# Indirect Obligations NC [Perry]

## NC

#### I negate: When interpreting how to act from an ethical framework, there are two kinds of obligations we can have. Direct Obligations, which represent a universal rule that we ought to act a particular way, and Indirect Obligations, which that a particular action is consistent with that rule, and therefor we ought not do it. We derive Indirect Obligations, from linking specific circumstances to Direct Obligations. For example, if our Direct Obligation is be do not kill, while our Indirect obligation would be that we believe shooting is a form of killing, and therefore we ought not shoot. The Aff is indirectly normative, since while their standard is \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_, the aff does not gain offense from the bare fact that \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ is good, but rather from the inference that standardized tests \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

#### Trying to create an indirect obligation from a direct obligation is incoherent for 3 reasons:

#### [1] Trying to infer an indirect obligation is arbitrary, since agents are no longer making judgements from an objective ethical principle but rather their infinitely varied subjective opinions on what that principle condones. For example, even if you and I are both Kantians I might believe that allowing fights violates freedom, and you might believe that not allowing fights violates freedom. Since there is no way to externally verify whether an action is good or bad under a principle, Kantianism can only objectively say that violating freedom is bad.

#### [2] The Open Question Argument: Premise 1: Either, A) the Indirect obligation is not equivalent to the original maxim, in which case you vote neg or B) The indirect obligation not to shoot is analytically the same as the direct obligation not to kill. This would mean a specific example of the good would be the same as goodness as a concept, which would just mean good things are good. Thus you vote neg, since cannot derive an obligation from a tautology.

#### [3] Even if Indirect Obligations could be valid they would have to prove that an indirect obligation is sufficient to prove a direct obligation. This requires the logical rule of modus Ponens, which says that Q is true via the fact that P implies Q and P is true. However, Modus Ponens fails.

McGee, V. (1985). A Counterexample to Modus Ponens. The Journal of Philosophy, 82(9), 462. doi:10.2307/2026276 ///AHS PB

THE rule of modus ponens, which tells us that from an indicative conditional rIf X then Y1Y together with its antecedent 0, one can infer , is one of the fundamental principles of logic.2 Yet, as the following examples show, it is not strictly valid; there are occasions on which one has good grounds for believing the premises of an application of modus ponens but yet one is not justified in accepting the conclusion. Later on, we shall see how these examples can be modified to give counterexamples to Stalnaker's semantics for the conditional: Opinion polls taken just before the 1980 election showed the Republican Ronald Reagan decisively ahead of the Democrat Jimmy Carter, with the other Republican in the race, John Anderson, a distant third. Those apprised of the poll results believed, with good reason: If a Republican wins the election, then if it's not Reagan who wins it will be Anderson. A Republican will win the election. Yet they did not have reason to believe If it's not Reagan who wins, it will be Anderson.

#### This independently negates, since even if all affs arguments are true, they don’t logically lead to the truth of the resolution.