# \*\*\*MICHIGAN 7 WEEK CORE – SAUDI PTX\*\*\*

# 1NC

## Off (Generic)

### 1nc Saudi ptx ~1:15

#### **Trump is about to let American companies sell nuclear technology to the Saudis—that causes Saudi nuclear proliferation. But, a bill checking these sales will pass soon—bipartisan consensus.**

Kheel 4/7 [Rebecca Kheel, (Staff Writer, TheHill) "Secrecy behind Saudi nuclear talks infuriates Congress" TheHill, 4-7-2019, https://thehill.com/policy/international/437649-secrecy-behind-saudi-nuclear-talks-infuriates-congress, DOA:4-22-2019 // WWBW]

**Congressional anger is growing over** President **Trump’s efforts to secure a nuclear energy deal with Saudi Arabia.** Lawmakers first became wary of the plans when the **Saudis refused to accept limits preventing them from developing a nuclear weapon.** But that skepticism quickly turned to fury when it was revealed that the Trump administration gave approval for companies to share certain nuclear energy technology with the kingdom without a broader nuclear deal in place. **Lawmakers are now demanding answers.** They particularly want to know whether any of the approvals came after the October murder of U.S.-based journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul. “First we want the information from [the Department of Energy], and we’re demanding it. We should get it,” said Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), the ranking member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “And I think it’s critical to know exactly how this happened, when it happened and particularly were you doing this after Khashoggi?” Congress has been re-evaluating the U.S.-Saudi relationship since Khashoggi’s death, with lawmakers blaming Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman for the killing. Propelled in part by anger over Khashoggi’s death, **Congress last week sent Trump a resolution that would end U.S. military support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen’s civil war.** Trump is expected to veto the resolution, making it the second veto of his presidency, and lawmakers are plotting their next steps to confront him for supporting the Saudis. One potential avenue for expressing that anger is the administration’s nuclear talks with Riyadh. House Democrats began investigating the administration’s nuclear talks with Saudi Arabia after the Oversight and Reform Committee announced in February it was launching a probe to “determine whether the actions being pursued by the Trump administration are in the national security interests of the United States or, rather, serve those who stand to gain financially as a result of this potential change in U.S. foreign policy.” The investigation was launched in conjunction with the release of an interim report that included detailed allegations by unnamed whistleblowers that senior White House officials ignored warnings from legal and ethics advisers to stop pursuing the plan to sell nuclear reactors to Saudi Arabia. The administration has been negotiating what’s known as a 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia that would allow U.S. companies to sell nuclear reactors to the kingdom. **Riyadh has resisted an agreement that includes prohibitions on enriching uranium and reprocessing spent fuel to produce plutonium — essential steps in producing nuclear weapons. Crown Prince Mohammed has also vowed his country would obtain a nuclear weapon if rival Iran does.** Satellite images first reported by Bloomberg News this past week show Saudi Arabia is nearing completion of its first nuclear facility. The administration argues a nuclear energy deal with Saudi Arabia is necessary because the kingdom will otherwise take its business to other countries, leaving U.S. companies in the lurch while doing nothing to prevent nuclear proliferation. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Friday was asked about the state of negotiations with Saudi Arabia but responded by criticizing the Obama administration’s nuclear deal with Iran in 2015. “I can’t tell you where the negotiations sit because they’re still ongoing. But make no mistake about it: We only wish that the previous administration had taken that threat seriously with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran,” he said in an interview with Norah O'Donnell on “CBS This Morning.” Pressed on whether that makes it acceptable for Saudi Arabia to be a nuclear power, Pompeo said, “We will not permit that to happen.” Congress has statutory review powers over 123 agreements and can block them once they are submitted to Capitol Hill. But even as the agreement remains in the negotiation stage, Energy Secretary Rick Perry approved seven authorizations that let U.S. companies share certain nuclear energy technology with Saudi Arabia. Such authorizations typically allow for sharing unclassified nuclear technology and services such as nuclear fuel fabrication, reactor designs and training for operating a nuclear facility, according to the Congressional Research Service. The Daily Beast first reported the approvals, which Perry later confirmed to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Perry told senators the Saudi-related approvals were among 37 authorizations granted since 2017, including two for Jordan, and that it’s “something that goes on every day.” He said details of the approvals were not shared publicly because the companies involved determined that doing so would divulge proprietary business information. In a statement following Perry's testimony, the Department of Energy stressed that 810 authorizations and 123 agreements are "are two distinct and different processes based on two separate sections of the Atomic Energy Act." But **lawmakers were outraged when they found out they were not told about the approvals, saying the secrecy violates the Atomic Energy Act, which requires that Congress be kept “fully and currently informed” of 123 agreement negotiations.** In a recent hearing with Pompeo, Rep. Brad Sherman (D-Calif.) said, “It appears that **this is an end run around the law in an effort to achieve a policy.**” “If you cannot trust a regime with a bone saw, you should not trust them with nuclear weapons,” Sherman said, referring to a weapon used in Khashoggi’s killing. Sherman and Rep. Ted Yoho (R-Fla.) introduced **a bill** in late February that **would require congressional approval of a 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia before it can take effect, as opposed to current law that says agreements go into effect unless Congress blocks them. A companion bill was introduced in the Senate** by Sens. Ed Markey (D-Mass.) and Marco Rubio (R-Fla.). Menendez and Rubio sent Perry a letter this past week demanding information by April 10 on his approval for the six authorizations by his agency. The two senators previously asked the Government Accountability Office to investigate the administration’s negotiations on a 123 agreement. “The kingdom has engaged in many deeply troubling actions and statements that have provoked alarm in Congress and led lawmakers to begin the process of reevaluating the U.S.-Saudi relationship and our long-term stability and interests in the region,” the senators wrote to Perry. “We therefore believe the United States should not be providing nuclear technology or information to them at this time.”

#### **And, put away your uniqueness answers – congress has been out of session since the 12th and returns on the 29th – our ev is as recent as possible.**

#### **Isolationism like the aff is a win for Trump—it’s popular and consolidates GOP support behind him on foreign policy.**

Pethiyagoda 19 [Kadira Pethiyagoda, (Kadira Pethiyagoda is a nonresident fellow in Asia-Middle East Relations at the Brookings Doha Centre.) "A Restrained Foreign Policy is Becoming More Popular in Washington" National Interest, 1-1-2019, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/restrained-foreign-policy-becoming-more-popular-washington-39962, DOA:2-9-2019 // WWBW]

**Donald Trump’s pull out of Syria, the Senate’s recent vote to end American support for the Saudi War in Yemen**, and Tulsi Gabbard’s announcement that she may run for President in 2020 all **suggest we are at a pivotal moment in U.S. foreign policy.** The Senate’s historic vote, which reasserted Congress’s right to decide on matters of war, suggests a recognition that foreign policy is back on the debating table after decades of being “above politics.” Gabbard constitutes a unique constellation of foreign policy positions, many of which may bridge the chasm between the views of the public and those of the political class and mainstream media. Trump himself recognized this and nodded to his base when he decided to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria. **Large swathes of the public**, on both the left and right, **believe that the foreign policy status quo of incessant interventionism has brought little benefit** to ordinary Americans. A J. Wallin Opinion Research survey revealed that 71.0 percent of Americans believed Congress should restrain military action. 86.4 percent felt the military should be used only as a last resort. Some **63.9 percent felt that military aid, both money and weapons, should not be provided to regimes like Saudi Arabia. Preferences for restraining military action overseas crossed boundaries of political party and researchers acknowledged that rarely do issues enjoy such bipartisan consensus.** A study by Boston University ( Douglas Kriner ) found that **attitudes against military intervention were running high amongst those communities which had lost soldiers.** Survey Sampling International revealed similar findings, that a greater share of military veterans (often more likely to be Republicans), 61 percent, are weary of foreign intervention than the general public. Sample Survey International polling found that 79 percent of Americans felt any extra funding should focus on domestic issues. As I argued in January 2018, **voicing the public’s concerns regarding status quo foreign policy allows astute politicians to carve out a unique and popular position. This is** now **being recognized** more broadly. **Trump’s acknowledgment of this is seen in his decision to def[ies]y the foreign policy establishment**, despite the fact that this would leave him open to outrage and criticism from both major parties and the mainstream media. The Senate’s historic vote to end U.S. support for the Saudis in Yemen, led by Bernie Sanders and championed by upcoming Democrats like Ro Khanna, reflects Senators’ awareness of this. It was the first time that the War Powers Act, established in 1973 just after the end of the Vietnam War, had been utilized.

#### Trump is awful at foreign aid appropriations—causes gridlock and kills political momentum.

Daniels 17 [Jeff Daniels, () "President Trump's fiscal 2018 defense budget request could 'add to budget gridlock'" CNBC, 2-28-2017, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/28/trumps-fiscal-2018-defense-budget-ask-could-add-to-budget-gridlock.html, DOA:2-14-2019 // WWBW]

**President Donald Trump's fiscal 2018 defense budget request** is probably "dead on arrival," an influential industry analyst said Tuesday. As reported Monday, the White House wants an additional $54 billion more in military spending for fiscal 2018, which would represent a nearly 10 percent jump overall for defense spending to $603 billion. The additional money for defense would come from essentially slashing non-defense discretionary spending to boost the military budget by the same amount. "The proposal **lacks meaningful detail and has the potential to add to budget gridlock because it doesn't seem to be fashioned in a manner that will allow Congress to form a coalition for an orderly passage of appropriations bills,**" Howard Rubel, a defense industry analyst at Jefferies said in a research note Tuesday. In short, Rubel sees **little chance of success on Trump's defense request** as it currently stands. "**His budget is likely to be dead on arrival**," the analyst said. The president will likely provide more clarity on his spending priorities and defense policy on Tuesday evening during his formal address to Congress. According to the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, non-defense discretionary spending represents only 15 percent of the budget and 5 percent of spending growth over the next decade. "**Getting that much money that quickly from that small a share of the budget I think will be challenging**," said Marc Goldwein, a senior vice president and policy director for the CRFB, a non-partisan think tank focused on budget issues. He pointed out that some of the non-defense discretionary spending goes to core functions of government as well as areas such as the Department of Homeland Security. Goldwein expects it would be easier for the Trump administration to focus on the mandatory part of the budget and use those areas for savings. "The mandatory budget is huge and most of the health and retirement parts are growing rapidly," he said. As an example, Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid and other health programs make up about half of the federal spending this year and are projected by the CRFB to be responsible for about two-thirds of spending growth over the next decade. However, if the Trump administration were to make cuts to entitlement programs, such as Social Security and Medicare, it could trigger more resistance particularly from Democrats. So far the administration has maintained it doesn't plan cuts to these major entitlement programs.

#### Saudi prolif causes nuclear war and extinction—miscalc and regional conflicts escalate.

Edelman et al. 11 ― Eric Edelman, Roger Hertog Distinguished Practitioner in Residence at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, Johns Hopkins University SAIS, Counselor at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, B.A. in History and Government from Cornell University, Ph.D. in U.S. Diplomatic History from Yale University; Andrew Krepinevich, president and chief operating officer of Solarium LLC, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, M.P.A. from Harvard University, Ph.D. from Harvard University; Evan Braden, Senior Fellow and the Director of Research and Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2011. (“The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran”, Foreign Affairs, January 2011, Available Online at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/persian-gulf/2011-01-01/dangers-nuclear-iran Accessed 8-28-2018)

There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. n-player competition Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multi- polar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine- based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war.

## Add-Ons

### 1nc – Exec = Normal Means

#### Executive branch is normal means.

Ryan 16 Missy Ryan, Reporter covering the Pentagon, military issues and national security, for the Washington Post, “State Department and Pentagon tussle over control of foreign military aid,” The Washington Post. July 10, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/state-department-and-pentagon-tussle-over-control-of-foreign-military-aid/2016/07/10/ddc98f3e-42b0-11e6-88d0-6adee48be8bc\_story.html?utm\_term=.9a5f308162e0//rjp

President Obama’s most senior advisers convened last month to consider changes to the way the United States provides security aid to foreign nations, as a long-running struggle for control between the State and Defense departments intensifies. At the heart of the controversy is whether the State Department will retain its historic jurisdiction over security aid, or whether the Pentagon, which Congress has bestowed with increasing autonomy and resources over the past decade, will eclipse Foggy Bottom in taking greater responsibility for engagement with allied nations overseas. The June 30 meeting of Cabinet officials centered on execution of Obama’s 2013 directive on security assistance, which sought to ensure that the billions of aid dollars the United States provides to allied nations each year are used more effectively. Adding to concerns at the State Department is a series of proposals in this year’s defense authorization bill, which would give the Pentagon permanent control over certain aid programs and greater flexibility in supporting counterterrorism activities overseas. [U.S. will seek billions more to support Afghan military efforts] The discussions are part of an effort to reform the United States’ unwieldy system for providing assistance to foreign security forces, which includes more than 100 different legislative authorities and accounted for at least $20 billion in U.S. spending in 2015. State Department officials fear that an expansion in Pentagon control over security assistance would impair diplomatic efforts and move the United States further from the Obama administration’s goal of getting the military out of foreign aid. Diplomats also say that military-led programs, without adequate input from the State Department, can overlook key human rights or governance concerns and heighten tensions with nations such as China and Russia, because foreign governments see assistance delivered by the U.S. military, rather than civilian agencies, as a potential threat. “We’ve got to balance the various components of our foreign policy,” said a senior State Department official who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations. “The more money and more authority you move out of traditional accounts we have used for decades to work with our partners, the more you lose the ability to balance.” [Outside the wire: How U.S. Special Operations troops secretly help foreign forces target terrorists] After World War II, the United States provided substantial aid to countries such as Egypt, Israel and Jordan, to help those nations build up their own militaries’ powers and, equally, to secure U.S. influence in support of key U.S. goals. That picture became more complicated after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, as Congress authorized new programs to help the U.S. military train and equip Iraqi and Afghan forces and assist allies in combating terrorism. The bulk of new programs were given to the Pentagon to lead, although the State Department retains a veto right over many of them. Pentagon officials, meanwhile, warn of State Department micromanagement of programs they see not as aid but activities central to U.S. military objectives. They consider certain joint training exercises, for instance, primarily as a vehicle for ensuring the readiness of U.S. troops, rather than a means to build up foreign militaries. Defense officials say the State Department has used the 2013 order, called a Presidential Policy Directive, to advance an “incredibly broad” definition of what security assistance is, a move that if supported by the White House could increase State Department say over certain programs. “A lot of what is going on here right now is this disconnect where the State Department has viewed our programs and our authorities and our resources as being in direct competition with theirs, whereas we view them very differently,” one senior defense official said. [After more than $1.6 billion in U.S. aid, Iraq’s army still struggles] The Pentagon has also complained for years that the State Department, which lacks a vast staff to oversee aid programs, is not as fast or nimble as it might be in processing aid proposals. Robust and flexible funding for such programs, defense officials say, will not only help them combat global terrorism threats but will compensate for a shrinking U.S. force. Gordon Adams, a former White House budget official who is a fellow at the Stimson Center, said the seemingly arcane bureaucratic competition had wide-reaching effects. “Who owns the ball matters here because it colors the way the U.S. engages overseas,” he said. “If American engagement wears a uniform . . . that’s one form of interaction. If it involves the ambassador and the [U.S. Agency for International Development] and people doing governance work, it’s a different set of missions and there’s a hugely different perception.” In practice, the Defense Department often executes even programs that are primarily State Department authorities. The Obama administration has threatened to veto both the Senate and House versions of the defense bill over multiple concerns, including what the White House said were excessive changes to security assistance programs. Officials said the recent meeting did not produce an immediate resolution to the issue of what programs will be subject to new assistance guidelines. No matter the final outcome, Michael McNerney, a former Pentagon official who is a scholar at the Rand Corp., said the trend of increasing Pentagon activity with foreign militaries was unlikely to be reversed. The Obama administration has prioritized efforts to build the skills of partner nations so they, often with U.S. support, can fight militant groups overseas, in part to avoid having to deploy American forces. Many of the initiatives that support that goal are overseen by the Pentagon. “The toothpaste can’t go back in the tube,” McNerney said. “It’s not realistic to make things the way they were before 9/11.”

### 1nc – Uranium Mining – Turns SV

#### Even peaceful nuclear technology is bad—Uranium mining causes meltdowns and nuclear waste.

Rÿser et al. 16 [Rudolph C. Rÿser, Janna Lafferty &amp; Yvonne Sherwood, (Rudolph Ryser is descendant from Oneida and Cree relatives and lived his early life in Taidnapum culture. He is Chairperson of the Center for World Indigenous Studies (CWIS), a research, education and public policy institution and he is a Fulbright Research Scholar. He has served as Senior Advisor to the President George Manuel of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, as former Acting Executive Director of the National Congress of American Indians (USA), and a former staff member of the American Indian Policy Review Commission – a Joint US Congressional Commission. Janna Lafferty is descendant from the Irish and Northumbrians. She holds a Master’s degree in Religions from Duke University. She is a doctoral student in the Department for Global and Sociocultural Studies at Florida International University with concentrations in critical food studies and cultural geography. Yvonne Sherwood is a member of the Yakama Nation. She is a doctoral student at the University of California, Santa Cruz in the Department of Sociology (with an emphasis in feminist studies). She is a UCSC Dean’s Diversity Fellow from 2011 to 2016 and was advanced to candidacy for her doctoral degree in the fall of 2015.) "The Indigenous World Under a Nuclear Cloud" Truthout, 3-27-2016, https://truthout.org/articles/the-indigenous-world-under-a-nuclear-cloud/, DOA:3-30-2019 // WWBW]

**Nuclear weapons**, electrical power **reactors and radioactive materials waste disposal results in the contamination** of surface and subsurface **water and soil** with substances such as radioactive plutonium, uranium, strontium and cesium. **These materials increase mutations, and they remain harmfully toxic for** **thousands** or even millions **of years. Accidents at nuclear** power **facilities have resulted in** decreases in regional animal and plant populations and **damaging food sources, water sources and entire ecosystems.** **Studies** conducted around Hanford, Washington **revealed that even small concentrations of nuclear waste damaged plants, contaminated soil, and rendered edible crops dangerous to eat.** To date, the only containment "solution" is to bury the waste. However, burial is neither safe nor predictable, since there are no successful ways to dispose of waste or remediate contaminated sites. Various amounts of radioactive materials continue to be found in animals, soils, plants, and water near storage and production facilities. Studies suggest that **protracted exposure to nuclear waste has resulted in genetic and epigenetic mutations in wildlife. The continuity of cultures in nuclear zones is an unstudied topic. The dynamic relationship between a people, earth and the cosmos is dramatically interrupted when the catastrophic introduction of nuclear radiation and toxic chemicals lays waste on a society.** Fourth World **[indigenous] nations across the globe repeatedly insist that the states responsible for the contamination of their territories have failed to clean up contaminated sites** or to prevent further damage. Even where state's government bodies have tried to manage the health risks of radioactive contamination, they have done so in ways that neglect harmful consequences to cultures. Some state's governments use risk avoidance strategies to reduce or prevent damage to people's health. In northwest United States, for example, the US Department of Ecology uses fish consumptions rates to prevent people from eating irradiated fish -- telling the public not to eat high levels of fish to avoid cancer risks. **Instead of cleaning up the waste, or preventing its storage in the first place, avoidance warnings ask** Fourth World **[indigenous] peoples to stop using foods and medicines, even though they are core aspects of their cultures and community.**

# 2NR

## 2NR – Extensions

### Impact Overview

Trump is about to sell nuclear technology to the Saudis, which causes regional proliferation from both Saudi Arabia and Iran; that’s **Kheel**.

Saudi prolif causes nuclear war—nuclear weapons are on hair-trigger, which causes miscalculation and regional conflicts to escalate; that’s **Edelman**.

Framing issue on the impact debate—I don’t need to win that Saudi Arabia actually proliferates—both Oswald and Edelman say that the threat of Saudi prolif triggers Iranian prolif, which would just as, if not more, destabilizing.

Outweighs the case:

A] Magnitude—extinction categorically outweighs since it prevents future value.

B] Scope—Nuclear war affects everyone on earth because it has far reaching geopolitical consequences—even local conflicts escalate—both World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam all prove that great powers get sucked in.

C] turns case—extemp

### Link Overview

Bipartisan consensus is willing to check Trump on selling nuclear tech to the Saudis—that’s **Kheel**.

[Long U/Q] All of congress is pissed at the Saudis because of Khashoggi—everyone from Marco Rubio to Rand Paul to Bob Mendenez is against these sales—empirically proven by the Yemen War vote.

[Link - Isolationism] The aff consolidates GOP support behind Trump, that’s **Pethiyagoda**. The aff is popular and gives Trump more support among the GOP on foreign policy—that makes congressmen afraid to defy him.

[Link - Gridlock] Trump’s budget proposals are terrible—they waste congressional time and cause gridlock because he doesn’t know how to submit a budget, that’s **Daniels**—that kills political momentum and prevents congress from passing other bills.

## 2NR – U/Q – Passes Now

### 2NR – Congress Pissed

#### Congress is ticked at Trump right now for circumventing their authority—they will act now.

DiChristopher 4/10 [Tom Dichristopher, (Energy Reporter, CNBC) “Senators seek oversight power after Trump administration reveals nuclear energy transfers to Saudi Arabia” CNBC, 4-10-2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/10/senators-seek-oversight-power-on-us-nuclear-energy-transfers.html, DOA:4-22-2019 // WWBW]

A group of **bipartisan** senators on Wednesday introduced **legislation** that **would require the executive branch to** regularly **disclose when it allows companies to engage in nuclear energy cooperation with foreign countries.** The move comes amid an uproar on Capitol Hill following reports that **the Department of Energy gave permission to several companies to share nuclear energy information with Saudi Arabia.** The Energy Department later confirmed that it has granted seven of the so-called Part 810 authorizations to U.S. firms competing to build nuclear reactors in the kingdom. Part 810 authorizations are issued to companies so they can discuss nonpublic nuclear energy technology with foreign counterparts. The companies responding to the Saudi request for bids would need the permissions to make their pitches. Former U.S. nonproliferation officials tell CNBC the authorizations likely cover very basic information and do not raise concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation. Still, members of Congress have hammered Trump officials over the authorizations in recent budget hearings and moved swiftly to introduce oversight to the Part 810 process. On Wednesday, Democratic Sens. Edward Markey of Massachusetts and Tim Kaine of Virginia partnered with Republican Sens. Marco Rubio of Florida and Todd Young of Indiana to introduce an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act. The amendment would require the Energy and State departments to report to Congress any Part 810 applications reviewed and approved or rejected over the last 90 days in a quarterly report. The amendment would also require the Energy Department to send to Congress all Part 810 authorizations going back to 2015, the last time the department revised the application process. Finally, the legislation would give the chairman or ranking member of several congressional committees the authority to request any pending or approved Part 810 applications. The Energy Department would have to answer the request within 10 days. The Energy and State departments are jointly responsible for approving Part 810 authorizations. They are not required to proactively report those permissions to Congress. The president is required to keep Congress “fully and currently informed of any initiative or negotiations” relating to 123 Agreements, the overarching deals that the U.S. must reach with foreign nations before shipping nuclear equipment and fuel overseas. These agreements lay out nine criteria meant to ensure nuclear energy technology is used responsibly and that transfers do not pave the way to atomic weapons programs. **Many members of Congress object to selling nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia** in light of the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi agents and the kingdom’s role in the ongoing war in Yemen. They also point to comments from **Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman** that his country **would try to obtain a nuclear weapon if regional rival Iran developed one.**

## 2NR – L – Prevents Passage

### 2NR – Time Finite

#### Legislative docket is finite – the aff CROWDS out passage – uniquely true since once Trump’s deal is approved it’s too late to act.

Heitshusen 13 (Valerie, Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process @ Congressional Research Service, 3/18/13, ‘The Legislative Process on the Senate Floor: An Introduction”, http://www.senate.gov/CRSReports/crs-publish.cfm?pid=%26\*2D4Q%5CK3%0A)

The legislative process is laborious and time-consuming, and the time available for Senate floor action each year is limited. Every day devoted to one bill is a day denied for consideration of other legislation, and there are not enough days to act on all the bills that Senators and Senate committees wish to see enacted. Naturally, the time pressures become even greater with the approach of deadlines such as the date for adjournment and the end of the fiscal year. So, for all but the most important bills, even the threat of a filibuster can be a potent weapon. Before a bill reaches the floor or while it is being debated, its supporters often seek ways to accommodate the concerns of opponents, preferring an amended bill that can be passed without protracted debate to the time, effort, and risks involved in confronting a filibuster or the threat of one.

### 2NR – Winners Win

**Omitted**

## 2NR – I/L – Yes Prolif

### 2NR – AT Reactors Inevitable

#### **[Generic Cut] The US holds the cards—other countries are not viable alternatives.**

Pierson 3/8 [Charles Pierson, (Charles Pierson is a lawyer and a member of the Pittsburgh Anti-Drone Warfare Coalition.) "Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the Bomb" Counterpunch, 3-8-2019, https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/03/08/saudi-arabia-pakistan-and-the-bomb/, DOA:4-4-2019 // WWBW]

If Trump’s nuclear deal dies, as it should, Russia, China, South Korea, and France have also submitted bids to build the Saudi reactors.  **Each** one of these **alternate suppliers has fatal drawbacks.**  Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, writes that “**If Saudi Arabia buys Russian, it is all but asking Moscow to let Iran know exactly what the kingdom is doing** in the nuclear realm.” **Reactors which China and France are building overseas are behind schedule and over-budget.  South Korea’s reactors incorporate American technology, which means that Congress has the power under the Atomic Energy Act to block a Saudi-Korean reactor sale.**

### 2NR – Significant Tech

#### Saudi Arabia is buying important technology and has refused restrictions—they’ll be able to produce nukes at will

Bandow 4/18 [Doug Bandow, (Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is author of Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire.) "Is the Trump Administration Helping the Saudis Build a Bomb?" American Conservative, 4-18-2019, https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/is-the-trump-administration-helping-the-saudis-build-a-bomb/, DOA:4-22-2019 // WWBW]

Nevertheless, the **Trump** administration **is pushing the sale of nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia.** And **no one seems to know what safeguards will be imposed and whether MbS will abide by those limits.** “There’s a legitimate question over whether such a government could be trusted with nuclear energy and the potential weaponization of it,” worries Senator Marco Rubio. Senator Jeff Merkley agrees: “The last thing America should do is inadvertently help develop nuclear weapons for a bad actor on the world stage.” The two are pushing legislation that would give Congress the final say over any sale. The transfer of nuclear reactors is usually not controversial, so long as it’s accompanied by a cooperation agreement under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. Deputy Energy Secretary Dan Brouillette insists, “We won’t allow them to bypass 123 if they want to have civilian nuclear power that includes U.S. nuclear technologies.” Legislators remain wary, however, complaining that seven **permits**, called “Part 810 authorizations,” **have been issued to firms to provide nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia without notification to Congress.** “I believe the Saudis saw an opportunity with Trump and [son-in-law Jared] Kushner to conclude this rapidly on their terms, holding out the promise of major purchases,” charges Thomas Countryman, head of the Arms Control Association. In fact, **the Saudis**, in contrast to the Emiratis, **want to enrich uranium, which offers a principal opportunity to divert nuclear materials for military use. And Riyadh hasn’t agreed to any weapons inspections. As a result, if the Saudis come to believe they “need” a bomb—and their criteria might broaden over time—any peacetime program could automatically be turned into one for military development.**

### 2NR – Peaceful Tech --> Prolif

#### **Peaceful tech causes prolif – laundry list.**

Murphy and Ramana 4/16 [Aileen Murphy, M. V. Ramana, (Aileen Murphy will be graduating from the University of British Columbia in Vancouver with a degree in International Relations, and was the recipient of the Simons Award in Nuclear Disarmament and Global Security for research on the efforts to sell nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia. Ramana is the Simons Chair in Disarmament, Global and Human Security at the Liu Institute for Global Issues in the School of Public Policy and Global Affairs at the University of British Columbia in Vancover, Canada. Ramana is a former member of the Bulletin’s Science and Security Board and is a member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials. He is the recipient of a Guggenheim Fellowship, and of the Leo Szilard Award from the American Physical Society.) "The Trump administration is eager to sell nuclear reactors to Saudi Arabia. But why?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 4-16-2019, https://thebulletin.org/2019/04/the-trump-administration-is-eager-to-sell-nuclear-reactors-to-saudi-arabia-but-why/, DOA:4-20-2019 // WWBW]

Why exactly is there a linkage between nuclear energy and nuclear weapon capacity? There are two separate elements, the technical and the institutional. **Any nuclear power plant that is under consideration in Saudi Arabia will need to be fueled with uranium that is typically enriched in the uranium-235 component.** Saudi officials would like to acquire not just nuclear power plants but have also hinted at the possibility that they want the technology to enrich uranium. It was also been reported that “Western and Israeli intelligence services” observed “signs that” Saudi Arabia’s interest “extends into nuclear enrichment.” Just as with Iran, **the same enrichment technology can be used to produce fuel or produce fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons.** Further, **all nuclear reactors produce plutonium, which**, if separated from spent reactor fuel, **can also be used to make nuclear weapons.** In principle, this plutonium could be placed under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Whether Saudi Arabia will agree to such safeguards is not yet determined; the country has not even instituted safeguards on the small research reactor it is constructing. **Regardless of whether or not Saudi Arabia agrees to safeguards, there is always the possibility that a country could withdraw from these safeguards**, as happened with North Korea. **Saudi Arabia’s acquisition of nuclear power plants could also contribute to its nuclear weapons quest by providing a reason for training personnel in the many skills that are involved in both pursuits. Finally, there is an extensive literature in political science demonstrat[es]ing the importance of atomic energy institutions to creating bureaucratic momentum to developing nuclear weapons.**

#### **Saudi Arabia will develop nuclear weapons from peaceful technology—they have both the will and capability.**

Fuhrmann 19 [Matthew Fuhrmann, (Matthew Fuhrmann (@mcfuhrmann) is professor of political science at Texas A&M University and author of “Atomic Assistance: How Atoms for Peace Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity” (Cornell University Press, 2012) and the co-author of “Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy” (Cambridge University Press, 2016).) "The Trump Administration Wants To Sell Nuclear Technology To The Saudis — Without A Nuclear Agreement. That’S Alarming." Washington Post, 2-21-2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/02/21/trump-administration-wants-sell-nuclear-technology-saudis-without-nuclear-agreement-thats-alarming/?utm\_term=.7373585d5cf9, DOA:3-29-2019 // WWBW]

Does selling peaceful nuclear technology lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons? Researchers disagree. According to one view, **helping other countries develop peaceful nuclear programs increases the risk that they will ultimately pursue and obtain nuclear bombs. That’s what my** own **research has found** — especially when, after receiving the nuclear technology, materials, and know-how, the recipient country finds itself in a military conflict. **By reducing the barriers to bombmaking, foreign nuclear aid makes nuclear proliferation less costly and therefore more likely.** For example, after Canada and the United States gave India nuclear technology and materials in the 1950s, India fought wars with China and Pakistan over disputed borders — and then used that assistance to build and test a nuclear explosive device in 1974. Iraq’s Saddam Hussein probably intended to use a French-supplied reactor for the same purpose before Israel destroyed it in a 1981 attack. And before J. Wynand de Villiers headed South Africa’s nuclear explosive program, the United States trained him in “peaceful” nuclear energy. Other scholars dispute the notion that peaceful nuclear assistance leads to nuclear weapons proliferation. Researcher Nicholas Miller, for instance, argues that investments in nuclear energy make countries more vulnerable to economic sanctions, since those would withhold the materials needed to produce electricity — and so might be less willing to risk building bombs. Since nuclear assistance brings factors that push nations both toward and away from building nuclear weapons, he contends, the net effect is neutral. Certainly, several countries — Belgium, Mexico, the Netherlands and others — have developed nuclear energy programs without seriously pursuing nuclear weapons. And researchers Matthew Kroenig and Alexander Montgomery show that peaceful nuclear assistance does not make weapons proliferation statistically more likely; it may actually decrease this danger. So how would Saudi Arabia respond to nuclear assistance? So how would Saudi Arabia respond to nuclear assistance? With its vast oil and natural gas reserves, **Saudi Arabia**’s immediate need for nuclear power is not critical. But it **is in a dangerous neighborhood and has already waged proxy wars with Iran and other regional rivals — and will likely have such conflicts again.** If my research is correct, **that combination of security threats and nuclear assistance would give the Saudis both the will and opportunity to build a nuclear arsenal. International safeguards would make it more difficult for Saudi Arabia to use its nuclear knowledge and supplies into weapons. But a Saudi Arabia with a well-developed peaceful nuclear program is probably more likely to behave like Iraq or India than Belgium or the Netherlands.**

## 2NR – ! – Prolif Bad

### 2NR – Yes Escalation

#### Middle east arms race triggers nuclear war—laundry list of causes.

Cirincione 18 [Joe Cirincione, () "The Biggest Nuclear Threats of 2018 Will Follow Us into the New Year" Defense One, 12-29-2018, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/12/biggest-nuclear-threats-2018-will-follow-us-new-year/153838/, DOA:4-4-2019 // WWBW]

War with Iran is not an immediate nuclear risk, but starting a new, larger war in an already chaotic region would lead quickly to new nuclear programs. Iran would undoubtedly restart and expand its program (now effectively frozen by the 2015 anti-nuclear deal). Saudi Arabia has already pledged to match Iran’s efforts. New nuclear-armed states would appear alongside Israel in the region within the coming decade. **This threat ranks ahead of** North Korea because unlike Northeast **Asia**, where there are no U.S. allies who want to go to war, **the Middle East features Saudi Arabia** under Mohammed bin Salman **and Israel** under Benjamin Netanyahu, who **may seek to provoke military conflict with Iran.** President Trump seems reluctant to start new wars, but John **Bolton and** Mike **Pompeo are orchestrating a “maximum pressure” campaign and staffing up the State and Defense Departments with Iran war hawks. Our European allies** oppose this campaign, say the administration has failed to build a coalition against Iran, and **worry it will lead to military escalation. As domestic difficulties increase for the leaders of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and America, one or more of them [they] could be tempted to distract critics and rally the public with a war crisis. The Persian Gulf** was in 2018 and **will remain in 2019 the area of the world most likely to see a new war, with profound nuclear consequences.**

### 2NR – Minor Conflicts

#### Even if regional conflicts don’t escalate, prolif causes more minor conflicts by making anything below the nuclear threshold seem safe.

Kahl 12 Colin, Associate Professor at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service [“Iran and the Bomb: Would a Nuclear Iran Make the Middle East More Secure?” Foreign Affairs (Sep/Oct 2012): 157-162.]

Waltz writes that "policymakers and citizens in the Arab world, Europe, Israel, and the United States should take comfort from the fact that history has shown that where nuclear capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability." In fact, the historical record suggests that competition between a nuclear-armed Iran and its principal adversaries would likely follow the pattern known as "the stability-instability paradox," in which the supposed stability created by mutually assured destruction generates greater instability by making provocations, disputes, and conflict below the nuclear threshold seem safe. During the Cold War, for example, nuclear deterrence prevented large-scale conventional or nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, the superpowers experienced several direct crises and faced off in a series of bloody proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and elsewhere. A recent statistical analysis by the political scientist Michael Horowitz demonstrated that inexperienced nuclear powers tend to be more crisis-prone than other types of states, and research by another political scientist, Robert Rauchhaus, has found that nuclear states are more likely to engage in low-level militarized disputes with one another, even if they are less likely to engage in full-scale war.