# Clean Coal AC

## Util

#### I affirm:

#### Pain is bad, Pleasure is good, and all things only have value insofar as they make us happy.

Ole Martin Moen, Post-Doctoral Fellow in Philosophy at Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo, 12 September 2015, <http://www.olemartinmoen.com/wp-content/uploads/AnArgumentForHedonism.pdf> ///AHS PB

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. ‘‘Pleasure’’ and ‘‘pain’’ are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: ‘‘What for?’’ This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: ‘‘To buy soda.’’ This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: ‘‘What is buying the soda good for?’’ This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: ‘‘Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.’’ If I then proceed by asking ‘‘But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?’’ the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes: ‘‘We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.’’4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says ‘‘This is painful!’’ we never respond by asking: ‘‘And why is that a problem?’’ We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.

**He Continues**

Many philosophers would accept the conclusion from the previous section, that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. Most of them would add, however, that this is probably not the complete story of what is intrinsically valuable and disvaluable. They would suggest that there are intrinsic values besides pleasure and intrinsic disvalues besides pain, and thus endorse some form of pluralism rather than hedonism. Pluralism has many defenders. W. D. Ross, for example, suggests that pleasure is indeed intrinsically valuable, but adds that so are knowledge and artistic activity.19 Noah Lemos adds consciousness, morally good actions, beauty, and flourishing to the list of intrinsic values.20 Martha Nussbaum suggests life, health, bodily integrity, emotional attachment, practical reason, affiliation, play, and more.21 William Frankena has provided what is arguably the most extensive list of intrinsic values: life, consciousness, and activity; health and strength; pleasures and satisfactions of all or certain kinds; happiness, beatitude, contentment, etc.; truth; knowledge and true opinions of various kinds, understanding, wisdom; beauty, harmony, proportion in objects contemplated; aesthetic experience; morally good dispositions or virtues; mutual affection, love, friendship, cooperation; just distribution of goods and evils; harmony and proportion in one’s own life; power and experiences of achievement; self-expression; freedom; peace, security; adventure and novelty; and good reputation, honor, esteem.22 Prima facie, these all seem to be reasonable suggestions for things worth having, not just for the sake of other things, but for their own sake. So is it clear, as G. E. Moore asks, that a hedonist can show ‘‘that all other things but pleasure, whether conduct or virtue of knowledge, whether life or nature or beauty, are only good as a means to pleasure or for the sake of pleasure, never for their own sakes or as ends in themselves’’?23 I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists. First, I do not think the burden of proof lies on hedonists to explain why the additional values are not intrinsic values. If someone claims that X is intrinsically valuable, this is a substantive, positive claim, and it lies on him or her to explain why we should believe that X is in fact intrinsically valuable. Possibly, this could be done through thought experiments analogous to those employed in the previous section. Second, there is something peculiar about the list of additional intrinsic values that counts in hedonism’s favor: the listed values have a strong tendency to be well explained as things that help promote pleasure and avert pain. To go through Frankena’s list, life and consciousness are necessary presuppositions for pleasure; activity, health, and strength bring about pleasure; and happiness, beatitude, and contentment are regarded by Frankena himself as ‘‘pleasures and satisfactions.’’ The same is arguably true of beauty, harmony, and ‘‘proportion in objects contemplated,’’ and also of affection, friendship, harmony, and proportion in life, experiences of achievement, adventure and novelty, self-expression, good reputation, honor and esteem. Other things on Frankena’s list, such as understanding, wisdom, freedom, peace, and security, although they are perhaps not themselves pleasurable, are important means to achieve a happy life, and as such, they are things that hedonists would value highly. Morally good dispositions and virtues, cooperation, and just distribution of goods and evils, moreover, are things that, on a collective level, contribute a happy society, and thus the traits that would be promoted and cultivated if this were something sought after. To a very large extent, the intrinsic values suggested by pluralists tend to be hedonic instrumental values. Indeed, pluralists’ suggested intrinsic values all point toward pleasure, for while the other values are reasonably explainable as a means toward pleasure, pleasure itself is not reasonably explainable as a means toward the other values. Some have noticed this. Moore himself, for example, writes that though his pluralistic theory of intrinsic value is opposed to hedonism, its application would, in practice, look very much like hedonism’s: ‘‘Hedonists,’’ he writes ‘‘do, in general, recommend a course of conduct which is very similar to that which I should recommend.’’24 Ross writes that ‘‘[i]t is quite certain that by promoting virtue and knowledge we shall inevitably produce much more pleasant consciousness. These are, by general agreement, among the surest sources of happiness for their possessors.’’25 Roger Crisp observes that ‘‘those goods cited by non-hedonists are goods we often, indeed usually, enjoy.’’26 What Moore and Ross do not seem to notice is that their observations give rise to two reasons to reject pluralism and endorse hedonism. The first reason is that if the suggested non-hedonicintrinsic values are potentially explainable by appealtojust pleasure and pain (which, following my argument in the previous chapter, we should accept as intrinsically valuable and disvaluable), then—by appeal to Occam’s razor—we have at least a pro tanto reason to resist the introduction of any further intrinsic values and disvalues. It is ontologically more costly to posit a plurality ofintrinsic values and disvalues, so in case all values admit of explanation by reference to a single intrinsic value and a single intrinsic disvalue, we have reason to reject more complicated accounts. The fact that suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values tend to be hedonistic instrumental values does not, however, count in favor of hedonism solely in virtue of being most elegantly explained by hedonism; it also does so in virtue of creating an explanatory challenge for pluralists. The challenge can be phrased as the following question: If the non-hedonic values suggested by pluralists are truly intrinsic values in their own right, then why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?27

#### Thus the standard is Utilitarianism. Prefer:

#### [1] Util is a lexical pre-requisite to any other framework: Threats to bodily security and life preclude the ability for moral actors to effectively utilize and act upon other moral theories since they are in a constant state of crisis that inhibit the ideal moral conditions which other theories presuppose – so, util comes first and my offense outweighs theirs under their own framework.

#### [2] Only natural observable moral facts exist:

#### Papineau 07, David Papineau, “Naturalism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007//SS Moore took this argument to show that moral facts comprise a distinct species of non-natural fact. However, any such non-naturalist view of morality faces immediate difficulties, deriving ultimately from the kind of causal closure thesis discussed above. If all physical effects are due to a limited range of natural causes, and if moral facts lie outside this range, then it follow that moral facts can never make any difference to what happens in the physical world (Harman, 1986). At first sight this may seem tolerable (perhaps moral facts indeed don't have any physical effects). But it has very awkward epistemological consequences. For beings like us, knowledge of the spatiotemporal world is mediated by physical processes involving our sense organs and cognitive systems. If moral facts cannot influence the physical world, then it is hard to see how we can have any knowledge of them

#### Two implications: A) Substantively affirms since we need the natural world to derive moral facts from it, so environmental destruction eliminates our ability to perceive and interact with those facts to create morality. B) Proves Util since we physically know the pleasure is good and pain is bad.

#### [3] Actor-specificity: side constraints freeze action b/c government policies always require trade-offs—the only justifiable way to resolve those conflicts is by benefiting everyone.

**[4] THEORY: ethical frameworks must be theoretically legitimate. Any standard is an interpretation of the word ought-thus framework is functionally a topicality argument about how to define the terms of the resolution. Prefer my interpretation:**

**A] Ground: Both debaters are guaranteed access to ground to engage under util – ie Aff gets plans and advantages, while Neg gets disads and counterplans. Additionally, anything can function as a util impact as long as an external benefit is articulated, so all your offense applies. Other frameworks deny 1 side the ability to engage the other on both the impact level and the link level.**

**B] Predictability: Debaters are most prepared to engage in a util debate since it is the most common framework read on the entirety of the west coast. Hyper-specific theories will always mean people have little to no prep on the issue.**

**[5] Use epistemic modesty for evaluating the framework debate: that means compare the probability of the framework times the magnitude of the impact under a framework. Prefer:**

**[A] Clash—disincentives debaters from going all in for framework which means we get the ideal balance between topic ed and phil ed—it’s important to talk about contention-level offense**

**[C] Action under one framework isn’t exclusive of action under another.**

Enoch ‘11, David. "Giving Practical Reasons." Philosophers Imprint. The Hebrew University, Mar. 2011. Web. <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/p/pod/dod-idx/giving-practical-reasons.pdf?c=phimp;idno=3521354.0011.004>.

I should also note something it does not take for the role played by the given reason in the receiver’s practical reasoning to be appropriate. **It is not required that the role be**, as it were, **ultimate**. In other words, it is perfectly consistent with robust reason-giving thus understood that there be a further, fuller, perhaps more basic story of why it is that B does and should take A’s relevant intentions as reason-giving. **Perhaps**, for instance, **B is a simple utilitarian**, and let’s further assume that simple utilitarianism is indeed the true fundamental story about all reasons for action. **If so, B will take A’s request as a reason to [act] if** and only if, and because, **doing so will maximize utility**. But this does not mean that she doesn’t take, in those cases, A’s request to be a (nonultimate) reason. The crucial question is whether the ultimate (or perhaps just more basic) story here is one that goes through the reasongiver’s special intentions identified above (and the receiver’s recognition thereof), as in the case of the utilitarian request-receiver, in which case we may have a case of robust reason-giving; or whether the more basic story here works directly, leaving no role for the specific intentions that make reason-giving robust (as is the case in the dictator’s child example). Cases of this latter type are not, on the account I’m suggesting here, cases of robust reason-giving. And **this seems to me the independently plausible result** here. Notice that the intentions mentioned above do not include something like the intention that B actually Φs. This is so because **A can give B a reason to [act] Φ knowing well that other reasons may be relevant, including possibly stronger reasons not to [act] Φ**.52 Indeed, it seems to me A can make a genuine request that B Φs, all the time acknowledging that if certain other considerations bear on the case, B should not (all things considered) Φ. We do not want to restrict robust reason-giving to just the cases in which the reason-giver intends the given reason to outweigh all others. For similar reasons, **A need not intend that the given reason be the only reason** for which B Φs.

#### [6] No intent-foresight distinction – If we foresee a consequence, then it becomes part of our deliberation which makes it intrinsic to our action since we intend it to happen.

#### The subject is created through interactions with other people, which

Judith Butler, American philosopher and gender theorist, whose theory of gender performativity has had a major influence on feminist and queer scholarship., Hegel for our Times, 22nd November 2019, <https://iai.tv/articles/hegel-for-our-times-judith-butler-auid-1273> ///AHS PB

It is probably odd to think that Hegel has something to tell us about our lives, but what if our most basic obligations toward one another and the planet could be illuminated by this philosopher who wrote in the early 1800s? In his Phenomenology of Spirit, he shows us that we are not simply solitary creatures, disconnected from one another, although he knows very well that we sometimes see ourselves precisely in that way. In his view, self-conscious subjects are never fully solitary in part because they depend upon one another and cannot really do without one another. He makes, however, a further claim: only as a social being can I begin to reflect upon myself. It is in the course of encountering another that I stand a chance to become self-conscious. "Once we come to know ourselves, we grasp the way in which we are fundamentally tied to others." Hegel reviews for us a dramatic scene in which one human subject seeks to destroy another, and then another extended scene in which one human subject seeks to dominate another. Destruction and domination turn out not to work very well. One reason they fail is that modes of acting seek to deny both social interdependency and reciprocal ethical obligation. It turns out that if the other can be destroyed, so too can the first, that their fates are in that sense interlinked, and that the strategy of destruction inevitably imperils them both. But there is a problem of self-knowledge here as well: one cannot have certain knowledge of the self without being recognized by another. So if we thought we could know ourselves by turning inward, away from the social world, we were mistaken, for only in the context of the social world is it possible to gain certainty about oneself. Only as alive and social do we stand a chance of knowing ourselves, and once we come to know ourselves, we grasp the way in which we are fundamentally tied to others and the sensuous conditions of our own existence: the earth as a network of living processes. There is also an ethical lesson learned through this encounter, namely, that my life is never my life alone, since my life belongs (a) to living processes that exceed and sustain me, and to (b) other lives, all those other animated and conscious shapes, as it were. And this means that I cannot destroy another’s life without attacking a set of living processes of which I am a part. In other words, in destroying another’s life, I destroy my own, which is not to say that I am the sole agent on the scene. It is rather to say that there is no way as a living being fully to individuate myself from other living beings. One could say, and I have tried to say, that this idea of a living socius is a possible argument for non-violence that emerges from Hegel’s text. "I cannot dominate another without losing track of the social equality that ideally defines us both." Only by turning away from violence as a viable alternative do the social bonds that define our lives appears for the first time. Violence emerges as a distinct possibility, but recognition that violence will not work is what inaugurates the sense of an ethical imperative to find a way of keeping oneself and the other alive, regardless of the conflict between us. Hegel takes account of angry and destructive relations as well as the lethal ruse of social domination. He understands the fury of the individual who wants no one to be like him or equal to him. And yet, he leads us to the realization that I cannot do away with this other without also doing away with myself, that I cannot dominate another without losing track of the social equality that ideally defines us both. At the moment that destroying or dominating the other are ruled out as possibilities, I realize that I am bound to this other who is bound to me, and that my life is bound up with the other’s life. On my reading of Hegel, this recognition that I am bound to the other who is bound to me, and that both of us are bound to a living world illuminates our status as living creatures, our bodily interdependency and a sense of reciprocal ethical obligation that is also an obligation to sustain the world that makes our lives possible and livable.

## Offense

### Plan

#### The United States provides billions dollars of subsidies for “Clean Coal”, which is treated with chemicals in order to lessen its environmental impact.

RFF, Energy and resource think tank, How Clean Is “Refined Coal”? An Empirical Assessment of a Billion-Dollar Tax Credit, June 10, 2019, <https://www.rff.org/news/press-releases/how-clean-is-refined-coal-an-empirical-assessment-of-a-billion-dollar-tax-credit/> ///AHS PB

WASHINGTON, DC—The US tax code presently provides a subsidy for “refined coal”—coal treated by methods intended to reduce emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and mercury (Hg). The tax credits have been supported over the years by members of both parties. The beneficiaries include subsidiaries of electric utilities as well as outside investors in financial services and pharmaceuticals. According to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), six corporations claimed nearly $300 million of credits in 2013, the last year the IRS published data. With its use rising, a new study by Resources for the Future (RFF) estimates nearly $1 billion in tax credits was conferred on producers of refined coal in 2018.

#### Thus the plan: The United States ought to eliminate subsidies for “refined coal”. To clarify this is not a generic coal aff, we just stop production subsidizes for a particular type of coal.

Autumn Hanna, Vice president of Tax Payers for Common Sense, Clean Coal Projects: Cleaning Out the Pockets of Taxpayers, Sep 9, 2008, <https://www.taxpayer.net/energy-natural-resources/clean-coal-projects-cleaning-out-the-pockets-of-taxpayers/> ///AHS PB

Congress must stop throwing billions of taxpayer dollars at a program that has been plagued with inefficiencies and mismanagement. Continued funding for the bloated clean coal program will do little to help our nation’s energy future and leave taxpayers paying a hefty price.

#### Clean coal is a logical contradiction. Coal can never be clean.

Jessica Conditt, Senior editor for Engagdet, Dear Donald Trump: 'Clean coal' doesn't exist, 03.30.17, <https://www.engadget.com/2017/03/30/clean-coal-myth-trump-carbon-capture-energy-no/> ///AHS PB

"Clean coal" is an oxymoron. Even if you took a hunk of coal, doused it in bleach and scrubbed it for six hours with a soapy horsehair brush, it would still cause lung cancer and fill the air with carbon emissions when you burned it. Anyone who says otherwise is lying.

### Advantage:

#### Empirics prove clean coal refining causes toxic chemicals to leak and contaminates the water supplies of poor communities.

Tim McLaughlin, Reporter for Reuters, The truth about ‘clean’ coal, Dec. 3, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-coal-pollution/> ///AHS PB

Refined coal has also led to contamination of water supplies for more than a million people, according to regulators and utility officials. In 2012, the South Carolina Department of Health & Environmental Control noticed elevated levels of bromides, the chemicals used to treat refined coal, in the Santee Cooper-Lake Moultrie public water system, said Tommy Crosby, a spokesman for the agency. The South Carolina plant’s refined coal operation stopped spraying bromide on the coal burned at the Cross Generating Station out of concern for the elevated levels of cancer-causing trihalomethanes, Crosby said, and the levels decreased within six months. Trihalomethanes are created when bromide mixes with the chlorine in treated drinking water. The plant’s refined coal facility was financed by global insurance firm AJ Gallagher, Boston-based mutual fund giant Fidelity and a U.S. subsidiary of France’s Schneider Electric SE. Fidelity declined to comment on the elevated TTHM levels and pointed out that federal limits were not exceeded. Schneider Electric and AJ Gallagher declined to comment. The North Carolina town of Mooresville, downstream of Duke’s Marshall power plant, saw its trihalomethanes surge as high as 127 parts per billion at times in 2015, after the facility discharged bromide used to treat coal into a nearby lake, according to the town’s drinking water quality report. That did not trigger a violation of federal clean water rules because the town’s annual average of 54 parts per billion that year was below the maximum trihalomethane contaminant level of 80 parts per billion. The same was true of the South Carolina plant, where trihalomethane levels in 2012 rose to 67 parts per billion. Over the past decade, however, many studies have shown that exposure to trihalomethanes at much lower levels than the federal limit raises the risk of cancer and of problems during pregnancy. Some people who drink water containing TTHMs in excess of the maximum standard over many years may experience problems with their liver, kidneys, or central nervous system, and may have an increased risk of getting cancer, according to the EPA. In 2016, the EPA included bromide in the Safe Water Drinking Act as an unregulated contaminant to be monitored by public water systems. Research by Jeanne VanBriesen, director of Carnegie Mellon University’s Center for Water Quality in Urban Environmental Systems, found that bromide additives used to reduce mercury could significantly boost trihalomethanes in drinking water supplies downstream of coal plants. Her 2017 study focused on 22 drinking water systems serving 2.5 million people in Pennsylvania. Once Duke Energy halted refined coal operations at the North Carolina plant, bromide dropped about 75 percent in the nearby Catawba River, Zachary Hall, director of environmental science at Duke, said in a February 2017 deposition given to the Southern Environmental Law Center. Duke officials concede that bromide applications contributed to the elevated trihalomethane levels. “While bromides from our facilities were not the sole cause,” Duke’s Culbert said, “we felt it was important to partner with downstream water utilities and suspend the program.”

#### Statistically no clean coal plant has ever worked—From a pure cost benefit analysis the policy is so bad that even if subsidies has a 1-1 ratio in reducing emissions, it would still waste a billion dollars a year.

Brian Prest, economist at Resources for the Future specializing in climate change, oil and gas, and electricity markets. Prest uses economic theory and econometric models to understand energy supply dynamics and improve the design of environmental policies. In his current work, he is assessing the impacts of poor incentive structures in electricity markets on plant emissions and negative prices. He is also working to establish an empirical basis for determining discount rates used in the social cost of carbon. His past work includes econometric analysis of the US oil and gas industry, modeling the intertemporal dynamics of climate change policy under policy uncertainty, and assessing household responses to dynamic electricity pricing. His work has appeared in the Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, Energy Economics, and The Energy Journal. Prior to joining RFF, Prest earned his PhD at Duke University and previously worked in both the public and private sectors. At the Congressional Budget Office, he developed economic models of various energy sectors to analyze the effects of proposed legislation, including the 2009 Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill and related Clean Electricity Standards. At NERA Economic Consulting, he conducted electricity market modeling, project valuation, and discounted cash flow analysis of various infrastructure investments in the United States, Latin America, Europe, Africa, and Southeast Asia, with a focus on the power sector. And Alan Krupnick, a Senior Fellow at Resources for the Future. Krupnick’s research focuses on analyzing environmental and energy issues, in particular, the benefits, costs and design of pollution and energy policies, both in the United States and abroad. He leads RFF’s research on the risks, regulation and economics associated with shale gas development and has developed a portfolio of research on issues surrounding this newly plentiful fuel. Krupnick also served as senior economist on the President‘s Council of Economic Advisers, advising the Clinton administration on environmental and natural resource policy issues. In 2011 he was elected President of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists and earlier that year was named an AERE Fellow. He has served on the Editorial Boards of a number of journals. He co-chaired a federal advisory committee counseling the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency on the implementation of new ozone and particulate standards. He is a regular member of expert committees from the National Academy of Sciences, the USEPA and various Canadian government and non-governmental institutions. Krupnick also consults with state governments, federal agencies, private corporations, the Canadian government, the European Union, the Asian Development Bank, the World Health Organization, and the World Bank. He received his PhD in Economics from the University of Maryland in 1980, How Clean is “Refined Coal”?An Empirical Assessment of aBillion-Dollar Tax Credit, Report 19-05 June 2019, <https://media.rff.org/documents/Refined_Coal_Report_11.pdf> ///AHS PB

4.3. Unit Level Regressions For further evidence, we estimate emissions reductions at the unit (boiler) level, where possible. Whereas the preceding results show average emissions rates, it is possible that these averages mask heterogeneous effects whereby some plants achieve the targeted reductions whereas others do not. To address this possibility, we re-estimate our model at the unit level where there is enough identifying variation to do so. This is possible for the majority of the “dual coal” units. It is not possible for all units because it requires observing a given unit both before and after switching from regular to refined coal (or vice versa), and under identical emissions control conditions. We have sufficient variation in the data to estimate potential reductions from refined coal for 47 units for NOx, 48 units for SO2, and 26 units for Hg.18 Histograms of these reductions are shown in Figure 8 (negative changes indicate reductions, positive ones indicate increases). Less than a fifth of these units is estimated to achieve the required NOx reductions. Only one unit achieved the reductions in SO2 (but it did not achieve the Hg reductions), and another achieved the reductions in Hg (but not the SO2 reductions), and neither of those units achieved the NOx reductions. As a result, none of these units are estimated to achieve the reductions required by the tax statute. Quite a few estimates even suggest an increase in emissions from refined coal use. In summary, we find no evidence that any plant is achieving the required reductions. Figure 8. Histograms of Estimated Emission Rate Reductions for Units with Sufficient Data 4.4. Reasons Why Plants Might Not Achieve Emissions Reductions Why might plants not be achieving the 20 percent and 40 percent reductions in emissions rates that the law requires? While we do not know how policymakers chose these particular targets when devising the legislation, we can speculate as to potential reasons that plants might be falling short. First, while the mechanism for the Hg reductions is well understood based on conversations with engineers (it oxidizes the Hg, making it easier to capture), it is not obvious why this would reduce NOx or SO2 emissions at all. This aligns well with our finding of negligible SO2 reductions, but we do estimate modest NOx reductions. The mechanism behind this reduction is not clear. A second possibility is that refined coal does reduce emissions, but plants systematically dial back or even shut down other emissions control technologies. For example, plants can save money by reducing the amount of ammonia injected to a SCR. Based on conversations with industry experts and EPA, some plants have indeed reduced their use of pollution controls when the NOx allowance caps became non-binding. If plants are indeed reducing the use of pollution control technology due to the refined coal tax credit, then the subsidy is creating perverse incentives. These effects would be correctly captured in our estimates, which considers the overall net effect of refined coal use. 4.5. Policy Evaluation and Cost–Benefit Analysis While our econometric analysis strongly suggests that the subsidy to refined coal plants is failing to generate the requisite NOx and SO2, or Hg emissions reductions, it may still be the case that the legislation passes a cost–benefit test from either or both of two perspectives: (1) based on the actual pollution reductions, or (2) based on the larger pollution reduction targets in the legislation. Therefore, we estimate these benefits and compare them to the social costs of the subsidy, which we estimate to be about $7 per ton (including private refining costs and the excess burden of taxation). Failure to pass based on both actual pollution reductions (1) and the larger reductions required by law (2) is evidence for repealing (not renewing) the legislation. Failure to pass based on actual reductions (1) but nonetheless passing test based on the larger required reductions (2) implies that society is better off with the legislation than not—as long as targeted emissions reductions are in fact met in the field. This implies that a change in the law is needed, to drop laboratory testing for demonstrating compliance and replace it with field testing. Because we observe the subsidy and the plants using the refined coal, this cost– benefit analysis is retrospective (as opposed to the prospective cost–benefit analysis performed in a federal government compare the benefits in 2017 with the total costs, including the private refining costs and the excess burden of taxation (i.e., the economic inefficiency caused by the government raising funds to pay for the subsidy) 4.5.1. Benefits The immediate impacts of using refined coal are the emissions reductions for the plants using this coal, which ultimately leads to health and environmental improvements. When these improvements are monetized, they are termed benefits. To be specific about our benefits analysis, we discuss the potential benefit pathways and those we actually model. Pollutants from a power plant are emitted from a tall stack where they then disperse and transform in the air—in particular, the NOx emissions convert to PM2.5 and ozone under the appropriate conditions, and the SO2 converts to PM2.5. The unconverted NOx and SO2, as well as the PM2.5, ozone, and Hg emissions, all cause physical impacts, depending on the populations and sensitive environmental resources being affected. Typically, the largest monetary benefits from air pollution control are those to human health, particularly to reducing human mortality. PM2.5 reductions have the largest marginal impacts on mortality risks of any of the affected pollutants. And the monetary values typically used in emissions control cost–benefit analysis (i.e., an RIA when performed by the federal government) are far larger for mortality risk reductions than for any other impact category. While a number of impact pathways are ignored in this analysis, as noted, we capture the main ones. Our analysis makes use of the COBRA model,19 an EPA-approved benefits model at the county level, which incorporates source-receptor matrices, pollutant transformation functions, demographics, and a variety of concentration-health response functions. We focus on the adult mortality risk reductions from PM2.5 reductions attributable reductions in NOx and SO2 emissions. We use the model to estimate the benefits in 2017 by calculating how emissions at plants burning refined coal would differ had they not achieved the reductions that we estimate. That is, we adjust actual 2017 emissions from refined coal plants according to the estimated reductions in Table 2 (columns 1–2).20 We then calculate benefits as the difference in mortality at actual emissions levels and at the (higher) emissions levels without refined coal. As a sensitivity, we re-run this analysis using the unit-level estimated reductions where possible. Finally, we estimate the benefits that would be achieved if the legislative targets were met. We emphasize that our estimates likely overstate the actual benefits attributable to the refined coal tax credit for several reasons. First, we assume that, absent the tax credit, the same amount of coal (in mmbtu) would be burned in absence of the refined coal tax credit, simply at a different emissions rate (lbs/mmbtu). In reality, the tax credit may have increased the amount of coal burned because it reduced the marginal cost of burning coal, leading them to operate more often. For example, Resources for the Future 23 for a typical coal plant burning coal with a heat content of 20 mmbtu/ton at a heat rate of 10 mmbtu/MWh, a $7 per ton tax credit effectively reduces after-tax operating costs by $3.5/MWh.21 This is can be a large cost reduction, for example, for plants burning cheap, low-quality coal such as lignite, which sells for $20 per ton, on average.22 While these estimates do not account for the private refining costs, they are roughly indicative of the magnitude of the tax credit relative to fuel costs, which could increase the amount of coal burned. The revenue from the tax credit may have an effect on the extensive margin as well, with the flow of revenues preventing the retirement of otherwise unprofitable plants. Both of these factors are ways in which the refined coal tax credit can increase total emissions by increasing the amount of coal burned, even if the coal has somewhat lower emissions per ton. The second reason why our estimates may overstate the benefits of refined coal has to do with how NOx and SO2 are regulated. Both pollutants are covered to varying degrees by emissions trading (i.e., cap-and-trade) programs: the Acid Rain Program and Cross-State Air Pollution Rule. To the extent that refined coal reduces emissions at regulated plants, this frees up emissions permits that can be sold to another plant. Some caps have been binding in recent years (i.e., summertime seasonal NOx), whereas others have not been binding. Any emission reductions covered by a binding cap would be offset one-for-one by emission increases at other covered plants. This implies that reductions attributable to refined coal at some plants may simply redistribute the location of emissions, rather than reducing emissions overall. On the other hand, NOx allowance prices have been very close to zero in recent years, except in the summer when seasonal allowances have been clearing at substantially positive prices. Further, SO2 caps have generally been non-binding in recent years.23 This suggests that the cap may not always be binding. Overall, this again suggests our estimates of the benefits of refined coal represent an upper bound of the true benefits. Another reason we may be overstating the impacts of the refined coal tax credit is other regulations. We assume that no firm would burn refined coal in absence of the tax credit, but some firms might continue to burn it to comply with other regulations, such as the MATS rule regulating Hg emissions. Hence, repealing the credit may have a smaller impact on refined coal use than we assume. One factor goes in the other direction: we focus only on the PM2.5 adult mortality benefits from reduced NOx and SO2 emissions. While this captures approximately 90 percent of the benefits of reducing PM2.5 based on results in many RIAs, it does not consider the benefits from reduced ozone formation and Hg emissions (the estimated benefits of the latter being particularly small in the MATS rule RIA).24 24 We report our results for several runs. For test (1) above, we compute the benefits from refined coal use using our estimated reductions for NOx and SO2 emissions relative to the actual emissions. For test (2) we compute the benefits from refined coal use under the assumption that all plants are meeting the legislative emission reduction targets for NOx and SO2, relative to the counterfactual of no refined coal use. For the latter test, we are effectively assuming that firms comply using the SO2 rather than the Hg emissions target. In contrast, the predominate reason for using refined control, judging from literature referenced in this paper, is to reduce Hg emissions. However, as noted above, the quantifiable HG effects on health and the monetary value of these effects are very small compared to the effects of reduced SO2 emissions and their conversion to fine particles. Thus, our approach greatly overstates the quantifiable benefits of refined coal in this scenario. Accordingly, we also show the COBRA model results separated by NOx and SO2 emissions, so we can consider the benefits if only NOx emissions are reduced by 20 percent. This would correspond to a scenario in which plants achieve eligibility using NOx and Hg reductions, but the Hg reductions are valued at close to zero (as EPA has done in its MATS RIA). 4.5.2. Costs There are two components of total (social) costs. The first is the private costs of the technology. Variable costs are low. We estimate25 that the real economic costs of refining are about $5 per ton of coal processed. Multiplying by the tons of refined coal processed and burned in 2017 suggests private costs of about $600 million annually.26 The second component of social costs is the excess burden of taxation. This represents the economic inefficiency caused by other taxes used to raise public funds to finance the subsidy. Parry (2002) suggests a typical excess burden of at least 30 percent, suggesting that a conservative estimate of the cost of excess burden is $7\*0.3=$2.1 per ton. The social cost is the private cost plus the excess burden, or $5 + 0.3\*$7, which is just about $7 per ton. Multiplying by the total tons of coal refined in 2017 yields a social cost of about $900 million annually.

#### Clean coal is propaganda—it makes the entire industry look environmentally sustainable and prevents future environmental reforms.

ANNE C. MULKERN, Reporter for E&E and has written extensively about California's climate law, the state's push on renewable power, electric vehicles, drought, and the people leading key energy developments, A 'Propaganda War' Over 'Clean Coal', April 20, 2009, <https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/04/20/20greenwire-propaganda-war-over-coal-escalates-ahead-of-hi-10594.html?pagewanted=print> ///AHS PB

Five months into an advertising war on coal, the phrase "clean coal" not only endures, it has become political shorthand. Everyone -- from Democratic Sen. Kent Conrad of North Dakota to Interior Secretary Ken Salazar -- refers to clean coal or clean coal technology. Environmentalists call the "clean coal" rhetoric dangerous, saying it creates complacency about the need to move toward true carbon-free energy. Policymakers, environmentalists say, know that coal remains one of the most polluting sources of energy. The word war over coal is escalating. There are billions of dollars at stake, as Congress moves toward historic legislation that could decide winners and losers in the green energy economy. Already, there are signs of small victories by the coal camp. "To a certain extent, it is a propaganda war," said Kenneth Green, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, a Washington think tank. "The coal industry believes the environmental community wants to put it out of business. The environmental groups are afraid the clean coal concept is appealing enough to lawmakers, it will stymie their progress in getting rid of coal." Coal's boosters and its critics are vying to shape public perception about the fuel. For coal, winning the battle could mean securing billions of dollars for years to come. Coal companies want federal money for research on removing and sequestering carbon emissions and to preserve their position as dominant players in the United States' energy supply. Meanwhile, environmentalists are hungry to minimize the role of polluting fossil fuels and capture federal money for wind, solar, other renewable power sources and conservation efforts.

#### And the Aff creates the starting point for a broader movement against climate change and environmental destruction. By specifically critiquing fossil fuels, we galvanize inclusive movements on environmental justice. You should ignore NC framing arguments that try to mask material violence in favor of abstract ethics.

Fergus Green, Researcher and climate policy consultant based at the London School of Economics & Political Science. From January 2014 to October 2015, Fergus was a Policy Analyst and Research Advisor to Professor Stern at the LSE’s Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change & the Environment and Centre for Climate Change Economics & Policy. In that role he was primarily responsible for providing academic and policy-related research assistance and advice to Professor Stern. He was also a Policy Analyst within the Institute’s Policy Team, working on projects relating to international climate cooperation, climate policy in China, and various theoretical topics concerning climate change mitigation policy. Fergus is currently an MRes/PhD candidate in Political Science in the LSE Department of Government and he remains actively involved with the Institute, Anti-fossil fuel norms, Published in Climatic Change September 2018, Volume 150, Issue 1–2, pp 103–116, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6> ///AHS PB Brackets for AFFN Abrivation

First, AFFNs [Anti Fossil Fuel Narratives] are amenable to framing using clear and simple language. Fossil fuels and associated infrastructure are readily understood by lay audiences. In contrast, concepts such as greenhouse gases, “2°C average warming”, and “350 ppm” are abstract, technical constructions not readily grasped by laypersons (Gauri [2012](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR28), 11). Moreover, the prohibitionary AFFNs with which I am concerned are straightforward deontological imperatives, whereas grasping climate change goals typically requires cognitively demanding forms of ethical reasoning, such as utilitarian calculation or the resolution of multiple conflicts among rights and duties (Green [2017](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR30)). These features make the empirical and moral messages associated with AFFNs more intuitively plausible (e.g., “coal kills: no new coalmines!”). Second, AFFNs [Anti Fossil Fuel Narratives] ameliorate a major challenge faced by climate campaigners: the harms caused by climate change are causally complex and (perceived to be) remote from their cause in time and space (van der Linden et al. [2015](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR69)). The production, transport and consumption of fossil fuels, however, in addition to causing climate change, cause and are popularly associated with a range of other harms. These may include adverse local environmental, health and social impacts, corruption, repressive governance practices, human rights abuses, energy insecurity, and economic volatility. Most of these harms affect communities temporally and physically proximate to the cause and in a direct and causally obvious, often physical way. These features make the impacts of fossil fuel activities easier to understand, more intuitively morally wrong, more relevant to the everyday concerns and priorities of target audiences, more likely to trigger feelings of indignation among diverse groups, and ultimately more likely to motivate engaged forms of social movement participation, compared with the impacts of climate change. Third, AFFNs [Anti Fossil Fuel Narratives] personalize the causes of climate change, thus strengthening the intuitiveness of their moral wrongness and more readily triggering feelings of indignation, compared with a climate change frame. As Keck and Sikkink note, “problems whose causes can be assigned to deliberate (intentional) actions of identifiable individuals are amenable to advocacy network strategies [including political mobilization] in ways that problems whose causes are irredeemably structural are not” (Keck and Sikkink [1998](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR40), 27). One of the reasons that climate change is not psychologically salient is precisely that its cause is (perceived to be) structural: it is (commonly framed as) an unintentional side-effect of the everyday actions of billions of people. So understood, it lacks an identifiable causal agent intending the kind of wrongdoing that automatically violates our moral intuitions (Markowitz and Shariff [2012](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR50), 244). Anti-fossil fuel initiatives, by contrast, help to concentrate moral pressure on the largest culprits of climate change, which makes such initiatives more effective at inspiring public anger/indignation (McAdam [2017](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR51), 204). Indeed, this is a key factor motivating AFFN entrepreneurship, especially the divestment movement (Gunningham [2017b](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR32), 378). As Bill McKibben has put it, “movements require enemies” and “the fossil-fuel industry … is Public Enemy Number One”, noting that just six of the largest listed oil and gas companies alone hold reserves that together “would use up more than a quarter of the remaining two-degree budget” (McKibben [2012](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR52), citing Carbon Tracker Initiative [2011](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR13)). This concentration of moral pressure on fossil fuel companies is also an important means by which anti-fossil fuel campaigners can undermine their more powerful opponents. While activist groups cannot come close to matching the fossil fuel industry’s financial resources, its elite political relationships or its “structural” power in our fossil fuel-dependent global economy, they typically do enjoy considerable “discursive” and “symbolic” power, meaning battles over ideas and legitimacy tend to be less one-sided (Gunningham [2017b](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR32), 382–85; Ayling [2017](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR5)). Moralized anti-fossil fuel frames therefore play to activists’ comparative advantage, threatening to stigmatize the fossil fuel industry in the eyes of the wider public (Ansar et al. [2013](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR3); Seidman [2015](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR64)) and to sap its legitimacy—a crucial intangible resource affecting its ability to realize its objectives (Ayling [2017](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR5), 351). To counter the mounting moral pressure and mitigate the risk of stigmatization, threatened industries tend to deploy “moral” counter-frames that attempt to justify their harmful practices, and this is exactly what the fossil fuel industry is now doing (Ayling [2017](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR5), 358, 361; Jamieson [2017](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR37); Seidman [2015](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR64), 1033). Yet the industry’s moral justifications are often transparently implausible, as with the coal industry’s public relations campaign that casts its objectives in moral terms of helping the world’s energy poor (e.g., Sheppard [2014](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR65)), and are thus easily debunked or parodied.[12](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#Fn12) But the industry has also responded to the heightened moral pressure of anti-fossil fuel activism by doubling down on its use of more naked, instrumental forms of power. For example, political corruption and heavy-handed tactics to repress activist opposition have allegedly been deployed by proponents of the Keystone XL and Dakota Access Pipelines (Federman [2013](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR24); S. King [2016](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR43); Rainforest Action Network et al. [2017](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR60), 52). Such tactics, in turn, further deplete the company/industry’s legitimacy, undermine its “moral” counter-frames, and further increase the likelihood of stigmatization. Empirical evidence suggests that the framing resonance and awareness-raising potential of AFFNs is strong. Survey evidence about energy sources in the USA and Australia, for example, supports the claim that anti-fossil fuel frames are likely to be more resonant than generic climate change frames (Anonymous [2016](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR2); Ansolabehere and Konisky [2014](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR4); Kennedy [2017](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR41); Lewis [2017](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR46)), and in China, local air pollution (caused by fossil fuels) is one of the highest issues of public concern (Wike and Stokes [2016](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR71)). Case studies indicate the potential for proposed fossil fuel infrastructure to generate strong local opposition, conflict among opponents and proponents/supporters, and wider media attention (Bomberg [2017](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR11); Cheon and Urpelainen [2018](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR14); Connor [2016](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR17); Connor et al. [2009](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR18), 501–3; Ordner [2017](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR55)). The divestment movement, with its moralized anti-fossil fuel frame, has in a very short time, enhanced public discourse on climate change, increasing the traction of both anti-fossil fuel messages and more mainstream, liberal climate policy responses in public debate (Schifeling and Hoffman [2017](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR63); see also Ayling and Gunningham [2017](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR6); Gunningham [2017a](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR31), 317–19; Seidman [2015](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR64), 1030–34). The concentration of moral pressure onto target companies/industries, discussed earlier, can also undermine the latter’s external relationships. Specifically, it can help to isolate them from private supporters and enabling institutions (e.g., sources of finance and cultural legitimacy) who may be more sensitive than fossil fuel companies themselves to the effects of such pressure on their own reputations, legitimacy and/or profits (Devers et al. [2009](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR21); King and Pearce [2010](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR44), 255–56). AFFNs arguably have strong potential to achieve such effects, primarily through targeting institutional investors and educational, religious and cultural institutions that enable or support fossil fuels (Ayling and Gunningham [2017](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR6); Gunningham [2017b](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR32); Seidman [2015](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR64); and see, e.g., Rainforest Action Network et al. [2017](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR60)). Ultimately, effective political mobilization against fossil fuel industry targets can cause delays to or cancelations of planned projects, and can raise political and legal risks that interact with economic variables to affect the viability of projects—as campaigns against US coal-fired power stations, Canadian tar sands projects, and north American pipeline projects attest (Cheon and Urpelainen [2018](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR14); Sanzillo et al. [2014](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR62)). Such mobilization also has the potential to change electoral outcomes by shifting the composition of advocacy coalitions and altering public opinion, facilitating the (full or partial) institutionalization of specific movement goals into policy and/or enabling wider climate-energy policy shifts (Cheon and Urpelainen [2018](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR14); Schifeling and Hoffman [2017](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-2134-6#CR63)). These domestic outcomes, in turn, can strengthen global AFFNs [Anti Fossil Fuel Narratives] (“no new oil pipelines”; “phase out coal” etc.).

#### Global climate change is an impact of unprecedented magnitude. Positive feedback loops, mass starvation, resource conflicts, biosphere uninhabitability, and grid collapse are all existential.

Peter Kareiva and Valerie Carranza, Director of the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at UCLA & Pritzker Distinguished Professor in Environment & Sustainability, in Futures, in 2018 ["Existential risk due to ecosystem collapse: Nature strikes back", https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328717301726, 7-30-2019] AR

In summary, six of the nine proposed planetary boundaries (phosphorous, nitrogen, biodiversity, land use, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution) are unlikely to be associated with existential risks. They all correspond to a degraded environment, but in our assessment do not represent existential risks. However, the three remaining boundaries (climate change, global freshwater cycle, and ocean acidification) do pose existential risks. This is because of intrinsic positive feedback loops, substantial lag times between system change and experiencing the consequences of that change, and the fact these different boundaries interact with one another in ways that yield surprises. In addition climate, freshwater, and acidification are all directly connected to the provision of food and water, and shortages of food and water can create conflict and social unrest. Climate change has a long history of disrupting civilizations and sometimes precipitating the collapse of cultures or mass emigrations (McMichael, 2017). For example, the 12th century drought in the North American Southwest is held responsible for the collapse of the Anasazi pueblo culture. More recently, the infamous potato famine of 1846-1849 and the large migration of Irish to the US can be traced to a combination of factors, one of which was climate. Specifically, 1846 was an unusually warm and moist year in Ireland, providing the climatic conditions favorable to the fungus that caused the potato blight. As is so often the case, poor government had a role as well—as the British government forbade the import of grains from outside Britain (imports that could have helped to redress the ravaged potato yields). Climate change intersects with freshwater resources because it is expected to exacerbate drought and water scarcity, as well as flooding. Climate change can even impair water quality because it is associated with heavy rains that overwhelm sewage treatment facilities, or because it results in higher concentrations of pollutants in groundwater as a result of enhanced evaporation and reduced groundwater recharge. Ample clean water is not a luxury – it is essential for human survival. Consequently, cities, regions and nations that lack clean freshwater are vulnerable to social disruption and disease. Finally, ocean acidification is linked to climate change because it is driven by CO2 emissions just as global warming is. With close to 20% of the world’s protein coming from oceans (FAO, 2016), the potential for severe impacts due to acidification is obvious. Less obvious, but perhaps more insidious, is the interaction between climate change and the loss of oyster and coral reefs due to acidification. Acidification is known to interfere with oyster reef building and coral reefs. Climate change also increases storm frequency and severity. Coral reefs and oyster reefs provide protection from storm surge because they reduce wave energy (Spalding et al., 2014). If these reefs are lost due to acidification at the same time as storms become more severe and sea level rises, coastal communities will be exposed to unprecedented storm surge—and may be ravaged by recurrent storms. A key feature of the risk associated with climate change is that mean annual temperature and mean annual rainfall are not the variables of interest. Rather it is extreme episodic events that place nations and entire regions of the world at risk. These extreme events are by definition “rare” (once every hundred years), and changes in their likelihood are challenging to detect because of their rarity, but are exactly the manifestations of climate change that we must get better at anticipating (Diffenbaugh et al., 2017). Society will have a hard time responding to shorter intervals between rare extreme events because in the lifespan of an individual human, a person might experience as few as two or three extreme events. How likely is it that you would notice a change in the interval between events that are separated by decades, especially given that the interval is not regular but varies stochastically? A concrete example of this dilemma can be found in the past and expected future changes in storm-related flooding of New York City. The highly disruptive flooding of New York City associated with Hurricane Sandy represented a flood height that occurred once every 500 years in the 18th century, and that occurs now once every 25 years, but is expected to occur once every 5 years by 2050 (Garner et al, 2017). This change in frequency of extreme floods has profound implications for the measures New York City should take to protect its infrastructure and its population, yet because of the stochastic nature of such events, this shift in flood frequency is an elevated risk that will go unnoticed by most people. 4. The combination of positive feedback loops and societal inertia is fertile ground for global environmental catastrophes Humans are remarkably ingenious, and have adapted to crises throughout their history. Our doom has been repeatedly predicted, only to be averted by innovation (Ridley, 2011). However, the many stories of human ingenuity successfully addressing existential risks such as global famine or extreme air pollution represent environmental challenges that are largely linear, have immediate consequences, and operate without positive feedbacks. For example, the fact that food is in short supply does not increase the rate at which humans consume food—thereby increasing the shortage. Similarly, massive air pollution episodes such as the London fog of 1952 that killed 12,000 people did not make future air pollution events more likely. In fact it was just the opposite—the London fog sent such a clear message that Britain quickly enacted pollution control measures (Stradling, 2016). Food shortages, air pollution, water pollution, etc. send immediate signals to society of harm, which then trigger a negative feedback of society seeking to reduce the harm. In contrast, today’s great environmental crisis of climate change may cause some harm but there are generally long time delays between rising CO2 concentrations and damage to humans. The consequence of these delays are an absence of urgency; thus although 70% of Americans believe global warming is happening, only 40% think it will harm them (http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us-2016/). Secondly, unlike past environmental challenges, the earth’s climate system is rife with positive feedback loops. In particular, as CO2 increases and the climate warms, that very warming can cause more CO2 release which further increases global warming, and then more CO2, and so on. Table 2 summarizes the best documented positive feedback loops for the Earth’s climate system. These feedbacks can be neatly categorized into carbon cycle, biogeochemical, biogeophysical, cloud, ice-albedo, and water vapor feedbacks. As important as it is to understand these feedbacks individually, it is even more essential to study the interactive nature of these feedbacks. Modeling studies show that when interactions among feedback loops are included, uncertainty increases dramatically and there is a heightened potential for perturbations to be magnified (e.g., Cox et al., 2000; Hajima et al., 2014; Knutti & Rugenstein, 2015; Rosenfeld et al., 2014). This produces a wide range of future scenarios. Positive feedbacks in the carbon cycle involves the enhancement of future carbon contributions to the atmosphere due to some initial increase in atmospheric CO2. This happens because as CO2 accumulates, it reduces the efficiency in which oceans and terrestrial ecosystems sequester carbon, which in return feeds back to exacerbate climate change (Friedlingstein et al., 2001). Warming can also increase the rate at which organic matter decays and carbon is released into the atmosphere, thereby causing more warning (Melillo et al, 2017). Increases in food shortages and lack of water is also of major concern when biogeophysical feedback mechanisms perpetuate drought conditions. The underlying mechanism here is that losses in vegetation increases the surface albedo, which suppresses rainfall, and thus enhances future vegetation loss and more suppression of rainfall—thereby initiating or prolonging a drought (Chamey et al., 1975). To top it off, overgrazing depletes the soil, leading to augmented vegetation loss (Anderies et al., 2002). Climate change often also increases the risk of forest fires, as a result of higher temperatures and persistent drought conditions. The expectation is that forest fires will become more frequent and severe with climate warming and drought (Scholze et al., 2006), a trend for which we have already seen evidence (Allen et al., 2010). Tragically, the increased severity and risk of Southern California wildfires recently predicted by climate scientists (Jin et al, 2015), was realized in December 2017, with the largest fire in the history of California (the “Thomas fire” that burned 282,000 acres, https://www.vox.com/2017/12/27/16822180/thomas-fire-californialargest-wildfire ). This catastrophic fire embodies the sorts of positive feedbacks and interacting factors that could catch humanity off-guard and produce a true apocalyptic event. Recordbreaking rains produced an extraordinary flush of new vegetation, that then dried out as record heat waves and dry conditions took hold, coupled with stronger than normal winds, and ignition. Of course the record-fire released CO2 into the atmosphere, thereby contributing to future warming. Out of all types of feedbacks, water vapor and the ice-albedo feedbacks are the most clearly understood mechanisms. Losses in reflective snow and ice cover drive up surface temperatures, leading to even more melting of snow and ice cover—this is known as the ice-albedo feedback (Curry et al., 1995). As snow and ice continue to melt at a more rapid pace, millions of people may be displaced by flooding risks as a consequence of sea level rise near coastal communities (Biermann & Boas, 2010; Myers, 2002; Nicholls et al., 2011). The water vapor feedback operates when warmer atmospheric conditions strengthen the saturation vapor pressure, which creates a warming effect given water vapor’s strong greenhouse gas properties (Manabe & Wetherald, 1967). Global warming tends to increase cloud formation because warmer temperatures lead to more evaporation of water into the atmosphere, and warmer temperature also allows the atmosphere to hold more water. The key question is whether this increase in clouds associated with global warming will result in a positive feedback loop (more warming) or a negative feedback loop (less warming). For decades, scientists have sought to answer this question and understand the net role clouds play in future climate projections (Schneider et al., 2017). Clouds are complex because they both have a cooling (reflecting incoming solar radiation) and warming (absorbing incoming solar radiation) effect (Lashof et al., 1997). The type of cloud, altitude, and optical properties combine to determine how these countervailing effects balance out. Although still under debate, it appears that in most circumstances the cloud feedback is likely positive (Boucher et al., 2013). For example, models and observations show that increasing greenhouse gas concentrations reduces the low-level cloud fraction in the Northeast Pacific at decadal time scales. This then has a positive feedback effect and enhances climate warming since less solar radiation is reflected by the atmosphere (Clement et al., 2009). The key lesson from the long list of potentially positive feedbacks and their interactions is that runaway climate change, and runaway perturbations have to be taken as a serious possibility. Table 2 is just a snapshot of the type of feedbacks that have been identified (see Supplementary Material for a more thorough explanation of positive feedback loops). However, this list is not exhaustive and the possibility of undiscovered positive feedbacks portends even greater existential risks. The many environmental crises humankind has previously averted (famine, ozone depletion, London fog, water pollution, etc.) were averted because of political will based on solid scientific understanding. We cannot count on complete scientific understanding when it comes to positive feedback loops and climate change. 5. It is multiplicative stresses (or “double whammies”) that should be our greatest concern It is easy to see how positive feedback loops exacerbate existential risks. A second, but less obvious danger is the linkage of seemingly unrelated processes or phenomenon that increase risk. A good example is wildfires and tornadoes. Both of these represent natural disasters that can cause great damage. Until recently no one linked these two phenomena, and no one would have imagined that an increase in wildfires might cause an increase in tornados. However, researchers in 2016 documented a linkage between wildfires in Central America and the worst episode of tornadoes in North America’s recorded history (Saide et al., 2016)—more than 120 twisters in one day, which killed 316 people. The mechanism is that the aerosol particles produced by wildfires increase the vertical sheer in atmospheric wind speeds, which in turn makes tornadoes more likely and more severe. While tornadoes and wildfires are both local there are other trends that are national or even global that entail interacting risks factors—or what the renowned ecologist Robert T. Paine called a “double whammy” (Paine, 1993). Paine makes the argument that whereas one perturbation or stress on its own might not be terribly worrisome, if an ecosystem is hit with two stresses or threats at the same time (or in quick succession) the result can be surprisingly catastrophic. For example, aging infrastructure in the United States (dams, bridges, levees, etc.) is often talked about as a disaster waiting to happen (Reid, 2008). Similarly, increased extreme rainfall is widely appreciated as a likely outcome of climate change. Putting the two together, we have a recipe for turning improbable events into something that should be expected. A specific example of what was once a highly unlikely tragedy, but is now perhaps a probable disaster is the failure of a large dam. If large aging dams fail due to the combination of decaying infrastructure and unprecedented rainfall, downstream communities could be destroyed. Existing dams were engineered for flood frequencies and rainfall regimes that have been replaced by much more extreme weather events. This should raise general concerns about flood-safety. Not only are the designs for major dams obsolete due to climate changes, the dams themselves are obsolete. In the United States alone, more than 85% of large dams will be more than 50 years old by 2020 (Hossain et al., 2009). Based on data from the National Performance of Dam Failures, the top ten causes of dam incidents in the United States are depicted in Fig. 2a. The most frequent type of incident was attributed to inflow floods—that is more than 1000 dam failures. The reason this is a global concern is that observations (Fig. 2b) in dry and wet regions all over the world show that extreme precipitation events have been increasing since the 1950s (Donat et al., 2017). The combined effect of intensified rainfall and old dams pose a clear risk to communities worldwide. California, which has used dams and reservoirs to store water on a massive scale, recently suffered through several consecutive years of both low rainfall and high temperatures that produced a 5-year record-breaking drought (Diffenbaugh et al., 2015). The drought ended when the state experienced massive amounts of precipitation in early 2017 leading to its wettest rainy season, on record (Vahedifard et al., 2017). The rainfall unleashed floods, landslides, and nearly collapsed the Oroville Dam, the tallest dam in North America. The tremendous water flows severely damaged the dam’s spillways, prompting the evacuation of about 190,000 people downriver of the dam (Park & Mclaughlin, 2017). This particular crisis is an example of how the intersection of climate change and infrastructure that is either aging or that was designed for different conditions can potentially lead to a catastrophe (Vahedifard et al., 2017). With the likelihood of more frequent extreme events in the future, situations like the one experienced at the Oroville Dam will become more common. The intersection of climate change and human activity is also elevating the risk of severe wildfires in large portions of the world. Models suggest that precipitation was the primary driver behind global fire regimes during the preindustrial era, and then shifted towards an anthropogenicdriven regime during the industrial period (Pechony & Shindell, 2010). Now it appears that temperature will play a strong role in the 21st century in global wildfires (Pechony & Shindell, 2010). The combination of increasing temperatures at the global scale with increased propensity of wildfires due to human activity at the local level, could lead to massive infernos (Bonan, 2008). Wildfire severity and frequency will be dramatically increased wherever the mean temperature in a region increases by 3°C or more; unfortunately, in the Sahel, central Australia, central Asia, southern Africa, the western U.S., and in most of South America, warming is indeed expected to exceed 3°C (Scholze et al., 2006). This is a global threat. Sometimes there is irony in the way stresses combine to produce a catastrophe. Humans have adapted to heat waves by installing air conditioning. The combination of a heat wave, with increased demands for irrigation and air conditioning led to the largest ever power outage in India during 2012. Over 600 million were left without electricity and without air conditioning to mitigate the heat wave (Lundgren & Kjellstrom, 2013). Hospitals lost power and cities shut down. While it is possible to improve on the design of electric grids to reduce such massive outages (Fang, 2014), it is clear that the combination of extreme climate events and how humans respond to those heat waves has led to several massive power outages around the world (Klinger & Landeg, 2014). The irony is that air conditioning is an adaption to heat—and the adoption of air conditioning routinely saves lives (Barreca et al., 2016). But the adaptation that saves human lives can overburden an electric grid and make it much more susceptible to failure. Again it is the interconnections of stresses and the way we respond to environmental shocks that promulgates the greatest existential risk.

#### Prioritize environmental impacts first: Current risk models favor reactionary panic over long term climate threats.

Dennis Soron, Professor at Brock University, Cruel Weather: Natural Disasters and Structural Violence, 2007 Issue No. 14 — Accidental Environments, <http://www.transformationsjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Soron_Transformations14.pdf> ///AHS PB

Although this blustery response is perhaps understandable as a psychological defense against painful self-knowledge, it makes little sense otherwise. Indeed, by almost any measure, King’s assessment of the relative dangers posed by climate change and terrorism is hard to deny. According to statistics compiled by the United States National Counterterrorism Center (NCC), only nine Americans were killed in “terrorist attacks” outside of Iraq in 2005 (NCC v) – that is, approximately the same number of people that died in the country that year of whooping cough. The NCC calculates that 14,600 deaths from terrorist attacks occurred globally in 2005, 55% of which took place in Iraq (NCC: V). Put another way, this means that outside of the destabilized war-zone created in Iraq by the United States itself, the total number of people who died at the hands of terrorists in 2005 (6570) was significantly less than the number (8493) that died each day that year of HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS 2005). In contrast to the threat of terrorism, Lester Brown writes, the 2003 heat wave in Europe alone “claimed 49,000 lives in eight countries… More than 15 times as many people died in Europe in this heat wave as died during the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001” (Brown, p. 60). On an even more tragic scale, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that climate change is now responsible for approximately 150,000 deaths and 5 million serious illnesses each year, a toll that could double by the year 2030 (Patz et al). The ideological influence of entrenched economic and political interests has helped to distort our understanding of the most urgent threats to human “security” today, creating a stark imbalance between the moral gravity we attribute to direct but limited forms of violence such as terrorism, and the casual expediency with which we accept the systematic harm inflicted on millions across the globe by climate change. Part of this imbalance, perhaps, derives from our very conceptualization of “violence” itself. Terrorist acts – understood as direct and premeditated inflictions of physical harm by identifiable perpetrators upon identifiable victims – fit neatly within our commonsense notions of “violence” and moral culpability, whereas the manifold forms of destruction and suffering associated with climate change do not. This paper aims to establish a provisional framework for understanding the manifold types of harm and suffering arising from climate-related disturbances, not as arbitrary environmental “accidents", but as expressions of “structural violence” – that is, the normal, unexceptional, anonymous, and often unscrutinized violence woven into the routine workings of prevailing power structures. In the classic disaster movie scenario, floods, fires, tornadoes, earthquakes, impending asteroid collisions, killer bee invasions, and so on, usually become a kind of projection screen for sublimated social anxieties and perceived political threats, providing the rationale for people of all ranks and stripes to lay aside their petty differences and pull together in opposition to some all-purpose inhuman enemy. Ironically enough, such ostensibly “accidental” occurrences in recent years have increasingly become a flashpoint for dissent rather than unity, providing opportunities for reflecting upon the inadequacies of a socioeconomic system that has proven miserably incapable of ensuring the security and well-being of countless vulnerable and marginalized people, and has continually fed and exacerbated the very “natural” disturbances giving rise to so much suffering, insecurity and dislocation. In short, “natural disasters” now promise to become a kind of privileged window onto the forms of structural violence upon which contemporary capitalism rests, and against which environmentalists and other progressive forces must pitch their political energies.

### Trump Advantage:

**Stone 19,** Peter. “'Swampy Symbiosis': Fossil Fuel Industry Has More Clout than Ever under Trump.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 27 Sept. 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/sep/27/fossil-fuel-industry-clout-trump-era>.

Robert Murray, a coal magnate who forged ties in 2016 with Donald Trump as he championed reviving the beleaguered coal industry, hosted a fundraising dinner this July in West Virginia that hauled in an estimated $2.5m for the president’s re-election coffers. Texas lobbyist Jeff Miller, who has several big fossil fuel clients and ran energy secretary Rick Perry’s 2016 presidential campaign, raised about $1m in this year’s second quarter for the Trump Victory Committee, campaign filings show. The stellar fundraising by figures like Murray and Miller highlight an early spurt of fossil fuel backing for Trump’s re-election as his campaign gears up, according to analysts and campaign finance reports. Leading coal, oil and gas CEOs and some industry lobbyists are ponying up millions of dollars to help Trump win in 2020, after reaping a regulatory windfall that has benefited some of their bottom lines during Trump’s first term. However, many of these pro-fossil fuel victories came via executive orders and regulatory actions and could be reversed if a Democrat wins in 2020 – perhaps showing why the fossil fuel industry is backing Trump’s re-election so aggressively. While a few of Trump’s biggest fossil fuel backers wrote six figure checks to his campaign and allied super Pacs in 2016, their wallets opened much wider after Trump won, giving millions of dollars to his inaugural committee, and to independent groups promoting Trump’s deregulatory agenda. Trump’s drive to boost fossil fuels by slashing regulations includes: withdrawing from the landmark 2015 Paris climate change accord which 195 countries signed to help reduce rising global temperatures; ending the Obama administration’s Clean Power rules to curb coal-fired power plant emissions; and sharply limiting an Obama-era regulation aimed at reducing methane emissions, an even more potent greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide. Watchdog groups are dismayed at the influence fossil fuel bigwigs have received from the Trump administration which tapped two former energy lobbyists to run the Environmental Protection Agency and interior department. “There is a certain swampy symbiosis to it all,” said Robert Maguire, research director at Crew which monitors ethics issues. “While coal, oil and gas interests generously fill President Trump’s war chest, his administration gives them something that’s arguably even more valuable: former industry lobbyists in positions of power at agencies that impact their bottom line, and a deregulatory agenda that reads like a wishlist written by the fossil fuel industry.” Similarly, Jerry Taylor, who heads the nonpartisan Niskanen Center, said that fossil fuel companies may have more clout than ever with Trump in office. “It’s hard to identify any industrial sector that has ever had this much success with any administration in modern history. The fossil fuels industry has gotten nearly every single last item on its wishlist from the Trump administration.” Still, Taylor noted that energy company wins could be short-lived. “Given that most of these policy gifts were achieved via executive order or regulatory action, they can all be undone rather quickly by a Democratic administration.” Which helps explain why fossil fuel interests seem to be moving early and with gusto to fill Trump campaign coffers, on top of writing other big checks since Trump’s election to outside groups that are promoting deregulatory agendas. Besides Murray and Miller, other early big Trump energy donors include Kelcy Warren who heads Energy Transfer, a Texas firm that constructed the controversial Dakota Access pipeline project which in early 2017 got a green light when the army approved a final permit for building it. Warren, who donated $300,000 to Trump’s inaugural, in the second quarter of 2019 chipped in the maximum $360,000 to Trump’s Victory Committee, the joint fundraising effort of the campaign and the RNC, according to campaign filings. Likewise the oil and gas billionaire Harold Hamm, who is CEO of Continental Resources and touted Trump’s credentials at the GOP convention in mid 2016, donated $50,000 in this year’s second quarter to Trump’s Victory Committee, according to public filings. Hamm was also one of an elite group of fossil fuel CEOs who wrote big checks to both the inaugural and to outside Pacs that have been instrumental in backing Trump’s deregulatory agenda. Hamm and his company donated $1m to both the inaugural, and another $1m to one of several Pacs that have promoted Trump’s energy policies. Murray and his eponymous Murray Energy, the nation’s largest privately owned coal company, also has contributed $1m to a Pac that helps push Trump’s energy agenda. According to a 2018 Public Citizen study, energy industry donors of at least $100,000 gave a total of $8.3m to six outside groups promoting Trump policies from early 2017 through mid-October last year, putting the energy sector right behind gambling and real estate as leading backers of Trump’s policies. Murray, a prominent climate change denier who has ridiculed widely accepted climate change science as “theology” and “politics”, gave the Trump administration a 14-point “action plan” on 1 March 2017 that included killing Obama’s clean power regulations. Murray himself was at EPA headquarters in March 2017 when Trump signed an executive order telling the then EPA administrator, Scott Pruitt, to start dismantling Obama’s Clean Power plan. Other coal industry titans like billionaire Joe Craft, the CEO of the nation’s third-largest coal company Alliance Resource Partners, have been riding high in the Trump era. Craft and his wife Kelly Knight Craft, both native Kentuckians with close ties to the Senate majority leader, Mitch McConnell, donated a total of $2m to Trump campaign coffers and the inaugural committee. Kelly Craft was confirmed this summer to be US ambassador to the United Nations, becoming the first big donor to hold that post. Craft agreed to recuse herself from discussions about climate change and coal because of her husband’s company. Some key Trump backers who lobby for fossil fuel clients are faring well too. Miller, the Texas lobbyist who rounded up $1m in just this year’s second quarter for the Trump campaign, also served as a vice-finance chair of Trump’s inaugural. Boasting a blue chip list of fossil fuel clients including Kelcy Warren’s Energy Transfer Partners, Southern Company and Occidental Petroleum, Miller’s firm has experienced a healthy uptick in clients since Trump’s election. And Miller has reportedly met with the president on some energy issues, plus his old boss, energy secretary Perry. “If you want to get to Rick Perry, you go to Miller,” said one veteran GOP Texas donor. Don Duncan, formerly ConocoPhillips’ top lobbyist, notes that Trump pledges to drain Washington’s influence swamps seem to have fizzled. “Trump hasn’t drained the swamp, he’s just filled it with more alligators.”

# 1AR

## Extension

## A2 Nebel

## A2 Set Col

#### Overview: We get to weigh case. Debates about whether the form of the state is good, only make sense if we talk about what the state does. This puts you in a doublebind either A) there is no link to the aff or B) your theory of set col is so profound that trying to prevent natives dying from cancer is a link. That is repugnant and ignores the role that indigenous activists like those at standing rock have played in preventing pollution on native land.

#### [1] Settlers cant read set col: A) it’s a perf con since your very existence in this country is denied by the alt and B) you as a settler can't accurately describe the structure which pervades natives because you have no ties or experiences within it.

#### [2] Doublebind: Either A) they don’t give back the land, so they don’t solve or B) they do, which causes settler’s to leave and settle elsewhere causing colonialism to become cyclical. This empirically proven by Liberia, where moving people of the land just led to them colonizing Africa.

#### [3] Reading set col is a move towards innocence: No decolonization has ever happened in the debate space and by reading the K, you just absolve your self from guilt without actually doing for the native people, whose land you are on.

#### [4] Doublebind: Either A) set col is ontological, in which case the alternative doesn’t solve because physical actions cant change metaphysical conditions or B) its not ontological, so you can vote aff because change is possible, which justifies the perm.

#### [5] Alt Fails: A) If Settler’s have a naturalized connection to the land, then they are never going to get off. Make them prove how 50 million Trump voters move back to Europe. B) State doublebind: either 1) the state doesn’t shut down every attempt at progress so reforms can occur inside the state and you vote neg or 2) the state is so oppressive, that it prevents any kind of actual change, in which case the police will just shut down your movement before anything happens.

#### [6] Incrementalism is good: A) Key to achieving the alt since, it’s a negative state policy that weakens the state B) Totalizing understandings of colonialism make indigenous liberation impossible – answers their state link and isopolitics disad.

Busbridge 18 [Busbridge, Rachel, Research Fellow at the Centre for Dialogue, La Trobe University. “Israel-Palestine and the Settler Colonial ‘Turn’: From Interpretation to Decolonization,” Theory, Culture & Society, Vol 35, Issue 1, 2018.] MT

The prescription for decolonisation—that is, a normative project committed to the liberation of the colonised and the overturning of colonial relationships of power (Kohn & McBride, 2011: 3)—is indeed one of the most counterhegemonic implications of the settler colonial paradigm as applied to IsraelPalestine, potentially shifting it from a diagnostic frame to a prognostic one which offers a ‘proposed solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack’ (Benford & Snow, 2000: 616). What, however, does the settler colonial paradigm offer by way of envisioning decolonisation? As Veracini (2007) notes, while settler colonial studies scholars have sought to address the lack of attention paid to the experiences of Indigenous peoples in conventional historiographical accounts of decolonisation (which have mostly focused on settler independence and the loosening of ties to the ‘motherland’), **there is** nevertheless **a ‘**narrative deficit’ when it comes to imagining settler decolonisation. While Veracini (2007) relates this deficit to a matter of conceptualisation, it is apparent that the structural perspective **of the paradigm** in many ways closes down possibilities of imagining the type of social **and** political transformation **to which the** notion of decolonisation aspires. In this regard, there is a worrying tendency (**if not** tautological discrepancy) **in settler colonial studies, where the** only solution to settler colonialism is decolonisation**—which a faithful adherence to the paradigm** renders largely unachievable**, if not** impossible**.** To understand why this is the case, it is necessary to return to Wolfe’s (2013a: 257) account of settler colonialism as guided by a ‘zero-sum logic whereby settler societies, for all their internal complexities, uniformly require the elimination of Native alternatives’. The **structuralism** of this account has immense power as a means of mapping forms of injustice and indignity as well as strategies of resistance and **refusal**, and Wolfe is careful to show how transmutations of the logic of elimination are complex, variable, discontinuous and uneven. **Yet, in** seeking to elucidate the logic of elimination as the overarching historical force guiding settler-native relations there is an operational weakness in the theory, whereby such a logic is simply there, omnipresent and manifest even when (and perhaps especially when) it appears not to be; the settler colonial studies scholar need only read it into a situation or context. It thus hurtles from the past to the present into the future, never to be fully extinguished until the native is, or until history itself ends. There is thus a powerful ontological (if not metaphysical) dimension to Wolfe’s account, where there is such thing as a ‘settler will’ that inherently desires the elimination of the native and the distinction between the settler and native can only ever be categorical, founded as it is on the ‘primal binarism of the frontier’ (2013a: 258). It is here that the differences between earlier settler colonial scholarship on Israel-Palestine and the recent settler colonial turn come into clearest view. While Jamal Hilal’s (1976) Marxist account of the conflict, for instance, engaged Palestinians and Jewish Israelis in terms of their relations to the means of production, Wolfe’s account brings its own ontology: the bourgeoisie/proletariat distinction becomes that of settler/native, and the class struggle the struggle between **settler**, who **seeks to** destroy and replace the native**, and native**, who can only ever push back. Indeed, **if the settler colonial paradigm views history in** similar **teleological terms** to the Marxist framework, **it** does not offer **the same hopeful vision of** a liberated future. After all, **settler colonialism has** only one story to tell—‘either total victory or total failure’ (Veracini, 2007). Veracini’s attempt to disaggregate different forms of settler decolonisation is revealing of the difficulties that come along with this zero-sum perspective. It is significant to note that beyond settler evacuation (which may decolonise territory, he cautions, but not necessarily relationships) the picture he paints is a relatively bleak one. For Veracini (2011: 5), claims for decolonisation from Indigenous peoples in settler societies can take two broad forms: an ‘anticolonial rhetoric expressing a demand for indigenous sovereign independence and self-determination… and an “ultra”-colonial one that seeks a reconstituted partnership with the [settler state] and advocates a return to a relatively more respectful middle ground and “treaty” conditions’. While both, he suggests, are tempting strategies in the struggle for change, though ‘ultimately ineffective against settler colonial structures of domination’ (2011: 5), it is the latter strategy that invites Veracini’s most scathing assessment. As he writes, under settler colonial conditions the independent polity is the settler polity and sanctioning the equal rights of indigenous peoples has historically been used as a powerful weapon in the denial of indigenous entitlement and in the enactment of various forms of coercive assimilation. This decolonisation actually enhances the subjection of indigenous peoples… it is at best irrelevant and at worst detrimental to indigenous peoples in settler societies (2011: 6-7). The ‘primal binarism of the frontier’ plays a particularly ambivalent role in Veracini’s (2011: 6) formulation, where the categorical distinction between settler and native obstructs the ‘possibility o**f a genuinely decolonised relationship**’ (by virtue of its lopsidedness) **yet is** a necessary political strategy to guard against the absorption of Indigenous people into the settler fold, which would represent settler colonialism’s final victory. **The battle here is between a ‘settler colonialism [that] is designed to produce a fundamental discontinuity as its “logic of elimination” runs its course until it actually extinguishes the settler colonial relation’ and an anti-colonial struggle that** ‘must aim to keep the settler-indigenous relationship going’ (2011: 7). In other words, **the categorical distinction produced by the frontier** must be maintained in order to struggle against its effects. Given the lack of options presented to Indigenous peoples by Veracini (2014: 315), his conclusion that settler decolonisation demands a ‘radical, post-settler colonial passage’ is perhaps not surprising – although he has ‘no suggestion as to how this may be achieved and [is] pessimistic about its feasibility’. Scholars have long reckoned with the ambivalence of the settler colonial situation, which is simultaneously colonial and postcolonial, colonising and decolonising (Curthoys, 1999: 288). **Given the generally dreadful** Fourth World **circumstances facing many Indigenous peoples** in settler societies, **it** could be argued that **there is good reason for** such pessimism. The settler colonial paradigm, in this sense, offers an important caution against celebratory narratives of progress. Wolfe (1994), it must be recalled, wrote the original articulation of his thesis precisely against the idea of ‘historical rupture’ that dominated in Australia post-Mabo, and was thus as much a scholarly intervention as it was a political challenge to the idea of Australia having broken with its colonial past. Nonetheless**, the** fatalism **of the settler colonial paradigm**—whereby decolonisation is by and large put beyond the realms of possibility—**has** seen it **come** under considerable critique for reifying settler colonialism as a **transhistorical meta-structure where colonial relations of domination are** inevitable (Macoun & Strakosch, 2013: 435; Snelgrove et al., 2014: 9). Not only does Wolfe’s **ontology** erase contingency**,** heterogeneity **and (crucially) agency** (Merlan, 1997; Rowse, 2014), **but its polarised framework** effectively ‘puts politics to death’ (Svirsky, 2014: 327). In response to such critiques, Wolfe (2013a: 213) suggests that ‘the repudiation of binarism’ may just represent a ‘settler perspective’. However, as Elizabeth Povinelli (1997: 22) has astutely shown, it is in this regard that **the** totalising logic **of** Wolfe’s **structure of invasion** rests on a disciplinary gesture where ‘any discussion which does not insist on the polarity of the [settler] colonial project’ is assimilationist, worse still, genocidal in effect if not intent. Any attempt to ‘explore the dialogical or hybrid nature of colonial subjectivity’—which would entail working beyond the bounds of absolute polarity—is disciplined as complicit in the settler colonial project itself, leaving ‘the only nonassimilationist position one that adheres strictly and solely to a critique of [settler] state discourse’. This gesture not only disallows the possibility of counter-publics and strategic alliances (even limited ones), but also comes dangerously close to ‘resistance as acquiescence’ insofar as the settler colonial studies scholar may malign the structures set in play by settler colonialism, but only from a safe distance unsullied by the messiness of ambivalences and contradictions of settler and Native subjectivities and relations. Opposition is thus left as our only option, but, as we know from critical anti-colonial and postcolonial scholarship, opposition in itself is not decolonisation.

#### [7] We link turn: Movements. Spill over.

#### [8] Case OW.

## A2 Afropess

## A2 Disads

### UMCA

US doesn’t pass

Canada doesn’t pass terminal defense

No link USMCA success is up to dems republicans want it s tin since it’s trumps bill. The aff is a democratic policy

No link—impeachment fight is obviously worse then the aff

No impact—farms aren’t collapsing since nafta ended

### Base

### Politics

### Econ

We Link turn: Clean Coal wastes a billion extra dollars in spending and produces negative health externalities that cause a drain on government health programs.

No link whatsoever: We only stop companies from burning a particular type of coal that is bad. This doesn’t have large scale ramifications for other fossil fuel subsidies

### Energy Prices

### Energy Independance

## A2 CPS

### Carbon Capture

### States

## A2 Warming Good