# 1NC – Framework

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#### Interpretation: Affirmatives must defend governmental action to eliminate financial contributions for fossil fuel

#### Subsidies are made by government and public bodies

WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures <https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf> //KohlW

Definition of a Subsidy 1.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if: (a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as "government"), i.e. where:

#### Resolve entails questions of lawmaking

Words and Phrases, 1964 (Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### Vote neg –

#### First is predictable limits – the resolution is the only predictable stasis point for debates – they justify letting the aff read anything tangentially related to the resolution – we can’t predict a near infinite amount of affs, which decks pre-round research and means the negative will always be ill prepared, preventing substantive debates with lots of clash. That decks fairness and means we’ll only ever gain surface-level knowledge of the topics covered

#### Second is ground – by changing the topic post facto, the aff has structurally tilted the debate in its favor and unilaterally determined neg ground especially since they speak last and can perm any counter advocacy

#### There are a few impacts

#### First is dialogue – defending the topic is hard because it requires you to admit you could be wrong—that generates competitive respect and dialogue. Voting aff reinforces group polarization and choir preaching

Talisse 5 – philosophy professor at Vanderbilt (Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 31.4, “Deliberativist responses to activist challenges”) \*note: gendered language in this article refers to arguments made by two specific individuals in an article by Iris Young

Nonetheless, the deliberativist conception of reasonableness differs from the activist’s in at least one crucial respect. On the deliberativist view, a necessary condition for reasonableness is the willingness not only to offer justifications for one’s own views and actions, but also to listen to criticisms, objections, and the justificatory reasons that can be given in favor of alternative proposals. In light of this further stipulation, we may say that, on the deliberative democrat’s view, reasonable citizens are responsive to reasons, their views are ‘reason tracking’. Reasonableness, then, entails an acknowledgement on the part of the citizen that her current views are possibly mistaken, incomplete, and in need of revision. Reasonableness is hence a two-way street: the reasonable citizen is able and willing to offer justifications for her views and actions, but is also prepared to consider alternate views, respond to criticism, answer objections, and, if necessary, revise or abandon her views. In short, reasonable citizens do not only believe and act for reasons, they aspire to believe and act according to the best reasons; consequently, they recognize their own fallibility in weighing reasons and hence engage in public deliberation in part for the sake of improving their views.15 ‘Reasonableness’ as the deliberative democrat understands it is constituted by a willingness to participate in an ongoing public discussion that inevitably involves processes of self-examination by which one at various moments rethinks and revises one’s views in light of encounters with new arguments and new considerations offered by one’s fellow deliberators. Hence Gutmann and Thompson write: Citizens who owe one another justifications for the laws that they seek to impose must take seriously the reasons their opponents give. Taking seriously the reasons one’s opponents give means that, at least for a certain range of views that one opposes, one must acknowledge the possibility that an opposing view may be shown to be correct in the future. This acknowledgement has implications not only for the way they regard their own views. It imposes an obligation to continue to test their own views, seeking forums in which the views can be challenged, and keeping open the possibility of their revision or even rejection.16 (2000: 172) That Young’s activist is not reasonable in this sense is clear from the ways in which he characterizes his activism. He claims that ‘Activities of protest, boycott, and disruption are more appropriate means for getting citizens to think seriously about what until then they have found normal and acceptable’ (106); activist tactics are employed for the sake of ‘bringing attention’ to injustice and making ‘a wider public aware of institutional wrongs’ (107). These characterizations suggest the presumption that questions of justice are essentially settled; the activist takes himself to know what justice is and what its implementation requires. He also believes he knows that those who oppose him are either the power-hungry beneficiaries of the unjust status quo or the inattentive and unaware masses who do not ‘think seriously’ about the injustice of the institutions that govern their lives and so unwittingly accept them. Hence his political activity is aimed exclusively at enlisting other citizens in support of the cause to which he is tenaciously committed. The activist implicitly holds that there could be no reasoned objection to his views concerning justice, and no good reason to endorse those institutions he deems unjust. The activist presumes to know that no deliberative encounter could lead him to reconsider his position or adopt a different method of social action; he ‘declines’ to ‘engage persons he disagrees with’ (107) in discourse because he has judged on a priori grounds that all opponents are either pathetically benighted or balefully corrupt. When one holds one’s view as the only responsible or just option, there is no need for reasoning with those who disagree, and hence no need to be reasonable. According to the deliberativist, this is the respect in which the activist is unreasonable. The deliberativist recognizes that questions of justice are difficult and complex. This is the case not only because justice is a notoriously tricky philosophical concept, but also because, even supposing we had a philosophically sound theory of justice, questions of implementation are especially thorny. Accordingly, political philosophers, social scientists, economists, and legal theorists continue to work on these questions. In light of much of this literature, it is difficult to maintain the level of epistemic confidence in one’s own views that the activist seems to muster; thus the deliberativist sees the activist’s confidence as evidence of a lack of honest engagement with the issues. A possible outcome of the kind of encounter the activist ‘declines’ (107) is the realization that the activist’s image of himself as a ‘David to the Goliath of power wielded by the state and corporate actors’ (106) is naïve. That is, the deliberativist comes to see, through processes of public deliberation, that there are often good arguments to be found on all sides of an important social issue; reasonableness hence demands that one must especially engage the reasons of those with whom one most vehemently disagrees and be ready to revise one’s own views if necessary. Insofar as the activist holds a view of justice that he is unwilling to put to the test of public criticism, he is unreasonable. Furthermore, insofar as the activist’s conception commits him to the view that there could be no rational opposition to his views, he is literally unable to be reasonable. Hence the deliberative democrat concludes that activism, as presented by Young’s activist, is an unreasonable model of political engagement. The dialogical conception of reasonableness adopted by the deliberativist also provides a response to the activist’s reply to the charge that he is engaged in interest group or adversarial politics. Recall that the activist denied this charge on the grounds that activism is aimed not at private or individual interests, but at the universal good of justice. But this reply also misses the force of the posed objection. On the deliberativist view, the problem with interest-based politics does not derive simply from the source (self or group), scope (particular or universal), or quality (admirable or deplorable) of the interest, but with the concept of interests as such. Not unlike ‘preferences’, ‘interests’ typically function in democratic theory as fixed dispositions that are non-cognitive and hence unresponsive to reasons. Insofar as the activist sees his view of justice as ‘given’ and not open to rational scrutiny, he is engaged in the kind of adversarial politics the deliberativist rejects. The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. The deliberativist view I have sketched holds that reasonableness involves some degree of what we may call epistemic modesty. On this view, the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons, and so she enters into public discourse as a way of testing her views against the objections and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly holds that her present view is open to reasonable critique and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness for the activist consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; discussion with those who disagree need not be involved. According to the activist, there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which there is no room for reasoned objection. Under such conditions, the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001a: ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies, demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. Activists also must engage in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movements must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tactics; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists. Group polarization is a well-documented phenomenon that has ‘been found all over the world and in many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81–2). Importantly, in groups that ‘engage in repeated discussions’ over time, the polarization is even more pronounced (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of any individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees in cases in which the requirements of justice are so clear that he can be confident that he has the truth. Group polarization suggests that deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even when we have the truth. For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views, but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth. In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggests that engagement with those with whom one disagrees is essential to the proper pursuit of justice. Insofar as the activist denies this, he is unreasonable.

#### Second is skills – Only a nuanced testing of policies trains advocates to denend their position – understanding the nuances of the government is exactly what allows for us to dismantle it – debating specific policies is critical to make us better advocates for our claims – simulation and institutional deliberation are valuable and motivate effective responses to climate risks

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Based on the observation that experiential and analytic processing systems compete and that personal experience and vivid descriptions are often favored over statistical information, we suggest the following research and policy implications.¶ Communications designed to create, recall and highlight relevant personal experience and to elicit affective responses can lead to more public attention to, processing of, and engagement with forecasts of climate variability and climate change. Vicarious experiential information in the form of scenarios, narratives, and analogies can help the public and policy makers imagine the potential consequences of climate variability and change, amplify or attenuate risk perceptions, and influence both individual behavioral intentions and public policy preferences. Likewise, as illustrated by the example of retranslation in the Uganda studies, the translation of statistical information into concrete experience with simulated forecasts, decisionmaking and its outcomes can greatly facilitate an intuitive understanding of both probabilities and the consequences of incremental change and extreme events, and motivate contingency planning.¶ Yet, while the engagement of experience-based, affective decision-making can make risk communications more salient and motivate behavior, experiential processing is also subject to its own biases, limitations and distortions, such as the finite pool of worry and single action bias. Experiential processing works best with easily imaginable, emotionally laden material, yet many aspects of climate variability and change are relatively abstract and require a certain level of analytical understanding (e.g., long-term trends in mean temperatures or precipitation). Ideally, communication of climate forecasts should encourage the interactive engagement of both analytic and experiential processing systems in the course of making concrete decisions about climate, ranging from individual choices about what crops to plant in a particular season to broad social choices about how to mitigate or adapt to global climate change.¶ One way to facilitate this interaction is through group and participatory decision-making. As the Uganda example suggests, group processes allow individuals with a range of knowledge, skills and personal experience to share diverse information and perspectives and work together on a problem. Ideally, groups should include at least one member trained to understand statistical forecast information to ensure that all sources of information—both experiential and analytic—are considered as part of the decision-making process. Communications to groups should also try to translate statistical information into formats readily understood in the language, personal and cultural experience of group members. In a somewhat iterative or cyclical process, the shared concrete information can then be re-abstracted to an analytic level that leads to action.¶ Risk and uncertainty are inherent dimensions of all climate forecasts and related decisions. Analytic products like trend analysis, forecast probabilities, and ranges of uncertainty ought to be valuable contributions to stakeholder decision-making. Yet decision makers also listen to the inner and communal voices of personal and collective experience, affect and emotion, and cultural values. Both systems—analytic and experiential—should be considered in the design of climate forecasts and risk communications. If not, many analytic products will fall on deaf ears as decision makers continue to rely heavily on personal experience and affective cues to make plans for an uncertain future. The challenge is to find innovative and creative ways to engage both systems in the process of individual and group decision-making.

#### Third is fairness – debate is a game and them breaking the rules means they should lose. Independently, it’s key to incentivize people to access any positive impacts resulting from debate

#### Some defense –

#### 1. Reading their aff on the neg solves their offense

#### 2. You can’t verify if any of the 1ac claims are true because they haven’t been rigorously tested by a well-prepared opponent. This means you can presume neg and don’t let them weigh the aff against framework.

#### 3. They could have read their aff in a forum or seminar or coffee shop instead of here

#### 4. The topic selection is a democratic process therefore they can propose this as a potential topic for next year

#### 5. There’s a topical version of the aff – \_\_\_\_\_ – subsidies are emblematic of the \_\_\_ they critique

#### 6. Advocating for a side that you believe is wrong allows for you to understand and defeat it better. Solves their offense comparatively better and is a net benefit to the topical version of the aff

Haskell 90. History professor at Rice University, May, Thomas, History and Theory, 29.2, “Objectivity is Not Neutrality: Rhetoric vs. Practice in Peter Novick’s That Noble Dream”, p. 129-157

Detachment functions in this manner **not by draining** us of **passion,** but by helping to **channel** our intellectual passions in such a way as **to insure collision** with rival perspectives. In that collision, if anywhere, our thinking transcends both the idiosyncratic and the conventional. Detachment both socializes and deparochializes the work of intellect; it is the quality that fits an individual to participate fruitfully in what is essentially a communal enterprise. Objectivity is so much a product of social arrangements that individuals and particular opinions scarcely deserve to be called objective, yet the social arrangements that foster objectivity have no basis for existence apart from individual striving for detachment. Only insofar as the members of the community are disposed to set aside the perspective that comes most spontaneously to them, and strive to see things in a detached light, is there any likelihood that they will engage with one another mentally and provoke one another through mutual criticism to the most complete, least idiosyncratic, view that humans are capable of. When the ascetic effort at detachment fails, as it often does, **we "talk past one another**," producing nothing but discordant soliloquies, each fancying itself the voice of reason. The kind of thinking I would call objective leads only a fugitive existence outside of communities that enjoy a high degree of independence from the state and other external powers, and which are dedicated internally not only to detachment, but also to intense mutual criticism and to the protection of dissenting positions against the perpetual threat of majority tyranny. Some hypothetical examples may clarify what I mean by objective thinking and show how remote it is from neutrality. Consider an extreme case: the person who, although capable of detachment, suspends his or her own perceptions of the world not in the expectation of gaining a broader perspective, but only in order **to learn how opponents think** so as to demolish their arguments more effectively - who is, in\* short, a polemicist, deeply and fixedly committed as a lifelong project to a particular political or cultural or moral program. Anyone choosing such a life obviously risks being thought boorish or provincial, but insofar as such a person successfully enters into the thinking of his or her rivals and produces arguments potentially compelling not only to those who already share the same views, but to outsiders as well, I see no reason to withhold the laurel of objectivity. 10 There is nothing objective about hurling imprecations at apostates or catechizing the faithful, but as long as the polemicist truly engages the thinking of the enemy he or she is being as objective as anyone. In contrast, the person too enamored of his or her own interpretation of things seriously and sympathetically **to entertain alternatives, even for the sake of learning** how best to defeat them, fails my test of objectivity, no matter how serene and even tempered. The most common failure of objectivity is preaching to the converted, proceeding in a manner that complacently presupposes the pieties of one's own coterie and makes no effort to appreciate or appeal to the perspectives of outsiders. In contrast, the most commonly observed fulfillment of the ideal of objectivity in the historical profession is simply the powerful argument-the text that reveals by its every twist and turn its respectful appreciation of the alternatives it rejects. Such a text attains power precisely because its author has managed to suspend momentarily his or her own perceptions so as to anticipate and take account of objections and alternative constructions -not those of some straw man, but those that truly issue from the rival's position, understood as sensitively and stated as eloquently as the rival him- or herself could desire. Nothing is rhetorically more powerful than this, and nothing, not even capitulation to the rival, could acknowledge any more vividly the force and respectability of the rival's perspective. To mount a telling attack on a position, one must first inhabit it. Those so habituated to their customary intellectual abode that they cannot even explore others can **never be persuasive** to anyone but fellow habitues. That is why powerful arguments are often more faithful to the complexity and fragility of historical interpretation - more faithful even to the irreducible plurality of human perspectives, when that is, in fact, the case -than texts that abjure position-taking altogether and ostentatiously wallow in displays of "reflexivity" and "undecidability." The powerful argument is the highest fruit of the kind of thinking I would call objective, and in it **neutrality plays no part**. Authentic objectivity has simply nothing to do with the television newscaster's mechanical gesture of allocating the same number of seconds to both sides of a question, or editorially splitting the difference between them, irrespective of their perceived merits

#### 7. The win/loss structure of debate means that voting for us is just endorsing us as reading the better arguments – the ballot will never resolve any of their offense so it should be a question of voting for the best model of debate

#### 8. Debate is a game and rules like speech times are nothing but codified norms – means a. fairness is a voter and b. vote them down for breaking the rule that is the topic

### 2NR – O/V – Dialogue

#### We’re going for the *dialogue* impact –

#### The resolution prevents all real negative engagement – they’ve conceded that the resolution is the only predictable stasis point – even if [their line by line] is true the lack of a counterdefinition means that any aff interpretation is infinitely regressive – only our interpretation can be broadly applied to all debates on the topic – their interpretation justifies an infinite number of affs – that’s impossible to engage with – regardless of how many books we read we can never find a theory that links to every aff – that turns debate into a monologue where we never question the aff on any level deeper than framework and the cap K [which is proven by them saying we conceded the core thesis of the 1ac]

#### [Do line by line on their defense to predictability]

#### That prevents all deliberative dialogue – extend Talisse – only them being willing to confront other approaches to the world through [the tva/reading the aff on the neg/other defense] allows for real engagement that requires them to admit that they could be wrong – anything else leads to choir preaching and echo chambers where the only thing they ever hit is framework, causing them to move farther into their ideologies without ever considering the nitty-gritties of their theory – only a model where in-depth clash over their thesis is inevitable enables this type of dialogue - there is an external VIOLENCE impact where they lashout against those things that differ from their unquestioned opinion on the issue, materializing in things like scapegoating where as soon as someone in your movement suggests state action might be better they are violently expunged from your project which is a mindset that will prevail in all of our endeavors and thus outweighs their offense – this is proven by K debaters calling framework fascism and lashing out against it

#### That comes before the aff – an inability to advocate your aff coherently decks public support that kills their movement – only being able to yell about how the other side is fascist and wrong won’t convince anyone - the affirmative’s advocacy fails to change anybody’s psychological reactions to difference and instead only functions on the level of textual endorsement – this is a presumptive level defensive claim because it points out that they don’t have an internal link between reading their aff and changing how people actually view the world – however, our form of debate forces people into a practice that actively changes how they think about their mileu

#### [And it’s independently a presumption ballot – extend Truth Testing]

### 2NR – O/V – Skills

#### Skills – only a predictable point of stasis allows for modes of contestation that trains advocates ready to defend their position against the wide-ranging and rigorous standards of the public. This is a pre-req to solving the affirmative and an external impact to our interpretation – sans the capacity for advocacy, the value of the 1ac will be forever left adrift in the echo-chamber of debate, defusing its revolutionary potential. THIS IS MASSIVE EXTERNAL OFFENSE THAT INDEPENTENTLY OUTWEIGHS THE AFF – these skills are *vital* to resolving other instances of violence in the world – clearly voting negative doesn’t solve all of these, but sans advocacy skills, our chance at doing so is functionally zero. Training good decision making skills allow for debaters to do things like become good local leaders, lead movements, and change the world for the better in a meaningful way. When we leave this space we definitely wont remember the specifics of every affirmative but we can create a form of debate that makes us able to change the world for the better.

#### Our Marx card does a great contextualization of this – policy scenario planning and forecasting empirically facilitates understanding of issues for potential denialists, encourages contingency planning and motivates policymakers to make concrete changes – allowing a large range of individuals to share perspectives through debate leads to action and creation of policies that create the best responses to climate change – that’s best for resolving the ecological and political violence due to climate change that rips apart indigenous communities and [is the root cause of \_\_\_] – just abstractly theorizing about [\_\_\_] means we’ll never have the knowledge resulting from successive debates to productively engage and create positive change in the world.