growth to GDP and 0.12 percent increase in employment in the first six years after implementation is relatively modest growth, White House officials were more concerned with the actual release of the study, which was a necessary step before Congress can act.

"The model estimates that the agreement would likely have a positive impact on all broad industry sectors within the U.S. economy," the report says. "Manufacturing would experience the largest percentage gains in output, exports, wages, and employment, while in absolute terms, services would experience the largest gains in output and employment."

The so-called United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement would also increase U.S. exports to Canada by 5.9 percent to $19.1 billion, and shipments to Mexico by 6.7 percent to $14.2 billion. Imports from Canada and Mexico would rise by 4.8 percent and 3.8 percent, respectively.

#### USMCA is vital to the US auto industry and broader economy

Lane 19 (Sylvan Lane is a Finance and Economy Reporter at The Hill, and graduated from Northwestern with a degree in journalism. 4-18-2019, "White House: New NAFTA would give $60B boost to auto sector," TheHill, <https://thehill.com/policy/finance/439564-white-house-new-north-american-trade-pact-would-give-60-billion-boost-to-auto>) cliv

President Trump’s proposed North American trade pact would spur more than $60 billion in investments and sales for the U.S. auto industry to create more than 70,000 new jobs, according to White House estimates released Thursday.

The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) projected a significant boost for U.S. automakers and parts producers in an economic analysis of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USCMA) published Thursday.

The White House trade office projected the USMCA to spur $34 billion in investments in U.S. auto plants, $23 billion in American auto parts sales and create 76,000 new industry jobs over the course of five years.

The employment gains would include roughly 22,800 automotive assembly jobs, 8,000 additional advanced battery supplier jobs, and 45,600 additional automotive supplier jobs, according to USTR estimates.

USTR said it based its estimates on “information provided by automakers with assembly operations in North America” and companies’ previously announced plans to bolster production in the U.S.

The deal, which is pending legislative approval in the U.S, Canada and Mexico, would replace the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which Trump pledged to revise or rip-up during his 2016 presidential campaign.

#### USMCA ensures foreign markets and US business which are vital to the US economy

Brilliant 6/11 (Myron Brilliant, executive vice president, U.S. Chamber of Commerce 6-11-19 “US Chamber of Commerce executive: Why Approving USMCA is an urgent priority,” CNBC, <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/14/why-approving-usmca-is-an-urgent-priority-us-chamber-of-commerce-exec.html>) cliv

One by one, obstacles are being removed. Important talks between the administration and congressional Democrats over lingering concerns are ongoing, and these concerns should not be minimized. But it’s also true that USMCA approval has taken on a fierce urgency to create certainty in the marketplace, boost economic growth and job creation, and pave the way for future trade talks.

Certainty. An early vote for USMCA will provide U.S. businesses from every sector—from agriculture to manufacturing and services—the certainty that their exports to Canada and Mexico will enter those markets duty-free.

This certainty is invaluable because these two markets are invaluable to American business. U.S. trade with Canada and Mexico:

Reached nearly $1.4 trillion last year, or $3.8 billion daily;

Supports 12 million American jobs spread across every state in the union;

Is vital for U.S. manufacturers, who export more made-in-America manufactured goods to Canada and Mexico than they do to the next 11 largest export markets combined;

Accounts for nearly one-third of U.S. agricultural exports; and

Powered growth in U.S. services exports from $27 billion in 1993 to $91 billion in 2017.

Certainty is what American job-creators require if they are to make brick-and-mortar investments and create more jobs for the long haul.

Growth. USMCA isn’t just about holding on to what you’ve got. USMCA will boost economic growth by improving the market access guaranteed for U.S. businesses.

For example, the agreement further opens the Canadian market to U.S. agricultural exports such as dairy products, poultry, and wine. U.S. farmers and ranchers have faced five years of declining commodity prices, so USMCA’s improved market access is more than welcome.

And make no mistake: These are growth markets. U.S. exports to Mexico and Canada have grown more over the past decade than sales to any other country. In each case, exports have expanded by more than $100 billion annually.

No other market comes close. In fact, Mexico and Canada accounted for about 40% of the growth in U.S. goods exports in dollar terms over the past decade.

In particular, USMCA promises growth for America’s small and midsized exporters. Canada and Mexico are the top two export destinations for U.S. small and medium-size enterprises, more than 120,000 of which sell their goods and services in our two North American neighbors. When an American small business starts exporting, it’s almost always to Canada or Mexico.

Modernization. USMCA also promises substantial new benefits by modernizing the rules for commerce in North America to reflect the realities of 21st century trade. Deferring enactment of the agreement means deferring these benefits.

To illustrate, when NAFTA was negotiated a quarter century ago, there was no e-commerce, so it’s no surprise the agreement did not address this booming sector. Here, USMCA’s digital trade chapter sets a new, high standard.

### A2: China Trade War thump

#### USMCA more important to the economy than China:

Breuninger 6/11 (Kevin Breuninger has a masters degree in journalism and works at the CNBC breaking news desk, 6-11-2019, “Trump’s Canada-Mexico trade pact is ‘more important’ to the economy than a deal with China, Larry Kudlow says,” CNBC, <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/11/larry-kudlow-usmca-more-important-for-economy-than-china-deal.html>) cliv

President Donald Trump’s top economic advisor, Larry Kudlow, told CNBC on Tuesday that enacting a trade pact with Mexico and Canada to replace the North American Free Trade Agreement is “more important” for the U.S. economy than a deal with China.

Kudlow also said that he remains hopeful that negotiations between Beijing and the U.S. can return to the position of apparent near alignment they enjoyed before talks appeared to stall out last month, amid disagreements between the two economic superpowers.

Kudlow’s remarks on CNBC’s “The Exchange ” came just days after Trump scrapped plans to slap increasing tariffs on all Mexican goods coming into the U.S. until Mexico took sufficient steps to stem the flow of migrants coming to the southern U.S. border. The two countries struck an agreement, many details of which are still unknown, on Friday after talks in Washington.

Experts have said that imposing new tariffs on Mexico — a move Trump has said is still on the table — could jeopardize the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA, which has been approved by the three countries’ leaders. The nations’ legislatures have yet to ratify the deal.

Kudlow’s emphasis on the USMCA over the China deal indicates that Trump aims to pressure Democrats to support ratification ahead of the 2020 election. Democrats, who hold the majority in the House, have raised concerns about how the new agreement would address labor and environmental issues, among other provisions.

“Let me give you something that I think is more important than China, vis-a-vis the economy,” Kudlow said, referring to the USMCA. “We are hoping that Congress will sign off on it ... Canada and Mexico are gigantic trading partners and I think in economic terms, that’s probably more important than the China story.”

#### For more impact evidence—go look in the dedev, econ da and debt ceiling da

### a2: 2009 proves no impact

#### It's different this time

 Mark Kolakowski, 2018 M.B.A. in finance from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania., “Banks Have No Plan For New Financial Crisis: Harvard's Rogoff”, Investopedia, Updated January 23, 2018, https://www.investopedia.com/news/banks-have-no-plan-financial-new-crisis-harvards-rogoff/

In response to the crisis, the Federal Reserve responded with an aggressive policy of quantitative easing that sent interest rates near zero. With rates still near historic lows, this policy lever has diminished efficacy today. Meanwhile, the TARP program, which injected capital into troubled financial institutions, was a one-off response to the 2008 crisis authorized by an Act of Congress. Whether Congress would vote similar emergency measures in a new crisis, and in a sufficiently rapid fashion, is anyone's guess. If a similar crisis happened today, it's unclear how early or quickly the Fed and other central banks would be willing to move to stanch the bleeding. And it's also unclear whether U.S. taxpayers would be willing to fund hundreds of billions of dollars of bailouts - if needed.

### a2: economy resilient

#### US economy not resilient to major crashes

Hughes 16 (Robert, Senior Research Fellow @ American Institute for Economic Research, 3/22, "An Economy, Growing But Vulnerable," https://www.aier.org/blog/economy-growing-vulnerable)

The economic outlook is modestly upbeat, but rife with risks. As we approach the seventh anniversary of the end of the worst recession since the Great Depression, the economy has made substantial progress. There are reasons to believe that later this year businesses could feel more confidence in hiring and making other investments. But obstacles remain. First, let’s look at the economy right now. On the positive side, the labor market has made substantial progress recovering from the severe job losses in 2008 and 2009. The unemployment rate is below 5 percent, and net job creation has averaged over 200,000 per month for the past five years. In addition, employers are trying to fill more than 5.5 million open positions across the country. Despite the progress, gains in hourly earnings remain modest. On the negative side, the U.S. dollar has appreciated against most currencies, making our exports more expensive and imports cheaper, both of which are bad for U.S. manufacturers, though cheaper imports generally benefit consumers by keeping prices low. An additional drag is that economic growth in many countries around the world remains subpar, further depressing demand for U.S. exports. The collapse in commodity prices, particularly energy, is a double-edged sword for the overall economy. Lower energy prices are helpful to consumers and some industries (think, transportation and shipping), but have hurt the domestic energy production industry. With that basic backdrop, the policy makers at the Federal Reserve have begun raising short-term interest rates. Signals from the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC, the group responsible for setting monetary policy) suggest further rate increases will come, though at an extremely slow pace given the shaky economic backdrop and benign outlook for inflation. How do these trends translate to an outlook for the second half of 2016? Overall, not too badly. The U.S. economy is still driven by the consumer. The slowly improving labor market, combined with lower energy prices and improved household balance sheets, provide a solid foundation for consumers to continue spending. A reasonably healthy consumer combined with low interest rates should help support activity in the housing market, particularly as the important spring and summer selling season approaches. If consumers do push ahead with spending and home purchases, that will likely give confidence to businesses to continue hiring and boost investment, sustaining a virtuous cycle to keep the economy growing. That’s the optimistic outlook, and in our view, the likely path. However, any number of things could turn the virtuous cycle into a vicious cycle. The latest reading from our Business Cycle Conditions model suggests a note of caution. The Leaders Index – our compilation of economic indicators that help forecast the health of the economy – had a value of 50 (on a scale of 0 to 100) in the latest month, exactly neutral. Generally, persistent readings below 50 would indicate an increased probability of recession in the next 6 to 12 months. So, according to our model, while we don’t expect a recession in the immediate future, the economy is somewhat vulnerable. There are a number of factors that could make an impact in such a state of vulnerability. For instance, the Fed could raise rates too quickly. Consumers could lose confidence and slow spending, or businesses could lose confidence and slow or stop hiring, or cut back on investment. We could be faced with an unforeseen geopolitical event. If one or some combination of these occur, it could tip our model and the economy into a new recession. There is always some ebb and flow to economic activity, and when those ebbs and flows happen while overall growth is modest, the risk of a recession can rise. The economy becomes more vulnerable, policy decisions become more important, and the potential impact of some shock to the system becomes magnified.

## a2: impact turns

### a2: warming turn

#### AG is key to combat climate and food insecurity

Adam Wentworth, 4-1-2018, "Sustainable agriculture is key to overcoming hunger and climate crises, says UN food agency," No Publication, <http://www.climateaction.org/news/sustainable-agriculture-is-key-to-overcoming-hunger-and-climate-crises-says> (VIK)

Agro-ecology is a farming style that focuses on utilising nature for food production without damaging it, also referred to as sustainable, ecological, or low-external input agriculture.

The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the UN believes these techniques are critical to solve issues of food insecurity among a growing population, increasing resilience to climate change and raising the earnings of farmers.

Pasquale Steduto, regional programme leader for the FAO in the Middle East and North Africa commented: “Agriculture is in transition. Climate change is adding new uncertainty as well as increasing uncertainty. By introducing agroecology principles, you can reduce the risks of exposure to climate change."

Currently, the global agricultural industry is rooted in the extensive use of chemical fertilisers and pesticides which can cause environmental damage and affect human health.

Agro-ecology sees chemical fertilisers replaced with natural methods such as planting trees amongst crops and rotating foods to improve soil.

Stephane Le Foll, a French parliamentarian and former agriculture minister, added: "We have three big challenges to manage - climate change, food security, and the connection between agriculture, forestry, economy and employment".

Stephane Le Foll also highlights that agriculture can be used to combat global warming and is part of a campaign to increase the amount of carbon held in agricultural soils by 4 percent a year.

Soil absorbs carbon through sequestration which in turn improves soil fertility. In Africa agro-ecology has proven successful in helping farmers overcome degraded soil and poor weather. For example, according to the Institute for Sustainable Development, agro-ecology has provided better yields than chemical fertilisers in five critical crops including barley and maize in Ethiopia.

### a2: prescription price turn

#### USMCA won’t increase drug prices- IP protections decrease them

Spiegel 7/21 (Andrew Spiegel is the executive director of the Global Colon Cancer Association, 7-21-2019, "Your View: To find tomorrow’s cures pass trade deal today," The Morning Call, <https://www.mcall.com/opinion/mc-opi-north-american-trade-deal-cancer-treatments-20190721-h2q24pk4efgwfhf4266ryz5alu-story.html>) cliv

That’s great news for patients. With scientific discoveries protected at home and abroad, more investors would be spurred to pour money into the next generation of biologics. Unfortunately, a handful of lawmakers want to eliminate USMCA’s section on biologics. This doesn’t make sense. There’s no evidence to suggest that reducing intellectual property protections would cut costs. In fact, a report from the Geneva Network found that USMCA would have zero effect on drug prices and total drug spending within overall health care systems.

The Geneva Network report examined the effects of increasing regulatory data protection in Canada and Japan. More than a decade ago, both nations extended an eight-year window to all medicines, not just biologics. The report concludes that increasing the protection had no impact on drug spending in Japan or Canada. In fact, drug spending declined as a percentage of both countries’ health spending after they increased regulatory data protection.

## da turns the case

### ag turns gender

#### Food crisis disproportionately harms women.

Botreau and Cohen 7/22 — Hélène Botreau and Marc Cohen, Botreau is Agriculture and Food Security Advocacy Officer at Oxfam France, former lead researcher at ANDES, small international indigenous non-profit organization working to support indigenous peoples in their struggles for rights, locally-controlled and biodiversity-based food systems, and endogenous development based on their core values, holds a master’s degree in food security and human development from Roma University, Cohen is a Senior Researcher at Oxfam America, former research fellow International Food Policy Research Institute, holds a master’s degree and a PhD in political science from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2019 (“Gender Inequalities and Food Insecurity,” *Oxfam*, July 22nd, Available Online at https://ousweb-prodv2-shared-media.s3.amazonaws.com/media/documents/gender-inequalities-en.pdf, Accessed 07-22-2019) PRK

Women and girls pay the price

The threat of soaring prices was particularly challenging for those whose rural livelihoods were already precarious. These affected food producers as well as consumers, as the overwhelming majority of small-scale farmers are net food buyers. The prohibitive cost of inputs (fertilizers, fuel, etc.) offset any opportunities higher output prices might have created.

Because agricultural gender inequalities remain strong, women farmers are particularly at risk of hunger, especially when crisis strikes. On average, rural women account for nearly half the agricultural workforce in developing countries. Despite their crucial roles in household food security, they face discrimination and limited bargaining power. Patriarchal norms create disadvantages for women farmers, specifically in land rights (small plots, difficulties attaining ownership, discriminatory inheritance rights), productive resources (no access to credit, extension services or inputs), unpaid work, insecure employment and exclusion from decision making and political representation. Within the household, because of weaker bargaining position they frequently eat least, last and least well. Women farmers who control resources generally have better-quality diets.

Women are vulnerable on all dimensions of food security: availability, access, utilization and stability. They suffer the most from macro- and micronutrient deficiencies, especially during reproductive years, with long-term negative development impacts for society as a whole.

Food-price spikes have negative repercussions for female household heads. They suffer labour market discrimination, which confines them to informal and casual employment, as well as pay inequity. Also, they frequently spend a bigger share of their family budget on food than male heads of household.

Women’s coping strategies

In times of crisis, poor households face asset losses and lower incomes. Men have more access to social capital and pathways out of crisis (their income pays past debts and secures new farm loans), whereas women often face severe time burdens, given their household food-security roles. As they usually have a weak bargaining position with regard to household income, they frequently must reduce spending on nutrition and family well-being. Indeed, households adjust to reduced food purchasing power by shifting to cheaper, less diverse diets. Women tend to buffer the impact through extreme strategies: reducing their own consumption to feed others, collecting wild food, migrating or selling assets, and even taking on risky jobs.

### ag turns climate

#### AG is key to combat climate and food insecurity

Adam Wentworth, 4-1-2018, "Sustainable agriculture is key to overcoming hunger and climate crises, says UN food agency," No Publication, <http://www.climateaction.org/news/sustainable-agriculture-is-key-to-overcoming-hunger-and-climate-crises-says> (VIK)

Agro-ecology is a farming style that focuses on utilising nature for food production without damaging it, also referred to as sustainable, ecological, or low-external input agriculture.

The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the UN believes these techniques are critical to solve issues of food insecurity among a growing population, increasing resilience to climate change and raising the earnings of farmers.

Pasquale Steduto, regional programme leader for the FAO in the Middle East and North Africa commented: “Agriculture is in transition. Climate change is adding new uncertainty as well as increasing uncertainty. By introducing agroecology principles, you can reduce the risks of exposure to climate change."

Currently, the global agricultural industry is rooted in the extensive use of chemical fertilisers and pesticides which can cause environmental damage and affect human health.

Agro-ecology sees chemical fertilisers replaced with natural methods such as planting trees amongst crops and rotating foods to improve soil.

Stephane Le Foll, a French parliamentarian and former agriculture minister, added: "We have three big challenges to manage - climate change, food security, and the connection between agriculture, forestry, economy and employment".

Stephane Le Foll also highlights that agriculture can be used to combat global warming and is part of a campaign to increase the amount of carbon held in agricultural soils by 4 percent a year.

Soil absorbs carbon through sequestration which in turn improves soil fertility. In Africa agro-ecology has proven successful in helping farmers overcome degraded soil and poor weather. For example, according to the Institute for Sustainable Development, agro-ecology has provided better yields than chemical fertilisers in five critical crops including barley and maize in Ethiopia.

### ag turns war

#### Food crisis creates interstate conflict, civil wars, and instability.

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Sudden Food Price Rises Can Trigger Conflict

An unexpected or higher-than-normal rise in food prices, which has an immediate impact on purchasing power and thus access to food, has already been noted as a key mechanism linking food insecurity and conflict. Food prices can rise rapidly in response to shifts in global markets, local shortfalls in supply that cannot be or are not compensated by trade, or deliberate changes in policies, especially those that lead to the removal of subsidies or price controls. Such price increases often bring protesting people into the streets. Food protests—sometimes peaceful, sometimes violent—ensue.

Food riots have a long history. Prior to the French Revolution in 1789, protests were directed at producers, traders, and merchants with the goal of forcing them to lower food prices. Since the French Revolution, however, food riots have become more political in nature and are largely an urban phenomenon (Bellemare, 2011). Protests against extraordinary increases in the price of rice (and, to a lesser extent, the prices of wheat and corn) led to a number of outbreaks of civil unrest in 2007 and 2008. Most involved nonviolent demonstrations that lasted a few days at most. Others turned violent and resulted in deaths. Demonstrations have continued sporadically from 2008 to the present as price volatility continues to affect global commodity markets and as national governments react to international price changes in different ways.

Marc Bellemare (2011) has explored the causal pathways between rising food prices, the volatility of food prices, and political unrest. Using monthly information on global food and cereal prices and newspaper reports of food riots from January 1990 to January 2011, he concludes that rising food prices, and specifically cereal prices, caused political unrest, but that price volatility did not.

Marco Lagi et al. (2011) examined the coincidence of high global food prices in 2011 and the riots that led to the revolutions of the Arab Spring. They conclude that it was highly likely that, while there were many other factors in play, high food prices were a precipitating condition for the unrest.

The potential for protests to become violent likely depends on contextual factors such as perceived government effectiveness and average income levels. For example, in recent research Joachim von Braun noted that the ratio of violent to nonviolent food price-related protests in 2008 was higher in low-income countries and in countries with lower government effectiveness (von Braun, 2008; Brinkman & Hendrix, 2011). There were 19 food protests in low-income countries, and 11 involved violence. Of the 15 protests in lower-middle-income countries, only 7 were violent; of the 6 protests in upper-middle-income countries, 2 were violent; and of the 9 food protests in upper-income countries, none were violent (Torero,2008). Rabah Arezki and Markus Brückner (2011) also show statistically that increases in international food prices lead to greater incidence of anti-government demonstrations, riots, and civil conflict in low-income countries, but not in higher-income countries.

Many have explained these differential responses by pointing to the higher relative share of household income devoted to food in lower-income countries (FAO, 2011). Any price change that reduces their purchasing power has a relatively greater impact on their food security. Brett L. Carter and Robert Bates (2012) introduce another perspective on the relationship between rising food prices and food riots. They look not only at the initial impact of the price increases but also at the result of governments’ efforts to mitigate them. They examine how price rises—due not just to changes in global food prices but also to changes in government policies, exchange rate variations, and so on—contribute to the potential for creating unrest and civil war. They find that food price shocks alone increase the likelihood of conflict. However, when they expand the analysis to take into account governments’ responses to the price shocks, they find that governments tend to implement policies that favor urban consumers and the probability of instability disappears. Urban consumers, they conclude, are both more sensitive to price changes for their staple commodities and better able to influence policy through their protest actions.

Competition for Food Production Resources Can Catalyze Recurrent Conflicts

Water, land for cultivation, and grazing lands are contested resources in many regions of the world. Communal conflict is often associated with localized competition among rural groups within a country, each seeking to ensure adequate access to production resources and, through the use of these resources, to their food security. Cattle-rustling, land grabs, and the diversion of water resources are signs of such conflict and communities’ inabilities to negotiate acceptable compromises peacefully.1

When weather conditions result in drought or flooding or when population growth and in-migration add new stresses, farmers and herders who see their food security and livelihoods threatened may escalate conflict to the point of violent clashes. Colin H. Kahl (2006) finds that there is much to suggest that “rapid population growth, environmental degradation, and competition over natural resources play important causal roles” in civil strife, although he does not draw a direct link to (or through) the food security status of those participating in the conflict.

Henk-Jan Brinkman and Cullen S. Hendrix (2011, p. 8) also note that communal conflicts over scarce resources, particularly land and water, have involved groups with permanent or semi-permanent armed militias and have been particularly important in recent cases of violent clashes in Kenya, Nigeria, the Sudan, and Uganda:

Repeated clashes between Fulani herders and Tarok farmers in Nigeria’s Plateau State killed 843 people in 2004. Similar clashes between Rizeigat Abbala and Terjam herders in the Sudan killed 382 in 2007. Cattle raiding in the Karamoja

cluster, a cross-border region of Ethiopian, Kenyan, and Ugandan territory, resulted in more than 600 deaths and the loss of 40,000 heads of livestock in 2004 alone.

And in August 2012, the farming Pokomo and cattle-herding Orma groups in Kenya instigated a violent conflict over access to the water and riparian lands of the Tana River. Newspaper reports indicate that the collapse of irrigation schemes along the river had reduced employment and incomes for the Pokomo and catalyzed the resurgence of a long-running conflict between the groups (“Kenya to Disarm Tribes,” 2012).

Water is a unique natural resource that can affect food security in many ways. Sandra L. Postel and Aaron T. Wolf (2001, p. 2) warn that “unlike oil and most other strategic resources, fresh water has no substitute in most of its uses. It is essential for growing food, manufacturing goods, and safeguarding human health.… Whether or not water scarcity causes outright warfare between nations in the years ahead, it already causes enough violence and conflict within nations to threaten social and political stability.”

Inequities Affecting Food Security Can Exacerbate Grievances and Build Momentum Toward Conflict

Perceived social, political, or economic inequities that affect people’s access to food can exacerbate grievances that, in combination with other factors, appear to build momentum toward conflict. Messer and Cohen (2006, p. 15) note that “historically, most individuals, households, communities, and peoples denied access to resources adequate to feed themselves and to live their lives with dignity have failed to rebel because they are (1) insufficiently organized and (2) overly terrorized and repressed.” However, they continue, “[t]hese conditions of unchanneled frustration and hopelessness can lead to violence and conflict once there emerges political leadership that can successfully mobilize this discontent in ways that serve a leader or group’s particular political ends, usually articulated as a struggle for social justice or political identity.”

The grievance linkage between food insecurity and civil conflict seems to be of particular importance in resource-rich countries, where the wealth and benefits of an exported natural resource (e.g., oil) are subject to elite

capture or corruption and do not translate into greater food security for all.

Brinkman and Hendrix (2011, pp. 5–6) concur in this view, noting that “[s]ome of the countries most plagued by conflict the past 20 years are characterized by widespread hunger, such as Angola, DRC [Democratic Republic of Congo], Papua New Guinea, and Sierra Leone. The mixture of hunger—which creates grievances—and the availability of valuable commodities— which can provide opportunities for rebel funding—is a volatile combination.”

Droughts in northern Mali led to reductions in food supply in the 1970s and 1980s. The greater food insecurity that resulted did not directly lead to conflict. Tor Benjaminsen (2008) argues, however, that the scarcity of food led to the migration of young men to Algeria and Libya, where they became exposed to revolutionary discourses. They returned to Mali to support an incipient rebellion launched by the nomads and Tuaregs of northern Mali, who believed that they were being unfairly treated by the national government, including being forced to settle in towns and villages rather than continuing their nomadic lifestyle. “Embezzlement of drought relief funds by government officials in Bamako added further to the anger felt by the young men who took up arms against the Malian state,” writes Benjaminsen (2008, p. 819). Thus, reduced availability of food and perceived inequities in systems intended to increase access to food combined with a complex set of cultural and political drivers to ignite violent conflict in northern Mali.

Food Insecurity May Give Individuals Incentives to Join or Support Conflicts and Rebellions

Poverty-based food insecurity may give incentives to individuals—likely, in Paul Collier et al.’s (2008) analysis, to be unemployed or underemployed young men— to join conflicts and rebellions. By participating in the conflict, they increase their chances of securing production resources (land, financial assets) through predation and/or acquisition of the spoils of conflict, thereby increasing their food security.

Anecdotal information suggests this to be the case in countries where population growth has resulted in a “bulge” of poorly educated rural youths who see little prospect of gaining resources through other means. Studies of demobilized combatants in Sierra Leone Where weak post-conflict governments are unable to provide either agricultural inputs, health care, or food safety nets to impoverished and food-insecure populations, the opportunity costs for individuals to join efforts to reignite conflict are low because little is forfeited by shifting towards insurgency. Harvesting Peace: Food Security, Conflict, and Cooperation 21 and Liberia provide some evidence that such opportunities for material gain for young people played a role in recent civil wars in those countries (Brinkman & Hendrix, 2011).

Micro-level research shows that households and communities take steps to protect their food security when conflict is imminent or already ongoing. Patricia Justino and others have found that households appear to initiate different strategies to mitigate the impact of conflict on their food security: staying neutral, moving (or escaping), being altruistic and providing assistance to others, or actively participating in the conflict and attempting to improve one’s own conditions (Justino, 2009; Verwimp, 2011; Zetter & Verwimp, 2011).

While neutrality, or “sitting on the fence,” appears to be the option preferred by most households, even when successful this strategy often results in malnutrition, a gradual depletion of assets as economic opportunities are constrained, and increased poverty. There are, therefore, strong incentives—rooted in the quest for food security—for individuals and households to participate in or actively support violent conflict. The hope of protecting or even improving their food security leads some households to seek the protection of local armed factions to increase their chances of survival as they continue to farm their land. They might even increase their chances of acquiring more land or opportunities to better their future food security by offering their support (food, some labor, etc.) to the armed groups (Justino, 2009).

Food Insecurity May Help to Sustain Conflict

Food insecurity may play a role in sustaining conflict as it becomes part of a vicious circle of recurring instability and civil strife. The 2011 WDR cites “the challenge of repeated cycles of violence” as the top challenge for the global community in the 21st century. Rather than following the old linear paradigm of conflict (escalation of dispute, full-scale hostilities, victory or defeat, postconflict phase, peace), the WDR asserts that the new paradigm involves repeated violence, weak governance, and instability (World Bank, 2011b). In this view:

[C]onflicts often are not one-off events, but are ongoing and repeated: 90 percent of the last decade’s civil wars occurred in countries that had already had a civil war in the last 30 years.… [N]ew forms of conflict and violence [such as crime] threaten development… [and] different forms of violence are linked to each other.… International ideological movements make common cause with local grievances… [and] grievances can escalate into acute demands for change—and the risks of violent conflict—in countries where political, social or economic change lags behind expectations, as in the Middle East and North Africa.

Since evidence shows that conflict leads to food insecurity, it seems likely, in this new perspective on conflict, that continued food insecurity could well contribute to continuing or restarting conflict. Where agricultural production assets have been destroyed, for example, the difficulties of regaining higher productivity levels may affect availability of food supplies or incomes (and thus food access), especially when export commodities are involved.

Where weak post-conflict governments are unable to provide either agricultural inputs, health care, or food safety nets to impoverished and food-insecure populations, the opportunity costs for individuals to join efforts to reignite conflict are low because little is forfeited by shifting towards insurgency. Social or political inequities that affect the potential for regaining food security and are unaddressed by government may also help to maintain a cycle of conflict. External price shocks that are not buffered by government action could again trigger or catalyze actions that could refuel conflicts.

#### Collapse in the U.S. goes global – global food infrastructure is highly sensitive

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The reality is that Trump’s coming transformation of U.S. trade policies will inevitably lead to changes in food security that dwarf even the most substantial of outcomes from the bipartisan Global Food Security Act. Why? First, the U.S. is a world superpower when it comes to global food production, so any shift in U.S. agriculture policy can have significant consequences both at home and abroad. But there is more to the story than just U.S. trade policy changes. It turns out that our global food system is highly sensitive — even to small changes. A minor disruption in the U.S. food supply could potentially produce cascading effects that spread rapidly and cause a major shock to the system. The world experienced this type of sensitivity firsthand when, much like a flu epidemic, food riots spread from country to country in Africa and other developing countries during the global food crisis of 2007/2008. Wheat and corn prices doubled over about two years prior to the crisis, and rice prices tripled over just a few months in late 2007 and early 2008. Economists continue to debate what caused these price spikes, offering explanations that include long-run drivers like greater biofuel demand and changes in Asian diets together with short-run factors such as trade restrictions, speculation, and depreciation of the U.S. dollar, hoarding, and panic purchases. Unfortunately, it turns out that “tipping points” leading to such crises (a term popularized by the author Malcolm Gladwell) are generally unpredictable. Yet the severe effects of the food-price spike, which included increases in poverty and malnourishment as well as violent protests in multiple countries, are clear. Importantly, the 2007/2008 crisis was not isolated to the developing world. Even in the U.S., food prices spiked, leading to hardship for many everyday Americans.

#### Shortages cause political instability, conflict and exacerbate poverty in the global south—existing checks fail and governments make things worse

Cullen S. Hendrix and Stephan M. Haggard 22 February 2015 [Cullen Hendrix is assistant professor at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver and nonresident senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Stephan Haggard is the Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor of Korea-Pacific Studies at School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California at San Diego; “Where and why food prices lead to social upheaval”; <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/02/22/where-and-why-food-prices-lead-to-social-upheaval/>]

The economic effects of higher food prices are clear: Since 2007, higher prices have put a brake on two decades of steady process in reducing world hunger. But the spikes in food prices over the past decade have also thrust food issues back onto the security agenda, particularly after the events of the Arab Spring. High food prices were one of the factors pushing people into the streets during the regionwide political turmoil that began in late 2010. Similar dynamics were at play in 2007-2008, when near-record prices led to food-related protests and riots in 48 countries. To what extent might high or rising food prices be a source of political instability? Food prices are the quintessential “kitchen table issue,” important even to those with no interest in politics. They’re especially salient in lower-income countries, where food-related expenditures often surpass 50 percent of household income. Unlike energy and electronics, demand for basic foodstuffs is income-inelastic: Whether I have adequate income has no effect on my need for sustenance. Not surprisingly, 97 percent of the post-2007 ‘food riots’ identified by a team at the New England Complex Systems Institute occurred in Africa and Asia, which are home to more than 92 percent of the world’s poor and chronically food-insecure. Careful empirical work bears out this conventional wisdom: High global food prices are more destabilizing in low-income countries, where per capita incomes are lower. Poverty isn’t the whole story, however. Food is an inherently political commodity and has been recognized as so for millennia. Nearly 2,000 ago, the Roman poet Juvenal noted that providing bread and circuses was an effective means of securing urban stability. In a recently published article in the Journal of Peace Research, we studied the relationship between food prices and urban unrest in Africa and Asia over 1961-2010, which included a period of price spikes in the 1970s. Our objective was to tease out how political institutions might affect the propensity for mass mobilization and protest. Politics might affect the relationship between food prices and protest through two channels. The first is the extent to which governments shield urban consumers from high global prices. Governments in developing countries often subsidize food purchases, especially those of urban dwellers, shifting welfare from rural producers to urban consumers. But this observation raises the second-order question of the conditions under which governments will subsidize urban consumers. We hypothesized that autocratic governments were more likely to shield urban consumers. While urban dwellers can riot in the absence of elections, rural dwellers have fewer channels through which they can voice grievances. Protest is also affected by the political opportunity structure: the opportunities for civil society to organize and mobilize. Famine in North Korea may have claimed as many as a million lives during the first half of the 1990s, but no rioting or demonstrations occurred in Pyongyang. Meanwhile, food-related protests are routine in more open systems such as India, where comparatively small price movements in the presence of ample stocks routinely bring trade unions into the streets. Our empirical analysis concluded that democracies and to a lesser extent anocracies (or “hybrid regimes” that combine democratic and authoritarian elements) experience more urban unrest in times of high prices; there is no relationship between food prices and urban unrest in autocracies. However, is this outcome the result of more pro-rural policies in democracies or a more liberal environment for protest? We found that democracies and anocracies did enact more pro-rural food policy. In particular, democracies in Africa and Asia enact policies that favor urban areas less and rural areas more. These take the form of enhancing farmer incomes and raising consumer prices, which often causes protests and rioting. Lessening urban bias in food policy may be good pro-poor policy, given the continued concentration of poverty in rural areas, but it carries political risks. What of the Arab Spring? These popular uprisings seem to challenge our findings, because they reflected autocracies that failed to pacify restive urban populations. However, it was not for lack of trying. Rather, the Arab Spring reflects some of the risks autocratic leaders face when attempting to insulate urban consumers from global market prices. Consumer subsidies have long been part of the “authoritarian bargain” between the state and citizens in the Middle East and North Africa, and attempts to withdraw them have been met with protest before: Egypt’s bread intifada, which erupted over an attempt to reform food subsidies, killed 800 in 1977. These subsidies explicitly encouraged citizens across the region to evaluate their governments’ effectiveness in terms of their ability to maintain low consumer prices — prices that, given these countries’ dependence on food imports, those governments ultimately could not control.

**This culminates in food wars in the global south that lead governmental collapse and further violence that exacerbates in the initial shortages—impact defense doesn’t assume empirics and expert consensus**

Julian **Cribb 2010** (Julian, the principal of Julian Cribb & Associates, specialists in science communication, 1996-2002 he was Director, National Awareness, for Australia’s national science agency, CSIRO, has received 32 awards for journalism including the Order of Australia Association Media Prize, fellow of the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering. “The Coming Famine: The Global Food Crisis and what we can do to avoid it”, University of California Press, 2010, p. 18-26)

Food and economic insecurity and natural resource scarcities . . .can be major sources of conflict. When politically dominant groups seize land and food resources, deny access to other culturally or economically marginalized groups, and cause hunger and scarcities, violence often arises. In Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Sudan, food crises resulting from drought and mismanagement of agriculture and relief and development aid led to rebellion and government collapse, followed by **even greater** food **shortfalls** in ensuing years of conflict. Denial of the right to food has been linked to uprisings and civil war in Central America and Mexico. Food insecurity is also integral to civil conflicts in Asia. Competition for resources has generated cycles of hunger and hopelessness that have bred violence in Sri Lanka as well as Rwanda." These afflicted regions are generally places disconnected from the global economic mainstream, where strong-man governments arise and just as quickly crumble, having only political quicksand on which to build a foundation for stability and progress. This is vital to an understanding of what is going wrong with global food production: in nearly all these countries, food is of the first importance, and only after you have enough food can you form a government stable enough to deliver water, health care, education, opportunity for women, justice, and economic development. By neglecting or reducing support for basic food production- as many have during the past twenty-five years-in order to spread aid across these equally deserving causes, the world's aid donors may unintentionally have laid the foundation for future government failure and conflict. "The absolute number of countries with food crises caused by war and conflicts has increased since the 1985 as has the relative share of food crises caused by socio-economic factors from about 2 percent to 2.7 percent by 2.007," the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization in- formed the Committee on World Food Security in 2008. "The recent sharp increase in the price of imported food commodities is an example of a socio-economic shock that can exacerbate or cause food crises in many countries."" In describing the triggers for today's conflicts, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency states in its online World Fact Book, "Territorial disputes may evolve from historical and/or cultural claims, or they may be brought on by resource competition. . . . [S]ources of contention include access to water and mineral (especially hydrocarbon) resources, fish- eries, and arable land." It adds, "Armed conflict prevails not so much between the uniformed armed forces of independent states as between stateless armed entities that detract from the sustenance and welfare of local populations, leaving the community of nations to cope with re- sultant refugees, hunger, disease, impoverishment, and environmental degradation." '4 The CIA presumably has a good grasp of what makes people fight. In its quest to predict where the world's next trouble spots are likely to erupt, it clearly recognizes-on the public record-the power of disputes over food, land, and water to fire the tinder. A scan of the scores of cur- rent disputes it lists soon reveals the frequent appearance of these three casus belli and of the border confrontations triggered by them. The question is why many of the world's governments appear unresponsive to the need to deal with these triggers for war, if these are the warnings their intelligence services are providing. The threat of conflict over food**,** land, and water is not, however, confined to the marginal world. Increasingly it imperils the economic powerhouses of the global economy in the early twenty-first century. In 2001 the Australian strategic analyst Alan Dupont predicted, “Food is destined tohave greater strategic weight and import in an era of environmental scarcity. While optimists maintain that the world is perfectly capable of meeting the anticipated increases in demand for essential foodstuffs, there are enough imponderables to suggest that prudent governments would not want to rely on such a felicitous outcome." Anticipating the food crisis of 2007-8 by several years, he presciently added, "East Asia's rising demand for food and diminishing capacity to feed itself adds an unpredictable new element to the global food equation for several reasons. The gap between production and consumption of key foodstuffs globally is narrowing dangerously and needs to be reversed." Bearing out his words, Singapore president Lee Hsieng Loong told a 2008 international defense conference, "In the longer term, the trends towards tighter supplies and higher prices will likely reassert themselves. This has serious security implications. The impact of a chronic food shortage will be felt especially by the poor countries. Thestresses from hunger and famine can easily result in social upheavaland civil strife, exacerbating conditions that lead to **failed states**. Between countries, competition for food supplies and displacement of people across borders could deepen tensions andprovoke conflict and wars."15 Indeed, the U.S. academics Ellen Messer and Marc Cohen argue that most modern conflicts ought to be viewed as "food wars," that is, "the practice of warring parties fighting for control of food supplies to re- ward their supporters and punish their enemies." In 2003 they estimated that there were fifty-six million people living in twenty-seven countries where food wars were taking place." Aid agencies understood this better than anyone else. When the 2007-8 food price crisis struck, the International Red Cross (IRC) immediately warned of the risk of a surge in violence. Jakob Kellenberger, the president of the IRC's International Committee, told media that "there is also the potential of food-related violence." Price hikes for staple foods had sparked riots in places such as Haiti, Egypt, and Somalia, and Kellenberger predicted that the neutral Red Cross would be facing even greater responsibility "when that violence reaches the level of an armed conflict. . . . You can imagine when you have countries where you have already an armed conflict, where you have already a high level of violence and you have at the same time a lot of poor and extremely vulnerable people," he said. "The price level for them is not only a question of higher prices. It becomes a question of survival, of just having access to food."'7 Despite all the views quoted here, the majority of the world's policy analysts, defense experts, and governments persist in viewing famine as a consequence of war-not war as a consequence of famine. This monocular perspective creates dangerous international blind spots both for peace and for hunger.

#### Causes global conflict

Castellaw 17 (John – 36-year veteran of the U.S. Marine Corps and the Founder and CEO of Farmspace Systems LLC, “Opinion: Food Security Strategy Is Essential to Our National Security,” 5/1/17, https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/9203-opinion-food-security-strategy-is-essential-to-our-national-security)

The United States faces many threats to our National Security. These threats include continuing wars with extremist elements such as ISIS and potential wars with rogue state North Korea or regional nuclear power Iran. The heated economic and diplomatic competition with Russia and a surging China could spiral out of control. Concurrently, we face threats to our future security posed by growing civil strife, famine, and refugee and migration challenges which create incubators for extremist and anti-American government factions. Our response cannot be one dimensional but instead must be a nuanced and comprehensive National Security Strategy combining all elements of National Power including a Food Security Strategy. An American Food Security Strategy is an imperative factor in reducing the multiple threats impacting our National wellbeing. Recent history has shown that reliable food supplies and stable prices produce more stable and secure countries. Conversely, food insecurity, particularly in poorer countries, can lead to instability, unrest, and violence. Food insecurity drives mass migration around the world from the Middle East, to Africa, to Southeast Asia, destabilizing neighboring populations, generating conflicts, and threatening our own security by disrupting our economic, military, and diplomatic relationships. Food system shocks from extreme food-price volatility can be correlated with protests and riots. Food price related protests toppled governments in Haiti and Madagascar in 2007 and 2008. In 2010 and in 2011, food prices and grievances related to food policy were one of the major drivers of the Arab Spring uprisings. Repeatedly, history has taught us that a strong agricultural sector is an unquestionable requirement for inclusive and sustainable growth, broad-based development progress, and long-term stability. The impact can be remarkable and far reaching. Rising income, in addition to reducing the opportunities for an upsurge in extremism, leads to changes in diet, producing demand for more diverse and nutritious foods provided, in many cases, from American farmers and ranchers. Emerging markets currently purchase 20 percent of U.S. agriculture exports and that figure is expected to grow as populations boom. Moving early to ensure stability in strategically significant regions requires long term planning and a disciplined, thoughtful strategy. To combat current threats and work to prevent future ones, our national leadership must employ the entire spectrum of our power including diplomatic, economic, and cultural elements. The best means to prevent future chaos and the resulting instability is positive engagement addressing the causes of instability before it occurs. This is not rocket science. We know where the instability is most likely to occur. The world population will grow by 2.5 billion people by 2050. Unfortunately, this massive population boom is projected to occur primarily in the most fragile and food insecure countries. This alarming math is not just about total numbers. Projections show that the greatest increase is in the age groups most vulnerable to extremism. There are currently 200 million people in Africa between the ages of 15 and 24, with that number expected to double in the next 30 years. Already, 60% of the unemployed in Africa are young people. Too often these situations deteriorate into shooting wars requiring the deployment of our military forces. We should be continually mindful that the price we pay for committing military forces is measured in our most precious national resource, the blood of those who serve. For those who live in rural America, this has a disproportionate impact. Fully 40% of those who serve in our military come from the farms, ranches, and non-urban communities that make up only 16% of our population. Actions taken now to increase agricultural sector jobs can provide economic opportunity and stability for those unemployed youths while helping to feed people. A recent report by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs identifies agriculture development as the core essential for providing greater food security, economic growth, and population well-being. Our active support for food security, including agriculture development, has helped stabilize key regions over the past 60 years. A robust food security strategy, as a part of our overall security strategy, can mitigate the growth of terrorism, build important relationships, and support continued American economic and agricultural prosperity while materially contributing to our Nation’s and the world’s security.

### ag turns middle east conflict

#### Food crisis destroys Middle East Stability – that creates civil war.

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5. Food security as a catalyst of conflict

When discussing the links between failing food security and conflict, it may be useful to focus attention on regions of the world that are more vulnerable to food insecurity than others and where food insecurity has been claimed to be a catalyst of conflict. These include the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and the Sahel as well as the Horn of Africa. In 2011, several MENA countries were seriously affected by conflict and remain so in 2013. Most of them are also affected by failing food security. Six of the nine Sahelian countries are currently involved in armed conflicts, and undernourishment and food security have been implicated as either a cause or a consequence of several of them. This applies as well to Somalia on the Horn.

5.1 The Arab Spring

The MENA region has been experiencing deteriorating parameters for both food production and consumption for some time. Agricultural output is constrained by limited water resources, diminishing arable land, and poor public policy. Consumption is driven by high population growth, urbanization and subsidies. A serious problem facing the region, particularly the non-oil states, is the matter of affordable food. About a fifth of the region lives under USD 2 a day.54

Egypt saw an increase in the prevalence of food insecurity to 17.2 percent (13.7 million people) in 2011 from 14 percent of the population in 2009. The increase was driven largely by rising poverty rates and a succession of crises from 2005, including the avian influenza epidemic in 2006, the food, fuel and financial crises of 2007-09, further global food price increases from late 2010 and a challenging macroeconomic context in the wake of the 2011 revolution. As a result, twice as many households were pushed into food insecurity than those moving out of it in 2011. While the highest poverty rates remain in rural Upper Egypt, significant pockets of poverty and food insecurity are emerging in urban areas, where poverty increased by nearly 40 percent between 2009 and 2011, which means that Greater Cairo had 3.8 million poor people in 2011.55

When food prices increase, the impact on household spending is enormous, and its effect is magnified politically and socially in two ways. The first is that higher prices are felt disproportionately by the urban population, which may enjoy higher incomes than the rural poor but do not share the extra income growers receive from rising food prices. The second is the less severe, but politically more critical, vulnerability of the MENA region’s middle class which is more sensitive to changes in food prices than their rich-economy peers.

Food subsidies have been an important element of the MENA economies since the 1950s. In 2010, Egypt spent about USD 3 billion on bread subsidies. Larbi Sadiki sees the subsidies as the heart of a social contract, “the democracy of bread”, between the regimes and their citizens to ensure peace and stability.56 Food, or more specifically its price, has played a recurring role in the domestic politics of the region. Since the 1970s, food inflation and/or reductions in subsidies prompted violent protests in Egypt in 1977, Morocco in 1981, Tunisia in 1984, Jordan in 1996, and across the Middle East in 2008. The latter was in response to the rapid acceleration of food prices on the eve of the global financial crisis.

54 Rosenberg, David: Food and the Arab Spring, IDC Herzliya, October 2011.

55 World Food Program: “The Status of Poverty and Food Security in Egypt”. WFP, Rome May 2013. 56 Sadiki, Larbi: ‘Towards Arab Liberal Governance: From the Democracy of Bread to the Democracy of the Vote’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 18, No.1 (March 1997), pp. 127-148.

At the end of 2010 and the start of 2011, as protests erupted first in Tunisia and then in Algeria, Yemen, Bahrain, Jordan, and Egypt, the price of food was widely seen as a significant, if not principal, factor in the prompting the unrest. The Food Price Index had been rising since the beginning of 2009, and by the time it peaked in February 2011, the index had registered a 68.3 percent increase. The Cereals Price Index rose an even sharper 75.5 percent in a shorter period of time, from a low in June 2010 to a high in April 2011.57

The result of rising food prices, along with other socio-economic factors, such as high levels of unemployment, especially amongst educated youth, was a steady increase in the cost of living and an erosion of living standards. Sharp rises in domestic food prices from 2007 onwards contributed to an unravelling of the social contract whereby the regimes offered cheap subsidized food, housing, utilities and fuel, often along with employment in a bloated public sector in exchange for political loyalty.

Governments across the region–including those that were not immediately threatened by protests– sought to alleviate pressure by the customary method of increasing subsidies and raising public sector salaries and pensions. The measures suggested that those in power believed that stated political grievances either masked underlying economic problems or at least could be assuaged by addressing those problems. However, subsidies provide only partial protection because they do not cover all foods and even in categories where they do, their impact is mitigated by corruption and black market sales.

A review of the relationship between food security problems and social unrest in the Middle East and North Africa 58 concludes that ‘the price of food was widely seen as a significant, if not principal, factor in prompting the unrest’ and ‘rising food prices played a role in fomenting Arab Spring unrest but appear to have been quickly overtaken by other grievances’. In the run-up to the uprisings, both living standards and food security deteriorated, but a wide array of factors precipitated the Arab Spring. It is true that food prices rose fairly rapidly in Egypt, but Algeria and Jordan also experienced rising prices while containing political unrest. Tunisia, with smaller changes in food prices, was the first country to erupt. In Egypt, though, food played an important symbolic role as ‘Tahrir Square in Cairo became the epicenter for people’s demands for bread, dignity and justice’.59

### ag turns democracy

#### Food crisis causes democratic breakdown and civil war.

Helland and Sørbø 14 — Johan Helland and Gunnar Sørbø, Helland is a Senior Research Fellow specializing in Social Anthropology at the Chr. Michelsen Institute, former Research Associate at the International Livestock Centre for Africa, holds a master’s degree in social sciences (social anthropology, political science and French language & literature) from the University of Bergen, Sørbø is a Senior Researcher specializing in Social Anthropology at the Chr. Michelsen Institute, former director of the Chr. Michelsen Institute, holds a master’s degree and PhD in Social Anthropology from the University of Bergen, 2014 (“Food security and social conflict,” *Chr. Michelsen Institute*, January 1st, Available Online at https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/5170-food-securities-and-social-conflict.pdf, Accessed 07-23-2019) PRK

5.3 Causal chains

Is food security a cause of conflict? Based on a review of recent research, the answer by Brinkman and Hendrix is a qualified yes: ‘Food insecurity, especially when caused by higher food prices, heightens the risk of democratic breakdown, civil conflict, protest, rioting, and communal conflict’.65

Conflicts come in many forms. Hendrix and Brinkman makes a distinction between (a) civil conflict between the state and an opposition group; (b) communal conflict between two or more distinct communities that neither targets nor directly involves the state; and (c) urban unrest.66

They argue that food insecurity may motivate participation in armed civil conflict at the individual level, but acute food insecurity may also diminish conflict because it diminishes the resources available to militants; it can hinder active political participation; and food denial is often part of counterinsurgency operations. The causal link, therefore, between food insecurity and civil conflict is both complex and ambiguous, while the reciprocal relationship (civil conflict causing food insecurity) is well established.

Communal conflicts tend to cluster in areas where land and water are scarce, such as the regions of the Sahel. Recurrent droughts have undermined cooperative relationships between pastoralists and sedentary farmers, as pastoralist encroachments on farmlands have increased, like in Sudan. Because herding activities occur in marginal lands, these conflicts often take place against a backdrop of chronic or frequent food insecurity and are exacerbated by poverty and political exclusion. However, some studies have found that communal conflict is more prevalent during times of both relative food security and abundance.67

Urban protests and riots have attracted particular attention after the food crisis and during the Arab Spring. A study from 2011 shows that violent and mostly urban protest (of varying degrees of intensity) took place in 14 out of 53 African countries68 in connection with the 2007/08 food crisis. The analysis tentatively concludes that food riots are more likely to occur in authoritarian states with few political freedoms and a high incidence of economic and human poverty. Low rates of urbanization reduce the likelihood of food protest, however, as does the presence of social protection programs. These rather general conclusions are also supported in a global review carried out by Christopher Barrett 69 in 2012, which only goes as far as stating that ‘food security worries can spark public protest when mixed with a sense of broader injustices’.

### ag turns structural violence

#### Food crisis supercharges structural violence – it disproportionately affects those in poverty.

UNCTAD 12 — UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2012 (“Development and Globalization: Facts and Figures 2012,” *UNCTAD*, April, Available Online at https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webgdsdsi2012d2\_en.pdf, Accessed 07-25-2019) PRK

Nearly one billion people in the world are now hungry (Chart); an additional 115 million people are suffering from hunger as a result of the combined impacts of rising food prices and the global economic recession. Two recent prices spikes have shown the limitations of the global food provisioning system. In 2007–2008, commodity prices doubled, and the estimated number of hungry people topped one billion, while food riots spread through the developing world. In 2010–2011, food prices increased again by 21 per cent.

The absolute number of undernourished people in the world has been on an upward trend since the mid-nineties. While the proportion of undernourished people has been more or less constant, it has risen sharply owing to the food and financial crises. In 2009, undernourished people accounted for 18 per cent of the world population.

Further, the 2007–2009 crisis has had a different impact on developed and developing countries, with the least developed countries being affected the most. Around 98 per cent of the world’s undernourished people live in developing countries According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, two thirds of the undernourished live in seven developing countries: Bangladesh, China, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia and Pakistan. The prevalence of undernourishment varies significantly from region to region, with sub-Saharan Africa heading the list with around 30 per cent of the population, followed by Asia with 16 per cent and Latin America and the Caribbean with 10 per cent.

In the developed world, most people were able to deal with the crisis reasonably well as a result of well-functioning safety nets; however, people in many relatively poor import-dependent countries, especially in Africa, experienced large price hikes that had permanent effects on their future income and their ability to escape poverty. Small farmers and poor consumers are extremely vulnerable to poverty as a result of unstable commodity prices. It is important to note that food represents a large share of farmer income and also a significant share of the budget of low-income consumers. As a result, big changes in food prices have a large negative impact on the real incomes of small landholders and poor families. For that reason, even temporary reductions in prices for farmers or price hikes in prices for consumers can cause permanent effects on income, leading to poverty traps.

Food prices have increased at an annual average rate of 12 per cent since 2002, despite the trend shift during 2009. Prices for rice, wheat and maize, traditional food staples, rose substantially during the global economic crisis (Chart). Further, climate change, leading to increasingly frequent natural disasters, the growing connections between energy and food markets as a result of the rising demand for biofuels, and the increased financialization of food and agricultural commodities seem to indicate that price volatility will remain an important problem in the near future. In addition, the fundamental causes of relatively high prices seem to persist; in particular, consumer demand in rapidly growing economies will increase, and the population continues to grow. On the supply side, challenges must be met to deal with the increasingly scarce natural resources in some regions, as well as declining rates of yield growth for some commodities.

In addition to high and volatile food prices, some countries are more vulnerable than others to undernourishment and recurrent food shortages. People in countries that are in protracted crises are more vulnerable to hunger. According to FAO, protracted crisis situations are characterized by recurrent natural disasters and/or social conflict, the longevity of food crises, the breakdown of livelihoods and insufficient institutional capacity to react to the crises. One way FAO identifies countries in protracted crises is by the proportion of humanitarian assistance received by the country as a share of total ODA . If a country has received 10 per cent or more of their ODA as humanitarian aid since 2000, then it is classified as being in a protracted crisis. Somalia, for example, one the 22 countries on FAO’s list of countries in protracted crisis has received as much as two thirds of its ODA as humanitarian aid.

#### Food crisis pushes people further into poverty.

Compton et al 10 — Julia Compton, Steve Wiggins and Sharada Keats, Compton is an independent consultant specialising in evaluation, agriculture and food security and rural development, former deputy head of evaluation at DFID (UK Department for International Development), Wiggins is a Research Fellow at the Rural Policy and Governance Group in the Overseas Development Institute, former Lecturer in Agricultural Economics at the University of Reading, holds a master’s degree in Geography from the University of Cambridge, holds a master’s degree in Agricultural Economics from the University of Manchester, holds a PhD in Administration and Management from University of Reading, Keats is a Research Officer at the Agriculture programme at ODI, former Research Assistant at the School of Agriculture, Policy and Development at the University of Reading, holds a Bachelor’s degree in Agricultural Economics from McGill University, holds a Master’s degree in Agricultural Development Economics from the University of Reading, 2010 (“Impact of the global food crisis on the poor: what is the evidence?,” *Overseas Development Institute*, November, Available Online at https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/6371.pdf, Accessed 07-26-2019) PRK

Summary

When international food prices were soaring in early 2008, there was a rush of publications predicting the impact of such price hikes on poor people and suggesting policy solutions. What hard evidence has been collected about the impact on poor and vulnerable people in developing countries? Does this support or change previous policy recommendations? This review draws together evidence from studies on the effects of the 2007–08 price spike, as well as from some other economic crises that resulted in high food prices.

As predicted, high food prices increased malnutrition (especially in young children) and poverty. Some findings were less obvious. These included: the depth of the impact in rural areas, the increase in inequality; the widespread use of credit to buy food, and the fact that most poverty impact came from increasing depth of poverty in the already‐poor, rather than increased ‘poverty headcount’.

Who was worst‐affected?

As widely expected, poor net food importing countries (e.g. island nations such as Haiti, rice importing areas of West Africa, and countries in conflict) were among the first to feel the effects of rising world food prices, and international assistance focused initially on these. However, high food prices were also recorded as having a serious impact on poor consumers in net food exporting areas such as Thailand, Uganda and northern Mozambique. The highest price rises were recorded from countries where there were exacerbating local or regional supply and demand pressures; these included conflict, drought or in a few cases, for example Benin, rapid regional economic growth leading to rising consumer demand.

The poorest households — including many female‐headed households and those with a large proportion of dependents — were worst hit everywhere. These households spend a higher proportion of their income on food and have less access to credit and savings. The main impact of rising food prices was therefore from increasing depth of poverty in those already poor (the so‐ called poverty gap) rather than the numbers of people newly pushed over the poverty line (the poverty headcount).

The worst‐affected groups were casual wage labourers (both rural and urban), land‐poor farmers, petty traders, and producers of commodities whose terms of trade declined against food grains: for example pastoralists in Kenya, cotton farmers in Benin and tea workers in Bangladesh. Salaried workers in the formal sector generally fared better than others.

While most of the high‐profile protests about food prices came from urban areas, many of the poorest and worst‐affected people live in rural areas. Existing social protection and financial systems often do not reach this group. The structure of land ownership and production patterns in most poor countries meant that only a minority of farmers and agribusinesses were able to benefit from rapidly‐rising prices.

Inequality is likely to have increased, although quantitative data is thin. One model estimated an increase in a country’s Gini (inequality) index of 1% for a 20% nominal food price rise, while actual price rises were often four times this level. Within countries, regional inequality is also likely to have increased, with marginal and dry agricultural areas coming off worst. The regressive effect of rising food prices contrasts with studies on rising fuel prices and the global financial crisis, which have generally found that urban and richer areas are the worst hit in the short term.

Children appear to have suffered most. Studies from Bangladesh, Cambodia and Mauritania reported increases to the order of 50% in levels of acute malnutrition of poor under‐fives, with plausible links to rising food prices. In some areas, children also lost out on education: a few studies reported very high (> 50%) school drop‐out rates of children from the poorest households, and many school drop‐outs never return.

Data on gender impacts, in contrast, was very limited, and it was not possible to confirm predictions that women would shoulder most of the burden of high food prices. The exception was Bangladesh, where several studies reported greater weight losses and school absences in young girls than boys. In surprising contrast to previous crises, no studies were located which reported significant weight loss in adult women.

### pharma turns nuclear war

#### Disease causes nuclear war

Koblentz 10 – Gregory Koblentz, Deputy Director of the Biodefense Program @ GMU, Assistant Professor in Public and International Affairs, March, "Biosecurity Reconsidered: Calibrating Biological Threats and Responses." International Security Vol. 34, No. 4, p. 96-132

Pandemics are disease outbreaks that occur over a wide geographic area, such as a region, continent, or the entire world, and infect an unusually high proportion of the population. Two pandemic diseases are widely cited as having the potential to pose direct threats to the stability and security of states: HIV/AIDS and influenza. HIV/AIDS. Since it was first identified in 1981, HIV is estimated to have killed more than 25 million people worldwide. According to the Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the percentage of the global population with HIV has stabilized since 2000, but the overall number of people living with HIV (33 million in 2007) has steadily increased. Sub-Saharan Africa continues to bear a disproportionate share of the global burden of HIV with 35 percent of new HIV infections, 75 percent of AIDS deaths, and 67 percent of all people living with HIV. 116 Scholars have identified four ways that HIV/AIDS can affect security. 117 First, the disproportionately high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the armed forces of some nations, particularly in Southern Africa, may compromise the ability of those states to defend themselves from internal or external threats. Militaries with high rates of HIV infection may suffer losses in combat readiness and effectiveness as infected troops are transferred out of combat roles, units lose cohesion because of high turnover rates, middle management is "hollowed out" by the early death or disability of officers, and defense budgets are strained because of rising medical costs and the need to recruit and train replacements for sick soldiers. The second threat is that HIV/AIDS will undermine the international peace-keeping system. Nations with militaries with high rates of HIV/AIDS will be unable to provide troops for international peacekeeping missions; nations with healthy militaries may be unwilling to commit troops to peacekeeping operations in nations with a high prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS; and war-torn nations may be unwilling to accept peacekeepers for fear they will spread the disease in their country. The third threat is that a "second wave" of HIV/AIDS could strike large, strategically important countries such as China, India, and Russia. These states, which possess nuclear weapons and are important players in critical regions, also suffer from internal security challenges that could be aggravated by a severe AIDS epidemic and its attendant socioeconomic disruptions. The fourth threat is that the high prevalence of HIV in less developed countries will cause political instability that could degenerate into internal conflict or spread into neighboring countries. Unlike most diseases, which affect primarily the poor, young, and old, HIV/AIDS strikes young adults and members of the middle and upper classes. By sickening and killing members of society when they should be their most productive, HIV/AIDS has inflicted the "single greatest reversal in human development" in modern history. 118

### pharma turns structural violence

#### Impoverished countries are disproportionately devastated by pandemics

Oppenheim and Yamey 17 (Ben Oppenheim received his Ph.D and M.A. from the University of California, Berkeley, an MSc from the London School of Economics and is a Fellow at Center for International Cooperation, and Gavin Yamey Professor of the Practice in the Sanford School of Publc Policy and associate of the Duke Initiative for Science & Society, 6-19-2017, "Pandemics and the poor," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2017/06/19/pandemics-and-the-poor/>) cliv

Regardless of where a pandemic starts, once underway, the poor tend to bear the brunt. Low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) have weaker health systems and limited capacity to handle surges in cases. Christopher Murray and colleagues estimate that if a flu pandemic similar in severity to the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic were to hit today, there could be 62 million deaths, of which 96 percent would be in LMICs.

We can curtail pandemics if we quickly develop vaccines and make them widely accessible. However, without vigorous efforts to secure equitable access, vaccine distribution will follow the logic of the market. During the 2009 swine flu pandemic, wealthy countries secured large advance orders for vaccines, but, despite the efforts of the World Health Organization to negotiate donations, poor countries were crowded out—receiving vaccines more slowly than rich countries and unable to cover as many of their citizens.

These same distributional inequalities are also likely to play out within poor countries. The poorest regions in a country are often the most vulnerable since they have fewer pandemic response resources—fewer health workers and clinics and less medicine. When outbreaks begin, the poor are also more likely to have already been suffering from malnutrition and immunosuppressive conditions, which can increase susceptibility to infectious diseases.

### pharma turns econ

#### Pandemics cause economic devastation

Oppenheim and Yamey 17 (Ben Oppenheim received his Ph.D and M.A. from the University of California, Berkeley, an MSc from the London School of Economics and is a Fellow at Center for International Cooperation, and Gavin Yamey Professor of the Practice in the Sanford School of Publc Policy and associate of the Duke Initiative for Science & Society, 6-19-2017, "Pandemics and the poor," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2017/06/19/pandemics-and-the-poor/>) cliv

Epidemics and pandemics can cause enormous economic damage as workers fall sick, fearful people avoid markets and public places, and quarantines and disease control measures reduce travel and clamp down on trade. Acute economic disruption carries particular risks for poor households, whose livelihoods are already precarious.

All three countries affected by the 2014 West African Ebola epidemic suffered large GDP growth shocks, totaling $2.8 billion in lost GDP. This figure probably underestimates the true economic impact. Victoria Fan and colleagues calculated the “inclusive” cost of outbreaks (the sum of the cost in lost income and a dollar valuation of the cost of early death) and found that for Ebola, the inclusive costs are two to three times the income loss.

#### Pandemic triggers a global economic recession

Begley 13 Sharon Begley, 1-21-2013, "Flu-conomics: The next pandemic could trigger global recession," U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-reutersmagazine-davos-flu-economy/flu-conomics-the-next-pandemic-could-trigger-global-recession-idUSBRE90K0F820130121

A global pandemic that lasted a year could trigger a “major global recession,” warned a 2008 report from the World Bank. If a pandemic were on the scale of the Hong Kong flu of 1968-69 in its transmissibility and severity, a yearlong outbreak could cause world GDP to fall 0.7 percent. If we get hit with something like the 1957 Asian flu, say goodbye to 2 percent of GDP. Something as bad as the 1918-19 Spanish flu would cut the world’s economic output by 4.8 percent and cost more than $3 trillion. “Generally speaking,” the report added, “developing countries would be hardest hit, because higher population densities and poverty accentuate the economic impacts.”

The majority of the economic losses would come not from sickness or death but from what the World Bank calls “efforts to avoid infection: reducing air travel … avoiding travel to infected destinations, and reducing consumption of services such as restaurant dining, tourism, mass transport, and nonessential retail shopping.”

The really bad news is that we may not be hearing all the bad news. Economists who study pandemics worry they may be underestimating the financial toll because they haven’t been considering all the ramifications. “Research to understand the indirect costs of an epidemic has been growing, focusing on how to accurately incorporate productivity losses and effects on economic activity,” says Bruce Lee of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, where he is an associate professor, director of the Public Health Computational and Operations Research Group, and an expert in the economics of infectious diseases.

### econ turns structural violence

#### Economic downturn increases structural violence

Klare 9 – Prof of Peace and Security Studies (Michael T. Author and Professor of Peace and World-Security Studies at Hampshire College, March 19, 2009 “The Second Shockwave” [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-t-klare/the-second-shockwave\_b\_176358.html)](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-t-klare/the-second-shockwave_b_176358.html%29)

While the economic contraction is apparently slowing in the advanced industrial countries and may reach bottom in the not-too-distant future, it's only beginning to gain momentum in the developing world, which was spared the earliest effects of the global meltdown. Because the crisis was largely precipitated by a collapse of the housing market in the United States and the resulting disintegration of financial products derived from the "securitization" of questionable mortgages, most developing nations were unaffected by the early stages of the meltdown, for the simple reason that they possessed few such assets. But now, as the wealthier nations cease investing in the developing world or acquiring its exports, the crisis is hitting them with a vengeance. On top of this, conditions are deteriorating at a time when severe drought is affecting many key food-producing regions and poor farmers lack the wherewithal to buy seeds, fertilizers, and fuel. The likely result: A looming food crisis in many areas hit hardest by the global economic meltdown. Until now, concern over the human impact of the global crisis has largely been focused -- understandably so -- on unemployment and economic hardship in the United States, Europe, and former Soviet Union. Many stories have appeared on the devastating impact of plant closings, bankruptcies, and home foreclosures on families and communities in these parts of the world. Much less coverage has been devoted to the meltdown's impact on people in the developing world. As the crisis spreads to the poorer countries, however, it's likely that people in these areas will experience hardships every bit as severe as those in the wealthier countries -- and, in many cases, far worse. The greatest worry is that most of the gains achieved in eradicating poverty over the last decade or so will be wiped out, forcing tens or hundreds of millions of people from the working class and the lower rungs of the middle class back into the penury from which they escaped. Equally worrisome is the risk of food scarcity in these areas, resulting in widespread malnutrition, hunger, and starvation. All this is sure to produce vast human misery, sickness, and death, but could also result in social and political unrest of various sorts, including riot, rebellion, and ethnic strife. The president, Congress, or the mainstream media are not, for the most part, discussing these perils. As before, public interest remains focused on the ways in which the crisis is affecting the United States and the other major industrial powers. But the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and U.S. intelligence officials, in three recent reports, are paying increased attention to the prospect of a second economic shockwave, this time affecting the developing world.Sinking Back Into Penury In late February, the World Bank staff prepared [a background paper](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/swimmingagainstthetide-march2009.pdf) for the Group of 20 (G-20) finance ministers meeting held near London on March 13 and 14. Entitled "Swimming Against the Tide: How Developing Countries Are Coping with the Global Crisis," it provides a preliminary assessment of the meltdown's impact on low-income countries (LICs). The picture, though still hazy, is one of deepening gloom. Most LICs were shielded from the initial impact of the sudden blockage in private capital flows because they have such limited access to such markets. "But while slower to emerge," the report notes, "the impact of the crisis on LICs has been no less significant as the effects have spread through other channels." For example, "many LIC governments rely on disproportionately on revenue from commodity exports, the prices of which have declined sharply along with global demand." Likewise, foreign direct investment is falling, particularly in the natural resource sectors. On top of this, remittances from immigrants in the wealthier countries to their families back home have dropped, erasing an important source of income to poor communities. Add all this up, and it's likely that "the slowdown in growth will likely deepen the deprivation of the existing poor." In many LICs, moreover, "large numbers of people are clustered just above the poverty line and are therefore particularly vulnerable to economic volatility and temporary slowdowns." As the intensity of the crisis grows, more and more of these people will lose their jobs or their other sources of income (such as those all-important remittances) and so be pushed from *above* the poverty line to *beneath* it. The resulting outcome: "The economic crisis is projected to increase poverty by around 46 million people in 2009."

### econ turns everything

#### Turns every impact

Robert D. Blackwill, Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. In government, he served under George W. Bush as U.S. ambassador to India and then as deputy assistant to the president, deputy national security adviser for strategic planning, and presidential envoy, “The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic Recession -- A Caution”, 2009, https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\_papers/OP275.html

So what are the likely effects of the global economic problem so far?9 It will cause the fall of some governments (Iceland, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, with more to come). It will lead to more poverty, more disease, more crime, more migration, and more Th ird World military conflict.10 It will trigger street violence in numerous countries, as has already occurred in Greece, China, Haiti, Latvia, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Russia, Italy, Ireland, Iceland, and Lithuania. It will increase Th ird World questioning of the Western economic model—Luis de Silva, President of Brazil, has stunningly asserted that “Th is crisis was caused by the irrational behavior of white people with blue eyes, who before the crisis appeared to know everything and now demonstrate that they know nothing.”11 It will, over time, make the G-20 more infl uential than the G-8, which, incidentally, is not saying all that much. It will marginally accelerate in the next decade more infl uence by rising powers in international organizations, beginning with International Monetary Fund voting rights (but it will not lead to reform of the UN Security Council). It will result in greater national and international fi nancial regulation. It will trigger more pressure on defense budgets in most nations. It will magnify world trade protectionism. It will weaken national efforts around the globe to reduce carbon emissions.12 Th is is a daunting list, but will all these combined developments cause any serious structural change in global politics writ large over the longer run? Th at is far from obvious. A reading of history suggests that there are transcending events that do fundamentally alter the internationally system. Th e French Revolution brings on Napoleon and 20 years of war in Europe. Th e Bolshevik Revolution produces the Soviet Empire and 70 years of Communist rule in Russia. Th e Great Depression reinforces the collapse of the Weimar Republic, the advent of Adolf Hitler, and the outbreak of Second World War. Th e World War II defeats of Germany and Japan and their subsequent occupation by foreign powers profoundly alter the international orientations of those countries. Th e Chinese Communist victory in 1949 launches a wholly diff erent Chinese foreign policy in succeeding decades. German Unifi cation results in the end of the Soviet Empire in East and Central Europe and then the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

# aff

### other pc theory cards

#### PC theory is assertions with zero support---reject their ev

Default to poli sci consensus

Edwards, 16 – George C. Edwards III, Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Jordan Chair in Presidential Studies at Texas A&M, 2016, “The Potential of Presidential Leadership”, Study Done for the White House Transition Project

The American political system is not a fertile field for the exercise of presidential leadership. Most political actors, from the average citizen to members of Congress, are free to choose whether to follow the chief executive’s lead; the president cannot force them to act. At the same time, the sharing of powers established by the Constitution’s checks and balances not only prevents the president from acting unilaterally on most important matters but also gives other power holders different perspectives on issues and policy proposals.

Nevertheless, the tenacity with which many commentators embrace the persuasive potential of political leadership is striking. They often fall prey to an exaggerated concept of the potential for using the “bully pulpit” to go public or pressuring members of Congress to fall into line with the White House. They routinely explain historic shifts in public policy, such as those in the 1930s, 1960s, and 1980s, in terms of the extraordinary persuasiveness of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, and Ronald Reagan. Equally striking is the lack of evidence of the persuasive power of the presidency. Observers in both the press and the academy base their claims about the impact of such leadership on little or no systematic evidence. There is not a single systematic study that demonstrates that presidents can reliably move others to support them.

In sum, we should not infer from success in winning elections that the White House can persuade members of the public and Congress to change their minds and support policies they would otherwise oppose. Indeed, such assumptions are likely to lead to self-inflicted wounds.

## ag impact

### 2ac – no impact to usmca general

#### There is no considerable benefit to USMCA

Brinkley 2018 (John Brinkley write about international trade and investment for Forbes, and graduated from American University, 10-1-2018, "USMCA Is Not The Magnificent Trade Deal Trump Says It Is," Forbes, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnbrinkley/2018/10/08/usmca-is-not-the-magnificent-trade-deal-trump-says-it-is/>) cliv

In summary, USMCA can be seen, on balance, as an improvement over NAFTA, but not much of one. It will have no measurable effect on economic growth, job growth or wage growth in the United States. It will have no appreciable effect on the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico.

Most important, Trump’s threats against Canada and Mexico and his malign comments about their heads of state during the negotiations pretty well wrecked the United States’ relationship with two of its most important allies.

A Pew Research Center poll found that only 6% of Mexicans and 25% of Canadians had confidence in Trump. And that was last spring, before Trump threatened to destroy Canada’s economy by imposing a 25% tariff on car imports therefrom.

### 2ac – no ag impx to usmca

#### No significant ag benefit from USMCA- NAFTA in the squo solves

Fakta 19 (Jacqui Fatka is the policy editor for Farm Futures, 4-19-2019 "ITC report shows nominal gains for ag under USMCA," Feedstuffs, <https://www.feedstuffs.com/news/itc-report-shows-nominal-gains-ag-under-usmca>) cliv

The report noted that the combined effect of all USMCA provisions would increase total annual U.S. agricultural and food exports by $2.2 billion (1.1%) when fully implemented. A commission simulation that considered only the effects of the agricultural market access provisions in USMCA showed increased U.S. agriculture and food exports to the world of $435 million.

USMCA would lead to small increases in U.S. exports to Canada of dairy products, poultry meat, eggs and egg-containing products, wheat and alcoholic beverages. At the same time, it would lead to a small increase in U.S. imports of sugar and sugar-containing products and dairy products from Canada.

Specifically, modeling results estimate a $226.8 million (0.1%) gain in total dairy product output, including $314.5 million (7.1%) of additional exports -- $227.0 million to Canada and $50.6 million to Mexico -- over the baseline. Increased exports to Canada would be driven largely by more exports of cheese and other milk and cream products. New country-specific tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) in Canada would create additional opportunities for U.S. exports of milk and milk powder, cheese, butter and other products.

USMCA would require Canada to establish a duty-free TRQ for live chickens and chicken meat of U.S. origin. The TRQ volume in the first year would be 47,000 metric tons. It would increase by 2,000 mt annually through the sixth year of USMCA and then increase by 1% per year to 62,963 mt in year 16, remaining at that level in following years. Model results indicate that U.S. poultry meat exports to Canada would increase by $183.5 million (or nearly 50%) in year 6 of the agreement.

Senate Finance Committee chairman Chuck Grassley (R., Iowa), who will be the one to shepherd approval of USMCA in the Senate, said he plans to conduct a thorough and thoughtful review of this and other studies of the economic impact of USMCA in the coming days. He also noted that he will be briefed by ITC officials early in the week of April 22.

“Many of the significant improvements in USMCA are reducing non-tariff barriers and implementing rules and fair practices that will help U.S. workers, jobs and businesses tremendously over the coming years. The USMCA makes critical updates to rules on intellectual property, currency practices, digital trade, customs, state-owned enterprises, sanitary and phytosanitary measures and technical barriers to trade that will be valuable to many American farmers and businesses, even though their impact on [gross domestic product] has historically been inherently difficult for economists to measure,” Grassley said.

In response to the report, many agricultural groups noted that many of the benefits under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have already been realized for the agriculture industry.

“While the ITC report is an important step in the process of considering trade agreements, the benefits of North American trade are already well understood, particularly by farmers and ranchers. Under NAFTA, ag exports to Canada and Mexico grew from $8 billion in 1993 to $40 billion last year,” according to Brian Kuehl, co-executive director of Farmers for Free Trade, a bipartisan coalition supported by American agricultural commodity groups.

### 1ar – no ag impx to usmca ext

#### USMCA will have no impact on food security- the dairy market proves

Brinkley 18 (John Brinkley write about international trade and investment for Forbes, and graduated from American University,, 10-1-2018, "USMCA Is Not The Magnificent Trade Deal Trump Says It Is," Forbes, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnbrinkley/2018/10/08/usmca-is-not-the-magnificent-trade-deal-trump-says-it-is/>) cliv

Canada agreed to allow more American dairy products into their market by setting higher import quotas. American farmers exported about $232.5 million worth of dairy products to add about $70 million to that.

In exchange for this, the Trump administration dropped its insistence that one of three NAFTA dispute settlement chapters be deleted, but it prevailed in getting rid of another, having to do with disputes between businesses and governments. Canadian businesses can no longer challenge U.S. government policies and vice versa. That chapter survived with regard to disputes between Mexico and the United States, but in a limited form.

American dairy farmers’ increased access to Canada will not offset the losses they are likely to suffer from Chinese and Mexican tariffs that were imposed in retaliation for Trump’s tariffs on aluminum and steel, according to a study performed in August for the U.S. Dairy Export Council. Those tariffs remain in place for the time being.

“U.S. dairy product exports combined could fall by $115 million in 2018 and $415 million in 2019,” said the study by Agribusiness Consulting. “From 2018-2023, U.S. dairy product exports combined could fall by roughly seven percent from baseline projections worth $2.7 billion.”

### 2ac – ag turn- usmca hurt ag

#### USMCA hurts the food industry- it benefits Mexican producers over American

Daniels 5/7 (Jeff Daniels holds a bachelor's degree in journalism from California State University-Northridge and is a reporter for CNBC.com 5-7-2019, “USMCA trade deal could cost Georgia produce growers nearly $900 million, report says,” CNBC, <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/07/usmca-losses-to-georgia-growers-could-reach-about-900-million-report.html>) cliv

Unless the proposed U.S. Mexico Canada Agreement (USMCA) is changed, it could “cause extensive economic damage to Georgia” and its fresh produce industry, according to economists at the University of Georgia.

“While the deal may be an overall positive for the United States, it exposes U.S. fruit and vegetable growers to a high risk of substantial harm through unfair competition from Mexican imports,” the report said.

The report projected annual economic losses to Georgia’s small fruit and vegetable industry under USMCA could be $340 million to nearly $900 million. It also said there could be job losses of about 3,300 to more than 8,600 under the proposed replacement to the 25-year-old North American Free Trade Agreement.

According to the report, Georgia’s blueberries usually have a market presence in Northern states ahead of local producers due to climate advantage. Similarly, it said Georgia’s climate is ideal to grow fall vegetables such as tomatoes, peppers, squash, cucumbers, and eggplant.

However, the UGA report dated April 22 said Mexico has ramped up production of fresh produce in recent years and now “their imports compete directly with Georgia fruits and vegetables. Georgia’s natural seasonal advantage has been diminished by Mexican imports arriving during Georgia’s selling season at prices well below Georgia’s production costs.”

U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue was not available for comment. Perdue is a former governor of Georgia and agribusinessman.

### 2ac – ag doesn’t cause conflict

#### Food crisis is not caused by agricultural crisis – political problems are the actual cause – experts agree.

Chou 17 — Sophie Chou, data journalist at PRI (Public Radio International), former Google News Fellow at the Pew Research Center, 2017 (“Drought doesn't cause famine. People do.,” *Public Radio International*, March 27th, Available Online at https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-03-27/drought-doesnt-cause-famine-people-do, Accessed 07-24-2019) PRK

The United Nations announced this month that more than 20 million people in four countries are teetering on the edge of famine, calling the situation “the worst humanitarian crisis” since the end of World War II.

The key for avoiding the worst outcomes? Political will, experts say.

Modern famines are different from those the world faced 60 to 70 years ago. In the past, with less warning and less international support, more people died from hunger. In the early and mid-20th century, famines killed millions in Europe and Asia, in areas with much larger populations than areas which suffer from food insecurity today.

According to estimates from the World Peace Foundation, the deadliest famine in recorded history actually did take place after World War II. During China’s Great Leap Forward, about 30 million people died from hunger between 1958 and 1962.

What explains the UN's statement, then? They may be counting famines by decade, which would have split the Great Leap Forward crisis between the 1950s and the 1960s:

These days, famines cause death by the thousands, and are mostly confined to the Horn of Africa. Improvements in transportation and communications infrastructure have been successful in eliminating large-scale famines in virtually all other parts of the world.

But the current situations in Somalia, Yemen, Nigeria and South Sudan are undeniably harsh.

“Those people will suffer, their children will be malnourished, they will likely be displaced, lose their livelihoods, and some people will no doubt die as a result of this crisis,” says Dan Maxwell, a food security professor and director of the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University.

Maxwell exphasizes that modern-day famines are rarely caused by a lack of food. “There has never been a case that agricultural production causes famine alone,” he says. “It only causes a famine if someone lets it cause a famine.”

And that's where data become especially important. Measuring early indicators is crucial for averting famine, as is early investment. In its March announcement, the UN asked for $4.4 billion in emergency funding for intervention, and released $22 million in an emergency loan to Somalia on March 21.

“If we get to the point where a famine is declared, it’s essentially indicating a failure on the part of the international community,” explains Chris Hillbruner of the Famine Early Warning Systems Network, or FEWS NET.

So, how do we measure the warning signs?

FEWS NET uses the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) 5-point rating system, which rates areas around the world to signal how serious food insecurity is there. The ratings go from "minimal" to "stressed, crisis, emergency and famine."

The scale, developed in 2006 and updated in 2012, is in use in 25 countries and gives a consistent measure for food insecurity.

“There should be a response at phase 3 and phase 4,” Hillbruner said. “Phase 4 is where people start dying because of food insecurity. If one waits until famine and then starts responding, inevitably it will be too late.”

Watch severe food insecurity in Africa and Yemen develop from 2015 through FEWS NET projections into July 2017. Famine information for Yemen is not yet available for February 2017 and 2017 projections. (Source: FEWS NET)

To declare a famine, at least 20 percent of households surveyed in an area must face lack of food, and more than 30 percent of children in an area have to have a weight that is recorded as dangerously low. If you don’t have data that says that, you can’t declare famine even if people are starving.

The situation in Yemen is the largest food insecurity emergency in the world right now, according to FEWS NET. Seven governorates there are classified as phase 4. An estimated 17 million people, or 60 percent of the population, are food insecure.

In South Sudan, about 4.9 million are estimated to be food insecure and that number will climb to 5.5 million by July. Five counties are classified at 4 and 5 and will worsen.

FEWS NET officials struggle to access parts of Nigeria, and reported in December that a famine likely occurred in Bama and Banki towns and the surrounding rural areas in 2016.

In Somalia, 400,000 people are in IPC phase 4 and face starvation; 5.2 million others are in phases 2 and 3. It is facing its third famine in the past 25 years, including one in 2011 which left 260,000 people dead.

Hunger is a political issue

Maxwell says there’s a common misconception among the public that overpopulation and lack of resources are the main drivers behind food insecurity. (It’s a theory that was put forth by Thomas Malthus nearly two centuries ago.) In other words, that people starve because there's not enough food.

But Emily Farr, Emergency Food Security and Vulnerable Livelihoods team leader at Oxfam, says that's not the underlying problem. “We are talking about situations that are caused by human behavior,” she says.

The Horn of Africa region, where hunger is worst, is also prone to drought — but the impacts of climate change alone are not enough to create famine, experts say, so long as they are managed.

Farr emphasizes that fast-acting humanitarian response is important for mitigating famines, although the data can be hard to come by.

“There have been cases in the past where we haven’t been able to declare food insecurity as much as it was because we simply didn’t have the data,” Farr says.

Conflict especially can limit access. In South Sudan, for example, violence has claimed the lives of at least 12 aid workers this year and as many as 79 since 2013.

Innovations in technology, such as the World Food Program’s Mobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping project, which uses cellphones to survey food security, can help fill in missing numbers. FEWS NET employs high resolution satellite imagery to estimate crop production and population displacement patterns.

Fundamentally, Hillbruner of FEWS NET describes famine as a humanitarian and political issue.

“I think there are times when it’s overstated that there are places we can’t get any information,” he said. “But when the political will is there, everyone suddenly has access.”

Clarification: This story has been updated to reflect the difference between populations in famine (IPC stage 4) and those facing severe food insecurity (IPC phases 2 and 3).

#### Conflict causes food insecurity – not agricultural crisis.

Yakupitiyage 18 — Tharanga Yakupitiyage, Development Journalist at the Inter Press Service, holds a bachelor’s degree in international affairs and development from Hampshire College, holds a master’s degree in international development and foreign policy from American University, 2018 (“Without Food Security, There Is No Peace,” *Inter Press Service*, September 27th, Available Online at http://www.ipsnews.net/2018/09/without-food-security-no-peace/?utm\_source=rss&utm\_medium=rss&utm\_campaign=without-food-security-no-peace, Accessed 07-24-2019) PRK

UNITED NATIONS, Sep 27 2018 (IPS) - Reversing years of progress, global hunger is on the rise once again and one of the culprits is clear: conflict.

A high-level side event during the 73rd session of the United Nations General Assembly brought together, U.N. officials, governments, and civil society to assess and recommend solutions to the pressing issue of conflict-based food insecurity.

“The use of hunger as a weapon of war is a war crime. Yet, in some conflict settings, parties to conflict use siege tactics, weaponise starvation of civilians, or impede life-saving humanitarian supplies to reach those desperately in need." -- Action Against Hunger’s CEO Veronique Andrieux

“Conflict-related hunger is one of the most visible manifestations to human suffering emerging from war…this suffering is preventable and thus all the more tragic,” said United States’ Agency for International Development’s (USAID) administrator Mark Green.

According to the State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2018, the number of hungry people increased to over 820 million in 2017 from approximately 804 million in 2016, levels unseen for almost a decade.

The Global Report on Food Crises found that almost 124 million people across 51 countries faced crisis-level food insecurity in 2017, 11 million more than the year before.

Conflict was identified as the key driver in 60 percent of those cases.

The report predicts that conflict and insecurity will continue to drive food crises around the world, including in the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.

### 1ar – ag doesn’t cause conflict ext

#### Bad governance and conflict are the root cause of food crisis.

O'Connell 17 — Simon O'Connell, Executive Director of Mercy Corps Europe, former Regional Director of West and Central Africa at Mercy Corps, attended the London School of Economics and Imperial College London, 2017 (“The true cause of hunger and famine? War and weak governance,” *World Economic Forum*, April 28th, Available Online at https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/04/conflict-and-famine-time-for-honesty/, Accessed 07-24-2019) PRK

Here we are again. Famine is back in the news. Following drought in Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya, the Disasters Emergency Committee has recently launched an appeal for East Africa. We have been reminded that we have one last chance to stop utter devastation in South Sudan. Across the continent more and more horror reveals itself as areas are taken back from Boko Haram by the Nigerian army. Outside Africa, across the Gulf of Aden, we have seen the little bodies of children wasting away in Yemen.

I have written before that aid professionals like me have done a bad job of explaining the reasons behind fragility and crisis – that we need to be more honest about how complex these phenomena are, and not oversimplify what we do. So here I will try to live up to that. That means when we talk about these hunger crises we shouldn’t just ask you to help feed the starving – though that is desperately needed. We should also talk about conflict.

Human-made crises

Last year, the World Bank revised its position on conflict – upgrading it from being one of many drivers of suffering and poverty, to being the primary driver. In Somalia, despite some political progress, the conflict has put more than half the population in need of assistance, with 363,000 children suffering acute malnutrition. In Nigeria, conflict with Boko Haram in the country’s northeast has left 1.8 million people still displaced, farmers unable to grow crops, and 4.8 million people in need of food assistance. In Yemen, an escalation in conflict since 2015 has worsened a situation already made dire by poor governance, poverty and weak rule of law. Now more than 14 million people need food aid.

Only if we understand conflict can we understand these hunger crises. South Sudan is another acute example. I worked there for two years following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 and know it well.

Right now a place called Koch, where Mercy Corps works, is in what FEWSNET (the famine early warning system) calls a ‘level 4 emergency phase’, which means that individuals and families will start to die of hunger in a matter of months if they don’t receive enough aid. But until recent years, Koch was a thriving community with fertile land. It has been destroyed in armed clashes since conflict broke out in South Sudan in December 2013. Families have been displaced multiple times and they have reported rampant communal disease due to the lack of clean water. As a father of five told our team in Koch: “I have lost everything; my house was burnt, everything was looted and I do not know how to rebuild my life.”

Across the places we work, where people are facing starvation, the pattern is the same. Hunger is not some freak environmental event; it is human-made, the result of a deadly mix of conflict, marginalization, and weak governance.

Long-term solutions

In South Sudan, as in Somalia, Nigeria and Yemen it is not generally a lack of food that has caused famine-like conditions to occur. The crises exist because of violence and conflict. They don’t need more food, they need investment into conflict prevention and the stability that brings.

Of course that is easier said than done. Addressing the root causes of conflict and building resilience to crisis is extremely difficult and complicated. But organisations like Mercy Corps are constantly developing new and better ways to deliver peace-building and conflict prevention, particularly at community level. We need these long-term, complex approaches to be supported, because they may mean we do not need another famine appeal. We also need people to understand that we are trying to address the underlying causes.

The World Economic Forum's Global Agenda Council on Fragility, Violence and Conflict found that corporate partners can foster stable, inclusive and prosperous societies that respect the rule of law and benefit from accountable governance. Both local and multinational businesses can play an important role, often working alongside each other to support and grow local and national economies and, in the process, help support efforts undertaken by others to reduce fragility and conflict.

I am not for a moment suggesting we shouldn’t support crisis appeals. Once a community is in the grip of famine it needs assistance, and fast. These responses save lives. But unless we take time to understand and support long-term approaches like conflict prevention and peace-building, we will continue to find ourselves wrestling with protracted crises, forced migration, and the associated security issues that affect every one of us.

#### US crops don’t solve food crisis – they don’t go to affected countries and they’re not nutritional – experts agree.

Charles 13 — Dan Charles, Food and Agriculture Correspondent at NPR, former technology correspondent at NPR, holds a bachelor’s degree in economics and international affairs from American University, 2013 (“American Farmers Say They Feed The World, But Do They?,” *NPR*, September 17th, Available Online at https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2013/09/17/221376803/american-farmers-say-they-feed-the-world-but-do-they, Accessed 07-24-2019) PRK

And this is why the words "feed the world" grate on the nerves of people who believe that large-scale, technology-driven agriculture is bad for the environment and often bad for people.

Margaret Mellon, a scientist with the environmental advocacy group Union of Concerned Scientists, recently wrote an essay in which she confessed to developing an allergy to that phrase. "If there's a controversy, the show-stopper is supposed to be, 'We have to use pesticides, or we won't be able to feed the world!' " she says.

Mellon says it's time to set that idea aside. It doesn't answer the concerns that people have about modern agriculture — and it's not even true.

American-style farming doesn't really grow food for hungry people, she says. Forty percent of the biggest crop — corn — goes into fuel for cars. Most of the second-biggest crop — soybeans — is fed to animals.

Growing more grain isn't the solution to hunger anyway, she says. If you're really trying to solve that problem, there's a long list of other steps that are much more important. "We need to empower women; we need to raise incomes; we need infrastructure in the developing world; we need the ability to get food to market without spoiling."

It seemed that this dispute needed a referee. So I called Christopher Barrett, an economist at Cornell University who studies international agriculture and poverty.

"They're both right," he says, chuckling. "Sometimes the opposite of a truth isn't a falsehood, but another truth, right?"

It's true, he says, that bigger harvests in the U.S. tend to make food more affordable around the world, and "lower food prices are a good thing for poor people."

For instance, Chinese pigs are growing fat on cheap soybean meal grown by farmers in the U.S. and Brazil, and that's one reason why hundreds of millions of people in China are eating much better than a generation ago — they can afford to buy pork. So American farmers who grow soybeans are justified in saying that they help feed the world.

But Mellon is right, too, Barrett says. The big crops that American farmers send abroad don't provide the vitamins and minerals that billions of people need most. So if the U.S. exports lots of corn, driving down the cost of cornmeal, "it induces poor families to buy lots of cornmeal, and to buy less in the way of leafy green vegetables, or milk," that have the key nutrients. In this case, you're feeding the world, but not solving the nutrition problems.

Arnot, from the Center for Food Integrity, recently did a survey, asking consumers whether they think the U.S. even has a responsibility to provide food to the rest of the world. Only 13 percent of these consumers strongly agreed.

In focus groups, many people said that if feeding the world means more industrial-scale farming, they're not comfortable with it.

This is not a message farmers like to hear. "It is a real sense of frustration for farmers that 'feeding the world' is no longer a message that resonates with the American public," Arnot says.

He tells farm groups that they'll have to find another message. They'll need to show that the way they grow food is consistent with the values of American consumers.

#### US agriculture doesn’t affect food crisis – US exports don’t go to poor countries.

Meador 16 — Ron Meador, Earth Journalist for MinnPost, former journalist specializing in environment, energy and science at the Star Tribune, 2016 (“Does American ag feed the world? Not if you focus on the hungry countries,” *MinnPost*, October 5th, Available Online at https://www.minnpost.com/earth-journal/2016/10/does-american-ag-feed-world-not-if-you-focus-hungry-countries/, Accessed 07-24-2019) PRK

We’ve heard it all our lives: American farmers feed the world.

Once it was a simple expression of pride. Since the 1970s it has morphed into a justification for resisting changes in industrial-scale agricultural practices that would reduce environmental harm from pesticides, runoff, excessive groundwater pumping … the list goes on and on.

But if feeding the world’s hungry has become a handy rationalization for unfettered farming, the slogan is increasingly taking on the tone of pressing moral imperative:

The world’s population is on track to reach 9 billion by 2050 and that will require increasing global food output by somewhere between 60 and 100 percent. Nobody’s in a better position to tackle that challenge than American farmers, who already feed the world.

But do they?

Some statistics from a piercing analysis published yesterday by the Environmental Working Group, based on fairly simple calculations from United Nations and U.S. Department of Agriculture data regarding this country’s 25 largest ag export products in 2015:

America’s top 20 customers for those products — 19 nations plus the European Union — got 86 percent of the total value of the exports, or about $114.4 billion.

All of these countries rank fairly high in a U.N. rating of development status — think Canada (the No. 1 importer), the EU (4), Japan (5), South Korea (6), Australia (14), Saudi Arabia (16).

With two exceptions — India (18) and Guatemala (20) — these countries also rank fairly low in the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization’s scoring of hunger and malnourishment. (India and Guatemala share a middling rank of “moderately high.”)

For the 19 nations of the world that rank as hungriest in the FAO scoring, U.S. exports were far smaller, contributing on average 2.3 percent of total food supply. Looking at this flow from the origin end of the pipeline, only one-half of 1 percent of all U.S. ag exports in 2015 went to the 19 hungriest countries — and fully 63 percent of that stream went to just two of them, Haiti and Yemen.

Collectively, the richest group received 158 times as much imported U.S. food as the poorest.

The EWG report also looked at historical data and found that these patterns haven’t changed much in the past 10 years, especially in regarded to our wealthier customers; membership in the top 20 has changed little and their aggregate share of U.S. ag exports averaged 85 percent over the decade.

It’s a slightly different story with the poor countries, to which exports have actually declined. America’s contribution to their food supply “has not changed significantly since 2004, ranging from a low of 2 percent to a high of 4.4 percent from 2004 through 2013, but the U.S. share of total food aid has dropped.”

In 2004, the U.S. contributed 78.1 percent of the food aid to the hungriest countries, but by 2013 it was down to 48.9 percent. The share of the hungriest countries’ total food supplies provided by food aid and food exports from all sources increased from 16 percent in 2004 to 25.1 percent in 2013.

Together, food exports and food aid from the U.S. constituted an inconsequential amount of the 19 undernourished countries’ total food supplies [in 2015]. … Overall, food aid and gross food imports to the 19 undernourished countries accounted for 25.1 percent of their total food supplies, dwarfing the 2.3 percent U.S. contribution.

As you might expect, the types of food exports going to rich versus poor countries also differs considerably. For the rich countries, exports were dominated by meat and dairy products, as well as animal feed to be used in producing their own meat and dairy products.

 For the poor countries, it was primarily grains and staples.

Today, most agricultural exports from the United States go to countries whose citizens can afford to pay for them.

## pharma impact

### 2ac – pharma turn

#### USMCA ensures a rise in drug prices, decreasing access to live saving medicine

Wirtz et al 6/23 (Veronika J. Wirtz and Warren A. Kaplan are professors at the Boston University School of Public Health and research fellows at Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center. Kevin P. Gallagher is a professor at Boston University’s Pardee School for Global Studies and director of the Global Development Policy Center. , 6-23-2019, "'Big Pharma' is the big winner of the USMCA," TheHill, <https://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/449741-big-pharma-is-the-big-winner-of-the-usmca>) cliv

The longstanding debate in the United States on its sky-high prescription drug prices and access to health care is raging where you might least expect it — within the pages of President Trump’s new trade deal: the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).

Critics of the USMCA are very concerned that it would increase medicine prices in North America and strengthen the hand of one of the world's most powerful industries.

At Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center and School of Public Health, we have been studying the impact of trade treaties on access to medicines and can confirm that there is real truth to these concerns. They require policy action.

At issue is a section of the USMCA that would protect pharmaceutical companies with new biologics from generic competition, so-called "biosimilars."

Biologic medicines come from living cells that contain proteins and other materials that can treat diseases and conditions like cancer, rheumatoid arthritis and multiple sclerosis.

“Biosimilar” medicines are similarly composed drugs that are approved for marketing when presenting data demonstrating that there is no clinically meaningful difference in their safety, quality and efficacy from the original biologic.

Biologics have been found to be the most significant driver of prescription medicine prices. Citing a report by IQVIA Institute, Forbes magazine reported that “biologic drugs represented 2 percent of all U.S. prescriptions, but 37 percent of net drug spending. Since 2014, biologic drugs account for nearly all of the growth in net drug spending: 93 percent of it, in fact.”

For this reason, many have argued to lower the number of years for biologic exclusivity, not increase them.

Even though only 2 percent of patients in the U.S. use biologic medicines, they represent 40 percent of total prescribing drug expenditure. It has been estimated that biosimilar medicine costs on average 30-percent less than the originator biologic medicine.

Promotion of biosimilar medicines in the U.S. could save consumers billions of dollars. According to Federal Drug Administration Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, the anticompetitive tactics used by manufacturers of biologic medicines are one reason market entry of biosimilar medicines is so slow.

A new tactic is the USMCA, which under Article 20 F. 14 would grant at least a 10-year “test data” exclusivity period for new biologics. Currently, Canada has an eight-year test data exclusivity period and Mexico has a five-year limit, so the USMCA would force both countries to increase this period.

Granting exclusivity essentially gives a pharmaceutical company monopoly rights that free the firm from competition and allows it to charge higher prices than it would under competitive conditions.

In a comprehensive review of the literature, we find that, generally, exclusivity rules like these in past trade agreements have tended to raise the prices of medicines.

In fact, in a study we did specific to biologics, we found that provisions that protect biologics in the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement increased the unit price of biologics in Chile.

In many ways, these measures are a form of mercantilism for the interests of firms in leading economic sectors, rather than "free trade" that would create more competition and lower prices.

Indeed, the pharmaceutical industry is the most active lobby group when it comes to trade agreements. One analysis of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) — a deal that was scrapped — stated that it ended up having many of the same provisions for pharmaceuticals and biologics that the USMCA has.

That analysis by Sunlight Foundation found that pharmaceutical companies and their associations mentioned the TPP in 251 separate lobbying reports — two-and-a-half times more than the next-most active industry, the auto sector.

Pharmaceutical companies argue that since test data is so expensive to produce, it is an unfair advantage to let other companies rely on that data without cost. Biologics research and development is supposedly a higher-risk endeavor, with:

higher capital costs,

higher material costs,

greater manufacturing costs and uncertainties,

longer development times, and

lower late-stage success rates compared to biosimilar drugs.

According to pharma, a failure to include substantial data exclusivity as part of a statutory framework for “biosimilars” would undermine incentives to invest in biomedical innovation and thus would slow progress in the development of breakthrough therapies for patients suffering from currently untreatable conditions.

Recent research published in Nature Biotechnology calls this rationale into question. The authors found no evidence that developing biologic drugs was more time-intensive than traditional small-molecule (biosimilar) medicines.

The study's lead author wrote: "Our study shows that biologic and small molecule drugs take a similar amount of time to develop through clinical trials. Policies intended to extend exclusivity periods for biologics, as Canada is now doing due to the USMCA trade deal, should not be justified by pointing to longer pre-market development times for biologic drugs."

Given the new evidence that developing biologic drugs is not more time-intensive, it is necessary to reconsider the period of market exclusivity for such innovation that would not unduly favor one type over others.

Whatever reward for innovation the policymakers choose, it should not impede access to such innovation for those who most need it.

#### Spiking drug prices are immoral and deplete spending from other social programs, locking in structural violence

Klitzman 18 (Robert Klitzman is a professor of psychiatry and director of the Masters of Bioethics Program at Columbia University, 9-18-2018, "Huge price hikes by drug companies are immoral," CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/18/opinions/nostrum-immoral-price-hikes-klitzman/index.html>) cliv

(CNN)Several pharmaceutical companies have been jacking up the prices of their drugs in unethical ways. Most recently, Nirmal Mulye, founder and president of Nostrum Pharmaceuticals, defended his decision to more than quadruple the price of nitrofurantoin, used to treat bladder infections, from about $500 to more than $2,300 a bottle. He said it was his "moral requirement to sell the product at the highest price."

Mulye argues that his only moral duty is to benefit his investors. As he said in defending Martin Shkreli, who in 2015 raised the price of an anti-parasite drug, daraprim, 5,000% from $13.50 to $750 per tablet, "When he raised the price of his drug he was within his rights because he had to reward his shareholders."

Mulye is wrong for many reasons. Drug companies deserve reasonable return on their investment in research and development, but some of these companies are abusing the system. The development of countless new drugs depends on taxpayer money and sacrifices that patients in studies make in good faith. Excessive price hikes harm many people, threaten public health and deplete huge amounts of taxpayer money that could be better used in other ways.

The US government pays more than 40% of all Americans' prescription costs, and this amount has been growing faster than inflation. In 2015, over 118 million Americans were on some form of government health insurance, including around 52 million on Medicare and 62 million on Medicaid. And these numbers have been increasing. Today, around 59 million Americans are on Medicare and 75 million on Medicaid.

And, in 2016, Medicare and Medicaid alone spent $174 billion on prescriptions drugs -- 23% of their entire budget. In short, the government spends more on health care than it spends on any other single segment of the federal budget, including defense or Social Security.

The United States already spends significantly more on drugs than any other country -- over twice as much as the average of the 19 major other industrialized countries. In the United States, one drug is even approaching close to $1 million per person per year. And while Mulye and Shkreli have increased the prices of brand-name drugs, other companies have raised the prices of generic medications, which require no new research or development -- often the excuse used for excessive drug prices.

Partly as a result, the United States spends about twice as much per person on health as do other Western countries, and this gap is growing. Yet we rank 26th in the world in life expectancy. People live longer in Chile and Slovenia than in the United States.

These high drug costs prevent many Americans from accessing vital treatments -- meaning they are at risk of getting sicker or dying. In recent surveys conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation, over 20% of Americans have difficulty affording their prescribed medications, 24% say they or a family member has not filled a prescription, cut pills in half or skipped doses due to high costs, and 80% say the cost of prescription drugs is unreasonable. Regardless of whether they are Republicans or Democrats, most Americans think more regulation is needed to limit prescription drug prices.

These higher drug costs limit our nation's ability to support other programs as much as we could -- from rebuilding aging bridges and roads, and creating more jobs, to enhancing education and public radio and television

Rapidly mounting government drug expenditures result partly from the fact that over the past decade, the pharmaceutical industry has spent $2.3 billion in lobbying efforts -- more than any other industry since 1998. Not surprisingly, while other Western countries negotiate prices with pharmaceutical companies, Congress has barred Medicare from doing so.

These huge price increases are also unjustified since the US government, through the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and other agencies, funds much of the basic science that enables pharmaceutical companies to develop new medications. Countless drug company researchers and physicians are also educated through National Science Foundation grants and government-subsidized hospitals and state universities.

Every year, Congress and the President debate how much to support these various agencies. Last year, Trump proposed slashing the NIH budget by 22%. Over the past 10 years, this budget has already been decreasing when adjusted for inflation. Luckily, Congress ultimately rejected Trump's proposed cuts -- but all of this funding, on which the pharmaceutical industry depends, clearly hinges on public support, and thus on the public feeling that it receives fair return on its generosity.

Moreover, thousands of patients enter studies, risking harm or even death, in order to help develop new drugs to aid future patients. Countless patients willingly share their genetic and other medical data to benefit science and other patients.

Exorbitant price gouging is also shortsighted and counterproductive. This year alone, 24 states, including Maryland, New York and Nevada, have passed 37 bills to reduce increasing drug costs. Additional bills under consideration would prohibit unfair pricing, cap annual price hikes and require companies to release information on prices and costs.

President Donald Trump promised to cut drug prices and has declared a victory in doing so, but Mulye's and other companies' price hikes demonstrate otherwise. Parts of Trump's proposals also seem to help drug companies more than consumers, reducing programs that require drug companies to lower costs to institutions that serve poorer patients. The fate of his proposals is unclear. But if he is truly interested in curbing drug company prices, he should set criteria for new drug prices and establish caps on annual price increases.

Physicians have long followed the Hippocratic Oath, with its moral commitments to prioritize patients' well-being and first do no harm. Nostrum and other drug companies should recognize the importance of helping not just shareholders, but patients. At stake is our individual and nation's health.

#### The impact is 125 thousand deaths per year

Joe Harpaz 19. "Price Transparency: Why Are Drug Prices Such A Bitter Pill to Swallow?". Forbes. 5-17-2019. https://www.forbes.com/sites/joeharpaz/2019/05/17/price-transparency-why-are-drug-prices-such-a-bitter-pill-to-swallow/#5ef23479396d

If we’re ever going to lower the exorbitant costs Americans pay for healthcare in the U.S., we need to start looking at the problem holistically. While drug prices are often in the news, it’s not the only challenge American’s face. In fact, while nearly a quarter of the population has trouble paying prescription drug prices, medical bills are an even bigger issue, as they are now the leading cause of bankruptcy in the U.S. Identifying and treating one symptom of the problem isn’t going to cure the underlying epidemic. Consider, for example, what happens when a patient skips filling their prescription. As former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop once said, “Drugs don’t work in patients who don’t take them.” By one estimate, lack of drug adherence causes approximately 125,000 deaths per year in the U.S. and least 10 percent of hospitalizations. Besides the loss of life, this is estimated to cost the American health care system between $100 billion and $289 billion a year.

### 1ar – pharma turn – uscma raise prices ext

#### The passage of USCMA guarantees medicine will not be available to people

Levitz 19 (Eric Levitz has a masters in writing from Johns Hopkins, and is a political writer at New York Magazine, 3-29-2019, "Trump’s NAFTA 2.0 Puts Big Pharma First, America Second," Intelligencer, <http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/03/trumps-nafta-2-0-usmca-trade-deal-puts-big-pharma-first-america-second.html>) cliv

If there’s anything Donald Trump hates more than globalist trade deals that restrict U.S. sovereignty, it’s the exorbitant cost of pharmaceuticals in this country.

“The next major priority for me, and for all of us, should be to lower the cost of health care and prescription drugs,” the president said in his most recent State of the Union Address. “It is unacceptable that Americans pay vastly more than people in other countries for the exact same drugs, often made in the exact same place.”

And yet, the president’s new version of NAFTA — the uncreatively named United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) — actually forbids the U.S. Congress from curtailing Big Pharma’s patent monopolies on some of the world’s most expensive drugs. In other words: Trump’s “America First” trade deal restricts U.S. sovereignty, for the sake of locking in high drug prices.

In the U.S. today, drug companies that produce new “biologics” — specialty drugs made with living cells — are provided 12 years of immunity from generic competition. This awards such firms monopolistic pricing power over their (often life-saving) medicines for more than a decade after their wares hit the market. The rationale for this policy is that companies will not invest in high-cost biologic research if they aren’t guaranteed windfall profits for their innovations. But even if one accepts this (tendentious) premise, a 12-year monopoly appears both arbitrary and excessive. In Mexico, biologic makers are only immunized against competition from so-called “biosimilars” for five years; in Canada, such protections last eight. Congressional Democrats have drafted legislation that would cut the duration of biologic monopolies down to seven years.

But if Trump’s revised version of NAFTA takes effect, Democrats will not have the legal authority to advance that legislation — because the USMCA guarantees biologic makers at least a ten-year monopoly on their new drugs across all three of North America’s major economies.

House Democrats say that’s unacceptable. As the administration pushes to get its trade deal through Congress, Nancy Pelosi’s caucus has made striking the provision on biologics one of it top demands.

If the rule isn’t rolled back, “I don’t think candidly that it passes out of my trade subcommittee,” Earl Blumenauer of Oregon told the Associated Press in February. “The biologics are some of the most expensive drugs on the planet.” Even staunchly pro-trade border-state Democrats are drawing a red line on the rule, with Texas’s Lloyd Doggett calling it “totally contrary to Trump’s professed interest in lower drug prices.”

It isn’t hard to see why Democrats are picking this fight. Few issues are more salient to a broader, more bipartisan swath of voters than the rising cost of prescription drugs. In January, a Politico-Harvard poll found 80 percent of Americans saying that congressional “action to lower prescription medicine prices is extremely important,” making it the top issue for voters in both parties. Meanwhile, in recent focus groups with soft Trump supporters, Democratic operatives say that the biologics issue has proven explosively potent.

#### High drug prices devastate all Americans

Halpenny 16 (Halpenny, Genevieve M. has a law degree from UC Hastings and works in Chemistry and biotech patent prosecution and patent enforcement “High Drug Prices Hurt Everyone.” ACS medicinal chemistry letters vol. 7,6 544-6. 3 May. 2016) cliv

Greater consumption of pharmaceuticals accounts for some of the differences in pharmaceutical spending between different countries. Another factor is that pharmaceutical prices are consistently greater in the United States than abroad. There is no satisfactory justification for the pricing disparity.

Every American should be concerned about the accessibility of medicines that reduce suffering and save lives. Some surveys report that up to one in four patients cannot afford and do not fill their prescriptions. The patients who suffer most under the current regime are the elderly and patients with chronic conditions. In addition to escalating pharmaceutical expenditures increasing the burden on taxpayers, we are all in the process of aging and face the risk of catastrophic illness. Medication accessibility is a problem for each American.

### 1ar – pharma turn – a2 innovation

#### “Innovation” and R&D is not justification for high drug prices

Halpenny 16 (Halpenny, Genevieve M. has a law degree from UC Hastings and works in Chemistry and biotech patent prosecution and patent enforcement “High Drug Prices Hurt Everyone.” ACS medicinal chemistry letters vol. 7,6 544-6. 3 May. 2016) cliv

Pharmaceutical companies argue that price regulation abroad forces pharmaceutical companies to charge more for patented medications in the United States to fund research and development of new and improved medicines. However, R&D expenditures hover around 20% of sales, less than pharmaceutical companies typically allocate toward marketing. And cuts in pharmaceutical R&D spending are regularly reported. Pharmaceutical companies refuse to substantiate their arguments by providing information about the cost of developing new medicines. These circumstances undermine the credibility of such arguments. At the same time, enough profit is required to incentivize investment in pharmaceutical innovation.

#### High drug prices destroy pharma innovation

Bach 14 (Peter Bach is The Director of Memorial Sloan Kettering’s Center for Health Policy and Outcomes. He is a member of the Institute of Medicine’s Board on Health Care Services, and the World Economic Forum. He has received speaking fees from Roche/Genentech, and is a consultant to Foundation Medicine, a company that markets a next generation sequencing test for cancer mutations including ALK. , 10-28-2014 "Could High Drug Prices Be Bad For Innovation?," Forbes, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2014/10/23/could-high-drug-prices-be-bad-for-innovation/#2833d2005a80>) cliv

Policymakers are scrutinizing high prices for specialty drugs like never before. Gilead’s Sovaldi at $84,000 for a treatment course is in part to blame -- or credit -- for this, but so are Vertex’ Kalydeco, Merck’s Keytruda , and a series of other six figure drugs.

The pharmaceutical industry has responded in a predictable way. High prices are needed to fuel the fire of innovation they explain. True. Absent a potential return, investors would certainly stay far away. But what about the follow on question? Just how high do prices need to be? When does the potential to profit exceed that which is needed to drive innovation and pervert the market?

I think we’re already there. Case in point: there are seven drugs in human trials that target lung or and/or other cancers caused by an acquired genetic abnormality called the ALK rearrangement (Figure). Roche’s Alectinib is in Phase 3. Ariad, Tesaro, Pfizer and Ignyta all have agents in Phase 2. There are four more compounds soon to enter human testing. That’s a lot of drugs that all target the same cancer causing mechanism.

Maybe this would make sense if ALK rearranged lung cancer constituted a vast market. But it doesn’t. The key first and second line indications in lung cancer are already occupied by Pfizer’s Xalkori and Novartis’ Zykadia, respectively. And only three to eight percent of metastatic lung cancers are driven by the ALK alteration, which amounts to only a few thousand patients per year in the US.

If it’s not a huge market, then why the ALK drug mosh pit?

I think its high drug prices. The Federal Medicare program, and most private insurers, must include new cancer drugs on formulary regardless of their price or the existence of cheaper alternatives. And as the industry has continued to test the waters with higher and higher prices, its gone swimmingly but for a few pointed editorials and stories of patients driven into bankruptcy.

With high prices available to every new drug for cancer, companies are stumbling over one another in a race down a well trodden molecular road to profits. That makes pursuing high risk innovation a less attractive option, even though that will be how we get novel drugs that tackle unmet needs. Drugs that will rely on mechanisms that today still seem hypothetical.

You might say that it’s not one or the other, but if so, then the whole argument about why we need high prices to fuel innovation falls apart. There are apparently only so many investment dollars to go around, so dollars going to generate yet another drug for ALK are dollars away from a new idea that hasn’t yet been proven. Same goes for the research infrastructure, and for the patients enrolling on these studies.

### 1ar – pharma turn – turns econ

#### Rising costs crush US economic leadership---extinction

Mathew Burrows 16, Director @ Atlantic Council’s Strategic Foresight Initiative; 28-year career in the CIA and State Department; PhD in European History @ Cambridge, “Global Risks 2035,” September, <http://espas.eu/orbis/sites/default/files/generated/document/en/Global_Risks_2035_web_0922.pdf>

The multilateralist global system that the United States and the West built after the end of the Second World War was premised on an economically strong United States and West. In 1945, the United States was the only victor that was not completely devastated. World War II had brought the country out of the Great Depression, and the US GDP constituted more than 50 percent of the world’s total. Into the twenty-first century, the members of the Group of Seven (G7) were the world’s political and economic heavyweights. It has only been in the past several years that the collective GDP of the developing world—led by China—has surpassed the developed world’s. Even as non-Western powers grow, it is psychologically hard for the West to think about relinquishing its reins. Demographically, the West has, for a long time, been in the minority. What’s more recent is the aging of the Western population (analyzed in chapter 2), which is already occurring in Japan and Europe, beginning to squeeze the availability of resources for anything but health, social security, and interest payments on debt. Unless healthcare becomes far more efficient, the US economy will be overburdened with healthcare and pension costs as the “baby boomer” generation ages. Healthcare constitutes a whopping 18 percent of the US GDP—significantly more than is the case for other industrialized countries—without necessarily providing better results. With more going to health and pensions, there will be less capacity for defense and military spending. The United States is the biggest military spender, but China is increasing its portion of worldwide military spending, while the worldwide share of European NATO members is diminishing. China’s military probably will not rival the United States’ power-projection capabilities even by 2035, but it will have greater anti-access and denial powers. In a military contest, China may never be able to deliver a knockout blow, but it could tarnish the US image of military invincibility in a conventional state-on-state contest held in its region. Equally, a confrontation that results in a Chinese humiliation could set back China’s aspirations for regional leadership, if not trigger a domestic legitimacy crisis for the Communist Party leadership. Biggest Problem Is Domestic The biggest psychological blow to ordinary Western citizens has been their sagging standard of living (more analysis in chapter 1). Despite a much better record of overall growth in the United States since the 2008 financial crisis, those with median incomes have taken a hit Worrisome for future US growth potential has been the drop in the labor-participation rate, from the 67 percent range before the 2008 financial crisis to 62-63 percent in the years since. The labor-participation rate was destined to drop due to a growing numbers of retirees, but much of the current sharp decrease comes from unskilled males in their prime working years—forties and early fifties—dropping out. Additionally, many younger women are not entering or staying in the job market. Global Trends 2030 looked at two scenarios for future US growth—one in which the United States maintained or slightly increased its average 2.5 percent pre-2008 growth rate, or one in which growth would slow to an average of 1.5 percent a year. In the first, there would still be the global economic shift to China. On the other hand, the 2.5 percent average growth would help boost average living standards, engendering a “feel-good” factor, which would make more Americans interested in reengaging with world issues.91 Given the record of slower growth and labor-force decline since the 2008 financial crisis, the likelihood of the second scenario is increasing. That scenario anticipated lower growth rates—which accelerated declines in average living standards—making it harder to continue trade-liberalization efforts. Indeed, the IMF warned in June 2016 that the United States faces potentially significant longer-term challenges to strong and sustained growth, saying, “concerted policy actions are warranted, sooner rather than later… focusing on the causes and consequences of falling labor force participation, an increasingly polarized income distribution, high levels of poverty, and weak productivity.”92 Moreover, it is not as if traditional US partners—Europe and Japan—are doing much better. Japan and many European countries are aging faster than the United States, eliminating labor-force growth as a driver of future economic growth. Europe’s and Japan’s economic performances have been declining since the 1990s. In Europe, the public discontent with high unemployment and declining incomes has helped to spur the rise of antiestablishment far-right and populist parties that want to weaken the EU and transatlantic ties. Even in richer European countries, such as Germany, a backlash has been growing against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), out of fear that Europe’s rewards would be meager and European standards would be diluted. McKinsey Global Institute, for example, believes a “return to sustained growth of 2-to-3 percent” is possible for Europe, but would require many politically difficult reforms.93 These include: reducing dependence on imports (much coming from Russia) for crude oil and natural gas; fostering a more vibrant digital economy; increasing workforce participation by the elderly, women, and migrants; and promoting flexibility in labor markets. China now spends a greater share of its GDP on research and development than does Europe. The latest OECD figures show that Europe now spends even less than the rest of the OECD.94 In both the United States and Europe, there is increasing anti-immigrant sentiment despite documented economic benefits from immigration. According to EU Commission Employment Analyst Dr. Jorg Peschner, productivity, by itself, will not be enough to reverse the negative employment trend absent more immigration: “EU’s productivity growth would have to double in order to keep the EU’s economy growing at the same pace as it did before the crisis started.” For employment growth to remain positive as long as possible, improving the labor participation of women, low-educated people, and migrants will also have to be a priority. In the United States, many of the new businesses started every year are started by first- or second-generation immigrants.95 Politically, there has been a large rise in support for right-wing and populist parties in the United States and Europe, undermining traditional parties. The gaps, for example, between the leadership and supporters in the US Republican and UK Tory and Labor Parties have been particularly evident in the selection of Donald Trump as presidential candidate and the June 2016 victory of the “Leave” vote in Britain. Unfortunately, there is no end of economic disruption. The job churn will continue as more and more skills and professions are automated, also increasing the potential for more “losers” from globalization, greater political polarization, and inequality. The increased competitiveness of the developing world with the West is a particular morale buster for Western middle classes who got used to ever-increasing prosperity for themselves and succeeding generations. Adapting to a new norm of economic turbulence—more prevalent in other eras—may be one of the biggest mental hurdles for Westerners. The West is used to thinking of the “Third World,” not home, as the place where economic turmoil happens. And a Multipolar Financial Architecture, Too Historically, US and Western power has rested on having a monopoly on reserve currencies and a Western-dominated financial system. In 2035, the dollar will be the biggest reserve currency, but its share of global financial transactions is expected to drop from 60 percent today to 45 percent. The euro will probably remain the second reserve currency, while the Chinese yuan or RMB—which became a part of the IMF benchmark-currency basket in 2015—will become a third reserve currency, accounting for 10 to 15 percent of global finance in two decades’ time.96 The financial architecture will also become more regionalized. The central role played by the financial centers of New York and London will also diminish, and a multitiered financial architecture will develop. Following the UK Brexit, those centers’ share in financial intermediation will decrease, as a second pole of global finance forms in the Eurozone. A third pole will develop in East Asia and Southeast Asia. Gradually, a growing share of global financial resources will be concentrated in those regional clusters. As with the growth of regional trade, the regional clusters will be more self-encapsulated, spurred by rising domestic demand in China and other developing countries with growing middle classes. With the role of electronic money likely to grow, the traditional banking system will probably also undergo major revision, with potential impacts on governmental powers. A more multipolar reserve system and regionalized financial architecture should lessen risks and contribute to greater stability. But the large-scale technological innovations—some of which contributed to the 2008 breakdown—will continue, making global finance still volatile. Emerging-market countries with fragmentary regulatory regimes will be particularly prone to suffering financial crises. The aging-population factor also increases risks to public finances. This report anticipates modestly increased volatility, lower than what occurred in the global economy during the 1890s through the 1940s, but higher than in the 1950s and 1960s—more of a continuation of what has been the trend line since the mid-1980s. Are There Alternative Visions to Western Order? Four years ago, when Global Trends 2030 was published, the answer was largely no.97 Increasingly, the facts on the ground would suggest otherwise. They do not add up to a cohesive plan to substitute wholesale all Western institutions and practices. However, they clearly indicate that there are some no-go areas, particularly those connected to regime change, democracy promotion, state control over NGOs, and maintaining sovereignty. Russia and China, in particular, see themselves as great powers and, as such, believe they have special rights to dominance in their regions. However, as other powers like India develop, it is likely that they will see themselves as regional powers with inherent prerogatives. It is worth recalling the United States’ expansive Manifest Destiny and nineteenth-century Monroe Doctrine, claiming special rights to determine the future of the Western Hemisphere. The Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) has been closely following Beijing’s efforts to build a network of parallel structures to existing international organizations. It has concluded that China “is not seeking to demolish or exit from current international organizations…It is constructing supplementary— in part complementary, in part competitive—channels for shaping the international order beyond Western claims to leadership.”98 As the accompanying chart indicates, China’s shadow network of alternative international structures encompasses everything from financial and economic partnerships (the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) to full-blown political groupings like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), and the BRICS association of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.99 Moreover, there is increasing cooperation among many of the emerging powers—beyond just authoritarians—to not just limit what they see as Western meddling in domestic affairs, but to go on the attack globally. According to a recent academic study, the “Big Five” authoritarian states of China, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela “have taken more coordinated and decisive action to contain democracy on the global level.” They have sought to “alter the democracy and human-rights mechanisms of key rules-based institutions, including the Organization of American States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and international bodies concerned with the governance of the Internet.”100 How durable are these preferences for nondemocracy and state control? By 2035, if not sooner (in the case of Venezuela), some of the now-authoritarian states could be liberalized, and the perceived threat posed by Western civil-society NGOs may ease. However, China and Russia are more likely than not to want to dominate their regions. Nationalism and democracy have been shown to be highly compatible. It is not clear that an even more powerful China or India would defer to Western leadership of the global order, even if both sides’ values in other areas begin to converge. What Kind of Post-Western World? Clearly, there is a need to plan for a world that will not have the West as its big economic powerhouse—a prospect hard for Western elites and publics to conceive of, despite a decade or more of publicity about the “rise of the rest.” According to a recent survey, Europeans and Americans are more comfortable with each other than they are with anybody else. Although a majority of Europeans said, in the most recent German Marshall Fund transatlantic-trends polling, that they would like to see their country take an approach more independent from the United States, both Americans and Europeans still prefer each other over more Russian or Chinese leadership in the world. The Obama administration—considered among the most multilateralist of recent administrations— campaigned hard in 2015 to convince Europeans not to join China’s proposed Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB). It was as if the United States was against any governance structure not “made in the USA,” even when those running the AIIB have made clear their intentions of operating with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. More and more, the talk among Western elites is about locking in as much as possible the status quo, which favors the West, so that it will be harder for the newcomers to overcome. The TPP was sold as a way to set the rules before China gains much more power. A former Obama administration official advised that now might be the best time to undertake UN Security Council reform, before China and other uncooperative powers become more powerful. “A new US administration may be able to advance a proposal to address the Security Council’s anachronistic makeup while perpetuating a council that Washington can work with.”101 For Westerners, the challenge will be to plan for a future that will not be solely run by them, but which they can live with. Handovers have been historically difficult and fraught—more often than not, decided by bloody contests. One could envisage different scenarios, some already described in the earlier chapter on conflict, of military contests between the United States and China, or the United States and China with Russia, or the United States with NATO against Russia. Without delivering a knockout blow by one side or the other, these contests would most likely pit West against East, creating something akin to a new Cold War. Even if there were a knockout blow by the United States against China, it is hard to imagine a defeated China deferring permanently to the West. Its population has been imbued with such a narrative about the injustices by the West against China that any defeat or setback would be confirmation that the United States and West are dead set against a rising China. Perhaps the most harmful effect of such a contest would be to convince both sides that neither is trustworthy. For the non-West, it would confirm the suspicion that the West does not want to relinquish its leadership position. For the West, it would make it harder to ever reach out and help establish a truly global system. Need for a Second-Generation US and Western Leadership Model War is not, and should not be, inevitable as the West struggles with the growing clout of China and other developing states on the world stage. Unlike during other transitions, the tools exist for ensuring more peaceful outcomes. They will require Western acquiescence to greater roles for the developing world to set and implement new rules of the road for the international order. A key feature of the post-1945 US design for the world order is its multilateralist structures. Many of these operate below most people’s radar. This plumbing of the international system has enabled the daily functioning of globalization. To keep it viable, China, as well as other developing countries, must be accorded more representation. There are too many long-term risks involved, for example, in China having only the equivalent of France’s voting rights in the IMF, when it is the first or second economic power in the world. This is how resentments are nurtured—all the more dangerous in China’s case because of its underlying “century of humiliation” mental complex. As emerging technologies come online, the lack of a truly global institutional framework could be particularly dangerous. Assuring the future security of the Internet is particularly important in this regard, because all the new emerging technologies—bio, 3D printing, robotics, big data—take for granted a secure, global Internet. Everyone loses if cyber crime and cyber terrorism undermine the Internet. In the worstcase scenarios, in which cyber crime proliferates or strong national borders fragment the Internet, an Atlantic Council study, as mentioned, found that the economic costs could be as much as $90 trillion out to 2030, in addition to the risk of open conflict.102 Besides bringing the emerging powers into leadership roles in the panoply of multilateral institutions, the United States will need to temper its often “exemptionalist” stance to ensure the survival of the multilateralist order. According to the Council on Foreign Relations’ Patrick Stewart, a prominent scholar of global governance, one of the persistent paradoxes of the post-1945 decades has been that the “United States is at once the world’s most vocal champion of a rules-based international order and the power most insistent on opting out of the constraints that it hopes to see binding on others.”103 No country has the networks and connections that the United States does, but the system is now polycentric, rather than unipolar, and others resent the “exceptional” privileges that the United States claims. The Global Trends works have talked about the need for a new model of US global leadership. The United States needs to be guiding the international system as a “first among equals,” and willing to play by its own rules. Paradoxically, there is likely to be no vibrant global-governance system without US and Western leadership, but too much domineering behavior could doom it. Even if the United States adapted its global role, this is not to say that the tensions and differences with many emerging powers would all disappear, or that the governance system would function seamlessly. In addition to the growing number of new state actors, the increasing importance of nonstate actors adds a new complexity to the functioning of global institutions. Moreover, there are clear-cut differences between the West and emerging powers on values-based issues, such as democracy promotion and the responsibility to protect. Many developing-country publics still resent Western colonialism and equate any intrusion with past historical wrong. They point to the 2011 humanitarian intervention in Libya, for example, as cover for the Western goal of regime change. Hence, the UN Security Council failure to stop the fighting in Syria, with more than two hundred thousand killed and 7.6 million displaced. Russia and China want to make a stand against the United States and the West getting their way and ousting the Assad regime. On the other hand, the lack of a solution smacks more of anarchy than global governance. Certainly, it shows one of the gaps that remains, and likely will remain, limiting global governance because of differences in values. The speed with which new technologies are coming online and becoming an important political, military, and economic tool—for both good and bad—carries big risks for global governance. Stewart Patrick lists four potential new technologies that “cry out for regulation”: geoengineering, drones, synthetic biology, and nanotechnology. Without some setting of rules for their operation, there is the risk of major disruptions, if not catastrophes, stemming from their abuse. The recent advances in synthetic biology lower the bar to abuse by amateurs and terrorists alike, forever affecting human DNA. Geoengineering involves planetaryscale interventions that could interfere with complex climatic systems. However cumbersome, politically unpopular, and ineffective at times, there is little alternative to increased global cooperation if one does not want to see higher risks of conflict and economic degradation. Without some sort of bolstered global governance, the West would end up with less sovereignty in a “dog-eat-dog” world, in which it was increasingly in the minority. But can the United States and the West rise to the challenge of investing in a global-governance system that will not always favor their interests on every issue? Historically, the United States could be especially generous because it was on top of the world in about everything after the Second World War. Europeans came to truly believe in pooling sovereignty and joint governance after centuries of internecine conflict. The tough economic times at home have seen US and European publics become distrustful of overarching multilateral institutions, believing the will of the United States or individual European countries will not be served. It is oftentimes easier for political leaders to fall in with the public mood rather than display leadership that might appear to work against it. The breakdown of the post-Cold War political and security order is irrevocable. Not only are there new powers—particularly China—that do not share the West’s vision of a liberal order, but Western publics themselves have turned against globalization, which has been the overall megatrend of the past three decades. The geopolitical landscape ahead will be much different. The best case is looking at multipolarity with limited multilateralism. In the worst case, that multipolarity evolves into bipolarity with China, Russia, and their partners pitted against the United States, Europe, Japan, and other allies. In that scenario, conflict would be almost inevitable.

### 2ac – pharma can’t solve

#### Pharma isn’t developing vaccines- no incentives

Rathi 17 (Akshat Rathi is a senior reporter for Quartz in London. He has previously worked at The Economist and The Conversation. His writing has appeared in Nature, The Guardian and The Hindu. He has a PhD in chemistry from Oxford University, 1-18-2017, "A global alliance is investing $500 million to stop deadly outbreaks we are utterly unprepared for," Quartz, <https://qz.com/886995/we-have-no-real-defense-against-deadly-pandemics-finally-a-global-alliance-is-investing-500-million-to-create-one/>) cliv

The Ebola epidemic showed that, if we have the right system in place, it’s possible to come up with new vaccines quickly. All we need to do is take the next step: create vaccines in preparation for when an outbreak strikes, rather than reacting after it begins spreading.

At the World Economic Forum in Davos, a global alliance announced today that it has secured nearly $500 million to do just that. The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), created by governments and nonprofits, has identified a key gap: though the World Health Organization (WHO) knows which diseases we need to prepare for, we don’t actually have vaccines for them. CEPI aims to use the money to fill the gap that is stopping the crucial development of such vaccines.

Why doesn’t Big Pharma do it?

Pharmaceutical companies make money from helping people live better lives. They also invest more money into research and development (R&D), as a proportion of profits, than companies in any other high-tech industry. These investments often result in big losses when drugs fail in clinical trials—but when a drug succeeds, it can lead to billions of dollars in profit. So, in theory, they should be more than willing to develop and test new vaccines.

But in recent years pharma companies are getting less return on their R&D investment. Lower profits have caused some of these companies to take extreme steps, such as promoting drugs for indications they have not been approved for.

On top of that, investments in vaccines is especially risky. If there isn’t an outbreak, there is no way to recoup the cost of developing vaccines. In other words, the vaccine gap exists because there’s no real incentive for big pharmaceutical companies to work on them.

#### Pharma resilient

Fitch 14[Fitch Ratings' Report at Reuters 12-11-2014 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/11/fitch-ma-drives-negative-global-pharma-r-idUSFit86078120141211>]

(The following statement was released by the rating agency) Link to Fitch Ratings' Report: 2015 Outlook: Global Pharmaceuticals (Strategic Industry Evolution to Continue; M&A Reduces Rating Headroom) here LONDON, December 11 (Fitch) Fitch Ratings believes 2015 will be a transitional year for global pharma companies as they continue to evolve their business models and position themselves for structural changes in the industry. Accordingly, we have revised the rating outlook to negative as we expected rating headroom for Fitch-rated pharmaceutical companies to remain under pressure in 2015. This is reflected in the Negative Outlook on 28% of the Fitch-rated global pharma universe (Amgen, BMS, Merck, Bayer). There was one downgrade in the sector during 2014 (AstraZeneca). Financial flexibility has been eroded during 2014 on the back of a sharp rise in debt-funded M&A activity as companies focus on boosting scale in therapeutic areas and consumer healthcare. They are also improving R&D productivity to manage increasing costs and risks of bringing new drugs to market. Fitch's sector outlook remains stable, reflecting that **underlying long-term growth drivers remain intact**, characterised by an ageing and growing world population leading towards an increase of chronic and lifestyle diseases, ongoing emerging-market investments in healthcare, and treatment and technology advances. However, we also factor in the intensifying efforts of healthcare authorities to reduce costs, improve outcomes and focus on patient value. As a result, we expect **stable** operating performance in 2015. Continued M&A, pressure towards increasing shareholder returns (particularly for US players), as well as the growing exposure to potentially rising interest rates as a result of increased debt levels across the sector are key rating risks. In addition, the industry's focus on scale in selected therapeutic areas over diversification, the execution and integration of recent corporate activity, as well as risks and costs bringing the competitive late state R&D pipeline to market may lead to pressures on the business risk profile of individual players. In aggregate, we expect global pharma sector to continue to display a strong investment grade credit profile, supported by favourable underlying demographics, emerging market growth, and anticipated innovation in specialist treatment areas, with rating underpinned by strong and above average profitability and cash generation. Fitch believes that stretched rating profiles could be repaired assuming a careful focus on capital allocation in the sector. The full report, '2015 Outlook: Global Pharmaceuticals' is available at www.fitchratings.com or by clicking the link above.

### 1ar – pharma can’t solve ext

#### Pharma develops the wrong medicine

Basulto 14“Ebola might change the way we think about pharmaceutical innovation” Dominic Basulto, Washington Post, August 14, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/innovations/wp/2014/08/14/ebola-might-change-the-way-we-think-about-pharmaceutical-innovation/

However, the current drug development system also produces a lot of market abnormalities, in the sense that pharmaceutical companies won’t produce certain drugs because it just doesn’t make **financial sense**. Instead, the focus is on creating drugs where there is a large target audience. (You can think of these as the types of drugs you see advertised on TV every night). Think about this from the perspective of a chief executive or shareholder – the share price is only going to go up if the market is convinced that you’re on to something really big. The easiest way to understand these market abnormalities is the current situation now, where we simply weren’t prepared for a large-scale Ebola outbreak. Ebola, unfortunately, is seen by many as “a disease of poor people in poor countries.” If you’re the chief executive of a Western pharmaceutical company, what’s the incentive for creating a cure that only a few thousand people are ever going to use or pay for? Doing the mortality math is an icky and morally challenging process, but the 1,000 lives already lost to Ebola are surely worth more than the $2 billion that it would have cost to develop the drug in the first place.

#### Adaption solves

Childers 14 **--** Magid Abou-Gharbia \* and Wayne E. Childers, Moulder Center for Drug Discovery Research, Temple University School of Pharmacy, Magid Abou-Gharbia received his B.Sc. in Pharmacy and his M.Sc. in Medicinal Chemistry from Cairo University in 1971 and 1974, respectively, and his Ph.D. in Organic Chemistry from the University of Pennsylvania in 1979. Following an NIH postdoctoral fellowship at Temple University, Magid joined Wyeth Pharmaceuticals in 1982, where he was ultimately promoted to Senior Vice President of Chemical and Screening Sciences. His team’s efforts led to the identification of eight marketed drugs and several clinical candidates. In 2008, Magid joined Temple University School of Pharmacy as Professor of Pharmaceutical Sciences, Associate Director of Research, and Director of the Molder Center for Drug Discovery Research. Magid serves on the Scientific Advisory Board of several companies and professional societies and has adjunct professor appointments at several universities, Wayne E. Childers received his B.A. in Chemistry from Vanderbilt University in 1975 and his Ph.D. in Organic Chemistry from the University of Georgia in 1984. While pursuing his Ph.D. studies, Wayne served as Assistant Adjunct Professor at Bucknell University from 1982–1984. Following a postdoctoral fellowship at Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Wayne joined Wyeth in 1987, where he led CNS-directed project teams that advanced four new chemical entities to clinical trials. In 2010, Wayne joined Temple University School of Pharmacy to serve as Associate Professor of Pharmaceutical Sciences and Associate Director of the Molder Center for Drug Discovery Research. Wayne’s research interests involve applying state-of-the-art techniques to the identification and development of new chemical entities for treating unmet medical needs, American Chemical Society, 1/15, <http://cdn-pubs.acs.org/doi/full/10.1021/jm401564r>

The pharmaceutical industry is facing enormous challenges, including reduced efficiency, stagnant success rate, patent expirations for key drugs, fierce price competition from generics, high regulatory hurdles, and the industry’s perceived tarnished image. Pharma has **responded by embarking on a range of initiatives.** Other sectors, including NIH, have also responded. Academic drug discovery groups have appeared to **support the transition of innovative academic discoveries and ideas into attractive drug discovery opportunities**. Part 1 of this two-part series discussed the criticisms that have been leveled at the pharmaceutical industry over the past 3 decades and summarized the supporting data for and against these criticisms. This second installment will focus on the current challenges facing the pharmaceutical industry and Pharma’s responses, focusing on the industry’s changing perspective and new business models for coping with the loss of talent and declining clinical pipelines as well as presenting some examples of recent drug discovery successes.

#### Pharma can’t solve disease – inventions fail, too slow, and don’t make it to market

Young 14 [Jeffrey Young is a health care reporter at The Huffington Post based in Washington. He has covered health care, business, and politics for 15 years at organizations including Bloomberg News and The Hill 10-2-2014 <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/02/ebola-cure_n_5915892.html>]

That doesn't mean it's easy, even with all possible support from governments, pharmaceutical companies or anyone else. Inventing medicines and vaccines and diagnostic tests is difficult, takes time and is more likely to fail than succeed, Ross said. "It really takes almost a decade from concept to finally put the drug into a vial that you're ready to hand to a physician or a nurse," Ross said. "Very few drugs ever make it to market." Scientists must follow a basic set of procedures throughout that can take an unknown amount of time and pose challenges all along, any one of which could scuttle the entire enterprise, Ross said. It starts out with the basic, fundamental research of understanding what the disease is, how it works and how it might be counteracted. If those stages are successful and researchers have an idea of a way to attack the disease, they have to test it on animals to see whether it works at all, and whether it's safe. Before a treatment or vaccine can be tested on living humans, scientists must conduct two rounds of research on human cells and tissue, first for safety and then for effectiveness. If all of that is successful, a drug company then has to get approval from the Food and Drug Administration and regulators in other countries to sell the product, which can take years. During those painstaking steps, researchers and drugmakers always have to think about money. "It costs millions of dollars to do human trials," Ross said. "Even if you have a drug that is effective, it really sometimes comes down to the economics of it. If it's going to cost you way more than what a person can afford, they're not going to be able to manufacture it," Ross said. "There won't be a market for it."

Note: Internally citing Ted Ross, program director for vaccines and viral immunity at the Vaccine and Gene Therapy Institute of Florida in Port Saint Lucie.

#### No impact – media and pharma hype benefits

Huff 9 [E. Huff, staff writer, Natural News, 12-16-2009 <http://www.naturalnews.com/027749_journalism_pharmas.html>]

Doctors and researchers are beginning to question the **outlandish claims** being made by the media in response to alleged breakthroughs in cancer research. In an editorial published in the Journal of the National Cancer Institute (JNCI), several doctors expressed concern that news pieces fail to accurately reflect the truth concerning drugs and scientific studies. Drs. Lisa Schwartz and Steven Woloshin from the Center for Medicine and the Media at the Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy and Clinical Practice in New Hampshire, along with Dr. Barnett Kramer from JNCI, examined media claims about a new anti-cancer drug called olaparib that was reported on in the acclaimed New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM). Though the study was uncontrolled and preliminary, some sources were claiming it as the most important cancer breakthrough in ten years. Another report exaggerated study findings concerning alcohol and cancer risk. In response to a study that showed a two-percent increase in breast cancer risk from drinking one alcoholic beverage a day versus not drinking at all, one media source produced a headline that said, "A drink a day raises a women's risk of cancer", with no mention of the important details in the article. Perhaps a simple oversight, the coverage failed to accurately assess the truth and may have needlessly scared readers concerning alcohol consumption. Coverage concerning pharmaceutical drugs is often **the most inaccurate**. Aside from the fact that many drug studies are corrupted from the start because of who is bankrolling them, negative findings are often **omitted** from the results while miniscule benefits are highlighted as breakthroughs. The intensity and rate of severe negative side effects from pharmaceutical drugs is routinely left out of mainstream reports concerning drug study results.

### 2ac – disease no extinction

#### Disease won’t cause extinction

Farquhar 17 – Sebastian Farquhar, Leader of the Global Priorities Project (GPP) at the Centre for Effective Altruism, et al., “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance”, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>

1.1.3 Engineered pandemics

For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to believe that natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic. One underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39

#### No global pandemics – other international actors solve – US efforts solve globalization and trade warrants

Wayne 14---- Alex, syndicated columnist on US health policy, “Global Effort Signed to Halt Spread of Infectious Disease,” Bloomber, 2/13, [http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-13/global-effort-signed-to-halt-spread-of-infectious-disease.html](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-13/global-effort-signed-to-halt-spread-of-infectious-disease.html#THUR)

The U.S. won commitments from 25 countries and the World Health Organization to work together on systems to better detect and combat outbreaks of infectious diseases such as H7N9 avian flu and Ebola virus. The Obama administration plans to spend $40 million in 10 countries this year to upgrade laboratories and communications networks so outbreaks can be controlled more quickly, Thomas Frieden, director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, said today in an interview. President Barack Obama will seek another $45 million next year to expand the program. Infectious diseases account for about 1 in 4 deaths worldwide, according to the U.S. National Institutes of Health. While diseases such as Ebola and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome haven’t posed a threat to the U.S., lapses in other countries may allow an outbreak to spread rapidly, Frieden said. “No country can protect itself solely within its borders,” Frieden said. “We’re all only as safe as the weakest link out there. This is an effort to essentially make the U.S. safer and make the world safer, to improve countries’ capacity to better find, stop and prevent health threats.” Frieden and Kathleen Sebelius, the U.S. health secretary, held a videoconference today with the partners in the effort. While no other country made a specific financial commitment today, Frieden said, all the nations at the conference including China, Russia, France and the U.K. agreed to “accelerate progress and address not just the health sector but include security in health in new ways.” First Consensus “For the first time, really, we have a consensus on not only what are the threats, but what do we have to do to address them,” he said. As an example, Frieden said Turkey’s government agreed to host a WHO office to respond to outbreaks in its region. The agreement will also target emerging infections such as Middle East Respiratory Syndrome. The 10 countries in line for the U.S. investment, which will be funded by the CDC and the Department of Defense, weren’t identified. The CDC plans to build on test projects last year in Uganda and Vietnam, where the agency helped the two nations’ health officials improve systems to detect and combat outbreaks of dangerous pathogens that include drug-resistant tuberculosis, Ebola virus and exotic flu strains. In Uganda, CDC officials helped the country’s Ministry of Health upgrade laboratories where tissue samples would be tested in the event of an outbreak, and developed a system for local doctors to report cases of illness by text message, according to an article published in the CDC’s journal Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. Uganda now is able to quickly transport tissue samples from rural outbreaks to a high-security lab in the capital, Kampala, by motorcycle courier and overnight mail, Frieden said. A mobile phone network-connected printer then texts lab results back to rural hospitals, he said. “Ultimately every country in the world should have this kind of system,” Frieden said. The $40 million, he said, “is certainly enough to make a good start.”

### 1ar – disease no extinction ext

#### Burnout

York 14 ---- Ian, head of the Influenza Molecular Virology and Vaccines team in the Immunology and Pathogenesis Branch, Influenza Division at the CDC, former assistant professor in immunology/virology/molecular biology (MSU), former RA Professor in antiviral and antitumor immunity (UMass Medical School), Research Fellow (Harvard), Ph.D., Virology (McMaster), M.Sc., Immunology (Guelph), “Why Don't Diseases Completely Wipe Out Species?” 6/4, <http://www.quora.com/Why-dont-diseases-completely-wipe-out-species>

But mostly diseases don't drive species extinct. There are several reasons for that. For one, the most dangerous diseases are those that spread from one individual to another. If the disease is highly lethal, then the population drops, and it becomes less likely that individuals will contact each other during the infectious phase. Highly contagious diseases tend to burn themselves out that way. Probably the main reason is variation. Within the host and the pathogen population there will be a wide range of variants. Some hosts may be naturally resistant. Some pathogens will be less virulent. And either alone or in combination, you end up with infected individuals who survive. We see this in HIV, for example. There is a small fraction of humans who are naturally resistant or altogether immune to HIV, either because of their CCR5 allele or their MHC Class I type. And there are a handful of people who were infected with defective versions of HIV that didn't progress to disease. We can see indications of this sort of thing happening in the past, because our genomes contain many instances of pathogen resistance genes that have spread through the whole population. Those all started off as rare mutations that conferred a strong selection advantage to the carriers, meaning that the specific infectious diseases were serious threats to the species.

**Empirics and isolated populations**

Beckstead 14 – Nick Beckstead, Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute, citing Peter Doherty, recipient of the 1996 Nobel Prize for Medicine, PhD in Immunology from the University of Edinburgh, Michael F. Tamer Chair of Biomedical Research at St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital, “How much could refuges help us recover from a global catastrophe?” in Futures, published online 18 Nov 2014, Science Direct

That leaves pandemics and cobalt bombs, which will get a longer discussion. While there is little published work on human extinction risk from pandemics, it seems that **it would be extremely challenging for any pandemic**—whether **natural or** manmade—to leave the people in a specially constructed refuge as the **sole survivors**. In his introductory book on pandemics (Doherty, 2013, p. 197) argues: “**No pandemic is likely to wipe out the human species.** Even without the protection provided by modern science, we survived **smallpox, TB, and the plagues of recorded history.** Way back when human numbers were **very small**, infections may have been responsible for some of the **genetic bottlenecks** inferred from evolutionary analysis, but there is **no formal proof** of this.” Though some authors have **vividly described worst-case scenarios** for engineered pandemics (e.g. Rees, 2003 and Posner, 2004; and Myhrvold, 2013), it would take a **special effort** to infect people in **highly isolated locations**, especially the 100+ **“largely uncontacted” peoples who prefer to be left alone.** This is not to say it would be impossible. A madman intent on annihilating all human life could use cropduster-style delivery systems, flying over isolated peoples and infecting them. Or perhaps a pandemic could be engineered to be delivered through animal or environmental vectors that would reach all of these people

#### Global health uniformly up – all their evidence is speculative fear mongering

Cohen 12 **----** Michael A., fellow at The Century Foundation, former senior fellow at the New America Foundation, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the American Security Project, IR Demigod, bachelor’s degree in international relations (American), a master’s degree (Columbia), adjunct lecturer in the School of International and Public Affair (Columbia), “Clear and Present Safety”, March/April, Accessed on Hein, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137279/micah-zenko-and-michael-a-cohen/clear-and-present-safety

A final trend contributing to the relative security of the United States is the improvement in global health and well-being. People in virtually all countries, and certainly in the United States, are living longer and healthier lives. In 2010, the number of people who died from aids-related causes declined for the third year in a row. Tuberculosis rates continue to fall, as do the rates of polio and malaria. Child mortality has plummeted worldwide, thanks in part to expanded access to health care, sanitation, and vaccines. In 1970, the global child mortality rate (deaths of children under five per 1,000) was 141; in 2010, it was 57. In 1970, global average life expectancy was 59, and U.S. life expectancy was 70. Today, the global figure is just under 70, and the U.S. figure is 79. These vast improvements in health and well-being contribute to the global trend toward security and safety because countries with poor human development are more war-prone. PHANTOM MENACE None of this is meant to suggest that the United States faces no major challenges today. Rather, the point is that the problems confronting the country are manageable and pose minimal risks to the lives of the overwhelming majority of Americans. None of them—separately or in combination—justifies the alarmist rhetoric of policymakers and politicians or should lead to the conclusion that Americans live in a dangerous world.

#### SARS changed everything – created effective mechanisms and political will for multilateral cooperation to survey, contain and treat disease

Roos 13 **----** Robert, medical editor, master's degree in science journalism (Minnesota), fellow at the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, “Experts: SARS Sparked Global Cooperation to Fight Disease,” Minnesota Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, 4/15, [http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2013/04/experts-sars-sparked-global-cooperation-fight-disease](http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2013/04/experts-sars-sparked-global-cooperation-fight-disease#THUR)

A new set of journal articles related to the 10th anniversary of the SARS epidemic in 2003 says the episode did much to boost recognition of the need for coordinated international and national responses to emerging infectious diseases. The articles and commentaries in Emerging Infectious Diseases reflect on the effects of SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome), which arose in China in late 2002 and spread to more than 30 countries in early 2003, sickening about 8,000 people and killing around 800. The outbreak was first publicized by the World Health Organization (WHO) on Mar 12, 2003. Among the reports is one describing two new SARS-like coronaviruses—close relatives of the SARS coronavirus—found in bats in China. The new viruses are more distant relatives of the novel human coronavirus that has caused illnesses in 17 people, with 11 deaths, in the past year. All of the cases had connections to the Middle East. Publication of the articles comes as the world is contending with still another emerging pathogen, the novel H7N9 influenza virus in China, which has infected at least 64 people and killed 14 in recent weeks. Surveillance and response In a "synopsis" piece, a team led by Christopher R. Braden, MD, of the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reports on progress in global surveillance and response capacity in the 10 years since SARS emerged. They review the milestones of the epidemic, from its silent emergence in southern China in November 2002 to its spread to Hong Kong and, boosted by a "superspreader," from there to many other countries. They say the SARS epidemic powerfully stimulated international cooperation to fight emerging diseases. "Perhaps the most important legacy of SARS is the recognition of the critical need for a multilateral response, led by WHO, in the event of a rapidly moving but ultimately containable global epidemic," they write. "The central role of WHO in coordinating the laboratory network that identified the etiologic agent and shared reagents, the epidemiology network that characterized the spread and identified the most effective control measures, and the policy and communications network that incorporated rapidly changing knowledge into measured travel advisories was critical for the control of the epidemic and a credit to WHO." The SARS epidemic dramatically reduced global travel and business, showing how disruptive a new pathogen could be, Braden and colleagues observe. Those effects stimulated pandemic flu planning and surveillance, a greater focus on global health security, and improved laboratory and surveillance networks. Further, the episode spurred efforts to update the International Health Regulations, which had not been revised since 1969, the article says. The regulations took effect in 2007. However, fewer than 20% of the 194 WHO countries that accepted the regulations had complied with their core requirements by the June 2012 deadline, according to Braden and colleagues. Another effect of SARS was to spur the establishment of new national public health agencies in Canada (the Public Health Agency of Canada, or PHAC) and the United Kingdom (the Health Protection Agency), the authors say. In a related perspective article, a team led by Jeffrey P. Koplan, MD, MPH, of Emory University, a former CDC director, says the value of national public health institutes was one of the major lessons of SARS. Koplan is joined by authors from the PHAC and its counterparts in Hong Kong and China. They note that more than 80 national public health institutes are now linked through the International Association of National Public Health Institutes, which promotes the establishment of new institutes and helps strengthen existing ones.

## econ impact

### 2ac – econ defense

#### USMCA will only result in small gains

IATP 19----IATP, the Institute for Agriculture & Trade Policy is an organization that has been studying NAFTA since before it was implemented. They are also advocators for policy, 4-18-2019, "USITC report confirms: New NAFTA fails consumers, farmers and environment," No Publication, https://www.iatp.org/documents/usitc-report-confirms-new-nafta-fails-consumers-farmers-and-environment

MINNEAPOLIS—Today, the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) released its economic analysis of the impact of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA, or New NAFTA) and concluded that implementation would result in only minor gains for portions of the U.S. economy (in particular, the automobile industry). Not only does New NAFTA fall well short of the economic windfall proponents promised to Americans, it fails consumers, farmers and the environment, said the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP).

"If the goal of the New NAFTA is to boost the economy and improve the lives of U.S. residents, the ITC report confirms it fails miserably," said Sharon Anglin Treat, IATP senior attorney. "The ITC analysis raises the question as to why such time and effort, not to mention over-the-top rhetoric, has been devoted to promoting it."

### 1ar – econ defense

#### USMCA has minor effects on the US economy

Buchwald 4/19 (Elisabeth Buchwald a reporting intern at MarketWatch. She is based in New York., 4-19-2019, "Key report on NAFTA successor finds deal would make only a slight boost to economy," MarketWatch, <https://www.marketwatch.com/story/key-report-on-nafta-successor-finds-deal-would-make-only-a-slight-boost-to-economy-2019-04-18>) cliv

A new report on the economic impact of the United-States-Mexico-Canada-Trade Agreement may not be sufficient enough to sway Democratic lawmaker reservations.

The International Trade Commission report released Thursday found that the USMCA that President Trump reached with this Canadian and Mexican counterparts would increase U.S. GDP by a slim margin of $68.2 billion, or 0.35%.

The ITC was required to prepare the report per the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 which mandates that the Commission provide lawmakers with a detailed report of a trade deal before they vote on it.

“This report confirms what has been clear since this deal was announced - Donald Trump’s NAFTA represents at best a minor update to NAFTA, which will only offer limited benefits to U.S. workers,” said Sen. Ron Wyden in a statement. The Democratic senator from Oregon who serves on the Senate Finance Committee refrained from mentioning the President’s proposed USMCA deal.

#### USMCA has no significant economic impact

Ikenson 4/10 (Daniel J. Ikenson is director of Cato’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, Ikenson holds a MA in economics from George Washington University, 4-10-2019, "USMCA: A Marginal NAFTA Upgrade at a High Cost," Cato Institute, <https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/usmca-marginal-nafta-upgrade-high-cost>) cliv

Despite backsliding in some areas and missed opportunities in others, the USMCA isn’t all bad. Most goods trade will continue to be tariff-free (the NAFTA status quo) under the new agreement, and barriers to certain agricultural products will be reduced, as well. The agreement establishes needed new rules in the realm of digital trade, including prohibitions of data transmission taxes and data localization requirements.

The USMCA is a marginal improvement over NAFTA—better in some areas, worse in others, about the same in most. Relative to the existing NAFTA, there are pros and cons. Though there is greater liberalization in goods trade, it is marginally to imperceptibly so. Taking into consideration the negative changes, especially to the rules of origin, it’s not obvious that USMCA is much of an upgrade from NAFTA. But it’s possible—even probable—that some of the less directly liberalizing, technical and procedural provisions, such as those governing “Digital Trade,” “Customs and Trade Facilitation,” “State-Owned Enterprises” and others, utilized in ways not completely apparent now, could lead to lower trade costs down the road.

### 2ac – econ turn

#### USMCA hurts the US economy

* Also functions as an indict to the neg int link data collection

Guilford 4/22 (Gwynn Guilford a reporter for Quartz who writes about the global economy, China, and her obsession with the sea. Before joining Quartz, she spent six years in China researching the economy for hedge funds. 4-22-2019 "The net impact of Trump’s new NAFTA is probably nothing," Quartz, <https://qz.com/1600240/the-net-impact-of-trumps-new-nafta-is-probably-nothing/>) cliv

What happens when America’s deal-maker-in-chief takes on “the worst trade deal in the history of the world”? Not much, it turns out.

That’s the conclusion drawn by an independent government agency in a new report (pdf) estimating the economic impact of the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement, as Donald Trump’s renegotiated version of the 1997 North American Free Trade Agreement is officially known. Written by US International Trade Commission economists, the report was legally required before Congress votes on the deal. If approved, the law would boost the US economy by less than 0.4%, accounting for inflation. About $68 billion.

But it very plausibly could hurt the US economy more than it helps.

There are good reasons to think the report’s prediction of a 0.4% GDP increase and a net increase of about 176,000 jobs overstates the likely impact of the USMCA. Those calculations—and the conclusion that the new trade deal will benefit the American economy—rest on one big assumption the report’s authors made, Chad Bown, an expert on trade at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

To understand what he means, it helps to break down the two main scenarios the report’s authors modeled. Let’s start with the most concrete of these—the estimated impact of the law if you don’t make the iffy assumption Bown mentions.

The default scenario: not so sunny

The key question the ITC report strives to answer is: How would the changes that Trump’s new deal makes to trade and investment barriers increase or decrease US output, employment, and wages?

The authors’ base case—what we’ll call the “default scenario”—models known barriers—tariffs, quotas, and labor regulations, for instance.

They find that the USMCA will cause the American economy to shrink a wee bit, say the authors—by about $23 billion. It will also drive down wages a tad and put nearly 54,000 people out of work. In other words, American companies, workers, and consumers as a whole will be slightly better off if the USMCA doesn’t pass.

Most media coverage of the report didn’t mention these findings at all—instead reporting only a slight boost in output, employment, and wages. (That’s not surprising, exactly. The report is 375 pages long. The first mention of these more sobering results is on page 56.)

What is it about the USMCA that will cause this small hit to the American economy?

The biggest change is created by its new “rules of origin requirements” for the auto industry. If passed, the USMCA would force US automakers to buy more of their parts from domestic part makers. That would, on balance, help workers and firms in auto-parts manufacturing. But those gains wouldn’t come from increased trade (which, all else equal, makes things cheaper). Instead, they’d be due to US consumers having to pay more for domestic-made autos. And that would reduce auto production, since higher prices would curb demand for American-made cars.

So in the authors’ default scenario, the economy as a whole would be worse off. Here’s the breakdown of those numbers, as reported on page 57 of the report1.

### 1ar – econ turn

#### Flaws within the USMCA hurts the economy

Ikenson 4/10 (Daniel J. Ikenson is director of Cato’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, Ikenson holds a MA in economics from George Washington University.4-10-2019, "USMCA: A Marginal NAFTA Upgrade at a High Cost," Cato Institute, <https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/usmca-marginal-nafta-upgrade-high-cost>) cliv

The U.S. market is generally open to foreign investment already, but investment restrictions persist in certain industries, including financial services, commercial air services, communications, and mining. The USMCA provides no significant new access to foreign investors in the United States.

Likewise, the USMCA does close to nothing to open any wider U.S. government procurement spending to bids from Canadian and Mexican companies. That’s a huge missed opportunity because under the various “Buy American” provisions, foreign firms and foreign products are limited in competing for the estimated $1.7 trillion of annual U.S. federal and state government procurement spending. This, of course, drives up the cost of every government project and ensures that taxpayers get the smallest bang for their buck. In light of the president’s interest in advancing a major infrastructure bill—maybe in the neighborhood of $1 trillion—this is a problem that should concern us all.

#### USMCA will hurt the economy

Jeffrey J. Schott, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. He is an Economist, 7-16-2019, "Just Say No to the New Nafta," Bloomberg, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-07-16/trump-s-nafta-alternative-is-a-bad-deal> (Vik)

President Donald Trump claims he has “tremendous Democrat support” in the House for the accord he signed last year with Mexico and Canada to replace the North American Free Trade Agreement. He threatens to withdraw from Nafta if Congress doesn’t quickly pass his new trade deal.

House Speaker Nancy Pelosi wants the deal, now called the United States-Mexico-Canada agreement, improved before Congress votes on it, with stronger labor and environmental protections, among other changes, even though some Democrats are willing to support the deal as is.

Pelosi’s instinct is right: Congress should call the president’s bluff and just say no to the USMCA. Compared with current policies, the new accord would restrict trade and investment, impose costs on consumers, and undercut U.S. economic growth. Rejecting it now can lead to a better deal with Mexico and Canada.

The main flaw is that the USMCA imposes costly regulatory mandates that would disrupt North American trade and investment, particularly in the auto sector. It also restricts bidding on government contracts and includes a “sunset” clause that requires review of the agreement every six years and provides for its possible termination in 16 years. These conditions will constrain investment and growth.

Some supporters of the deal say it provides new rules that will benefit the U.S. But those “new” rules aren’t new. Rather they mirror provisions affecting labor, the environment and e-commerce from the revised Trans-Pacific Partnership that have been carried out by Mexico and Canada since that accord went into effect on Dec. 30, 2018. Trump withdrew from the TPP, but Canada and Mexico remained in it, and already apply these provisions in trade relations with the U.S.

The administration’s claim that the USMCA will boost economic activity is based on a study by the United States International Trade Commission, which estimated the pact would increase U.S. growth by 0.3 percent of GDP per year. But in fact the study says that on balance the market access provisions of the accord would restrict trade and cause U.S. growth to decline by 0.12 percent.

The positive overall result touted by American officials is based on a separate estimation that USMCA rules in areas like intellectual property and digital trade will reduce uncertainty and encourage investment and growth. But those gains result from Mexico and Canada’s participation in the revised TPP; US firms already get those benefits without the USMCA.

Moreover, the commission’s study failed to account for the greater uncertainty caused by the sunset clause, not to mention the cost of Trump’s threats to raise tariffs on Mexico unilaterally over immigration issues. Overall, the USMCA would increase uncertainty for traders and investors alike and have a negative impact on growth.

The costly regulatory mandates imposed by the USMCA are in the form of requirements that high percentages of goods must be made in North America in order to get U.S. trade preferences. The administration claims these “rules of origin” would yield new investment in U.S. production and increase the nation’s auto sector jobs by 7.6 percent.

But the trade commission study refutes that claim. It estimates that these very rules would increase U.S. and Mexican production costs. In the U.S., the rules would reduce output and increase imports from outside North America, while raising the average price of vehicles, factors that would cut auto sales. Simply put, USMCA auto rules would hurt auto firms and workers.

Automakers in the U.S. opposed these rules during the trade negotiations but they are now going along with them out of fear that Trump will make things even worse by pulling out of Nafta. It is debatable if the president has the legal authority to do that. In any case, abrogating Nafta without a replacement would devastate the auto industry in states Trump needs to win in 2020, including Texas.

House Democrats can easily afford to call his bluff.

A better approach for Congress would be to defer consideration of legislation until U.S. trade officials fix what’s wrong with the pact, starting with consumer protections in pharmaceuticals and stronger enforcement of labor and environmental provisions. Importantly, revisions should also scale back the damaging auto provisions exposed by the U.S. International Trade Commission study. And the Democrats should insist that the pact cover climate change issues, a glaring omission in the version Trump signed.

Trump may not go along with this path. But there’s little economic cost in deferring action and planning how the USMCA can be properly fixed in the post-Trump era. The USMCA requires more than cosmetic changes. It’s time for Congress to set that process in motion.

### 2ac – econ no war

#### Economy is resilient and slight bumps don’t escalate

Martin Wolf, 1-5-16 —Financial Times Martin, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/db57a57e-b38b-11e5-b147-e5e5bba42e51.html#axzz3yIDas1ev, “Why global economic disaster is an unlikely event”

Measured at purchasing power parity, the world economy has grown in every year since 1946, even (albeit barely) in 2009, in the wake of the global financial crisis. The period between 1900 and 1946 was more unstable than the era of managed capitalism that succeeded it. Even so, the world economy grew in all but nine of those years.

The innovation-driven economy that emerged in the late 18th and 19th centuries and spread across the globe in the 20th and 21st just grows. That is the most important fact about it. It does not grow across the world at all evenly — far from it. It does not share its benefits among people at all equally — again, far from it. But it grows. It grew last year. Much the most plausible assumption is that it will grow again this year.

The world economy will not grow forever. But it will only stop when the economics of Thomas Malthus overwhelm those of Joseph Schumpeter — that is, when resource constraints offset innovation. We are certainly not there yet.

Since 1900, the world’s output has grown at a rate of just over 3 per cent a year. Such is the power of compound interest that world output has expanded more than 30-fold over this period. Output grew relatively slowly in the early part of the 20th century and relatively fast between 1947 and the early 1970s. Intriguingly, it grew a bit faster under postwar Keynesian economics than under the conservative revival launched by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the 1980s.

Now consider the pattern of volatility. The marked volatility between 1914 and 1919 was due to the first world war; that of the 1930s to the Great Depression; and that of the 1940s to the second world war. The instability of the 1970s and early 1980s was due to the oil shocks, triggered (or augmented) by war (the Yom Kippur war of 1973 and Iraq’s 1980 invasion of Iran). Inflationary financing of the Vietnam war generated the inflationary backdrop to the instability. Ultimately, that led to disinflation by the Federal Reserve, under Paul Volcker.

The slowdown in 1990 and 1991 was again due to disinflation and the first Gulf war, which followed Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. The slowdown in 1998 was triggered by the Asian financial crisis, that in 2001 by the bursting of a huge stock market bubble and that in 2009 by the western financial crisis.

This picture of the past indicates the kind of events one should worry about. In brief, there seem to be three: wars; inflation shocks (perhaps linked to wars or jumps in commodity prices); and financial crises. These phenomena can be linked: wars will trigger inflation if their finance is by inflationary means.

In this light, let us consider current risks. Some analysts have been convinced for years that high inflation must result from the expansion of central-bank balance sheets. They are wrong. It is quite possible for central banks to control the effects of their policies upon the expansion in credit and money.

A second set of risks, again ceaselessly promoted, is that of financial crisis. The biggest risks seem to be in emerging economies. But these risks are likely to be contained or prove manageable at the global level. If the worst came to the worst, the results are likely to be more like those of 1998 than of 2009.

#### No impact to economic decline

Christopher **Clary 15**, Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT, Postdoctoral Fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” April 22, 2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2597712

Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with **conciliatory policies between strategic rivals.** For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from **109 distinct rival dyads** since 1950, **67 of which terminated,** the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately **twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns** than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for **all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes** (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international **systemic changes),** as well as **many** **other** possible **confounding variables**. This research **questions existing theories** claiming that economic downturns are associated with **diversionary war**, and instead argues that in certain circumstances **peace may result from economic troubles**.

### 1ar – econ no war ext

#### Their ev can’t explain 2007 – this also answers any possible aff warrants (gambling for resurrection, diversion, prolif, lash out, nationalism, ethnic exclusion, and protectionism all did not happen)

Drezner 14 (Daniel, Professor of International Relations (Tufts), Nonresident senior fellow at Brookings, former international economist at the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of International Banking and Securities Markets, “The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession”, B.A. in political economy (Williams College), M.A. in economics and Ph.D. in political science (Stanford), World Politics, 66.1, January)

The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggest otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected."43

#### Empirically denied, instability burns out, and no backing for extremism – reject their evidence, it’s internet fear-mongering

Barnett 9 (Thomas, Senior Strategic Researcher – Naval War College, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis”, Asset Protection Network, 8-25, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had **virtually no impact** whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) **predates** the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process **wholly unrelated** to global economic trends. And with the **U**nited **S**tates effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite **modest**, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much **let it burn**, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); **Not a single state-on-state war directly caused** (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the **W**orld **T**rade **O**rganization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order. Do I expect to read any analyses along those lines in the blogosphere any time soon? Absolutely not. I expect the **fantastic fear-mongering** to proceed apace. That's what the Internet is for.

#### No resources mean no war

Bennett 2K ---- D. Scott and Timothy Nordstrom, Professors of Political Science (Penn State), “Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic Problems in Enduring Rivalries,” February, Journal of Conflict Resolution

In this analysis, we focus on using economic conditions to understand when rivalries are likely to escalate or end. Rivalries are an appropriate set of cases to use when examining substitutability both because leaders in rival states have clearly substitutable choices and because rivalries are a set of cases in which externalization is a particularly plausible policy option.7 In particular, when confronted with domestic problems, leaders in a rivalry have the clear alternatives of escalating the conflict with the rival to divert attention or to work to settle the rivalry as a means of freeing up a substantial amount of resources that can be directed toward solving internal problems. In the case of the diversion option, rivals provide logical, believable actors for leaders to target; the presence of a clear rival may offer unstable elites a particularly inviting target for hostile statements or actual conflict as necessary. The public and relevant elites already consider the rival a threat or else the rivalry would not have continued for an extended period; the presence of disputed issues also provides a casus belli with the rival that is always present. Rivals also may provide a target where the possible costs and risks of externalization are relatively controlled. If the goal is diversion, leaders willwant to divert attention without provoking an actual (and expensive)war. Over the course of many confrontations, rival states may learn to anticipate response patterns, leading to safer disputes or at least to leaders believing that they can control the risks of conflict when they initiate a new confrontation. In sum, rivals provide good targets for domestically challenged political leaders. This leads to our first hypothesis, which is as follows: *Hypothesis 1*: Poor economic conditions lead to diversionary actions against the rival. Conflict settlement is also a distinct route to dealing with internal problems that leaders in rivalries may pursue when faced with internal problems. Military competition between states requires large amounts of resources, and rivals require even more attention. Leaders may choose to negotiate a settlement that ends a rivalry to free up important resources that may be reallocated to the domestic economy. In a “guns versus butter” world of economic trade-offs, when a state can no longer afford to pay the expenses associated with competition in a rivalry, it is quite rational for leaders to reduce costs by ending a rivalry. This gain (a peace dividend) could be achieved at any time by ending a rivalry. However, such a gain is likely to be most important and attractive to leaders when internal conditions are bad and the leader is seeking ways to alleviate active problems. Support for policy change away from continued rivalry is more likely to develop when the economic situation sours and elites and masses are looking for ways to improve a worsening situation. It is at these times that the pressure to cut military investment will be greatest and that state leaders will be forced to recognize the difficulty of continuing to pay for a rivalry. Among other things, this argument also encompasses the view that the cold war ended because the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could no longer compete economically with the United States. *Hypothesis 2*: Poor economic conditions increase the probability of rivalry termination. Hypotheses 1 and 2 posit opposite behaviors in response to a single cause (internal economic problems). As such, they demand a research design that can account for substitutability between them.

### 1ar – econ no war – resilient ext

#### Econ’s resilient – shocks don’t spill over

Posen, 16 – Adam S. Posen, president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics and external voting member of the Bank of England’s rate-setting Monetary Policy Committee, “Chapter 1: Why We Need a Reality Check”, REALITY CHECK FOR THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, Peterson Institute for International Economics, PIIE Briefing 16-3, March 2016

A combination of public policies and decentralized private-sector responses to the crisis have increased our economic resilience, diminished the systemic spillovers between economies, and even created some room for additional stimulus if needed. Large parts of the global financial system are better capitalized, monitored, and frankly more risk averse than they were a decade ago, with less leverage. The riskier parts of today’s global economy are less directly linked to the center’s growth and financing than when the troubles were within the United States and most of Europe in 2008. Trade imbalances of many key economies are smaller, though growing, and thus accumulations of foreign debt vulnerabilities are also smaller than a decade ago. Most central banks are now so committed to stabilization that they are attacked for being too loose or supportive of markets, making them at least unlikely to repeat some policy errors from 2007–10 of delaying loosening or even excessive tightening. Finally, corporate and household balance sheets are far more solid in the US and some other major economies than they were a decade ago (though not universally), and even in China the perceptions of balance sheet weakness exceed the reality in scope and scale.

#### Governments buffer damages, safety nets work, and empirics prove

Zakaria 9 (Fareed, Ph.D. in Political Science – Harvard University and Editor – Newsweek International, “The Secrets of Stability”, Newsweek, 12-21, Lexis)

One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of -globalization--about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology--were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s. Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression." Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis--soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 19**30s**. The predictions of economic and political collapse have **not materialized** at all. A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?" This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy--through central banks and national treasuries--they **buffered** the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 19**30s**, when governments played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again--the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 19**87**, the recession of 19**92**, the Asian crisis of 19**97**, the Russian default of 19**98**, and the tech-bubble collapse of 20**00**. The current global economic system is **inherently more resilient** than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.

#### 2008 crushes their impact

Drezner, 12 (Professor International Politics Tufts University, ’12 (Daniel, October, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked” Council on Foreign Relations International Institutions and Global Governance)

In looking at outcomes, the obvious question is how well the global economy has recovered from the 2008 crisis. The current literature on economic downturns suggests two factors that impose significant barriers to a strong recovery from the Great Recession: it was triggered by a financial crisis and it was global in scope. Whether measuring output, per capita income, or employment, financial crashes trigger downturns that last longer and have far weaker recoveries than standard business cycle downturns.10 Furthermore, the global nature of the crisis makes it extremely difficult for countries to export their way out of the problem. Countries that have experienced severe banking crises since World War II have usually done so when the global economy was largely unaffected. That was not the case for the Great Recession. The global economy has rebounded much better than during the Great Depression. Economists Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke have compiled data to compare global economic performance from the start of the crises (see Figures 1 and 2).11 Two facts stand out in their comparisons. First, the percentage drop in global industrial output and world trade levels at the start of the 2008 financial crisis was more precipitous than the falloffs following the October 1929 stock market crash. The drop in industrial output was greater in 2008 nine months into the crisis than it was eighty years earlier after the same amount of time. The drop in trade flows was more than twice as large. Second, the post-2008 rebound has been far more robust. Four years after the onset of the Great Recession, global industrial output is 10 percent higher than when the recession began. In contrast, four years after the 1929 stock market crash, industrial output was at only two-thirds of precrisis levels. A similar story can be told with aggregate economic growth. According to World Bank figures, global economic output rebounded in 2010 with 2.3 percent growth, followed up in 2011 with 4.2 percent growth. The global growth rate in 2011 was 44 percent higher than the average of the previous decade. Even more intriguing, the growth continued to be poverty reducing.12 The World Bank’s latest figures suggest that despite the 2008 financial crisis, extreme poverty continued to decline across all the major regions of the globe. And the developing world achieved its first Millennium Development Goal of halving the 1990 levels of extreme poverty.13 An important reason for the quick return to positive economic growth is that cross-border flows did not dry up after the 2008 crisis. Again, compared to the Great Depression, trade flows have rebounded extremely well.14 Four years after the 1929 stock market crash, trade flows were off by 25 percent compared to precrisis levels. Current trade flows, in contrast, are more than 5 percent higher than in 2008. Even compared to other postwar recessions, the current period has seen robust crossborder exchange. Indeed, as a report from CFR’s Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies concluded in May 2012, “The growth in world trade since the start of the [current] recovery exceeds even the best of the prior postwar experiences.”15 Other cross-border flows have also rebounded from 2008–2009 lows. Global foreign direct investment (FDI) has returned to robust levels. FDI inflows rose by 17 percent in 2011 alone. This put annual FDI levels at $1.5 trillion, surpassing the three-year precrisis average, though still approximately 25 percent below the 2007 peak. More generally, global foreign investment assets reached $96 trillion, a 5 percent increase from precrisis highs. Remittances from migrant workers have become an increasingly important revenue stream to the developing world—and the 2008 financial crisis did not dampen that income stream. Cross-border remittances to developing countries quickly rebounded to precrisis levels and then rose to an estimated all-time high of $372 billion in 2011, with growth rates in 2011 that exceeded those in 2010. Total cross-border remittances were more than $501 billion last year, and are estimated to reach $615 billion by 2014.16 Another salient outcome is mass public attitudes about the global economy. A general assumption in public opinion research is that during a downturn, demand for greater economic closure should spike, as individuals scapegoat foreigners for domestic woes. The global nature of the 2008 crisis, combined with anxiety about the shifting distribution of power, should have triggered a fall in support for an open global economy. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the reverse is true. Pew’s Global Attitudes Project has surveyed a wide spectrum of countries since 2002, asking people about their opinions on both international trade and the free market more generally.17 The results show resilient support for expanding trade and business ties with other countries. Twenty-four countries were surveyed both in 2007 and at least one year after 2008, including a majority of the G20 economies. Overall, eighteen of those twenty-four countries showed equal or greater support for trade in 2009 than two years earlier. By 2011, twenty of twenty-four countries showed greater or equal support for trade compared to 2007. Indeed, between 2007 and 2012, the unweighted average support for more trade in these countries increased from 78.5 percent to 83.6 percent. Contrary to expectation, there has been no mass public rejection of the open global economy. Indeed, public support for the open trading system has strengthened, despite softening public support for free-market economics more generally.18 The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on crossborder conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.19 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. A fundamental conclusion from a recent report by the Institute for Economics and Peace is that “the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”20 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis—as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.21

## warming turn

### 2ac – warming turn

#### USMCA is CATASTROPHIC for warming---deregulates ag and entrenches fossil fuel dependence

Ben Lilliston 18. Director of Rural Strategies and Climate Change, "“New NAFTA” continues damaging climate legacy". Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy. 10-17-2018. https://www.iatp.org/documents/new-nafta-continues-damaging-climate-legacy

Free trade agreements, like the 25-year-old North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), have been a major driver of climate change. Through legally-binding rules, these deals have favored **high greenhouse gas (GHG) emitting and extractive industries, like energy and agriculture, over environmental protection**. The Trump administration’s rebranded NAFTA, called the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), repeats past mistakes by ignoring climate change, disregarding the pact’s impact on GHG emissions and failing to consider how climate change will affect the three countries into the future. The deal stands in stark contrast to the warning in the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report that “rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented changes in all aspects of society” are needed to avoid the severe and costly impacts of climate change.1 The new NAFTA represents a lost opportunity to fundamentally reconsider trade deals in the context of climate change. The role of trade agreements in driving climate change has taken on new importance. Recent research estimated that 25 percent of global GHG pollution is from operations that have been off-shored, with the products then imported.2 The U.S. is the number one importer of products with embedded emissions. The new NAFTA further integrates a North American market for fossil-fuel intensive sectors like agriculture, forestry and energy itself. In doing so, the new NAFTA charts a dangerous path forward, accelerating climate change. Specifically, the new NAFTA empowers energy companies to legally challenge environmental protections, creates new venues for governments to weaken or block environmental regulations, and facilitates a North American system of energy, fuel and agriculture that are major sources of GHG emissions. Here are a few areas of particular concern: Protecting the fossil fuel industry One of the most highly criticized provisions of NAFTA is the Investor State Dispute System (ISDS). Under ISDS, private corporations can sue governments if they believe a new government policy treats them unfairly. Fossil fuel companies have used ISDS numerous times to sue governments over environmental protections critical to protect the climate.3 In a step forward, the new NAFTA phases out ISDS between the U.S. and Canada over three years. But the existing ISDS will remain in place in U.S.-Mexico relations for the oil, gas and energy industries, infrastructure, transportation, and telecommunications sectors. For other sectors, ISDS could be used on a more limited basis by corporations based in the U.S. or Mexico to challenge domestic policies unfavorable to the industry. As the Sierra Club points out,4 “That means, for example, that Chevron and ExxonMobil—the two largest corporate climate polluters in history and repeat users of ISDS—would be allowed to challenge environmental protections in Mexico by relying on the same broad corporate rights that they have used to successfully challenge public interest policies from Ecuador to Canada.” Maintaining ISDS between the U.S. and Mexico was a major win for the oil industry.5 After 77 years under state ownership, Mexico amended its constitution in 2013 to open its oil and gas reserves to private investment. U.S.-based energy companies are jumping to invest in Mexico’s natural gas reserves,6 while the two countries explore cross-border electric transmission projects.7 A new NAFTA annex on energy regulatory measures between the U.S. and Canada makes clear the goal is to support “North American energy market integration,” with non-discriminatory access to pipelines and other electric transmission facilities.8 It’s worth noting a positive step for the climate: New NAFTA does away with the Proportionality Clause. The highly controversial clause required Canada (and only Canada) to export a portion of its oil to the U.S. indefinitely.9 The clause has been linked to the development of the highly polluting Tar Sands and its elimination should have long-term benefits for Canada in reducing its GHG emissions. Expanding high GHG emitting industrial agriculture The original NAFTA largely eliminated tariffs between the three countries in the trade of agricultural goods. There were exceptions, including the Canadian dairy, poultry and egg supply management programs and the U.S. sugar program. The new NAFTA whittles away at supply management programs in Canada that protect dairy, poultry and egg producers.10 Canada will allow marginal new access for U.S. dairy products, while equivalent U.S. access will be given for Canadian dairy imports. Canada will also provide new access for U.S. chicken, turkey and eggs. Canada’s supply management programs remain, but are noticeably weaker. (See “’New NAFTA’ puts the brakes on farm policy reforms” for more detail) The agriculture sector is the fifth-highest source of GHGs in the U.S., according to the EPA.11 The primary sources of agriculture emissions are linked to large-scale industrial operations—the heavy use of synthetic fertilizers (linked to the GHG nitrous oxide12) particularly for corn, and methane emissions associated with livestock (mostly from confined animal feeding operations or CAFOs13). California has identified methane emissions from their giant dairy CAFOs as an important target for the state’s climate mitigation strategy.14 NAFTA, coupled with the U.S. Farm Bill, has played a major role in expanding the CAFO model of production for pork, poultry, beef and dairy in all three countries—where animals often cross borders during their lifetime as part of an increasingly integrated, tri-national system.15 The Trump administration ignored calls from family farm groups to include mandatory Country of Origin Labeling (COOL) for meat in new NAFTA to help consumers support local markets, after Mexico and Canada had successfully challenged COOL at the World Trade Organization. Recent research has documented the role of global meat and dairy companies as major contributors to climate change.16 The erosion of agricultural supply management programs in new NAFTA is a setback for a critically important climate strategy. Supply management programs reduce GHGs by effectively limiting production, including on environmentally sensitive land. Supply management programs that place food grains in reserve are also an important adaptation tool in years of climate disruption.17 Deregulatory harmonization The new NAFTA includes a broad and novel chapter on Good Regulatory Practices.18 The GRP chapter, along with regulatory provisions in other chapters, consists of a complex, bureaucratic and confusing web of rules restricting how domestic regulators research, draft and implement public policies. For the first time in a U.S. free trade agreement, a chapter that focuses on regulations broadly will include a dispute settlement provision—meaning it is legally enforceable. These provisions have no precedent in the original NAFTA, which contained only limited and completely voluntary regulatory transparency measures. Under the chapter, countries will be required to report publicly on regulations under consideration for the following year and provide justification and pre-implementation impact assessments. The intended result is to harmonize state, federal, and international regulations and standards. The practical result, though, is that corporate interests can head off proposed regulations, even if such measures are designed specifically to meet climate goals. Weakening environmental protections The new NAFTA Environment Chapter is considerably weaker than the original.19 In 2007, Congress reached a bipartisan agreement20 to include obligations to seven multilateral environmental agreements in future Free Trade Agreements: The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Substances, Convention on Marine Pollution, InterAmerican Tropical Tuna Convention (IATTC), Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, International Whaling Convention (IWC), and Convention on Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). The new NAFTA includes only three of those treaties (Montreal Protocol, Marine Pollution and CITES). Of those three, it weakens the commitment for two of them, making it generally unenforceable. One of the main criticisms of trade agreements has been the lack of enforceable environmental commitments. The new NAFTA contains no substantive changes in this regard. The Trump administration has yet to conduct an Environmental Review of the new NAFTA as has been done with recent U.S. free trade agreements.21 Reinforcing a climate vulnerable agricultural system Maintaining genetic diversity in crop and animal production is essential for adapting to climate change, according to a recent report by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization.22 Climate adaptation strategies identified by the U.S. Department of Agriculture contain practices that strengthen soil health and include more perennial and diverse systems. These same systems have the added benefit of producing less GHGs. Less diversity and more homogeneity results in agricultural systems vulnerable to extreme weather and new pests and weeds, all of which are expected outcomes of climate change. Rather than supporting strategies to build climate resilience in agriculture, the new NAFTA requires all participating countries to sign on to a global seed breeders’ rights treaty (known as UPOV91), which prohibits farmers and breeders from exchanging established seeds.23 (See “’New NAFTA’ puts the brakes on farm policy reforms” for more detail). In addition, it includes new rules covering patented genetically engineered crops at the behest of the biotech industry. GE crops, primarily used for monocultural commodity crop production, have played an integral role in expanding the high GHG model of agricultural production in the U.S. and Canada. The USTR boasts that the new NAFTA is superior to the Trans-Pacific Partnership when it comes to advancing agriculture biotechnology, including for the first time new technologies like gene editing.24 The new rules will make it difficult for Mexico and Canada to block imports of GMO and gene-edited crops approved for use in the U.S., but not in those countries. (See “Entrenching the non-regulation of food and agricultural products of “modern biotechnology” in the USCMA” for more detail) Increasing food safety risks Climate change is expected to increase risks related to food safety and plant and animal health due to variances of temperatures and the spread of animal and plant diseases.25 Under new NAFTA, countries would be given new powers to challenge food safety inspectors who stopped food shipments, and require a quick review of the action. Equivalency elements in the agreement establish that food safety systems and inspections are the same in all three countries—thereby reducing the need for food safety inspections at the border. A major concern is the inability of governments, including the U.S., to fully fund enforcement of existing food safety rules. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration has conducted less than one-third of the inspections of foreign facilities exporting into the U.S. as required under the current national food safety law, partially due to a lack of funding.26 (For more, see Food safety and agricultural biotechnology in USMCA: the anti-science Trump administration negotiates rules based on “scientific principles”) Undermining the Paris Climate Agreement At the heart of the Paris Climate Agreement are national-level plans to reduce GHG emissions.27 Within each plan are goals, policies and strategies to reduce GHG emissions and adapt to climate change. Both Mexico and Canada are part of, and remain committed to, the United Nations’ Paris Climate agreement. And while the Trump administration has signaled it will withdraw from the Accord, at least nine U.S. states and 125 U.S. cities have expressed their commitment to the Paris Climate Agreement. Each country, along with sub-federal governments, will need policy flexibility to meet their climate goals. New climate policies like carbon markets, carbon taxes, carbon tariffs, emission regulations and renewable energy programs could come into conflict with new NAFTA’s various deregulatory rules. Conclusion The Trump administration’s attacks on climate action have been numerous. From the announcement to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement, to attempts to kill the Clean Power Plan,28 to the steady removal of scientific expertise from government agencies29—the administration’s assault on environmental protections has been unrelenting. The new NAFTA represents a critical opportunity to ensure that trade policy does not conflict with policies or inhibit investments to reduce greenhouse gases and adapt to climate change. Instead of setting a new bar and integrating climate goals within a trade deal, the Trump administration has done the opposite, not only setting the U.S. back, but also Canada and Mexico, in efforts to address climate change. **NAFTA has helped drive GHG emissions** for the last 25 years. **The climate can’t afford to continue this damaging legacy under the new NAFTA.**

### 1ar – warming turn – usmca bad

#### Wrecks the environment---causes warming, destroys the oceans and arctic

Wilkins 19 --- Mackenzie Mcdonald Wilkins, Trade For People And Planet ("USMCA is Another Corporate Power Grab. We Need a Real NAFTA Replacement!," 2-27-2019, http://tradeforpeopleandplanet.org/usmca-is-another-corporate-power-grab-we-need-a-real-nafta-replacement/, accessed 7-1-2019) bm

As discussed, USMCA lacks labor and environmental enforcement mechanisms. But this is just part of the problem. Even if there were enforcement, the USMCA lacks good rules to enforce. Further, the new NAFTA includes two ways–ISDS and good regulatory practices–that allow corporations to change or repeal regulations that hurt their profits. USMCA is fundamentally oriented towards corporations, not people or the planet, which is why it must be stopped altogether not simply reformed. Stopping the USMCA will allow us to go back to the drawing board. A [better model](http://tradeforpeopleandplanet.org/alternatives-to-corporate-trade/) for North American trade is achievable if we maintain that focus. A new North American agreement needs strong and enforceable labor and environmental standards. It needs to raise wages in all three countries, support unions, repeal right-to-work laws, and end the outsourcing of jobs and pollution. It needs to protect small and indigenous farmers, sustainable food systems and consumers by strengthening food labeling and inspections of imported foods. It needs to make medicine and health care more accessible and affordable. It needs to protect wildlife, clean air and water, and the health of our communities. It needs to address climate change head on and defend the most vulnerable communities from environmental disasters. Trade must be used to obtain positive goals that reduce inequality and treat people with dignity. It must prioritize reparations to indigenous peoples and black and brown communities through financial compensation and decolonization and respect the sovereignty of Indigenous Nations to control what happens on their land. Any new ‘trade’ deal must be negotiated through a democratic and transparent process that includes public participation with broad swaths of society, not just corporations. NAFTA 2 falls far short of meeting these basic criteria. Dr. Margaret Flowers and Kevin Zeese [write](http://tradeforpeopleandplanet.org/trump-trade-revealed-another-rigged-corporate-deal/), the “new NAFTA framework remains trade for corporations while undermining health, the environment, food, and worker rights.” NAFTA 2 provides [new avenues](https://www.iatp.org/documents/new-nafta-imposes-hurdles-delay-and-weaken-public-protections) for corporations to challenge public interest laws that hurt their profits. It maintains NAFTA offshoring of jobs and pollution as well as buy american and buy local waivers for Canadian and Mexican industries. The USMCA facilitates the expansion of chemical agriculture and GMOs while undermining food safety inspections and labelling. It encourages dirty energy from fracking and tar sands, and fails to even mention climate change. As the recent [IPCC report](https://popularresistance.org/ipcc-radical-energy-transformation-needed-to-avoid-1-5-degrees-global-warming/) shows, we don’t have 16 years to start talking about climate change. In terms of offshoring, the current language of USMCA allows corporations to send jobs and pollution to Mexico where environmental and human rights protections are often lower. For instance, this new NAFTA would allow metal recyclers to send [toxic used car batteries](https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2016/02/26/a-dangerous-export-americas-car-battery-waste-is-making-mexican-communities-sick/?noredirect=on&fbclid=IwAR0fw4gOrwoMNAOBtadJWq8gM0AjoGJ8CmQ2jqos8xknaPgIKfqxFDE6xS4) to Mexican recycling factories that do not have lead exposure controls and where workers have and continue to get lead poisoning. The US-Mexico border has become a [dumping ground](https://therevelator.org/border-betrayed/) for the excessive waste of corporate America. In terms of energy, fossil fuel companies are major winners of the new NAFTA. Instead of moving North America towards renewables, USMCA locks us into oil and gas. According to [Sierra Club](https://www.sierraclub.org/sites/www.sierraclub.org/files/NAFTA-environment-statement.pdf) the USMCA maintains NAFTA rules that prevent the U.S. government, the Department of Energy, “from determining whether gas exports to Mexico or Canada are in the public interest.” This basically is an automatic guarantee of gas export which would “increase fracking in the U.S., expand cross-border gas pipelines,” and create greater Mexican dependency on natural gas which has been the main contributor, way more than any other fuel type, to Mexico’s [recent increase](https://www.sierraclub.org/sites/www.sierraclub.org/files/uploads-wysiwig/NAFTA%20and%20Climate%20Report%202018.pdf) in climate pollution. Also in Mexico, the USMCA will lock in the government’s recent deregulation of oil and gas. Big oil successfully lobbied for two ways–ISDS and good regulatory practices–to challenge the Mexican government if it tries to nationalize its energy sector agan. The USMCA also [supports tar sands](https://www.sierraclub.org/press-releases/2018/11/opposition-trump-s-pro-polluter-nafta-deal-mounts-ahead-deal-signing), though in a little different way from NAFTA.. NAFTA supported tar sands with the proportionality rule that locks in tar sands oil extraction in Canada. USMCA, on the other hand, supports tar sands by making it cheaper for oil companies to export Canadian tar sands through U.S. oil pipelines. This could make it harder to shut down existing tar sands pipelines like Keystone Phase 1, Enbridge line 6b, line 5, and line 17 as well as stop new ones like the proposed Enbridge line 3. ’USMCA’s proposed expansion of the fossil fuel empire is an environmental disaster on its own. But, NAFTA 2 goes further by reducing environmental protections that are included in the last four US trade deals. It does this by “failing to reinforce a standard set of seven Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEA)” that protect wetland ecosystems, arctic ecosystems, and endangered species and prevent overfishing, unnecessary marine pollution, and so much more. An [environmental coalition](https://www.sierraclub.org/sites/www.sierraclub.org/files/NAFTA-environment-statement.pdf)shows: “the deal includes standard enforcement language for only one of the seven MEAs, while using weak language for two and failing to even mention four of these essential environmental agreements.”

#### Ocean biodiversity solves extinction

Craig ‘3 (Robin Kundis Craig, Professor at Florida State University College of Law, leading environmental law scholar who has written important works on water and ocean and coastal issues, Winter 2003, “Taking Steps Toward Marine Wilderness Protection? Fishing and Coral Reef Marine Reserves in Florida and Hawaii,” 34 McGeorge L. Rev. 155, Lexis)

The world’s oceans contain many resources and provide many services that humans consider valuable. “Occupying more than seventy percent of the Earth’s surface and ninety-five percent of the biosphere,” oceans provide food; marketable goods such as shells, aquarium fish, and pharmaceuticals; life support processes, including carbon sequestration, nutrient cycling, and weather mechanics; and quality of life, both aesthetic and economic, for millions of people worldwide. Indeed, it is difficult to overstate the importance of the ocean to humanity’s well-being: “The ocean is the cradle of life on our planet, and it remains the axis of existence, the locus of planetary biodiversity, and the engine of the chemical and hydrological cycles that create and maintain our atmosphere and climate.” Ocean and coastal ecosystem services have been calculated to be worth over twenty billion dollars per year, worldwide. In addition, many people assign heritage and existence value to the ocean and its creatures, viewing the world’s seas as a common legacy to be passed on relatively intact to future generations. (It continues…) More generally, “ocean ecosystems play a major role in the global geochemical cycling of all the elements that represent the basic building blocks of living organisms, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorous, and sulfur, as well as other less abundant but necessary elements”. In a very real and direct sense, therefore, **human degradation** of marine ecosystems **impairs the planet’s ability to support life**. Maintaining biodiversity is often critical to maintaining the functions of marine ecosystems. Current evidence shows that, in general, an ecosystem’s ability to keep functioning in the face of disturbance is strongly dependent on its biodiversity, “indicating that more diverse ecosystems are more stable. Coral reef ecosystems are particularly dependent on their biodiversity. [\*265] Most ecologists agree that the complexity of interactions and degree of interrelatedness among component species is higher on coral reefs than in any other marine environment. This implies that the ecosystem functioning that produces the most highly valued components is also complex and that many otherwise insignificant species have strong effects on sustaining the rest of the reef system. n860 Thus, maintaining and restoring the biodiversity of marine ecosystems is critical to maintaining and restoring the ecosystem services that they provide. Non-use biodiversity values for marine ecosystems have been calculated in the wake of marine disasters, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. n861 Similar calculations could derive preservation values for marine wilderness. However, economic value, or economic value equivalents, should not be "the sole or even primary justification for conservation of ocean ecosystems. Ethical arguments also have considerable force and merit." n862 At the forefront of such arguments should be a recognition of how little we know about the sea - and about the actual effect of human activities on marine ecosystems. The United States has traditionally failed to protect marine ecosystems because it was difficult to detect anthropogenic harm to the oceans, but we now know that such harm is occurring - even though we are not completely sure about causation or about how to fix every problem. Ecosystems like the NWHI coral reef ecosystem should inspire lawmakers and policymakers to admit that most of the time we really do not know what we are doing to the sea and hence should be preserving marine wilderness whenever we can - especially when the United States has within its territory relatively pristine marine ecosystems that may be unique in the world.We may not know much about the sea, but we do know this much: **If we kill the ocean we kill ourselves, and** we will take most of **the biosphere** with us.

#### Extinction---Arctic key.

Ford 3, Inuit Circumpolar Conference vice president, 2003 (Violet, “Global Environmental Change: An Inuit Reality”, 10-15, <http://www.mcgill.ca/files/cine/Ford.pdf>)

The Arctic ecosystem is a fundamental contributor to global processes and the balance of life on earth. Both the unique physical and biological characteristics of the Arctic ecosystem play key roles in maintaining the integrity of the global environment. Massive ice sheets and ice cover regulate the global temperatures by reflecting much of the solar radiation back into space, the Arctic ocean influences global ocean currents which are responsible for a variety of weather conditions and events, to name but two. The Arctic is also the recipient of the by-products of southern-based industry and agricultural practices. In February 2003, UNEP’s Governing Council passed a resolution effectively recognizes the Arctic as a “barometer” or indicator region of the globe’s environmental health. This is important and is further reason why Arctic indigenous peoples should work together at the international level. Late last year ICC and RAIPON participated in the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Council meeting in Beijing, China with the aim of sensitizing this organization to the Arctic dimension of global environmental issues. I understand that the GEF is now willing to consider indigenous peoples and their organizations to be distinct and separate from environmental and other NGO’s.

# Michigan 2019 v2

### AT Winners Win

#### Trump PC is finite — he’ll take the heat for the plan — every ounce is key to legislation.

Buchanan 17 — Neil H. Buchanan, Economist and Legal Scholar, Professor of Law at George Washington University and a Senior Fellow at the Taxation Law and Policy Research Institute at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia, 2017 (“Neil Buchanan: Trump is Fast Blowing His Political Capital,” *News Week*, March 18th, Available Online at <http://www.newsweek.com/neil-buchanan-trump-fast-blowing-his-political-capital-569695>, Accessed 07/21/2017)

In short, Trump is making himself [look like a fool](http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/trumps-defense-his-wiretap-conspiracy-theory-goes-horribly-awry). More importantly, he is doing this when it is absolutely unnecessary to do so. Trump might believe that he has unlimited political capital—and with most of his supporters, [he might well be right](http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2017/03/trump-will-hang-on-because-press-will.html)—but he does not, and it makes no sense for him to make this unforced political error. It makes no sense, that is, unless he has drawn one of two conclusions: (1) Going through with building the wall will actually become popular with people who currently do not support it, or (2) He is willing to lose political popularity over this issue, because the substantive advantages of building a wall are worth it. If he believes explanation No. 1, he is fooling himself. If it is No. 2, he simply does not understand how border protection works. (See also his travel bans.) It could be both, and I am betting that it is. The reason that this is all so odd is that Trump seemed to have figured out a way to glide through his presidency without actually doing anything important. He has created such a distorted political atmosphere that he can, for example, [both confirm and deny](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/15/us/politics/trump-calls-2005-tax-return-release-fake-news.html) that a 2005 tax form was accurate, leaving everyone to wonder whether the "leak" of that shred of information was planted by the White House. Watching the press chase every crazy thing coming from his Administration was turning out to be a seriously plausible survival strategy. All Trump had to do was say something bizarre every time anything serious came up, and he could skate along to the next news cycle. Would it matter that nothing ever happened under Trump's presidency? Not really. Trump could blame the Democrats, the Republicans (especially his chew toy, Paul Ryan), and pretty much anyone else for not getting it right. More importantly, he would not have to put his name on anything that would be open to attack. This is especially important because a White House does have to do some things that are going to be politically contentious. The federal budget is a minefield, for example, and any president is going to be take heat for the choices of winners and losers that his budget implies. Trump's first budget proposal makes it obvious that he is not going to do anything to help his non-rich supporters, and he is actually proposing to [make their lives worse](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/15/us/politics/trump-budget-military-analysis.html). (This is also true of the new health care bill.) All of which means that a president who came into office with historically low approval ratings, and who still cannot accept his drubbing in the popular vote, needs to do everything he can to avoid self-inflicted wounds.

Even if Winners Win is true it takes too long to regenerate

Silber, Political Science PhD, 7

[Marissa Silber, Political Science PhD Student at the University of Florida, Prepared for delivery at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30th-September 2nd, 2007, “WHAT MAKES A PRESIDENT QUACK? UNDERSTANDING LAME DUCK STATUS THROUGH THE EYES OF THE MEDIA AND POLITICIANS,” <http://convention3.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/1/0/8/9/p210893_index.html>, Accessed 7/9/12]

Important to the discussion of political capital is whether or not it can be replenished over a term. If a President expends political capital on his agenda, can it be replaced? Light suggests that “capital declines over time – public approval consistently falls: midterm losses occur” (31). Capital can be rebuilt, but only to a limited extent. The decline of capital makes it difficult to access information, recruit more expertise and maintain energy. If a lame duck President can be defined by a loss of political capital, this paper helps determine if such capital can be replenished or if a lame duck can accomplish little. Before determining this, a definition of a lame duck President must be developed.

### AT Intrinsicness

#### We should evaluate the politics DA as an intrinsic cost of the plan—all of our link evidence proves the DA is intrinsic and passage will undermine Trump’s ability to credibly pass USMCA post plan

#### Intrinsicness is a voter

#### 1. Infinitely regressive- the aff could use Intrinsicness to solve any DA, means the neg always loses

#### 2. C/I- judge is an active and concerned citizen. This includes the politics DA and excludes the Intrinsicness test b/c and active citizen does not have their hands on the lever of power and is concerned about the political viability of their goals.

#### 3. Politics DAs are good-

#### Fairness – Politics is a key core generic – maintains link uniqueness and applies to small affs

#### Education – provides a competitive incentive to keep abreast of current events, empowers young persons with the acumen to navigate an intentionally obfuscated political apparatus, enhances negotiation skills necessary to become an effective advocate

#### It’s anti-educational to exclude an entire genre of an argument especially when it is the most salient question to the plan’s passage – the squo is the squo because of the politics da ignoring it is inane

# Impacts

## Economy !

### Impact I/L – Economy

#### USMCA necessary to maintain economic momentum – delay hurts nearly every sector of the economy

Wenstrup, 7/5—American politician, U.S. Army Reserve officer, and Doctor of Podiatric Medicine, who has been the U.S. Representative for Ohio's 2nd congressional district since 2013. (Brad, “Rep. Brad Wenstrup: It’s time to pass the USMCA deal,” The Clermont Sun, 7/5/19, <https://www.clermontsun.com/2019/07/05/rep-brad-wenstrup-its-time-to-pass-the-usmca-deal/>, AS)

After years of stagnation and slow recovery, our economy is roaring. The unemployment rate is at a 50-year low, average wages are rising and Americans are keeping more money in their pockets thanks to tax relief. But this economic momentum for American families is at risk if Congress continues to delay consideration of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement. Trade with Mexico and Canada supports 12 million jobs in the United States. Here in Ohio, trade with Mexico and Canada supports 428,400 jobs. We can support these workers and add more jobs to the American economy by updating our trade agreement. The time is long overdue to usher in a new trade agreement with our North American neighbors. American businesses and workers have been forced to operate under a 20th century trade deal unfit for our 21st century economy. The current North American trade agreement was created long before the dominance of internet commerce. Consumer behavior looks a lot different today than it did 25 years ago when our current trade agreement was established. We now live in a world where people can find and purchase products from across the world in seconds using a device in their pocket. Innovation has forced us to change the way we do business, but our current trade agreement has not kept up with the pace of innovation In the fall, the United States, Canada and Mexico reached an agreement to modernize and improve our North American trade agreement. Earlier this week, the Mexican Senate voted overwhelmingly to ratify the USMCA. Now the ball is in our court. It’s time for the United States Congress to act. Delaying consideration of USMCA tells our trading partners that we’re not serious about doing business with them. This is the wrong message to send. In addition, delays in considering USMCA delay important provisions that will create jobs and grow the economy. Make no mistake, delay hurts each and every American. The USMCA modernizes our regional trade framework by establishing rules of the road for digital trade, setting the global standard on digital market access. USMCA addresses the technological landscape that has developed in the past 25 years. It also ensures that companies of all sizes and in all sectors of our economy can compete by prohibiting forced data localization. This new agreement also includes important provisions to ensure American innovators are able to sell products to Canada and Mexico, while protecting them from intellectual property theft. With USMCA, America will retain its place as the global leader in the digital economy. The USMCA would level the playing field for American farmers and manufacturers, making it easier to sell “made in America” products in our neighboring countries. Expanded markets for American businesses would create and support more jobs in the United States. In 2018, Canada and Mexico were the top two markets for Ohio exports. Combined, they were worth $27.9 billion, more than half of the total value of exports from Ohio. The approval of, or failure to approve, the USMCA would have enormous implications for our Buckeye economy and the millions of Americans whose jobs rely on trade with Canada and Mexico. In 2017, 88 percent of iron and steel, 80 percent of rubber and 75 percent of motor vehicle parts produced in Ohio were exported to Mexico and Canada, according to the Business Roundtable. In order to keep shifts scheduled and workers employed, the businesses producing these products in America need certainty that they will continue to have markets in Canada and Mexico to sell their products. In addition to manufacturing, Ohio farmers depend on trade. Ohio is the 12th-largest agricultural exporting state. Ohio boasts 75,000 farms; 90 percent are family-owned. The USMCA will level the playing field for these families by reducing the use of unfair trade-distorting policies. It also will open new opportunities for farmers to sell poultry and dairy products in Canada for the first time. The USMCA would provide farmers with much-needed certainty as they seek to grow. However, none of this can happen if Congress does not act. American innovators, workers and farmers depend on trade. The USMCA offers the opportunity to rebalance North American trade and create more jobs, higher wages and better opportunities for American families. No more delays. It’s time to pass the USMCA.

#### USMCA is key to the economy – trade boosts multiple critical sectors

Cox 19 --- Phil Cox, cochair of the Trade Works for America Coalition and a former executive director of the Republican Governors Association, ("Opinion: Trump's trade deal with Canada and Mexico is a huge win for Americans, and it's time for Congress to pass it," 5-31-2019, Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/opinion-congress-trump-usmca-canada-mexico-trade-deal-2019-5, accessed 6-16-2019)

Free trade is at the heart of the US economy. Each year, our companies sell more than $2.5 trillion worth of goods and services to customers around the world. Of those exports, nearly $300 billion worth of exports go to Mexico and another $360 billion worth go to Canada, two key markets for US enterprise. The importance of these markets is the reason the US entered into a trade agreement with our North American neighbors 25 years ago and why President Donald Trump and his administration signed a new deal, a better deal — the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA. And now it's time for Congress to reaffirm how important trade with Mexico and Canada is for the US economy and pass the USMCA. Our country recognizes the importance of these markets. A quarter of a century ago, the US entered into a trade agreement with our North American neighbors that helped to level the playing field and reduce barriers to trade for American job creators. But 25 years later, that trade agreement is no longer the best agreement for US businesses. That's why Trump and his administration signed the USMCA. As it goes in Washington, there are lawmakers on both sides of the aisle who are not 100% pleased with the agreement. To me, that means the Trump administration negotiated a balanced agreement that deserves support from all members of Congress. The USMCA updates the old agreement and ensures that American workers and families are put first. This is also a welcome agreement for industries that depend on free, fair, rules-based trade with Canada and Mexico. America's farmers, ranchers, auto manufacturers, and small businesses are set to gain once the USMCA is signed into law. According to the US International Trade Commission, the USMCA will create 176,000 US jobs and add over $68 billion to the US economy — that is, in addition to the 12 million jobs already in the US that are supported by trade with Canada and Mexico. This positive report suggests that pro-growth policies promoting free, fair, and enforceable trade are a win for American workers and job creators alike. Supporters of the USMCA recognize that this agreement contains provisions that will help make American job creators more competitive. For agriculture, those provisions provide increased access to Canadian dairy markets. For manufacturing, the USMCA establishes requirements that promote American-made cars and machinery as well as new worker protections to ensure American factory jobs do not get shipped overseas. The economic boost comes from a number of provisions in the USMCA that will help American businesses and consumers, including increased access to Canadian dairy markets for farmers and requirements that promote American-made cars and machinery for manufacturers. The USMCA also established new rules around e-commerce, making it easier for American small businesses to connect and sell to customers in Mexico and Canada. The USMCA is also a winning proposition for American innovators because it strengthens intellectual-property protections, alleviating worries about a competitor gaining access to their trade secrets.

#### USMCA key to the economy – IP protections

KERINS 6/12 (Raymond F., Jr.; chairman of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's Global Innovation Policy Center, “Mexico tariffs averted, USMCA back in bullseye,” https://www.foxbusiness.com/economy/mexico-tariffs-usmca-trade)ww

Congress will soon decide whether to ratify the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, the trade deal that would update NAFTA in several ways. Most importantly, the new pact would significantly strengthen intellectual property rights. It's hard to overstate the value of IP rights to America's economy. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office reports that IP-intensive industries account for 45.5 million U.S. jobs and more than $6 trillion in GDP. Without strong IP rights, the industries that enhance our lives would cease to function. Congress can set the stage for years of job creation and economic growth by ratifying the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). Innovation isn't cheap or easy. This is especially true in my industry of biopharmaceuticals. It costs an average of $2.6 billion and often takes more than a decade to develop just one new medicine. By patenting their drug designs, biopharmaceutical firms can prevent rivals from creating knockoff medicines for a limited time. That enables innovative firms to earn a return on investment and plow the revenues into new lines of research, leading to yet more innovation. Today, the biopharmaceutical sector supports 4.7 million American jobs and contributes more than $1.3 trillion a year to the economy -- none of which would be possible without our nation's strong IP protections. Other IP-intensive sectors have similarly impressive statistics. Copyright industries support 5.7 million jobs, while the tech industry employs 6.7 million. Importantly, these creative industries produce the majority of American exports, which help reduce the trade deficit. These sectors account for about $840 billion in merchandise exports and another $80 billion in service exports annually. The USMCA contains numerous intellectual property provisions. For instance, the deal would create a Committee on Intellectual Property Rights. Representatives from each country would work together to boost enforcement of IP rights and improve transparency in issues concerning trade secrets. That's a necessary reform to prevent IP theft. By one estimate, the sale of counterfeit American goods costs our economy $29 billion a year. Stolen trade secrets, meanwhile, cost businesses and workers $180 billion. The USMCA also includes critical protections for sophisticated drugs known as "biologics," which represent some of the most promising cures of the future. Policies like these will preserve the incentive for American individuals and companies to innovate and protect them from IP theft. American, Canadian, and Mexican leaders already finalized the terms of the USMCA back in November, but Congress hasn't yet approved the deal. There's little reason to wait. The USMCA would give the nation's most innovative and creative industries the security they need to create jobs and grow our economy. Passing it is a no-brainer.

#### Certainty and access to new markets.

Brilliant 19 --- Myron Brilliant, executive vice president and head of international affairs at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, (“US Chamber of Commerce executive: Why Approving USMCA is an urgent priority,” 6-14-2019, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/14/why-approving-usmca-is-an-urgent-priority-us-chamber-of-commerce-exec.html, accessed 6-16-2019)

Certainty. An early vote for USMCA will provide U.S. businesses from every sector—from agriculture to manufacturing and services—the certainty that their exports to Canada and Mexico will enter those markets duty-free. This certainty is invaluable because these two markets are invaluable to American business. U.S. trade with Canada and Mexico: Reached nearly [$1.4 trillion](https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/current_press_release/ft900.pdf) last year, or $3.8 billion daily; Supports [12 million American jobs](https://www.businessroundtable.org/policy-perspectives/trade-international/trade-with-canada-and-mexico) spread across every state in the union; Is vital for U.S. manufacturers, who [export more made-in-America manufactured goods to Canada and Mexico](https://www.uschamber.com/series/all-about-baseline-how-interpret-the-international-trade-commission-report-usmca) than they do to the next 11 largest export markets combined; Accounts for nearly [one-third of U.S. agricultural exports](https://www.usmcacoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/023607_INTL-USMCA-Coalition_Onepager_final.pdf); and Powered growth in U.S. services exports from $27 billion in 1993 to $91 billion in 2017. Certainty is what American job-creators require if they are to make brick-and-mortar investments and create more jobs for the long haul. Growth. USMCA isn’t just about holding on to what you’ve got. USMCA will boost economic growth by improving the market access guaranteed for U.S. businesses. For example, the agreement further opens the Canadian market to U.S. agricultural exports such as dairy products, poultry, and wine. U.S. farmers and ranchers have faced five years of declining commodity prices, so USMCA’s improved market access is more than welcome. And make no mistake: These are growth markets. U.S. exports to Mexico and Canada have grown more over the past decade than sales to any other country. In each case, exports have expanded by more than $100 billion annually. No other market comes close. In fact, Mexico and Canada accounted for about 40% of the growth in U.S. goods exports in dollar terms over the past decade. In particular, USMCA promises growth for America’s small and midsized exporters. Canada and Mexico are the top two export destinations for U.S. small and medium-size enterprises, more than 120,000 of which sell their goods and services in our two North American neighbors. When an American small business starts exporting, it’s almost always to Canada or Mexico.

#### Key to the economy---digital trade.

Holding 19 --- George Holding, represents North Carolina’s 2nd District. Mr. Holding serves on the Ways and Means Subcommittees on Trade and Health, ("Delay of new trade deal harms America's digital advantage," 6-10-2019, TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/448711-oberlin-college-case-shows-how-universities-are-losing-their-way, accessed 6-16-2019)

Today, nearly six out of 10 American jobs created by exports of digital services are jobs outside the tech industry. Sectors like agriculture, health care, and manufacturing make up a large part of the 5 million total jobs and $1.35 trillion in annual productivity of the digital economy, according to the Internet Association. As a result, it is now more important than ever to ensure the rules of the road on the digital highway are modernized and clear. That’s why [President Trump](https://thehill.com/people/donald-trump) and U.S. Trade Ambassador [Robert Lighthizer](https://thehill.com/people/robert-bob-lighthizer) spent countless hours negotiating the creation of a new “digital chapter” in the updated proposed trade agreement with Mexico and Canada – the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (USMCA). The USMCA includes a host of new benefits for American workers, families, and the economy. And the changes impacting the digital economy are among the most important. It will, for the first time, prohibit the imposition of customs duties, fees, or other charges on digital products traded electronically. It will also safeguard cross-border data flows. USMCA is the first trade agreement to ensure the free flow of data for all sectors. Businesses of all sizes, across all sectors, will benefit from the free and safe flow of information. The trade pact prohibits data localization requirements that force businesses to use or locate computing facilities in a specific country or territory as a condition for conducting business. Additionally, USMCA streamlines customs processes to support e-commerce. As the digital economy continues to evolve and grow, modernizing the mechanics of how goods flow between countries in North America is critical. The new agreement will help speed the growth of e-commerce. Finally, as this sector continues to evolve and expand, enhanced data protection becomes even more important. The proposed agreement encourages, for the first time, data privacy and cybersecurity collaboration. USMCA requires all three countries to adopt measures to comply with each other’s data privacy laws. USMCA also promotes a collaborative, risk-based approach and adoption of industry best practices to keep networks and services secure. These new digital provisions and protections are both timely and important. A lot has changed in the 25 years since NAFTA was signed into law. Back then, folks didn’t have cell phones, internet access required a dial-up connection, and movies had to be rented in VHS format. Today, we live in an interconnected world driven by rapidly evolving digital technologies and capabilities. We do our work on lightning-fast computers, interact through mobile phones, and buy goods with a single click. These changes have benefited workers and consumers across every sector. It has created countless jobs and grown wages, all while improving Americans’ day-to-day lives. It has made it easier for farmers to find customers, leading to increased revenue and production. It has overhauled logistics entirely, empowering manufacturers across the country to be able to expand and grow, and it is even forcing health care providers to adapt to new standards. Imagine the potential if we can make our digital economy even more competitive on a global scale – making our products more affordable while simultaneously expanding markets for our local job creators. That is what USMCA sets out to achieve. And that’s why the agreement’s new digital provisions are so important. Yet, unfortunately, USMCA is currently being held hostage by the partisan political circus in Washington. Delaying approval of the trade pact hits the pocketbooks of the workers and families in North Carolina and across the nation. Folks across all sectors – from farmers and factory floor workers to programmers and engineers – are losing out. Far too much hangs in the balance. USMCA will lead to more jobs, larger paychecks, and cheaper prices for American consumers. It provides a much-needed foundation for the expansion of free and fair digital trade and investment in innovative products and services. And it creates a framework for a cutting edge, 21st-century economy. It’s time for Washington to buck up and get this agreement over the finish line. We have before us a once in a generation opportunity to define a new global standard in digital trade, one that positions the United States as the world leader in the digital economy. We can’t afford to let it slip away.

### T/Oil Shocks

#### USMCA ensures energy independence – that solves their oil shocks impact

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At a press conference last month, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi expressed cautious optimism about the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which is set to replace the quarter-century-old North American Free Trade Agreement. "I have always thought that this was probably one of the easier trade agreements to come to agreement on, but so far we're not there yet," she said. For the sake of the American energy industry, lawmakers should get "there" soon. By ratifying USMCA, the United States will spur economic growth and bolster our booming domestic energy sector for years to come. It's time for Congress to put partisan hangups aside and pass the deal as quickly as possible. USMCA retains key provisions from NAFTA that have helped sustain North American energy trade. The new agreement will keep oil and gas products like gasoline tariff-free. It will also reduce tariffs on thinning materials that help crude oil pass through U.S.-Canadian pipelines. USMCA maintains an important legal provision for U.S. oil and gas firms operating in Mexico. The investor/state dispute settlement allows companies to sue governments that impose harmful regulations. This would be crucial for American firms if Mexico attempts to nationalize its energy industry and expel foreign companies as it did in 1938. Such protection is crucial to continuing the vast flow of energy between North American nations. According to the Congressional Research Service, petroleum products made up between 10 and 17 percent of total North American trade over the past decade. More than 80 refineries across America process imported crude oil from Canada or Mexico for domestic use. In addition to providing us with the energy we need, Canada and Mexico are some of our best energy customers. In 2016, energy exports to Mexico exceeded imports by a two-to-one margin. Mexico is now the biggest market for U.S. natural gas exports, and the fourth largest market for exported oil and gas equipment. In fact, American petroleum and natural gas exports to our southern neighbor exceeded $20 billion in 2017 -- more than double that of a decade ago. And that figure is expected to rise. Mexican demand for natural gas will likely jump more than 26 percent by 2031, according to Mexico's Secretariat of Energy. Canada's demand for American energy is also growing. Canadian imports of U.S. crude oil increased more than a hundredfold between 1993 and 2017. Most of that growth has come in the last decade. Passing USMCA would benefit countless Americans. The oil and natural gas industry supports over 10 million U.S. jobs and accounts for nearly 8 percent of the nation's economy. USMCA will also continue to reduce our dependence on oil from hostile foreign countries. Rather than import oil from the Middle East to supplement domestic energy production, we can turn to our friendly neighbors to the north and south. In 2017, we imported more oil from Mexico than Iraq.

## Innovation !

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#### USMCA key to economic and innovative leadership---otherwise China outcompetes.

David A. Gantz, 11-15-2018 - Will Clayton fellow in international economics at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy and the Samuel M. Fegtly professor of law at the University of Arizona’s James E. Rogers College of Law; "US needs USMCA if it's serious about competing with China," TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/416739-us-needs-usmca-if-its-serious-about-competing-with-china

The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) negotiated by the Trump administration to replace the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is to be signed by the three countries' presidents Nov. 29. This complex agreement, which makes major changes in rules governing automotive trade, dispute settlements and agriculture, while adding or expanding coverage of such areas as labor rights, environmental protection, small and medium-sized enterprises, state-owned enterprises, corruption and e-commerce, cannot go into force until it is approved through the applicable constitutional procedures in each member state. Approval by the Canadian Parliament and Mexican Congress seems assured. Yet, questions arise as to when and if the U.S. Congress will approve. For many reasons, including the preservation of North America as a world leader in manufacturing efficiency, job growth and innovation as well as maintaining strong economic and political relations with Canada and Mexico, it is imperative for Congress to approve USMCA as soon as possible. However, because a Democratic majority will control the House of Representatives as of January, enactment of USMCA-approval legislation is less assured there than in the Senate, where Republicans will maintain their majority. Under Trade Promotion Authority legislation, the administration must submit a list of required changes to U.S. law, a Statement of Administrative Action setting out the nature of the legislative changes required and a U.S. International Trade Commission study of the economic effects, all before the agreement can be formally submitted to Congress, hopefully by mid-March 2019. TPA mandates action by Congress within 90 legislative days after submission. Congress can vote only for or against the agreement; no amendment is possible. The prospects for eventual congressional approval of TPA may not be dimmed by Democrats' control of the House, but House consideration of USMCA could be delayed because of more pressing items on the Democratic agenda: Robert Mueller’s Russia investigation, immigration and health care, for example. Also, Democrats in the House may demand changes in the text, most likely to strengthen the labor and environmental provisions (which are already considerably more robust than those in the NAFTA “side” agreements), as a condition of supporting the agreement. Major support for USMCA in the House can be expected from the 200 Republican members, but even if most of them support the agreement, the administration will need 25 to 30 Democrat votes to reach the 218-vote majority required for passage. USMCA may attract more votes from Democrats than has historically been the case for trade agreements. New automotive rules are expected to create jobs in the U.S., while stronger labor provisions protecting independent unions in Mexico will likely be supported by some Democrats because they should result in wage increases in Mexico and reduce the wage disparity with the U.S. Also, Democrats who have opposed the inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement in past trade agreements may welcome its elimination entirely with Canada and significant narrowing with Mexico. It is possible that Democrats will take a totally obstructionist position on all Trump administration initiatives. However, prior to November, current House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), the likely Speaker of the House come January, indicated that Democrats would be looking for areas where they could cooperate with the Republicans. USMCA approval could well be one of those areas, even if most Democratic House members decide to oppose it. While some Republicans might have opposed the president’s will if Canada had been excluded, given extensive U.S. bilateral trade with Canada and the critical importance of Canadian manufacturers in supply chains for U.S. manufactured goods, that problem has disappeared. Also, while business groups have expressed dissatisfaction with USMCA’s investment and government procurement provisions, it can be expected that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and many other organizations will pressure both Republicans and Democrats in Congress to support USMCA. Thus, there is still a reasonable possibility that the USMCA could take effect as soon as Jan. 1, 2020. If the United States is seriously interested in competing with China for world leadership in innovation, and in maintaining a robust North American manufacturing and export base, the administration and Congress must work together to enact USMCA as promptly as possible.

#### Key to all aspects of hard and soft power---solves cyber and bioweapon attacks

Knipfer 17 – MA Candidate in Space Policy at George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute (Cody, 3/7/17, “On the Nature of Science and Technology Power,” <http://www.reallycoolblog.com/on-the-nature-of-science-and-technology-power/>)

Indeed, the United States’ leadership in science and technology has been a historical cornerstone of its capacity for “hard power” force application and projection and economic and societal “soft power.” It buttresses the country’s economic might, enables the modern standards of living of our citizenry, and expands our global cultural and normative reach.[ii] Equally so, the power of science and technology has been decisive in the context of national security. As President Truman noted in 1945, while urging Congress to create a Department of National Defense, “no aspect of military preparedness is more important than scientific research.”[iii] Through discoveries, technological innovation, and the capacity to develop ideas into deployable weapons, systems, and concepts, the United States has arrived at its modern-day military advantage and superiority.[iv] To that end, science and technology may be considered key elements of the United States’ comprehensive national power – fundamentals of the country’s strength vis-à-vis competitors. Yet science and technology alone cannot ensure any country’s continued security, prosperity, or hegemony; far from operating in a vacuum, science and technology are constantly evolving to address changing domestic and international circumstances and threats. To reap advantage from science and technology, especially in their national security application, a country must continually innovate to tackle contemporary developments and anticipate future ones. This poses a considerable challenge, the solution to which extends beyond advanced engineering and research. To explore these notions, this essay, particularly interested in the application of science and technology toward national security ends, examines the United States’ recent employment of security-related technologies. From this, it explores the attributes of science and technology power and the similarities and differences between science and technology power and other forms of national power such as the economic and diplomatic. Looking at the relative importance of science and technology in the United States today and likely significance in the coming future, it lays out a series of policy recommendations that may guide policymakers as they make decisions that impact the direction of the country’s scientific and technological course. Employment of – and Challenges Facing – National Security-Related Technolog Recognizing the vital role that technology played in winning World War Two, along with the emerging threat of Soviet technological competitiveness, the United States established in the war’s wake an extensive infrastructure to support national security science and technology efforts. This provided foundation and catalyst for the development of military capabilities and tools needed to meet the challenges of the Cold War and the modern day: the nuclear triad, intelligence-gathering and cyber infrastructure, space-based radar and communications systems, advanced precision-guided munitions, and integrated command and control, along with myriad other assets.[v] These technologies have seen extensive use in contemporary military conflicts. The wars in the Balkans and the Gulf saw the ever-increasing use of position, navigation, and timing assets such as GPS to provide precise and reliable information to the warfighter and direct precision-guided weaponry.[vi] Targeted airstrikes and weapons such as the long-range cruise missile have allowed for far more rapid, responsive, and accurate strikes than those of the past while substantially reducing collateral damage. Combat drones and unmanned aerial vehicles, innovations emblematic of the “War on Terror,” enable the warfighter to engage adversaries and conduct reconnaissance while safely remaining away from the front lines of the battlefield. Stealth aircraft, using a range of advanced technologies that reduce reflections and emissions, have helped pilots conduct sorties while evading detection.[vii] Technology abets the United States’ security beyond warfighting. Advanced cyber capabilities – encryption, for example – seek to defend the networks which control the country’s power, transit, and water infrastructure from malicious hacks and crippling denial of service.[viii] Technologies capable of detecting harmful biological and chemical agents guard the country against potentially devastating attack by non-state actors.[ix] Increasingly sophisticated monitoring and surveillance technology enables the government to globally track and work to counter criminal activity, terrorist organizations, and other developments which threaten the country’s safety.[x] Crucially, though, the United States’ contemporary application of national security systems has also demonstrated the inherent challenges of innovation and the limitations of technology. Despite advanced military hardware, principally designed to fight large-scale conventional wars against Cold War-era foes, the United States military had to “catch up” and react to unconventional tactics, such as roadside bombs and sniper attacks, employed against it in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Though decidedly outnumbered and outgunned, enemy combatants effectively countered the United States’ asymmetric technological advantage through guerilla warfare, propaganda, and exploiting collateral damage that advanced weapons systems created – doctrines which the United States’ technology did not anticipate and was unprepared or unsuited to counter.[xi] Likewise, despite the sophistication of the United States’ homeland security technologies, the government has struggled to prevent incidents of domestic terrorism such as mass shootings, often characterized by the use of simple, off-the-shelf equipment.[xii] Meanwhile, in reaction to the United States’ present-day technological superiority, competitive foreign powers such as Russia and China are heavily investing in hardware and capabilities in the cyber and military realms specifically designed to counter the United States’ technological strengths and exploit its demonstrated vulnerabilities. The technological capabilities underlying the United States’ comparative military advantage are now proliferating to an increasing number of state and non-state actors, including potential adversaries, leveling the military “playing field.”[xiii] The Attributes of National Security Science and Technology Power From this, several key attributes and characteristics of science and technology as a form of national power can be identified. Foremost is the capacity for technology and science to be a significant, occasionally decisive, enhancer of a country’s military strength against enemies. Countries which develop innovative military technologies which effectively counter an adversary’s offenses or defensives, or against which an adversary has no means to protect itself, find themselves disproportionately advantaged on the battlefield. Indeed, technologies which upend dominant “status quo” warfighting paradigms – such as, historically, the introduction of the chariot, the tank, or nuclear weapons – are poised to significantly disrupt and reorder the geopolitical and military balance of power.[xiv] To that end, science and technology power, particularly in the national security sphere, is developed and sustained through the adaption to, and more so through the anticipation of, revolutionary changes in military affairs, doctrine, and hardware. As Lieutenant Colonel Scott Stephenson noted in the influential “The Revolution in Military Affairs,” “those slow to adapt to military revolutions… are likely to suffer painful results. When the pace of change accelerates, the militaries that anticipate and adapt are likely to gain a massive advantage over potential enemies who are less agile.”[xv] That agility is, in large part, borne from innovations in science and the development of new technologies which lead to unanticipated, and therefore difficult to counter, doctrines. A defining characteristic of science and technology power, then, is the continual quest for states to match, counter, and out-compete the technology of their adversaries. This continuing interplay between technology and national power, characterized by the sustained technological evolution and described often as an “offset,” has been a key focus for national security-related research and development throughout the Cold War and into the present. The United States’ deployment of nuclear weapons, for example, offset the numerical advantage held by the Soviet Union’s land forces in the early Cold War. Soviet parity in nuclear weapons catalyzed the development of guided weapon and integrated command and control as a counter, focusing on accuracy of targeted weapons systems independent of range.[xvi] The United States’ capacity to offset Soviet technology through innovative developments – and the Soviet bankruptcy borne from military expenditure that came as a corollary – was an important factor in maintaining a generally peaceful stable of power along with the country’s ultimate triumph in the Cold War. In the present-day, China and Russia’s focus on countering the systems and technologies which currently provide the United States’ military asymmetry is emblematic of this “offset” approach to science and technology power. Paradoxically, however, national security-related technology in the present day has become as great an equalizer as it has historically been a separator of actors’ strengths. Technological superiority in the present may provide the United States’ unrivaled military strength, especially against foes (historically, state actors with large conventional forces) for which its national security technologies anticipated countering. Yet as the example of the Iraq and Afghani insurgencies amply demonstrated, technological superiority coupled with innovation focused on addressing hypothetical future battlefields may not be adequate to oppose or defeat all actors or all forms of warfare, regardless of the level of their sophistication. Indeed, advanced technologies may be entirely vulnerable to actors utilizing doctrines with simple technologies that nonetheless exploit their weaknesses, as was the case with sophisticated – and expensive – American vehicles being destroyed by crude, homemade IEDs. Technology itself also creates weaknesses; the United States’ progressing economic and social reliance upon interconnected networks, for example, makes the country more vulnerable to potentially crippling attack. Despite advanced American cybersecurity technologies and techniques, non-state actors have still proven themselves capable of infiltrating, attacking, and even denying use of American cyber capabilities; considering recent trends, this vulnerable seems likely to continue, if not worsen.[xvii] It may be that an attribute of science and technology power, borne more from the focus and perceptions of the technologists, theorists, and military leadership that employ it than from science and technology itself, is that it obscures other factors which equally dictate important developments in military, international, and geopolitical affairs. Political upheaval, social change, and economic development can change warfare dramatically, for example – and have nothing to do with “offset” strategies or war-room predictions of possible enemies’ future high-tech military hardware. As a product of the military-industrial complex that emerged in the Cold War United States to sustain continued technological development, Americans tend to be acutely – perhaps overly – sensitive to technological innovation among competitors and potential rivals. Fears during the Cold War and contemporary discussions of the “Third Offset” paint pictures of emerging, potential, and fanciful enemy weapon systems – which military planning and technology development was and is oriented toward countering.[xviii] This fixation on solutions entailing engineering and technological complexity blinds the national security technology apparatus to external trends that could definitively impact the future course of war – such as the collapse of the Soviet Union leaving the United States with a high-tech military and warfighting doctrine unsuited for the military pressures and asymmetric nature of counterinsurgency; the rise of radical terrorism with ideological underpinnings that condone unconventional guerilla tactics such as suicide bombings, which had great effect against high-tech targets; or the continuing crisis where lone-wolf gunmen using off-the-shelf rifles can commit massacres despite the government’s highly complex and pervasive surveillance and monitoring technology. Similarities and Differences to Other Forms of National Power With these attributes in mind, a comparison can be drawn between science and technology power and other forms of power which constitute a country’s comprehensive strength, such as the economic and diplomatic. Regarding the economic, science and technology power is similar in that the development of science and technology is driven by the same forces as economic growth. Like new economic products, services, and methods of operation, science and technology power relies upon the ingenuity of human actors predicting and anticipating future trends, possibilities, and human behavior. Innovation, iteration, and competitiveness are fundamental catalysts for the continued evolution and growth of both. The rapid proliferation and subsequent use of innovative technologies across the world quickly equalizes both the national security advantage and the economic advantage they provided their inventor. Economic power, like national security technology, is a key element of a country’s warfighting capability – industrial might, strength in quality production, and capable infrastructure are crucial facets of a country’s ability to mobilize and project force. A fundamental difference between economic power and science and technology power, however, is competition. While economies naturally compete, there is incentive for states to specialize in the economic product or service most suited for it – their comparative advantage. Competing economies are not actively incentivized to counter the economic specialization of their rivals. With science and technology power for national security use, however, states decidedly hope to actively and explicitly counter the relative advantage of their adversaries. Like diplomatic power, science and technology has a “soft power” element; other states and their societies may be influenced or compelled to action by the might, prestige, or cultural and technological hegemony of a country in possession of highly advanced and capable technologies.[xix] Diplomatic power occasionally experiences the same issue of science and technology policy in being blinded to unpredicted or external trends in the social, cultural, and economic spheres. The power of diplomacy, for example, did not anticipate and struggled to deal with the cultural, social, and political circumstances that led to a breakdown of order in post-invasion Iraq; just as national security technology was unprepared for the guerilla warfare of the Iraqi insurgency. Diplomatic power and science and technology power differ, though, in the fields of innovation and evolution. Whereas the military regime is constantly evolving and occasionally being upended by revolutions in security technology and associated doctrine, the Westphalian diplomatic order has remained largely similar through centuries – even as it has grown gradually more complex and interconnected. States do not tend seek to outcompete each other in the diplomatic sphere through revolutionary new approaches to diplomacy; negotiations, sanctions, deals, bi- and multilateral agreements, and the like have remained consistent “doctrines” employed by states in their dealings with international friends and foes. Science and Technology Power’s Present and Future Importance To return to Vannevar Bush’s assertion over half a century ago, science and technology is crucially important for a states’ economic growth and prosperity, the wellbeing of its citizens, and national security. This remains absolutely the case today. Despite the challenges facing innovation in the face of unanticipated adversaries and the proliferation of advanced, equalizing technologies among adversarial states and non-state actors, science and technology provides the United States’ unrivaled levels of security and military hegemony. With the appearance of significant global challenges – refugee crises, environmental degradation, the possible emergence of a bi- or multi-polar world characterized by states with rough or equal technological parity, to name a few – the future importance of science and technology power cutting across all aspects of national security will undoubtedly redouble. Science and technology and its application as an element of the United States’ national power will need to be directed to address these challenges. While the exact characteristics that will define domestic and foreign national security technologies of the future – not to mention the economic and social – remain uncertain, the United States cannot afford to permit its current technological advantage to slip. Indeed, as revision states such as China continue to develop their technologies to directly counter the United States’ capabilities, it will likely become an imperative for the country to more actively engage in and support the development of innovative new security technologies and doctrines – lest, as history would suggest, the international order again be upended.

#### Prevents global nuclear war

Henricksen 17 – emeritus senior fellow at the Hoover Institution (Thomas, “Post-American World Order,” Hoover, <http://www.hoover.org/research/post-american-world-order>)

The tensions stoked by the assertive regimes in the Kremlin or Tiananmen Square could spark a political or military incident that might set off a chain reaction leading to a large-scale war. Historically, powerful rivalries nearly always lead to at least skirmishes, if not a full-blown war. The anomalous Cold War era spared the United States and Soviet Russia a direct conflict, largely from concerns that one would trigger a nuclear exchange destroying both states and much of the world. Such a repetition might reoccur in the unfolding three-cornered geopolitical world. It seems safe to acknowledge that an ascendant China and a resurgent Russia will persist in their geo-strategic ambitions. What Is To Be Done? The first marching order is to dodge any kind of perpetual war of the sort that George Orwell outlined in “1984,” which engulfed the three super states of Eastasia, Eurasia, and Oceania, and made possible the totalitarian Big Brother regime. A long-running Cold War-type confrontation would almost certainly take another form than the one that ran from 1945 until the downfall of the Soviet Union. What prescriptions can be offered in the face of the escalating competition among the three global powers? First, by staying militarily and economically strong, the United States will have the resources to deter its peers’ hawkish behavior that might otherwise trigger a major conflict. Judging by the history of the Cold War, the coming strategic chess match with Russia and China will prove tense and demanding—since all the countries boast nuclear arms and long-range ballistic missiles. Next, the United States should widen and sustain willing coalitions of partners, something at which America excels, and at which China and Russia fail conspicuously. There can be little room for error in fraught crises among nuclear-weaponized and hostile powers. Short- and long-term standoffs are likely, as they were during the Cold War. Thus, the playbook, in part, involves a waiting game in which each power looks to its rivals to suffer grievous internal problems which could entail a collapse, as happened to the Soviet Union.

### Impact I/L – Innovation

#### **USMCA is key to American innovation**

Estes, 6/28—American politician serving as the U.S. Representative for Kansas's 4th congressional district since April 25, 2017 and member of the U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means. A member of the Republican Party, he previously served as the 39th Kansas State Treasurer from 2011 to 2017 under Governor Sam Brownback. (Ron, “USMCA will unleash American innovation: Dems must not stand in the way,” Fox Business, 6/28/19, <https://www.foxbusiness.com/economy/usmca-will-unleash-american-innovation-dems-must-not-stand-in-the-way>, AS)
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi told reporters this week that the pending U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) would need to be reopened and tweaked before the House will vote on it. This is bad news for America.

Mexico earlier this month made a monumental step forward in becoming the first country to ratify the deal. With Canada not far behind, it is past time for Pelosi to allow the USMCA to move forward in Congress. Each day the Speaker waits to act, America is missing out on innovation, opportunity and increased job growth. According to the U.S. International Trade Commission, the USMCA will create 176,000 new jobs and increase U.S. GDP by $68 billion.The modernized USMCA is light-years ahead of the outdated NAFTA and it will create jobs, boost wages, and open markets for American agriculture, manufacturing and technology. NAFTA is so outdated that it doesn’t even reference the internet. The USMCA is the framework for future digital trade agreements and will unleash unprecedented American innovation. In addition to Kansas-grown wheat or Wichita-produced aerospace components, some of America’s most important exports also include our ideas. Every day, farmers, programmers, artists, doctors and entrepreneurs throughout our country develop new technologies and products. This innovative spirit is at the heart of America’s ingenuity and we should do everything we can to unleash it. The USMCA will unlock creativity, job growth and opportunity in our digital world and global economy. The USMCA includes strong intellectual property provisions that protect American patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets. It also expedites the patent approval process in Canada and Mexico, allowing America’s innovative products to be sold in those markets sooner while protecting them from theft. When NAFTA was negotiated in 1992, Motorola cellphones were carried around in a bag and just 1 in 5 households had a home computer. Even fewer than that could connect to dial-up internet in order to access the World Wide Web, which was unveiled in 1991. Clearly a lot has changed in the last 30 years. Our laws and trade deals should change as well. As NAFTA was negotiated before the dawn of iPhones and Wi-Fi, updating intellectual property standards are critical. The USMCA meets the challenge of setting 21st century standards to support and protect American jobs and innovation. Thirty years ago, no one could have imagined a drone delivering food to your doorstep within minutes of ordering it online from your phone. In 30 more years, one can only guess what new technology and innovation will be on the forefront. But one thing is certain – by passing the USMCA, we can make sure it’s American innovators and workers who are leading the charge.

### Impact I/L – Innovation – Small Business

#### USMCA is key to small business --- key to econ and innovation

Kerrigan 19 – president & CEO of the Small Business & Entrepreneurship Council (Karen, “Why America's small businesses and entrepreneurs win under USMCA,” Fox Business, <https://www.foxbusiness.com/small-business/americas-small-businesses-and-entrepreneurs-win-under-usmca>)

The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) was signed by President Trump and his fellow leaders at the G20 in Argentina. The accord modernizes the decades-old NAFTA and is chock full of meaningful provisions that will help American small businesses boost exports and safeguard their intellectual property (IP). Small businesses drive the U.S. economy, and they certainly dominate trade with Mexico and Canada. Thirty million small businesses employ more than 58 million American workers. They also account for roughly half of U.S. GDP. Many small businesses are looking to expand into global markets, and agreements like the USMCA will lower costs and provide more certainty and opportunity. Many small businesses rely heavily on North American trade to stay afloat. Of the U.S. companies that export to Canada and Mexico, three in four have fewer than 50 employees, and four in five have fewer than 100. Modernizing NAFTA to strengthen IP protections is an important achievement that will provide a much-needed boost to the U.S. economy. Small firms and startups invest heavily in research and development. They produce 16 times more patents per employee than larger businesses. This innovation would grind to a halt without patents, copyrights and other IP protections, which prevent rival firms from unfairly replicating and undermining an innovator's creation. Entrepreneurs wouldn't invest in product development and innovative ideas - and neither would outside investors - if rivals could steal the fruits of such labor. The USMCA bolsters IP protections in several ways. Consider copyrights, which prevent competitors from stealing creative content like books, movies, music and art. These protections are vital for countless small media and publishing firms. More than 80 percent of U.S. film and television companies have fewer than ten employees. CLICK HERE TO GET THE FOX BUSINESS APP The USMCA would extend Canada's copyright terms by 20 years, putting them on par with U.S. standards. This change would give U.S. small business owners and their families more time to benefit financially from their creations. The USMCA also furthers the capabilities of research companies that develop biologic medicines -- drugs derived from living organisms. These firms are set to receive ten years of "regulatory data protection" for their biologics. During that time, no rival firm can use the innovators' lab or clinical trial data to create a knockoff treatment. The ten-year standard represents a major improvement over Canada's and Mexico's previous standards. Canada used to grant just eight years of data protection. Mexico offered a maximum of five years of protection. The new, stronger standard will spur additional research in the biopharmaceutical industry, which directly employs more than 800,000 Americans and indirectly supports roughly 4 million other jobs. Big drug companies depend on thousands of small vendors for help in producing lifesaving treatments. Small entrepreneurial firms also dominate the biopharmaceutical industry. Among pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing firms, 57 percent have less than 20 workers, and 79 percent have less than 100 employees. This critical industry is about entrepreneurial businesses that innovate, compete with larger firms and bring life-saving drugs to the market. The USMCA would assist small firms in other ways, too. For instance, it establishes a committee to educate small and medium-sized businesses about ways to expand their exports and reach new markets. This ensures that America's businesses take advantage of every development opportunity in the new deal. The agreement further takes aim at costly e-commerce trade barriers. Currently, just one in four small businesses sells online -- partly because it's expensive to do so. But in this digital age, e-commerce is essential to business growth. The USMCA makes it easier to sell online by raising the minimum cost of shipments subject to taxes in Mexico and Canada. This allows companies to ship a greater number of e-commerce goods tax-free. The deal also prevents countries from imposing fees on goods and services traded digitally. The USMCA would greatly benefit American small businesses and encourage new business creation in America. Congress should waste no time in approving the deal.

#### Small businesses key to the economy

Decker et al 16

Ryan Decker, Economist for the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Adjunct Professor at the University of Maryland College Park, and previous economist at the Center for economic studies with the Census Bureau. PHD from the University of Maryland. John Haltiwanger, Department of Economics, University of Maryland and NBER, Ron Jarmin, U.S. Census Bureau, Javier Miranda, U.S. Census Bureau, 2/23/16 (“Where has all the skewness gone? The decline in high-growth (young) firms in the U.S.”, <http://econweb.umd.edu/~haltiwan/EER_DHJM.pdf>, Accessed 11/15/18)

There is now robust evidence, from multiple data sources using a variety of indicators, of a pervasive decline in U.S. business dynamism over the last several decades. We have added to the core facts about this decline by focusing on the changing patterns of skewness in the firm growth rate distribution. We find that prior to 2000 the decline in the dispersion of firm growth rates was accounted for by roughly equal declines in the 9050 and the 5010 differentials in firm growth rates. However, since 2000 the decline in dispersion has been driven primarily by a decline in the 9050 differential. The decline in the 9050 has been so substantial that skewness in the firm growth rate distribution has largely been eliminated, both within the major sectors of the economy and in the overall firm growth rate distribution.

Declining business dynamism can be the outcome of efficient responses to changing tastes and technology as has been occurring in the retail sector. However, the post-2000 decline in dynamism, driven largely by smaller contributions to job growth of young high-growth firms, may be more troubling. Evidence shows that high-growth young firms have disproportionately accounted for job creation and productivity growth. The pattern for the U.S. used to be that in any given year, most newly entered firms would fail while a few would grow very fast. These high-growth young firms yielded substantial skewness in the firm growth rate distribution. Now the U.S. has a much lower pace of startups, and those that do enter are less likely to be high-growth firms. Thus, startups and high-growth young firms contributed less to U.S. job creation in the post-2000 period than in prior periods. We do not yet fully understand the labor market implications of a reduced role of young firms in job creation, but the evidence highlights the importance of further research on the topic.

Aggregate productivity growth depends not only on innovations and technology investments within firms but also on the economy's ability to reallocate resources from businesses with lower productivity to businesses with higher productivity. Evidence suggests that young firms devote disproportionately more resources to innovation, so the high growth of young firms is particularly important for aggregate productivity growth (Acemoglu et al., 2013; Foster et al., 2001, 2006, 2008). If rapid firm-level growth reflects efficient movement of labor toward high-productivity producers, then reductions in the number and impact of such firms may be a cause for concern. While we have highlighted the year 2000 as a turning point for trend growth rates across several categories of firms, that year should not be interpreted as precise—nor should we necessarily expect the effect of changes in reallocative patterns on aggregate productivity to be instantaneous. Further research is necessary to determine whether the patterns we describe are related to Fernald's (2014) evidence of a trend break in US productivity growth around 2003.

While we have attempted to describe in detail several aspects of declining skewness in the U.S. using industry, size, and age comparisons, we have not identified the underlying causes of these trends. Theory suggests several possible candidates. In canonical models of firm dynamics, rapid growth of individual firms results from revelations about, or changing realizations of, firm-level productivity or demand conditions. Firms may sometimes operate below optimal scale as a result of credit constraints or imperfect information about their own quality, and high growth follows the loosening of these constraints as the firm size distribution evolves to better reflect the underlying firm productivity distribution. In other research, we empirically study the relationship between productivity and establishment growth in the high tech Manufacturing sector and find that recent changes in growth patterns reflect declining sensitivity of businesses to productivity shocks rather than declining productivity dispersion or persistence (Decker et al., 2016). Those findings point in the direction of increasing adjustment frictions or changes in market structure that somewhat insulate businesses from the competitive pressures that typically drive productivity responsiveness.25

Alternatively, changes in employment growth patterns could reflect an optimally changing role of the employment adjustment margin for firm growth. For example, it might be that, historically, young businesses with high draws of productivity and profitability rapidly added employees, while more recently innovative businesses grow by adding machines or expanding internationally. Alternatively, changing business models may imply that young, innovative businesses now increasingly find it profitable to be acquired by larger, mature businesses. If these changes in firm dynamics are at work, declining skewness may matter less for productivity growth but still be of critical importance for job growth.

Investigating these alternative hypotheses should have high priority. Historically, the U.S. has exhibited a high pace of entrepreneurship with a small share of fast growing young firms disproportionately accounting for job creation and productivity growth. The decline in startups and the accompanying decline in high growth young firms either suggests adverse consequences for U.S. economic growth or a change in the way that such growth will be achieved. Only through identifying the causes of the decline in entrepreneurship and high growth young firms will it be possible to understand the possible consequences.

### Impact I/L – Innovation – Manufacturing

#### Solves off-shoring

Kirbyien 2018

Jen Kirbyjen “USMCA, the new trade deal between the US, Canada, and Mexico, explained The three countries signed the deal at the G20 on Friday.” Nov 30, 2018 https://www.vox.com/2018/11/30/18119700/usmca-nafta-replacement-g20-trump

Labor provisions

The most striking difference about this new deal involves protections for workers in all three countries. The agreement calls for 40 to 45 percent of automobile components to be made by workers who earn at least $16 an hour by 2023. This provision specifically targets Mexico and is meant to bring wages there up to US and Canadian standards. That’s good for Mexican workers, but that’s not the only motivation behind it. The Trump administration hopes that if Mexico no longer pays its workers a lot less than the US and Canada do, companies will no longer have a reason to move their factories there (and out of the US), thus keeping manufacturing jobs in the US and Canada. In addition, Mexico has agreed to pass laws giving workers the right to real union representation, to extend labor protections to migrants workers (who are often from Central America), and to protect women from discrimination. And unlike NAFTA, the new deal allows each country to sanction the others for labor violations that impact trade. It’s a complex, multi-step process modeled after similar protections in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a multinational trade deal that Trump pulled the United States out of after taking office. These are much-needed reforms, and they address a lot of concerns that US labor unions have long had about NAFTA.

### Impact I/L Innovation k/t Leadership

#### Technological leadership is the foundation of US economic, hard and soft power and ensures global economic leadership

Heath and Thompson, 18 - Timothy R. Heath is a Senior Defense and International Analyst at the RAND Corporation, has over sixteen years of experience as a China analyst in the U.S. government; William R. Thompson is Distinguished Professor and the Donald A. Rogers Professor of Political Science (emeritus) at Indiana University, Bloomington (“Avoiding U.S.-China Competition Is Futile: Why the Best Option Is to Manage Strategic Rivalry”; Asia Policy, volume 13, number 2 (april 2018), 91–120; The National Bureau of Asian Research, <http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/ap13-2/AsiaPolicy13-2_Heath_Thompson_April2018.pdf>

The Importance of Technological Leadership

A half century of social science on precedents in which rising powers competed with system leaders underscores the importance of the quality of economic leadership—evaluated primarily in terms of dominance in technology and energy—over quantity of economic output or other variables.43 Why is technological predominance so important? The first, most fundamental reason is that long-term economic growth is predicated on generating radical new technologies (new products, methods of production, markets, trade routes, fuel sources, and commercial organizations à la Joseph Schumpeter’s intermittent bouts of creative destruction). Whichever economy masters these new technologies first profits most from its pioneering innovations. In due time, the world economy’s leading innovator is likely to extend its lead to commercial, financial, and military areas as well. Ultimately the leading economy can shape the global economy according to its own preferences and advantage. Second, mastering surges in new technologies thus means that the leading economy—i.e., the country with the most technologically innovative economy—maintains the most competitive and lucrative position in the global economy. But it also means that technological superiority is transferred between the military and civilian economies. Gains made in military technology can be transferred to the civilian economy, and gains made in the civilian economy can be transferred to military technology. Examples of the former may be seen in the transfer of radar technology from the military to the civilian sector, while an example of the latter can be seen in the way basic research at universities has traditionally fueled advances in weapons technologies. The country with the leading economy thus is well positioned to also field the most technologically advanced military. As a consequence, it is likely to develop a command of the global commons and, for a period of time, unrivaled global reach. Third, technological predominance generates huge economic gains because corporations in the leading economy are set up to dominate new markets in the new industries. The expansion of commercial activity abroad to exploit new markets means that technological leaders profit enormously from a functioning and stable world economy, and are thus well positioned to provide global military and political leadership. A vivid example of this may be seen in the expansion of U.S. multinational corporations in the twentieth century, which fueled the need for a large military force that could police trade routes and the global commons to keep the world economy operating as smoothly as possible. The global presence of U.S. companies and military forces provided a strong incentive for U.S. leaders to focus on solving global issues. It also encouraged countries around the world to look to the United States as a leader, since it alone had the resources and reach to address global problems. Finally, a fourth reason technological predominance matters is that it fuels the soft power that makes the leading economy attractive. People around the world tend to admire and emulate the wonders of new technology as manifested in a vibrant and sophisticated economy. The media reinforces the appeal of the leading economy by delivering messages about how citizens in that country employ new technologies to enhance their quality of life. The technological superiority of the leading economy also yields soft power because the country’s political and military advantages allow it to exercise influence at levels unattainable by other countries. Technological predominance cannot deliver legitimacy, however, and thus a country with attractive political and cultural values and ideals will be better positioned to maintain its influence than one that relies heavily on coercion, such as today’s authoritarian China. But the main point remains: technological predominance opens opportunities for a country to increase its soft power. The importance of technological leadership means that the popular focus on the quantity of China’s economic output as the key index of national power is in many ways insufficient. China, after all, had the world’s largest economy in the 1700s and 1800s, but its relatively low level of technology and energy consumption left it at the mercy of much smaller Western countries that possessed more dynamic economies, fossil fuel-driven energy, and powerful militaries. The United States, by contrast, built its post–World War II global primacy on the foundation of an impressive technological-energy prowess. The accelerated rate of technology transfer and energy consumption in the 21st century, however, has considerably weakened this lead.44 Asia, in particular, has made rapid gains that pose a challenge to U.S. technological leadership.45 For now, despite impressive economic and technological gains, China continues to lag behind the United States. Per capita GDP is regarded as an indicator of the level of technological achievement (albeit an imperfect one), and as of 2014 the United States’ per capita GDP was more than eight times that of China.46 But Chinese officials have made technological leadership a key policy priority and are investing enormous sums of time and money accordingly. The result is that analysts now debate whether China could at some point surpass the United States to become the world leader in technological innovation.47

### Impact – Extinction LL

#### Innovation solves a litany of existential risks

hÉigeartaigh 17 – Professor @ Cambridge, PhD in Genomics from Trinity College Dublin (Sean, “Technological Wild Cards: Existential Risk and a Changing Humanity”, <https://www.bbvaopenmind.com/en/articles/technological-wild-cards-existential-risk-and-a-changing-humanity/>, Accessed 3-7-2019)

Technological progress now offers us a vision of a remarkable future. The advances that have brought us onto an unsustainable pathway have also raised the quality of life dramatically for many, and have unlocked scientific directions that can lead us to a safer, cleaner, more sustainable world. With the right developments and applications of technology, in concert with advances in social, democratic, and distributional processes globally, progress can be made on all of the challenges discussed here. Advances in renewable energy and related technologies, and more efficient energy use—advances that are likely to be accelerated by progress in technologies such as artificial intelligence—can bring us to a point of zero-carbon emissions. New manufacturing capabilities provided by synthetic biology may provide cleaner ways of producing products and degrading waste. A greater scientific understanding of our natural world and the ecosystem services on which we rely will aid us in plotting a trajectory whereby critical environmental systems are maintained while allowing human flourishing. Even advances in education and women’s rights globally, which will play a role in achieving a stable global population, can be aided specifically by the information, coordination, and education tools that technology provides, and more generally by growing prosperity in the relevant parts of the world. There are catastrophic and existential risks that we will simply not be able to overcome without advances in science and technology. These include possible pandemic outbreaks, whether natural or engineered. The early identification of incoming asteroids, and approaches to shift their path, is a topic of active research at NASA and elsewhere. While currently there are no known techniques to prevent or mitigate a supervolcanic eruption, this may not be the case with the tools at our disposal a century from now. And in the longer run, a civilization that has spread permanently beyond the earth, enabled by advances in spaceflight, manufacturing, robotics, and terraforming, is one that is much more likely to endure. However, the breathtaking power of the tools we are developing is not to be taken lightly. We have been very lucky to muddle through the advent of nuclear weapons without a global catastrophe. And within this century, it is realistic to expect that we will be able to rewrite much of biology to our purposes, intervene deliberately and in a large-scale way in the workings of our global climate, and even develop agents with intelligence that is fundamentally alien to ours, and may vastly surpass our own in some or even most domains—a development that would have uniquely unpredictable consequences.

### Impact T/Warming

#### Innovation solves every internal link to environmental unsustainability

hÉigeartaigh 17 – Professor @ Cambridge, PhD in Genomics from Trinity College Dublin (Sean, “Technological Wild Cards: Existential Risk and a Changing Humanity”, <https://www.bbvaopenmind.com/en/articles/technological-wild-cards-existential-risk-and-a-changing-humanity/>, Accessed 3-7-2019)

Current advances in science and technology, while not sufficient in themselves, will play a key role in making a more resilient and sustainable future possible. Rapid progress is happening in carbon-zero energy sources such as solar photovoltaics and other renewables.15 Energy storage remains a problem, but progress is occurring on battery efficiency. Advances in irrigation techniques and desalination technologies may allow us to provide water to areas where this has not previously been possible, allowing both food production and other processes that depend on reliable access to clean water. Advances in materials technology will have wide-ranging benefits, from lighter, more energy-efficient vehicles, to more efficient buildings and energy grids, to more powerful scientific tools and novel technological innovations. Advances in our understanding of the genetics of plants are leading to crops with greater yields, greater resilience to temperature shifts, droughts and other extreme weather, and greater resistance to pests—resulting in a reduction of the need for polluting pesticides. We are likely to see many further innovations in food production; for example, exciting advances in lab-grown meat may result in the production of meat with a fraction of the environmental footprint of livestock farming.

Many of the processes that have resulted in our current unsustainable trajectories can be traced back to the Industrial Revolution, and our widespread adoption of fossil fuels. However, the Industrial Revolution and fossil fuels must also be recognized as having unlocked a level of prosperity, and a rate and scale of scientific and technological progress that would simply not have been possible without them. While a continued reliance on fossil fuels would be catastrophic for our environment, it is unclear whether many of the “clean technology” breakthroughs that will allow us to break our dependence on fossil fuels would have been possible without the scientific breakthroughs that were enabled directly, or indirectly, by this rich, abundant, and easily available fuel source. The goal is clear: having benefitted so tremendously from this “dirty” stage of technology, we now need to take advantage of the opportunity it gives us to move onto cleaner and more powerful next-generation energy and manufacturing technologies. The challenge will be to do so before thresholds of irreversible global consequence have been passed.

## Mexican Instability

### 1nc

#### Failure to pass the deal wrecks Mexican stability

Saunders 2017

Doug, is The Globe and Mail's international affairs columnist. He has been a writer with the Globe since 1995, and has extensive experience as a foreign correspondent, having run the Globe's foreign bureaus in Los Angeles and Londo, The Globe and Mail, “A NAFTA collapse could push Mexico over the edge” November 17, 2017 <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/a-nafta-collapse-could-push-mexico-over-the-edge/article37015503/>

As such, the current round of NAFTA negotiations going awry or Mr. Trump scuppering the heart of the agreement pose a far, far greater threat to Mexico than to Canada or the United States. It would be damaging, but not fatal, to the Canadian economy. For Mexico, it is an existential threat. "For Canada, NAFTA is all about trade and economic growth," said Agustin Barrios Gomez, a former social-democratic Mexican member of parliament who specializes in Mexico-U.S. relations. "For Mexico, NAFTA is a national-security agreement – it is an agreement that anchors an entire geostrategic situation in North America. It is infinitely more important. It establishes an entire direction for the country." Indeed, by signing NAFTA in 1994, Mexico transformed its entire economic system from one that was often state-owned and closed to the world into an export-oriented economy that has raised living standards and built a middle class. That transformation was painful and often ugly and is far from complete: The entire southern half of the country has missed most of the trade-driven growth, and while the very poor remain loyal to Mr. Pena Nieto's party, the darkening prospects for North American integration and a general disgust with the Trump atmosphere have led many to reject the status quo. "In Mexico, there's an element of betrayal that goes missing in a lot of these discussions of NAFTA," Mr. Barrios Gomez said. "Twenty-three years later, after we have gone through all the pain of adjustment, it turns out the Americans are going back on their word. It's not just a matter of political stability, it's a matter of being humiliated and betrayed by a neighbour." To make matters worse, Mr. Pena Nieto's party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party – which governed Mexico for seven decades as a centre-left de facto autocracy before a decade in opposition forced it to reform itself – has once again come to be seen as corrupt and self-serving and perhaps too beholden to Washington. The mainstream left-wing and centre-right opposition parties aren't well organized and appear too, well, mainstream. Politicians such as Mr. Barrios Gomez warn that Canada is in a precarious position: One wrong move – even one that sacrifices NAFTA to preserve Canadian interests – could provoke a shift to dangerous instability in our vulnerable partner nation. "It's not inconceivable that you could end up having a rogue nation right next door to the United States – and for no good reason."

#### Mexican instability results in international arms racing

Haddick 10 - Currently a Visiting Senior Fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, Columnist for Foreign Policy Magazine, Infantry Company Commander at the United States Marine Corps ( “This Week at War: If Mexico Is at War, Does America Have to Win It?,” *Foreign Policy*, http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/09/10/this-week-at-war-if-mexico-is-at-war-does-america-have-to-win-it/)

Most significantly, a strengthening Mexican insurgency would very likely affect America’s role in the rest of the world. An increasingly chaotic American side of the border, marked by bloody cartel wars, corrupted government and media, and a breakdown in security, would likely cause many in the United States to question the importance of military and foreign policy ventures elsewhere in the world. Should the southern border become a U.S. president’s primary national security concern, nervous allies and opportunistic adversaries elsewhere in the world would no doubt adjust to a distracted and inward-looking America, with potentially disruptive arms races the result. Secretary Clinton has looked south and now sees an insurgency. Let’s hope that the United States can apply what it has recently learned about insurgencies to stop this one from getting out of control.

#### Global arms racing causes nuclear conflict

Chertoff 14 – Former Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (Michael Chertoff, “The U.S. Must Stand Behind Its Security Obligations,” *Washington Post*, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-us-must-stand-behind-its-security-obligations/2014/04/16/111c379c-c4cd-11e3-bcec-b71ee10e9bc3\_story.html?utm\_term=.134c8f152bce)

Of course, diminished U.S. credibility is a result of more than administration policy. Some neo-isolationist Republican lawmakers and advocacy groups have repeatedly disparaged the value of standing with our allies or been dismissive of aggression on the other side of the globe. They have supported budget cuts that seriously diminish U.S. military capabilities and contradict our promises of support for allies. Make no mistake: A world that doubts whether the United States will stand with its allies is a much more dangerous world. If nations in the Middle East and Asia believe that we are irresolute in our security commitments, they will make their own arrangements. The risk of miscalculation leading to conflict will increase. Some nations will take the lesson that securing themselves requires obtaining nuclear capability. And when countries believe our red lines are revocable or mere bluffs, the danger that they will provoke a war increases, as did Saddam Hussein’s misreading of U.S. intentions in 1990, which led to the invasion of Kuwait.

### Impact I/L – Stability

#### USMCA key to stability

Packard 19 - trade policy counsel for the R Street Institute (Clark, “Two changes could pave the way for the USMCA trade agreement,” <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/two-changes-could-pave-the-way-for-the-usmca-trade-agreement>)

It has been a tumultuous time for North American commercial relations. For too long, President Trump has misled the public about the supposed failures of the North American Free Trade Agreement, sowing uncertainty and doubt about the future of the trading relationship. The next few months will be crucial to repair that damage. Two policy changes could help deliver much-needed certainty and grease the skids for NAFTA’s replacement, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement. First, the United States needs to lift the dubious “national security” tariffs it levied on Mexico and Canadian steel and aluminum imports. Doing so would be savvy politics and policy. Rep. Kevin Brady, R-Texas, the ranking member on the House Ways and Means Committee, which has jurisdiction over trade policy, recently said Congress will not pass the USMCA as long as the steel and aluminum tariffs on Mexican and Canadian imports remain in place. Echoing Brady, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa, suggested after meeting with the respective foreign ministers that neither Canada nor Mexico will move forward to ratify USMCA as long as the tariffs remain in place. The steel and aluminum tariffs have been misguided policy all along. The U.S. military’s steel and aluminum needs amount to only about 3 percent of domestic production. Not only does the Pentagon not rely on imported steel and aluminum, but Mexico and Canada are longstanding allies who pose no national security threat to the United States. Moreover, the tariffs have raised costs on consumers and failed to revive the steel and aluminum industries. As Benn Steil of the Council on Foreign Relations noted in a recent blog post, the steel industry has taken a nosedive over the past year since the tariffs were announced. The only winner here has been steel industry lobbyists. According to a recent Wall Street Journal story, steel lobbying expenditures topped $12 million in 2018, up considerably from the past two years. Meanwhile, north of the border, the Province of Alberta recently announced significant cuts to its crude oil production in order to combat the supposed scourge of low prices. The cuts coincided with Saudi Arabia’s production cuts at the end of 2018. Canada supplied about 40 percent of U.S. imported oil in 2017. This decision will put upward pressure on prices and further jeopardize North American commercial relations. There are already signs the plan is backfiring. The initial plan to cut production by 325,000 barrels a day beginning in January was meant to clear a glut of excess oil. Officials recently lowered the mandated reduction by 75,000 barrels a day, to 250,000, after complaints by Alberta oil producers. To date, inventories have fallen by about 5 million barrels. As oil prices have skyrocketed, oil shipments in Canada have precipitously declined in recent weeks. It is simply becoming too expensive to ship Alberta’s oil right now. Though the Alberta government’s decision to permit more production was a step in the right direction, more needs to be done. North American firms are dependent on stable and predictable supplies of oil. This issue could become a point of contention as policymakers across North America look to finalize the USMCA. Unnecessary commercial tensions will only stand in the way of progress. Despite being a target for misleading rhetoric and unnecessary threats from politicians, NAFTA has been a tremendous success. Since NAFTA’s inception, tariffs, and other barriers have fallen across North America and trade volumes have increased. The pact has integrated the economies and served as a bulwark for stability. Mexico and Canada are important allies and our commercial relationships are an integral part of that alliance. We can provide additional certainty to this relationship, but policymakers in the U.S. and Canada need to address some outstanding issues before the USMCA will become reality.

#### USMCA and updated NAFTA key to Mexican FDI and internal political stability

Luis **Rubio, 4-15**-2019, "Why NAFTA Is Critical for Mexico," Americas Quarterly, <https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/why-nafta-critical-mexico> //RS

For Mexico, the North American Free Trade Agreement as originally designed was much more about politics than trade. The George Bush administration that negotiated the agreement understood that and, in fact, saw NAFTA in geopolitical, rather than economic terms. A senior adviser to the White House at that time once told me that it was “a no-brainer: a prosperous Mexico is in the best interest of the United States.” How times change. The importance of NAFTA cannot be overstated, which is why uncertainty over its replacement, provoked first by Donald Trump as a candidate for the presidency and now by the Democrat-held Congress, is so dangerous. NAFTA was conceived as a mechanism through which the Mexican government obtained a kind of certificate from the U.S. government as a guarantor that the rules of the game would be preserved, that an open trading regime would be maintained and that the commitments made in the agreement would be strictly adhered to. In this sense, NAFTA constitutes an anchor of stability, a source of certainty that enjoys international support and recognition. This certainty is key both for internal confidence and for attracting foreign investment. Mexico proposed the trade and investment agreement in 1990 after having gone through a series of economic reforms that streamlined the federal government’s finances, liberalized the economy and modernized its regulatory framework. The objective was to attract investment in order to foster fast economic growth. However, potential investors, both domestic and foreign, worried about the country’s propensity for changing the rules, carrying out unlawful expropriations and making capricious decisions without notice. Through NAFTA, Mexico’s government committed to preserving the rule of law implicit in the agreement and submitted itself to the procedures established by Chapter 11 on dispute resolution. The result was an extraordinary source of certainty for investors, which led to the establishment of new ventures, plants and operations in the country. Mexico’s expectations for attracting investment were far superior to what actually materialized, not because of NAFTA, but because of a new player in the field to which neither the Americans nor the Mexicans had given even the slightest thought: China. But over the past quarter century, NAFTA fulfilled its political role beyond expectations. Mexico accepted dramatically limiting the latitude of future governments for making changes to the basic framework of economic policy (the open trading regime) in the event that a president with a different economic philosophy came to government. In this regard, NAFTA was fundamentally a political act, a proxy for a lack of checks and balances that are present in the United States. It is thanks to NAFTA that Mexican economic policy was not altered in the midst of the massive crisis of 1995. In contrast with the geopolitical clarity that motivated the first Bush administration, Trump's rhetoric and actions altered Mexico’s politics in a dramatic way. First, by putting the existing NAFTA in doubt in 2016, it created a political vacuum that was filled by the winner of Mexico's presidential contest in 2018, Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Second, and most importantly, it opened the way for a series of decisions that slowly but surely will eliminate or neutralize autonomous regulatory agencies that were created over the past two decades in energy, competition, telecoms and, now, the Supreme Court. Put simply, NAFTA’s erosion has had an immense impact on Mexico. Despite the rhetoric, NAFTA has fulfilled its core objective of supporting Mexico’s political stability through the creation of a framework that made it possible to attract investment and for about half the country to grow above 6% and, in some states, such as Aguascalientes and Queretaro, at Asian rates. Surely, NAFTA did not transform all of Mexico, for that would have required much deeper reforms for which the Mexican establishment was not ready. In fact, NAFTA (and migration to the U.S.) helped preserve the status quo, an unintended consequence of a trade and investment agreement that nonetheless served its core purpose. One could speculate what might have happened had China not become such a powerful force in the world trade arena, but the one certainty is that Mexico lost significant opportunities as a result. The USMCA, which resulted from last year’s renegotiation of NAFTA, updates some key components.

### Impact – Global War

#### Neighboring instability causes great powers to intervene

Ellis 16 – Dr. R. Evan Ellis 16. Research professor of Latin American Studies at the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), with a focus on the region’s relationships with China and other non-Western Hemisphere actors, as well as transnational organized crime and populism in the region, Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics. 12-09-16. "Strategic Insights: Thinking Strategically About Latin America and the Caribbean", Strategic Studies Institute, <http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/index.cfm/articles/Thinking-Strategically-About-Latin-America-Caribbean/2016/12/09>

As noted previously, there is arguably no region (including Asia) upon which the United States is more dependent for its prosperity and security, and with which it is more closely tied through bonds of family, than Latin America and the Caribbean. In terms of trade and investment, from manufacturers to the food Americans put on the table, there is no region for which disruption of commerce with the United States could do more damage to our economy and the everyday lives of Americans. Reciprocally, the region’s proximity to the United States makes it a logical and attractive business partner; there is not another region of the world for which prosperity, healthy infrastructure, and institutions could contribute more to a win-win commercial relationship with the United States. With respect to security, the United States is blessed by the absence of neighbors that pose a direct military threat to the nation, are experiencing conditions of chaos, or permit U.S. adversaries to operate from their territory. Yet, if these fortunate conditions were to change, the resulting threat to U.S. national security could force a significant reorientation of U.S. security initiatives away from its foreign engagements to address the emergent threat closer to home. To use a military analogy, Latin America and the Caribbean is, for the United States, an “unoccupied high ground.” The fact that the United States does not fully leverage the opportunities offered by Latin America, nor suffers a significant immediate security threat from the region, does not make it any less strategic. The Challenge of Transnational Organized Crime in the Region. The activities of transnational organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean, often characterized as the principle security issue in the region, is more of a strategic challenge to the United States than is commonly understood. On the one hand, the activities of groups such as the Maras in the Northern Triangle and warring cartels in Mexico generate violence and destroy economic opportunity in ways that generate refugee flows toward the United States. Indeed, the 2014 crisis of child migrants from Central America obliged the Obama administration to request an additional $3.7 billion to respond to the situation, eclipsing the $979 million previously spent on the region under the Central America Regional Security Initiative since 2008.2 In addition, the money used to enable transnational criminal activities corrupts institutions, undermining governance, and expanding criminal networks that can be used by terrorist organizations to raise and launder money, smuggle persons and materiel through the region, as well as creating spaces in which they can hide, train, plan operations, and recruit fighters for their global activities. Such threats are magnified further where anti-U.S. governments, such as the “Bolivarian Socialist” government of Venezuela, tolerate and possibly even facilitate the activities of such groups, permitting, for example, the entry of Iranian paramilitary Qods forces into the region through the country.3 The Need for U.S. Scenario Planning to Include the Potential Use of the Region by U.S. Adversaries to Conduct Actions Against the United States. Military professionals in the United States have the responsibility for planning how to fight the nation’s wars if called upon to do so by their elected leaders. In today’s globally interconnected world, it is highly unlikely that a U.S. “near-peer competitor,” such as China or Russia, would allow the United States to engage with them in such a conflict (however undesirable) entirely as an “away game.” U.S. defense planners must expect that in such a conflict, the adversary would employ its full global range of assets, capabilities, and options, including: relationships and access agreements with foreign militaries (however benign) in all parts of the world, knowledge of, and the potential for, staging activities leveraging their commercial operations near the United States, as well as information technology infrastructure built by the adversary’s companies there. Potential U.S. adversaries such as Russia and China may be expected to leverage such assets and relationships in Latin America and the Caribbean, in addition to other regions, in order to undermine U.S. coalition formation in the run-up to a conflict, to conduct operations in the region during the conflict to disrupt the U.S. economy and financial system, and potentially to conduct military operations from Latin America and the Caribbean to attack U.S. deployment and sustainment flows, and to put the U.S. homeland at risk, thus forcing the diversion of U.S. forces from other theaters. While Russia and China have not currently established formal military bases in the region that could be used against the United States, their familiarity with Latin American armed forces through regular military-to-military engagement, their knowledge of regional infrastructure such as ports, airports, and commercial logistics systems, means that they could achieve a functional military capability in the region rapidly in the months leading up to the conflict, if U.S. adversaries in Latin America permitted them to do so.

#### That leads to nuclear war

Krepinevich et al. 13 — Andrew F. Krepinevich, President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, M.P.A. and a Ph.D. from Harvard University, Eric Lindsey, Analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, M.A. in Strategic Studies and International Economics from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, “Hemispheric Defense In The 21st Century” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment , <https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Hemispheric-Defense-in-the-21st-Century.pdf>

As the previous chapter demonstrates, for the past two hundred years the principal cause of concern for U.S. defense policymakers and planners thinking about Latin America has been the prospect that great powers outside the Western Hemisphere could exploit the military weakness and internal security challenges of the states within it to threaten U.S. security. While there is reason for optimism about the future of Latin America,58 there is also cause for concern. The region faces enduring obstacles to economic59 and political development60 as well as significant internal security challenges. As General John Kelly, the commander of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)61 noted in his March 2013 posture statement before Congress, Latin America: >I@s a region of enormous promise and exciting opportunities, but it is also one of persistent challenges and complex threats. It is a region of relative peace, low likelihood of interstate conflicts, and overall economic growth, yet is also home to corrosive criminal violence, permissive environments for illicit activities, and episodic political and social protests.62 The instability and non-traditional security challenges that General Kelly cites provide potential opportunities for the United States’ major rivals to (borrowing a term from Monroe’s declaration) “interpose” themselves into the region and, by so doing, threaten regional stability and U.S. security. Two discernible trends suggest that current and prospective Eurasian rivals could seek to exploit regional conditions and dynamics in ways that could impose immense costs on the United States and divert its attention from more distant theaters overseas. The first trend is a return to a heightened level of competition among the “great powers” following two decades of U.S. dominance. The second trend concerns the growing cost of projecting power by traditional military means due to the proliferation of “anti-access/area-denial” (A2/AD) capabilities in general, and precision-guided munitions (PGMs) in particular. These trends suggest that, despite a possible decline in relative U.S. power, external forces will continue to find it beyond their means to threaten the hemisphere through traditional forms of power projection. Far more likely is a return of a competition similar to that which the United States engaged in with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. During that period both powers sought to avoid direct conflict with the other, given the risks of escalation to nuclear conflict. Instead each focused primarily on gaining an advantage over the other through the employment of client states and non-state groups as proxies. Proxies were employed for reasons other than avoiding a direct clash, such as gaining positional advantage (e.g., enabling the sponsor to establish bases in its country, as the Soviets did in Cuba). Proxies were also employed as a means of diverting a rival’s attention from what was considered the key region of the competition and to impose disproportionate costs on a rival (e.g., Moscow’s support of 1orth Vietnam as a means of drawing ŏ U.S. resources from Europe). This chapter outlines trends in the Western Hemisphere security environment that outside powers may seek to exploit to advance their objectives in ways that threaten regional stability and U.S. security. This is followed by a discussion of how these external powers might proceed to do so. Seeds of Instability Crime, Illicit Networks, and Under-Governed Areas Latin America has a long history of banditry, smuggling, and organized crime. As in the case of Pancho Villa and the 1916-1917 Punitive Expedition, these activities have occasionally risen to a level at which they inÀuence U.S. national security calculations. Rarely, however, have these activities been as pervasive and destabilizing as they are today. Although a wide variety of illicit activity occurs in Latin America, criminal organizations conducting drug trȧcking are the dominant forces in the Latin American underworld today, accounting for roughly 0 billion per year63 of an estimated 100 billion in annual illicit trade.6Since the Colombian cartels were dismantled in the 1990s, this lucrative trade has been dominated by powerful Mexican cartels whose operations extend across the length and breadth of Mexico, as well as up the supply chain into the cocaine-producing regions of the Andean Ridge and through their wholesale and retail drug distribution networks across the United States.65 The cartels, along with countless smaller criminal organizations, comprise what the head of SOUTHCOM has described as, >a@n interconnected system of arteries that traverse the entire Western Hemisphere, stretching across the Atlantic and Paci¿c, through the Caribbean, and up and down 1orth, South, and Central America . . . >a@ vast system of illicit pathways >that is used@ to move tons of drugs, thousands of people, and countless weapons into and out of the United States, Europe, and Africa with an ėciency, payload, and gross pro¿t any global transportation company would envy.66 That being said, the drug trȧcking underworld is by no means a monolithic entity or cooperative alliance. Rather, it is a fractious and brutally competitive business in which rival entities are constantly and literally ¿ghting to maximize their share of the drug trade and for control of the critical transshipment points, or plazas, through which it Àows. To attack their competitor’s operations and protect their own operations from rivals and the Mexican government’s crackdown that began in 2006, the cartels have built up larger, better armed, and more ruthless forces of hired gunmen known as sicarios. Using the billions of dollars generated by their illicit activities, they have acquired weapons and equipment formerly reserved for state armies or state-sponsored insurgent groups, including body armor, assault riÀes, machine guns, grenades, landmines, anti-tank rockets, mortars, car bombs, armored vehicles, helicopters, transport planes, and—perhaps most remarkably—long-range submersibles.67 The cartels’ pro¿ts have also enabled them to hire former police and military personnel, including members of several countries’ elite special operations units68 and, in several cases, active and former members of the U.S. military.69 These personnel bring with them—and can provide to the cartels—a level of training and tactical pro¿ciency that can be equal or superior to those of the government forces they face. As a result of this pro¿ciency and the military-grade weapons possessed by the cartels, more than 2,500 Mexican police ȯcers and 200 military personnel were killed in confrontations with organized crime forces between 2008 and 2012 along with tens of thousands of civilians.70 In the poorer states of Central America, state security forces operate at an even greater disadvantage.71 While their paramilitary forces enable the cartels to dominate entire cities and large remote areas through force and intimidation, they are not the only tool available. The cartels also leverage their immense wealth to buy the silence or support of police and government ȯcials who are often presented with a choice between plata o plomo—“silver or lead.” According to the head of the Mexican Federal Police, around 2010 the cartels were spending an estimated 100 million each month on bribes to police.72 By buying ŏ ȯcials—and torturing or killing those who cannot be corrupted—the cartels have greatly undermined the ĕectiveness of national government forces in general and local police in particular. This, in turn, has undermined the con¿dence of the population in their government’s willingness and ability to protect them. Through these means and methods the cartels have gained a substantial degree of de facto control over many urban and rural areas across Mexico, including major cities and large swathes of territory along the U.S.-Mexico border. In many of these crime-ridden areas the loss of con¿dence in the government and police has prompted the formation of vigilante militias, presenting an additional challenge to government control.73 Meanwhile, in the “northern triangle” of Central America (the area comprising Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador through which the cartels transship almost all cocaine bound for Mexico and the United States) the situation is even more dire. Approximately 90 percent of crimes in this area go unpunished, while in Guatemala roughly half the country’s territory is ĕectively under drug trȧckers’ control.7Further south, similar pockets of lawlessness exist in coca-growing areas in Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. In Colombia and along its borders with Venezuela, Ecuador, and Peru, much of the coca-growing territory remains under the control of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC. A guerrilla organization founded in the 1960s as a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement dedicated to the overthrow of the Colombian government, the FARC embraced coca growing in the 1990s as a means of funding its operations and has subsequently evolved into a hybrid mix of left-wing insurgent group and pro¿t-driven cartel.76 This hybrid nature has facilitated cooperation between the FARC and ideological sympathizers like the Bolivarian Alliance, Hezbollah, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and other extremist groups77 as well as with purely criminal organizations like the Mexican cartels. Although the FARC has been greatly weakened over the past decade and no longer poses the existential threat to the Colombian government that it once did, it remains ¿rmly in control of large tracts of coca-producing jungle, mostly straddling the borders between Colombia and FARC supporters Venezuela and Ecuador. In summary, organized crime elements have exploited under-governed areas to establish zones under their de facto control. In so doing they pose a signi¿cant and growing threat to regional security in general and U.S. interests in particular. As SOUTHCOM commander General Kelly recently observed: >T@he proximity of the U.S. homeland to criminally governed spaces is a vulnerability with direct implications for U.S. national security. I am also troubled by the signi¿cant criminal capabilities that are available >within them@ to anyone—for a price. Transnational criminal organizations have access to key facilitators who specialize in document forgery, trade-based money laundering, weapons procurement, and human smuggling, including the smuggling of special interest aliens. This criminal expertise and the ability to move people, products, and funds are skills that can be exploited by a variety of malign actors, including terrorists.78 Hezbollah and the Bolivarian Alliance Hezbollah in Latin America 1on-state entities recognized by the U.S. as terrorist organizations also operate in the region, most notably Lebanon-based Hezbollah, an Iranian client group. Hezbollah maintains an active presence in the tri-border area (TBA) of South America—the nexus of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay—stretching back to the 1980s. The TBA has traditionally been under-governed and is known by some as “the United 1ations of crime.”79 Eight syndicate groups facilitate this activity in South America’s so-called “Southern Cone,” overseeing legitimate businesses along with a wide range of illegal activities to include money laundering, drug and arms traf- ¿cking, identity theft and false identi¿cation documents, counterfeiting currency and intellectual property, and smuggling. 1ot surprisingly they are linked to organized crime and to non-state insurgent and terrorist groups, such as the FARC.80 Estimates are that over 12 billion in illicit transactions are conducted per year, a sum exceeding Paraguay’s entire GDP by a substantial amount.81 Hezbollah achieved notoriety in the region in 1992 when it bombed the Israeli embassy in Argentina. This was followed with the bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires two years later. Like many other terrorist organizations, as Hezbollah expanded it established relationships with drug cartels82 that it supports in a variety of ways. For example, the cartels have enlisted Hezbollah, known for its tunnel construction along the Israeli border, for help in improving their tunnels along the U.S.-Mexican border. In 2008, Hezbollah helped broker a deal in which one of Mexico’s major drug cartels, Sinaloa, sent members to Iran for weapons and explosives training via Venezuela using Venezuelan travel documents. 83 As the locus of the drug trade and other illegal cartel activities moved north into Central America and Mexico, Hezbollah has sought to move with it with mixed success. In October 2011, Hezbollah was linked to the ĕorts of an Iranian-American to conspire with Iranian agents to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States. The plot involved members of the Los Zetas Mexican drug cartel.8The would-be assassin, Mansour Arbabsiar, had established contact with his cousin, a Quds Force85 handler, Gen. Gholam Shakuri. The plot is believed by some to be part of a wider campaign by the Quds Force and Hezbollah to embark on a campaign of violence extending beyond the Middle East to other Western targets, including those in the United States.86 In early September 2012, Mexican authorities arrested three men suspected of operating a Hezbollah cell in the Yucatan area and Central America, including a dual U.S.-Lebanese citizen linked to a U.S.-based Hezbollah money laundering operation.87A few months later, in December 2012, Wassim el Abd Fadel, a suspected Hezbollah member with Paraguayan citizenship, was arrested in Paraguay. Fadel was charged with human and drug trȧcking and money laundering. Fadel reportedly deposited the proceeds of his criminal activities—ranging from 50-200,000 per transaction—into Turkish and Syrian bank accounts linked to Hezbollah.88 In summary, Hezbollah has become a ¿xture in Central and Latin America, expanding both its activities and inÀuence over time. It has developed links with the increasingly powerful organized crime groups in the region, particularly the narco cartels, along with radical insurgent groups such as the FARC and states like Venezuela who are hostile to the United States and its regional partners. Hezbollah’s principal objectives appear to be undermining U.S. inÀuence in the region, imposing costs on the United States, and generating revenue to sustain its operations in Latin America and elsewhere in the world. These objectives are shared by Iran, Hezbollah’s main state sponsor. The Bolivarian Alliance As noted above, geographic, economic, and cultural factors have traditionally helped to prevent the emergence in Latin America of any real military rival to the United States. Although there are no traditional military threats in the region, there are indigenous states whose actions, policies, and rhetoric challenge regional stability and U.S. security. Over the past decade, several states have come together to form the Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas (ALBA), an organization of left-leaning Latin American regimes whose overarching purpose is to promote radical populism and socialism, foster regional integration, and reduce what they perceive as Washington’s “imperialist” influence in the region.89 Since its founding by Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and Fidel Castro of Cuba in December 200, the Bolivarian Alliance has expanded to include Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Dominica, Ecuador, 1icaragua, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Although the members of the Bolivarian Alliance are militarily weak and pose almost no traditional military threat to the United States or its allies in the region,90 they challenge American interests in the region in other ways. First, they espouse an anti-American narrative that finds substantial support in the region and consistently oppose U.S. efforts to foster cooperation and regional economic integration.91 Second, in their efforts to undermine the government of Colombia, which they consider to be a U.S. puppet, ALBA states provide support and sanctuaries within their borders to coca growers, drug traffickers, other criminal organizations, and the FARC.92 Links to Hezbollah have also been detected.93 Perhaps of greatest concern, they have aligned themselves closely with Iran, inviting it and Syria to participate as “observer states” in the alliance. Other worrisome ALBA activities involve lifting visa requirements for Iranian citizens and hosting large numbers of Iranian diplomats and commercial exchange members that some observers believe to be Iranian intelligence and paramilitary Quds Force operatives.9By hosting and cooperating with both foreign agents and violent non-state actors, the ALBA states have come to function as critical nodes in a network of groups hostile to the United States. A Coming Era of Proxy Wars in the Western Hemisphere? History shows that Washington has often emphasized an indirect approach to meeting challenges to its security in Latin America. Yet the United States has not shied away from more direct, traditional uses of force when interests and circumstances dictated, as demonstrated over the past half century by U.S. invasions of the Dominican Republic (1965), Grenada (1983), and Panama (1989) and the occupation of Haiti (199).Yet several trends seem likely to raise the cost of such operations, perhaps to prohibitive levels. Foremost among these trends is the diffusion of precision-guided weaponry to state and non-state entities. The Second Lebanon War as “Precursor” War A precursor of this trend can be seen in the Second Lebanon War between Israel and Hezbollah.95 During the conÀict, which lasted less than ¿ve weeks, irregular Hezbollah forces held their own against the highly regarded Israeli Defense Force (IDF), demonstrating what is now possible for non-state entities to accomplish given the proliferation of militarily-relevant advanced technologies. Hezbollah’s militia engaged IDF armor columns with salvos of advanced, man-portable, antitank guided missiles and other ĕective anti-armor weapons (e.g. rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) with anti-armor warheads) in great numbers. When the IDF employed its ground forces in southern Lebanon, its armored forces sŭered severe losses; out of the four hundred tanks involved in the ¿ghting in southern Lebanon, forty-eight were hit and forty damaged.96 Hezbollah’s defensive line was also well equipped with latest-generation thermal and low-/ no-light enhanced illumination imaging systems, while frontline units were connected to each other and higher command elements via a proprietary, ¿ber-optic based communications network, making collection of communications trȧc by Israeli intelligence extremely di̇cult. Perhaps most important, Hezbollah possessed thousands of short- and medium-range rockets, often skillfully hidden below ground or in bunkers that made detection from overhead surveillance platforms nearly impossible. During the brief conÀict Hezbollah’s forces ¿red some four thousand unguided rockets of various types that hit Israel. Hezbollah’s rocket inventory enabled its forces to attack targets throughout the northern half of Israel. Over nine hundred rockets hit near or on buildings, civilian infrastructure, and industrial plants. Some two thousand homes were destroyed, and over ¿fty Israelis died with several thousand more injured. The casualties would undoubtedly been greater if between 100,000 and 250,000 Israeli civilians had not Àed their homes. Haifa, Israel’s major seaport had to be shut down, as did its oil re¿nery.97 Hezbollah also employed several unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance of Israel, as well as C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles used to attack and damage an Israeli corvette. 98 The G-RAMM Battlefield The brief war between Israel and Hezbollah suggests that future irregular forces may be well-equipped with enhanced communications, extended-range surveillance capabilities, and precision-guided rockets, artillery, mortars and missiles (G-RAMM) 99 able to hit targets with high accuracy at ranges measured from the tens of kilometers perhaps up to a hundred kilometers or more. In projecting power against enemies equipped in this manner and employing these kinds of tactics U.S. forces—as well as other conventional forces—will find themselves operating in a far more lethal battlefield than those in either of the Gulf wars or in stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, currently constituted conventional forces typically depend on large fixed infrastructure (e.g., military bases, logistics depots, ports, airfields, railheads, bridges) to deploy themselves and sustain combat operations. These transportation and support hubs also serve as the nodes through which internal commerce and foreign trade moves within a country. This key, fixed infrastructure will almost certainly prove far more difficult to defend against irregular forces armed with G-RAMM weaponry. Indeed, had Hezbollah’s “RAMM” inventory had only a small fraction of G-RAMM munitions, say 10-20 percent, it would have been able to inÀict far greater damage than it did historically to Israeli population centers, key government facilities, military installations, and essential commercial assets such as ports, air¿elds, and industrial complexes. An irregular enemy force armed with G-RAMM capabilities in substantial numbers could seriously threaten Latin American governments as well as any U.S. (or external great power) forces and support elements attempting a traditional intervention operation. Implications for the U.S. and Other Major Powers The preceding narrative suggests that the combat potential of irregular forces is likely to increase dramatically in the coming years. As this occurs, the cost of operating conventional forces—especially ground forces—and defending key military support infrastructure is likely to rise substantially. Given these considerations the United States and other major powers external to the Western Hemisphere will have strong incentives to avoid the use of conventional forms of military power, particularly large ground forces, in favor of employing irregular proxy forces to advance their interests. Moreover, the high cost and questionable bene¿t of the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq are likely to create strong domestic opposition in the United States to such operations for some time to come. This must be added to the United States’ greatly diminished ¿scal standing that has led to large cuts in planned investments in defense. These factors suggest that Washington will be much less likely to engage in direct military action in Latin America in the coming years than historically has been the case. At the same time, rivals of the United States like China and Russia may be incentivized by these trends, as well as the United States’ overwhelming military dominance in the Western Hemisphere, to avoid the direct use of force to expand their inÀuence in Latin America. Instead, like some of the Bolivarian Alliance members, they appear likely to follow the path taken by the Soviet Union during the Cold War and Iran today: supporting non-state proxies to impose disproportionate costs on the United States and to distract Washington’s resources and attention from other parts of the world. This is not to say that Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran would eschew future opportunities to establish bases in Latin America. As in the past, such bases can support ĕorts to accomplish several important objectives. They can, for example, further insulate a Latin American regime from the threat of direct U.S. military intervention, since Washington would have to account for the possibility that the conflict would lead to a direct confrontation with a more capable and potentially nuclear-armed power.100 Bases in the hemisphere can also enable external powers to conduct military assistance activities, such as training, more easily. Electronic surveillance of the United States and Latin American states could be accomplished more cheaply and ĕectively from forward positions. Finally, certain kinds of military capabilities, such as long-range ballistic missiles and attack submarines, could be pro¿tably stationed in Latin America by powers external to that region, particularly if they intended to create the option of initiating conÀict at some future date. These reasons, among others, have made preventing an extra-hemispheric power from establishing bases in Latin America an enduring U.S. priority. Players in a Latin American Great Game Given current trends, several powers external to the region may, either now or over the coming decade, have both the motive and the means to employ both state and non-state proxies in Latin American to achieve their interests. Principal among them is Iran, which is already engaged in supporting proxies against the United States and its partners in the Middle East and has long been developing proxies in Latin America. Additionally, there are reasons to think that China and Russia may be interested in cultivating and supporting Latin American proxies as well.

### Impact T/Economy

#### Mexican recession turns the United States---Exports, Supply Chains, Interdependence

Stephanie Buck 12, Program Assistant in Latin America and the Caribbean @ Center for International Private Enterprise, “Why You Should Care About Mexico,” 6/20/12, <http://www.cipe.org/blog/2012/06/20/why-you-should-care-about-mexico/#.VAoF2vldWSo>

Mexico today is one of the world’s most open economies, the thirteenth largest by GDP, and the United States’ third largest trading partner. While many Americans associate Mexico with words like “drugs,” “violence,” “immigrants,” or maybe “Cancun,” the truth is that the US economy is inextricably linked to Mexico’s, and vice versa: economic, civil, social, or political unrest on one country greatly affects the other, both directly and indirectly. The aim of this three-part blog series is to look at the bigger picture: Mexico is far more important to the US, and the US to Mexico, than conventional wisdom suggests — and in many more ways. A recent New York Times article discusses the importance of Mexico’s rapidly approaching presidential elections to the state of Texas. However, these elections will affect more than just the border states. The economies of more than a dozen other states, including Nebraska, Iowa, and Michigan depend heavily on exports to Mexico. Mexican companies are now the largest suppliers of cement, baked goods, and dairy products to the US market. Mexico is also the second largest supplier of oil to the US, after Canada. In addition to providing each other with important export markets, the Mexican and US economies are becoming increasingly integrated in ways that blur traditional understandings of trade. The regional supply chains of US companies criss-cross the US-Mexico border, meaning that Mexico and the US work together to manufacture goods that are eventually sold on the global market. For example, cars built in North America may cross the border as many as eight times as they are being produced. In other words, the US and Mexico are more than just neighbors. Economic interdependence, shared cultural heritage, and grim security issues that both countries must face together mean that what happens in Mexico affects the US in more ways than just immigration and drug trafficking. Mexico’s economic, political, institutional, social, and security challenges are all interconnected: whoever wins the Mexican presidential elections on July 1 will have to face a myriad of complex problems. He or she will help set policies that will both directly and indirectly affect everyone from US business leaders to migrant workers to white suburban teenagers. A Mexico that is fully equipped with leaders who can help navigate the process to the reforms the country needs is an even more important economic and political ally that can help increase prosperity throughout the region. This is not a zero-sum game. If Mexico flourishes, the US will also flourish.

#### Collapse of Mexican advanced manufacturing and energy industries disrupts American imports and economic growth

Parilla 17 – Joseph Parilla is a fellow at the Brookings Institution's Metropolitan Policy Program where he conducts research on the trends and policies that shape economic performance in cities and regions in the United States and across the world. “How US states rely on the NAFTA supply chain,” March 30, 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2017/03/30/how-u-s-states-rely-on-the-nafta-supply-chain//jtsang

Earlier this week, the U.S. Trade Representative’s office sent a draft letter to Congressional leaders outlining the Trump administration’s objectives for a renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

For companies, cities, and states reliant on North American trade, the stakes of a NAFTA renegotiation are potentially high. In January, my colleague Mark Muro and I explored how changing trade policy may influence U.S. metropolitan economies. Because Canada and Mexico are the nation’s two largest export markets, changes to NAFTA could matter greatly to these metros. In fact, the United States trades as much with Canada and Mexico as it does with Japan, Korea, and the BRICS—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—combined. Millions of jobs in U.S. states depend on exports to Canada and Mexico. A recent analysis in The Economist finds that introducing higher tariffs or new border taxes for Mexican trade as part of a NAFTA renegotiation would particularly impact states like Texas and Michigan, where exports south of the border account for a large share of the economy.

Simply looking at how changes to NAFTA would affect state-level exports to Canada and Mexico misses the complexity and distinctiveness of North American trade. Beyond just using Canada and Mexico as export markets for final goods, many U.S. firms (and by extension, the states in which they operate) depend on supply chains that link their U.S.-based operations with suppliers in Canada and Mexico. As a result, much North American trade occurs in “intermediate goods”—materials or components that companies import and integrate into the production of a final good.

Why intermediate goods imports matter

Intermediate imports matter. At first glance, the benefits of imports to a state may seem counterintuitive. Sourcing imports internationally can result in higher transportation costs for firms, increase the risk of supply-chain disruptions, and displace domestic production and jobs. As we have argued, the country undoubtedly needs a more comprehensive suite of policies that help workers and communities adjust to rising import competition. Yet, evidence suggests that sourcing intermediate goods internationally also improves product quality and lowers product cost, making a firm’s products more competitive in the global marketplace and ultimately supporting jobs and wages at home.

Companies, cities, and states must import to compete in today’s integrated economy. The United States depends on intermediate goods imports from its North American neighbors more than from other parts of the world. In 2015, intermediate goods imports accounted for 43 percent of total U.S. goods imports. From Canada and Mexico, the share was 50 percent, much higher than the European Union (37 percent) or China (28 percent).

State dependence on NAFTA intermediate imports varies

Every state imports intermediate goods from Canada and Mexico, but the volume of those imports varies depending on industry makeup and geographic location. Data from the U.S. Census Bureau on state-level imports, classified by the United Nations’ definition of intermediate goods, provides a unique look at which state economies rely most on intermediate imports from Canada and Mexico, and are therefore most exposed to changes in NAFTA.

When measured by total volume, the nation’s largest states dominate intermediate goods imports from North America. Texas, Illinois, Michigan, New York, Ohio, and Washington all import more than $15 billion in intermediate goods, together accounting for over half of the nation’s total. Given the large size of their economies, disruptions to trade in these states have significant potential to influence national economic growth.

However, some states’ production relies more on NAFTA imports, measured by the share of total intermediate goods imports that come from Canada and Mexico. Table 1 ranks states based on this metric.

The states that rely most on NAFTA intermediate imports as a share of their total import base tend to be involved in one of two broad sectors: advanced manufacturing and energy.

Advanced manufacturing

Advanced manufacturing in many states greatly depends on intermediate imports from Canada and Mexico. Michigan’s automotive industry has long relied on suppliers in Canada and Mexico who provide 61 percent of Michigan’s total intermediate imports. Tens of billions of dollars’ worth of motor vehicle seats, ignitions, wires, and other parts flow into southeast Michigan to support local production. Beyond Michigan, North American supply chain relationships extend to the remainder of the industrial Midwest. Canada and Mexico supply Ohio with nearly $3 billion worth of automotive parts and Indiana with over $2 billion. As the auto belt has shifted south, so too has the North American supply chain. Texas imports nearly $6 billion in auto parts from Mexico alone. Tennessee imports over $2 billion in motor vehicle parts from North America while Kentucky imports nearly $1.6 billion.

North America’s most prominent shared industry is automotive manufacturing, but it also supports a burgeoning aerospace supply chain. Washington—led by the Seattle-Tacoma area—imports more than $1 billion annually from Canadian aerospace suppliers. Kansas—where aerospace manufacturing anchors the Wichita metro economy—receives at least $700 million annually in North American-sourced aircraft component parts. Arizona imports nearly $300 million worth of turbojets and turbopropellers from Mexico to supply its aerospace manufacturing base. In 2016, U.S. aerospace exports totaled nearly $147 billion overall.

Energy

Energy is the second major U.S. sector that relies on NAFTA intermediate imports. The United States is a major importer of crude oil from Canada, and to a lesser extent, Mexico. In 16 states—including Illinois, Texas, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Washington, Montana, and Colorado—crude oil is the largest intermediate good import from North America. Pipelines carry oil from Alberta into the northern and western United States where it is refined and sent into markets throughout the west. Further south, Mexican petroleum ships through the Gulf of Mexico to major refining and chemical manufacturing hubs in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. Even as domestic energy production has expanded in recent years, U.S. states continue to rely on North American partners to create the basic inputs to everything from plastics to chemicals.

# AT Impact Turns

### AT Environment T/

#### USMCA requires maintenance of protections on a wide variety of environmental areas, especially protection of the ozone layer – ensures vigorous monitoring and enforcement

Bradley 19 Brian Bradley. Mar 11, 2019. “Nations united on USMCA labor, environment provisions” <https://www.americanshipper.com/news/nations-united-on-usmca-labor-environment-provisions?autonumber=846921&origin=relatedarticles>. “I'm trade reporter seeking to leverage my experience in the mass communications field. I have five years of news reporting experience in Washington, D.C., and have covered international trade for 3 1/2 years. My coverage focuses include customs, free trade agreements, and tariffs.” Associate Editor for American Shipper

Interlocutors from all three parties of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) on Friday highlighted the pact’s labor and environmental provisions as groundbreaking, as the Democrat-controlled House is expected to closely scrutinize that language in forthcoming implementing legislation. “Whether it’s illegal timber or ozone depletion, the substantive standards on environment and labor are nothing like we’ve ever seen before,” Colin Bird, minister-counselor for trade and economic policy at the Embassy of Canada in Washington, said during a trade conference. USMCA would require each party to treat intentional transnational trafficking of wildlife protected under its laws as a crime constituting an offense punishable by at least four years’ “deprivation of liberty” or a more serious penalty, as defined by the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime. The agreement also would require parties to cooperate in addressing matters of mutual interest related to ozone-depleting substances, including exchanging information and experience in areas such as environmentally friendly alternatives to ozone-depleting substances; refrigerant management practices, policies and programs; and combating illegal trade in ozone-depleting substances. Also, “in a way that is rarely seen,” USMCA strives to make sure the benefits of the agreement are widely shared, including through automotive rules of origin that incentivize raising of Mexican wages, Bird said during the Georgetown University Law Center 2019 International Trade Update. Kenneth Smith Ramos, who was Mexico’s chief negotiator for the USMCA and now works in the private sector, said the deal’s labor chapter is the strongest and most advanced labor chapter in any free trade agreement and reflects the types of labor reform being discussed in Mexican Congress, including strengthening collective bargaining rights. “I believe that it will be part of the discussion, of course, from groups in the United States and probably [lawmakers] who, in all fairness, would not vote for a trade agreement anyway but are using it as leverage for other things that could be even of a domestic nature,” he said. “But we are very satisfied with the result obtained in the labor chapter negotiations.” Also, making labor and environment provisions subject to the same dispute settlement mechanisms as other chapters adds “teeth” to those provisions, Ramos said. Noting USMCA’s labor and environment provisions, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for the Western Hemisphere John Melle said Mexico is in the process of “overhauling” its justice system so workers have the right to secret ballot votes and challenging union leadership and that USMCA environment provisions combat trafficking in wildlife, timber and fish and address ocean litter, among other things. “And unlike NAFTA, these provisions are fully enforceable in the core of the agreement, and coupled with robust monitoring and enforcement provisions, will create fairer competition among North American workers,” said Melle, who was the United States’ chief USMCA negotiator.

#### USMCA sustains environmental protection of the ozone layer, marine life, air quality, biodiversity, and forest management

Bobechko 18 Janet Bobechko. November 2018. “USMCA – Impact on environmental issues” <https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/0c1e6826/usmca---impact-on-environmental-issues>. Janet Bobechko is a well-recognized senior practitioner with extensive experience in all aspects of environmental law. She routinely provides sophisticated environmental advice on environmental compliance, strategic advice on environmental impact assessments, mergers, acquisitions, real estate and portfolio acquisitions, financings and environmental management systems. Her dispute resolution work includes providing advice on environmental aspects in complex civil litigation for legacy contamination, mediation, for migration of contamination and managing environmental regulatory inspections, charges, orders and providing due diligence advice. Janet works with many industrial sectors, including manufacturing, mining, transportation, chemical, pulp and paper. Ms. Bobechko has advised on renewable energy projects for solar and cogeneration. She is involved in infrastructure projects for linear transportation. Ms. Bobechko has a particular specialty in providing advice on management of legacy contaminated sites and brownfield development and has been extensively involved in law reform on these issues. Ms. Bobechko provides assistance regarding environmental approvals (all media), chemical management and importation of new substances into Canada, transportation of dangerous goods, hazardous products, pesticides, stewardship and producer responsibility as well as emergency planning and spills response. She is routinely consulted on issues related to water taking, sewage and waste water management and treatment and source water protection. She advises on climate change issues including climate risk issues. She advises boards of directors regarding environmental compliance, corporate reporting strategies and risk mitigation and environmental insurance. Ms. Bobechko advises clients on environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) matters and sits on the external advisory Committee for Ryerson's Corporate Social Responsibility Institute. Ms. Bobechko is certified by the Law Society of Ontario as a specialist in environmental law and is recognized as a leading practitioner in environmental law. She recently received a career achievement award from the Canadian Brownfields Network as a person who has had a profound impact on the Brownfield industry in Canada. She regularly updates “Falconbridge on Mortgages,” chapter 10 “ Environmental issues Affecting the Mortgagee” and wrote the inaugural chapter on “Environmental Considerations for Landlord” in the second edition of Landlord's Rights and Remedies in a Commercial Lease: A Practical Guide. \\ anko

The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which is set to replace NAFTA, concluded on September 30, 2018. Chapter 24 of this trilateral trade deal sets out the framework for environmental issues between the parties. Here is a high-level summary of this chapter. Chapter 24 puts an emphasis on USMCA parties cooperating to protect and conserve the environment. It requires each country to maintain an environmental impact assessment process that covers issues related to protecting the ozone layer, protecting the marine environment from ship pollution, improving air quality, preventing the loss of biodiversity, preventing, detecting and controlling invasive alien species, protecting and conserving marine species as well as promoting sustainable forest management. There is no mention of climate change in this chapter. It also notably takes into consideration the constitutional rights of indigenous people, addresses the important economic, social and cultural role that the environment plays in their lives and recognizes the importance of consulting with them on efforts to enhance the long-term protection of the environment. Some of the other notable provisions in the USMCA are mentioned below. Environmental Goods and Services: The parties have agreed it is important to trade and invest in environmental goods and services, including clean technologies spurring potential growth in this important sector. Ocean and Fisheries Issues: There are many provisions dealing with fisheries management that relate to overfishing, fish stock health, conservation and protection of marine species and marine litter. Corporate Social Responsibility: The parties have agreed to promote corporate social responsibility and responsible business conduct within their borders by encouraging enterprises “to adopt and implement voluntary best practices of corporate social responsibility that are related to the environment.” Enforcement: USMCA’s environmental provisions are designed to allow each party the discretion to decide how best to allocate its environmental enforcement resources. Yet, the parties agree they will enforce environmental laws and not “derogate from” these laws in a manner that weakens them to encourage trade or investment. The USMCA puts a bona fide test in place to ensure each party’s focus and agenda items are in line with the common goal of achieving greater environmental protection. It provides for an Environmental Cooperation Agreement with a mechanism for expanding the cooperative relationship on environmental matters, as well as an obligation to establish an environment committee made up of senior government representatives to assist with the implementation. Conclusion: While the USMCA allows discretion over the specific initiatives a party can prioritize, the parties have agreed to work together towards better protecting the environment and promoting sustainable development.

#### USMCA provides greater environmental protections than previous agreements – provides full coverage regulations and prohibits countries from lowering standards

Miller 18 Elizabeth Miller. October 1, 2018. “What the USMCA – The New NAFTA – Means For The Environment” Reporter/producer Elizabeth Miller joined ideastream after a stint at NPR headquarters in Washington D.C., where she served as an intern on the National Desk, pitching stories about everything from a gentrified Brooklyn deli to an app for lost dogs. Before that, she covered weekend news at WAKR in Akron and interned at WCBE, a Columbus NPR affiliate. Elizabeth grew up in Columbus before moving north to attend Baldwin Wallace, where she graduated with a degree in broadcasting and mass communications. <https://radio.wosu.org/post/what-usmca-new-nafta-means-environment#stream/0 \\> anko

Late Sunday night, the Trump Administration and Canada agreed on a deal to renew the North American Free Trade Agreement The renamed U.S.-Mexico-Canada-Agreement (USMCA) addresses environmental issues including invasive species, pollution from ships, sustainable forestry, plastics pollution, and ozone protections. Case Western Reserve University professor Juscelino Colares teaches international business law. He says this latest agreement goes into more detail on environmental issues than the original pact signed nearly 25 years ago. “It was more like a statement of goals to preserve environmental quality,” said Colares on the 1994 NAFTA deal. “Now there’s more of an engagement of conversation between the three countries on environment.” The document includes a directive for the U.S., Canada, and Mexico to implement a fisheries management system that “must include the control, reduction, and eventual elimination of all subsidies that contribute to overfishing and overcapacity.” According to Colares, the document features stronger language on how the countries will work together to set similar environmental standards in an effort to prevent jobs from moving to countries with less stringent environmental regulations. “The new agreement -- the USMCA -- specifically has language providing that countries will not use lower standards as a way to attract business,” said Colares. In a written statement, Democratic Congressman Tim Ryan said he will be reviewing the text to ensure labor and environmental standards are enforced. Both Republican Senator Rob Portman and Democratic Senator Sherrod Brown praised progress on the agreement but said they will be reviewing the details. It must be approved by Congress.

# Aff

# AT Impact

### Impact T/Climate 2ac

#### USMCA blocks transition to clean energy – boosts fracking, oil pipelines, and exports climate pollution to countries with lower standards

Goffman 18 (Ethan, writer and national reporter for Mobility Lab, *The Progressive,* “A Mixed, Muddled Bag: Trump’s USMCA Trade Pact May Help Labor, But Will Hurt the Environment,” published October 8th, 2018, <https://progressive.org/dispatches/a-mixed-muddled-bag-trumps-new-nafta-usmca-181008/>, accessed 7/6/19, JME.)

Yet the USMCA giveth and the USMCA taketh away. The Mexican exceptions to removing ISDS include U.S. oil and gas companies, which will have a variety of tools to block environmental laws. Chevron and Exxon Mobil, “the number one and number two largest climate polluters in history,” will thus be protected, says Beachy. This is like “keeping away all animals from the henhouse, except for foxes.” Perez-Rocha further characterized the new agreement as unfair to Mexico, calling it “inconceivable that ISDS, while apparently scrapped for the U.S. and Canada, remains for Mexico, creating a two tier system.” Although Obrador has agreed to abide by the new agreement, this may prove too constraining once he is in office. Perez-Rocha thinks that when Obrador “tries to improve things in the Mexican countryside he will realize he will need changes” in the new agreement also. For Dey, too, the USMCA will intrude on national sovereignty, in this case Canada’s. She explains that, despite the removal of ISDS, rules in the new agreement would enable, for instance, an energy company building a tar sands oil pipeline to influence regulations and even legislation, since it will now be privy to details in advance. This will likely also hinder Mexico’s transition to a clean energy economy, says Beachy. Another key weakness in the original NAFTA that the USMCA would largely maintain is the ability of companies to export pollution to countries with lower environmental standards, in this case Mexico. This has happened with the dumping of lead waste, since Mexico’s standards are only a tenth as strong as those of the United States. Globally, waste often ends up in poor countries, where it poisons the air and water. Climate pollution is also being exported to countries with lower standards as factories move to developing countries (although, of course, it ultimately affects us all). Dey explains that the agreement “doesn’t mention the [United Nations] Paris climate agreement at all, doesn’t actually have a section to deal with global warming.” Without binding standards, it will be virtually impossible for countries to meet their climate emissions targets, says Beachy. Another holdover from NAFTA is a rule that “bars the U.S. government from determining whether or not gas exports to Mexico are in the public interest,” adds Beachy. This means that the USMCA will encourage fracking in Texas for export to Mexico along with additional cross-border pipelines. Beachy also points to two steps forward in environmental protections: Canada will no longer be mandated to exporting tar sands oil to the United States, due to the elimination of the proportionality rule that, under NAFTA, forced Canada to maintain oil exports to the U.S. In addition, fishery protections will be strengthened. Yet these two glimmers of hope only begin to point to the robust environmental policies and enforcement standards that should be included in free trade agreements, says Beachy.

### Impact T/Climate I/L

#### USMCA rolls back environmental protection regs and makes it harder to reduce emissions—warming

Nicholas **Kusnetz**, 10-5-20**18**, "How Trump's New Trade Deal Could Prolong His Pollution Legacy," InsideClimate News, https://insideclimatenews.org/news/04102018/trump-trade-deal-climate-change-canada-mexico-pollution-outsourcing-nafta-usmca//RS

President Donald Trump's new trade deal with Canada and Mexico makes no mention of climate change, but it's likely to have lasting implications for North America's energy future. In many ways, the deal extends features of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that environmentalists say promote fossil fuel development and polluting practices. But it also contains new provisions that could make it easier for corporations to challenge climate and environment regulations in the three countries even before they're adopted. In this way, the new United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) has the potential to enshrine the Trump administration's anti-regulatory agenda into one of the country's most important trade agreements, environmental advocates said. "Trump's NAFTA deal could have the effect of prolonging his polluting legacy for years after he leaves office," said Ben Beachy, director of the Sierra Club's responsible trade program. The deal won quick support from the oil and gas industry. In a statement released Monday, a day after the agreement was announced, the American Petroleum Institute's president and chief executive, Mike Sommers, urged Congress to approve the deal. Climate and environment advocates pointed to several ways the agreement could make it harder for the U.S., Mexico and Canada to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions that are causing climate change. The agreement's text recognizes that "air pollution is a serious threat to public health, ecosystem integrity, and sustainable development." It also makes a nod to climate change in a section on forestry, which recognizes the important ecosystem services that forests play, including carbon storage. But Beachy and others say the language is weak, and the enforcement mechanisms even weaker. For example, while the agreement recognizes the problem of air pollution, it contains no specific measures to reduce it. "It's almost insulting that the parties recognize the problem without addressing it," Beachy said. Gordon Laxer, an emeritus professor of political economy at the University of Alberta and a critic of NAFTA, called the environment chapter "totally useless." The agreement would continue to allow companies to move polluting practices to jurisdictions with weaker environmental regulations. When the U.S. tightened limits on lead pollution, some companies moved lead-polluting operations to Mexico rather than comply with the new standards. Similar outsourcing could occur if any of the countries were to adopt a carbon tax or limits on greenhouse gas pollution, Beachy said. That's already happening to some extent with carbon emissions. As developed nations import more raw materials like steel and cement from China and other countries with lower wages and looser environmental regulations, they have effectively outsourced the emissions. One recent report found that the U.S. is far and away the leading "outsourcer" of climate pollution. Making It Easier for Polluters to Block New Regulations The most worrisome new provisions come in a chapter called "good regulatory practices," Beachy said. The section lays out a series of measures countries must follow with their own regulatory procedures. Under the section, companies would be guaranteed a chance to comment on proposed regulations across borders, and governments would have to publish data to support to the regulations. It also says governments also would have to develop processes to promote consideration of the burdens regulations place on small businesses as well as any "unnecessary restrictions on competition." Beachy said this would be the first U.S. trade agreement to guarantee companies can use this method to challenge and delay climate or other environmental regulations. He also said it could help entrench the Trump administration's anti-regulatory agenda even after Trump leaves office. When a new U.S. government starts to restore the health and climate protections that the Trump administration is now erasing, it will be up against onerous rules that will make it hard to make strong, swift changes, he said. Another provision of NAFTA that consistently drew condemnation from public advocacy groups was a dispute system established for corporations to challenge environmental and other regulations. Under the system, called investor state dispute settlement, companies can sue for damages if they claim a regulation would cost them future profits. TransCanada, the company behind the Keystone XL pipeline, used this clause to pursue a $15 billion claim against the U.S. government after President Barack Obama rejected the project. The company dropped the suit after Trump approved the pipeline. All told, Canada has paid nearly CAN$220 million to U.S. investors through the system, according to an analysis by the Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives. While the new deal largely eliminates this system, American companies in several sectors—including oil and gas—will still be able to use the dispute settlement system against the Mexican government. "It's just a shameful handout to oil and gas," Beachy said. Environmentalists say the threat of claims has deterred officials from adopting stricter regulations. Companies in the power generation, transportation and telecommunications sectors that have contracts with the Mexican government can also continue to use the dispute settlement process. Blocking Challenges to Natural Gas Exports The new agreement would continue another NAFTA provision that has long irritated environmentalists: the nearly automatic approval of natural gas exports to Mexico. Normally, opponents of gas exports can challenge a project by arguing that it doesn't serve the public interest. Gas exports to Mexico are exempt, however, and Beachy said this clause has hamstrung efforts to generate more electricity from renewable energy sources like wind and solar. One Change Could Help Canada Cut Emissions To the north, another export clause environmentalists opposed would be eliminated. NAFTA had compelled Canada to export a certain amount of oil and gas into the U.S.—the provision was a legacy of a brief attempt by the federal government to exert more control over its oil industry. Canadian critics of the clause have long argued that it undermined the country's sovereignty and promoted development of the Canada's tar sands, which produces oil that is largely destined for the U.S. Laxer said that while the change will not have any immediate effect, it would free a future Canadian government to more dramatically limit its emissions and oil production. "It means in the 2020s and 2030s," he said, "the Canadian government could actually reduce the production of tar sands oil for export and fracked gas." Canadian officials had said early in the trade negotiations that a new agreement to replace NAFTA would have to address climate change, but that largely fell by the wayside in recent weeks. While talks with the U.S. were underway, Canada did add a climate clause to its trade deal with the European Union.

#### USMCA locks in fossil fuel dependency

Goffman 18 (Ethan, writer and national reporter for Mobility Lab, *The Progressive,* “A Mixed, Muddled Bag: Trump’s USMCA Trade Pact May Help Labor, But Will Hurt the Environment,” published October 8th, 2018, <https://progressive.org/dispatches/a-mixed-muddled-bag-trumps-new-nafta-usmca-181008/>, accessed 7/6/19, JME.)

Long after Donald Trump ceases to be President, the newly renegotiated North American Free Trade Agreement may be harming the environment. As Ben Beachy of the Sierra Club describes it, the new agreement “will encourage further outsourcing of pollution and jobs, includes special handouts to some of the world’s most notorious polluters, [and] would help lock in fossil fuel dependency.” Beachy was discussing the United States, Mexico and Canada Agreement, or USMCA, a name that seems designed to be hard to remember or know how to pronounce. The full text of the agreement, designed to replace NAFTA, was released on October 1, but must be verified to come into effect. Besides continuing NAFTA’s quarter century legacy of environmental degradation, the USMCA has new wrinkles likely to worsen pollution. It moves backwards from current language included in the most recent free trade agreements signed by the U.S., to protect endangered species, ocean health, and wetlands, among other issues. And it doesn’t even mention climate change.

#### USMCA expands emissions from second largest region in the world

Polaski and Capaldo 2019 SANDRA POLASKI AND JERONIM CAPALDO. July 7, 2019. ”New NAFTA brings high risks and few rewards”. <https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/451775-new-nafta-brings-high-risks-and-few-rewards>. Sandra Polaski is a senior research fellow at the Global Development Policy Center, Boston University and former deputy director-general for policy of the International Labour Organization. Jeronim Capaldo is a research fellow at Tufts University’s Global Development and Environment Institute. \\ anko

It is no surprise that calls to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have resonated with many Americans over the years. Numerous studies have documented the negative effects of NAFTA on certain groups, regions and the environment in the United States, Mexico and Canada. President Trump can be credited with renegotiating NAFTA and is now pressing Congress to ratify it. Yet according to the evidence we reviewed with our colleague Kevin Gallagher in a recent policy brief, the revised NAFTA, now called the United Stated Mexico Canada Agreement (USMCA), will not restore industrial jobs, worker rights and living wages; nor will it provide the needed protections for affordable health care and the environment, which the original NAFTA has eroded. It also introduces serious new restrictions on the right of the three governments to regulate privacy and harmful content on the Internet. Based on our review of the terms of the agreement and projections of its impact, we argue that the USMCA will shift the balance further against working households and local communities. If our interest is sustainable, shared prosperity, the USMCA is a step in the wrong direction. Recent research and data indicate that trade agreements have adversely affected jobs and wages. For example, a 2016 study that looks at the effects of NAFTA by measuring each industry’s vulnerability to Mexican imports and each locality’s dependence on vulnerable industries finds that wage growth was dramatically lower for blue-collar workers in the most affected industries and localities, with negative effects on service-sector workers in those localities as well. Will the USMCA remedy the adverse distributional effects of NAFTA and avoid new distortions? Based on the official US government study, the answer is no. The U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) projects that the USMCA will bring small and skewed economic gains in the U.S., including: a one-time increase in GDP of only 0.35 percent; a one-time increase in total employment of a small fraction of one percent, mainly in low-paid service sector jobs; and a one-time wage increase of about a quarter of 1 percent on average. It is important to note that the USITC study finds any positive effects at all only because it attributes economic value to the reduction of “policy uncertainty” for investors as a result of increased protections for firms in a few sectors, including pharmaceuticals and information technology. Without this imputation of value for the private sector, the study finds that the impact of USMCA on economic growth, employment and wages will be negative. Furthermore, the idea of policy certainty arising from the USMCA sits uncomfortably with the recent threats to impose high tariffs on all imports from Mexico. Turning to the specific provisions of most concern to the public and many legislators, on labor the USMCA expands the scope of commitments to protect labor rights but does nothing to strengthen their enforcement, meaning that even seeming improvements will have little impact in practice. The experience with NAFTA and subsequent U.S. free trade agreements demonstrates that replicating the weak enforcement provisions will mean that there is no leverage to achieve progress on rights and wages in trading partner countries. On environment, the USMCA fails to even mention climate change, despite that the World Trade Organization and the United Nations have shown that trade expansion increases carbon dioxide emissions and that North American fossil fuel emissions are the second largest of any region in the world. The chapter on environment eliminates NAFTA provisions that parties should heed commitments under Multilateral Environmental Agreements even if they conflict with NAFTA rules. And there is a loophole (in Annex 14E of the text) whereby U.S. oil and gas companies with Mexican government contracts can still sue the Mexican government if it adopts higher environmental and public health standards. The USMCA introduces new restrictions on the right of the parties – including the US government – to adopt new regulations that would protect the public interest. For example, the chapter on “digital trade” would prevent the U.S. from instituting new requirements that US individuals' personal and financial data must be kept in the U.S. to protect it from malign or less secure handling abroad. USMCA intellectual property protections would constrain the U.S. (as well as Canada and Mexico) from future efforts to reduce prescription drug prices by locking in the number of years biotechnology companies can avoid competition based on their test data. This will allow firms to keep high drug prices for longer periods also reducing incentives for new research. The 2020 presidential election season is the perfect opportunity to have a national debate about a new, more equitable trade strategy for the country. A trade regime suitable for 21st century challenges will need to support, not undermine a more equitable and inclusive economy where costs and gains are distributed more fairly to working households and corporations. It will need to support low-carbon growth paths and address pollution and environmental degradation. It will also have to devise a new generation of intellectual property rules that ensure affordable access to medicine. A sustainable and politically acceptable trade regime must recognize that investors’ interests often run counter to the public good and must be kept in check. Instead of seizing the opportunity to devise a new trade model, the USMCA locks in and even adds to policies that have contributed to rising inequality, stagnant wages, rising health care costs, environmental degradation and political disaffection. To protect working households and their communities, Congress should either take the time to fix the USMCA or reject it.

#### USMCA locks in fossil fuels in massive emissions regions – loaded with hand outs for oil and gas sectors

Jarsulic, Green, and Zessoules 19 Marc Jarsulic, Andy Green, and Daniella Zessoules. February 1, 2019. “Trump’s Trade Deal and the Road Not Taken” <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2019/02/01/465744/trumps-trade-deal-road-not-taken/>. Marc Jarsulic is the senior vice president for Economic Policy at American Progress. He has worked on economic policy matters as deputy staff director and chief economist at the Joint Economic Committee, as chief economist at the Senate Banking Committee, and as chief economist at Better Markets. He has practiced antitrust and securities law at the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and in private practice. Before coming to Washington, he was professor of economics at the University of Notre Dame.

Andy Green is the managing director of Economic Policy at American Progress. He writes and speaks about financial markets and regulation; corporate governance and competition; international trade; and the economy and middle class. Green was editor of “Raising Wages and Rebuilding Wealth: A Roadmap for Middle-Class Economic Security,” a wide-ranging CAP report on causes and solutions to the wages and wealth squeeze on middle-class America. He writes regularly on financial regulation, including the Volcker rule, and has co-authored prominent CAP reports on the relationship between corporate long-termism and workforce training and on how to revitalize competition policy. He has appeared on CNN, Fox Business News, Bloomberg TV, C-SPAN, and a range of radio talk shows, and he has testified before Congress. He earned an economics Ph.D. at the University of Pennsylvania and a J.D. at the University of Michigan. His most recent book is Anatomy of a Financial Crisis.

 Daniella Zessoules is a special assistant for Economic Policy at American Progress. Before joining American Progress, Zessoules served as the domestic policy intern at the Center for Economic and Policy Research, as well as a federal legislative affairs intern at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. She holds a degree in economics from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, where she spent time as a research assistant focusing on the intersections of race, gender, and comparative health care policy. She is also an alumna of the American Bar Foundation’s Montgomery Summer Research Diversity Fellowship program in Chicago. \\ anko

Raise environmental and sustainability standards in North America The Trump administration has pursued a damaging environmental policy agenda, including through its withdrawal from the Paris agreement, expansion of offshore drilling, and has proposed significant defunding of vital climate and energy research programs.52 The USMCA is consistent with the administration’s approach to environmental policy. While it pays lip service to the importance of environmental standards, it fails to incorporate the meaningful standards and tools necessary to ensure signatory compliance with domestic environmental laws and international agreements to which they are parties.53 Notably, it steps backwards on requirements to comply with international environmental agreements, and omits the necessary standards needed to address the global threat of climate change.54 As with the labor chapter, enforcement, discussed below, is also sorely lacking. Given what scientists know about the immediate threats to the planet and their consequences for economies and societies, no trade agreement should fail to incorporate new, high-road approaches to environmental standards that recognize the costs of pollution and climate change.55 Not only should countries be discouraged from lowering their environmental standards and enforcement to attract trade and investment, but trade agreements should also be structured to enable and indeed incentivize countries to raise their standards. It should also sanction those who allow firms to seek to outsource pollution to trading partner countries, which harms both their workers and American workers. The shift in car battery recycling from the U.S. to Mexico is an example of just this type of dual harm.56 The agreement should also explicitly exempt from trade-related challenges those domestic policies that are intended to reduce or adapt to environmental harm, such as measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or regulate practices such as fracking or offshore drilling.57 This would prevent challenges to domestic policies that otherwise would be considered violations of NAFTA rules. One positive provision in the USMCA is that it does remove a requirement that the United States and Canada continue to export natural resources, including fossil fuels, based on previous years’ trade, even if a country sought to enact conservation policies. This rule in the original NAFTA impacted Canada’s ability to reduce oil sand production to meet its international environmental commitments.58 The rule also impacts the United States’ ability in the future to dial back resource exports from any public lands that the Trump administration opens up. The United States trades more energy with Canada and Mexico than with the rest of the world combined,59 and a successful NAFTA renegotiation should seize opportunities to promote higher standards and incentives for clean energy and efficiency among all three North American countries, such as the appliance efficiency standards that the United States and Canada typically harmonize on a bilateral basis.60 In addition, although none of the NAFTA countries currently has a formal economy-wide carbon price, a rewritten NAFTA should seek to foreclose the possibility of carbon leakage across borders in the event one of the countries adopts such a measure.61 It is also important to safeguard countries’ other tools to take action to address the climate crisis. Whether it’s securing climate-friendly labeling on products traded across borders in North America or boosting climate-friendly procurement, trade agreements should enhance a country’s efforts to tackle climate change— not potentially limit them.62 Lastly, it is no small matter that Trump’s agreement contains a loophole to the reformed ISDS provisions that is principally a special giveaway to the oil and gas sectors, which have contracts with the government in Mexico.63 That’s representative of a deeply unfortunate failure to make the threat of climate change—as it impacts workers, communities, and the planet—central to a new vision for North American economic cooperation. Enforce labor and environmental standards Not only is it important to have stronger labor and environmental standards, but any renegotiated agreement should have effective enforcement mechanisms, ensuring that all countries meet these standards. While the USMCA proposes to enforce labor and environmental standards through the general dispute settlement procedures, that is likely to be inadequate. State-to-state enforcement has a poor history of effectiveness.64 In part, this is because of a loophole in the original NAFTA that enabled countries to avoid participating in a dispute settlement panel—a problem that remains in the USMCA. More broadly, labor and the environment often get pushed aside by governmental priorities in state-to-state relationships. Lastly, cases that require evaluating the compliance of an entire economy can be difficult to prove and force meaningful, timely change. Given the complexity of the issues surrounding labor and environmental matters, as well as the limited resources of the individuals and organizations they affect, an independent authority is needed to enable investigations to be conducted when violations are reported. It ought to be independent, well-staffed, and with sufficient authority to investigate or monitor compliance when remedies are agreed on for violations.65 The need for an effective approach to enforcement has been recognized by progressive policy makers for some time. One important idea that some have floated is an inspection, compliance, and exclusion system modeled on the U.S.-Peru Free Trade Agreement’s timber annex.66 The annex gave the United States the power to verify that Peruvian lumber had been produced legally, including provisions permitting on-site inspections in Peru. It also empowers customs officers to block illegal products at the border and to prohibit future shipments. Illegal logging of Peruvian timber remains a serious problem that the U.S. has only begun to address, but were the authorities and inspections strengthened and the enforcement made more automatic, this could be a potential pathway towards enforcing standards that are important to workers in the United States, Canada, and Mexico.67 In addition, private parties ought to be able to supplement governmental actions and directly challenge violations of labor and environmental provisions of trade agreements. Strong private rights of action, which are present in U.S. trade remedy law (antidumping and countervailing duty cases), could be deployed to help ensure that labor and environmental protections and rights are authentic. One way to accomplish this is to insert labor and environmental standards into the way the U.S. Department of Commerce (or relevant trade ministry) calculates the normal value for a particular import.68 However, it is important to remember that private actions, including trade remedy cases, cannot replace swift and certain state enforcement. Private cases can be expensive and difficult to bring because of barriers to needed information. They also are limited in their ability to produce systemic changes throughout an economy, such as securing union organizing rights. But they and similar mechanisms offer a useful way to pressure improved behavior in trading partners and could signal to the United States Trade Representative that broader action is needed.

#### USMCA backslides on environmental regulations – allows too much autonomy for trading partners and provides no accountability for environmental violations

Watkins 19 Zoe Watkins. June 6, 2019. “Environmental groups push Dems to tank USMCA over climate change” <https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/06/environmental-groups-push-dems-to-tank-usmca-over-climate-change-1356576>. Zoe Watkins is a graduate at Lenoir-Rhyne University and journalist for Politico. \\ anko

Environmental groups say the version of the agreement Trump signed last fall included vague and unenforceable language that gave U.S. trading partners too much leeway. They want Democrats to highlight environmental concerns alongside other provisions —such as those on labor and prescription drugs — that House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and other Democratic leaders are demanding to secure their support. “The House has a responsibility and an opportunity to stand up for trade agreements that actually protect people and the planet,” said Ben Beachy, director of the Sierra Club’s Living Economy Program. Environmental groups want binding environmental provisions ￼for climate, water and land pollution. “This international trade agreement offers a big opportunity to raise awareness about the intersection of climate and trade issues. And it gives us another chance to remind the American public about the importance of the Paris climate agreement,” Dan West, legislative advocate for the Natural Resources Defense Council, said at the June 4 briefing. They say the latest deal includes only a few improvements from the original North American Free Trade Agreement, which took effect in 1994. “It’s crazy to think that it’s already June and we’re halfway through 2019, but it’s even crazier to realize that we’re a fifth of the way through the 21st century and our international trade agreements still aren’t even acknowledging the threat of global warming,” West said. Congress will have to decide in the coming months whether to sign off on the agreement or withdraw it from the fast-track process. Demands for changes could lead to back-and-forth negotiating that could last months or even years. Democrats on the House Ways and Means Committee this spring expressed their disappointment that the USMCA deal didn’t force other countries to sign onto seven international environmental agreements. The trade deal’s environment chapter lacked provisions directed at combating climate change. The Trump administration said in a recent document submitted to Congress on May 30 that it intends to work with Congress to change U.S. law to ensure enforcement of the environment chapter. The lawmakers said the deal also falls short on rules against illegal trading of animals and plant products, failing to bring other countries close to current U.S. law on those fronts. More broadly, they expressed alarm that the deal may not hold other countries accountable for breaking environmental rules. “This procedural design will, we fear, doom the environment commitments in the new Agreement to be as ineffective as the provisions in the existing NAFTA,” the Democrats said in an April letter to U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer.

# Samford 2019

## AFF

### Impact---AT: Ag---2AC

#### **Tons of thumpers to ag.**

Donnan & Singh 19 --- Shawn Donnan, Shruti Singh, ("Trump’s Trade War Is Hurting Farmers, But They Still Think He Can Win It," 4-11-2019, Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-04-11/trump-s-trade-wars-sap-spring-optimism-and-profits-on-u-s-farms, accessed 4-22-2019) bm

Spring is supposed to be a time of optimism in rural communities across America. It’s when farmers sow the seeds of prosperity into neat, GPS-calibrated rows and when they pray for just the right amount of rain and sun and for prices to hold up so that when fall approaches, there’s a crop worth harvesting. This year is different. In Washington apple orchards, North Carolina hog farms, and soybean fields along the Mississippi River Basin, the season is filled with doubt. After taking a hit to their bottom line in 2018 of the sort that some say they haven’t seen since the 1980s, farmers in much of the U.S. are hoping for a return to normalcy. Trump’s determination to upend the global trading system comes at an inconvenient time for one of the nation’s premier export industries. No country has mastered the science of the ever-increasing yield quite like the U.S. has. It’s the world’s leading producer of commodity crops such as soybeans and corn and a major source of apples, beef, pork, and wheat. Agriculture has also been an important backer of successive administrations’ push to seal trade agreements around the world. Pacts such as the North American Free Trade Agreement have spurred agricultural exports, which have grown 170 percent over the past 20 years. Yet U.S. farm profits have been shrinking since they peaked six years ago, amounting last year to roughly half what they were in 2013. As a result of successive years of bumper crops, prices for key commodities like soybeans and corn are about 40 percent lower than they were in 2013. At the same time, farmers have had to contend with the administration’s crackdown on immigration, which deprives them of migrant labor, and climate change, which most recently took the form of historic floods that devastated Midwestern agricultural states. The [trade wars](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2019-03-05/trump-trade-war-hits-hard-video) have come on top of all that. In the year since the Trump administration launched its tariff offensive, the country’s trade partners have retaliated by hiking duties on apples, cherries, ginseng, sorghum, and [soybeans](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-29/corn-calls-farmers-as-china-trade-war-erodes-u-s-soy-profits), to name a few crops. It’s a familiar pattern: American farmers have long borne the cost for protectionist policies pushed by the country’s industrialists. The 1828 “tariff of abominations” designed to safeguard Northern manufacturers from an influx of lower-priced imports from Britain was opposed stridently in the agrarian South. It led to a political crisis that dogged Andrew Jackson’s presidency and precipitated South Carolina’s first threats of secession.

#### Food shortages won’t cause war.

Allouche 11, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT (Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January)

The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable. Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level. In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric.

### Impact---AT: Econ---2AC

#### USMCA not key to the economy – multiple studies.

Lynch 4-18 (David J.; Washington Post, “Trump’s USMCA trade agreement would have a limited but positive impact on U.S. economy, report finds,” https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trumps-usmca-trade-agreement-would-have-a-limited-but-positive-impact-on-us-economy-report-finds/2019/04/18/b8ccb48c-6200-11e9-9ff2-abc984dc9eec\_story.html)ww

President Trump’s new North American trade deal will have a marginal effect on the nearly $21 trillion U.S. economy, boosting output by just 0.35 percent and delivering an even smaller gain to the labor market, according to an independent analysis by the International Trade Commission. In a 379-page report released Thursday, the ITC said the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement would “have a positive impact” on both manufacturing and services industries. The largest gains would arise from eliminating “uncertainty” by preventing future barriers to cross-border e-commerce, services and investments. “There can be no doubt that the USMCA is a big win for America’s economy,” said Robert E. Lighthizer, the president’s chief trade negotiator. Notably, the deal would increase auto parts production and employment, key administration goals. But the narrow benefits for the auto sector would come at the expense of the broader economy, making overall U.S. production more expensive, reducing exports, and denting wages and employment, the report said. Congress required the assessment, which was delayed five weeks by the partial government shutdown, before lawmakers hold an up-or-down vote on the agreement. “I don’t see it as providing much ammunition to either side. The skeptics will still be skeptical, and the advocates will still be advocating,” said William Reinsch, a trade expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Administration officials are pushing for quick congressional action, but most trade analysts expect the process to drag on for months. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) has said tougher enforcement measures need to be written into the deal to make sure that Mexico complies with promised labor reforms. Several prominent lawmakers, including Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa), chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, say the president must remove tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from Mexico and Canada before a vote. Both countries have imposed retaliatory measures that have damaged U.S. exports, especially from farm states. Administration officials said last year that the tariffs would be eliminated once the three countries reached a new trade deal. But instead, they have remained in place while the United States tries to get Mexico and Canada to accept quotas on their shipments of industrial metals. “This report confirms what has been clear since this deal was announced — Donald Trump’s NAFTA represents at best a minor update to NAFTA, which will offer only limited benefits to U.S. workers,” said Sen. Ron Wyden, (D-Ore.), the committee’s ranking member. The USMCA provides for the free flow of data among the three trading partners, an important step for banks, airlines, online retailers and entertainment companies. It limits an existing procedure for companies to settle disputes with the three governments, which the report says will discourage U.S. investment in Mexico and boost capital spending in U.S. manufacturing and mining. An overhaul of the 25-year-old North American Free Trade Agreement, the changes in the USMCA are less sweeping than the broad elimination of virtually all trade barriers in the earlier accord, economists say. NAFTA was expected to increase the size of the U.S. economy by just 0.5 percent and boost employment by less than 1 percent, according to the ITC’s 1993 study. Those effects exceeded what’s likely from the new deal, including an employment gain of just 176,000 jobs, or 0.12 percent, according to the ITC. “Most trade deals don’t have an outsized effect on growth over the long term,” said David Page, senior economist for AXA Investment Managers in London. “It does tend to be a little bit peripheral.” While its top-line effects are modest, the deal would reshape North American auto production by requiring more American content and mandating that 40 percent of each vehicle be produced by workers earning $16 per hour — aimed at steering jobs away from lower-wage Mexican workers. The administration sought to preempt the report, releasing an assessment that concluded the deal would create 76,000 auto jobs over the next five years and trigger $34 billion in new auto plant investments and $23 billion in added auto parts purchases. Current auto industry employment is about 999,000, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The ITC study comes after a recent International Monetary Fund study cast doubt on USMCA’s effectiveness, saying the agreement would reduce trade among the three North American neighbors, have a “negligible” effect on economic output and fail to bring auto jobs back to the United States. “The new rules lead to a decline in the production of vehicles and parts in all three North American countries, with shifts toward greater sourcing of both vehicles and parts from outside of the region,” the IMF paper said. The deal also would have no impact on inflation-adjusted wages in the United States or Canada while resulting in a slight decline for Mexican workers. Consumers also would face higher prices and thus buyer fewer vehicles, the study said. A senior official in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative denigrated the IMF study as reflecting the “opinions” of its authors. The more favorable USTR conclusions were derived from confidential business plans that major automakers submitted to the government and that were more reliable than economic modeling, the official said. “We have unique insights,” said the official, who insisted on anonymity to brief reporters. Changing North American trade rules is especially important as the auto industry gears up for major investments in autonomous and electric vehicle production, the official said. The new deal should result in more next-generation plants in the United States rather than in Mexico, the official said.

### Impact---AT: Trade---2AC

#### Trump has damaged US trade too much – USMCA can’t overcome

Diaz 6-18 (Hugo; deputy director of international law at the Centre for International Governance Innovation, “Think trade agreements will mend relationships with the U.S.? Think again,” https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-think-trade-agreements-will-mend-relationships-with-the-us-think/)ww

The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) – which will replace the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) – has largely been received with enthusiasm. U.S. President Donald Trump called it a “very, very good deal.” Former Mexican secretary of economy Ildefonso Guajardo said that Mr. Trump’s trade threats had "practically been defused” thanks to the agreement. Jesus Seade, who then-president-elect Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador appointed as his chief NAFTA negotiator, added that the agreement would bring certainty and stability to trade in North America. The agreement was reason for Canada to celebrate, too, and it elicited at least a sigh of relief from other countries around the world, particularly those engaged in trade negotiations with the United States. There has been some sense of renewed hope that deals will bring the superpower back to our decades-long global trajectory toward an international system of trade rules, and rein in the worst protectionist impulses of Mr. Trump, whose zero-sum approach assumes that one country’s gain is another country’s loss. But the USMCA does little to modernize or upgrade the 25-year-old NAFTA beyond what had been achieved in the Obama administration’s negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement; in fact, it actually backtracks in important areas, such as in the automobile sector, where stricter rules of origin will reduce the competitiveness of North American industry. And with trade escalation with China, and the imposition of tariffs on Mexico (which, if Mr. Trump is to be believed, resulted in action on migration on the southern border), it is evident that, regardless of any trade agreements, new or old, Mr. Trump will continue to use the U.S.'s economic might and tariffs to push his policy objectives. And rather than being a pursuit of policy goals, it is far more likely that the reason is Mr. Trump’s hardened instinct for electoral gains. The USMCA features plenty of other hints of Mr. Trump’s enduring anti-trade sentiment. Although many dismissed the change of name as innocuous, it is no coincidence that the word “free” was dropped from the title. But more importantly, in an exchange of side letters attached to the deal, Mexico and Canada recognized that the U.S. can impose tariffs on any products imported from Mexico or Canada for alleged national-security reasons. Although they also recognize both countries’ right to retaliate if the U.S. were to impose such tariffs, these letters clearly reflect a move in the opposite direction from free trade. Signing the USMCA didn’t even really help Ottawa or Mexico City. The U.S. didn’t remove the 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum products that it had imposed on Mexico and Canada in May 2018 until a year later – after Mr. Trump had further escalated his trade war with China – in exchange for both countries removing the tariffs that each of them had imposed on U.S. goods in retaliation. And then it took only a few days for Mr. Trump to threaten, yet again, to levy tariffs not only on steel and aluminum products from Mexico, but on all goods imported from there, for reasons unconnected to trade: Mexico’s performance on stemming the northward flow of migrants. Mr. Trump appears to be pursuing his immigration-policy objectives to cater to his political base as the 2020 presidential elections draw nearer. Even the migration deal that has since been struck between the U.S. and Mexico is no reason to celebrate, as Mr. Lopez Obrador did last week after claiming victory in the three-day long negotiations that prompted what Mr. Trump calls an “indefinite" suspension of the tariffs on all Mexican goods. Despite the optimism being expressed around the power of trade deals to nudge the U.S. back toward certain norms, we can be sure this will not be the end of Mr. Trump’s deployment of trade weaponry. Mexico, Canada and the rest of the world should heed the writing on the wall.

#### No interdependence impact.

Joel Einstein 17. Australian National University. 01-17-17. “Economic Interdependence and Conflict – The Case of the US and China.” E-International Relations. <http://www.e-ir.info/2017/01/17/economic-interdependence-and-conflict-the-case-of-the-us-and-china/>

In 1913, Norman Angell declared that the use of military force was now economically futile as international finance and trade had become so interconnected that harming the enemy’s property would equate to harming your own.[1] A year later Europe’s economically interconnected states were embroiled in what would later become known as the First World War. Almost a century later Steven Pinker made a similar claim. Pinker argues, “Though the relationship between America and China is far from warm, we are unlikely to declare war on them or vice versa. Morality aside, they make too much of our stuff and we owe them too much money.”[2] His argument rests upon the liberal assumption that high levels of trade and investment between two states, in this case the US and China, will make war unlikely, if not impossible. It is this assumption that this essay seeks to evaluate. This essay is divided into three sections. The first briefly outlines the theory that economic interdependence results in a reduced likelihood of conflict, breaking the theory down into smaller components that can be examined. In the second section, this essay suggests that the premise ‘more trade equals less conflict’ is simplistic. It does not take into account many of the variables that can influence the strength of economic interdependence’s conflict reducing attributes. Within this section, the essay considers: the extent to which conflict cuts off trade, theories arguing that how and what a state trades matters, Copeland’s theory of trade expectations and the differences between status quo and revisionist states. The final section deals with the realist perspective, concentrating on arguments pertaining to the primacy of strategic interests and arguments that economic interdependence will increase the likelihood of conflict owing to a reduction of deterrence credibility. Each section will be related back to the US-China relationship with a view to assessing Pinker’s claim. The essay will conclude that economic interdependence does reduce the likelihood of conflict but is insufficient on its own to completely prevent it. To calculate the likelihood of conflict correctly one would need to factor in the nature of the economic interdependence alongside the strength of the strategic interests at stake. Economic Interdependence and Conflict The theory that increased economic interdependence reduces conflict rests on three observations: trade benefits states in a manner that decision-makers value; conflict will reduce or completely cut-off trade; and that decision-makers will take the previous two observations into account before choosing to go to war. Based on these observations, one should expect that the higher the benefit of trade, the higher the cost of a potential conflict. After a certain point, the value of trade may become so high that the state in question has become economically dependent on another. Proponents of this theory argue that if two states have reached this point of mutual dependence (interdependence), their decision-makers will value the continuation of trade relations higher than any potential gains to be made through war.[3] It is on this argument that Pinker rests his statement that the economic relationship between the US and China precludes war. One can see evidence of this when analysing US views on China as trade rises. A 2014 Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey indicates that only a minority of Americans see China as a critical threat, compared to a majority in the mid-1990s. This number is even higher when analysing Americans who directly benefit from trade with China.[4] As compelling as this argument may be, high levels of economic interdependence have not always resulted in peace. The decades preceding WW1 saw an unprecedented growth in international trade, communication, and interconnectivity but needless to say, war broke out.[5] This instance alone is not enough to disprove Pinker’s logic. War may become very unlikely but began nonetheless.[6] Let us take two hypothetical scenarios, one in which the chances of war is 80% and the other in which trade has reduced the likelihood of war to 10%. Just knowing that war did indeed take place does not tell us which scenario was in play. Similarly, the fact that WW1 took place gives us no information about whether economic interdependence made war unlikely or not. In fact, evidence even exists to suggest that economic linkages prevented a war from breaking out during the sequence of crises that led up to WW1.[7] However, the fact that a war as detrimental as WW1 could break out despite a supposed reduction of the likelihood of conflict gives us an impetus to examine whether this reduction does take place. Additionally, if this is the case, what variables can weaken this pacifying effect? Does Conflict Cut off Trade? Economic interdependence theory makes the assumption that conflict will reduce or cut-off trade. This assumption appears to be logical, as one would expect that the moment two states are officially adversaries, fear of relative gains would ensure that policy makers want to completely cut-off trade. However, there are many historical examples of trade between warring states carrying on during wartime, including strategic goods that directly affect the ability of the enemy to carry out the war.[8] For example, in the Anglo-Dutch Wars, British insurance companies continued to insure enemy ships and paid to replace ships that were being destroyed by their own army.[9] Even during WW2, there are numerous examples of American firms continuing to trade strategic goods with Nazi Germany.[10] Barbieri and Levy argue that these examples and their own statistical analysis suggest that the outbreak of war does not radically reduce trade between enemies, and when it does, it often quickly returns to pre-war levels after the war has concluded.[11] In response to this result, Anderton and Carter conducted an interrupted time-series study on the effect war has on trade in which they analysed 14 major power wars and 13 non-major power wars. Seven of the non-major power wars negatively impacted trade (although only four of these reductions were significant), but in the major war category, all results bar one showed a reduction of trade during wartime and a quick return to pre-war levels at its conclusion.[12] Accompanying this contradictory finding one must take into account that even if war does not radically reduce trade, if a state believes that it does then potential opportunity cost would still figure in their calculations. Variables that Impact the Pacifying Effect of Economic Interdependence The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that the pacifying effect of economic interdependence is not constant. It achieves this via a discussion of the effect of changes in a number of variables pertaining to how and what a state trades. Once it is established that changes in such variables may alter the effect of economic interdependence on the likelihood of conflict, Pinker’s statement (that the level of trade between the US and China makes conflict unlikely) can be considered to be an over-simplification. One variable is the relative levels of economic dependence. Some argue that asymmetry of trade can increase the chances of conflict if the trade is more important to one state than it is to the other; their resolve would not be reduced by the same degree. The less dependent state would be far more willing than its adversary to initiate a conflict.[13] An example is the possibility of the prevalent idea in China that ‘Japan needs China more than China needs Japan’ leading to China becoming more assertive in Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute.[14] It is important to recognize that all trade is asymmetric in one fashion or another. It is radical asymmetry that one has to fear, which at the moment does not appear to be the case in the China-Japan or US-China case. Another variable is the specifics of what is being traded. A study by Dorussen suggests that the pacifying effect of trade is less evident if the trade consists of raw materials and agriculture but stronger if the trade consists of manufactured goods. Even within the category of manufactured goods there are differences in effect. Mass consumer goods yield the strongest pacifying results whilst high-technology sectors such as electronics and highly capital-intensive sectors such as transport and metal industries tend to have a relatively weak effect.[15] If it is a sector with alternative trade avenues then embargos and boycotts as a result of conflict will have far less effect.[16] The rule is that the more inelastic the import demand, the higher the opportunity cost and the smaller the probability of conflict.[17] According to these studies, trade still generally reduces the likelihood of conflict however it is by no means homogeneous in its effects. Additionally, the opportunity costs are not the same for importers and exporters. Dorussen’s study suggests that increased trade in oil tends to make the exporters more hostile and the importers friendlier in relations to their foreign policy.[18] Taking this framework into account, in 2014 China’s top five exports to the US (computers, broadcasting equipment, telephones and office machine parts) all fell under the category of electronics,[19] whilst the US’s top five exports to China (air and/or spacecraft, soybeans, cars, integrated circuits and scrap copper) were all either high-capital intensive sectors or raw materials and agriculture.[20] According to Dorussen’s study, these exports should not yield the strongest possible conflict reducing results, which could impact the validity of Pinker’s statement. Copeland presents another variable, namely expectations of trade. Copeland argues that if a highly dependent state expects future trade to be high, decision makers will behave as many liberals predict and treat war as a less appealing option. However if there are low expectations of future trade, then a highly dependent state will attach a low or even negative value to continued peaceful relations and war would become more likely.[21] As an example, he points out that despite high levels of trade in 1914 German leaders believed that rival great powers would attempt to undermine this trade in the future, so a war to secure control over raw materials was in the interests of German long-term security.[22] Via this framework, if the US began to believe that in future years they would be less dependent on China’s economy, or if it became apparent that a US-China trade war was about to take place, there would be a sharp rise in the probability of conflict. The final variable this essay will discuss relates to the differences between status quo and revisionist states. Most empirical analyses of economic interdependence tend to group together states as different as the United States, Pakistan, Australia, Germany and China and assume that variations in their behaviour would be the same.[23] Papayoanou on the other hand, argues that when analysing the effects of economic interdependence it is useful to differentiate the effects on great power states and states with revisionist aspirations.[24] If a status quo power has strong economic ties with revisionist state there will be interest groups who advocate engagement and who believe that confrontational stances will threaten the political foundation of economic links. This will constrain the response of the status quo state.[25] One can see evidence of such an interest group in the US, a group Friedberg describes as the Shanghai coalition, who he argues advocate engagement with China at the expense of balancing.[26] A study by Fordham and Kleinberg backs up this argument as they find that US business elites who benefit from trade with China tend to see little benefit in limiting the growth of Chinese power.[27] A 21st Century revisionist power is far less likely to be a democracy, and therefore, interest groups will influence the leadership far less. This means an authoritarian revisionist power will be working under fewer constraints and will be able to take a more aggressive stance.[28] This appears to be the case in China where rather than having domestic constraints on taking an aggressive stance against Japan, one of their biggest trading partners, grassroots nationalism has made explicit cooperation a domestically risky option.[29] There are many indicators to suggest that China is a revisionist power willing to wage war. Lemke and Werner argue that an extraordinary growth of military expenditures’ reveals when a state is dissatisfied with the status quo.[30] Data provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute certainly indicates that China qualifies as its military expenditure has nominally increased by 1270% between 1995 and 2015.[31] Additionally, the military modernization appears to be aimed at capabilities to contest US primacy in East Asia.[32] Much like German strategists recognized that Britain was operating under significant domestic constraints, China could realize the same of the US.[33] This is not to say that Chinese decision-makers would be cavalier about making a decision that would be to the detriment its economy. A crash in the Chinese economy due to the loss of exports to the US could potentially undermine the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist party and endanger the regime. However, the view that China is a revisionist power indicates that good trade relations alone will not result in a low probability of conflict. Realist Arguments Pertaining to Dominance of Strategic Interests Having established that if the pacifying effect of trade does exist, it can rise or fall depending on changes in a series of variables this essay proceeds to deal with realist theories arguing that trade has a negligible or even negative effect on the likelihood of conflict. Buzan argues that noneconomic factors contribute far more to major phenomena than liberal theorists usually cite to support their theory.[34] There is evidence of the primacy of strategic interests in Masterson’s 2012 study on the relationship between China’s economic interdependence and political relations with its neighbours. The study concluded that as economic interdependence with neighbouring states increased the likelihood of conflict did indeed decrease, but that the impact was minimal when compared to the impact of relative power capabilities. In other words, political and military issues dominated interstate relations. Growth in power disparities were associated with decreases in dyadic political relations that were greater than the increase caused by economic interdependence.[35] If the pacifying effect of trade can rise and fall so can the provocative effect of strategic interests. It is important to distinguish between the existence of a strategic interest and a situation of unbearable strategic vulnerability. China and the US have many opposing strategic interests, but neither is in a strategically vulnerable position. For example, China shares many borders, but none present the same threat of invasion that Tsarist Russia did to Imperial Germany as none of the current maritime tensions between China, Japan, and the US equate to a matter of national survival.[36] This is crucial as some believe that for a crisis to escalate to a major war an actor who is isolated and believes that history is conspiring against them is needed. Only this actor would take an existential risk to try and offset their strategic vulnerability.[37] Imperial Germany fit this description, but neither China nor the US does. This is largely due to the geography of the region. The tension between the US, China and Japan are over maritime regions. Maritime issues still relate to national interests but, as Krause points out, “Land armies are still the only forces that can conquer and hold territory.”[38] Taking this into account one can argue that the benefits of US-China trade are, for each state, currently greater than the benefits of pursing strategic benefits via force, but this situation will only remain as long as the situation does not become one of unbearable strategic vulnerability. Realist Arguments Pertaining to the Undermining of Deterrence Having established that scenarios exist where strategic interests and vulnerabilities have a greater effect on the likelihood of war than economic interdependence, this essay will now evaluate arguments that economic interdependence can increase the likelihood of conflict through the undermining of deterrence. The argument proceeds as follows: if economic interdependence constrains the ability or willingness of a state to use its military, security is lowered as the state now has a weakened ability to engage in deterrence and defensive alliances. Deterrence relies on the ability of a state to make credible threats and defensive alliances rely on credible promises to protect one’s allies.[39] Credibility is defined as the product of the operational capability to follow through with a threat and the communication of resolve to use force.[40] What is at risk here is that if economic interconnectivity interferes with the communication of resolve to use force then states may end up with a way that neither side expected or wanted. Some argue that it was such a failure to communicate resolve that resulted in the beginning of WW1. Indeed, Jolly claims that: “The Austrians had believed that vigorous actions against Serbia and a promise of German support would deter Russia: the Russians had believed that a show of strength against Austria would both check the Austrians and deter Germany. In both cases, the bluff had been called and the three countries were faced with the military consequences of their actions.”[41] The risk in the US-China case would be that the interest groups described earlier would prevent the US from effectively communicating its resolve to use force if China were to cross a redline. The flaw in this argument lies in the fact that whilst interest groups might push back against public statements outlining redlines; the US has many less overt options available to it to communicate resolve. Modern technology and the forms of interconnectivity have resulted in many more lines of communication between China and the US than adversaries had access to in 1914. Private meetings, electronic communication and numerous other methods of communication have the capability to be candid without being visible to interest groups. It is for this reason that this essay discounts the theory that Sino-American economic interdependence results in a reduction of deterrence and therefore increases the likelihood of conflict. Conclusion This essay has shown that the strength of the pacifying effect of economic interdependence is subject to change depending on a series of dynamic variables. It has also demonstrated that the strength of the conflict provoking effects of strategic interests can change depending on whether the strategic interest amounts to a situation of unbearable strategic vulnerability. It has discounted the theory that interdependence leads to a higher chance of conflict through an erosion of credibility. To sum up, trade does seem to reduce the likelihood of conflict but should not be seen as a deterministic factor as strategic interests, and vulnerabilities also have a large effect. There is no hard rule as to what will be the driving factor as the nature of economic interdependence and of strategic factors impact their relative values. Accordingly, Pinker’s statement that the trade between the US and China makes war exceptionally unlikely is simplistic and misleading because it fails to account for a wide array of variables that can radically change the likelihood of a Sino-American war. An intellectually honest thesis would insist upon a comprehensive approach in which the level of economic activity is simply one of many variables that is required.

### Impact---AT: Pharma---1AR

#### Mergers thump---innovation low now

**Fassbender 16** (Melissa Fassbender, writer, Outsourcing-Pharma, October 2016, "Is industry consolidation stifling pharma innovation?," http://www.outsourcing-pharma.com/Preclinical-Research/Is-industry-consolidation-stifling-pharma-innovation)

In a year of “merger mania,” researchers suggest the elimination of competition is reducing innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. Earlier this year, PwC told us that this so-called “merger mania” could leave strategic contract research organizations (CROs) vulnerable in 2016. In fact, mergers topped the research institute’s annual list of top health industry issues. “Over the past couple years [we have] seen a tremendous amount of acquisition,” said James Prutow, advisory partner, PcW. And as M&A increases, researchers at the Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Germany, Joel Stiebale and Justus Haucap, suggest innovation does the opposite. According to the researchers, within the sample of pharmaceutical companies, innovation activities – which were measured by patents and R&D expenditures – decline substantially, both for the merged entity and among its non-merging competitors after M&As. “While a reduction in innovation of merging firms could in principle be due to efficient elimination of duplicated R&D, our results for competitors indicate that innovation declines due to a reduction of competition induced by mergers,” Stiebale told us. For the researchers, these results raise concerns about the negative consequences for patients in the long run, given the rate of M&A in the industry**.**

#### Pricing pressure now---patent cliff and public backlash

Selina McKee 17, Pharma Times, Global drug sales forecast to take a downturn, <http://www.pharmatimes.com/news/global_drug_sales_forecast_to_take_a_downturn_1196326>, DOA: 9-15-17, y2k

For the first time in 10 years global sales of pharmaceuticals are forecast by Evaluate to take a downturn because of growing pricing pressures.

Analysts at the group are projecting that sales will hit $1.06 trillion in 2022, down from the $1.12 trillion forecast last year for the same period.

The fall also marks the first time in a decade of Evaluate analysis that total drug sales have failed to beat previous year forecasts, the group noted.

“The continued political and public scrutiny over pricing of both the industry’s new and old drugs is not going to go away and we are starting to feel the impact now,” said Antonio Iervolino, head of forecasting at Evaluate.

“Market access is becoming harder,” and “the increasing cost of taking a novel therapy to market, now at $4 billion over the last 10 years puts additional pressure on the productivity of the industry and its longer term sustainability,” he added.

Cancer immunotherapies like Keytruda (pembrolizumab) and Opdivo (nivolumab) are expected to help drive the sector to its expected trillion dollar sales target, while orphan drugs are now set to make up a third of pharma sales by 2022 despite questions over their cost, according to the World Preview report.

In other headline predictions: patent expiries could wipe out $194 billion worth of pharma sales during 2016-2022, potentially signalling a second patent cliff; AbbVie’s Humira (adalimumab) will continue to be the leading product in the USA in 2022, with sales of $12.0 billion; and Keytruda is due to knock off Opdivo as the top-selling PD-1/PD-L1 product.

### 2AC- Prices Turn

#### USMCA skyrockets drug prices.

Wirtz & Kaplan 19 --- Veronika J. Wirtz and Warren A. Kaplan, professors at the Boston University School of Public Health and research fellows at Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center, ("'Big Pharma' is the big winner of the USMCA," 6-23-2019, TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/449741-big-pharma-is-the-big-winner-of-the-usmca, accessed 7-1-2019) bm

The longstanding debate in the United States on its sky-high prescription drug prices and access to health care is raging where you might least expect it — within the pages of President Trump’s new trade deal: the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). Critics of the USMCA are very concerned that it would increase medicine prices in North America and strengthen the hand of one of the world's most powerful industries. At Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center and School of Public Health, we have been studying the impact of trade treaties on access to medicines and can confirm that there is real truth to these concerns. They require policy action. At issue is is a section of the USMCA that would protect pharmaceutical companies with new biologics from generic competition, so-called "biosimilars." Biologic medicines come from living cells that contain proteins and other materials that can treat diseases and conditions like cancer, rheumatoid arthritis and multiple sclerosis. “Biosimilar” medicines are similarly composed drugs that are approved for marketing when presenting data demonstrating that there is no clinically meaningful difference in their safety, quality and efficacy from the original biologic. Biologics have been found to be the most significant driver of prescription medicine prices. Citing a report by IQVIA Institute, Forbes magazine reported that “biologic drugs represented 2 percent of all U.S. prescriptions, but 37 percent of net drug spending. Since 2014, biologic drugs account for nearly all of the growth in net drug spending: 93 percent of it, in fact.” For this reason, many have argued to lower the number of years for biologic exclusivity, not increase them. Even though only 2 percent of patients in the U.S. use biologic medicines, they represent 40 percent of total prescribing drug expenditure. It has been estimated that biosimilar medicine costs on average 30-percent less than the originator biologic medicine. Promotion of biosimilar medicines in the U.S. could save consumers billions of dollars. According to Federal Drug Administration Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, the anticompetitive tactics used by manufacturers of biologic medicines are one reason market entry of biosimilar medicines is so slow. A new tactic is the USMCA, which under Article 20 F. 14 would grant at least a 10-year “test data” exclusivity period for new biologics. Currently, Canada has an eight-year test data exclusivity period and Mexico has a five-year limit, so the USMCA would force both countries to increase this period. Granting exclusivity essentially gives a pharmaceutical company monopoly rights that free the firm from competition and allows it to charge higher prices than it would under competitive conditions. In a comprehensive review of the literature, we find that, generally, exclusivity rules like these in past trade agreements have tended to raise the prices of medicines. In fact, in a study we did specific to biologics, we found that provisions that protect biologics in the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement increased the unit price of biologics in Chile. In many ways, these measures are a form of mercantilism for the interests of firms in leading economic sectors, rather than "free trade" that would create more competition and lower prices. Indeed, the pharmaceutical industry is the most active lobby group when it comes to trade agreements. One analysis of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) — a deal that was scrapped — stated that it ended up having many of the same provisions for pharmaceuticals and biologics that the USMCA has. That analysis by Sunlight Foundation found that pharmaceutical companies and their associations mentioned the TPP in 251 separate lobbying reports — two-and-a-half times more than the next-most active industry, the auto sector. Pharmaceutical companies argue that since test data is so expensive to produce, it is an unfair advantage to let other companies rely on that data without cost. Biologics research and development is supposedly a higher-risk endeavor, with: higher capital costs, higher material costs, greater manufacturing costs and uncertainties, longer development times, and lower late-stage success rates compared to biosimilar drugs. According to pharma, a failure to include substantial data exclusivity as part of a statutory framework for “biosimilars” would undermine incentives to invest in biomedical innovation and thus would slow progress in the development of breakthrough therapies for patients suffering from currently untreatable conditions. Recent research published in Nature Biotechnology calls this rationale into question. The authors found no evidence that developing biologic drugs was more time-intensive than traditional small-molecule (biosimilar) medicines. The study's lead author wrote: "Our study shows that biologic and small molecule drugs take a similar amount of time to develop through clinical trials. Policies intended to extend exclusivity periods for biologics, as Canada is now doing due to the USMCA trade deal, should not be justified by pointing to longer pre-market development times for biologic drugs." Given the new evidence that developing biologic drugs is not more time-intensive, it is necessary to reconsider the period of market exclusivity for such innovation that would not unduly favor one type over others. Whatever reward for innovation the policymakers choose, it should not impede access to such innovation for those who most need it.

#### The impact is 125 thousand deaths per year

Joe Harpaz 19. "Price Transparency: Why Are Drug Prices Such A Bitter Pill to Swallow?". Forbes. 5-17-2019. https://www.forbes.com/sites/joeharpaz/2019/05/17/price-transparency-why-are-drug-prices-such-a-bitter-pill-to-swallow/#5ef23479396d

If we’re ever going to lower the exorbitant costs Americans pay for healthcare in the U.S., we need to start looking at the problem holistically. While drug prices are often in the news, it’s not the only challenge American’s face. In fact, while nearly a quarter of the population has trouble paying prescription drug prices, medical bills are an even bigger issue, as they are now the leading cause of bankruptcy in the U.S. Identifying and treating one symptom of the problem isn’t going to cure the underlying epidemic. Consider, for example, what happens when a patient skips filling their prescription. As former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop once said, “Drugs don’t work in patients who don’t take them.” By one estimate, lack of drug adherence causes approximately 125,000 deaths per year in the U.S. and least 10 percent of hospitalizations. Besides the loss of life, this is estimated to cost the American health care system between $100 billion and $289 billion a year.

#### Rising costs crush US economic leadership---extinction

Mathew Burrows 16, Director @ Atlantic Council’s Strategic Foresight Initiative; 28-year career in the CIA and State Department; PhD in European History @ Cambridge, “Global Risks 2035,” September, <http://espas.eu/orbis/sites/default/files/generated/document/en/Global_Risks_2035_web_0922.pdf>

The multilateralist global system that the United States and the West built after the end of the Second World War was premised on an economically strong United States and West. In 1945, the United States was the only victor that was not completely devastated. World War II had brought the country out of the Great Depression, and the US GDP constituted more than 50 percent of the world’s total. Into the twenty-first century, the members of the Group of Seven (G7) were the world’s political and economic heavyweights. It has only been in the past several years that the collective GDP of the developing world—led by China—has surpassed the developed world’s. Even as non-Western powers grow, it is psychologically hard for the West to think about relinquishing its reins. Demographically, the West has, for a long time, been in the minority. What’s more recent is the aging of the Western population (analyzed in chapter 2), which is already occurring in Japan and Europe, beginning to squeeze the availability of resources for anything but health, social security, and interest payments on debt. Unless healthcare becomes far more efficient, the US economy will be overburdened with healthcare and pension costs as the “baby boomer” generation ages. Healthcare constitutes a whopping 18 percent of the US GDP—significantly more than is the case for other industrialized countries—without necessarily providing better results. With more going to health and pensions, there will be less capacity for defense and military spending. The United States is the biggest military spender, but China is increasing its portion of worldwide military spending, while the worldwide share of European NATO members is diminishing. China’s military probably will not rival the United States’ power-projection capabilities even by 2035, but it will have greater anti-access and denial powers. In a military contest, China may never be able to deliver a knockout blow, but it could tarnish the US image of military invincibility in a conventional state-on-state contest held in its region. Equally, a confrontation that results in a Chinese humiliation could set back China’s aspirations for regional leadership, if not trigger a domestic legitimacy crisis for the Communist Party leadership. Biggest Problem Is Domestic The biggest psychological blow to ordinary Western citizens has been their sagging standard of living (more analysis in chapter 1). Despite a much better record of overall growth in the United States since the 2008 financial crisis, those with median incomes have taken a hit Worrisome for future US growth potential has been the drop in the labor-participation rate, from the 67 percent range before the 2008 financial crisis to 62-63 percent in the years since. The labor-participation rate was destined to drop due to a growing numbers of retirees, but much of the current sharp decrease comes from unskilled males in their prime working years—forties and early fifties—dropping out. Additionally, many younger women are not entering or staying in the job market. Global Trends 2030 looked at two scenarios for future US growth—one in which the United States maintained or slightly increased its average 2.5 percent pre-2008 growth rate, or one in which growth would slow to an average of 1.5 percent a year. In the first, there would still be the global economic shift to China. On the other hand, the 2.5 percent average growth would help boost average living standards, engendering a “feel-good” factor, which would make more Americans interested in reengaging with world issues.91 Given the record of slower growth and labor-force decline since the 2008 financial crisis, the likelihood of the second scenario is increasing. That scenario anticipated lower growth rates—which accelerated declines in average living standards—making it harder to continue trade-liberalization efforts. Indeed, the IMF warned in June 2016 that the United States faces potentially significant longer-term challenges to strong and sustained growth, saying, “concerted policy actions are warranted, sooner rather than later… focusing on the causes and consequences of falling labor force participation, an increasingly polarized income distribution, high levels of poverty, and weak productivity.”92 Moreover, it is not as if traditional US partners—Europe and Japan—are doing much better. Japan and many European countries are aging faster than the United States, eliminating labor-force growth as a driver of future economic growth. Europe’s and Japan’s economic performances have been declining since the 1990s. In Europe, the public discontent with high unemployment and declining incomes has helped to spur the rise of antiestablishment far-right and populist parties that want to weaken the EU and transatlantic ties. Even in richer European countries, such as Germany, a backlash has been growing against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), out of fear that Europe’s rewards would be meager and European standards would be diluted. McKinsey Global Institute, for example, believes a “return to sustained growth of 2-to-3 percent” is possible for Europe, but would require many politically difficult reforms.93 These include: reducing dependence on imports (much coming from Russia) for crude oil and natural gas; fostering a more vibrant digital economy; increasing workforce participation by the elderly, women, and migrants; and promoting flexibility in labor markets. China now spends a greater share of its GDP on research and development than does Europe. The latest OECD figures show that Europe now spends even less than the rest of the OECD.94 In both the United States and Europe, there is increasing anti-immigrant sentiment despite documented economic benefits from immigration. According to EU Commission Employment Analyst Dr. Jorg Peschner, productivity, by itself, will not be enough to reverse the negative employment trend absent more immigration: “EU’s productivity growth would have to double in order to keep the EU’s economy growing at the same pace as it did before the crisis started.” For employment growth to remain positive as long as possible, improving the labor participation of women, low-educated people, and migrants will also have to be a priority. In the United States, many of the new businesses started every year are started by first- or second-generation immigrants.95 Politically, there has been a large rise in support for right-wing and populist parties in the United States and Europe, undermining traditional parties. The gaps, for example, between the leadership and supporters in the US Republican and UK Tory and Labor Parties have been particularly evident in the selection of Donald Trump as presidential candidate and the June 2016 victory of the “Leave” vote in Britain. Unfortunately, there is no end of economic disruption. The job churn will continue as more and more skills and professions are automated, also increasing the potential for more “losers” from globalization, greater political polarization, and inequality. The increased competitiveness of the developing world with the West is a particular morale buster for Western middle classes who got used to ever-increasing prosperity for themselves and succeeding generations. Adapting to a new norm of economic turbulence—more prevalent in other eras—may be one of the biggest mental hurdles for Westerners. The West is used to thinking of the “Third World,” not home, as the place where economic turmoil happens. And a Multipolar Financial Architecture, Too Historically, US and Western power has rested on having a monopoly on reserve currencies and a Western-dominated financial system. In 2035, the dollar will be the biggest reserve currency, but its share of global financial transactions is expected to drop from 60 percent today to 45 percent. The euro will probably remain the second reserve currency, while the Chinese yuan or RMB—which became a part of the IMF benchmark-currency basket in 2015—will become a third reserve currency, accounting for 10 to 15 percent of global finance in two decades’ time.96 The financial architecture will also become more regionalized. The central role played by the financial centers of New York and London will also diminish, and a multitiered financial architecture will develop. Following the UK Brexit, those centers’ share in financial intermediation will decrease, as a second pole of global finance forms in the Eurozone. A third pole will develop in East Asia and Southeast Asia. Gradually, a growing share of global financial resources will be concentrated in those regional clusters. As with the growth of regional trade, the regional clusters will be more self-encapsulated, spurred by rising domestic demand in China and other developing countries with growing middle classes. With the role of electronic money likely to grow, the traditional banking system will probably also undergo major revision, with potential impacts on governmental powers. A more multipolar reserve system and regionalized financial architecture should lessen risks and contribute to greater stability. But the large-scale technological innovations—some of which contributed to the 2008 breakdown—will continue, making global finance still volatile. Emerging-market countries with fragmentary regulatory regimes will be particularly prone to suffering financial crises. The aging-population factor also increases risks to public finances. This report anticipates modestly increased volatility, lower than what occurred in the global economy during the 1890s through the 1940s, but higher than in the 1950s and 1960s—more of a continuation of what has been the trend line since the mid-1980s. Are There Alternative Visions to Western Order? Four years ago, when Global Trends 2030 was published, the answer was largely no.97 Increasingly, the facts on the ground would suggest otherwise. They do not add up to a cohesive plan to substitute wholesale all Western institutions and practices. However, they clearly indicate that there are some no-go areas, particularly those connected to regime change, democracy promotion, state control over NGOs, and maintaining sovereignty. Russia and China, in particular, see themselves as great powers and, as such, believe they have special rights to dominance in their regions. However, as other powers like India develop, it is likely that they will see themselves as regional powers with inherent prerogatives. It is worth recalling the United States’ expansive Manifest Destiny and nineteenth-century Monroe Doctrine, claiming special rights to determine the future of the Western Hemisphere. The Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) has been closely following Beijing’s efforts to build a network of parallel structures to existing international organizations. It has concluded that China “is not seeking to demolish or exit from current international organizations…It is constructing supplementary— in part complementary, in part competitive—channels for shaping the international order beyond Western claims to leadership.”98 As the accompanying chart indicates, China’s shadow network of alternative international structures encompasses everything from financial and economic partnerships (the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) to full-blown political groupings like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), and the BRICS association of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.99 Moreover, there is increasing cooperation among many of the emerging powers—beyond just authoritarians—to not just limit what they see as Western meddling in domestic affairs, but to go on the attack globally. According to a recent academic study, the “Big Five” authoritarian states of China, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela “have taken more coordinated and decisive action to contain democracy on the global level.” They have sought to “alter the democracy and human-rights mechanisms of key rules-based institutions, including the Organization of American States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and international bodies concerned with the governance of the Internet.”100 How durable are these preferences for nondemocracy and state control? By 2035, if not sooner (in the case of Venezuela), some of the now-authoritarian states could be liberalized, and the perceived threat posed by Western civil-society NGOs may ease. However, China and Russia are more likely than not to want to dominate their regions. Nationalism and democracy have been shown to be highly compatible. It is not clear that an even more powerful China or India would defer to Western leadership of the global order, even if both sides’ values in other areas begin to converge. What Kind of Post-Western World? Clearly, there is a need to plan for a world that will not have the West as its big economic powerhouse—a prospect hard for Western elites and publics to conceive of, despite a decade or more of publicity about the “rise of the rest.” According to a recent survey, Europeans and Americans are more comfortable with each other than they are with anybody else. Although a majority of Europeans said, in the most recent German Marshall Fund transatlantic-trends polling, that they would like to see their country take an approach more independent from the United States, both Americans and Europeans still prefer each other over more Russian or Chinese leadership in the world. The Obama administration—considered among the most multilateralist of recent administrations— campaigned hard in 2015 to convince Europeans not to join China’s proposed Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB). It was as if the United States was against any governance structure not “made in the USA,” even when those running the AIIB have made clear their intentions of operating with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. More and more, the talk among Western elites is about locking in as much as possible the status quo, which favors the West, so that it will be harder for the newcomers to overcome. The TPP was sold as a way to set the rules before China gains much more power. A former Obama administration official advised that now might be the best time to undertake UN Security Council reform, before China and other uncooperative powers become more powerful. “A new US administration may be able to advance a proposal to address the Security Council’s anachronistic makeup while perpetuating a council that Washington can work with.”101 For Westerners, the challenge will be to plan for a future that will not be solely run by them, but which they can live with. Handovers have been historically difficult and fraught—more often than not, decided by bloody contests. One could envisage different scenarios, some already described in the earlier chapter on conflict, of military contests between the United States and China, or the United States and China with Russia, or the United States with NATO against Russia. Without delivering a knockout blow by one side or the other, these contests would most likely pit West against East, creating something akin to a new Cold War. Even if there were a knockout blow by the United States against China, it is hard to imagine a defeated China deferring permanently to the West. Its population has been imbued with such a narrative about the injustices by the West against China that any defeat or setback would be confirmation that the United States and West are dead set against a rising China. Perhaps the most harmful effect of such a contest would be to convince both sides that neither is trustworthy. For the non-West, it would confirm the suspicion that the West does not want to relinquish its leadership position. For the West, it would make it harder to ever reach out and help establish a truly global system. Need for a Second-Generation US and Western Leadership Model War is not, and should not be, inevitable as the West struggles with the growing clout of China and other developing states on the world stage. Unlike during other transitions, the tools exist for ensuring more peaceful outcomes. They will require Western acquiescence to greater roles for the developing world to set and implement new rules of the road for the international order. A key feature of the post-1945 US design for the world order is its multilateralist structures. Many of these operate below most people’s radar. This plumbing of the international system has enabled the daily functioning of globalization. To keep it viable, China, as well as other developing countries, must be accorded more representation. There are too many long-term risks involved, for example, in China having only the equivalent of France’s voting rights in the IMF, when it is the first or second economic power in the world. This is how resentments are nurtured—all the more dangerous in China’s case because of its underlying “century of humiliation” mental complex. As emerging technologies come online, the lack of a truly global institutional framework could be particularly dangerous. Assuring the future security of the Internet is particularly important in this regard, because all the new emerging technologies—bio, 3D printing, robotics, big data—take for granted a secure, global Internet. Everyone loses if cyber crime and cyber terrorism undermine the Internet. In the worstcase scenarios, in which cyber crime proliferates or strong national borders fragment the Internet, an Atlantic Council study, as mentioned, found that the economic costs could be as much as $90 trillion out to 2030, in addition to the risk of open conflict.102 Besides bringing the emerging powers into leadership roles in the panoply of multilateral institutions, the United States will need to temper its often “exemptionalist” stance to ensure the survival of the multilateralist order. According to the Council on Foreign Relations’ Patrick Stewart, a prominent scholar of global governance, one of the persistent paradoxes of the post-1945 decades has been that the “United States is at once the world’s most vocal champion of a rules-based international order and the power most insistent on opting out of the constraints that it hopes to see binding on others.”103 No country has the networks and connections that the United States does, but the system is now polycentric, rather than unipolar, and others resent the “exceptional” privileges that the United States claims. The Global Trends works have talked about the need for a new model of US global leadership. The United States needs to be guiding the international system as a “first among equals,” and willing to play by its own rules. Paradoxically, there is likely to be no vibrant global-governance system without US and Western leadership, but too much domineering behavior could doom it. Even if the United States adapted its global role, this is not to say that the tensions and differences with many emerging powers would all disappear, or that the governance system would function seamlessly. In addition to the growing number of new state actors, the increasing importance of nonstate actors adds a new complexity to the functioning of global institutions. Moreover, there are clear-cut differences between the West and emerging powers on values-based issues, such as democracy promotion and the responsibility to protect. Many developing-country publics still resent Western colonialism and equate any intrusion with past historical wrong. They point to the 2011 humanitarian intervention in Libya, for example, as cover for the Western goal of regime change. Hence, the UN Security Council failure to stop the fighting in Syria, with more than two hundred thousand killed and 7.6 million displaced. Russia and China want to make a stand against the United States and the West getting their way and ousting the Assad regime. On the other hand, the lack of a solution smacks more of anarchy than global governance. Certainly, it shows one of the gaps that remains, and likely will remain, limiting global governance because of differences in values. The speed with which new technologies are coming online and becoming an important political, military, and economic tool—for both good and bad—carries big risks for global governance. Stewart Patrick lists four potential new technologies that “cry out for regulation”: geoengineering, drones, synthetic biology, and nanotechnology. Without some setting of rules for their operation, there is the risk of major disruptions, if not catastrophes, stemming from their abuse. The recent advances in synthetic biology lower the bar to abuse by amateurs and terrorists alike, forever affecting human DNA. Geoengineering involves planetaryscale interventions that could interfere with complex climatic systems. However cumbersome, politically unpopular, and ineffective at times, there is little alternative to increased global cooperation if one does not want to see higher risks of conflict and economic degradation. Without some sort of bolstered global governance, the West would end up with less sovereignty in a “dog-eat-dog” world, in which it was increasingly in the minority. But can the United States and the West rise to the challenge of investing in a global-governance system that will not always favor their interests on every issue? Historically, the United States could be especially generous because it was on top of the world in about everything after the Second World War. Europeans came to truly believe in pooling sovereignty and joint governance after centuries of internecine conflict. The tough economic times at home have seen US and European publics become distrustful of overarching multilateral institutions, believing the will of the United States or individual European countries will not be served. It is oftentimes easier for political leaders to fall in with the public mood rather than display leadership that might appear to work against it. The breakdown of the post-Cold War political and security order is irrevocable. Not only are there new powers—particularly China—that do not share the West’s vision of a liberal order, but Western publics themselves have turned against globalization, which has been the overall megatrend of the past three decades. The geopolitical landscape ahead will be much different. The best case is looking at multipolarity with limited multilateralism. In the worst case, that multipolarity evolves into bipolarity with China, Russia, and their partners pitted against the United States, Europe, Japan, and other allies. In that scenario, conflict would be almost inevitable.

### 1AR- High Prices kill econ

#### Rising healthcare costs affect *every economic indicator* and produce a structural drag on growth---risks national security.

Schaeffer & Goldman 17 (Leonard D. Schaeffer, professor @ USC, CEO of WellPoint, founder of Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics @ USC; with Dana Goldman, distinguished professor of Public Policy & Econ @ USC, director of Schaeffer Center, 5-22-2017, “Healthcare reforms are real prescription for American economic growth”, http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/healthcare/334573-healthcare-reforms-are-real-prescription-for-american-economic accessed 8-10-2017) bm

Businesses are wrong to blame taxes for strangling American competitiveness, he said. The real culprit is healthcare costs. Corporate taxes as a percentage of gross domestic product have actually gone down over the past 50 years and now hover at about 2 percent. Meanwhile, the American healthcare system consumes nearly 18 percent of GDP, up from 13.1 percent in 1995. Buffett’s main point was that healthcare costs are the bigger threat to business. A Kaiser Family Foundation study, for example, found that corporations now spend ~~$12,591~~ [$12.5 thousand] on average for insurance for a family of four, up 54 percent since 2005. But the danger goes much further. Healthcare costs are a threat to the entire economy, not just to business. Left to current market forces, those costs will result in higher government deficits, increased borrowing, and eventually higher taxes on everyone, both personal and corporate. By 2040, the government projects healthcare will consume one-quarter of the economy. The connection between healthcare spending and the national deficit is rarely made in congressional debate. That is not a good thing. Healthcare costs are rapidly overwhelming both state and federal budgets, while raising costs for businesses that provide health insurance to their employees. As former Congressional Budget Office head Alice Rivlin puts it, “long-run fiscal policy is health policy.” What can we do to control these costs? First, recognize that we are not getting what we think we are paying for. Spending more on healthcare does not mean better health. The RAND Health Insurance Experiment, for example, found that families provided with [free care spent nearly 50 percent more on medical care than those in high-deductible plans](http://www.rand.org/health/projects/hie.html) but did not experience any measurable differences in average population health. The [Dartmouth Atlas](http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/) tells a similar story in Medicare: regions that spend more on treatment do not have better outcomes. Evidence shows that the U.S. healthcare system is laden with fat and overpays for care, much of which is unnecessary and not evidence-based. According to Health Affairs, multiple studies have concluded that 30 percent or more of U.S. health spending is wasteful. Despite widely outspending other developed countries, we have poorer outcomes, including higher infant mortality, greater prevalence of chronic conditions and shorter lifespans. Second, accelerate a shift in focus from treatment to prevention. We know that it is cheaper to reduce high cholesterol than to repair a body after a heart attack. Similarly, we know that public health programs to reduce smoking, and deliver clean water and food, dramatically cut disease rates. Much of the money that flows to expanding hospital facilities would be better spent on social or other community-based services that sustain health rather than restore it. Third, providers, insurers and drug manufacturers need to rein in costs by redesigning how we deliver and pay for healthcare. By changing how, where and by whom preventive and curative care is delivered, and by ensuring that evidence-based care is provided, we can get better care, better outcomes and lower costs. If this is not done, political pressure for a single payer plan will increase. Buffett, for one, likes the idea. Even if single payer is ruled out, failure to control costs will likely lead to onerous new regulations throughout the healthcare sector. When we reach a point where the accumulated debt threatens the economy and, ultimately, our national security, federal and state health policy will become even more Draconian. A fiscal crisis could lead to blunt cuts in healthcare funding. If the system has not been redesigned, however, we will simply be buying less from the same poorly performing health care delivery system. Buffett put it succinctly: “Medical costs are the tapeworm of American economic competitiveness,” he said. It’s time to extract the tapeworm, and give Americans an affordable and sustainable healthcare system that will not eat them from the inside out.

### 2AC- Heg Turn

#### USMCA signals disregard for US allies---kills heg.

Gertz 18 --- Geoffrey Gertz, Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Oxford, fellow in the Global Economy and Development program at the Brookings Institution and a research associate at the Global Economic Governance Programme at the University of Oxford ("5 things to know about USMCA, the new NAFTA," 10-2-2018, Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/10/02/5-things-to-know-about-usmca-the-new-nafta/, accessed 7-1-2019) bm

While this might be a (modest) short-term victory for the U.S., it risks undermining America’s long-term interests. The fact that both Mexico (on autos) and Canada (on dairy) took some small steps to appease Trump’s demands should not be surprising—the U.S. is more important to their economies than vice versa. Does this imply Trump was right all along, that previous American trade negotiators had been foolishly taken advantage of? Hardly. Indeed, while the U.S. gained a few minor, discrete achievements in these talks, Trump’s approach in the renegotiations have likely undermined broader long-term American interests. As a global power, the U.S. has sought to exert influence by investing in “[soft power](https://www.amazon.com/Soft-Power-Means-Success-Politics/dp/1586483064),” the ability to convince other countries their own interests in fact align with those of the U.S. In seeking to squeeze a few more dimes out of Canada and Mexico, Trump is telling America’s allies that they should no longer be so inviting of American power. Since Trump’s election, [a number of U.S. allies have already taken steps to balance against U.S. power](https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/08/28/allies-they-are-waverin/?utm_term=.07c429d910ba), and diversify their interests away from America. The U.S. approach to NAFTA’s renegotiation should only accelerate this trend. In other words, the important question was never whether the U.S. could shake down its trade partners to extract some modest gains, but rather whether it should. Mexico and Canada won’t forget how the U.S. treated them—and will readjust their plans accordingly, as will other countries that observed these talks. In the long run, this will undermine America’s influence in the world.

#### Hegemony solves great power war---best empirical evidence

Brands 18 --- Hal Brands, Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, ("Choosing Primacy: U.S. Strategy and Global Order at the Dawn of the Post-Cold War Era," 2-2-2018, Texas National Security Review, https://tnsr.org/2018/02/choosing-primacy-u-s-strategy-global-order-dawn-post-cold-war-era-2/, accessed 6-13-2019) bm

Finally, there is now significant scholarship to support the idea that a primacist strategy indeed accomplished some of the most important goals the Bush administration initially set out. In a recent book, Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth provide a robust body of evidence and analysis demonstrating that the persistence of assertive American engagement did have the effect of suppressing security competitions and instability in key strategic theaters while also providing the overall climate of reassurance in which the international economy could continue to thrive.[142](https://tnsr.org/2018/02/choosing-primacy-u-s-strategy-global-order-dawn-post-cold-war-era-2/%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn142) Other scholars have noted the role of America’s post-Cold War policies in assisting the continued spread of democracy and market institutions, and in limiting nuclear proliferation in East Asia and Eastern Europe.[143](https://tnsr.org/2018/02/choosing-primacy-u-s-strategy-global-order-dawn-post-cold-war-era-2/%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn143) Not least, even consistent critics of America’s post-Cold War strategy, such as John Mearsheimer, have acknowledged that a persistent U.S. presence in key regions such as Europe and East Asia helped to avoid the major interstate wars that characterized many earlier historical eras, and to avert a rapid return to the more unstable and violent climate that many observers feared when the Cold War ended.[144](https://tnsr.org/2018/02/choosing-primacy-u-s-strategy-global-order-dawn-post-cold-war-era-2/%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn144) All of these points could, surely, be debated at length. Yet if a key premise of a primacist strategy was that assertive American engagement would help produce a more stable and liberal international order than one might otherwise have expected, then there is a defensible argument to be made that this premise, too, looks fairly good twenty-five years later. A primacist strategy has never been without its problems, from the economic costs associated with a global military presence to the fact that the United States has periodically succumbed to the temptation to overuse its tremendous power. Today, moreover, the United States faces more serious challenges to its primacy and global interests than at any other time in the post-Cold War era, from a rising China, a resurgent Russia, and an international rogues’ gallery that is more empowered and better armed than at any moment since Saddam Hussein’s defeat in 1991. Not least, there is some uncertainty as to whether American leaders and the body politic still support such an engaged and assertive strategy, and the policies and mannerisms of the Trump administration may well pose their own challenge to U.S. effectiveness and leadership on the global stage.[145](https://tnsr.org/2018/02/choosing-primacy-u-s-strategy-global-order-dawn-post-cold-war-era-2/%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn145) Yet when one considers the more constructive effects that a primacist strategy has arguably had, and the fact that some of its foundational premises have proven fairly solid over time, one does, perhaps, gain a greater degree of appreciation for the logic of America’s post-Cold War strategy, and for the Bush administration’s role in shaping that strategy at a moment of great promise and uncertainty in international affairs.

# MGC 2019

## 1NC

## Internal Links

### A2 Winners Win

#### Winning doesn’t produce more wins – empirics and studies

Edwards 2013 – University Distinguished Professor of Political Science and the Jordan Chair in Presidential Studies at Texas A&M University (George C, Overreach: Leadership in the Obama Presidency, Book Review, <http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9690.html>, CR)

When Barack Obama became president, many Americans embraced him as a transformational leader who would fundamentally change the politics and policy of the country. Yet, **two years into his administration**, the public resisted his calls for support and **Congress was deadlocked over many of his major policy proposals.** How could this capable new president have difficulty attaining his goals? Did he lack tactical skills? In Overreach, respected presidential scholar George Edwards argues that **the problem was strategic**, not tactical. He finds that in President Obama's first two years in office, **Obama governed on the premise that he could create opportunities for change by persuading** the public and some **congressional Republicans to support his major initiatives.** As a result, **he proposed a large, expensive, and polarizing agenda** in the middle of a severe economic crisis. The president's proposals alienated many Americans and led to a severe electoral defeat for the Democrats in the 2010 midterm elections, undermining his ability to govern in the remainder of his term. Edwards shows that **the president's frustrations were** predictable and **the inevitable result of misunderstanding the nature of presidential power**. The author demonstrates that **the essence of successful presidential leadership is recognizing and exploiting existing opportunities, not in creating them through persuasion**. When Obama succeeded in passing important policies, it was by mobilizing Democrats who were already predisposed to back him. Thus, **to** **avoid overreaching, presidents should be alert to the limitations of their power to persuade and rigorously assess the possibilities for obtaining** public and **congressional support in their environments**.

## Impacts

### Agriculture US Key

#### Food price spikes trigger global conflict---U.S. ag supply is key

CCGA 17 (The Chicago Council on Global Affairs - an independent, nonpartisan think tank, “STABILITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY FOR PEACE AND PROSPERITY,” 3/30/17, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/stability-21st-century-global-food-security-peace-and-prosperity)

America is facing enormous global challenges at the beginning of 2017, including the threat of rapidly increasing **global instability, conflict, and migration as a result of inadequate global food supplies** and water scarcity. Today’s global population of 7.4 billion people is expected to grow to 8 billion by 2024 and 10 billion by 2056.1 In addition, rising incomes in many low- and middle-income countries are further increasing the demand for food to satisfy the desire for higher quality, more nutritious, and diverse diets. Yet we have never been as well equipped as we are today to respond to these challenges. Bipartisan leadership from the United States and action by the global community over the past 25 years has led to impressive results in the fight against the destabilizing forces of food insecurity. The US government, in close cooperation with the private sector and university system, is well positioned to expand its legacy of commitment to food security and not only bolster the livelihoods of millions of smallholder farmers and entrepreneurs around the world, but also open up new business opportunities and partnerships in emerging economies. Global food and nutrition security is in America’s national security and economic interests Food security promotes national security. Particularly in urban areas of low- and middle-income countries, **high food prices** and reduced access to food can trigger protests and rioting, including **armed conflict**, that lead to political and economic instability with **global consequences.**2 The global food crisis of 2007-08 demonstrated how spikes in food prices can plunge millions into hunger and deeper poverty, sparking riots that can undermine progress for years. The food price crisis hit hardest in countries with systems that were least able to respond effectively to global price volatility. For example, food price–related protests toppled governments in Haiti and Madagascar in 2007 and 2008. In 2010 and 2011 food prices and grievances related to food policy were one of the major drivers of the Arab Spring.3 Food insecurity can also be a powerful driver for migration. Despite ongoing conflicts, much of today’s global migration crisis is driven by economic factors, as millions of people flee hunger and poverty in their countries. On the other hand, countries that have achieved sustained development progress and greater food security are less susceptible to volatility and violence. Food security promotes stability and economic opportunity. Greater prosperity and economic growth in low-income countries create new and expanding markets, presenting growth opportunities for American farmers, ranchers, and businesses. For instance, in Africa alone the value of the agriculture and food sector is expected to reach $1 trillion by 2030.4 Rising incomes and changing diets are increasing demand for more diverse and nutritious foods. As economies grow, so does the demand for agricultural products, benefiting farmers locally and globally. Growing economic opportunities in the agriculture sector reach well beyond food production into sales of machinery and inputs, growth in demand for consumer packaged goods, and digital technologies for agriculture, where American companies are global leaders.

#### The US is key to world agriculture---decline causes global instability

Horwich 12 (Jeff, Interim host of Marketplace Morning Report and Rob Bailey, Royal Institute of International Affairs, “U.S. drought could have global impact on food prices,” ’12, http://www.marketplace.org/topics/world/us-drought-could-have-global-impact-food-prices)

Bailey: Well America is an **agricultural superpower** as well as a traditional global superpower, so it's the biggest producer of maize in the world, it's the biggest producer of soy beans in the world. So as soon as there's a decrease in U.S. agricultural production, that has massive effects **for the global economy**. These sorts of price impacts could ripple across economies across borders. Horwich: And geopolitically, let's just think back a few years when food prices start to rocket in some parts of the world, crazy **things can happen**. Bailey: Absolutely, if you think back to 2008 in Haiti the government actually fell as a result of riots connected to food prices. Fast forward a couple more years to 2011, the Arab Spring actually was sparked by initial protests in a number of countries **about the price of bread** because the price of wheat had gone up in response to export bans following a really bad harvest in Russia and Ukraine after a heat wave and wild fires there. Horwich: Are there any particular flash points that you are looking at this time around? Bailey: The situation in the Middle East remains much the same, there is still **huge political vulnerability to a spike in wheat prices**. The other thing that the U.S. is having a big impact on is soy bean prices. But if we see a very sharp increase soy bean prices, you can expect meat prices to rise and this could actually have implications for China, quite seriously.

#### US ag is critical to global food security and low food prices

Gore 15 (Anna Applefield Gore is a research associate with the Global Food Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “U.S. has crucial role to play in reducing world hunger” Feb. 07, 2015 http://archive.jsonline.com/news/opinion/us-has-crucial-role-to-play-in-reducing-world-hunger-b99439803z1-291123531.html) swap

The world is facing real and complex challenges to reducing global hunger, and the United States has a crucial role to play in overcoming them. The world today has more than 7 billion people, 800 million of whom do not receive enough food to be healthy, and the global population is expected to pass 9 billion by 2050. The areas of the world where populations are growing the fastest are the same areas where hunger is most prevalent: Africa and Asia. Especially in sub-Saharan Africa, food systems are not equipped to feed their current populations, never mind their rapidly expanding ones. At the same time populations are expanding, they are also becoming more urban. In 2030, two-thirds of the world's population will be urban, compounding the challenge of getting food to those who need it. Urban populations demand more processed foods and meats, which are more resource-intensive to produce. These trends will drastically increase the strain we are putting on our already limited natural resources. The rapid economic growth of cities is also causing urban migration, which pulls people from rural areas, reducing the overall number of investments in rural infrastructure. It is against this demographic backdrop that we must assess the future of the American agriculture sector. Increasingly, our food system is shared and global in nature. Currently, about 12% of food crosses borders because of trade, and that number is growing rapidly, having doubled since 2006. Agriculture is a substantial part of the U.S. economy; totaling over $115 billion in exports annually. As a global leader in agriculture, the U.S. has the potential to be a major player in getting food to those who need it and sharing its wealth of knowledge and expertise with farmers in developing countries. American foreign assistance has a history of commitments to agricultural development, which peaked in the 1960s and has subsequently declined. President Barack Obama's Feed the Future program has re-ignited that work; helping teach farmers new farming practices, giving them loans to afford new and improved inputs and making investments in rural infrastructure to improve market access. Our Food for Peace program provides more than 1 million metric tons in food aid annually to those in need, as well. But some of the most effective work in this area is simple, straightforward exchange programs between American and African farmers, in which American farmers help Africans troubleshoot and solve agricultural problems. There are many ways American farmers and agricultural experts can export their knowledge to those who need it in the developing world. The U.S. Agency for International Development's Farmer-to-Farmer program has helped more than 1 million farmers since its creation in 1985, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture has similar programs run out of its Foreign Agriculture Service. USAID also funds innovation labs and collaborative research support programs that form long-term university partnerships between American land grant institutions and African university agricultural research centers. Many agriculturally oriented non-governmental organizations have farmer exchange programs as well. In addition to reducing global hunger, these investments in agricultural development go to the core of the the United State's self-interest. We are the biggest global exporter of corn, and one of every three acres of U.S. farmland is planted for export. The global agricultural trade system is a delicate balance that requires predictability and effective diplomatic relationships in order to function. These major demographic shifts throughout the developing world will surely change the balance of global trade, and building capacity and trust in areas of growth allows the U.S. to preserve and grow its export markets. Finally, this work protects our national security interests. In 2008-'09, there were riots in over 20 countries ranging from Latin America to Europe to the Middle East due to a massive food price crisis. It is also famously recounted that the Arab Spring started when a man's produce cart business was shut down due to corrupt enforcement of agricultural policies, and he set himself on fire in protest.

#### US ag shortages go global

Edmark 15 (Dave, U of A System Division of Agriculture, “Food security vital for national interests, world markets,” Cattle News Network, http://www.cattlenetwork.com/news/food-security-vital-national-interests-world-markets)

Improving global food security should be a U.S. priority because it is the right thing to do and it will create new market opportunities for American agriculture in the long run, said Stephanie Mercier, a senior policy and advocacy adviser for the Farm Journal Foundation. A more stable world Recognizing a U.S. tradition of aiding in world food relief dating back to World War I and including the Marshall Plan after World War II, Mercier noted that encouraging food security also promotes a more stable world. “The World Bank has done research that shows a country facing extreme poverty and hunger faces a much higher probability in any given year of seeing internal conflict erupt either in the form of a civil war or a military coup,” she said. Mercier noted that the U.S. ability to help countries improve their economies has frequently led to the creation of new opportunities for U.S. exports. Fifty percent of U.S. agricultural exports go to developing countries, she said, and six of the world’s fastest growing economies are in sub-Saharan Africa.

### A2 USMCA Bad – Econ

#### USMCA boosts the economy---ITC report

Sean Higgins 2019. Senior writer for the Washington Examiner covering labor. He was previously a Washington correspondent for Investor's Business Daily., 4-18-2019, "Trump USMCA would add $68B to GDP and 176,000 jobs, independent report says," Washington Examiner, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/economy/trump-usmca-would-add-68b-to-gdp-and-176-000-jobs-independent-report-says, accessed 4-23-2019//JDi

The Trump administration's proposed U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement on trade would boost the U.S. economy by $68.2 billion and add 176,000 jobs, according to a report released Thursday by the U.S. International Trade Commission, an independent federal agency. The analysis should aid passage of the deal, which would replace the 1993 North American Free Trade Agreement but is currently stalled in Congress. The commission nevertheless said that the deal's impact would be "moderate" in light of the trade agreements already in place with Canada and Mexico. "Because NAFTA has already eliminated duties on most qualifying goods and significantly reduced nontariff measures, USMCA’s emphasis is on reducing remaining nontariff measures on trade and the U.S. economy," the report said. The deal would strengthen labor standards and rights, especially those in Mexico, increase intellectual property rights protections enjoyed by U.S. firms, and reduce the scope of the system for settling disputes between investors and individual countries, likely leading to less U.S. investment in Mexico — and freeing up capital for domestic manufacturing and mining, according to the report. The projected positive effect would be small, though. The Trump administration is trying to booster support the deal's approval by Congress and get it passed by this summer. It released a report Thursday touting the deal as [adding 76,000 jobs to the domestic auto industry](https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/economy/usmca-to-create-76-000-auto-industry-jobs-white-house-says). U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer said the report's findings "validate" the administration's decision to renegotiate NAFTA. "This report is an important step forward in gaining congressional approval of the USMCA ... There can be no doubt that the USMCA is a big win for America’s economy," he said. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., has been noncommittal about bringing it up for a vote, however, and [many Democrats](https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/economy/democrats-dig-in-on-nafta-replacement-as-mexico-move-forward) have argued the administration should reopen talks with Canada and Mexico. Business groups said the study showed that Congress should embrace the deal. "This agreement will level the playing field for manufacturers in the United States and support the 2 million American manufacturing jobs that depend on our exports to Canada and Mexico,” said Linda Dempsey, vice president of international economic affairs for the National Association of Manufacturers.

## AFF

### No Spillover

**Partisan fights dont spill over - Kavanaugh proves that issues are compartmentalized**

**Pergram 18** — Chad Pergram, Senior Congressional Reporter (“Amid Kavanaugh cacophony, Congress forges bipartisan agreements on key issues,” Fox News, October 13th, Available Online at https://www.foxnews.com/politics/amid-kavanaugh-cacophony-congress-forges-bipartisan-agreements-on-key-issues, Accessed 10-13-2018)

Sen. Jeff Flake, R-Ariz., fretted that “tribalism” was on the rise in American politics and “is ruining us.” “I’m so tempted to use the ‘l’ word,” said Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-NY, on the floor when describing the tactics of Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky. “But he’s my friend.” Schumer instead tempered the aspersion directed at his Senate counterpart as a “blatant falsehood.” “Boy, ya’ll want power!” spat Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., across the dais at Democrats at the second confirmation hearing for Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh.. “God, I hope you never get it.” After delivering his closing floor speech in opposition to Kavanaugh, Sen. Ed Markey, D-Mass., lamented that the Senate has “hit rock bottom.” Lawmakers shredded civility like a Banksy painting at Sotheby’s during the confirmation fight over Brett Kavanaugh. Angst and enmity often consume Capitol Hill when big issues split the sides. The rise of former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, R-Ga., and the 1994 Republican takeover of the House. Multiple government shutdowns. The impeachment of President Clinton. The Bush administration’s handling of the Iraq War. The skirmish to approve ObamaCare. A monumental 2011 fight over the debt ceiling. The 2013 government shutdown over repealing ObamaCare. And now, Kavanaugh. The rancor spilled over the Kavanaugh confirmation ranks right up there with some of the most intense imbroglios in Washington over the past quarter century. You know it’s tense in Congress when the workers who operate the trolleys which shuttle people back and forth from the Russell Senate Office Building and the Capitol start browbeating aides and journalists. Sen. Lisa Murkowski, R-Alaska, is the lone Republican to oppose Kavanaugh. She didn’t cast a ballot for or against the nominee. Instead, Murkowski “paired” her vote with Sen. Steve Daines, R-Mont. Daines backed Kavanaugh but couldn’t cast a ballot due his daughter’s wedding. So neither registered their view on the Senate floor. Still, President Trump and former Alaska Gov. Sarah Palin (R) directed invective at Alaska’s senior senator. New York Yankees fans were more gentle with Aaron Boone after some of his managerial decisions in the playoffs than some Republicans were with Murkowski. “The Senate is no place for sissies,” said Murkowski. “The feelings are pretty raw.” She added that Senate’s ebb “feels lower than any place I have ever been.” Murkowski huddled with a scrum off reporters in the Senate Reception Room just off the floor after the historic confirmation vote. A reporter asked Murkowski what she thought about when listening to the screams from protesters, blasting senators as they cast their ballots inside the chamber. “I was closing my eyes and praying,” said Murkowski. “Praying for them. Praying for us. I’m praying for the country. We need prayers. We need healing.” Congress is a hemorrhaging gash right now, bleeding odium and hostility….. Or…. Is it? Step back from the Kavanaugh cacophony. Examine what lawmakers from both parties in both chambers accomplished in September and early October, with virtually zero fanfare. Amid the turmoil, Congress approved the first revamp of national aviation policy in years. The Senate approved the final version of the legislation 93-6. This came after a staggering six extensions due to bickering and disagreement. Then, Congress approved a sweeping, bipartisan measure to combat opioid abuse. The House okayed the package 393-8. The Senate adopted the measure 98-1. And, there was no government shutdown. The House and Senate came to terms on two bipartisan bills which funded five of the 12 annual spending bills which operate the government. The sides agreed to latch an additional measure to one of the spending plans to fund the remaining seven areas of federal spending through December 7. President Trump briefly threatened to force a government shutdown if lawmakers didn’t include money for his border wall in the plan. But the President ultimately punted that battle until December. Democrats praised Republicans for keeping conservative “poison pill” riders out of the appropriations bills. That decision drew Democratic support for the measures. The Senate approved a bipartisan water and infrastructure package. McConnell hailed the bipartisanship which descended upon the Senate – even as the senators fought over Kavanaugh. Nearly in the same breath, McConnell derided boisterous, anti-Kavanaugh protesters outside the Capitol as a “mob.” McConnell insisted this week he needed the Senate to clear a slate of 15 conservative judges to lower courts before he could cut senators loose for the midterm elections. McConnell and Schumer appeared at loggerheads. McConnell’s goal was clear: extract the confirmation of these nominees – or tether to Washington vulnerable Democratic senators from battleground states to keep them off the campaign trail. Schumer knew McConnell would ultimately prevail on the nominees after the midterms. So the New York Democrat accepted McConnell’s ransom, permitting the Senate vote on a slate of nominees on Thursday night. Schumer also extracted a concession from McConnell: send senators home until November 13th. One may wonder how lawmakers can find themselves in an imbroglio over a major issue like Kavanaugh – yet forge major bipartisan accords on another. Frankly, **that’s just politics**. Politics always elicits strange bedfellows. **Successful lawmakers know they should compartmentalize their disputes.** The enemy today may be your best ally tomorrow.

## Impact Defense

### Agriculture

#### Food shortage doesn’t cause war – best studies

Allouche 11, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT (Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January)

The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable. Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level. In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up by military action. The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems. None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18). As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984). The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example Allouche, 2005, Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006). In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable. The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch, 2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane and Gray, 2008).

#### No food wars---no causal evidence, only maybe true for the poorest countries, and government responses solve the impact

Mark W. Rosegrant 13, Director of the Environment and Production Technology Division at the International Food Policy Research Institute, et al., 2013, “The Future of the Global Food Economy: Scenarios for Supply, Demand, and Prices,” in Food Security and Sociopolitical Stability, p. 39-40

The food price spikes in the late 2000s caught the world’s attention, particularly when sharp increases in food and fuel prices in 2008 coincided with street demonstrations and riots in many countries. For 2008 and the two preceding years, researchers identified a significant number of countries (totaling 54) with protests during what was called the global food crisis (Benson et al. 2008). Violent protests occurred in 21 countries, and nonviolent protests occurred in 44 countries. Both types of protest took place in 11 countries. In a separate analysis, developing countries with low government effectiveness experienced more food price protests between 2007 and 2008 than countries with high government effectiveness (World Bank 201la). Although the incidence of violent protests was much higher in countries with less capable governance, many factors could be causing or contributing to these protests, such as government response tactics, rather than the initial food price spike. Data on food riots and food prices have tracked together in recent years. Agricultural commodity prices started strengthening in international markets in 2006. In the latter half of 2007, as prices continued to rise, two or fewer food price riots per month were recorded (based on World Food Programme data, as reported in Brinkman and Hendrix 2011). As prices peaked and remained high during mid-2008, the number of riots increased dramatically, with a cumulative total of 84 by August 2008. Subsequently, both prices and the monthly number of protests declined. Several researchers have studied the connection between food price shocks and conflict, finding at least some relationship between food prices and conflict. According to Dell et al. (2008), higher food prices lead to income declines and an increase in political instability, but only for poor countries. Researchers also found a positive and significant relationship between weather shocks (affecting food availability, prices, and real income) and the probability of suffering government repression or a civil war (Besley and Persson 2009). Arezki and Bruckner (2011) evaluated a constructed food price index and political variables, including data on riots and anti-government demonstrations and measures of civil unrest. Using data from 61 countries over the period 1970 to 2007, they found a direct connection between food price shocks and an increased likelihood of civil conflict, including riots and demonstrations. Other researchers have broadened the analysis by considering government responses or underlying policies that affect local prices, and consequently influence outcomes and the linkage between food price shocks and conflict. Carter and Bates (2012) evaluated data from 30 developing countries for the time period 1961 to 2001, concluding that when governments mitigate the impact of food price shocks on urban consumers, the apparent relationship between food price shocks and civil war disappears. Moreover, when the urban consumers can expect a favorable response, the protests only serve as a motivation for a policy response rather than as a prelude to something more serious, such as violent demonstrations or even civil war. Many in the international development community see war and conflict as a development issue, with a war or conflict severely damaging the local economy, which in turn leads to forced migration and dislocation, and ultimately acute food insecurity. Brinkman and Hendrix (2011) ask if it could be the other way around, with food insecurity causing conflict. Their answer, based on a review of the literature, is "a highly qualified yes," especially for intrastate conflict. The primary reason is that insecurity itself heightens the risk of democratic breakdown and civil conflict. The linkage connecting food insecurity to conflict is contingent on levels of economic development (a stronger linkage for poorer countries), existing political institutions, and other factors. The researchers say establishing causation directly is elusive, considering a lack of evidence for explaining individual behavior. The debate over cause and effect is ongoing. Policies can nevertheless be implemented to reduce price variability. Less costly forms of stabilization, at least in terms of government outlays, include reducing import tariffs (and quotas) to lower prices and restricting exports to increase food availability. However, these types of policy responses, while perhaps helping an individual country's consumers in the short run, can lead to increased international price volatility, with potential for disproportionate adverse impacts on other countries that also may be experiencing food insecurity.

### Disease

#### No extinction- burnout

Adalja 16—infectious-disease physician at the University of Pittsburgh [Amesh, “Why Hasn't Disease Wiped out the Human Race?” 6/17/2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/06/infectious-diseases-extinction/487514/ Accessed 5 July 2017]

In Michael Crichton’s The Andromeda Strain, the canonical book in the disease-outbreak genre, an alien microbe threatens the human race with extinction, and humanity’s best minds are marshaled to combat the enemy organism. Fortunately, outside of fiction, there’s no reason to expect alien pathogens to wage war on the human race any time soon, and my analysis suggests that any real-life domestic microbe reaching an extinction level of threat probably is just as unlikely. When humans began to focus their minds on the problems posed by infectious disease, human life ceased being nasty, brutish, and short. Any apocalyptic pathogen would need to possess a very special combination of two attributes. First, it would have to be so unfamiliar that no existing therapy or vaccine could be applied to it. Second, it would need to have a high and surreptitious transmissibility before symptoms occur. The first is essential because any microbe from a known class of pathogens would, by definition, have family members that could serve as models for containment and countermeasures. The second would allow the hypothetical disease to spread without being detected by even the most astute clinicians. The three infectious diseases most likely to be considered extinction-level threats in the world today—influenza, HIV, and Ebola—don’t meet these two requirements. Influenza, for instance, despite its well-established ability to kill on a large scale, its contagiousness, and its unrivaled ability to shift and drift away from our vaccines, is still what I would call a “known unknown.” While there are many mysteries about how new flu strains emerge, from at least the time of Hippocrates, humans have been attuned to its risk. And in the modern era, a full-fledged industry of influenza preparedness exists, with effective vaccine strategies and antiviral therapies. HIV, which has killed 39 million people over several decades, is similarly limited due to several factors. Most importantly, HIV’s dependency on blood and body fluid for transmission (similar to Ebola) requires intimate human-to-human contact, which limits contagion. Highly potent antiviral therapy allows most people to live normally with the disease, and a substantial group of the population has genetic mutations that render them impervious to infection in the first place. Lastly, simple prevention strategies such as needle exchange for injection drug users and barrier contraceptives—when available—can curtail transmission risk. Ebola, for many of the same reasons as HIV as well as several others, also falls short of the mark. This is especially due to the fact that it spreads almost exclusively through people with easily recognizable symptoms, plus the taming of its once unfathomable 90 percent mortality rate by simple supportive care. Beyond those three, every other known disease falls short of what seems required to wipe out humans—which is, of course, why we’re still here. And it’s not that diseases are ineffective. On the contrary, diseases’ failure to knock us out is a testament to just how resilient humans are. Part of our evolutionary heritage is our immune system, one of the most complex on the planet, even without the benefit of vaccines or the helping hand of antimicrobial drugs. This system, when viewed at a species level, can adapt to almost any enemy imaginable. Coupled to genetic variations amongst humans—which open up the possibility for a range of advantages, from imperviousness to infection to a tendency for mild symptoms—this adaptability ensures that almost any infectious disease onslaught will leave a large proportion of the population alive to rebuild, in contrast to the fictional Hollywood versions. While the immune system’s role can never be understated, an even more powerful protector is the faculty of consciousness. Humans are not the most prolific, quickly evolving, or strongest organisms on the planet, but as Aristotle identified, humans are the rational animals—and it is this fundamental distinguishing characteristic that allows humans to form abstractions, think in principles, and plan long-range. These capacities, in turn, allow humans to modify, alter, and improve themselves and their environments. Consciousness equips us, at an individual and a species level, to make nature safe for the species through such technological marvels as antibiotics, antivirals, vaccines, and sanitation. When humans began to focus their minds on the problems posed by infectious disease, human life ceased being nasty, brutish, and short. In many ways, human consciousness became infectious diseases’ worthiest adversary.

# MSDI 2019

## Neg

### Biotech Mod

**USMCA is key to biotech advancements**

Rick Dearborn and Gary Locke 19 (Congress should pass the USMCA trade deal,, http://sonorannews.com/2019/04/11/congress-should-pass-the-usmca-trade-deal/ ,) Full Date: 4-17-2019

**Congress will soon vote to approve — or reject — the biggest trade deal in a generation.** Called the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, the pact will modernize North American trade, thus enriching American workers and supercharging the economy. **It’s critical for lawmakers to pass the agreement.** Canada and Mexico are two of our top trading partners. Trade with our neighbors accounts for one-third of U.S. exports and adds billions of dollars to the nation’s economy each year. This trade also supports 14 million American jobs. Yet the trade agreement we have in place, NAFTA, is outdated. It took effect in 1994. USMCA builds on NAFTA’s successes and fixes its many shortcomings. Consider how **the new trade pact would help American farmers. USMCA retains all of NAFTA’s existing zero-tariff provisions on farm products. And it eases some existing market restrictions on eggs and poultry, so American farmers will be able to boost exports. The deal also expands U.S. farmers’ access to Canada’s dairy market by raising export quotas.** U.S. dairy exports to Canada could more than triple as a result. And for the first time, American wheat headed to Canada will be treated identically to Canadian wheat headed our way. Expanding the market for agricultural exports means more revenue for America’s farmers and more job opportunities for farmhands. The agriculture industry already supports close to 6 million jobs. Increased trade will boost job creation on America’s 2 million farms — including 42,000 dairy farms. Or **consider how USMCA will help spur medical innovation. The deal brings intellectual property protections in Canada and Mexico for advanced “biologic” medicines closer to the U.S. standard that was implemented under President Obama in 2010 with bipartisan support. This will ensure that Canada and Mexico pay their fair share — and thus help American scientists develop more lifesaving treatments.** The deal also protects American software companies. NAFTA was drafted when the internet was in its infancy, so the pact understandably lacked strong protections for digital products. USMCA, by contrast, was developed to facilitate trade in a high-tech world. It prohibits the imposition of customs duties on digital products like software and e-books. That will make it easier for U.S. companies to sell those products in Canada and Mexico. Finally, USMCA is the first American trade deal to include a chapter devoted entirely to fostering small businesses. In the United States, over 30 million small businesses employ nearly half of the nation’s private-sector workforce. USMCA establishes a special committee to help small firms navigate international trade law. USMCA retains the best parts of NAFTA while fixing its flaws. **Congress should ratify USMCA as soon as possible.**

**Bioweapons cause extinction**

**Sandberg 8** — Anders Sandberg 8, is a James Martin Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University; Jason G. Matheny, PhD candidate in Health Policy and Management at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and special consultant to the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center; Milan M. Ćirković, senior research associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade and assistant professor of physics at the University of Novi Sad in Serbia and Montenegro, 9/8/8, “How can we reduce the risk of human extinction?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,<http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-risk-of-human-extinction>

The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, **humanity is** still **threatened by**the possibility of a **global thermonuclear war** and a resulting nuclear winter. **We may face even greater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics**. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And **unlike other weapons, pathogens are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive**. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild species. **Although most pandemics "fade out**" by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release of **engineered pathogens** **with high transmissibility**, **latency**, **and lethality might be capable of causing human extinction**. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law.

### Blackouts Mod

**USMCA is key to grid security.**

Thomas F. "Mack" McLarty and Ernest J. Moniz, 4/20/2018. \*\*Chair of McLarty Associates and former chairman of Arkla/Entex. He served as chief of staff in the Clinton Administration and helped enact NAFTA. \*\*Served on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology faculty from 1973 until becoming Secretary of Energy in 2013 and is now a professor emeritus of physics and engineering and special advisor to the MIT president. “5 ways to modernize NAFTA by focusing on energy.” https://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/commentary/2018/04/20/5-ways-modernize-nafta-focusing-energy.

We are confident that **it's possible to reach the modernized NAFTA** that the president promised, building on its foundations and expanding fair and reciprocal trade, **with energy at the heart of these efforts**. The most strident opponents of free trade insist that **pulling out of NAFTA** would free the U.S. from foreign entanglements. **When it comes to energy however, this is neither desirable nor possible**. And **there's no question that an integrated North American energy economy is better overall for our national security**. Earlier this year, Mexico became the 30th member of the International Energy Agency, joining the U.S. and Canada in an organization dedicated to energy security collective actions in emergencies. **Trilateral natural gas trade is growing rapidly**. Between 2012 and 2017, **U.S. exports of natural gas to Mexico via pipeline grew by a factor of 2.5 and Canadian imports of natural gas from the US increased by 10 percent** last year. In fact, **the U.S. energy resurgence ensures that we remain strongly connected to global oil markets**. We now export crude oil for the first time in decades. At the same time, petroleum as a share of the U.S. trade deficit declined from 40 percent in 2013 to 9 percent last January. **Electricity integration is** also **key**. **Most of Canada's provinces and the US have adopted the reliability standards of the** **N**orth **A**merican **E**lectric **R**eliability **C**orporation, **which is dedicated to securing the border's bulk power system. In both countries, grid managers have seen electricity reliability and efficiency benefits from that relatively seamless integration of the systems**. **This can be the future for the relationship between Mexico and the US, including all four border states**. **An example of the benefits of integration on our southern border: when operational issues threatened the Texas grid, electricity imports from Mexico helped prevent rolling blackouts**. **Mexico, after major energy reforms, is also focused on adopting NERC reliability standard**. **We buy billions of dollars' worth of energy from Canada** and Mexico **each year**, but we're a major seller to our North American partners as well, with more than $30 billion in energy exports in 2016. Over the last five years, our energy trade balance with Mexico has gone from a $20 billion deficit to an $11.5 billion surplus. This translates directly into U.S. jobs. And it all occurred under NAFTA. Clearly, energy is one sector in which NAFTA has achieved its intended goals: broad-based growth, improved national security and good jobs. U.S. companies were able to take advantage of Mexico opening its energy market in 2013 due to the critical protections of NAFTA's Investor State Dispute Settlement mechanism. And by eliminating tariffs, mandating the liberalization of natural gas exports, and guaranteeing market access, we've created tangible, ongoing benefits for American workers. The choice is not energy independence vs. dependence. Rather, it's a choice of increased interdependence with two of our closest allies with whom we have integrated economies. **Modernization, is however, needed**. What would **an updated NAFTA with a revised energy chapter** look like? 1. **It would facilitate the permitting process for regional infrastructure projects to build quality infrastructure**. 2. **It would remove "carve-outs" for Mexico and codify** the country's energy reforms by **maintaining strong investment protections** and a robust Investor-State Dispute Settlement mechanism to protect private-sector investment. 3. It would **create norms for state-owned enterprises**. Each country will take its own approach to managing its energy resources, but **it is important that all countries compete on a level playing field**. 4. **Worker and environmental protections would be upgraded** to assure that appropriate standards are followed throughout the NAFTA region. 5. **Cooperation** between states and provinces, not just nations, **must be mandated to ensure that interlocking layers of government don't stifle increased cooperation**. We don't envy the negotiators. It's hard to remember a time when trade was more politically contentious. Yet we believe an updated, **improved NAFTA is possible and in fact is necessary to improve America's energy future**. **If we** make an honest assessment of the economic benefits we've already experienced, build on the progress we've made, and **modernize** a 25-year-old agreement **for today's economy, we can make America safer**, and dare we say it, greater.

**Blackouts go nuclear.**

Richard Andres and Hanna Breetz 2011. Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology. “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications”, [www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf)

The DOD interest in small reactors derives largely from problems with base and logistics vulnerability. Over the last few years, the Services have begun to reexamine virtually every aspect of how they generate and use energy with an eye toward cutting costs, decreasing carbon emissions, and reducing energy-related vulnerabilities. These actions have resulted in programs that have significantly reduced DOD energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions at domestic bases. Despite strong efforts, however, two **critical security issues have** thus far **proven resistant to existing solutions: bases’ vulnerability to civilian power outages, and the need to transport large quantities of fuel via convoys** through hostile territory to forward locations. Each of these is explored below. Grid Vulnerability. **DOD is unable to provide its bases with electricity when the civilian electrical grid is offline for an extended period of time**. Currently, **domestic military installations receive 99 percent of their electricity from the civilian power grid**. As explained in a recent study from the Defense Science Board: DOD’s key problem with electricity is that **critical missions, such as national strategic awareness and national command authorities, are** almost **entirely dependent on the national transmission grid** . . . **[which] is fragile, vulnerable, near its capacity limit, and outside of DOD control**. In most cases, **neither the grid nor on-base backup power provides sufficient reliability to ensure continuity of critical national priority functions and oversight of strategic missions in the face of a long term (several months) outage**.7 **The grid’s fragility was demonstrated during the 2003 Northeast blackout** in which 50 million people in the United States and Canada lost power, some for up to a week, when one Ohio utility failed to properly trim trees. The blackout created cascading disruptions in sewage systems, gas station pumping, cellular communications, border check systems, and so forth, and demonstrated the interdependence of modern infrastructural systems.8 More recently, awareness has been growing **that the grid is** also **vulnerable to purposive attacks**. A report sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security suggests that a coordinated cyberattack on the grid could result in a third of the country losing power for a period of weeks or months.9 Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure are not well understood. It is not clear, for instance, whether existing **terrorist groups might be able to develop the capability to conduct this type of attack**. It is likely, however, **that some nation-states either have or are working on developing the ability to take down the U.S. grid**. In the event of a war with one of these states, **it is possible, if not likely, that parts of the civilian grid would cease to function, taking with them military bases located in affected regions**. Government and private **organizations are currently working to secure the grid against** **attacks**; however, **it is not clear that they will be successful**. Most military bases currently have backup power that allows them to function for a period of hours or, at most, a few days on their own. If power were not restored after this amount of time, the results could be disastrous. First, **military assets taken offline by the crisis would not be available to help with disaster relief**. Second, **during an extended blackout, global military operations could be seriously compromised; this disruption would be particularly serious if the blackout was induced during major combat operations**. During the Cold War, this type of event was far less likely because the United States and Soviet Union shared the common understanding that **blinding an opponent with a grid blackout could escalate to nuclear war**. **America’s current opponents**, however, **may not share this fear or be deterred by this possibility**. In 2008, the Defense Science Board stressed that **DOD should mitigate the electrical grid’s vulnerabilities by turning military installations into “islands**” of energy self-sufficiency. **The department has made efforts to do so by promoting efficiency programs** that lower power consumption on bases and by **constructing renewable power generation facilities** on selected bases. **Unfortunately, these programs will not come close to reaching the goal of islanding the vast majority of bases**. **Even with massive investment in efficiency and renewables, most bases would not be able to function for more than a few days** after the civilian grid went offline **Unlike other alternative sources of energy, small reactors have the potential to solve DOD’s vulnerability to grid outages**. Most bases have relatively light power demands when compared to civilian towns or cities. **Small reactors could easily support bases’ power demands separate from the civilian grid during crises**. In some cases, **the reactors could be designed to produce enough power not only to supply the base, but also to provide critical services in surrounding towns during long-term outages**. Strategically, islanding bases with small reactors has another benefit. **One of the main reasons an enemy might be willing to risk reprisals by taking down the U.S. grid during a period of military hostilities would be to affect ongoing military operations. Without the lifeline of** intelligence, communication, and logistics provided by **U.S. domestic bases, American military operations would be compromised in almost any conceivable contingency. Making bases more resilient to civilian power outages would reduce the incentive for an opponent to attack the grid**. An opponent might still attempt to take down the grid for the sake of disrupting civilian systems, but **the powerful incentive to do so in order to win an ongoing battle or war would be greatly reduced**.

## Aff

### A2 Blackouts

#### No risk of or impact to blackouts.

Douglas Birch is a former foreign correspondent for the Associated Press and the Baltimore Sun who has written extensively on technology and public policy, 10/1/2012 (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/01/forget\_revolution?page=full)

The specter of what Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has called a "digital Pearl Harbor" led to the creation of U.S. Cyber Command, which is tasked with developing both offensive and defensive cyber warfare capabilities, and prompted FBI Director Robert Mueller to warn in March that cyber attacks would soon be "the number one threat to our country." Similar concerns inspired both the Democrats and Republicans to sound the alarm about the cyber threat in their party platforms. But are cyber attacks really a clear and present danger to society's critical life support systems, capable of inflicting thousands of casualties? Or has **fear of full-blown cybergeddon at the hands of America's enemies become just another feverish national obsession** -- another of the long, dark shadows of the 9/11 attacks? Worries about a large-scale, devastating cyber attack on the United States date back several decades, but escalated following attacks on Estonian government and media websites during a diplomatic conflict with Russia in 2007. That digital ambush was followed by a cyber attack on Georgian websites a year later in the run-up to the brief shooting war between Tbilisi and Moscow, as well as allegations of a colossal, ongoing cyber espionage campaign against the United States by hackers linked to the Chinese army. Much of the concern has focused on potential attacks on the U.S. electrical grid. "If I were an attacker and I wanted to do strategic damage to the United States...I probably would sack electric power on the U.S. East Coast, maybe the West Coast, and attempt to cause a cascading effect," retired Admiral Mike McConnell said in a 2010 interview with CBS's 60 Minutes. But the scenarios sketched out above are not solely the realm of fantasy. **This summer, the United States and India were hit by two massive electrical outages** -- caused not by ninja cyber assault teams but by force majeure. And, **for** most people anyway, the results were less terrifying than imagined. First, **the** freak "derecho" **storm** that barreled across a heavily-populated swath of the eastern United States on the afternoon of June 29 knocked down trees that crushed cars, bashed holes in roofs, blocked roads, and sliced through power lines. According to an August report by the U.S. Department of Energy, 4.2 million homes and businesses lost power as a result of the storm, with the **blackout** stretching across 11 states and the District of Columbia. **More than 1 million** customers **were** still **without power five days later**, and in some areas power wasn't restored for 10 days. Reuters put the death toll at 23 people as of July 5, all killed by storms or heat stroke. The second incident occurred **in** late July, when 670 million people in northern **India**, or about **10 percent of the world's population, lost power** in the largest blackout in history. The failure of this huge chunk of India's electric grid was attributed to higher-than-normal demand due to late monsoon rains, which led farmers to use more electricity in order to draw water from wells. Indian officials told the media there were no reports of deaths directly linked to the blackouts. But **this** cataclysmic event **didn't cause widespread chaos** in India -- indeed, for some, it didn't even interrupt their daily routine. "[M]any people in major cities barely noticed the disruption because localized blackouts are so common that many businesses, hospitals, offices and middle-class homes have backup diesel generators," the New York Times reported. **The most important thing about both events is what didn't happen. Planes didn't fall out of the sky. Governments didn't collapse. Thousands of people weren't killed. Despite disruption and delay, harried public officials, emergency workers, and beleaguered publics mostly muddled through.**  The summer's blackouts strongly suggest that **a cyber weapon that took down an electric grid even for several days could turn out to be little more than a weapon of mass inconvenience**. "Reasonable people would have expected a lot of bad things to happen" in the storm's aftermath, said Neal A. Pollard, a terrorism expert who teaches at Georgetown University and has served on the United Nation's Expert Working Group on the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. However, he said, **emergency services, hospitals, and air traffic control towers have backup systems to handle short-term disruptions in power supplies**. After the derecho, Pollard noted, a generator truck even showed up in the parking lot of his supermarket. The response wasn't perfect, judging by the heat-related deaths and lengthy delays in the United States in restoring power. But nor were the people without power as helpless or clueless as is sometimes assumed. That doesn't mean the United States can relax. James Lewis, director of the technology program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, believes that hackers threaten the security of U.S. utilities and industries, and recently penned an op-ed for the New York Times calling the United States "defenseless" to a cyber-assault. But he told Foreign Policy the recent derecho showed that even a large-scale blackout would not necessarily have catastrophic consequences. "That's a good example of what some kind of attacks would be like," he said. "You don't want to overestimate the risks. You don't want somebody to be able to do this whenever they felt like it, which is the situation now. But this is not the end of the world." The question of how seriously to take the threat of a cyber attack on critical infrastructure surfaced recently, after Congress rejected a White House measure to require businesses to adopt stringent­ new regulations to protect their computer networks from intrusions. The bill would have required industries to report cyber security breaches, toughen criminal penalties against hacking and granted legal immunity to companies cooperating with government investigations. Critics worried about regulatory overreach. But the potential cost to industry also seems to be a major factor in the bill's rejection. A January study by Bloomberg reported that banks, utilities, and phone carriers would have to increase their spending on cyber security by a factor of nine, to $45.3 billion a year, in order to protect themselves against 95 percent of cyber intrusions. Likewise, some of the bill's advocates suspect that in the aftermath of a truly successful cyber attack, the government would have to bail the utilities out anyway. Joe Weiss, a cyber security professional and an authority on industrial control systems like those used in the electric grid, argued that a well-prepared, sophisticated cyber attack could have far more serious consequences than this summer's blackouts. "The reason we are so concerned is that cyber could take out the grid for nine to 18 months," he said. "This isn't a one to five day outage. We're prepared for that. We can handle that." But pulling off a cyber assault on that scale is no easy feat. Weiss agreed that **hackers intent on inflicting** this kind of **long-term interruption of power would need to use a tool capable of inflicting physical damage. And so far, the world has seen only one such weapon: Stuxnet**, which is believed to have been **a joint military project** of Israel and the United States. Ralph Langner, a German expert on industrial-control system security, was among the first to discover that Stuxnet was specifically designed to attack the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system (SCADA) at a single site: Iran's Natanz uranium-enrichment plant. The computer worm's sophisticated programs, which infected the plant in 2009, caused about 1,000 of Natanz's 5,000 uranium-enrichment centrifuges to self-destruct by accelerating their precision rotors beyond the speeds at which they were designed to operate. Professionals like Weiss and others warned that Stuxnet was opening a Pandora's Box: Once it was unleashed on the world, they feared, it would become available to hostile states, criminals, and terrorists who could adapt the code for their own nefarious purposes. But two years after the discovery of Stuxnet, there are no reports of similar attacks against the United States. What has prevented the emergence of such copycat viruses? A 2009 paper published by the University of California, Berkeley, may offer the answer. The report, which was released a year before Stuxnet surfaced, found that **in order to create a cyber weapon capable of crippling a specific control system ­­-- like the ones operating the U.S. electric grid -- six coders might have to work for up to six months to reverse engineer the targeted center's SCADA system. Even then, the report says, hackers likely would need the help of someone with inside knowledge of how the network's machines were wired together to plan an effective attack. "Every SCADA control center is configured differently, with different devices, running different software/protocols**," wrote Rose Tsang, the report's author. **Professional hackers are in it for the money -- and it's a lot more cost-efficient to search out vulnerabilities in widely-used computer programs like the Windows operating system, used by banks and other affluent targets, than in one-of-a-kind SCADA systems linked to generators and switches.**  According to Pollard, **only the world's industrial nations have the means to use the Internet to attack utilities and major industries. But given the integrated global economy, there is little incentive, short of armed conflict, for them to do so**. "If you're a state that has a number of U.S. T-bills in your treasury, you have an economic interest in the United States," he said. "You're not going to have an interest in mucking about with our infrastructure." **There is also the threat of retaliation**. Last year, the U.S. government reportedly issued a classified report on cyber strategy that said it could respond to a devastating digital assault with traditional military force. The idea was that if a cyber attack caused death and destruction on the scale of a military assault, the United States would reserve the right to respond with what the Pentagon likes to call "kinetic" weapons: missiles, bombs, and bullets. An unnamed Pentagon official, speaking to the Wall Street Journal, summed up the policy in less diplomatic terms: "If you shut down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one of your smokestacks." **Deterrence is sometimes dismissed as a toothless strategy against cyber attacks** because hackers have such an easy time hiding in the anonymity of the Web. **But investigators typically come up with key suspects, if not smoking guns, following cyber intrusions and assaults** -- the way suspicions quickly focused on the United States and Israel after Stuxnet was discovered. And with the U.S. military's global reach, even terror groups have to factor in potential retaliation when planning their operations. None of these considerations is an argument for dismissing the risk of cyber attacks. However, they do suggest the need to keep the degree of risk in perspective. In an op-ed last year in The Hill, the Center for a New American Security's Kristin M. Lord and Travis Sharp warned the United States to avoid "billion dollar solutions to million dollar problems." "A collective sense of urgency is needed about the growing threats in cyber space," they wrote. "But so too is pragmatic levelheadedness expressed through a U.S. cyber security strategy that prioritizes intelligently. Such a strategy will enable the U.S. government to craft policies that ensure safe access to the Internet without breaking the bank." Strengthening U.S. cyber security is common sense, like locking your door at night. But it's one thing to turn the lock -- and another to spend the night hunched in your living room with a shotgun.

#### No prolonged blackouts---restoration is fast.

Stockton 16—Managing Director of Sonecon LLC, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, Stanford University Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, and a PhD from Harvard [Paul, “Superstorm Sandy: Implications for Designing a Post-Cyber Attack Power Restoration System,” Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, p. 1-2, <http://www.jhuapl.edu/ourwork/nsa/papers/PostCyberAttack.pdf>]

Sandy packed a one-two punch for electric infrastructure. On the night of October  29,  2012, Sandy made landfall near Atlantic City, New Jersey, as a post-tropical cyclone. Over the next three days, the impacts of Sandy could be felt from North Carolina to Maine and as far west as Illinois. With an unprecedented storm surge in the affected areas, there was especially severe damage to the energy infrastructure. Peak outages to electric power customers occurred on October  30 and 31 as the storm  proceeded inland from the coast, with  peak outages in all states totaling over 8.5  million, as reported in the Department of Energy (DOE) Situation Reports. Much of the damage was concentrated in New York and New Jersey, with some customer outages and fuel disruptions lasting weeks.1 The second punch landed on November 7, 2012, as a nor’easter impacted the Mid-Atlantic and Northeast with strong winds, rain and snow, and coastal flooding. The second storm caused power outages for more than 150,000 additional customers and prolonged recovery.2

The combined damage to critical electricity substations, high-voltage transmission lines, and other key grid components was massive—as would be expected from the second-largest Atlantic storm on record.3 Some major utilities in the region suffered from gaps in their preparedness to conduct repair operations on the scale that Sandy required.4 Overall, however, utilities restored power with remarkable speed and effectiveness in most areas hit by the superstorm. Despite the vast number of grid components that needed to be repaired or replaced and the fallen trees and other impediments that restoration crews encountered, within two weeks of Sandy’s landfall, utilities had restored power to 99 percent of customers who could receive power.5

The mutual assistance system in the electric industry was the linchpin for this success. Although the linepeople and other power restoration personnel in utilities across Sandy’s impact zone performed admirably, no single utility retains the restoration capabilities needed to repair the damage caused by a storm on that scale. Achieving such restoration preparedness would be extraordinarily expensive. Moreover, given the rarity of such catastrophic events, the amount of money required to enable a utility to restore power on its own would be difficult to justify as a prudent expense to state public utility commissions (PUCs), shareholders, or elected officials responsible for approving such expenditures.6 Instead, utilities have built a highly effective voluntary system of mutual support, whereby utilities that are not at risk of being struck by a hurricane or other hazard can send restoration assets to those that are. The overall restoration capacity of the industry is immense; the mutual assistance system enables utilities to target support when and where specific utilities request aid.

Sandy highlighted the effectiveness of this system. Tens of thousands of mutual assistance personnel, including linepeople, engineers, vegetation crews, and support personnel provided by eighty electric utilities from across the United States, flowed in to the area to help the utilities hit by Sandy—by far the largest deployment of mutual assistance capabilities in US history.7 Utilities contributed these assets from the West Coast, the Midwest, and other regions far beyond the storm’s footprint. Now, drawing on the lessons learned from Sandy, utilities are expanding the mutual assistance system to bring to bear still greater restoration capabilities in future catastrophes.8

This system did not emerge by chance. For decades, hurricanes and other severe weather events have hammered utilities in the eastern and southern United States. Massive ice storms, wildfires, and other natural hazards have also inflicted wide-area power outages in other regions of the United States. In response, utilities gradually built up the mutual assistance system, developing increasingly effective governance and decision-making mechanisms to allocate restoration crews and other limited resources and prioritize assistance when multiple power providers requested help.9 Restoration crews have become as expert at line stringing, replacing power poles, and performing other functions for partner utilities as they are for their own organizations. So that personnel stay sharp between events, utilities conduct frequent exercises that are modeled on the hurricanes and other hazards they typically face. They have also established mechanisms to reimburse each other for the cost of providing assistance and (together with state PUCs) have created special cost recovery mechanisms to help pay for restoration operations in severe storms.

Decades of experience also strengthened government support for power restoration after Sandy. When the superstorm hit, state National Guard personnel in New York, New Jersey, and other states were already prepared to perform well-established (and crucial) support functions at the request of their local utilities, including road clearance and debris removal to help utility repair crews reach damaged equipment. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) system enabled thirty-seven states outside the affected area to send thousands of additional Guard personnel to help to execute these missions.10 The National Response Framework (NRF) also provided time-tested mechanisms to coordinate the provision of government assistance.11 Moreover, as in the case of the power industry’s mutual assistance system, federal and state agencies have launched a wide array of initiatives to draw on lessons learned from the superstorm and strengthen support for power restoration in future catastrophic blackouts.

# Dan Ban

### ---AT: National Emergency Thumper

#### National emergency irrelevant

Zhou & Nilsen 3-14-19 (Li Zhou and Ella Nilsen, Vox, “Senate Republicans see the national emergency vote as a one-time break with Trump,” 3-14-2019, <https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/3/14/18265825/national-emergency-vote-senate-trump>

Senate Republicans see the national emergency vote as a one-time break with Trump It’s not a sign of more to come, they say. Twelve Senate Republicans made a stark break from President Donald Trump on Thursday, voting to block his national emergency declaration in an unprecedented rebuke. It was the second time this week that Republican lawmakers went against the president: On Wednesday, seven Republicans voted for a resolution ending US involvement in Saudi Arabia’s conflict in Yemen. Trump is expected to veto both measures. Republicans, including some who voted against the emergency, say they see these two instances as one-off occasions. “I think they’re really unique,” Senate Majority Whip John Cornyn (R-TX) told Vox. “The Yemen vote was based on concerns Congress had acquiesced too much executive authority when it comes to engaging in conflicts or supporting allies and obviously concerns about the humanitarian crisis, which is terrible, in Yemen. This vote is more an institutional concern about separation of powers and Congress’s prerogatives more than anything else, so I don’t [see] those as part of a larger trend.” Both votes highlighted key splits from the president by a party that’s broadly supported him even as he’s plunged the country into a devastating government shutdown, championed the rollback of crucial environmental protection, and employed racist rhetoric to champion hardline immigration policies. As the Washington Post’s Aaron Blake points out, this isn’t the first time Republicans have signaled opposition to Trump, but it is one of the rare instances when it hasn’t been purely symbolic. By voting in favor of a resolution terminating Trump’s national emergency, Senate Democrats and Republicans indicated, in the strongest terms, that they were effectively willing to end the emergency that helped bolster one of his key campaign promises. Given Republicans’ longstanding reluctance to openly confront Trump, the fact that it happened at all seemed to suggest there could be more openness in the GOP to push back against the president in general. That’s not exactly the case, Republican senators told Vox. “I don’t think [this shows a willingness to oppose the president in the future],” Sen. Steve Daines (R-MT) said. “Each senator had to come to his or her conclusion.” Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY), one of the dozen Republicans who did go against the president on the emergency, added that he and Trump still had plenty of common ground. “I’m still supportive of the president on lower taxes, less regulations, conservative Supreme Court justices,” he said. “I just see it as, I’m also for the Constitution.” Senators argue that this vote was about preserving the Constitution — and that they actually still agree with the president on border security Many Republicans justified their vote against Trump by citing more abstract concerns about executive power. Several GOP lawmakers who voted against the national emergency went out of their way to argue that they were simply preserving the sanctity of the Constitution, and not so much disagreeing with Trump at all. “I share President Trump’s goal of securing our borders, but expanding the powers of the presidency beyond its constitutional limits is something I cannot support,” Sen. Jerry Moran (R-KS) emphasized in a statement explaining his vote in favor of the resolution. Instead of calling out Trump, their stances on the vote were broadly reframed to focus on Congress’s responsibility to respect the Constitution and protect the separation of powers. “I think the Senate’s waking up a little bit to our responsibilities,” said Sen. Lamar Alexander (R-TN). “We’ve gotten a little lazy about our responsibilities, and forgotten the founders had very good reason to give powers to the Senate. The reason was to keep from having an executive with too much power.” Alexander, who is retiring in 2020, told Vox he hoped the two recent votes would remind senators of their constitutional power. “I think the value of these last two weeks has been to remind the Senate of our constitutional place, and the reason for it,” he said. “It goes to the very source of our freedom; it’s the way we balance power in this country.” There’s a big reason Republicans have been unwilling to confront Trump While Republican lawmakers undoubtedly need the president’s support to advance policies they’ve long prioritized, like tax reform, there’s also another big reason some have held off on confronting Trump: They’re worried about what opposing him could mean for their own future elections. Trump laid out the electoral threat for Republicans who voted against his national emergency pretty explicitly earlier this month. “I really think that Republicans that vote against border security and the wall, I think you know, I’ve been okay at predicting things, I think they put themselves at great jeopardy,” he said during a Fox News interview. And as Sen. Thom Tillis (R-NC) quickly discovered, this certainly didn’t seem like an idle statement. Tillis was one of the first senators to come out with his support for the resolution blocking the national emergency, writing a splashy Washington Post op-ed breaking down his reasoning. “Republicans need to realize that this will lead inevitably to regret when a Democrat once again controls the White House, cites the precedent set by Trump, and declares his or her own national emergency to advance a policy that couldn’t gain congressional approval,” he wrote at the time. Roughly two weeks later, Tillis flipped and instead voted against the resolution. What changed in the interim? Republican activists in North Carolina began floating the idea of a primary challenge in 2020, a cycle in which Tillis is up for reelection, the Hill’s Scott Wong and Alexander Bolton reported. “North Carolina Republican primary voters have made their voices clear. They stand with the President. Our senators should as well,” Rep. Mark Walker, a potential Republican primary candidate, told the Hill. In a statement on his vote, Tillis said that his focus was now working with the president to amend the National Emergencies Act to curb executive overreach. Some other senators up for reelection in 2020 also stuck by the president in the national emergency vote, including Sens. Cory Gardner (R-CO), Martha McSally (R-AZ), and Ben Sasse (R-NE). Sen. Susan Collins (R-ME), however, voted against the emergency. Because of Trump’s ongoing popularity with a sizable portion of the Republican base, it’s certainly possible his sway in their respective states could continue to affect lawmakers’ decision-making.

### AT: Energy Security K

#### Nafta modernization is key to grid security.

Thomas F. "Mack" McLarty and Ernest J. Moniz, 4/20/2018. \*\*Chair of McLarty Associates and former chairman of Arkla/Entex. He served as chief of staff in the Clinton Administration and helped enact NAFTA. \*\*Served on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology faculty from 1973 until becoming Secretary of Energy in 2013 and is now a professor emeritus of physics and engineering and special advisor to the MIT president. “5 ways to modernize NAFTA by focusing on energy.” https://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/commentary/2018/04/20/5-ways-modernize-nafta-focusing-energy.

We are confident that it's possible to reach the modernized NAFTA that the president promised, building on its foundations and expanding fair and reciprocal trade, with energy at the heart of these efforts.

The most strident opponents of free trade insist that pulling out of NAFTA would free the U.S. from foreign entanglements. When it comes to energy however, this is neither desirable nor possible. And there's no question that an integrated North American energy economy is better overall for our national security.

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In fact, the U.S. energy resurgence ensures that we remain strongly connected to global oil markets. We now export crude oil for the first time in decades. At the same time, petroleum as a share of the U.S. trade deficit declined from 40 percent in 2013 to 9 percent last January.

Electricity integration is also key. Most of Canada's provinces and the US have adopted the reliability standards of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, which is dedicated to securing the border's bulk power system. In both countries, grid managers have seen electricity reliability and efficiency benefits from that relatively seamless integration of the systems. This can be the future for the relationship between Mexico and the US, including all four border states.

An example of the benefits of integration on our southern border: when operational issues threatened the Texas grid, electricity imports from Mexico helped prevent rolling blackouts. Mexico, after major energy reforms, is also focused on adopting NERC reliability standard.

We buy billions of dollars' worth of energy from Canada and Mexico each year, but we're a major seller to our North American partners as well, with more than $30 billion in energy exports in 2016. Over the last five years, our energy trade balance with Mexico has gone from a $20 billion deficit to an $11.5 billion surplus. This translates directly into U.S. jobs. And it all occurred under NAFTA.

Clearly, energy is one sector in which NAFTA has achieved its intended goals: broad-based growth, improved national security and good jobs. U.S. companies were able to take advantage of Mexico opening its energy market in 2013 due to the critical protections of NAFTA's Investor State Dispute Settlement mechanism. And by eliminating tariffs, mandating the liberalization of natural gas exports, and guaranteeing market access, we've created tangible, ongoing benefits for American workers.

The choice is not energy independence vs. dependence. Rather, it's a choice of increased interdependence with two of our closest allies with whom we have integrated economies.

Modernization, is however, needed. What would an updated NAFTA with a revised energy chapter look like?

1. It would facilitate the permitting process for regional infrastructure projects to build quality infrastructure.

2. It would remove "carve-outs" for Mexico and codify the country's energy reforms by maintaining strong investment protections and a robust Investor-State Dispute Settlement mechanism to protect private-sector investment.

3. It would create norms for state-owned enterprises. Each country will take its own approach to managing its energy resources, but it is important that all countries compete on a level playing field.

4. Worker and environmental protections would be upgraded to assure that appropriate standards are followed throughout the NAFTA region.

5. Cooperation between states and provinces, not just nations, must be mandated to ensure that interlocking layers of government don't stifle increased cooperation.

We don't envy the negotiators. It's hard to remember a time when trade was more politically contentious. Yet we believe an updated, improved NAFTA is possible and in fact is necessary to improve America's energy future. If we make an honest assessment of the economic benefits we've already experienced, build on the progress we've made, and modernize a 25-year-old agreement for today's economy, we can make America safer, and dare we say it, greater.

#### Blackouts go nuclear.

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The DOD interest in small reactors derives largely from problems with base and logistics vulnerability. Over the last few years, the Services have begun to reexamine virtually every aspect of how they generate and use energy with an eye toward cutting costs, decreasing carbon emissions, and reducing energy-related vulnerabilities. These actions have resulted in programs that have significantly reduced DOD energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions at domestic bases. Despite strong efforts, however, two critical security issues have thus far proven resistant to existing solutions: bases’ vulnerability to civilian power outages, and the need to transport large quantities of fuel via convoys through hostile territory to forward locations. Each of these is explored below. Grid Vulnerability. DOD is unable to provide its bases with electricity when the civilian electrical grid is offline for an extended period of time. Currently, domestic military installations receive 99 percent of their electricity from the civilian power grid. As explained in a recent study from the Defense Science Board: DOD’s key problem with electricity is that critical missions, such as national strategic awareness and national command authorities, are almost entirely dependent on the national transmission grid . . . [which] is fragile, vulnerable, near its capacity limit, and outside of DOD control. In most cases, neither the grid nor on-base backup power provides sufficient reliability to ensure continuity of critical national priority functions and oversight of strategic missions in the face of a long term (several months) outage.7 The grid’s fragility was demonstrated during the 2003 Northeast blackout in which 50 million people in the United States and Canada lost power, some for up to a week, when one Ohio utility failed to properly trim trees. The blackout created cascading disruptions in sewage systems, gas station pumping, cellular communications, border check systems, and so forth, and demonstrated the interdependence of modern infrastructural systems.8 More recently, awareness has been growing that the grid is also vulnerable to purposive attacks. A report sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security suggests that a coordinated cyberattack on the grid could result in a third of the country losing power for a period of weeks or months.9 Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure are not well understood. It is not clear, for instance, whether existing terrorist groups might be able to develop the capability to conduct this type of attack. It is likely, however, that some nation-states either have or are working on developing the ability to take down the U.S. grid. In the event of a war with one of these states, it is possible, if not likely, that parts of the civilian grid would cease to function, taking with them military bases located in affected regions. Government and private organizations are currently working to secure the grid against attacks; however, it is not clear that they will be successful. Most military bases currently have backup power that allows them to function for a period of hours or, at most, a few days on their own. If power were not restored after this amount of time, the results could be disastrous. First, military assets taken offline by the crisis would not be available to help with disaster relief. Second, during an extended blackout, global military operations could be seriously compromised; this disruption would be particularly serious if the blackout was induced during major combat operations. During the Cold War, this type of event was far less likely because the United States and Soviet Union shared the common understanding that blinding an opponent with a grid blackout could escalate to nuclear war. America’s current opponents, however, may not share this fear or be deterred by this possibility. In 2008, the Defense Science Board stressed that DOD should mitigate the electrical grid’s vulnerabilities by turning military installations into “islands” of energy self-sufficiency. The department has made efforts to do so by promoting efficiency programs that lower power consumption on bases and by constructing renewable power generation facilities on selected bases. Unfortunately, these programs will not come close to reaching the goal of islanding the vast majority of bases. Even with massive investment in efficiency and renewables, most bases would not be able to function for more than a few days after the civilian grid went offline Unlike other alternative sources of energy, small reactors have the potential to solve DOD’s vulnerability to grid outages. Most bases have relatively light power demands when compared to civilian towns or cities. Small reactors could easily support bases’ power demands separate from the civilian grid during crises. In some cases, the reactors could be designed to produce enough power not only to supply the base, but also to provide critical services in surrounding towns during long-term outages. Strategically, islanding bases with small reactors has another benefit. One of the main reasons an enemy might be willing to risk reprisals by taking down the U.S. grid during a period of military hostilities would be to affect ongoing military operations. Without the lifeline of intelligence, communication, and logistics provided by U.S. domestic bases, American military operations would be compromised in almost any conceivable contingency. Making bases more resilient to civilian power outages would reduce the incentive for an opponent to attack the grid. An opponent might still attempt to take down the grid for the sake of disrupting civilian systems, but the powerful incentive to do so in order to win an ongoing battle or war would be greatly reduced.