# ND22 Kant NC Frontlines

Omitted args that I did not cut/write myself

## 1NC – AT: DD Kant

### 1NC – Toplevel

#### Toplevel – Kant negates

#### [1] Prioritization is incoherent – it assumes degrees of wrongness where some action can be marginally better or traded off for another, but Kant operates under a binary and can’t prioritize between the environment and property if they’re both valuable.

#### [2] Destruction is a consequence – we can’t logically know if econ growth will lead to the destruction of the environment if they are right that ethics are a priori.

#### [3] I’ll preempt the “environmental destruction bad for property” arg here – if someone’s actions damaged another’s property that’s not bad because it harmed the environment, but because it would harm how someone could use their property rights for economic growth. For example, it is just as bad for you to cultivate environmentally friendly wheat on my land as it is for you to pour acid over it because both would violate my right to use my property for economic means, even though the former protects the environment. Property destruction is a neg argument – the only reason you care about a good environment is to have more property rights for further growth.

#### [4] It is impossible for nature to have external worth – only things that can generate value themselves by deliberating on actions can have moral worth since they have autonomy we can respect, but nature can’t do any of these things.

#### [5] It’s coercion – when I have a right to property and you arbitrarily restrict that right, then you violate my rights. Even if they can make an argument for hindering a hindrance, that’s dependent on them winning that their offense is true in the first place, and any piece of defense won means you negate

### 1NC – AT: Animal Rights

#### [4] Their reading only justifies the protection of animals, but not necessarily the protection of the environment – they aren’t proving the whole resolution true so they haven’t met their burden

### 1NC – AT: Self Reflection

#### [1] This is an imperfect duty – we don’t have a perfect duty to orient our attitudes to non-human things – the only impact is that we might develop the wrong attitude, but the resolution is a question of action and not just intent. For example, if I want to determine whether a person should murder, how they are personally oriented towards murder is irrelevant to whether it is their duty.

#### [2] This is virtue ethics – our dispositions cannot be determined by other people, only by ourselves. If someone tells me to prioritize telling the truth over lying, it will not change my attitude towards lying if I truly believed lying to be permissible. Saying the resolution is true does not mean people will cultivate the correct attitude.

#### [3] This is incoherent under a state resolution – the state has no intent that it can use to cultivate the correct disposition since it is not an individual agent capable of having correct or incorrect intuitions.

### 1NC – AT: Kingdom of Ends

#### [1] No brightline to what environment is – would we also have to prioritize sewers over the economy because they are a realm of nature? Arbitrary brightlines matter – otherwise we can’t assign duties.

#### [2] Requires an a posteriori conception of what a human environment needs – we can’t know if a specific environment requires something unless we have studied environments of the past.

#### [3] This is an imperfect duty – it is good if we do it but it isn’t morally obligated, which means it doesn’t prove the resolution as true. Their evidence.

**De Paula Oliveira 12** [Maria Lucia de Paula Oliveira, “Law, Environmental Policy and Kantian Philosophy”, Law Science and Technology, <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/14524867.pdf>] [pT]

**[\*\*\* Prospect in blue\*\*\*]**

The aforementioned political theory makes it possible to think of the role of the State relative to the implementation of environmental law. This applies both to current citizens and future ones. As Gillroy reminds us, a just State would be a necessary condition (even if not a sufficient one) for establishing a “Realm of Ends”, and these conditions certainly include an environment that is conducive to mankind’s moral and political enhancement. While political justice distributes freedom, nature is the environment where mankind’s best features can be achieved. Consequently, public policies meant to protect and preserve the environment are possible. Kant wrote about the “Realm of Ends” as the only consideration of human moral choices, but he also wrote about a “Kingdom of Nature” that exists in perfect harmony with the former, and is indispensable for the supreme being of the human condition. Kant proposes a new harmony between nature and culture that is to be reached with the adoption of a perfect political Constitution. As suggested by Gillroy, in today’s terms one could use this Kantian relationship between political morals and nature to state that “…Humanity alone has both the moral capacity and the strategic rationality to express freedom responsibly and to innovate or adapt itself so that interdependence with the environment can persist over time and establish the harmony of human and natural realms.”16Thus, respecting nature does not mean stopping the use of natural resources, which would be impossible. Respecting nature means recognizing its existence as a system that is by itself capable of and directed to perfection, regardless of human choices.

#### It doesn’t matter if the Kingdom of Nature is good – it’s a question of whether we are morally obligated to be consistent with it, and we aren’t.

## 1NC – AT: Scopa Kant

### 1NC – Toplevel

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### 1NC – AT: Self Legislation

#### The universe is not self-legislating –

#### [1] It is controlled by causal factors like physics that restrain its actions so its path is predetermined and it has no agency. The big bang proves that the universe’s expansion is a result of science and not because of deliberation, otherwise it could take action to stop generating.

#### [2] It cannot generate its own worth and if its worth is placed on it by external things, that means it is instrumental. Their analysis is wrong – no external values on an object means that the object has no value, not that it generates its own values. For example, a knife has no value unless someone uses it as an instrumental end but is a mere object by itself.

### 1NC – AT: Emergence

#### No emergence –

#### [1] This analytic doesn’t prove that the universe has agency, it just asserts that it does. Even if they are correct that pointing out one part of nature has no agency that doesn’t mean their argument has a warrant

#### [2] No warrant for why consciousness is a non-natural emergence – just because I and a rock are part of the universe doesn’t mean the rock is an agent or that the universe is an agent – this is a category mistake – broad categories apply to specifics but specifics don’t necessarily apply to broad categories.

#### [3] If nature’s an agent then affirming is impossible since the People’s Republic of China and the environment and economy are all the same thing and they can’t prove that one should be prioritized.

### 1NC – AT: Ataner

#### Ataner is wrong –

#### [1] Ataner assumes that resources are finite because otherwise people could just find more land but – (A) To know that land is limited we need to use our prior experiences of the way earth is constructed however that relies on our experience. However, your framework rejects the use of experiences (B) Even if they do win that we can use our experiences, the universe is infinitely expanding so there are theoretically enough resources for everyone

#### [2] Causes a contradiction in conception – I need to be able to use the environment to allow me to exercise freedom, otherwise I would violate my own rights. For example, if I own an apple tree, I should be allowed to pluck and eat an apple if I am starving even if it prevents the tree from photosynthesizing to the max since human agency must come first. Even if I destroy my property, it doesn’t violate rights because others were not entitled to that apple in the first place. Their offense relies on the notion that my use of property affects other people, but this is illogical since they have not made physical contributions to it by mixing their labor with it or else the very idea of property would be incoherent because everyone would own everything.

#### [3] There is no reason why we can’t own damaged property – no libertarian or Kantian framework establishes why we own a specific piece of property, e.g. I’m not entitled to a specific piece of land or a specific apple, rather I’m entitled to the ability to find and own land. Their examples are absurd – you wouldn’t say that a farmer with less fertile land is any less free than a farmer with fertile land because these distinctions are [A] experience based and [B] not an inherent part of ownership

#### [4] Fallacy of origin – just because we use the environment to justify property rights doesn’t mean that the environment is something inherently good, just that it is instrumental.

### 1NC – AT: Free Riding

#### No free-riding –

#### [1] This isn’t free-riding – free-riding is when you enter into an agreement with others that everyone will fairly contribute their part but then you put in less effort which is not universalizable. For example, if I go to a potluck and I don’t bring food even though that is an inherent part of potlucks then that wouldn’t be universalizable, but if I don’t give my neighbors free money that is permissible because it doesn’t violate their freedom as we had no agreement in the first place

#### [2] If everyone dirtied the environment it would be universalizable because nobody would be acting more unfair than another person. For example, if I use my land to grow potatoes while you dig a hole in your land to build a house it isn’t free riding because your individual action only destroys property you have owned.

#### [3] Free-riding is a fake argument – if my neighbor shovels my snow there’s no reason why I’m obligated to shovel his snow either, even if it would be a nice action. It can’t generate a duty, so even if you treat the environment well there is no reason for me to treat the environment well either.

#### [4] Your own authors say the solution to this is an ECONOMIC GROWTH-based tax – environmental protection can be done through prioritizing econ growth which proves prioritization is incoherent.

Marc **Daube and** David **Ulph ‘16**, Environmental and Resource Economics, 2016, Volume 63, Number 2, Page 505

**[\*\*\*Prospect is in blue\*\*\*]**

Free-riding is often associated with self-interested behaviour. However, if there is a global pollutant, free-riding will arise if individuals calculate that their emissions are negligible relative to the total, so total emissions and hence any damage that they and others suffer will be unaffected by whatever consumption choice they make. In this context consumer behaviour and the optimal environmental tax are independent of the degree of altruism. For behaviour to change, individuals need to make their decisions in a different way. We propose a new theory of moral behaviour whereby individuals recognise that they will be worse off by not acting in their own self-interest, and balance this cost off against the hypothetical moral value of adopting a Kantian form of behaviour, that is by calculating the consequences of their action by asking what would happen if everyone else acted in the same way as they did. We show that: (a) if individuals behave this way, then altruism matters and the greater the degree of altruism the more individuals cut back their consumption of a ‘dirty’ good; (b) nevertheless the optimal environmental tax is exactly the same as that emerging from classical analysis where individuals act in self-interested fashion […] In the classical analysis of externalities, free-riding arises because individuals are purely self-interested, and so perceive that, while they bear all the costs of changing their consumption behaviour, they may get only a very small gain in terms of the reduced damage that they themselves will suffer. In the extreme case, individuals may calculate that their emissions are so insignificant relative to the total, that total emissions and hence any damage that they (and others) might suffer will be unaffected by whatever consumption choices they make.1 In these circumstances individuals make their consumption choices ignoring any effect these choices have on climate change and the damage it will cause.2 The classic prescription is the introduction of a Pigovian tax (equal to social marginal damage) so that individuals face the full economic cost of their consumption decisions. It is sometimes thought that if individuals are not self-interested, but instead are altruistic and so take account of the effect of their actions on others, this may overcome free-riding behaviour. However, as we will show, as long as individuals continue to believe that total emissions are completely unaffected by whatever they do, then however much they care about others, their behaviour will not change, and the optimal policy is to impose exactly the same tax as if individuals were self-interested.

## 1NC – AT: Strake Kant

### 1NC – Toplevel

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### 1NC – AT: Ataner

#### Group the Ataner cards –

#### [2] Causes a contradiction in conception – they have no brightline for a healthy environment or environment destruction. I need to be able to use the environment to allow me to exercise freedom, otherwise I would violate my own rights. For example, if I own an apple tree, I should be allowed to pluck and eat an apple if I am starving even if it prevents the tree from photosynthesizing to the max since human agency must come first. Even if I destroy my property, it doesn’t violate rights because others were not entitled to that apple in the first place. Their offense relies on the notion that my use of property affects other people, but this is illogical since they have not made physical contributions to it by mixing their labor with it or else the very idea of property would be incoherent because everyone would own everything.

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#### [4] Fallacy of origin – just because we use the environment to justify property rights doesn’t mean that the environment is something inherently good, just that it is instrumental.

#### [5] Hindering a hindrance doesn’t apply – (A) We’re winning why having property rights are a prerequisite to the environment since they are necessary for people to have freedom in the first place. If I could not exercise my will on external objects then I also could not preserve the environment because that assumes that I can legislate my will over the land I am trying to preserve. (B) Even if you don’t buy that, any defense means the aff has no obligation and you vote neg on the property offense

### 1NC – AT: Promise-Breaking

#### [2] Promise breaking begs the question – promises are only good insofar as they are universalizable otherwise you could promise to murder which is incoherent – we’re winning offense which proves this false