# Rawls Plan AC v8

## 1AC

### 1AC – Framing

#### Finding a fair social structure is an apriori issue since the organization of society has a profound impact on an individual’s life path; the primary concern of justice must be to structure institutions such that arbitrary matters do not shape the entirety of someone’s life

Arneson 15 [Richard Arneson, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Equality of Opportunity (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)", Summer 2015, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/equal-opportunity/#JusEquOpp] **Tfane23**
The ideal of a society in which people do not suffer disadvantage from discrimination on grounds of supposed race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation is widely upheld as desirable in itself. For many, the ideal is more compelling than any argument that might be offered to support it. However, what is objectionable is wrongful discrimination. Distinguishing wrongful from innocent discrimination is tricky (Alexander 1992). Statistical discrimination is not per se wrong. A black man may correctly perceive black skin to be roughly correlated with traits such as common experiences and outlook that he values in friends, and prefer blacks as friends on this basis. This is surely not morally wrong. Nor would it be wrong to desire on the same basis to be employed in a firm that employs mainly blacks. It might well be the case, however, that acting on such a desire in concert with others might have significant negative consequences for others. Heterosexuals flocking together in the workplace might tend sharply to limit employment opportunities available to nonheterosexuals. On grounds of equal opportunity, then, law and social custom might be framed to restrict or prohibit acting on the desire to club together with others whom one identifies as like oneself in certain salient ways, even though this sort of discrimination is not deemed per se wrong. Formal and substantive equality of opportunity ideals require more than avoidance of discrimination. These broader ideals might be regarded as morally valuable per se and unconditionally. They might also be justified on instrumental grounds. For example, when women are excluded from the labor force, markets function less efficiently, and the ensemble of people's desires can in many settings be satisfied more fully if equal opportunity for men and women is secured. Since formal and substantive equality of opportunity norms are proposed as components of a moral theory of justified social inequality, the full justification of any candidate conception of equality of opportunity must be sought by way of examining the justification of the full theory of justice in which the candidate conception is to play a part. In much the same way, one examines a component of a car, a candidate design for a carburetor for instance, by seeing how the component would function in the car and how well the car with that component in place would perform. A conception of equality of opportunity, deemed to be morally valuable per se, might be deemed so either as a deontological requirement or as a valuable state of affairs to be promoted. A deontological requirement specifies ways in which each agent should always treat other people. An absolute deontological requirement demands to be obeyed come what may, a less than absolute requirement may be overridden if conformity to it produces an excessively bad outcome or conflicts with other deontological requirements that taken together have greater moral weight.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the Difference Principle.

**Thompson 13** [Ronald Thompson, Clemson University, "A Rawlsian Instrument for the Evaluation of Justice in Educational Policy Documents", August 2013,, <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/bf9b/52f9b742238c9509b155ac6ad755ec12cf01.pdf>] **Tfane23**
 **The Second Principle For the purposes of creating a tool to measure the justice of educational policy documents, the first principle is often background; however, it merits examination as part of the evaluative tool. This part of just policy deals mostly with structures inhabited by adults; the second principle has more application directly to the children in the educational process.** In its final rendition the second principle reads: 42 **Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.** (Rawls, 2005, p. 6) One thing that stands out immediately is that **Rawls** (1999a) **explicitly allows for the fact that different people have different talents and motivations and these different talents and motivations lead to differences in social status and income** (§12). The **societal obligation is to provide educational resources necessary for each individual to reach his potential.** Thus, he reasons, that all people with the same talents and motivation can achieve the same (Rawls, 1999a, p.63). This is very different than saying that schools have the obligation to provide all children with equal success in life. Rawls clearly accepts that economic and social inequalities will exist even in a just society. This is a revised conception of distributive justice, that societal wealth is justly, but not evenly, distributed in a cooperative manner (Freeman, 2007, p. 87). It is no surprise that those from the Marxian tradition would respond very negatively to a proposition that it is possible to do so in a market economy (Rawls, 2007, pp. 356-357; Miller, 1974) and that **Rawls allows for inequalities under the difference principle.** The Difference Principle. **The difference principle is a critical concept of Rawlsian theory that applies directly to education.** In the evaluative instrument I propose in chapter 3, it is fully 1/3 of the measurement tool, thus I am obligated to discuss this principle. Though Rawls most directly addresses this principle in economic terms, its application as a measure of social 43 justice goes to the heart of using Rawls as a foundation for educational justice. **This is the second part of the second principle: “they (social institutions) are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society**” (Rawls, 2005, p. 6). The principle can be most easily understood as an application of the Pareto efficiency (Audard, 2007, p. 148). **Vilfredo Pareto’s concept of a moving state of affairs to which at least one person is better off and no one is worse off (Pareto principle) and the point which the most benefit is accrued with harm to none is called the Pareto optimum and has been widely used in welfare economics** (Rawls, 1999a, p. 58; The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics, 2009). **Rawls** (1999a) **took this idea and applied it** in an active formulation in which he suggests that not only can this principle be used with economics, but also **with social institutions as a whole** (p.61). **It is with this in mind he proposed that social and economic inequalities be arranged to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.** Rawls (1999a) explained his concept of the efficiency difference principle: **Thus we can say an arrangement of right and duties in the basic structure is efficient only if it is impossible to change the rules to redefine the scheme of rights and duties, so as to raise the expectations of any representative man** (at least one) **without at the same time lowering the expectations of some** (at least one) **other representative man.”** (p.61) In this rendition of the Pareto optimum Rawls expands the conception from strictly one of economic concern, such as the justice of merging two companies, to include the operation of the most basic institutions, such as education. Such institutions could be as broad as methods of voting to environmental regulations to criminal 44 sentencing guidelines. School reform efforts would most certainly need to adhere to this model. Though Rawls’s difference principle is the subject of a great deal of writing in economics, that part is only indirectly related to this study and thus I will not go into the intricacies of that usage. However, the overarching issue is that public policy, including educational policy, has a goal of Pareto optimality in that inequities may exist so long as those inequalities continue to benefit those least well off. So **in a Rawlsian justice model, policies are to be arranged to the disproportionate benefit of the least well off. This is important in the design of a measurement of justice for educational policy**; however, it must be noted that this principle is subordinate to the principle of fair equality of opportunity (Freeman, 2007, p. 92).

**Normative statements like the resolution require understanding the distinction between subjects that traditional frameworks deem worthy of recognition. This means the primary moral obligation must be focused on granting recognition of the oppressed**

**Butler 09**, Judith. Frames of war: When is life grievable?. London: Verso, 2009. 138

In a recent exchange,1 the British sociologist Chetan Bhatt remarked that "in sociology, cultural theory or cultural studies, many of us assume a field of truths ... a (albeit contested) field of theoretical intelligibility for understanding or describing 'Self', 'Other', the subject, identity, culture."2 He adds: "I am no longer sure these concepts necessarily have the expansive capacity to speak to the massive transformations of life-worlds outside Euro America, the rapid unscrambling and repackaging of what we call 'identity' ..." If Bhatt is right, then the very framework by which we proceed, whether that of multiculturalism or human rights, presumes specific kinds of subjects that mayor may not correspond to the modes of life in play within the present time. **The subjects presumed by** the liberal and multicultural **frameworks** (and we will have to try to distinguish between them) **are characterized as belonging to certain** kinds of cultural **identities**, variously conceived as singularly or multiply determined by lists of categories that include ethnicity, class, race, religion, sexuality, and gender. **There are persistent questions about** whether and **how such subjects can be represented** in law, and what might count as sufficient cultural and institutional recognition for such subjects. We ask such normative questions as if we know what we mean by the subjects even as we do not always know how best to represent or recognize various subjects. Indeed, the “we” who asks such questions for the most part assumes that the problem is a normative one, namely, how best to arrange political life so that recognition and representation can take place. And though surely this is a crucial, if not the most crucial, normative question to ask, **we cannot** possibility **approach an answer if we do not consider the** ontology of the subject whose recognition and representation is at issue. Moreover, any inquiry into that ontology requires that we consider another level at which the normative operates, namely, through **norms that produce the idea of the human who is worthy of recognition** and representation at all. That is to say, **we cannot** ask and **answer** the most commonly understood **normative questions**, regarding how best to represent or recognize such subjects, **if we fail to understand the differential of power** at work **that distinguishes between** those **subjects who will be eligible for recognition and those who will not**. In other words, what is the norm according to which the subject is produced who then becomes the presumptive "ground" of normative debate?

### 1AC – Advantage

#### There is an obvious performance divide on the basis of race for standardized tests – empirics prove.

Reeves and Halikias 17 [Richard V. Reeves and Dimitrios Halikias, Brookings Institute, "Race gaps in SAT scores highlight inequality and hinder upward mobility", February 1, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/research/race-gaps-in-sat-scores-highlight-inequality-and-hinder-upward-mobility/] **Tfane23**
The SAT provides a measure of academic inequality at the end of secondary schooling. Moreover, insofar as SAT scores predict student success in college, inequalities in the SAT score distribution reflect and reinforce racial inequalities across generations. In this paper, we analyze racial differences in the math section of the general SAT test, using publicly available College Board population data for all of the nearly 1.7 million college-bound seniors in 2015 who took the SAT. (We do not use the newest data released for the class of 2016, because the SAT transitioned mid-year to a new test format, and data has so far only been released for students who took the older test.) Our analysis uses both the College Board’s descriptive statistics for the entire test-taking class, as well as percentile ranks by gender and race. (The College Board has separate categories for “Mexican or Mexican American” and “Other Hispanic, Latino, or Latin American.” We have combined them under the term Latino.) The mean score on the math section of the SAT for all test-takers is 511 out of 800, the average scores for blacks (428) and Latinos (457) are significantly below those of whites (534) and Asians (598). The scores of black and Latino students are clustered towards the bottom of the distribution, while white scores are relatively normally distributed, and Asians are clustered at the top: CCF\_20170201\_Reeves\_1 Race gaps on the SATs are especially pronounced at the tails of the distribution. In a perfectly equal distribution, the racial breakdown of scores at every point in the distribution would mirror the composition of test-takers as whole i.e. 51 percent white, 21 percent Latino, 14 percent black, and 14 percent Asian. But in fact, among top scorers—those scoring between a 750 and 800—60 percent are Asian and 33 percent are white, compared to 5 percent Latino and 2 percent black. Meanwhile, among those scoring between 300 and 350, 37 percent are Latino, 35 percent are black, 21 percent are white, and 6 percent are Asian: CCF\_20170201\_Reeves\_2 The College Board’s publicly available data provides data on racial composition at 50-point score intervals. We estimate that in the entire country last year at most 2,200 black and 4,900 Latino test-takers scored above a 700. In comparison, roughly 48,000 whites and 52,800 Asians scored that high. The same absolute disparity persists among the highest scorers: 16,000 whites and 29,570 Asians scored above a 750, compared to only at most 1,000 blacks and 2,400 Latinos. (These estimates—which rely on conservative assumptions that maximize the number of high-scoring black students, are consistent with an older estimate from a 2005 paper in the Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, which found that only 244 black students scored above a 750 on the math section of the SAT.)

#### Race is the strongest predictor of SAT scores—large-scale regression analysis.

Geiser 15, [Saul, PhD in Sociology @ UCB], 10-1-15, “THE GROWING CORRELATION BETWEEN RACE AND SAT SCORES: New Findings from California by Saul Geiser”, Berkeley Center for Studies in Higher Education

Figure 1 (next page) shows the multiple correlation between SAT scores and three measures of socioeconomic status -- family income, parental education, and race/ethnicity -- among 1,144,047 California high school graduates who applied for freshman admission at UC from 1994 through 2011. SAT scores are the sum of the verbal and mathematical components of the SAT I until that test was revised in 2006; the sum of the critical reading and math components is used thereafter. Family income is derived from information reported in the UC application and is adjusted for inflation. Following standard practice in economic research, this analysis uses the log of income, which takes into account the diminishing marginal effect of income at higher income levels (i.e., a $10,000 increase in income is likely to have a greater effect for a student whose family earns $35,000 annually than one from a family earning $350,000). Data on parental education and race/ethnicity are also derived from information reported in the UC application. Parents’ education is that of the applicant’s highest-educated parent.3 The three socioeconomic variables were entered into a multiple regression to determine the extent to which they “explained” or statistically accounted for differences in SAT scores among UC applicants. To provide a point of comparison, the same regression was run with high-school grade point average as the dependent variable to determine the extent to which differences in students’ HSGPA could be explained by these same factors. The regression results show a marked increase since 1994 in the proportion of variance in SAT scores that can be predicted from socioeconomic background factors largely determined at students’ birth. After falling slightly from 25% to 21% between 1994 and 1998, the proportion of explained variance increased each year thereafter, growing to 35% by 2011, the last year for which the author has obtained data. Remarkably, more than a third of the variance in SAT scores among UC applicants can now be predicted by family income, education, and race/ethnicity. This result contrasts sharply with that for high school GPA: Socioeconomic background factors accounted for only 7% of the variance in HSGPA in 1994 and 8% in 2011.4 This is not to suggest that socioeconomic factors “cause” SAT scores in any simple or direct fashion. As the College Board cautions in its annual reports on SAT performance, “[R]elationships between test scores and other factors such as educational background, gender, racial/ethnic background, parental education and household income are complex and interdependent. These factors do not directly affect test performance; rather, they are associated with educational experiences both on tests such as the SAT I and in schoolwork” (College Board, 2000, p. iii). Socioeconomic factors, in other words, are mediated by other, more proximate experiences that do have an impact on test performance, such access to test prep services or the quality of the schools that students attend. Nevertheless, even without being able to observe those intermediating experiences directly, regression analysis enables one to assess the relative importance of different socioeconomic factors in predicting test performance. Figure 2 provides standardized regression coefficients, or “beta weights,” for predicting SAT scores conditional on family income, parents’ education, and race/ethnicity. The coefficients show the predictive weight of each factor after controlling for the effects of the other two, thereby providing a measure of the unique contribution of each factor to the prediction. In 1994, at the beginning of the period covered in this analysis, parental education was the strongest of the three socioeconomic predictors of test performance. (The standardized regression coefficient of 0.27 in that year means that, for each one standard deviation increase in parental education, SAT scores increased by 0.27 of a standard deviation, when income and underrepresented minority status were held constant.) The predictive weight for parental education has remained about the same since then. The weight for family income has shown a small but steady increase from 0.13 in 1998 to 0.18 in 2011. But the most important change has been the growing salience of race/ethnicity. By 2011, the predictive weight for underrepresented minority status, 0.29, was greater than that for either family income or parental education. When the regression results for the UC sample are pooled across applicant cohorts, race/ethnicity is the strongest predictor of SAT scores over the last four years.5 A key implication of this finding is that racial and ethnic group differences in SAT scores are not simply reducible to differences in family income and parental education. At least for the UC sample, there remains a large and growing residual effect of race/ethnicity after those factors are taken into account. Whatever mediating factors may be involved, it appears that their effects are different and more pronounced for students of color. If true, this conclusion has important implications about the efficacy of race-neutral policies for redressing racial disparities in college admissions.

#### Standardized testing is wielded to exclude qualified minorities in favor of rich whites – skews minorities out of selective colleges.

Carnevale et al 18 [Anthony P. Carnevale, research Professor and Director of the Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce, PhD public finance economics from Syracuse; Jeff Strohl, Director of Research, PhD economics from American; Martin Van Der Werf, former reporter and editor at The Chronicle of Higher Education, award-winning reporter, columnist and editor at The St. Louis Post-Dispatch and The Arizona Republic; Michael C. Quinn, Research Analyst, MA public policy from Georgetown; Dmitri Repnikov, MS Applied Econ from Johns Hopkins] “Our Separate and Unequal Public Colleges” Executive Summary, Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce RE

America’s selective public colleges should be among the great equalizers in our society. Funded primarily by taxpayers and carrying a relatively low price tag, these colleges are meant to be engines of opportunity for all.

In reality, however, the doors of these colleges are open wider to White students than to their Black and Latino peers. Whites have almost two-thirds (64%) of the seats in selective public colleges even though Whites make up barely half (54%) of the nation’s college-age population. Blacks and Latinos are making unprecedented gains in college-going, but the vast majority of Black and Latino students enroll in overcrowded and underfunded open-access colleges, primarily community colleges. Consequently, fewer Black and Latino students receive a bachelor’s degree.

Leaders of selective public colleges justify the disparity in the racial makeup of their student bodies by citing the fact that Black and Latino students don’t score as high on standardized admissions tests (the SAT and ACT) as White students do. The average test score of incoming students is an important factor in college rankings, and colleges have long set prestige as their highest pursuit rather than a commitment to upward mobility for all.

The result is we are left with a taxpayer-funded postsecondary system that does not reflect the public it supposedly is serving. Selective public colleges reflect the Latino college-age population (18-to-24-year-olds) in just one state: Florida. Meanwhile, other states are far from parity: for example, in California, 48 percent of the college-age population is Latino, but only 25 percent of students in selective public colleges are Latino. Blacks are not proportionately represented in selective public colleges in any state. Only Kentucky comes close. Other states are egregiously unbalanced. In Alabama, for example, 32 of every 100 college-age residents are Black, but only seven of every 100 students at the state’s selective public colleges are Black.

The SAT and ACT are given more weight than they actually deserve as predictors of completion and success after college. The tests reflect the earlier schooling and upbringing of the testtakers far more than they reflect their ability and potential. The use of test results as arbitrary qualifications for entry into selective colleges has made a mockery of educational opportunity. Admission test scores are a dodge: a means of laundering race and class inequality behind a scientific façade of quantitative metrics. In 2014, for example, 341,000 Black and Latino high school seniors scored above average on standardized college-entrance examinations, such as the SAT, but only 19 percent of them attended a selective college. Meanwhile, 31 percent of White students who scored above average on a standardized test attended a selective college. So, like many factors in college admissions, the argument favoring academic merit is just another name for affirmative action for already-privileged Whites.

The disparity is not just about fairness, it’s about money. Selective public colleges are spending nearly three times as much per student on instructional and academic support as public open-access colleges. Even among equally qualified students, what that money buys at selective public colleges is much higher graduation rates and, as a result, likely access to at least a middle-class income. The funding divide between the selective public colleges and the open-access public colleges is due in part to an elite political bargain among legislators, governors, selective public colleges, and affluent (mostly White) families. Affluent families have tolerated large tuition increases at selective public colleges because their children get access to a quality education subsidized by the public. The tuitions at selective public colleges are still in many cases far lower that at selective private colleges. This makes the tuitions at selective public colleges affordable and attractive to wealthy families even as they may seem prohibitively expensive to poor families.

The combination of racial segregation and widening disparities in spending between public selective and public open-access colleges has exacerbated race-based gaps in educational and economic outcomes. Not all students can access the best public colleges and the benefits they confer. The result is that the public higher education system is another factor that is disproportionately keeping Blacks and Latinos from fulfilling their potential, entering the middle class, and living fully in their time—the basic commitments of a democratic capitalist society.

#### The impact is cycles of poverty and poor education

Carnevale et al 2 [Anthony P. Carnevale, research Professor and Director of the Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce, PhD public finance economics from Syracuse; Jeff Strohl, Director of Research, PhD economics from American; Martin Van Der Werf, former reporter and editor at The Chronicle of Higher Education, award-winning reporter, columnist and editor at The St. Louis Post-Dispatch and The Arizona Republic; Michael C. Quinn, Research Analyst, MA public policy from Georgetown; Dmitri Repnikov, MS Applied Econ from Johns Hopkins] “Our Separate and Unequal Public Colleges” Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce RE

Separate and unequal public college systems increase earnings disparities and hurt the careers of Blacks and Latinos. In combination, all these fiscal, demographic, and educational forces have resulted in racially separate and financially unequal public colleges.

The fact that we are devoting more public resources to the colleges where Whites are highly concentrated while underfunding the open-access public colleges where minority students are more likely to enroll is of great consequence. Since Whites are disproportionately attending the colleges that produce the highest graduation rates, the result is a continued widening of the already yawning gaps in college degrees among Whites, Blacks, and Latinos. In the United States, 37 percent of Whites have a bachelor’s degree or higher, compared to 22 percent of Blacks and 17 percent of Latinos (Figure 4).

These disparities in educational credentials carry over into the workforce. On average, Whites earn $50,000 annually while Blacks earn $38,000 and Latinos earn $33,000.37 In other words, for every dollar a White worker earns, a Black worker earns 76 cents, and a Latino worker earns 66 cents.38

All workers, no matter their race or ethnicity, see a huge earnings boost from completing a bachelor’s degree compared to those who at most completed a high school education. While Blacks and Latinos with bachelor’s degrees still earn less than Whites, their earnings gains are greater, on a percentage basis, after they earn the degrees. In 2015, for Blacks, the median earnings for a prime-age working adult were 67 percent higher for those with a bachelor’s degree than for those who had only a high school diploma. The jump in earnings between a high school diploma and a bachelor’s degree was even larger for Latinos: 78 percent. For Whites, a bachelor’s degree resulted, on average, in a 59 percent boost in earnings (Figure 5).

### 1AC – Solvency

#### Plan: In the United States, colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests for undergraduate admissions decisions.

#### CX solves any interps or spec issues – I’ll comply to anything that doesn’t substantially change the aff advocacy. Infinite interps exist – including bidirectional ones, which ensures that I can never meet – CX checks ensure engagement.

#### Our framing affirms – the plan is an act of the difference principle

#### Eliminating standardized tests deals a significant blow to educational inequalities

Dandaneau PhD 18 [Steven P. Dandaneau, sociology from Brandeis] "Dr. King and Standardized Testing," No Publication, https://firstgen.naspa.org/blog/dr-king-and-standardized-testing 4-2-2018 RE

That’s where the USC Center for Enrollment Research, Policy, and Practice meeting provides reason for hope. To hear tell of it, many who gathered placed standardized testing in the crosshairs. Based on decades of compelling historical, statistical, theoretical and educational research—not to mention mountains of anecdotal experience—a new generation of enrollment experts argue that test optional admission and scholarship decisions should give way to test-adverse policies and practices. If the ACT, SAT, and their kin epitomize institutional discrimination—culturally biased, geared to ratify rather than subvert existing class inequalities, susceptible to gaming, derived from theoretically and historically disreputable sources--why would educators not reject their use and warn students away from them? Yet, year after year, these exams are used to erect predictable barriers for students who, for no fault of their own, were born, raised, and schooled in the bottom half of the social class system.

Vested interests will protest. The morally lazy will prefer the status quo. But when did Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. or the many in league with him in the struggle for social justice abide predictable discrimination, countenance systemic injury and harm, turn a blind eye to intellectual bankruptcy?

A successful national movement to eliminate use of standardized tests for admissions and scholarship allocation would strike a blow against prevailing inequality and injustice in higher education. No single alternative reform would do more to make our institutions more first-generation student-ready, first, by eliminating the perhaps greatest barrier to access and affordability, and, second, by fostering a learning environment in which the diversity of intelligences and life experiences is recognized and respected. It would not solve all our problems nor render schooling in America fair and democratic. It would be a significant leap in the right direction, and it might inspire additional forms of social change.

I had occasion during my university’s celebration of Dr. King’s legacy to share some of these ideas with colleagues. I was surprised at how many readily agreed that standardized testing would be useless were it not for its odious discriminatory consequences. Two physicists reported that, from their vantage, the GRE was as unhelpful as standardized exams aimed at prospective undergraduate students. Our new Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer interviewed for his position, in part, by sharing his personal, if you will, score-story; how a scarlet letter ACT nearly prevented him from gaining access to higher education. In my work, I often speak with prospective students and their families about honors opportunities. Few respond with anything but recognition and gratitude for efforts to disavow the value of standardized test results. This includes students whose scores place them in the highest percentiles.

I would venture that few are vested in standardized testing. Most, I believe, would welcome its demise and the flourishing in its wake of multifaceted evaluation of genuine merit and discernable potential, increase in need-based institutional aid, and heightened awareness concerning both overt and subtle forms of class privilege. Most would welcome the expansion of opportunity and diversity, and reintroduction of primary reliance on sensitive and skilled scholarly judgment in admissions decisions and scholarship allocation. If Dr. King were with us, I think he would march against standardized tests. Reiteration of his dream aside, today’s educational leaders might honor Dr. King’s social justice legacy by taking it upon themselves, as only they can, to eliminate standardized testing from higher education.

**Test-optional fails—supporting data is unreliable**

**Jaschik 18,** Scott, Writer at Inside Higher Ed. 4/27/18, Making the Case for Test Optional. [https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/04/27/large-study-finds-colleges-go-test-optional-become-more-diverse-and-maintain](https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/04/27/large-study-finds-colleges-go-test-optional-become-more-diverse-and-maintain%20)

Each year, more colleges announce that they are ending requirements that applicants submit SAT and ACT scores -- joining hundreds of others in the "test-optional" camp. Just this week, Augsburg University in Minnesota made such a shift. The university's announcement said that the policy had strong faculty support and was seen as likely to boost the diversity of the student body. High school grades in college preparatory courses are the key to good admissions decisions, said officials there, just as their peers have said at many other institutions. But **even as more colleges drop the testing requirements, the College Board has insisted evidence backs its view that the best way to predict college success is to review both grades and test scores.** Measuring Success: Testing, Grades and the Future of College Admissions, published by Johns Hopkins University Press in January, was a major salvo in the debate. Essays in the book (edited by three scholars with ties current or past to the College Board) described research that generally questioned test-optional policies. **The policies**, the book argued, **have failed to add to diversity -- or at a minimum have not led to increases in diversity that outpace gains at institutions with testing requirements**. Further, the book highlighted research on high school grade inflation, which some see as an argument for standardized testing. (Of course, others don't.) Studying the impact of test-optional policies isn't easy, say both supporters and critics of the policy, because control groups are hard to come by. **A college dropping testing requirements as part of an effort to attract minority students is likely doing multiple things with that goal in mind. And shifts having nothing to do with testing can depress applications or change the pool.**

### 1AC – Theory UV

#### [1] 1AR theory is drop the debater and no RVIs: a) it’s the only way to check NC abuse, b) there’s a 13-7 rebuttal skew, and c) the NR can brute force any issue with 6 to my 3.

#### [2] The negative debater may only defend one unconditional route to the ballot a] reciprocity – I’m stuck with one unconditional aff b] Clash – only having one route to the ballot ensures better interaction of arguments because there are less arguments for the 1ar to interact, otherwise all the arguments will be blippy

#### [3] Methodological pluralism creates critical reflexivity and sustainable critique – it legitimizes the perm.

Bleiker 14 [Roland Bleiker 2014 (professor of international relations at the University of Queensland) INTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW, International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique, 2014. Retrieved May 26, 2016 from EBSCOhost.] **Tfane23**

Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine’s sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” (p. 63, see also pp. 101-102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. But each should, in a way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 102). In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when—or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. They can range from poststructural deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences. The benefit of such a methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives. Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them. For Levine, this is how reification may be “checked at the source” and this is how a “critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable” (p. 103). It is in this sense that Levine’s approach is not really post-foundational but, rather, an attempt to “balance foundationalisms against one another” (p. 14). There are strong parallels here with arguments by assemblage thinking and complexity theory—links that could have been explored in more detail.

#### [4] All neg theory violations and kritik links must come from the text of the AC, not the absence of specification – a] it skews the round in your favor by forcing me to defend all of history or bidirectional theory.

#### [5] Affirming is harder – [A] all theory arguments have an implicit aff flex standard because of huge side bias – outweighs neg fairness arguments unless they prove how it uniquely outweighs the disparity since it’s structural.

Shah 19 Sachin “A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SIDE-BIAS ON THE 2019 JANUARY-FEBRUARY LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE TOPIC” NSD, 15 February 2019. <http://nsdupdate.com/2019/a-statistical-analysis-of-side-bias-on-the-2019-january-february-lincoln-douglas-debate-topic/> SJCP//JG

To further quantify the side-bias, the proportion of negative wins when the affirmative was favored (p1) can be compared with the proportion of affirmative wins when the negative is favored (p2). Ideally the difference between the proportions would be 0; however, p1 = 34.84% while p2 = 28.77, a staggering 6.07% difference. Now the question is whether this difference is statistically significant. In order to determine the answer, a two-proportion z-test was used. The null hypothesis is p1 – p2 = 0 , because that means both sides are able to overcome the debating level skew equally. The alternative hypothesis is then p1 – p2 > 0, meaning the negative is able to overcome the skew more than the affirmative is able, demonstrating a side-bias. This two-proportion z-test rejected the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative (p-value < 0.0001). There is sufficient evidence that the negative is able to overcome the skew more often than the affirmative can. This implies there is a less than 0.01% chance that there is no side-bias because it demonstrates the higher proportion of negative wins when the affirmative is favored is significant. In short, the negative has a greater ability to win difficult rounds than the affirmative does, which indicates there exists a skew in the negative’s favor. This analysis is statistically rigorous and relevant in several aspects: (A) The p-value is less than the alpha. (B) The data is on the current January-February topic, meaning it’s relevant to rounds these months [2]. (C) The data represents a diversity of debating and judging styles across the country. (D) This analysis accounts for disparities in debating skill level. (E) Type I error was reduced by choosing a small alpha level. The combination of these points validates this analysis. As a final note, it is also interesting to look at the trend over multiple topics. In the rounds from 93 TOC bid distributing tournaments (2017 – 2019 YTD), the negative won 52.99% of ballots (p-value < 0.0001) and 54.63% of upset rounds (p-value < 0.0001). This suggests the bias might be structural, and not topic specific, as this data spans six different topics. Therefore, this analysis confirms that affirming is in fact harder again on the 2019 January-February topic [3]. So don’t lose the flip!

### 1AC – Kritonk UV

#### [1] You can’t link to higher education – a] it explodes prep burdens bcuz it forces me to think of all the ways colleges are bad, which is not in my burden of solvency and b] I don’t defend colleges, I simply defend that an oppressive structure is bad. This would mean that you would have to affirm standardized testing as a method of keeping people out of college, but you retrench them in oppressive structures which is a double turn.

#### We need to remedy the political disengagement being caused by the K’s narrative of futility

Levine 17 (Adam, associate professor in the Department of Government at Cornell University and received his Ph.D. from University of Michigan. Author of American Insecurity: Why Our Economic Fears Lead to Political Inaction, “The Myth of Civic Engagement During Trump’s Presidency,” Behavioral Scientist, Nov. 6, 2017 <http://behavioralscientist.org/myth-civic-engagement-trumps-presidency/> dsk)

Since President Donald Trump’s election, countless news stories have touted massive increases in civic engagement. We’ve read that Trump is “Reviving American Democracy” and “Driving New Political Engagement.” An opinion piece in The Atlantic says he’s “triggered a systemic immune response in the body politic.” Another in The Washington Post reports Trump’s “most striking accomplishment so far … [is] one of the greatest surges of American citizen action in half a century.” These stories illustrate an increasingly popular narrative: The Trump presidency has set the stakes so high and made politics so important to people’s daily lives that Americans are becoming politically active and aware in record numbers. The evidence for this narrative seems obvious. Just look at the record-setting Women’s March, the March for Science, and the many “resistance” groups that have sprouted up around the country. The media can even point to their own sky-high ratings for proof of greater political consciousness. In many ways the American public is just as disengaged now as it was before Trump’s election. Unfortunately, traditional metrics tell a more lackluster story. The American public continues to exhibit low awareness of major national news stories and national figures. Voters in New Jersey and Virginia know little about their major gubernatorial candidates, just like in previous elections. There was no evidence of any increase (and even some evidence of a decrease) in civic action in fall 2016 compared to spring 2016. There was almost record low turnout in the Los Angeles mayoral election in March 2017. And there were extremely low turnout rates in most special elections earlier this year as well. Taken together, these patterns suggest that in many ways the American public is just as disengaged now as it was before Trump’s election. Behavioral science research also challenges the logic that when the stakes are high, civic engagement is also high. In fact, this is (often) a myth. While some people become more engaged once they see how political issues are relevant to their interests and values, others become disengaged precisely because they view political issues as relevant to their interests and values. How could personal relevance lead to less engagement? In short, because it highlights our constraints. In many cases, the stakes involved directly relate to time and money constraints that people face in their personal lives or the impact of their voice in the political process. At moments like these, political rhetoric calling attention to what’s at stake makes people feel poorer and less efficacious, which reduces engagement. For instance, I conducted several experiments on civic engagement related to health care reform from 2009 to 2012. I found that among people who lack health insurance, large medical bills were not automatically salient whenever they were asked to contribute money to an organization advocating for health care reform. However, solicitations that referenced the high cost of health care led people to think about their personal financial burdens, which made them feel poorer and donate less. Consistent with research on the psychology of scarcity, my findings underscore how people’s perceptions of what they can afford depend upon whatever other demands on their resources are salient at that moment. Comparing these findings with the recent surge in activism in response to efforts to repeal the Affordable Care Act (ACA) underscores something critical as well: It is much more difficult to motivate activism based on relieving current struggles (as in 2009 when the ACA was introduced in Congress) versus averting the threat of future struggles (as in 2017 when Republicans tried to repeal the ACA). People can become disengaged precisely because they view political issues as relevant to their interests and values. We’d expect similar patterns when asking people to volunteer time (such as canvassing door-to-door), and when the stakes remind them of their own time pressures. For example, many people support expanded public transit because it promises to relieve traffic congestion. Yet this means that people view the stakes of the issue as directly related to a large drain on their time—how much time they spend stuck in traffic between the grocery store and work and the doctor’s office. We’d thus expect that solicitations for volunteers that reference these stakes will reduce volunteering. We even see this effect in situations in which the stakes are more fundamental to democracy: voting. In 2016 Robyn Stiles at Louisiana State University and I conducted field experiments to examine how calling attention to political inequality impacts people’s interest in registering to vote. We used several common phrases like, “the system is rigged,” “wealthy buying elections”, and “your voice is not yet being heard.” We found that framing the decision to vote in these ways reduces feelings of power and, in turn, also reduces interest in participating in the electoral process. Yet we also found that the rhetoric was persuasive in the sense that people saw it as a clear violation of equality. The fact that it’s persuasive no doubt accounts for its prevalence in the first place, yet we should recognize that it may have unintended negative consequences for engagement. At a time when a large part of the American public remains highly disengaged from public affairs, even after the 2016 election, it is more important than ever that we not only diagnose the problem but also understand the barriers that need to be overcome to solve it. Recognizing the myth of civic engagement underscores how common forms of political rhetoric may be self-undermining. Precisely because they are persuasive, they reduce people’s desire to spend scarce resources of attention, time, and money on politics. Going forward, as we work to expand civic engagement and help ensure that our democracy lives up to its ideals of equal responsiveness, we can’t assume that simply high stakes will get people to take action. Instead, we should investigate how other influences—such as social factors—foster engagement.

#### Our approach to the debate endorses radical pragmatism which provides the best model for critiquing and changing problematic social structures

Winant ‘4 [Howard Winant, Ph. D, Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, fouunder and director of the University of California Center for New Racial Studies, *The New Politics of Race: Globalism, Difference, Justice*, 2004, University of Minnesota Press (Minneapolis/London) schauer]

Pragmatist social theory has proved effective at theorizing micro-macro linkages as aggregations or iterations of small-scale ("micro") interactions (Collins 1987). But it works better in making links "from the small to the large" than in the opposite direction. Making links "from the large to the small," explaining processes of political socialization or acculturation, has generally been the province of macro level theoretical approaches.15 Certainly the standard pragmatist approach has a great deal to offer. Racial formation theory has adopted much of its version of racialization, much of its explanation of the dynamics of racial identity, from the symbolic interactionist account of "role-taking" that comes through Blumer from its origins in Mead. In addition there are important links between this pragmatist approach and the work of Frantz Fanon (1967), as well as with subalternity theory (Scott 1990). Yet, valuable as this account of microlevel agency is, a more convincing approach would highlight cause-effect relationships, and micro-macro linkages, that work in both directions. In other words, a more effective pragmatist approach would go beyond "iterated interaction ritual chains"-Randall Collins's model is just one of several that work "from the small to the large"; it would simultaneously recognize macrosocial determinations of micro level experience and interaction, thus seeing the linkage as a "two-way street." Racial formation theory does this through its concept of the complex intersection of racial projects, which operate simultaneously at micro- and macrolevels. Supreme Court decisions, say, and friendships in a schoolyard, are in this sense both racial projects (Omi and Winant 1994). Not only that, these large-scale and small-scale instances of racialization are complexly interconnected. Individual identities and microlevel relationships both repeat and resist the racial identities and roles in which they are located. Simultaneously, large-scale, macro level political processes (those Supreme Court decisions, for example) are effective only to the extent that they can be socialized, ideologically interpellated (Althusser 1971), and "inhabited," so to speak, as well as enforced. I emphasize that there is no concrete division between micro- and macrolevel social relationships. Pragmatist social theory can neither dispense with the centrality of individual interpretation and agency nor with the effectivity of institutions and collective action in its account of social structure. Pragmatism must avow-or at least cannot avoid-the necessarily indeterminate, or unstable, character of social structure. For after all, interpretations are flexible, and cooperation can be withheld or stinted (as in the formula: "I comply but I do not obey"). Similarly, social agencies and organizations can lose their legitimacy, their "grip" on their members, the adhesion of their subjects. In such recognitions and avowals, pragmatism can take on a radical new applicability to the pressing tasks of social theory

#### Rawls solves your ontology claims.

**Shelby 04** [Tommie Shelby, Fordham Law Review Volume 72 | Issue 5, "Race and Ethnicity, Race and Social Justice: Rawlsian Considerations", 2004, <https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3969&context=flr>] **Tfane23**
 **Rawls claims that moral persons have two characteristics: (1) "they are capable of having** (and are assumed to have) **a conception of their good** (as expressed by a rational plan of life)"; and **(2) "they are capable of having** (and are assumed to acquire) **a sense of justice, a normally effective desire to apply and to act upon the principles of justice, at least to a certain minimum degree**.",2' Rawls maintains that the capacity for moral personality "is a sufficient condition for being entitled to equal justice. 22 (He leaves aside the question of whether the capacity for moral personality is also a necessary condition.) No claim about the degree to which normal, adult persons embody or realize the powers of moral personality can justify unequal justice. From the standpoint of social justice, then, there is no distinction to be made between complete and incomplete moral persons, i.e., there are no sub-persons in a legitimate conception of justice. **Now not only does Rawls assume that the overwhelming majority of humankind are moral persons in his sense, but he explicitly denies that any race is without the capacity for moral personality: "There is no race or recognized group of human beings that lacks this attribute**. '23 Indeed, he urges that we simply assume that the requirement of a capacity for moral personality is always met, noting that to suppose otherwise would be imprudent, as this could 19. Mills, supra note 17, at 30-31. 20. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 3, at 112-18. 21. Id. at 442. 22. Id. (emphasis added). 23. Id. § 77, at 443. 1702 [Vol. 72 RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE lead to injustice.24 **Thus it is quite clear that, within justice as fairness, the principles of justice apply equally to all regardless of race.** The principle of equal justice regardless of race is also firmly secured in Political Liberalism, where Rawls explicitly defends a strictly political (as opposed to a metaphysical) conception of justice and a corresponding political conception of persons. **A political conception of justice aims to be, as far as possible, independent of contested and incompatible, comprehensive philosophical, moral, and religious doctrines, as these controversial views cannot form the basis for reasoned, informed, and voluntary political agreement among citizens in a democratic society.**

### 1AC – Phil UV

#### Prefer Comparative Worlds

#### Fiat centered debate creates real world change— recent empirics prove.

Gurney 18

Kyra Gurney, Columbia University M.S., Journalism, “Last fall, they debated gun control in class. Now, they debate lawmakers on TV,” Tampa Bay Times, 23 February 2018, accessed: 29 July 2019, <http://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2018/02/23/they-debated-gun-control-in-class-last-fall-now-they-debate-lawmakers-on-tv/>, A.K.

When students at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High debated gun control in class last November, they never imagined they were preparing to lead a national discussion on how to prevent school shootings. As the debate team filled Google docs with research on state laws, brainstormed arguments for and against universal background checks and wrote speeches, they were amassing information that would later help them formulate arguments on national TV, in face-to-face meetings with Florida legislators and at vigils for their murdered classmates. And it’s not just the students at Stoneman Douglas. Since a gunman opened fire at the high school last Wednesday, killing 17 people, teenagers from across Broward County have joined the call for stricter gun control policies. They have been praised for their composure and well-articulated arguments, which often appear so polished they have fueled conspiracy theories that the students are “crisis actors.” But what really explains the students’ poise, said Broward Schools Superintendent Robert Runcie, is the school district’s system-wide debate program that teaches extemporaneous speaking from an early age. Every public high school and middle school in the county has a debate program, along with more than two dozen elementary schools. It’s one of the largest debate programs in the country — and, amid the heartbreak, it has helped Broward students position themselves on the front lines of the #NeverAgain movement. “I’m like a parent that is just beaming with pride in terms of how they have been able to express themselves, how they’ve exhibited a kind of courage that everybody needs to have and how they’re working to reclaim their future and do what they know is right,” Runcie said. “In some ways it seems like we’ve been preparing our kids for this moment without realizing it.” The debate program has certainly helped prepare David Hogg, a senior at Stoneman Douglas who has appeared on nearly every major network and cable news program over the past week. “It’s been immensely helpful because I’ve been able to speak articulately about these current events,” Hogg said Wednesday evening on his way to a CNN town hall at the BBandT Center in Sunrise. With no time to prepare any new arguments in recent days, Hogg said he’s relied on the research he conducted in debate class last fall. “Exhausted is an understatement, but I like it,” he added, referring to the frequent media appearances. “The fast pace of the media cycle is what keeps me going.” Hogg said he joined Stoneman Douglas’ debate program on a whim in ninth grade. At the high school, debate is both a class and an after-school activity. Roughly 80 percent of the 150 students who take the class also participate in competitions, which means they spend time preparing for debates in the afternoons and on weekends. Although Hogg said he’s not a star on the team, he enjoys arguing about current events. “I’ve never won a single debate tournament, even come in 10th place,” he said. “I guess it shows you don’t have to be great at something to make an impact.” Sophomore Sari Kaufman has also used her debate training to advocate for stricter gun control policies. On Sunday, the 15-year-old Stoneman Douglas student wrote a letter to lawmakers, which was grounded in her debate class research, that has been shared hundreds of times on social media. Kaufman also brought her debate notes on a trip to Tallahassee earlier this week to meet with lawmakers. “I don’t think we made a huge change, but we definitely moved the needle a little more than it was before,” she said. Gun control isn’t the only lesson from debate class that’s come in handy this past week. Students recently studied special interest groups and lobbying, said debate teacher and program director Jesus Caro. They talked about political action committees, the groups that raise money for candidates, and about groups like the National Rifle Association. “Just to see that these kids aren’t bound by any of these rules ... it’s really moving,” Caro said. “It does make me proud.” Katherine Guerra, a sophomore at Stoneman Douglas and a debate team captain, has stayed out of the limelight. But she said the debate program has helped her classmates respond to the shooting. “We know what we want, and we have the research,” she said. “We know how things work and that gives us more liberty to speak out because we’re not unsure of things.” “The thing is in debate you have to argue both sides, which is also beneficial because as much as we want to change things we also need to see the different views,” she added. In recent years, some of the students on the team, which Caro described as “up and coming,” have traveled around the country to attend tournaments. This year, the national tournament will be held in Fort Lauderdale in June. The location was decided before the shooting, but Runcie said he plans to ask the National Speech and Debate Association to make gun control one of the topics at the competition. The Stoneman Douglas team has a long road ahead before the national competition. A beloved member, 14-year-old Alyssa Alhadeff, was killed during the shooting and the team is grieving the loss of other classmates and staff as well. Caro said he hopes the open environment in debate class, where students have space to discuss controversial issues, will give them the opportunity to share what they’re feeling. “I just know I’m going to try to give everybody a chance to speak, try to create some sense of normalcy and definitely give them opportunities to develop solutions,” he said.

#### Scenario analysis is valuable—the aff employs it in order to enhance creativity, deconstruct epistemic biases, and impart advocacy skills.

**Barma et al 16**

Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard. “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19. May 2016, R.S.

What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science? Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking. Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present. Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global political economic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8 An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

#### Reasons to reject Truth Testing

#### Their prioritization of pursuing truth over equal dialogue results in authoritarianism

**Morson** Northwestern prof **4**— (Greg, Bakhtinian Perspectives on Language, Literacy, and Learning, 317-23)

Sarah Freedman and Arnetha Ball describe learning as a dialogic process. It is not merely a **transmission of knowledge**, but an activity in which whole selves are formed and acquire new capacities for development. We live in a world of enormous cultural diversity, and the various languages and points of view—ideologies in Bakhtin’s sense—of students have become a fact that cannot be ignored. Teachers need to enter into a dialogue with those points of view and to help students do the same. For difference may best be understood not as an obstacle but as an opportunity. The range of “authoritative” and “innerly persuasive discourses” in our classrooms appears to be growing along with our cultural diversity. Freedman and Ball observe: “This rich and complex ‘contact zone’ inside the classroom yields plentiful opportunity for students to decide what will be internally persuasive for them, and consequently for them to develop their ideologies. This diversity presents both challenges and opportunities as teachers seek to guide their students on this developmental journey” (pp. 8– 9, this volume). The journey they have in mind does not so much lead to a particular goal as establish an ever-enriching process of learning. Freedman and Ball’s approach grows out of Bakhtin’s key concepts, especially one that has been largely neglected in research on him: “ideological becoming” (see Chapter 1, this volume). The implications of the essays in this volume therefore extend well beyond educational theory and practice to the humanities and social sciences generally. How does a thinking person– and we are all thinking people—develop? What happens when ideas, embodied in specific people with particular voices, come into dialogic contact? What factors guide the creation of a point of view on the world? The specific problematic of pedagogy serves as a lens to make the broader implications of such questions clearer. [End Page 317] Authority and testing How does a person develop a point of view on the world, a set of attitudes for interpreting and evaluating it ? How systematic is that point of view? Is our fundamental take on the world a philosophy with implicit doctrines or is it more like a set of inclinations and a way of probing? Perhaps it is not one, but a collection of ways of probing, a panoply of skills and habits, which a person tries out one after another the way in which one may, in performing a physical task, reach for one tool after another? What does our point of view have to do with our sense of ourselves, whether as individuals or as members of groups? What role does formal education play in acquiring and shaping it? What happens when contrary evidence confronts us or when the radical uncertainty of the world impinges on us? Whatever that “point of view” is, how does it change over time ? In any given culture or subculture, there tends to be what Bakhtin would call an “authoritative” perspective. However, the role of that perspective is not necessarily authoritarian. Despite Bakhtin’s experience as a Soviet citizen, where the right perspective on just about all publicly identified perspectives was held to be already known and certain, he was well aware that outside that circle of presumed certainty life was still governed by opinion. It is not just that rival ideologies—Christian, liberal, and many others—were still present; beyond that, each individual’s experiences led to half-formed but strongly held beliefs that enjoyed no formal expression. Totalitarianism was surely an aspiration of the Soviet and other such regimes, but it could never realize its ideal of uniformity–“the new Soviet man” who was all of a piece—for some of the same reasons it could not make a centrally planned economy work. There is always too much contingent, unexpected, particular, local, and idiosyncratic, with a historical or personal background that does not fit. Bakhtin may be viewed as the great philosopher of all that does not fit. He saw the world as irreducibly messy, unsystematizable, and contingent, and he regarded it as all the better for that. For life to have meaning, it must possess what he called “surprisingness.” If individual people are to act morally, they cannot displace their responsibility onto some systematic ideology, whether Marxist, Christian, or any other. What I do now is not reducible to any ethical, political, or metaphysical system; and I—each “I”– must take responsibility for his or her acts at this moment. As Bakhtin liked to say, there is “no alibi.” Authoritative words in their fully expressed form purport to offer an alibi. They say, like Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor: we speak the truth and you need not question, only obey, for your conscience to be at rest. Yet, every authoritative word is spoken or heard in a milieu of difference. It may try to insulate itself from dialogue with reverential tones, a special script, and all the other signs of the authority fused to it, but at the margins 319 dialogue waits with a challenge: you may be right, but you have to convince me. Once the authoritative word responds to that challenge, it ceases to be fully authoritative. To be sure, it may still command considerable deference by virtue of its past, its moral aura, and its omnipresence. But it has ceased to be free from dialogue and its authority has changed from unquestioned to dialogically tested. Every educator crosses this line when he or she gives reasons for a truth. My daughter once had a math teacher who, when asked why a certain procedure was used to solve an equation, would reply, “because some old, dead guy said so.” Of course, no answer could be further from the spirit of mathematics, where logic counts for everything and authority for nothing. Nobody proves the Pythagorean theorem by saying Pythagoras said so. Compare this reply with actually showing the logic of a procedure so the student understands the “why.” In that case, one immediately admits that there must be a good reason for proceeding in a certain way, and that it needs to be shown. The procedure does not end up as less sure because of this questioning; quite the contrary. Rather, questioning is seen as intrinsic to mathematics itself, which enjoys its authority precisely because it has survived such questioning. Even in fields that do not admit of mathematical proof, an authoritative word does not necessarily lose all authority when questioning enters into it. We can give no mathematically sure reason why democracy is preferable to dictatorship or market economies are generally more productive than command economies. But we can give reasons, which admit the possibilities of challenges we had not foreseen and may have to think about. Education and all inquiry are fundamentally different when the need for reasons is acknowledged and when questioning becomes part of the process of learning. Truth becomes dialogically tested and forever testable. In short, authoritative words may or may not be authoritarian. In the Soviet Union, authoritarian words were the norm and questioning was seen as suspect. One no more questioned Marxism-Leninism than one questioned the law of gravity (a common comparison, suggesting that each was equally sure). What the Party said was right because it was the outcome of sure historical laws guaranteeing the correctness of its rulings. Education reflected this spirit. Bakhtin’s embrace of dialogue, then, challenged not so much the economic or historical theories the regime propounded, but its very concept of truth and the language of truth it embraced. Dialogue by its very nature invites questioning, thrives on it, demands it. It follows from Bakhtin’s argument that nonauthoritarian authoritative words are not necessarily weaker than authoritarian ones. After all, one may believe something all the more because one has questioned it, provided that defenders have been willing to answer and have been more or less cogent in their defense. They need not answer all objections perfectly—we are often convinced with qualifications, with a “just in case,” with “loopholes.” 320 However, they must demonstrate that the authority is based on generally sound reasons. Morever, for many, enormous persuasive power lies in the very fact that the authoritative belief is so widely held. Everyone speaks it, even if with ironizing quotation marks. An authoritative word of this nonauthoritarian kind functions not as a voice speaking the Truth, but as a voice speaking the one point of view that must be attended to. It may be contested, rejected, or modified, the way in which church dogmas are modified over time by believers, but it cannot be ignored. Think of Huck Finn (discussed by Mark Dressman, this volume). Even when he cannot bring himself to turn in Jim as a runaway slave, he accepts the authority of the social voice telling him that such an action would be right. He does not question that voice, just realizes he will not follow it and will do “wrong.” Much of the moral complexity of this book lies in Huck’s self-questioning, as he does what we believe to be right but what he thinks of as wrong; and if we read this book sensitively, we may ask ourselves how much of our own behavior is Huckish in this respect. Perhaps our failure to live up to our ideals bespeaks our intuition without overt expression that there is something wrong with those ideals. What Huck demonstrates is that there may be a wisdom, even a belief system, in behavior itself: we always know more than we know, and our moral sensitivity may be different from, and wiser than, our professed beliefs. our own authoritative words The basic power of an authoritative voice comes from its status as the one that everyone hears. Everyone has heard that democracy is good and apartheid is bad, that the environment needs preserving, that church must not be merged with state; and people who spend their lives in an academic environment may add many more to the list. In our academic subculture, we are, almost all of us, persuaded of the rightness of greater economic equality, of plans for inclusion and affirmative action, of abortion rights, of peace, of greater efforts to reach out to all the people in the world in all their amazing diversity. These are our authoritative voices, and, too, **we may accept either because they are simply not to be questioned or because we have sought out intelligent opponents who have questioned them and have thought about**, if not ultimately accepted, **their answers**. Again, educators know the moment when a student from a background different from ours questions one of our beliefs and we experience the temptation to reply like that math teacher. Thinking of ourselves as oppositional, **we often forget that we, too, have our own authoritative discourse** and must work to remember that, in a world of difference, authority may not extend to those unlike us. **The testable authoritative voice**: we hear it always, and though some may disagree with it, they cannot ignore it. Its nonauthoritarian power is based 321 above all on its ubiquity. In a society that is relatively open to diverse values, that minimal, but still significant, function of an authoritative voice is the most important one. It demands not adherence but attention. And such a voice is likely to survive far longer than an authoritarian voice whose rejection is necessarily its destruction. We have all these accounts of Soviet dissidents—say, Solzhenitsyn—who tell their story as a “narrative of rethinking” (to use Christian Knoeller’s phrase): they once believed in Communist ideology, but events caused them to raise some questions that by their nature could not be publicly voiced, and that silence itself proved most telling. You can hear silence if it follows a pistol shot. If silence does not succeed in ending private questioning, the word that silence defends is decisively weakened. The story of Soviet dissidents is typically one in which, at some point, questioning moved from a private, furtive activity accompanied by guilt to the opposite extreme, a clear rejection in which the authoritative voice lost all hold altogether. Vulnerability accompanies too much power. But in more open societies, and in healthier kinds of individual development, an authoritative voice of the whole society, or of a particular community (like our own academic community), still sounds, still speaks to us in our minds. In fact, we commonly see that people who have questioned and rejected an authoritative voice find that it survives within them as a possible alternative, like the minority opinion in a court decision. When they are older, they discover that experience has vindicated some part of what they had summarily rejected. Perhaps the authoritative voice had more to it than we thought when young? Now that we are teachers, perhaps we see some of the reasons for practices we objected to? Can we, then, combine in a new practice both the practices of our teachers and the new insights we have had? When we do, a flexible authoritative word emerges, one that has become to a great extent an innerly persuasive one. By a lengthy process, the word has, with many changes, become our own, and our own word has in the process acquired the intonations of authority. In much the same way, we react to the advice of our parents. At some point it may seem dated, no more than what an earlier generation unfortunately thought, or we may greet it with the sign of regret that our parents have forgotten what they experienced when our age. However, the dialogue goes on. At a later point, we may say, you know, there was wisdom in what our parents said, only why did they express it so badly? If only I had known! We may even come to the point where we express some modified form of parental wisdom in a convincing voice. We translate it into our own idiolect, confident that we will not make the mistakes of our parents when we talk to our children. Then our children listen, and find our own idiolect, to which we have devoted such painful ideological and verbal work, hopelessly dated, and the process may start again. It is always a difficult moment when we realize that our own voice is now the authority, especially because we have made it different, persuasive in its 322 own terms, not like our parents’ voice. When we reflect on how our children see us, we may even realize that our parents’ authoritative words may not have been the product of blind acceptance, but the result of a process much like our own. They may have done the same thing we did—question, reject, adapt, arrive at a new version—and that rigid voice of authority we heard from them was partly in our own ears. Can we somehow convey to our students our own words so they do not sound so rigid? We all think we can. But so did our parents (and other authorities). Dialogue, Laughter, And Surprise Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid a voice of authority, however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture. We speak the language and thoughts of academic educators, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our students. **We are so prone to think of ourselves as fighting oppression that it takes** some **work to realize that we** ourselves **may be felt as** oppressive and **overbearing, and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree**. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that **many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors**. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal **rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance**, unless one is very careful. 323 For the skills of fighting or refuting an oppressive power are not those of openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading Hitler’s Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was precisely that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal—otherwise so inexplicable—was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, the Gulag, and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power—unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: **the aura of righteous authority**. If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, in an ongoing spiral of intolerance. By contrast, if one’s **rebellion against an authoritative word is truly dialogic**, that is unlikely to happen, or to be subject to more of a self-check if it does. Then one questions one’s own certainties and invites skepticism, lest one become what one has opposed. One may even step back and laugh at oneself. Laughter at oneself invites the perspective of the other. Laughter is implicitly pluralist. Instead of looking at one’s opponents as the unconditionally wrong, one imagines how one sounds to them. Regarding earlier authorities, one thinks: that voice of authority, it is not my voice, but perhaps it has something to say, however wrongly put. It comes from a specific experience, which I must understand. I will correct it, but to do that I must measure it, test it, against my own experience. **Dialogue is a process of real testing**, and one of the characteristics of a genuine test is that **the result is not guaranteed**. It may turn out that sometimes the voice of earlier authority turns out to be right on some point. Well, we will incorporate that much into our own “innerly persuasive voice.” Once one has done this, once one has allowed one’s own evolving convictions to be tested by experience and by other convictions, then one may allow the dialogue to continue.

#### And, Truth Testing promotes bad weighing practices – comparing worlds has clear burdens and weighing scenarios – we weigh offense under the standard and burdens are clearly established. It also promotes analysis of the resolution in the context of the real world which is key to advocacy and field context. Truth testing makes weighing ambiguous – no clear burdens and makes debate moot as far as real life skills.

## 1AR

### A2 K’s – Generic

#### [1] Lemme weigh the aff against the k – a] it moots 6 min of offense and forces me to restart in the 1AR with a 13-7 time skew AND time skew is the biggest link to fairness because you need time to make arguments. b] it’s not educational to exclude aff impacts because it denies education on material conditions of the world.

#### [2] Permutation: do the plan and the alternative--The permutation solves best: Methodological pluralism creates critical reflexivity and sustainable critique.

Bleiker 14 [Roland Bleiker 2014 (professor of international relations at the University of Queensland) INTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW, International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique, 2014. Retrieved May 26, 2016 from EBSCOhost.] **Tfane23**

Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine’s sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” (p. 63, see also pp. 101-102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. But each should, in a way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 102). In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when—or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. They can range from poststructural deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences. The benefit of such a methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives. Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them. For Levine, this is how reification may be “checked at the source” and this is how a “critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable” (p. 103). It is in this sense that Levine’s approach is not really post-foundational but, rather, an attempt to “balance foundationalisms against one another” (p. 14). There are strong parallels here with arguments by assemblage thinking and complexity theory—links that could have been explored in more detail.

#### [3] No root cause claims

**Thompson et al 13**

Jack S. Levy, Board of Governors' Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, and Affiliate at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, and William R. Thompson is Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly, "The Decline of War? Multiple Trajectories and Diverging Trends", International Studies Review, 2013, accessed: 18 July 2019, 15, pp. 396-419, R.S.

If true, we would have a unified theory of violence. Pinker subsequently steps back from this expansive claim. He notes that some other forms of violence— including homicides, lynchings, domestic violence, and rapes—do not fit a power law model, suggesting that the mechanisms driving these practices differ from those driving international war. Still, there are others who have insisted on a unified theory of violence. Examples might include Freud’s psychoanalytic theory of aggressive instincts as a root cause of war (Einstein and Freud 1933), frustration-aggression theory (Durbin and Bowlby 1939), and contemporary rational choice theories. We are highly skeptical. We fear that any theory broad enough to explain violence at the levels of the individual, family, neighborhood, communal group, state, and international system would be too general and too indiscriminating to capture variations in violence within each level, which is a prerequisite for any satisfactory theoretical explanation. It is difficult to imagine an explanation for great power war, or interstate war more generally, that does not include system-level structures of power and wealth, dyadic-level rivalries, and domestic institutions and processes. All but the latter contribute little if anything to an explanation of homicides and domestic violence. It is not even clear whether different kinds of organized warfare—hegemonic wars, interstate wars, colonial wars, and civil wars—can be explained with a single theory. In fact, the theoretical literature on interstate war and civil war remains for the most part two distinct literatures, with little overlap in their respective analyses of the causes of war.9 Exceptions include the concept of the security dilemma (Posen 1993; Snyder and Jervis 1999) and the increasingly influential bargaining model of war (Fearon 1995), which cut across both literatures. International relations scholars are even divided on the question of whether different kinds of interstate wars can be subsumed under a single theory. A 1990 symposium addressed the questions of whether big wars and small wars had similar causes and whether a single theory could account for both.10 Whereas Bueno de Mesquita (1990) argued that an expected utility framework can explain all kinds of wars, Thompson (1990) argued that system-level structures of power and wealth differentiate big wars from small wars.11 The closely related question of whether the outbreak and spread (expansion) of war are driven by the same or different variables and processes was the subject of another recent symposium (Vasquez, Diehl, Flint, and Scheffran 2011). Our skepticism about the utility of a unified theory of violence or war is reinforced by the systematic and rigorous evidence Pinker provides about the trends in different forms of violence over time.

#### [4] Scenario analysis is valuable—the aff employs it in order to enhance creativity, deconstruct epistemic biases, and impart advocacy skills

**Barma et al 16**

Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard. “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19. May 2016, R.S.

What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science? Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking. Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present. Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global political economic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8 An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

**AND, Status quo debate shuts down conversations about everyday violence—only focus on material violence that creates spaces for finding solutions is productive and ethical.**

**Curry ’14**

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Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue, thinking, and (personal) politics **when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory over the other.** In “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that “**ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics)**; [s]ince ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, [it is set] against factual/descriptive issues.” **At the most general level, the conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically—the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy “problem” by an audience—is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively.** Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one “necessarily has to abstract away from certain features” of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. **This gap between what is actual (in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures** which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations. As Mills states: “What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual,” so what we are seeking to resolve on the basis of “thought” is in fact incomplete, incorrect, or ultimately irrelevant to the actual problems which our “theories” seek to address. **Our attempts to situate social disparity cannot simply appeal to the ontologization of social phenomenon—meaning we cannot suggest that the various complexities of social problems (which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we observe) are totalizable by any one set of theories within an ideological frame be it our most cherished notions of Afro-pessimism, feminism, Marxism, or the like.** At best, theoretical endorsements make us aware of sets of actions to address ever developing problems in our empirical world, but even this awareness does not command us to only do X, but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the material conditions addressed by the action X. As a whole, debate (policy and LD) neglects the need to do X in order to remedy our cast-away-ness among our ideological tendencies and politics.’ How then do we pull ourselves from this seeming ir-recoverability of thought in general and in our endorsement of socially actualizable values like that of the living wage? It is my position that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s thinking about the need for a living wage was a unique, and remains an underappreciated, resource in our attempts to impose value reorientation (be it through critique or normative gestures) upon the actual world. In other words, King aims to reformulate the values which deny the legitimacy of the living wage, and those values predicated on the flawed views of the worker, Blacks, and the colonized (dignity, justice, fairness, rights, etc.) used to currently justify the living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters.

### A2 Afropess

#### Warren is wrong--- political hope is good and productive for black politics

Vincent **Lloyd, 2015**, assistant prof. religion @ Syracuse University, “Afro-Pessimism and Christian Hope,” Forthcoming in Grace, Governance, and Globalization: Theology and Public Life, edited by Lieven Boeve, Stephan van Erp, and Martin Poulsom, Bloomsbury Press, http://vwlloyd.mysite.syr.edu/afro-pessimism-christian-hope.pdf

Deep Racism and Secular Hope Afro-pessimist scholarship itself **rarely** turns towards practical questions **and rarely asks**: what are we to do, **or how are we to hope**?12 [Footnote] 12 For an exception, concluding that Afro-pessimism must reject hope and embrace nihilism, **see** Calvin L. **Warren**, “Black Nihilism and the Politics of Hope,” CR: The New Centennial Review 15:1 (2015): 215-248. [End Footnote]V Afro-pessimist scholarship is largely descriptive work, taking political events (lynchings and police shootings, for example) as symptomatic of a deeper, racialized metaphysics. There is, however, **a broader** scholarly **conversation** about deep pessimism caused by difference that may be instructive. Scholars of Native American studies, immigration, and queer studies have also explored how these categories of difference are deeply embedded in Western culture, but in some cases they have grappled more explicitly with questions of hope. Jonathan Lear has identified a virtue he labels “radical hope” in Native American communities facing the elimination of their ways of life.13 Focusing on Plenty Coups, the last chief of the Crow, Lear studies a context where the social practices that constituted the Crow world were no longer possible. For example, with lands stolen by the US government and traditional means of resolving conflicts disrupted by firearms, the practice of bravery in battle - which involved face painting by a wife, care for horses, and recounting the victory post-battle, so was woven into Crow life in many ways - was no longer possible. To be a Crow meant to do the social practices of the Crow, but when those social practices are foreclosed, Lear echoes Plenty Coups in concluding that “nothing happened.” Crow continued to live, but with their culture gone it was only the barest form of biological existence. The good life, its meaning culturally determined, could no longer be pursued; practical reasoning went haywire when there were no longer goods to be pursued. However, all was not lost. As Lear tells it, Plenty Coup had a dream (significant because it indicates a break with practical reason) which the chief interpreted to mean that the Crow must acknowledge their traditional way of life was coming to an end, but they also must be committed to the notion that the Crow will survive and new social practices and new goods will come about, even if it is impossible to know what they are or how they will come about now. This radical hope rejected as futile practical reasoning, self-destruction, and fantasy. Soberly assessing the world as it is, radical hope persists in acting as if a wholly new world is possible – and so exercises the virtues of adaptability and perceptiveness. Yet radical hope only works, Lear argues, because of the Crow’s premise that God exists and is good. Might radical hope offer a way for Black theology to respond to the problem of Afropessimism? There are clear similarities between the cultural devastation faced by the Native American community Lear studies and the cultural devastation wrought on Blacks through, among other things, the slave trade and the prison system. Unlike the Crow, Black cultural devastation was not a one-off event but, according to the Afro-pessimist critique, is an ongoing process inherent in Euro-American culture itself, continually grinding away at the social practices of Blacks. Or, put another way, the continual pressures on Black individuals and communities tend not simply to take away social practices but to corrupt them, changing them at 13 times from incubators of virtue to incubators of vice (one thinks of the corporate appropriation of Black music or the performance of Black respectability necessary for success in the white business world). Lear’s account of radical hope depends on a robust culture that once, in the nottoo-distant past, existed to fuel hope for the future (this past is the source of the chickadee, the symbol of hope in Plenty Coups’ dream, along with the Crow view of God and the crucial practice of dream interpretation). The Afro-pessimist charges that Western anti-Blackness is so deep-seeded that there was never a robust culture from which such a radical hope could flow; even if there was, the centuries of fruitless hope and embattled community would surely lead to the collapse of the virtue. Another approach to deep racism found in recent secular scholarship **is to reject hope altogether**. Such approaches propose two different sorts of alternatives: an embrace of grief or an embrace of the present. Anne Cheng’s The Melancholy of Race exemplifies the former approach.14 She agrees that racialization has an enormous, persistent impact – in the context of her study, on African Americans and Asian Americans. She agrees that race shapes the ideological foundations of the West. On her view, the usual response to racism, articulating grievances and pressing for them to be addressed, does not adequately address the depths of the problem; indeed, **it masks those depths**. By formulating a list of grievances and putting one’s hopes in the possibility that they will be rectified, the racialized subject imagines that she will achieve equality and dignity. Then, she will be just like everyone else: the world will be postracial. Cheng argues that grievances obscure grief, the deeper process that afflicts the psyche of racialized subjects who know they will never be “normal” – and grief distorts the psyche of 14 Anne Anlin Cheng, The Melancholy of Race: Psychoanalysis, Assimilation, and Hidden Grief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 14 white subjects as well since white identity is constituted in relation to the racialized other. In the face of deep pessimism, the proper response, on this view, is to look beyond the specific grievances (and hopes) of a racial minority and instead explore the varied ways that the wound of racism sabotages the affective economy of that minority. Acknowledging and interrogating rather than rejecting grief – racial melancholia – is the only way to see the world rightly and so is the prerequisite for any properly directed social or political action. **Cheng’s response to deep racial pessimism** **is decidedly secular and decidedly individualist**. Her critique of grievance, which could be read as a critique of hope directed at specific objects or as desire for specific goals masked as hope, is in a sense of critique of idolatry, but her response to idolatry is **to reject transcendence altogether** in favor of the folds and wrinkles of immanence – of our affective economies. But **what if we consider grievances not as ends in themselves but as instrumentally used in collective (anti-racist) struggle**? Might the process of collective struggle, and not any particular goal, provide a means of healing psyches damaged by racism? Tracking and probing this damage seems less important than commending the forms of collective practice and community organizing that could cultivate the virtues which serve as a buffer against disabling grief. Indeed, this is a point made forcefully by the first and second generations of Black theologians: Black communities are essentially communities of struggle and, as such, shape character in a way that **holds off despair.** Like Cheng, Lee Edelman rejects hope and acknowledges the radical exclusions faced by minority communities.15 Edelman is particularly concerned with queer men, and for him queer identity is fundamentally opposed to any future orientation – and so to any hope. The normative, 15 Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004). 15 heterosexual world is concerned with the future because it is concerned with reproduction: individuals with reproducing themselves through their children and societies with reproducing themselves from generation to generation. The figure of the child is sanctified, according to Edelman, because she or he represents this reproduction of the way things are. Yet queers, as incapable of reproduction, are excluded from this heteronormative way of seeing the world. Indeed, queers disrupt the smooth reproduction of the ways of the world – and, Edelman contends, they ought to embrace this role. They ought to embrace pleasure **in the moment** rather than pleasure deferred to the next generation; they will not suffer now so that a child can have a better life. In short, queers are a minority structurally excluded from Western metaphysics, and the proper response for the minority is to happily embrace hopelessness along with all temporality **other than the now**. Edelman helpfully demonstrates the way that interest in the future is closely tied to selfinterest and to the powers that be in the present. He also helpfully demonstrates the way that minority groups whose exclusion is fundamental to regnant ideology can potentially short-circuit that ideology by refusing to participate in normative future-directed practices. Indeed, there is at times a messianic tone to Edelman’s project, finding the fullness of time in the present moment. Yet the heart of Edelman’s project is an extension of Cheng’s, an extension from the critique of idolatry to the critique of ideology. Where Cheng took issue with specific hopes, Edelman presents himself as taking issue with hope as such – but in fact he is taking issue with hope motivated by present social structures and institutions. In other words, Edelman is warning against an embrace of hope that is really not about the wholly new, hope that advances the interests of the old with the rhetoric of the wholly new. For Edelman, as for Cheng, the only alternative is making ourselves into gods: **an even deeper form of idolatry** (**an even subtler rouse** 16 **of ideology**). Black theologians grappling with Afro-pessimism can learn much from these secular efforts and their sharp critical perspectives, but Black theologians also bring to the problem of racism a view of hope directed towards a God who is irreducible to worldly terms or desires. God the Future of Blacks The quick and easy response of Black theologians to Afro-pessimism is to simply present Christ as the solution. In the Afro-pessimist framework, Black being is an oxymoron: Blackness has no being, is defined by its exclusion from being. Christ raises the dead, turning non-being into being, flesh defined by death into flesh defined by life. Participation in Christ means participation in His resurrection: denying the world’s denial of being. Such a stance does not take the form of overcoming Blackness, of becoming white. That Blackness is defined by death does not mean that whiteness is defined by life. To the contrary, whiteness hubristically claims life, being, on its own – whiteness claims ontology without theology and that is idolatry. Blackness is not outside of being but paradoxically inside and outside at once, being that is not counted as being, that thus disturbs the regime that would define being. J. Kameron Carter, working along these lines, labels Blackness “paraontological.”16 Concealing the being of the slave, or the prisoner, or the native, takes much ideological work, for the principle of Black non-being must overcome the stubbornness of lived reality. Blackness points to the precariousness of ontology, reminds that the present order of being is not natural, not universal. Blackness essentially destabilizes the order of things, so the resurrection of 16 J. Kameron Carter, “Paratheological Blackness,” South Atlantic Quarterly 112:4 (2013): 589- 611, though my formulation here differs somewhat from his. 17 Black being is not the assimilation of Blackness into the order of things, into whiteness, but rather is triumph of the theological over the ontological. What does this mean concretely? The resurrection of Black being means Black agency: Black writing, Black art, Black rhetoric, Black creativity that is unexpected, unauthorized, and, from the perspective of the white world, often unintelligible. The slave writes, the prisoner paints, or the native imagines. The objects of these verbs, these acts, need not be God – indeed cannot be God, for that would be idolatry. Independent of their object, these verbs represent participation in God because they represent the resurrection of non-being into being, Blackness triumphant, Christ triumphant. **This account** of Black theology responsive to Afro-pessimism **is** appealing but ultimately **deeply flawed**. **It suffers from individualism**, a profoundly secular ailment – the ailment that defines the secular. The creativity and strength of the Black man (for such creative agency is gendered) will save the world from itself. In this theology there is no space for community, for love, or, crucially, for hope. There are no virtues of Blackness developed in community, just the act of individual rebellion against the powers that be. And there is no vision of a future world transformed, **just a set of disconnected Black men doing art in their attics**, as it were. The Black theologian inclined to such a view may respond that “church” would consist of the informal networks created among these, what Fred Moten calls the “undercommons.”17 But **such networks seem a far cry from communities of virtue that could nurture, sustain, and properly order the Black rebellious spirit**. Indeed, such a theological perspective suffers from an extreme **Christocentrism**, the theological vice corresponding to the secular vice of individualism. Christ 17 Stefano Harney and Fred Moten, The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study (Wivenhoe: Minor Compositions, 2013). 18 cleaved from God and Spirit defines all value; indeed, what matters on this account is not even a Christ who **loves** or **suffers** but **exclusively a Christ who is risen.** What is needed is a Black theology responsive to Afro-pessimism but also concerned **with the social world**, with **love**, and with **justice**. The theological reflections of Edward Schillebeeckx offer a useful if unexpected resource to accomplish this task. Of Schillebeeckx’s extensive, learned corpus, I will focus exclusively on one essay, “The New Image of God, Secularization and Man’s Future on Earth,” the final chapter of God the Future of Man. 18 This is a particularly important essay, consolidating much of Schillebeeckx’s thought and clearly developing the themes that are central to much of his writing over the decades before and after. In this essay, Schillebeeckx makes three key points. First, he offers a new way to think about secularization. Christians, instead of lamenting declining church membership rolls, should see secularization as part of a re-orientation away from the past and towards the future. **Science and technology hold new possibilities** while changing social arrangements create new ways of living. **Life no longer consists of repeating the past or interpreting the past for lessons on the present**. Instead of looking backwards we now look forwards. To determine what ought to be done now we look less to what has always been done than to what might eventually be done. **We act on our hopes instead of on our memories.**

#### Ontologizing race is a self-fulfilling prophecy-slavery isn’t a completed project, afropessimists cherry pick evidence to show it is

**Marriott, PhD, 14**

(David, Humanities @Santa Cruz,The Year’s Work in Critical and Cultural Theory, 20 “Black Cultural Studies,” The Year’s Work in Critical and Cultural Theory 22.1 (2014):The Author (2012) All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com doi:10.1093/ywcct/mbs003)

In the concluding pages of Darker Than Blue, Gilroy restates why he finds the ongoing attachment to the idea of race in the US so very unsatisfactory in comparison, say, to the anti-racism of Frantz Fanon: [Fanon’s] ‘audacious commitment to an alternative conception of humanity reconstituted outside ‘‘race’’ [...] is something that does not endear Fanon’s work to today’s practitioners of the facile antihumanism and ethnic absolutism so characteristic of life on US college campuses, where class-based homogeneity combines smoothly with deference to racial and ethic particularity and with resignation to the world as it appears. Fanon disappoints that scholastic constituency by refusing to see culture as an insurmountable obstacle between groups, even if they have been racialized. He does not accept the ‘‘strategic’’ award of an essential innocence to the oppressed and the wretched of the earth. Their past and present sufferings confer no special nobility upon them and are not invested with redemptive insights. Suffering is just suffering, and Fanon has no patience with those who would invoke the armour of incorrigibility around national liberation struggles or minority cultures’. (pp. 157–8, my emphasis) Whatever one might think of the cogency of these remarks (if only because the notion of a non-racial life is predicated on the idea that the human can somehow reside ‘outside’ of race, a humanism that would always then be constitutively compromised by the racism at its frontier), the question of whether US culture can ever escape racial antagonism is the primary focus of Frank B. Wilderson III’s powerful Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the Structure of US Antagonisms, as part of a more general reading of US film culture. And indeed Fanon’s anti-philosophical philosophical critique of racial ontology (historically blacks were seen as part of existence but not, as yet, part of human being, a not-yet that forces Fanon to rethink the teleological form of the human as already and essentially violent in its separation from the state of nature from which it has come) forms a major part of Wilderson’s conception of anti-blackness as the major structural antagonism of US history and culture. It is against the conception that racism could ever be simply contingent to black experience that Wilderson protests, reflecting on the fact that racial slavery has no parallel to other forms of suffering, and perhaps most strikingly social death is the constitutive essence of black existence in the US. In brief, slavery remains so originary, in the sense of what he calls its ‘accumulation and fungibility’ (terms borrowed from Saidiya Hartman), it not only has no ‘analogy’ to other forms of antagonism— Wilderson’s examples are the Holocaust and Native American genocide— there is simply no process of getting over it, of recovering from the loss (as wound, or trauma): as such, slavery remains the ultimate structure of antagonism in the US. Whether at a personal level or at the level of historical process, if ‘black slavery is foundational to modern Humanism’, then any teleological appeal to a humanism beyond racism is doomed from the start (p. 22). The problem with Wilderson’s argument, however, is that it remains of a piece with the **manichean imperatives that beset it**, and which by definition are structurally uppermost, which means that he can only confirm those imperatives **as absolutes rather than chart a dialectical path beyond them**, insofar as, structurally speaking, there is no ‘outside’ to black social death and alienation, or no outside to this outside, and **all that thought can do is mirror its own enslavement by race**. This is not so much ‘afro-pessimism’—a term coined by Wilderson—**as thought wedded to its own despair**. However, this is also not the entire story of Red, White, and Black, as I hope to show. For example, in Chapter One (‘The Structure of Antagonisms’), written as a theoretical introduction, and which opens explicitly on the Fanonian question of why ontology cannot understand the being of the Black, Wilderson is prepared to say that black suffering is not only beyond analogy, it also refigures the whole of being: ‘the essence of being for the White and non-Black position’ is non-niggerness, consequently, ‘[b]eing can thus be thought of, in the first ontological instance, as non-niggerness, and slavery then as niggerness’ (p. 37). It is not hard when reading such sentences to suspect a kind of absolutism at work here, and one that manages to be peculiarly and dispiritingly dogmatic: throughout Red, White, and Black, despite variations in tone and emphasis, **there is always the desire to have black lived experience named as the worst**, and the politics of such a desire inevitably **collapses into a kind of sentimental moralism**: for the claim that ‘Blackness is incapacity in its most pure and unadulterated form’ means merely that the black **has to embody this abjection without reserve** (p. 38). This logic—and the denial of any kind of ‘ontological integrity’to the Black/Slave due to its endless traversal by force does seem to reduce ontology to logic, namely**, a logic of non-recuperability**—moves through the following points: (1) Black non-being is not capable of symbolic resistance and, as such, falls outside of any language of authenticity or reparation; (2) for such a subject, which Wilderson persists in calling ‘death’, the symbolic remains foreclosed (p. 43); (3) as such, Blackness is the record of an occlusion which remains ever present: ‘White (Human) capacity, in advance of the event of discrimination or oppression, is parasitic on Black incapacity’ (p. 45); (4) and, as an example of the institutions or discourses involving ‘violence’, ‘antagonisms’ and ‘parasitism’, Wilderson describes White (or non-Black) film theory and cultural studies as incapable of understanding the ‘suffering of the Black—the Slave’ (they cannot do so because they are erroneously wedded to humanism and to the psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan, which Wilderson takes as two examples of what the Afro-pessimist should avoid) (p. 56); as a corrective, Wilderson calls for a new language of abstraction, and one centrally concerned with exposing ‘the structure of antagonisms between Blacks and Humans’ (p. 68). Reading seems to stop here, at a critique of Lacanian full speech: Wilderson wants to say that Lacan’s notion of the originary (imaginary) alienation of the subject is still wedded to relationality as implied by the contrast between ‘empty’ and ‘full’ speech, and so apparently cannot grasp the trauma of ‘absolute Otherness’ that is the Black’s relation to Whites, because psychoanalysis cannot fathom the ‘structural, or absolute, violence’ of Black life (pp. 74; 75). ‘Whereas Lacan was aware of how language ‘‘precedes and exceeds us’’, he did not have Fanon’s awareness of how violence also precedes and exceeds Blacks’ (p. 76). The violence of such abjection—or incapacity—is therefore that it cannot be communicated or avowed, and is always already delimited by desubjectification and dereliction (p. 77). Whence the suspicion of an ontology reduced to a logic (of abjection). Leaving aside the fact that it is **quite mistaken to limit Lacan’s** notion of full speech to the search for communication (the unconscious cannot be confined to parole), it is clear that, according to Wilderson’s own ‘logic’, his description of the Black is working, via analogy, to Lacan’s notion of the real but, in his insistence on the Black as an absolute outside Wilderson **can only duly reify this void at the heart of universality**. The Black is ‘beyond the limit of contingency’—**but it is worth saying immediately** that this ‘beyond’ is indeed a foreclosure that defines a violence whose traces can only be thought violently (that is, analogically), and whose nonbeing returns as the theme for **Wilderson’s political thinking** of a non-recuperable abjection. The Black is nonbeing and, as such, is more real and primary than being per se: **given how much is at stake, this insistence on a racial metaphysics of injury implies a fundamental irreconcilability between Blacks and Humans** (there is really no debate to be had here: irreconcilability is the condition and possibility of what it means to be Black) (46-9)

#### Reducing anti-blackness to the level of ontology is counter-productive—cements nihilism and has no alt

**Rogers 15**, Associate Professor of African American Studies & Political Science University of California, Los Angeles. Ta-Nehisi Coates’s Wounded Attachment: Reflections on Between the World and Me Fugitive Thoughts, August 2015, http://www.academia.edu/14337627/Ta-Nehisi\_Coatess\_Wounded\_Attachment\_Reflections\_on\_Between\_the\_World\_and\_Me

The Dream seems to run so deep that it eludes those caught by it. Between the World and Me initially seems like a book that will reveal the illusion and in that moment open up the possibility for imagining the United States anew. Remember: “Nothing about the world is meant to be.” But the book does not move in that direction. **Coates** rejects the American mythos and the logic of certain progress it necessitates, but **embraces the certainty of white supremacy and its inescapable constraints. White supremacy is not merely a historically emergent feature** of the Western world generally, and the United States particularly; **it is an ontology**. By this I mean that **for Coates white supremacy does not structure reality; it is reality. There is, in this, a danger. When one conceptualizes white supremacy at the level of ontology, there is little room for one’s imagination to soar and** one’s **sense of agency is inescapably constrained**. The meaning of action is tied fundamentally to what we imagine is possible for us. “The missing thing,” Coates writes, “was related to the plunder of our bodies, the fact that any claim to ourselves, to the hands that secured us, the spine that braced us, and the head that directed us, was contestable.” The body is one of the unifying themes of the book. It resonates well with our American ears because the hallmark of freedom is sovereign control over our bodies. This was the site on which slavery did its most destructive work: controlling the body to enslave the soul. We see the reconstitution of this logic in our present moment—the policing and imprisoning of black men and women. **The reality of this colonizes not only the past and the present, but also the future. There can be no affirmative politics when race functions primarily as a wounded attachment—when** our **bodies are the visible reminders that we live at the arbitrary whim of another**. But **what of** **those** young men and women **in the streets of Ferguson, Chicago, New York, and Charleston—how ought we to read their efforts?** We come to understand Coates’s answer to this question in one of the pivotal and tragic moments of the book—the murder of a college friend, Prince Jones, at the hands of the police. As Coates says: “This entire episode took me from fear to a rage that burned in me then, animates me now, and will likely leave me on fire for the rest of my days.” With his soul on fire, all his senses are directed to the pain white supremacy produces, the wounds it creates. This murder should not be read as a function of the actions of a police officer or even the logic of policing blacks in the United States. His account of this strikes a darker chord. What he tells us about the meaning of the death of Prince Jones, what we ought to understand, reveals the operating logic of the “universe”: She [referring to his mother] knew that the galaxy itself could kill me, that all of me could be shattered and all of her legacy spilled upon the curb like bum wine. And no one would be brought to account for this destruction, because my death would not be the fault of any human but the fault of some unfortunate but immutable fact of ‘race,’ imposed upon an innocent country by the inscrutable judgment of invisible gods. The earthquake cannot be subpoenaed. The typhoon will not bend under indictment. They sent the killer of Prince Jones back to his work, because he was not a killer at all. He was a force of nature, the helpless agent of our world’s physical laws. **But if we are all just helpless agents of physical laws, the question might emerge again: What does one do? Coates recommends interrogation and struggle**. His love for books and his journey to Howard University, “Mecca,” as he calls it, serve as sites where he can question the world around him. **But interrogation and struggle to what end? His answer is contained in his** incessant **preoccupation with natural disasters**. We might say, at one time we thought the Gods were angry with us or that they were moving furniture around, thus causing earthquakes. Now **we know earthquakes are the result of tectonic shifts. Okay, what do we do with that knowledge? Coates seems to say: Construct an early warning system—don’t misspend your energy trying to stop the earthquake itself.** There is a lesson in this: “**Perhaps one person can make a change, but not the kind of change that would raise your body to equality with your countrymen…And still you are called to struggle, not because it assures you victory, but because it assures you an honorable** and sane **life**.” One’s response can be honorable because it emerges from a clear-sightedness that leaves one standing upright in the face of the truth of the matter—namely, that your white counterparts will never join you in raising your body to equality. “It is truly horrible,” Coates writes in one of the most disturbing sentences of the book, “to understand yourself as the essential below of your country.” Coates’s sentences are often pitched as frank speech; it is what it is. This produces a kind of sanity, he suggests, releasing one from a preoccupation with the world being other than what it is. **Herein lies the danger**: Forget telling his son it will be okay. **Coates cannot even muster a tentative response to his son; he cannot tell him that it may be okay.** “The struggle is really all I have for you,” he tells his son, “because it is the only portion of this world under your control.” What a strange form of control. Black folks may control their place in the battle, but never with the possibility that they, and in turn the country to which they belong, may win. **Releasing the book at this moment—given all that is going on with black lives under public assault and black youth in particular attempting to imagine the world anew—seems the oddest thing to do. For all** of **the channeling of James Baldwin, Coates seems to have forgotten that black folks “can’t afford despair.” As Baldwin went on to say: “I can’t tell my nephew, my niece; you can’t tell the children there is no hope.” The reason** why **you can’t say this is not because you are living in a dream or selling a fantasy, but because there can be no certain knowledge of the future. Humility, borne out of our lack of knowledge of the future, justifies hope.** Much has been made of the comparison between Baldwin and Coates, owing largely to how the book is structured and because of Toni Morrison’s endorsement. But what this connection means seems to escape many commentators. In his 1955 non-fiction book titled Notes of a Native Son, Baldwin reflects on the wounds white supremacy left on his father: “I had discovered the weight of white people in the world. I saw that this had been for my ancestors and now would be for me an awful thing to live with and that the bitterness which had helped to kill my father could also kill me.” Similar to Coates, Baldwin was wounded and so was Baldwin’s father. Yet **Baldwin knew all too well** that **the wounded attachment if held on to would destroy not the plunderers of black life, but the ones who were plundered. “Hatred,** which could destroy so much, **never failed to destroy the man who hated and this was an immutable law.” Baldwin’s father, as he understood him, was destroyed by hatred. Coates is less like Baldwin in this respect and, perhaps, more like Baldwin’s father.** “I am wounded,” says Coates. “I am marked by old codes, which shielded me in one world and then chained me in the next.” The chains reach out to imprison not only his son, but you and I as well. **There is a profound sense of disappointment** here. **Disappointment because** given the power of the book, **Coates seems unable to linger in the conditions that have given life to** **the Ta-Neisha Coates that now occupies the public stage.** Coates’s own engagement with the world—his very agency—has received social support. Throughout the book he often comments on the rich diversity of black beauty and on the power of love. His father, William Paul Coates, is the founder of Black Classic Press—a press with the explicit focus of revealing the richness of black life. His mother, Cheryl Waters, helped to financially support the family and provided young Coates with direction. And yet he seems to stand at a distance from the condition of possibility suggested by just those examples. **One ought not to read these moments above as expressive of the very “Dream” he means to reject. Rather, the point is that black life is at once informed by, but not reducible to**, the **pain exacted on our bodies by this country. This eludes Coates. The wound is so intense he cannot direct his senses beyond the pain.**

#### We criticize the material issues surrounding your theory. If we win material debate, then we preclude your offense.

#### Afropess affirms, by trying to deny higher education to black people, you might think you are doing a good thing, but you actually further systemic racism by affirming standardized testing.

**Rendering blackness as “ontological” is a totalizing claim that means blackness is reduced to and remains in a singular political frame, discrediting and inhibiting legitimate political resistance.**

**Klein 17** (David Kline, “The Pragmatics of Resistance Framing Anti-Blackness and the Limits of Political Ontology”, Penn State University Press, Volume 5, Issue 1, 2017)//shreyas

Rather, what I want to focus on is how the absolute prioritization of a formal ontological framework of autonomous and irreconcilable spheres of positionality—however descriptively or epistemologically accurate in terms of a regime of ontology and its corresponding macropolitics of anti-Blackness—ends up limiting a whole range of possible avenues of analysis that have their proper site within what Deleuze and Guattari describe as the micropolitical. The issue here is the distinction between the macropolitical (molar) and the micropolitical (molecular) fields of organization and becoming. Wilderson and Afro-pessimism in general privilege the macropolitical field in which Blackness is always already sedimented and rigidified into a political onto-logical position that prohibits movement and the possibility of what Fred Moten calls “fugitivity.” The absolute privileging of the macropolitical as **[End Page 57]** the frame of analysis tends to bracket or overshadow the fact that “every politics is simultaneously a macropolitics and a micropolitics ([Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 213](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/645848#b9)). Where the macropolitical is structured around a politics of molarisation that immunizes itself from the threat of contingency and disruption, the micropolitical names the field in which local and singular points of connection produce the conditions for “lines of flight, which are molecular” (ibid., 216). The micropolitical field is where movement and resistance happens against or in excess of the macropolitical in ways not reducible to the kind of formal binary organization that Agamben and Wilderson’s political ontology prioritizes. Such resistance is not necessarily positive or emancipatory, as lines of flight name a contingency that always poses the risk that whatever develops can become “capable of the worst” (ibid., 205). However, within this contingency is also the possibility of creative lines and deterritorializations that provide possible means of positive escape from macropolitical molarisations. Focusing on Wilderson, his absolute prioritization of a political onto-logical structure in which the law relegates Black being into the singular position of social death happens, I contend, at the expense of two significant things that I am hesitant to bracket for the sake of prioritizing political ontology as the sole frame of reference for both analyzing anti-Black racism and thinking resistance within the racialized world. First, it short-circuits an analysis of power that might reveal not only how the practices, forms, and apparatuses of anti-Black racism have historically developed, changed, and reassembled/reterritorialized in relation to state power, national identity, philosophical discourse, biological discourse, political discourse, and so on—changes that, despite Wilderson’s claim that focusing on these things only “mystify” the question of ontology (Wilderson 2010, 10), surely have implications for how racial positioning is both thought and resisted in differing historical and socio-political contexts. To the extent that Blackness equals a *singular* ontological position within a macropolitical structure of antagonism, there is almost no room to bring in the spectrum and flow of social difference and contingency that no doubt spans across Black identity as a legitimate issue of analysis and as a site/sight for the possibility of a range of resisting practices. This bracketing of difference leads him to make some rather sweeping and opaquely abstract claims. For example, discussing a main character’s abortion in a prison cell in the 1976 film *Bush Mama*, Wilderson says, “Dorothy will abort her baby at the clinic or on the floor of her prison cell, not because she fights for—and either wins **[End Page 58]** or loses—the right to do so, but *because she is one of 35 million accumulated and fungible (owned and exchangeable) objects living among 230 million subjects*—which is to say, her will is always already subsumed by the will of civil society” (Wilderson 2010, 128, italics mine). What I want to press here is how Wilderson’s statement, made in the sole frame of a totalizing political ontology overshadowing all other levels of sociality, flattens out the social difference within, and even the possibility of, a micropolitical social field of 35 million Black people living in the United States. Such a flattening reduces the optic of anti-Black racism as well as Black sociality to the frame of political ontology where Blackness remains stuck in a singular position of abjection. The result is a severe analytical limitation in terms of the way Blackness (as well as other racial positions) exists across an extremely wide field of sociality that is comprised of differing intensities of forces and relational modes between various institutional, political, socio-economic, religious, sexual, and other social conjunctures. Within Wilderson’s political ontological frame, it seems that these conjunctures are excluded—or at least bracketed—as having any bearing at all on how anti-Black power functions and is resisted across highly differentiated contexts. There is only the binary ontological distinction of Black and Human being; only a macropolitics of sedimented abjection. Furthermore, arriving at the second analytical expense of Wilderson’s prioritization of political ontology, I suggest that such a flattening of the social field of Blackness rigidly delimits what counts as legitimate political resistance. If the framework for thinking resistance and the possibility of creating another world is reduced to rigid ontological positions defined by the absolute power of the law, and if Black existence is understood only as ontologically fixed at the extreme zero point of social death without recourse to anything within its own position qua Blackness, then there is not much room for strategizing or even imagining resistance to anti-Blackness that is not wholly limited to expressions and events of radically apocalyptic political violence: the law is either destroyed entirely, or there is no freedom. This is not to say that I am necessarily against radical political violence or its use as an effective tactic. Nor is to say that I think the law should be left unchallenged in its total operation, but rather that there might be other and more pragmatically oriented practices of resistance that do not necessarily have the absolute destruction of the law as their immediate aim that should count as genuine resistance to anti-Blackness.

**General Refutations…**

**Even if afro-pessimism is true, it is unstrategic: Solidarity is necessary to achieve black revolutionary aims – anti-blackness in non-black institutions is inevitable, but strategically allying with them is essential**

**Thomas 18**
(Greg Thomas teaches global Black Studies texts out of the English Department at Tufts University. The founding editor of PROUD FLESH, an e-journal, he is the author of The Sexual Demon of Colonial Power: Pan-African Embodiment and Erotic Schemes of Empire (Indiana UP, 2007) as well as Hip-Hop Revolution in the Flesh: Power, Knowledge and Pleasure in Lil' Kim's Lyricism (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). He is also co-editor with L.H. Stallings of Word Hustle: Critical Essays and Reflections on the Works of Donald Goines (Black Classic Press, 2011). Currently, he is at work on a critical study of George L. Jackson and political captivity in Palestine. “Afro-Blue Notes: The Death of Afro-pessimism (2.0)?” Theory & Event > Volume 21, Number 1, January 2018 <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/685979> rvs)

A glaring absence of Black radical and revolutionary intellectual history should be expected from any expression of "Afro-pessimism." Indeed, could Afro-pessimism 2.0 take hold as another trend in mainstream academia except in the political void produced after the 1960s and '70s by local as well as global counter-revolution and counter-insurgency? This absence affects the shape and agenda of the critical analysis of "anti-Black racism" in essential ways. Wilderson's critique of the "ruse of analogy" in Red, White & Black becomes a refrain that naturalizes academic approaches to politics now institutionalized with the continued reign of Western bourgeois liberalism. For older and enduring Black radical perspectives, the existence of "anti-Black racism" among non-Black peoples, organizations, and movements is neither a new nor shocking phenomenon. For many Black revolutionary movement logics of the '60s and '70s, for instance, this did not preclude alliance (or the exhaustion of alliances made) or lead to a doctrinaire rejection of "solidarity" work and its international (or "intercommunal") possibilities.[27](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/685979%22%20%5Cl%20%22f27) "Contradictions" were expected, so to speak, in theory and practice, which might be resolved or not, depending on material interest, circumstance, etc. **For them, this work was not about gauging identity, or the perfection of a projected analogy, but mobilization for the political accomplishments of revolution**—a revolutionism that could or may not work toward the development of a new humanism not white or racist or anti-Black after all. The reach for potential solidarities was not construed as a gift or an act of good-willed benevolence, wise or unwise given the risks. Even solidarity work with obviously problematic, openly enemy forces could be a strategic or tactical mode of advancing Black collective self-interests that might dispense with any alliance at any given moment in time without seeing the relationship as a statement of some total identity or non-identity of condition and interests. The notion of solidarity has nowadays been superficialized, remaining riveted on mere rhetorical proclamation and aesthetic or representational identification in neo-colonial culture industries here and there. An older, praxical approach to alliance, perhaps "analogy," and solidarity is not taken up by current analyses of identity conflicts that prevail with the resurgence of a more academic political-intellectualism and a now much less contested liberalism. This is imperial "multiculturalism" and its malcontents. As much as Afro-pessimism (2.0) may object to certain instances of liberalism, or [End Page 292] regulation white racist liberalism at least, it assumes these Western epistemic frameworks of white academic liberalism all the same, thereby ensconcing the colonialism and neo-colonialism it constantly and symptomatically denegates in text after text.

**Pessimism doesn’t require fatalism. Wilderson’s alternative locks in oppression.**

**Marriott 12** — David S. Marriott, Professor in the History of Consciousness Department at the University of California-Santa Cruz, holds a Ph.D. in Literature from the University of Sussex, 2012 (“Black Cultural Studies,” *The Year’s Work in Critical and Cultural Theory*, Volume 20, Issue 1, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Oxford Journals Online, p. 46-47)

2. Race and Visual Culture The year saw several important publications in the field of black visual culture studies; and all concerned with the post-slave condition of the still and moving image in Europe and the US. In the concluding pages of Darker Than Blue, Gilroy restates why he finds the ongoing attachment to the idea of race in the US so very unsatisfactory in comparison, say, to the anti-racism of Frantz Fanon: [Fanon’s] ‘audacious commitment to an alternative conception of humanity reconstituted outside ‘‘race’’ [. . .] is something that does not endear Fanon’s work to today’s practitioners of the facile antihumanism and ethnic absolutism so characteristic of life on US college campuses, where class-based homogeneity combines smoothly with deference to racial and ethic particularity and with resignation to the world as it appears. Fanon disappoints that scholastic constituency by refusing to see culture as an insurmountable obstacle between groups, even if they have been racialized. He does not accept the ‘‘strategic’’ award of an essential innocence to the oppressed and the wretched of the earth. Their past and present sufferings confer no special nobility upon them and are not invested with redemptive insights. Suffering is just suffering, and Fanon has no patience with those who would invoke the armour of incorrigibility around national liberation struggles or minority cultures’. (pp. 157–8, my emphasis) Whatever one might think of the cogency of these remarks (if only because the notion of a non-racial life is predicated on the idea that the human can somehow reside ‘outside’ of race, a humanism that would always then be constitutively compromised by the racism at its frontier), the question of whether US culture can ever escape racial antagonism is the primary focus of Frank B. Wilderson III’s powerful Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the Structure of US Antagonisms, as part of a more general reading of US film culture. And indeed Fanon’s anti-philosophical philosophical critique of racial ontology (historically blacks were seen as part of existence but not, as yet, part of human being, a not-yet that forces Fanon to rethink the teleological form of the human as already and essentially violent in its separation from the state of nature from which it has come) forms a major part of [end page 46] Wilderson’s conception of anti-blackness as the major structural antagonism of US history and culture. It is against the conception that racism could ever be simply contingent to black experience that Wilderson protests, reflecting on the fact that racial slavery has no parallel to other forms of suffering, and perhaps most strikingly social death is the constitutive essence of black existence in the US. In brief, slavery remains so originary, in the sense of what he calls its ‘accumulation and fungibility’ (terms borrowed from Saidiya Hartman), it not only has no ‘analogy’ to other forms of antagonism—Wilderson’s examples are the Holocaust and Native American genocide— there is simply no process of getting over it, of recovering from the loss (as wound, or trauma): as such, slavery remains the ultimate structure of antagonism in the US. Whether at a personal level or at the level of historical process, if ‘black slavery is foundational to modern Humanism’, then any teleological appeal to a humanism beyond racism is doomed from the start (p. 22). The problem with Wilderson’s argument, however, is that it remains of a piece with the manichean imperatives that beset it, and which **by definition** are structurally uppermost, which means that he can only **confirm those imperatives as absolutes** rather than chart a dialectical path beyond them, insofar as, structurally speaking, there is no ‘outside’ to black social death and alienation, or no outside to this outside, and all that thought can do is **mirror its own enslavement by race**. This is not so much ‘afro-pessimism’—a term coined by Wilderson—as **thought wedded to its own despair**. However, this is also not the entire story of Red, White, and Black, as I hope to show.

### A2 Set Col

**Futurity is key to challenge oppressive structures – focus on reproductive futurism allows us to be reflexive of the past and present**

**Unger 7** (Robert Mangabeira, Professor of Law Harvard, “The Self Awakened: Pragmatism Unbound,” <http://www.law.harvard.edu/unger/english/docs/pragmatism.doc>)

**The third theme is Futurity**. Whether or not time is for real in the vast world of nature, of which our knowledge always remains at once remote and contradictory, is a subject that will always continue to arouse controversy. **That time is for real in human existence is not, however, a speculative thesis; it is a pressure we face with mounting force, so long as we remain conscious and not deluded, in our passage from birth to death. The temporal character of our existence is the consequence of our embodiment, the stigma of our finitude, and the condition that gives transcendence its point. We are not exhausted by the social and cultural worlds we inhabit and build. They are finite. We, in comparison to them, are not. We can see, think, feel, build, and connect in more ways than they can allow**. That is why we are required to rebel against them: to advance our interests and ideals as we now understand them, but also to become ourselves, affirming the polarity that constitutes the law-breaking law of our being**.       To seek what goes beyond the established structure and represents, for that very reason, the possible beginning of another structure,** even of a structure that organizes its own remaking**, is to live for the future. Living for the future is a way of living in the present as a being not wholly determined by the present conditions of its existence**. We never completely surrender. We go about our business of passive submission, of voiceless despair, as if we knew that the established order were not for keeps, and had no final claim to our allegiance. Orientation to the future **-- futurity -- is a defining condition of personality**.       So fundamental is this feature of our existence that it also shapes the experience of thinking, even when our thoughts are directed away from ourselves to nature. Ceaselessly reorganizing our experience of particulars under general headings, constantly breaking up and remaking the headings to master the experience, intuiting in one set of known relations the existence of another, next to it or hidden under it, finding out one thing when we had set out to find out another, and discovering indeed what our assumptions and methods may have ruled out as paradoxical, contradictory, or impossible, we come to see the next steps of thought -- its possibilities, its future -- as the point of the whole past of thought.       **Futurity should cease to be a predicament and should become a program: we should radicalize it to empower ourselves**. That is the reason to take an interest in ways of organizing thought and society that diminish the influence of what happened before on what can happen next. Such intellectual and institutional innovations make change in thought less dependent on the pressure of unmastered anomalies and change in society less dependent on the blows of unexpected trauma. In any given historical situation, the effort to live for the future has consequences for how we order our ideas and for how we order our societies. There is a structure to the organized revision of structures. Its constituents, however, are not timeless. We paste them together with the time-soaked materials at hand.

#### The K creates a false dichotomy between the indigenous and colonizer – that’s the worst form of essentialism

Andersen 9 [Chris, Associate Professor of Native Studies at Alberta, “critical indigenous studies From Difference to Density”, Cultural Studies Review, Vol. 15 No 2 2009, pg. 80-100] KLu

Champagne’s abstraction, imprecision and internal contradictions make it difficult to produce definitive conclusions about his work. However, Indigeneity-as-different constitutes a major staple of his argument and even a sympathetic reading requires some agility to avoid the essentialism which grounds it. My point is this: Champagne’s argument that the ‘continued emphasis on how race and ethnic identity in mainstream institutions tends to overshadow the less well understood perspectives of an Indigenous paradigm grounded in the cultures, sovereignty, identities, land, and nation building of indigenous peoples’42 loses its relevance if it fails to include a precise explanation of what the latter terms mean and how they differ from ‘race’ and ‘ethnic identity’. His repeated failure to delineate them leaves little analytical purchase to deal with the complexities of being Indigenous in modern, Western societies, either with respect to how we identify ourselves, how we critique dominant, whitestream representations or how we employ Western discursive authorities in our daily struggles. For example, Champagne proposes that ‘[i]mproving existing theories or categorizations [of Western disciplines] will involve significant revision, and it is doubtful that existing theories can conceptualize or explain the cultural, land, self-government, and colonial histories of Indigenous nations’;43 and further, that ‘most current theories do not provide powerful enough tools for explaining the Indigenous experience’.44 One of many questions which arise from such statements, of course, is the extent to which Indigenous studies—which must necessarily place itself within the same academic relations of power that shape ‘Western’ disciplines—can under any circumstances cash the kind of cheque Champagne is writing on its behalf (more on this in part three). Of more immediate concern: given that Native studies must operate within the forms of power and associated conditions of possibility that characterise other academic disciplines, what allows it to step outside in ways the other disciplines cannot? For Champagne, it is our valorisation of Indigenous epistemologies. Given the centrality of his criticism of Western concepts, his positioning of their central terms deserves to be quoted in their full length, precisely because they explicate the conceptual bases from which he launches his critique of Western disciplines: race: ‘Race and critical race theories focus on marginalization of socially conceived racial groups and provide critiques of dominant group methods of oppression and control … the focus of race and critical race theories tends to assume achievement of equality and inclusion into US society as a primary goal. Such goals of social equality are taken up by some American Indians, but race and critical race theories do not conceptualize or center collective American Indian goals such as preservation of land, self-government, and reclaiming culture’;45 class: ‘while helpful, class theory provides little conceptual or explanatory power for understanding American Indian emphases on reclaiming culture and collective tribal forms of economic organization’;46 ethnicity: ‘Theories of ethnicity focus on group organization and culture but do not include issues such as collective land retention and institutions of self-government’;47 nation: ‘ “Nation” is a term often used in Indian country today partly because the expression makes sense in English and in American culture for a political grouping, but its meaning may have powerful cultural meanings for many American Indian communities that are not implied in the English expression’;48 post-modernism/post-colonialism: ‘are imbued with the deep social epistemologies of Western society. There is much emphasis on marginalization, generally in materialistic forms, and on emancipation and liberation from oppression. Such arguments make sense given the economic and colonial conditions under which indigenous peoples often live, but the goals of the theories should not be imputed to be the goals and values of many indigenous peoples and communities’.49 Given the apparent inadequacy of these concepts in Champagne’s argument and his stated focus on Indigenous communities and nations, what is he left with in his pursuit of an academic basis for Indigenous studies? His looming but largely unacknowledged essentialism leaves him—as essentialism usually does—with an emphasis on Indigenous difference. Champagne repeatedly stresses elements which supposedly render Indigenous communities and cultures different from settler society and its communities: for example, our collective forms of governance, collective land retention and institutions of self government, the centrality of non-human powers and the importance of balance between human and nonhuman powers, all sit outside the ability of Western disciplines to analyse.50 Thus, the epistemological (and, one assumes, ontological) commitment of concepts of race, class, ethnicity, nation and culture to Western society—to assimilation or renationalisation—precludes the ‘deep cultural or institutional perspective of American Indians or center American Indian history or individual, group, or cultural experiences’.51 They fail, for example, to ‘emphasize ways of life that seek spiritual or moral balance with the human and nonhuman forces of the world’.52 Perhaps equally importantly, (Champagne’s) American Indian communities are, he tells us, likely to find such concepts troubling insofar as they rely on ‘epistemological assumptions usually alien to those made in American Indian communities and traditions’.53 Few Native studies practitioners would quarrel with Champagne’s argument that Indigenous communities differ in fundamental ways from dominant, whitestream society. This acknowledgement, however, is accompanied by two rubs. First, in the specific context of the academy, in his failure to explain specifically why Indigenous studies as a discipline should hold a privileged place in the academy to render pronouncements regarding the authenticity of this difference. Second and relatedly, Champagne unproblematically conflates community Indigeneity with its academic manifestation and in doing so reproduces the very same epistemological power of whiteness (at the heart of all academic disciplines) he critiques in his original formulation. What epistemological distances exist between academic and community knowledge? Where can we place Native studies in this continuum? Champagne doesn’t answer these questions because for him, the latter question is, in an ideal world, a solution to the former: Native studies is Indigenous knowledge in the academy. Champagne’s failure to account for the constitutive character of power which shapes ‘academic Indigeneity’ pushes his argument unnecessarily and uncomfortably close to an ‘Aboriginalist’ logic which locates Indigeneity by precisely what, apparently, it is not: white/ capitalist/secular/modern. Certainly, his intentions differ from those of colonial administrators who sought to destroy our distinctiveness, disregard our complexity and produce representations which apparently reaffirm(ed) their superiority over us. Nonetheless, his essentialism effectively marginalises ‘dynamic, kinetic, and unfolding [Indigenous] voice[s]’54 at a time when many (including Champagne himself) have laboured so intensively to interrogate and denaturalise such static representations. Perhaps equally importantly, his analytical lens remains focused solely in the direction of Indigenous communities and in so doing handcuffs our ability to undertake an immanent deconstruction of Indigenous representations produced in and by white society. Champagne’s argument is clearly dedicated to clearing intellectual space for an Indigenous studies willing to do the heavy lifting involved in exploring and analysing what ‘the Western gaze rarely acknowledges’ (see below) by using distinctive theoretical and methodological tools apparently unavailable to Western disciplines. We might, then, merely (if generously) read Champagne’s argument as advocating that a proper study of contemporary Indigeneity requires both Indigenous and Western epistemologies. This strand of his argument, though abruptly anti-essentialist and almost wholly at odds with his earlier discussion, appears reasonably to suggest that Indigenous communities are not so different after all, and certainly allows him to avoid his articles’ more essentialist moments. However, this move paints Champagne into another, equally tricky corner. If Indigenous communities are not essentially different, on what epistemological basis can Indigenous studies stake a theoretical or methodological claim separate from those of other disciplines? With all due respect to Champagne, we can no longer base such a claim around an ability to ask questions about Indigeneity in ways Western disciplines cannot, since that ship sailed when he cracked open his positioning of Indigeneity to all epistemological comers. Likewise, he has a larger problem which, perhaps ironically, stems from this same stated centring of Indigenous communities. Though in placing our communities front and centre he rightfully positions us as knowledgeable, agentic subjects, his argument narrows this knowledge to what we know about ourselves and presents no sustained analysis of our equally important knowledge about whiteness. This latter task requires expertise in the very ‘Western’ disciplinary concepts he dismisses. In doing so, Champagne places us outside of the regimes of power which accord these concepts their currency. In a phrase, Champagne has valorised our difference at the expense of our density. The third and final part of the paper will address these issues.

**Scenario analysis is pedagogically valuable – enhances creativity and self-reflexivity, deconstructs cognitive biases and flawed ontological assumptions, and enables the imagination and creation of alternative futures.**

Barma et al. 16 – (May 2016, [Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15], Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19, <http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using_scenarios_in_political_science_isp_2015.pdf>)

\*\*FYI if anyone is skeptical of Barma’s affiliation with the Naval Postgraduate School, it’s worth looking at her publication history, which is deeply opposed to US hegemony and the existing liberal world order:

1. co-authored an article entitled “How Globalization Went Bad” that has this byline: “From terrorism to global warming, the evils of globalization are more dangerous than ever before. What went wrong? The world became dependent on a single superpower. Only by correcting this imbalance can the world become a safer place.” (http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/publications/how\_globalization\_went\_bad)
2. most recent published scenario is entitled “World Without the West,” supports the a Non-Western reinvention of the liberal order, and concludes that “This argument made a lot of people uncomfortable, mostly because of an endemic and gross overestimation of the reach, depth and attractiveness of the existing liberal order” (http://nationalinterest.org/feature/welcome-the-world-without-the-west-11651)

Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus **typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool** to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. **Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses**. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to **articulate surprising and yet plausible futures**, often **referred to as “alternative worlds.”** Scenarios are thus **explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns**, and they are **not hypothesis-based expert predictions**. **Nor should they be equated with simulations**, which are best characterized as functional representations of **real institutions** or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). **Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world**, offered **together with a narrative of the driving causal forces** and potential exogenous shocks **that could lead to those futures**. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by **well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias** (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals **break out of conventional modes of thinking** and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. **Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present**. Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8 An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our **scenarios are deliberately forward-looking** and are designed to **explore potential futures** that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these **do not appear** as puzzles **in existing research programs** or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to **tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future** so that they can **begin thinking critically about them now**. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants **learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity** and for **overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding** the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

#### Futurity is good for Native people

Anne Spice 16, Tlingit member of Kwanlin Dun First Nation and a doctoral student in anthropology at the CUNY Graduate Center, A History and Future of Resistance, <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/09/standing-rock-dakota-access-pipeline-protest/>

The struggle against the Dakota Access Pipeline is rooted in this history. Indeed, the pipeline violates the same treaty that underwrote the AIM occupation of Wounded Knee. And just as AIM demanded respect for the treaties and indigenous sovereignty, the Standing Rock Sioux are demanding that the Fort Laramie Treaty be honored and the land and water be protected. The people who have endured centuries of dispossession and attempted elimination — the poorest of the poor, the most likely to be killed by law enforcement, the most easily forgotten — are still here and still fighting. They have built alternatives within and beyond capitalism for hundreds of years. They are the carriers of traditions of indigenous resistance and resurgence simultaneously rooted in Lakota land and history, and global in scope. In recent decades, this struggle has been threatened by neoliberal cooptation. Repelled by a colonizing state, many indigenous groups found themselves in an uneasy alliance with neoliberals who denounced “big government” and jumped at the opportunity to slash the welfare state and restructure tribes as junior corporate partners in the global economy. “Tribal sovereignty” became increasingly conflated with owning and profiting from an Indian casino. Yet despite the absence of a free-market critique in some indigenous circles, Standing Rock and other actions have emerged as exemplary counterweights to this pernicious drift. And elsewhere, indigenous land protectors are also navigating the currents of globalization to great effect. The Unist’ot’en camp in northern British Columbia has, thus far, blocked construction of numerous potential and proposed pipelines through their territory, building a space where indigenous lifeways can persist on lands defined by industry as an “energy corridor.” In Minnesota, the energy company Enbridge recently shelved plans for the Sandpiper pipeline, partially in response to tribal opposition. And the Obama administration nixed the Keystone XL Pipeline, after facing enormous pressure from tribes and their allies. In each of these instances, indigenous peoples are more than cameo extras. They are central protagonists in the fight against the forces of capitalist expansion, who would destroy the land and water, and trample indigenous sovereignty, all for the purposes of resource extraction. At Standing Rock, disparate tribes have set aside differences and come together as one. People from indigenous nations across the continent have travelled thousands of miles to stand with them. Indigenous people are rallying in support from New York City to San Francisco. Together, they are envisioning a future without a Dakota Access Pipeline, and enacting a future where indigenous nations exercise their rights to define a more just, equal, and sustainable path forward, as stewards of land, water, humanity, and each other. At Standing Rock, the audacious vision for an indigenous future, handed down from Wounded Knee and global in force, is alive and well. This is how you Ghost Dance in 2016.

#### Permutation do both — bottom-up indigenous movements and top-down leftists should form alliances which results in the eventual dismantling of colonialism.

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Movements working to reshape infrastructure, environmental policy, financial systems, policing, and work will be of particular importance to indigenous people. Fossil fuel divestment and the “Keep It in the Ground” movement can weaken and even undermine companies seeking to exploit fossil fuels on indigenous lands. Regulations that dismantle financial instruments and policies that profit from natural resource speculation could divert and damage returns on capital flows. The abolition of mass incarceration would loosen the death grip of prisons and police on indigenous communities. Unions can turn individual workers into collective forces of resistance, helping drive up costs for developers and protect laborers from unsafe working conditions. Long-term efforts to reimagine work through full automation and a universal basic income could prevent laborers from having to seek such dangerous work in the first place. As Standing Rock has shown, indigenous nations that use their unique standing to advocate for viable alternatives to unjust systems will gain supporters. Our traditional territories encompass the rivers, mountains, and forests that capital exploits with abandon. Our resistance — to the pipelines, bulldozers, and mines that cut through our lands and communities — has greater potential than yet realized. Ours is a powerful voice envisioning a more harmonious and sustainable relationship with the natural world rooted in the resurgence of indigenous sovereignty. As long as indigenous people continue to make this argument, we are positioned to win policies, court decisions, and international agreements that protect and enlarge our sovereignty and jurisdiction. As our jurisdiction and sovereignty grow, we will have more power to stop, reroute, and transform carbon-based, capitalist, and colonial infrastructure. When the Justice Department halted construction of DAPL in October, they also said they would begin looking into Free Prior Informed Consent legislation. This is a minimal first step, and we must hold them to it. Longstanding alliances with progressive parties and politicians are key to our success. In the United States, Native people have worked with Democratic elected officials like Bernie Sanders and Raúl Grijalva to advance bills like the Save Oak Flat Act, which aimed to stop an international mining conglomerate from exploiting an Apache sacred site in Arizona. In Canada, First Nations have supported the New Democratic Party. In New Zealand, the Maori Rātana religious and political movement has an alliance with the Labour Party that stretches back to the 1930s. Some indigenous leaders, such as outspoken Aboriginal Australian leader Pat Dodson, a Labour senator for Western Australia, have won prominent positions in these parties. This does not mean, of course, that we should pay deference to elected officials. In 2014, Obama became one of the first sitting presidents to visit an Indian reservation when he travelled to Standing Rock. His visit was historically symbolic and emotionally important, but if Obama fails to stop DAPL, indigenous people should renounce him. Politicians are helpful when they change policies and outcomes. We cannot and should not settle for symbolic victories. If there is to be an enduring indigenous-left coalition, the Left must support indigenous demands for land, jurisdiction, and sovereignty. At their core, these demands undermine the imperial cut-and-paste model of the nation-state, stretching from Hobbes to the present, which insists that there is room for just one sovereign entity in the state apparatus. Thomas Piketty’s call for a global wealth tax implies an international governance structure to levy such a tax. He pushes us to think beyond the state. Similarly, indigenous demands for lands, jurisdiction, and sovereignty imply that we must think beneath it. As the Fourth World continues to push states to recognize our inherent, constitutional, and treaty rights as sovereign nations, the Left cannot remain neutral. To remain neutral is to perpetuate a long history of colonization. To remain neutral is to lose a valuable, organized, and powerful ally.

#### Indigenous Tribes must work through state reform to dismantle oppressive laws and assert autonomy?

Bradford 02 (William, Chiricahua Apache. LL.M., 2001, Harvard Law School; Ph.D., 1995, Northwestern University, "’With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts’: Reparations, Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice,” University of Oklahoma College of Law, American Indian Law Review Vol. 27 No. 1 pp. 1-175) dsk

Nevertheless, even if the non-Indian majority would reject the American Myth in the interest of mending national fences, the path to Indian redress winds through terrain unmapped heretofore. Compensation and apologies, gestures potentially part of an amicable settlement, are not germane to the resolution of Indian claims for injustices that cannot be remedied save by reinvestiture of lands and sovereignty in self-determining Indian tribes.70 This requires not merely an abstract acknowledgment ofthe value of pluralism but a comprehensive program of legal reform that dispenses with doctrines and precedents perpetuating the denial ofthe human rights of Indian tribes and people.71 As law, more than any other social variable, has (reproduced the subordination of Indians in the United States,72 legal reform occupies a central position in the claim for Indian redress.73 In short, proponents of Indian redress must not only displace a flawed version of history: they must articulate a proposal for remediation that transports the American people far beyond the strictures of existing law to enable the peaceful restoration of Indian lands and powers of self government.74 Such a transformative mission cannot be accomplished by positing Indians and the non-Indian majority as adversaries, as would reparations; rather, redress of Indian claims and the healing ofthe American nation -- crucial foci of the drive toward perfection -- necessitate dialogue, reconciliation, and joint authorship of a future history of peace, harmony, and justice.75 Part II of this Article offers a disquieting version of U.S-Indian history that accelerates erosion of the American Myth and acquaints the non-Indian majority with the necessary factual predicate to Indian redress. Parts III and IV contrast the assumptions, procedures, and remedies that distinguish reparations and reconciliation,76 the dominant contending models of redress available to group victims of human injustice, and demonstrate that, because it offers the best hope for a peaceful American coexistence marked by mutual respect for sovereignty, reconciliation is a more appropriate avenue to Indian redress. Several preliminary proposals, including the introduction of traditional tribal peacemaking as perhaps the most appropriate form of reconciliation, will be offered to stimulate thinking.

#### State policies are used to oppress indigenous groups – working to get rid of them is key

Tsosie 16 (Rebecca, Regents Professor of Law at the University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law with the Indigenous Peoples Law and Policy (IPLP) Program and Special Advisor to the Vice Provost for Diversity and Inclusion for the University of Arizona, “The Politics of Inclusion: Indigenous Peoples and U.S. Citizenship,” UCLA Law Review, [https://www.uclalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Tsosie-63-6.pdf)](https://www.uclalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Tsosie-63-6.pdf%29) dsk

This Article explores the dynamics of U.S. citizenship and indigenous selfdetermination to see whether, and how, the two concepts are in tension and how they can be reconciled. The Article explores the four historical frames of citizenship for indigenous peoples within the United States—treating indigenous peoples as citizens of separate nations, as wards of the federal government, as American citizens, and as members of a racial minority group—as well as a fifth frame, which emerges through recognition of the right to self-determination. Taken in historical context, the doctrines defining eligibility for U.S. citizenship have created an overarching view of nationality that supports the political identity of the nation-state. Today, this approach continues under the rubric of “birthright citizenship” and efforts to deploy immigration law to restrain the transnational movement of people across borders. This approach clearly affects indigenous groups that are divided by an international border, but it also affects other indigenous peoples because of its implicit understandings about the nature of their rights. The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples specifies that nation-states should accommodate the spiritual, social, and cultural needs of indigenous peoples divided by an international border. Yet, that right is challenged by a domestic politics about immigration that is often racialized and discounts the political identity of transborder peoples. This Article posits that the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion have always served as the twin pillars of American equality—and oppression. Today, this binary extends beyond U.S. domestic law to affect the rights of indigenous peoples under international law; there is a growing tension between multiculturalism and multinationalism within the realms of domestic and international policy. In this Article, I argue that a human rights framework requires the development of coherent theories about citizenship, sovereignty and self-determination, and I outline an approach for this work. […] Many indigenous epistemologies hold that the people belong to the land, rather than the inverse premise that the land belongs to people.352 Under this view, many of the people deemed to be illegal immigrants are indigenous peoples on the wrong side of an international border.353 In North America, the traditional lands of indigenous nations have been carved into separate national boundaries for the United States, Mexico, and Canada.354 The United States, as of its creation in 1776, had no political claim to the lands in the Southwest.355 Arizona and New Mexico were originally annexed through a treaty with Mexico as a single territory, and then admitted separately to statehood in 1912.356 One hundred years later, that border now divides many indigenous nations, including the Tohono O’odham, Apache, Yaqui, and Kickapoo.357 The members of each Indigenous nation may be split by an international border, but this does not relieve them of continuing duties to carry out the spiritual obligations associated with their ancestral territories. In some cases, the right to access a sacred site or practice religious ceremonies that implicate restricted items, such as peyote and eagle feathers, may be protected by federal law.358 For example, the Tohono O’odham Nation’s reservation straddles the border and the tribal government provides limited services to tribal members on the Mexican side of the border, with the approval of Congress.359 In other cases, however, the United States discounts the human rights of tribal members born on the other side of the border because they lack the political status of those peoples whom the United States recognizes as indigenous.360 Is the status of an indigenous people inherent or is it created by the modern nation-state? Whether the individuals are indigenous or not, it should give us great pause to see that the current group most likely to be deprived of rights under U.S. law is the group constructed as an illegal (undocumented) immigrant. This was the only group to be denied health coverage under the Obama administration’s comprehensive statute governing national healthcare.361 They do not merit the same due process rights as U.S. citizens or lawful permanent aliens, nor do they enjoy the same set of civil rights.362 Yet, do they not have rights as human beings? Many of these individuals are, in fact, indigenous peoples from Mexico and Central America, pushed out of their traditional lands by development projects and disenfranchised from legal rights by their domestic governments.363 Can we craft a conception of human rights that is more just and more humane than the current laws of states such as Arizona, or nation-states such as the United States? That is the question that we must address in an era of indigenous self-determination. The human rights of indigenous peoples are both political and cultural.364 We must acknowledge the inherent cultural sovereignty of all indigenous peoples, including their right to exist as separate peoples within the nation-states that encompass them.365 This should not detract from the political rights that have been negotiated and validated with particular groups, such as the federally recognized tribes in the United States. The pervasive tendency of liberal theorists to demand equality on a categorical basis (for example, as applied to citizens) while negating the rights of others (for example, as applied to undocumented immigrants) must give way to a more nuanced account of the fundamental human rights of the indigenous peoples that belong to the lands that are now under the political control of the United States. One of those rights might entail the need to acknowledge the histories and narratives that have shaped our conceptions of human rights and civil rights. This became clear to me in 2010, when the Arizona legislature enacted a law prohibiting any school district from offering classes that “promote resentment toward a race or class of people,” or “[a]re designed primarily for pupils of a particular ethnic group.”366 In an effort to comply with the law, the superintendent of the Tucson Unified School District (TUSD) banned a program intended to educate Mexican American children about their cultural histories in an effort to enhance their self-esteem and promote their educational achievement.367 TUSD has a long history of inequality in dispersing educational resources, purportedly due to the differential funding that exists for the schools (predominantly Latino and Native American) in the poorer neighborhoods in the southwest part of the city, as opposed to the affluent schools (predominantly white) in the northeast part of the city.368 As an economic issue, the disparity is constitutionally tolerable under federal law pursuant to the logic of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.369 The net result of these disparities in Tucson, however, has denied equal opportunity to a broad cross section of Latino and Native American children in public school education. Not surprisingly, the schools in these neighborhoods suffer from high dropout rates and historically low achievements on standardized tests.370 As Richard Delgado points out, the Mexican American Studies (MAS) program had, over eleven years, proven effective in improving student achievement and retention.371 Prior to the program’s inception, the Latino schoolchildren in this districtsuffered from a 50 percent dropout rate. Eleven yearslater, 90 percent of the Latino schoolchildren were graduating from high school, and a significant number went on to attend colleges and universities.372 Students read Latino and Native American authors, studied accounts of indigenous histories on the Borderlands, and experienced an empowering account of indigenous/Latino intellectualism by teachers who often came from similar cultural backgrounds.373 Despite the proven success of the program, the school district acquiesced to political pressure and banned the program as promoting separatism and impairing the values of unitary democratic citizenship for all Americans.374 The banned books included several by Native American authors, inspiring an immediate negative reaction from tribal leaders.375 Amidst the resultant furor, the superintendent clarified that nothing in the ban was intended to preclude Native American students from reading Native American authors because Native American students are part of their tribal governments.376 Nor did the Tucson book ban preclude white students in the affluent and exclusive public high school from reading the same texts by Latino and Native American authors in their program for academically talented students.377 It turned out that the only group barred from accessing their cultural history was the targeted population of Latino students, largely comprising U.S. citizens of Mexican descent, as well as some children of immigrant parents.378 According to population geneticists, the transborder population within the Southwest Borderlands region shares a genetic heritage.379 But, the genetic identity (ancestry) of these individuals is irrelevant within the cultural politics of the Borderlands, which treats indigenous peoples separatelywith regard to race and politicalstatus.380 There is an eerie similarity between the Tucson case, which primarily affects Mexican American people, and the logic of Rice v. Cayetano381 for Native Hawaiian peoples. Both groups have longstanding cultural and political ties to their lands, which predate the existence of the United States.382 Their rights are now entirely dependent upon the will of a nation-state, however, that continues to selectively include and exclude them from the benefits of citizenship and the enjoyment of their human rights. The assimilationist focus of American citizenship is apparent in both examples, and in both cases, courts and policymakers are careful to differentiate the political rights of the federally recognized Indian nations from the position of other groups within the multicultural politics of American democracy. We might be tempted to accept that logic because it secures the special rights of members of federally recognized indigenous nations using the logic of the plenary power doctrine. In both cases, U.S. Congress has the power to define who may be a citizen and which groups may be recognized as having a trust relationship with the United States. But, by reviewing the four historical frames of American citizenship for indigenous peoples, we can see the perils of an essentialist account of birthright citizenship. In fact, members of the Bush administration formally opposed efforts to extend federal recognition to Native Hawaiian people on the grounds that it would open the door to a similar movement among Mexican Americans in Texas, which was also annexed into the United States by a joint resolution.383 Similarly, the people of Puerto Rico are carefully examining their political status, which also positions U.S. citizenship in relation to selfdetermination.384 If, as Bethany Berger claims, the individual citizen and the nation-state are the “fundamental legal categories” defining civil rights in the United States, then all “nonstate . . . self-governance rights” exist as a limited exception to the norm.385 They can then be categorically included or excluded from the structures and institutions of the nation-state, depending upon the will of the political majority.386 The politics of citizenship and multiculturalism must be reconciled with the right of self-determination in a manner that honestly engages the multiple histories and cultural identities of the affected peoples. It is likely that the fifth frame of citizenship for Native peoples will require articulation of a framework of multinationalism that serves the human rights of indigenous peoples to self-determination.

#### Indigenous Resistance to the state can and should work within that structure

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What do we mean by resistance to globalization? Indigenous resistance to global capitalism is worldwide, diverse, and loosely interconnected.’ Many forms of resistance are covert, echoing Scott’s concept of “weapons of the weak” (1985); they often transmute and/or masquerade as something else. Other forms, while appearing classically revolutionary, defy any easy description. For instance, the events in Chiapas have sometimes been seen as part of a regional, or a peasant (and hence a class), or a caudiio-d ri ven rebellion. They are less often discussed as an indigenous Mayan rebellion.’0 Movements in the United States, such as the American Indian Movement, are often seen solely in terms of localized ethnic, urban, or racial rebellions. Indigenous resisters are often connected via international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), the United Nations, a large variety of their own organizations, and the Internet (Langman et al. 2003; Smith and Ward 2000). In other cases traditional culture and organization itself is a resource that facilitates resistance and survival (Calliou 2005; Champagne 1989, 1992, 2005, 2007; Fenelon 1998). Indigenous resistance struggles are occurring all over the world, even in Europe as, for example, among the Saami (Eidheim 1969) Kurd ish activities in West Asia and Miskito resistance in Nicaragua have long been noted as indigenous movements (Harff and Gurr 2004). Gurr’s (1993, 2000) Minorities at Risk is a catalog of such movements, and Linda Smith’s (1999) Decolonizing Methodologies is itself an act of resistance against the hegemony of European-rooted social science concepts. Her work is rooted in her Mãori com munity and her academic experiences. These movements are so diverse, so fluid in organization. goals, and methods, they all but defy summary. Probably the most salient difference for indigenous movements is the emphasis on local community, identity politics, land claims, and rights io a variety of traditional practices. The latter include alternative family organizations such as extended kinship, matrilineality and! or polygyny, communal ownership of resources such as land, the use of land for sacred ceremonies, less or nonhierarchical decision making, cultural membership in community, and indigenous knowledge that may include use of plant-life for medicine and psychic treatment. Many of these practices contradict, challenge, or threaten deeply held values in state-based systems. The most fundamental challenge to capitalism, though, comes from communal ownership of resources because it denies the overarching dominance of private property rights. Contrary to what many early explorers, missionaries, and colonizers thought, and unfortu nately many so-called development experts today continue to think, it is not that indigenous people do not understand individual ownership. Rather, they have long recognized what many environmental movements are beginning to force capitalists to accept: most resources are partially, if not wholly, «public goods” (to use the terminology of economists) and are thereby sites of political, economic, or social contestation. The interactions of environmentalists and indigenous peoples have been something of a mixed bag, although in the first decade of the twenty-first century, alliances have become more common.’2 Another form of resistance has been overt, conscious efforts to maintain “traditional culture.” We think of traditional culture not as static and unchang ing but rather as evolving according to the desires of group members resisting domination, rather than in accord with desires or directions of outsiders. That is, traditional culture, like all other social forms and structures, evolves and changes continuously, if sporadically and unevenly (Fenelon 1998, 27—30, 72; Smith and Ward 2000). We have observed these processes in North America taking place over some 500 years, ranging from Inuit to Lakota to Zapotecs. They are even older in other parts of the world, such as among the Adevasi in India, who have kept traditional cultures and languages alive for thousands of years. Culture-building can be another form of resistance. For instance, there are nearly three dozen tribal colleges in the United States (American Indian Higher Education Consortium 2008; Boyer l997).’ These are institutions of higher education, typically equivalents of community colleges, run by various Native American groups. They differ from the typical U.S. community college in that many courses promote traditional culture, language, crafts, and customs. In some cases, language programs have been aimed at reviving or reinvigorating a language that has fallen into disuse.’4 Indeed, language education is often a pri mary mission of these colleges. Thus, tribal colleges are an institutional means of preserving and enhancing “traditional cultures.” Some inroads have recently been made in colleges and universities around the world, although these institutions continue to remain purveyors of hegemonic ideologies and history (Champagne and Abu-Saad 2003; Wolf 1982). Resistance can also take the form of building other localized institutions that conform to traditional cultural values. The Diné (Navajo) have several such institutions. The tribal police force, while acting much like any other rural police force in the United States, is also culturally sensitive to Navajo traditions and works within them. More direct are the “peacemaker courts,” which avoid adversarial techniques of Anglo courts by pursuing resolution of disputes among Navajos through means that are in accord with Navajo concepts of harmony.’ We now see new social forms arise among indigenous resistance, such as the “ junta del buen gobierno” local justice of the Zaparistas, the coca growers in Bolivia with Evo Morales, or even the autonomous yet Islamic justice of the Kurds. Other forms of resistance are less institutionalized but nonetheless impor tant. Ward et al. (2000; and Baird-Olsen and Ward 2000) analyze how women among the northern Cheyenne have adapted conventional 12-step programs that address alcohol abuse or spouse abuse to Cheyenne culture, promoting Cheyenne family values. Another common institution among Native Americans in the United States is maintenance of matrilineal family systems, especially through the ownership of property This often comes at a great price, as missionaries and bureaucratic functionaries have repeatedly attacked marrilineality as “barbaric,” “unchristian,” or chaotic. Native American feminists often organize in ways that oppose more mainstream feminist movements. Typically, indigenous feminists focus on issues of identity and cultural preservation prior to more narrowly fo cused feminist concerns (Chiste 1994; Jaimes and Halsey 1992; Marcos 2005; Miller 1994; Shoemaker 1995). Rigoberru Menchu (1984) has documented the oppression and resistance by Mayan women and families in Guatemala, as Gloria Muñoz Ramírez (2003) has done for Zapatista women. Religion can be yet another form of resistance (e.g., Champagne 2003b). Maintenance of religious practices despite massive attempts to destroy them as serts an entirely different way of approaching the supernatural and the sacred. Among the most critical of these practices are lands that are sacred and necessary for religious ceremonies. This leads to conflicts over use of the land for sacred functions versus “productive” and/or “recreational” use (McLeod 2001). Today as “New Agers” have practiced various forms of shamanism, Indian groups have protested attempts to appropriate native traditions (Fenelon 1998, 295—30 1; Rose 1992). Native scholars see these multifarious intrusions into traditional culture as a last arena of conflict, where the holistic knowledge of indigenous peoples could once again be exploited by western markets that have a different orientation toward people and land, and of knowledge itself (Deloria 1994). The revival of older traditions, such as the SunDance (see for example, Jorgensen 1972; Fenelon 1998, 114, 288—294), can be another form of religious resistance. These revivals hark back to many revitalization movements: the Longhouse religion of the Iroquois (Wallace 1969), the Ghost Dance movement (Brown 1976; Champagne 1983; DeMallie 1982; Landsman 1979; Thornton 1986, 1987), and the Native American Church (La Barre 1964; Aberle 1982; Stewart 1987), to name a few. These movements, all of which are somewhat syncretic, preserve many traditional values and have met with some success in combating the destructiveness of incorporation into the capitalist world-system. The Longhouse religion has been a source of strength among Iroquois. Russell Thornton (1986) argues persuasively that adoption of the Ghost Dance religion helped many small groups that had suffered severe demographic losses due to disease to recover both demographically and culturally. More recently the Na tive American Church (NAC, also known as the peyote religion) has been very successful in helping individuals recover from alcoholism. NAC has won several court battles that allow members to use peyote (Iverson 1999, 181—182). All of these religious traditions are vastly different from the various monothe isms found in the states of the modern world-system. Their survival and growth are important forms of resistance to the ideologies of the modern world-system and to pressures for increasing homogeneity of culture due to various globaliza tion processes. Duane Champagne argues, “Natives do not see the world as one where only humans have agency or soul. The Native world is full of forces that have agency, soul or spirit. Humans have a role to play in the Cosmic drama, but not necessarily a central role or an exclusive role” (2005, 6). Thus, many in digenous religions not only oppose capitalist philosophies but also challenge the underpinnings of enlightenment philosophy. Indeed, this challenge is the basis of ambivalent relations with ecologists: “Land is given as a sacred gift and a sacred stewardship. People do not own land, but must care for the land as part of their sacred task within the purpose and direction of the cosmic order” (Champagne 2005, 7). These core values are inseparable from traditional culture and are often a very important component of continuing resistance to hegemonic domination. Some of the most significant forms of resistance are the various ways that resources are managed collectively, for collective good. Phrased alternatively, there are various ways of pursuing collective rationality. Here one must be care ful nor to read this solely as conventional “public goods” administration. This goes much further, in collective ownership of goods—land and livestock most commonly—that are typically individually, privately owned commodities in the capitalist world-system. As Champagne suggests, many indigenous peoples see their roles primarily as stewards who are a part of nature, nor as its controllers or owners. One of the more dramatic examples of such resistance is the continuing ef fort of Lakota peoples to regain control of the Black Hills. Several court decisions, including one by the U.S. Supreme Court, have determined that the territory of the Black Hills (in what is now South Dakota) was illegally taken from the Lakota peoples (Lazarus 1991; Iverson 1999, 117; Churchill 1996, 69—80). In accord with capitalist values and U.S. jurisprudence, the settlement of this claim has been monetary. The Lakota peoples, however, have steadfastly refused such commodified settlements and have insisted on the return of the land that they consider sacred. The intensity of this commitment is underscored by the relative poverty of Lakota people. Shannon County, where the Pine Ridge Reservation is located (the reservation dosest to the Black Hills), has been, since 1980, the poorest county in the United States. Despite the temptation to take the cash settlement, the Lakotas have continued to reject such a settlement and to struggle for the return of their land. Running through all these discussions concerning indigenous peoples in the United States has been the issue of sovereignty. Because of initial treaty agreements, indigenous peoples in the United States have a special relationship directly with the U.S. federal government (Deloria and Wilkins 1999; Fenelon 2002). It is on this legal status that many actions of Native American groups rest. Indeed, sovereignty issues are often the basis of challenges to states around the world and cut to the heart of the interstate system built on the 1648 Peace of Westphalia (Wilmer 1993, 2002). Although native peoples have met with some success in maintaining ereignty, they have had to fight on European grounds—within European law (for detailed examples from northern New Spain, see Cutter l995a, 1995b). We will discuss the sovereignty issue in more detail later. Recently, one of the more outstanding successes has been to use the doctrine of sovereignty to build various gaming operations (Mullis and Kamper 2000; Fenelon 2006). By exploiting the contradictory desires for access to gambling and a desire to forbid it, American Indians have begun to turn considerable profits. But for some other groups, such as the Choctaw, this success is fragile and volatile and subject to federal redefini tion (Faiman-Silva 1997). The question remains, How much have they had to give up to win these victories? By fighting European civilization on its own turf; indigenous peoples have had to accept some of the premis of that turf. Thomas Biolsi argues that the law is “a fundamental constituting axis of modern social life—not just a political resource or an institution but a constituent of all social relations of domination” (Biolsi 1995, 543). Thus, courts have been a leading institutional means of commodifying everything, especially land (Biolsi 1995, 2001). Still, indigenous peoples continue to use legal systems to resist incorporation and global capitalism when they are available with direct access. Here we must note an important dif ference between indigenous struggles in the core or “first” world or global north and those in the “third world” or peripheral areas or global south. The rule of law carries much more force in the first world and so is a more useful tool there. Although this is generally the case, there are exceptions in both directions. There have been many forms of symbolic resistance. For instance, political pressure has led to several national and/or state parks reserving some areas for traditional Native American ceremonies, such as Bear Butte, Devil’s Postpile, and Medicine ‘Wheel (McLeod 2001), although these have been limited in scope. Another example has been the movement against the use of Native American images as sports mascots (Fenelon 1999), along with national movements to remove the injurious term squaw from many place names. The expansion of the powwow circuit is also a vital form of asserting Indian-ness that both reinforces Indian identity and presents Indian culture to a general audience (Mattern 1996; Lassiter 1997). In recent decades there have been indigenous movements that have chal lenged globalizing capitalism (Wilmer 1993; Champagne 2003a). Among these movements are those by INGOs such as Cultural Survival, the International Work Group on Indigenous Affairs, the Center for World Indigenous Studies, and the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations. There are also several indigenous organizations (see Wilmer 1993, 227—229; Smith and Ward 2000). Most of these movements and organizations represent indigenous peoples on both the social group level and collectively, with great variation in their approaches toward issues, the nature of resistance, and the amount of their participation in political spheres. The Zapatista movement—Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, or the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), centered in Chiapas—has been one of the most dramatic. The Zapatista ideology contradicts the logic of capitalism; so too do some Zaparista practices. Members reject modernization and so-called development (Ross 1995; Katzenberger 1995; Collier and Quaratiello 1999; Mattiace 2003). Mignolo (2002) argues that the Zapatista movement constitutes an alternative to Greco-Roman legacies of state-making. The Zap- aristas seek to maintain traditional lifeways in the face of overwhelming pressure to assimilate into the capitalist culture and practice and are thus opposed to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Free Trade in the Americas Agreement (FTAA). The march to Mexico City and the demonstra tions in the Zocalo (March 13, 2001) accompanied by a huge outpouring of civil society in support of the Zapatistas are some indication of the growing impact of such movements. We discuss the Zapatistas in more detail in Chapter 3. (See the photo on the back cover.) Although this catalog of indigenous resistances, overt or implicit, to global capitalism and to the international state system is large, it is but a small sample of such movements. We argue that these movements are more than oppositions to the states within which various indigenous groups are embedded. They are all claims to a continued right to exist as separate entities, a claim to have the right to preserve their own cultures as they see fit. In short, they are claims to autonomy: from the state and from the many forms of globalization. The latter claim, for some degree of autonomy from globalization, is what links indigenous movements to other social movements.’6 It is a ko why these quintessentially local movements are simultaneously part of a global process. But why do we insist on a global approach?

#### Double bind—Either the aff doesn’t challenge the state and is intellectual masturbation or it’s perceived as a revolution outside the state which would be suppressed with military action and nuclear use

-also important to understand state to predict its retaliation to movements

-reformism is a prereq to radical change because it shifts acceptance towards the left

Hailwood 3 (Simon Hailwood, 12/1/3, Liverpool University Philosophy Lecturer, "Eco-Anarchism and Liberal Reformism," Ecotheology 8.2 (2003) 224-241, EBSCO)

Perhaps it will be thought I am hiding behind an abstract (bourgeois) conception of voluntarism and simply ignoring the greater radical edge of eco-anarchism, wherein lies its greater appeal. But the more the greater radicalness of eco-anarchist, over eco-reformist, activity is emphasized, the more it slides back into unrealistic utopianism. Take the following ‘major problem’ for eco-reformers (who produce policy suggestions that state personnel find too radical) identified by Carter: ‘How can the state be employed to put such radical policies into effect when the whole complex structure appears to have been developed in order to pursue as effectively as possible the opposite course?’(Carter 1999: 294). Eco-reformism therefore seems doomed to failure. But although reactionary tendencies of state personnel are a problem for ecoreformists (as are illiberal tendencies of many state personnel within ‘liberal’ states a problem for liberals), it is hard to see Carter’s ecoanarchist alternative as anything but more problematic. Eco-anarchists need to oppose the state and the other elements of the environmentally hazardous dynamic. This seems to cash out in the aforementioned ‘prefiguring cooperative autonomy’, with a general ‘radical disobedience’ as its most effectively transformative feature (Carter 1999: 304-6). I want to emphasize two problems with this. Firstly, it is not just state personnel who tend to balk at radical activity that seems to undermine their immediate material interests. We can expect many needing to make a living for themselves and their family to be reluctant to ‘radically disobey’ the competitive, hierarchical and diffident relationships and ‘hard’, ‘non-convivial’, technologies constituting their immediately available opportunities. This ‘situational logic’ applies even when they have Green sympathies. Secondly, widespread radical disobedience is problematic for just the reason it is supposed to be necessary: one cannot just explain the situation to state personnel (and other powerful actors in the dynamic), with any hope they will act accordingly. They are too locked into the dynamic for it to be rational to expect them to be rational (or moral), other than in ways internal to the dynamic. But then they are likely to view any truly widespread upsurge in radical disobedience as a huge threat requiring a military response. Perhaps they will not succeed in suppressing the disobedience, and they will feel their backs against the wall. But it is unclear how the presence of radically de-stabilized and well-armed hierarchical power structures (viewed with hungry interest by other such structures) will help. War (especially nuclear war) is the greatest threat to the environment, as Carter knows. Thus it is necessary to assume some degree of rationality on the part of the powerful in order for the strategy of widespread radical disobedience itself to be rational. If we assume that then it is reasonable also to present the case for change within the system, and find as many ways as possible to encourage thinking in the right direction as a precursor to radical policy change. Carter apparently thinks this is to increase the likelihood of a military coup, such being the probable result of focusing on eco-reform with a view to radicalizing state policy in a Green direction (Carter 1999: 294- 95). But surely a military coup is more likely as a result of a large-scale, if non-violent (although complete non-violence is unlikely), confrontation with the state and those other elements of the dynamic involved in maintaining the supremacy of its coercive forces. I think the main worry is not that ‘liberal societies’ are incapable of embracing meaningful change in a Green direction, such that anarchism is the only hope. That hope seems more unrealistic—more utopian in that sense—than that of liberal reform. The main worry is that those from the authoritarian end of the spectrum will convince people the liberal mainstream is inherently incapable of reform and so must be replaced by more coercive forms of Green politics (and that people from the left will help with the critique, provide no realist

#### Rhetorical Imperialism DA—Academic theorizations of indigeneity are a privileged distractions from the rights of Natives that recreates Eurocentric pedagogy

-Academy K link

-Also pragmatics good and ignored by critical scholars, becomes a Eurocentric model, turns pedagogy claims

Grande 15 (Sandy Grande, 9/28/15, Quechua Native, Prof Education at Connecticut College, Director of the Center for the Critical Study of Race and Ethnicity (CCSRE), founder and director of the Tecumseh Institute, a Think Tank for Native American and Indigenous Public Policy and Intellectual Discourse, committee member on the National Education Taskforce’s Committee on Race and Ethnicity, “Red Pedagogy: Native American Social and Political Thought”, Rowman & Littlefield, <https://academictrap.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/sandy-grande-red-pedagogy-native-american-social-and-political-thought.pdf>, p. 1-2)//SJK

This book examines the tensions and intersections between dominant modes of critical educational theory and issues relative to American Indian' education. Though at the forefront of educational struggles for equity and social justice, justice, critical theorists have failed to recognize and, more importantly, to theorize the relationship between American Indian tribes and the larger democratic imaginary. This failure has severely limited their ability to produce political strategies and educational interventions that account for the rights and needs of American Indian students. To compound the issue, American Indian scholars have largely resisted engagement with critical educational theory, concentrating instead on the production of historical monographs, ethnographic studies, tribally centered curriculums, and site-based research? The combined effect of external neglect by critical scholars and internal resistance among indigenous scholars has kept matters of American Indian education on the margins of educational discourse. This lack of interchange has additionally raised a series of important questions: How has the marginalization of critical analyses within American Indian education contributed to the "culturalization" of American Indian issues and concerns? How has the focus on "cultural" representations of Indian-ness contributed to a preoccupation with parochial questions of identity and authenticity? And, finally, how has this preoccupation obscured the sociallitical and economic realities facing indigenous communities, substituting politics of representation for one of radical social transformation?3 Before responding to these questions, it is important to acknowledge that lack of engagement with the broader educational discourse on the part of American Indian scholars derives from real pressures to address the social political urgencies of their own communities. The impulse to concentrate , energy, and resources on recovering, developing, and refining tribally centered forms of schooling is, after all, an effect of the severe loss of tribal knowledge suffered through centuries of colonization. Indeed, centuries of "rhetorical imperialism" committed by "mainstream" scholars pressures indigenous scholars to concentrate their research efforts on their own communities.4 In this context, restorative projects that affirm and sustain the value of indigenous languages, cultural knowledge, and intellectual history are a first priority. Against such immediate needs, engagement in abstract theory seems indulgent—a luxury and privilege of the academic elite. Further, theory itself is viewed as definitively Eurocentric — inherently contradictory to the aims of indigenous education

#### Death Dance DA—The aff is a false choice between Western adoption and Native complacency—growing indigenous diversity demands political solidary and social transformation

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Though perhaps justified, it is important to consider how the "Native theory of antitheory" ultimately limits possibilities for broad-based coalition and political solidarity. Particularly at a time when indigenous communities are under siege from the forces of global encroachment, such a limitation has serious implications. Communities either unable or unwilling to extend borders of coalition and enact transcendent theories of decolonization will only compound their vulnerability to the whims and demands of the "new global order." These realities indicate that the time is ripe for indigenous scholars to engage in critique-a15 studies. In addition, the current explosion in American Indian scholarship renders the once small and insular field of American Indian education both broad and deep enough to sustain internal reflection as well as external engagement. Further still, the burgeoning diversity among peoples who identify themselves as Native American increasingly transforms "the Native American experience" into a multifarious, polyvocal space. In Peru, roads and airports have brought people and tourism to communities previously inaccessible to all but well-funded anthropologists and wealthy individuals. In the United States, reservation communities experience an even greater influx of tour buses, social service agencies, religious organizations, and corporate prospectors. The effect has transformed once pastoral communities like Chinle, Arizona, and Ayacucho, Peru, into quasi-urban landscapes and, cities like Lima, Peru, and Los Angeles, California, into virtual denizens for a vast array of dislocated and relocated Indian peoples. Indeed, over the centuries, the forces of conquest, genocide, removal, colonization, imperialism, detribalization, urbanization, and relocation have deeply altered indigenous communities worldwide. As indigenous communities continue to be transformed by movement, access, border crossing, and transgression, it becomes even more pertinent for American Indian scholars to abandon what Robert Allen Warrior (1995) refers to as the "death dance of dependence"—the vacillation between wholesale adoption of Anglo-Western theories and the declaration by American Indian scholars that they need nothing outside of themselves to understand their world or place within it. In other words, as the sociocultural geography of Indian Country expands, so too must the intellectual borders of indigenous intellectualism. While there is nothing inherently healing, liberatory, or revolutionary about theory, it is one of our primary responsibilities as educators to link the lived experience of theorizing to the processes of self-recovery and social transformation.

### **A2 Deschooling K**

#### The alternative fails and reinforces the status quo – its pessimistic negation is not liberating.

Gintis 72 – Herbert Gintis, Visiting professor in the Economics Department of Central European University, Former Professor Emertius in Economics at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University, B.A. in Mathematics from the University of Pennsylvania, 1972 (“Towards a Political Economy of Education: A Radical Critique of Ivan Illich 's Deschooling Society,” *Harvard Educational Review*, February, Available Online at: <http://hepgjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.17763/haer.42.1.h2m4644728146775>, Accessed 6-22-17)

Illich recognizes that the problems of advanced industrial societies are institutional, and that their solutions lie deep in the social core. Therefore, he consciously rejects a partial or affirmative analysis which would accept society's dominant ideological forms and direct its innovative contributions toward marginal changes in assumptions and boundary conditions. Instead, he employs a methodology of total critique and negation, and his successes, such as they are, stem from that choice. Ultimately, however, his analysis is incomplete. Dialectical analysis begins with society as is (thesis), entertains its negation (antithesis), and overcomes both in a radical reconceptualization (synthesis). Negation is a form of demystification—a drawing away from the immediately given by viewing it as a "negative totality." But negation is not without presuppositions, is not itself a form of liberation. It cannot "wipe clean the slate" of ideological representation of the world or one's objective position in it. The son/daughter who acts on the negation of parental and societal values is not free—he/she is merely the constrained negative image of that which he/she rejects (e.g., the negation of work, consumption order, and rationality is not liberation but negative un-freedom). The negation of male dominance is not women's liberation but the (negative) affirmation of "female masculinity." Women's liberation in dialectical terms can be conceived of as the overcoming (synthesis) of male dominance (thesis) and female masculinity (antithesis) in a new totality which rejects/embodies both. It is this act of overcoming (synthesis, consciousness) which is the critical and liberating aspect of dialectical thought. Action lies not in the act of negation (antithesis, demystification) but in the act of overcoming (synthesis/consciousness). The strengths of Illich's analysis lie in his consistent and pervasive methodology of negation. The essential elements in the liberal conceptions of the Good Life— consumption and education, the welfare state and corporate manipulation—are demystified and laid bare in the light of critical, negative thought. Illich's failures can be consistently traced to his refusal to pass beyond negations-—beyond a total rejection of the appearances of life in advanced industrial societies—to a higher synthesis. While Illich should not be criticized for failing to achieve such a synthesis, nevertheless he must be taken seriously to task for mystifying the nature of his own contribution and refusing to step—however tentatively—beyond it. Work is alienating—Illich rejects work; consumption is unfulfilling—Illich rejects consumption; institutions are manipulative—Illich places "nonaddictiveness" at the center of his conception of human institutions; production is bureaucratic—Illich glorifies the entrepreneurial and small-scale enterprise; schools are dehumanizing— Illich rejects schools; political life is oppressive and ideologically totalitarian— Illich rejects politics in favor of individual liberation. Only in one sphere does he go beyond negation, and this defines his major contribution. While technology is in fact dehumanizing (thesis), he does not reject technology (antithesis). Rather he goes beyond technology and its negation towards a schema of liberating technological forms in education. The cost of his failure to pass beyond negation in the sphere of social relations in general, curiously enough, is an implicit affirmation of the deepest characteristics of the existing order.30 In rejecting work, Illich affirms that it necessarily is alienating—reinforcing a fundamental pessimism on which the acceptance of capitalism is based; in rejecting consumption, he affirms either that it is inherently unfulfilling (the Protestant ethic), or would be fulfilling if unmanipulated; in rejecting manipulative and bureaucratic "delivery systems," he affirms the laissez-faire capitalist model and its core institutions; in rejecting schools, Illich embraces a commodityfetishist cafeteria-smorgasbord ideal in education; and in rejecting political action, he affirms a utilitarian individualistic conception of humanity. In all cases, Illich's analysis fails to pass beyond the given (in both its positive and negative totalities), and hence affirms it.

#### The alternative fails and harms disadvantaged students – those who are disinterested will turn back to manipulative institutions.

Varbelow and Griffith 12 – Sanja Varbelow, Assistant Professor in the Department of Teacher Education at Angelo State University, Former Field-Based Teaching Specialist in Learning and Innovation and Lecturer in Curriculum and Instruction at The University of Texas at Brownsville, Member of the American Educational Research Association and the Society for Professors of Education, Ph.D. in Curriculum and Instruction from Texas A&M University, M.A. in Education from Humbolt University, Bryant Griffith, Professor in the Department of Curriculum and Instruction at Texas A&M University Corpus Christi, 2012 (“Deschooling Society: Re-Examining Ivan Illich’s Contributions to Critical Pedagogy for 21st Century Curriculum Theory,” *Education Resources Information Center*, June 6th, Accessed Online at: <http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED532618.pdf>, Accessed 6-2-17)

Illich illustrates the “Reference Service to Educational Objects” with the example of a friend who brought a pair of dice to the market with which he taught volunteers rules of semantics. While some children enjoyed the educational game and benefitted from it, others walked away. This is a fundamental concern in Illich’s concept of deschooling society: Why did they leave? Did they understand too little of the concept to be curious? Or had they heard of semantics before and considered it boring? Should we ask them to stay? It can be concluded that Illich would object. If so, his approach might work only for highly motivated students but might not effective for those children we label “disadvantaged.” One of the purposes of school must be to allow children to learn enough about themselves and an idea to decide whether it is worthy of finding out more about or whether it does not interest them. I often see my students “walk away.” After having aroused their curiosity towards a particular idea, I see them never returning to it unless prompted by homework assignments to be rewarded/punished with a grade. I doubt they don’t pursue it because of their ignorance. Rather, I believe they are overwhelmed with the requirements school puts before them in order to acquire their certificate. Therefore, they have to prioritize and lack the leisure to find out more about that initially interesting idea. Now, if we gave students a choice of what we ought to require of them based on their interests, would they be more engaged or would they spend their time following the beckoning of “manipulative” institutions such as the mall? I think Illich would not only entrust students to entertain their curiosity but also to know what concerns them based on their lives’ circumstances. His purpose of deschooling society is that students regain the ability and the courage to ask questions and voice concerns. If we successfully transform school into a “convivial” institution, students, by definition, would enjoy engaging in it.

#### Deschooling’s freedom kills motivation and detracts from instrumental skills.

Mitchell 07 – Ethan Mitchell, Independent Researcher for Philica Institute in the United States, 2007 (“Educational Antidisestablishmentarianism”, *Philica*, Available Online at <http://www.philica.com/display_article.php?article_id=74>, Accessed 06-27-2017)

Freedom

A good many authors saw the fundamental thesis of consensual learning as an error. Freedom may not be intrinsically valuable[41], or may not be valued by children[42]. They argued that children have no experiential background to make educational choices, especially in terms of envisioning what they would find useful or fulfilling years hence[43]. The "hidden curriculum" of schools was an intentional effort to provide children with intellectual tools and patterns of thought that they would not seek out on their own accord[44]. If children are left to study only what they want, they will learn prejudices[45], impulsively switch topics[46], or simply do nothing and waste their potential (27,13). Finally, the suggestion that lessons are optional inferred that they are unimportant, and that students were valueless because adults had no expectations of them (7, 21) A more moderate version of this critique was the idea that while certain skills can be learned in a consensual environment, other indispensable skills could not be. The major focus here was literacy, whose importance was denigrated by several of the early consensual educators[47]. Their position was very widely condemned, and did not appear so much in later writings on consensual learning. In addition to its direct utility, Ashton-Warner pointed out that reading and writing have therapeutic and behavior-modifying effects which are of value in schools[48]. Beyond literacy, there are other skills that society needs to reproduce-and that subgroups of society need for their own empowerment-but which arguably cannot be learned in a "spontaneous and ecstatic" fashion[49]. These include systematic and logical thought, mathematics, medicine, classical languages, and law[50]. The studium generale cannot afford to leave open the possibility that such skills will not be reproduced. Still a third group of authors, more optimistic about the potential of consensual learning, were concerned about its scope and practice. Perhaps consensual learning is adequate or even desirable for most students, but there is some group for whom it would be disastrous[51]. A particularly common criticism in this regard was that consensual learning posits essentially negative, divisive freedoms-there is little emphasis on mutualism and solidarity[52]. Students are not presented with adequate guidance, or actively drawn into new interests, which could be accomplished without coercion[53]. Moreover, they may not be encouraged to persist in the face of intellectual setbacks, a trend that Kozol terms the "Cult of Incompletion[54]." Without direction and guidance, the choices of a consensual learner resemble someone watching television, flipping from one channel to the next[55].

Finally, some authors who supported the idea of consensual learning nevertheless warned that it carries great psychic risks. It demands a great level of self-respect, and-failing that-might plunge the learner into depression, alcoholism, or insanity[56].

#### The impact is inevitable – the “institutionalized values” they criticize are produced by everyday social processes and convivial institutions are irrelevant.

Gintis 72 – Herbert Gintis, Visiting professor in the Economics Department of Central European University, Former Professor Emertius in Economics at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University, B.A. in Mathematics from the University of Pennsylvania, 1972 (“Towards a Political Economy of Education: A Radical Critique of Ivan Illich 's Deschooling Society,” *Harvard Educational Review*, February, Available Online at: <http://hepgjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.17763/haer.42.1.h2m4644728146775>, Accessed 6-22-17)

Mich's model of consumption-manipulation is crucial at every stage of his political argument. But it is substantially incorrect. In the following three sections I shall criticize three basic thrusts of his analysis. 75 First, Illich locates the source of social decay in the autonomous, manipulative behavior of corporate bureaucracies. I shall argue, in contrast, that the source must be sought in the normal operation of the basic economic institutions of capitalism (markets in factors of production, private control of resources and technology, etc.),3 which consistently sacrifice the healthy development of community, work, environment, education, and social equality to the accumulation of capital and the growth of marketable goods and services. Moreover, given that individuals must participate in economic activity, these social outcomes are quite insensitive to the preferences or values of individuals, and are certainly in no sense a reflection of the autonomous wills of manipulating bureaucrats or gullible consumers. Hence merely ending "manipulation" while maintaining basic economic institutions will affect the rate of social decay only minimally. Second, Illich locates the source of consumer consciousness in the manipulative socialization of individuals by agencies controlled by corporate and welfare bureaucracies. This "institutionalized consciousness" induces indivduals to choose outcomes not in conformity with their "real" needs. I shall argue, in contrast, that a causal analysis can never take socialization agencies as basic explanatory variables in assessing the overall behavior of the social system.4 In particular, consumer consciousness is generated through the day-to-day activities and observations of individuals in capitalist society. The sales pitches of manipulative institutions, rather than generating the values of commodity fetishism, merely capitalize upon and reinforce a set of values derived from and reconfirmed by daily personal experience in the social system. In fact, while consumer behavior may seem irrational and fetishistic, it is a reasonable accommodation to the options for meaningful social outlets in the context of capitalist institutions. Hence the abolition of addictive propaganda cannot "liberate" the individual to "free choice" of personal goals. Such choice is still conditioned by the pattern of social processes which have historically rendered him or her amenable to "institutionalized values." In fact, the likely outcome of de-manipulation of values would be no significant alteration of values at all. Throughout this paper, I restrict my analysis to capitalist as opposed to other economic systems of advanced industrial societies (e.g., state-socialism of the Soviet Union type). As Illich suggests, the outcomes are much the same, but the mechanisms are in fact quite different. The private-administrative economic power of a capitalist elite is mirrored by the public-administrative political power of a bureaucratic elite in state-socialistcountries, and both are used to reproduce a similar complex of social relations of production and a structurally equivalent system of class relations. The capitalist variety is emphasized here because of its special relevance in the American context.

#### Deschooling cements inequality.

Mitchell 07 – Ethan Mitchell, Independent Researcher for Philica Institute in the United States, 2007, (“Educational Antidisestablishmentarianism”, *Philica*, Available Online at <http://www.philica.com/display_article.php?article_id=74>, Accessed 06-27-2017)

Re-Entrenching Inequality

Deschooling, several authors contested, would be bad for the poor, who were alleged to oppose it[33]. Consensual learning as a type of laissez-faire might undo the redistributive economics of democratic education, creating new concentrations of power and privilege or maintaining the status quo[34]. By shifting to a local scale, consensual learning tended to create a race- and class-homogenous studium generale, and allowed educators in privileged communities to abandon the rest of society; Kozol described a typical free school in Vermont as "a sandbox for the children of the SS guards at Auschwitz.[35]." On a world scale, deschooling "in its most anarchistic sense" would ossify the unequal levels of development between nations[36]. These concerns are exacerbated and extended if consensual education is especially costly. Added expenses might be incurred as economies of scale are lost, or if small free-schools are expected to have "an implausibly wide range of ‘relevant equipment' or resources at their disposal.[37]" Potentially, all the successes of free schools could be attributed to the high socio-economic status of the students[38]. However, free schools seemed to run on very narrow financial margins[39], and thus were also criticized for being unsustainably financially vulnerable. Moreover, decision-making around finance depended on the adult community-both in the conventional and alternative models-and adults might have different and internally conflicting goals for the studium generale [40].

#### Permutation do both- Educated hope is the best form of praxis to challenge axioms of power without succumbing to the trap of leftist cynicism. Only by making impossible demands can concrete struggle become possible

Stern 2012. Stern is an Assistant Professor of Educational Studies @ Colgate University. “We Can’t Build Our Dreams On Suspicious Minds” Neoliberalism, Education Policy, and the Feelings Left Over. Vol 12, Issue 5, 2012. SAGE Journals.]

Here, Giroux’s notion of educated hope is terribly important, and yet I also think somewhat limiting. For Giroux, educated hope is the condition of possibility foundational for real social struggle and transformation. In conversation with Judith Butler, Ernest Block, Robin D.G. Kelley, and others, Giroux argues, rightly I believe, that educated hope “makes the leap for us between critical education, which tells us what must be changed; political agency, which gives us the means to make change; and the concrete struggle through which change happens” (p. 38; italics original; see also Edmondson and D’Urso 2007). Educated hope is an enabling and activating social location, which emerges from a critical engagement with power, inequality, and injustices. It emerges from precisely the types of strong, paranoid critiques Sedgwick was warning us about. It allows us to understand and engage with the present with a historical, social, and political competency. In questioning the historical and the present, educated hope opens us spaces to think about and the horizons of possibility for different future. Jameson (2005) argues something similar in relation to the genre of science fiction when he claims that Utopian visions of other worlds both make “us more aware of our mental and ideological imprisonment” (p. xiii) and allow us to express our “relationships to a genuinely political future” (p. 232). Educated hope is one of the desired intellectual, political, and emotional outcomes of a class engaging in critical policy studies. Opposing the neoliberal illusion of escaping the social into our individual liberties, educated hope examines the social, is critical of the social, and also sees an engaged and justice-oriented social as the means toward liberation (Giroux 2004, p. 39). If, though, critical education is the gateway to political agency and the concrete struggle, which, again, I agree with, I do think the content of critical education matters. In terms of teaching, Edmundson and D’Urso (2007), responding to a call from a then Dean and now President of a college of education to focus less on dreams (of justice or real democratic schooling) and more on reality, argue that critical policy studies “seek to locate the underlying causes of class exploitation and economic oppression [in order to] serve a broader purpose in determining better ways to address social problems in the classroom and community.” Critical policy studies are influenced and in conversation with various strains of libratory and emancipatory philosophies, which start with a notion that knowledge is always situated, always historical, and always related to power. This is where, for many of us, the hermeneutics of suspicion comes into play. And from this, from an intense encounter with the embeddedness of power/knowledge, one is then freed (from false consciousness) to critique, imagine, and become an agent of change. And here is where my story might create pause. There is a difference, as Sedgwick wants us to see, between a paranoid type and depressive position. Without recuperation, without examples, without the pages of and other authors, activists, and publications that highlight the concrete struggles and provide examples of political agency, one runs the risk of creating paranoid types. This, I believe, is what happened in my own class. I was too excited about critique, too interested in making sure that they could, at any moment, find the thing to be suspicious of. As such, I left a mechanism to get from suspicion to educated hope at bay. It can’t always be critique and think that the critical will smoothly lead to agency and struggle. Agency and struggle, in their own respective multiplicities, also need classroom time and space. “If hope is an impossible demand,” Judith Butler (2011) remarked visiting the Occupy Movement in Zuccotti Park, “then we demand the impossible. If the right to shelter, food, and employment are impossible demands, then we demand the impossible” (p. 193). To build our dreams, however impossible sounding, to bring justice and democratic principles into being, one needs critique and one needs educated hope. The two are neither mutually exclusive, nor are they necessarily related by causation. The neoliberal critique is so fundamentally structural, so fundamentally global, and so fundamentally all-encompassing that real change does seem impossible. And yet we need to figure out ways to oscillate between the two, to suspend suspicion, even if merely for a moment, to make sure that hope and struggle find their ways in; to not create paranoid types, always on the neoliberal prowl; to also provide concrete examples of agency and struggle; to make our students deal as closely with those recuperations as they do with the critiques. Dreams should always remain and the impossible should always be something we ask our students to engage with for, as Derrida has pointed out (e.g., Malabou & Derrida, 2004), it is the impossible that creates the conditions for possibility. The suspicion of the present will and should always create the conditions for imaging another impossible future, a more just future, a different future. And finding other means, perhaps weak and locale theories, we might also set students off on their own acts and feelings of political agency and concrete struggle**.**

**Capitalism has made poverty better – has allowed for better living conditions, innovation, and health improvements**

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**Critics frequently accuse markets and capitalism of making life worse for the poor. This refrain is certainly common in the halls of left-leaning academia as well as in broader intellectual circles**. But like so many other criticisms of capitalism**, this one ignores the very real, and very available, facts of history.** The biggest gains in **the fight against poverty have occurred in countries that have opened up their markets.** **Nothing has done more to lift humanity out of poverty than the market economy.** This claim is true whether we are looking at a time span of decades or of centuries. The number of people worldwide living on less than about two dollars per day today is less than half of what it was in 1990. **The biggest gains in the fight against poverty have occurred in countries that have opened up their markets, such as China and India. If we look over the longer historical period, we can see that the trends today are just the continuation of capitalism’s victories in beating back poverty**. For most of human history, we lived in a world of a few haves and lots of have-nots. That slowly began to change with the advent of capitalism and the Industrial Revolution. As economic growth took off and spread throughout the population, it created our own world in the West in which there are a whole bunch of haves and a few have-more-and-betters. For example, the percentage of American households below the poverty line who have basic appliances has grown steadily over the last few decades, with poor families in 2005 being more likely to own things like a clothes dryer, dishwasher, refrigerator, or air conditioner than the average household was in 1971. And consumer items that didn’t even exist back then, such as cell phones, were owned by half of poor households in 2005 and are owned by a substantial majority of them today. **Capitalism has also made poor people’s lives far better by reducing infant and child mortality rates, not to mention maternal death rates during childbirth, and by extending life expectancies by decades.** We spend a much smaller percentage of our lives working for pay, whether we’re rich or poor. Consider, too, the way **capitalism’s engine of growth has enabled the planet to sustain almost 7 billion people, compared to 1 billion in 1800.** As Deirdre McCloskey has noted, if you multiply the gains in consumption to the average human by the gain in life expectancy worldwide by 7 (for 7 billion as compared to 1 billion people), **humanity as a whole is better off** by a factor of around 120. That’s not 120 percent better off, but 120 times better off since 1800. **The competitive market process has also made education, art, and culture available to more and more people.** Even the poorest of Americans, not to mention **many of the global poor, have access through the Internet and TV to concerts, books, and works of art that were exclusively the province of the wealthy for centuries**. And in the wealthiest countries, the dynamics of capitalism have begun to change the very nature of work. Where once humans toiled for 14 hours per day at backbreaking outdoor labor, now an increasing number of us work inside in climate-controlled comfort. **Our workday and workweek have shrunk thanks to the much higher value of labor that comes from working with productive capital.** We spend a much smaller percentage of our lives working for pay, whether we’re rich or poor. And even with economic change, the incomes of the poor are much less variable, as they are not linked to the unpredictable changes in weather that are part and parcel of a predominantly agricultural economy long since disappeared. Think of it this way: the fabulously wealthy kings of old had servants attending to their every need, but an impacted tooth would likely kill them. **The poor in largely capitalist countries have access to a quality of medical care and a variety and quality of food that the ancient kings could only dream of.** Consider, too, that the working poor of London 100 years ago were, at best, able to split a pound of meat per week among all of their children, which were greater in number than the two or three of today. In addition, the whole family ate meat once a week on Sunday, the one day the man of the household was home for dinner. That was meat for a week. These changes are not about technology. Compare that to today, when we worry that poor Americans are too easily able to afford a meal with a quarter pound of meat in it every single day for less than an hour’s labor. Even if you think that **capitalism has made poor people overweight, that’s a major accomplishment compared to the precapitalist norm of constant malnutrition and the struggle even 100 years ago for the working poor to get enough calories.** The reality is that the rich have always lived well historically, as for centuries they could commandeer human labor to attend to their every need. In a precapitalist world, the poor had no hope of upward mobility or of relief from the endless physical drudgery that barely kept them alive. Today, **the poor in capitalist countries live like kings, thanks mostly to the freeing of labor and the ability to accumulate capital that makes that labor more productive and enriches even the poorest**. The falling cost of what were once luxuries and are now necessities, **driven by the competitive market and its profit and loss signals, has brought labor-saving machines to the masses.** When profit-seeking and innovation became acceptable behavior for the bourgeoisie, the horn of plenty brought forth its bounty, and even the poorest shared in that wealth. **Once people no longer needed permission to innovate, and once the value of new inventions was judged by the improvements they made to the lives of the masses in the form of profit and loss, the poor began to live lives of comfort and dignity**. These changes are not, as some would say, about technology. After all, the Soviets had great scientists but could not channel that knowledge into material comfort for their poor. **And it’s not about natural resources, which is obvious today as resource-poor Hong Kong is among the richest countries in the world thanks to capitalism**, **while Venezuelan socialism has destroyed that resource-rich country. Wealth is not about natural resources**. Inventions only become innovations when the right institutions exist to make them improve the lives of the masses. That is what capitalism did and continues to do every single day. And that’s why capitalism has been so good for the poor. Consider, finally, **what happened when the Soviets decided to show the film version of The Grapes of Wrath as anticapitalist propaganda**. In the novel and film, a poor American family is driven from their Depression-era home by the Dust Bowl. They get in their old car and make a horrifying journey in search of a better life in California. The Soviets had to stop showing the film after a short period because the Russian audiences were astonished that poor Americans were able to own a car. Even anticapitalist propaganda can’t help but provide evidence that contradicts its own argument. **The historical truth is clear: nothing has done more for the poor than capitalism**.

### A2 Baudrillard

#### Hyperreality Turns

**Baudrillard’s critique offers no way out of hyperreal simulation.**

**Luke 91 [LUKE**, Timothy W. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, **91** [“Power and politics in hyperreality: The critical project of Jean Baudrillard,” *Social Science Journal*, 1991, Vol. 28, Issue 3, Accessed Online through Emory Libraries]

Power and politics do seem to assume new forms in hyperreality as their mediations substitute the imaginary for the real, simulations displace actuality, simulacra merge into the real. No longer duplicity or counterfeit, **simulation acquires** total **integrity**, actually **becoming what is considered the real**. In informational society, the community and solidarity of "the masses" appear to be melting into hyperreality.( n48) Where unity or commonality can no longer exist organically, it is created via mobilization of images and illusions, beginning, for example, in the 1960s and 1970s with "the Woodstock Nation," extending through the 1980s with Band Aid-style "we are the world" solidarity and Ronald Reagan's (or Peggy Noonan's) myths of "It's morning again in America," and continuing into the 1990s with George Bush's (or Roger Ailes') visions of "kinder, gentler America." Images now form group identity among the silent majorities. Unifying together and exerting pressure as blocs of like-minded consumers willing to appear at the sites of consumption, individuals make a statement simply by showing up to consume or appearing to accept identity from such signs. By the same logic, exurban consumers shopping at a Banana Republic or Ralph Lauren store at Georgetown Park, Inner Harbor or Union Station believe their buyers' choices are revitalizing Washington, Baltimore, or St. Louis as real cities. Here the silent majorities ironically may take on a voice and accept a vision in the hyperreal presentation of this sort of collective consciousness. Saying it or showing it to be so in this or that particular frame makes it so, and in making it so, makes it hyperreal. **Power in hyperreality, derives from controlling the means of simulation, dominating the codes of representation, and managing the signs of meaning that constitute what hyperreality is taken as being at any particular time. By setting the limits of what is hyperreal**, and therefore at least temporarily "real," **movements on the mediascapes appear to set agendas, determine loyalties, frame conflicts, and limit challenges to the prevailing organization of what is or is not taken as being real**. Baudrillard's critical project, then, provisionally sums up the state of society as hyperreal simulacra displace traditional representations of social reality. While his critical project is not perfect, Baudrillard shows how human needs increasingly have no autonomous basis in an authentic conception of humanity outside of sign-driven commodity exchange. In hyperreality, needs are instead grounded in the prepacked expectations of cultural codes conveyed to individuals as part and parcel of their aestheticized duty to consume. Individuals serve as the vital productive force of monopoly capitalism, while the code enforces their productive potential through a free-floating flow of signifiers and signs. Under this regime, art and industry continually "exchange signs" in order to keep "art productive" and industrial production masked in "esthetic signs of prestige." In the postmodern terrains of cybernetic hyperrealism, "we already live out the `esthetic' hallucination of reality."( n49) Still, **in the end, there are neither clear political visions nor obvious moral imperatives to be gained from Baudrillard's critique** of hyperreality. **Paradoxically, his work promotes a deep distrust of collective action, while providing new categories both to define postmodernity and to refine the critical analysis of its operations. Yet, what** must be or, at least, **might be done to resist or contest the hyperreal webs of simulation** effectively **is largely left unanswered. Perhaps the "future" will only be like the "present" as it endlessly reiterates the empty play of signs in the never-ending simulations of hyperreality**. It remains, however, for others to take these insights and then use them to reinterpret today and tomorrow these still unfolding logics of postmodernity.

**They link to themselves.**

**Baudrillard 76** (Jean, “Symbolic Exchange and Death”, p. 74)

The consummate enjoyment [jouissance] of **the signs of** guilt, despair, violence and death are **replacing** guilt, anxiety and even death in **the total euphoria of simulation**. This euphoria aims to abolish cause and effect, origin and end, and replace them with reduplication. Every closed system **protects itself** in this way from the referential and the anxiety of the referential, as well as **from all metalanguage** that the system wards off by **operating its own metalanguage**, that is, by **duplicating itself as its own critique**. In simulation, the metalinguistic illusion reduplicates and **completes the referential illusion** (the pathetic hallucination of the sign and the pathetic hallucination of the real).

**Baudrillard is contradictory**

**Marsh 95** –(Philosophy Professor Fordham James Marsh “Critique, Action, and Liberation”)

In such a postmodernist account is **a reduction of everything to image** or symbol that **misses the relationship of these to realities such as corporations seeking profit**, impoverished workers in these corporations, or peasants in Third-World countries trying to conduct elections. **Postmodernism does not adequately distinguish here between a reduction of reality to image and a mediation of reality by image. A media idealism exists rooted in the influence of structuralism and poststructuralism and doing insufficient justice to concrete human experience**, judgment, and free interaction in the world.4 **It is** also paradoxical or **contradictory to say** it really is true **that nothing is** really **true,’ that everything is** illusory or **imaginary. Postmodemism makes judgments that implicitly deny the reduction of reality to image.** For example, Poster and Baudrillard do want to say that we really are in a new age that is informational and postindustrial. Again, **to say that everything is imploded into media images is akin** logically **to the** Cartesian **claim that everything** is or **might be a dream. What happens is that dream or image is absolutized or generalized to the point that its original meaning lying in its contrast to natural, human, and social reality is lost. We can discuss Disneyland as reprehensible because we know the difference between Disneyland and the larger, enveloping reality of Southern California and the United States.5**

**Baudrillard’s theory is necessarily self-defeating – they could win every argument and it still doesn’t justify a ballot.**

**Merrin 01** (William, Prof. of School of Cultural Studies, Leeds Metropolitan University, “To play with phantoms: Jean Baudrillard and the Evil Demon of the Simulacrum” Economy and Society Volume 30 Number 1)

The power of the simulacrum, therefore, may prove to be **greater than Baudrillard realized**. On a personal level this is certainly the case. In a candid 1984–5 interview he reveals that his courtship of its demon became an unlivable experience: ‘I stopped working on simulation. I felt I was going totally nuts’ (1993a: 105). The simulacrum, however, could not be so easily disposed of. Despite his desire to ‘cast off this yoke of simulacres and simulation’ (1993a: 184), the ‘simulacrum’ has thrived, becoming an idea popularly and irrevocably identified with Baudrillard. It has, appropriately, exerted its simulacral power to appear in the popular imagination as the real philosophy of Jean Baudrillard, eclipsing his critique, and all other aspects of his work and career. Journalistic commentary and student texts are typical here in identifying the simulacrum as Baudrillard’s sole approved project. Thus the problem of finding Baudrillard’s flat is turned into an obvious and banal hook by one interviewer, who takes the opportunity to enquire whether ‘Baudrillard himself . . . might be a simulacrum’: Does he really exist? (Leith 1998: 14). More importantly for Baudrillard, however, is the simulacral efficacy of doubling – the theoretical strategy of employing simulation which, quite naturally, has a simulacral effect. The theory of simulation Baudrillard did not believe in has now been realized: as the Japanese interviewer makes clear, the simulacrum has become reality. Volatized in, and as, the real, its victory is the concept’s defeA2: once it is ‘true’, the simulacrum becomes a commonplace, robbed of its capacity to arouse the world’s denial and thus its critical force: if there is nothing beyond the simulacrum then it is not even open to question but is simply ‘our absolute banality, our everyday obscenity’ (Zurbrugg 1997: 11). Hence Baudrillard’s emphasis upon the theoretical challenge of the simulacrum. Once realized, unless – as Baudrillard hopes – it can itself be reversed against simulation, then this critical function is lost. Opposing Baudrillard with the simulacrum – with its success – is, therefore, the most effective means of critique. For his work is not wrong, but too true: the simulacrum has become reality and **this is his end**; the game is over. It is, therefore, in the hyperdefence of Baudrillard that we find a means of leaving him behind. With his success, Baudrillard disappears. If we want him to survive, we must **condemn him** as a nihilistic proponent of the simulacrum and oppose him with an outraged, vituperic, moral appeal to reality, as Kellner and Norris do; thereby restoring his work to life. For, if it is only in its contradiction that it can live as a provocation and diabolical challenge, then once it is true this ends. Kellner and Norris, therefore, may yet prove to be Baudrillard’s greatest defenders. Baudrillard, of all people, should have anticipated his disappearance, for the simulacrum’s demonic power rests also in its attraction for, and hold over, humanity. Aristotle, for example, recognized this, writing of this instinctive pleas- ure of imitation in man, ‘the most imitative of living creatures’ (1997: 5), while Nietzsche also speaks of ‘the delight in simulation’ and of its effects in ‘explod- ing as a power that pushes aside one’s so-called “character”, 􏰝 ooding it and at times extinguishing it’ (1974: para. 361). One courts this demon, therefore, at one’s own risk, as it captivates and ovearwhelms our personality. As the author of the Psalms cautioned the makers and worshippers of idols, ‘they that make them are like unto them: so is everyone who trusteth in them’ (Barasch 1992: 20). The efficacy of simulation and the danger of disappearance are key themes in Roger Caillois’ influential essay on animal mimicry and the mimetic instinct – no less powerful in insects than in man (Caillois 1984). The instinct of mimesis parallels primitive magic, Caillois says, though it is a mimetic spell which is too strong for those who cast it. For the insects it is a spell which has ‘caught the sorcerer in his own trap’ (1984: 27) – Phylia, for example, ‘browse among them- selves, taking each other for real leaves’ (1984: 25). So, Caillois argues, simulation absorbs the simulator, leading to their mimetic ‘assimilation to the surroundings’ with a consequent ‘psychasthenic’ loss of distinction, personality, and also, in a thanatophilic movement, the loss of the signs of life itself (1984: 28, 30). Simulation, therefore, 􏰜 nally overwhelms the simulator: as Caillois warns in the epigram which opens his article, ‘Take care: when you play with phantoms, you may become one’ (1984: 17). So Baudrillard’s game has the same result.  If **the simulacrum has been realized**; if simulation is now our everyday banality, then Baudrillard is condemned to a lifeless disappearance as a sorcerer trapped by his own magical invocation, **absorbed by his own simulation**. Baudrillard may not believe in the ghost of the simulacrum, but he himself becomes this very ghost. His game with phantoms ends, as Caillois knew it would, with his own phantasmatic transformation, with his apparitional disappearance. But this is only fitting, for in the pact with the devil it is always your soul that is the stake.

#### Hyperreality Disads

**Baudrillard’s understanding of hyperreality is reductive and ignores individual’s agency**

**Vitucci 4** [Francisco, “*Critic Of Baudrillard”*]

Images push their way into the fabric of our social lives. They enter into how we look and what we earn, and they are still with us when we worry about bills, housing and bringing up children. They compete for attention through shock tactics, reassurance, sex and mystery, and by inviting viewers to participate in series of visual puzzles. Billboard advertising showing an image without a code impose themselves, infuriatingly, on the most recalcitrant passer-by (McRobbie, 1994, 18). Accordingly, audiences or viewers, lookers or users are no more simple-minded multitudes, but rather active and conscious counterparts. The more the interconnections between audiences and media representations become intricate, the more the former division between ‘reality’ and ‘virtuality’ seems to fade in a kind of renewed, interactive and collaborative form: Baudrillard’s pessimistic thesis is that the media appear to extend themselves generously to their audience in a gesture designed to demonstrate democratic embrace while in fact merely extending the sphere of their influence and control. A less pessimistic postmodernist account might instead emphasize not just the flow of images and texts as they circulate through the new economy of the sign but also the flow of active agents, whose role in the production and distribution of the image is not as robotic as Baudrillard would suggest. Such an account would also require much more analysis of the occupational culture and experience of media workers employed in this postmodern de-regulated sector, as well as of their audiences. (…) The problems with the old model of the moral panic are as follows. First it assumed a clear distinction between the world of the media and the world of social reality. But in one simple sense the media are as much a part of social reality as any other component can be. We do not exist in social unreality while we watch television or read the newspaper, nor are we transported back to reality when we turn the TV off to wash the dishes or discard the paper and go to bed. Indeed perhaps there is no pure social reality outside the world of representation. Reality is relayed to us through the world of language, communication and imagery. Social meanings are inevitably representations and selections (idem, 1994, 216-217). This approach seems to be backed up also by other thinkers’ theories such as those of Marshall MacLuhan who arguing that the ‘the medium is the message’ (1967) agrees on the ability of mass broadcasting to create visual symbols and mass action as a liberating force in human affairs. According to this ‘technological utopianism’ associated with postmodernism, digital communication would make the fragmentation of modern society a positive feature, since individuals can seek out those artistic, cultural and community experiences which they regard as being correct for themselves. In other words, the individual becomes able to form its identity and to structure the ‘truth’ from fragments while gaining, at the same time, the independence to organize his own environment. On this escort, McRobbie (1994) seems to recall somehow the concepts explained by MacLuhan when she states that ‘real life means talking about what was on TV last night’ . Also other authors like Lyotard (1979), debating about the possibly positive outcomes of mass media and in particular about computerization of society, states that bringing people knowledge in the form of information, it will produce more liberty for the entire social system.

**Reality has not died, but merely been sent to the global south – baudrillard’s Eurocentric understanding of capitalism obscures massive violence done on the periphery**

**Robinson 13** [Andrew Robinson Jean Baudrillard and Activism: A critique]

One limit to Baudrillard’s theory is his tendency to over-totalise. Baudrillard is talking about tendential processes, but he often talks as if they are totally effective. There are still, for instance, a lot of uncharted spaces, a lot of unexplained events, a lot of things the system can’t handle. While Baudrillard is describing dominant tendencies in the present, these tendencies coexist with older forms of capitalism, in a situation of uneven development. The persistence of the system’s violence is a problem for Baudrillard’s perspective: the smooth regime of neutralisation and inclusive regulation has not ended older modalities of brutality. At times, Baudrillard exaggerates greatly the extent to which the old authoritarian version of capitalism has been replaced by subtle regimes of control. He exaggerates the extent to which contemporary capitalism is tolerant, permissive and ‘maternal’. This may be because his works were mostly written in France in the 1970s-80s, when the dominant ethos was still largely social-democratic. What Baudrillard recognises as the retrograde version of capitalism associated with the right-wing was to return with a vengeance, especially after 911. Another problem is a lack of a Southern dimension. Like many Northern authors, Baudrillard’s approach mainly applies to the functioning of capitalism in the North. The penetration of the code is substantially less in countries where information technology is less widespread. In parts of Africa, even simple coding exercises such as counting votes or recording censuses are extremely difficult. This is for the very reasons of respondent reflexivity which Baudrillard highlights. People will under-record themselves to stay invisible, or over-record themselves to obtain benefits. And without massive resources to put into its bureaucracies, the system is unable to find enough people who will act as transmitters for the code. Instead, people use their power to extract what they can from the system. Explosions still happen regularly in the South. Furthermore, a contracting system ‘forcibly delinks’ large portions of the globe. Its power on the margins is lessened as its power at the core is intensified. As the system becomes ever more contracted and inward-looking, liberated zones may appear around the edges. Without an element of border thinking, Baudrillard tends to exaggerate the system’s completeness and effectiveness. Baudrillard assumes that any excess is everywhere absorbed into the code. He ignores the persistence of borderlands. And when he talks about the South, he admits that the old regime of production might still exist here: people still work seeking betterment; colonial wars are fought to destroy persisting symbolic exchange; Saddam was not playing the Gulf War by the rules of deterrence. The Arab masses are still able to become inflamed by war or non-war; Iran and Iraq can still fight a real war, not a simulated non-war. So perhaps only a minority, only the included layers within the North, are trapped within simulation and the ‘masses’. Perhaps reality has not died, but been displaced to the South. It seems, therefore, premature to suggest that the system has encompassed all of social life in the code. To be sure, its reach has expanded, but it has also forcibly delinked large areas of the globe. The penetration of simulated reality into everyday life varies in its effectiveness. At the limit, as in Somalia, simulated states collapse under their own irrelevance. In other cases, an irrelevant state hovers over a largely autonomous society. And the struggle Baudrillard advocated in his early works against subordination as labour-power is not simply theoretical. In fact, there is a constant war, fought at various degrees of intensity, between the system and its others, especially in highly marginal parts of the global South: Chiapas, Afghanistan, the Niger Delta, Somalia, West Papua, rural Colombia, Northeast India, the Andes… The system continues to be drawn into these conflicts, despite its apparent self-deterrence from total nuclear annihilation.

**Baudrillard’s theory of hyper-reality deconstructs the real, ignoring that colonial violence has extended itself through the real.**

**McCarthy 6** [Bridie, Ph.D. in Philosophy from Deakin University, “At the Limits: Postcolonial and Hyperreal Translations of Australian Poetry”, August 2006]

As Forbes’ poetry arguably embraces, the most iconic feature of Baudrillard’s work—and a useful theoretical tool for postcolonial studies—is simulation. As the chief mechanism with which he reveals the fictitiousness of “reality”, simulation represents a form of (un)mapping in Baudrillard’s philosophy, a metaphysical and semiotic deconstruction of materialism. Hence, as Nick Perry outlines: what has now disappeared is the very notion that maps and territories, representation and reality, might be ontologically discrete. Both have been displaced by simulacra (69). Where colonial discourses assume the control of material geographies (arguably for symbolic as much as material reasons), this hyperreal deconstruction allows for a critique of colonialism based on its reliance on the “reality contract”. If we accept the new hegemony of simulacra (as Perry suggests), along with the impossibility of access to the “real”, it follows that the necessary power of Empire is destabilised. As much as hyperreality can discursively and ideologically combat colonial discourses, however, its scope is of course limited in that postcolonial subjects cannot simply redress all forms of subjugation or oppression by hyperreal means. However, in its applicability to new forms of imperialism (such as contemporary U.S. imperialism) which often rely on representational politics and virtualised modes of domination, Baudrillard’s work on simulation and hyperreality provides a workable vocabulary for the critique of the New World Order. As Chapters 1, 2 and 3 demonstrate, Australian poets engage with hyperreal simulation in their depictions and analyses of the representational politics that inform mythologies of national and global identity. For example, Kevin Hart’s work reveals the simulatory basis of Australian identity in its denial of incarceration as an Australian problematic, and the subsequent mythologies of liberty and security that obfuscate this denial. In Chapter 3, Maiden’s analysis of the Gulf War and the War on Terror presents an astute reading of the simulatory basis of New World Order logic, as it manifests in U.S imperialism. As a boundary to postcolonial politics and discourses, therefore, hyperreal simulation is both restricted and productive in navigating contemporary engagements with the “real”. Hence, as Rex Butler argues, simulation is not just a decorative description of a mode of representation, but an extension and deconstruction of realist logic: The aim of simulation is not to do away with reality, but on the contrary to realise it, make it real. Simulation in this sense is not a form of illusion, but opposed to illusion, a way of getting rid of the fundamental illusionality [sic] of the world (24). This sense in which Baudrillard’s deconstructive critique of reality operates simultaneously as a desire for reality—an obvious but vital inconsistency in his work—is also apparent in his recent formulation of “Integral Reality” as the excessive internalisation of the reality principle at the level of the social. In Baudrillard’s analysis of the “real”, it is possible to perceive a theoretical trajectory from “objective reality”, to “virtual reality”, to this most recent Integral Reality as the constituent elements of his “hyperreality” (Intelligence 45). Characterised by the impossibility of a realist or historicist imaginary, Baudrillard’s Integral Reality plots the social at “zero degrees”—at an axis where the hyperreal hypothesis has reached its final ideological completion: Let us be clear about this: when we say reality has disappeared, the point is not that it has disappeared physically, but that it has disappeared metaphysically. Reality continues to exist; it is its principle that is dead (Intelligence 18). As an antagonistic counterpoint to postcolonial theory, Integral Reality is engaged with in this dissertation in relation to the reliance on the history principle implicit in postcolonial studies. The absence of an historical imaginary under an Australian Integral Reality is thus tested against the poetry of Sykes and Birch in Chapter 3. This investigation seeks to establish how the dictates of linear progress (as a modernist inheritance) are central to colonialism and to much contemporary postcolonialism, just as this linearity influences notions of “official” History.

**Baudrillard’s rejection of Affect destroys will to action, and in the process destroys the foundation of life itself.**

**Deleuze and Parnet 87** (Gilles and Claire, “Dialogues II”)

All individuals are in Nature as though on a plane of consistence whose whole figure they form, a plane which is variable at each moment. **They affect each other in so far as the relationship which constitutes each one forms a degree of power, a capacity to be affected.** **Everything is simply an encounter in the universe, a good or a bad encounter.** Adam eats the apple, the forbidden fruit. This is a phenomenon of the indigestion, intoxication, poisoning type: this rotten apple decomposes Adam's relationship. Adam has a bad encounter. Whence the force of Spinoza's question: 'What can a body do?' of what affects is it capable? **Affects are becomings**: sometimes they weaken us in so far as they diminish our power to act and decompose our relationships (sadness), sometimes **they make us stronger in so far as they increase our power and make us enter into a more vast or superior individual (joy)** . Spinoza never ceases to be amazed by the body. He is not amazed at having a body, but by what the body can do. Bodies are not defined by their genus or species, by their organs and functions, but by what they can do, by the affects of which they are capable - in passion as well as in action. You have not defined an animal until you have listed its affects. In this sense there is a greater difference between a race horse and a work horse than between a work horse and an ox. A distant successor of Spinoza would say: look at the tick, admire that creature; it is defined by three affects, which are all it is capable of as a result of the relationships of which it is composed, nothing but a tri-polar world! Light affects it and it climbs on to the end of a branch. The smell of a mammal affects it and it drops down on to it. The hairs get in its way and it looks for a hairless place to burrow under the skin and drink the warm blood. Blind and deaf, the tick has only three affects in the vast forest, and for the rest of the time may sleep for years awaiting the encounter. What power, nevertheless! Finally, one always has the organs and functions corresponding to the affects of which one is capable. Let us begin with the simple animals who only have a few affects, and who are neither in our world, nor in another, but with an associated world that they have learnt how to trim, cut up, sew back together: the spider and his web, the louse and the scalp, the tick and a small patch of mammal skin: these and not the owl of Minerva are the true philosophical beasts. That which triggers off an affect, that which effectuates a power to be affected, is called a signal: the web stirs, the scalp creases, a little skin is bared. Nothing but a few signs like stars in an immense black night. Spider-becoming, flea-becoming, tick-becoming, an unknown, resilient, obscure, stubborn life. When Spinoza says 'The surprising thing is the body ... we do not yet know what a body is capable of...', he does not want to make the body a model, and the soul simply dependent on the body. He has a subtler task. He wants to demolish the pseudo-superiority of the soul over the body. There is the soul and the body and both e.xpress one and the same thing: an attribute of the body is also an expressed of the soul (for example, speed) . Just as you do not know what a body is capable of, just as there are many things in the body that you do not know, so there are in the soul many things which go beyond your consciousness. This is the question: what is a body capable of? what affects are you capable of? Experiment, but you need a lot of prudence to experiment. We live in a world which is generally disagreeable, where not only people but the established powers have a stake in transmitting sad affects to us. Sadness, sad affects, are all those which reduce our power to act. The established powers need our sadness to make us slaves. The tyrant, the priest, the captors of souls need to persuade us that life is hard and a burden. The powers that be need to repress us no less than to make us anxious or, as Virilio says, to administer and organize our intimate little fears. The long, universal moan about life: the lack-to-be 18\* which is life ... In vain someone says, ' Let's dance'; we are not really very happy. In vain someone says, 'What misfortune death is'; for one would need to have lived to have something to lose. Those who are sick, in soul as in body, will not let go of us, the vampires, until they have transmitted to us their neurosis and their anxiety, their beloved castration, the resentment against life, filthy contagion. It is all a matter of blood. It is not easy to be a free man, to flee the plague, organize encounters, increase the power to act, to be moved by joy, **to multiply the affects which express or encompass a maximum of affirmation.** To make the body a power which is not reducible to the organism, to make thought a power which is not reducible to consciousness. Spinoza's famous first principle (a single substance for all attributes) depends on this assemblage and not vice versa. There is a Spinoza-assemblage: soul and body, relationships and encounters, power to be affected, affects which realize this power, sadness and joy which qualify these affects.

**Baudrillard’s critique of Marx is just as totalizing as the systems he criticizes --- but worse because it has zero warrant**

**Zander 14** --- Associate Professor at Aalborg University (PäR-Ola Zander, 7-7-2014, "Baudrillard's Theory of Value: A Baby in the Marxist Bath Water?" Taylor & Francis, 7-11-2016)//jonah

The **Problems with Baudrillard's Anti-Marxism** Baudrillard has lined up a number of arguments for abandoning Marxism, and perhaps as a result, his value theory has not attracted wide attention. Nevertheless, I will argue both that we can see some **major weaknesses** with the abandonment and also for the potential in his value theory. Although Smith (1990) dealt with Baudrillard's arguments in MoP, additional consideration is warranted. Before this attack on Baudrillard's late position, I want to highlight that his transition from Marxism to anti-Marxism does not mean the rejection of all his previous insights before MoP. It should be noted that the French subtitle of Mirror of Production is critique du matérialisme historique. Baudrillard concentrates his attack primarily on historical materialism, which is only a single part of the Marxian system, although some of the central tenets of dialectical materialism also get their share of critique. Baudrillard positions himself beyond needs, beyond truth, beyond ideology, and beyond revolution. Smith (1990) has convincingly refuted all these claims by showing that they are either untenable or tenable but compatible with the writings of Marx. But an important criticism not mentioned by Smith concerns Baudrillard's critique of historical universalism. The Marxist conceptions of (for example) history and material production are developed within the temporal context of capitalism. Marx conceives history as the history of modes of production, and thus periods before capitalism can also be analyzed through production, the concept is no longer temporal, and the Marxist analysis becomes universal (see Baudrillard 1975, 48). Baudrillard objects to this universalism, peculiarly enough by merely postulating that there were no dialectics in primitive societies. Poster (1975) rightly points out that this argument is problematic in several ways. Poster's strongest argument states that, if we accept that applying any contemporary concept to the past is a kind of universalism, Baudrillard is defeated by his own argument. Poster observes that Baudrillard's texts are infested with such “universalism.” For instance, his semiotic concepts are **problematic**, as he employs them on all stages of human societies without justification. Another problem is that Baudrillard has framed his critique so that it is in **need of empirical support**. He claims that there are **no longer any exchange-value transactions untouched by sign values**. That **begs for** empirical evidence, and the onus is on Baudrillard, if he is to be believed, rather than other social scientists. There may be some nonempirical explanation as to why exchange-value transactions must be dominated by sign values, but that is not the way Baudrillard frames the discussion. Instead, he treats current trends and possibilities as finalities, treats tendencies as realized states (see Kellner 1989), **and extrapolates wildly from interesting insights** (see Smith 1990). Related to this, Baudrillard makes no qualification or delimitation as to the scope of his ideas. Indeed, he tends to **totalize the system of the society**. This is **very problematic** because **totalization** is the germ source that will cause Baudrillard to **rule out all political strategies**, including his own theoretical interventions. In his later works, Baudrillard positions himself, in Smith's (1990) words, “beyond truth,” yet Baudrillard's arguments (in particular those in MoP) are made in such a way as to invite empirical evidence. He extrapolates from singular cases in his search for a strategy. From studies in fashion (CS), goods consumption (MoP), and French Communist Party activity (UB), Baudrillard wildly extrapolates that every political activity has one or more sign values as its objective, making any political activity futile (including even gifts and Saussurean anagrams). But this is an unwarranted extrapolation. A political activity that is use-value-oriented is conceivable, and theorization may also be proffered as an act governed by use value. A final problem is that his later theories generally overlook or neglect many aspects of many people's current social experience. This does not necessarily make the theory false—but it needs to be taken into account (Kellner 1989). How does **Baudrillard respond** to the many **third-world workers** who feel **resentment** over their **labor being exploited**? According to Baudrillard, they should rather be immersed in sign-value-related activity, such as identity management. He leaves unarticulated whether the **perception of social injustice** is exactly that. Before there is reason to take Baudrillard's later standpoints seriously, they need to be **grounded in empirical investigations**, or at least **theoretically justified**. What stands clear from the analysis of Baudrillard's attack on Marxism is that, while some of it is relevant, the attack is **far too weak** to justify abandoning his own value theory altogether—his theory from “within”—from the power of that analysis alone. And while Baudrillard simply abandoned Marxism because he thought that he had proven it completely untenable, there is **no problem in continuing down the path from which he diverted**.

**Baudrillard’s work re-ifies settler colonial violence**

**McCarthy 06**

(Bridie Mccarthy., 2006, "At the limits : postcolonial and hyperreal translations of Australian poetry / by Bridie McCarthy.," Trove, <https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/26495416?selectedversion=NBD41301911>) AJN

Like postcolonial theory, Baudrillard’s hyperreal theory also exhibits a tension between discursive and historical practices. Although often useful in its analyses of contemporary politics and sociology, Baudrillard’s work has been fiercely criticised for its polemical rhetoric and abstract vocabulary. As Paul Hegarty demonstrates, Baudrillard represents an enigma for many critics, in that his work moves between “hard” political analysis and “soft” philosophy: For someone who seeks not to be a critic, but a hyperbolic theorist of extremes, Baudrillard’s writings betray a continual interest in politics, and often provide a critical perspective, even if it is not critique in the sense of exposing a hidden ideological truth (91). As Hegarty’s lexicon betrays here, it is difficult for critics to resolve the poetics of Baudrillard’s work—the effects of the “hyperbolic theorist of extremes”—from his political analyses, which are registered as serious even though they don’t conform to traditional rationalism. **The viability of Baudrillard’s work is thus highly dependent upon whether or not his vocabulary and ideological platform are accepted as legitimate “rational” logic** (regardless of whether or not the results of this logic are agreed upon or opposed). For Hegarty, the problem of Baudrillard’s reception arises from his deconstruction of “the reality principle”, which results in his being read as “politically apathetic” (2). In this sense, Baudrillard shares a communal limitspace with both poetry and postcolonial theory. In other words, a sympathetic aporia arises within these fields in the irresolution of their praxes as either poetic/discursive/rhetorical or political/historical/analytical. The divide between these poles is treated in this dissertation as the most productive mutual border crossed by postcoloniality, hyperreality and poetry. At the limits of postcolonial studies therefore, hyperreality—in its refusal of the “reality contract” and in its unmasking of the seductive and simulatory interplay between coloniality and postcoloniality, the material and the discursive, the lost real and the sign—provides a means by which to negotiate the impasses within postcolonial theory. However, as many theorists point out, **Baudrillard’s work is both obtuse in its idiosyncratic vocabulary and abstract in the ways in which it applies itself to “real” politics.**19 His prose presupposes the reader’s familiarity with a Baudrillardian vocabulary that is not only particular to his oeuvre, but is subject to change between his texts, as Hegarty outlines: Since the 1980s, his texts have become increasingly aphoristic, speculative, and often free of argument as such. Instead there is a wall of assertions, claims, twists of logic, fictions, spews of metaphors losing their representative value, as they become something both more or less (1). As a simulatory machine itself, **Baudrillard’s work can pervert its own reception**. However, as probably the most significant limit to postcolonial hyperreal studies**, Baudrillard’s idiom and textual composition are also enabling, in that his texts provide original ways of (re)negotiating the discourses and representational strategies of world orders.** In other words, in their “speculative” tendencies, **these texts work against modern rationalism**. In their “aphoristic”, assertive and metaphorical language and “twists of logic”, they also both deconstruct and mirror the clichéd and formulaic rhetoric of the global systems of representation and political hegemony that they analyse.

**Baudrillard’s analysis of simulation is Orientalist – creates hierarchal structure that reproduces violence**

**Almond 7** (Ian, literary scholar and writer, Professor of World Literature at Georgetown University, Published in 2007 by I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd, “THE NEW ORIENTALISTS: Postmodern representations of Islam from Foucault to Baudrillard”) RR Jr

The passage is remarkable for a number of points. First of all, we in the West are hampered by truth. Here Baudrillard, bringing in both Nietzsche and Derrida, seems to link the history of mimesis, of truth and representation, in the West with a certain naïveté. This naïveté, it seems, is ultimately logocentric – the delusion of correspondence theory, still nurtured by modernity, that an image must necessarily correspond to ‘something’ on the other side of it. Arabs (and, oddly enough, Romanians – not for the first time does the Islamic East and the Soviet/Orthodox East become united in common opposition to Protestant capitalism) possess a cynicism which enables them to see truth as purely functional, rather than representational. Of course, the unpleasant implication of the passage is that lies are second-nature to the Arab mind – unhampered 170 | Islam, ‘theory’ and Europe by the burden of sincerity, enlightened as to the real nature of ‘unconditional simulacra’, the irrelevance of the signifier to the signified, the Arab sees no distinction between truth and lies, between fact and fiction, between the genuine and the fake. Although this idea is reminiscent of a common Western conviction of nihilism in the Oriental mind – the secret maxim of Nietzsche’s Assassins (‘Nothing is true. Everything is Allowed’) – Baudrillard provides a surprisingly original justification for this cliché by an appeal to the iconoclast/Islamic prohibition of the image, a historical reference he has already made use of elsewhere (see Baudrillard’s belief that the Iconoclast’s ‘rage to destroy images arose precisely because they sensed this omnipotence of simulacra’).14 Because Muslims and iconoclasts already believe images to be haram or unclean, they have no moral reservations about misusing them in order to obtain what they desire. Hence the West’s naïveté which rises from its idolatry of the image, its over-sanctification of a non-existent truth, its deluded belief in the image’s divine referent. Baudrillard’s Arabs, the passage suggests, manipulate images with greater dexterity than their Western counterparts because they know them to be nothing more than idols, false gods, empty signs. For all its Islamic stereotypes and Oriental clichés, the most positive gesture towards Islam in Baudrillard’s text lies in his straightforward recognition of the ‘Enlightenment Fundamentalist’ (p. 80), an acknowledgement which, while omitting to exempt Islam from the charge of fundamentalism, sees standard ‘rational’ objections to it as groundless, dogmatic and equally dangerous: ‘We do not practise hard, fundamentalist traditionalism, we practise soft, subtle and shameful democratic traditionalism by consensus. However, consensual traditionalism (that of the Enlightenment, the Rights of Man, the Left in power, the repentant intellectual and sentimental humanism) is every bit as fierce as that of any tribal religion or primitive society’ (p. 79). If Islam is an honest, open, unashamed fundamentalism, the beliefs one could almost redefine here as ‘Western traditionalism’ are more hypocritical, forever pretending to be something they are not, forever claiming their opposites (superstition, religion, tribalism) to be radically different from themselves. This denial of the Enlightenment’s universal exclusiveness and moral/ontological superiority over the superstitions and tribalisms it tries to denounce is a gesture we have seen in all the thinkers examined in this book – an unconscious sympathy with Islam as an unjustly defamed primitivism, an impatience with modernity’s self-denial and 200-year-old ignorance of what it really is.

### A2 Cap K

#### **Permutation do both— only educational reform helps counter the neoliberal norms of markets and other social injustices**

Gerrard ‘13, Melbourne Graduate School of Education, The University of Melbourne (Jessica, “Class Analysis and the Emancipatory Potential of Education,” Volume 63, Issue 2, April 2013, Pages 185–202, Wiley Online Library)

In many ways, this focus on knowledge and identity exploration appears to offer a productive pathway for understanding how the cultural practice of education might contribute to challenging social injustices and oppression. For instance, it suggests that pedagogical encounters between teachers and students may provide a basis for creating dialogical cultures of emancipatory education. Undoubtedly, there is much value in insisting on pedagogical openness and in questioning “absolutist and ahistorical categories and values, sustained and propagated through the symbolic unifying power of grand narratives, by which ‘~~man~~ (person),’ ‘reason,’ ‘history’ and ‘culture’ were first projected in universalist European terms.”15 There is significant value in — and need for — interrogating taken-for-granted conceptualizations of social power that obfuscate or exclude the multiple operations of power, including gender, race, sexuality, disability, age, and so on. Correspondingly, Rancière's and others' insistence on interrogating the locus of authority is a useful reminder of the paternalistic tendencies of some enactments of emancipatory politics, and with this education. However, there is a danger that a narrow focus on openness and deconstruction and on classroom cultures of dialogue draws attention away from the need to engage with and name the material character — and effect — of social inequalities and oppression. There is an urgent need, as Slavoj Žižek argues, to reclaim radical dissent without slipping into relativist claims of authority and power, on the one hand, or liberal fantasies of the potential for democratic social power under capitalism, on the other.16 If we focus solely on the interactive dynamics of pedagogy as the primary site of radical education, we may overstate the possibilities for enacting social change through education and at the same time gloss over the very real possibilities for education to disturb neoliberal “common sense” through connecting classroom learning to analyses of, and challenges to, the social, cultural, and material inequalities of everyday life.17 What is particularly lost in the move away from normative definitions of power is recognition of the perpetual (though changing) patterns of social class. Foundationally groundless conceptions of emancipation have shifted focus from materialist understandings of social structure to everyday local sites of repression and agency.18 Class analysis, by definition, rests on a desire to understand the workings of discursive and material structures and, with this, normative conceptions of oppression and power. Moreover, while complexly intertwined with other oppressions, and remade anew under contemporary neoliberal economic, social, and cultural conditions, class remains a powerful foundation for social relations. Of course, there are many who remain firmly dedicated to Marxian analysis in critical pedagogy and, along with this, to an assertion of working-class action in education.19 These contributions help to counter powerful neoliberal norms of markets, “choice,” high-stakes standardized achievement, and competitive meritocracy. Nevertheless, there is an underlying tension in much of this work between the proclamation of — and urging for — emancipatory working-class education and the lived reality of working-class schooling.20 Feminists have long charged champions of critical pedagogy with neglecting to address the difficult roles it assigns to classroom teachers, leaving them unsupported in the complicated task of becoming “critical pedagogues” (a criticism that resonates with my own personal experience).21 More recently, others have suggested that critical pedagogy has become overly reliant on rhetoric, leaving it “stretched so much that what it actually signifies is nearly impossible to ascertain.”22 Awad Ibrahim goes so far as to say that the reliance on Marxism leads to a glossing over of difference and identity.23 Moreover, while clearly based upon considered analyses of class relations and social power, there is a danger that the fervent call for revolutionary pedagogy may romanticize radical working-class education. Ironically, it is the complex working-class relations to education, and with this the difficulty of mobilizing struggles for social change, that are in danger of being glossed over.24 There is a need, therefore, to understand better the intersections between the existing schooling experiences of working-class communities and the potential for a radical or emancipatory orientation in working-class education. It is with this in mind that I open a conversation between critical educational theory and the analyses of working-class relations to education in the sociology of education

#### Permutation do aff then alternative- capitalism can be good in some instances

McElvain ‘9-- (Robert S., history teacher at Millsaps College, “A Spoonful Of 'Socialism' Makes Capitalism Work”, October 26th, 2009, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=114163098>) kb

Eighty years ago this week, the freewheeling, free-market economy of the 1920s collapsed. Why it happened then and why it happened again last year is a subject worthy of consideration on this week's anniversary of Black Tuesday. The reasons for both collapses were very much the same: people who believed that a totally free market, with no interference from government, is the way — the only way — to achieve prosperity pursued policies in the years preceding both crashes that allowed greed to rule and income to become heavily concentrated at the highest levels, leaving too little in the hands of most people to consume all that was being produced. In both cases, credit was used to allow people with insufficient income to continue to buy. The economy kept rising — but in the end, this credit burst just made the collapse more dramatic. The economic and political arguments after both crashes have also been remarkably similar, with conservatives calling for spending freezes and tax cuts, condemning proposals for government action to deal with the problems as "socialism." No one should pretend that capitalism is perfect or all-wise. What Franklin D. Roosevelt understood during the Great Depression and what we must see now is that this is a false debate. Capitalism and government intervention are not an either/or choice. We have to find ways to get the obvious benefits of the market system while minimizing that system's risks. And those ways necessarily involve government action. "No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise," Winston Churchill once noted. "Indeed," he continued, "it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government — except all the others that have been tried." The same could accurately be said of capitalism: No one should pretend that capitalism is perfect or all-wise. Yet those who worship the market as God pretend just that. Capitalism is the worst economic system — except for all the others that have been tried. The Founding Fathers of the United States well recognized the flaws in democracy. As Churchill would nearly two centuries later, they believed that democracy is the best — or 'least bad' — political system, but that it contains within it many inherent dangers. We need to realize now that capitalism is the 'least bad' economic system, and likewise, contains within it many problem areas. Therefore, we need an economy that is basically capitalist, but with a system of economic checks and balances to make it work properly and lessen those dangers. One of the most prominent of those dangers is that income will become too concentrated at the top, undermining the functioning of a consumer-based economy. When Barack Obama said during the campaign, "When you spread the wealth around, it's good for everybody," opponents cried, "Socialism!" In fact, it is the only way to make modern capitalism work well. Just a spoonful of socialism helps the capitalism go up.

#### Individual criticism is ineffective— institutional engagement is key to create a new socialist system- that’s justification for the perm

Stavinoha ’17-- (Larry, Bylines at Paste Magazine, “Beyond a New "New Deal": Why Reformism Cannot Tame Capitalism”, May 5th, 2017, <https://www.pastemagazine.com/articles/2017/05/beyond-a-new-new-deal-why-reformism-cannot-tame-ca.html>) kb

What happens the day after the revolution? How does one not only translate revolutionary ideas into the material organization of society, but ensure that the revolution lasts? The question is not a new one, nor is it one delegated to only Marxist revolutionaries. It’s particularly pertinent for the fledgling “Political Revolution” movement as articulated by the likes of Bernie Sanders and others as they attempt to fashion a new political order in the wake of the demise of New Deal Democrats in America and Social Democrats in the broader western world. This means addressing the limits of reformism alone—the political revolution may begin with a tax on Wall Street speculation, but it cannot end there. Social democracy failed the “day after,” and so now we must go further than those reformists did, responding to the system of capitalism with nothing less than a loud and clear demand for socialism itself. The welfare state created in the aftermath of World War II helped to better the lives of millions of people, and the programs that sprung out of the movement fought against the excesses of the worst of late 19th and early 20th century capitalism. But the welfare state’s reticence to do anything more than provide a human face to the capitalist order were ultimately inadequate at beating the system in the long run, and resulted in a few distinct problems. Little was done in the US to combat the development of a private healthcare industry or an Eisenhower-era infrastructure policy that favored private automobile industries over more robust forms of public transportation—or the wielding of housing policy to further institutionalize the previously existing economic subjugation of black Americans. It struggled to oppose, institutionally, a military-industrial complex that profited greatly from the long and brutal wars in Vietnam, Cambodia, Afghanistan, etc., and ultimately dropped any resistance to this altogether. Without going against capitalism—and the way in which it makes wars profitable—it hardly stood a chance. Further, the welfare state’s inability to go beyond reforming capitalism meant that it was always wedded to the capitalist system’s creation and distribution of wealth. An alternative to the wage system remained essentially unarticulated, and even making wages livable has been opposed by both parties. Poverty and unemployment—the results of political choices that work to keep wages low by maintaining a pool of extra labor (something especially potent in an era with few institutions capable of collective bargaining)—remain a fact of daily life. The economic crises of both the late ‘70’s and the late aughts has only exacerbated these problems. Beyond these limits, just instituting a new New Deal doesn’t prevent an erosion of institutional support for it. The programs of the New Deal Democrats remain highly popular—but the New Deal Democrats themselves are long gone. The popularity of universal programs is such that any attempts to cut them have been met with a quick backlash. Those politicians who do wish to cut these programs often must obscure their real intentions. Paul Ryan, for example, spent years presenting himself as a “wonk” and winning over liberal pundits such as Vox founder Ezra Klein, who described Ryan as a thoughtful and smart individual years before having to admit what Ryan’s agenda actually was. In the UK, the Tories are all but set to enact another round of austerity—specifically planning cuts to the country’s national healthcare service. But it wasn’t that long ago that Tories like Boris Johnson were campaigning for “Leave” with the specific promise of increasing funding to the NHS. For those that wish to dismantle these programs, they must rely on obfuscation of their real goals. Considering this, it should follow that it would be easy to build a political constituency not only focused on protecting the existing universal programs but expanding them and developing more. But whether they call themselves New Dealers or Social Democrats, the parties that built these programs were coalitions and, in the end, it was in the interests of the professional classes, the rich and the businesses, that won out over the rank-and-file voters who are largely none of the stated above. That, in America, party loyalty went to those who could write the bigger checks saw the rise of means-tested, and not universal, programs. And it is the means-tested programs that divide and exploit the people into the deserving and the undeserving, contrary to universal programs. Medicaid, by design, inevitably draws a line around who is a member of the “deserving poor” and who is not. Liberals were right to admonish the talk on the right of welfare queens, but—by endorsing a healthcare program that is anything less than universal—they essentially conceded that they too believe there is such a thing as the undeserving poor in practice, if not in words. Each subsequent means-tested program has defined the same kinds of boundaries, whether it relates to college tuition or housing or childcare. By 2016, even the nominal support for universal programs was abandoned as the Democratic Party’s nominee chastised her rival for wanting to give away free stuff. The question of what happens the day after the revolution, even the political one put forth now, is not just about how to translate specific ideals into practice, but how to ensure that it does not collapse. The point is no longer to put a human face on capitalism—and the eventual erosion that movement invited—but the creation of a new socialist system itself.

#### World is getting better- hunger decline, poverty rates declining, child mortality rates going down— empirics

Norberg 17--(Johan, a Swedish author and historian, devoted to promoting economic globalization, “Despite Many Obstacles, the World is Getting Better”, Tuesday, February 14th, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2017/feb/14/despite-many-obstacles-the-world-is-getting-better>) kb

If someone had told you in 1990 that over the next 25 years world hunger would decline by 40%, child mortality would halve, and extreme poverty would fall by three quarters, you’d have told them they were a naive fool. But the fools were right. This is truly what has happened. Even though all the millennium development goals (MDGs) were not met, the world has been a stunning development success over the last 25 years. The most important goal, to halve by 2015 the number living in extreme poverty in 1990, was met five years early. But when we discuss the UN’s new sustainable development goals (SDGs), there is widespread pessimism. International cooperation is not what it used to be, and some leading politicians are actively undermining it. After Brexit, the rise of nationalism in Europe and the election of Donald Trump in the US, suddenly China’s Xi Jinping is not laughed off the Davos stage when he presents himself as the defender of globalisation and international cooperation. Deborah Doane is right to worry that rich countries will spend their energy on domestic affairs and squabbles rather than on the development agenda. Even so, I am optimistic about world development, for the simple fact that we overestimate the need for big pushes to development. Howard Steven Friedman of Columbia University has tried to find out what effect the MDG project had by looking at what happened to MDG indicators before and after September 2000, when they were agreed upon. It turns out that most of the indicators did not experience an acceleration after 2000, they just continued the improvements seen between 1990 and 2000, so in most instances the adoption of the goals did not speed up progress. Where there was an acceleration after 2000, that had usually begun earlier. Food for thought for those who believe that development comes from the top and abroad. It is easier to understand this if you’ve learned from history that economic growth and local reforms have more impact on development than international targets. The most successful countries were the ones that opened up to the global economy and spurred growth. Some countries that made the most progress, like China, did not receive development aid and never really cared about the MDGs. Development was homegrown. The goals focused minds on specific problems and created useful yardstick. The MDGs did play a role. They gave a firm foundation to an already emerging consensus, and the goals focused minds on specific problems and created useful yardsticks. Some countries feared being shamed if they didn’t provide safe water or education after having agreed to it. But in the end, it was their own decisions that made the difference, and the results vary dramatically according to those decisions. For an example of the shortcomings of big plans, look at the Millennium Villages, the ambitious attempt to create model communities that would quickly reach the MDGs in several African countries. Instead of limited interventions, the idea was to invest on multiple fronts at once, from health and education to agriculture and infrastructure. The man behind the plan, development economist Jeffrey Sachs, believed that all these things would support each other. He wrote in a UN report that quick wins would ensure that “large-scale progress can begin immediately” and we would see “major results in three or fewer years”. That did not happen. A recent study published by the UK department for international development concludes that the villages had “moderately positive impacts”, but had “little overall impact on poverty” and crucially “has not yet had a sizeable impact on the MDGs”. And unlike other villages, they are now dependent on aid money that will one day dry up. Nina Munk’s book The Idealist grippingly relates the issues with the Millennium Villages and the idea that poverty is an intellectual problem to be solved. It doesn’t matter how often academics from far away mention empowerment and local ownership in their plans. When they draw them up in their institutions, and try to implement them on the other side of the planet, they constantly clash with local culture, traditions, knowledge and needs. Donors often succeed with limited interventions – like bed nets against malaria, vaccinating kids or improving irrigation – because they can rely on the local cultural and economic ecosystem to take care of everyday life and work in those places, and adapt to and make the intervention work, technologically and socially. But when they try to do everything at once, they have to replace all these things and so run into all the problems of planned economies throughout history. In an interview at the end of Munk’s book, Sachs admitted that the world “is complicated, hard, and messy”. Despite setbacks, more countries are democratic, more farmers get titles to land and to sell goods to other countries. A big push towards development makes the world complicated, hard and messy by pushing aside local knowledge, initiative and adaptation. On the other hand, the reason why the world is improving right now is that in many countries these sources of progress have gained much more room to manoeuvre. Despite setbacks, more countries are democratic, more farmers get titles to their land, more people are allowed to experiment with social organisation and business models, and to sell their goods to other countries. As a result, they can improve their lives and activities in their own way and on their own terms, with cellphones and better fertiliser, power grids and health clinics, micro loans and mobile money. This is often done with the help of aid workers, as long as they understand that their role is to strengthen communities, not to redesign them. They can also improve gender equality and combat other forms of local discrimination, which is both an end in itself, and a way to empower more people so they can contribute to this progress. Obviously, we need strong international cooperation to create a hospitable climate for these local efforts. We need an open world economy with the freedom to trade, we need an international security architecture that guarantees safety and peace, and we have to deal with global environmental problems. Recent political developments in the US and Europe might very well create obstacles on all these fronts. But if we manage to get at least the basics right in the international arena – granted that this is a big “if” – I am hopeful that billions of people will continue to make tomorrow better than today for themselves, their families and their communities. Many complain that the SDGs are long on rhetoric and short on detail. They are right. At times they just read like a declaration of hope. But the role of the goals is to focus minds and inspire people, not to replace them. Perhaps what the world needs right now is fewer plans and more lofty rhetoric.

#### Capitalism overcomes the environmental impact – their understanding of the relationship between cap and the environment is flawed

Harvey 14 (David Harvey, British-born Marxist political economist and Distinguished Professor of anthropology and geography at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. He received his PhD in geography from the University of Cambridge in 1961., 3-7-2014, "Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism," <https://kehuelga.net/diario/IMG/pdf/harvey17contradictions.pdf>) AM

The idea that capitalism is encountering a fatal contradiction in the form of a looming environmental crisis is widespread in certain circles. I consider it a plausible but controversial thesis. Its plausibility largely derives from the accumulating environmental pressures arising from capital’s exponential growth. There are four main reasons to cast doubt on the idea. First, capital has a long history of successfully resolving its ecological difficulties, no matter whether these refer to its use of ‘natural’ resources, the ability to absorb pollutants or to cope with the degradation of habitats, the loss of biodiversity, the declining qualities of air, land and water, and the like. Past predictions of an apocalyptic end to civilisation and capitalism as a result of natural scarcities and disasters look foolish in retrospect. Throughout capital’s history far too many doomsayers have cried ‘wolf’ too fast and too often. In 1798 Thomas Malthus, as we have seen, erroneously predicted social catastrophe (spreading famine, disease, war) as exponential population growth outran the capacity to increase food supplies. In the 1970s Paul Ehrlich, a leading environmentalist, argued that mass starvation was imminent by the end of the decade, but it did not occur. He also bet the economist Julian Simon that the price of natural resources would soon dramatically increase because of natural scarcities: he lost the bet.1 Because such predictions – and there have been many of them – turned out wrong in the past does not guarantee, of course, that a catastrophe is not in the making this time. But it does give strong grounds for scepticism. Second, the ‘nature’ we are supposedly exploiting and exhausting and which then supposedly limits or even ‘takes revenge’ on us is actually internalised within the circulation and accumulation of capital. The ability of a plant to grow is incorporated, for example, into agribusiness in its pursuit of profit and it is the reinvestment of that profit that has the plant growing again the next year. Natural features and elements are active agents at all points in the process of capital accumulation. Money flow is an ecological variable and the transfer of nutrients through an ecosystem may also constitute a flow of value. While matter can neither be created nor destroyed, its configuration can be radically altered. Genetic engineering, the creation of new chemical compounds, to say nothing of massive environmental modifications (the creation of whole new ecosystems through urbanisation and the fixing of capital in the farms, fields and factories on the land), now go well beyond what has been a long history of humanly induced environmental modifications that have remade the earth in aggregate into a far more hospitable place for human life and, over the last three centuries, for 141 profitable activity. Many organisms actively produce a nature conducive to their own reproduction and humans are no exception. Capital, as a specific form of human activity, does the same, but increasingly in the name of capital and not of humanity. The ‘domination of nature’ thesis that has broadly held sway both in scientific writings and in the popular imagination since the Enlightenment (from the writings of Descartes onwards) has no place in this conceptual scheme. This poses some problems for thinking through the capital– nature relation. Cartesian thinking wrongly constructs capital and nature as two separate entities in causal interaction with each other and then compounds this error by imagining that one dominates over (or, in the case of nature, ‘takes revenge’ upon) the other. More sophisticated versions incorporate feedback loops. The alternative way of thinking proposed here is at first not so easy to grasp. Capital is a working and evolving ecological system within which both nature and capital are constantly being produced and reproduced. This is the right way to think of it.2

#### Capitalism is good for education—none of your arguments are supported by real evidence

Blanchard 15 - Kate Blanchard, has been teaching religious studies to undergraduates in central Michigan for over a decade. She is the author of 'The Protestant Ethic or the Spirit of Capitalism' (Cascade 2010), co-editor of 'Lady Parts: Biblical Women and the Vagina Monologues' (Wipf & Stock 2012), and co-author of 'An Introduction to Christian Environmentalism' (Baylor 2014). She has also written for Religion Dispatches, the Chronicle of Higher Education, and the Wabash Center, 15 ("Higher Ed and Capitalism: The Best of Frenemies," Huffington Post, 5-26-2015, Available Online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kate-blanchard/higher-ed-and-capitalism-\_b\_7437098.html, Accessed on 7-6-2017 //JJ)

One particular statement from a UNC board member, though, is especially jarring to those of us who are still naïve enough to believe in higher education as a good in and of itself. “We’re capitalists,” said Steven Long, “and we have to look at what the demand is, and we have to respond to the demand.”

As the beneficiary of both public high school and private institutions, I do not wish to dismiss the importance of markets to education. Excellent public education depends upon a healthy tax base, which in turn depends on a strong economy. Markets, when well regulated, on the whole do a better job of creating strong economies than the two alternative systems - theft or gift, both of which quash incentives to productivity. (I hasten to add, however, that taxation and theft are not necessarily the same thing, since citizens expect to get something for their taxes.) Well-funded education tends to be much better than under-funded education, so anything that produces funds for education is welcome. Thus, capitalism can be a friend to education in so far as it helps pay for it.

What the business-minded people who now populate most college and university boards fail to understand, however, is that not-for-profit education - while it may potentially thrive under a capitalist system - is not inherently “capitalist” in that it is not defined by the pursuit of profits. It is, rather, defined by the pursuit of human beings who are better than they would have been without education. Students, to speak capitalist language, could be called the products of a university rather than the customers; if there is any customer in the mix, it is society at large. But even to use the terms “product” and “customer” is already to have lost the argument. Capitalism is the enemy of education when it colonizes its logic, replacing the motivating values of genuine learning and personal growth with the values of radical individualism and material gain.

American higher education has been, indeed still is, globally admired for its excellence. That excellence was enabled both by healthy markets that provided a healthy tax base, and by civic-minded Americans who believed that their neighbors’ well-being (at least those neighbors who looked like them) would ultimately benefit their own. But somewhere along the way, a majority of American voters apparently decided, against all data to the contrary, that taxation was essentially stealing from the deserving rich to help the undeserving poor.

#### Their inequality impact is wrong—capitalism solves inequality

Worstall 15 - Tim Worstall, Fellow at the Adam Smith Institute in London, a writer on many topics, one of the global experts on the metal scandium, one of the rare earths, has written for The Times, Daily Telegraph, Express, Independent, City AM, Wall Street Journal, Philadelphia Inquirer and online for the ASI, IEA, Social Affairs Unit, Spectator, The Guardian, The Register and Techcentralstation, also ghosted pieces for several UK politicians in many of the UK papers, including the Daily Sport, 15 ("It's Not Capitalism That Causes Poverty, It's The Lack Of It," Forbes, 12-19-2015, Available Online at https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2015/12/19/its-not-capitalism-that-causes-poverty-its-the-lack-of-it/#3c46ee3e5613, Accessed on 7-4-2017 //JJ)

It is indeed true, in one specific sense, that we can say that capitalism causes poverty. It's also equally true that the statement "capitalism causes poverty" is entirely wrong given the way that it is generally meant. That general meaning being that the capitalist plutocrats (and a few lucky running dog lackeys like myself) get to scoop up the profits extorted from the brows of the workers, the bitter tears of their starving waiflings, and this is what makes poor people poor.

In this sense the statement is simply absurd. The poor in today's current world live as the human poor have done since the very invention of agricultures. That $1.90 a day which the World Bank uses as the definition of today's absolute poverty (and, as always, that is at today's U.S. retail prices--we are defining poverty as living in what you can buy in Walmart for less than two bucks per day per person, housing, clothing, healthcare, food, heating, everything, included) is the standard of living of the vast majority of humankind for almost all of the last ten millennia. A very few priests and aristocrats rose above it but not many in any generation.

This does not mean that we should ignore such poverty, nor not work to alleviate it. But it does mean that we've got to switch the question around: What was it that allowed some to leave that poverty behind and what is it allowing even more to do so? The answer being this odd mixture of capitalism and free markets that we have. Starting around and about 1750 in Britain, this is the only economic system ever which has appreciably and sustainably raised the standard of living of the average person. And if we acknowledge this then we can indeed start to say that capitalism causes poverty because the people who don't have it remain poor, while those oppressed by the capitalist plutocrats (and of course, their lackey dog runners such as myself) get rich, as have all of us in the currently rich countries.

All of which is a lead in to this same point being extremely well made by Ricardo Hausman:

Our research has uncovered that in the developing world, there are enormous differences in productivity within countries, across their different regions. For example, in the US, the richest state, which is probably Connecticut, is about twice as rich as the poorest state, which is either Mississippi or West Virginia. The difference is a factor of two. In Mexico, the difference between Chiapas and Nuevo León is a factor of nine. Similar differences exist between the Indian states of Bihar and Goa or between the cities of Patna and Bangalore. These differences in income are mainly differences in productivity. It’s not the result of what share of the pie goes to capital and what size of the pie goes to labor. It is differences in the sizes of the pie.

So there are these enormous differences in productivity that make the productive places rich and the unproductive places poor. The poor people are not being exploited. They’re being excluded from the higher productivity activities. It’s not that the capitalists are taking a very large share of what they produce. It’s just that they produce very little in the first place.

As Dierdrie McCloskey is wont to note, the only thing worse than being oppressed by a capitalist is not being oppressed by a capitalist (although that might originate with Joan Robinson if memory serves):

Many of those that worry about inequality blame capitalism for it. Even Pope Francis has been framing the issue in this way. Now, let’s define capitalism the way Karl Marx did. It is a mode of production where some people own the means of production and others work as wage laborers for them. But if this is the case, capitalism hires 8 out of each 9 workers in the USA, 2 out of 3 in Nuevo Leon, 1 out of 7 in Chiapas and 1 out of 19 in India. Places where more of the labor force works for capitalist firms are richer, because capitalist firms allow for much higher productivity.

Poor places are characterized by the absence of capitalist firms and by self-employment, employment: these are small peasants and farmers or owners of small shop. In these settings, there are no wages, there’s no employment relationship. There are no pensions. There is no unemployment insurance. The trappings of a capitalist labor market do not exist.

#### The alternative is woefully insufficient to resolve inequality—only capitalism solves inequality

Siebold 15 - Steve Siebold, one of the world’s foremost experts in the field of critical thinking and mental toughness training. He is the author of seven books, two of which are international bestsellers and have been called the gold standard in the field of psychological performance training. A former professional athlete (Top 500 tennis player in the world), Siebold could never understand why on some days he could triumph over the world’s top-ranked players, and other days would lose miserably. He started studying the mental aspects of performance to better understand the thoughts, beliefs, philosophies and actions of world-class performers. After his professional tennis days were over, he continued studying mental toughness and for the past 20 years has worked with Fortune 500 sales and management teams, professional athletes, entrepreneurs and other super achiever to improve performance. Steve’s clients include Fortune 500 companies such as Johnson & Johnson, Toyota, Procter & Gamble and GlaxoSmithKline, as well as thousands of direct salespeople in 10 countries worldwide. As a professional speaker, Steve has been awarded the Certified Professional Speaker designation from the National Speakers Association. Steve ranks among the top 1% of income earners in the professional speaking industry worldwide. Steve has been featured on NBC’s Today Show, Good Morning America, Fox Business, BBC Television, CBS News, and hundreds of other television, radio, newspapers, magazine and online sites around the globe. His books, videos and audio programs have been sold in 30 countries around the world. In December 2001, Steve was appointed to the National Charity Awards Committee, Chaired by President George W. Bush, 15 ("Capitalism Can Defeat Economic Inequality," Huffington Post, 9-11-2015, Available Online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-siebold/capitalism-can-defeat-eco\_b\_8123186.html, Accessed on 7-1-2017 //JJ)

The answer to fixing the deficit and fixing income inequality is innovation driven through capitalism. Many of the best ideas that work in anything are the non-linear strategies, or the non-obvious ways of getting things done. When the obvious doesn’t work, which it isn’t right now, it’s time to look at the problem in a non-linear fashion.

If you want to help balance the budget and reduce the federal deficit, instead of putting a gun to the head of the wealthy and forcing them to pay more in taxes, play to the vanity of large corporations and sell them the naming writes to streets, parks and other publicly held properties. Instead of I-95 it could be Johnson & Johnson Highway (or whatever company). Imagine that: billions of dollars come trickling into the government and it’s some of the best advertising a large corporation could buy. It’s no different than legalized pot in Colorado and other states bringing in millions of dollars to help support the economy.

We also need to educate the poor and the middle class on how to earn more money. Through capitalism, we can get the ultra-wealthy to sponsor the middle class for education purposes in exchange for a write off. It’s value for value. Capitalism built this country and it’s capitalism that will solve our problems.

The sustained rise in inequality is years in the making, but the truth is making money has never been easier because there are so many problems waiting to be solved. We just need to teach people how to do it.

The reality is that while higher education and even continuing education courses are certainly great accomplishments, they don’t teach the financial basics of how to get ahead and succeed in a free market economy. After studying the wealthy for more than 30 years, most millionaires will tell you the way they look at money compared to how the rest of the world looks at it is not even in the same ballpark. It’s like the two groups are operating on totally different planets.

If you’re one of those people whose financial situation isn’t quite where you want it to be, start focusing your mental energy where it belongs: on the big money! Making money is easy once you know how to do it.

In the meantime, the only way to close the income inequality gap is through non-linear ideas and strategies driven through capitalism.

#### Capitalism is inevitable

Stromberg 4 - Joseph R. Stromberg, Research Fellow at the Independent Institute and has held the JoAnn B. Rothbard chair in History at the Ludwig von Mises Institute. He received his BA and MA from Florida Atlantic University, and his further graduate work was completed at the University of Florida, 2004 ("Why Capitalism is Inevitable," Mises Institute, 7-09-2004, Available Online at https://mises.org/library/why-capitalism-inevitable, Accessed on 7-5-2017 //JJ)

How striking to discover, then, how few writers and thinkers are willing to spell out precisely what they mean when they refer to the economics of capitalism. For many, the term capitalism is nothing but a vessel into which they pour all the people, institutions, and ideas that they hate. And so capitalism emerges as a synonym for greed, dirty rivers and streams, pollution, corrupt businessmen, entrenched social privilege, the Republican Party, criminal syndicates, world Jewry, war for oil, or what have you. In fact, the advocates of capitalism themselves haven't always been entirely clear on the meaning and implications of capitalist theory.

And this is why Murray Rothbard went to such lengths to spell out precisely what he was endorsing when he championed the economics of capitalism. This was especially necessary when he was writing in 1973, a time which was arguably the low point for capitalist theory. Mises died that year, all economists were said to be Keynesians, Nixon closed the gold window, wage and price controls were fastened on industry as an inflation fix, and the US was locked in a titanic Cold War struggle that emphasized government weaponry over private enterprise. Murray Rothbard, meanwhile, was hard at work on his book For A New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto, an effort to breath new life into a traditionally liberal program by infusing it with a heavy dose of political radicalism. It must have seemed like a hopeless task.

The same year, he was asked to contribute an essay in a series of readings called Modern Political Economy (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1973). He was to address "The Future of Capitalism" (pp. 419-430), the conclusion of which might have seemed self-evidently bleak. But not to Rothbard. His contribution to the volume was lively, optimistic, enormously clarifying, and prescient to the extreme. Above all, he used the opportunity to explain with great clarity what precisely he means when he refers to capitalism: no more and no less than the sum of voluntary activity in society, particularly that characterized by exchange.

Does that seem like a stretch? Rothbard explains that the term capitalism itself was coined by its greatest enemy Karl Marx, and ever since the term has conflated two very different ideas: free-market capitalism, on the one hand, and state capitalism, on the other. "The difference between them, Rothbard notes, "is precisely the difference between, on the one hand, peaceful, voluntary exchange, and on the other, violent expropriation." This may seem like a small point, but the confusion accounts for why whole swaths of American historiography are incorrect, for example, in distinguishing Alexander Hamilton's supposed sympathy for capitalism from Thomas Jefferson's sympathy for "agrarianism." Rothbard points out that Jefferson was in fact an advocate of laissez-faire who had read and understood the classical economists; as an "agrarian" he was merely applying the doctrine of free markets to the American regional context, even as Hamilton's mercantilist and inflationist sympathies are best described as a preference for state capitalism.

As Rothbard explains, capitalism is nothing but the system that emerges in the framework of free exchange of property and the absence of government efforts to stop it. Whether you are talking about buying a newspaper from a vendor or a group of stockholders hiring a CEO, the essence of the exchange is the same: two parties finding ways to benefit by the trade goods and services. From the exchange, both parties expect to benefit else the trade would not have occurred. The global marketplace at all levels is nothing but the extension of the idea of mutual betterment through peaceful exchange.

In contrast to market exchange, we have its opposite in government intervention. It can be classified in two ways: either as prohibiting or partially prohibiting an exchange between two people or forcing someone to make an "exchange" that would otherwise not take place in the market. All government activity—regulation, taxation, protectionism, inflation, spending, social insurance, ad infinitum—can be classified as one of those two types of interventions. Taxation is nothing more than robbery (Rothbard challenges anyone to define taxation in a way that would not also describe high-minded theft), and the state itself is nothing but a much-vaunted robber on a mass scale—and it matters not whether the state is conducting domestic or foreign policy; the essence of statecraft is always coercion whereas the essence of markets is always voluntarism.

In Rothbard's conception, it is not quite correct to characterize support for free markets as either right or left. In 1973, he heard as many complaints about the supposed greed unleashed by markets from the followers of Russell Kirk as he did from the new left socialists. The right, in fact, was afflicted with a serious intellectual attachment to pre-capitalistic institutional forms of monopoly privilege, militarism, and the unrelenting drive to war.

This was what Rothbard saw the political establishment of 1973 bringing to the US: the march of the partnership between government and business that is nothing but the reinvention of political forms that pre-dated the capitalist revolution that began in the Italian city states of the 16th century. The US conservatives were entirely complicit in this attempt to reverse the classical liberal revolution in favor of free markets in order to fasten an old-world monopolist system on society.

In this, the conservatives resembled their supposed enemies, the socialists. After all, socialism was, as Rothbard put it, "essentially a confused, middle-of-the-road movement." Its supposed goal of liberty, peace, and prosperity was to be achieved through the imposition of new forms of regimentation, mercantilism, and feudalism. Socialism seeks, in Rothbard's words, "liberal ends by the use of conservative means." ("Left and Right: The Prospects for Liberty," Left and Right, I, 1, Spring 1965).

Conservatives could be counted on to support the means but not the ends, and the result is something that approaches the current status quo in the US: a mixed political system that combines the worst features of egalitarian ideology with corporate militarism—a system that leaves enough of the private sector unhampered to permit impressive growth and innovation. It was precisely the productive power of market, as versus the dead-end of statist methods favored by both left and right, that led Rothbard to see that the gains of capitalism could not finally be reversed.

In addition, he may have been the first to anticipate the way in which the terms left and right would eventually come to mean their precise opposite in the reforming economies of Eastern Europe. He was fascinated but not entirely surprised by the events in old Yugoslavia, where a Stalinist system had been forced to reform into a more market oriented economy. In fact, he noted that the trend had begun in the 1960s, and extended all over Eastern Europe. What was essentially happening, Rothbard wrote, was that socialism had been tried and failed and now these countries were turning to market models.

Keep in mind that this was 1973, when hardly anyone else believed these countries capable of reform: "In Eastern Europe, then, I think that the prospects for the free market are excellent--I think we’re getting free-market capitalism and that its triumph there is almost inevitable." Ten years later, it was still fashionable to speak of authoritarian regimes that could reform, as contrasted with socialist totalitarianism that could not be reform and presumably had to be obliterated. Rothbard did not believe this, based on both theory and evidence.

Rothbard saw that all sectors in all countries moving either toward capitalism or toward socialism, which is to say, toward freedom or toward control. In the US, the trends looked very bleak indeed but he found trends to cheer in the antiwar movement, which he saw as a positive development against military central planning. "Both in Vietnam and in domestic government intervention, each escalating step only creates more problems which confront the public with tile choice: either, press on further with more interventions, or repeal them--in Vietnam, withdraw from the coun­try."

His conclusion must have sounded impossibly naïve in 1973 but today we can see that he saw further than any other "futurists" of his time:

"the advent of industrialism and the Industrial Revolution has irreversibly changed the prognosis for freedom and statism. In the pre-industrial era, statism and despotism could peg along indefinitely, content to keep the peasantry at subsistence levels and to live off their surplus. But industrialism has broken the old tables; for it has become evident that socialism cannot run an industrial system, and it is gradually becoming evident that neomercantilism, interventionism, in the long run cannot run an industrial system either. Free-market capi­talism, the victory of social power and the economic means, is not only the only moral and by far the most productive system; it has become the only viable system for mankind in the industrial era. Its eventual triumph is therefore virtually inevitable."

Rothbard's optimism about the prospects for liberty is legendary but less well understood is the basis for it: markets work and government do not. Left and right can define terms however much they want, and they can rant and rave from the point of view of their own ideological convictions, but what must achieve victory in the end is the remarkable influence of millions and billions of mutually beneficial exchanges putting relentless pressure on the designs of central planners to thwart their will. To be optimistic about the prospects for capitalism requires only that we understand Mises's argument concerning the inability of socialist means to produce rational outcomes, and to be hopeful about the triumph of choice over coercion.

#### Capitalism is fundamentally sustainable- innovation, increasing equality, improved standard of living, democracy, and empirics prove

Forbes 09 Steve Forbes, editor in chief of Forbes Magazine, (“How Capitalism Will Save Us”, <https://www.forbes.com/2009/11/03/capitalism-greed-recession-forbes-opinions-markets.html>, 11/3, accessed 7/7/17 EVH)

Because of the Rap, people are blind to the Reality–that far from having failed, democratic capitalism is the world’s greatest economic success story. No other system has improved the lives of so many people. The turmoil of the past few years by no means mitigates the explosion of prosperity that has taken place since the early 1980s, when President Ronald Reagan enacted promarket reforms to free the economy from the Carter-Nixon stagnation of the 1970s. Those reforms–lowering tax rates and loosening regulations–unleashed job-creating capital. The result: a roaring economy that produced a flood of innovations–from personal computers and cellular phones to the Internet. Indeed, we may one day look back on the period of 1982 to 2007 as an economic golden age. Many conveniences we take for granted today–from automatic teller machines and DVD players to home computers and CAT scans–did not exist or were not widely used as recently as the 1970s and early ’80s. It’s not just that we have more and better gizmos. All you have to do is watch an old movie from the 1970s. Even when the past is glamorized by Hollywood, it’s obvious–looking at everything from appliances to cars to homes–that living standards back then were lower. We’ve come a long way. Not only “the rich” but people of all incomes today are doing better. No system has been as effective as capitalism in turning scarcity into abundance. Think of computers. Forty years ago, only business and government could afford the old massive mainframes. A single machine filled an entire room. Today the BlackBerry device in the palm of your hand has even more computing power than those old machines. Thanks to capitalism, Americans as a nation are living dramatically better and longer than they did at the beginning of the twentieth century. In The Greatest Century That Ever Was: 25 Miraculous Trends of the Past 100 Years, noted economist Stephen Moore and the late business professor Julian Simon make the powerful observation that since the early twentieth century, life expectancy has increased; infant mortality rates have fallen tenfold. Major killer diseases–from tuberculosis to polio, typhoid, and pneumonia–have in most parts of the world been, if not eradicated, drastically reduced; agricultural productivity has soared. The environment is also cleaner in many parts of the world. Air quality has improved about 30 percent in American cities since 1977. Not only that, Moore and Simon write, “the affordability and availability of consumer goods have greatly increased. Even most poor Americans have a cornucopia of choices that a century ago the Rockefellers and the Vanderbilts could not have purchased.” Until the credit crisis, tens of millions of people a year worldwide were joining the middle class. Between 2003 and 2007, the growth of the American economy alone exceeded the size of the entire Chinese economy. We grew the equivalent of China in four and a half years. China’s growth rates are higher–but they’re coming from a much smaller base. Free-market economic reforms–especially since the fall of the Berlin wall–have brought an unprecedented explosion of wealth to India, China, Brazil, and nations in central and eastern Europe as well as in Latin America and Africa. Capitalism has helped to usher in an era of wealth and economic growth that failed foreign-aid programs since World War II were never able to accomplish. In China, for example, over two hundred million people now have discretionary income. The country has a burgeoning middle class. The current recession should be seen historically as an interruption, not an end, of this extraordinary economic expansion. Along with bringing prosperity to millions, democratic capitalism has undermined political tyranny and promoted democracy and peace between nations of the world. It is, without doubt, the world’s most moral system. This last statement may raise eyebrows in an era that has seen scandals from the collapse of Enron to the devastation of personal and charitable wealth caused by Bernard Madoff. That is not to minimize the crimes of individuals like Madoff and others or the damage they cause. As we explain, the off-the-charts criminality of individuals like Madoff no more reflects the immorality of free enterprise than the murderous crimes of a Ted Bundy or a Jeffrey Dahmer reflect a fundamental breakdown of democratic society. Democratic capitalism, as a system, is more humane than government-dominated economies, including those in countries that are otherwise democracies. Nations that liberalize their economies, that allow people greater economic self-determination, end up moving, sooner or later, toward democracy. Since the nations of the world began to liberalize their economies in the mid-1980s, the percentage of democratically elected governments has surged from 40 percent to more than 60 percent today. China, for example, is not yet a Western-style democracy. But the nation is freer today than it was during the era of Mao Tse Tung and the repressive Cultural Revolution. Despite all the gloom and doom voiced by its critics, the free-enterprise system is–and has always been–the best way to unleash the creativity, inventiveness, and energy of people and mobilize them to meet the wants and needs of others. That’s because free-market transactions, far from being driven by greed, are about achieving the greatest possible mutual benefit, not only for the parties directly involved but eventually for the rest of society.

**No prior questions --- political practice comes before epistemology or ontology**

**Jarvis 2k** (Darryl, Senior Lecturer in International Relations – University of Sydney, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism, p. 128-9)

More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflect our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating theory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorists have to the real world. Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge. But to support that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, **smacks of intellectual elitism** and **displays** a certain **contempt** for those who search for guidance in their daily struggle as actors in international politics. What does Ashley’s project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and destitute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the émigrés of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer **no**. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to support that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary—or in some way bad—is a **contemptuous position** that abrogates any hope of solving some of the **nightmarish realities that millions confront daily**. As Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, **“So what?”** To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this “debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics” be judged pertinent, relevant, helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate. Contrary to Ashley’s assertions, then, a poststructural approach fails to empower the marginalized and, in fact, abandons them. Rather than analyze the political economy of power, wealth, oppression, production, or international relations and render and intelligible understanding of these processes, Ashley succeeds in ostracizing those he portends to represent by delivering an obscure and highly convoluted discourse. If Ashley wishes to chastise structural realism for its abstractness and detachment, he must be prepared also to face similar criticism, especially when he so adamantly intends his work to address the real life plight of those who struggle at marginal places.

### A2 Ruse of Solvency

#### SAT’s are not used independently – GPA’s next indicator, which means we see grade inflation’s impact in the neg world as well.

**Wooldridge 14** [Adrian Wooldridge, The New Republic, "In defense of the Standardized Tests like the SAT | The New Republic", September 4, 2014, <https://newrepublic.com/article/119322/defense-standardized-tests-sat>] **Tfane23**
 **One obvious problem with this critique is that it rests on an exaggerated view of how blindly and exclusively public universities rely on the SAT.** SATs are primarily used as screening devices at highly competitive institutions such as Berkeley**. Most prospective students can get into lesser institutions almost regardless of their SAT scores. And the most exclusive universities use the SAT alongside a range of other indicators, such as grade-point averages** (GPAs), standardized achievement tests (which are designed by the same company that administers the SAT and test knowledge in specific subjects, like history or math), **teacher recommendations, and other school records.** The real question, then, is what role SATs should play in the mixture of tests that are used to decide who gets into elite universities. And the problem facing the SAT's critics is that putting less weight on these tests could end up making the already fraught system even worse than it is at the moment. To succeed in the peculiar conditions of American higher education, **selection systems must have two attributes. First, they must be susceptible to mass production.** At Oxford, for example, **the selection system avoided the most obvious defects of the SAT. Candidates wrote large numbers of one-hour essays; their prospective teachers spent days pouring over their manuscripts; and what mattered was the quality of the arguments rather than the mere ability to regurgitate facts.** But applying that model in the United States would be difficult. Oxford sits on the top of a ruthlessly selective system of education that sorts people into streams early in life and devotes a disproportionate amount of public resources to grooming the elite. In the United States, with its emphasis on providing everybody with second chances, such a system would be impossible. **The University of California**, which selects more than 25,000 students each year, **has no choice but to reduce selection to something of a routine. Essays and projects will inevitably end up being evaluated by admissions officers according to one predetermined formula or another. The second requirement of selection systems is that they must appear as objective as possible**, relying on precise measurement rather than fine judgment. In a country as ethnically divided and litigious as the United States, **universities need to be able to point to value-free measures in order to minimize strife.** The Oxford dons who pronounce mystically on whether a candidate possesses "a trace of alpha" would soon create a backlash in the United States--particularly since such a large number of those who show up favorably on the alpha detectors turn out to be Old Etonians.

#### Minorities are more likely to be GPA discrepant—turns grade inflation

Sanchez PhD and Mattern 18 [Edgar, educational psychology from UT and senior research director for ACT; Krista, Director of the ACT] “Measuring Success: Testing, Grades, and the Future of College Admissions,” When High School Grade Point Averages and Test Scores Disagree: Implications for Test Optional Policies, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018 RE

Despite the various methods that have been used to define discrepancy, there has been remarkable consistency in identifying which students are most likely to display discrepancy between their test scores and HSGPA. Studies have found that students who have higher HSGPAs than test scores tend to be female, minority, and low-income students (Edmunds and Sanchez 2014; Kobrin, Camara, and Milewski 2002; Mattern, Shaw, and Kobrin 2011; Ramist, Lewis, and Jenkins 1997; Sanchez and Edmunds 2015; Sanchez and Lin 2017). For example, Sanchez and Lin (2017) found that the gender distribution of students who had a high HSGPA but a moderate or low ACT Composite score to be more heavily represented by females (66% and 62%, respectively). Additionally, for students with a moderate HSGPA and low ACT Composite score, only 60% of students were female. More than 50% of students with a high HSGPA and low ACT Composite score or moderate HSGPA and low ACT Composite score were minority and lowincome students. On the other hand, only a small percentage of minority and low-income students constituted the high HSGPA and high ACT Composite score group (8.77% of minorities; 9.63% of low-income students) as well as the high ACT Composite score and moderate HSGPA group (12.78% of minorities; 12.57% of lowincome students). There are also several noteworthy findings about the differences between these groups. HSGPA discrepant students are more likely to have lower socioeconomic status backgrounds (e.g., household income, parental education level) than either the SAT discrepant or consistent achievement groups (Mattern, Shaw, and Kobrin 2011; Ramist, Lewis, and Jenkins 1997). HSGPA discrepant students also tend to speak languages other than English at home (Kobrin, Camara, and Milewski 2002). Furthermore, an examination of subgroup differences reveal that while the average discrepancy for the student subgroups of gender, race/ethnicity, and family income can be considered consistent (difference in standardized achievement between −1 and 1), this average discrepancy was often nonzero (Sanchez and Edmunds 2015). African American and Hispanic, female, and low-income students, for example, tended to have slightly higher standardized HSGPAs than ACT Composite scores. Conversely, white, male, and middleand higher-income students tended to have a slightly higher standardized ACT Composite score than HSGPA

#### The plan results in more rigorous applications that boost the effectiveness of admissions decisions

McCubbin PhD 18 [Erin Margaret, this was her PhD thesis] Success in College: Is It Possible Without the Use of Standardized Test Scores?” PhD Thesis in the field of Curriculum, Teaching, Learning, and Leadership College of Professional Studies Northeastern University, March 2018 RE

A replicable model for colleges and universities. When a college takes the time to distinguish themselves in the application process, it makes it easier for students to identify their potential fit at the school. Recently, the trend has been to homogenize college applications to make it easier and more efficient for students to apply (Alon & Tienda, 2007; Belasco, Hearn, & Rosinger, 2015; Lemann, 1999; Posselt, Jaquette, Bielby, & Bastedo, 2012). The result has been a sharp increase in the number of colleges who use platforms like the Common Application, which boasts a single, generic essay that a student can send to any college who uses the platform and requests it. There are some customization features on the Common Application available to colleges in terms of supplements, but generally schools are heavily constrained in terms of the structure of their application. Most colleges who utilize the Common Application have indeed seen an increase in applications, but it has become increasingly harder to weed through them and to predict yield. While the Common Application has made it easier for students to apply, that ease has led to a bloated application pool and overwhelmed application readers who must rely on things like standardized test scores to cut the pool to a manageable load (Belasco, Hearn, & Rosinger, 2015; Lewin, 2013). Hampshire seems to have found the right formula to cut through the noise. While eliminating the use of standardized test scores in the admission process might not be the right choice for all schools, the practice of intentionally identifying the right kind of student who is successful on a particular campus should be (Duckworth et al., 2011; Linnenbrink & Pintrich, 2002; Scales, 2006). For the schools who are currently overwhelmed with the number of applications they recieve and struggle to single out the students who are not only good fits but who will also ultimately choose to attend, the first step is to take a look inward. The answer to efficiency is not ease, it is intentionality. Blanketly eliminating standardized test scores may not be the answer for every school because each school has a different formula to determine what makes a student academically and socially thrive on their campus. By conducting their own version of a Thriver Study, a school can identify what unique qualities make a student successful on their campus and intentionally craft their application to identify those things. A school that is not seeking to increase socioeconomic and racial diversity and finds that test scores really are a predictor of success in their environment may opt to continue utilizing them in their admission process (Jencks & Phillips, 1998). They may even consider utilizing a test optional or test flexible strategy to provide greater access (Simon, 2015). But chances are, that same school will uncover additional factors that carry equal weight to success on their campus and can incorporate opportunities in their application for students to demonstrate those things as well. In doing this, a school may see a decrease in the number of applications they receive but their likelihood of yielding the students that do apply should increase. If a school receives less applications but still admits a certain number, their admit rate increases because of the smaller size of the pool (Belasco, Hearn, & Rosinger, 2015; Ortagus, 2016). That increase in acceptance rate may impact things like rankings or bond ratings (Bowman & Bastedo 2009; Nelson-Espeland & Sauder 2007). That initial dip in applications is likely what holds many colleges back from radically changing their application. For some, the fear stems from not having enough applications to adequately shape a class and for others it stems from a change in perceived selectivity.

#### Grade inflation isn’t a problem – it’s still far more accurate and is a better predictor of success.

**Cooper 18** “What Predicts College Competion? High School GPA Beats SAT Score” Preston Copper is a higher education analysis based in Washington, D.C. I formerly worked in higher education research at the American Enterprise Institute and the Manhattan Institute. In addition to writing for Forbes, my writing has appeared in the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, the Seattle Times, U.S. News and World Report, the Washington Examiner, Fortune, RealClearPolicy, and National Review. I hold a B.A. in economics from Swarthmore College. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/prestoncooper2/2018/06/11/what-predicts-college-completion-high-school-gpa-beats-sat-score/#7f123f904b09> // SJ aNeE1

Knowing which factors predict completion, and intervening accordingly, can save students and colleges a world of grief. That’s where a **new report by Matthew Chingos of the Urban Institute** comes in. (The report was published through the American Enterprise Institute, my employer, but I had no involvement with its production.) For obvious reasons, **students who exhibit better academic preparation in high school are more likely to complete college**. But “**academic preparation**” **can mean different things**. There are **two primary ways to measure a student’s academic aptitude: scores on standardized tests** such as the SAT, **and grades in high school coursework**. The SAT and similar tests exist to account for differences in how high schools grade students. **Some teachers feel pressured to give students high marks despite middling academic performance, a phenomenon known as grade inflation. Certain high schools may run more rigorous courses than others. As a result, an A-average GPA at one high school might be equivalent to a B+** at another. As **SAT scores** are a more consistent indicator of aptitude, **one might expect them to better predict a student’s chances of graduating college than high school GPA. But Chingos’ research shows exactly the opposite.** **Using a sample of students who attended a group of less selective four-year public colleges and universities, Chingos calculates a student’s likelihood of graduation based on** both her high school **GPA and** her **SAT or ACT score**. While better marks on both measures predict a better chance of completion, **the relationship between high school GPA and graduation rates is by far the strongest.** For instance, a student with a **high SAT score** (above 1100) **but a middling high school GPA** (between 2.67 and 3.0) **has an expected graduation rate of 39%**. **But students with** the opposite credentials—**mediocre SAT scores but high GPAs—graduate from college at a 62% rate**. Put another way, the expected graduation rate of a student with a given GPA doesn’t change very much depending on her SAT score. But the expected graduation rate of a student with a given SAT score varies tremendously depending on her GPA. Given differences in grading standards across high schools, **GPA may not provide a consistent measure of a student’s ability in mathematics, reading, and other subjects. But GPA usually captures whether a student consistently attends class and completes** her **assignments** on time. Students need to cultivate these behaviors in order to succeed in college, and such good habits can lead to success even for students of modest academic ability. “Students could in theory do well on a test even if they do not have the motivation and perseverance needed to achieve good grades,” notes Chingos. “**It seems likely that the kinds of habits high school grades capture are more relevant for success in college than a score from a single test**.”

#### Best studies go aff and prove GPA has a stronger correlation with success.

Yang 18 – Greg Yang writes for Poets and Quants. ("The Case For 'Test Optional' College Admissions," 4-30-2018, Poets&Quants for Undergrads, https://poetsandquantsforundergrads.com/2018/04/30/the-case-for-test-optional-college-admissions/)//julian

Colleges that don’t require the SAT or ACT for admission enroll a higher proportion of low-income, first-generation students, and students from more diverse backgrounds, a new study says. Produced by the National Association for College Admission Counseling (NACAC), the study found that roughly two-thirds of colleges using “Test Optional Policies” saw an increase in enrollment of students “underrepresented in college populations,” or underrepresented U.S. minorities (URM).“The number of colleges using Test Optional Policies (TOPs) in higher education admissions has dramatically expanded in recent years,” the study reads. “And these colleges have avoided ‘one-size-fits-all,’ finding varied ways to administer TOPs and experiencing varied outcomes. Much of the momentum around Test-Optional admission is focused on whether the use of standardized tests (specifically SAT and ACT) unnecessarily truncates the admission of otherwise well-qualified students.”NEARLY ONE MILLION APPLICANT RECORDS INCLUDEDThe NACAC collected student-record level data from 28 institutions including long-time users of TOP and institutions that have recently adopted the policies. These schools’ undergraduate enrollments ranged from 1,500 to 20,000 students and 15% to 90% in admission rates. In total, the study represents a dataset of 955,774 individual applicant records. The study specifically focused on underrepresented college populations in America’s universities. “A TOP was described by many of the admission deans of the participating institutions as a tool they employed in the hope of increasing applications from a more diverse range of students, so this report focuses great attention on traditionally under-represented populations in American higher education,” the study reads. “To do so, we used our record-level data to identify the intersectionality of these underserved populations: First-Generation College Bound, students from lower SES backgrounds (Pell recipients as proxy), and students from racial and ethnic groups that have traditionally been underrepresented in college populations (URM).” HIGH SCHOOL GPA IS A STRONGER PREDICTOR OF COLLEGE SUCCESS One of the most striking findings of the study was that high school GPA had a stronger correlation with college success for non-submitters (students in the study who did not submit standardized test scores with their college application) than standardized tests, like the SAT and ACT. While non-submitters had “modestly lower” high school GPAs than submitters, they ultimately graduated at rates equivalent to, or higher than, submitters. “While test scores had a generally stronger relationship with college GPAs for the Submitters, for the Non-Submitters they tended to show a weaker relationship, essentially underpredicting the college GPA,” the study reads. “The test scores continued to most strongly correlate with family income.” THE GROWING ‘TEST-OPTIONAL’ MOVEMENT Over 1,000 undergraduate institutions now officially deemphasize standardized tests in admission, according to The National Center for Fair and Open Testing. Among those 1,000, over 100 additional nonprofit universities have deemphasized standardized tests in admissions in the past four years. These schools aren’t low-ranking universities either. Participating TOP adopters include schools like Bowdoin, George Washington University, and Wesleyan University.

#### It resolves inequality in the entire education system by changing the way we view education.

Atkinson and Geiser 09 (Richard C. Atkinson, president emeritus of the University of California and professor emeritus of cognitive science and psychology at the University of California, his research is on memory, perception, and cognition. and Saul Geiser, a research associate at the Center for Studies in Higher Education at the University of California, he is a former director of research for admissions and outreach for the University of California system. “Reflections on a Century of College Admissions Tests.” Educational Researcher, vol. 38, no. 9, 2009, pp. 665–676. JSTOR, [www.jstor.org/stable/25592189](http://www.jstor.org/stable/25592189).) AG

The core feature of achievement testing is criterion-referenced or standards-based assessment. This approach to assessment is now widely established in the nation's K-12 schools but has yet to take hold in college admissions, where norm-referenced assessments still prevail. Norm-referenced tests like the SAT or ACT are often justified as necessary to help admissions officers sort large numbers of applicants and evaluate their relative potential for success in college. Once started, however, norm-referenced assessment knows no stopping point. The competition for scarce places at top institutions drives test scores ever higher, and average scores for this year's entering class are almost always higher than last year's. Tests are used to make increasingly fine distinctions within applicant pools where almost all students have relatively high scores. Small differences in test scores often tip the scales against admission of lower scoring applicants, when in fact such differences have marginal validity in predicting college performance. The ever-upward spiral of test scores is especially harmful to low-income and minority applicants. Even where these students achieve real gains in academic preparation, as measured on criterion-referenced assessments, they lag further behind other applicants on norm referenced tests.17 The emphasis on "picking winners" makes it difficult for colleges and universities to extend opportunities to those who would benefit most from higher education. And the preoccupation with test scores at elite institutions spreads outward, sending mixed messages to other colleges and universities and to the schools. Criterion-referenced tests, on the other hand, presuppose a very different philosophy and approach to college admissions. Their purpose is to certify students' knowledge of college preparatory subjects, and they help to establish a baseline or floor for judging applicants' readiness for college. Along with high school grades, achievement test scores tell us whether applicants have mastered the foundational knowledge and skills required for college-level work. When we judge students against this standard, two truths become evident. First is that the pool of qualified candidates who could benefit from and succeed in college is larger than can be accommodated at selective institutions. Second is that admissions criteria other than test scores - special talents and skills, leadership and community service, opportunity to learn, and social and cultural diversity - are more important in selecting whom to admit from among this larger pool. Admissions officers often describe their work as "crafting a class," a phrase that nicely captures this meaning. Achievement testing reflects a philosophy of admissions that is at once more modest and more expansive than predicting success in college. It is more modest in that it asks less of admissions tests and is more realistic about what they can do: Our ability to predict success in college is relatively limited, and the most we should ask of admissions tests is to certify students' mastery of foundational knowledge and skills. It is more expansive in holding that beyond some reasonable standard of college readiness, other admissions criteria must take precedence over test scores if we are to craft an entering class that reflects our broader institutional values. And beyond the relatively narrow world of selective college admissions, testing for achievement and curriculum mastery can have a broader and more beneficial "signaling effect" throughout all of education. It is not our intention to try to anticipate the specific forms or directions that admissions testing may take in the 21st century. Yet we believe that the general principles just outlined - and the paradigmatic idea of achievement testing that unites them - will be useful and relevant as a guide for evaluating new kinds of assessments that may emerge in the future. For example, these principles lead us to be initially skeptical about efforts to develop "noncognitive" assessments for use in college admissions insofar as those efforts sometimes blur the crucial distinction between achievement and personality traits over which the student has little control. On the other hand, notwithstanding the many difficulties involved in adapting K-12 standards-based tests for use in admissions, we conclude that this is unquestionably a worthwhile goal if it can be realized. It should be evident that no existing admissions tests satisfy all of the principles we have outlined. Our purpose is not to endorse any particular test or set of tests but to contribute to the national dialogue about admissions testing and what we expect it to accomplish. Two decades ago in their classic brief The Case Against the SAT, James Crouse and Dale Trusheim (1988) argued persuasively for a new generation of achievement tests that would certify students' mastery of college preparatory subjects, provide incentives for educational improvement, and encourage greater diversity in admissions tests. What is new is that today, more than at any time in recent memory, American colleges and universities seem open to the possibility of a fresh start in standardized admissions testing

#### Be highly skeptical of pro-testing arguments- the testing industrial complex is waging a propaganda war to justify existing inequality.

Hernandez, PhD Candidate, 18

(Theresa A., <https://www.huffpost.com/entry/abolish-standardized-testing-for-college-admissions_n_5b045869e4b003dc7e470ee3?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAFTiEZ_Bt337jgSx8ed4aN3c5mXdZD3pnvYx_6K8SlY6Ch1fpy17WykFIcy2kRNPZIny0_2sj6B8qZJhxZBX2z0U2PRza2kOlvgZ7q0WDYDeZnFJF8Cb99r2qh1c0aYlGGynHIeEWeGDKeUk_P2q1utUO7REcEk6Q8QXg1A7_buf> 5-22)

A new study from the National Association for College Admission Counseling provides evidence that test-optional policies ― a variety of policies that allow students not to submit scores on standardized tests like the SAT or GRE during the admissions process ― can help colleges improve their diversity without sacrificing academic quality. The study found that schools that do not require the SAT/ACT saw an increased enrollment of underrepresented students of color relative to comparable institutions that require a test score and that admitted students who did not submit scores were just as likely to graduate as admitted students who did. The report also found that high school grade point average (GPA) was a better predictor of success in college GPA than test scores for non-submitters. As of January 2018, over 1,000 colleges and universities have stopped requiring SAT or ACT scores for undergraduate applicants. The conversation also extends to the graduate level, where institutions are grappling with whether to use standardized tests, which ones and how. In particular, the Inclusive Graduate Education Network and the Alliance for Multicampus, Inclusive Graduate Admissions, are promoting and studying the effects of inclusive holistic review practices. These projects are also exploring what factors of an application are most important for admission to graduate school versus success in graduate school. (Full disclosure: I am affiliated with IGEN and AMIGA, but the opinions here are mine and do not necessarily represent these projects or anyone affiliated with them.) The NACAC report contrasts with Measuring Success: Testing, Grades, and the Future of College Admissions, a recent book published by scholars tied to the testing industry, which argues test-optional policies are either ineffective at increasing diversity or do no better than similar institutions that require these tests. Unfortunately, this debate sidesteps a serious issue: the urgent need to seek solutions beyond the ways that selective college admissions are conducted today. We need to pay attention to the deeper purposes that selection criteria serve — and for whom. The use of standardized tests in admissions disproportionately exclude people of color and other marginalized groups. The truth is that overwhelming research has shown that performance on these tests is better at predicting demographic characteristics like class, gender and race than educational outcomes. This disproportionately excludes racial minorities, women and low-income persons from selective colleges. For many practitioners in higher education, these tests are simply the most efficient and common metric for evaluating students. But efficiency can no longer be an excuse for maintaining a flawed system. The only result we can expect from that course of action is efficiently maintaining the status quo of inequality. The makers and advocates of standardized tests promote the notion that equality requires we use a singular metric to evaluate everyone in the same way. But one common tool cannot equitably measure the potential of people who have been afforded different chances in life. Our limited resources must be redirected to finding better ways to reach equitable outcomes, which will require offsetting prior inequality of opportunity and resources. As of January 2018, over 1,000 colleges and universities have stopped requiring SAT or ACT scores for undergraduate applicants. From academics to policymakers, people mistakenly believe that standardized tests are better at predicting college outcomes, like grades and graduation, than they really are. This uncritical belief in the current system of admissions allows those who have benefited to feel that they earned their position completely on their own. In reality, our success is a combination of our effort, our opportunities and the resources to make the most of both. This misplaced faith also makes us complicit in the exclusion of those who have not had our same privileges. Even if standardized tests perfectly predicted achievement, they would be doing so on the basis of accumulated resources that have helped children from privileged backgrounds to reach the levels of success that they have by the time they take the test. These testing disparities do not represent students’ potential to learn and achieve. As Jerome Karabel documented in The Chosen: The Hidden History of Admission and Exclusion at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, standardized tests played a devious role in the history of admissions at selective institutions. Selection criteria like the SAT/ACT and GRE come out of historical actions that have defined merit purposefully to exclude students based on their social identities, including religious affiliation. Add to that history generations of underfunded schools and a bevy of other racial and class-based discriminations that continue to hamper the achievements of racially minoritized and low-income students. To accept any “predictive” measure that perpetuates these inequalities, even indirectly, is a disservice to communities of color and poor people today and robs future generations of their potential. For the United States to live up to its highest potential, we have to stop turning away students from the possibilities of higher education just because their backgrounds have not afforded them the same opportunities or the resources needed to take advantage of earlier opportunities. To that end, researchers like Estela Bensimon highlight the responsibility of our educators and educational institutions to better serve marginalized students in order to support the success of all students. So how do we move forward? Some research indicates that holistic review may be better at judging a student’s potential given the context of their prior experiences. Many highly selective institutions such as Harvard, Yale and Columbia already claim to practice a version of holistic review due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s backing of this approach in affirmative action cases. However, these options are largely used and researched in tandem with standardized tests that produce racially and class-based disparate outcomes. We have inherited a society built on grave injustices, and we perpetuate them through both intentional acts and failures to redress what has been done. Higher education, from college to graduate school, can provide the opportunities and resources for people to make the most of their potential but only if we make access to it more equitable. The only way forward is to enact policies and practices, especially in education, that are corrective and redistributive. The time has come to end the perpetuation of systemic inequity through institutional practices that appear facially neutral, but which have a disparate impact by race and class. Ending the use of standardized tests at all levels of admissions is one of the ways we can do so.

### A2 Scholarships DA

#### Cross apply the second Rosales card. It indicts this very notion of “merit” scholarships due to disproportionately skewing the process of the tests in favor of white, wealthy individuals. The ev turns the disad, we don’t want to keep funneling money to the privileged while continuously ignoring the oppressed.

### A2 Funding DA

#### Closures are healthy – they get absorbed into other colleges.

Toppo ’19 Toppo, Greg (Former Senior Editor at Inside Higher Ed and Former National Education Reporter at USA Today). “Why Do Colleges Die?” *Inside Higher Ed*, 20 March 2019, <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/03/20/white-paper-debt-tuition-dependence-doom-small-colleges>. [Premier]

Sapiro also suggests critics pay closer attention to what she calls higher ed's “ecology” -- literally its cycle of birth, death and rebirth. When colleges die, they don’t simply disappear. Their physical assets, as well as their faculty, staff and students, often enrich another, sometimes related, college. “In some way or another, they feed the birth of another institution,” she said. She noted that Wheelock College didn’t simply disappear in 2017 -- it merged into Boston University, bringing together two institutions with campuses separated by about a mile. The former college now houses the Boston University Wheelock College of Education & Human Development. Struggling denominational colleges serve another interesting function, Sapiro said: when the religious institution that oversees one finally decides that it's unsustainable, it typically transfers funding to another educational undertaking that is sustainable, much as a holding company might do. “It’s very sad when your alma mater or your institution goes down -- and it’s bad for the community because of all those business that depend on it," she said. "But very often it feeds the sustainability of another institution.”

#### AND, we only endorse the SAT as a bad model for standardized testing – we don’t link

#### AND, the link evidence assumes that the aff world defers to a holistic admissions method – we don’t fiat the method.

### A2 Rankings DA

#### Impact turn the DA – rankings are bad and we should topple them.

Cohen 13 [Steve Cohen, Forbes, "College Rankings Aren't Meaningless; They're Just Misleading", March 25, 2013, https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevecohen/2013/03/25/college-rankings-arent-meaningless-theyre-just-misleading/#18c9a2ff57d0] **Tfane23**
What were revelations in 1983 are common knowledge today – at least among the chattering class of college-bound students, parents and counselors.  They also don’t have to be told that the odds of getting into a “highly selective” school are ridiculously low.  Brown and Dartmouth will each accept about 9% of applicants; Cornell, Northwestern, and Georgetown about 16%  And Harvard, Yale, and Stanford?  Forget about it: under 7%! Wanting to attend a “name” school isn’t illogical.  With the sticker price of attending all of these private universities nudging $250,000, parents are heeding college administrators’ advice that college should not be looked at as an expense, but rather as an investment.  And there is nothing illogical in parents wanting a better return on their investment.  A college’s brand value – whether that school’s name will be recognized and open employers’ doors – is a reasonable measure of ROI.  (To be clear: an Ivy League degree does not guarantee someone success or even a job.  But make no mistake: it does open doors more quickly for an interview.) PROMOTED UNICEF USA BRANDVOICE Celebrating Women Humanitarians On The Front Lines For UNICEF 5 Best Budget Noise Cancelling Headphones Of 2019 Personal Capital BRANDVOICE 5 Simple Ways To Increase Your Net Worth What is missing from this calculus is that colleges are very different.  Dartmouth is not at all like Brown; Princeton is completely different from Yale; and Georgetown shouldn’t be discussed in the same breath as Northwestern.  Colleges, counselors, and parents talk a lot about finding the right “fit” between a school and a student.  In reality, the process is dominated by reputation. The problem is that college reputation has been hijacked by rankings.  Far too many  “highly ranked” colleges are gaming the rankings and trying to attract more and more applicants --  when the particular college is actually a poor “fit” for many of the kids applying.  Colleges want to attract and reject more kids because, perversely, that “selectivity” improves a college’s ranking. College presidents publicly bemoan the plethora of college rankings.  Privately, they admit they have to provide the data that feeds the ranking maw.  They can’t afford to be left off a rankings list.  And more than a few colleges have been caught fudging the data to improve their rankings. The real losers in this system are kids and their parents.  A bad fit is costly, not just in dollars, but in time, energy, and psychological well-being.  My co-authors Paulo de Oliveira and Mike Muska started out as senior admission officers and coaches at Brown, Oberlin, Auburn and Northwestern.  We’ve subsequently counseled thousands of families in the college search and admissions process.  And all too often we’ve seen the same pattern: parents come in with a set of “ranked” colleges and want to spend 90% of their effort figuring out how to get Sam admitted. That’s backwards.  The emphasis should be on finding the right fit.  But finding the right fit is not easy.  Subjective guidebooks like Edward Fiske’s – originally titled the New York Times Selective Guide to Colleges – are very useful and consciously do not include rankings.  Ted (who is a friend and occasional collaborator) changed his three-category rating system to make it more difficult to simply add “stars” and rank-list colleges.   Even families who can afford to visit lots of colleges and endure the backwards-walking tour guides’ patter find that campus personalities soon blur in their memory. Thus it is not surprising that anxious, busy parents turn to rankings for shorthand solace.  Unfortunately, the data that U.S. News and other media companies are collecting is largely irrelevant.  And as a result, the rankings they generate are not meaningless, just misleading.

### **A2 Homeschooling DA**

#### [1] Homeschooling laws differ in each state – your impact can’t be C/A to all states because it lacks legal specificity.

CRHB N.D. [Coalition for Responsible Home Education, "Current Homeschool Law – Coalition for Responsible Home Education", No Date, https://www.responsiblehomeschooling.org/policy-issues/current-policy/] **Tfane23**
Homeschooling is legal in all fifty states, but requirements vary from state to state and are often inadequate to safeguard children’s interests. Click on the map below to learn more about individual states, and scroll down to read more about homeschooling law across the country.

#### [2] Colleges and universities will accept parent-issued diplomas – but even if your link ev is true accreditation solves all your offense.

THSM 18 [The Homeschool Mom, "What Is Accreditation? Should My Homeschool Be Accredited?", October 29, 2018, https://www.thehomeschoolmom.com/what-is-accreditation-should-my-homeschool-be-accredited/] **Tfane23 \*Bracketed for clarity and grammar**
Why Might a Homeschooler Want to use an Accredited Homeschool Program? The number of distance learning programs for all grade levels has grown so great that it’s hard to know how to choose. So while accreditation does not guarantee quality, it does provide assurance that there is oversight and adherence to standards. Some parents receive peace of mind knowing that they’ve invested in a program that has been reviewed and approved by an accrediting agency. If there is a likelihood that your student will return to public high school, then the transfer of recognized course credit becomes an important matter. Your state may have a list of recognized distance learning providers; any coursework completed with one on the list should transfer easily to public school. If your high schooler intends to pursue NCAA sports in college, more extensive documentation becomes necessary, and some families may find it easier to use an online or virtual school (which may or may not be accredited) and be evaluated as a nontraditional program rather than a homeschool program. Be sure to go directly to the source for updated information on NCAA requirements: http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/future/home-school-students What’s missing from this very short list? Acceptance to community colleges, trade schools, the military, employment, and colleges/universities generally. In years past, this was not always the case. For example, up until 2012, a high schooler interested in joining the military upon graduation would have been advised to earn an accredited diploma, since it was more readily accepted by military recruiters than parent-issued diplomas. New policies went into effect in 2012 that recognize the parent-issued diploma as the standard for enlistment in all branches of service. Likewise, many vocational schools unfamiliar with homeschool laws have sometimes denied enrollment to a homeschooled student who does not hold an accredited diploma or a GED. These cases are usually based on erroneous assumptions, not on fact; and while frustrating to deal with, are usually resolved in favor of the homeschooled student based on state law. Regarding employment: a prospective employer may ask if a distance learning program is accredited, and may see it favorably since it rules out the possibility of it being a “diploma mill”, but again, there is nothing in state or federal law that requires such accreditation. Lastly, regarding colleges/universities: over the past several decades, it has actually been easier for a homeschooled graduate to gain acceptance to [colleges and universities] than to vocational schools or military enlistment. In part, the latter two have dealt more with applicants who did not complete high school. Colleges/universities have a wide array of factors to evaluate for student admission: coursework, standardized test scores, letters of reference, written essays, personal interview, etc.; thus having an accredited diploma was not required. How do I Find an Accredited Homeschool Program? With the rise of online, distance learning programs for all grade levels comes a cottage industry of unofficial accrediting agencies. Make sure that the accreditation you see for a particular online school comes from a legitimate agency. The best choice is the Distance Education Accrediting Commission (DEAC), which up until 2015 was known as the Distance Education & Training Council (DETC). https://www.deac.org/  Enter the name of a program you’re considering, or search the entire list. This will also help you to avoid the 50-plus dubious accrediting agencies and all the online schools they promote, thus saving your time and sanity. Accreditation for homeschoolers applies mostly to those in very specific situations like potentially returning to public high school, and even that is only in certain localities. For the rest, accreditation is a nice-to-have, not a must-have.

### **A2 Shift DA**

#### [1] They miss the forest for the trees – They say that there will be a laundry list of problems that come with eliminating standardized tests, but the structures of standardized tests currently keep minorities out of college. We should vote aff to liberate minorities from this oppressive structure.

#### [2] Our impact outweighs – gaming’s a nu impact because it’s going to happen at all points in life. The only real impact is oppressive structures, and we’d argue subjecting minorities to a test that is Institutionally biased against them is far worse than potential gaming.

#### [3] Extend the Maguire ev – the debate is a measure of trade offs, meaning that we have to figure if the best impact is accuracy or diversity. Which means we’re winning the debate – a] we’re the only one who explicitly explains the effect of standardized testing on college admissions and b] we ought to reject inequalities in our world – it’s key to our framing.

#### [4] You can’t assume college admissions are going to work the exact same after the aff – there may be additional criteria and different metrics of grading. That means you can’t claim GPA inflation, policymakers will definitely answer this question after the aff – your evidence talking about it is indicative of the fact of awareness and the aff is a call to end that inequality as well.

### A2 Educational Attainment DA

#### Mismatch is good—their studies are bad and empirics conclude aff, turns their link.

Chingos 13 Matthew M. Ph.D in Government from Harvard, Former Brookings Expert Senior Fellow, Director of Education Policy Program @ Urban Institute

("Are Minority Students Harmed by Affirmative Action?" Brookings, 3-7-2013, https://www.brookings.edu/research/are-minority-students-harmed-by-affirmative-action/) EE

Affirmative action is back in the news this year with a major Supreme Court case, Fisher v. Texas. The [question](http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Fisher-v-UT-Cert-Petition.pdf) before the Court is whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause permits the University of Texas at Austin’s use of race in its undergraduate admissions process. The Court may declare the use of racial preferences in university admissions unconstitutional when it decides the case in the coming months, potentially overturning its decision in the landmark Grutter case decided a decade ago.

Accompanying the general subject of affirmative action in the spotlight is the “mismatch” hypothesis, which posits that minority students are harmed by the very policies designed to help them. Justice Clarence Thomas made this argument in his [dissent](http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/pdf/02-241P.ZX1) in the Grutter case: “The Law School tantalizes unprepared students with the promise of a University of Michigan degree and all of the opportunities that it offers. These overmatched students take the bait, only to find that they cannot succeed in the cauldron of competition. And this mismatch crisis is not restricted to elite institutions.”

The mismatch idea is certainly plausible in theory. One would not expect a barely literate high-school dropout to be successful at a selective college; admitting that student to such an institution could cause them to end up deep in debt with no degree. But admissions officers at selective colleges obviously do not use affirmative action to admit just anyone, but rather candidates they think can succeed at their institution.

The mismatch hypothesis is thus an empirical question: have admissions offices systematically overstepped in their zeal to recruit a diverse student body? In other words, are they admitting students who would be better off if they had gone to college elsewhere, or not at all? There is very little high-quality evidence supporting the mismatch hypothesis, especially as it relates to undergraduate admissions—the subject of the current Supreme Court case.

In fact, most of the research on the mismatch question points in the opposite direction. In our 2009 [book](http://press.princeton.edu/titles/8971.html), William Bowen, Michael McPherson, and I found that students were most likely to graduate by attending the most selective institution that would admit them. This finding held regardless of student characteristics—better or worse prepared, black or white, rich or poor. Most troubling was the fact that many well-prepared students “undermatch” by going to a school that is not demanding enough, and are less likely to graduate as a result. Other prior [research](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272775709001150) has found that disadvantaged students benefit more from attending a higher quality college than their more advantaged peers.

A November 2012 [NBER working paper](http://www.nber.org/papers/w18523) by a team of economists from Duke University comes to the opposite conclusion in finding that California’s Proposition 209, a voter-initiated ban on affirmative action passed in 1996, led to improved “fit” between minority students and colleges in the University of California system, which resulted in improved graduation rates. The authors report a 4.4-percentage-point increase in the graduation rates of minority students after Proposition 209, 20 percent of which they attribute to better matching.

At first glance, these results appear to contradict earlier work on the relationship between institutional selectivity and student outcomes. But the paper’s findings rest on a questionable set of assumptions, and a more straightforward reanalysis of the data used in the paper, which were provided to me by the University of California President’s Office (UCOP), yields findings that are not consistent with the mismatch hypothesis.

First, the NBER paper uses data on the change in outcomes between the three years prior to Prop 209’s passage (1995-1997) and the three years afterward (1998-2000) to estimate the effect of the affirmative action ban on student outcomes. Such an analysis is inappropriate because it cannot account for other changes occurring in California over this time period (other than simple adjustments for changes in student characteristics).

A key problem with the before-and-after method is that it does not take into account pre-existing trends in student outcomes. This is readily apparent in Figure 1, which shows that the graduation rates of underrepresented minority (URM) students increased by about four percentage points between 1992-1994 and 1995-1997, before the affirmative action ban. The change from 1995-1997 to 1998-2000 was smaller, at about three percentage points. The NBER paper interprets this latter change as the causal impact of Prop 209, but this analysis assumes that there would have been no change in the absence of Prop 209. If the prior trend had continued, then graduation rates would have increased another four points—in which case, the effect of Prop 209 was to decrease URM graduation rates by one percentage point.

Adjusting for student characteristics does not change this general pattern. The adjustment makes no difference in the pre-Prop 209 period, but explains about 36 percent of the increase in the immediate post-Prop 209 period (which is consistent with the NBER paper’s finding that changes in student characteristics explain 34-50 percent of the change). But if the 1992-1994 to 1995-1997 adjusted change was four points, and the 1995-1997 to 1998-2000 adjusted change was one point, then Prop 209 might be said to have a negative effect of three percentage points.

None of these alternative analyses of the effect of Prop 209 should be taken too seriously, because it is difficult to accurately estimate a pre-policy trend from only two data points. The bottom line is that there probably isn’t any way to persuasively estimate the effect of Prop 209 using these data. But this analysis shows how misleading it is in this case to only examine the 1995-1997 to 1998-2000 change, while ignoring the prior trend.

Second, the NBER paper finds that less-selective universities produce better outcomes among minority students with weaker academic credentials. This must be the case in order for “mismatch” to exist, but it runs counter to most prior research on the subject. The one exception is a [2002 study](http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/117/4/1491.full.pdf) by Stacy Dale and Alan Krueger, which found no impact of college selectivity on earnings except among students from low-income families. However, the methodology of the Dale-Krueger study severely limits the relevance of its results for students and policymakers.

In order to control for unobserved student characteristics, Dale-Krueger control for information about the institutions to which students applied and were accepted. This takes into account potentially valuable information that is observable by admissions committees but not the researcher. But it is problematic because it produces results that are based on comparisons between students who attended more or less selective colleges despite being admitted to the same set of institutions. As Caroline Hoxby [explains](http://www.immagic.com/eLibrary/ARCHIVES/GENERAL/NBER_US/N091014H.pdf): “since at least 90 percent of students who [were admitted to a similar group of schools] choose the more selective college(s) within it, the strategy generates estimates that rely entirely on the small share of students who make what is a very odd choice.” In other words, the method ignores most of the variation in where students go to college, which results from decisions about where to apply.

The problem with the NBER paper is that it uses a variant of the Dale-Krueger method by controlling for which UC campuses students applied to and were admitted by. And the UCOP data are consistent with Hoxby’s argument: in 1995-1997, 69 percent of URM students attended the most selective UC campus to which they were admitted and 90 percent attended a campus with an average SAT score within 100 points of the most selective campus that admitted them (the corresponding figures for all UC students are 72 and 93 percent).

A more straightforward analysis is to compare the graduation rates of URM students with similar academic preparation and family backgrounds who attended different schools. The mismatch hypothesis predicts that URM students with weak qualifications will be more likely to graduate, on average, from a less selective school than a more selective one.

The data show the opposite of what mismatch theory predicts: URM students, including those with less-than-stellar academic credentials, are more likely to graduate from more selective institutions. I calculate graduation rates by individual campus that are adjusted to take into account SAT scores, high school GPA, parental education, and family income.[[1]](https://www.brookings.edu/research/are-minority-students-harmed-by-affirmative-action/#_ftn1) I restrict this analysis to URM students with SAT scores in the 900-990 and 1000-1090 range during the three years before Prop 209, which should be exactly the group and time period when mismatch is most likely to occur.

Figure 2 shows that for both of the low-scoring groups of URM students, graduation rates are higher at more selective institutions. Results for individual institutions vary somewhat, but the upward trend in Figure 2 is clear. I find a similar pattern of results in the period after Prop 209 was passed (not shown). The main limitation of this type of analysis is that it does not take into account unobserved factors such as student motivation that may be associated with admission decisions and student choice of institution. The Dale-Krueger method is meant to address this issue, but for the reasons explained above produces results that are not particularly informative.

A better solution is to find instances of students who attended institutions of differing selectivity for reasons unrelated to their likelihood of success. This is not possible with the UCOP data, but such quasi-experimental methods are used in two other studies that finds a positive relationship between selectivity and student outcomes. In a [study](http://www.econ.pitt.edu/papers/Mark_flagship.pdf) published in 2009, Mark Hoekstra used a cutoff in the admissions process at a flagship state university to estimate the impact of attending that university on earnings. This strategy eliminates bias by comparing students who are very similar except that some were just above the cutoff for admission and others were just below. Hoekstra finds that attending the flagship increased earnings by 20 percent for white men.

In a more recent [working paper](http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/jgoodma1/papers/collegequality.pdf), Sarah Cohodes and Joshua Goodman employed a cutoff-based approach to measure the effect of a Massachusetts scholarship that could only be used at in-state institutions. Students who won the scholarship were more likely to attend a lower quality college, which caused a 40 percent decrease in on-time graduation rates, as well as a decline in the chances of earning a degree at any point within six years.

These two studies do not directly address the mismatch question because they do not focus on the beneficiaries of affirmative action, but they show that taking into account students’ unobserved characteristics leaves intact the positive relationship between selectivity and student outcomes that has been consistently documented in the many prior studies that are less causally persuasive.

To truly put the mismatch theory to rest, rigorous quasi-experimental evidence that focuses on the beneficiaries of preferential admissions policies is needed. But the current weight of the evidence leans strongly against the mismatch hypothesis. Most importantly, not a single credible study has found evidence that students are harmed by attending a more selective college. There may well be reasons to abolish or reform affirmative action policies, but the possibility that they harm the intended beneficiaries should not be among them.

### Meritocracy K

#### Meritocracy is a lie, the negative’s assumptions of a meritocratic admissions and testing system is embedded in Americanist logic that seeks to provide us false hope. Reject their advocacy to break down the myth of meritocracy.

Alvarado 10 [Lorriz Anne Alvarado, The Vermont Connection Vol 3 , "Dispelling the Meritocracy Myth: Lessons for Higher Education and Student Affairs Educators", 2010, https://www.uvm.edu/~vtconn/v31/Alvarado.pdf] **Tfane23**
Americans continue to follow the advice of Benjamin Franklin in making “the proper education of youth” the most important American social policy (as cited in Hochschild, 2003, p. 9). Education is the American answer to all the issues in the country, from waves of immigrations to the abolishing of subordination based on race, class, gender, sexual orientation, and other historically marginalized groups. Although public schools in the United States are expected to accomplish a lot for their students, “underlying all of these tasks is the goal of creating the conditions needed for people to believe in and pursue the ideology of the American Dream” (p. 9). Americans want the educational system to help translate the American Dream from vision to practice. Today, higher education is depicted in American culture as a panacea for some of the most significant problems in our society. This past year, one of President Obama’s initiatives to help with unemployment and the declining economy mainly focused on increasing United States college graduates. He “asked every American to complete at least one year of higher education or vocational training” (Swami, 2009, para. 1). As of 2005, after accounting for the differences between those who go to college and those who do not, the premium for a year of college education was about 13-14% of an individual's weekly wage (Winters, 2009). Just a decade ago, a high school education was enough to succeed in the job market and going to college would make a person competitive. Today, a college education is required in order to be considered a competitive candidate. Higher education is now understood as a way to realize the American Dream. Alvarado • 15 As described above, the American Dream is understood to follow its first tenet that every American has the equal opportunity to attain success. But contrary to this belief, the principle of equal opportunity does not apply to higher education. Higher education in the United States has a history of racial and class-based exclusion that continues to effect education today (Rudolph, 1991; Thelin, 2004). This is also the case for K-12 education, in that it is uneven on lines of race and class so that those in low-income neighborhoods have schools that have fewer resources than their higher-income counterparts. These inequalities are carried over when these students apply to colleges and universities, the majority of which base their decisions heavily on academics and standardized test scores. Some may argue that admissions decisions based on a student’s academic record and test scores is educational meritocracy (Stevens, 2008), but in the larger scheme of things, does everyone have the equal opportunity to work hard and do well in high school and on standardized tests? The fact is that the affluent can afford the infrastructure necessary to produce that accomplishment in their children: academically excellent high schools, rich with extracurricular programs; summer sport camps and private tutoring; “service” trips to Israel or Guatemala; and, of course, the time and money to invest in the elaborate competition for seats at selective institutions. Not everyone has the opportunity to apply or even attend college, which puts many at a disadvantage in our society; it is not merely the hard work one puts in but rather the status that one has. Even if the playing field were level in K-12 education and all students had the monetary means to pay for college, admissions is highly competitive. Chad Aldeman (2009) referred to college admissions as a lottery: Each year, thousands of qualified applicants bombarded the admissions office, and, even after setting a relatively high standard, the admissions office had far too many qualified applicants to choose from, and very little time to do so. … At many institutions, in other words, it is a far more random process than colleges would like students to believe. The myth of a meritocracy, on which the selective admissions system is built, is substantially a lie. (para. 5-6) Similar to hiring and promoting, acceptance to college is not merely about merit, but may seem like a random decision from an outside perspective. In other words, the most academically, hard-working students will not all be accepted to an Ivy League school. An example of this is the reality that not all high school valedictorians who apply to Harvard will be accepted. They may have the same qualifications and characteristics, but there is far greater demand to attend Harvard than there are available seats. Although the meritocratic utopian idea of 16 • The Vermont Connection • 2010 • Volume 31 higher education is that everyone has an equal opportunity to attend, this idea has proven to be as mythical as the American Dream.

### A2 Reform CP’s

#### Frequent reforms of education cause “reform fatigue”. This is the biggest impediment to meaningful educational change and turns the case.

Matt Collette MARCH 5 2015 8:45 AMA Painful Decade of School Reformhttp://www.slate.com/blogs/schooled/2015/03/05/reform\_fatigue\_how\_constant\_change\_demoralizes\_teachers.html

Reforms come and go so quickly at Intermediate School 61 in Queens. First there was the push for smaller schoolsthat began in 2003. Then a mind-boggling data system was introduced in 2007. The implementation of Common Core began in 2012, a process on track to continue through at least 2022. A new teacher evaluation system debuted in 2013. The experience over the last decade at this very large middle school—which enrolls nearly 2,400 students, employs close to 200 teachers, and takes up nearly an entire city block—offers a case study in howfatigue with top-down reforms can become the biggest impediment to meaningful educational change. With each reform, teachers and administrators have lost a little more trust in the city, state, and federal officials setting the agenda—not to mention a lot of their time. The decade of ceaseless change started with one of then-Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s signature initiatives: the push for smaller schools. Bloomberg (as well as the deep-pocketed Gates Foundation) was a big proponent of small schools, aggressively shutting down or breaking apart a total of 157 large, comprehensive schools. This shift, which occurred simultaneously in several districts across the United States, dramatically altered the New York City school system and helped give the charter movement a more significant foothold.

#### More problems with reform…

#### Reforms too often overrule the desires of professional educators, which increases the chances they will fail.

Geoff Nixon How The Education Reform Movement Affects Your ChildMay 26, 2015https://www.gemmlearning.com/blog/education\_trends/how-education-reform-impacts-your-child

Education Wasn’t Always a Political Issue and Wasn’t Always ReformingAs the knowledge economy has made life more complex and career requirements more demanding at every level, a good education has become a more pressing basic necessity for every citizen.This has meant that education has become more of a mainstream political priority over the past 20 to 30 years.Concerns about the lack of progress in educational outcomes and concerns about equity of outcomes — the gap between rich and poor student performance — have become emotional flash points on both sides of the political aisle, putting politicians under pressure to act!And since the 1990s they have.There has been increasing willingness to overrule professional educators who previously controlled the levers of power in education, to “reform” education and to legislate what goes on in the classroom.Education reform has been happening at district, state and the federal level.This growing boldness to reform is occurring in a period of market-based reform elsewhere, and so not surprisingly the main thrust of reforms has been around privatization, business-like accountability and incentives.How The Sides Line UpAccording to the reformers, the villains are the teachers unions who resist accountability and bloated public education bureaucracies that are slow moving and over-staffed. On the other side we have teachers.For them, the villains are big business — e.g., Pearson the testing conglomerate, Bill Gates and others who are leading the charge on bringing business accountability to education — and ideological politicians who teachers feel do not understand education.

#### Large, utopian reforms like the counterplan backfire. Any actual reform that has worked has been gradual and incremental.

Robert Kunzman (Indiana University) Life as Education and the Irony of School Reform, Other Education: The Journal of Educational Alternatives ISSN 2049-2162 Volume 1(2012), Issue 1 · pp. 121-129.

It seems, however, that an unreflective pursuit of educational upheaval is too often the norm in the world of educational policymaking. Many reformers, including the current U.S. Secretary of Education, call for drastic and dramatic changes to our schools. Tinkering around the edges, they assert, is for the timid and unimaginative. But Tyack & Cuban’s (1995) historical analysis – entitled Tinkering Toward Utopia, by the way – offers a different perspective, one we would be wise to consider: Although policy talk about reform has had a utopian ring, actual reforms have typically been gradual and incremental – tinkering with the system. It may be fashionable to decry such change as piecemeal and inadequate, but over long periods of time such revisions of practice, adapted to local contexts, can substantially improve schools. Rather than seeing the hybridizing of reform ideas as a fault, we suggest it can be a virtue. Tinkering is one way of preserving what is valuable and reworking what is not. (Tyack & Cuban, 1995, p. 5) The irony is that the most vocal school reformers today, the ones who rail so passionately against the status quo, are ultimately seeking to replace it with another singularly prescriptive vision of schooling, one driven by a testing regimen that narrows the learning experience even further. Just when boundaries of schooling are blurring and conventional notions of time, place, content, and pedagogy are being questioned and transcended, policymakers are grasping at unsophisticated and ultimately counterproductive formulas, beguiled by the promise of “raising standards” by demanding more accountability. But this vision of accountability is one that, in the end, bases its terms of success on yet more simplistic “countables” – credits, hours in school, test scores, graduation rates. Instead, what our schools and societies require is a steady commitment to navigate the necessary tension between educational forms and options that honor the individual while also preserving an appreciation for and dedication to the common good. Re-forming our schools into institutions that support this vision means understanding time, place, and subject matter as variables in service of an education where critical thinking and authentic learning are the ultimate goals. That may not work well as a catchy reform slogan, but perhaps that’s a virtue.

### A2 Adversity Score/Landscape CP

#### **The recanting of the “adversity score” proves critical sentiment correct – it’s a bad idea.**

Nietzel 19 [Michael T. Nietzel, Forbes Magazine, "College Board Is Dropping The 'Adversity Score.' Good.", August 27, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeltnietzel/2019/08/27/college-board-is-dropping-the-adversity-score-good/#5abdbf9718c1] **Tfane23**
The College Board announced today that it is dropping its recent plan to calculate an "adversity score" for students who take the SAT. David Coleman, CEO of the College Board admitted, "The idea of a single score was wrong. It was confusing and created the misperception that the indicators are specific to an individual student.” However, the College Board is not totally abandoning any attempt to give colleges more information about applicants' backgrounds that might be related to their education. It's going to use the tool it calls "Landscape" that will include a variety of data - not reduced to a single number - such as characteristics of the the student’s school, the size of the school’s graduating class, the percentage of students eligible for free and reduced lunch, and performance in Advanced Placement courses. According to reporting in the Los Angeles Times, admissions officers also will see a range of test scores to show where applicants fall in relation to others, as well as information like the median family income, education levels and crime rates in the student’s neighborhood. Today In: Leadership The decision to jettison the adversity score was an acknowledgment of the many criticisms that had been leveled against the College Board's creation of the original tool (the Board never referred to it as an "adversity score") as well as how it planned to use it. Critics were not convinced it would do what was promised because the College Board refused to report the weightings it used in computing scores, and it reported only neighborhood characteristics rather than variables unique to a given student. In addition it refused to make the score available to students themselves, raising suspicion about its own confidence in the measure.

#### AND, data doesn’t solve. There’s no guarantee that admissions officers will use this information as the cp text just gives officers the info – it doesn’t mandate that it be considered.

### A2 Coaching CP

#### 2 warrants – 1. Test prep courses actually don’t boost scores by much, which means they aren’t the cause of the score gap and 2. Paid prep permeates into all aspects of the college application – blaming the SAT is just creating a scapegoat.

DeBoer 18 [Freddie DeBoer, Jacobin Magazine, "The Progressive Case for the SAT", 2018, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/03/sat-class-race-inequality-college-admission] **Tfane23**
Critics of standardized tests often complain that affluent students have greater access to test prep materials and coaching. This is indeed a concern, but the research here is clear: coaching services produce far smaller gains than those advertised by the big test-prep companies, which routinely claim triple-digit improvements. A 2006 meta-analysis found that students retaking the SAT after coaching resulted in, on average, an increase of about 50 points on a 1600 scale. That’s not an insignificant number. However, as the researchers point out, we can expect some of that gain to occur simply through increased familiarity with the test and, for lower-scoring students — the type most likely to retake the test — regression to the mean. More recent research found that, after using statistical controls to compare similar students, the combined effect of coaching on a 1600 point scale was about 20 points. It’s also worth noting that affluent parents can hire a wide variety of coaches and tutors for their children to improve their grades, performance in sports, or ability in extracurricular activities, all of which impact their chances of college admission. Coaching is thus far from a problem with testing alone. Yes, the game is rigged, but it’s rigged from the top to bottom — not just with the SAT.

### A2 Research CP

#### [1] Extend the first Rosales evidence – their research will simply be founded on the principles of eugenics used to make the tests in the first place.

### A2 Universal CP

#### [1] Extend the Au evidence that explains that the process and content of the test is the problem – regardless of accessibility these tests will be skewed out of the grasp of people of color.

### A2 States CP

#### [1] Doesn’t include Puerto Rico.

#### [2] 50 State Fiat Bad

**Not reciprocal – 1 vs 50 actors they can have as many as they want**

**There is lit on states counterplan that makes it utopian and kills policy making education**

**States counterplan prevents any small cases and makes them all heg affs**

**Infinitely regressive – it could be infinite become worse and worse – citys do it or have people do it**

**They mooch off the 1ac and just add a fed link – kills debate**

**Voter for fairness and education**

#### [3] Doesn’t solve – private colleges still consider the test. Actually puts people in more problems because they have a lesser chance of getting into college.

### A2 AP PIC

#### **[1] Clear solvency deficit – even if you allow minorities to take the AP exams, they won’t be able to get the benefits because they won’t pass.**

Tugend 17 [Alina Tugend, The New York Times, "Who Benefits From the Expansion of A.P. Classes? - The New York Times", September 7, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/magazine/who-benefits-from-the-expansion-of-ap-classes.html] **Tfane23**
Until recently, this fact alone would have been considered remarkable. A.P. classes were, for years, primarily taught in wealthier school districts. But over the last decade, the program has grown rapidly. In 2006, 1.3 million students took at least one A.P. exam; by 2016, the number had increased to 2.6 million. The total number of tests taken grew during the same time period to 4.7 million from 2.3 million. Much of this growth is due to increased federal funding for A.P. tests and concerted efforts by the College Board to reach low-income and minority students. The organization has a program called “All In,” which identifies lower-income students who might succeed in an A.P. class based on their PSAT scores — the Preliminary SAT, which the College Board also administers — and then reaches out to those students (and their teachers and advisers) to persuade them to take the courses. From one viewpoint, the expansion has been successful. In 2005, only 6.4 percent of the nation’s high school seniors who took A.P.s were black; that figure increased to 9.5 percent in 2015. Hispanics’ participation grew to 20 percent from 13.4 percent. For low-income students, that figure doubled, to about 30 percent from about 15 percent. You have 8 free articles remaining. Subscribe to The Times But taking an A.P. class and succeeding at it are two different things. After class let out, Fuchs told me, with a note of frustration in her voice, how few of her students passed the A.P. exam at the end of the year. “I’ve got five to six kids reading on grade level, and three of those don’t show up,” she said. “The rest are significantly below grade level.” Fuchs, whose class meets for 85 minutes daily, works with her students through lunch periods and whenever she has a free moment. She took some of them canvassing out of state on weekends during the 2016 campaign to teach them about real-world politics. She buys them breakfast the morning of the A.P. exam. Many of her students are engaged and passionate. Still, she said, “for six years, the passage rate has always been completely flat.” Usually, only one or two students in her class score a 3 or higher. Fuchs’s students are part of a broader trend. Nationally, over 70 percent of African-Americans and 57 percent of Hispanics who took an A.P. test in 2016 did not pass. (Over all, the failure rate was 42 percent.) And over the past two decades, although the percentage of students scoring between 2 and 5 remained fairly stable, the percentage of students scoring 1 has grown to 19 percent from 12 percent. In 2016, at the nine open-enrollment neighborhood high schools in Washington, the passage rates were fairly dismal; at three schools, only one student score a 3 or above, and one had no students pass at all. This failure rate, which is rarely highlighted by the College Board — or the policy makers and legislators who also drive the A.P. expansion — raises questions that are as tangled as any about race, class and education in this country. Critics of the program see the A.P.’s expansion as a boondoggle, with scarce resources being thrown at a program that simply wasn’t designed to address the systemic problems facing public education — at a real cost to these students.

#### [2] AP is a reason grade inflation exists. Higher income schools have more money to spend on AP certification and curriculum, which means that exclusive access to AP tests is a root cause for grade inflation – the PIC turns their case turns.

#### [3] AP programs are dying and the existent ones are concentrated in high income neighborhoods.

Thomas 18 [Jaqueline Rabe Thomas, The CT Mirror, "Access to AP courses often elusive for low-income students", May 14, 2018, https://ctmirror.org/2018/05/14/advanced-placement-debate-open-closed-gate/] **Tfane23**
The letters were aimed at increasing enrollment in Advanced Placement (AP) or International Baccalaureate (IB) courses by students who might otherwise be overlooked as candidates, particularly those from low-income families. The pushback came from school officials who said they didn’t have enough seats in these challenging courses or disagreed over whether many of these students could succeed. Despite the resistance, enrollment has increased in Advanced Placement courses – though low-income students still are significantly underrepresented. Of the additional 3,400 high school students to enroll in an additional AP course over the last three years, 24 percent came from low-income families, though such students account for 36 percent of Connecticut’s high school-aged population. Statewide, one in 10 students from low-income families will take an AP course, compared to one in four students from middle- or high-income homes. The increases in AP enrollment have done little to close these large disparities. And the gains that have been made among historically overlooked students have been concentrated in a handful of school districts, state data show. Participation in the College Board’s Advanced Placement courses gives the best picture of student access to high-level courses and are much more common throughout the state than other college-level offerings. Twenty-one percent of Connecticut high school students take at least one AP course. Only 2 percent are in other special programs for gifted students, and a half percent take an International Baccalaureate course, which also enable students to earn college credit. The University of Connecticut’s Early College Experience program enrolls 6 percent of Connecticut’s public high schoolers, and the state Board of Regents system enrolls just under 1 percent of high schoolers in courses at its dozen community colleges. The State Department of Education was only able to provide data on students who take the College Board’s Advanced Placement courses and their outcomes. However, data collected by the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights shows large disparities also exist in access to IB and gifted programs in Connecticut. UConn’s program also enrolls many fewer lower-income students. Gatekeeping The letters the state sends home also are meant to embolden parents to nudge their districts to enroll more students in advanced courses, but the decision ultimately depends on how many high-level courses are offered and whether guidance counselors and other school leaders are on board. In Bridgeport – the state’s second largest school district – leadership in the past was not on board and cut in half the number of available AP courses – down to seven districtwide. With fewer offerings, only 198 of the district’s 5,352 high school students took at least one AP course last school year – putting Bridgeport’s participation rate in AP courses dead last among Connecticut districts. In addition, 349 Bridgeport students were enrolled in IB courses, 140 in UConn’s early college courses and none in gifted programs. Fewer than 100 were enrolled in a community college program. CTMIRROR.ORG FILE PHOTO A magnet high school in Bridgeport. “The electives and AP courses were almost entirely wiped out. It was a terrible decision, just terrible. I don’t think the public knew this was going on at the time,” said Fran Rabinowitz, who served as the city’s superintendent in the aftermath of the major reduction in course offerings. “It is incredibly important that we tap the potential of every student. It is important for students to be in those courses.” Advertisement The state education department says such local decisions are at the heart of creating the disparities between who can and cannot take advanced courses. “We have looked at this data. [These courses] are not equally available,” Ajit Gopalakrishnan, the leader of the State Department of Education’s performance office, told the State Board of Education in April. “It is not even, and some of that is driven by the communities. “There are a lot of local dynamics that come into play on what their course offerings are,” he said. To provide another nudge, the state education department two years ago began factoring participation in college and career-ready courses into the zero-to-100 grade that the state gives annually to each school and district. Four percent of the grade is based on enrollment levels in advanced courses, with an expectation that at least three-quarters of high school juniors or seniors will be enrolled in at least one. “We want our students graduating academically ready for what’s next,” Gopalakrishnan told the State Board of Education recently. “Our putting this in the accountability system and making it more visible has pushed the conversation, most definitely to, ‘What are we doing?’… Some districts are realizing they didn’t have what they needed to expose it to all students.”

### A2 Military PIC

#### [1] The AP evidence turns case – decreases diversity in the military, which means that minorities who want to serve their country will not be able to.

#### [2] Eugenics roots of Standardized testing comes from the use of the test for the military – the PIC is a reaffirmation of eugenics which turns the case

Rosales 18 [John Rosales, National Education Association, "NEA - The Racist Beginnings of Standardized Testing", 2018, http://www.nea.org/home/73288.htm] **Tfane23**
At the time, psychologist Carl Brigham wrote that African-Americans were on the low end of the racial, ethnic, and/or cultural spectrum. Brigham had helped to develop aptitude tests for the U.S. Army during World War I and was influential in the development of the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT). At the time, he and other social scientists considered the SAT a new psychological test and a supplement to existing college board exams. In the 21st century, the SAT and the ACT (American College Testing) are part of a wide range of tests students may face before reaching college. The College Board also offers SAT II tests, designed for individual subjects ranging from biology to geography. The marathon four-hour Advanced Placement (AP) examinations—which some universities accept for students who want to opt out of introductory college-level classes—remain common: Nearly 350,000 took the U.S. history AP test in 2017, the most popular subject test offered. There’s also the PSAT (Preliminary Scholastic Aptitude Test) taken primarily by eleventh graders as preparation for the SAT and as an assessment for the National Merit Scholarships. Biased Testing from the Start Brigham’s Ph.D. dissertation, written in 1916, “Variable Factors in the Binet Tests,” analyzed the work of the French psychologist Alfred Binet, who developed intelligence tests as diagnostic tools to detect learning disabilities. The Stanford psychologist Lewis Terman relied on Binet’s work to produce today’s standard IQ test, the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Tests. During World War I, standardized tests helped place 1.5 million soldiers in units segregated by race and by test scores. The tests were scientific yet they remained deeply biased, according to researchers and media reports. In 1917, Terman and a group of colleagues were recruited by the American Psychological Association to help the Army develop group intelligence tests and a group intelligence scale. Army testing during World War I ignited the most rapid expansion of the school testing movement.

### A2 Descriptive Phil

#### [1] They need to explain how their moral theory functions as a method of evaluating the moral repercussions of applying the resolution – anything else moots the debate of education – a] it’s not educational to debate grammar and English conventions we can learn that in English class and b] technicalities don’t work in the real world which means if you lose TT then you lose the NC and c] if the theory can’t evaluate normative decisions then you should lose under TT because you can’t evaluate the resolution, which is a normative event and d] the resolution is not merely a grammatical sentence, it’s an event in the world so the resolution justifies comparing worlds – this turns TT bcuz now the burdens of affirming and negating mean to prove the merits or downfalls for a normative event i.e. the resolution.

**Evaluating abstract philosophies before issues of oppression is nonsensical – it’s just a way to avoid confronting oppression.**

**Matsuda 89**, Mari, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Hawaii, “When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method”, 11 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 7 1989

 The multiple consciousness I urge lawyers to attain is not a random ability to see all points of view, but a deliberate choice to see the world from the standpoint of the oppressed. That world is accessible to all of us. We should know it in its concrete particulars. We should know of our sister carrying buckets of water up five flights of stairs in a welfare hotel, our sister trembling at 3 a.m. in a shelter for battered women, our sisters holding bloodied children in their arms in Cape Town, on the West Bank, and in Nicaragua. The jurisprudence of outsiders teaches that these details and the emotions they evoke are relevant and important as we set out on the road to justice. These details are accessible to all of us, of all genders and colors. We can choose to know the lives of others by reading, studying, listening, and venturing into different places. For lawyers, our pro bono work may be the most effective means of acquiring a broader consciousness of oppression. **Abstraction and detachment are ways out of the discomfort of direct confrontation with the ugliness of oppression**. Abstraction, criticized by both feminists and scholars of color, is the, method that allows theorists to discuss liberty, property, and rights in the aspirational mode of liberalism with **no connection** to what those concepts mean in real people's lives. Much in our mainstream intellectual training values **abstraction and denigrates nitty-gritty detail**. Holding on to a multiple consciousness will allow us to operate both within the abstractions of standard jurisprudential discourse, and within the details of our own special knowledge. Whisperings at Yale and elsewhere about how deconstructionist heroes were closet fascists remind me of how important it is to stay close to oppressed **communities. High talk** about language, meaning, sign, process, and law can mask **racist and sexist ugliness** if we never stop to ask: "Exactly what are you talking about and what is the implication of what you are saying for my sis- ter who is carrying buckets of water up five flights of stairs in a welfare hotel? What do you propose to do for her today, not in some abstract future you are creating in your mind?" If you have been made to feel, as I have, that such inquiry is theoretically unsophisticated, and quaintly naive, resist! Read what Professor Williams, Professor Scales-Trent, and other feminists and people of color are writing.' The reality and detail of oppression are a starting point for these writers as they enter into mainstream debates about law and theory.

### A2 Truth Testing

#### Prefer Comparative worlds

#### A. Key to reciprocity.

Nelson ’08 Adam F. Nelson, J.D.1. Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Lincoln-Douglas Debate. 2008.

And the truth-statement model of the resolution imposes an absolute burden of proof on the affirmative: if the resolution is a truth-claim, and the afﬁrmative has the burden of proving that claim, in so far as intuitively we tend to disbelieve truthclaims until we are persuaded otherwise, the afﬁrmative has the burden to prove that statement absolutely true. Indeed, one of the most common theory arguments in LD is conditionality, which argues it is inappropriate for the afﬁrmative to claim only proving the truth of part of the resolution is sufﬁcient to earn the ballot. Such a model of the resolution also gives the negative access to a range of strategies that many students, coaches, and judges ﬁnd ridiculous or even irrelevant to evaluation of the resolution. If the negative need only prevent the affirmative from proving the truth of the resolution, it is logically sufficient to negate to deny our ability to make truth-statements or to prove normative morality does not exist or to deny the reliability of human senses or reason. Yet, even though most coaches appear to endorse the truth-statement model of the resolution, they complain about the use of such negative strategies, even though they are a necessary consequence of that model. And, moreover, such strategies seem fundamentally unfair, as they provide the negative with functionally inﬁnite ground, as there are a nearly inﬁnite variety of such skeptical objections to normative claims, while continuing to bind the afﬁrmative to a much smaller range of options: advocacy of the resolution as a whole. Instead, it seems much more reasonable to treat the resolution as a way to equitably divide ground: the affirmative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to the value judgment implied by the resolution and the negative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to a value judgment mutually exclusive to that implied by the resolution. By making the issue one of desirability of competing world-views rather than of truth, the affirmative gains access to increased flexibility regarding how he or she chooses to defend that world, while the negative retains equal flexibility while being denied access to those skeptical arguments indicted above. Our ability to make normative claims is irrelevant to a discussion of the desirability of making two such claims. Unless there is some significant harm in making such statements, some offensive reason to reject making them that can be avoided by an advocacy mutually exclusive with that of the affirmative such objections are not a reason the negative world is more desirable, and therefore not a reason to negate. Note this is precisely how things have been done in policy debate for some time: a team that runs a kritik is expected to offer some impact of the mindset they are indicting and some alternative that would solve for that impact. A team that simply argued some universal, unavoidable, problem was bad and therefore a reason to negate would not be very successful. It is about time LD started treating such arguments the same way. Such a model of the resolution has additional benefits as well. First, it forces both debaters to offer offensive reasons to prefer their worldview, thereby further enforcing a parallel burden structure. This means debaters can no longer get away with arguing the resolution is by definition true of false. The “truth” of the particular vocabulary of the resolution is irrelevant to its desirability. Second, it is intuitive. When people evaluate the truth of ethical claims, they consider their implications in the real world. They ask themselves whether a world in which people live by that ethical rule is better than one in which they don’t. Such debates don’t happen solely in the abstract. We want to know how the various options affect us and the world we live in.

**B. Real World Ed – Ensures policymaking and dissuades random abstract phils inapplicable to the real world.**

**C. Truth testing allows Neg to read infinite NIBs that screw over my offense.**

#### Use comparative worlds – truth testing makes up rules to constrain discussion of race and cement the status-quo and is just plain wrong

**Overing and Scoggin 15** “In Defense of Inclusion”; September 10, 2015; John Scoggin (coach for Loyola in Los Angeles and former debater for the Blake School in Minneapolis. His students have earned 77 bids to the Tournament of Champions in the last 7 years. He’s coached 2 TOC finalists, a TOC quarterfinalist, and champions of many major national tournaments across the country) and Bob Overing (former debater for the USC Trojan Debate Squad, and current student at Yale Law School. As a senior in high school, he was ranked #1, earned 11 bids and took 2nd at TOC. In college, he cleared at CEDA and qualified to the NDT. His students have earned 98 career bids, reached TOC finals, and won many championships.); <http://premierdebatetoday.com/2015/09/10/in-defense-of-inclusion-by-john-scoggin-and-bob-overing/> //BWSWJ

In establishing affirmative and negative truth burdens, truth-testing forecloses important discussions even of the resolution itself. Consider the fact that in 1925-1926, there were two college policy topics, one for men and one for women. Men got to debate child labor laws, and women had to debate divorce law. *On the truth-testing view, the women debating the women’s topic would be barred from discussing the inherent sexism of the topic choice and the division of topics to begin with*. Or consider the retracted 2010 November Public Forum topic, “Resolved: An Islamic cultural center should be built near Ground Zero.” Many debaters would feel uncomfortable arguing that resolution, just like they did on the 2012 January/February LD topic about domestic violence. We both know individuals who felt the domestic violence topic was so triggering that they did not want to compete at all. We can draw two conclusions from examples like these. First, there are good reasons to not debate a particular topic. These reasons have beenspelled out over decades of debate scholarship ranging from Broda-Bahm and Murphy (1994) to Varda and Cook (2007) to Vincent (2013). Second, truth-testing prevents either team from making the argument that the topic is offensive or harmful. A hypothetical case, such as a resolution including an offensive racial epithet, makes the problem more obvious. Maybe the idea behind the resolution is good, but there’s something left out by analysis that stops there and ignores the use of a derogatory slur. *Truth-testing makes irrelevant the words in the topic and the words used by the debaters*. Thus, it fails to capture the reasons that any good person would “negate” or even refuse to debate an offensive topic. Clearly, there are elements of a topical advocacy beyond its truth that are worthy of questioning. Nebel (2015) acknowledges that some past resolutions were potentially harmful to debate (1.2, para. 5). Rather than exclude affected students as ‘not following the rules’ of semantics or truth-testing, we conclude that they should not be required to debate the topic. Nebel grapples with harmful topics in the following passage: I don’t think there is a magic-bullet response to critiques of the topic…I think they must be answered on a case-by-case basis, in their own terms…The question boils down to whether or not the topic is harmful for students to debate, and whether those harms justify breaking, or making an exception to, the topicality rule (1.2, para. 5) This statement is hard to square with Nebel’s thesis that semantic interpretations of the resolution come “lexically prior” (in other words, they always come first). He wants to allow exceptions, but doing so proves thatharmfulness concerns can and do trump the topicality rule. As Nebel’s struggle with the critique of topicality illustrates, every article that claims to espouse a comprehensive view of debate must allow some exceptions to comply with our intuitions. The exceptions do not prove the rule. They prove there is a high level of concern in debate for affording dignity and respect to different kinds of arguments and modes of argumentation. There is no one principle of proper debate. Once the door is open for external factors like harmfulness, the inference to the priority of pragmatics is an easy one to make. If we care about the effects of debating the resolution on the students debating it, then other values like exclusion, education, and fairness start to creep in. If we can justify avoiding discussion of a bad topic on pragmatic grounds, we can also justify promoting discussion of a good topic. Any advantage to allowing discursive kritiks, performances, and roles of the ballot further justifies thispragmatic view against truth-testing. NDT champion Elijah Smith (2013) warns that without these argument forms, we “distance the conversation from the material reality that black debaters are forced to deal with every day”. Christopher Vincent (2013) built on that idea, arguing that universal moral theory “drowns out the perspectives of students of color that are historically excluded from the conversation” (para. 3). While we don’t agree wholesale with these authors, their work unequivocally demonstrates the value of departures from pure truth-testing. While we may not convince our opposition that they should presume value in kritik-based strategies, they should remain open to them. In a recent article for the Rostrum, Pittsburgh debate coach Paul Johnson (2015) extolled the ‘hands-off’ approach. Let the debaters test whether the arguments have merit, rather than deciding beforehand: In a debate round, one may argue the impertinence of theses about structural racism with regards to a particular case…But when we explicitly or implicitly suggest such theses have little to no value by deciding in advance that they are inaccurate, we are forswearing the hard, argumentative work of subjecting our own beliefs to rigorous testing and interrogation (p. 90)Suggesting that non-topical, race-based approaches are “vigilantist” and “self-serving” “adventure[s]” is to demean the worth of these arguments before the debate round even starts (Nebel 2015, 1.1, para. 2). The claim that they ‘break the rules’ or exist ‘outside the law’ otherizes the debaters, coaches, and squads that pursue non-traditional styles. Especially given that many of these students are students of color, we should reject the image of them as lawless, self-interested vigilantes. Students work hard on their positions, often incorporating personal elements such as narrative or performance. To defend a view of debate that excludes their arguments from consideration devalues their scholarship and the way they make debate “home.”*That’s unacceptable*. Branse notes “the motivation for joining the activity substantially varies from person to person” yet excludes some debaters’ motivations while promoting others (5, para. 4). We agree with Smith on the very tangible effects of such exclusion: “If black students do not feel comfortable participating in LD they will lose out on the ability to judge, coach, or to force debate to deal with the truth of their perspectives” (para. 5). Of course, we do not believe that Nebel or Branse intend their views to have these effects, but they are a concern we need to take seriously. III. Changing the Rules In Round One thought is that rejecting truth-testing is the wrong solution. Instead, we should create a better topic-selection process or an NSDA-approved topic change when the resolution is particularly bad. These solutions, however, are not exclusive of a rejection of truth-testing. An offensive topic might be reason to reform the selection process and to stop debating it immediately. Good role of the ballot arguments are the best solution because they pinpoint exactly why a debater finds the resolution inadequate. They highlight the problems of the proposed topic of discussion, and outline reasons why a different approach is preferable. While Branse believes these examples of in-round rule-making are problematic, we think debate rounds are an excellent location for discussing what debate should be. The first reason is the failure of consensus. Because there are a wide variety of supported methods to go about debating, we should be cautious about paradigmatic exclusion. While we don’t defend the relativist conclusion that all styles of debate are equally valuable, there is significant disagreement that our theories must account for. Truth-testing denies a number of ways to debate that many find valuable. The second reason is the internalization of valuable principles. Even people who do not think kritiks are the right way to debate have taken important steps like removing gendered language from their positions. NDT champion Elijah Smith (2013) identified hateful arguments and comments “you expect to hear at a Klan rally” as commonplace in LD rounds and the community (para. 2). We’d like to think those instances are at least reduced by the argumentation he’s encouraged. For instance, the much-maligned “you must prove why oppression is bad” argument now sees little play in high-level circuit rounds. *Truth-testing forecloses this kind of learning from the opposition.*Roles of the ballot and theory interpretations are examples of how in-round argumentation creates new rules of engagement. We welcome these strategies, and debaters should be prepared to justify their proposed rules against procedural challenges. The arguments we have made thus far are objections to truth-testing as a top-down worldview used to exclude from the get-go, not in-round means of redress against certain practices. There is a major difference between a topicality argument in a high school debate round and a prominent debate coach and camp director’s glib dismissal of non-topical argument as follows: [Y]ou can talk about whatever you want, but if it doesn’t support or deny the resolution, then the judge shouldn’t vote on it (Nebel 2015, 1.2, para. 4) Branse is equally ideological: Within the debate, the judge is bound by the established rules. If the rules are failing their function, that can be a reason to change the rules outside of the round. However, in round acts are out of the judge’s jurisdiction (2, para. 12) We take issue with debate theorists’ attempts to define away arguments that they don’t like. At one point, Jason Baldwin (2009) actually defended truth-testing for its openness, praising the values of the free market of ideas: That’s how the marketplace of ideas is supposed to work. But it is supposed to be a free marketplace where buyers (judges) examine whatever sellers (debaters) offer them with an open mind, not an exclusive marketplace where only the sellers of some officially approved theories are welcome (p. 26) Unfortunately for the truth-tester, debate has changed, and it will change again. What was once a model that allowed all the arguments debaters wanted to make – a prioris, frameworks, and meta-ethics – is now outdated in the context of discursive kritiks, performance, and alternative roles of the ballot. IV. Constitutivism, Authority, and the Nature of Debate Branse’s goal is to derive substantive rules for debate from the ‘constitutive features’ of debate itself and the roles of competitors and judges. We’ll quote him at length here to get a full view of the argument: [P]ragmatic benefits are constrained by the rules of the activity….education should not be promoted at the expense of the rules since the rules are what define the activity. LD is only LD because of the rules governing it – if we changed the activity to promoting practical values, then it would cease to be what it is (2, para. 7) Internal rules of an activity are absolute. From the perspective of the players, the authority of the rules are non-optional. (2, para. 12) The resolution, in fact, offers one of the only constitutive guidelines for debate. Most tournament invitations put a sentence in the rules along the lines of, “we will be using [X Resolution].” Thus, discussion confined to the resolution is non-optional (3, para. 5) [T]he delineation of an “affirmative” and a “negative” establishes a compelling case for a truth testing model…two debaters constrained by the rules of their assignment – to uphold or deny the truth of the resolution…[J]udging the quality of the debaters requires a reference to their roles. The better aff is the debater who is better at proving the resolution true. The better neg is the debater who is better at denying the truth of the resolution. The ballot requests an answer to “who did a comparatively better job fulfilling their role”, and since debaters’ roles dictate a truth-testing model, the judge ought to adjudicate the round under a truth testing model of debate. The judge does not have the jurisdiction to vote on education rather than truth testing (3, para. 7-8) Once a judge commits to a round in accordance with a set of rules…the rules are absolute and non-optional (4, para. 4) Similarly, Nebel uses contractual logic – appealing to the tournament invitation as binding agreement – to justify truth-testing: “The “social contract” argument holds that accepting a tournament invitation constitutes implicit consent to debate the specified topic….given that some proposition must be debated in each round and that the tournament has specified a resolution, no one can reasonably reject a principle that requires everyone to debate the announced resolution as worded. This appeals to Scanlon’s contractualism (1.1, para. 2) This approach is attractive because it seeks to start from principles we all seem to agree on and some very simple definitions. The primary problem is that the starting point is very thin, but the end point includes very robust conclusions. *The terms “affirmative” and “negative” are insufficient to produce universal rules for debate, and certainly do not imply truth-testing* (Section I, paragraph 3.) Branse does some legwork in footnoting several definitions of “affirm” and “negate,” but does little in the way of linguistic analysis. We won’t defend a particular definition but point out that there are many definitions that vary and do not all lend themselves to truth-testing. On a ballot the words “speaker points” are as prominently displayed as the words “affirmative” or “negative,” but neither Branse nor Nebel attempt to make any constitutive inference from their existence. Further, to find the constitutive role of a thing, one needs to look at what the thing actually is, rather than a few specific words on a ballot. Looking at debates now, we see that they rarely conform to the truth-testing model. It is simply absurd to observe an activity full of plans, counterplans, kritiks, non-topical performances, theory arguments, etc. and claimthat its ‘constitutive nature’ is to exclude these arguments. Not only that, but the truth-testing family has been heavily criticized in both the policy and LD communities (Hynes Jr., 1979; Lichtman & Rohrer, 1982; Mangus, 2008; Nelson, 2008; O’Donnell, 2003; O’Krent, 2014; Palmer, 2008; Rowland, 1981; Simon, 1984; Snider, 1994; Ulrich, 1983). The empirical evidence also points toward argumentative inclusion in three important ways. The first is argument trends. The popularity of kritiks, a prioris, meta-ethics, etc. confirm that at different times the community at large has very different views of what constitutes not only a good argument but also a good mode of affirming or negating. The second is argument cycles. An alternate view would suggest that debate evolves and leaves bad arguments by the wayside. Nevertheless, we see lots of arguments pop in and out of the meta-game, suggesting that we have not made a definitive verdict on the best way to debate. The third is judge deference. While people’s views on proper modes of debate shift, we retain a strong deference to a judge’s decision. Judges have different views of debate; if there were some overarching principle that all judges should follow, we would expect tournament directors to enforce such a rule. In sum, there is no way to view debate as a whole and see truth-testing as the general principle underlying our practices. The existence of a judge and a ballot are also insufficient to produce universal rules for debate. Branse thinks “[t]he ballot requests an answer to ‘who did a comparatively better job fulfilling their role.’” While that may be a valid concern, it is dependent on what the judge views the roles of debaters to be. The absence of any sort of instruction other than determining the ‘better debating’ or the ‘winner’ most naturally lends itself to a presumption of openness. In fact, many practices very explicitly deviate from the constitutive roles Branse lays out. Some counterplans (PICs, PCCs, topical CPs and the like) may do more to prove the resolution than disprove it, yet are generally accepted negative arguments. Another type of objection to Branse’s view is an application of David Enoch’s “agency shmagency” argument. Enoch (2011) summarizes in his paper “Shmagency revisited”: [E]ven if you find yourself engaging in a kind of an activity…inescapably…and even if that activity is constitutively governed by some norm or…aim, this does not suffice for you to have a reason to obey that norm or aim at that aim. Rather, what is also needed is that you have a reason to engage in that activity…Even if you somehow find yourself playing chess, and even if checkmating your opponent is a constitutive aim of playing chess, still you may not have a reason to (try to) checkmate your opponent. You may lack such a reason if you lack a reason to play chess. The analogy is clear enough: Even if you find yourself playing the agency game, and even if agency has a constitutive aim, still you may not have a reason to be an agent (for instance, rather than a shmagent) (p. 5-6) The application to chess helps us see the application to debate. Truth-testing may be the constitutive aim of doing debate, but it does not follow that our best reasons tell us to test the truth of the resolution. In fact, you may have no reasons to be a truth-testing debater in the first place. If “affirmative” means “the one who proves the resolution true,” we’ve demonstrated times when it’s better to be “shmaffirmative” than “affirmative.” Finally, we thinkone of the most important (perhaps constitutive) features of debate is its unique capacity to change the rules while playing within the rules. Education-based arguments and non-topical arguments are just arguments – they’re pieces on the chess board to be manipulated by the players. Branse concedes that in APDA debate, the resolution is “contestable through a formal, in-round mechanism (3, para. 9). LD and policy debate also have this mechanism through theory arguments, kritiks, and alternative roles of the ballot. Branse is right that in soccer and chess, there is no way to kick a ball or move a chess piece that would legitimately change the rules of the game. Debate is different. While soccer and chess have incontrovertible empirical conditions for victory (checkmates, more goals at fulltime), debate does not. In fact, *discussing the win conditions is debating*! Whenever a debater reads a case, they assume or justify certain win conditions and not others. This deals with Branse’s “self-defeatingness” objection because debate about the rules does not create a “free-for-all” — it creates a debate (6, para. 1). The truth-testing judge does not get to pick and choose what makes a good debate; to do so is necessarily interventionist. This demonstrates truth-testing is more arbitrary and subjective [2] than the education position Branse criticizes (4, para. 4; 5, para. 2, 5). To be truly non-interventionist, we should accept them as permissible arguments until proven otherwise in round. Of course, not all rules are up for debate. There is a distinction between rules like speech times (call these procedural rules) and rules like truth-testing (call these substantive rules). The former are not up for the debate in the sense that the tournament director could intervene if a debater refused to stop talking. The latter are debate-able and have been for some time. No tournament director enforces their pet paradigm. Because the tournament director, not the judge, has ultimate authority, we liken her to the referee in soccer. On this view, the judge is not the referee tasked with enforcing “the rules”; she should decide only on the basis of arguments presented in the debate. Tournaments are not subject to any form of higher authority and are not obligated to follow NSDA rules, TOC guidelines, or anything else to determine a winner. Something is only a procedural rule if it is enforced by the tournament, and truth-testing has not and shouldn’t be enforced in this manner. To our knowledge, no bid tournament director has ever imposed a truth-testing burden on all competitors. If anything is a binding contract, it is the judge paradigm. Judge philosophies or paradigms are explicitly agreed to in writing because each judge establishes their own, and there is no coercion at play. Most tournaments mandate or strongly encourage written paradigms, have time to review them, and accept judge services instead of payment for hiring a judge. These norms establish a clearer contractual agreement in favor of judge deferral than universal truth-testing. We have tested the constitutive and contractual arguments by considering how truth-testing is not a procedural rule like speech times. As such, it cannot accrue the benefits of bindingness, authority, and non-arbitrariness. We can also test the argument in the opposite direction. There are some rules that seem even more “constitutive” of debate than the resolution but are not examples of procedural rules. For instance, every judge and debate theorist would likely reject completely new arguments in the 2AR, but there is nothing within Branse’s constitutive rules (speech times, the resolution, the aff and neg) to justify the norm. The no-new-arguments rule does not need to be written in a rulebook to have a lot of force. V. Pragmatic Justifications for Truth-testing With the priority of pragmatics established and constitutive arguments well addressed, we turn to some hybrid arguments that attempt to justify truth-testing by appealing to pragmatics. Nebel argues that the advantages stemming from truth-testing must be weighed against all exceptions to it and that the advantages of debating the ‘true meaning’ of the topic nearly always outweigh: It would be better if everyone debated the resolution as worded, whatever it is, than if everyone debated whatever subtle variation on the resolution they favored. Affirmatives would unfairly abuse (and have already abused) the entitlement to choose their own unpredictable adventure, and negatives would respond (and have already responded) with strategies that are designed to avoid clash…people are more likely to act on mistaken utility calculations and engage in self-serving violations of useful rules (1.1, para. 2) However, the advantages of topicality for the semantic/truth-testing view hold on the pragmatic view as well. We agree that the reasons to debate the meaning of the topic are strong. The only difference is that the pragmatic theory can explain the possibility of exceptions to the rule without interpretive contortion. It makes much more sense to understand that strict topicality is just a very good practice than to tout it as an absolute, lexically prior, constitutively- and contractually-binding rule. Ultimately, all benefits to topicality and debating something other than the resolution are weighed on the same scale, so we should adopt the theory that explicitly allows that scale. We are unconvinced that direct appeals to pragmatic considerations would be worse on pragmatic grounds than an external and absolute rule like ‘always be topical.’ If topicality is as important and beneficial as Nebel says it is, then it should be easy to defend within a particular debate, avoiding the worst slippery slope scenarios. Nebel also argues that the pragmatic view “justifies debating propositions that are completely irrelevant to the resolution but are much better to debate” (1.1, para. 5). Branse makes the same claim about education: “Education as a voting issue legitimizes reading positions and debating topics that have no association with the resolution” (5, para. 3). This alarmism we’ve answered with our discussion of harmful resolutions. There is no empirical indication of a slippery slope to a world where no one discusses the topic. The disadvantages to one debate round departing from topical debate are quite small, and we have no problem biting the bullet here. Sometimes (and it may be very rare), it’s better not to debate the resolution. There may also be reasons to debate something else even when the resolution is very good. *Black students should not have to wait for a reparations topic to talk about race in America*. As conversations about racial oppression and police brutality grow louder and louder, it becomes increasingly unreasonable to defend a view of debate that ignores their relevance to the everyday lives of our students. It should be clear that the pragmatic view takes no absolute stance on topicality or burdens. A debate practice may be pragmatic in one context but not another. For that reason, we reject the narrowness of truth-testing.

#### Resolvability—cant weigh truth claims

**Mangus 8** (Mangus, Michael. UC Santa Barbara department of Communication. "Value Comparison". <http://ldtheoryjournal.blogspot.com/2008/04/value-comparison-michael-mangus.html?m=1>. 15 Apr 2008. Accessed 25 Sep 2017 SM)

3. irresolvable debates. instead of reaching a sort of strategically-skewed synthesis, these two forces instead create debates that leave judges dumbfounded. the affirmative will drop an overview that “proves” the resolution contradictory while the negative will drop a spike that “proves” the resolution tautological. if the judge is lucky, one of these arguments will somehow respond to or undermine the other and a decision can be rendered with some degree of fairness. oftentimes, however, there is no comparison between the arguments and no obvious interaction between them. even in the first case, this is not the pinnacle of substantive debate. in the latter case, it is a direct invitation for judge intervention. this is not isolated to the lower brackets of tournaments either – manyhigh-powered prelims and elimination rounds feature these strategies.

### A2 Test Spec

#### Counter interp: the affirmative must adhere to the bare plurality of “standardized tests” and defend all standardized tests.

#### [1] Textuality: “Standardized tests” can’t be specced because it’s an existential bare plural. It wouldn’t make grammatical sense.

Nebel 19 [Jake Nebel, VBriefly, "Genericity on the Standardized Tests Resolution – Briefly", August 12, 2019, https://www.vbriefly.com/2019/08/12/genericity-on-the-standardized-tests-resolution/] **Tfane23**
One might argue that “standardized tests” is a dependent plural with respect to “colleges and universities.” On this view, if the resolution were, “Colleges and universities ought to consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions,” the affirmative would not have to show that colleges and universities ought to consider multiple standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. Now, this wouldn’t necessarily mean that a single-test affirmative would be topical. I hesitate because, in our other examples of dependent plurals, each unicycle has its own wheel, and each dog has its own tail. If all colleges and universities ought to consider the same test, would it be true that colleges and universities ought to consider standardized tests? It’s not obvious to me. Again, I’d be curious to know what others think. For now I’m content to challenge the idea that plurals necessarily mean “more than one” and to raise the question for further research. For present purposes, however, these subtle distinctions don’t matter, because the resolution says “ought not.” Why does this matter? Consider again “Unicycles have wheels.” This sentence means, roughly, that each unicycle has at least one wheel (“roughly” because I’m glossing over the distinction between generic and universal for simplicity). By contrast, consider “Unicycles don’t have wheels.” This sentence means, roughly, that each unicycle has no wheels. It’s not just the logical negation of the original proposition, which would be the following: it’s not the case that, for every unicycle, there’s a wheel that it has—i.e., that some unicycle lacks a wheel. This means that, if “standardized tests” is a dependent plural with respect to “colleges and universities,” the resolution means that colleges and universities not consider any standardized tests. Compare: if the resolution were “Unicycles don’t have wheels,” they would have to argue that unicycles don’t have any wheels, not just that there are some wheels unicycles don’t have (e.g., the wheels on my car). This is because the negation of an existential statement (“it’s not the case that some do”) is a universal statement (“all of them don’t”). This is the observation about quantifier scope I made about the Jan–Feb 2019 resolution, and it applies straightforwardly to the standardized tests topic because of the “ought not” wording. So, if “Colleges and universities ought to consider standardized tests” means roughly that colleges and universities ought to consider at least one standardized test, then the sentence “Colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests” would mean roughly that colleges and universities ought to consider no standardized tests. Crucially, this argument is not specific to dependent plurals. It applies to all existential bare plurals. Consider “Mary saw zebras.” That’s true just in case Mary saw more than one zebra. It means the same thing as “Mary saw some zebras.” By contrast, “Mary didn’t see zebras” is true just in case Mary saw no zebras; it cannot be interpreted to mean merely that there are some zebras Mary didn’t see. It does not mean the same thing as “Mary didn’t see some zebras,” which at least has a reading on which it’s true as long as some of the zebras were unseen by Mary. So, if “Colleges and universities ought to consider standardized tests for undergraduate admissions decisions” means roughly that colleges and universities ought to consider more than one standardized test for undergraduate admissions decisions (or: ought to consider standardized tests for more than one undergraduate admissions decision), then “Colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests for undergraduate admissions decisions” would mean that colleges and universities ought to consider no standardized tests (or: ought to consider standardized tests for no undergraduate admissions decisions.)

#### Semantics outweighs – a] the resolution is the only stasis point of debate, making the round defy the resolution’s parameters is problematic for prep skew and b] pragmatics justifys self-serving interpretations of debate and violates objectivity in debate, which justifies judge intervention by forcing them to “gut check” your pragmatics interp.

#### Breadth over depth – a] Resource Disparity: small school debaters aren’t able to engage in a depth debate because you’ll outcard them with more evidence in the specific topic, which makes breadth the only way to allow for inclusion and b] Prep Skew: your interp is bad for you – makes it so you have to right a specific DA for all 26 standardized tests and specific sections in those tests – explodes neg prep burdens

#### Theory is a matter of norm creation – vote for the interp that upholds the best norm for debate.

### FL Rawls

#### Rawlsian society solves for anti-blackness in society – we are able to reframe ontology to allow for moral personhood for all – I read this in the UV but it’s an amazing card.

**Shelby 04** [Tommie Shelby, Fordham Law Review Volume 72 | Issue 5, "Race and Ethnicity, Race and Social Justice: Rawlsian Considerations", 2004, <https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3969&context=flr>] **Tfane23**
 **Rawls claims that moral persons have two characteristics: (1) "they are capable of having** (and are assumed to have) **a conception of their good** (as expressed by a rational plan of life)"; and **(2) "they are capable of having** (and are assumed to acquire) **a sense of justice, a normally effective desire to apply and to act upon the principles of justice, at least to a certain minimum degree**.",2' Rawls maintains that the capacity for moral personality "is a sufficient condition for being entitled to equal justice. 22 (He leaves aside the question of whether the capacity for moral personality is also a necessary condition.) No claim about the degree to which normal, adult persons embody or realize the powers of moral personality can justify unequal justice. From the standpoint of social justice, then, there is no distinction to be made between complete and incomplete moral persons, i.e., there are no sub-persons in a legitimate conception of justice. **Now not only does Rawls assume that the overwhelming majority of humankind are moral persons in his sense, but he explicitly denies that any race is without the capacity for moral personality: "There is no race or recognized group of human beings that lacks this attribute**. '23 Indeed, he urges that we simply assume that the requirement of a capacity for moral personality is always met, noting that to suppose otherwise would be imprudent, as this could 19. Mills, supra note 17, at 30-31. 20. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 3, at 112-18. 21. Id. at 442. 22. Id. (emphasis added). 23. Id. § 77, at 443. 1702 [Vol. 72 RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE lead to injustice.24 **Thus it is quite clear that, within justice as fairness, the principles of justice apply equally to all regardless of race.** The principle of equal justice regardless of race is also firmly secured in Political Liberalism, where Rawls explicitly defends a strictly political (as opposed to a metaphysical) conception of justice and a corresponding political conception of persons. **A political conception of justice aims to be, as far as possible, independent of contested and incompatible, comprehensive philosophical, moral, and religious doctrines, as these controversial views cannot form the basis for reasoned, informed, and voluntary political agreement among citizens in a democratic society.**

#### Only the difference principle solves inequality – it necessitates disproportional support for the underrepresented, which other frameworks can’t justify

**Altham 73** [J. E. J. Altham, Philosophy Vol. 48 | No. 183, "Rawl's Difference Principle", January 1973, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3749710.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A7d37e8e77f77b8fa85a7b3c3112d8df0>] **Tfane23**
In A Theory of Justicel **the difference principle plays a very important role, since the justification of social and economic inequalities is made to depend upon satisfying it.** The difference principle states that the long-run expectations of the least advantaged social group should be maximized. The application of this principle is subject to certain constraints in Rawls's theory, notably that the requirement of the most extensive equal liberties for all has priority over it. To simplify discussion, **the satisfaction of this and other constraints are taken for granted in what follows. The difference principle can be used to justify inequality in the following way: if the greater expectations of a representative man in one social group work out to the advantage of the least advantaged, then those greater expectations are consistent with justice.** For **the absence of that inequality would give the least advantaged less than the practicable maximum**, which would violate the difference principle. The application of the difference principle requires that the least ad- vantaged group be defined. Rawls (op. cit., p. 98) thinks that in doing this it is impossible to avoid a certain arbitrariness, and that it may turn out that an exact definition is unnecessary. But the difficulty is greater than he appears to realize. It can be illustrated by means of a simple example. **The difference principle is a maximin principle, directing us to make a minimum as large as possible.** Of two social schemes, that one will be preferred, from the point of view of justice, in which the long-run expecta- tions of the worst off are the best. In the table below, A, B and C stand for social groups, si and S2 for social schemes, and the numbers represent expectations.

#### Rawls is best for pluralism – it’s another reason we’re better than util.

Peter 09 [Fabienne Peter, University of Warwick, "Rawlsian Justice", 2009, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2a94/ee901f674a3c3c9250e60860a186d2f42266.pdf] **Tfane23**
Rawls’ theory of justice relies on a distinction between what is rational for individuals and what is reasonable. Persons are reasonable insofar as they recognize that, though they have good reasons to hold their own conception of the good, there are good reasons for other citizens to hold different views. Reasonable citizens accept that their society will always contain a plurality of conceptions of the good. They also accept what Rawls calls the “burdens of judgment” – a list of considerations for why reasonable disagreement over conceptions of the good is likely to persist (Rawls 1993: II, §2). In addition, by virtue of their sense of justice, persons are assumed to be willing to propose fair terms of cooperation, which guarantee fair prospects for all to pursue their respective rational advantage. The persons recognize, thanks to their capacity for a sense of justice, that the rational pursuit of their own advantage needs to be made compatible with the possibility for others to pursue their conception of the good, provided those conceptions are reasonable too. They are willing to refrain from imposing their own conception of the good upon others and will want principles of justice which are compatible with the fact of reasonable pluralism – an irreducible pluralism of reasonable comprehensive conceptions of the good. Utilitarianism reduces the reasonable – reasons that refer to the regulation of the individual pursuit of a good life through cooperative arrangements – to the rational – reasons that refer to the individual pursuit of a good life. In the theory of justice as fairness, by contrast, the reasonable is an independent idea. Reasonable persons in Rawls’ sense “are not moved by the general good as such but desire for its own sake a 6 world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can accept” (Rawls 1993: 50). His idea of cooperation thus entails an idea of fair cooperation; it is based on reciprocity. Reciprocity refers to generally recognized rules which secure everybody an adequate share of the benefits produced through cooperation. As such, Rawls’ idea of fair cooperation has to be distinguished from an idea of mutual advantage, which demands that everyone gains from cooperation. A conception of justice that specifies fair terms of cooperation respects and ensures equal liberties for the citizens to develop and pursue their reasonable conceptions of the good. According to Rawls, this idea of cooperation not only distinguishes justice as fairness from utilitarianism and mutual advantage theories. There is also an important difference between justice as fairness and the libertarian approach here. Libertarianism tends to view cooperative schemes as voluntary associations – and deflects demands for more equality with reference to the voluntariness of such schemes. Justice as fairness, by contrast, treats membership in society as involuntary – given by birth and where exit is, in what concerns justice, not an option. Citizens have, qua membership in this cooperation, a right to the benefits produced

#### The difference principle doesn’t ignore basic rights and liberties.

Peter 09 [Fabienne Peter, University of Warwick, "Rawlsian Justice", 2009, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2a94/ee901f674a3c3c9250e60860a186d2f42266.pdf] **Tfane23**
The second principle is divided into two parts. The first part is called the principle of fair equality of opportunity and the second the difference principle. Fair equality of opportunity contrasts with merely formal equality. Formal equality of opportunity is satisfied if there are no discriminating legal barriers that bar some groups in society from access to social institutions. Fair equality of opportunity is more demanding. It requires that no factual social barriers exist which make access dependent upon the social and economic position. According to Rawls (1971: 73): [T]hose who are at the same level of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social system, that is, irrespective of the income class into which they are born. In all sectors of society there should be roughly equal prospects of culture and achievement for everyone similarly motivated and endowed. The expectations of those with the same abilities and aspirations should not be affected by their social class. Rawls argues that, from the point of view of the original position, it is reasonable to want to impose the principles of equality of basic liberties and rights and of fair equality of opportunity on the basic structure. Prevented from knowledge of one's social position, abilities and talents and preferences, citizens who view themselves as free and equal have no reason to depart in these fundamental matters from the position of equality that characterizes the original position. Looking at it the other way around, the set-up of the original position provides a rationale for selecting egalitarian principles of justice that aim at dissociating the prospects citizens face from their social endowments. In spite of this egalitarian commitment, Rawls also emphasizes that some economic and social inequalities are justifiable. The question is which and the difference principle, the second part of the second principle of justice, answers this question. This well13 known principle demands that the basic structure of society should be organized so as to admit social and economic inequalities to the extent that they are beneficial to the least advantaged group. It allows deviations from the situation of equal liberty that characterizes the original position insofar as these deviations allow for a more productive scheme of cooperation that leaves the least advantaged group better off than it would be were the basic structure set up so as to preserve absolute equality. Given a range of possibilities for how to design the institutions of the basic structure, the difference principle says that the institutional arrangement which maximizes the prospects of the least advantaged group. What the difference principle rules out is a basic structure which grants greater benefits for more advantaged groups while worsening the prospects of the least advantaged group The principles are ordered lexicographically. The first principle of justice has priority over the second and the principle of fair equality of opportunity has priority over the difference principle.12 This implies that the equality of basic liberties and rights, including the fair value of the political liberties, is not to be overridden by other considerations. Furthermore, the difference principle has to be interpreted as applying to an environment where the lexicographically prior principles are already in place. The social and economic inequalities that the difference principle might justify are those that do not undermine the equality of basic rights and liberties and principle of fair equality of opportunities. Finally, the lexicographic structure also implies that in social evaluation, the principles of justice taken together have priority over other considerations – for example over considerations of maximum welfare or efficiency.

#### Justice is contextual – it takes into consideration the circumstances of the situation to which it is applied and is used as such. This solves particularism.

Buckley 12 [Michael Buckley, Ethics and Global Politics Vol. 5 | No. 2 pp. 71-94, "Justice in Context: assessing contextualism as an approach to justice ", 2012, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.3402/egp.v5i2.8970] **Tfane23**
In contrast to ‘universalist’ approaches to justice, which view principles as both justified independently of their context of application and universally applicable to all contexts, contextualism treats diverse political issues in terms of their unique contextual features rather than systematically as part of\*and answered in terms of\*an overarching theory of justice.5 It does this by ‘tracing systematic links between principles of justice and their contexts of application,’ and by exposing an ‘underlying logic that we can both grasp and use as a critical tool to assess prevailing conceptions of justice at any particular moment.’ 6 As a result, contextualism interprets the relationship between facts and principles as interdependent or mutually supportive. Miller thinks that contextualism is intuitively appealing insofar as people tend to think a just or unjust action depends on the circumstances of the situation.7 In addition, it accommodates a plurality of principles, which he again believes is appealing insofar as it explains the persistence of diverse moral judgments across various political issues. And finally, contextualism supports the idea that different principles of justice are rationally justified in virtue of their being tethered, but not reduced, to facts. Consequently, contextualism comprises a number of related positions that bear on the relationship between facts and principles: it is a piecemeal, pluralistic approach that avoids intuitionism, relativism, and reductionism by defending normative judgments in terms of a link between principles and factual circumstances. Miller frames his defense of contextualism in general terms, prompting the need for further evaluative scrutiny, which he invites. This paper takes up his invitation. Following Thomas Pogge, it begins by defending the claim that Miller’s general view is best labeled critical contextualism. 8 Critical contextualism traces systematic links between principles of justice and their contexts of application, as noted earlier, but makes clear what seems implicit in Miller’s position, namely, that the delineation of contexts must also be justified. In the absence of further justification, moral disputes over principles slip too easily into disputes over competing contextual descriptions. If one person defends a particular response to global poverty by reference to context A, and another defends a different response by reference to context B, then it is difficult to see how references to contexts are anything but normative disputes themselves. Ideally, critical contextualism can resolve the normative dispute by encompassing a non-normative defense of the context. As Miller puts it, ‘clashes of principle will not, in general occur, once the context in which the distributive decision in question is being made is properly specified.’ 9

#### The resolution asks a normative question in regard to education – Rawls’ form of distributive justice uniquely applies.

Beattie 82 [Catherine Beattie, Canadian Journal of Education, "Rawls and the Distribution of Education", 1982, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1494694.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A332d3be28d6ef4eaa9d611e60866af13] **Tfane23**
expense of the least well off (see pp. 78-79). Suppose we consider the educational system from kindergarten to post-secondary education. Clearly spending per student increases as you ascend the educational ladder, and those who pass to the top will enjoy the higher incomes and satisfactions available in society. The question is: are these fortunates at the same time raising the quality and material standard of life enjoyed by those who leave school very early, and who therefore absorb a smaller proportion of educational resources and presumably constitute the less favoured group, both socially and economically? The other question to be considered, prior to deciding on this issue, is whether the educational system provides students of differing backgrounds with a fair opportunity to climb the educational ladder and ultimately obtain the positions of power and wealth. Let's get a bit clearer on who the least favoured are and how their expectations are to be assessed. The worst off, says Rawls, are those "with the least authority and lowest income" (p. 94). Having picked them out, their expectations are to be determined by the index of primary goods This content downloaded from 204.129.232.189 on Thu, 29 Aug 2019 00:36:34 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 44 CATHERINE BEATTIE they may hope to enjoy. These include rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth and, most important, self-esteem (see P. 94). The first task as I said, is to decide what is required to ensure fair equality of opportunity. Meeting this objective is not construed as requiring equality of achievement or indeed any attempt to counteract differences in family background. As Rawls puts it, "the principle of fair equality of opportunity can be only imperfectly carried out, at least as long as the institution of the family exists" (p. 74). Tuition-free compulsory education up to age 16, along with financial support for able students who wish to go to university or college, would seem sufficient to meet the first requirement of the second principle. Since Rawls construes equal educational opportunity in terms of equality within ability groups, a testing system is needed to sort students into groups of comparable talent and motivation. Rawls' account, it seems, can be used to justify current allocations for basic services at all levels of education. Yet we must also consider the differentials in expenditures on groups identified in terms of expecta-tions. This seems to boil down to the question of what ratio of dollars is to be given to the most favoured as compared to the less favoured. Our least favoured are, remember, those generally of low authority and power. Now Rawls seems to assume that generally those of low ability constitute this class. (Obvious exceptions would be recent immigrants, and presumably they have to be considered a special case.) At present, it seems clear, more resources go to the favoured than to those of lowest expectations. Should proportionally even more go to them? If the system is just, but not perfectly just, it seems that to do so could lead either to a system closer to perfection (i.e., optimally good for all segments of society), or to an unjust one, that is one which depressed the expectations of the least well off while enhancing the expectations of the best off (see pp. 78-79). It follows that if the system is just at present, then the only legitimate shift in allocations would increase the proportion of resources going to the able or upper end of the educational system. If the system is at present unjust, then a reduction in the expectations of the best off would lead to an improvement for the less well off and the proportion of resources going to the less well off should be increased. It at least appears that Rawls has built a bias favourable to the most able into the concept of perfect just

### FL Offense

#### [1] They miss the point of the advantage – we don’t critique the accessibility factor of the test but rather the structure of the exam itself. We need to rid the consideration of the tests from admission decisions so that the structure of racism within the test won’t be projected into higher education.

#### [2] AND, we don’t need to abolish tests to make them moot. The SAT suite, AP exams, and ACT were all designed to factor into admissions decisions. By making them unable to be considered, the tests have no purpose.

#### Standardized tests are racist

Singer 19 (Steven, educational advocate who writes for Common Dreams, “Standardized Testing is a Tool of White Supremacy”, published in Common Dreams on April 6, 2019, https://www.commondreams.org/views/2019/04/06/standardized-testing-tool-white-supremacy) [Premier]

Let’s say you punched me in the face. I wouldn’t like it. I’d protest. I’d complain. And then you might apologize and say it was just an accident. Maybe I’d believe you. Until the next time when we met and you punched me again. That’s the problem we, as a society, have with standardized tests. We keep using them to justify treating students of color as inferior and/or subordinate to white children. And we never stop or even bothered to say, “I’m sorry.” Fact: [black kids don’t score as high on standardized tests as white kids](https://www.educationnext.org/americas-mediocre-test-scores-education-poverty-crisis/). It’s [called the racial achievement gap](https://gadflyonthewallblog.com/2018/11/16/why-is-there-a-racial-achievement-gap/) and it’s been going on for nearly a century. Today [we’re told that it means our public schools are deficient.](https://gadflyonthewallblog.com/2017/01/29/u-s-public-schools-are-not-failing-theyre-among-the-best-in-the-world/) There’s something more they need to be doing. But if [this phenomenon has been happening for nearly 100 years](https://www.educationnext.org/achievement-gap-fails-close-half-century-testing-shows-persistent-divide/), is it really a product of today’s public schools or a product of the testing that identifies it in the first place? After all, teachers and schools have changed. They [no longer educate children today the same way they did in the 1920s](https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/culture-magazines/1920s-education-overview)when the first large scale standardized tests were given to students in the U.S. There are no more one-room schoolhouses. Kids can’t drop out at 14. Children with special needs aren’t kept in the basement or discouraged from attending school. Moreover, none of the educators and administrators on the job during the Jazz Age are still working. Instead, [we have robust buildings serving increasingly larger and more diverse populations](https://gadflyonthewallblog.com/2017/09/15/top-10-reasons-public-schools-are-the-best-choice-for-children-parents-communities/). Students stay in school until at least 18. Children with special needs are included with their peers and given a multitude of services to meet their educational needs. And that’s to say nothing of the innovations in technology, pedagogy and restorative justice discipline policies. But [standardized testing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standardized_test)? That hasn’t really changed all that much. It still reduces complex processes down to a predetermined set of only four possible answers—a recipe good for guessing what a test-maker wants more than expressing a complex answer about the real world. It still attempts to produce [a bell curve of scores](http://apa.nyu.edu/hauntedfiles/race-and-intelligence-the-bell-curve-20-years-later/) so that so many test takers fail, so many pass, so many get advanced scores, etc. [It still judges correct and incorrect by reference to a predetermined standard of how a preconceived “typical” student would respond.](https://gadflyonthewallblog.com/2016/10/26/standardizing-whiteness-the-essential-racism-of-standardized-testing/) Considering [how and why such assessments were created in the first place](https://gadflyonthewallblog.com/2016/04/05/standardized-tests-have-always-been-about-keeping-people-in-their-place/), the presence of a racial achievement gap should not be surprising at all. That’s the result these tests were originally created to find. Modern testing comes out of Army IQ tests developed during World War I. In 1917, a [group of psychologists led by Robert M. Yerkes, president of the American Psychological Association (APA), created the Army Alpha and Beta tests](https://www.teenvogue.com/story/the-history-of-the-sat-is-mired-in-racism-and-elitism). These were [specifically designed to measure the intelligence of recruits](http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095424949)and help the military distinguish those of “superior mental ability” from those who were “mentally inferior.” These assessments were based on explicitly [eugenicist](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eugenics_in_the_United_States) foundations—the idea that certain races were distinctly superior to others. In 1923, one of the men who developed these intelligence tests, Carl Brigham, took these ideas further in his seminal work [A Study of American Intelligence](http://www.archive.org/stream/studyofamericani00briguoft/studyofamericani00briguoft_djvu.txt). In it, he used data gathered from these IQ tests to argue the following: The decline of American intelligence will be more rapid than the decline of the intelligence of European national groups, owing to the presence here of the negro. These are the plain, if somewhat ugly, facts that our study shows. The deterioration of American intelligence is not inevitable, however, if public action can be aroused to prevent it. Thus, Yerkes and Brigham’s [pseudoscientific tests were used to justify Jim Crow laws, segregation, and even lynchings](https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2004/feb/06/race.usa). Anything for “racial purity.” People [took this research very seriously](http://www.rougeforum.org/newspaper/fall1999/Social_Control.htm). States passed forced sterilization laws for people with “defective” traits, [preventing between 60,000 and 70,000 people](http://mentalfloss.com/article/27029/frightening-history-eugenics-america) from “polluting” America’s ruling class. The practice was even upheld by the [U.S. Supreme Court](https://www.democracynow.org/2016/3/17/buck_v_bell_inside_the_scotus) in the 1927 [Buck v. Bell](http://www.eugenicsarchive.org/html/eugenics/static/themes/39.html) decision. Justices decided that mandatory sterilization of “feeble-minded” individuals was, in fact, constitutional. Of the ruling, which has never been explicitly overturned, [Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oliver_Wendell_Holmes_Jr.) wrote: “It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. ...Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”  Eventually [Brigham took his experience with Army IQ tests to create a new assessment for the College Board](https://gadflyonthewallblog.com/2016/03/15/blinded-by-pseudoscience-standardized-testing-is-modern-day-eugenics/)—the Scholastic Aptitude Test—now known as the [Scholastic Assessment Test or SAT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SAT). It was first given to high school students in 1926 as a gatekeeper. Just as the Army intelligence tests were designed to distinguish the superior from the inferior, the SAT was designed to predict which students would do well in college and which would not. It was meant to show which students should be given the chance at a higher education and which should be left behind. And unsurprisingly it has always—and continues to—privilege white students over children of color. The [SAT remains a tool for ensuring white supremacy](https://www.fairtest.org/act-biased-inaccurate-and-misused)that is essentially partial and unfair—just as its designers always meant it to be. Moreover, it is the model by which all other high stakes standardized tests are designed. But [Brigham was not alone in smuggling eugenicist ideals into the education field](https://indyweek.com/news/american-eugenics-movement-world-war-ii-part-1-3/). These ideas dominated pedagogy and psychology for generations until after World War II when their similarity to the Nazi philosophy we had just defeated in Europe dimmed their exponents’ enthusiasm. Another major eugenicist who made a lasting impact on education was [Lewis Terman](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lewis_Terman), Professor of Education at Stanford University and originator of the Stanford-Binet intelligence test. In his highly influential 1916 textbook, [The Measurement of Intelligence](http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/20662?msg=welcome_stranger) he wrote: Among laboring men and servant girls there are thousands like them [feebleminded individuals]. They are the world’s “hewers of wood and drawers of water.” And yet, as far as intelligence is concerned, the tests have told the truth. …No amount of school instruction will ever make them intelligent voters or capable voters in the true sense of the word. ...The fact that one meets this type with such frequency among Indians, Mexicans, and negroes suggests quite forcibly that the whole question of racial differences in mental traits will have to be taken up anew and by experimental methods. Children of this group should be segregated in special classes and be given instruction which is concrete and practical. They cannot master, but they can often be made efficient workers, able to look out for themselves. There is no possibility at present of convincing society that they should not be allowed to reproduce, although from a eugenic point of view they constitute a grave problem because of their unusually prolific breeding (91-92). This was the original [justification for academic tracking](https://gadflyonthewallblog.com/2014/09/07/tracking-testing-and-the-myth-of-meritocracy/). Terman and other educational psychologists convinced many schools to use high-stakes and culturally-biased tests to place “slow” students into special classes or separate schools while placing more advanced students of European ancestry into the college preparatory courses.

#### Standardized testing is a tool designed to “scientifically justify” systemic oppression

Thomas 17 P.L. Thomas , professor of education (Furman University, Greenville, SC), is author of Beware the Roadbuilders and Trumplandia (Garn Press). Oct 09, 2017. Huffington Post. The Lingering, Powerful Legacy Of “Scientific Racism” In America. <https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-lingering-and-powerful-legacy-of-scientific_b_59d0d76ee4b0f58902e5cd14> [Premier]

Writing about the class of 2017’s performance on the newly redesigned SAT, [Catherine Gewertz notes](http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2017/09/25/new-sat-yields-higher-scores-but-dont.html), “The number of students taking the SAT has hit an all-time high,” and adds cautiously: What appear to be big scoring increases should be understood not as sudden jumps in achievement, but as reflections of the differences in the test and the score scale, psychometricians said. More test takers and higher scores, albeit misleading ones, are the opening discussion about one of the most enduring fixtures of U.S. education ― standardized testing as gatekeeping for college entrance, scholarships, and scholastic eligibility. However, buried about in the middle of Gewertz’s article, we discover another enduring reality: The 2017 SAT scores show inequities similar to those of earlier years. Asian (1181), white (1118), and multiracial (1103) students score far above the average composite score of 1060, while Hispanic (990) and African-American (941) students score significantly below it. Throughout its long history, the SAT, like all standardized testing, has reflected tremendous gaps along race, social class, and gender lines; notable, for example, is the powerful correlation between SAT scores and takers’ parental income and level of education as well as the fact that males have had higher average scores than females for the math and verbal sections [every year of SAT testing](https://www.alternet.org/education/what-sat-good-absolutely-nothing) (the only glitch in that being the years the SAT included a writing section). The SAT is but one example of the lingering and powerful legacy of [“scientific racism”](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/25/opinion/white-collar-supremacy.html) in the U.S. [Tom Buchanan](https://radicalscholarship.wordpress.com/2017/09/26/the-vast-carelessness-of-white-america/), in F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, punctuates his racist outbursts with “It’s all scientific stuff; it’s been proved.” Buchanan represents the ugly and rarely confronted relationship between “scientific” and “objective” with race, social class, and gender bigotry. In short, science has often been and continues to be tainted by bias that serves the dominant white and wealthy patriarchy. Experimental and quasi-experimental research along with so-called standardized testing tends to avoid being implicated in not only identifying racism, classism, and sexism, but also [perpetuating social inequity](http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/3067-poverty-and-testing-in-education-%E2%80%9Cthe-present-scientificolegal-complex%E2%80%9D). As I noted recently, since Carol Dweck and Angela Duckworth have produced mainstream scientific studies and published in reputable peer-reviewed journals, their inherently biased work has been nearly universally embraced ― among the exact elites who tend to ignore or outright reject the realities of inequity and injustice. As just one example, Duckworth [grounded her work in and continues to cite a Eugenicist,](http://speedchange.blogspot.com/2014/03/angela-duckworths-eugenics-university.html) [Francis Galton](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francis_Galton), with little or no consequences. Racism, classism, and sexism are themselves built on identifying deficits within identifiable populations. Science allows these corrupt ideologies to appear factual, instead of simple bigotry. “Scientific” and “objective” are convenient Teflon for bias and bigotry; they provide cover for elites who want evidence they have earned their success, despite incredible evidence that success and failure are more strongly correlated with the coincidences of birth ― race, social class, gender. It takes little effort to imagine a contemporary Tom pointing to the 2017 SAT data and arguing, “It’s all scientific stuff; it’s been proved.” Such ham-fisted scientism, however, mutes the deeper message that SAT data is a marker for all sorts of inequity in the U.S. And then when that data have the power to determine college entrance and scholarships, the SAT also perpetuates the exact inequities it measures. The SAT sits in a long tradition including [IQ testing](https://www.amazon.com/Mismeasure-Man-Revised-Expanded/dp/0393314251/) that speaks to a jumbled faith in the U.S. for certain kinds of [numbers](https://www.peterlang.com/view/product/69807) and so-called science; when the data and the science reinforce our basest beliefs, we embrace, but when data and science go against out sacred gods, we refute (think climate change and evolution). Science that is skeptical and critical, questioning and interrogating, has much to offer humanity. But science continues to be plagued by human frailties such as bias. Science, like history, is too often written by the winners, the oppressors. As a result, Foucault details, “[I]t is the individual as he[/she] may be described, judged, measured, compared with others, in his[/her] very individuality; and it is also the individual who has to be trained or corrected, classified, normalized, excluded, etc.” [1] “Scientific racism,” as a subset of science that normalizes bigotry, allows the accusatory white gaze to remain on groups that are proclaimed inherently flawed, deficient, in need of correction. “Scientific racism” distracts us from realizing that the tests and science themselves are the problem. And thus, we must abandon seeking ever-new tests, such as revising the SAT, and begin the hard work of addressing why the gaps reflected in the tests exist—a “why” that is not nested in any group but our society and its powerful elite. [1] Foucault, M. (1984). [The Foucault reader](http://www.amazon.com/Foucault-Reader-Michel/dp/0394713400). Ed. P. Rabinow. New York: Pantheon Books, p. 203.

#### SAT test-question selection is racially biased – it produces and reproduces racialized outcomes.

**Au 18**

Wayne Au (a professor in the School of Educational Studies and interim dean of diversity and equity and chief diversity officer at the University of Washington Bothell. He is also a longtime editor of the social- just ice teaching magazine, Rethinking Schools. His newest book, A Marxist Education: Learning to Change the World, will be published with Haymarket Books later this spring.), ”The Socialist Case Against the SAT”, Jacobin, 4/14/18, hĴps://jacobinmag.com/2018/04/against-the-sat-testing-meritocracy-race-class

 **It also turns out that the process of SAT test-question selection is flawed in racially biased ways.** When the SAT tries out new questions, unbeknownst to students, they put these questions in a special trial section of the test. If a test-taker gets the trial test ques- tion correct and goes onto score high on the SAT overall, then the question is deemed a valid and good question and gets included in a future test — all because it is the kind of question that a high SAT test-scorer gets correct. This means that **the SAT** is popu- lated by questions that high-scoring SAT takers answer correctly. The problem is that this process **creates a self-reinforcing cycle of race and class inequality.** A 2003 study by Kidder and Rosner published in the Santa Clara Law Review found racist outcomes in the SAT test-question selection: there were trial **SAT questions where blacks got the right answer more often than whites,** and where Latinos got the right answer more of- ten than whites. However, these questions, where the typical racial outcomes of the SAT were inverted, **were deemed invalid as real questions for use in future tests. Because their paĴern of correct responses didn’t match the overall paĴerns among individual SAT test-takers. The black** and Latino students **who got those trial questions right more often than the white students, didn’t outscore the white students overall.** Writing in the Nation, Rosner explained: Each individual SAT question ETS chooses is required to parallel outcomes of the test overall. So, if high-scoring test-takers — who are more likely to be white — tend to answer the question correctly in [experimental] pretesting, it’s a worthy SAT question; if not, it’s thrown out. Race and ethnicity are not considered explicitly, but **racially disparate scores drive question selection, which in turn reproduces racially disparate test results in an internally reinforcing cycle.** In this sense **the SAT is a textbook example of** what race scholar Eduardo Bonilla-Silva calls **colorblind racism.** Officially **it is race neutral, but empirically it produces and reproduces racialized outcomes. In this context it is important to remember that the SAT is designed to sort and stratify human populations.** The SAT is a norm-referenced test. This means its primary purpose is to sort and rank students in comparison to each other — estab- lishing a “norm” for performance and demarcating who is above and below this norm. Consequently, the SAT is designed to produce a “bell curve” of test scores, where some score high, a bunch land in the middle, and some score low. The bell-curve assump- tion built into the SAT extends directly from the eugenics movement: It presumes that intelligence is naturally distributed across human populations unequally. Within this frame a good test not only requires that a portion of students to fail, it also mirrors this presumed “natural” distribution of human intelligence. In this way, **the SAT is required to produce inequality, not equality. In a racist, capitalist system, that the SAT unequally stratifies human populations by race and class** should come as no surprise.

#### Standardized tests are not the benign form of aptitude measurement that the education systems make them out to be, but rather are a complex form of social control that reproduces status quo relations by setting certain students about for failure in order to maintain the racial disparities of the status quo.

Au 09 Wayne ( PH.D Curriculum & Instruction Curriculum Theory major, Education Policy Studies minor, University of Wisconsin, Madison.) Unequal by design: high-stakes testing and the standardization of inequality| zH

Promoters of federal education policy assert that high-stakes testing leads to increased achievement (Ravitch, 2002a) and that “No Child Left Behind Is Working” (U.S. Department of Education, 2006, original emphasis). These promoters argue that student achievement is improving generally and that achievement gaps between Whites and other students are closing because of high-stakes testing used in policies like NCLB. However, such arguments do not necessarily match the data. Analyses of NCLB have found that the high-stakes testing has not improved reading and math achievement across states and has not significantly narrowed national and state level achievement gaps between White students and students of color nor gaps between rich and poor students (J. Lee, 2006; Mathis, 2006). Additionally, studies which compare test score results of the Texas high-stakes testing system (the blueprint for NCLB) with four other standardized tests commonly taken by students in Texas and nationally—the American College Test (ACT), the Scholastic Achievement Test (SAT), the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), and the Advanced Placement (AP) test—fi nds that the Texas high-stakes testing in early grades either was indeterminate, had no impact, or had a negative impact on student achievement in relation to the other tests. Th us, the implementation of high-stakes testing in Texas could not be shown to improve learning (Amrein & Berliner, 2002b; Nichols, Glass, & Berliner, 2006).1 These findings correlate with other research nationally (Harris & Herrington, 2004) and raise the question of the overall eff ectiveness of high-stakes tests in improving achievement generally. If the correlation between high-stakes testing and increased learning is questionable, empirically unproven, and possibly even false, what does this indicate about the validity of using such testing to measure learning, teaching eff ectiveness, as well as to allocate fi nancial sanctions? First and foremost, it may indicate that the tests themselves are not valid. For instance, in their research on the statistical validity of standardized high-stakes tests, Kane and Staiger (2002) found that between 50% to 80% of any change in individual test scores from year to year and test to test occurs due to completely random factors. Th is means that 50% to 80% of any improvement or decline in individual test scores may be due to any number of randomly occurring events— whether a child taking a test ate breakfast that morning, population changes from year to year, who was in attendance the day the test was taken, who was proctoring that test, whether or not a dog was barking outside of the school window, the physical conditions of the space where the test is being taken, and so on. Other research has also found that the testing industry does not have the infrastructure necessary to keep up with the enormous technical and administrative demands created by NCLB’s high-stakes testing provisions, which has lead to many widely reported scoring errors (Toch, 2006), and that some districts, principals, teachers, and students are cheating on the tests in response to the immense pressures created by the high-stakes policies (Nichols & Berliner, 2005), thus raising further questions about test-score validity in general. Putting this evidence together with the fact that it is a statistical impossibility for all students to reach 100% profi ciency on high-stakes tests (DarlingHammond, 2007; Linn, 2003), in part because standardized test require that a certain percentage of students fail in order to be considered valid and reliable (Popham, 2001) and in part because bias can be structured into test criterion and test question language, and considering that it is also financially impossible to reach 100% proficiency on the tests since the monetary investment curve increases exponentially the closer one approaches 100% proficiency (Haas, Wilson, Cobb, & Rallis, 2005), it seems more than reasonable to question the use of these tests to make important decisions regarding the lives of children, teachers, administrators, and their communities. If the tests do not necessarily measure learning, then, what do they do? Based on the evidence and analysis presented in this book, they sort human populations along socially, culturally, and economically determined lines. Madaus and Horn (2000) speak to the elitism that is oft en involved with testing when they state: In addition to the basic proposition that testing is a technology, there is an additional characteristic of technologies that must be recognized and addressed. It is that technological endeavours tend to be directed by elites who isolate themselves from those who are not members of that elite... (p. 52) From this vantage, high stakes testing can be seen as a form of regulated elitism (Gibson, 2001), where, on the most basic level, there is an extremely close correlation between high standardized test scores and the wealth of students’ parents and grandparents (Sacks, 1999). Th is may be a vulgar assertion, but based on the available evidence regarding the achievement gaps between rich and poor students and between White students and students of color, high-stakes tests are incredibly effi cient at sorting for race and economic class in the United States. Indeed, as I noted earlier, this outcome demonstrates a remarkable affi nity to the outcomes of the I.Q. tests associated with the eugenics and social effi ciency movements of the early 20th century. Th us, De Lissovoy and McLaren (2003) may not be overreaching when they assert that: If the main tool of accountability initiatives, the norm-referenced standardized test, is racist…in its use, and if these initiatives are touted both as a means of restructuring schools and understanding the truth of what goes on in them, then what is confronted in this [standardized testing] movement is really a large-scale staging of the failure of students of colour. In other words, it is not simply that students of colour compete on an unequal playing field. Th e field is more than unequal. In fact, the fi eld is constructed so that the responses of these students will come to constitute what is called failure. (p. 135, original emphasis)

#### Standardized Tests further stereotypes and notions that underprivileged students are less intelligent, less hard working and less deserving of higher education/jobs

**AAPF** (The African American Policy Forum “Standardized Testing” No Date, <http://aapf.org/standardized-testing>)

Standardized tests often measure knowledge of literature, language, or concepts that white students are more likely to have been exposed to both through better funded educational environments and through participation in white culture, particularly among those with more class privilege (i.e. middle and upper class students). Studies of cultural bias also indicate that school curriculum is heavily geared towards racially dominant norms, and that students are more resistant to learning material that contains negative cultural stereotypes or alternately that ignores or under-represents their own cultures. As a consequence white students will often feel more “at home” in areas like social studies, history, and English or literature, particularly if they have not been taught using “multicultural” or culturally inclusive content. Standardized Tests Measure Educational Privilege More Than Intelligence or Potential Aside from the problems of stereotype threat, barriers to testing for students with disabilities, and cultural bias, a major criticism of standardized testing focuses on what it measures: the extent to which a student has already acquired knowledge through education. Poor schooling, or “educational disparities” (inequalities in education based on race or other categories), result in students getting less individual attention from teachers, having fewer learning aids such as computers, games, field trips, or other resources, out of date textbooks, and often facing more discipline or policing in schools. All of these may result in students acquiring less knowledge or skills, because they are not well taught or get fewer options for learning. Therefore although standardized tests may measure differences in intelligence or learning between students who actually have the same resources and backgrounds, on the large scale, what they measure best is who has had access to higher or lower quality education. As a way to measure the success or failure of schools, they may be useful – for instance, if female students or students of color as a group are performing poorly, then that tells us that educational discrimination is continuing. However, they are instead used to judge or evaluate students as learners and individuals – whether they should be allowed to advance, graduate, or go to college. As a consequence, they become part of the pattern by which under-privileged students are reframed as less intelligent, or less hard-working, and less deserving of higher education or employment opportunity.

#### Structural barriers in the test create a reinforcing cycle of racism and entrench discriminatory structures in society.

Rosales 18 [John Rosales, National Education Association, "NEA - The Racist Beginnings of Standardized Testing", 2018, http://www.nea.org/home/73288.htm] **Tfane23**
Biased Testing from the Start Brigham’s Ph.D. dissertation, written in 1916, “Variable Factors in the Binet Tests,” analyzed the work of the French psychologist Alfred Binet, who developed intelligence tests as diagnostic tools to detect learning disabilities. The Stanford psychologist Lewis Terman relied on Binet’s work to produce today’s standard IQ test, the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Tests. During World War I, standardized tests helped place 1.5 million soldiers in units segregated by race and by test scores. The tests were scientific yet they remained deeply biased, according to researchers and media reports. In 1917, Terman and a group of colleagues were recruited by the American Psychological Association to help the Army develop group intelligence tests and a group intelligence scale. Army testing during World War I ignited the most rapid expansion of the school testing movement. By 1918, there were more than 100 standardized tests, developed by different researchers to measure achievement in the principal elementary and secondary school subjects. The U.S. Bureau of Education reported in 1925 that intelligence and achievement tests were increasingly used to classify students at all levels. The first SAT was administered in 1926 to more than 8,000 students, 40 percent of them female. The original test lasted 90 minutes and consisted of 315 questions focused on vocabulary and basic math. “Unlike the college boards, the SAT is designed primarily to assess aptitude for learning rather than mastery of subjects already learned,” according to Erik Jacobsen, a New Jersey writer and math-physics teacher based at Newark Academy in Livingston, N.J. “For some college officials, an aptitude test, which is presumed to measure intelligence, is appealing since at this time (1926) intelligence and ethnic origin are thought to be connected, and therefore the results of such a test could be used to limit the admissions of particularly undesirable ethnicities.” By 1930, multiple-choice tests were firmly entrenched in U.S. schools. The rapid spread of the SAT sparked debate along two lines. Some critics viewed the multiple-choice format as encouraging memorization and guessing. Others examined the content of the questions and reached the conclusion that the tests were racist. Eventually, Brigham adapted the Army test for use in college admissions, and his work began to interest interested administrators at Harvard University. Starting in 1934, Harvard adopted the SAT to select scholarship recipients at the school. Many institutions of higher learning soon followed suit. Since the beginning of standardized testing, students of color, particularly those from low-income families, have suffered the most from high-stakes testing in U.S. public schools. Decades of research demonstrate that African-American, Latino, and Native American students, as well as students from some Asian groups, experience bias from standardized tests administered from early childhood through college. Assessment By the 1950s and 1960s, top U.S. universities were talent-searching for the “brainy kids,” regardless of ethnicity, states Jerome Karabel in “The Chosen: The Hidden History of Admission and Exclusion at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton.” This dictum among universities to identify the brightest students as reflected by test scores did not bode well for students from communities of color, who were—as a result of widespread bias in testing—disproportionately failing state or local high school graduation exams, according to the National Center for Fair and Open Testing, also known as FairTest. The center addresses issues related to accuracy in student test taking and scoring, while working to eliminate racial, class, gender, and cultural barriers posed by standardized tests. According to Fair Test research, on average, students of color score lower on college admissions tests, thus many capable youth are denied entrance or access to so-called “merit” scholarships, contributing to the huge racial gap in college enrollments and completion. High stakes testing also causes additional damage to some students who are categorized as English language learners (ELLs). The tests are often inaccurate for ELLs, according to FairTest, leading to misplacement or retention. ELLs are, alongside students with disabilities, those least likely to pass graduation tests.  African-Americans, especially males, are disproportionately placed or misplaced in special education, frequently based on test results. In effect, the use of high-stakes testing perpetuates racial inequality through the emotional and psychological power of the tests over the test takers, according to FairTest.

### FL Solvency

**Secondary Solvency Advocate: Viera 18**, Mariana, “The History of the SAT Is Mired in Racism and Elitism”, teenVogue, 10/1/18, [https://www.teenvogue.com/story/the-history-of-the-sat-is-mired-in-racism-and-elitism](https://www.teenvogue.com/story/the-history-of-the-sat-is-mired-in-racism-and-elitism%20)

“**Compare two** 1998 **SAT verbal** [section] **sentence-completion items** with similar themes: **The item correctly answered by more blacks than whites was discarded** by [the Educational Testing Service] (ETS), **whereas the item that has a higher disparate impact against blacks became part of the actual SAT**. On one of the items, which was of medium difficulty, 62% of whites and 38% of African-Americans answered correctly, resulting in a large impact of 24%...On this second item, 8% more African-Americans than whites answered correctly...”

In essence, **questions for future tests were deemed “good questions” if they replicated the outcomes of previous exams**; specifically, **tests where black and Latinx students scored lower than their white peers**. Test-makers might argue that race was not explicitly used to determine which questions would be included, but **the method used was inherently racist and biased toward knowledge held by white students**. Beyond the issue of affirming whiteness as a marker of neutrality — as questions are deemed to be good when white students do well on them — the SAT is **mired in a long history of racism, classism, and nativism.**

#### The abolition of standardized testing empirically increases racial diversity and applicant pool quality. Allows Colleges look at many other applicant facets over standardized testing. Without abolition, underrepresented groups remain underrepresented groups struggling for admission.

Perez 04 [CHRISTINA PEREZ (University Testing Reform Advocate, FairTest), “Reassessing College Admissions: Examining Tests and Admitting Alternatives” published in Rethinking the SAT: The Future of Standardized Testing in University Admissions by Rebecca Zwick (researcher in educational assessment and psychometrics. She is a professor emeritus in the Gevirtz Graduate School of Education at the University of California, Santa Barbara), 2004, https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9780203463932/chapters/10.4324/9780203463932-24]

Colleges and universities that have dropped or sharply restricted the use of the SAT I and ACT are widely pleased with the results. Regardless of size or selectivity, these institutions have seen substantial benefits, including increased student diversity, more and better-prepared applicants, and positive reactions from alumni, students, guidance counselors, and the public. Test-optional colleges and universities have not experienced particular difficulties recruiting and selecting their entering classes. Without the SAT I or ACT, how can colleges and universities select a talented pool of applicants? Many test-score-optional schools evaluate students through a more “holistic” lens, reviewing high school grades, class rank, interviews, extracurricular activities, and rigor of high school classes. Some schools even consider teacher-graded written papers or portfolios, as these provide a way to evaluate the grading standards at a particular high school and answer the concerns raised by testing proponents about the need to have an external or “objective” tool in the admissions process. Considering an applicant holistically is an approach that works well for large public universities such as UT-Austin. Approximately one-half of the incoming freshman class is filled through the “Top 10%” law. For the rest of its 19,000 applicants, UT considers 19 other items as part of the application. Some of these criteria include academic record in high school; socioeconomic background; if the applicant would be the first generation in a family to attend college; bilingualism; involvement in community activities; commitment to a particular field of study; the applicant’s admissions interview; performance on standardized tests as compared with students from similar backgrounds; and a personal essay. The compilation of this information allows admissions officers to gain a picture of applicants that moves beyond the more traditional numerical index of grades and test scores utilized by many public universities. UT-Austin president Faulkner counters critics’ claims that percentage admissions programs exclude students who were “better qualified” on the basis of test scores, noting “top-10-percent students at every level of the SAT-I earn grade point. Christina Perez averages that exceed those of non-top-10-percent students, having SAT-I scores that are 200 to 300 points higher” (Faulkner, 2001, p. 1). Several other public university systems admit a substantial number of students without regard to SAT I or ACT scores when applicants meet certain GPA or class rank requirements. These include the University of Alaska, the California State University system, the University of Minnesota, Montana State University, the Florida State University system, and the University of Wisconsin. Test-score-optional policies are also a success at smaller, liberal arts colleges. Mount Holyoke College, a selective women’s college in Massachusetts, made test scores optional for all applicants in 2001. Data on the first year of enrollees under this policy showed that the high school GPA, class rank, and rigor of courses for test-score “submitters” versus “nonsubmitters” were comparable (Mount Holyoke College, 2001). The change in policy was a welcome one for students of color, who constituted 30% of the applicant pool and 22% of all admitted students, up from 18% the previous year (Constantine, 2001). Since deciding in 1991 to admit students in the top 10% of their high school class without regard to test scores, Franklin and Marshall College in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, has made a commitment to the thoughtful and individual screening of applicants, using tools more appropriate to their needs than the SAT I. The college requires two graded writing assignments from those who choose not to submit test scores: “We will be looking at a student’s command of the language, ability to communicate, and willingness to probe”2 (Van Buskirk, 1991). At Wheaton College in Norton, Massachusetts, test scores have been an optional part of the admissions process since 1991. Since that time, the number of applicants has more than quadrupled, with a concomitant rise in the average high school GPA of applicants from 3.2 to 3.5 (Geller, 2002). Racial diversity also increased, with the percentage of minority freshmen nearly doubling over the ten-year period (College Board, 1989, 2000). Committed to comprehensively evaluating students’ academic skills, Wheaton requires all applicants to submit a graded, research-based or analytical writing sample and two academic letters of recommendation. The admissions process at Bates College relies on high school record, essays, recommendations, personal interviews, and student interests in evaluating students. In particular, the Bates staff values the personal interview, noting that “the College remains committed to the personal interview as part of its evaluation, and Bates is bucking a noticeable trend at other similar colleges away from doing personal interviews” (Hiss, 1990, p. 17). In a recent essay in The Chronicle of Higher Education, William Hiss, Vice President for External and Alumni Affairs at Bates College, sounded a Reassessing College Admissions. 353 challenge to all institutions—large and small, private and public—to drop test score requirements: Observers often contend that even if optional testing works for Bates, it can’t be used at a big university with tens of thousands of application. . . With all due respect, that argument is nonsense. Many large universities with tens of thousands of applicants . . . read applications carefully and give weight to multiple layers of demonstrated talents...Institutions and states should consider the costs of running a reasonably well-staffed admissions office versus the costs of throwing away a decent percentage of a college’s or state’s pool of talent (Hiss, 2001, p. B10) The SAT’s weak predictive power, its negative effects on educational equity, and its susceptibility to coaching will not substantially change with the introduction of a revised exam in 2005. The flaws in the “old” and “new” SAT should all lead educators to one conclusion—test score requirements can and should be dropped at both large public universities and small private colleges. The broader goal of higher education—to provide opportunities to students from diverse backgrounds—is severely truncated by the employment of test scores. The debate about which test score(s) to require doesn’t acknowledge the larger issue present in reassessing college admissions practices—all current standardized admissions exams act as gatekeepers for many otherwise talented students. Until university officials and test makers are willing to confront this fact, shifts in admissions policies from one test score requirement to another will simply uphold the faulty paradigm that test scores equal merit and will maintain the narrow pipeline through which traditionally underrepresented groups struggle to pass.

#### Standardized Tests fail to measure intelligence. Furthermore, the SAT was founded upon racist notions of white supremacy that have been unchanged. The 1AC has an audience of supporters, proving the solvency and reform capable. Further proves the 1AC is more than hypothetical wishful thinking but instead k2 to genuine progress.

Rosales 18 (John Rosales “The Racist Beginnings of Standardized Testing” National Education Association, 2018 <http://www.nea.org/home/73288.htm>)

[Prior to his appointment to the Illinois Commerce Commission, Rosales was a director for the City Colleges of Chicago, in charge of the satellite campus of Olive Harvey College. He was also vice president of community and governmental affairs for the Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Chicago, operating at the intersection between the private and public sectors. In 2011, Rosales became a member of the Cook County Merit Board. In this role, Rosales worked on employee disciplinary cases for the county sheriff's department among various other responsibilities.]

In his essay “The Racist Origins of the SAT,” Gil Troy calls Brigham a “Pilgrim-pedigreed, eugenics-blinded bigot.” Eugenics is often defined as the science of improving a human population by controlled breeding to increase the occurrence of desirable heritable characteristics. It was developed by Francis Galton as a method of improving the human race. Only after the perversion of its doctrines by the Nazis in World War II was the theory dismissed. “All-American decency and idealism coexisted uncomfortably with these scientists’ equally American racism and closemindedness,” Troy writes. Binet, Terman, and Brigham stood at the intersection of powerful intellectual, ideological, and political trends a century ago when the Age of Science and standardization began, according to Troy. “In (those) consensus-seeking times, scientists became obsessed with deviations and handicaps, both physical and intellectual,” Troy states. “And many social scientists, misapplying Charles Darwin’s evolving evolutionary science, and eugenics’ pseudo-science, worried about maintaining white purity.” Today, a reform movement is growing across the country to resist testing abuse and overuse, and to promote authentic assessment. In some communities, according to FairTest, parents, students, education support professionals, and teachers are boycotting and opting out of tests. Also, demonstrations, rallies, forums and town halls focusing on testing reform have been organized.

#### Abolishing standardized testing is the only educational practice that can correct generations of structural inequalities

**Hernandez 18** [Theresa E. Hernandez (Theresa E. Hernandez is a scholar of higher education policy working toward her doctorate at the University of Southern California. Her research examines issues of race, gender, class and intersectional equity in academia.), 5-22-2018, "Abolish Standardized Testing For College Admissions" HuffPost, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/abolish-standardized-testing-for-college-admissions\_n\_5b045869e4b003dc7e470ee3]

From academics to policymakers, people mistakenly believe that standardized tests are better at predicting college outcomes, like grades and graduation, than they really are. This uncritical belief in the current system of admissions allows those who have benefited to feel that they earned their position completely on their own. In reality, our success is a combination of our effort, our opportunities and the resources to make the most of both. This misplaced faith also makes us complicit in the exclusion of those who have not had our same privileges. Even if standardized tests perfectly predicted achievement, they would be doing so on the basis of accumulated resources that have helped children from privileged backgrounds to reach the levels of success that they have by the time they take the test. These testing disparities do not represent students’ potential to learn and achieve. As Jerome Karabel documented in The Chosen: The Hidden History of Admission and Exclusion at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, standardized tests played a devious role in the history of admissions at selective institutions. Selection criteria like the SAT/ACT and GRE come out of historical actions that have defined merit purposefully to exclude students based on their social identities, including religious affiliation. Add to that history generations of underfunded schools and a bevy of other racial and class-based discriminations that continue to hamper the achievements of racially minoritized and low-income students. To accept any “predictive” measure that perpetuates these inequalities, even indirectly, is a disservice to communities of color and poor people today and robs future generations of their potential. For the United States to live up to its highest potential, we have to stop turning away students from the possibilities of higher education just because their backgrounds have not afforded them the same opportunities or the resources needed to take advantage of earlier opportunities. To that end, researchers like Estela Bensimon highlight the responsibility of our educators and educational institutions to better serve marginalized students in order to support the success of all students. So how do we move forward? Some research indicates that holistic review may be better at judging a student’s potential given the context of their prior experiences. Many highly selective institutions such as Harvard, Yale and Columbia already claim to practice a version of holistic review due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s backing of this approach in affirmative action cases. However, these options are largely used and researched in tandem with standardized tests that produce racially and class-based disparate outcomes. We have inherited a society built on grave injustices, and we perpetuate them through both intentional acts and failures to redress what has been done. Higher education, from college to graduate school, can provide the opportunities and resources for people to make the most of their potential but only if we make access to it more equitable. The only way forward is to enact policies and practices, especially in education, that are corrective and redistributive. The time has come to end the perpetuation of systemic inequity through institutional practices that appear facially neutral, but which have a disparate impact by race and class. Ending the use of standardized tests at all levels of admissions is one of the ways we can do so.

### FL Fiat Good

#### Fiat’s good- voting for the best potential future is liberatory

Brooks 18 (Lonny J. Avi, Professor of Strategic Communication, Communication & Media Studies, CSU East Bay. "Cruelty and Afrofuturism" Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1. //sp)

Now, in the Age of Trump, we are confronted with a resurgence of patriarchal authority that seeks to deny and reverse advances in civil rights and restore a time where everyone knew their place in the hierarchy of white supremacy.4 Our current present recapitulates in part the cruelty of the last centuries, and demands that we recreate stronger alternative futures. Imagining new futures can serve as a strategy to understand the nature of cruelty, and how we negotiate with cruel acts as constitutive of our greatest aspirations. As Giorgio Baruchello states, “embracing the cruel character of existence might serve itself as a precondition for any meaningful life to be lived.” 5 I argue that affirming pathways that use cruelty against itself can function as a fulcrum to reduce its trauma. In this essay, I integrate Afrofuturism and game studies as a pathway and route in supplanting cruelty and reducing the space it occupies. Specifically, I discuss the use of Game Jams to bring into existence new artifacts and strategies to embrace cruel truths while amplifying and developing better futures. The Game Jam is an event in which game developers, made up of designers, artists, social scientists, from amateur to professional get together, develop a game, and release it in an extremely short period. A relatively recent phenomenon dating back to 2002, Game Jams take place across institutions and communities (Fowler et al. 2015).6 Distinct in theme and composition of participant skill sets and outcomes, they all share the requirement of developing a game-like experience, a piece of playable media within a set of constraints typically taking place within 24–72 hours. These limitations include time and specific, local technologies. Game Jams serve as social catalysts, creating individual social capacity, communities of practice (Freire 1970), and friendships that extend well beyond the duration of the event. My colleague, Ian Pollock, and I have integrated Afrofuturism with the Minority Reports Game Jam in May 2017 to address cruel dilemmas by developing software and board games to augment our imaginative capacities to deal with our fears and plan what game players call “epic wins.” According to Jane McGonigal, an epic win is an outcome that is so extraordinarily positive you had no idea it was even possible until you achieved it … it was almost beyond the threshold of imagination and when you get there you are shocked to discover what you are truly capable of.

#### Fiat good – imagining political possibilities is key to change

Shove and Walker 07 [Elizabeth **SHOVE** Sociology @ Lancaster **AND** Gordon **WALKER** Geography @ Lancaster **‘7** [“CAUTION! Transitions ahead: politics, practice, and sustainable transition management,” *Environment and Planning C* 39 (4)]

For academic readers, our commentary argues for loosening the intellectual grip of ‘innovation studies’, for backing off from the nested, hierarchical multi-level model as the only model in town, and for exploring other social scientific, but also systemic theories of change. **The more we think about the politics and practicalities of** reflexive **transition management**, the more complex the process appears: for a policy audience, our words of caution could be read as an invitation to abandon the whole endeavour. If agency, predictability and legitimacy are as limited as we’ve suggested, this might be the only sensible conclusion.However, **we are with Rip** (2006) i**n recognising the value, productivity and everyday necessity of an ‘illusion of agency’**, **and of the working expectation that a difference can be made even in the face of so much evidence to the contrary. The outcomes of actions are unknowable, the system unsteerable and the effects of deliberate intervention inherently unpredictable and, ironically, it is this that sustains concepts of agency and management**. As Rip argues ‘**illusions are productive because they motivate action and repair work, and thus something** (whatever) **is achieved’** (Rip 2006: 94). **Situated inside the systems they seek to influence, governance actors** – and actors of other kinds as well - **are part of the dynamics of change: even if they cannot steer from the outside they are necessary to processes within. This is**, of course, also **true of academic life**. Here **we are**, busy critiquing and **analysing transition management in the expectation that somebody somewhere is listening and** maybe **even taking notice. If we removed that illusion would we bother writing anything at all? Maybe we need such fictions to keep us going, and maybe – fiction or no - somewhere along the line something really does happen**, but not in ways that we can anticipate or know.

#### Even if "fiat’s not real", and Affs don’t control levers of power today, we advance a heuristic. Without this heuristic of fiat, we’ll re-enforce dangerous nihilism.

Hoff, 6

(et al, Dr. Dianne Hoff, professor in the College of Education and Human Development and president of Faculty Senate, University of Maine, Journal of Educational Administration, 44:3 – available via Emerald Management 120 database).

There is no question that helping educational leadership students become self-analytical and reflect upon the areas where their own leadership and decisions can be improved is an important aspect of self and school improvement. If, however, an educational leadership program fails to push students to reflect beyond their individual actions and their current setting, it can actually reinforce their tendency both to think and act locally. This confines their actions to the norms of their local schools and communities, which can only result in the maintenance of the status quo. More problematic, local thinking can mask deep prejudice that exists to sustain a system that advantages the dominant culture. School leaders who hesitate to challenge local norms may perpetuate a system of schooling that marginalizes people who are considered different. As Counts reminds us, all education includes the imposition of ideas and values, but educators have an obligation to be clear about what assumptions shape their practice. A narrow focus on local concerns may involve “the clothing of one's own deepest prejudices in the garb of universal truth” (Counts, 1932, p. 180).There is an alternative. Educational leaders have to decide in big and small ways every day whether to let local or global contexts shape their actions. School leaders who go out of their way to welcome immigrant students, hire openly gay teachers, support a multi-cultural curriculum, honor a variety of religious holidays, and routinely examine school practices that might reinforce privilege (to list just a few examples), perhaps even in the face of local disapproval, contribute to the important task of creating an arena for expanding local and parochial weltanschauungen. Exemplary acts by school leaders speak even louder than exemplary words. They send messages about the inclusiveness of the schools' social and intellectual environments. They quite literally set up a level playing field for the arena of ideas and beliefs. This is an arena from which a new social order can emerge.