#### I value morality because ought implies a moral obligation[[1]](#footnote-1).

#### There are two kinds of moral systems: Duty based ethics which ask what I should do, and Agent based ethics which what kind of person should I be, in order to determine the qualities of a good actor. Only agent based ethics gives us a more complete view of ethical life and avoids the internal contradictions of a duty based system.

Stan Hooft, Professor of philosophy at Deakin University in Australia, Understanding Virtue Ethics, published November 30, 2005 ///AHS PB

Duty ethics is said to make use of “thin” concepts, whereas virtue ethics uses “thick” concepts. This is an implication of saying that duty ethics uses deontic terms and is primarily concerned with whether an action is right or wrong. These are “thin” concepts because they do not offer us much in the way of a description of the action. We do not learn anything about an action when we describe it as “wrong” except that it is morally forbidden. To say of murder that it is wrong is to give no clue as to what it is about an act of murder that makes it wrong or what it is about the agent that attracts our moral condemnation. Indeed, it might even be a tautology that tells us nothing. Aft er all a “murder” is defined as a wrongful killing of a human being. So to say that murder is wrong is to say something that is true by definition. It gives us no substantive information at all. To describe an action as “courageous” or “generous”, on the other hand, is to convey considerably more information. In the fi rst case it suggests that the situation in which the action was performed was one of danger to the agent. It suggests that the agent acted with fortitude and commitment in the face of that danger. It suggests that such fortitude and commitment are excellent ways of being a human being. In this way, because a lot of meaning is conveyed in it, the word “courageous” is deemed to be a “thick” concept. Virtue terms are generally thick in this way. IV

#### Good and bad are attributive properties that only make sense in the context of a specific actor. For example, a good gun kills people, but a good person doesn’t. Virtue ethics consists in discovering what it means to be a good human through our intuitive understanding of how humans exist in the world.

Stan Hooft, Professor of philosophy at Deakin University in Australia, Understanding Virtue Ethics, published November 30, 2005 [2] ///AHS PB

For the ethics of duty, moral goodness is defined in relation to what is demanded by the moral law or by moral principles and rules. For human beings to be good is simply for them to act rightly for the right reasons. But this is a thin conception of goodness. It defines goodness as little more than avoiding wrongdoing. What virtue ethics places before us, on the other hand, are ideals of goodness for human beings. It does not ask what would be morally right so much as what would constitute human excellence. Very oft en, virtue ethics begins by articulating a theory about distinguishing virtue ethics from the ethics of duty 15 human beings and then builds ideals of human excellence on that basis. If the purpose of a knife is to cut things, then an excellent knife is one that cuts things well. In this way, by understanding what a knife is and what it is for, we can define what a good knife would be. In the same way, if we can say what a human being is in terms of its function, we will be able to say what it is to be an excellent or good human being. Although philosophers have spent an enormous amount of time on the question, it is not difficult to develop an intuitively acceptable theory of what human beings are. Taking adult, fully competent human beings as a paradigm case, we could suggest that among the central and distinctive features of such human beings is that they are rational, social, creative and communicative. We are rational in that we think about what we might do, plan for our futures and seek to establish satisfactory arrangements for living a successful human life. We are social in that we live in families, communities and societies and could hardly survive without these social arrangements. We are creative in that we fi nd new solutions to practical problems, develop the arts and continually seek to improve the ways we do things. And we are communicative in that we use language not just to increase the effi ciency of practical projects, but also to express our ideas and feelings, develop our cultures and generally lubricate our social lives. I am not saying that these are the only important qualities of human beings. But they will do in order for me to illustrate my point. Nor am I suggesting that we are entirely unique in evincing these qualities. Many animals may be rational, social, creative and communicative in rudimentary ways as well. Th e argument does not depend on these qualities being unique to human beings. Th e argument says that if these are qualities that mark human existence, then a good human being is one who displays these qualities to an excellent degree. For human beings goodness does not consist just in obeying the moral law or adhering to moral principles. It consists in doing well what is in us as human beings to do. A good individual is one who is good as a human being. Accordingly, a fully developed theory of virtue ethics will include a fully developed account of what it is to be a human being and will then suggest that being virtuous consists in being a human being excellently.

#### And intuitions are reliable and form the foundation for all philosophical thought: 1] Every argument is based on an unjustifiable intuitive premise about the world such as pleasure exists and 2] We accept and reject moral arguments in relation to preexisting intuitions: IE you wouldn’t except an ethical system that allowed racism even if it was logically justified.

#### Virtue Ethics calls actions right or wrong based on whether the process of becoming a good human is intrinsic to them. To clarify my standard is not consequentialist, it judges actions based on whether a virtuous person would take them. For example, charity is innately a virtuous action while genocide is always wrong. Only virtue ethics can universally condemn atrocities regardless of their particular nature.

Jeremy Reid, Professor of Philosophy at San Francisco State, Virtue, Rule-Following, and Absolute Prohibitions, Journal of the American Philosophical Association, (2019) 5(1), 78–97. doi:10.1017/apa.2018.43 ///AHS PB

Absolute prohibitions in secular virtue ethics are grounded in the fact that there are some actions that are impossible to do virtuously or that directly manifest vice. Foot suggests such an approach when she says that ‘if the frequently unchallengeable description “torture” applies to an action, then, whatever the circumstances, it is in my firm opinion morally “out”’ (: ). She claims that some actions necessarily manifest injustice or cruelty, and that one ‘necessarily acts badly’ if one does them, but that it may be hard to know whether some action is in fact cruel or unjust (: ). However, both Foot and Hursthouse discuss absolute prohibitions only in passing (and somewhat gingerly). Foot’s discussion occupies a few lines in a discussion of Mill, and Hursthouse speaks only of ‘the (possible) existence of a few absolute prohibitions’ (: –). One can see why Vogler is skeptical of the extent to which Anscombe’s own colleagues and students have incorporated absolute prohibitions into their theories. But there are historical precedents from which contemporary virtue ethicists could draw inspiration. Plato thinks that a just person will never embezzle money, take bribes, rob temples, steal, betray friends, betray his country, be untrustworthy in keeping oaths and agreements, commit adultery, disrespect his parents, or neglect the gods (Republic e–a). Notoriously, Plato’s just person refrains from these actions because they would disrupt the internal harmony of his soul—but notice that they have this effect because those actions are unjust. They bring injustice into the soul. At any rate, Plato has no qualms in listing actions that a just person would never do. Aristotle is less forthcoming with examples, but he provides some. ‘Not every action or feeling admits of a mean’, he writes, ‘for some have names immediately connected with depravity, such as spite, shamelessness, envy, and, among actions, adultery, theft, homicide’ (Nicomachean Ethics a–). Some actions are by their nature unvirtuous and so cannot be performed virtuously (Irwin : , ). One cannot do adultery well. It is Cicero, however, who says it best: ‘There are some acts either so repulsive or so wicked that a wise man would not commit them, even to save his country. Posidonius has made a large collection of them; but some of them are so shocking, so indecent, that it seems immoral even to mention them. The wise man, therefore, will not think of doing any such thing for the sake of his country; no more will his country consent to have it done for her’ (On Duties I.). Cicero thinks that saving one’s country is one of our most important moral concerns, so his position is that there are some consequences that cannot outweigh the wrongness of the action. This is not a bad start, but we do not need Posidonius’s list to find other actions that cannot be done virtuously (see also Tsu ). Some of these actions are mundane and whose performance is shocking precisely because they violate basic standards of decency: cutting in line; trying to get onto the bus or subway while people are still coming out; singing along at the opera; posting someone else’s sex tapes or nude photos without consent; randomly shoving strangers on the street; putting graffiti on artworks or archaeological sites. In addition, there are actions that occur more regularly but that are nonetheless unvirtuous: bullying; cheating; fearmongering; corruption; whining; taking credit for others’ work; plagiarizing; knowingly misquoting texts; fabricating evidence; slander; discriminating on the basis of race, gender, sexuality, and using related epithets and slurs; driving while drunk or chemically impaired. Then there are those actions that are horrifying and extreme paradigms of vice: rape; defiling sacred spaces; genocide; abusing children; abduction; engaging in sexual activity with minors. I could continue with these lists (Anscombe would add lying, knowingly punishing the innocent, and murdering, i.e., intentionally killing the innocent), but the point is to draw attention to the many action prohibitions that most of us have so thoroughly internalized that they rarely figure in ethical discussion or are considered in moral deliberation, precisely because they are not hard cases. The aforementioned actions directly connote vice. Some of these actions are morally reprehensible and manifest an especially vicious character, whereas other actions are more trivial but nonetheless show a defect in character. While it is jarring to consider these cases side by side, we should remember the scope of virtuous deliberation and action. Prohibitions show up all over the place—not just in serious moral dilemmas—and many of them are so obvious we do not often think about them. Moreover, we feel confident in determining that people who do these things are not good people without needing to make reference to the consequences of the action. What explains why we feel justified in making such judgments, and what is it that makes those actions impermissible? There is no single thing because of which all of those actions are impermissible—nor should we expect to find one. What makes singing along at the opera wrong depends on the inconsiderateness of making noise in conjunction with the conventions of concert-going, where the understanding is that people have paid money to hear the people on stage and not those sitting next to them. This is very different from what makes rape wrong, or why a lack of academic integrity undermines the project of scholarship. Thus we should not expect there to be a single ‘prohibition-making’ feature of all actions that directly connote vice. But what makes such actions manifestly vicious in general? We can say something more about what these actions have in common that makes them indefeasibly wrong as opposed to merely wrong in some respect by considering the structure of virtuous and vicious action. Virtuous actions have noble ends and demonstrate deliberative excellence, so what these prohibited actions have in common is that either (a) there is no way to give a virtuous justification of how they would achieve some good, or (b) their ends and natural consequences are things that a virtuous person avoids or prevents. Thus the error consists in choosing actions that are either reliably bad ways of achieving an end or require taking an end that is unvirtuous. For example, cutting in line at the airport is an unvirtuous means because it does not make the plane leave any faster and it is unfair and disrespectful to the other passengers; thus, it reliably involves vice and reliably fails to achieve any good. By contrast, torture manifests vice because it necessarily involves intending intense pain and distress to another sentient being; thus, the action is prohibited because the end of the action is vicious. A virtuous agent would respond to someone who performs these kinds of actions by saying either, ‘But that’s not how you go about getting your end!’ or, ‘But you shouldn’t want to achieve that!’ and would then proceed to give a further explanation based on the particular wrong-making features of the case, highlighting either the deliberative failure in instrumental reasoning or the teleological failing of wanting to achieve the end in the first place. So, in general, actions manifest vice when some part of the structure of the action is corrupt, but what explains the corruption and the degree of moral seriousness will depend on the particulars of the action.

#### Thus, my value criterion is promoting human flourishing. This entails avoiding actions that promote vice, while taking those that promote virtue. Prefer:

#### [1] The purpose of the state is to promote virtue, otherwise practical action is impossible.

Aaron Ross Powell, Director and Editor of [Libertarianism.org](http://www.libertarianism.org/), a project of the Cato Institute, The State Through the Lens of Virtue, May 23, 2013, <https://www.libertarianism.org/blog/state-through-lens-virtue> ///AHS PB

There are two senses in which we might think about the telos of the state. First, if we create a state at all, we create it to fulfill some purpose–just like any other tool. The telos of a knife is to cut. The telos of a hammer is to pound nails. The telos of the state is what we made it to accomplish: a well-functioning society. Yet “the state” doesn’t exist as a thing in itself. Instead it’s a collection of people authorized to behave in certain ways and with certain authority over the rest of us. So the second way to think about the state’s telos is to look at those people. A doctor is a human, and so has the telos of humans generally: achieving eudaimonia. But “doctor” is also a profession with a purpose of its own: promoting health. Thus the telos of a doctor, when he or she acts in her capacity as a doctor, is health. The profession of doctor brings its own set of situational virtues that don’t necessarily apply outside of doctoring. Agents of the state, then, have the telos of their profession, which will be closely tied–if not identical–to the telos of the broader state-as-tool. These virtues govern what it means to be a good politician, a good bureaucrat, a good public servant, and so on. This second sense of the state’s telos addresses a potential concern raised by [methodological individualism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Methodological_individualism). This is the claim that social phenomena are nothing but the aggregate actions of individuals, and it’s a position libertarians generally accept. Thus to talk about “the state” having virtues or a purpose or needs would seem to violate methodological individualism. But if we instead talk about the telos of those agents vested with the authority of the state, then we’re talking only about individuals, and so avoid the violation. Still, I think it’s probably easier and clearer to just talk about the state’s virtues and the state’s goals, and just assume that what we really mean is the virtues and goals of those individual agents. Okay, so now our state-as-virtue-ethical-entity has a telos. It exists to enable the well-functioning society. To fulfill that purpose, it needs to act in accord with the virtues, do so with practical wisdom, and have the goods needed for both. The state’s “virtues” will be those traits crucial to the well-functioning society. Justice is an obvious one. A state that is not motivated by justice and does not seek to create justice in the world will not be a good state. But justice isn’t alone here. A good state will also be fair. It will respect its citizens. And so on. But even if the “state” has a virtuous character (i.e., all the people who make decisions about what it’ll do are of right character), it will also need the practical wisdom to take right action (i.e., action that is actually in accord with the virtues). As I’ll discuss two posts from now, understanding practical wisdom as it applies to state action is one way to approach Hayek’s knowledge problem. Even if the state has the proper motivations, it lacks the knowledge–and thus the wisdom–to realize its goals. No matter how virtuous economic planners are, they lack sufficient information to adequately plan an economy. A socialist state can never possess practical wisdom. Finally, a state needs whatever goods are required to act in accord with the virtues that apply to it and with the aim of achieving its telos. For example, if one of the state’s proper duties is the provision of police and courts, then it will need some way to pay for them. Otherwise, it won’t attain (that portion of) its telos.

#### [2] Only virtue ethics can hold agents responsible for their decisions.

Stan Hooft, Professor of philosophy at Deakin University in Australia, Understanding Virtue Ethics, published November 30, 2005 ///AHS PB

This last is an important point. If it were true that we could just deduce our decisions from general principles or act merely in obedience to moral laws, then we could assign the responsibility for our actions to those principles or laws. We could say, in a sense, that we were just following orders. Th e “orders” may have come from moral norms, but it would still be valid to think that we were not fully responsible for our actions. If we deduced our decisions on the basis of logic alone, then we could only have an attenuated sense of responsibility for our actions. But we are fully responsible. And the reason we are responsible is that we have had to make a judgement about the specific situation, about all the people and other values in that situation, about what other admirable people may have done in similar situations, and about the norms and principles that might apply to it. Our decision will be a declaration of where we stand on the matter at hand. If I decide not to lie, I shall be making a leap of faith that, in this situation, being truthful was the best thing to do. I shall be declaring myself as truthful and committing myself to the value of truth in such situations as this. Nothing guarantees that this will have been the best option to take and subsequent refl ection may lead me to revise my judgement. Th at is the risk I take when I take responsibility for my decision. It is the accumulation of decisions, understood in this rich sense of taking risks and committing myself to moral values, that constitutes my character as it shapes itself through my life. Virtue ethics acknowledges the moral ambiguity of many issues and situations. In morally complex situations you cannot always know for certain that what you decide to do would be the right course of action. You simply have to decide, make that leap of faith, and take responsibility

#### [3] Normativity – virtue ethics can adapt to moral situation whereas duty ethics will always fail to guide action in specific situations.

**Mayo 58,** Bernard Mayo, English philosopher , The Moral Life.//SS

No doubt **the** fundamental moral **question is** just **“what ought I to do?”** **And according to** the philosophy of moral **principles, the answer** (which must be an imperative “Do this”) **must be derived from a** conjunction of premises consisting (in the simplest case) firstly of a **rule**,or universal imperative, enjoining (or forbidding) all actions of a certain type in situations of a certain type, and , secondly, a statement to the effect that this is a situation of that type, falling under the rule. IN practice the emphasis may be on simply only one of these premises, the other being assumed or taken for granted: one may answer the question “what ought I to do?” either by quoting a rule which I am to adopt, or by showing that my case is legislated for by a rule which I do adopt… [I]f I am in doubt whether to tell the truth about his condition to a dying man, my doubt may be resolved by showing that the case comes under a rule about the avoidance of unnecessary suffering,which I am assumed to accept. **But if the case is without precedent** in my moral career, **my problem may be a soluble only by adopting a new principle** about what I am to do now and the future about cases of this kind.This second possibility offer a connection with moral ideas. **Suppose my perplexity is not merely an unprecedented situation** which I could cope with by adopting a new rule. **Suppose the new rule is** thoroughly **inconsistent with my existing** moral **code.** This may happen, for instance, if the moral code is one to which I only pay lip-service, if… its authority is not yet internalized, or if its final rejection awaits a moral crisis such as we are assuming to occur. **What I** now **need is not a rule** for deciding how to act in this situation and other of its kind.I need a whole set of rules. A complete morality, new principle to live by.Now, according to the philosophy of moral character, **there is another way of answering the** fundamental **question “what ought I to do?”** instead of quoting a rule**, we quote** a quality of character, **a virtue: we say “be brave**,” or “be patient” or “Be lenient.” We may even say “be a man”: if I am in doubt, say, whether to take are risk, and someone says “Be a man,” meaning a morally sound man, in this case a man of sufficient courage. (compare the very different ideal invoked in “be a gentleman.” I shall not discuss whether this is a *Moral* ideal.) Here, too, we have the extreme cases, where a man’s moral perplexity extends not merely to a particular situations but to his whole way of living. And now **the question “what ought I to do?” turns into the question “What ought I to be?”—**as, indeed, it was treated in the first place. (“be brave.”) **It is answered, not by quoting a rule** or a set of rules, **but by describing a** quality of character of a **type of person. And here the ethic**sof character **gains a** practical **simplicity** which offsets the greater logical simplicity of the ethics of principles. We do not have to give a list of characteristics or virtues, as we might list a set of principles we can give a unity to our answer. Of course we can in theory give a unity to our principles: this is implied by speaking of a set of principles. But if such a set is to be a system and not merely aggregate, the unity we are looking is a logical one, namely the possibility that some principles are deductible from others, and the ultimately from one. But the attempt to construct a deductive moral system is notoriously difficult, and in any case ill-founded. Why should we expect that all rules of conduct should be ultimately reducible to a few?

#### [4] Duty based ethics are not binding since they fail to establish a universal law giver we can derive obligations from.

Kirsten Ainley, Professor at London School of Economics, Virtue Ethics and International Relations, Published Nov 2017, 10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.107 ///AHS PB

The story of the recent resurgence of VE starts in the late 1950s, with attacks on the notion of moral obligation found in secular moral theory, particularly Kantian philosophy, and on the nature of moral claims. In 1958, Anscombe published what transpired to be an enormously influential article attacking modern moral philosophy and calling for a return to ancient concerns. Anscombe argues that modern approaches to ethics (principally Kantian and utilitarian) take a law-based approach—they see morality as stemming from law of some form, and as centrally concerned with defining duties and obligations. This trend in morality towards a focus on obligation became embedded, according to Anscombe, due to the rise of Christianity, which saw morality as proceeding from divine law. Rather than thinking about morality in terms of the virtues, as the Greeks did, “we” (Western analytic philosophers, and, following them, Western political theorists) began to think in terms of obligation: “[i]n consequence of the dominance of Christianity for many centuries, the concepts of being bound, permitted or excused became deeply embedded in our language and thought” (Anscombe, [1958](https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/internationalstudies/abstract/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-107#acrefore-9780190846626-e-107-bibItem-0010), p. 5). However, she argues, law conceptions of ethics only make sense if there is a law-giver—an authoritative agent or place from which the laws emanate and which acts as a foundation to our obligations. In the past, this was God, but in contemporary society we do not share a conception of God that would allow us to view him as an authoritative foundation for moral law. She dismisses the possibility of alternative law-givers, arguing that “the concepts of [moral] obligation, and [moral] duty . . . and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of ought, ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible” (Anscombe, [1958](https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/internationalstudies/abstract/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-107#acrefore-9780190846626-e-107-bibItem-0010), p. 1). Foot, also in 1958, published two articles equally as damning of the moral philosophy of the time (Foot, [1958a](https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/internationalstudies/abstract/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-107#acrefore-9780190846626-e-107-bibItem-0037), [1958b](https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/internationalstudies/abstract/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-107#acrefore-9780190846626-e-107-bibItem-0038)). Just as Anscombe exposed ideas of the “right” as reliant upon an assumed authoritative legislator, so Foot attacked the idea that moral evaluations could be separated from a robust and shared concept of the “good,” in terms of human well-being. She shows that for ethical positions (on duties, rightness, obligations, goodness, etc.) to be intelligible (rather than simply logical), they cannot just be an expression of preference or approval. Rather, they must observe the commonly understood grammar inherent in each ethical concept, which links whatever it is that is being commended back to human flourishing in some relatively objective way. There is, for Foot, something concrete about morality, such that moral statements are connected to the factual rather than simply the interpretative, and can thus be judged as better or worse rather than only viewed as one among a range of equally plausible attitudes or manifestations of emotion.

#### [5] Ends Based ethics can never call things right or wrong.

Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe, British analytic philosopher, Modern Moral Philosophy, Philosophy, Vol. 33, No. 124 (Jan., 1958), pp. 1-19 ///AHS PB BRACKETS ADDED FOR GENDERED LANGAUGE

It is a necessary feature of consequentialism that it is a shallow philosophy. For there are always borderline cases in ethics. Now if you are either an Aristotelian, or a believer in divine law, you will deal with a borderline case by considering whether doing such-and-such in such-and-such circumstances is, say, murder, or is an act of injustice; and according as you decide it is or it isn't, you judge it to be a thing to do or not. This would be the method of casuistry; and while it may lead you to stretch a point on the circumference, it will not permit you to destroy the centre. But if you are a consequentialist, the question "What is it right to do in such-and-such circumstances?" is a stupid one to raise. The casuist raises such a question only to ask "Would it be permissible to do so-and-so?" or "Would it be permis- sible not to do so-and-so?" Only if it would not be permissible not to do so-and-so could he say "This would though he [one] may speak against some action, he cannot prescribe any- for in an actual case, the circumstances (beyond the ones imagined) might suggest all sorts of possibilities, and you can't know in advance what the possibilities are going to be. Now the consequentialist has no footing on which to say "This would be permissible, this not"; because by his own hypothesis, it is the consequences that are to decide, and he has no business to pretend that he can lay it down what possible twists a man could give doing this or that; the most he can say is: a man must not bring about this or that; he has no right to say he will, in an actual case, bring about such-and-such unless he does so-and-so. Further, the consequentialist, in order to be imagining borderline cases at all, has of course to assume some sort of law or standard according to which this is a borderline case, Where then does he get the standard from? In practice the answer invariably is: from the standards current in his society or his circle. And it has in fact been the mark of all these philosophers that they have been extremely conventional; they have nothing in them by which to revolt against the conventional standards of their sort of people; it is impossible that they should be profound. But the chance that a whole range of conventional standards will be decent is small.-Finally, the point of considering hypothetical situations, perhaps very improbable ones, seems to be to elicit from yourself or someone else a hypothetical decision to do something of a bad kind. I don't doubt this has the effect of predisposing people-who will never get into the situations for which they have made hypothetical choices-to consent to similar bad actions, or to praise and flatter those who do them, so long as their crowd does so too, when the desperate circumstances imagined don't hold at all.

#### [6]. Happiness may be preferable. However, objects and conditions that bring us happiness cannot hold value in themselves, because their goodness is conditional. Only virtues that contribute to a content life can possess intrinsic value.

Baltzly (Dirk Baltzly. Stoicism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/#Eth>. First published Mon Apr 15, 1996; substantive revision Fri Dec 6, 2013)

The best way into the thicket of Stoic ethics is through the question of what is good, for all parties agree that possession of what is genuinely good secures a person's happiness. The Stoics claim that whatever is good must benefit its possessor under all circumstances. But there are situations in which it is not to my benefit to be healthy or wealthy. (We may imagine that if I had money I would spend it on heroin which would not benefit me.) Thus, things like money are simply not good, in spite of how nearly everyone speaks, and the Stoics call them ‘indifferents’ (Diog. Laert., 58A)—i.e., neither good nor bad. The only things that are good are the characteristic excellences or virtues of human beings (or of human minds): prudence or wisdom, justice, courage and moderation, and other related qualities. These are the first two of the ‘Stoic paradoxes’ discussed by Cicero in his short work of that title: that only what is noble or fine or morally good (kalon) is good at all, and that the possession (and exercise) **of the virtues is both necessary and sufficient for happiness**. But the Stoics are not such lovers of paradox that they are willing to say that my preference for wealth over poverty in most circumstances is utterly groundless. They draw a distinction between what is good and things which have value (axia). Some indifferent things, like health or wealth, have value and therefore are to be preferred, even if they are not good, because they are typically appropriate, fitting or suitable (oikeion) for us.

#### [7] Virtue ethics is the best way to explain and solve oppression—MLK proves.

Desai 16 [Shrey Desai, debated for four years at Saratoga High School, 4-11-2016, "Philosophy and Oppression by Shrey Desai," Briefly, <https://www.vbriefly.com/2016/04/11/philosophy-and-oppression-by-shrey-desai/>] AG highlighted AHS PB

What makes virtue ethics an attractive theory to address oppression is its emphasis on character. Moral character is achieved through societal deliberation and character traits such as respect, compassion, and benevolence are cultivated throughout the way. Virtue ethicists argue that a strong moral character is key to eudaimonia, the Greek word for “a good life.” In order to relate virtue ethics to oppression, I will use white supremacists as an example. White supremacists fundamentally believe that their race and culture is superior to those of others, such as African-Americans, Hispanics, or Asians. Through mere intuition, one can safely say that these white supremacists have inculcated a lot of vices; just to name a few, these supremacists lack empathy for the feelings of others and are definitely not humble when weighing between cultural beliefs. They are not leading “the good life,” and they are fundamentally devoid of important virtues and a strong moral character. Tessman (2005) argues that oppressors “exhibit moral vices (such as callousness, greed, self‐centeredness, dishonesty, cowardice, in addition to injustice) or at least the absence of certain specific moral virtues (perhaps compassion, generosity, cooperativeness, openness to appreciating others).” In order to cleanse themselves of their repugnant mindsets and oppressive tendencies, these oppressors must first and foremost rid themselves of these vices. Through the Aristotelian ways of moral education and practice, the oppressors can develop a moral character, ultimately solving for the root cause of their harm towards others.

This phenomenon also has historical precedent. The use of virtues was empirically successful in bringing down oppressors during the Civil Rights movement. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was an important moral authority for the United States; he encouraged the discipline of nonviolence and tolerance in order to spread racial justice. The methods that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. used were morally praiseworthy, and ultimately, successful. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 proved that policymakers in the United States federal government had come to terms with their vices and were cognizant of the racism that had infiltrated the nation. The same white supremacists that had segregated African-Americans were forced to develop a moral conscience and inculcate virtues such as respect and compassion that allowed them to view the African-American people as equals. Moral integrity and the promotion of virtue were not only effective but also essential in stopping real world oppression.

#### [8] Virtue Ethics is key to motivating those in privilege to question their assumptions of the world and improve.

Maureen H. O’Connell, Associate professor and chair of the Department of Religion at La Salle University in Philadelphia, After White Supremacy? The Viability of Virtue Ethics for Racial Justice, Journal of Moral Theology, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2014): 83-104 ///AHS PB

As a white Christian ethicist and protagonist in the scenes above, I wonder whether virtue ethics as it is understood and practiced in Catholic moral theology serves as a viable moral method for examining and responding to these racial events. There are many reasons to think that would be the case. To begin, virtue ethics generally aims for moral development in personal or intrapersonal spheres,2 which are also the spaces where racism in our post-civil rights era has retreated and remains firmly entrenched as evidenced in the first scenario. Virtue ethics is also attentive to the material or concrete particularities of agents and contexts, and therefore invites attuned perception to the more subtle dimensions of human moral action such as intention and emotive reasoning, as well as the fitting or appropriate response in light of the underlying relationships of a given situation.3 This would make it helpful in combating racism in its more covert contemporary forms such as internalized dispositions of superiority (operative in the first scenario), situations where stereotypes are likely to occlude actual facts (the second scenario), or situations where one’s place in the racial hierarchy is likely to determine how one relates to others (the third scenario). Finally, virtue ethics encourages ongoing and future-oriented transformation through a process of striving toward a vision of what one hopes to become, whether as an individual or as a community, operative in the second and third scenarios.4 Americans were recently reminded of the indispensability of virtue ethics for racial justice as we marked the 50th Anniversary of the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, recalling a prophetic imperative to judge people on their character rather than the color of their skin and recommitting ourselves to making dreams of racial equality a reality.

#### [9] Virtue ethics is intrinsic to the process of judging and participating in deliberation, which means my framework is a prior question.

James A. Herrick, American academic. He is the Guy Vanderjagt Professor of Communication and former communication chair at Hope College, Rhetoric, ethics, and virtue, Published (1992), Communication Studies, 43(3), 133–149. doi:10.1080/10510979209368367 ///AHS PB BRACKETS IN ORIGINAL CARD

Aristotle's theory of virtue is also firmly rooted in the concept of choice as the outcome of deliberation guided by practical wisdom or phronesis. As Robert Rowland and Deanna Womack note, Aristotle applied this concept to the practice of rhetoric. "The final presupposition of Aristotle's ethical theory," they write, "is that practical wisdom (phronesis) guides the ethical rhetor to right action."43 The connection between ethics and rhetoric is often affirmed by Aristotle, and exhibited in the fact that deliberation (choice-making) is the rhetorical activity central to Aristotle's Rhetoric.44 "Choice seems to be very closely related to virtue and to be a more reliable criterion for judging character than actions are" (111 la 5). Choice-making must be trained by attending to human examples of virtuous action, as well as by engaging in the activity of training the sense of pleasure and pain. Virtue itself is a kind of habit of making sound choices, and habituation is only possible because it is part of human nature to make moral choices (1103b 15). Since choice-making is a product of deliberation, the process of deliberation becomes central to any discussion of ethics or virtue for Aristotle, as well as to any discussion of rhetoric. Also of interest to the rhetorical ethicist is John Milbank's contention that, for Aristotle, ethics is a rhetorical concern by its very nature. The "argument" for virtue is only "probable" and derived from examples of virtuous people, writes Milbank. Thus, any theory of virtue involves an essentially rhetorical induction. Moreover, phronesis is concerned principally with "deliberation concerning the means to realize the desired ends."45 Phronesis is a kind of master-virtue, since all virtues must be passed through the deliberative process by which the mean so essential to virtue is determined. Phronesis deals in contingent matters, and engages reason. In both of these ways the central virtue shows its close kinship to rhetoric. Thus, virtue and rhetoric are linked more directly than are virtue and any other practice. How do virtues work, then, as guides to deliberation, choice, and action? Amelie O. Rorty provides a helpful description of how virtues operate in the deliberative process: virtue[s] form interpretations of situations; they focus the person's attention and define what is salient, placing other concerns in the background. To act well, and to do so reliably, a person must perceive and interpret situations appropriately, and do so reliably. Without appropriate cognitive structures—thresholds of attentiveness that are sensitive without being hypersensitive, habits of salient focusing that are corrigible without being destructive, imaginative habits of association that elicit relevant material without being volatile—good will remains empty.46 Thus, virtues are guides to deliberation and action that assist in selecting and focusing the situational and personal factors relevant to choice-making. Joel Kupperman writes, "ethical theories are not merely rarified decision procedures but are also (much more importantly) ways of structuring our experience of and reflection on our moral life."47 "What duties we perceive," writes Meilander, "may depend upon what virtues shape our vision of the world."48

#### [10] Use Epistemic confidence in evaluating the framework debate. 1] We have to be confident that modesty is true. 2] We would have to be modest to the validity of terrible belief systems like Nazism which is morally repugnant 3] Modesty kills phil ed since we never have a framework debate, only a race to the biggest impacts.

#### [11] No theoretically justified framing mechanisms or ROBS. A] Kills phil ed since we only debate the fairness of our philosophy not its validity B] If my framework is substantively true than its more educational to learn about it and C] Aff arguments mean evaluating your framework is incoherent.

## Offense

#### I defend States ought to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

#### 1. Nuclear weapon possession is morally myopic – it corrupts nations that control them and allows the domination of other states. Additionally, nukes violate the golden mean – they are indiscriminant and violate the primary virtue of reciprocity, as they are an overcompensation for any other form of violence.

**Kent No Date,** kent, Chris. “Military Technology Out of Control? .” Virtue Ethics, miltech.ethics.angelfire.com/MilTech\_files/page0019.htm.//Scopa **Human society has ethical and moral norms based on wisdom, conscience, and practicality. Many norms are universal and have withstood the test of human experience** over long periods of time. **One such principle is that of reciprocity.** It is often called the Golden Rule: “Treat others as you wish to be treated.” It is an ethical and moral foundation for all the world’s major religions. So first of all, **it is inconsistent with moral wisdom** and practical common sense **for a few states to violate** the ancient and universally valid principle of **reciprocity. Such moral myopia has a corrosive effect on the law**, which gains its respect largely through moral coherence. **Global security cannot be obtained while rejecting wisdom universally recognized for thousands of years.** Second of all from the ethical perspective of view **any kind of weaponry should comply with two main principles: discrimination and proportionality**. The first implies that **only combatants must suffer from weapon**, the second says that the way warfare is conducted may be out of proportion to the reasons the war is waged. The same principles are reinforced in the international law: **the rules of armed conflict**, including humanitarian law, **prohibit the use of any weapon that is likely to cause unnecessary suffering** to combatants**; that is incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets;** that violates principles protecting neutral states (such as through fall-out or nuclear winter); **that is not a proportional response** to an attack**; or that does permanent damage to the environment**. Takashi Hiraoka, the former Mayor of Hiroshima, described **the horrors of nuclear blast, which was indiscriminative to its victims**: ‘Beneath the atomic bomb’s monstrous mushroom cloud, human skin was burned raw. Crying for water, human beings died in desperate agony. With thoughts of these victims as the starting point, it is incumbent upon us to think about the nuclear age and the relationship between human beings and nuclear weapons… **The unique characteristic of the atomic bombing was that the enormous destruction was instantaneous and universal**. Old, young, male, female, soldier, civilian – the killing was utterly indiscriminate. The entire city was exposed to the compound and devastating effects of thermal rays, shock wave blast, and radiation…’ So the **use and possession of nuclear weapons is unjustifiable** from the point of view of main ethical considerations.

#### 2. Nuclear possession is hyprociritcal exceptionalism that generates the conditions for control over other states – it violates the moral community by prioritizing the interests of the individual. Nuclear arsenals can only generate any positive virtue through actual use.

**Kent 2,** kent, Chris. “Military Technology Out of Control? .” Virtue Ethics, miltech.ethics.angelfire.com/MilTech\_files/page0019.htm.//Scopa The implication of Aristotelian **Virtue Ethics in** the question of **developing nuclear technologies proved that under no circumstances nuclear weapons can be considered as good** from this point of view. First of all, for Aristotle there must be one overall or final aim towards which everything else is directed. For Aristotle, that final aim is the Good; not only the good for oneself but the Good for all humanity. However in reality **nuclear weapons are held by a handful of states which insist that these weapons provide unique security** benefits, and **yet reserve uniquely to themselves the right to own them. This situation is highly discriminatory and thus unstable**; it cannot be sustained. The **possession of nuclear weapons by any state is a constant stimulus to other states to acquire them**. Assuming that **a particular state is considered as an individual and the humanity as a community** the following argument presented by Aristotle in Nichomachean Ethics still holds true: ‘For **even if the good of the community coincides with that of the individual, it is** clearly **a greater and more perfect thing to achieve and preserve that of a community**.’ So on the one hand we have **a nuclear weapon possessing state**, which has a certain virtue of either **directly imposing it’s will upon other states** or using it as very strong argument when solving it’s political problems and on the other hand we have the **humankind which would be better off without any potential threat of nuclear weapons**. So, assuming that the possession of nuclear weapons is a virtue for a particular state the last argument to call upon is the following: **each virtue is identifiable as a trait that enables it’s possessor to perform its function well under the set of conditions where this function could be relevantly used to full extent. That means that the virtue of possessing nuclear weapon can be only identified through using it. However it’s not true, since a mere possession of nuclear weapons without ever trying to use them would already be considered as a ‘virtue’**.

#### That’s a double bind – either a) intrinsic possession of nukes is something that determines virtue and that possession is intrinsically wrong or b) It can only be assessed as virtue after its use, which means turns don’t negate since we eliminate their possession rather than their use so it’s impossible to generate a positive virtue from them.

#### 3. Cultivating Virtue requires a commitment to pacifism and strong presumption against violence.

Franco V. Trivigno, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oslo, A Virtue Ethical Case for Pacifism, Published in 2013 in Virtues in Action ///AHS PB

First, the psychological resistance to killing is morally significant in that it is involved in the development and maintenance of good character. Given that the resistance is triggered by recognizing the humanity in the other, it is plausible to suppose that the resistance is fundamentally related to empathy. To recognize shared humanity from a virtue ethical perspective means that one affords others and their prospects for flourishing due consideration in one’s moral perception and deliberations about what to do. 19 One must perceive and think of others and their goals, values and ideals as morally salient features of one’s own moral situation. I understand empathy broadly to be a complex psychological capacity that makes possible individual acts of subjective feeling-with. 20 As several psychological studies have indicated, empathy is important for causing altruistic behavior and inducing helping behavior. 21 It is also important for preventing violent and aggressive behavior. 22 Virtue ethics would understand these studies as providing indirect evidence about the role of empathy in the performance of virtuous actions and the nonperformance of vicious actions. 23 In order to develop virtuous traits, one must habitually engage in virtuous action. As Aristotle puts the point, “we become just by doing just actions, temperate by doing temperate actions, brave by doing brave actions.” 24 If empathy plays a role in causing virtuous action, then it plays a role in causing virtuous character. Consider, for example, the virtue of compassion, which can be roughly defined as a disposition to feel sadness for another’s suffering accompanied by the desire to provide solace. The resistance to killing can be said to be a kind of visceral sensitivity to another’s suffering, perhaps even of empathetic responses more generally, but it is not yet compassion or any other virtue. Compassion requires that the perceptive sensitivity, emotions, desires and beliefs be habituated in such a way that they work together, as it were, in the face of another’s suffering. Those who are in the process of developing the virtue will have a strengthened resistance to violence, one in which the resistance is bolstered by the habituation of cognitive, affective, and conative states. The resistance is thus not merely a brute fact about our psychology; it is, rather, trainable through habituation. Though the resistance is not under direct conscious control, it is clear that through the repeated processes of desensitization, we can weaken it, and we can strengthen it through the repeated processes of sensitization. 25 A compassionate person whose empathy is highly engaged will be more likely to be sensitive to the suffering of others, more likely to see it as cause for sadness, more likely to desire that something ought to be done to alleviate it, and more likely to form beliefs about whom to help and how to do so. Second, if enabling effective killing involves weakening one’s empathy and empathy is causally related both to the performance of virtuous action and the development of virtuous traits, then it would seem that enabling effective killing already involves moral harm to the soldier. As we have seen, the dehumanization strategies seem aimed directly at blocking the empathic recognition of shared humanity with one’s enemy, and this will inhibit the development of virtuous traits. 26 If one focuses on the ‘positive’ strategy used to suppress the resistance to kill, one can see that it may also contribute to the development of vicious character traits precisely by inculcating bad habits of moral perception and deliberation. As we have seen, dehumanizing involves habitually thinking of a certain group as less than human and seeing them as such. Thus, training to kill involves both a perceptive and deliberative aspect. Indeed, since it is never clear against whom the next war will be, one needs to be ready, as it were, to dehumanize any group of people in order to be able to kill them. Given that the acknowledgement of another’s humanity is crucial in granting others proper moral consideration and seeing them as warranting moral consideration, we might say that disabling empathy will have a deleterious effect on both moral deliberation and perception. It would seem to foster, in short, a kind of moral blindness, which affects the moral world one lives in and moral reasons one gives. One becomes less likely to be sensitive to the suffering of others, to see it ascause for sadness, to desire that something ought to be done to alleviate it, and to bother to form beliefsabout whom to help and how to do so. These bad perceptual and deliberative habits may end up fostering vicious character traits, in particular those associated with a lack of empathy. One may becomes callous and insensitive, when confronted with the suffering of others; one may become cruel and malicious in what one says about them and hopes for them; one may become spiteful and vindictive when confronted with their wrongdoing. Conversely, several virtuous character traits will be harder to develop and impossible to fully realize: compassion, sympathy, benevolence, and kindness come to mind. Even if the character traits fostered are local ones – keyed to the soldier’s specific enemy – they are nevertheless vicious character traits. 27 Further, as years of research have demonstrated, local traits acquired from the experience of military training and war have a tendency to spill over into civilian life. 28 Third, dehumanization strategies of desensitization cannot be achieved with enough fineness of grain to allow for making decisions about whether to kill, whom to kill, and how to kill. For Aristotle, virtuous action involves getting the moral particulars right across a number of axes: one should endeavor to get angry, for example, “with the right person and to the right degree and at the right time and for the right purpose, and in the right way.” 29 Training effective killing would seem to require of soldiers a high level of factual precision, but, as I have been suggesting, it also involves a low level of moral precision. Dehumanizing masks the moral status of enemy soldiers. Consider that on most jus in bello theories, enemy soldiers deserves some moral consideration despite one’s alleged right to kill them. 30 If the enemy do not deserve moral consideration at all, then how could there be limits on what can be done to them? 31 The core point here is that the mechanisms that enable killing – those of dehumanization – are precisely those that enable atrocity. 32 In a qualitative study of the participation of Israeli soldiers in atrocity during the first Intifada, the authors, Elizus and Yishay-Krien, report that those who were the leaders in committing atrocities against imprisoned Palestinians explicitly “dehumanized and demonized [them] by calling them ‘animals,’ ‘filthy,’ ‘primitive,’ and ‘people who do not care for their children.’” 33 The focus of their study was on the small-group situational dynamics whereby the more aggressive in the group commit the larger share of atrocities and influence most of the rest of the group to follow along, either by actively participating or by passively watching. 34 In the study, the soldiers who were most active knew perfectly well that what their actions were illegal and might get them court-marshaled. This suggests that they had been trained on the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate uses of force, but that what they had internalized as a result of the suppression of the resistance to kill was more powerful than this knowledge. Further, habits of dehumanization may not be confined or confinable to the enemy soldiers and may extend to those associated with them. Indeed, they may extend to still others who, for one reason or another, are distant, threatening and different. There is, in addition, psychological literature dealing with soldiers who have difficulties readjusting to ordinary life after military conflict, including adverse effects on interpersonal relationship and problems with uncontrollable rage and violent outbursts. 35 Given all these potential negative effects, to eliminate or suppress the resistance to killing thus seems morally irresponsible. Last, the empirical literature on the psychological conditions that enable killing suggests that these cannot be made compatible with the psychological conditions for virtuous action. 36 According to Aristotle, for an action to count as virtuous, the agent must [a] know that the action is virtuous; [b] choose the action for its own sake; and [c] the action must proceed from a firm and unchanging state.37 The fact that non-psychopathic humans require a suppression of the resistance to kill in order to enable effective killing and that several mechanisms of moral disengagement are employed to achieve this suggests that such actions will fail all three criteria. To satisfy conditions [a] and [b], the agent would need to know what the action is, or know the action under the correct description. Otherwise, it would be impossible either to know the action to be virtuous or to choose it for its own sake. The distancing mechanisms I have discussed aim precisely at disguising the true nature of the action from the agent, by either omitting or actively denying the humanity of the enemy (which gives a false picture of the action) and/or training automatic reflex responses (which gives an incomplete picture of the action). It seems clear that such actions will likely also fail condition [c], that is, they will not be the result of a firm and unchanging state of character, since the soldier will have an unstable relationship to the action of killing the enemy. For when the soldier is confronted with a true and complete picture of the action, different psychological mechanisms will come into play and the soldier may feel regret. 38 Further, the incidence of combat guilt among combat veterans indicates precisely such an unstable relationship. 39 Indeed, given the moral harm involved in inculcating dehumanization strategies, the soldier who did satisfy condition [c] would seem vicious, not virtuous – she would resemble the psychopath. 40 In short, the distancing mechanisms that enable killing cannot be made to square with virtuous action. Thus, in my view, killing in war cannot be done without what Williams calls “moral remainder,” the leftover moral disagreeableness involved when something basic like a right is overridden by other moral considerations. 41 If killing in war is warranted or morally justified, the situation must be understood, from the virtue ethical perspective, as tragic, and the properly empathetic person will feel regret at having been the agent of killing. 42 III Virtue politics and pacifism So far I have used a virtue ethical perspective to make killing the central focus of the moral implications of military training and war. In order for my analysis to amount to an argument for pacifism, I need some principle that governs state actions, or some way to connect the moral harm to soldiers to the state’s responsibilities to them. As a minimal virtue political principle, one that attempts to sidestep concerns about paternalism, one might endorse the following: states should refrain from putting its citizens in situations that are likely to hinder eudaimonia. Since virtue is at least necessary for eudaimonia and training citizens to kill harms their character, those who are concerned about being virtuous should strongly prefer governments which do not compromise their character by putting them in such a situation. Because the potential sacrifice made by soldiers will involve not only their lives but their moral dispositions and their potential for eudaimonia, which the virtue political state has a duty to protect, the bar will have to be set very high in order to justify the use of military force. In short, the state should display a very strong presumption against the use of military force.

## Underview

#### [1] The aff gets 1ar theory because otherwise the negative can be infinitely abusive, and make it impossible for the aff win the round. Fairness is a voter because you cant determine who is winning if access to the round is skewed. Education is since it’s the only terminal impact of the activity. Aff theory is--

#### A] Drop the debater because the 4-minute 1ar is too short to win both theory and substance against the 6 minute 1n and 7 minute 2n.

#### B] Competing interps since the 2nr can brute forced a selectively picked brightline too frame out all aff offense.

#### C] No Rvi since the neg has 6 minutes to auto win by dumping on a short 1 minute shell.

#### D] Prior to every other layer since the speech is so short that I cant engage with the other layers.

#### [2] No new 2nr theory or paradigm issues:

#### A] Its unpredictable since only I adapted to what I knew from the 1nr, and allows ex post facto punishment

#### B] It scews over the 3 minute 2ar since I have to deal with 6 minutes of new framing.

#### [3] The Aff gets RVIS:

**A] Anything else gives the neg to read 7 minutes of no risk issue theory that makes the 4 minute 1ar impossible.**

#### B] Only the neg can run T, so Aff RVIS make our ability to gain offense from theory 2-2 reciprocal.

#### [4] Nuclear arsenals risk global suffering, guarantee ongoing poisoning and waste public funds.

ICAN ’17 “Arguments for Nuclear Abolition.” International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (Coalition of non-governmental organizations in one hundred countries promoting adherence to and implementation of the United Nations nuclear weapon ban treaty). 2017, <https://www.icanw.org/why-a-ban/arguments-for-a-ban/>. MBPZ

The abolition of nuclear weapons is an urgent humanitarian necessity. Any use of nuclear weapons would have catastrophic consequences. No effective humanitarian response would be possible, and the effects of radiation on human beings would cause suffering and death many years after the initial explosion. Prohibiting and completely eliminating nuclear weapons is the only guarantee against their use. Even if a nuclear weapon were never again exploded over a city, there are intolerable effects from the production, testing and deployment of nuclear arsenals that are experienced as an ongoing personal and community catastrophe by many people around the globe. This humanitarian harm, too, must inform and motivate efforts to outlaw and eradicate nuclear weapons. “Nuclear weapons are unique in their destructive power, in the unspeakable human suffering they cause, in the impossibility of controlling their effects in space and time, and in the threat they pose to the environment, to future generations, and indeed to the survival of humanity.” – International Committee of the Red Cross, 2010. The security case. Nuclear weapons pose a direct and constant threat to people everywhere. Far from keeping the peace, they breed fear and mistrust among nations. These ultimate instruments of terror and mass destruction have no legitimate military or strategic utility, and are useless in addressing any of today’s real security threats, such as terrorism, climate change, extreme poverty, overpopulation and disease. While many thousands of nuclear weapons have been dismantled since the end of the cold war, the justifications for maintaining them remain largely unchanged. Nations still cling to the misguided idea of “nuclear deterrence”, when it is clear that nuclear weapons only cause national and global insecurity. There have been many documented instances of the near-use of nuclear weapons as a result of miscalculation or accidents. The environmental case. Nuclear weapons are the only devices ever created that have the capacity to destroy all complex life forms on Earth. It would take less than 0.1% of the explosive yield of the current global nuclear arsenal to bring about devastating agricultural collapse and widespread famine. The smoke and dust from fewer than 100 Hiroshima-sized nuclear explosions would cause an abrupt drop in global temperatures and rainfall. “Climate change may be the global policy issue that has captured most attention in the last decade, but the problem of nuclear weapons is at least its equal in terms of gravity – and much more immediate in its potential impact.” – International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, 2009. The economic case. Nuclear weapons programmes divert public funds from health care, education, disaster relief and other vital services. The nine nuclear-armed nations spend many tens of billions of dollars each year maintaining and modernizing their nuclear arsenals. Funding allocated to disarmament efforts is minuscule by comparison. It is time to redirect money towards meeting human needs.

1. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)