# Note

This was my process cp I had ready for TOC—I read it r2 v HWL JG.

# 1NC

## Off ~1:30

### 1NC – CP – State Department

#### Resolved: The executive branch of the United States federal government ought to:

#### A] Grant all authority over military aid to the State Department

#### B] Immediately end all military aid provided to [authoritarian regimes], and issue, publicize, and enforce an executive order implementing this opinion

#### Normal means is DOD

McBride 18 McBride, James. “How Does the U.S. Spend Its Foreign Aid?” Council of Foreign Relations. 1 October 2018. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-does-us-spend-its-foreign-aid. [Premier]

**The Department of Defense plays a major role as the agency primarily responsible for implementing traditional military aid, though the State Department also funds and influences many security assistance programs.** The Department of Health and Human Services implements many health-related programs, including the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). The Treasury Department helps manage funding of global financial institutions, as well as programs for debt relief and economic reforms in poor countries. There is also a plethora of other agencies and autonomous organizations, including the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Peace Corps, and the African Development Foundation, involved in aid work.

### 1NC – DA – China War

#### The Pentagon is preparing for war to check Chinese expansionism.

Reimann 18 [Jakob Reimann, (Jakob Reimann is a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus. He runs the German website www.justicenow.de.) "The U.S. Air Force is Preparing for a Great Power War Against Russia and China" Foreign Policy In Focus, 11-8-2018, https://fpif.org/the-u-s-air-force-is-preparing-for-a-great-power-war-against-russia-and-china/, DOA:1-1-2019 // WWBW]

In September, at the Air Force Association’s annual Space & Cyber ​​Conference, Heather Wilson — Donald Trump’s Secretary of the U.S. Air Force — presented the Trump administration’s new roadmap for the U.S. Air Force: the historic expansion of the already, by far, largest air force in the world. Wilson identified the perceived context of the new expansionist developments right at the start of her 30-minute speech — Russia conducted its largest military exercise on “Russian soil in four decades,” she said, and China sent its first operational aircraft carrier into the Pacific and has “militarized” the South China Sea — and thus exposed at the same time the old dilemma of global security policy: The one’s defense looks quite like offense to the other, and vice versa. **The largest expansion since the end of the Cold War Secretary Wilson explained that the U.S. Air Force will expand its current operational squadrons** — which she martially called “the clenched fist of American resolve” — from 312 to 386 between 2025 and 2030. That’s an increase of 25 percent — **the largest expansion ever since the end of the Cold War.** A squadron consists of 12 to 24 aircraft. Wilson’s expansion thus corresponds to well over 1,000 new bombers, fighter jets, and drones, as well as reconnaissance and refueling aircraft. Approximately $25 billion will be added to the annual Air Force budget, and no less than 40,000 additional staff will be needed. That amounts to the Trump administration reversing recent trends, as the Air Force has “drastically downsized in past years,” Military.com reports. Foreign Policy received exclusive insight into the composition of these 74 new squadrons. **The largest percentage increase among the various squadrons is attributed to the bomber squadrons: aircraft that can be equipped with nuclear weapons and, above all, aim at the destruction of stationary targets such as buildings or other massive infrastructure — but not mobile combat units — which is largely interpreted as a shift in strategic focus towards wars against nations, not terrorist groups.** There is also a massive increase in the number of refueling aircraft, which are currently deployed in support of the Saudi-Emirati war against the civilian population of Yemen — an air war, waged across the endless deserts of the Arabian Peninsula, that would be virtually impossible without U.S. air-refueling. Another central theme in Wilson‘s speech was the creation of a Space Force as the sixth branch of the military. Donald Trump initially understood that project as a joke, but then quickly recognized it as a catchy slogan that was well received by his base. In March, he finally included the Space Force into the national security strategy. “Space is a war-fighting domain, just like the land, air, and sea”, Trump stated, although his White House, the U.S. Air Force, and Secretary of Defense James Mattis have vehemently opposed this move in the past. “We can no longer view space as a function, it is a war-fighting mission,” Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson told a crowd of applauding military staff in her speech in National Harbor, Maryland. The military, Wilson promised, is working to “put a war fighter’s focus on space operation.” New fighter jets at Russia’s borders **In recent years, NATO has carried out its largest troop deployment on its eastern flank — right at the Russian border — since the fading of the Cold War in the 1980s.** At the insistence of German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen, a new NATO headquarters is being set up in Germany for the purpose of coordinating the movement of these troops. And with the establishment of the “Military Schengen” area, the rapid and unbureaucratic deployment of troops across Europe’s borders should be guaranteed. **In the wake of this escalating militarization of the European continent, the U.S. Air Force massively increased its presence at Russia’s doorstep too. In all NATO countries in Eastern Europe, the U.S. Air Force is investing multimillion-dollar sums in the expansion of its air bases:** with more than $50 million pouring into a base in Hungary, more than $60 million allocated to the modernization of two air force bases in Romania, and two bases in Slovakia that will be upgraded with more than $ 100 million, besides various base upgrades in other countries in the region. **The majority of these funds are dedicated to explicitly war-related investments such as new hangars for fighter jets or facilities to store weapons and fuel.** In addition to hundreds of soldiers, the U.S. Air Force also recently sent several dozens of new fighter jets to Romania alone, including twelve A-10 Thunderbolts, better known as “Warthogs,” that are armed with radioactive uranium munitions. Reaper combat drones have been stationed in Poland for months, and soon they will likely launch from Romania too. **Both the excessive deployment of air forces in Eastern Europe and the establishment of Trump’s Space Force — as well as the historic, long-term upgrade of the U.S. Air Force as a whole — reflect a tendency to slowly abandon the infamous “War on Terror” doctrine** of the past 17 years. The relevance of the countless petty wars against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and ISIS & Co. is slowly dwindling. Neither is North Korea, Iran, or Syria the prime target of this strategic realignment. **The historic upgrade of the U.S. Air Force, military experts agree, reflects a shift in focus in the military doctrine of the U.S. empire towards great power wars in the 21st century: wars against Russia or China.** No hegemon besides me **It is one of the fundamental motives of strategic geopolitics that the present empire, in order to maintain its global power, must prevent the rise of other regional hegemons at any cost** — especially in the three geostrategic core regions of East Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Europe. This is the primary reason why the U.S. went to war against Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan — and transformed the latter into a military colony that still exists today and whose own army is still under Washington’s command. It’s why NATO functions as a U.S. tool for military control of Europe’s armies and the alliance ceaselessly moves eastward to Russia’s borders, why Saddam was overthrown and Iraq obliterated, why Saudi Arabia’s military was brought into vital dependency on the U.S., why the war against Iran is currently being prepared, and why the U.S. empire has deployed 240,000 troops in 172 countries around the world. **A rising China, as an empire in its infancy, however, is of a completely different caliber than the other wannabe-hegemons. Washington’s policy of containment may have a certain time-delaying effect, but ultimately it is irrelevant: China will become the regional hegemon in East Asia in the not-too-distant future, and eventually overtake the U.S. as the world’s primary superpower on the planet in the decades to come.** The 21st century is the Chinese one. This transition can either go ahead peacefully — or with a big bang, potentially in the form of World War III. Secretary of the U.S. Air Force Heather Wilson once again made it clear in her recent keynote speech which scenario Washington is working towards.

#### The CP reaffirms State department control over military aid and checks DoD warmongering. And, the CP solves better—the State department is more responsible and transparent.

Stohl 16 [Rachel Stohl, (Rachel Stohl is Managing Director and directs the Conventional Defense Program. Her areas of expertise focus on issues relating to the international arms trade, including drones, small arms and light weapons, and children in armed conflict. Prior to joining Stimson, Stohl was an Associate Fellow at Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, from 2009-2011. She was a Senior Analyst at the Center for Defense Information in Washington, D.C. from 1998-2009. Stohl has been a consultant for a variety of international organizations, including Oxfam, Project Ploughshares, SIPRI, the Small Arms Survey, and World Vision. She served as a Scoville Fellow at the British American Security Information Council in D.C. and worked at the United Nations Center for Disarmament Affairs in New York and at the Program for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Conversion in Monterey, CA. Stohl is an adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. Stohl was the consultant to the U.N. ATT process from 2010-2013 and was previously the consultant to the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on the Arms Trade Treaty in 2008 and the U.N. Register for Conventional Arms in 2009. She is co-author of two books, The International Arms Trade (Polity Press, 2009) and The Beginners Guide to the Small Arms Trade (Oneworld Publishing, 2009). Stohl holds an M.A. in international policy studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies and an honors B.A. in political science and German from the University of Wisconsin-Madison.) "The Pitfalls of the Pentagon Taking the Lead on U.S. Security Assistance" World Politics Review, 9-20-2016, https://www.stimson.org/content/pitfalls-pentagon-taking-lead-us-security-assistance, DOA:1-1-2019 // recut WWBW]

This tension between the State Department and the Pentagon is not new. For decades, there have been contradictions between advancing U.S. security interest and foreign policy goals, such as the protection of human rights. Traditionally, the State Department was the primary decision-maker that determined who received security assistance and for what purpose. Yet all of that began to change after Sept. 11. Before 9/11, Congress had already begun authorizing the Pentagon to support foreign militaries in roles that had long been filled by the State Department. Starting with anti-drug training in the Western Hemisphere, the number and size of these programs has steadily grown since. In the aftermath of Sept. 11, the purpose of “train and equip” programs was altered to fill an expanding list of priorities to “build partner capacity,” known as BPC. A RAND Corporation study in 2013 found that of 184 unique authorities that underwrite 165 BPC programs, at least 70 are managed and can be utilized by the Pentagon to provide security cooperation. The mandates of these programs are vast, ranging from counterterrorism to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. **After 9/11, the Defense Department created military assistance programs to supplement traditional State Department ones.** But from the outset, **the appropriated funds that support these programs were subject to fewer restrictions than their State Department counterparts.** For example, the Pentagon’s Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program was originally created in 2002 with a mandate that critics claimed served the same purpose as the State Department’s International Military Education and Training program. The Pentagon program provided nonlethal counterterrorism training, but lethal training was made available two years later. Similarly, **in 2006, the Pentagon was authorized to use $200 million of its Operation and Maintenance funds to equip and train foreign militaries for counterterrorism operations. In creating these parallel training authorities and funding them through the defense budget, the Pentagon is, in effect, able to implement its security assistance without applying Foreign Assistance Act restrictions, which are intended to ensure that human rights and other foreign policy concerns are taken into consideration when determining the provision of security assistance. Experts have counted a tripling of military assistance out of the Pentagon budget from 2008 to 2015. That money comes with greater influence.** And **although the State Department can veto some programs, others are outside its authority, and program planning is not always shared with State Department personnel. After 9/11, the Pentagon gained a larger role, not just because it had the money, but because it was believed that it had the experience and means to react more quickly to changing situations** and needs in an expansive and fast growing war on terror. While many of the countries receiving Pentagon military assistance are seen as national security priorities, their behavior often raises foreign policy concerns that make diplomatic engagement difficult. Providing arms to these countries also increases the risk that U.S.-origin weapons could be used against the United States, its soldiers, its allies and/or its interests. In many cases, military and security assistance is provided to achieve short-term security gains, which may undermine long-term U.S foreign policy interests. **These issues are compounded by the fact that the Pentagon simply has more money and resources to address these concerns, and it has become easier for it to simply foot the bill. Pentagon spending on military assistance has totaled at least $122 billion since 2001, compared to approximately $119 billion for the State Department.** The Security Assistance Monitor, a program of the Center for International Policy that tracks U.S. security assistance to countries around the world, has documented **a tenfold increase in Pentagon security aid programs** since 2001—from $1 billion in 2001 to $10.8 billion in 2015. **State Department spending nearly doubled in that time from $4.6 billion to $8.3 billion.** However, it is not the dollar figure that is worth comparing, but rather the meteoric rise of Pentagon spending, as opposed to a more gradual increase from the State Department. **This increased spending has made some observers apprehensive. A Congressional Research Service report last May raised serious concerns about the roles of the State Department and the Pentagon with regard to security assistance and reconciling foreign policy objectives with security goals.** It highlighted the lack of reporting requirements for Pentagon programs compared to the State Department and the resulting lack of oversight and accounting. In addition, Pentagon programs are not subject to country-by-country public reporting, making understanding a recipient country’s priorities, activities and funding impossible. At least 66 Pentagon programs do not allow any specific country information to be made available at all. Beyond this lack of transparency and oversight, a larger and more philosophical concern is that **foreign policy has become militarized. Recipient countries and communities have the impression that help only comes from the U.S. military, which changes the context of assistance and the relationship with those receiving it. The mission and its perception differ depending on whether the help comes from the U.S. military, or instead from the U.S. Embassy, the United States Agency for International Development or other civil servants from various U.S. government agencies. Today, American security assistance has become unnecessarily military in nature, simply because there are additional Pentagon funds and programs that can quickly move money.** At a fundamental level, **when speaking with members of the U.S. military involved in these types of missions, such as building schools or bridges in African countries, they have recognized that they are simply there to complete their work and to strengthen military-to-military relationships.** They often don’t worry about diplomatic aspects or the types of relationships they are establishing. To be sure, developing any relationship, particularly in countries with questionable and at times poor records of democracy and human rights, is important, and military relationships may buy the security that is desired in the short term. But **in the long term, without deeper diplomatic relationships and nonmilitary engagement, it will be impossible to achieve larger strategic objectives and foster an environment of trust.**

#### Solves extinction—China war goes nuclear.

Talmadge 18 (Caitlin, Associate Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University, Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT “Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of Control” Foreign Affairs November/December 2018 Issue https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option)

**As China’s power has grown in recent years**, **so**, too, **has the risk of war** with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, **China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence** in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And **the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most** policymakers and analysts **think**. Members of China’s strategic community tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.” This assurance is misguided. **If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation.** Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that **a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons** while they were still able to. As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that **a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating.** As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, **the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing** or resolving the political, economic, and military **tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place.** A NEW KIND OF THREAT There are some reasons for optimism. For one, China has long stood out for its nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. After its first nuclear test, in 1964, China largely avoided the Cold War arms race, building a much smaller and simpler nuclear arsenal than its resources would have allowed. Chinese leaders have consistently characterized nuclear weapons as useful only for deterring nuclear aggression and coercion. Historically, this narrow purpose required only a handful of nuclear weapons that could ensure Chinese retaliation in the event of an attack. To this day, China maintains a “no first use” pledge, promising that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The prospect of a nuclear conflict can also seem like a relic of the Cold War. Back then, the United States and its allies lived in fear of a Warsaw Pact offensive rapidly overrunning Europe. NATO stood ready to use nuclear weapons first to stalemate such an attack. Both Washington and Moscow also consistently worried that their nuclear forces could be taken out in a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear strike by the other side. This mutual fear increased the risk that one superpower might rush to launch in the erroneous belief that it was already under attack. Initially, the danger of unauthorized strikes also loomed large. In the 1950s, lax safety procedures for U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on NATO soil, as well as minimal civilian oversight of U.S. military commanders, raised a serious risk that nuclear escalation could have occurred without explicit orders from the U.S. president. The good news is that these Cold War worries have little bearing on U.S.-Chinese relations today. **Neither country could rapidly overrun the other’s territory in a conventional war. Neither seems worried about a nuclear bolt from the blue.** And civilian political control of nuclear weapons is relatively strong in both countries. What remains, in theory, is the comforting logic of mutual deterrence: in a war between two nuclear powers, neither side will launch a nuclear strike for fear that its enemy will respond in kind. The bad news is that one other trigger remains: **a conventional war that threatens China’s nuclear arsenal. Conventional forces can threaten nuclear forces in ways that generate pressures to escalate—especially when ever more capable U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with relatively small and fragile nuclear arsenals, such as China. If U.S. operations endangered or damaged China’s nuclear forces, Chinese leaders might come to think that Washington had aims beyond winning the conventional war—that it might be seeking to disable or destroy China’s nuclear arsenal outright, perhaps as a prelude to regime change. In the fog of war, Beijing might reluctantly conclude that limited nuclear escalation—an initial strike small enough that it could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation—was a viable option to defend itself.**

# 2NR

## Extensions – CP

### 2NR – Solvency O/V

Framing issue on the counterplan—only one department can implement the plan, since only one department can have jurisdiction over military aid programs. That means winning the CP solves the aff better is a net benefit to the CP and a reason to reject the perm since it means we should cede all power to the State department in making decisions on foreign aid.

Go to the counterplan proper

### 2NR – Solvency

The counterplan solves the aff better—that’s the **Stohl** evidence. Two warrants—[1] Soft Power—other countries perceive the State department as less hostile and better able to deal with issues of aid—that means they’re more cooperative and allow the aff to be implemented more easily [2] Transparency—Pentagon aid programs are not subject to congressional oversight or Foreign Assistance Act restrictions, which means the DoD can and will circumvent the aff—only the State department will follow through.

### 2NR – Competition

The counterplan competes:

[1] normal means is DoD—that’s McBride—if they did not specify, hold them to normal means—anything else makes the aff a moving target that makes giving the 1NC impossible. If they don’t have to defend normal means, they could make up new definitions in the 1AR to shift out of the entire 1NC.

2] net benefits—the perm links into the DA—it doesn’t signal a significant change in foreign policy necessary to change foreign policy calculi.

### AT Perm Do Both

Having just the state department implement is more effective than the permutation:

1] tradeoff—only one department can have final jurisdiction over military aid programs—means the perm is incoherent.

2] funding—having both departments implement wastes federal funding for diplomacy and prevents work on important diplomatic initiatives—the perm is redundant and wastes time and money

3] legal confusion—the perm creates confusion over which department has jurisdiction—that traps the plan in a web of bureaucratic red tape that prevents it from being successfully implemented.

## Extensions – DA

### 2NR – O/V

The thesis of the DA is very simple—the Department of Defense is on the warpath—a war with China is coming soon. The CP is both a material and a perceptual shift that lessens the Pentagon’s power—that increases soft power and decreases the militarization of US foreign policy. The CP avoids nuclear war with China—that outweighs the aff:

A] sufficiency framing

B] Magnitude

C] Time Frame

### 2NR – U/Q – War Now

Extend **Reimann**—the US is getting ready for war with China because it is a rising regional hegemon that is a threat to US power. This is empirically proven—US and NATO forces are increasing investments at the Russian border and new aircraft are bomber that can be used against other countries.

### 2NR – Link – State Dept. Influence Solves

Extend **Stohl**—the Pentagon’s current control over military aid has contributed to a militarized foreign policy that causes more hostility from other countries and undermines their faith in US diplomatic relations—the CP relegates the military back to a secondary role in foreign policy and prioritizes soft power solutions over hard power ones—that prevents war.

Call for the card—it’s excellent on military aid is so important for Pentagon influence—there are two warrants. [1] Funding—the military uses its control over military aid as a mechanism to get more funding, which causes it to play a greater role in foreign policy. There is virtually no oversight over Pentagon aid programs, which means the military can use the money however it wants. [2] Perception—military control over aid causes over countries to perceive the military as the face of foreign policy, which makes them less trusting and more hostile towards US foreign policy.

### 2NR – Impact – China War

Extend **Talmadge**—the war with China will go nuclear—Beijing uses nukes in response to the US’s conventional war strategies because nuclear weapons are the US army’s first strategic targets.