# CD20 – AC – Existentialism

# LARP AC

## Framing

#### Existence precedes essence – agents are born into the world without essence. We are responsible for the formation of our own identities since nothing is constitutive to human nature. Sartre.

Sartre, Jean Paule. “Existentialism is a Huminism” SHS ZS

Atheistic existentialism, of which I am a representative, declares with greater consistency that if God does not exist there is at least one being whose **existence comes before** its **essence**, **a being** which **exists before it can be defined by any conception** of it. .... What do we mean by saying that existence precedes essence? We mean that **man first** of all **exists**, encounters himself, surges up in the world – **and defines himself afterwards**. **If man** as the existentialist sees him **is not definable**, **it is because** **to begin** with **he is nothing**. He will not be anything until later, and then **he will be what he makes of himself**. Thus, **there is no human nature**, because there is no God to have a conception of it. **Man simply is**. Not that he is simply what he conceives himself to be, but **he is what he wills**, and as **he conceives himself after already existing** – as **he wills** to be after **that leap towards existence**. **Man** is nothing else but that which he **makes of himself**. That is the first principle of existentialism. And this is what people call its “subjectivity,” using the word as a reproach against us. But what do we mean to say by this, but that man is of a greater dignity than a stone or a table? For we mean to say that man primarily exists – that **man** is, before all else, something which **propels itself towards a future** and is aware that it is doing so. **Man** is, indeed, a project which **possesses a subjective life**, instead of being a kind of moss, or a fungus or a cauliflower. Before that projection of the self nothing exists; not even in the heaven of intelligence: **man will only attain existence when he is what he purposes to be**. Not, however, what he may wish to be. For **what we** usually **understand by wishing** or willing **is a conscious decision** taken – much more often than not – **after we have made ourselves what we are**. I may wish to join a party, to write a book or to marry – but in such a case what is usually called my **will is** probably **a manifestation of** a **prior** and more spontaneous **decision**. If, however, it is true that existence is prior to essence, **man is responsible for what he is**. Thus, the first effect of **existentialism** is that it **puts** every **man in possession of himself** as he is, **and places** the entire **responsibility for** his **existence** squarely **upon his** own **shoulders**. And, when we say that man is responsible for himself, we do not mean that he is responsible only for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men.

#### This lack of essence results in an overburdening of freedom – since we lack identities and are responsible for our every action, we are placed in situations where we are unwillingly forced to choose. Sartre 2.

* Motivation/determinacy good

Sartre, Jean Paule. “Existentialism is a Huminism” SHS ZS

The existentialist, on the contrary, finds it extremely embarrassing that God does not exist, for there disappears with Him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. .... **For** if indeed **existence precedes essence**, **one will never be able to explain** one’s action by reference to a given and specific **human nature**; in other words, **there is no determinism** – **man is free, man is freedom**. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behavior. Thus **we have** neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any **[no] means of justification or excuse**. – We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that **man is condemned to be free**. Condemned, **because he did not create himself**, **yet is nevertheless at liberty**, and from the moment that he is thrown into this world **he is responsible for everything he does**. .... As an example by which you may the better understand this state of abandonment, **I will refer to** the case of **a pupil of mine**, who sought me out in the following circumstances. His father was quarreling with his mother and was also inclined to be a “collaborator”; **his elder brother had been killed in the German offensive** of 1940 and this young man, with a sentiment somewhat primitive but generous, burned to avenge him. **His mother was living alone** with him, deeply afflicted by the semi-treason of his father and by the death of her eldest son, and her one consolation was in this young man. But **he**, at this moment, **had the choice between going to England** to join the Free French Forces **or** of **staying near his mother** and helping her to live. He fully realized that **this woman lived only for him** and that his disappearance – or perhaps **his death** – **would plunge her into despair**. He also realized that, concretely and in fact, **every action he performed on his mother’s behalf would** be sure of effect in the sense of **aid**ing **her to live**, **whereas** anything he did in order to go and **fight would be an ambiguous action** **which might** vanish like water into sand and **serve no purpose**. .... Consequently, **he found himself confronted by two** very different **modes of action**; the **one** **concrete, immediate**, but directed towards only one individual; and **the other** an action **addressed to an end infinitely greater**, a national collectivity, but for that very reason ambiguous – and it might be frustrated on the way. At the same time, **he was hesitating between two kinds of morality**; on the one side the morality of sympathy, of personal devotion and, on the other side, a morality of wider scope but of more debatable validity. **He had to choose** between those two. What could help him to choose? Could the Christian doctrine? No. Christian doctrine says: Act with charity, love your neighbor, deny yourself for others, choose the way which is hardest, and so forth. But which is the harder road? To whom does one owe the more brotherly love, the patriot or the mother? Which is the more useful aim, the general one of fighting in and for the whole community, or the precise aim of helping one particular person to live? Who can give an answer to that a priori? No one. Nor is it given in any ethical scripture. .... **If values are uncertain**, if they are still **too abstract** to determine the particular, concrete case under consideration, **nothing remains but to trust in our instincts.** That is what this young man tried to do; and when I saw him he said, “In the end, it is feeling that counts; the direction in which it is really pushing me is the one I ought to choose. If I feel that I love my mother enough to sacrifice everything else for her – my will to be avenged, all my longings for action and adventure then I stay with her. If, on the contrary, I feel that my love for her is not enough, I go.” But how does one estimate the strength of a feeling? The value of his feeling for his mother was determined precisely by the fact that he was standing by her. I may say that I love a certain friend enough to sacrifice such or such a sum of money for him, but I cannot prove that unless I have done it. I may say, “I love my mother enough to remain with her,” if actually I have remained with her. **I can only estimate the strength of this affection** if I have performed an action by which it is defined and ratified. But if I then appeal to this affection to justify my action, I find myself drawn into a vicious circle.

#### Since we are responsible for our freedom, agents should make choices free of by external authorities – embrace the ability to guide one’s own identity without interference. Thus, the standard and role of the ballot is embracing an ethics of choice. Sartre 3.

* Facticity / a priori truth fails

Sartre, Jean Paule. “Existentialism is a Huminism” SHS ZS

Our point of departure is, indeed, the subjectivity of the individual, and that for strictly philosophic reasons. .... And at the point of departure there cannot be any other truth than this, I think, therefore I am, which is the absolute truth of consciousness as it attains to itself. **Every theory which begins with man**, outside of this moment of self-attainment, **is a theory which** thereby **suppresses the truth**, **for** outside of the Cartesian cogito, all **objects are no more than probable**, and **any doctrine of probabilities which is not attached to a truth will crumble into nothing**. In order to define the probable one must possess the true. **Before there can be any truth** whatever, then, **there must be an absolute truth**, and there is such a truth which is simple, easily attained and within the reach of everybody; i**t consists in one’s immediate sense of one’s self.** In the second place, **this theory alone is compatible with the dignity of man**, **it** is the only one which **does not make man into an object**. All kinds of **materialism lead one to treat every man** including oneself **as an object** – that is, **as a set of pre- determined reactions**, in no way different from the patterns of qualities and phenomena which constitute a table, or a chair or a stone. **Our aim is** precisely **to establish the human kingdom as a pattern of values in distinction from the material world**. .... .... What is **at the very heart** and center **of existentialism**, **is the absolute character of the free commitment**, by which every man realizes himself in realizing a type of humanity – a commitment always understandable, to no matter whom in no matter what epoch – and its bearing upon the relativity of the cultural pattern which may result from such absolute commitment. .... This does not completely refute the charge of subjectivism. Indeed that objection appears in several other forms, of which the first is as follows. People say to us, “Then it does not matter what you do,” and they say this in various ways. .... For, when I confront a real situation – for example, that I am a sexual being, able to have relations with a being of the other sex and able to have children – **I am obliged to choose my attitude to it**, and in every respect **I bear the responsibility of** the **choice** which, in committing myself, also commits the whole of humanity. Even if my **choice is determined by no a priori value** whatever, it can have nothing to do with caprice: .... Rather let us say that the **moral choice is comparable to the construction of a work of art**. It is the same upon the plane of morality. There is this in common between art and morality, that in both **we have to do with creation and invention**. **We cannot decide a priori what** it is that **should be done**. .... In the second place, people say to us, “You are unable to judge others.” This is true in one sense and false in another. It is true in this sense, that **whenever a man chooses his purpose** and his commitment in all clearness and in all sincerity, whatever that purpose may be, **it is impossible for him to prefer another**. .... We can judge, nevertheless, for, as I have said, one chooses in view of others, and in view of others one chooses himself. **One can judge**, first – and perhaps this is not a judgment of value, but it is a logical judgment – that in certain cases **choice is founded upon an error**, and in others upon the truth. One can judge a man by **saying** that **he deceives himself**. Since we have defined the situation of man as one of free choice, without excuse and without help, **any man who takes refuge behind the excuse of his passions**, or by inventing some deterministic doctrine, **is a self-deceiver**. One may object: “But why should he not choose to deceive himself?” I reply that it is not for me to judge him morally, but I define his self-deception as an error. Here one cannot avoid pronouncing a judgment of truth. The self-deception is evidently a falsehood, because it is a dissimulation of man’s complete liberty of commitment. .... The third objection, stated by saying, “You take with one hand what you give with the other,” means, at bottom, “your values are not serious, since you choose them yourselves.” To that I can only say that I am very sorry that it should be so; but if I have excluded God the Father, there must be somebody to invent values. We have to take things as they are. And moreover, **to say that we invent values means** neither more nor less than this; that **there is no sense in life a priori**. **Life is nothing until it is lived**; but it is yours to make sense of, and the value of it is nothing else but the sense that you choose. .... .... **There is no other universe except the human universe**, the universe of **human subjectivity**. This relation of transcendence as constitutive of man (not in the sense that God is transcendent, but in the sense of self-surpassing) with subjectivity (in such a sense that man is not shut up in himself but forever present in a human universe) – it is this that we call existential humanism. This is humanism, because we remind man that there is no legislator but himself; that he himself, thus abandoned, must decide for himself; also because we show that it is not by turning back upon himself, but always by seeking, beyond himself, an aim which is one of liberation or of some particular realization, that man can realize himself as truly human.

#### Impact Calculus: The standard is an ethic of choice. Normative truth is produced through individual choice itself, meaning ethics requires we ought to give agents the ability to peruse ends without others interfering on their value construction.

#### Prefer additionally:

#### [1] Performativity – freedom is constitutive to human subjecthood and any moral theory because the act of adopting an ethical framework presupposes the ability to radically choose.

#### [2] Culpability – only an existentialist theory ensures agents take responsibility for their own actions since they cannot justify their motives for action upon some external or transcendental basis. De Beauvoir.

[Simon de Beauvoir. “The Ethics of Ambiguity.” Lyle stuart Inc. 1948. Translated by Bernard Frechtman.] SHS ZS

But if man is free to define for himself the conditions of a life which is valid in his own eyes, can he not choose whatever he likes and act however he likes? Dostoevsky asserted, "If God does not exist, everything is permitted." Today's believers use this formula for their own advantage. To re-establish man at the heart of his destiny is, they claim, to repudiate all ethics. However, far from God's absence authorizing all license, the contrary is the case, **because man is abandoned on the earth**, because **his acts are definitive, absolute engagements**. **He bears the responsibility for a world** which is not the work of a strange power, but **of himself, where his defeats are inscribed**, and **his victories as well**. **A God can pardon**, efface, and compensate. **But if God does not exist**, **man's faults are inexpiable**. **If** it is **claimed that**, whatever the case may be, this **earthly stake has no importance**, **this is** precisely **because** **one invokes** that **inhuman objectivity** which we declined at the start. One can not start by saying that our earthly destiny has or has not importance, for it depends upon us to give it importance. **It is up to man to make it important to be a man**, and **he alone can feel** his **success or failure**. And if it is again said that nothing forces him to try to justify his being in this way, then one is playing upon the notion of freedom in a dishonest way. The believer is also free to sin. The divine law is imposed upon him only from the moment he decides to save his soul. In the Christian religion, though one speaks very little about them today, there are also the damned. Thus, on the earthly plane, **a life which does not seek to ground itself will be a pure contingency**. **But it is permitted to** wish to **give itself** a **meaning and a truth**, and it then meets rigorous demands within its own heart.

#### [3] Linguistic inconsistency – it’s impossible to compare competing normative claims since they assume their own legitimacy, meaning it’s impossible to debate between objective frameworks. But, prefer my framing because it is a meta constraint that allows for the freedom to debate between framework to begin with.

Joyce 02 Joyce, Richard. Myth of Morality. Port Chester, NY,x USA: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p 45-47. SHS ZS

This distinction between what is accepted from within an institution, and “stepping out” of that institution and appraising it from an exterior perspective, is close to Carnap’s distinction between internal and external questions. 15 Certain “**linguistic frameworks**” (as Carnap calls them) **bring** with them **new terms and ways of talking**: accepting the language of “things” licenses making assertions like “The shirt is in the cupboard”; accepting mathematics allows one to say “There is a prime number greater than one hundred”; **accepting the language of propositions** permits saying “Chicago is large is a true proposition,” etc. **Internal to the framework in question**, **confirming** or disconfirming **the truth of** these **propositions is** a **trivial** matter. **But** traditionally **philosophers have** **interested themselves in** the external question – the issue of the adequacy of **the framework itself:** “Do objects exist?”, “Does the world exist?”, “Are there numbers?”, “Are the propositions?”, etc. Carnap’s argument is that **the external question[s]**, as it has been **typically** construed, **does not make sense**. **From a perspective that accepts mathematics**, the answer to the question “**Do numbers exist**?” is just trivially “**Yes**.” **From a perspective which has not accepted mathematics**, Carnap thinks, th**e only sensible way of construing the question is** not as a theoretical question, but as a practical one: “**Shall I accept the framework of mathematics?**”, and **this pragmatic question** **is** to be **answered by** consideration of the efficiency, the fruitfulness, the **usefulness,** etc., of the adoption. **But** the (traditional) **philosopher’s questions** – “But is mathematics true?”, “Are there really numbers?” – **are pseudo-questions**. By **turning traditional philosophical questions into** practical questions of the form “**Shall I adopt**...?”, Carnap is offering a noncognitive analysis of metaphysics. Since I am claiming that we can critically inspect morality from an external perspective – that we can ask whether there are any non-institutional reasons accompanying moral injunctions – and that such questioning would not amount to a “Shall we adopt...?” query, Carnap’s position represents a threat. What arguments does Carnap offer to his conclusion? He starts with the example of the “thing language,” which involves reference to objects that exist in time and space. **To step out of** the thing **language and ask** “But **does the world exist?”** **is a mistake**, Carnap thinks, **because the** very **notion of** “**existence” is a term which belongs to the** thing **language**, **and can be understood only** **within that framework**, “hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the system itself.” 16 Moving on to the external question “Do numbers exist?” Carnap cannot use the same argument – he cannot say that “existence” is internal to the number language and thus cannot be applied to the system as a whole. Instead he says that **philosophers** who ask the question do not mean material existence, but **have no clear understanding of what other kind of existence might be involved**, **thus such questions have no cognitive content**. It appears that this is the form of argument which he is willing to generalize to all further cases: **persons who dispute whether propositions exist, whether properties exist**, etc., **do not know what they are arguing over, thus they are not arguing over the truth of a proposition, but3 over the practical value of their respective positions**. Carnap adds that this is so because there is nothing

#### [4] Facticity is dependent on applying external values to determine the validity moral actions, but these values are nonverifiable because they are external to beings and there exists no evaluative metric to determine their authenticity. De Beauvoir.

[Simon de Beauvoir. “The Ethics of Ambiguity.” Lyle stuart Inc. 1948. Translated by Bernard Frechtman.]

The failure described in Being and Nothingness is definitive, but it is also ambiguous. **[Humans]** Man, Sartre tells us, is "a **being[s] who make**s **[themselves]**himself **a lack of being in order that there might be being.**" That means, first of all, that his **passion is not inflicted upon [humans]**him **from without**. He **[They] choose**s **it**. It is his **[One’s] very being and, as such, does not imply the idea of unhappiness**. If this choice is considered as useless, it is because **there exists no absolute value before the passion of [humans]** man, outside of it, **in relation to which one might distinguish the useless from the useful**. **The word "useful" has not** yet **received a meaning on the level of description where Being and Nothingness is situated**. **It can be defined only in the human world established by** **[human’s]** man's **projects and the ends [they]** he **set**s **up**. In the original helplessness from which man surges up, nothing is useful, nothing is useless. It must therefore be understood that **the passion to which [humans have]**man has **acquiesced finds no external justification**. No outside appeal, **no objective necessity permits of its being called useful**. It has no reason to will itself.

#### [5] Compatibility – All theories are compatible with and concede the validity of existentialism insofar as the choice to follow a theory is a commitment to radical freedom. De Beauvoir.

[Simon de Beauvoir. “The Ethics of Ambiguity.” Lyle stuart Inc. 1948. Translated by Bernard Frechtman.] SHS ZS

**Existence** asserts itself as an absolute which **must seek its justification within itself and not suppress itself**, even though it may be lost by preserving itself. To attain his truth, **man must not** attempt to **dispel the ambiguity of his being but**, on the contrary, **accept** the task of realizing **it**. He rejoins himself only to the extent that he agrees to remain at a distance from himself. This conversion is sharply distinguished from the Stoic conversion in that it does not claim to oppose to the sensible universe a formal freedom which is without content. **To exist genuinely is not to deny** this spontaneous movement of my **transcendence, but only to refuse to lose myself in it**. Existentialist conversion should rather be compared to Husserlian reduction: **let man put his will to be "in parentheses" and he will thereby be brought to the consciousness of his true condition**. And just as phenomenological reduction prevents the errors of dogmatism by suspending all affirmation concerning the mode of reality of the external world, whose flesh and bone presence the reduction does not, however, contest, so **existentialist conversion does not suppress my instincts, desires, plans, and passions. It merely prevents any possibility of failure** by refusing to set up as absolutes the ends toward which my transcendence thrusts itself, and **by considering them in their connection with** the **freedom** which projects them.

#### [6] Consequentialism fails. A) Induction fails B) Aggregation fails C) Infinite universe D) Butterfly effect E) Culpability fails

#### [7] The Negative debater must engage solely under the terms of the framing set up by the affirmative and not read a separate framing absent proving a substantive reason they can’t engage. Time Skew – The aff must read six minutes of offence without knowledge of the negative framing structure. If the negative contests the affirmative framing, they attempt moot all the aff. The Neg would have 13 minutes under their framework while I would only have 7. This is key to fairness as it skews our ability to access the ballot. Time skew outweighs all other standards – it’s impossible to come back when I’m structurally disadvantaged by not having enough time to answer arguments. Drop the negative if they violate to deter future abuse, set norms for debate, and they were forewarned.

## Offense

#### Nuclear weapons eliminate life-affirming value as they serve as a constant reminder that that value could one day end instantaneously – deterrence merely ensures infinite moral violations. Mason 17.

[Kelvin Mason, (Independent Researcher) "Ghosts of the Future "Acme Journals. https://acme-journal.org/index.php/acme/article/view/1426/1243. 2017, 16(1): pp. 149-155 DOA:2-2-2020 // NSUSF Recut WHSRS]

This film (https://vimeo.com/182695880) explores the UK’s decision to replace its Trident nuclear weapons system. Due to the ‘alternative format’i , the script and a response to reviewers is printed below. The film’s narration draws upon an **existentialist ethics** to **critique a politics and culture of nuclear weapons, Mutually Assured Destruction and deterrence**. The film was made at an academic seminar intervention at the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Burghfield in Berkshire in June 2016. Thematically linking ‘war’ and (global) ‘warming’, the seminar explored nuclear weapons and energy as, literally, signature technologies of the Anthropocene. A particular phenomenological approach employs close observation and social participation in place as an ‘incandescence’ to illuminate wider geographies and diverse temporalities. Physically inhabiting the AWE space made visible these ‘ghosts’ and highlighted the inextricability of emotion and reason. The film argues that **deterrence is antithetic to the key existentialist tenet of transcendence. Deterrence is immoral** not (only) because it is defined by abominable revenge rather than justice, but **because it shapes an oppressive politics and culture that preclude the attainment of freedom and the acceptance of** a concomitant **personal responsibility. Owning one’s radical freedom and responsibility is Sartre’s definition of ‘authenticity’**, living the truth about ourselves. Keywords Trident; deterrence; existentialism; ethics; place Ghosts of the Future 150 Narrator’s Script Robert Macfarlane observes that, ‘**We** mostly **respond to mass extinction with ‘stuplimity’: the aesthetic experience in which astonishment is united with boredom, such that we overload on anxiety** to the point of outrage-outrage’. He asks: ‘How might a novel or poem possibly account for our authorship of global scale environmental changes across millennia – let alone shape the nature of that change?’ What is the perfect text for the Anthropocene? I prepare for participation in an academic intervention (here) at the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Burghfield near Reading in Berkshire by reading about existentialist ethics and phenomenological research methods. The intervention follows the ‘no war, no warming’ theme of a month of direct action at AWE and we issued a call for participation to people interested in issues around nuclear weapons and climate change. AWE is responsible for the assembly and maintenance of nuclear warheads for the Trident missile system: four nuclear powered Vanguard submarines, Trident D-5 ballistic missiles, and the nuclear warheads. The Anthropocene is the geological age in which human influence on planet Earth is the most significant impact and ‘will leave a long-term signature in the strata record’. The Anthropocene and the nuclear age start simultaneously, and part of this signature will be the global dispersal of artificial radionuclides from the testing and, perhaps, use of nuclear weapons. We are without excuse. In an existentialist view, at least, **our identities are** partly **constituted by how we live the ‘already’ and the ‘not yet’ in our everyday life**. Heidegger dubs this our ‘ekstatic temporality’. Facticity and **transcendence stand as**, respectively, **our ecstatic** past and **future**. While we live in the present, **we are animated by** both the past and, most significantly for **who we can come to know ourselves to be, the possibility of the future;** this is Heidegger’s ‘ek-sistence’. Encountering, a grizzly bear feasting on a caribou carcass, Barry Lopez suggests that, rather than concentrate on the bear, his indigenous travelling companions ‘would focus on that part of the world of which, at this moment, the bear was only a fragment. The bear here might be compared with a bonfire, a kind of incandescence that throws light on everything around it’. Experiencing the event in this way ‘extended the moment of encounter with the bear backwards and forwards in time’. Simone de Beauvoir outlined an existentialist morality: ‘Every time transcendence lapses into immanence, there is a degradation of existence into ‘initself’, of freedom into facticity; this fall is a moral fault if the subject consents to it; if this fall is inflicted on the subject, it takes the form of frustration and ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies, 2017, 16(1): 149-155 151 oppression; in both cases it is an absolute evil.’ We can – we should - transform the way we live every moment, seek freedom from oppression. Angie Zelter, who organised the month of direct action at Burghfield with the network Trident ploughshares, refuses to be confined by facticity. Her every action at AWE is an attempted step into a different future right now. **The more the police try to impose the** order of the moment on her, immanence, the **social order determined by nuclear deterrence and the coercive security which adherence to that doctrine dictates, the more she steps out of line: she tries to push through the police** cordon into AWE; she sits down in the road to block it, **constantly shuffling into a more obstructive position**; she never stops talking to the police explaining the moral fault of Trident, the future it defines, the alternatives it constrains… Jean Paul **Sartre defined ‘authenticity’ as owning one’s radical freedom and responsibility**: it is a matter of living the truth about ourselves. We are without excuse. I am filming a wild rose, trying not to mind whether or not a bee lands on it to feed. I am focussed on holding my own attention, resisting the temptation to flit, to film something else; something ‘happening’. I am acutely aware of my own breathing; aware how impossible it is to hold the camcorder steady, trying to ‘go with’ that. Looking intently through the viewfinder at this one speck of the landscape, I am more aware than I otherwise would be of the soundscape. The rush of cars passing on the road behind me is inescapable; from white noise to cacophonous intrusion. There is birdsong too. Behind me a policeman. I am again contravening bye-laws, filming Ministry of Defence property. I must stop. A bee is feeding on the rose. Each Vanguard submarine is armed with up to 16 missiles each of which can carry at least three warheads. And each warhead has an explosive power eight times that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. That bomb, ‘Little Boy’, devastated an area of five square miles and killed at least 135,000 people. Many others suffered long-term sickness and disability. The U.S. dropped a second nuclear bomb, ‘Fat Man’, on the city of Nagasaki, killing at least another 50,000 people. We are without excuse. One morning, in the impromptu peace camp set up across from the construction gate at AWE, my friend and colleague **Kye tells me she awoke in her tent to the sound of birdsong, which filled her with a life-affirming joy. Then, she realised that she was lying so very close to a place that could obliterate all birdsong forever.** I am still taking that in. **Ghosts of the Future** 152 For a moment, when I am filming, I mistake the distant beep-beep warning of a lorry reversing inside AWE for birdsong. Perhaps some birds imitate lorries in their calls? Perhaps, on some level, the design engineer based the lorry’s alarming sound on the call of birds? Each warhead on a Trident missile could kill more than a million people. And the ‘payload’ of one Vanguard submarine has the potential to kill some fiftythree million people: the entire population of South Africa. The UK always has one armed Vanguard submarine at sea. (Lotte Reimer sings) **All that we have created with our hands And our minds**, for the glory of the world we live in, **Now it can be smashed, in a moment destroyed, Deadly the harvest of two atom bombs**. Then, people of the world, we must watch and take care That the third atom bomb never comes. Exponents of the Trident system claim it is a deterrent. The military theory of deterrence runs that the threat of using powerful weapons against an enemy deters that enemy from attacking you with similar weapons. Applied to nuclear weapons, deterrence translates into a security policy of Mutually Assured Destruction. Exponents of the policy seem to have no problem living with the darkest of ironies, that the acronym for this system is MAD. Professor Rebecca Kay sees **MAD as the ultimate ‘othering’, and questions the moral logic** of deterrence. She asks how, **if ‘we’ were subject to a nuclear attack, ‘it would better to die knowing that ‘our’ bombs were killing those people too’?** How? The moral philosopher Mary Midgely pinpoints the indiscriminate nature of nuclear weapons, likening them to landmines on a vastly greater scale. ‘This feature cannot be sanitised by claiming that their owners are never going to use them. To say nothing of the fact that they have actually once already been used in combat, the mere act of threatening others with an abomination is itself already abominable.’ Ratified by one hundred and sixty two states, the Ottawa Treaty prohibits the production, transfer or use of landmines, committing signatories to their destruction. The UK signed the Ottawa Treaty in 1997. We are without excuse. People are striking the peace camp that has been my home for the past two nights. There is a fire with an ash-clagged and smoke-blackened kettle upon it, tarpaulins strung overhead between trees, a few pop-up tents… I resist the urge to go and help my comrades, as I feel I should. I keep filming. I keep my back to the construction gate of AWE: a wide, heavy-duty, heavy-metal structure with black ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies, 2017, 16(1): 149-155 153 painted bars and close steel mesh. Behind the gate, MoD police with guns and a German Shepherd dog on a leash keep a close watch. In ‘The Castle’ Kafka wrote: ‘All [the authorities] did was to guard the distant and invisible interests of distant and invisible masters.’ We are without excuse. Twenty yards down the road, civilian police are parked, also observing. A police car drives by, perhaps just to make sure all their other colleagues aren’t missing anything sinister. I do not turn the camera on any of them. Across the road, a handful of people, thrown together in their opposition to nuclear weapons or their academic interest in nuclear weapons or in climate or protest or place, continue packing away food, taking down tents, tipping rain water carefully off tarpaulins not to drench the packed-away kit, themselves or each other. Nothing happens. So much is happening. On 14th March 2016, the House of Commons voted by 409 to 161 to retain a strategic nuclear deterrent beyond the life of the current system. A vote on renewing the Trident weapons programme specifically is scheduled for 18th July 2016. If that vote carries, as seems certain, Vanguard submarines will be replaced and the life of Trident missiles extended. AWE is poised to play a major role when the warheads themselves need to be refurbished or replaced. According to the government’s estimate, Vanguard replacement will cost £31 billion. This figure does not include an extra £10bn that the MoD has put aside as contingency for an anticipated overspend. Trident’s opponents estimate the cost very significantly higher. Updating a 2014 estimate by the independent Trident Commission, in 2015 international news agency Reuters put the cost at £167bn. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) calculates the cost as high as £205bn. This sum could, CND claim, ‘improve the NHS by building 120 state of the art hospitals and employing 150,000 new nurses, build 3 million affordable homes, install solar panels in every home in the UK or pay the tuition fees for 8 million students.’ The UK is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament. On 19th July, the House of Commons parliament in Westminster voted to replace Britain’s Trident nuclear weapons system by 472 votes to 117. In the debate, George Kerevan, Scottish National Party Member of Parliament for East Lothian, asked Theresa May, the Prime Minister, ‘Is she personally prepared to authorise a nuclear strike that could kill one hundred thousand men, women and children?’ Previous Prime Ministers have avoided answering this question. With no hesitation, though, Theresa May answered, ‘Yes.’ She then added, ‘The whole point of a deterrent is that our enemies need to know that we would be prepared to use it.’ Ghosts of the Future 154 We are without excuse. In the peace camp a woman from Scotland, Cat, paints a series of watercolour landscapes of AWE. I ask, and she kindly gives me one of the paintings. It shows the heavy, dark metal construction gate, the No Trident signs that protesters have installed. And a bird. To our academic seminar, held in front of the construction gate to AWE, Kye brings red paper-chain people. They are an audience to represent absence: the ghosts of the future that the use of Trident might create, particularly our academic colleagues from the past and especially those from the future who are not here, or who may not be able to be here; and our colleagues in the present who are also absent, also ghosts. We weave the paper-chain people between the mesh of the construction gate. With their dog and their guns, the two MoD police officers come to warn us that this action infringes a by-law and that we must take the figures down immediately or face arrest. They are paper figures four inches tall. We argue. And - after a stand-off - one of the police officer concedes that the figures can stay in the fence for five minutes. The quality of that short time is immense. Seminar participants are suffused by emotion. The police decision seems at once rational and compassionate. We note that these are not separate mechanisms. Existentialism acknowledges time as binding: it cannot be escaped. However, it further holds, that time is lived and should be measured qualitatively. So, if we can’t change time, we can transform the way we live every moment. Because Kye’s paper-chain people are prohibited from staying on the real construction gate, I rescue some of them and add them into Cat’s picture of the gate. The ghosts have a home. But they are not at peace. …. you and your children matter. I hope your love will teach the nations that emit the most carbon and violence that they should, instead, remit the most compassion. I hope, soon Presenting in the seminar, Phil stresses how nuclear deterrence is compelled to go hand in glove with secrecy and security; how it is incommensurable with transparency and freedom; how it is undemocratic. **Inherent in deterrence is a pessimistic view of human nature that restricts us from developing a future of nobler virtue**: of trust and empathy not suspicion; of justice rather revenge; of nonviolence, of openness in place of threat; welcome and inclusion instead of othering, of care and compassion beyond fear.

#### The atomic bomb is even worse for oppressed nations – it forces them into Western modes of thinking and leaves them unable to achieve their own value construction. Lethbridge 2.

Lethbridge, David. “onstructing Peace by Freedom: Jean-Paul Sartre, Four Short Speeches on the Peace Movement”. rtre Studies International, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2012), pp. 1-18 SHS ZS

But **the atomic bomb was the weapon of choice for the West** since its threatened use was **aimed precisely at the colonized nations strug- gling for independence**. "The people's army has found its exact counterpart in the nuclear weapon; **the people's army and the atom bomb are the two opposed characteristics** of our time." The atom bomb was a weapon to be launched by the ruling circles of the West, who no longer required a mass army, against a defensive people's army that had no greater strength than the support of its own peo- ple. "**The atom bomb is the only weapon suitable for oppressive minorities**. Without it their task would be impossible. Their task is the maintenance of abstract barriers between the nations and between people inside each country, and to govern against the necessities of history and political economy." But **the West was in the process of losing its control over Vietnam** and other colonized nations. There- fore, for the West, "**there remains** but **one way out - the atom bomb**. The atom bomb is a weapon against history Despite the evident reality that nuclear war would mean an utter catastrophe that would "wipe out the whole of humanity," **its poten- tial use was an attempt to blackmail the entire human race**. "In order to stop the world turning **they are threatening to suppress history by liquidating those who make history**. It is all they can do: wipe out man in case he changes. **The bomb is in itself** the basis and the sum total of a policy completely **hostile to the true development of humanity** . . . Because the atom bomb wishes to fly in the face of his- tory, **it risks falling out of history altogether**."42 Middle East;49 alert South Asia to the lessons of stability;50 and erode the barriers to technology transfers that would enhance deterre

## Advantage

#### Nuclear war inevitable via escalation, accidents, miscalc, and terrorism. Studies prove we’re on the brink in multiple hotspots. Cyberwarfare and mixed signaling answers their generic defense.

Borger ’16 Borger, Julian. “Nuclear weapons risk greater than in cold war, says ex-Pentagon chief.” *The Guardian*, 7 January 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/07/nuclear-weapons-risk-greater-than-in-cold-war-says-ex-pentagon-chief>. MBPZ

The risks of a nuclear catastrophe – in a regional war, terrorist attack, by accident or miscalculation – is greater than it was during the cold war and rising, a former US defence secretary has said. William Perry, who served at the Pentagon from 1994 to 1997, made his comments a few hours before North Korea’s nuclear test on Wednesday, and listed Pyongyang’s aggressive atomic weapons programme as one of the global risk factors. He also said progress made after the fall of the Soviet Union to reduce the chance of a nuclear exchange between the US and Russia was now unravelling. “The probability of a nuclear calamity is higher today, I believe, that[n] it was during the cold war,” Perry said. “A new danger has been rising in the past three years and that is the possibility there might be a nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia … brought about by a substantial miscalculation, a false alarm.” Alongside the risks stemming from cyber-attack, North Korea’s nuclear programme and volatility between India and Pakistan in Kashmir, Russia’s military interventions in Ukraine and Syria and the increasingly assertive posture of its air and sea patrols have brought Russian forces into close proximity to their western counterparts. In a new study, the arms control advocacy group Global Zero analysed 146 such incidents over the past 21 months, classing two of them as high risk. It deemed 33 provocative in that they “stray from the norm of routine incidents, resulting in more aggressive or confrontational interaction that can quickly escalate to higher-risk incidents or even conflict”. Over the same period, the group counted 29 incidents between North and South Korea, including three high-risk incidents, and 40 military encounters around disputed islands in the South China Sea, which brought confrontations and near-misses between Chinese forces and those of the US or its regional allies. Ten of the incidents were deemed provocative. In south Asia, where three nuclear-armed states face off , the study counted 54 significant military incidents between India, Pakistan and China, including 22 border clashes in and around Kashmir. Pakistan is outnumbered by India in terms of conventional forces and is growing increasingly reliant on the threat of the early use of tactical weapons to deter an attack. Such weapons would have to be deployed to border positions in a crisis to represent an effective deterrent, but it is not clear if or when launch authority would be delegated to field commanders. Kashmir remains the most volatile nuclear frontline, but the zone where Russia and the west rub up against each other is also becoming increasingly precarious, underlining the inherent risks of US and Russian nuclear doctrine. Twenty years after the cold war, neither nation has ruled out first use of its nuclear arsenal and both maintain a launch-on-warning, keeping a combined total of 1,800 nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert. Barack Obama would have less than 30 minutes to decide whether early warning satellite data showing an incoming missile attack was credible. His Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, would have under half that time to make up his mind because Russia does not currently have a working early warning satellite. “These weapons are literally waiting for a short stream of computer signals to fire. They don’t care where these signals come from.” said Bruce Blair, a former US missile launch officer and co-founder of Global Zero. “Their rocket engines are going ignite and their silo lids are going to blow off and they are going to lift off as soon as they have the equivalent of you or I putting in a couple of numbers and hitting enter three times.” The risks are compounded by inexperience. Neither the US nor Russian presidents, nor the overwhelming bulk of the military leadership in both countries, had to deal with the near-misses and constant pressure of the cold war standoff. Communication between Nato and Russian chains of command is at a new low, far worse than in the 1970s and 80s. The shooting down of a Russian warplane by the Turkish air force over the Turkey-Syria border in November - the first time a Nato member had downed a Russian warplane since the Korean war – exposed the breakdown. “It showed how our institutional memory and understanding of Russia has been allowed to atrophy. We believed our own propaganda about partnership,” a senior Nato official said a few days after the incident. Referring to the possibility of a nuclear exchange triggered by a military incident that spiralled out of control, the official said: “It is still remote, but it is no longer trivial.” Nuclear experts say the growth of cyberwarfare potentially poses the biggest threat to the integrity and reliability of automated command and control systems. “In the cold war we were not contemplating how a cyber-attack might go awry. Its hard to be specific about that risk, but it seems to be very real and a growing danger,” said Perry, who has written a book, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink, which highlights the increasing risks. “Some kind of cyber-attack on our nuclear command system either in the United States or Russia could be the basis for a miscalculation made about a launch.” US Strategic Command headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska, had not provided comment by the time of publication, but the generals in charge of the nuclear arsenal admit they do not know the extent to which it has been compromised because the threat is so new. “The sophistication of the cyberthreat has increased exponentially” over the past decade, the command’s former head, retired general James Cartwright, told the Associated Press in April. It was “reasonable to believe that that threat has extended itself”to nuclear command and control systems,” he said. “Have they been penetrated? I don’t know. Is it reasonable technically to assume they could be? Yes.” A 2013 review by the Pentagon’s defence science board found that US nuclear weapon control systems had not been properly assessed for their cyber-vulnerabilities. The then head of US Strategic Command, General Robert Kehler, told the Senate armed services committee in 2013 that there was “no significant vulnerability” in the nuclear command and control system, but later conceded: “We don’t know what we don’t know.” When asked whether Russia and China could prevent a cyber-attack from launching their nuclear missiles, he replied: “Senator, I don’t know.” The threats of cyber and nuclear warfare collide at a time when momentum is draining away from the arms control effort under way at the beginning of Obama’s presidency, when he vowed to work for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Moscow has made increasingly frequent reference to Russia’s nuclear arsenal in combative rhetoric directed at its perceived adversaries. The country’s ambassador in Copenhagen has said Danish warships would be “targets for Russian nuclear missiles” if they installed advanced radar equipment. The US has accused Moscow of violating the intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty by secretly developing a medium-range cruise missile. On 9 November, Putin was filmed meeting some of his generals in Sochi, and the cameras captured a glimpse of a graphic presentation of what appeared to be an alarming new weapon. Codenamed Status-6, it was a large drone submarine designed to carry a huge thermonuclear dirty bomb into a foreign port. “If detonated, Status-6 would be capable of dousing cities like New York in massive amounts of radioactive fallout,” Jeffrey Lewis, of the James Martin Centre for Non-proliferation Studies, wrote in Foreign Policy magazine. “At the risk of understating things, this project is bat-shit crazy. It harkens back to the most absurd moments of the cold war, when nuclear strategists followed the logic of deterrence over the cliff and into the abyss.” In its efforts to reassure its eastern European allies over the threat of Russian encroachment, the US has also been mixing its conventional and nuclear signalling. For the first time since the cold war, it flew formations of strategic bombers over the Arctic last year. Over the next decade, the Pentagon is planning a $355bn (£243bn) spending spree to fund 12 new nuclear-armed strategic submarines, as many as 100 new strategic bombers, new land-based, intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of deployment on mobile launchers, and more than 1,000 nuclear-capable cruise missiles. The missiles are described as uniquely destabilising, as they come in conventional and nuclear variants, so an adversary would have no way of knowing which was being launched. The UK rejected a cruise-based deterrent in 2013 because, as the then defence secretary Philip Hammond said, it “would carry significant risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation”. Perry said: “In the cold war, we and Russia were in the process of dismantling nuclear weapons … Today, in contrast, both the Russia and the US are beginning a complete rebuilding of the cold war nuclear arsenals. And today Russia is threatening the use of nuclear weapons … Those are very dramatic steps between today and the 90s. That is a major difference.”

#### Nukes encourage aggression and nuclear war comes first.

Baum ’15 Baum, Seth (executive director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute). “Breaking down the risk of nuclear deterrence failure.” *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 27 July 2015, <https://thebulletin.org/2015/07/breaking-down-the-risk-of-nuclear-deterrence-failure/>. [Premier]

Evaluating the possibility of deterrence failure should be based on the same principles always called for when making decisions under risky conditions. Everyone agrees that the risk of nuclear war is bad; if all else were equal, we would rather not have this risk. But all else is not equal. The crucial step is to clarify what decision is being faced. In this case, we are not deciding between the risk of nuclear deterrence failure and no risk at all. If that were the case, it would be clear that there should be no nuclear weapons. But the actual decision we’re facing is whether to rapidly disarm. Complete and permanent nuclear disarmament would end the possibility of nuclear war, but not the possibility of war. Thus, the key comparison should be between the risk of deterrence failure—and therefore war—with nuclear weapons and the risk of deterrence failure without them. Which risk is larger? This is where the empirical details come in. Risk can be quantified as the probability of some harm times the severity of that harm if it were to occur. That means we are comparing four quantities: the probability of war with nuclear weapons, the probability without them, the severity of war with them, and the severity without them. The probability of any war is a very difficult number to pin down. The causes of war are complex and contingent on many case-specific factors, and the historical record is murky and limited. But at least one thing is clear: The probability of nuclear war is not zero. Nuclear deterrence can fail. It is a fallacy to presume that just because no nuclear war has occurred since the post-World War II advent of nuclear deterrence, therefore it will never happen. The historical record contains several near-misses in which nuclear war was narrowly avoided due in no small part to luck. When these points are raised in disarmament debates, there is no significant international divide. When pushed, everyone seems to agree that nuclear deterrence can fail. Like nuclear weapons, conventional weapons can also act as deterrents, discouraging states from going to war by presenting a counter-threat. So how does the probability of deterrence failure with nuclear weapons compare to the probability without them? This is a much harder question, and not one commonly considered in athe debates. Several studies have attempted to answer it by looking at data on the history of war between states that do and do not have nuclear weapons. A 2009 study by Robert Rauchhaus found a lower probability of war between states that both have nuclear weapons but a higher probability when only one has them. However, a 2015 study by Mark Bell and Nicholas L. Miller finds no significant difference in the relative probabilities. These studies are helpful but inconclusive. Such an important policy decision should ideally rest on more robust research. (I would welcome any reader comments on these two studies or suggestions for additional ones.) The relative severity of nuclear and non-nuclear war is also complex and uncertain, but easier to compare. In principle, either war could result in few or many deaths depending on how it proceeded. In practice, there is reason to believe that nuclear war would be vastly more severe. Non-nuclear war could result in many millions of deaths, as in the two World Wars, but the unparalleled explosive force of nuclear weapons makes great harm much easier to cause and therefore more probable. By far the biggest difference between nuclear and non-nuclear war would be that the former would likely result in nuclear winter. Nuclear explosions send smoke up past the clouds, into the stratosphere, which causes global environmental problems for years. Crop failures could ensue in every country, no matter where the war occurred. The survival of human civilization could be at stake. Nuclear winter could astronomically dwarf the potential harm of a non-nuclear war, unless the latter involved some other weapon of global destruction, such as contagious biological weapons. (Those are already banned by treaty and not in active deployment). The relative severity of nuclear and non-nuclear war is likewise not a point of international disagreement. While awareness of nuclear winter remains low, all sides concur that the impacts of the former would be catastrophic, and the impacts of the latter not as bad. Taking nuclear winter into account, the ambiguity about the probabilities of whether war will occur becomes less important. That is, even if nuclear weapons significantly improve deterrence, nuclear disarmament still reduces the risk of war. Thus, while it is understandable that nuclear-armed states would want to avoid disarmament in order to avoid war, the world will ultimately be safer without nuclear weapons. In other words, nuclear disarmament should proceed rapidly.

#### Deterrence theory fails – historical analysis checks. Barash 18.

[Barash, David P. “Nuclear deterrence continues to dominate international relations. Yet there is no proof it ever worked, nor that it ever will.” The Guardian. Published 14 Jan 2018] SHS ZS

* Historical analysis checks back
* Requires arsenal remain invulnerable
* Assumes rationality of leader
* No way to know when country obtain enough nukes

Every government that now possesses nuclear weapons claims that they deter attacks by their threat of catastrophic retaliation. Even a brief examination, however, reveals that **deterrence is not remotely** as **compelling** a principle as its reputation suggests. In his novel The Ambassadors (1903), Henry James described a certain beauty as ‘a jewel brilliant and hard’, at once twinkling and trembling, adding that ‘what seemed all surface one moment seemed all depth the next’. The public has been bamboozled by the shiny surface appearance of deterrence, with its promise of strength, security and safety. But wh**at has been touted as profound strategic depth crumbles with surprising ease** when subjected to critical scrutiny. **Let’s start by considering the core of deterrence theory: that it has worked**. Advocates of nuclear deterrence insist that we should thank it for the fact that a third world war has been avoided, even when tensions between the two superpowers – the US and the USSR – ran high. Some supporters even maintain that deterrence set the stage for the fall of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Communism. In this telling, the West’s nuclear deterrent prevented the USSR from invading western Europe, and delivered the world from the threat of Communist tyranny. **There are**, however, **compelling arguments suggesting** that **the US and the former Soviet Union avoided world war for several** possible **reasons**, most **notably because neither side wanted to go to war**. Indeed, **the US and Russia never fought a war prior to the nuclear age**. Singling out nuclear weapons as the reason why the Cold War never became hot is somewhat like saying that a junkyard car, without an engine or wheels, never sped off the lot only because no one turned the key. Lo**gically speaking, there is no way to demonstrate that nuclear weapons kept the peace during the Cold War, or that they do so now**. **Perhaps peace prevailed between** the two superpowers simply because **they had no quarrel that justified fighting a terribly destructive war**, even a conventional one. **There is no evidence**, for example, that the **Soviet leadership ever contemplated trying to conquer western Europe**, much less that it was restrained by the West’s nuclear arsenal. Post facto arguments – especially negative ones – might be the currency of pundits, but are impossible to prove, and offer no solid ground for evaluating a counterfactual claim, conjecturing why something has not happened. In colloquial terms, if a dog does not bark in the night, can we say with certainty that no one walked by the house? Deterrence enthusiasts are like the woman who sprayed perfume on her lawn every morning. When a perplexed neighbour asked about this strange behaviour, she replied: ‘I do it to keep the elephants away.’ The neighbour protested: ‘But there aren’t any elephants within 10,000 miles of here,’ whereupon the perfume-sprayer replied: ‘You see, it works!’ We should not congratulate our leaders, or deterrence theory, much less nuclear weapons, for keeping the peace. What we can say is that, as of this morning, those with the power to exterminate life have not done so. But this is not altogether comforting, and history is no more reassuring. The duration of ‘nuclear peace’, from the Second World War to the end of the Cold War, lasted less than five decades. More than 20 years separated the First and Second World Wars; before that, there had been more than 40 years of relative peace between the end of the Franco-Prussian War (1871) and the First World War (1914), and 55 years between the Franco-Prussian War and Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo (1815). Even in war-prone Europe, decades of peace have not been so rare. Each time, when peace ended and the next war began, the war involved weapons available at the time – which, for the next big one, would likely include nuclear weapons. **The only way to make sure that nuclear weapons are not used is to make sure that there are no such weapons**. **There is** certainly **no reason to think that the presence of nuclear weapons will prevent their use**. The first step to ensuring that humans do not unleash nuclear holocaust might be to show that the Emperor Deterrence has no clothes – which would then open the possibility of replacing the illusion with something more suitable. It is possible that the post-1945 US-Soviet peace came ‘through strength’, but that need not imply nuclear deterrence. It is also undeniable that the presence of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert capable of reaching each other’s homeland in minutes has made both sides edgy. **The Cuban Missile Crisis** of 1962 – when, by all accounts, the world came closer to nuclear war than at any other time – is not testimony to the effectiveness of deterrence: the crisis **occurred because of nuclear weapons**. **It is more likely** that **we have** been **spared nuclear war** not because of deterrence but **in spite of it**. Even when possessed by just one side, nuclear weapons have not deterred other forms of war. **The Chinese, Cuban, Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions all took place even though a nuclear-armed US backed the overthrown governments**. Similarly, **the US lost the Vietnam War,** just as the Soviet Union lost in Afghanistan, **despite both countries** not only **possessing nuclear weapons**, but also more and better conventional arms than their adversaries. Nor did nuclear weapons aid Russia in its unsuccessful war against Chechen rebels in 1994-96, or in 1999-2000, when Russia’s conventional weapons devastated the suffering Chechen Republic. [Nuclear weapons](https://www.theguardian.com/world/nuclear-weapons) did not help the US achieve its goals in Iraq or Afghanistan, which have become expensive catastrophic failures for the country with the world’s most advanced nuclear weapons. Moreover, **despite its nuclear arsenal, the US remains fearful of domestic terrorist attacks**, which are more likely to be made with nuclear weapons than be deterred by them. In short, it is not legitimate to argue that nuclear weapons have deterred any sort of war, or that they will do so in the future. **During the Cold War, each side engaged in conventional warfare**: the Soviets, for example, in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979-89); the Russians in Chechnya (1994-96; 1999-2009), Georgia (2008), Ukraine (2014-present), as well as Syria (2015-present); and the US in Korea (1950-53), Vietnam (1955-75), Lebanon (1982), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989-90), the Persian Gulf (1990-91), the former Yugoslavia (1991-99), Afghanistan (2001-present), and Iraq (2003-present), to mention just a few cases. Nor have their weapons deterred attacks upon nuclear armed states by non-nuclear opponents. In 1950, China stood 14 years from developing and deploying its own nuclear weapons, whereas the US had a well-developed atomic arsenal. Nonetheless, as the Korean War’s tide was shifting dramatically against the North, **that US nuclear arsenal did not inhibit China from sending more than 300,000 soldiers across the Yalu River**, resulting in the stalemate on the Korean peninsula that divides it to this day, and has resulted in one of the world’s most dangerous unresolved stand-offs. In 1956, the nuclear-armed United Kingdom warned non-nuclear Egypt to refrain from nationalising the Suez Canal. To no avail: the UK, France and Israel ended up invading Sinai with conventional forces. In 1982, Argentina attacked the British-held Falkland Islands, even though the UK had nuclear weapons and Argentina did not. Following the US-led invasion in 1991, conventionally armed Iraq was not deterred from lobbing Scud missiles at nuclear-armed Israel, which did not retaliate, although it could have used its nuclear weapons to vaporise Baghdad. It is hard to imagine how doing so would have benefitted anyone. Obviously, **US nuclear weapons did not deter the terrorist attacks** on the US of 11 September 2001, just as the nuclear arsenals of the UK and France have not prevented repeated terrorist attacks on those countries. Deterrence, in short, does not deter. The pattern is deep and geographically widespread. Nuclear-armed France couldn’t prevail over the non-nuclear Algerian National Liberation Front. The US nuclear arsenal didn’t inhibit [North Korea](https://www.theguardian.com/world/north-korea) from seizing a US intelligence-gathering vessel, the USS Pueblo, in 1968. Even today, this boat remains in North Korean hands. US nukes didn’t enable China to get Vietnam to end its invasion of Cambodia in 1979. Nor did US nuclear weapons stop Iranian Revolutionary Guards from capturing US diplomats and holding them hostage (1979-81), just as fear of US nuclear weapons didn’t empower the US and its allies to force Iraq to retreat from Kuwait without a fight in 1990. In Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (2017), the **political scientists** Todd Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann examined 348 territorial disputes occurring between 1919 and 1995. They **used statistical analysis to see whether nuclear-armed states** **were more successful than conventional countries in coercing their adversaries** during territorial disputes**. They weren’t**. Not only that, but nuclear weapons didn’t embolden those who own them to escalate demands; if anything, such countries were somewhat less successful in getting their way. In some cases, the analysis is almost comical. Thus, among the very few cases in which threats from a nuclear-armed country were coded as having compelled an opponent was the US insistence, in 1961, that the Dominican Republic hold democratic elections following the assassination of the dictator Rafael Trujillo, as well as the US demand, in 1994, following a Haitian military coup, that the Haitian colonels restore Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. In 1974-75, nuclear China forced non-nuclear Portugal to surrender its claim to Macau. These examples were included because the authors honestly sought to consider all cases in which a nuclear-armed country got its way vis-à-vis a non-nuclear one. But no serious observer would attribute the capitulation of Portugal or the Dominican Republic to the nuclear weapons of China or the US. All of this also suggests that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran or North Korea is unlikely to enable these countries to coerce others, whether their ‘targets’ are armed with nuclear or conventional weapons. It is one thing to conclude that nuclear deterrence hasn’t necessarily deterred, and hasn’t provided coercive power – but its extraordinary risks are even more discrediting. First, **deterrence via nuclear weapons lacks credibility**. A police officer armed with a backpack nuclear weapon would be unlikely to deter a robber: ‘Stop in the name of the law, or I’ll blow us all up!’ Similarly, during the Cold War, NATO generals lamented that towns in West Germany were less than two kilotons apart – which meant that defending Europe with nuclear weapons would destroy it, and so the claim that the Red Army would be deterred by nuclear means was literally incredible. The result was the elaboration of smaller, more accurate tactical weapons that would be more usable and, thus, whose employment in a crisis would be more credible. But deployed weapons that are more usable, and thus more credible as deterrents, are more liable to be used. Second, **deterrence requires that each side’s arsenal remains invulnerable to attack**, or at least that such an attack would be prevented insofar as a potential victim retained a ‘second-strike’ retaliatory capability, sufficient to prevent such an attack in the first place. **Over time**, however, **nuclear missiles have become increasingly accurate**, raising concerns about the vulnerability of these weapons to a ‘counterforce’ strike. In brief, **nuclear states are increasingly able to target their adversary’s nuclear weapons** for destruction. In the perverse argot of deterrence theory, this is **called counterforce vulnerability**, with ‘vulnerability’ referring to the target’s nuclear weapons, not its population. The clearest outcome of increasingly accurate nuclear weapons and the ‘counterforce vulnerability’ component of deterrence theory is to increase the likelihood of a first strike, while also increasing the danger that a potential victim, fearing such an event, might be tempted to pre-empt with its own first strike. The resulting situation – in which each side perceives a possible advantage in striking first – is dangerously unstable. Third, **deterrence theory assumes optimal rationality on the part of decision-makers**. It presumes that those with their fingers on the nuclear triggers are rational actors who will also remain calm and cognitively unimpaired under extremely stressful conditions. **It** also **presumes that leaders will** always retain control over their forces and that, moreover, they will always retain control over their emotions as well, **making decisions based** **solely on a cool calculation of strategic costs and benefits**. Deterrence theory maintains, in short, that each side will scare the pants off the other with the prospect of the most hideous, unimaginable consequences, and will then conduct itself with the utmost deliberate and precise rationality. **Virtually everything known about human psychology suggests that this is absurd.** In Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey Through Yugoslavia (1941), Rebecca West noted that: ‘Only part of us is sane: only part of us loves pleasure and the longer day of happiness, wants to live to our 90s and die in peace …’ It requires no arcane wisdom to know that people often act out of misperceptions, anger, despair, insanity, stubbornness, revenge, pride and/or dogmatic conviction. Moreover, in certain situations – as **when either side is convinced that war is inevitable,** or when the pressures to avoid losing face are especially intense – **an irrational act**, including a lethal one, **can appear appropriate, even unavoidable**. When he ordered the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese defence minister observed that: ‘Sometimes it is necessary to close one’s eyes and jump off the platform of the Kiyomizu Temple [a renowned suicide spot].’ During the First World War, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany wrote in the margin of a government document that: ‘Even if we are destroyed, England at least will lose India.’ While in his bunker, during the final days of the Second World War, **Adolf Hitler ordered** what he hoped would be **the total destruction of Germany, because he felt that Germans had ‘failed’ him.** Consider, as well, a US president who shows signs of mental illness, and whose statements and tweets are frighteningly consistent with dementia or genuine psychosis. National leaders – nuclear-armed or not – aren’t immune to mental illness. Yet, deterrence theory presumes otherwise. Finally, **there is** just **no way for civilian or military leaders to know when their country has accumulated enough nuclear firepower to satisfy the requirement of having an ‘effective deterrent’**. For example, if one side is willing to be annihilated in a counterattack, it simply cannot be deterred, no matter the threatened retaliation. Alternatively, if one side is convinced of the other’s implacable hostility, or of its presumed indifference to loss of life, no amount of weaponry can suffice.

#### Extinction—nuclear winter, ozone damage, and EMP-induced meltdowns.

Starr 14 {Steven, Senior Scientist for Physicians for Social Responsibility, Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program (Missouri), commentator in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Strategic Arms Reduction, Associate member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, “The Lethality of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear War has No Winner,” Global Research: Centre for Research on Globalization, 6/5, http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-lethality-of-nuclear-weapons-nuclear-war-has-no-winner/5385611}

Nuclear war has no winner. Beginning in 2006, several of the world’s leading climatologists (at Rutgers, UCLA, John Hopkins University, and the University of Colorado-Boulder) published a series of studies that evaluated the long-term environmental consequences of a nuclear war, including baseline scenarios fought with merely 1% of the explosive power in the US and/or Russian launch-ready nuclear arsenals. They concluded that the consequences of even a “small” nuclear war would include catastrophic disruptions of global climate[i] and massive destruction of Earth’s protective ozone layer[ii]. These and more recent studies predict that global agriculture would be so negatively affected by such a war, a global famine would result, which would cause up to 2 billion people to starve to death. [iii]¶ These peer-reviewed studies – which were analyzed by the best scientists in the world and found to be without error – also predict that a war fought with less than half of US or Russian strategic nuclear weapons would destroy the human race.[iv] In other words, a US-Russian nuclear war would create such extreme long-term damage to the global environment that it would leave the Earth uninhabitable for humans and most animal forms of life.¶ A recent article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Self-assured destruction: The climate impacts of nuclear war”,[v] begins by stating:¶ “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self-assured destruction.”¶ In 2009, I wrote an article[vi] for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament that summarizes the findings of these studies. It explains that nuclear firestorms would produce millions of tons of smoke, which would rise above cloud level and form a global stratospheric smoke layer that would rapidly encircle the Earth. The smoke layer would remain for at least a decade, and it would act to destroy the protective ozone layer (vastly increasing the UV-B reaching Earth[vii]) as well as block warming sunlight, thus creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last 10 years or longer.¶ Following a US-Russian nuclear war, temperatures in the central US and Eurasia would fall below freezing every day for one to three years; the intense cold would completely eliminate growing seasons for a decade or longer. No crops could be grown, leading to a famine that would kill most humans and large animal populations.¶ Electromagnetic pulse from high-altitude nuclear detonations would destroy the integrated circuits in all modern electronic devices[viii], including those in commercial nuclear power plants. Every nuclear reactor would almost instantly meltdown; every nuclear spent fuel pool (which contain many times more radioactivity than found in the reactors) would boil-off, releasing vast amounts of long-lived radioactivity. The fallout would make most of the US and Europe uninhabitable. Of course, the survivors of the nuclear war would be starving to death anyway. Once nuclear weapons were introduced into a US-Russian conflict, there would be little chance that a nuclear holocaust could be avoided. Theories of “limited nuclear war” and “nuclear de-escalation” are unrealistic.[ix] In 2002 the Bush administration modified US strategic doctrine from a retaliatory role to permit preemptive nuclear attack; in 2010, the Obama administration made only incremental and miniscule changes to this doctrine, leaving it essentially unchanged. Furthermore, Counterforce doctrine – used by both the US and Russian military – emphasizes the need for preemptive strikes once nuclear war begins. Both sides would be under immense pressure to launch a preemptive nuclear first-strike once military hostilities had commenced, especially if nuclear weapons had already been used on the battlefield.

#### Complete elimination is necessary, feasible, and consistent with reforms.

Perkovich and Acton ’09 George Perkovich and James M. Acton. “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons.” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 2009, <https://carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing_nuclear_weapons_debate.pdf>. MBPZ

The debate that this paper seeks to facilitate is about how complete nuclear disarmament could be achieved safely and securely, not whether it should be tried. Some commentators on earlier drafts charged us with minimising the difficulties of nuclear abolition. They suggested that our belief in the desirability of abolition blinded us to its infeasibility. Others have said that we have identified too many obstacles, and that the paper should not be published in case it disappoints those who desire total nuclear disarmament, turning them further against initiatives to prevent proliferation, which they may see as merely advantaging the nucleararmed states. To be clear, we believe that nuclear-weapons states have political and moral obligations to seek to eliminate all nuclear arsenals. These obligations stem from Article VI of the NPT, which specifies that parties should pursue negotiations leading to complete nuclear disarmament,8 the 1995 negotiations over indefinite extension of the treaty, and the basic principle that a nuclear order cannot be maintained and strengthened over time on the basis of inequity. Double standards on matters as materially and psychologically important as nuclear weapons will produce instability and non-compliance, creating enforcement crises that increase the risk of conflict and nuclear anarchy.9 Lawyers, diplomats and military commanders may debate the relevance and precise meaning of Article VI of the NPT. But it is clear that states would not have agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely, as they did in 1995, if the nuclear-weapons states had tried to claim that they were not obliged to pursue nuclear disarmament. In any case, the problem of states resisting strengthened non-proliferation rules because they say they are frustrated by the nuclear-weapons states’ refusal to uphold their side of the NPT bargain must be addressed. More generally, so long as large ready-to-launch nuclear arsenals exist (and especially if more states acquire nuclear weapons), the risk that these weapons will one day be detonated is not negligible. For these reasons, we do not argue why disarmament is desirable, except briefly in the conclusions. None of this, of course, makes nuclear-weapons abolition feasible. Indeed, it is easy to say why it is not. Conversely, it is difficult to show how conditions could be created that would encourage states to make a nuclear-weapons prohibition verifiable and enforceable. This is the challenge that motivates us here. Our specific aims are twofold: first, to identify and explore the challenges to the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, and second, to discuss what states can start doing today to circumvent them. We do not claim to exhaust the range of issues that must be resolved, or to have optimally framed the subjects we do address. If there are places where we appear defeated by obstacles that could be dismissed or better navigated, we welcome other people’s responses. We do want to dispatch one objection at the outset. It is sometimes said that nuclear weapons ‘cannot be disinvented’. We recognise this, but believe that the point is made to deflect careful thinking rather than encourage it. No human creation can be disinvented. Civilization has nevertheless prohibited and dismantled artefacts deemed too dangerous, damaging or morally objectionable to continue living with. Mass-scale gas chambers such as those used by Nazi Germany have not been disinvented, but they are not tolerated. The CFCs (chlorofluorocarbons) that created a hole in the ozone layer cannot be disinvented, but they have been prohibited with great benefit and other means have been found to perform their functions. The issue is rather whether means could exist to verify that a rejected technology—nuclear weapons in this theoretical case—had been dismantled everywhere, and to minimise the risk of cheating. Ultimately, the challenges of verification and enforcement could be so daunting that states would choose not to prohibit and dismantle all nuclear weapons, but the question of ‘disinvention’ should not deter us from this exploration. Some readers may conclude that the difficulties and costs we identify of moving from the last few weapons to zero are so great that we should have focused more on the benefits and relative ease of earlier steps. One commentator on an early draft spoke for several when he said, ’Why don’t you highlight the value of reducing nuclear arsenals to a few tens of nuclear weapons, and posturing them for no-first-use, and treating them as anathema, hidden-in-the-basement weapons of last resort? That world would be much less threatening than today’s, and we shouldn’t let the difficulties of getting to perfect zero keep us from it.’ We agree absolutely that the challenges of getting to zero do not and should not preclude many steps being taken in that direction. Mindful of this admonition, therefore, we address in the first chapter steps that nuclear-armed states could take in cooperation with others towards a world in which tackling the more difficult task of prohibiting nuclear weapons could be envisaged. The remainder of the paper focuses on the more distant prospect of actually prohibiting nuclear weapons. It is tempting to avoid exploring some of the crucial difficulties involved in going to zero by saying, ’problems of enforcement and international politics would naturally be worked out on the way towards zero, or else states would not agree ultimately to create a nuclear-weapon-free world’. We believe this is inadequate. States will not begin to make the changes necessary for abolishing nuclear weapons if there is not a shared sense that the goal is realistic. And states cannot demonstrate their real commitment to this goal if they do not understand and accept the challenge of trying to implement the changes that must be made along the way. Chapter 2 examines some of the greatest verification challenges of going from low numbers of nuclear weapons to zero. Although this chapter does discuss some essentially political questions, such as how good verification would need to be for states to feel enough confidence to eliminate their arsenals, it is largely technical. This cannot be avoided; nuclear abolition is an interdisciplinary problem that requires politicians, diplomats and nongovernmental experts to engage with technical issues. The third chapter explores the implications of nuclear-weapons abolition for the management of the forecast spread of nuclear energy to new markets. The risk of civilian-use fissile materials or expertise being diverted to make nuclear weapons is tolerated today in large part because major powers (and others) retain nuclear weapons that are felt to deter both proliferation and nuclear aggression from states cheating on their non-proliferation obligations. But tolerance of the risks associated with nuclear power would be much lower if all nuclear arsenals were eliminated. On the other hand, the equity of a world in which all states forswore nuclear weapons, and worked actively towards their elimination, could facilitate the establishment and enforcement of more robust rules to ensure that the growing number of states seeking nuclear-energy capabilities used them exclusively for peaceful purposes. Chapter 4 imagines that the political and security conditions had been created to motivate negotiations on prohibiting nuclear weapons worldwide, and explores key practical questions that would need to be resolved for states to have confidence that a prohibition would be enforced effectively. This discussion is necessarily speculative, and is intended to stimulate further international analysis and debate, rather than resolve the complex issues involved. Chapter 5 examines the issue of hedging. Were all nuclear arsenals to be dismantled, the states that had possessed them would still retain know-how and probably some infrastructure that would enable them to reconstitute at least a small number of nuclear weapons rather quickly. This latency might represent an inescapable problem, or a desirable means of deterring or retaliating against cheating, or indeed both. In this chapter we explore some of the pros and cons of ‘virtual’ arsenals and international control of a minimal deterrent, and examine approaches to the management of nuclear-weapons know-how. The conclusions come full circle by responding to the question, ’why bother with nuclear abolition?’. After citing five global security interests that would be served by fully fledged efforts to create a nuclear-weaponsfree world, we suggest that the only way to resolve the ’who goes first?’ problem among nuclear-weapons and non-nuclear-weapons states is to move on both the disarmament and non-proliferation fronts simultaneously. We recognise that governments could be informed and inspired to pursue reciprocating steps if unofficial advance work were done by international experts, a process to which this paper seeks to modestly contribute. The paper ends with an appendix summarising key questions and suggestions that it has outlined.

## Underview

#### [1] Aff gets 1AR theory – It’s key to check neg abuse, no 1AR theory means neg can be infinitely abusive because nothing can stop them, which outweighs because it means aff can’t win. Drop the debater on 1AR theory because the aff can’t split the 2ar between both theory and substance. No neg RVIs since the neg can dump on the shell for 6 minutes and make the 2AR impossible. Competing interpretations because reasonability collapses – you have to win offense to your justification which concedes the validity of the theory. 1AR Theory before neg theory – a) the neg can win their shell in the long 2nr but it’s impossible for the aff to beat the shell back in the 2ar b) key to check back against abusive neg strategies.

#### [2] Fairness is a voter a) all argumentation presupposes fairness – i.e. that the judge won’t hack for either side b) judges cannot evaluate the round properly if it is skewed

#### [3] Permissibility and presumption affirm a) we assume the validity of statements unless given a reason to deny – i.e. if I told you my name was Zach you’d believe me b) if agents had to reflect on every action they take and justify why it was a good one we would never be able to take an action because we would have to justify actions that are morally neutral ie drinking water is not morally right or wrong but if I had to justify my action every time I decided upon a course of action I would never be able to make decisions. C) affirming is harder because the 6-3 skew makes the 2ar impossible so if we come out even it means I did the better job debating so vote aff

# Phil AC

## Framing

#### Existence precedes essence – agents are born into the world without essence. We are responsible for the formation of our own identities since nothing is constitutive to human nature. Sartre.

Sartre, Jean Paule. “Existentialism is a Huminism” SHS ZS

Atheistic existentialism, of which I am a representative, declares with greater consistency that if God does not exist there is at least one being whose **existence comes before** its **essence**, **a being** which **exists before it can be defined by any conception** of it. .... What do we mean by saying that existence precedes essence? We mean that **man first** of all **exists**, encounters himself, surges up in the world – **and defines himself afterwards**. **If man** as the existentialist sees him **is not definable**, **it is because** **to begin** with **he is nothing**. He will not be anything until later, and then **he will be what he makes of himself**. Thus, **there is no human nature**, because there is no God to have a conception of it. **Man simply is**. Not that he is simply what he conceives himself to be, but **he is what he wills**, and as **he conceives himself after already existing** – as **he wills** to be after **that leap towards existence**. **Man** is nothing else but that which he **makes of himself**. That is the first principle of existentialism. And this is what people call its “subjectivity,” using the word as a reproach against us. But what do we mean to say by this, but that man is of a greater dignity than a stone or a table? For we mean to say that man primarily exists – that **man** is, before all else, something which **propels itself towards a future** and is aware that it is doing so. **Man** is, indeed, a project which **possesses a subjective life**, instead of being a kind of moss, or a fungus or a cauliflower. Before that projection of the self nothing exists; not even in the heaven of intelligence: **man will only attain existence when he is what he purposes to be**. Not, however, what he may wish to be. For **what we** usually **understand by wishing** or willing **is a conscious decision** taken – much more often than not – **after we have made ourselves what we are**. I may wish to join a party, to write a book or to marry – but in such a case what is usually called my **will is** probably **a manifestation of** a **prior** and more spontaneous **decision**. If, however, it is true that existence is prior to essence, **man is responsible for what he is**. Thus, the first effect of **existentialism** is that it **puts** every **man in possession of himself** as he is, **and places** the entire **responsibility for** his **existence** squarely **upon his** own **shoulders**. And, when we say that man is responsible for himself, we do not mean that he is responsible only for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men.

#### This lack of essence results in an overburdening of freedom – since we lack identities and are responsible for our every action, we are placed in situations where we are unwillingly forced to choose. Sartre 2.

* Motivation/determinacy good

Sartre, Jean Paule. “Existentialism is a Huminism” SHS ZS

The existentialist, on the contrary, finds it extremely embarrassing that God does not exist, for there disappears with Him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. .... **For** if indeed **existence precedes essence**, **one will never be able to explain** one’s action by reference to a given and specific **human nature**; in other words, **there is no determinism** – **man is free, man is freedom**. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behavior. Thus **we have** neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any **[no] means of justification or excuse**. – We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that **man is condemned to be free**. Condemned, **because he did not create himself**, **yet is nevertheless at liberty**, and from the moment that he is thrown into this world **he is responsible for everything he does**. .... As an example by which you may the better understand this state of abandonment, **I will refer to** the case of **a pupil of mine**, who sought me out in the following circumstances. His father was quarreling with his mother and was also inclined to be a “collaborator”; **his elder brother had been killed in the German offensive** of 1940 and this young man, with a sentiment somewhat primitive but generous, burned to avenge him. **His mother was living alone** with him, deeply afflicted by the semi-treason of his father and by the death of her eldest son, and her one consolation was in this young man. But **he**, at this moment, **had the choice between going to England** to join the Free French Forces **or** of **staying near his mother** and helping her to live. He fully realized that **this woman lived only for him** and that his disappearance – or perhaps **his death** – **would plunge her into despair**. He also realized that, concretely and in fact, **every action he performed on his mother’s behalf would** be sure of effect in the sense of **aid**ing **her to live**, **whereas** anything he did in order to go and **fight would be an ambiguous action** **which might** vanish like water into sand and **serve no purpose**. .... Consequently, **he found himself confronted by two** very different **modes of action**; the **one** **concrete, immediate**, but directed towards only one individual; and **the other** an action **addressed to an end infinitely greater**, a national collectivity, but for that very reason ambiguous – and it might be frustrated on the way. At the same time, **he was hesitating between two kinds of morality**; on the one side the morality of sympathy, of personal devotion and, on the other side, a morality of wider scope but of more debatable validity. **He had to choose** between those two. What could help him to choose? Could the Christian doctrine? No. Christian doctrine says: Act with charity, love your neighbor, deny yourself for others, choose the way which is hardest, and so forth. But which is the harder road? To whom does one owe the more brotherly love, the patriot or the mother? Which is the more useful aim, the general one of fighting in and for the whole community, or the precise aim of helping one particular person to live? Who can give an answer to that a priori? No one. Nor is it given in any ethical scripture. .... **If values are uncertain**, if they are still **too abstract** to determine the particular, concrete case under consideration, **nothing remains but to trust in our instincts.** That is what this young man tried to do; and when I saw him he said, “In the end, it is feeling that counts; the direction in which it is really pushing me is the one I ought to choose. If I feel that I love my mother enough to sacrifice everything else for her – my will to be avenged, all my longings for action and adventure then I stay with her. If, on the contrary, I feel that my love for her is not enough, I go.” But how does one estimate the strength of a feeling? The value of his feeling for his mother was determined precisely by the fact that he was standing by her. I may say that I love a certain friend enough to sacrifice such or such a sum of money for him, but I cannot prove that unless I have done it. I may say, “I love my mother enough to remain with her,” if actually I have remained with her. **I can only estimate the strength of this affection** if I have performed an action by which it is defined and ratified. But if I then appeal to this affection to justify my action, I find myself drawn into a vicious circle.

#### Since we are responsible for our freedom, agents should make choices free of by external authorities – embrace the ability to guide one’s own identity without interference. Thus, the standard and role of the ballot is embracing an ethics of choice. Sartre 3.

* Facticity / a priori truth fails

Sartre, Jean Paule. “Existentialism is a Huminism” SHS ZS

Our point of departure is, indeed, the subjectivity of the individual, and that for strictly philosophic reasons. .... And at the point of departure there cannot be any other truth than this, I think, therefore I am, which is the absolute truth of consciousness as it attains to itself. **Every theory which begins with man**, outside of this moment of self-attainment, **is a theory which** thereby **suppresses the truth**, **for** outside of the Cartesian cogito, all **objects are no more than probable**, and **any doctrine of probabilities which is not attached to a truth will crumble into nothing**. In order to define the probable one must possess the true. **Before there can be any truth** whatever, then, **there must be an absolute truth**, and there is such a truth which is simple, easily attained and within the reach of everybody; i**t consists in one’s immediate sense of one’s self.** In the second place, **this theory alone is compatible with the dignity of man**, **it** is the only one which **does not make man into an object**. All kinds of **materialism lead one to treat every man** including oneself **as an object** – that is, **as a set of pre- determined reactions**, in no way different from the patterns of qualities and phenomena which constitute a table, or a chair or a stone. **Our aim is** precisely **to establish the human kingdom as a pattern of values in distinction from the material world**. .... .... What is **at the very heart** and center **of existentialism**, **is the absolute character of the free commitment**, by which every man realizes himself in realizing a type of humanity – a commitment always understandable, to no matter whom in no matter what epoch – and its bearing upon the relativity of the cultural pattern which may result from such absolute commitment. .... This does not completely refute the charge of subjectivism. Indeed that objection appears in several other forms, of which the first is as follows. People say to us, “Then it does not matter what you do,” and they say this in various ways. .... For, when I confront a real situation – for example, that I am a sexual being, able to have relations with a being of the other sex and able to have children – **I am obliged to choose my attitude to it**, and in every respect **I bear the responsibility of** the **choice** which, in committing myself, also commits the whole of humanity. Even if my **choice is determined by no a priori value** whatever, it can have nothing to do with caprice: .... Rather let us say that the **moral choice is comparable to the construction of a work of art**. It is the same upon the plane of morality. There is this in common between art and morality, that in both **we have to do with creation and invention**. **We cannot decide a priori what** it is that **should be done**. .... In the second place, people say to us, “You are unable to judge others.” This is true in one sense and false in another. It is true in this sense, that **whenever a man chooses his purpose** and his commitment in all clearness and in all sincerity, whatever that purpose may be, **it is impossible for him to prefer another**. .... We can judge, nevertheless, for, as I have said, one chooses in view of others, and in view of others one chooses himself. **One can judge**, first – and perhaps this is not a judgment of value, but it is a logical judgment – that in certain cases **choice is founded upon an error**, and in others upon the truth. One can judge a man by **saying** that **he deceives himself**. Since we have defined the situation of man as one of free choice, without excuse and without help, **any man who takes refuge behind the excuse of his passions**, or by inventing some deterministic doctrine, **is a self-deceiver**. One may object: “But why should he not choose to deceive himself?” I reply that it is not for me to judge him morally, but I define his self-deception as an error. Here one cannot avoid pronouncing a judgment of truth. The self-deception is evidently a falsehood, because it is a dissimulation of man’s complete liberty of commitment. .... The third objection, stated by saying, “You take with one hand what you give with the other,” means, at bottom, “your values are not serious, since you choose them yourselves.” To that I can only say that I am very sorry that it should be so; but if I have excluded God the Father, there must be somebody to invent values. We have to take things as they are. And moreover, **to say that we invent values means** neither more nor less than this; that **there is no sense in life a priori**. **Life is nothing until it is lived**; but it is yours to make sense of, and the value of it is nothing else but the sense that you choose. .... .... **There is no other universe except the human universe**, the universe of **human subjectivity**. This relation of transcendence as constitutive of man (not in the sense that God is transcendent, but in the sense of self-surpassing) with subjectivity (in such a sense that man is not shut up in himself but forever present in a human universe) – it is this that we call existential humanism. This is humanism, because we remind man that there is no legislator but himself; that he himself, thus abandoned, must decide for himself; also because we show that it is not by turning back upon himself, but always by seeking, beyond himself, an aim which is one of liberation or of some particular realization, that man can realize himself as truly human.

#### Impact Calculus: The standard is an ethic of choice. Normative truth is produced through individual choice itself, meaning ethics requires we ought to give agents the ability to peruse ends without others interfering on their value construction.

#### Prefer additionally:

#### [1] Performativity – freedom is constitutive to human subjecthood and any moral theory because the act of adopting an ethical framework presupposes the ability to radically choose.

#### [2] Motivation – people are internally motivated to follow an existentialist theory – which means they will understand the basis behind their actions compared to other transcendent principles. De Beauvoir.

[Simon de Beauvoir. “The Ethics of Ambiguity.” Lyle stuart Inc. 1948. Translated by Bernard Frechtman.] SHS ZS

The first implication of such an attitude is that the **genuine man will not agree to recognize any foreign absolute**. When a **man** projects into an ideal heaven that impossible synthesis of the for-itself and the in-itself that is called God, it is because he wishes the regard of this existing Being to change his existence into being; but **if he agrees** not to be in order t**o exist genuinely, he will abandon the dream of an inhuman objectivity**. He will understand that **it is not a matter of being right in the eyes of a God, but of being right in his own eyes**. Renouncing the thought of seeking the guarantee for his existence outside of himself, **he will** also **refuse to believe in unconditioned values** which would set themselves up athwart his freedom like things. **Va**l**ue is this lacking-being of which freedom makes itself a lack**; and it is because the latter makes itself a lack that **value** appears. It **is desire which creates the desirable**, and the project which sets up the end. **It is human existence which makes values spring up** in the world on the basis of which it win be able to judge the enterprise in which it will be engaged. But first **it locates itself beyond any pessimism**, as beyond any **optimism**, **for** the fact of **its original springing forth is a pure contingency**. **Before existence there is no more reason to exist than not to exist**. **The lack of existence can not be evaluated** since it is the fact on the basis of which all evaluation is defined. It can not be **compared** to anything **for there is nothing** outside of it **to serve as a term of comparison**. **This rejection of** any **extrinsic justification** also **confirm the rejection of an original pessimism** which we posited at the beginning. Since it is unjustifiable from without, to declare from without that it is unjustifiable is not to condemn it. And the truth is that **outside of existence there is nobody**. Man exists. For him it is not a question of wondering whether his presence in the world is useful, whether life is worth the trouble of being lived. These questions make no sense. **It is a matter of knowing whether he wants to live** and **under what conditions.**

#### [3] Culpability – only an existentialist theory ensures agents take responsibility for their own actions since they cannot justify their motives for action upon some external or transcendental basis. De Beauvoir.

[Simon de Beauvoir. “The Ethics of Ambiguity.” Lyle stuart Inc. 1948. Translated by Bernard Frechtman.] SHS ZS

But if man is free to define for himself the conditions of a life which is valid in his own eyes, can he not choose whatever he likes and act however he likes? Dostoevsky asserted, "If God does not exist, everything is permitted." Today's believers use this formula for their own advantage. To re-establish man at the heart of his destiny is, they claim, to repudiate all ethics. However, far from God's absence authorizing all license, the contrary is the case, **because man is abandoned on the earth**, because **his acts are definitive, absolute engagements**. **He bears the responsibility for a world** which is not the work of a strange power, but **of himself, where his defeats are inscribed**, and **his victories as well**. **A God can pardon**, efface, and compensate. **But if God does not exist**, **man's faults are inexpiable**. **If** it is **claimed that**, whatever the case may be, this **earthly stake has no importance**, **this is** precisely **because** **one invokes** that **inhuman objectivity** which we declined at the start. One can not start by saying that our earthly destiny has or has not importance, for it depends upon us to give it importance. **It is up to man to make it important to be a man**, and **he alone can feel** his **success or failure**. And if it is again said that nothing forces him to try to justify his being in this way, then one is playing upon the notion of freedom in a dishonest way. The believer is also free to sin. The divine law is imposed upon him only from the moment he decides to save his soul. In the Christian religion, though one speaks very little about them today, there are also the damned. Thus, on the earthly plane, **a life which does not seek to ground itself will be a pure contingency**. **But it is permitted to** wish to **give itself** a **meaning and a truth**, and it then meets rigorous demands within its own heart.

#### [4] Linguistic inconsistency – it’s impossible to compare competing normative claims since they assume their own legitimacy, meaning it’s impossible to debate between objective frameworks. But, prefer my framing because it is a meta constraint that allows for the freedom to debate between framework to begin with.

Joyce 02 Joyce, Richard. Myth of Morality. Port Chester, NY,x USA: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p 45-47. SHS ZS

This distinction between what is accepted from within an institution, and “stepping out” of that institution and appraising it from an exterior perspective, is close to Carnap’s distinction between internal and external questions. 15 Certain “**linguistic frameworks**” (as Carnap calls them) **bring** with them **new terms and ways of talking**: accepting the language of “things” licenses making assertions like “The shirt is in the cupboard”; accepting mathematics allows one to say “There is a prime number greater than one hundred”; **accepting the language of propositions** permits saying “Chicago is large is a true proposition,” etc. **Internal to the framework in question**, **confirming** or disconfirming **the truth of** these **propositions is** a **trivial** matter. **But** traditionally **philosophers have** **interested themselves in** the external question – the issue of the adequacy of **the framework itself:** “Do objects exist?”, “Does the world exist?”, “Are there numbers?”, “Are the propositions?”, etc. Carnap’s argument is that **the external question[s]**, as it has been **typically** construed, **does not make sense**. **From a perspective that accepts mathematics**, the answer to the question “**Do numbers exist**?” is just trivially “**Yes**.” **From a perspective which has not accepted mathematics**, Carnap thinks, th**e only sensible way of construing the question is** not as a theoretical question, but as a practical one: “**Shall I accept the framework of mathematics?**”, and **this pragmatic question** **is** to be **answered by** consideration of the efficiency, the fruitfulness, the **usefulness,** etc., of the adoption. **But** the (traditional) **philosopher’s questions** – “But is mathematics true?”, “Are there really numbers?” – **are pseudo-questions**. By **turning traditional philosophical questions into** practical questions of the form “**Shall I adopt**...?”, Carnap is offering a noncognitive analysis of metaphysics. Since I am claiming that we can critically inspect morality from an external perspective – that we can ask whether there are any non-institutional reasons accompanying moral injunctions – and that such questioning would not amount to a “Shall we adopt...?” query, Carnap’s position represents a threat. What arguments does Carnap offer to his conclusion? He starts with the example of the “thing language,” which involves reference to objects that exist in time and space. **To step out of** the thing **language and ask** “But **does the world exist?”** **is a mistake**, Carnap thinks, **because the** very **notion of** “**existence” is a term which belongs to the** thing **language**, **and can be understood only** **within that framework**, “hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the system itself.” 16 Moving on to the external question “Do numbers exist?” Carnap cannot use the same argument – he cannot say that “existence” is internal to the number language and thus cannot be applied to the system as a whole. Instead he says that **philosophers** who ask the question do not mean material existence, but **have no clear understanding of what other kind of existence might be involved**, **thus such questions have no cognitive content**. It appears that this is the form of argument which he is willing to generalize to all further cases: **persons who dispute whether propositions exist, whether properties exist**, etc., **do not know what they are arguing over, thus they are not arguing over the truth of a proposition, but3 over the practical value of their respective positions**. Carnap adds that this is so because there is nothing

#### [5] Facticity is dependent on applying external values to determine the validity moral actions, but these values are nonverifiable because they are external to beings and there exists no evaluative metric to determine their authenticity. De Beauvoir.

[Simon de Beauvoir. “The Ethics of Ambiguity.” Lyle stuart Inc. 1948. Translated by Bernard Frechtman.]

The failure described in Being and Nothingness is definitive, but it is also ambiguous. **[Humans]** Man, Sartre tells us, is "a **being[s] who make**s **[themselves]**himself **a lack of being in order that there might be being.**" That means, first of all, that his **passion is not inflicted upon [humans]**him **from without**. He **[They] choose**s **it**. It is his **[One’s] very being and, as such, does not imply the idea of unhappiness**. If this choice is considered as useless, it is because **there exists no absolute value before the passion of [humans]** man, outside of it, **in relation to which one might distinguish the useless from the useful**. **The word "useful" has not** yet **received a meaning on the level of description where Being and Nothingness is situated**. **It can be defined only in the human world established by** **[human’s]** man's **projects and the ends [they]** he **set**s **up**. In the original helplessness from which man surges up, nothing is useful, nothing is useless. It must therefore be understood that **the passion to which [humans have]**man has **acquiesced finds no external justification**. No outside appeal, **no objective necessity permits of its being called useful**. It has no reason to will itself.

#### [6] Transcendental theories fail because we cannot universalize actions without understanding the particular circumstance of every agent. Benhabib.

[Benhabib, Seyla. "The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory." Praxis International. 1986. Pg. 38-60.]

**It is no longer plausible to maintain that** such **a standpoint can[not] universalize adequately**. Kohlberg views the veil of ignorance not only as exemplifying reversibility but universalizability as well. This is the idea that “we must be willing to live with our judgment or decision when we trade places with others in the situation being judged” (Kohlberg, 1981: 197). But the question is, which situation? Can **moral situations [can’t] be individuated independently of our knowledge of the agents involved in these situations, of [and] their histories, attitudes, characters, and desires**? Can I describe a situation as one of arrogance or hurt pride without knowing something about you as a concrete other? Can I know how to distinguish between a breach of confidence and a harmless slip of the tongue, without knowing your history and your character? **Moral situations, like moral emotions and attitudes, can only be individuated if they are evaluated in light of our knowledge of the history of the agents involved in them**. While every procedure of universalizability presupposes that “like cases ought to be treated alike” or that I should act in such a way that I should also be willing that all others in a like situation act like me, **the most difficult aspect of any such procedure is to know what constitutes a “like” situation or what it would mean for another to be exactly in a situation like mine**. Such a process of reasoning, to be at all viable, must involve[s] the viewpoint of the concrete other, for situations, to paraphrase Stanley Cavell, do not come like “envelopes and golden finches,” ready for definition and description, “nor like apples ripe for grading.”29 When we morally disagree, for example, we do not only disagree about the principles involved; very often we disagree because what I see as a lack of generosity on your part you construe as your legitimate right not to do something; we disagree because what you see as jealousy on my part I view as my desire to have more of your attention. **Universalistic moral theory[ies] neglects such everyday, interactional morality and assumes that the public standpoint of justice, and our quasi-public personalities as right-bearing individuals, are the center of moral theory**. Kohlberg emphasizes the dimension of ideal role-taking or taking the viewpoint of the other in moral judgment. Because he defines the other as the generalized other, however, he perpetrates one of the fundamental errors of Kantian moral theory. **Kant’s error was to assume that** I, **as a pure rational agent reasoning for [themself]** myself, could reach a conclusion that would be **acceptable for all at all times and places**.31 In Kantian moral theory, moral agents are like geometricians in different rooms who, reasoning alone for themselves, all arrive at the same solution to a problem. Following Habermas, I want to name this the “monological” model of moral reasoning. Insofar as he interprets ideal role-taking in the light of Rawls’s concept of a “veil of ignorance,” Kohlberg as well sees the silent thought process of a single self who inaginatively puts himself in the position of the other as the most adequate form of moral judgment. I conclude that **a definition of the self that is restricted to the standpoint of the generalized other becomes incoherent and cannot individuate among selves**. Without assuming the standpoint of the concrete other, **no coherent universalizability test can be carried out, for we lack the necessary epistemic information to judge my moral situation to be “like” or “unlike” yours.**

#### [7] Compatibility – All theories are compatible with and concede the validity of existentialism insofar as the choice to follow a theory is a commitment to radical freedom. De Beauvoir.

[Simon de Beauvoir. “The Ethics of Ambiguity.” Lyle stuart Inc. 1948. Translated by Bernard Frechtman.] SHS ZS

**Existence** asserts itself as an absolute which **must seek its justification within itself and not suppress itself**, even though it may be lost by preserving itself. To attain his truth, **man must not** attempt to **dispel the ambiguity of his being but**, on the contrary, **accept** the task of realizing **it**. He rejoins himself only to the extent that he agrees to remain at a distance from himself. This conversion is sharply distinguished from the Stoic conversion in that it does not claim to oppose to the sensible universe a formal freedom which is without content. **To exist genuinely is not to deny** this spontaneous movement of my **transcendence, but only to refuse to lose myself in it**. Existentialist conversion should rather be compared to Husserlian reduction: **let man put his will to be "in parentheses" and he will thereby be brought to the consciousness of his true condition**. And just as phenomenological reduction prevents the errors of dogmatism by suspending all affirmation concerning the mode of reality of the external world, whose flesh and bone presence the reduction does not, however, contest, so **existentialist conversion does not suppress my instincts, desires, plans, and passions. It merely prevents any possibility of failure** by refusing to set up as absolutes the ends toward which my transcendence thrusts itself, and **by considering them in their connection with** the **freedom** which projects them.

#### [8] Fluidity – ethics must begin with the cogito and we cannot attempt to model the human experience, which diminishes radical freedom by starting with the presupposition that there is something constitutive to the human identity.

Gordon 15 [Lewis, Afro-Jewish philosopher, political thinker, educator, and musician, Professor at the University of Connecticut in Philosophy and Africana Studies, European Union Visiting Chair in Philosophy; Nelson Mandela Visiting Professor of Politics and International Studies at Rhodes University, South Africa; and Chairman of the Frantz Fanon awards committees of the Caribbean Philosophical Association, transcribed from <https://youtu.be/UABksVE5BTQ>, presenting and discussing his book “What Fanon Said”] SHS ZS

The first thing to bear in mind you may wonder why in the beginning of the talk I talked about philosophical anthropology. And **many people when they** are trying to **talk about social change** they **never think about what a human being** is and this is something Fanon pays attention to. Many **people want to have closed conceptions of human beings because then human beings can be predicable**. In fact, in fanons writing he gave an example. One of the problems is that when he would walk in reason seems to walk out. One problem we have to bear in mind **when we** try to **look at** the question of **human beings in** terms of rigid **closed systems** is that **we** often **are trying** **to** get as a **model** of how we work as theorists on issues of **social change** that are actually based **on** what we can call law like **generalizations**. Now what is a law like generalization? It is when **you make sure** that **whatever you say has no contradiction down the line**. So if you are to say this much [gestures with hand] the next stage must be consistent with that, and the next stage until you are maximally consistent. Do you get that? But here is the problem – and I can just put it in a nut shell- nobody, **nobody in this room would like** to date, be married to, or **be** **a** best **friend with a maximally consistent person**. You know what that is. Its hell. And this tells you something, because i**f somebody where maximally consistent**, you know what you would say th**at person is not reasonable**. And we have a person here who does work on Hegel that can point out this insight, that **a human being has the ability to evaluate rationality.** Now why is that important? Because you see the mistake many of us make is **many of us want to push the human being** **into that** maximized law like **generalization model**. So when we think about our philosophical anthropology, some people, our question about intersectionality for instance, what some people don’t understand is **nowhere is there ever a human being who is one identity**. People talk about race – **do you ever** really **see a race walking**? You see a racialized man or woman, or transman or transwoman. Do you ever see **a class walking**? Class is embodied in flesh and blood people. And we can go on and on. So if we enrich our philosophical anthropology we begin to notice certain other things. And one of the other things we begin to realize is that we commit a serious problem when we do political work. And the problem is this. The question about Wilderson for instance. There is this discussion going on (and allot of people build it out of my earlier books). **I have a category** I call, as a metaphor, **an antiblack world**. You notice an indefinite article – an anti-black world. The reason I say that is because **the world is different from an anti-black world**. **The project of racism** **is to create a world that would be completely anti-black** or anti-woman. Although that is a project, it is not a fait accompli. **People don’t** seem to **understand how recent this phenomenon** we are talking about **is**. A lot of people talk about race they don’t even know the history of how race is connected into theonaturalism. How, for instance, Andalucia and the pushing out of the Moors. The history of how race connected to Christianity was formed. A lot of people don’t understand – **from the standpoint of a species whose history is 220,000 years old, what the hell is 500 years**? But the one thing that we don’t understand to is **we create a false model for how we study those last 500 years**. **We study** the 500 years **as if the people who have been dominated have not been fighting** and resisting. **Had they not been fighting** and resisting **we wouldn’t be here**. And then we come into this next point because you see the problem in **the formulation of pessimism and optimism is** **they are** both **based on** **forecasted knowledge**, a prior knowledge. B**ut human beings don’t have prior knowledge**. And in fact – what in the world are we if we need to have guarantees for us to act. You know what you call such people? Cowards. The fact of the matter is our ancestors – let’s start with enslaved ancestors. **The enslaved ancestors who were burning down** those **plantations**, who were finding clever ways to **poison their masters**, who were **organizing** meetings for **rebellions**, none of them **had any [no] clue what the future would be 100 years later**. Some had good reason to believe that it may take 1000 years. But you know why **they fought**? **Because they knew it wasn’t for them**. One of the problems we have in the way we think about political issues is we commit what Fanon and others in the existential tradition would call a form of political immaturity. **Political immaturity is saying it is not worth it unless I, me,** individually **get the payoff**. When you are thinking what it is to relate to other generations – remember Fanon said the problem with people in the transition, the pseudo postcolonial bourgeois – is that they miss the point, **you fight for liberation for other generations**. And that is why Fanon said other generations they must have their mission. But you see some people fought and said no I want my piece of the pie. And that means the biggest enemy becomes the other generations. And that is why the postcolonial pseudo-bourgeoisie they are not a bourgeoisie proper because they do not link to the infrastructural development of the future, it is about themselves. And that’s why, for instance, as they live higher up the hog, as they get their mediating, service oriented, racial mediated wealth, the rest of the populations are in misery. **The** very **fact that** **in** many **African countries there are people whose futures have been mortgaged**, the fact that in this country the very example of mortgaging the future of all of you is there. **What happens to people when they have no future**? **It** now colla**pses the concept of maturation** and places people into perpetual childhood. So one of the political things – and this is where a psychiatrist philosopher is crucial – is to ask ourselves what does it mean to take on adult responsibility. And that means to understand that in all **political action it’s not about you**. **It is what you are doing for a world you may not even be able to understand**. Now that becomes tricky, because how do we know this? People have done it before. There were people, for instance, who fought anti-colonial struggles, there are people (and now I am not talking about like thirty or forty years ago, I am talking about the people from day one 17th 18th century all the way through) and **we have no idea what we are doing for the 22nd century.** And this is where developing political insight comes in. Because we commit the error of forgetting the systems we are talking about are human systems. They are not systems in the way we talk about the laws of physics. **A human system can only exist by human actions maintaining them**. Which means every human system is incomplete. Every human being is by definition incomplete. Which means you can go this way or you can go another way. The system isn’t actually closed.

#### [9] The Negative debater must engage solely under the terms of the framing set up by the affirmative and not read a separate framing absent proving a substantive reason they can’t engage. Time Skew – The aff must read six minutes of offence without knowledge of the negative framing structure. If the negative contests the affirmative framing, they attempt moot all the aff. The Neg would have 13 minutes under their framework while I would only have 7. This is key to fairness as it skews our ability to access the ballot. Time skew outweighs all other standards – it’s impossible to come back when I’m structurally disadvantaged by not having enough time to answer arguments. Drop the negative if they violate to deter future abuse, set norms for debate, and they were forewarned.

## Offense

#### Nuclear weapons perpetuate this constant fear of securitization which is antithetical to an existential value construction – rather than pursuing our ability to make choices, nuclear weapons foreclose ourselves from others and cause us to live out of fear of our own choices. Lethbridge 12.

Lethbridge, David. “onstructing Peace by Freedom: Jean-Paul Sartre, Four Short Speeches on the Peace Movement”. rtre Studies International, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2012), pp. 1-18 SHS ZS

At the Vienna Congress itself, held between 12-19 December 1952, Sartre delivered one of the opening addresses.29 The themes expressed were not complex: Sartre was calling for unity among peo- ple who had been divided by suspicion and ignorance, by what he referred to as an "unreality." He began his remarks by noting: "**Cur- rent politics** and ways of thinking **lead us to massacre because they are unreal**. The **world has been cut in half** **and each half** **is afraid of the other**. After this happens **everyone** **acts without knowledge of the wishes and decisions of the person living opposite**: they **make conjec- tures**, they don't believe what he says, **they interpret their actions according to what they think the adversary will do**." **Everyone**, in short, **becomes "the Other,"** an enemy not to be trusted, and "under these circumstances **only one position is possible**, summa- rized by a consummate piece of madness - if you want peace, prepare for war - **the triumph of unreality**." The essential point of the Con- gress, for Sartre, was that it represented a new starting point, a way forward to a world without separation, and therefore without war. In Sartre's view, "just as one can say that unreality leads to conflict, one can say that what is reality unites: because that which is real is the sum of ties that bind men together. And if we but think of the sum of the ties that bind us together, we shall see that our making war would be an utterly imbecile enterprise."30 For Sartre, there was no question of creating a new international body, or of trying to substitute a new organization to replace the United Nations, but to set in motion a resolution, a set of popular demands, that could be effectively communicated with the various governments in the nations from which the delegates had come: **a people's unity was key**. "If there are still people at the UN," Sartre said, "who think that the third world war will be a struggle of Good against Evil, we will tell them they are wrong. The peoples have seen one another, have spoken to one another, have touched one another, and they agree in saying that in every way the war being prepared for them is Evil, that in every way the Peace they are try- ing to make is Good."31 But it was not a matter of pacifism per se , or of peace at any price. "We don't want just any kind of peace, **we don't want peace through terror.** ... or in humiliation, or in servitude." Most especially, **Sartre did not want a false peace under the shadow of the atomic bomb**. When the reactionary press absurdly suggested that every new atomic weapon was "peace on the march," Sartre responded that "our first duty is to go and look for the beautiful word peace in the mud where it has fallen, and then to cleanse it." **Peace** "is a pro- tracted piece of constructing to do on a world scale and one which **demands the collaboration of all the peoples of the world**."32 Most especially, Sartre was opposed to the development of "two blocs" - of capitalist America and the USSR, separated by a gulf of unreality, and crushing Europe between them. He pointed out, accurately, that the economy of the Western European nations depended "daily more and more on the United States," while, on the other hand, in these same nations "the proletariat turns with hope towards the Soviet Union and the Eastern democracies." Sartre was adamant that the nations of Western Europe should remain independent, and could become, and ought to become, a "meeting- place of the currents flowing from capitalist America and the socialist Soviet Union, where these currents must meet and mix. I say that a new taking up or an intensification of the commercial currents between the Eastern democracies and the democracies of Western Europe would be not only a natural thing, but above all would con- tribute to making Europe . . . one of the indispensable links between the Great Powers."33 Sartre recognized that the abolition of nuclear weapons and the establishment of amicable relations between the world's peoples were neither guaranteed nor imminent. The point was - **in the face of** the escalating threat of **atomic war** - to **commit oneself to** the -9- necessary **political struggles to bring about these goals**. "But all of us," Sartre said, "who vote for the final resolution should consider themselves on their return home as mandated by the Congress. The Congress must be our conscious will and it is in the name of that will that we shall go back to our countries with new obligations and new tasks."3

#### Nuclear weapons eliminate life-affirming value as they serve as a constant reminder that that value could one day end instantaneously – deterrence merely ensures infinite moral violations. Mason 17.

[Kelvin Mason, (Independent Researcher) "Ghosts of the Future "Acme Journals. https://acme-journal.org/index.php/acme/article/view/1426/1243. 2017, 16(1): pp. 149-155 DOA:2-2-2020 // NSUSF Recut WHSRS]

This film (https://vimeo.com/182695880) explores the UK’s decision to replace its Trident nuclear weapons system. Due to the ‘alternative format’i , the script and a response to reviewers is printed below. The film’s narration draws upon an **existentialist ethics** to **critique a politics and culture of nuclear weapons, Mutually Assured Destruction and deterrence**. The film was made at an academic seminar intervention at the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Burghfield in Berkshire in June 2016. Thematically linking ‘war’ and (global) ‘warming’, the seminar explored nuclear weapons and energy as, literally, signature technologies of the Anthropocene. A particular phenomenological approach employs close observation and social participation in place as an ‘incandescence’ to illuminate wider geographies and diverse temporalities. Physically inhabiting the AWE space made visible these ‘ghosts’ and highlighted the inextricability of emotion and reason. The film argues that **deterrence is antithetic to the key existentialist tenet of transcendence. Deterrence is immoral** not (only) because it is defined by abominable revenge rather than justice, but **because it shapes an oppressive politics and culture that preclude the attainment of freedom and the acceptance of** a concomitant **personal responsibility. Owning one’s radical freedom and responsibility is Sartre’s definition of ‘authenticity’**, living the truth about ourselves. Keywords Trident; deterrence; existentialism; ethics; place Ghosts of the Future 150 Narrator’s Script Robert Macfarlane observes that, ‘**We** mostly **respond to mass extinction with ‘stuplimity’: the aesthetic experience in which astonishment is united with boredom, such that we overload on anxiety** to the point of outrage-outrage’. He asks: ‘How might a novel or poem possibly account for our authorship of global scale environmental changes across millennia – let alone shape the nature of that change?’ What is the perfect text for the Anthropocene? I prepare for participation in an academic intervention (here) at the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Burghfield near Reading in Berkshire by reading about existentialist ethics and phenomenological research methods. The intervention follows the ‘no war, no warming’ theme of a month of direct action at AWE and we issued a call for participation to people interested in issues around nuclear weapons and climate change. AWE is responsible for the assembly and maintenance of nuclear warheads for the Trident missile system: four nuclear powered Vanguard submarines, Trident D-5 ballistic missiles, and the nuclear warheads. The Anthropocene is the geological age in which human influence on planet Earth is the most significant impact and ‘will leave a long-term signature in the strata record’. The Anthropocene and the nuclear age start simultaneously, and part of this signature will be the global dispersal of artificial radionuclides from the testing and, perhaps, use of nuclear weapons. We are without excuse. In an existentialist view, at least, **our identities are** partly **constituted by how we live the ‘already’ and the ‘not yet’ in our everyday life**. Heidegger dubs this our ‘ekstatic temporality’. Facticity and **transcendence stand as**, respectively, **our ecstatic** past and **future**. While we live in the present, **we are animated by** both the past and, most significantly for **who we can come to know ourselves to be, the possibility of the future;** this is Heidegger’s ‘ek-sistence’. Encountering, a grizzly bear feasting on a caribou carcass, Barry Lopez suggests that, rather than concentrate on the bear, his indigenous travelling companions ‘would focus on that part of the world of which, at this moment, the bear was only a fragment. The bear here might be compared with a bonfire, a kind of incandescence that throws light on everything around it’. Experiencing the event in this way ‘extended the moment of encounter with the bear backwards and forwards in time’. Simone de Beauvoir outlined an existentialist morality: ‘Every time transcendence lapses into immanence, there is a degradation of existence into ‘initself’, of freedom into facticity; this fall is a moral fault if the subject consents to it; if this fall is inflicted on the subject, it takes the form of frustration and ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies, 2017, 16(1): 149-155 151 oppression; in both cases it is an absolute evil.’ We can – we should - transform the way we live every moment, seek freedom from oppression. Angie Zelter, who organised the month of direct action at Burghfield with the network Trident ploughshares, refuses to be confined by facticity. Her every action at AWE is an attempted step into a different future right now. **The more the police try to impose the** order of the moment on her, immanence, the **social order determined by nuclear deterrence and the coercive security which adherence to that doctrine dictates, the more she steps out of line: she tries to push through the police** cordon into AWE; she sits down in the road to block it, **constantly shuffling into a more obstructive position**; she never stops talking to the police explaining the moral fault of Trident, the future it defines, the alternatives it constrains… Jean Paul **Sartre defined ‘authenticity’ as owning one’s radical freedom and responsibility**: it is a matter of living the truth about ourselves. We are without excuse. I am filming a wild rose, trying not to mind whether or not a bee lands on it to feed. I am focussed on holding my own attention, resisting the temptation to flit, to film something else; something ‘happening’. I am acutely aware of my own breathing; aware how impossible it is to hold the camcorder steady, trying to ‘go with’ that. Looking intently through the viewfinder at this one speck of the landscape, I am more aware than I otherwise would be of the soundscape. The rush of cars passing on the road behind me is inescapable; from white noise to cacophonous intrusion. There is birdsong too. Behind me a policeman. I am again contravening bye-laws, filming Ministry of Defence property. I must stop. A bee is feeding on the rose. Each Vanguard submarine is armed with up to 16 missiles each of which can carry at least three warheads. And each warhead has an explosive power eight times that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. That bomb, ‘Little Boy’, devastated an area of five square miles and killed at least 135,000 people. Many others suffered long-term sickness and disability. The U.S. dropped a second nuclear bomb, ‘Fat Man’, on the city of Nagasaki, killing at least another 50,000 people. We are without excuse. One morning, in the impromptu peace camp set up across from the construction gate at AWE, my friend and colleague **Kye tells me she awoke in her tent to the sound of birdsong, which filled her with a life-affirming joy. Then, she realised that she was lying so very close to a place that could obliterate all birdsong forever.** I am still taking that in. **Ghosts of the Future** 152 For a moment, when I am filming, I mistake the distant beep-beep warning of a lorry reversing inside AWE for birdsong. Perhaps some birds imitate lorries in their calls? Perhaps, on some level, the design engineer based the lorry’s alarming sound on the call of birds? Each warhead on a Trident missile could kill more than a million people. And the ‘payload’ of one Vanguard submarine has the potential to kill some fiftythree million people: the entire population of South Africa. The UK always has one armed Vanguard submarine at sea. (Lotte Reimer sings) **All that we have created with our hands And our minds**, for the glory of the world we live in, **Now it can be smashed, in a moment destroyed, Deadly the harvest of two atom bombs**. Then, people of the world, we must watch and take care That the third atom bomb never comes. Exponents of the Trident system claim it is a deterrent. The military theory of deterrence runs that the threat of using powerful weapons against an enemy deters that enemy from attacking you with similar weapons. Applied to nuclear weapons, deterrence translates into a security policy of Mutually Assured Destruction. Exponents of the policy seem to have no problem living with the darkest of ironies, that the acronym for this system is MAD. Professor Rebecca Kay sees **MAD as the ultimate ‘othering’, and questions the moral logic** of deterrence. She asks how, **if ‘we’ were subject to a nuclear attack, ‘it would better to die knowing that ‘our’ bombs were killing those people too’?** How? The moral philosopher Mary Midgely pinpoints the indiscriminate nature of nuclear weapons, likening them to landmines on a vastly greater scale. ‘This feature cannot be sanitised by claiming that their owners are never going to use them. To say nothing of the fact that they have actually once already been used in combat, the mere act of threatening others with an abomination is itself already abominable.’ Ratified by one hundred and sixty two states, the Ottawa Treaty prohibits the production, transfer or use of landmines, committing signatories to their destruction. The UK signed the Ottawa Treaty in 1997. We are without excuse. People are striking the peace camp that has been my home for the past two nights. There is a fire with an ash-clagged and smoke-blackened kettle upon it, tarpaulins strung overhead between trees, a few pop-up tents… I resist the urge to go and help my comrades, as I feel I should. I keep filming. I keep my back to the construction gate of AWE: a wide, heavy-duty, heavy-metal structure with black ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies, 2017, 16(1): 149-155 153 painted bars and close steel mesh. Behind the gate, MoD police with guns and a German Shepherd dog on a leash keep a close watch. In ‘The Castle’ Kafka wrote: ‘All [the authorities] did was to guard the distant and invisible interests of distant and invisible masters.’ We are without excuse. Twenty yards down the road, civilian police are parked, also observing. A police car drives by, perhaps just to make sure all their other colleagues aren’t missing anything sinister. I do not turn the camera on any of them. Across the road, a handful of people, thrown together in their opposition to nuclear weapons or their academic interest in nuclear weapons or in climate or protest or place, continue packing away food, taking down tents, tipping rain water carefully off tarpaulins not to drench the packed-away kit, themselves or each other. Nothing happens. So much is happening. On 14th March 2016, the House of Commons voted by 409 to 161 to retain a strategic nuclear deterrent beyond the life of the current system. A vote on renewing the Trident weapons programme specifically is scheduled for 18th July 2016. If that vote carries, as seems certain, Vanguard submarines will be replaced and the life of Trident missiles extended. AWE is poised to play a major role when the warheads themselves need to be refurbished or replaced. According to the government’s estimate, Vanguard replacement will cost £31 billion. This figure does not include an extra £10bn that the MoD has put aside as contingency for an anticipated overspend. Trident’s opponents estimate the cost very significantly higher. Updating a 2014 estimate by the independent Trident Commission, in 2015 international news agency Reuters put the cost at £167bn. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) calculates the cost as high as £205bn. This sum could, CND claim, ‘improve the NHS by building 120 state of the art hospitals and employing 150,000 new nurses, build 3 million affordable homes, install solar panels in every home in the UK or pay the tuition fees for 8 million students.’ The UK is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament. On 19th July, the House of Commons parliament in Westminster voted to replace Britain’s Trident nuclear weapons system by 472 votes to 117. In the debate, George Kerevan, Scottish National Party Member of Parliament for East Lothian, asked Theresa May, the Prime Minister, ‘Is she personally prepared to authorise a nuclear strike that could kill one hundred thousand men, women and children?’ Previous Prime Ministers have avoided answering this question. With no hesitation, though, Theresa May answered, ‘Yes.’ She then added, ‘The whole point of a deterrent is that our enemies need to know that we would be prepared to use it.’ Ghosts of the Future 154 We are without excuse. In the peace camp a woman from Scotland, Cat, paints a series of watercolour landscapes of AWE. I ask, and she kindly gives me one of the paintings. It shows the heavy, dark metal construction gate, the No Trident signs that protesters have installed. And a bird. To our academic seminar, held in front of the construction gate to AWE, Kye brings red paper-chain people. They are an audience to represent absence: the ghosts of the future that the use of Trident might create, particularly our academic colleagues from the past and especially those from the future who are not here, or who may not be able to be here; and our colleagues in the present who are also absent, also ghosts. We weave the paper-chain people between the mesh of the construction gate. With their dog and their guns, the two MoD police officers come to warn us that this action infringes a by-law and that we must take the figures down immediately or face arrest. They are paper figures four inches tall. We argue. And - after a stand-off - one of the police officer concedes that the figures can stay in the fence for five minutes. The quality of that short time is immense. Seminar participants are suffused by emotion. The police decision seems at once rational and compassionate. We note that these are not separate mechanisms. Existentialism acknowledges time as binding: it cannot be escaped. However, it further holds, that time is lived and should be measured qualitatively. So, if we can’t change time, we can transform the way we live every moment. Because Kye’s paper-chain people are prohibited from staying on the real construction gate, I rescue some of them and add them into Cat’s picture of the gate. The ghosts have a home. But they are not at peace. …. you and your children matter. I hope your love will teach the nations that emit the most carbon and violence that they should, instead, remit the most compassion. I hope, soon Presenting in the seminar, Phil stresses how nuclear deterrence is compelled to go hand in glove with secrecy and security; how it is incommensurable with transparency and freedom; how it is undemocratic. **Inherent in deterrence is a pessimistic view of human nature that restricts us from developing a future of nobler virtue**: of trust and empathy not suspicion; of justice rather revenge; of nonviolence, of openness in place of threat; welcome and inclusion instead of othering, of care and compassion beyond fear.

#### The atomic bomb is even worse for oppressed nations – it forces them into Western modes of thinking and leaves them unable to achieve their own value construction. Lethbridge 2.

Lethbridge, David. “onstructing Peace by Freedom: Jean-Paul Sartre, Four Short Speeches on the Peace Movement”. rtre Studies International, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2012), pp. 1-18 SHS ZS

But **the atomic bomb was the weapon of choice for the West** since its threatened use was **aimed precisely at the colonized nations strug- gling for independence**. "The people's army has found its exact counterpart in the nuclear weapon; **the people's army and the atom bomb are the two opposed characteristics** of our time." The atom bomb was a weapon to be launched by the ruling circles of the West, who no longer required a mass army, against a defensive people's army that had no greater strength than the support of its own peo- ple. "**The atom bomb is the only weapon suitable for oppressive minorities**. Without it their task would be impossible. Their task is the maintenance of abstract barriers between the nations and between people inside each country, and to govern against the necessities of history and political economy." But **the West was in the process of losing its control over Vietnam** and other colonized nations. There- fore, for the West, "**there remains** but **one way out - the atom bomb**. The atom bomb is a weapon against history Despite the evident reality that nuclear war would mean an utter catastrophe that would "wipe out the whole of humanity," **its poten- tial use was an attempt to blackmail the entire human race**. "In order to stop the world turning **they are threatening to suppress history by liquidating those who make history**. It is all they can do: wipe out man in case he changes. **The bomb is in itself** the basis and the sum total of a policy completely **hostile to the true development of humanity** . . . Because the atom bomb wishes to fly in the face of his- tory, **it risks falling out of history altogether**."42 Middle East;49 alert South Asia to the lessons of stability;50 and erode the barriers to technology transfers that would enhance deterre

#### Nuclear weapons have an inherently negative view of humanity – rather than assuming the subject will improve and be good, it assumes the worst – that we will go to war and need the weapons to defend ourselves. Woods 19

Woods, Matthew. “Reflections on Nuclear Optimism: Waltz, Burke and Proliferation”. Cambridge University Press. SHS ZS

Since analogical reasoning yields proliferation optimism it is the best method of critical inquiry, as it gives optimism the advantage in the debate. Waltz explains the puzzle of a stable international order by drawing a parallel between the acts of self interest by states and the acts of self-interest by economic units that yield a stable market order.8 Egoism under anarchy creates order. And just as the known consequences of a price war work with the widespread ability to initiate one to generate uniform restraint among competitors, or market stability, **the known consequences of nuclear use will combine with** widespread **nuclear proliferation to induce** nuclear stability, or nuclear **peace**. Waltz uses the resemblance between international and economic structure to defend proliferation optimism. Yet **the similarity between this ideal nuclear world and another ideal society** ultimately **exposes the pessimism within proliferation optimism**. It is the society Burke defends in his Reflections on the Revolution in France.9 This article uses Burkean conservatism as Waltz uses microeconomic theory: as a lens to view and understand a puzzling international order, a stable world of nuclear-armed states. It follows Waltz?methodologically?to argue that since **the operation of this ideal nuclear world resembles Burke's ideal conservative society**, that optimism must share the first principles and consequences of conservatism, as well.10 Scholars of political theory generally agree that **conservatism emanates from a view of human nature as irremediably flawed**.11 **This belief** motivates and anchors the defining elements of conservatism and, in parallel, ultimately **reproduces its pessimism within proliferation optimism**. In sum, this article claims, **working proliferation optimism contains an unheralded view of human nature that renders i pessimistic about the wide spread of nuclear weapons.**12 And when optimism is pessimism, optimism is no longer a viable theoretical or practical choice. Burke and international theory Burke appears infrequently in international studies, and those who join the two tend to seek Burke's view of international relations rather than how his work influences international theory.13 Vincent maintains that since Burke does not compartmentalize social relations (all human relations exist as dimensions within the one moral domain that flows from God) he believes that a broad and unified world society?similar to medieval Christendom?envelops international relations just as local society embeds personal relations.14 And just as local leaders execute the duties society imposes upon them, Burke argues, international relations amount to sovereign states yielding to and abiding by the defensive imperatives, as duties, which a unified, global social order generates. Burke concludes, Vincent writes, that to defend the prevailing order, world society obliges England to intervene in the French Revolution. Boucher complements this analysis with the claim that Burke typifies the approach to international relations Boucher labels 'historical reason': grounding interest and right, as the criteria for state behaviour, in the 'common historical experience of the European nations'.15 But while Boucher uses Burke to illustrate the need for and usefulness of another category of international theory, and Vincent substitutes modernity for religion to indicate how his views on prescriptive institutions can illuminate the current state system, neither asks directly?as scholars examine the influence of, say, Hobbes or Kant?how Burke informs current international theory. Harle addresses this issue and claims that Burke is a prime source of dualism within international theory, especially in the formation of Cold War enemy images.16 Yet recalling that dualism originates with the distinction between appearance and reality (not to mention mind and body, Persian Manicheism, and so on) suggests that dualism within international theory has roots much deeper than Burke.17 Thus using Burke to understand Waltz and proliferation optimism has a secondary effect: it draws together efforts to join Burke and international relations. Using conservatism, Burke's seminal contribution to political thought (domestic and international, Vincent argues), rather than dualism, as an interpretive lens accomp lishes the principal task of illuminating proliferation optimism which, in turn, ultimately indicates the way Burke influences a version of current international theory, namely neorealism. The article contains three additional sections. The next section unfolds in greater detail the claims about proliferation optimism. The following section develops the conservative lens, and the final section applies that lens to proliferation optimism to reveal via analogy its pessimism. This article then provides a brief conclusion. The spread of optimism Convinced the spread of nuclear weapons yields nuclear peace, supporters depict our ordinary aversion to proliferation as the ultimate source of nuclear violence. Restricting wide access to nuclear arms ensures their eventual use, in this view. As a result, scholars work at two tasks over the decades: explaining the basic reasoning behind optimism and ensuring that optimism materializes by rendering the spread of nuclear weapons inevitable among normal states. It is the latter task that most troubles early optimism. Optimism appears in four waves. It arises in Europe during the 1950s as a response to Europe's perceived vulnerability to Soviet aggression and its unsettled post-war relationship with America. Gallois says the destructiveness of nuclear weapons transforms states and alters both immediate and extended deterrence.18 Existing under the prospect of annihilation gives self-interested states a reason to constrain their activity and a universal standard against which to assess the rationality of their behaviour. This transformation enhances immediate deterrence by rendering threats to retaliate with nuclear arms at once more credible and less susceptible to misinterpretation.19 Gallois writes that when: 'the evaluation of the risks to be taken is made by leaders who have all learned to calculate according to the same measuring system [nuclear annihilation], a major error of interpretation is less and less plausible and ... the dangers inherent in the policy of dissuasion grow less and less likely.'20 On principle, nuclear-rational states are secure from attack. Yet the inspiration for this argument also leads Gallois to view the extended deterrent threats and collective security arrangements meant to protect non-n allies in a nuclear world as unworkable.21 When the risk of nuclear war confronts states motivated by self-interest and survival, nuclear retaliation for attacks upon others is untenable. Moreover, this reasoning undermines even the uncontroversial commitments accorded allies by denuding the notion of 'limited nuclear war' and bolstering the threat of 'escalation'.22 There is only one solution to this problem, contends Gallois, the intentional proliferation of nuclear weapons. Proliferation has several benefits. First, it makes nuclear war virtually impossible as it provides every recipient with inviolable deterrence. Second, it obviates the need for expensive diplomatic actions meant to bolster suspect alliance commitments. And third, since it renders nuclear-armed states neutral and impotent, proliferation enables all states to pursue their vast economic interests: it contributes to the global economy.23 Yet Gallois ultimately tempers his optimism in two ways. First, since only enlightened states will learn these lessons, he warns, a 'double-check' control system must accompany all proliferation. This system allows America to prevent the untoward use of nuclear weapons but provides states with enough nuclear autonomy to reinforce their immediate deterrence. With this qualification, however, Gallois concedes that certain states will never be transformed by nuclear weapons and that those which are will likely revert to non-rational behaviour. Second, even this modification in control is insufficient for Gallois because the contradictions inherent in liberal democracies render the transition to conscientious proliferation virtually impossible to perform. In this vein, Gallois claims public education, the mass media and excessive leisure time work in concert within democratic society to create the only serious threat to state security: an emotional, partially informed populace which refuses to cede total control of security issues to an omnipotent, rational elite. He laments: 'It is not easy to explain that peace is all the more solid when, on either side, the weapons of retaliation are more numerous, feared, and in readiness. And also that the limitation of these weapons would be more dangerous than their proliferation. No one subscribes to such arguments willingly, though they unfortunately correspond to the realities of our age.'24 In turn, 'democratic governments find it difficult to justify their actions, and the people are no more apt to grasp the numerous implications of the nuclear fact. Actually, the more enlightened public opinion seems, the more it burdens its governments and the less the latter are free to act and to exploit their specialists' achievements.'25 The obstacles to optimism and nuclear peace, Gallois avers, are pluralism and unenlightened states. Gallois devises optimism when he discerns and expresses its main claim: nuclear arms breed rationality, deterrence and peace. Yet other assertions hinder this view. Gallois denies universal rationality in two ways. First, Gallois depicts the world as comprised of differently enlightened states, with only some able to absorb the imperatives of proliferation. Second, he claims emotionalism prevails in pluralist democracies and, by extension, in all representative leaders. Finally, Gallois pre cludes the assumption of widespread proliferation by identifying proliferation as an avoidable phenomenon via his denunciation of effective public opinion-inspired efforts to halt it. Put another way, he lessens the likelihood of peace-via-proliferation since his critique advertises proliferation as a thing that remains vulnerable to prevention or reversal by an emotional yet influential populace. In the end, Gallois regards proliferation as subservient to the whims and anxieties of the public; and without inevitability, proliferation will remain partial and thus dangerous. Gallois delineates optimism but gives it little chance of success. Gallois identifies both the unique claim and enduring problems of optimism: namely, non-rationality among so-called uncivilized states and imperfect or non existent proliferation as the result of popular sentiment and its enervating effect on elites. In this sense, Gallois serves as a source of inspiration to and as an impetus for refinement among the subsequent waves of proliferation optimism. The second wave appears in the 1970s when events, such as America's retrenchment via the Nixon Doctrine, the international oil crisis, revitalized non-proliferation efforts and France and China's (and India's) ascension to nuclear or near-nuclear status, encouraged scholars to revisit and refurbish the claims made by Gallois. While the second wave tackles vigorously the twin problems within Gallois's work, it eventually returns to the same general outlook. Regarding uncivilized states, the second wave embraces brazenly the transform ative potential of nuclear weapons which bolsters the notions of universal rationality and inviolable deterrence. In this sense, the second wave expands the parameters of rationality to such an extent that it envelops even national leaders popularly reviled as borderline psychotics. 'The world may be shocked by the actions of Amin and el Qaddafi, and even of the Black Septembers and other Palestinian terrorists', Clark observes, 'but their actions pale when compared with the murders, death camps, and unbelievable horrors of Joseph Stalin. Still, even Stalin resisted the temptation to use nuclear weapons once acquired.'26 The second wave asserts that nuclear arms induce stabilizing rationality in all states, irrespective of the irrationality or instability of national leaders. In two ways, **the second wave casts proliferation as autonomous** by removing it from the realm of things under human control and placing it within the realm of things governed by universal laws. First, **it presents the spread of nuclear weapons as inevitable** by declaring that scientific knowledge, rather than political decisions, determines proliferation. Wentz writes in this manner: 'the natural evolution of [Canada's] military establishment will likely see atomic arms by the early 1970s ... [and] developments could hasten this process considerably.'27 Next, the second wav **argues that** objective, empirical evidence proves that **proliferation is neither preventable nor dangerous.** Essentially, these scholars invoke the peaceful nuclear experiences of France and China and then defy critics to disavow their own faith (as students of world politics) in the lessons and tides of history. As LeFever comments: 'Looking to the future, the burden of proof certainly rests with those who would argue that additional national nuclear arsenals would be good for local and world stability. But an equal burden of proof rests upon those who maintain as most spokesmen in the arms control community seem to?that all further acquisitions anywhere and in all circumstances are equally dangerous.'28 **The second wave** performs two moves: it **reinforces** the tenet of **universal ration ality** by including states Gallois shuns, **and it preserves the autonomy of prolifer ation** by situating it within the domain of immutable laws. Three conclusions rest on these moves. First**, nuclear proliferation makes the ideal of world security realizable**. Sandoval writes: 'With the defense of its borders entrusted to forces structured around the firepower of nuclear weapons, **any nation not now a nuclear power** and not harboring ambitions for territorial aggrandizement, **could walk like a porcupine through the forests of international affairs:** no threat to its neighbors, and too prickly to swallow.'29 Second, consequently, nations will reject additional arms control until it is achieved.30 Reducing the number of nuclear arms requires their initial proliferation, in this view. And third, since war continues only in those areas without nuclear arms, non-proliferation endeavors are more than merely wasteful, ineffective and a hindrance to national security?they are immoral. Although I don't exactly love the H-bomb', Baker writes in this spirit, 'it comes close to my idea of what a bomb should be ... In the more than 25 years since it became popular, it has never been used against anybody. A person could get fond of a bomb like that.'31 Aspirations aside, the second wave realizes the same practical conclusion as Gallois. As ordinary persons are unable to become even a bit fond of the bomb, the world remains a dangerous place. 'Humanity sees in it only a scourge', Gallois says, 'projecting its memories of great wars of the past into an avalanche of atomic missiles and contemplating a future of horrors'.32 Sandoval echoes this view: 'The principle obstacle appears to be the emotionalism, a legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that has blocked recognition of the nuclear weapon as the dominant force on the battlefield and sees it only as an agency of indiscriminate destruction'.33 And LeFever adds: 'The stubborn problems of "nuclear proliferation" are made less tractable by Countervailing assumptions cause the initial two waves to qualify their optimism, not abandon it. The assumption of rationality receives a boost when Amin is included, but falters when emotionalism is cast as the obstacle to proliferation. Similarly, the assertion that science and history engender proliferation, rather than corruptible elite choices, suffers when popular hysteria is held to account for successful efforts to halt it. Facing this situation, the third wave strives to eliminate every source of resistance on the notions of rationality, proliferation and optimism. It invokes the logic of the structure of anarchy to complement the arguments about universal rationality, and adopts a refined view of history to diminish the effect of popular sentiment on the security elite. In the end, the third wave aims to severe completely its links to Gallois. Waltz establishes the third wave with two arguments. His initial claim has three sub-claims.35 One, Waltz contends the organizing principle of international politics is anarchy. The anarchic structure means that states exist in a self-help environment where each state?succumbing to the structure's mechanism (the dual impulse to compete and socialize) and the imperative to survive?is compelled to perform the same task: provide for its own security. Despite this uniform obligation, actual success varies with a unit's relative position within the distribution of power that overlays the international system. Units respond to opportunities to improve their placement (as security) within the system, which means conflict is both natural and to be shunned, whenever possible, due to the dual need to survive and maintain a strong relative position.36 Consequently, a bipolar distribution of power is the most stable for two reasons. First, bipolarity is simple and simplicity breeds the clear vision that eliminates miscalculations about rivals and opportunities that may lead to conflict. Second, because hegemons balance internally, a bipolar distribution is rigid which reduces the opportunity for and significance of any unit manoeuvering.37 Armed with the structure of anarchy and the lens of 'unit tasks', Waltz recon stitutes the world of diverse states into a stable, bipolar universe of like-behaving, like-built units. With his next sub-claim, Waltz seizes upon the transformative effect of nuclear weapons to amplify the global stability he manufactures in his first sub claim. Two, unlike anything else, Waltz observes, nuclear weapons alter world politics and with it the manner in which states reason about their behaviour. With an combativeness, incites caution, induces rationality and elevates the dampening power of uncertainty in a nuclear relationship.38 Waltz uses this analysis to develop two essential points. First, the fear-based reasoning that renders immediate deter rence inviolable has also worked for extended deterrence, despite its earlier abandonment.39 Rescuing extended deterrence allows Waltz to showcase the transformative effect nuclear weapons have on state reasoning, as well as to contend that a proliferated world will be protected by a thick, double-layer of working deterrence. Second, Waltz applies this thesis to devise several reasons why even so called rogue states will learn these lessons at least as well as did the current nuclear powers. Aware that victory is impossible, he writes, radical states have reason to restrain both their actions and their incendiary rhetoric. Moreover, while states must protect their vital interests, in the nuclear world territory is no longer an essential security interest. Next, since effective fear requires only a rudimentary nuclear capability, states can and should avoid arms races and forgo expensive command and control systems. Finally, should something go awry, nuclear-armed states are predisposed toward de-escalatory behaviour.40 In short, nuclear arms evoke a transformation among state/units that intensifies the clarity and stability inspired by the original structure of anarchy.41 Three, Waltz deems proliferation a product of the system. Just as prices both align and stabilise as profit-driven businesses react alike to the incentives of the market, proliferation materialises as the unintended effect of units providing for their own security. Presenting proliferation as both inevitable and unintentional allows Waltz to do more than depict a world of nuclear states as something that cannot be avoided and so should be embraced quietly?it also allows him to exempt stable nuclear proliferation from the traditional realist critique that, as a product of human design, universal proliferation amounts to an imperfect institution that will inevitably collapse into nuclear holocaust.42 Waltz uses both structure and fear t resituate and fortify the universal elements of optimism (rationality) as well as deflate claims premised upon prejudiced views of human society (uncivilised states). The remaining issue is that with sufficient reason and resources a hegemon can thwart, temporarily, the incentives of anarchy and thus prevent proliferation. Waltz addresses the problem of corrupted elites in his second main argument. Waltz depicts hegemonic non-proliferation as the product of elites that, ignorant of the workings of history and society, are motivated more by spectacle than insight.43 The third wave responds to such behaviour in three ways. First, the motivating concern that arms races will be repeated in the future?only with radical states at the helm?relies improperly upon objects as the basis for prediction when it should look to conditions. The past presages the future only when conditions are the same. And new nuclear states operate in novel conditions because the premier nuclear states worked through all the difficulties, thereby altering the nuclear world. The one condition that remains as it was in the past is the fear generated by nuclear weapons. Consequently, the restraint associated with that condition may be expected to characterise the future, too, Waltz argues.44 Second, previous rational behaviour during periods of extreme, but non-nuclear, duress presages future rational action since one 'cannot expect countries to risk more in the presence of nuclear weapons than they did in their absence'.45 The third wave invokes Israel as evidence for the claim that small, vulnerable (even messianic) states will behave rationally when armed with nuclear weapons. State character does not justify non-proliferation. And third, elites motivated by popular sentiment overdraw the public's rare capacity to incite change through activism and ignore its determinative ability to absorb radical change. Joffe describes the failed European anti-nuclear campaign when he writes: Though seemingly the very epitome of brooding terror, nuclear weapons apparently do not terrorise enough to rouse the populace from its habitual lassitude in matters of defence and security policy ... Once nuclear weapons are psychologically absorbed, once they are hidden in remote silos or isolated bases, they become "good", that is, non-oppressive weapons.'46 The third wave counsels elites to trust themselves in the execution of their duties and allow the public sufficient time to adjust to distasteful but necessary events. The third wave relies upon two assertions. One, **the structure of anarchy combines with the character of nuclear weapons to induce** both uniform rational restraint among like-behaving units and the unintentional and so **unqualified spread of nuclear arms**. Two, while potentially corrosive popular sentiment is present, the nature of history, rationality and society means that public opinion can and should be disregarded. Leaders must rely upon their own clear-sighted wisdom. While the third wave clearly revolves around Waltz it spawned numerous studies that maintain that **the spread of nuclear weapons or capability47 will: re-establish rigidity in a dangerously fluid Europe;4**8 inspire a smothering fear in the

## Underview

#### [1] Aff gets 1AR theory – It’s key to check neg abuse, no 1AR theory means neg can be infinitely abusive because nothing can stop them, which outweighs because it means aff can’t win. Drop the debater on 1AR theory because the aff can’t split the 2ar between both theory and substance. No neg RVIs since the neg can dump on the shell for 6 minutes and make the 2AR impossible. Competing interpretations because reasonability collapses – you have to win offense to your justification which concedes the validity of the theory. 1AR Theory before neg theory – a) the neg can win their shell in the long 2nr but it’s impossible for the aff to beat the shell back in the 2ar b) key to check back against abusive neg strategies.

#### **[2] Fairness is a voter a) all argumentation presupposes fairness – i.e. that the judge won’t hack for either side b) judges cannot evaluate the round properly if it is skewed**

#### [3] Permissibility and presumption affirm a) we assume the validity of statements unless given a reason to deny – i.e. if I told you my name was Zach you’d believe me b) if agents had to reflect on every action they take and justify why it was a good one we would never be able to take an action because we would have to justify actions that are morally neutral ie drinking water is not morally right or wrong but if I had to justify my action every time I decided upon a course of action I would never be able to make decisions. C) affirming is harder because the 6-3 skew makes the 2ar impossible so if we come out even it means I did the better job debating so vote aff

# Critical AC

## Framing

#### Existence precedes essence – agents are born into the world without essence. We are responsible for the formation of our own identities since nothing is constitutive to human nature. Sartre.

Sartre, Jean Paule. “Existentialism is a Huminism” SHS ZS

Atheistic existentialism, of which I am a representative, declares with greater consistency that if God does not exist there is at least one being whose **existence comes before** its **essence**, **a being** which **exists before it can be defined by any conception** of it. .... What do we mean by saying that existence precedes essence? We mean that **man first** of all **exists**, encounters himself, surges up in the world – **and defines himself afterwards**. **If man** as the existentialist sees him **is not definable**, **it is because** **to begin** with **he is nothing**. He will not be anything until later, and then **he will be what he makes of himself**. Thus, **there is no human nature**, because there is no God to have a conception of it. **Man simply is**. Not that he is simply what he conceives himself to be, but **he is what he wills**, and as **he conceives himself after already existing** – as **he wills** to be after **that leap towards existence**. **Man** is nothing else but that which he **makes of himself**. That is the first principle of existentialism. And this is what people call its “subjectivity,” using the word as a reproach against us. But what do we mean to say by this, but that man is of a greater dignity than a stone or a table? For we mean to say that man primarily exists – that **man** is, before all else, something which **propels itself towards a future** and is aware that it is doing so. **Man** is, indeed, a project which **possesses a subjective life**, instead of being a kind of moss, or a fungus or a cauliflower. Before that projection of the self nothing exists; not even in the heaven of intelligence: **man will only attain existence when he is what he purposes to be**. Not, however, what he may wish to be. For **what we** usually **understand by wishing** or willing **is a conscious decision** taken – much more often than not – **after we have made ourselves what we are**. I may wish to join a party, to write a book or to marry – but in such a case what is usually called my **will is** probably **a manifestation of** a **prior** and more spontaneous **decision**. If, however, it is true that existence is prior to essence, **man is responsible for what he is**. Thus, the first effect of **existentialism** is that it **puts** every **man in possession of himself** as he is, **and places** the entire **responsibility for** his **existence** squarely **upon his** own **shoulders**. And, when we say that man is responsible for himself, we do not mean that he is responsible only for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men.

#### This lack of essence results in an overburdening of freedom – since we lack identities and are responsible for our every action, we are placed in situations where we are unwillingly forced to choose. Sartre 2.

* Motivation/determinacy good

Sartre, Jean Paule. “Existentialism is a Huminism” SHS ZS

The existentialist, on the contrary, finds it extremely embarrassing that God does not exist, for there disappears with Him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. .... **For** if indeed **existence precedes essence**, **one will never be able to explain** one’s action by reference to a given and specific **human nature**; in other words, **there is no determinism** – **man is free, man is freedom**. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behavior. Thus **we have** neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any **[no] means of justification or excuse**. – We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that **man is condemned to be free**. Condemned, **because he did not create himself**, **yet is nevertheless at liberty**, and from the moment that he is thrown into this world **he is responsible for everything he does**. .... As an example by which you may the better understand this state of abandonment, **I will refer to** the case of **a pupil of mine**, who sought me out in the following circumstances. His father was quarreling with his mother and was also inclined to be a “collaborator”; **his elder brother had been killed in the German offensive** of 1940 and this young man, with a sentiment somewhat primitive but generous, burned to avenge him. **His mother was living alone** with him, deeply afflicted by the semi-treason of his father and by the death of her eldest son, and her one consolation was in this young man. But **he**, at this moment, **had the choice between going to England** to join the Free French Forces **or** of **staying near his mother** and helping her to live. He fully realized that **this woman lived only for him** and that his disappearance – or perhaps **his death** – **would plunge her into despair**. He also realized that, concretely and in fact, **every action he performed on his mother’s behalf would** be sure of effect in the sense of **aid**ing **her to live**, **whereas** anything he did in order to go and **fight would be an ambiguous action** **which might** vanish like water into sand and **serve no purpose**. .... Consequently, **he found himself confronted by two** very different **modes of action**; the **one** **concrete, immediate**, but directed towards only one individual; and **the other** an action **addressed to an end infinitely greater**, a national collectivity, but for that very reason ambiguous – and it might be frustrated on the way. At the same time, **he was hesitating between two kinds of morality**; on the one side the morality of sympathy, of personal devotion and, on the other side, a morality of wider scope but of more debatable validity. **He had to choose** between those two. What could help him to choose? Could the Christian doctrine? No. Christian doctrine says: Act with charity, love your neighbor, deny yourself for others, choose the way which is hardest, and so forth. But which is the harder road? To whom does one owe the more brotherly love, the patriot or the mother? Which is the more useful aim, the general one of fighting in and for the whole community, or the precise aim of helping one particular person to live? Who can give an answer to that a priori? No one. Nor is it given in any ethical scripture. .... **If values are uncertain**, if they are still **too abstract** to determine the particular, concrete case under consideration, **nothing remains but to trust in our instincts.** That is what this young man tried to do; and when I saw him he said, “In the end, it is feeling that counts; the direction in which it is really pushing me is the one I ought to choose. If I feel that I love my mother enough to sacrifice everything else for her – my will to be avenged, all my longings for action and adventure then I stay with her. If, on the contrary, I feel that my love for her is not enough, I go.” But how does one estimate the strength of a feeling? The value of his feeling for his mother was determined precisely by the fact that he was standing by her. I may say that I love a certain friend enough to sacrifice such or such a sum of money for him, but I cannot prove that unless I have done it. I may say, “I love my mother enough to remain with her,” if actually I have remained with her. **I can only estimate the strength of this affection** if I have performed an action by which it is defined and ratified. But if I then appeal to this affection to justify my action, I find myself drawn into a vicious circle.

#### Since we are responsible for our freedom, agents should make choices free of by external authorities – embrace the ability to guide one’s own identity without interference. Thus, the standard and role of the ballot is embracing an ethics of choice. Sartre 3.

* Facticity / a priori truth fails

Sartre, Jean Paule. “Existentialism is a Huminism” SHS ZS

Our point of departure is, indeed, the subjectivity of the individual, and that for strictly philosophic reasons. .... And at the point of departure there cannot be any other truth than this, I think, therefore I am, which is the absolute truth of consciousness as it attains to itself. **Every theory which begins with man**, outside of this moment of self-attainment, **is a theory which** thereby **suppresses the truth**, **for** outside of the Cartesian cogito, all **objects are no more than probable**, and **any doctrine of probabilities which is not attached to a truth will crumble into nothing**. In order to define the probable one must possess the true. **Before there can be any truth** whatever, then, **there must be an absolute truth**, and there is such a truth which is simple, easily attained and within the reach of everybody; i**t consists in one’s immediate sense of one’s self.** In the second place, **this theory alone is compatible with the dignity of man**, **it** is the only one which **does not make man into an object**. All kinds of **materialism lead one to treat every man** including oneself **as an object** – that is, **as a set of pre- determined reactions**, in no way different from the patterns of qualities and phenomena which constitute a table, or a chair or a stone. **Our aim is** precisely **to establish the human kingdom as a pattern of values in distinction from the material world**. .... .... What is **at the very heart** and center **of existentialism**, **is the absolute character of the free commitment**, by which every man realizes himself in realizing a type of humanity – a commitment always understandable, to no matter whom in no matter what epoch – and its bearing upon the relativity of the cultural pattern which may result from such absolute commitment. .... This does not completely refute the charge of subjectivism. Indeed that objection appears in several other forms, of which the first is as follows. People say to us, “Then it does not matter what you do,” and they say this in various ways. .... For, when I confront a real situation – for example, that I am a sexual being, able to have relations with a being of the other sex and able to have children – **I am obliged to choose my attitude to it**, and in every respect **I bear the responsibility of** the **choice** which, in committing myself, also commits the whole of humanity. Even if my **choice is determined by no a priori value** whatever, it can have nothing to do with caprice: .... Rather let us say that the **moral choice is comparable to the construction of a work of art**. It is the same upon the plane of morality. There is this in common between art and morality, that in both **we have to do with creation and invention**. **We cannot decide a priori what** it is that **should be done**. .... In the second place, people say to us, “You are unable to judge others.” This is true in one sense and false in another. It is true in this sense, that **whenever a man chooses his purpose** and his commitment in all clearness and in all sincerity, whatever that purpose may be, **it is impossible for him to prefer another**. .... We can judge, nevertheless, for, as I have said, one chooses in view of others, and in view of others one chooses himself. **One can judge**, first – and perhaps this is not a judgment of value, but it is a logical judgment – that in certain cases **choice is founded upon an error**, and in others upon the truth. One can judge a man by **saying** that **he deceives himself**. Since we have defined the situation of man as one of free choice, without excuse and without help, **any man who takes refuge behind the excuse of his passions**, or by inventing some deterministic doctrine, **is a self-deceiver**. One may object: “But why should he not choose to deceive himself?” I reply that it is not for me to judge him morally, but I define his self-deception as an error. Here one cannot avoid pronouncing a judgment of truth. The self-deception is evidently a falsehood, because it is a dissimulation of man’s complete liberty of commitment. .... The third objection, stated by saying, “You take with one hand what you give with the other,” means, at bottom, “your values are not serious, since you choose them yourselves.” To that I can only say that I am very sorry that it should be so; but if I have excluded God the Father, there must be somebody to invent values. We have to take things as they are. And moreover, **to say that we invent values means** neither more nor less than this; that **there is no sense in life a priori**. **Life is nothing until it is lived**; but it is yours to make sense of, and the value of it is nothing else but the sense that you choose. .... .... **There is no other universe except the human universe**, the universe of **human subjectivity**. This relation of transcendence as constitutive of man (not in the sense that God is transcendent, but in the sense of self-surpassing) with subjectivity (in such a sense that man is not shut up in himself but forever present in a human universe) – it is this that we call existential humanism. This is humanism, because we remind man that there is no legislator but himself; that he himself, thus abandoned, must decide for himself; also because we show that it is not by turning back upon himself, but always by seeking, beyond himself, an aim which is one of liberation or of some particular realization, that man can realize himself as truly human.

#### Impact Calculus: The standard is an ethic of choice. Normative truth is produced through individual choice itself, meaning ethics requires we ought to give agents the ability to peruse ends without others interfering on their value construction.

#### Prefer additionally:

#### [1] Performativity – freedom is constitutive to human subjecthood and any moral theory because the act of adopting an ethical framework presupposes the ability to radically choose.

#### [2] Motivation – people are internally motivated to follow an existentialist theory – which means they will understand the basis behind their actions compared to other transcendent principles. De Beauvoir.

[Simon de Beauvoir. “The Ethics of Ambiguity.” Lyle stuart Inc. 1948. Translated by Bernard Frechtman.] SHS ZS

The first implication of such an attitude is that the **genuine man will not agree to recognize any foreign absolute**. When a **man** projects into an ideal heaven that impossible synthesis of the for-itself and the in-itself that is called God, it is because he wishes the regard of this existing Being to change his existence into being; but **if he agrees** not to be in order t**o exist genuinely, he will abandon the dream of an inhuman objectivity**. He will understand that **it is not a matter of being right in the eyes of a God, but of being right in his own eyes**. Renouncing the thought of seeking the guarantee for his existence outside of himself, **he will** also **refuse to believe in unconditioned values** which would set themselves up athwart his freedom like things. **Va**l**ue is this lacking-being of which freedom makes itself a lack**; and it is because the latter makes itself a lack that **value** appears. It **is desire which creates the desirable**, and the project which sets up the end. **It is human existence which makes values spring up** in the world on the basis of which it win be able to judge the enterprise in which it will be engaged. But first **it locates itself beyond any pessimism**, as beyond any **optimism**, **for** the fact of **its original springing forth is a pure contingency**. **Before existence there is no more reason to exist than not to exist**. **The lack of existence can not be evaluated** since it is the fact on the basis of which all evaluation is defined. It can not be **compared** to anything **for there is nothing** outside of it **to serve as a term of comparison**. **This rejection of** any **extrinsic justification** also **confirm the rejection of an original pessimism** which we posited at the beginning. Since it is unjustifiable from without, to declare from without that it is unjustifiable is not to condemn it. And the truth is that **outside of existence there is nobody**. Man exists. For him it is not a question of wondering whether his presence in the world is useful, whether life is worth the trouble of being lived. These questions make no sense. **It is a matter of knowing whether he wants to live** and **under what conditions.**

#### [3] Linguistic inconsistency – it’s impossible to compare competing normative claims since they assume their own legitimacy, meaning it’s impossible to debate between objective frameworks. But, prefer my framing because it is a meta constraint that allows for the freedom to debate between framework to begin with.

Joyce 02 Joyce, Richard. Myth of Morality. Port Chester, NY,x USA: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p 45-47. SHS ZS

This distinction between what is accepted from within an institution, and “stepping out” of that institution and appraising it from an exterior perspective, is close to Carnap’s distinction between internal and external questions. 15 Certain “**linguistic frameworks**” (as Carnap calls them) **bring** with them **new terms and ways of talking**: accepting the language of “things” licenses making assertions like “The shirt is in the cupboard”; accepting mathematics allows one to say “There is a prime number greater than one hundred”; **accepting the language of propositions** permits saying “Chicago is large is a true proposition,” etc. **Internal to the framework in question**, **confirming** or disconfirming **the truth of** these **propositions is** a **trivial** matter. **But** traditionally **philosophers have** **interested themselves in** the external question – the issue of the adequacy of **the framework itself:** “Do objects exist?”, “Does the world exist?”, “Are there numbers?”, “Are the propositions?”, etc. Carnap’s argument is that **the external question[s]**, as it has been **typically** construed, **does not make sense**. **From a perspective that accepts mathematics**, the answer to the question “**Do numbers exist**?” is just trivially “**Yes**.” **From a perspective which has not accepted mathematics**, Carnap thinks, th**e only sensible way of construing the question is** not as a theoretical question, but as a practical one: “**Shall I accept the framework of mathematics?**”, and **this pragmatic question** **is** to be **answered by** consideration of the efficiency, the fruitfulness, the **usefulness,** etc., of the adoption. **But** the (traditional) **philosopher’s questions** – “But is mathematics true?”, “Are there really numbers?” – **are pseudo-questions**. By **turning traditional philosophical questions into** practical questions of the form “**Shall I adopt**...?”, Carnap is offering a noncognitive analysis of metaphysics. Since I am claiming that we can critically inspect morality from an external perspective – that we can ask whether there are any non-institutional reasons accompanying moral injunctions – and that such questioning would not amount to a “Shall we adopt...?” query, Carnap’s position represents a threat. What arguments does Carnap offer to his conclusion? He starts with the example of the “thing language,” which involves reference to objects that exist in time and space. **To step out of** the thing **language and ask** “But **does the world exist?”** **is a mistake**, Carnap thinks, **because the** very **notion of** “**existence” is a term which belongs to the** thing **language**, **and can be understood only** **within that framework**, “hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the system itself.” 16 Moving on to the external question “Do numbers exist?” Carnap cannot use the same argument – he cannot say that “existence” is internal to the number language and thus cannot be applied to the system as a whole. Instead he says that **philosophers** who ask the question do not mean material existence, but **have no clear understanding of what other kind of existence might be involved**, **thus such questions have no cognitive content**. It appears that this is the form of argument which he is willing to generalize to all further cases: **persons who dispute whether propositions exist, whether properties exist**, etc., **do not know what they are arguing over, thus they are not arguing over the truth of a proposition, but3 over the practical value of their respective positions**. Carnap adds that this is so because there is nothing

#### [4] Facticity is dependent on applying external values to determine the validity moral actions, but these values are nonverifiable because they are external to beings and there exists no evaluative metric to determine their authenticity. De Beauvoir.

[Simon de Beauvoir. “The Ethics of Ambiguity.” Lyle stuart Inc. 1948. Translated by Bernard Frechtman.]

The failure described in Being and Nothingness is definitive, but it is also ambiguous. **[Humans]** Man, Sartre tells us, is "a **being[s] who make**s **[themselves]**himself **a lack of being in order that there might be being.**" That means, first of all, that his **passion is not inflicted upon [humans]**him **from without**. He **[They] choose**s **it**. It is his **[One’s] very being and, as such, does not imply the idea of unhappiness**. If this choice is considered as useless, it is because **there exists no absolute value before the passion of [humans]** man, outside of it, **in relation to which one might distinguish the useless from the useful**. **The word "useful" has not** yet **received a meaning on the level of description where Being and Nothingness is situated**. **It can be defined only in the human world established by** **[human’s]** man's **projects and the ends [they]** he **set**s **up**. In the original helplessness from which man surges up, nothing is useful, nothing is useless. It must therefore be understood that **the passion to which [humans have]**man has **acquiesced finds no external justification**. No outside appeal, **no objective necessity permits of its being called useful**. It has no reason to will itself.

#### [5] Abstract theories fail because we cannot guide actions without understanding the particular circumstance of every agent. Benhabib.

[Benhabib, Seyla. "The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory." Praxis International. 1986. Pg. 38-60.]

**It is no longer plausible to maintain that** such **a standpoint can[not] universalize adequately**. Kohlberg views the veil of ignorance not only as exemplifying reversibility but universalizability as well. This is the idea that “we must be willing to live with our judgment or decision when we trade places with others in the situation being judged” (Kohlberg, 1981: 197). But the question is, which situation? Can **moral situations [can’t] be individuated independently of our knowledge of the agents involved in these situations, of [and] their histories, attitudes, characters, and desires**? Can I describe a situation as one of arrogance or hurt pride without knowing something about you as a concrete other? Can I know how to distinguish between a breach of confidence and a harmless slip of the tongue, without knowing your history and your character? **Moral situations, like moral emotions and attitudes, can only be individuated if they are evaluated in light of our knowledge of the history of the agents involved in them**. While every procedure of universalizability presupposes that “like cases ought to be treated alike” or that I should act in such a way that I should also be willing that all others in a like situation act like me, **the most difficult aspect of any such procedure is to know what constitutes a “like” situation or what it would mean for another to be exactly in a situation like mine**. Such a process of reasoning, to be at all viable, must involve[s] the viewpoint of the concrete other, for situations, to paraphrase Stanley Cavell, do not come like “envelopes and golden finches,” ready for definition and description, “nor like apples ripe for grading.”29 When we morally disagree, for example, we do not only disagree about the principles involved; very often we disagree because what I see as a lack of generosity on your part you construe as your legitimate right not to do something; we disagree because what you see as jealousy on my part I view as my desire to have more of your attention. **Universalistic moral theory[ies] neglects such everyday, interactional morality and assumes that the public standpoint of justice, and our quasi-public personalities as right-bearing individuals, are the center of moral theory**. Kohlberg emphasizes the dimension of ideal role-taking or taking the viewpoint of the other in moral judgment. Because he defines the other as the generalized other, however, he perpetrates one of the fundamental errors of Kantian moral theory. **Kant’s error was to assume that** I, **as a pure rational agent reasoning for [themself]** myself, could reach a conclusion that would be **acceptable for all at all times and places**.31 In Kantian moral theory, moral agents are like geometricians in different rooms who, reasoning alone for themselves, all arrive at the same solution to a problem. Following Habermas, I want to name this the “monological” model of moral reasoning. Insofar as he interprets ideal role-taking in the light of Rawls’s concept of a “veil of ignorance,” Kohlberg as well sees the silent thought process of a single self who inaginatively puts himself in the position of the other as the most adequate form of moral judgment. I conclude that **a definition of the self that is restricted to the standpoint of the generalized other becomes incoherent and cannot individuate among selves**. Without assuming the standpoint of the concrete other, **no coherent universalizability test can be carried out, for we lack the necessary epistemic information to judge my moral situation to be “like” or “unlike” yours.**

#### [6] Compatibility – All theories are compatible with and concede the validity of existentialism insofar as the choice to follow a theory is a commitment to radical freedom. De Beauvoir.

[Simon de Beauvoir. “The Ethics of Ambiguity.” Lyle stuart Inc. 1948. Translated by Bernard Frechtman.] SHS ZS

**Existence** asserts itself as an absolute which **must seek its justification within itself and not suppress itself**, even though it may be lost by preserving itself. To attain his truth, **man must not** attempt to **dispel the ambiguity of his being but**, on the contrary, **accept** the task of realizing **it**. He rejoins himself only to the extent that he agrees to remain at a distance from himself. This conversion is sharply distinguished from the Stoic conversion in that it does not claim to oppose to the sensible universe a formal freedom which is without content. **To exist genuinely is not to deny** this spontaneous movement of my **transcendence, but only to refuse to lose myself in it**. Existentialist conversion should rather be compared to Husserlian reduction: **let man put his will to be "in parentheses" and he will thereby be brought to the consciousness of his true condition**. And just as phenomenological reduction prevents the errors of dogmatism by suspending all affirmation concerning the mode of reality of the external world, whose flesh and bone presence the reduction does not, however, contest, so **existentialist conversion does not suppress my instincts, desires, plans, and passions. It merely prevents any possibility of failure** by refusing to set up as absolutes the ends toward which my transcendence thrusts itself, and **by considering them in their connection with** the **freedom** which projects them.

#### [7] Optimism – an ethics of choice is key to liberation as our standard places its highest faith on one to choose good because it is good, not because they rely on an absurd notion of objective ethics or social responsibility – which would not truly be liberating.

Solomon [From Rationalism to Existentialism: The Existentialists and Their Nineteenth-century Backgrounds, by Robert C. Solomon] SJ MC // SHS ZS

**A common argument against** all forms of ‘nihilism’, of which **existentialism** is one, **is that it opens the way of** all sorts of **horrors**; it places rape and genocide on the same (a)moral plane as giving gifts and keeping promises. One of the traditional pragmatic arguments against all such philosophies of freedom of choice is the argument **that chaos will break loose** if people accept it. Existentialism has always been identified as the philosophy with the pessimistic view of man. But what must be evident here is that it is **existentialism** which **places its highest confidence in humanity**- **that people will choose to be humane** as well as human. It is just those **philosophies and moralities that depend upon** sanctions, **authority**, **and ‘given’ values** that presume man will naturally kill, plunder, pillage. Traditional Christianity **is clearly degrading to man**. **It** explicitly **sees him as pathetically** unable to resist temptation to ‘**evil**’ without the most horrid of threats. And British utilitarianism, with its ‘happy’ view of man, depends upon the idea of sanctions to make man’s life more than ‘nasty, brutish, and short’. Even J.S. Mill feels it absolutely necessary to argue with men that it is rational to be moral. The **existentialists** argue that there can be no argument to that conclusion. Yet they **do not look at** their **‘nihilism’ as a gateway to disaster**. Some existentialist, of course, particularly Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, don't believe for a second that their ideas will spread beyond ‘a few’. But **all** apparently **believe** that the **freedom they seek will lead** not to murder and chaos, but **to artistic sensitivity**, deeply felt religion, Socratic ethics, or new political and social conscience. **Existentialism** **does not replace morality** and humane values **but places them on surer ground**. To give up belief in ‘morality’ as a set of a priori or empirically practical principles is not to take the role of the ‘fanatic’. **It is to set aside invalid justifications and become moral for the right reasons**- because one commits himself. **Existentialism gives** us perhaps **the most optimistic view of man** ever advanced in western philosophy: **man will**, without being ordered, instructed, forced by man or nature, **chose to be humane**. Sartre’s ‘Existential hero’ and Camus ‘Absurd hero’ are not madmen, and it is more than clear that Nietzsche’s nihilist ubermensch is not a nazi prototype. The existentialist may begin with Dostoevsky’s concern, “If there is no God, all is permitted,” but they soon leave Dostoevsky’s worries behind. **Why** should we **suppose** that **man will do ‘evil’ if we remove the forces of** authority of the **‘good’**. Perhaps there is no reason, and the existentialists do not even argue the point. In every author, there is the optimistic and almost simple-minded presupposition that man’s freedom is desirable without qualification. (This is not to say, however, that freedom is, for the existentialists, an ‘end in itself’. It sometimes appears, in De Beauvoir’s Ethics of Ambiguity, for example, that freedom is the end to which all actions are to be means. But this notion of freedom has no ‘content’ in precisely this sense; it cannot intelligibly function in an ends-means relationship with any particular choices. It is a description of the choice, not the objet of choice. In Sartre, freedom is consciousness, and just as consciousness “cannot be its own object,” freedom cannot be its own object either.)

#### [8] Overcoming oppression – practices of radical freedom come conceptually prior to any strategy against oppression – they assume a vision of ourselves as non-oppressed subjects – that is radical freedom.

Gordon 02 [Gordon, Lewis R. “Existentia Africana: Understanding Africana Existentialist Thought.” (Frederick Douglass as an Existentialist). Routledge publishing. 2002. LHP MK] SHS ZS

Reading exemplified a transgression; it exemplified being able to do what was both denied and forbidden. But the moment the possibility that it could be achieved was raised, **Douglass** **was thrown into a process of imagining himself beyond his condition**. He **became aware** that there was **nothing** inside him that **precluded reaching beyond his circumstance**. His self became, as Sartre would put it, a project. **He faced** himself in **existential anguish**. But **this realization**, that disobedience raised an anguish-riddled relation to the system of oppression, also **raised the question of how far he should go**. **Being secretly disobedient draws the weight of existence onto the self**. Public disobedience needs to be waged at some point as absolute disobedience. Later on, **exemplification of this disobedi- ence** on a group level too **the form of black Union soldiers**. But for Douglass, this absolute disobedience took existential, situa- tional form, which we shall discuss below. We have here, then, the basis of all existential theses: The human being emerges but must paradoxically be presumed if but for the sake of that emergence. **Kierkegaard urged** modern **humanity to break down systemic dehumanization** **so** that **authentic individuals could emerge**. But he was aware that **such emergence depended upon contexts of universal**, and then absolute, **preconditions**. In the same century, **Douglass explored these issues through** the developmental reality of **human life:** from birth through child- hood into adulthood. His biographies provide details of the struggle of slave children and their grandmothers (since their fathers, mothers, older sisters, and brothers were put to toil as soon as they were able), **struggles in which there was effort to nurture the human spirit in an inhumane world**. At this point, we find Douglass’s thought bearing many similar- ities to one of his successors, Fanon, who, as I’ve argued, has per- haps written the most influential body of black existential texts. In an illuminating passage of Black Skin,White Masks, Fanon observes that “a black who quotes Montesquieu had better be watched. Please understand me: watched in the sense that he is starting something” (p. 35). “Starting something” is, of course, here an assertion of his humanity. The similarities between Douglass and Fanon lead to a question on the liberating project itself in both’s work, for both start with autobiographical reflections that lead to reflections on violence. For Fanon, the latter is addressed in the discussion of violence in The Wretched of the Earth; for Douglass, it is the fight with Covey. Fanon’s discussion of violence has its early formulation, however, in Black Skin, White Masks. There, Fanon brings to the surface the limitations of the sparks of freedom as struggle for humanity that Douglass experienced in his initial en- counters with written literacy. The clue is in chapter 1 of Black Skin, White Masks, where Fanon discusses language. His argument is, as we have seen in our preceding chapter, a provocative perfor- mance of indirection. He explores what appear to be solutions only to point out their folly: that if they succeed, they have failed. Let us look at Fanon’s argument again, but this time with some additional considerations. He points out that **the location of the human being in a colonial, racist world has been displaced: human being has distortedly collapsed into white**. Thus, **most of the structural resources** by which the term human is designated **have been infected by whiteness**. **The black** then **faces the problem of** trying to **overcome negative blackness** when the linguistic and semiotic resources available for positive identity are white. Semiotically, **to resignify oneself out of blackness leads to signifying oneself in terms of whiteness.** “Nothing is more astonishing,” observes Fanon in Black Skin,White Masks, “than to hear a black express himself prop- erly, for then in truth he is putting on the white world” (p. 36). The semiotic project must be waged. Something is achieved through achieving what is deemed an impossibility, a feat against nature. **All liberation struggles are** to an extent that: **a defiance of “nature” as ontological closure**. Something ontological is achieved when black people read and write, when they do that which supposedly cannot be done. Yet the underlying limitation of this view is that it lacks a creative moment. It carries the sense of taking from in- stead of contributing and being entitled to. In Euro-mythological terms, the black’s immediate satisfaction is Promethean. Prometheus has stolen fire.

#### [9] Internal power – existentialism provides the best framework for overcoming domination that allows us to affirm the power we hold within ourselves.

**Newman ‘06**, (Saul, Senior Lecturer in Politics @ U of London, “Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment,” Theory & Event - Volume 4, Issue 3, Muse, 2006 AD: 7/8/09) SHS ZS

**Rather than having an external enemy** -- **like the State** -- in opposition to which one's political identity is formed, **we must work on ourselves**. As political subjects **we must** **overcome ressentiment by transforming our relationship with power**. One can only do this, according to Nietzsche, through eternal return. **To affirm eternal return is to** acknowledge and indeed **positively affirm the** continual **'return' of same life** with its harsh realities. Because it is an active willing of nihilism, it is at the same time a transcendence of nihilism. Perhaps in the same way, **eternal return refers to power**. **We must acknowledge** and affirm the 'return' of **power,** the fact that it **will always be with us**. To overcome ressentiment we must, in other words, will power. **We must affirm a will to power** -- in the form of creative, life-affirming values, according to Nietzsche.[56] This is **to accept the notion of 'self-overcoming'**. To 'overcome' oneself in this sense, would mean an **overcoming** of **the essentialist identities** and categories **that limit us**. As Foucault has shown, we are constructed as essential political subjects in ways that dominate us -- this is what he calls subjectification. **We hide behind essentialist identities that deny power**, **and produce through this denial**, a Manichean **politics of absolute opposition** that only reflects and reaffirms the very domination it claims to oppose.

#### [10] Fluidity – ethics must begin with the cogito and we cannot attempt to model the human experience, which diminishes radical freedom by starting with the presupposition that there is something constitutive to the human identity.

Gordon 15 [Lewis, Afro-Jewish philosopher, political thinker, educator, and musician, Professor at the University of Connecticut in Philosophy and Africana Studies, European Union Visiting Chair in Philosophy; Nelson Mandela Visiting Professor of Politics and International Studies at Rhodes University, South Africa; and Chairman of the Frantz Fanon awards committees of the Caribbean Philosophical Association, transcribed from <https://youtu.be/UABksVE5BTQ>, presenting and discussing his book “What Fanon Said”] SHS ZS

The first thing to bear in mind you may wonder why in the beginning of the talk I talked about philosophical anthropology. And **many people when they** are trying to **talk about social change** they **never think about what a human being** is and this is something Fanon pays attention to. Many **people want to have closed conceptions of human beings because then human beings can be predicable**. In fact, in fanons writing he gave an example. One of the problems is that when he would walk in reason seems to walk out. One problem we have to bear in mind **when we** try to **look at** the question of **human beings in** terms of rigid **closed systems** is that **we** often **are trying** **to** get as a **model** of how we work as theorists on issues of **social change** that are actually based **on** what we can call law like **generalizations**. Now what is a law like generalization? It is when **you make sure** that **whatever you say has no contradiction down the line**. So if you are to say this much [gestures with hand] the next stage must be consistent with that, and the next stage until you are maximally consistent. Do you get that? But here is the problem – and I can just put it in a nut shell- nobody, **nobody in this room would like** to date, be married to, or **be** **a** best **friend with a maximally consistent person**. You know what that is. Its hell. And this tells you something, because i**f somebody where maximally consistent**, you know what you would say th**at person is not reasonable**. And we have a person here who does work on Hegel that can point out this insight, that **a human being has the ability to evaluate rationality.** Now why is that important? Because you see the mistake many of us make is **many of us want to push the human being** **into that** maximized law like **generalization model**. So when we think about our philosophical anthropology, some people, our question about intersectionality for instance, what some people don’t understand is **nowhere is there ever a human being who is one identity**. People talk about race – **do you ever** really **see a race walking**? You see a racialized man or woman, or transman or transwoman. Do you ever see **a class walking**? Class is embodied in flesh and blood people. And we can go on and on. So if we enrich our philosophical anthropology we begin to notice certain other things. And one of the other things we begin to realize is that we commit a serious problem when we do political work. And the problem is this. The question about Wilderson for instance. There is this discussion going on (and allot of people build it out of my earlier books). **I have a category** I call, as a metaphor, **an antiblack world**. You notice an indefinite article – an anti-black world. The reason I say that is because **the world is different from an anti-black world**. **The project of racism** **is to create a world that would be completely anti-black** or anti-woman. Although that is a project, it is not a fait accompli. **People don’t** seem to **understand how recent this phenomenon** we are talking about **is**. A lot of people talk about race they don’t even know the history of how race is connected into theonaturalism. How, for instance, Andalucia and the pushing out of the Moors. The history of how race connected to Christianity was formed. A lot of people don’t understand – **from the standpoint of a species whose history is 220,000 years old, what the hell is 500 years**? But the one thing that we don’t understand to is **we create a false model for how we study those last 500 years**. **We study** the 500 years **as if the people who have been dominated have not been fighting** and resisting. **Had they not been fighting** and resisting **we wouldn’t be here**. And then we come into this next point because you see the problem in **the formulation of pessimism and optimism is** **they are** both **based on** **forecasted knowledge**, a prior knowledge. B**ut human beings don’t have prior knowledge**. And in fact – what in the world are we if we need to have guarantees for us to act. You know what you call such people? Cowards. The fact of the matter is our ancestors – let’s start with enslaved ancestors. **The enslaved ancestors who were burning down** those **plantations**, who were finding clever ways to **poison their masters**, who were **organizing** meetings for **rebellions**, none of them **had any [no] clue what the future would be 100 years later**. Some had good reason to believe that it may take 1000 years. But you know why **they fought**? **Because they knew it wasn’t for them**. One of the problems we have in the way we think about political issues is we commit what Fanon and others in the existential tradition would call a form of political immaturity. **Political immaturity is saying it is not worth it unless I, me,** individually **get the payoff**. When you are thinking what it is to relate to other generations – remember Fanon said the problem with people in the transition, the pseudo postcolonial bourgeois – is that they miss the point, **you fight for liberation for other generations**. And that is why Fanon said other generations they must have their mission. But you see some people fought and said no I want my piece of the pie. And that means the biggest enemy becomes the other generations. And that is why the postcolonial pseudo-bourgeoisie they are not a bourgeoisie proper because they do not link to the infrastructural development of the future, it is about themselves. And that’s why, for instance, as they live higher up the hog, as they get their mediating, service oriented, racial mediated wealth, the rest of the populations are in misery. **The** very **fact that** **in** many **African countries there are people whose futures have been mortgaged**, the fact that in this country the very example of mortgaging the future of all of you is there. **What happens to people when they have no future**? **It** now colla**pses the concept of maturation** and places people into perpetual childhood. So one of the political things – and this is where a psychiatrist philosopher is crucial – is to ask ourselves what does it mean to take on adult responsibility. And that means to understand that in all **political action it’s not about you**. **It is what you are doing for a world you may not even be able to understand**. Now that becomes tricky, because how do we know this? People have done it before. There were people, for instance, who fought anti-colonial struggles, there are people (and now I am not talking about like thirty or forty years ago, I am talking about the people from day one 17th 18th century all the way through) and **we have no idea what we are doing for the 22nd century.** And this is where developing political insight comes in. Because we commit the error of forgetting the systems we are talking about are human systems. They are not systems in the way we talk about the laws of physics. **A human system can only exist by human actions maintaining them**. Which means every human system is incomplete. Every human being is by definition incomplete. Which means you can go this way or you can go another way. The system isn’t actually closed.

#### [11] The Negative debater must engage solely under the terms of the framing set up by the affirmative and not read a separate framing absent proving a substantive reason they can’t engage. Time Skew – The aff must read six minutes of offence without knowledge of the negative framing structure. If the negative contests the affirmative framing, they attempt moot all the aff. The Neg would have 13 minutes under their framework while I would only have 7. This is key to fairness as it skews our ability to access the ballot. Time skew outweighs all other standards – it’s impossible to come back when I’m structurally disadvantaged by not having enough time to answer arguments. Drop the negative if they violate to deter future abuse, set norms for debate, and they were forewarned.

## Offense

#### Nuclear weapons perpetuate this constant fear of securitization which is antithetical to an existential value construction – rather than pursuing our ability to make choices, nuclear weapons foreclose ourselves from others and cause us to live out of fear of our own choices. Lethbridge 12.

Lethbridge, David. “onstructing Peace by Freedom: Jean-Paul Sartre, Four Short Speeches on the Peace Movement”. rtre Studies International, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2012), pp. 1-18 SHS ZS

At the Vienna Congress itself, held between 12-19 December 1952, Sartre delivered one of the opening addresses.29 The themes expressed were not complex: Sartre was calling for unity among peo- ple who had been divided by suspicion and ignorance, by what he referred to as an "unreality." He began his remarks by noting: "**Cur- rent politics** and ways of thinking **lead us to massacre because they are unreal**. The **world has been cut in half** **and each half** **is afraid of the other**. After this happens **everyone** **acts without knowledge of the wishes and decisions of the person living opposite**: they **make conjec- tures**, they don't believe what he says, **they interpret their actions according to what they think the adversary will do**." **Everyone**, in short, **becomes "the Other,"** an enemy not to be trusted, and "under these circumstances **only one position is possible**, summa- rized by a consummate piece of madness - if you want peace, prepare for war - **the triumph of unreality**." The essential point of the Con- gress, for Sartre, was that it represented a new starting point, a way forward to a world without separation, and therefore without war. In Sartre's view, "just as one can say that unreality leads to conflict, one can say that what is reality unites: because that which is real is the sum of ties that bind men together. And if we but think of the sum of the ties that bind us together, we shall see that our making war would be an utterly imbecile enterprise."30 For Sartre, there was no question of creating a new international body, or of trying to substitute a new organization to replace the United Nations, but to set in motion a resolution, a set of popular demands, that could be effectively communicated with the various governments in the nations from which the delegates had come: **a people's unity was key**. "If there are still people at the UN," Sartre said, "who think that the third world war will be a struggle of Good against Evil, we will tell them they are wrong. The peoples have seen one another, have spoken to one another, have touched one another, and they agree in saying that in every way the war being prepared for them is Evil, that in every way the Peace they are try- ing to make is Good."31 But it was not a matter of pacifism per se , or of peace at any price. "We don't want just any kind of peace, **we don't want peace through terror.** ... or in humiliation, or in servitude." Most especially, **Sartre did not want a false peace under the shadow of the atomic bomb**. When the reactionary press absurdly suggested that every new atomic weapon was "peace on the march," Sartre responded that "our first duty is to go and look for the beautiful word peace in the mud where it has fallen, and then to cleanse it." **Peace** "is a pro- tracted piece of constructing to do on a world scale and one which **demands the collaboration of all the peoples of the world**."32 Most especially, Sartre was opposed to the development of "two blocs" - of capitalist America and the USSR, separated by a gulf of unreality, and crushing Europe between them. He pointed out, accurately, that the economy of the Western European nations depended "daily more and more on the United States," while, on the other hand, in these same nations "the proletariat turns with hope towards the Soviet Union and the Eastern democracies." Sartre was adamant that the nations of Western Europe should remain independent, and could become, and ought to become, a "meeting- place of the currents flowing from capitalist America and the socialist Soviet Union, where these currents must meet and mix. I say that a new taking up or an intensification of the commercial currents between the Eastern democracies and the democracies of Western Europe would be not only a natural thing, but above all would con- tribute to making Europe . . . one of the indispensable links between the Great Powers."33 Sartre recognized that the abolition of nuclear weapons and the establishment of amicable relations between the world's peoples were neither guaranteed nor imminent. The point was - **in the face of** the escalating threat of **atomic war** - to **commit oneself to** the -9- necessary **political struggles to bring about these goals**. "But all of us," Sartre said, "who vote for the final resolution should consider themselves on their return home as mandated by the Congress. The Congress must be our conscious will and it is in the name of that will that we shall go back to our countries with new obligations and new tasks."3

#### Nuclear weapons eliminate life-affirming value as they serve as a constant reminder that that value could one day end instantaneously – deterrence merely ensures infinite moral violations. Mason 17.

[Kelvin Mason, (Independent Researcher) "Ghosts of the Future "Acme Journals. https://acme-journal.org/index.php/acme/article/view/1426/1243. 2017, 16(1): pp. 149-155 DOA:2-2-2020 // NSUSF Recut WHSRS]

This film (https://vimeo.com/182695880) explores the UK’s decision to replace its Trident nuclear weapons system. Due to the ‘alternative format’i , the script and a response to reviewers is printed below. The film’s narration draws upon an **existentialist ethics** to **critique a politics and culture of nuclear weapons, Mutually Assured Destruction and deterrence**. The film was made at an academic seminar intervention at the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Burghfield in Berkshire in June 2016. Thematically linking ‘war’ and (global) ‘warming’, the seminar explored nuclear weapons and energy as, literally, signature technologies of the Anthropocene. A particular phenomenological approach employs close observation and social participation in place as an ‘incandescence’ to illuminate wider geographies and diverse temporalities. Physically inhabiting the AWE space made visible these ‘ghosts’ and highlighted the inextricability of emotion and reason. The film argues that **deterrence is antithetic to the key existentialist tenet of transcendence. Deterrence is immoral** not (only) because it is defined by abominable revenge rather than justice, but **because it shapes an oppressive politics and culture that preclude the attainment of freedom and the acceptance of** a concomitant **personal responsibility. Owning one’s radical freedom and responsibility is Sartre’s definition of ‘authenticity’**, living the truth about ourselves. Keywords Trident; deterrence; existentialism; ethics; place Ghosts of the Future 150 Narrator’s Script Robert Macfarlane observes that, ‘**We** mostly **respond to mass extinction with ‘stuplimity’: the aesthetic experience in which astonishment is united with boredom, such that we overload on anxiety** to the point of outrage-outrage’. He asks: ‘How might a novel or poem possibly account for our authorship of global scale environmental changes across millennia – let alone shape the nature of that change?’ What is the perfect text for the Anthropocene? I prepare for participation in an academic intervention (here) at the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Burghfield near Reading in Berkshire by reading about existentialist ethics and phenomenological research methods. The intervention follows the ‘no war, no warming’ theme of a month of direct action at AWE and we issued a call for participation to people interested in issues around nuclear weapons and climate change. AWE is responsible for the assembly and maintenance of nuclear warheads for the Trident missile system: four nuclear powered Vanguard submarines, Trident D-5 ballistic missiles, and the nuclear warheads. The Anthropocene is the geological age in which human influence on planet Earth is the most significant impact and ‘will leave a long-term signature in the strata record’. The Anthropocene and the nuclear age start simultaneously, and part of this signature will be the global dispersal of artificial radionuclides from the testing and, perhaps, use of nuclear weapons. We are without excuse. In an existentialist view, at least, **our identities are** partly **constituted by how we live the ‘already’ and the ‘not yet’ in our everyday life**. Heidegger dubs this our ‘ekstatic temporality’. Facticity and **transcendence stand as**, respectively, **our ecstatic** past and **future**. While we live in the present, **we are animated by** both the past and, most significantly for **who we can come to know ourselves to be, the possibility of the future;** this is Heidegger’s ‘ek-sistence’. Encountering, a grizzly bear feasting on a caribou carcass, Barry Lopez suggests that, rather than concentrate on the bear, his indigenous travelling companions ‘would focus on that part of the world of which, at this moment, the bear was only a fragment. The bear here might be compared with a bonfire, a kind of incandescence that throws light on everything around it’. Experiencing the event in this way ‘extended the moment of encounter with the bear backwards and forwards in time’. Simone de Beauvoir outlined an existentialist morality: ‘Every time transcendence lapses into immanence, there is a degradation of existence into ‘initself’, of freedom into facticity; this fall is a moral fault if the subject consents to it; if this fall is inflicted on the subject, it takes the form of frustration and ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies, 2017, 16(1): 149-155 151 oppression; in both cases it is an absolute evil.’ We can – we should - transform the way we live every moment, seek freedom from oppression. Angie Zelter, who organised the month of direct action at Burghfield with the network Trident ploughshares, refuses to be confined by facticity. Her every action at AWE is an attempted step into a different future right now. **The more the police try to impose the** order of the moment on her, immanence, the **social order determined by nuclear deterrence and the coercive security which adherence to that doctrine dictates, the more she steps out of line: she tries to push through the police** cordon into AWE; she sits down in the road to block it, **constantly shuffling into a more obstructive position**; she never stops talking to the police explaining the moral fault of Trident, the future it defines, the alternatives it constrains… Jean Paul **Sartre defined ‘authenticity’ as owning one’s radical freedom and responsibility**: it is a matter of living the truth about ourselves. We are without excuse. I am filming a wild rose, trying not to mind whether or not a bee lands on it to feed. I am focussed on holding my own attention, resisting the temptation to flit, to film something else; something ‘happening’. I am acutely aware of my own breathing; aware how impossible it is to hold the camcorder steady, trying to ‘go with’ that. Looking intently through the viewfinder at this one speck of the landscape, I am more aware than I otherwise would be of the soundscape. The rush of cars passing on the road behind me is inescapable; from white noise to cacophonous intrusion. There is birdsong too. Behind me a policeman. I am again contravening bye-laws, filming Ministry of Defence property. I must stop. A bee is feeding on the rose. Each Vanguard submarine is armed with up to 16 missiles each of which can carry at least three warheads. And each warhead has an explosive power eight times that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. That bomb, ‘Little Boy’, devastated an area of five square miles and killed at least 135,000 people. Many others suffered long-term sickness and disability. The U.S. dropped a second nuclear bomb, ‘Fat Man’, on the city of Nagasaki, killing at least another 50,000 people. We are without excuse. One morning, in the impromptu peace camp set up across from the construction gate at AWE, my friend and colleague **Kye tells me she awoke in her tent to the sound of birdsong, which filled her with a life-affirming joy. Then, she realised that she was lying so very close to a place that could obliterate all birdsong forever.** I am still taking that in. **Ghosts of the Future** 152 For a moment, when I am filming, I mistake the distant beep-beep warning of a lorry reversing inside AWE for birdsong. Perhaps some birds imitate lorries in their calls? Perhaps, on some level, the design engineer based the lorry’s alarming sound on the call of birds? Each warhead on a Trident missile could kill more than a million people. And the ‘payload’ of one Vanguard submarine has the potential to kill some fiftythree million people: the entire population of South Africa. The UK always has one armed Vanguard submarine at sea. (Lotte Reimer sings) **All that we have created with our hands And our minds**, for the glory of the world we live in, **Now it can be smashed, in a moment destroyed, Deadly the harvest of two atom bombs**. Then, people of the world, we must watch and take care That the third atom bomb never comes. Exponents of the Trident system claim it is a deterrent. The military theory of deterrence runs that the threat of using powerful weapons against an enemy deters that enemy from attacking you with similar weapons. Applied to nuclear weapons, deterrence translates into a security policy of Mutually Assured Destruction. Exponents of the policy seem to have no problem living with the darkest of ironies, that the acronym for this system is MAD. Professor Rebecca Kay sees **MAD as the ultimate ‘othering’, and questions the moral logic** of deterrence. She asks how, **if ‘we’ were subject to a nuclear attack, ‘it would better to die knowing that ‘our’ bombs were killing those people too’?** How? The moral philosopher Mary Midgely pinpoints the indiscriminate nature of nuclear weapons, likening them to landmines on a vastly greater scale. ‘This feature cannot be sanitised by claiming that their owners are never going to use them. To say nothing of the fact that they have actually once already been used in combat, the mere act of threatening others with an abomination is itself already abominable.’ Ratified by one hundred and sixty two states, the Ottawa Treaty prohibits the production, transfer or use of landmines, committing signatories to their destruction. The UK signed the Ottawa Treaty in 1997. We are without excuse. People are striking the peace camp that has been my home for the past two nights. There is a fire with an ash-clagged and smoke-blackened kettle upon it, tarpaulins strung overhead between trees, a few pop-up tents… I resist the urge to go and help my comrades, as I feel I should. I keep filming. I keep my back to the construction gate of AWE: a wide, heavy-duty, heavy-metal structure with black ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies, 2017, 16(1): 149-155 153 painted bars and close steel mesh. Behind the gate, MoD police with guns and a German Shepherd dog on a leash keep a close watch. In ‘The Castle’ Kafka wrote: ‘All [the authorities] did was to guard the distant and invisible interests of distant and invisible masters.’ We are without excuse. Twenty yards down the road, civilian police are parked, also observing. A police car drives by, perhaps just to make sure all their other colleagues aren’t missing anything sinister. I do not turn the camera on any of them. Across the road, a handful of people, thrown together in their opposition to nuclear weapons or their academic interest in nuclear weapons or in climate or protest or place, continue packing away food, taking down tents, tipping rain water carefully off tarpaulins not to drench the packed-away kit, themselves or each other. Nothing happens. So much is happening. On 14th March 2016, the House of Commons voted by 409 to 161 to retain a strategic nuclear deterrent beyond the life of the current system. A vote on renewing the Trident weapons programme specifically is scheduled for 18th July 2016. If that vote carries, as seems certain, Vanguard submarines will be replaced and the life of Trident missiles extended. AWE is poised to play a major role when the warheads themselves need to be refurbished or replaced. According to the government’s estimate, Vanguard replacement will cost £31 billion. This figure does not include an extra £10bn that the MoD has put aside as contingency for an anticipated overspend. Trident’s opponents estimate the cost very significantly higher. Updating a 2014 estimate by the independent Trident Commission, in 2015 international news agency Reuters put the cost at £167bn. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) calculates the cost as high as £205bn. This sum could, CND claim, ‘improve the NHS by building 120 state of the art hospitals and employing 150,000 new nurses, build 3 million affordable homes, install solar panels in every home in the UK or pay the tuition fees for 8 million students.’ The UK is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament. On 19th July, the House of Commons parliament in Westminster voted to replace Britain’s Trident nuclear weapons system by 472 votes to 117. In the debate, George Kerevan, Scottish National Party Member of Parliament for East Lothian, asked Theresa May, the Prime Minister, ‘Is she personally prepared to authorise a nuclear strike that could kill one hundred thousand men, women and children?’ Previous Prime Ministers have avoided answering this question. With no hesitation, though, Theresa May answered, ‘Yes.’ She then added, ‘The whole point of a deterrent is that our enemies need to know that we would be prepared to use it.’ Ghosts of the Future 154 We are without excuse. In the peace camp a woman from Scotland, Cat, paints a series of watercolour landscapes of AWE. I ask, and she kindly gives me one of the paintings. It shows the heavy, dark metal construction gate, the No Trident signs that protesters have installed. And a bird. To our academic seminar, held in front of the construction gate to AWE, Kye brings red paper-chain people. They are an audience to represent absence: the ghosts of the future that the use of Trident might create, particularly our academic colleagues from the past and especially those from the future who are not here, or who may not be able to be here; and our colleagues in the present who are also absent, also ghosts. We weave the paper-chain people between the mesh of the construction gate. With their dog and their guns, the two MoD police officers come to warn us that this action infringes a by-law and that we must take the figures down immediately or face arrest. They are paper figures four inches tall. We argue. And - after a stand-off - one of the police officer concedes that the figures can stay in the fence for five minutes. The quality of that short time is immense. Seminar participants are suffused by emotion. The police decision seems at once rational and compassionate. We note that these are not separate mechanisms. Existentialism acknowledges time as binding: it cannot be escaped. However, it further holds, that time is lived and should be measured qualitatively. So, if we can’t change time, we can transform the way we live every moment. Because Kye’s paper-chain people are prohibited from staying on the real construction gate, I rescue some of them and add them into Cat’s picture of the gate. The ghosts have a home. But they are not at peace. …. you and your children matter. I hope your love will teach the nations that emit the most carbon and violence that they should, instead, remit the most compassion. I hope, soon Presenting in the seminar, Phil stresses how nuclear deterrence is compelled to go hand in glove with secrecy and security; how it is incommensurable with transparency and freedom; how it is undemocratic. **Inherent in deterrence is a pessimistic view of human nature that restricts us from developing a future of nobler virtue**: of trust and empathy not suspicion; of justice rather revenge; of nonviolence, of openness in place of threat; welcome and inclusion instead of othering, of care and compassion beyond fear.

#### The atomic bomb is even worse for oppressed nations – it forces them into Western modes of thinking and leaves them unable to achieve their own value construction. Lethbridge 2.

Lethbridge, David. “onstructing Peace by Freedom: Jean-Paul Sartre, Four Short Speeches on the Peace Movement”. rtre Studies International, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2012), pp. 1-18 SHS ZS

But **the atomic bomb was the weapon of choice for the West** since its threatened use was **aimed precisely at the colonized nations strug- gling for independence**. "The people's army has found its exact counterpart in the nuclear weapon; **the people's army and the atom bomb are the two opposed characteristics** of our time." The atom bomb was a weapon to be launched by the ruling circles of the West, who no longer required a mass army, against a defensive people's army that had no greater strength than the support of its own peo- ple. "**The atom bomb is the only weapon suitable for oppressive minorities**. Without it their task would be impossible. Their task is the maintenance of abstract barriers between the nations and between people inside each country, and to govern against the necessities of history and political economy." But **the West was in the process of losing its control over Vietnam** and other colonized nations. There- fore, for the West, "**there remains** but **one way out - the atom bomb**. The atom bomb is a weapon against history Despite the evident reality that nuclear war would mean an utter catastrophe that would "wipe out the whole of humanity," **its poten- tial use was an attempt to blackmail the entire human race**. "In order to stop the world turning **they are threatening to suppress history by liquidating those who make history**. It is all they can do: wipe out man in case he changes. **The bomb is in itself** the basis and the sum total of a policy completely **hostile to the true development of humanity** . . . Because the atom bomb wishes to fly in the face of his- tory, **it risks falling out of history altogether**."42 Middle East;49 alert South Asia to the lessons of stability;50 and erode the barriers to technology transfers that would enhance deterre

## Underview

#### [1] Aff gets 1AR theory – It’s key to check neg abuse, no 1AR theory means neg can be infinitely abusive because nothing can stop them, which outweighs because it means aff can’t win. Drop the debater on 1AR theory because the aff can’t split the 2ar between both theory and substance. No neg RVIs since the neg can dump on the shell for 6 minutes and make the 2AR impossible. Competing interpretations because reasonability collapses – you have to win offense to your justification which concedes the validity of the theory. 1AR Theory before neg theory – a) the neg can win their shell in the long 2nr but it’s impossible for the aff to beat the shell back in the 2ar b) key to check back against abusive neg strategies.

#### **[2] Fairness is a voter a) all argumentation presupposes fairness – i.e. that the judge won’t hack for either side b) judges cannot evaluate the round properly if it is skewed**

#### [3] Permissibility and presumption affirm a) we assume the validity of statements unless given a reason to deny – i.e. if I told you my name was Zach you’d believe me b) if agents had to reflect on every action they take and justify why it was a good one we would never be able to take an action because we would have to justify actions that are morally neutral ie drinking water is not morally right or wrong but if I had to justify my action every time I decided upon a course of action I would never be able to make decisions. C) affirming is harder because the 6-3 skew makes the 2ar impossible so if we come out even it means I did the better job debating so vote aff