# One last ride

I negate and value morality.Actions are expressions of an agent’s will and derive from their practical reason. If I cross the street to get bread, the only reason we call that crossing the street is because my intention to get bread unifies all the different steps involved into one action. Any action can be divided up into an infinite number of smaller end states; but the intentionality that we carry through the multiple steps unifies them. So, we can only evaluate intentions. Thus, look to practical reason, which gives us the ability to will something in accordance with our principles, i.e. to intend something. And even if they win the AC framework, if I win that intentionality unifies action, then all their offense must still be conceptualized through intents. Also, unintended harms can be solved for by extra-topical action since they’re not inherent to the maxim of the resolution, thus they’re irrelevant. Prefer a starting point of practical reason:

## (\_) Only practical identities can ground the unconditional value of human action, Korsgaard:

Korsgaard, Christine M. The Sources of Normativity. THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES, Delivered at Clare Hall, Cambridge University. November 16 and 17, 1992. Pg. 81-85

Those who think that **the** human **mind** is internally luminous and transparent to itself think that the term “self-consciousness” is appropriate because what we get in human consciousness is a direct encounter with the self. Those who think that the human mind has a reflective structure use the term too, but for a different reason. The reflective structure of the mind is a source of “self- consciousness” because it **forces us to have a conception of ourselves.** As Kant argues, this is a fact about what it is like to be reflectively conscious and it does not prove the existence of a metaphysical self. From a third person point of view, outside of the deliberative standpoint, it may look as if what happens when someone makes a choice is that the strongest of his conflicting desires wins. But that isn’t the way it is for you when you deliberate. When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above all of your desires, something that is you, and that chooses which desire to act on. This means that **the principle** or law **by which you determine** your **actions is one that** you regard as being **[is] expressive** of yourself. To identify with such a principle or law is to be, in St. Paul’s famous phrase, a law to yourself. **[How] an agent** might think of herself as a Citizen in the Kingdom of Ends. Or she might think of herself as a member of a family or an ethnic group or a nation. She might think of herself as the steward of her own interests, and then she will be an egoist. Or she might think of herself as the slave of her passions, and then she will be a wanton. And how she **thinks of herself will determine** whether it is **the law** of the Kingdom of Ends, or the law of some smaller group, or the law of the egoist, or the law of the wanton that is the law that she is to herself. The conception of **one’s identity** in question here **is not** a **theoretical** one, a view about what **as** a matter of inescapable **scientific fact** you are. It is better understood as **[but] a description under which you value yourself**, a description under which you find your life to be worth living **and your actions** to be worth undertaking. So I will call this a conception of your practical identity. Practical identity is a complex matter and for the average person there will be a jumble of such conceptions. You are a human being, a woman or a man, an adherent of a certain religion, a member of an ethnic group, someone’s friend, and so on. And all of **these identities give rise to** reasons and **obligations.** Your reasons express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what that identity forbids.

## (\_) Physical facts and empirical realities cannot be the basis of morality because we’re not responsible for descriptive characteristics of the world – another reason why empirics can’t turn case. Only a priori practical reason solves, Furrow:[[1]](#footnote-1)

“This is because the source of human dignity is our capacity for freedom. We are distinguished from all other beings by our capacity to rationally choose our actions. If God, nature or other persons imposed moral[s] requirements on us, against our will, our freedom would be fatally compromised. What is more, if our moral decisions were not free but imposed on us, we would not be morally responsible for them, thus undermining the system of praise and blame that is central to our moral framework. Thus, according to Kant, the basic condition for moral agency is moral autonomy – the capacity that each of us has to impose moral constraints on ourselves. Thus far, Kant’s thrilling praise of moral freedom seems compatible with ethical egoism. If moral decisions are up to me then it would seem that I am free to choose in accordance with my self-interest. However, Kant goes on to argue that **I cannot achieve moral autonomy if desires, emotions and inclinations govern my moral judgements.** Kant was convinced that **nature is a mechanical system governed by deterministic, physical laws** – causal relationships determine the behaviour of plants, animals and inanimate objects. They have no capacity to choose. But human desires, emotions and inclinations are also part of that deterministic universe, since they are a function of our bodily nature. When we act in accordance with desires, emotions and inclinations, we are simply responding to physical urges much as an animal does. How can human beings escape this deterministic physical world? **The only way we can exercise our freedom** and autonomy **is to rationally assess our actions independently of our desires**. Moral reasoning will set us free – free from desires **and** emotions that chain us to nature. In contexts where moral judgement is required, by reasoning independently of desires, I am imposing **[impose] moral principles on [ourselves]** myself**.** My actions are self-directed rather than caused by external forces. Kant is not arguing that we should never act on our desires or inclinations. In fact, most of the time we act on what he calls hypothetical imperatives, which involve desires. ‘If you want to earn money, go to work.’ ‘If you are afraid of tigers, then stay out of the jungle.’ These are perfectly acceptable as a basis for action. Actions based on these hypothetical imperatives have instrumental value – they get us something we want. But such actions have no moral value. **When our actions reflect only our desires** and inclinations, **and not** our capacity for moral **reason, they are not free and thus** they **have no moral worth, since morality requires freedom.**

## (\_) Any rule must be known by all actors the rule governs, two warrants. A. Just as you wouldn’t blame for not getting you a present if I didn’t know it was your birthday, we wouldn’t hold someone responsible for failing to meet a standard that they didn’t know. B. Rules guide action but they can never guide action if we don’t know what to use to guide our actions. Takes out descriptive standards because some people won’t know the literal fact or document that morality is based upon and thus won’t know the moral rule. Only practical reason solves because all agents possess rationality and can act upon the conclusions of reason.

## (\_) A priori practical reason is necessary to ground all moral judgments, Kant:[[2]](#footnote-2)

We have therefore wanted to say that **all our intuition is nothing but** the **representation** of appearance; that **the things** that **we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them to be**, nor are their relations so constituted in themselves as they appear to us; and that **if we remove** our own subject or even only **the subjective constitution of** the **senses** in general, **then all constitution**, all relations of objects in space and time, indeed space and time themselves **would disappear**, and as appearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us. **We are acquainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them**, which is peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarily pertain to every being, though to be sure **it pertains to every human being**. We are concerned solely with this. Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in general its matter. We can **cognize[d]** only the former **a priori**, i.e., prior to all actual perception, **and** they are **therefore** called **pure** intuition.

Means external description can never be relevant since our knowledge of the physical world is necessarily filtered. And, such externalist theories can’t evaluate moral properties, **Korsgaard 2:**

There is another reason why the idea of a constitutive standard is important—or rather, this is the same reason, described a different way, coming from a different direction. It is that we *need* the concept of the *defective*, in the sense described above. Say we have two objects, call them A and B, and they are in some respect different from each other. They have some different non-accidental properties. Now we need to distinguish two ways that A and B can be different from each other in this way: A can be a different *kind* of thing from B, or A can be a *defective instance* of the same kind of thing as B. Suppose A is a defective instance of the same kind of thing as B. Then say we have two objects Y and Z, which differ in regard to the same property, but which areof different kinds. Should we treat these two cases, the case of A and B and the case of Y and Z, any differently? Does it matter what *kinds of things* things are? Why shouldn't all that matters be the properties themselves? If properties are all that matter, then we need not—and cannot—distinguish the different from the defective: different collections of properties will just be different•

Theories reliant on external description can’t reconcile defective and different actions, so under such a framework, moral imperfection is impossible. My framework is the only way to guarantee culpability of actions.

## Universality

Next, agents must act by universal rules since they must view themselves as the cause of their actions for the coherence of their own agency, so they must identify with their principles and reject non-universal rules, **Korsgaard 2:**

“The first step is this: [t]o conceive yourself as the cause of your actions is to identify with the principle of choice on which you act. **A rational will is** a self-conscious causality, and a self-conscious causality is **aware of itself as a cause.** To be aware of yourself as a cause is to identify yourself with something in the scenario that gives rise to the action, and this must be the princxiple of choice. For instance, **suppose** you experience a conflict of desire: **you** have a **desire** to do both **A and B,** and they are incompatible. **You have some principle which favors A** over B, **so you** exercise this principle, and you **choose** to do **A.** In this kind of case,you do not regard yourself as a mere passive spectator to the battle between A and B. **You regard the choice as yours,** as the product of your own activity, **because you regard the principle of choice as expressive**, or representative, **of yourself.** You must do so, for **the only alternative** to identifying with the principle of choice **is regarding the principle of choice as some third thing in you,** another force on a par with the incentives to do A and to do B, which happened to throw in its weight in favor of A, in a battle at which you were, after all, a mere passive spectator. **But then you are not the cause of the action.”**

**And,** prefer this view because if rationality serves as the basis for normative claims, anything that is asserted to be a maxim must be universalizable because it’s arbitrary to reject a maxim for one person or circumstance while making it sufficient to guide other actions. Thus, the standard is **respecting individual liberty** since willing a violation of liberty couldn’t be universal since you simultaneously extend your own freedom while limiting another’s.

## Offense

*First,* a right to freedom entails being able to own property with which we use to pursue our ends, **Huemer:**

Second, and more plausibly: one might claim that the value of the lives that could be saved by anti-gun laws is simply much greater than the recreational value of firearms. It is not obvious that this is correct, even if gun control would significantly reduce annual gun-related deaths. Many gun owners appear to derive enormous satisfaction from the recreational use of firearms, and it is no exaggeration to say that for many, recreational shooting is a way of life. Furthermore, there are a great many gun owners. At a rough estimate, [T]he number of gun owners is two thousand times greater than the number of annual firearms-related deaths. Even if we assume **optimistically** that a substantial proportion **of recreational gun users could and** would substitute other **forms of** recreation, we **should** conclude that **the** net utility of gun control **legislation** is **greatly** overestimated by those who discount **the** recreation**al value of guns. For obvious reasons, the utility resulti**ng from recreational use of firearms is not easy to quantify, nor to compare with the value of the lives lost to firearms violence. Yet this is no reason for ignoring the former, as partisans in the gun control debate often do. But our present concern is not chiefly utilitarian. The argument here is that [G]un enthusiasts' prima facie right to own guns is significant in virtue of **the** central **place that such** ownership **plays in their** chosen life style. A prohibition on firearms ownership would constitute a major interference in their plans for their own lives. On the criteria given in §2.3, this suffices to show that such a prohibition would be a serious rights violation.

Any object can be desired and freely owned, and it’s incoherent to will a maxim that entails limiting autonomy for some other good, **Huemer 2:**

The **recreational uses** of guns **include target shooting,** various sorts of shooting **competitions, and hunting.** In debates over gun control, participants almost never attach any weight to this recreational value —perhaps because that value initially appears minor compared with the deaths caused or prevented by guns. The insistence that individuals have a right to engage in their chosen forms of recreation may seem frivolous in this context. But it is not. Consider two forms that the charge of frivolousness might take. *First*: **One might think life is *lexically superior to*** (roughly, of infinitely greater value than) **recreation**, such that no amount of recreational value could counterbalance even one premature death. **This cannot be** [305] taken to imply that risks to life should never be accepted, **since it is impossible to eliminate all** such **risks.** Instead, I will assume that those who affirm the infinite value of life would favor maximizing life expectancy. This position is implausible, since **recreation is a major source of** enjoyment, and enjoyment is (at least) a major part of **what gives life value.** Consider the range of activities whose primary value is recreational or, more broadly, pleasure-enhancing: non-reproductive **sex**ual activity, reading fiction, **watching** television or **movies**, talking with friends, listening to music, eating **dessert**, going out to eat, playing games, and so on. **Would it be rational to give up all those activities if by doing so one could increase one’s life expectancy** by, say, five minutes? Or suppose that a drive to the park slightly reduces one’s life expectancy (due to the risks of traffic accidents, passing criminals, airborne germs, and so on). Would it be irrational to make the trip—no matter how much one enjoys the park?

*Property rights must be recognized a priori independent of the rest of the framework debate, Kinsella:*

 *“The first rationalist argument that I will discuss is Hans-Hermann Hoppe's path-breaking argumen ta tion ethic^.^ Professor Hoppe shows that* ***basic rights are implied in*** *the activity of* ***argumentation itself****, so that anyone asserting any claim about anything necessarily presupposes the validity of rights. Hoppe first notes that* ***any truth*** *at all (including norms such as individual rights to life, liberty and property)* ***that one would wish to discuss****, deny, or affirm,* ***will be brought up in the course of*** *an* ***argumentation****, that is to say, will be brought up in dialogue. in order to engage in argumentation, they could never challenge these norms in an argument without thereby engaging in a performative contradiction. This would establish these norms as literally incontestable truths. Hoppe establishes self-ownership by pointing out that argumentation,* ***[which] as a form of action, implies the use of*** *the scarce resources of* ***one's body.*** *One must have control over, or own, this scarce resource in order to engage in meaningful discourse. This is because* ***argumentation is a conflict-free way of interacting****, by its very nature, since it is an attempt to find what the truth is, to establish truth, to persuade or be persuaded by the force of words alone.* ***If one is threatened into accepting*** *the statements or* ***truth-claims*** *of another,* ***this does not*** *tend to* ***get at the truth****, which is undeniably a goal of argumentation or discourse. Thus, anyone engaging in* ***argumentation*** *implicitly* ***presupposes*** *the right of* ***self-ownership*** *of other participants in the argument, for otherwise the other [one] would not be able to consider freely and accept or reject the proposed argument. Only as long as there is at least an implicit recognition of each individual's property right in his or her own body can true argumentation take place. When this right is not recognized, the activity is no longer argumentation, but threat, mere naked aggression, or plain physical fighting. Thus, anyone who denies that rights exist contradicts himself since, by his very engaging in the cooperative and conflict-free activity of argumentation, he necessarily recognizes* ***the right of [the] listener to be free to listen, think, and decide.*** *That is, any participant in discourse presupposes the non-aggression axiom, the libertarian view that one may not initiate force against others.*

Second, you are required to respect another only until they cease to respect your own agency, and the only way for freedom to be cogently willed is for us to will a corresponding entitlement to protect that freedom. Thus we have a right to self-defense, which the aff violates, **Huemer 3:**

The analogy between the accomplice’s action in this case and a general firearms prohibition should be clear. **A** firearms **ban would require confiscating** the **weapons that many individuals keep for self-defense** [308] purposes, with the result that some of those individuals would be murdered, robbed, raped, or seriously injured. If the accomplice’s action in example 2 is a major violation of the right of self-defense, then gun prohibition seems to be about equally serious *as* a violation of the right of self-defense. Consider some objections to this analogy. First, it might be said that in the case of a gun ban, the government would have strong reasons for confiscating the guns, in order to save the lives of others, which (we presume) is not true of the accomplice in example 2. This, I think, would amount to arguing that the self-defense rights of non-criminal gun owners are overridden by the state’s need to protect society from criminal gun owners. I deal with this suggestion in §5 below. Second, it might be argued that example 2 differs from a gun ban in that the murder is *imminent* at the time the accomplice takes the gun away. But this seems to be morally irrelevant. For suppose that the accomplice, knowing that someone is coming to kill the victim tomorrow (while the victim does not know this), decides to take the victim’s gun away from him today, again resulting in his death. This would not make the accomplice’s action more morally defensible than it is in example 2. A third difference might be that, whereas we assume that in example 2 the accomplice *knows* that the victim is going to be killed or seriously injured, the state does not *know* that its anti-gun policy will result in murders and injuries to former gun-owners. This, however, is surely not true. Although the state may claim that the lives saved by a gun ban would *outnumber* the lives cost, one cannot argue that no lives will be cost at all, unless one claims implausibly that guns are never used in self-defense against life-threatening attacks. Some will think the former claim is all that is needed to justify a gun ban; this would return us to the first objection. Fourth, it may be observed that in example 2, there is a specific, identifiable victim: the accomplice knows who is going to die as a result of his gun-confiscation. In contrast, a gun-banning government cannot identify any specific individuals who are going to be killed as a result of its gun ban, even though it can predict that *some* people will be. But this seems morally irrelevant. Consider: Exaple 3: An ‘accomplice’ ties up a family of five somewhere in the wilderness where he knows that wolves roam. He has good reason to [309] believe that a pack of wolves will happen by and eat one or two of the family members (after which they will be satiated), but he doesn’t know which ones will be eaten. He leaves them for an hour, during which the mother of the family is eaten by the wolves.In this case, the fact that the accomplice did not know who would die as a result of his action does not mitigate his guilt. Likewise, it is unclear how the state’s inability to predict who will become the victims of its anti-gun policy would mitigate the state’s responsibility for their deaths or injury. Fifth, the victims of a gun ban would presumably have sufficient forewarning of the coming ban to take alternative measures to protect themselves, unlike the victim in example 2. Unfortunately, **stat**i**s**tics from the National Crime Victimization Survey **indicate** that such **alternative means of self-protection would be relatively ineffective**—**individuals who defend themselves with a gun are less likely to be injured and far less likely to have the crime completed against them** than are persons who take any other measures. Consequently, though the present consideration seems to mitigate the state’s culpability, it does not remove it. The situation is analogous to one in which the accomplice, rather than taking away the victim’s only means of defending himself against the killer, merely takes away the victim’s *most effective* means of self-defense, with the result that the victim is killed. Here, the accomplice’s action is less wrong than in example 2, but it is still very wrong. Since **gun prohibition is a significant violation** of an extremely weighty right, we must conclude that it is a very serious rights-violation. The above examples initially suggest that it is on a par with the commission of (multiple) murders, robberies, rapes, and assaults—although the consideration of the preceding paragraph may show that it is somewhat less wrong than that. The point here is not that would-be gun banners are *as blameworthy* as murderers and other violent criminals (since the former do not *know* that their proposals are morally comparable to murder and have different motives from typical murderers). The point is just to assess the strength of the reasons against taking the course of action that they propose.

## Ideal Theory Good

1. Just as you cannot measure something with a ruler constantly changing in length, you need fixed principles by which to judge real world events. Otherwise your framework is incoherent because it can’t measure progress, which is your goal, **Chesterton[[3]](#footnote-3):**

Silly examples are always simpler; let us **suppose a person wanted a** particular kind of world; say, a **blue world**. He would have no cause to complain of the slightness or swiftness of his task; he might toil for a long time at the transformation; he could work away (in every sense) until all was blue. He could have heroic adventures; the putting of the last touches to a blue tiger. He could have fairy dreams; the dawn of a blue moon. But **if they worked hard, that** high-minded **reformer would certainly** (from his own point of view) **leave the world better and bluer** than he found it. If he altered a blade of grass to his favorite color every day, he would get on slowly. But **if they altered [their]** his **favorite color every day, they would not get on at all. If, after reading a fresh philosopher, they started to paint everything red or yellow, their work would be thrown away**: there would be nothing to show except a few blue tigers walking about, specimens of their early bad manner. This is exactly the position of the average modern thinker. It will be said that this is avowedly a preposterous example. But it is literally the fact of recent history. The great and grave changes in our political civilization all belonged to the early nineteenth century, not to the later.

2. Abstraction is key to stopping oppression. **Wood[[4]](#footnote-4):**

There is no plausibility at all, for example, in the suggestion that such **Kantian principles as** human **equality**, rationalism, **universalism**, and cosmopolitanism **are [not]** in their content **favorable to racism**, sexism, **or** other forms of **oppression**, and such a thesis needs only to be stated explicitly to discredit itself. But this highly implausible thesis may be put forward by implication if it can be associated with the quite distinct but correct point that *even* a cosmopolitan and universalistic ethical theory, such as Kant’s, can be combined with racist or male-supremacist views in its application. It is also true that **[these principles]** egalitarianism, rationalism, universalism, and cosmopolitanism **are** especially **liable to rhetorical** **abuse** by those who advocate policies in direct violation of them, because subscribing to the correct principles at an abstract level is often enough a shabby ploy used to protect contrary policies from criticism. **The thought that this point has any** *philosophical***significance**, however, **rests on** an **error** of abysmal proportions about philosophy and its relation to human practices. **If someone thinks there is a** philosophical **theory** of morality **whose** uncritical **adoption** and mechanical application **would suffice to**  **protect us from evil,** then **that person is looking for something that could never exist. The correct standard for an ethic**al theory **is whether it get things right** at the level of basic principles and values, **not whether it contains some** **magical property that protects us**, in the application of the theory, **from every perversion** or abuse through the influence of tradition and prejudice or the infinite human ingenuity of rationalization. **All theories are** about **equally subject to** such **abuse**, and no theory is immune to it. In fact, if we **[To] think** that the adoption of **a certain philosoph[y]**ical theory, or a certain set of religious dogmas, **will protect us from all** **moral error**, that way of thinking itself **is** extremely dangerous, quite irrespective of the content of the theory or dogma with which we associate it. That thought itself is actually **responsible for** a lot of **the evil** that **people do.**

Any theory, including yours, can be misused – but that’s not a problem with theorizing, that’s a problem with us – also means we should reclaim the true function of these ethical concepts in places like debate to challenge the way they are misunderstood. Your argument is only uniqueness for mine.

3. Your framework doesn’t actually guide action. It’s unclear whether minimizing oppression is better, or acting so we never oppressed anyone in a means based way. If I oppressed or killed one person, which prevented the oppression of two, would it be ok? Only debating philosophical justification can ensure any value to your method. Even if certain things are always bad the project of ethics is not to prove the obvious – science doesn’t seek to do that either. We know an apple falls but want to know more how the force of gravity interacts with the rest of the universe. In the same way, we know oppression is bad but interrogating the normative reasoning behind those claims allows us to deal with issues that aren’t so obvious in the real world.

# Frontlines

## A/T right to not be attacked

1. The extension of the Huemer evidence is very good on this issue – it is impossible to ensure a right to safety since anything can be a source of danger. Sex can lead to disease, driving can lead to accidents; if your turn were valid, the government would have to ban literally every action since everything you do leads to potential danger making ethics moot since its purpose is to guide action.

2. Banning handguns doesn’t solve – potential aggressors will just use other weapons or even just their bare hands. Especially true since you don’t even ban other types of guns.

3. The right to self-defense outweighs – it is necessary recourse for when our right to not be attacked is infringed upon.

4. Since you have conceded the intentions argument at the top of the NC framework your argument is not offense. Even if negating leads to violence, violence is not an intended harm since it is not willed by the maxim. When you will the maxim of gun ownership the potential misuse of guns is not included; only the NC offense is actually offense since willing the maxim of prohibition requires using people as means to ends by denying them the ability to own a gun.

## A/T shooting ranges solve/recreation still allowed

1. It doesn’t matter if you can still rent a gun – by being precluded from *owning* one, your right to own property to use for your free ends is already being violated by definition.

2. Purposes and recreational uses of guns are broader than just being able to shoot one at a firing range. Collecting guns for example is still prohibited. If stamps were banned, stamp collectors would not be satisfied with “you could rent stamps.”

3. Shooting ranges and gun clubs aren’t public government organizations, they’re still private institutions so you defend banning handguns for them too.

1. Dwight Furrow. “Moral Agency.” Ethics. 2005. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Critiqueof Pure Reason. Immanuel Kant. 1781. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Gilbert Chesterton [Christian apologist and writer]. “Orthodoxy.” 1908. [modified for gendered language]. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Kantian Ethics ALLEN W. WOOD Stanford University [↑](#footnote-ref-4)