# JANFEB Disad and Case

# Case Answers/Turns

## Impact Turns

### High Oil Prices Good

#### No negative impact on high prices

Rapier 18 Robert Rapier [Chemical engineer in the energy industry, contributor to Forbes], "Mr. President, High Oil Prices Are Actually Not That Bad For U.S. Anymore," Forbes, 4-20-2018 https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2018/04/20/mr-president-high-oil-prices-are-no-longer-that-bad-for-u-s/

Earlier today, President Trump tweeted: "Looks like OPEC is at it again. With record amounts of Oil all over the place, including the fully loaded ships at sea, Oil prices are artificially Very High! No good and will not be accepted!" The President might need reminding that the top three oil-producing states in the country -- Texas, North Dakota, and Alaska -- all voted for him. Of the Top 25 oil-producing states, only California, New Mexico, Colorado, and Illinois (at No. 16) voted against him. Oil country is Trump country, and I would imagine he will hear from some constituents that they like high oil prices. Rising oil prices have enabled U.S. shale oil production to rebound from the decline it suffered in 2016. Further, it isn't true that there is still record amounts of oil "all over the place." A couple of years ago, global inventories were indeed at record highs. There was also a tremendous amount of oil in floating storage -- the "fully loaded ships at sea." That's no longer the case. The production cuts from OPEC have reduced crude oil inventories back into a normal range. This can be seen in the most recent Oil Market Report from the International Energy Agency: Once upon a time, when the U.S. imported 10 million barrels per day of crude oil, high oil prices were a serious drag on the U.S. economy. But with U.S. net exports plummeting toward zero, this situation is changing. If the U.S. ultimately becomes a net exporter of crude oil and petroleum products, then higher crude oil prices will bring more revenue into the U.S. This is a very different situation from the days when the U.S. was sending record amounts of cash overseas to purchase foreign oil. Yes, there are certain sectors that will be harmed by higher oil prices, but the net impact on the economy should start to improve as U.S. net exports increase. As a result, the notion that high oil prices are necessarily bad for the U.S. should be re-evaluated.

#### Shocks cause a shift to renewables without damaging the world economy

Warner 18 (Warner, Jeremy, award-winning economics expert. “We are heading for a new oil shock – but it will be the last hurrah”. The Telegraph. May 24, 2018. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2018/05/24/price-oil-soaring-rise-renewables-may-last-hurrah/>) BW

**Yet the possibility of Middle Eastern war is already very much in the mix,** and in the event of outright hostilities the price would sky-rocket to $100 and beyond. **Saudi Arabia could theoretically compensate for the loss of Iranian production by boosting its own supply. Yet if the effect of war is to disrupt shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, then it may be in no position to do so.** Besides, Saudi is by no means averse to the current upward trajectory; it needs an $80 plus oil price just to break even fiscally on current expenditures. On the other side of the fence, an economically struggling Russia would also very much welcome a much higher oil price. **Fortunately, the world economy is no longer as sensitive to oil price shocks as it used to be. Oil intensity in the global economy** - the amount of oil needed to produce a single unit of output - **has long been in steep decline,** having fallen by more than a half in advanced economies since the 1960s. What is more, **all those warnings of “peak oil” - the idea that the oil would run out before alternatives are found - have turned out to be so much poppycock. The shale revolution has created an abundance of supply,** such that peak world demand for oil will be reached - probably around fifteen years from now - long before the reserves begin to dwindle. **The rapid advance of renewables makes it highly likely that a large part of these reserves will never be used at all.** Happily, the shale revolution has in any case transformed the world’s largest economy, the US, into a net beneficiary of a high oil price, a complete reversal of the position it has found itself in during previous oil price spikes. **The world over, economies are weaning themselves off oil.** Even so, **oil still has the power to shock.** The macro-economic impact of a rising oil price is both inflationary and deflationary at the same time. It raises general price inflation, and by taking money out of consumers' pockets, depresses wider economic demand. As a general rule of thumb, a 10 percent rise in the oil price knocks around 0.1 percent off global output. It doesn’t sound much, and certainly the price would need to rise a lot to in itself derail the current global recovery. Nonetheless, combined with the knock to confidence from an all embracing Middle East conflict, the effect would be quite bad enough, especially on oil poor regions such as China. **Yet there is also a longer term bonus to be had from higher oil prices, the effect of which is to incentivise the development of alternative sources of energy. These are coming on in leaps and bounds, such that some of them are already cheaper than traditional hydrocarbons. We are at a tipping point, where the march of renewables starts to render older forms of energy production obsolete. Oil producers should enjoy the price spike while it lasts.** They’ve got a few decades left in them yet, but this may be their last hurrah.

#### Renewables prevent extinction

Wood 10, PhD, (Duncan, PoliticalStudies@Queens, https://www.csgwest.org/programs/documents/USMexico\_Cooperation\_Renewable\_Energies.pdf)

It is by now common knowledge that **the world is facing a climate change crisis caused by the effects of fossil fuel driven industrializatio**n. **A significant rise in global temperatures, combined with more severe weather conditions, more frequent floods and droughts**, are bringing a paradigm shift to the way we think about our relationship with the planet. For the first time in over 150 years policy makers are thinking seriously about decreasing dependency on fossil fuels and looking for alternatives that may be more expensive in the short and medium terms, but ultimately more sustainable. 7 All of this has happened at the same time as two other, related phenomena. The first is that the global population is reaching new highs and by 2040‐50 will total over 9 billion people. Experts predict that 85% of the world’s population will be located in the developing world, which will mean a rapidly growing demand for goods and for energy. Both of these factors will result in a **need to increase energy efficiency as well as find new sources of energy**. What’s more, this massive jump in population will coincide not only with climate change but also with increasingly difficult conditions for hydrocarbons exploration and production. **As most of the world’s “easy” oil has already been discovered, oil companies and nation states are turning to alternatives such a non‐conventional oil reserves (tar sands, complex fields) and reserves that in the past would have been considered unrecoverable, such as in very deep ocean waters.** Furthermore, **political conditions in many of the world’s oil rich regions are uncertain, unstable and often unfriendly to private oil companies and to the countries of the West.** Climate change and natural disasters The **urgency of finding alternatives to fossil fuels has been confirmed in recent years by mounting scientific evidence that we are undergoing a noticeable anthropogenic shift in the world’s weather and temperature**. Not only are a **range of indicators showing that the planet is warming, but the retreat of the polar ice caps, the melting of glaciers, and most importantly in the short term extreme weather conditions and increased incidence of natural disasters** have highlighted the consequences of maintaining the status quo in our patterns of energy consumption and industrial development. It is estimated that **we have experienced a 1 degree Celsius rise in global temperatures over the past 100 years and that by the end of the current century global temperatures may have risen by as much 7 or 8 degrees.** Even with the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions that is contemplated by the most ambitious mitigation strategies, **global temperatures may rise by as much as 6%.** This would have a **dramatic and disastrous impact on both developed and developing nations and will threaten the existence of both humans and animal and plant species**. **Though the connection between man‐made greenhouse gases and global warming was denied for many years by industry and governments alike, it has now been accepted that something must be done to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere.** Given that 86% of all global energy comes from fossil fuels, and that these fossil fuels produce 27,000,000,000 tons of CO2 emissions annually**, finding alternative sources of energy is a crucial component of climate change mitigation strategies**

### Heg Good

#### Hegemony under Trump scares everyone off

Twining 4/18 (Daniel, Counselor and Asia Director at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. As director of the Asia Program, he leads a 15-member team working on the rise of Asia and its implications for the West through a program of convening and research spanning East, South, and Southeast Asia. Dr. Twining previously served as a Member of the U.S. Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff, as the Foreign Policy Advisor to U.S. Senator John McCain, and as a staff member of the U.S. Trade Representative. He is an Associate of the U.S. National Intelligence Council, has taught at Georgetown University, and served as a military instructor associated with the Naval Postgraduate School. He holds a BA with Highest Distinction from the University of Virginia and MPhil & DPhil degrees from Oxford University, where he was the Fulbright/Oxford Scholar from 2004-07. He writes regular columns for Nikkei and Foreign Policy and has served as an advisor to six presidential campaigns. foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/18/trump-might-be-a-traditional-president-after-all/)

Trump may seem an odd champion of some of these causes. But his national security Cabinet, which now seems to be finding its feet, is in keeping with American foreign-policy traditions. In international affairs, Trump relies on two of the leading general officers of their generation, James Mattis and H.R. McMaster; a pillar of America’s globalist-corporate establishment, former ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson; and the former president of Goldman Sachs, Gary Cohn, who has led a so-far-successful effort to check the mercantilist instincts of White House advisers Steve Bannon and Peter Navarro. The internationalists have an ally in Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and key adviser, who takes a pragmatic view of U.S. policy priorities. For all the focus on Trump’s personality, his unorthodox presidency may yield a more traditional focus on deploying American power for broader ends. Obama decried American exceptionalism, emphasized “nation-building at home,” and pursued a dedicated policy of retracting American power from pivotal theaters like the Middle East, enabling revisionist regional powers to go on the offensive. He did not do enough as the humanitarian tragedy of Syria played out in slow motion, destabilizing not only the Middle East but also Europe, dividing and weakening Washington’s closest ally in world affairs. His rhetorical “pivot” to Asia left U.S. allies wanting more American presence and leadership than they got. Trump remains at odds with much of Washington’s bipartisan foreign-policy establishment. He has yet to embrace the trade leadership that makes the world’s biggest economy more competitive and dynamic, and Americans more prosperous. But his willingness to employ limited military force — including ramping up military action against the Islamic State in Syria and Afghanistan — and to stand up to the regional power plays of revisionist states, creates opportunities to more effectively manage complex conflicts, from the Levant to the Korean Peninsula. It is telling that a modest set of missile strikes against a remote Syrian airbase represents the boldest use of American military power against the murderous regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. It is also telling that the tangible threat of U.S. military action against North Korea is on the table after eight years of a policy the Obama administration termed “strategic patience,” which created a window of opportunity that Pyongyang used to continue to perfect its intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons programs while America looked away. Even China and Russia look off-balance after early fears in Washington that an inexperienced president would appease the leaders of these countries. Chinese President Xi Jinping came to Trump’s Mar-a-Lago estate bearing concessions designed to fend off an American trade war. At their inaugural summit, Trump was clear with Xi that the quality of U.S.-China relations would be tied to Beijing’s cooperation in tightening economic pressure on North Korea. Having secured strategic gains during the Obama presidency, and given the five-year leadership plenum approaching this fall, Xi would be wise to exercise strategic restraint during Trump’s first term, and demonstrate China’s utility by tightening the pressure on its ally North Korea to deter further nuclear tests. Given that Trump wants to manage trade with what he sees as a mercantilist superpower that does not play by the rules, China would also be prudent to pursue the kind of voluntary export restraint agreements that Japan struck with the Ronald Reagan administration in the 1980s, when trade frictions with Tokyo peaked. Trump’s threat to use trade barriers as leverage to move China to assume a tougher posture with its client in Pyongyang clearly has gotten Beijing’s attention and may even yield dividends. Ironically, Trump is likely to be the first American president since the end of the Cold War not to pursue a “reset” in relations with Russia. The ongoing investigations into the Trump campaign’s dealings with Russian agents of influence severely restrict the ability of this administration to pursue any kind of improvement in relations with a regime that invades democratic neighbors, threatens NATO allies with nuclear attack, attempts as a matter of state policy to subvert Western elections, and murders political opponents. Indeed, the mounting domestic opposition to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s autocratic rule — as manifested in popular protests in cities across Russia — creates a new pressure point that the United States could leverage through a heightened force posture in Europe and more robust campaign for Russia to conform to international law by severing dealings with the outlaw Syrian regime. As Tillerson pointed out on his way to Moscow to meet Putin, Assad has become a liability rather than an asset to Russia’s geopolitical ambitions. The Trump administration is still in its first 100 days. It has not been subjected to the kind of international crisis that tests every administration, and which will call into question not only its statecraft but the judgment of the commander-in-chief. There remain reasons to be concerned, particularly about the administration’s trade agenda. But anxious allies are breathing a sigh of relief that American power is back as a force to be reckoned with in a dangerous world, after what many see as Obama’s abdication of the U.S. role as global guarantor and following a political campaign in which America was presented as a victim of globalization rather than as its engine. In Asia in particular, friends of the United States seek a robust commitment to U.S. military and diplomatic leadership as well as skill in stewarding the pivotal U.S.-China relationship in ways that preclude both condominium and conflict. North Korea poses a harder test than Syria: Asian allies will want to see that the Trump administration is as adept at diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula as it is at projecting military power in the Middle East. The White House will also need to be willing to risk an increase in tensions with Beijing by imposing secondary sanctions on Chinese banks and businesses that are the lifeline of the North Korean economy.

#### Heg decline creates global instability – causes war and prevents international cooperation on all issues.

Brzezinski 12 [Zbigniew Brzezinski, former presidential national security advisor, 1-3-2012, "After America," Foreign Policy, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/01/03/after-america/>]

Not so long ago, a high-ranking Chinese official, who obviously had concluded that America's decline and China's rise were both inevitable, noted in a burst of candor to a senior U.S. official: "But, please, let America not decline too quickly." Although the inevitability of the Chinese leader's expectation is still far from certain, he was right to be cautious when looking forward to America's demise. For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes. While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue. The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role. China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership. At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents. Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability**. In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because** the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict. **None of this will necessarily come to pass. Nor is the concern that America's decline would generate global insecurity, endanger some vulnerable states, and produce a more troubled North American neighborhood an argument for U.S. global supremacy. In fact, the strategic complexities of the world in the 21st century make such supremacy unattainable. But those dreaming today of America's collapse would probably come to regret it. And as** the world after America would be increasingly complicated and chaotic, it is imperative that the United States pursue a new, timely strategic vision for its foreign policy -- or start bracing itself for a dangerous slide into global turmoil.

#### Hegemonic transition wars are highly probable and cause extinction.

Chase-Dunn and Podobnik 95 [Christopher Chase-Dunn, and Bruce Podobnik. "The next world war: world-system cycles and trends." *Journal of World-Systems Research* 1.1 (1995): 295-326.]//SJ

This essay places the contemporary period of global development in long-run historical perspective, elaborates a model of world-system cycles and trends, and discusses the main structural forces influencing the probability of future war among core powers. The possible continuation of the cycle of hegemonic rivalry is discussed in terms of the similarities and differences between the coming three decades and earlier periods in which a declining hegemon was challenged by upwardly mobile states. Possible bids for economic and political hegemony by Japan, Germany, China and the United States are discussed, as are the possibilities for different coalitions in East Asia and Europe. The phenomenon of bloc formation is discussed in a long-term perspective that includes earlier periods of colonial empire and "commonwealth." We conclude that there is a **significantly high probability** that **warfare among core states** could **occur in the 2020s**. The prospects for global state formation within the next three decades are considered. We recommend a combination of the build-up of U.N. peace-keeping forces and the continuation of U.S. military strength as the least worst and most feasible solution to the problem of avoiding **nuclear holocaust in the 2020s**. The continuing globalization of the world capitalist system, and, more recently, the apparent triumph of global liberalism following the collapse or restructuring of most socialist states, have led a number of scholars to claim that a fundamentally new era has begun in which economic rather than military competition will become the sole basis of geopolitics (e.g. Fukuyama, 1992). While assorted regional bloodbaths (as in the Persian Gulf, the Balkans, Somalia, Rwanda, and Chechnya) will, of course, continue to occur, unrivaled U.S. military dominance, the strengthening of international institutions, and the continuing consolidation of a world capitalist class are all seen as promoting peace and stability within the core of the world-system. For many contemporary analysts, therefore, it appears to be increasingly unlikely that an all-out shooting war among core states will occur in the future. Certain new and historically-unique characteristics of the contemporary era are frequently cited as serving to dampen military conflict among core powers. The existence of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear, biological, chemical, and unknown possible future variants) have led some scholars to argue that the very idea of core warfare has become obsolete, as it implies the **total destruction of the contending states and probably most of the world**. Keohane (1984:49) and Goldstein and Rapkin (1991:957), for example, independently conclude that while **U.S. hegemony will continue to decline**, no rising contender will be willing to risk nuclear annihilation by undertaking a military bid for dominance. Instead of the traditional pattern of hegemonic transition, in which one core power emerges victorious from **a world war**, these scholars foresee the gradual consolidation of international institutions with the capability of coordinating a multipolar, "post-hegemonic" world.

#### Foreign military aid is key to US power projection—countries we abandon will turn to Russia and China

Goure 16

Daniel Goure, Ph.D. “Foreign Military Sales Remain An Important Tool Of U.S. National Security.” Lexington Institute. February 26, 2016. https://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/foreign-military-sales-remain-an-important-tool-of-u-s-national-security/

As still the world’s sole superpower, the United States possesses an unequaled array of instruments to support its foreign and defense strategies. With so much attention being focused on the conflicts in the Middle East, Russian aggression in Eastern Europe and Chinese efforts to assert its hegemony in the Western Pacific, the fact that the United States employs a wide range of non-military, or at least non-kinetic tools in pursuing its national interests is lost. Most recently, for example, the United States and China agreed on the imposition of new trade sanctions on North Korea in response to that country’s test of a long-range ballistic missile. One of the most important of these tools is foreign military sales (FMS). The complex role of FMS is reflected, in part, in the fact that the program is run by the Department of State and not the Department of Defense. One reason for this unusual management approach is that the FMS program involves sales by the U.S. government of U.S. arms, defense equipment, defense services, and military training to foreign governments. As a result, such sales reflect the views of the U.S. government with respect to the recipient country, its relationships with others in the region and the overall approach this country takes to mitigating the threat of regional or global conflict. The FMS program serves many other purposes. The sales of U.S. arms and related items to foreign countries helps reduce the cost of those systems to our own military. FMS sales help to ensure the ability of U.S. allies to defend themselves and support the maintenance of stable regional military balances. Equally important, FMS sales over time establish enduring relationships between foreign governments and their militaries and the U.S. When the U.S. military trains alongside those of allies equipped with the same hardware, it helps to cement the bonds between our countries. Moreover, it improves communications and understanding among these militaries, often helping to inculcate U.S. values related to the use of military force. Foreign militaries dependent on access to U.S. hardware, spare parts, software upgrades and training are more likely to listen to this country when there is a dispute regarding regional politics or defense issues. FMS has been particularly important as an instrument for influencing foreign governments and shaping regional balances of power in the Middle East. Following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the United States completely reequipped the Egyptian military. The Egyptian-Israeli border has been remarkably stable ever since. Sales of military aircraft, missile defense systems and precision munitions to the nations of the Persian Gulf have been instrumental in ensuring a stable balance of forces in that area. Pakistan has been a recipient of U.S. arms. FMS sales have been extremely important to U.S. efforts to ensure Pakistan’s reliability as an ally in the war on terror. Congress has appropriated about $3.6 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Pakistan since 2001. The kind of equipment provided ranges from radios, transport aircraft and unmanned systems to F-16 fighters. Recently, the State Department approved the sale of eight F-16s to Pakistan. Pakistan intends to use these aircraft in its fight against domestic terrorists. The U.S. and other regional allies have found the F-16 to be an effective platform for conducting precision strikes against terrorist targets. In addition, India is pursuing a major Air Force modernization program. The sale of F-16s to Pakistan would help to maintain the balance of power in the subcontinent. Unfortunately, Senator Rand Paul has filed a Joint Resolution of Disapproval for this sale, something that hasn’t happened since the 1980s. The effort to block this sale is a mistake. It will serve only to weaken the relationship between our two countries even as the fight against the Taliban continues and intensifies in Afghanistan. In addition, it leaves the way open for Pakistan to acquire aircraft from other suppliers, such as China or Russia. The only practical effect that disapproval of this sale will have is to weaken Washington’s hand at a time when it needs all the policy instruments it can muster.

#### Heg stops global nuclear war

Zalmay Khalilzad 16, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, counselor at the CSIS, 3/23/16, “4 Lessons about America's Role in the World,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/4-lessons-about-americas-role-the-world-15574?page=show

Ultimately, however, we concluded that the United States has a strong interest in precluding the emergence of another bipolar world—as in the Cold War—or a world of many great powers, as existed before the two world wars. Multipolarity led to two world wars and bipolarity resulted in a protracted worldwide struggle with the risk of nuclear annihilation. To avoid a return such circumstances, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney ultimately agreed that our objective must be to prevent a hostile power to dominate a “critical region,” which would give it the resources, industrial capabilities and population to pose a global challenge. This insight has guided U.S. defense policy throughout the post–Cold War era. Giving major powers the green light to establish spheres of influence would produce a multipolar world and risk the return of war between the major powers. Without a stabilizing U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf and U.S. relationships with Jordan and the Gulf States, Iran could shut down oil shipments in its supposed sphere of influence. A similar scenario in fact played out during the 1987 “tanker war” of the Iran-Iraq war, which eventually escalated into a direct military conflict between the United States and Iran. Iran’s nuclear program makes these scenarios even more dangerous. The United States can manage the rise and resurgence of great powers like China, Russia and Iran at an acceptable cost without ceding entire spheres of influence. The key is to focus on normalizing the geopolitics of the Middle East, Europe and the Asia-Pacific, which the United States can do by strengthening its transatlantic and transpacific alliances and adapting them to the new, dangerous circumstances on the horizon. The United States should promote a balance of power in key regions while seeking opportunities to reconcile differences among major actors.

### CO2 Ag

#### Agricultural crises are creating global food shortages – that kills a billion people – increased CO2 is key to solve

Idso’s 11 [Sherwood PhD and former research physicist for the Department of Agriculture, Keith PhD Botany, Craig PhD Geography, 6/6/2011, “Meeting the Food Needs of a Growing World Population”, http://www.co2science.org/articles/V14/N27/EDIT.php] / MM

Parry and Hawkesford (2010) introduce their study of the global problem by noting that "food production needs to increase 50% by 2030 and double by 2050 to meet projected demands," and they note that at the same time the demand for food is increasing, production is progressively being limited by "non-food uses of crops and cropland," such as the production of biofuels, stating that in their homeland of the UK, "by 2015 more than a quarter of wheat grain may be destined for bioenergy production," which surely must strike one as both sad and strange, when they also note that "currently, at least one billion people are chronically malnourished and the situation is deteriorating," with more people "hungrier now than at the start of the millennium." So what to do about it: that is the question the two researchers broach in their review of the sad situation. They begin by describing the all-important process of photosynthesis, by which the earth's plants "convert light energy into chemical energy, which is used in the assimilation of atmospheric CO2 and the formation of sugars that fuel growth and yield," which phenomena make this natural and life-sustaining process, in their words, "a major target for improving crop productivity both via conventional breeding and biotechnology." Next to a plant's need for carbon dioxide comes its need for water, the availability of which, in the words of Parry and Hawkesford, "is the major constraint on world crop productivity." And they state that "since more than 80% of the [world's] available water is used for agricultural production, there is little opportunity to use additional water for crop production, especially because as populations increase, the demand to use water for other activities also increases." Hence, they rightly conclude that "a real and immediate challenge for agriculture is to increase crop production with less available water." Enlarging upon this challenge, they give an example of a *success story*: the Australian wheat variety 'Drysdale', which gained its fame "because it uses water more efficiently." This valued characteristic is achieved "by slightly restricting stomatal aperture and thereby the loss of water from the leaves." They note, however, that this ability "reduces photosynthetic performance slightly under ideal conditions," but they say it enables plants to "have access to water later in the growing season thereby increasing total photosynthesis over the life of the crop." Of course, Drysdale is but one variety of one crop; and the ideal goal would be to get nearly all varieties of all crops to use water more efficiently. And that goal can actually be reached by doing nothing, by merely halting the efforts of radical environmentalists to deny earth's carbon-based life forms -- that's all of us and the rest of the earth's plants and animals -- the extra carbon we and they need to live our lives to the fullest. This is because allowing the air's CO2content to rise in response to the burning of fossil fuels naturally causes the vast majority of earth's plants to progressively reduce the apertures of their stomata and thereby lower the rate at which water escapes through them to the air. And the result is even better than that produced by the breeding of Drysdale, because the extra CO2 in the airmore than overcomes the photosynthetic reduction that results from the partial closure of plant stomatal apertures, allowing even more yield to be produced per unit of water transpired in the process. Yet man can make the situation better still, by breeding and selecting crop varieties that perform better under higher atmospheric CO2 concentrations than the varieties we currently rely upon, or he can employ various technological means of altering them to do so. Truly, we can succeed, even where "the United Nations Millennium Development Goal of substantially reducing the world's hungry by 2015 will not be met," as Parry and Hawkesford accurately inform us. And this truly seems to us the moral thing to do, when "at least one billion people are chronically malnourished and the situation is deteriorating," with more people "hungrier now than at the start of the millennium."

#### Food crises escalate into food wars and regional conflicts**Smith 98** [Paul J., Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, <http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Report_Food_Security_98.html>] / MM

Food security and political stability are often inextricably linked in many countries. Historically, significant malnutrition and famine have been caused by the disruption of food supplies through wars and civil strife.[53](http://www.apcss.org/Publications/food-ftnt-46-64.htm)  Yet, the concepts of food security and political stability are often mutually dependent and reinforcing. Food security, for example, can influence the political stability of countries. Simultaneously, political instability (such as wars or other forms of civil strife) can influence food security, as can be seen recently in the case of Indonesia. One seminar participant noted that the greatest risk for regime stability is the risk of urban riots—riots that are sometimes sparked by food shortages or sudden price increases among food products. Generally, starvation in the countryside does not result in political instability. This is because those who experience the brunt of food shortages tend to be rural and have little political voice. A recent example of this phenomenon occurred in India where rising food prices led to urban riots directed at India’s ruling political party—the Bharatiya Janata Party. Similarly, when the price of rice soared in Indonesia, thereby making it prohibitively expensive for a large segment of the population, food riots erupted in eastern Java. The government deployed military forces around markets to prevent looting. Moreover, China’s sharp rejection of the Lester Brown thesis that China needs to import massive amounts of grain from the world market in the coming century was partially rooted in a persistent fear within the Chinese government that food insecurity could potentially provoke widespread anger against the Communist Party and perhaps lead to civil unrest. Thus, the sensitivity that many Asian governments have about food security may be linked to fears of social instability and perhaps even political revolution. Food security thus becomes an issue of regime survival. Another security concern prominent in many Asian capitals is the prospect for increased economic migration as a result of food shortages. Internal migration is the first concern for many governments, especially as internal migration is often a natural "coping response" in times of famine. When North Korea experienced severe floods in September 1995, South Korea responded by creating refugee camps to deal with the possible flood of people who might have fled toward the south. Similarly, Indonesia’s food crisis in 1997 was partly responsible for the outflow of thousands of Indonesian migrants to Malaysia. As the crisis in Indonesia intensified in early 1998, many neighboring countries feared that many more "hungry Indonesians [would] take to boats in search of a better life."[54](http://www.apcss.org/Publications/food-ftnt-46-64.htm)Many countries in East Asia are extremely sensitive and wary about immigration—especially mass migration or illegal migration. The recent surge in labor and economic migration throughout the region has catapulted the immigration issue to the highest levels of government. Immigration disputes, moreover, have broken out between nations—such as the in case of Singapore and the Philippines in 1995—regarding illegal immigration and repatriation policies. Few governments in the region officially desire more immigration. To the extent that food insecurity might spur greater migration, then it may be viewed by many governments in the region as a security concern.

#### Elevated CO2 lets cotton thrive

Kakani et al, 4 – Department of Plant and Soil Sciences, Mississippi State University, Department of Plant and Soil Sciences, Mississippi State University, Department of Plant and Soil Sciences, Mississippi State University, and USDA UV-B Monitoring and Research Program, Natural Resource Ecology Laboratory, Colorado State University, Fort Collins (Vijaya Gopal Kakani, Kambham Raja Reddy, Duli Zhao and Wei Gao, 2004, “Senescence and hyperspectral reflectance of cotton leaves exposed to ultraviolet-B radiation and carbon dioxide”, PHYSIOLOGIA PLANTARUM 121: 250–257. 2004, pubmed.gov | JJ)

Considerable growth and developmental variations occur in plants exposed to UV-B radiation and atmospheric [CO2 ]. Selection of leaves from a plant at different node positions provided us with leaves that differed in age, and the leaves at same node in different treatments enabled us to study the effect of different intensities of UV-B radiation and [CO2 ] on leaves of the same age. In cotton (Gossypium hirsutum L. cv. DES119), Sassenrath-Cole et al. (1996) found that changes in leaf photosynthetic responses to light environment during leaf ageing were solely as a result of physiological changes within the senescing leaf and not the result of photon flux density environment or shading. Decline in photosynthesis and chlorophyll are early symptoms of senescence, with chloroplasts as one of the primary targets for degradation (Thomas and Stoddart 1980, Grove and Mohanty 1992). In cotton, remobilization of leaf N to reproductive organs appears to be the principle component leading to photosynthetic decline (Pettigrew et al. 2000) and the data also suggest that environmental factors can play a role in causing the photosynthetic decline. In our study, atmospheric [CO2 ] did not alter the senescence as indicated by Pn and chlorophyll pigments. Elevated [CO2 ], however, increased Pn by 35% similar to that recorded in earlier studies in well-watered and well fertilized conditions (Reddy et al. 1997, 2000). In this study, at 0 kJ of UV-B and with increase in leafage, a decrease in Pn was recorded with no change in chlorophyll pigments indicating that decline in Pn is a stimulant for leaf senescence in cotton. The photosynthesis activity below a certain threshold level is known to induce leaf senescence (Smart 1994, Dai et al. 1999). Hensel et al. (1993) postulated that a decrease in photosynthesis efficiency reduces sugar levels that may be an early signal for induction of senescence. In the current study, near ambient UV-B radiation (7.7 kJ) reduced the Pn of30day-old leaves by 50% compared with that at 0 kJ UV-B radiation. In detached maize leaves, senescence induced loss of chlorophyll and photosynthesis was significantly enhanced by UV-B radiation (Biswal et al. 1997). Under high UV-B of15.1 kJ, the 12-day-old leaves had Pn on par with the 30-day-old leaves in the control treatment. The 21-day-old leaves exposed to high UV-B were on par with the 30-day-old leaves exposed to ambient and high UV-B, suggesting that these leaves were in a similar senescence phase as a result of their exposure to UV-B radiation. Thus, the UV-B radiation resulted in accelerated leaf ageing.

#### Cotton’s key to the Pakistani economy

Nadeem et al, 10 - Department o f Agronomy, University o f Agriculture, Faisalabad , Pakistan, 1 = University College of Agriculture and Environmental Sciences , Islamia University, Bahawalpur , Pakistan (Muhammad Ather Nadeem, Asghar Ali, Muhammad Tahir , Muhammad Naeem 1 , Asim Raza Chadhar and Sagheer Ahmad, 2010, “Effect of Nitrogen Levels and Plant Spacing on Growth and Yield of Cotton”, Pakistan Journal of Life and Social Sciences, Vol. 8 No. 2, [http://www.pjlss.edu.pk/sites/default/files/121-124%20(dr.%20Athar%202).pdf](http://www.pjlss.edu.pk/sites/default/files/121-124%20%28dr.%20Athar%202%29.pdf) | JJ)

Cotton (Gossypium hirsutum L.) is considered as mainstay of Pakistan’s economy. It is an important cash crop, major source of foreign exchange and plays an important role in agriculture, industry and economic development of the country. In Pakistan cotton is grown on an area is 3.22 million hectares with total production of 12417 thousand bales and average seed cotton yield of 732 kg ha -1 (Anonymous, 2007). Despite of concerted efforts of breeders and agronomists, yield per unit area is still far below from many other cotton producing countries of the world. Low yield of cotton in Pakistan is attributed to some production as well as economic constraints. Poor quality seed, low seed rate, low plant population, poor management or agronomic practices, conventional sowing methods, imbalanced fertilizer application, weed infestation and insect attack are main causes of its low yield. In cotton plant, spacing has effects on the growth and yield characteristics of the plant. Plant population (density) is very important for attaining optimum crop growth and yield under irrigated conditions. Mostly, farmers maintain plant spacing and density according to their traditional methods of planting rather than variety requirement and hence do not obtain the high crop yield. Hussain et al. (2000) reported that 30 cm spacing between cotton plants increased plant height, number of bolls per plant and boll weight as compared to 10 cm and 20 cm. However, plant spacing did not affect ginning out turn or fiber quality. On the other hand Muhammad et al. (2002) found that boll weight decreased by increasing plant population. The field conditions that produce short stature plants can generally tolerate higher plant density without incurring significant yield reduction (Hake et al., 1991). Adequate plant population facilitates the efficient use of applied fertilizers and irrigation (Abbas, 2000). When density is low, fruiting branches are longer and a greater percentage of bolls are produced on outer position of fruiting branches but first position bolls produced by high density are the biggest and best resulting in high yield. Fruit initiation was influenced by plant density in upland cotton (Buxton et al., 1977).

#### Nuclear War

Guthrie, 2K (Grant, J.D. candidate, 2000, University of California, Hastings College of the Law., Hastings International and Comparative Law Review “Nuclear Testing Rocks the Sub-Continent: Can International Law Halt the Impending Nuclear Conflict Between India and Pakistan?” Spring/Summer 2000, pg lexis wyo-ef)

Nuclear testing creates political instability because it requires a substantial economic investment. One, small fission device typically costs five million U.S. dollars to manufacture. 84 Pakistan's economy is fragile already. 85 Pakistan's total budget for 1996-1997 was $ 12.5 [\*503] billion, out of which 45 percent was spent on debt service and 24 percent on defense. 86 If Pakistan begins increasing its defense budget there will be nothing left for its people. 87 The spending effects of continued nuclear tests might bankrupt the Pakistani economy. One day, the Pakistani government might be forced to sell nuclear fuel, nuclear weapons or nuclear technology to generate capital. Uncontrollable nuclear proliferation could ensue and the world political regime might become destabilized. There are strong political forces contending for control of Pakistan. 88 Pakistan has been ruled on and off by the military for half of its history. 89 In October of 1999, Pakistan's democratically elected government was overthrown and traded for a military regime. 90 If Pakistan's political climate does not eventually stabilize, Pakistan may become divided and compartmentalized, like a warlord-ridden, nuclear Somalia. Each faction would control nuclear weapons and a nuclear civil war could ensue. The world could be at the mercy of a rogue nuclear state. The effect on the world could be incredibly destabilizing.

### Dedev

**Even massive economic decline has zero chance of war**

Robert **Jervis 11**, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, **it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough** to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that **even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited**, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen **such a sharp economic down-turn** without **anyone** suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that **even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict**, **it will not make war thinkable**.

#### Growth causes war

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If this limits-to-growth analysis is at all valid, the implications for the problem of global peace and conflict and security are clear and savage. If we all remain determined to increase our living standards, our level of production and consumption, in a world where resources are already scarce, where only a few have affluent living standards but another 8 billion will be wanting them too, and which we, the rich, are determined to get richer without any limit, then nothing is more guaranteed than that there will be increasing levels of conflict and violence. To put it another way, if we insist on remaining affluent we will need to remain heavily armed. Increased conflict in at least the following categories can be expected. First, the present conflict over resources between the rich elites and the poor majority in the Third World must increase, for example, as ‘development’ under globalisation takes more land, water and forests into export markets. Second, there are conflicts between the Third World and the rich world, the major recent examples being the war between the US and Iraq over control of oil. Iraq invaded Kuwait and the US intervened, accompanied by much high-sounding rhetoric (having found nothing unacceptable about Israel’s invasions of Lebanon or the Indonesian invasion of East Timor). As has often been noted, had Kuwait been one of the world’s leading exporters of broccoli, rather than oil, it is doubtful whether the US would have been so eager to come to its defence. At the time of writing, the US is at war in Central Asia over ‘terrorism’. Few would doubt that a ‘collateral’ outcome will be the establishment of regimes that will give the West access to the oil wealth of Central Asia. Following are some references to the connection many have recognised between rich world affluence and conflict. General M.D. Taylor, US Army retired argued ‘... US military priorities just be shifted towards insuring a steady flow of resources from the Third World’. Taylor referred to ‘… fierce competition among industrial powers for the same raw materials markets sought by the United States’ and ‘… growing hostility displayed by have-not nations towards their affluent counterparts’.62 ‘Struggles are taking place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor nations over their share of the world product; within the industrial world over their share of industrial resources and markets’.63 ‘That more than half of the people on this planet are poorly nourished while a small percentage live in historically unparalleled luxury is a sure recipe for continued and even escalating international conflict.’64 The oil embargo placed on the US by OPEC in the early 1970s prompted the US to make it clear that it was prepared to go to war in order to secure supplies. ‘President Carter last week issued a clear warning that any attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf would lead to war.’ It would ‘… be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States’.65 ‘The US is ready to take military action if Russia threatens vital American interests in the Persian Gulf, the US Secretary of Defence, Mr Brown, said yesterday.’66 Klare’s recent book Resource Wars discusses this theme in detail, stressing the coming significance of water as a source of international conflict. ‘Global demand for many key materials is growing at an unsustainable rate. … the incidence of conflict over vital materials is sure to grow. … The wars of the future will largely be fought over the possession and control of vital economic goods. … resource wars will become, in the years ahead, the most distinctive feature of the global security environment.’67 Much of the rich world’s participation in the conflicts taking place throughout the world is driven by the determination to back a faction that will then look favourably on Western interests. In a report entitled, ‘The rich prize that is Shaba’, Breeze begins, ‘Increasing rivalry over a share-out between France and Belgium of the mineral riches of Shaba Province lies behind the joint Franco– Belgian paratroop airlift to Zaire. … These mineral riches make the province a valuable prize and help explain the West’s extended diplomatic courtship …’68 Then there is potential conflict between the rich nations who are after all the ones most dependent on securing large quantities of resources. ‘The resource and energy intensive modes of production employed in nearly all industries necessitate continuing armed coercion and competition to secure raw materials.’69 ‘Struggles are taking place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor nations over their share of the world product, within the industrial world over their share of industrial resources and markets …’70 Growth, competition, expansion … and war Finally, at the most abstract level, the struggle for greater wealth and power is central in the literature on the causes of war. ‘… warfare appears as a normal and periodic form of competition within the capitalist world economy. … world wars regularly occur during a period of economic expansion. ’71 ‘War is an inevitable result of the struggle between economies for expansion.’72 Choucri and North say their most important finding is that domestic growth is a strong determinant of national expansion and that this results in competition between nations and war.73 The First and Second World Wars can be seen as being largely about imperial grabbing. Germany, Italy and Japan sought to expand their territory and resource access. Britain already held much of the world within its empire … which it had previously fought 72 wars to take! ‘Finite resources in a world of expanding populations and increasing per capita demands create a situation ripe for international violence.’74 Ashley focuses on the significance of the quest for economic growth. ‘War is mainly explicable in terms of differential growth in a world of scarce and unevenly distributed resources … expansion is a prime source of conflict. So long as the dynamics of differential growth remain unmanaged, it is probable that these long term processes will sooner or later carry major powers into war.’75 Security The point being made can be put in terms of security. One way to seek security is to develop greater capacity to repel attack. In the case of nations this means large expenditure of money, resources and effort on military preparedness. However there is a much better strategy; i.e. to live in ways that do not oblige you to take more than your fair share and therefore that do not give anyone any motive to attack you. Tut! This is not possible unless there is global economic justice. If a few insist on levels of affluence, industrialisation and economic growth that are totally impossible for all to achieve, and which could not be possible if they were taking only their fair share of global resources, then they must remain heavily armed and their security will require readiness to use their arms to defend their unjust privileges. In other words, if we want affluence we must prepare for war. If we insist on continuing to take most of the oil and other resources while many suffer intense deprivation because they cannot get access to them then we must be prepared to maintain the aircraft carriers and rapid deployment forces, and the despotic regimes, without which we cannot secure the oil fields and plantations. Global peace is not possible without global justice, and that is not possible unless rich countries move to ‘The Simpler Way’.

#### Extinction

**Chase-Dunn 96** Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Director of the Institute for Research on World-Systems at the University of (Christopher, Conflict Among Core States: World-System Cycles and Trends, 23 January 1996, http://wsarch.ucr.edu/archive/papers/c-d&hall/warprop.htm)

Note-figure omitted

Late in the K-wave upswing (i.e. in the 2020s), the world-system schema predicts a window of vulnerability to another round of world war. This is when world wars have occurred in the past. Intensified rivalry and competition for raw materials and markets will coincide with a multipolar distribution of military power among core states. The world-system model does not predict who the next hegemon will be. Rather it designates that there will be structural forces in motion that will favor the construction of a new hierarchy. Historical particularities and the unique features of the era will shape the outcome and select the winners and losers. If it were possible for the current system to survive the holocaust of another war among core states, the outcome of the war would be the main arbiter of hegemonic succession. While the hegemonic sequence has been a messy method of selecting global "leadership" in the past, the settlement of hegemonic rivalry by force in the future will be a disaster that our species may not survive. It is my concern about this possible disaster that motivates this effort to understand how the hegemonic sequence has occurred in the past and the factors affecting hegemonic rivalry in the next decades. What are the cyclical processes and secular trends that may affect the probability of future world wars? The world-system model is presented in Figure 1. This model depicts the variables that I contend will be the main influences on the probability of war among core states. The four variables that raise the probability of core war are the Kondratieff cycle, hegemonic decline, population pressure (and resource scarcity) and global inequality. The four variables that reduce the probability of core war are the destructiveness of weaponry, international economic interdependency, international political integration and disarmament. The probability of war may be high without a war occurring, of course. Joshua Goldstein's (1988) study of war severity (battle deaths per year) in wars among the "great powers" demonstrated the existence of a fifty-year cycle of core wars. Goldstein's study shows how this "war wave" tracks rather closely with the Kondratieff long economic cycle over the past 500 years of world-system history. It is the future of this war cycle that I am trying to predict. Factors that Increase the Likelihood of War Among Core States The proposed model divides variables into those that are alleged to increase the probability of war among core states and those that decrease that probability. There are four of each. Kondratieff waves The first variable that has a positive effect on the probability of war among core powers is the Kondratieff wave -- a forty to sixty year cycle of economic growth and stagnation. Goldstein (1988) provides evidence that the most destructive core wars tend to occur late in a Kondratieff A-phase (upswing). Earlier research by Thompson and Zuk (1982) also supports the conclusion that core wars are more likely to begin near the end of an upswing. Boswell and Sweat's (1991) analysis also supports the Goldstein thesis. But several other world-system theorists have argued that core wars occur primarily during K-wave B-phases. This disagreement over timing is related to a disagreement over causation. According to Goldstein states are war machines that always have a desire to utilize military force, but wars are costly and so statesmen tend to refrain from going to war when state revenues are low. On the other hand, statesmen are more likely to engage in warfare when state revenues are high (because the states can then afford the high costs of war). Boswell and Sweat call this the "resource theory of war."

### US Modeling

#### Withdrawal from Iran nuclear deal and failures in Middle East plus counterbalancing means US leadership is dead now --- trying to go back to unipolarity triggers violent conflict, especially under Trump.

Adams 18 Gordon Adams, Gordon Adams is emeritus faculty from American University and a Distinguished Fellow at the Stimson Center. He oversaw national security budgets in the Clinton White House from 1993-97. “Beyond Hegemony And A Liberal International Order.” May 17, 2018. https://lobelog.com/beyond-hegemony-and-a-liberal-international-order/

America’s place in the world is experiencing an historic turning point. All the mumbo-jumbo about being the “exceptional” and “indispensable” nation, the natural “leader” of something called the “West,” the guarantor of some kind of international system of “rules” is finally being cast into the dustbin of history. This moment is not just about leaving the Iran nuclear agreement, or even the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris climate agreement. It is not simply attributable to the unpredictable, childish impulses of the current president. Nor is it the result of Obama’s failure to enforce a red line in Syria, or “leading from behind” in Libya. It is not even about Bush’s invasion of Iraq with the goal of regime change, setting in motion the destruction of what little political stability existed in the Middle East. Of course, it is about all these decisions. But in every case, those decisions, and even the critics of those decisions, have failed to realize how they have played into, helped cause, and now accelerate a fundamental shift in global realities—the centrifugal redistribution of power and influence in the international system that has brought to an end the “American century.” The United States has become just another power in a system for which it no longer sets or enforces the rules, if it ever really did. Both political parties fail to cope with this reality. Democrats and liberals insist that Trump’s foreign-policy decisions threaten the “rules-based” international order America built and dominated. A simple change in leadership, they believe, can restore order and America’s primacy. Republicans [demand](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/03/24/john-bolton-wants-regime-change-in-iran-and-so-does-the-cult-that-paid-him/?utm_term=.68aa7b4e3cce) bellicose American assertiveness, believing that force and military strength guarantee that the world will behave. Columnists bewail America’s declining status, [arguing](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/trump-has-put-america-in-the-worst-of-all-possible-worlds/2018/05/11/ff68940c-5553-11e8-9c91-7dab596e8252_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.76f57dea9018) that greater iinvestment in allies and diplomacy, combined with military engagement might reverse the tide. Think tanks scurry to [define](https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/credibility-matters-strengthening-american-deterrence-in-an-age-of-geopolit) new national security and military policies that can put America back on top. This debate is a circular firing squad. Both liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans are struggling to recreate a myth: that the US dominates the world by dint of power, values, wisdom, even God’s decisions. America, and only America, can bring order and security to the world. Any other option spells chaos. Power Shifts The latest foreign policy whim—withdrawing from the nuclear agreement with Iran—is the most recent nail in the coffin lid in which the myth is buried. Rather than restore leadership, withdrawing from the agreement simply accelerates the global rebalancing already underway, a tectonic shift that began with the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The signs are everywhere. In the Middle East, the power shift is palpable. The United States has treated Iran as a pariah since 1979, trying to stuff the ayatollahs back into some imaginary bottle, hoping that they will go away or be overthrown. This approach has failed, and the withdrawal from the nuclear deal will only make that failure more evident. Iran is a regional power, defending its interests, engaging other powers and movements inside and outside the region, such as Russia. US regime change in Iraq not only destabilized the region but helped usher the Iranians into this active regional role. The other influential countries in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia and Israel, will have to deal with this reality. In addition to these three countries, Russia is also key to regional stability and instability. There’s no way of pushing the Russians out, short of direct conflict. Nor can Turkey be forced to comply with American policy. It is clearly asserting its own interests and influence in three directions at the same time: Central Asia and Russia, Europe, and the Middle East. The invasion of Iraq may have helped open this Pandora’s box. The US is rapidly becoming a marginal player in the chaotic security environment of the Middle East. In Asia, decades of US condemnation and containment of China have failed. How dare China rise? How dare China steal intellectual property, stifle democracy, arm its artificial islands in the South China Sea, develop a powerful military, mess in Africa (complete with a military base in Djibouti), and intrude into Latin America? And yet, to paraphrase Galileo, “they move.” There is a new, global, competitive player in the system, a reality the United States can not contain or reverse. That player is disrupting that lovely system of rules, acting without U.S. permission or approval. It is even creating new international institutions—an infrastructure development bank and a global trading infrastructure programs (the Belt and Road initiative) to which the US is not even a party. The balance has changed, permanently, and the rules are being rewritten, whether the United States likes it or not. At the end of the Cold War, American power surrounded Russia, coopting its former satellites, provoking a Russian reaction. Today, the Russian government is, poisoning its citizens overseas, arming Assad, intruding on elections globally, stifling dissent and killing dissenters, and rebuilding its military. Confront Russia, condemn Putin, pretend that they are isolated, treat them with contempt and moral judgment, but Putin does not go away. He is asserting his view of Russia’s interests and Russia’s role in the world, like any great power is likely to do. No amount of US pressure, sanctions, or policy is likely to change that reality. Russia is consciously and actively rebalancing the United States, with some success. American bullying and presidential rhetoric may have played a role in the apparent, but uncertain, willingness of the North Korean regime to put its nuclear program on the table. But if that program disappears, the putative Nobel Peace Prize may actually belong to President Moon Jae-in of South Korea and even Kim Jong Un, for seizing an opportunity. Even that regional balance and the key players are shifting. Reckoning with the Shift America has not been able to use its dominant military to prevent this evolution or restore order. Where it has been deployed in large numbers—Iraq and Afghanistan—U.S. military force has failed. War grinds on in Afghanistan with no light suddenly appearing at the end of the tunnel, despite the promises of generations of officers. Rousting the Islamic State from Iraq has not solved the internal problems of that unhappy country, which is still recovering from a US occupation. Special Operations forces in dozens of countries whack at terrorist moles only to find others arising in their place, stimulated by the confrontation. Order is not restored; the American rules are not being obeyed. If the US fails to read global rebalancing accurately and tries either to bully the rest of the world or to “restore” the liberal international order, the entire world will find itself at an even more dangerous moment. Bullying will only accelerate the centrifugal trend. Asserting the superiority of an American “order” and American “rules” will no longer persuade other rising powers. The rules will change with the rebalancing. Eliminating the Trump presidency will not restore the previous order. His actions are not an aberration, but an accelerant, spreading the fires that were already under way. The challenge is to completely redesign US foreign and national security policy to fit with a world where America is just another power, competing and cooperating for influence. The United States must learn to play well with others in the global sandbox.

#### Liberal constitutionalism has been a weapon of imperial war for nearly a century. The aff is a failed attempt to reassert a lost ideal of neoliberal internationalism that is fundamentally unsustainable and results in unethical violence.

Bâli & Rana ’18 (Asli, Prof. of Law @ UCLA, Faculty Director, Promise Institute for Human Rights, Director, UCLA Center for Near Eastern Studies, and Aziz, Prof. of Law @ Cornell U., “Constitutionalism and the American Imperial Imagination,” 85 U. Chi. L. Rev. 257)

President Donald **Trump's ascendance** to the White House **has been understood as signaling a breakdown in American global leadership.** For some, the last year reflects the end of the American century; for others, the combination of the Trump ad- ministration and Brexit suggests the demise of over two centuries of Anglo-American global leadership. In short, disorienting developments across the Atlantic in the last year have triggered questions about the stability and sustainability of an international order premised on a particular brand of American imperium. We argue that **while the Trump administration has certainly broken with** the **decorum** and diplomacy of past American presidential policies, the unraveling of the international order put in place under American leadership in the postwar period has been more than a quarter century in the making. The postwar order that replaced the age of empires was one that reflected the American constitutional imagination and marked a break from the earlier era of formal colonial dependencies. By contrast with its predecessor, the American-led order, grounded in constitutional principles, had two international components. The first was a commitment to spreading market-based capitalist democracy and its correlate, liberal constitutionalism, through American bilateral and multilateral foreign policy.2 The second was support for a rule-based international order that was understood as an extension of the American constitutional imagination to the challenges of global governance. Indeed, the post-war liberal international regime represented a clear expression of American constitutionalism from the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (tied eventually to an "International Bill of Rights") and the UN Charter (a "constitution" for world order), to the creation of a tight web of interlocking institutions governing everything from international monetary policy and global trade to health, education, and scientific cooperation. As a consequence, the United States served as a global hegemon in a multilateral framework whose legitimacy depended on legality and a kind of international social contract that would command consensual participation from the international community, albeit in a system **that still preserved asymmetric benefits for its author.**3 And during the Cold War, as the self-styled leader of the "free world," America and its commitments to legality and capitalist democracy were contrasted with the authoritarian control economies of the Soviet sphere. In this Essay, we explore the degree to which the version of American empire that characterized the postwar project has given way to competing commitments and preferences that have ultimately eroded basic faith at home and abroad in constitutionalism itself. **The Cold War period was no doubt filled with gross violations of international legality, antidemocratic overthrows, and support for American-aligned dictatorships.** Indeed, in many ways the defining feature of American Cold War power was the degree to which the promotion of liberal constitutionalism in actuality produced coercion and widespread violence on the ground. And as we suggest below, **America's** departures **from its own presumptive constitutional values** were in truth not defections at all. They were instead hard baked into the very structure of how American policymakers attempted to marry universal claims with efforts to project power, often on highly racialized terms. **This means that the vision of American imperium** that marked the Cold War **was always an unstable one, cyclically breaking down under the internal weight of its own inherent contradictions.** But crucially, even in the context of these tensions – such as during the Vietnam War – **the persistent tendency of policymakers was to revive and defend the ideology of American imperium.** **The destructive consequences of US power were justified, time and again, either as aberrations necessitated by the imperatives of anticommunism or** unfortunate transitional developments on the way to full-fledged **liberal democracy.** Perhaps most critically, despite these real and damaging consequences, the requirements of offering a credible alternative to the Soviet example pressed American officials to invest in developmental and reconstructive efforts as well as multilateral institutions that highlighted the compatibility of the American model with foreign prosperity and mutual constraint. In this way, the default American postwar order not only remained wedded to constitutional liberal democracy in its self-presentation. Especially during the heady postwar years of American economic largesse, it also embodied a plausible account both at home and abroad of shared economic and political security.4 These characteristics of the postwar order were further manifest in what Professor Samuel Huntington memorably framed as the "waves of democratization" that spread through the international system.5 The end of World War II was marked by American assistance to help postfascist Western European states resurrect market democracies. Postcolonial independence brought a wave of new states that embraced constitutions-along with flags and anthems-as markers of self-determination.6 Joining international human-rights treaties became a rite of passage as states gained sovereignty and entered the United Nations. In later waves, countries emerging from military rule in Latin America and postcommunist reforms in Eastern Europe appeared to confirm the transnational spread of constitutional democracy as an incident of American-led international order. This meant that for all the profound violence and real democracy demotion of the Cold War years, liberal constitutionalism as a "default design choice"7 did diffuse broadly in the decades following World War II. While this earlier era of democratization depended on many factors, this diffusion was facilitated, on our account, by the background conditions of multilateral order and the presentation of constitutional democracy as the legitimate domestic political order for countries maintaining good standing in the American-led "free world." Although it was viewed as a system without ideological competitors by the end of the Cold War, this seemingly "default" framework nonetheless depended on American commitments that underwrote the postwar international order. While the decline of liberal constitutionalism may be tied to numerous factors, the gradual American retreat from its own international and domestic model has surely played a role. During the Cold War, American leaders commonly regarded the constraints of international institutions as conducive to entrenching the nation's hegemony. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fact of unipolarity seemed to remove many of the external pressures that had previously connected national self-interest to international legal restraint.8 Moreover, in the absence of an alternative model as a foil against which the United States proclaimed its democratic commitments, other strategic priorities gained salience. In particular, counterterrorism and the national security state became increasingly central to American governance imperatives. In the very regions where American analysts awaited the arrival of a "fourth wave" of democracy – notably the Muslim world – these new imperatives not only displaced constitutional priorities but were in many cases in direct tension with them.9 Certainly, during the Cold War there had always been a tension between democratization and anticommunism, leading to the support of pliable dictatorships.o But in the post-World War II years, such support was presented as transitional or as still bound to a narrative of shared economic growth that would in time generate liberal democratic regimes. However, **with the Muslim world styled as an incubator of terrorist threat and a general American retreat from the domestic and international welfarist policies** that marked the early Cold War, **the United States increasingly moved simply to consolidate executive power abroad.**11 This consolidation persisted without any plausible account of political transition or collective economic improvement- and despite half-hearted invocations of "democracy promotion." In essence, the Cold War's coercive security means became increasingly disconnected from any credible aspirational ends. In some ways, **the Trump administration represents the apotheosis of these broad** international and transnational **trends.** **The Cold War era had been marked by a persistent cycle in which American policymakers elaborated a framework of constitutional values and norms only to see those norms break down in political practice.** But the post-Cold War era culminating in Trump has now seemingly ended the cycle. It has produced a final collapse of commitment to the values themselves and, thus, of the basic justifications for American imperium.12 At the domestic level, **the president shows little deference to constitutional norms** at home-decrying judicial independence when it undermines executive fiat's and setting aside long-standing practices in areas ranging from conflict-of-interest rules to the treatment of the White House press corps.14 On the international front, Trump entered office announcing a determination to withdraw from key American commitments in multilateral agreements from NAFTA to the Paris Climate Agreement, proposed to slash funding to the State Department and other domestic agencies with foreign policy or foreign aid responsibilities, called into question the country's commitment to NATO, and evinced a pronounced hostility to the United Nations.15 Trump has also expressed disdain for projects of nation building and promised to cut support for American foreign policy programs designed to advance democracy abroad.16 While Trump's intemperate behavior is clearly unusual, his boastful unilateralism is not. The post-Cold War period, from the Clinton administration through the Obama administration, has more often been characterized by departures from the rule-based order of twentieth-century international institutions than support for them.1 In this sense, events of the last year reflect an accumulating momentum decades in the making rather than the eccentricities of an accidental president. A slow trickle of defections from earlier multilateral commitments by the United States has gathered into a tidal shift, reducing the coherence and stability of liberal constitutional design as a default internationally and transnationally. Thus, to understand the continuities between Trump and earlier administrations requires an appreciation for the complex role liberal constitutionalism and American exceptionalism have played in both creating and undermining an inter- national social contract premised on US hegemony. Over the following pages, we lay out this argument in greater detail, emphasizing how as the domestic creedal commitment tying constitutionalism back to America's founding narrative came under pressure domestically in the post-Cold War era, its imperial correlates-capitalist democratization and a rule- based international ordering principle-began to lose support. We view this as an explanation for the decline in the spread of liberal constitutionalism that is consistent with and indeed underlies other hypotheses in the literature, but one that remains underappreciated. We begin with an analysis of the commitment to con- stitutionalism at the heart of the American century and its rela- tionship to racial and economic policies pursued by American elites. We then trace how the international dimensions of the constitutional project receded with the end of the Cold War by tracking key changes to strategies of democracy promotion and multilateral governance under the Clinton, Bush, and Obama presidencies. **Understanding the diffusion of constitutionalism and rule-based international governance as a means of projecting American power transnationally** (**as a domestic prescription**) **and globally** (**as an ordering principle**) **exposes the degree to which** empire and constitutionalism have been deeply imbricated. By extension, we contend that the decline in constitutionalism represents a crisis in the articulation of American global power in the post-Cold War era in which international order has been reframed around a Global War on Terror.

#### Rebels use terrorism---democracy enables passive support for funding and arms trafficking

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Conclusion

The empirical analysis reveals that democracy influences terrorism through a channel that is yet to be explored. Democracies often find themselves to be ‘‘passive supporters’’ of rebel groups committing acts of terrorism because the liberties and freedoms inherent in democracies create a convenient environment for opportunistic actors to exploit. The empirical findings provide further support for the facilitating effect of democracy on terrorism, yet in a different context and through a previously unexplored causal mechanism. Terrorism is just one of the many tactics employed by rebels that try to achieve concessions from a government; it is most definitely not a tool reserved for only the use of broad transnational networks, such as Al-Qaeda. Examining the interaction between states that are potential supporters and those that are targeted by terrorism improves our understanding of the role of interstate relations in terrorism. The preceding findings reveal the conditions under which potential supporters transform into actual supporters for terrorism and suggest the following:

Democracies are less likely to create direct channels of support for terrorism. This has implications for promoting democracy as a means to fight terrorism in the long run and compliments the work of Abrahms (2007) and Piazza (2007).

Democratic states cannot avoid exploitation by rebel groups because of inherent freedoms and liberties existing in democracies. This holds true even after we control for various other significant factors, such as press freedom, whether a rebel group fights an external adversary and shares some ethnic and religious ties with the majority group in the potential supporter state that may motivate states to support a rebel group.

#### Successful attacks cause retaliation and collapse the economy

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The escalating threats between North Korea and the United States make it easy to forget the “nuclear nightmare,” as former US Secretary of Defense William J. Perry put it, that could result even from the use of just a single terrorist nuclear bomb in the heart of a major city.

At the risk of repeating the vast literature on the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—and the substantial literature surrounding nuclear tests and simulations since then—we attempt to spell out here the likely consequences of the explosion of a single terrorist nuclear bomb on a major city, and its subsequent ripple effects on the rest of the planet. Depending on where and when it was detonated, the blast, fire, initial radiation, and long-term radioactive fallout from such a bomb could leave the heart of a major city a smoldering radioactive ruin, killing tens or hundreds of thousands of people and wounding hundreds of thousands more. Vast areas would have to be evacuated and might be uninhabitable for years. Economic, political, and social aftershocks would ripple throughout the world. A single terrorist nuclear bomb would change history. The country attacked—and the world—would never be the same. The idea of terrorists accomplishing such a thing is, unfortunately, not out of the question; it is far easier to make a crude, unsafe, unreliable nuclear explosive that might fit in the back of a truck than it is to make a safe, reliable weapon of known yield that can be delivered by missile or combat aircraft. Numerous government studies have concluded that it is plausible that a sophisticated terrorist group could make a crude bomb if they got the needed nuclear material. And in the last quarter century, there have been some 20 seizures of stolen, weapons-usable nuclear material, and at least two terrorist groups have made significant efforts to acquire nuclear bombs. Terrorist use of an actual nuclear bomb is a low-probability event—but the immensity of the consequences means that even a small chance is enough to justify an intensive effort to reduce the risk. Fortunately, since the early 1990s, countries around the world have significantly reduced the danger—but it remains very real, and there is more to do to ensure this nightmare never becomes reality. Brighter than a thousand suns. Imagine a crude terrorist nuclear bomb—containing a chunk of highly enriched uranium just under the size of a regulation bowling ball, or a much smaller chunk of plutonium—suddenly detonating inside a delivery van parked in the heart of a major city. Such a terrorist bomb would release as much as 10 kilotons of explosive energy, or the equivalent of 10,000 tons of conventional explosives, a volume of explosives large enough to fill all the cars of a mile-long train. In a millionth of a second, all of that energy would be released inside that small ball of nuclear material, creating temperatures and pressures as high as those at the center of the sun. That furious energy would explode outward, releasing its energy in three main ways: a powerful blast wave; intense heat; and deadly radiation. The ball would expand almost instantly into a fireball the width of four football fields, incinerating essentially everything and everyone within. The heated fireball would rise, sucking in air from below and expanding above, creating the mushroom cloud that has become the symbol of the terror of the nuclear age. The ionized plasma in the fireball would create a localized electromagnetic pulse more powerful than lightning, shorting out communications and electronics nearby—though most would be destroyed by the bomb’s other effects in any case. (Estimates of heat, blast, and radiation effects in this article are drawn primarily from Alex Wellerstein’s “Nukemap,” which itself comes from declassified US government data, such as the 660-page government textbook The Effects of Nuclear Weapons.) At the instant of its detonation, the bomb would also release an intense burst of gamma and neutron radiation which would be lethal for nearly everyone directly exposed within about two-thirds of a mile from the center of the blast. (Those who happened to be shielded by being inside, or having buildings between them and the bomb, would be partly protected—in some cases, reducing their doses by ten times or more.) The nuclear flash from the heat of the fireball would radiate in both visible light and the infrared; it would be “brighter than a thousand suns,” in the words of the title of a book describing the development of nuclear weapons—adapting a phrase from the Hindu epic the Bhagavad-Gita. Anyone who looked directly at the blast would be blinded. The heat from the fireball would ignite fires and horribly burn everyone exposed outside at distances of nearly a mile away. (In the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum, visitors gaze in horror at the bones of a human hand embedded in glass melted by the bomb.) No one has burned a city on that scale in the decades since World War II, so it is difficult to predict the full extent of the fire damage that would occur from the explosion of a nuclear bomb in one of today’s cities. Modern glass, steel, and concrete buildings would presumably be less flammable than the wood-and-rice-paper housing of Hiroshima or Nagasaki in the 1940s—but many questions remain, including exactly how thousands of broken gas lines might contribute to fire damage (as they did in Dresden during World War II). On 9/11, the buildings of the World Trade Center proved to be much more vulnerable to fire damage than had been expected. Ultimately, even a crude terrorist nuclear bomb would carry the possibility that the countless fires touched off by the explosion would coalesce into a devastating firestorm, as occurred at Hiroshima. In a firestorm, the rising column of hot air from the massive fire sucks in the air from all around, creating hurricane-force winds; everything flammable and everything alive within the firestorm would be consumed. The fires and the dust from the blast would make it extremely difficult for either rescuers or survivors to see. The explosion would create a powerful blast wave rushing out in every direction. For more than a quarter-mile all around the blast, the pulse of pressure would be over 20 pounds per square inch above atmospheric pressure (known as “overpressure”), destroying or severely damaging even sturdy buildings. The combination of blast, heat, and radiation would kill virtually everyone in this zone. The blast would be accompanied by winds of many hundreds of miles per hour. The damage from the explosion would extend far beyond this inner zone of almost total death. Out to more than half a mile, the blast would be strong enough to collapse most residential buildings and create a serious danger that office buildings would topple over, killing those inside and those in the path of the rubble. (On the other hand, the office towers of a modern city would tend to block the blast wave in some areas, providing partial protection from the blast, as well as from the heat and radiation.) In that zone, almost anything made of wood would be destroyed: Roofs would cave in, windows would shatter, gas lines would rupture. Telephone poles, street lamps, and utility lines would be severely damaged. Many roads would be blocked by mountains of wreckage. In this zone, many people would be killed or injured in building collapses, or trapped under the rubble; many more would be burned, blinded, or injured by flying debris. In many cases, their charred skin would become ragged and fall off in sheets. The effects of the detonation would act in deadly synergy. The smashed materials of buildings broken by the blast would be far easier for the fires to ignite than intact structures. The effects of radiation would make it far more difficult for burned and injured people to recover. The combination of burns, radiation, and physical injuries would cause far more death and suffering than any one of them would alone. The silent killer. The bomb’s immediate effects would be followed by a slow, lingering killer: radioactive fallout. A bomb detonated at ground level would dig a huge crater, hurling tons of earth and debris thousands of feet into the sky. Sucked into the rising fireball, these particles would mix with the radioactive remainders of the bomb, and over the next few hours or days, the debris would rain down for miles downwind. Depending on weather and wind patterns, the fallout could actually be deadlier and make a far larger area unusable than the blast itself. Acute radiation sickness from the initial radiation pulse and the fallout would likely affect tens of thousands of people. Depending on the dose, they might suffer from vomiting, watery diarrhea, fever, sores, loss of hair, and bone marrow depletion. Some would survive; some would die within days; some would take months to die. Cancer rates among the survivors would rise. Women would be more vulnerable than men—children and infants especially so. Much of the radiation from a nuclear blast is short-lived; radiation levels even a few days after the blast would be far below those in the first hours. For those not killed or terribly wounded by the initial explosion, the best advice would be to take shelter in a basement for at least several days. But many would be too terrified to stay. Thousands of panic-stricken people might receive deadly doses of radiation as they fled from their homes. Some of the radiation will be longer-lived; areas most severely affected would have to be abandoned for many years after the attack. The combination of radioactive fallout and the devastation of nearly all life-sustaining infrastructure over a vast area would mean that hundreds of thousands of people would have to evacuate. Ambulances to nowhere. The explosion would also destroy much of the city’s ability to respond. Hospitals would be leveled, doctors and nurses killed and wounded, ambulances destroyed. (In Hiroshima, 42 of 45 hospitals were destroyed or severely damaged, and 270 of 300 doctors were killed.) Resources that survived outside the zone of destruction would be utterly overwhelmed. Hospitals have no ability to cope with tens or hundreds of thousands of terribly burned and injured people all at once; the United States, for example, has 1,760 burn beds in hospitals nationwide, of which a third are available on any given day. And the problem would not be limited to hospitals; firefighters, for example, would have little ability to cope with thousands of fires raging out of control at once. Fire stations and equipment would be destroyed in the affected area, and firemen killed, along with police and other emergency responders. Some of the first responders may become casualties themselves, from radioactive fallout, fire, and collapsing buildings. Over much of the affected area, communications would be destroyed, by both the physical effects and the electromagnetic pulse from the explosion. Better preparation for such a disaster could save thousands of lives—but ultimately, there is no way any city can genuinely be prepared for a catastrophe on such a historic scale, occurring in a flash, with zero warning. Rescue and recovery attempts would be impeded by the destruction of most of the needed personnel and equipment, and by fire, debris, radiation, fear, lack of communications, and the immense scale of the disaster. The US military and the national guard could provide critically important capabilities—but federal plans assume that “no significant federal response” would be available for 24-to-72 hours. Many of those burned and injured would wait in vain for help, food, or water, perhaps for days. The scale of death and suffering. How many would die in such an event, and how many would be terribly wounded, would depend on where and when the bomb was detonated, what the weather conditions were at the time, how successful the response was in helping the wounded survivors, and more. Many estimates of casualties are based on census data, which reflect where people sleep at night; if the attack occurred in the middle of a workday, the numbers of people crowded into the office towers at the heart of many modern cities would be far higher. The daytime population of Manhattan, for example, is roughly twice its nighttime population; in Midtown on a typical workday, there are an estimated 980,000 people per square mile. A 10-kiloton weapon detonated there might well kill half a million people—not counting those who might die of radiation sickness from the fallout. (These effects were analyzed in great detail in the Rand Corporation’s Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack and the British Medical Journal’s “Nuclear terrorism.”) On a typical day, the wind would blow the fallout north, seriously contaminating virtually all of Manhattan above Gramercy Park; people living as far away as Stamford, Connecticut would likely have to evacuate. Seriously injured survivors would greatly outnumber the dead, their suffering magnified by the complete inadequacy of available help. The psychological and social effects—overwhelming sadness, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, myriad forms of anxiety—would be profound and long-lasting. The scenario we have been describing is a groundburst. An airburst—such as might occur, for example, if terrorists put their bomb in a small aircraft they had purchased or rented—would extend the blast and fire effects over a wider area, killing and injuring even larger numbers of people immediately. But an airburst would not have the same lingering effects from fallout as a groundburst, because the rock and dirt would not be sucked up into the fireball and contaminated. The 10-kiloton blast we have been discussing is likely toward the high end of what terrorists could plausibly achieve with a crude, improvised bomb, but even a 1-kiloton blast would be a catastrophic event, having a deadly radius between one-third and one-half that of a 10-kiloton blast. These hundreds of thousands of people would not be mere statistics, but countless individual stories of loss—parents, children, entire families; all religions; rich and poor alike—killed or horribly mutilated. Human suffering and tragedy on this scale does not have to be imagined; it can be remembered through the stories of the survivors of the US atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the only times in history when nuclear weapons have been used intentionally against human beings. The pain and suffering caused by those bombings are almost beyond human comprehension; the eloquent testimony of the Hibakusha—the survivors who passed through the atomic fire—should stand as an eternal reminder of the need to prevent nuclear weapons from ever being used in anger again. Global economic disaster. The economic impact of such an attack would be enormous. The effects would reverberate for so far and so long that they are difficult to estimate in all their complexity. Hundreds of thousands of people would be too injured or sick to work for weeks or months. Hundreds of thousands more would evacuate to locations far from their jobs. Many places of employment would have to be abandoned because of the radioactive fallout. Insurance companies would reel under the losses; but at the same time, many insurance policies exclude the effects of nuclear attacks—an item insurers considered beyond their ability to cover—so the owners of thousands of buildings would not have the insurance payments needed to cover the cost of fixing them, thousands of companies would go bankrupt, and banks would be left holding an immense number of mortgages that would never be repaid. Consumer and investor confidence would likely be dramatically affected, as worried people slowed their spending. Enormous new homeland security and military investments would be very likely. If the bomb had come in a shipping container, the targeted country—and possibly others—might stop all containers from entering until it could devise a system for ensuring they could never again be used for such a purpose, throwing a wrench into the gears of global trade for an extended period. (And this might well occur even if a shipping container had not been the means of delivery.) Even the far smaller 9/11 attacks are estimated to have caused economic aftershocks costing almost $1 trillion even excluding the multi-trillion-dollar costs of the wars that ensued. The cost of a terrorist nuclear attack in a major city would likely be many times higher. The most severe effects would be local, but the effects of trade disruptions, reduced economic activity, and more would reverberate around the world. Consequently, while some countries may feel that nuclear terrorism is only a concern for the countries most likely to be targeted—such as the United States—in reality it is a threat to everyone, everywhere. In 2005, then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that these global effects would push “tens of millions of people into dire poverty,” creating “a second death toll throughout the developing world.” One recent estimate suggested that a nuclear attack in an urban area would cause a global recession, cutting global Gross Domestic Product by some two percent, and pushing an additional 30 million people in the developing world into extreme poverty. Desperate dilemmas. In short, an act of nuclear terrorism could rip the heart out of a major city, and cause ripple effects throughout the world. The government of the country attacked would face desperate decisions: How to help the city attacked? How to prevent further attacks? How to respond or retaliate? Terrorists—either those who committed the attack or others—would probably claim they had more bombs already hidden in other cities (whether they did or not), and threaten to detonate them unless their demands were met. The fear that this might be true could lead people to flee major cities in a large-scale, uncontrolled evacuation. There is very little ability to support the population of major cities in the surrounding countryside. The potential for widespread havoc and economic chaos is very real. If the detonation took place in the capital of the nation attacked, much of the government might be destroyed. A bomb in Washington, D.C., for example, might kill the President, the Vice President, and many of the members of Congress and the Supreme Court. (Having some plausible national leader survive is a key reason why one cabinet member is always elsewhere on the night of the State of the Union address.) Elaborate, classified plans for “continuity of government” have already been drawn up in a number of countries, but the potential for chaos and confusion—if almost all of a country’s top leaders were killed—would still be enormous. Who, for example, could address the public on what the government would do, and what the public should do, to respond? Could anyone honestly assure the public there would be no further attacks? If they did, who would believe them? In the United States, given the practical impossibility of passing major legislation with Congress in ruins and most of its members dead or seriously injured, some have argued for passing legislation in advance giving the government emergency powers to act—and creating procedures, for example, for legitimately replacing most of the House of Representatives. But to date, no such legislative preparations have been made. In what would inevitably be a desperate effort to prevent further attacks, traditional standards of civil liberties might be jettisoned, at least for a time—particularly when people realized that the fuel for the bomb that had done such damage would easily have fit in a suitcase. Old rules limiting search and surveillance could be among the first to go. The government might well impose martial law as it sought to control the situation, hunt for the perpetrators, and find any additional weapons or nuclear materials they might have. Even the far smaller attacks of 9/11 saw the US government authorizing torture of prisoners and mass electronic surveillance. And what standards of international order and law would still hold sway? The country attacked might well lash out militarily at whatever countries it thought might bear a portion of responsibility. (A terrifying description of the kinds of discussions that might occur appeared in Brian Jenkins’ book, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?) With the nuclear threshold already crossed in this scenario—at least by terrorists—it is conceivable that some of the resulting conflicts might escalate to nuclear use. International politics could become more brutish and violent, with powerful states taking unilateral action, by force if necessary, in an effort to ensure their security. After 9/11, the United States led the invasions of two sovereign nations, in wars that have since cost hundreds of thousands of lives and trillions of dollars, while plunging a region into chaos. Would the reaction after a far more devastating nuclear attack be any less?

#### American-grown democracies in the Middle East fuel terrorism

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Will promoting democracy in the Middle East reduce terrorism, both within Middle-Eastern countries and among countries that are potential targets of Middle Eastern–based terrorist groups? The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania have led to a dramatic re-orientation of United States foreign policy toward the Middle East. Predicated on the hypothesis—now the dominant foreign policy paradigm within the Bush administration—that terrorism is a product of nondemocratic governance, a new idealistic interventionism has replaced the legacy of Cold War realism, culminating in the 2003 invasion of Iraq for the purposes of “draining the swamp”; that is to say removing the conditions that foster terrorism, namely dictatorship. How might promotion of democracy and civil freedoms in the Middle East reduce terrorism? Proponents of democracy promotion view the climate of “unfreedom” that pervades most Middle-Eastern countries as a dangerous precipitant to extremist thought and behavior that results in terrorist activity.1 The repression, violence, and systematic humiliation used by Middle Eastern regimes like Iraq or Syria as tools of popular control foster public rage and increase the appeal of fanaticism. In the absence of a free press or freedom of public expression, proponents of democracy promotion argued, an “epistemological retardation” pervades political discourse fostering a mood of paranoia and giving credence to conspiracy stories in which the United States and its allies, namely Israel, are perpetual villains. Also, in these nondemocracies, public grievances are not addressed and are allowed to fester, providing extremist groups with material for propaganda, facilitating their recruiting efforts and legitimizing their acts of political violence. Finally, the nature of nondemocratic regimes retards the public virtues of political moderation and compromise, which are necessary ingredients of nonviolent political expression (Muravchik 2001). Jennifer L. Windsor, executive director of the Washington, D.C.–based nonprofit Freedom House, articulates a similar vision of the relationship between democratic governance and the reduction of terrorism in the Middle East: The underlying logic is that democratic institutions and procedures, by enabling the peaceful reconciliation of grievances and providing channels of participation in policymaking, can help to address those underlying conditions that have fueled the rise of Islamist Extremism. ... More specifically, promoting democratization in the closed societies of the Middle East can provide a set of values and ideas that offer a powerful alternative to the kind of extremism that today has found expression in terrorist activity, often against U.S. interests. (Windsor 2003, 43) Democracy, Civil Liberties, and Terrorism: Political Access versus Strategic Targeting By and large, scholarly research on the relationship between terrorism, dictatorship, and democracy does not lend empirical support to the argument that there is a linear relationship between democratic governance or protection of civil liberties and the incidence of terrorism. Traditionally, scholars have proposed the opposite: that democracies are more conducive to terrorist activity than are dictatorships (Schmid 1992; Charters 1994; Eubank and Weinerg 1994, 1998 and 2001). Other research indicates that the relationship between democracy and terrorism is either mixed and qualified (Li 2005) or nonlinear (Eyerman 1998). Recent research by Li (2005) finds that although “democratic participation” is a negative predictor of the incidence of international terrorism within a country, “government constraints” in the form of institutional limitations to executive power found in most democracies increases terrorism in countries. Li further illustrates that various electoral institutions within democracies—for example, proportional verses “first-past-the-post” systems—are also positive and negative predictors of the incidence of terrorism. In his seminal study Eyerman (1998), using the assumption that terrorist groups, like all political groups, seek to maximize their rational utility and weigh the costs against the benefits associated with each terrorist act, observes that there are two theoretical schools of thought regarding the relationship between democracy and terrorism. The first, termed the “political access” school, holds that by providing multiple avenues by which actors can advance their political agendas, democracies increase the utility of legal political activity for all political actors, including terrorists. Within democracies there is more political space available than in dictatorships, so there is room “within the system” for actors who subscribe to anti-status quo or non-mainstream opinions. It is important to note that the access school is a “political actor-focused” conceptual framework, meaning that it argues that democracy provides greater opportunities for terrorists to join mainstream politics. This is in contrast to “consumer-focused” conceptions that argue that democracy makes extremists who may engage in terrorism less appealing to the public. One would therefore expect democracies to have fewer terrorist attacks, as would-be terrorists merely pursue legitimate political activities to achieve their goals (Crenshaw 1990; Denardo 1985). The second, termed the “strategic school,” maintains that democracies are more tempting targets for terrorism than are dictatorships because their respect for civil liberties constrain them from more effective antiterrorism efforts such as surveillance, control over movement and personal ownership of weapons, associational life, and media. These same restrictions of executive and police power that are features of democracy also make democratic countries good hosts for terrorist groups. Moreover, the legitimacy of democratic government rests ultimately on the public’s perception of how well it can protect it citizens, and in a democracy citizens can punish elected officials at the ballot box for failure to protect the public. This quality of public responsiveness makes democracies more willing to negotiate with terrorists, thus increasing the potential benefits reaped for extremist groups by terrorist action (Charters 1994; Schmid 1993; Eubank and Weinberg 1992). Eyerman (1998) and a new generation of scholars find empirical support for both the access and strategic schools. In his own study, Eyerman found that although democracies overall did exhibit fewer terrorist acts, “new” democracies were more prone to terrorism. New democracies possess all of the liabilities inherent in democracies in general, making them tempting targets for terrorists as expected by the strategic school, but they are not as able as established democracies to provide to terrorists benefits that consistently outweigh the costs of engaging in political violence as opposed to legal political action because they lack strong and durable political institutions. Similar results are found by Abadie (2004) and Iqbal and Zorn (2003), that nonconsolidated democracies are more likely to exhibit terrorism and political violence, and are consistent with earlier empirical work by Gurr (2000, 1993), which finds that democratization itself can promote political violence because powerful actors may seek to preserve their authority in the midst of uncertainty fostered by the democratic process. The findings produced in these studies linking new democracies to terrorism, however, are limited by several design and theoretical qualities. First, with the exception of Li (2005), they employ rather limited time-frames—most are confined to one or two decades of events or less—and therefore might be distorted by medium-term episodic rises or falls in general levels of political violence. This is a limitation given that some scholarship has indicated terrorism occurs in waves that coincide with longer-term changes in global political and economic trends (Bergensen and Lizardo 2004). The exception is Iqbal and Zorn (2003), but their study is limited only to examination of predictors of assassinations of heads of state from 1946 to 2000 rather than general incidents of terrorism. Second, all but one of the studies (Abadie 2004) considers only international terrorist acts, where the perpetrators and the victims or targets are of different nationalities, rather than both domestic and international incidents, and all of the studies code their dependent variable (terrorism) based on the country where the incident took place. These design features not only eliminate a rather large number of events from the studies, but also severely impair any examination of both the access school and the neoconservative hypothesis on the causes of terrorism. In the post-911 context, in which policymakers speculate that political conditions, namely the lack of democracy, in the “home” countries of the terrorist perpetrators themselves (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Lebanon, and the United Arab Emirates) are important causes for attacks, it seems particularly important to be able to consider the regime typology of the country from which the perpetrators are based and to consider all manifestations of terrorism, including the most common manifestation: domestic terrorism. Finally, with the exception of Iqbal and Zorn (2003) who include a variable for civil wars, none of the studies control for domestic political instability. The shift in Washington toward democratic state-building as a means to reduce terrorism has been accompanied by a much less pronounced discussion among foreign policymakers about the appropriate timeframe for the withdrawal of United States troops from Iraq. Within this discussion lies the question of whether or not Iraq is becoming a “failed state:” a society experiencing severe political instability in which the state is unable to provide basic “political goods” to its citizens such as personal security. This raises a second foreign policy conventional wisdom, though one that is much less vociferously articulated by the Bush administration, that failed states like Colombia, Somalia, or Indonesia (or potentially Iraq) are incubators for terrorist groups and terrorist activity (Campbell and Flourney 2001). U.S. Republican U.S. Senator Chuck Hagel explains that these types of states pose the most severe threat to U.S. security at home and abroad because, “Terrorism finds sanctuary in failed or failing states...” (Hagel 2004, 65), Terrorism and State Failure There is a small body of literature on the relationship between failed states and terrorism, but it is theoretical or qualitative case study–oriented rather than empirical (Rotberg 2002, 2003; Kahler 2002; Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002). The relationship has two mutually reinforcing features: (1) state failure helps to create the conditions that create terrorists and (2) failed states provide crucial opportunities for already existing terrorist groups. First, by failing to provide for basic human needs and lacking functioning governing institutions, failed states cannot adequately manage conflicts in society or provide citizens with essential public goods such as security, education, or economic opportunity. This damages the legitimacy of the state and of mainstream, legal political behavior, thus propelling individuals into extralegal action such as terrorism. Failed states are also characterized by predatory political elites that prey on citizens and damage the government’s ability to manage social strife. The result is that significant proportions of the population reject the authority of the central government, providing a wider recruiting pool for terrorist groups and a citizenry that will tolerate, if not aid, them. Second, state failure erodes the ability of national governments to project power internally, creating a political space for non-state actors like terrorist groups, and creates the conditions under which state agents may provide organizational and financial assets to terrorists. Terrorists can rely on large amounts of territory to base operations such as training, communications, arms storage, and revenue generating activities that go beyond the much more limited network of safe houses they are limited to constructing in countries with stronger states. Frequently, political elites within failed states are willing to tolerate the presence of large-scale terrorist operations within national borders in exchange for material compensation, political support or terrorist services during times of political turmoil. Failed states lack adequate or consistent law-enforcement capabilities, thus permitting terrorist organizations to develop extra-legal fundraising activities such as smuggling or drug trafficking. However, failed states are recognized nation-states within the world community and therefore retain “the outward signs of sovereignty” (Tadekh and Gvosdev 2002, 100), thus providing terrorist groups with the necessary legal documentation, such as passports or end user certificates for arms acquisition, and protection from external policing efforts. The Middle East Although the Middle East is the primary laboratory for testing the utility of democracy promotion as anti-terrorism policy—exemplified by the 2003 war and occupation in Iraq and ruminations of the use of military force against Syria and Iran—the states of the Middle East provide a useful universe to empirically test the relationship between (lack of) democracy, civil liberties, state failure, and terrorism. Table 1 illustrates that the states of the Middle East afford researchers with a large number of illiberal political regimes as well as significant numbers of states that have experienced state failures, making the region central to the discussion of regime type and political stability as determinants of terrorism. The Middle East is arguably the least democratic region of the world. Freedom House notes that in 2003, only 5.6 percent of Middle Eastern and North African states could be considered “free” in terms of political rights or civil liberties, placing it behind every other developing world area including Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, the Middle East is “bucking the trend” of democratization in the world. The “Freedom in the World 2004” report issued by Freedom House notes that while every other region has increased the number of states considered to be free—the so-called Third Wave of democratization—the Middle East has actually seen a reduction in the number of free states since the mid-1990s. Only two democracies exist in the Middle East: Israel and Turkey. While the former, Israel, guarantees democratic freedoms only for Israeli citizens, who are roughly 65 percent of the population of the total territory Israel administers, the latter, Turkey, is an incomplete and unconsolidated democracy where elected civilian government is regularly punctuated by military rule. A second strata of states—Algeria, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, and Kuwait—are all nondemocracies, but have at times experimented with limited political and civil liberalization. The remaining states are solid dictatorships, one group of which—Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Tunisia, Syria, and Yemen—are bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes characterized by one-party rule and personalistic dictators and another group—Bahrain, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—are autocratic monarchies. Next to Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East is the region exhibiting the largest percentage of states that suffer from state failures from 1998 to 2003, although all of the regions of the world dominated by developing or transitional states besides Latin America have relatively high levels of state failure. What makes the Middle East unique, and what is not captured by the figures in Table 1, is the intense and chronic nature of state failure exhibited in some states in the region. Several states—Lebanon from 1975 to 1991; Israel from 1987 to 2004; Iraq from 1980 to 1998; and Turkey from 1984 to 2000—have experienced prolonged periods of armed ethnic conflict, civil war, and widespread political insurgency. Others suffer from prolonged but low-grade insurgencies such as the Saharawi insurrection in Morocco 1975 to 1989 or the Dhofar tribal insurgency in Oman from 1970 to 1976, or from short but intense bouts of large-scale conflict such as the Syrian confrontation with Islamist guerrillas in 1982 or the suppression of a separatist insurgency by Yemen in 1993. Like many African states, Middle Eastern states suffer from what Kahler (2002) refers to as “stateless areas,” a condition linked to the incubation of terrorism where the central government is unable to project its power in substantial regions of the country controlled by insurgents or regional actors. A report on terrorism in Yemen by the International Crisis Group faults the weakness of Yemeni political institutions, poverty and the inability of the state to extend its authority to more remote tribal regions as precipitants of domestic terrorism (International Crisis Group 2003). Kahler does allow for a non-spatial variant of the stateless area condition in the case of Saudi Arabia, arguing that the Saudi government was not able to penetrate powerful civil society and parastatal institutions, namely Muslim charities, that provide material sustenance to groups like Al Qaeda. Lebanon from 1975 to 1982 (and possibly later) also fits the bill as failed state suffering from stateless areas, which permitted the Palestine Liberation Organization to base its operations in Beirut and Southern Lebanon. Analysis This study seeks to add to the discussion of dictatorship and state failures as root causes of terrorism by conducting a cross-national, pooled, time-series statistical regression analysis on the incidence of terrorism in 19 Middle Eastern states from 1972 to 2003. The analysis is limited to the Middle East, specifically the cases of Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel–Palestine, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen, in order test the contention that democracy is a panacea for terrorism in the region of the world that U.S. foreign policymakers have chosen as their laboratory for their counterterrorism policy model and to also provide an empirical base to the largely descriptive and theoretical body of scholarship on terrorism produced by Middle Easternists2 (see, for example, Zunes 2003; Khashan 1997; Lewis 1987; Martin 1987; Amos 1985). There are three hypotheses tested in the analysis, using 16 negative binomial regression models on a total of 493 observations: Hypothesis 1: Democratic governance and state protection of civil liberties in the Middle East are negatively related to the incidence of terrorism. Hypothesis 2: Democratic governance and state protection of civil liberties in the Middle East are positively related to the incidence of terrorism. Hypothesis 1 captures the expectations of the political access school of thought regarding terrorism where one would expect more politically liberal states to be equipped to integrate the political expectations of would-be terrorists into a legal rather than extra-legal framework. The result would be fewer terrorist attacks both at home and abroad. Hypothesis 2 captures the expectations of the strategic school of thought, which argues that democracies are both particularly vulnerable to attack from domestic and or international terrorists and may find themselves hosts to terrorist groups because their antiterrorism policies are constricted by the rights protections inherent in all democratic societies. The states of the Middle East also provide a wide range of state failures to examine as predictors of terrorist activity. Controlling for democratic governance and other socioeconomic variables, a third hypothesis is also studied: Hypothesis 3: State failures, measured in the aggregate, are positively related to the incidence of domestic and international terrorism in the cases examined. Because of the nature of the dependent variable in the study, a Poisson distribution is more appropriate that an ordinary least squares (OLS) statistical regression model to analyze the data. The study seeks to explain change or variation in the incidence (frequency) of terrorist incidents, sorted by country targeted by the attacks and the country that is the “host” of the group launching the attacks. Terrorist attacks are sporadic and concentrated in certain countries or at certain time periods, and therefore from a quantitative perspective cannot be expected to be conform to a normal distribution. Also, an event count of terrorist incidents cannot produce negative count data for any given observation; the lowest value of any observation is a zero, indicating that no terrorist attacks have occurred in that country in that year. Both of these qualities violate basic assumptions of OLS regression analysis and recommend a Poisson distribution instead. Furthermore, given that the individual event counts used in the study are not theoretically independent of each other—a country may very well experience a rash of attacks spread out across multiple years by the same terrorist group—a negative binomial Poisson distribution is most appropriate. It produces the same mean as a basic Poisson distribution, but is better suited to data exhibiting a wider variance, thus reducing standard errors and netting less biased estimators (Brandt et al. 2000; Cameron and Trivedi 1998; King 1989). In the study the state of Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories are operationalized as one aggregated case, though this may be a controversial methodological decision. There are two justifications for aggregating these two entities into one case: First and foremost, the two entities are highly interconnected in terms of political, economic, and social life. The political conflict that produces terrorism within both of the entities was produced by the political conflict originating in the 1967 occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem by Israeli forces that continues to this day. Moreover, nationals of both political entities reside throughout Israel proper and the occupied territories, and until recently, Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank regularly commuted into Israel for employment. Second, the state of Israel has effectively controlled public policy within the occupied territories since 1967, and this has meant that the Israeli government has helped to determine the shape of political and economic development both for Jewish residents of Israeli proper and Palestinians living in the territories. This poses a simple methodological problem: there is no independent government, or economy, on which to base measurements of variables for the Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank. Although a semi-independent Palestinian National Authority was created in 1994, it still lacks sovereignty, the quintessential quality of all nation-states. To remedy this, all variables for the case Israel–Palestine are operationalized as indexes of population-weighted averages that include the State of Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories, producing aggregate measures of the regime type, economy, and demographic structure of the populations of both entities. However, this methodological decision could potentially bias the study and is vulnerable to charges of subjectivity on the part of the researcher. Therefore, a separate set of statistical models are run that exclude Israel–Palestine as a case to determine the dependence of models on the total 19 cases on inclusion of Israel–Palestine. The source for yearly terrorist incidents by case—the unit of analysis for the study—is the data collected by the Rand Corporation and collated by the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, which operationally defines terrorism as: ...violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm. These acts are designed to coerce others into actions they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they desired to take. All terrorist acts are crimes. Many would also be violation of the rules of war if a state of war existed. This violence or threat of violence is generally directed against civilian targets. The motives of all terrorists are political, and terrorist actions are generally carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity. Unlike other criminal acts, terrorists often claim credit for their acts. Finally, terrorist acts are intended to produce effects beyond the immediate physical damage of the cause, having long-term psychological repercussions on a particular target audience. The fear created by terrorists may be intended to cause people to exaggerate the strengths of the terrorist and the importance of the cause, to provoke governmental overreaction, to discourage dissent, or simply to intimidate and thereby enforce compliance with their demands.3 To fully test the two hypotheses, especially in order to examine both the access and strategic schools, and to make appropriate use of the MIPT data, terrorism is operationalized as four dependent variables which are run in separate models: (1) international terrorist incidents sorted by the country targeted from 1972 to 1997; (2) international and domestic terrorist incidents sorted by the country targeted from 1998 to 2003; (3) terrorist incidents sorted by country or countries that serve as the base for terrorist attacks abroad from 1972 to 1997; (4) terrorist incidents sorted by country or countries that serve as the base for terrorist attacks both domestically and abroad from 1998 to 2003. The first distinction, between international and international and domestic incidents, is one driven by the data available from MIPT. Although it is methodological desirable to consider both domestic and international attacks combined—incidents committed where the perpetrator and the target or victim may or may not be nationals of the same country—for the entire time-series, aggregation of incidents in this way is only available post 1998.4 Prior to 1998, data is only available for international incidents. Terrorists incidents are also sorted both by “target,” the country and year within the time-series in which the terrorist act occurred, and by “source,” the country or countries per year that serve as bases of operation for terrorist groups that engage in operations, as defined by the MIPT database of terrorist organizations. Targeted countries and source countries are analyzed in separate dependent variables. Examining both states targeted by terrorism and states that are sources for terrorist groups facilitates a more confident evaluation of both the access and strategic schools as well as the role played by state failures because it paints a complete picture of the domestic vulnerability of the state to terrorist attacks and the domestic political conditions that may breed terrorists. The analysis contains no incidents that occurred across two different countries, thereby yielding two target countries. However, as is often the case, terrorist groups base their operations in more than one state. For the analysis, each state that is the host of the terrorist group perpetrating the act in question is allocated an equal count of the event. As an example, because the Black September Organization, a Palestinian militant group active in the 1970s and 1980s, is listed by MIPT as having bases of operation in Jordan, Lebanon, and in the Palestinian Occupied Territories during its active period, a terrorist act committed by Black September in a given year will be recorded as one incident for Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel–Palestine. This is an imperfect methodology because it equally weights three states as sources for terrorism though in reality the “stateless area” afforded Black September by civil-war wracked Lebanon in the 1980s or the lack of political freedom that plagues Palestinians living in Jordan or the limitations to counterterrorism efforts placed on the Israeli state by its democratic process and legal institutions might play a disproportionate role in fueling terrorist incidents. However, data do not permit fine-tuning of this nature and this is the least-subjective method of distribution of acts by source country. Table 2 lists all variables used in the models as well as their operationalization. To test the hypotheses, three independent variables are used: one that measures the degree of democratic governance in each case per year, “Democracy (Polity IV)”; another that measures the degree of civil liberties protections in each case per year, “FH Civil Liberties”; and the other measures the presence and intensity of state failures in each case per year, “State Failures.” The first independent variable is operationalized as the yearly “POLITY” measurement from the Polity IV database. This measurement is an index ranging from -10, signifying a complete autocracy, to 10, signifying a complete democracy. The expectation, given the two-tailed nature of the first hypothesis, is that Democracy (Polity IV) will either be a positive or negative predictor of the incidents in terrorism, measured all four ways in the statistical models. The second independent variable is operationalized as annual index of civil liberties protections coded by the independent nongovernmental agency Freedom House in its annual publication “Freedom in the World.” The Freedom House civil liberties index is an ordinal measure between “1,” which would indicate a status of the highest protection of civil liberties such as freedom of speech, conscience or association, and “7,” which would indicate a status of the lowest protection of aforementioned rights. As with Democracy (Polity IV), the expectation given the two-tailed nature of the first hypothesis is that FH Civil Liberties will either be a positive or negative predictor of the incidents in terrorism, measured all four ways in the statistical models. The third independent variable is operationalized as a measure of aggregate state failures suffered by a given case in a given year. All data for state failures is taken from the State Failure Task Force database, collected by researchers associated with the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) at the University of Maryland. The CIDCM State Failure Task Force defines state failures as episodes of extreme political instability that test the ability of the state to preserve order and identifies four major types of state failure: ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, genocides and politicides, and adverse regime changes. The variable “State Failures” in this analysis is an additive index ranging from 0 to 16 of the intensity levels of all four types of state failure, which themselves are coded by the State Failure Task Force as measures of intensity where 0 indicates no state failures and 4 indicates highly intense manifestations of state failures. The expectation is that State Failures will be a positive predictor of the incidence of terrorism across all of the models. The models control for several socioeconomic features. The first is “Area,” or the total surface area contained within the recognized boundaries of each state, and the second is “Population,” or the yearly total population count in millions. Eyerman (1998) notes that geographically large countries have higher policing costs and are therefore more susceptible to terrorist attacks. Likewise, populous countries also raise the costs associated with counterterrorism efforts as terrorist groups can more easily obscure their activities and escape detection. Gross domestic product (“GDP”), measured yearly in millions of $U.S., is a control used by Abadie (2004) and Eyerman (1998) in their respective studies and measures the total resources available to enhance state policing and or repressive measures. It is something of a conventional wisdom that poverty and poor economic development are root causes of terrorism, although this has not been validated by a slate of recent empirical studies (Piazza 2006; Abadie 2004; Krueger and Maleckova 2003), though Li and Schaub (2004) in their statistical study of 112 countries from 1975 to 1997 did find that a country’s GDP was a negative predictor of terrorism, positioning level of economic development as an interaction variable linking international economic openness to lower levels of terrorism. It is nonetheless considered as a control and is expected to be a negative predictor of terrorism across the models, if significant at all. Finally, a variable measuring the total years that the current political regime has been in place in each observation, labeled “Regime Durability,” is also included in the analysis. Regime Durability is operationalized by inserting the value for “Durable” coded in the Polity IV dataset. It is expected that more durable regimes are less likely to experience terrorism. (Li 2005) Sixteen statistical models are run in all. The nucleus of the analysis is contained in models 1 through 8 to accommodate four dependent variables—the two measures of terrorist incidents, international and international and domestic attacks, each of which is sorted into attacks by target and attacks by source—and to accommodate two independent variables—both Democracy (Polity IV) and FH Civil Liberties—which are run in separate models. Furthermore, models 1 through 8 are run yet again omitting Israel–Palestine as a case as models 9 through 16 to control for the outlier effect that those observations may contain. Finally, two features are added to the models to correct for autocorrelation and multicollinearity errors. A 1-year lagged dependent variable [B1Incidents(t-1)j] is inserted after the intercept, as is appropriate in time-series multiple regression analysis, and a collinearity test is run on all of the independent variables. Results Table 3 presents the results of the first four models, which examine the effects of the independent variables on the incidence of terrorism by target country in the Middle East The results of models 1 through 4 lend partial support to the strategic school, rather than the political access school, as it applies to Middle Eastern states. In Models 1 and 3, which examine international terrorist attacks only, specifically where the perpetrator and the target or victim are of different national origins, Democracy (Polity IV) is a positive predictor of terrorism whereas FH Civil Liberties is a negative predictor. This suggests that terrorism is more likely to occur in Middle-Eastern states that are political democracies and that protect civil liberties. (Note that the operationalization of FH Civil Liberties is inverted—regimes that protect civil liberties are scored low on the scale—so results are interpreted using the opposite sign of results for Democracy [Polity IV]). However, when terrorism is measured as both domestic and international attacks by target, neither Democracy (Polity IV) nor FH Civil Liberties are signfiicant. This is an interesting result because the two measurements of terrorism are logically and quantitatively—there are more total attacks coded per year when using the international and domestic aggregation—different. However, it is also possible that the different results found in models 1 and 3 and models 2 and 4 are due to the very different time-series used: the 26-year series (1972 to 1997) for international only verses the six year series (1998 to 2003) for the international combined with domestic. A more comparable span of data would be desirable, although presently unobtainable. However, across three of the first four models, State Failures is a strong, significant, and positive predictor of terrorism, regardless of how terrorism is measured. This suggests that Middle-Eastern states that suffer from state failures are more likely to both host groups that will commit terrorist acts at home and abroad and are also more likely to be the target of terrorist groups from other states. Moreover, in three of the four models, the coefficient for State Failures is the largest in the model, and the coefficients are significant at the highest (.000) level. Few of the control variables are significant across models 1–4, and there are two surprising results. Population is a significant predictor in models 1 and 3, as expected, but GDP is a significant positive predictor of terrorism in models 2 and 4 whereas Regime Durability is a significant negative predictor in model 2. The results for GDP and Regime Durability run counter to expectations, but it is telling that these counterintuitive results occur in the models with the shorter time series, as previously found. Table 4 presents the results of models 5 through 8, in which the dependent variable, terrorism, is sorted by source country among Middle-Eastern states. As in models 1 through 4, models 5 through 8 provide partial vindication for the strategic school at the expense of the political access school but leave some nagging questions. In Table 4, Democracy (Polity IV) is a consistent, significant positive predictor of terrorist attacks; however, FH Civil Liberties is not. That is to say that more politically liberal regimes in the Middle East, as measured by Polity IV, are more prone to harbor terrorist groups that commit terrorist acts either at home or abroad than are politically illiberal regimes. However, Middle-Eastern states that respect civil liberties—the very same freedoms that pose barriers to state actors who may seek to apprehend terrorists or quash terrorist networks—are no more likely than Middle-Eastern states with poor civil liberties protections to host terrorist groups. This is difficult to reconcile within the confines of the strategic school and either prompts a consideration of Middle-Eastern exceptionalism or a re-conceptualization of the relationship between the self-imposed limitations within democracies fighting terrorism. It may be possible that within the Middle East, mass political participation serves to inhibit governmental efforts to arrest terrorists and disrupt terrorist networks because the significant segments of the public regards them as having a legitimate political agenda. A cases in point would be Yemen, where Al Qaeda militants might enjoy some sympathy from a public that is permitted to participate in albeit incomplete elections. Or, a second possibility is that in countries where public outrage against terrorists has prompted an over-zealous antiterrorism policy from the government that itself fuels terrorist activity and recruitment. The case here would be Turkey, where public outrage against Kurdish Worker Party (PKK) attacks in the 1980s and 1990s facilitated a harsh antiterrorism policy that included torture, arbitrary arrest, detention, and sentencing, and direct military reprisal against Kurdish civilians. These measures on the part of Turkish government security forces enhanced Kurdish support for the PKK’s objectives, thus assisting PKK recruitment, organization of safe houses, and procurement of supplies. Again, in models 5 through 8 state failures is a significant, at times highly significant, positive predictor of the incidence of terrorism. This illustrates that regardless of whether or not the Middle-Eastern state in question is considered to be a target of terrorist attacks or a source of terrorist attacks, terrorists thrive in countries beset with state failures. A few control variables are significant, and again yield results that counter expectations. GDP is a negative predictor of international terrorism in model 5, but is a positive predictor of terrorism in model 8, as is regime durability. Again, it is possible that sample size is responsible for these differences. Finally, all models are re-run omitting the potentially problematic case of Israel–Palestine, producing the results shown in Table 5: Roughly the same results are obtained in the modified data set analyzed in models 9 through 16. Democratic governance seems to be a somewhat consistent positive predictor of terrorism, while in at least one model (model 11), civil liberties protections are a positive predictor of international terrorism by source—given the negative relationship between FH Civil Liberties, an indicator where states exhibiting poor protections of civil rights are scored higher. Some support for the strategic school is found, although no support is evident for the political access school. And State Failures is a nearly perfectly consistent positive predictor of terrorism, regardless of how terrorism is measured or how terrorist attacks are sorted. Population, as a control variable, is significant in two of the models (9 and 11) and is a positive predictor, as expected. However, GDP and Regime Durability continue to exhibit inconsistent and counterintuitive results. Overall, models 9 through 16 dispel the possibility that the results found in Tables 1 and 2—that state failure is the most significant predictor of the incidence of terrorism, while democracy and civil liberties are more weakly associated with terrorist incidents—are a mere product of the inclusion of a set of observations from an outlier case: a combined Israel and Palestine. Conclusion The results of this study are preliminary, but they do not lend support to the hypothesis that fostering democracy in the Middle East will provide a bulwark against terrorism. Rather, the results suggest the opposite: that more liberal Middle-Eastern political systems are actually more susceptible to the threat of terrorism than are the more dictatorial regimes, as predicted by the strategic school approach to the relationship between democracy and terrorism. Furthermore, the result of the study do lend empirical support to the descriptive literature linking failed states to terrorism: those Middle-Eastern states with significant episodes of state failures are more likely to be the target of and the host for terrorists. Because the study examines multiple measurements of terrorism, by target and by source, multiple measures of political liberalization, democratic processes and civil liberties, and includes what is strangely overlooked by other studies of democracy and terrorism, the role played by state failures, it contributes to scholarly understanding of the relationship between terrorism, democracy, and political stability while assessing the potential effectiveness of current antiterrorism policy. These findings have significant policy implications. The results suggests that a foreign policy toward the Middle East constructed around democracy promotion, or around widening of civil liberties, will not reap a significant security dividend in terms of terrorism. Rather, it may exacerbate the problems of terrorism, both within Middle-Eastern states and for other countries targeted by terrorist groups based in Middle-East states. These findings potentially dampen the enthusiasm of some scholars of the Middle East who have hoped that stalled (or nonexistent) efforts at democratization or the widening of rights through the creation of “civil society” in the Middle East would be revived as the beneficiaries of a new U.S. foreign policy imperative toward the region. For much of the past ten years, the Middle East has lagged far behind every other world region in terms of democratization, as noted previously, and the field of Middle East Studies has vainly searched for signs of nascent democratization among civil society actors in Middle-Eastern countries. This study is the first to lend empirical support to a criticism of democracy-promotion already present within the field of foreign policy research. In his December 2003 article in Foreign Affairs (2003), director of the Democracy and Rule of Law Project for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Thomas Carothers critiques the Bush administration emphasis on democracy-building in the Middle East as a means to preventing terrorism. Although lionizing the principle of promoting democracy in a region so characterized by dictatorial rule—but seriously questioning whether or not the new policy really will really prove to be a departure from the Cold War policy of supporting pro-U.S. dictatorships in the region out of self-interest in the final analysis—Carothers warns that democracy might not prove to be the solid bulwark against terrorism that it is fashioned to be. He notes that democracy-promotion policy in the Middle East relies too heavily on what is essentially a fairly simplistic modernization theory conception of Islamic radicalism, that it is a manifestation of traditional society that can be eradicated through more modern and Western political and social engineering. The roots of radical Islamist movements, on the contrary, are complex, varied and “multifaceted” Carothers argues, and democracy is not likely to be the cure-all. Moreover, borrowing a page from the strategic school, Carothers warns that democratization might widen the political space for radicals in the Middle East and he regards the histories of newly democratized states as a cautionary tale to those who see rapid democratization as a stabilizing force in Islamic societies. Finally, Carothers observes that democracy, itself is not always a simple panacea for terrorism outside of the Middle East. He specifically notes Spain as a case study: it is a consolidated, though newer, Western democracy that is the target of regular and violent terrorist attacks from the Basque separatist movement, ETA. One could add a host of other established democracies to the list of countries that are either sources for or targets of terrorism: Great Britain, India, Italy, Greece, and the United States.

#### Democratization causes civil war

Savun 9 (Barcu, Political Science Professor at Pittsburg, “Foreign Aid, Democratization, and Civil Conflict: How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?”, 2011, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 233-246)

As Cederman, Hug and Krebs (2007) note, most theoretical and empirical treatments of the democratization-conflict link have occurred with a focus on interstate wars. In From Voting to Violence, Snyder (2000) provides one of the first exclusive systematic studies of the link between democratization and civil conflict, particularly ethnic conflicts. Snyder (2000) proposes that during the early phases of the democratization process, two conditions favorable to the initiation of civil conflict emerge: (a) political elites exploit rising nationalism for their own ends to create divisions in the society and (b) the central government is too weak to prevent elites’ polarizing tactics. According to Snyder, before democratization, the public is not politically active and hence its sense of belonging to a nation is relatively weak (35).3 Democratization increases the feeling of nationalism, especially with the provocation of the elites who feel threatened by the arrival of democracy. To maintain or increase their grab on political power, the elites may depict the political opponents and the ethnic minorities as traitors by invoking nationalist sentiments in the public (37).4 These polarizing tactics, in turn, create tensions among ethnic groups and hence increase the risk of violent clashes in the society.5 For example, during 1987 Milosevic skillfully used the Serbian state TV to convince the Serbian minority that Serbs in the Kosovo were suffering discrimination and repression at the hands of the Albanian majority. These kinds of inciting polarizing tactics by Milosevic and the Serbian nationalist elites were pivotal in contributing to violence in Kosovo. Violent struggles in post-communist regimes such as Croatia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia during the 1990s are other examples of nationalist upheavals incited by the domestic political elites during democratization process. Snyder (2000) argues that the elites’ use of exclusionary nationalism is particularly strong and damaging if the democratizing state has weak political institutions. If state institutions are strong, the institutions may be able to deter the elites’ opportunistic behavior and curb its potentially damaging impacts. However, during early phases of democratization, the institutions are usually new and fragile and the central authority is weak. The weakening of central authority gives the elites the opportunity to monopolize the media, create divisions in the society, and control the political discourse. Without the constraints of strong institutions and state authority, the political elites have more leeway to pull the society to any direction their interests dictate. Rustow’s (1970) seminal work on regime transition divides democratization into three phases. In the preparatory phase, a prolonged political struggle representing different interests takes place.6 Polarization of the elites usually ensues in this phase. In such an environment, a weakening of the central authority is inevitable. As the balance of power shifts from the old authority to the new actors in political life, a power vacuum emerges. The transition of power also weakens the state’s monopoly on the use of force as the military usually plays a key (and often independent) role in the democratization process, as was the case in most democratization episodes in Latin America. In addition, the early phase of a regime change usually renders the policing capacity of the state inefficient and thereby increases its vulnerability to attacks by domestic groups. The extant literature on civil war shows that organizationally and politically weak central governments make civil conflicts feasible due to weak local policing and inept counterinsurgency practices (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 75). The weaker the central government, the less likely it is to deter domestic groups from using violence. Weak states also provide the opportunity for rebellion because the rebels’ chances of scoring a victory increase. As the state capacity weakens and questions arise about its legitimacy, the rebels find it easier to recruit and thereby strengthen their base. During democratization, uncertainty also looms large (e.g., Gill 2000; O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986; Teixeira 2008). As Rustow (1970) puts it, “a new political regime is a novel prescription for taking joint chances on the unknown” (358). Uncertainty of the regime change creates several credible commitment problems. First, the political elites have difficulty in trusting each other’s intentions and promises. As Karl (1990) suggests, during regime transitions political actors “find it difficult to know what their interests are, who their supporters will be, and which groups will be their allies or opponents” (6). The new political elites and the old regime are wary of each other’s intentions and hence are unlikely to believe that any promises made or concessions given during the transition period will be honored once the central authority and institutions are consolidated. The key problem is that the elites perceive each other as “conditional in their support for democracy and equivocal in their commitment to democratic rules of the game” (Burton, Gunther, and Higley 1992, 31). The “equivocal commitment to democratic rules” increases the level of distrust and suspicion among the elites and thereby increases the risk of collapse of the political rule. Another credibility problem arises between the elites and ethnic groups in the state. The weakening of the state authority, combined with the uncertainty in the environment, increases the sense of insecurity that comes with the transition (Pridham 2000). This insecurity is particularly acute among minority groups who feel unprotected in an environment of nascent institutions, opportunistic elites, a weak state authority, and rising nationalism. Weingast (1997, 1998) formally demonstrates that during fundamental political changes in a society, institutions are typically weak and everything is at stake. This implies two things. First, the mechanisms limiting one ethnic group from using the state apparatus to take advantage of another are not effective. That is, institutions cannot credibly commit to protect the state apparatus from being captured by any group to exploit the other (Weingast 1998). The literature on democratization similarly contends that the new regimes are not usually successful in honoring their commitments and showing self-restraint (e.g., Huntington 1991). Second, since the stakes are high during regime change, the critical threshold probability that breeds violence based on fears of victimization is particularly low (Weingast 1998, 191). That is, it does not take much for the minority group to resort to violence out of its fear. The extant literature on civil wars shows that minority groups are more likely to resort to violence if they fear that there is a risk of annihilation in the future and the commitments made by the state are not credible (e.g., Fearon 1998; Walter 1997, 2002).

#### Democracy is net-worse for peace

Ghatak 17 (Sam, Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Tennessee Knoxville; Aaron Gold, PhD Student in Political Science at UT Knoxville; Brandon C. Prins, Professor and Director of Graduate Studies of Political Science at UT Knoxville; “External threat and the limits of democratic pacifism,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 141-159)

It has become a stylized fact that dyadic democracy lowers the hazard of armed conflict. While the Democratic Peace has faced many challenges, we believe the most significant challenge has come from the argument that the pacifying effect of democracy is epiphenomenal to territorial issues, specifically the external threats that they pose. This argument sees the lower hazards of armed conflict among democracies not as a product of shared norms or institutional structures, but as a result of settled borders. Territory, though, remains only one geo-political context generating threat, insecurity, and a higher likelihood of armed conflict. Strategic rivalry also serves as an environment associated with fear, a lack of trust, and an expectation of future conflict. Efforts to assess democratic pacifism have largely ignored rivalry as a context conditioning the behavior of democratic leaders. To be sure, research demonstrates rivals to have higher probabilities of armed conflict and democracies rarely to be rivals. But fundamental to the Democratic Peace is the notion that even in the face of difficult security challenges and salient issues, dyadic democracy will associate with a lower likelihood of militarized aggression. But the presence of an external threat, be that threat disputed territory or strategic rivalry, may be the key mechanism by which democratic leaders, owing to audience costs, resolve and electoral pressures, fail to resolve problems nonviolently.

This study has sought a ‘‘hard test’’ of the Democratic Peace by testing the conditional effects of joint democracy on armed conflict when external threat is present. We test three measures of threat: territorial contention, strategic rivalry, and a threat index that sums the first two measures. For robustness checks, we use two additional measures of our dependent variable: fatal MID onset, and event data from the Armed Conflict Database, which can be found in our Online Appendix. As most studies report, democratic dyads are associated with less armed conflict than mixed-regime and autocratic dyads. In every one of our models, when we control for each measure of external threat, joint democracy is strongly negative and significant and each measure of threat is strongly positive and significant. Here, liberal institutions maintain their pacific ability and external threats clearly increase conflict propensities. However, when we test the interactive relationship between democracy and our measures of external threat, the pacifying effect of democracy is less visible. Park and James (2015) find some evidence that when faced with an external threat in the form of territorial contention, the pacifying effect of joint democracy holds up. This study does not fully support the claims of Park and James (2015). Using a longer timeframe, we find more consistent evidence that when faced with an external threat, be it territorial contention, strategic rivalry, or a combination, democratic pacifism does not survive. What are the implications of our study? First, while it is clear that we do not observe a large amount of armed conflict among democratic states, if we organize interstate relationships along a continuum from highly hostile to highly friendly, we are probably observing what Goertz et al. (2016) and Owsiak et al. (2016) refer to as ‘‘lesser rivalries’’ in which ‘‘both the frequency and severity of violent interaction decline. Yet, the sentiments of threat, enmity, and competition that remain—along with the persistence of unresolved issues—mean that lesser rivalries still experience isolated violent episodes (e.g., militarized interstate disputes), diplomatic hostility, and non-violent crises’’ (Owsiak et al., 2016). Second, our findings show that the pacific benefits of liberal institutions or externalized norms are not always able to lower the likelihood of armed conflict when faced with external threats, whether those hazards are disputed territory, strategic rivalry, or a combination of the two. The structural environment clearly influences democratic leaders in their foreign policy actions more than has heretofore been appreciated. Audience costs, resolve, and electoral pressures, produced from external threats, are powerful forces that are present even in jointly democratic relationships. These forces make it difficult for leaders to trust one another, which inhibits conflict resolution and facilitates persistent hostility. It does appear, then, that there is a limit to the Democratic Peace.

### Corruption

#### Exposing corruption turns the case: It causes a distrust of the process of democracy which backslides into authoritarian rule: US, Europe, and Latin America prove

Fischer 11/1 Max Fisher writes The Interpreter, a news column and newsletter that explore the ideas and context behind major world events. Based in London, he uses political science and social science to examine and explain topics from authoritarianism to arms control. Fisher, Max. "The Weaknesses in Liberal Democracy That May Be Pulling It Apart." N. Y. Times, 1 Nov. 2018, [www.nytimes.com/2018/11/01/world/americas/democracy-brazil-populism.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/01/world/americas/democracy-brazil-populism.html). / MM

For anyone curious about the future of democracy, two developments out of Brazil and Germany pose something of a mystery. The election of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil looks too similar to the wave of right-wing, anti-establishment populism sweeping Europe and the United States to be dismissed as coincidence. Mr. Bolsonaro, known for praising his country’s former military dictatorship and insulting minorities and women, has championed anger at Brazil’s establishment by promising strong-fisted rule. Underscoring the sense of a global shift, within hours of Mr. Bolsonaro’s victory, Angela Merkel, Germany’s longtime chancellor and pillar of European stability, announced she would not seek re-election. Yet there is no obvious link between Mr. Bolsonaro’s rise and that of Western populists. Figures like Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary and German populist parties rose by railing against the European Union and immigration, neither of them issues in Brazil. Mr. Bolsonaro rode a backlash against corruption and crime epidemics that are distinctly Latin American. Maybe Brazil’s election, along with the rest of the populist trend, represents something more disruptive than a single wave with a single point of origin. Research suggests it exemplifies weaknesses and tensions inherent to liberal democracy itself — and that, in times of stress, can pull it apart. When that happens, voters tend to reject that system in all but name and follow their most basic human instincts toward older styles of government: majoritarian, strong-fisted, us-versus-them rule. It’s a pattern that might feel shocking or new in the West, but is all too familiar in Latin America, which has experienced several populist surges like the one that elevated Mr. Bolsonaro. “Most attempts at democracy end in a return to authoritarian rule,” Jay Ulfelder, a political scientist, wrote in 2012 as elected populists in Venezuela, Ecuador and Nicaragua rolled back rights in ways that look familiar today. At the time, most experts blamed issues specific to that region and that moment. But Mr. Ulfelder countered, “I think we get a lot farther if we think of these regimes as the end state toward which most attempts at democracy will slide.” When Democracy Doesn’t Work as Imagined There is a gap between how liberal democracy, which protects individual rights and rule of law, is sold and how it works. It is often portrayed as rule by the people. But, in practice, elections and public sentiment are meant to be only part of a system governed by institutions and norms that protect the common good. That gap is often where the problems begin. When institutions fall short, as they did in Brazil, voters can grow skeptical of the entire idea of accruing power to bureaucrats and elites who failed in ways that highlight the gap. So voters move to replace institutions with a style of government that feels more like democracy as they’d thought it would be: direct rule by the people. That often means electing leaders like Mr. Bolsonaro, who promise to dismantle the establishment and rule through personal authority. In practice, such leaders tend to consolidate power for themselves, as Silvio Berlusconi did after riding to power in Italy on a wave of outrage against corruption. He seized control of state bureaucracies, stalling their once-promising progress, and replaced the old system of patronage with a new one loyal to him. Defying Popular Will Sometimes an anti-establishment backlash comes when there really is a deep rot in the system, as in Brazil or Italy. But it can also come when governments do things that are simply unpopular. This has driven much of the instability in Europe, where leaders see eurozone and immigration reforms as essential to Europe’s long-term survival. But those measures are unpopular with voters, bringing a spark of realization that the system is engineered to, at times, ignore what they want. No one wants to believe their leaders are defying their wishes because a functioning democracy requires checks on public demand. It is easier to see those leaders as serving some other, unseen constituency. This creates an opening for a canny outsider to rise to power by scapegoating foreign or moneyed interests — the liberal philanthropist George Soros is a popular target — and by promising to restore the people’s will. The European Union, which never managed an identity that wasn’t associated with bankers and technocrats, has been easy to cast as an enemy of popular will. Establishment parties, closely tied to that project, have collapsed. In Latin America, institutional failures were graver, with corruption rotting out political parties. Voters were aware of this corruption because justice systems had grown strong enough to root it out. A technocrat would say this showed the need for even stronger and more independent institutions. But to voters, it felt like an indictment of the entire system — a reason to tear it down and elevate someone who could impose order. That is not so different from what happened in the United States, where party officials became seen as unresponsive and beholden to moneyed interests. President Trump rose in part by arguing that his wealth granted him independence — though, in practice, he has empowered industry insiders — and by promising policies that party leaders had considered too extreme. Craving Majority Rule Populist backlashes, even if they focus on distant elites, tend to emerge as a desire for majority rule, which feels democratic to members of the majority — and, in certain circumstances, like a matter of life and death. Human beings are tribal by nature. Our instincts are to put our group first and see ourselves as locked in competition with other groups. Liberal democracy, which promises that everyone gains when rights are protected for all, asks us to suppress those impulses. But this is no easy ask. And tribal instincts tend to come to the fore in times of scarcity or insecurity, when our capacity for lofty ideals and long-term planning is weakest. When people believe they are at risk of targeted violence, their sense of community narrows, according to research by Daphna Canetti-Nisim, a University of Maryland political psychologist. They grow more supportive of policies to control minorities and less supportive of pluralism or democracy. Those impulses can be exploited. The grisly campaign of state-sanctioned vigilante violence by President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines pins his country’s problems on an undesirable social class — in his telling, a vast army of drug dealers and users — and promises to control them through force. Mr. Bolsonaro has promised his own extrajudicial war on drugs. Such tactics work best when rallying a majority group. Liberal democracy, for all its protections of minorities, still delegates power by elections that favor whoever has the numbers. In Europe and the United States, this has meant encouraging a subtle but unmistakable sense that white Christians are under siege. White voters have grown more defensive of their whiteness and afraid of minorities, tempting them to see democracy as a zero-sum struggle. Imposing Equality A three-country study led by Marta Marchlewska of the Polish Academy of Sciences found that the trouble often starts when members of a particular social group believe their group is declining in status relative to others. This makes members of that group care much more about their group identity — and see people outside of it as threats. This can lead to a politics of us-versus-them, in which the ideals of liberal democracy feel like foolhardy surrender. Liberal democracy is designed to flatten out social hierarchies, making this kind of majoritarian backlash all but inevitable. This helped lead Poland’s Catholics, a once-dominant group, to support a political party that had promised to subvert the courts. It may have also led European and American whites who feared losing what they viewed as their special place in society to support populist leaders who promised to control immigrants and minorities, and led middle-class Brazilians to crave harsh policing of poor communities. Liberal democracy comes with features like independent courts and constitutional protections meant to check tribalist impulses and impose equality. But to the people whose impulses are being checked, those features can feel tyrannical. A populist’s promise to tear them down feels like freedom, though that is rarely what it brings. Scholars are still struggling to understand what will happen to democracy, whose growth stalled over a decade ago and may now be receding. Brazil hints at one possibility. Latin America’s experience — with voters pulling their countries between periods of fuller democracy and populist strongman rule — may be the natural default. The West’s half century of democratic stability may have been the exception, a byproduct of Cold War power rivalries. We had long thought that democracies in regions like Latin America or Southeast Asia would catch up to those in the West. And maybe they will. Or maybe we had it backward all along.

#### Constant corruption scandals just make it worse – it’s better to let current legislation run its course than test the waters

Shenk 10/16 Shenk, Jamie. Jamie Shenk is a Latin America Fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy (YPFP) and a doctoral student at the University of Oxford. "Latin Americans are Tired of Corruption - and Increasingly Tired of Fighting It." Atlantic Council, 16 Oct. 2018, [www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/latin-americans-are-tired-of-corruption-and-increasingly-tired-of-fighting-it](http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/latin-americans-are-tired-of-corruption-and-increasingly-tired-of-fighting-it). / MM

Argentine headlines in August were dominated by revelations from the “notebook” scandal, which revealed years of bribes hand-delivered from private corporations to the residences of former-presidents Néstor and Cristina Fernéndez de Kirchner. Meanwhile in Brazil, the drama of the judiciary’s years-long corruption investigations continued to play out, as former president and then-presidential front-runner Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva spent the summer contesting his conviction on corruption and money-laundering charges. Most recently, Guatemalan President Jimmy Morales raised international alarms when he sent army tanks to the headquarters of the United Nations-backed Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), ending the anti-graft body’s mandate in dramatic fashion. But the streets of São Paulo, Buenos Aires, and Guatemala City are surprisingly quiet. While more than a million Brazilians took to the streets to protest corruption in 2016, and protests by thousands in Guatemala in favor of the CICIG in 2017 forced Morales to reverse an earlier decision to expel the commission, recent protests have been considerably smaller. Latin Americans, it seems, are growing tired of their countries’ never-ending stream of corruption scandals. This could spell disaster for the region’s anti-corruption crusaders. Latin American countries have made notable strides in fighting corruption over the past few years. Changes to the region’s legal systems have made the judicial system more transparent, and new corruption fighting tools, like plea deals and specific anti-corruption measures, have allowed prosecutors to go after corrupt officials and uncover cases of bribery like never before. These successes, however, represent a double-edged sword. As each new case helps illuminate the scale of corruption in Latin American politics, the resulting never-ending media coverage of corruption scandals is testing citizens’ patience and confidence. The result is what sociologist Silvio Waisbord refers to as “scandal fatigue.” While the first revelations of corruption may mobilize the public to protest against official wrongdoing, subsequent coverage can actually foster apathy. Constant revelations of wrongdoing can create the perception among the public that misbehavior is the norm rather than an anomaly deserving of special punishment. Citizens become increasingly ambivalent, rather than outraged, at wrongdoings. Take, for example, the case of Brazil. When Brazil’s federal prosecutors launched “Operation Car Wash,” an investigation into bribes paid by the country’s largest construction firm, Odebrecht, to governments across Latin America, in 2014, the ensuing scandals prompted millions of Brazilians to take to the streets to protest the rot uncovered in their political system. Public outrage and continued conversation forced the judiciary and the legislature to hold the accused accountable; as of August 2018, more than 200 politicians and business leaders have been convicted for bribery and money laundering. But after four years of non-stop media coverage of corruption by local and national politicians, Brazilians seem too tired to care about the misdeeds of officials that they have long assumed to be corrupt anyway. Although most international media has covered Lula’s conviction as a main story of the country’s 2018 presidential election, polls show that ordinary Brazilians are more concerned about issues that affect their daily life, like violence, unemployment, and the economy. This situation is not unique to Brazil. The “notebooks” scandal has already faded from Argentina’s front pages, and experts predict that the scandal will have little effect on the Kirchners’ party’s chances in the country’s 2019 presidential election. The picture is not all bleak: in September 2018, Colombia’s new president, Iván Duque, joined the political opposition to promote a national referendum on anti-corruption reforms. While turnout was not high enough to enact any of the ballot measures as law, the mobilization of 11.6 million voters has given the referendum’s backers a strong mandate to push the reforms through Congress. Weeks later, Peru’s President Martin Vizcarra announced that he intends to hold a similar referendum. Even Brazilians can be heartened knowing that corruption scandals have spurred a new generation of candidates to run for office on the congressional level and face their country’s corrupt ruling class head-on. But those fighting corruption in Latin America need the public to continue to push for anti-corruption legislation and hold their governments accountable. Tackling Latin America’s corruption problem will be a slow process; successes in other countries, like Georgia and Rwanda, took decades to achieve. Latin America is on the right track, but it can only stay on this path if its citizens don’t fall asleep at the wheel.

## Generic

### Generic

#### Status quo is goldilocks – pulling out leaves the oppressed hopeless as they pray for internal reform

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Development and military aid constitute tools of persuasion; attempts to alter the behavior of another state by changing its costs and benefits through carrots or sticks.27 Although both types of aid may persuade recipients to act more in line with donor demands, the unique characteristics of military and development aid have different impacts on state actors’ use of one-sided violence. I argue that the effects of U.S. military aid and international development aid to states can be better understood in terms of two distinct effects on state actors—persuasion and predation. U.S. military aid has a persuasion effect on state actors, which decreases states’ incentives and necessity to target civilians while enhancing their capacity to identify and target rebels more precisely. In contrast, development aid flows have a predation effect on state actors. Development aid flows create adverse incentives for resource capturing in recipient states, which exacerbate conflict and governments’ use of collective violence. Framing the effects as persuasion and predation is useful to draw out the causal mechanisms by which recipient states’ existing motivations to target civilians interact with donors’ security objectives and the effects of aid, to result in observable changes in state perpetrated civilian killings. U.S. Military aid and One-Sided Violence The United States frequently uses military aid to pressure governments in counterinsurgency efforts, and to influence the “behavior and capabilities of their partners to achieve a specific outcome.” 28 I argue that military aid results in states’ decreased use of one-sided violence STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 779 due to a persuasion effect. This is rooted in its effectiveness to incentivize governments as well as boost their capacity to conduct more targeted military operations. Examples from Pakistan are particularly useful in illustrating the persuasion effects of U.S. military aid. They help in drawing out theoretically how military aid can shape state actors’ behavior in underdeveloped and conflict-ridden states where there is a presence of rebels that pose both a domestic and international security concern. Pakistan also represents a political environment where external states are likely to intervene through foreign aid than direct intervention. It exemplifies situations where recipient governments must balance external pressure with domestic objectives and where local militants hold strategic utility for recipient governments in proxy wars, as is the case in many ungoverned spaces in the Middle East and Africa. Given that Pakistan has been receiving U.S. military aid over an extended period of time, it’s a particularly useful case to examine closely. Incentivizing Recipients In terms of incentives, provision of military aid increases a recipient’s political will to comply, first in order to avoid becoming a victim of other coercive policies by the donor. Second, it signals an alliance between donors and recipients that can enhance the recipient’s international standing and legitimacy. Thus, as supported by previous studies, U.S. military aid can induce governments to cooperate.29 For example, after 9/11, Pakistan opted to assist the United States in overthrowing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan over the alternative of becoming a target of the United States.30 Pakistan’s Musharraf was portrayed as an international hero on various media outlets, with inflows of aid indicating that Pakistan was no longer a pariah state.30 Subsequently, Pakistan arrested militants on its soil especially targeting Al Qaeda and foreign fighters who posed the biggest threats to the United States32 as well as rebels that threatened the Pakistani government in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). While Pakistan frequently turns a blind eye to many militant groups for its own interests, many of its counterterrorism efforts have been prompted by U.S. assistance to Pakistan’s national security agencies.33 Donor-Recipient Security Objectives Additionally, where donors seek to counter nonstate actors located in another state through military assistance, there is likely to be some overlap in the security objectives of both donors and recipients. Militant groups in Pakistan pose a security threat not just to the United States and other countries, but also to Pakistan itself, which saw a 48 percent increase in domestic terrorist attacks between 2008 and 2009.34 Even though Pakistan is rightly criticized for not targeting all rebels, it’s still conducting operations against rebels that have directly challenged the writ of the state such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP). Therefore, the higher levels of congruence in the security objectives of donors and recipients of military aid, as far as addressing domestic security threats is concerned, is generally suggestive of a more cooperative approach. Governments that increase military operations against internal security threats have their own strong incentives to avoid use of collective punishment. Targeting civilians is likely to be counterproductive if the government has coercive objectives as opposed to brute force objectives.35 The goal of suppressing internal opposition in a state is a “moderately coercive” objective implying that the state requires its target to acquiesce to prevail. It must use force persuasively to establish peace within its territorial borders especially to increase popular 780 A. JADOON support.36 This is precisely why the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan were encouraged by leaders in 2009 to exercise “courageous restraint” to achieve strategic success.37 Thus, in asymmetric conflicts, information flows, collaboration, and support of civilians are key for success from a utilitarian perspective. In the absence of sufficient capability though, governments may resort to civilian targeting as a cheaper mechanism to fight guerilla warfare. Indeed, weaker governments are more likely to employ tactics of civilian targeting to undermine their opponent’s capacity.38 In the Pakistan case, where the army made use of collective violence in targeting local and foreign fighters by demolishing private residences (e.g., in Operation Kalosha II), it triggered multiple attacks against army bases and enraged locals.39 Similarly, where government militias in Iraq have engaged in revenge killings, many civilians have lost trust in them and prefer the ISIS despite disagreeing with the latter’s brutality and interpretation of Islam.40 Governments will lose legitimacy if their penetration is associated with increased civilian victimization and will reinforce civilian support for rebels.41 Military aid can thus provide governments with the means to maintain their legitimacy while conducting internal security operations, and offset costs associated with minimizing reliance on civilian targeting. Building Coercive Capacity Beyond enhancing incentives, U.S. military aid’s persuasion effect is also rooted in its capacity effect. Military aid includes a wide variety of military support including weapons, technology, and intelligence capability. Governments use collective punishment against communities perceived to be supportive of rebel groups, or to counter guerrilla warfare that is more difficult and expensive to tackle through conventional means.42 Strategic explanations of one-sided violence argue that armed actors employ violence against civilians to change their strategic environment43 and that shifts in the capability balance between actors triggers changes in actors’ tactics in war. For example, the Pakistani army relied on the use of excessive force for counterinsurgency operations where it lacked logistical and precision abilities and had shortcomings in technical intelligence.44 General Tarik Khan, who has led the fight against the TTP, has said, “any kind of military operation that seeks to take out individuals is an intelligence-driven operation that requires a lot of technology, a lot of surveillance capacity.” 45 As such, military aid will help states overcome the capability deficiencies that previously may have necessitated the use of collective violence. Improved counterinsurgency ability allows governments to target rebels more precisely, offset costs of increased efforts against rebels, harden soft targets and thus engage in more selective violence. U.S. military funding to Pakistan has identified priority areas such as precision strike capability, air mobility, combat search and rescue, counter improvised explosive device and survivability, battlefield communications and night operations.46 The Pakistani military has used F-16s for precise targeting of rebels in civilian areas47 and intelligence-based operations have helped the state preempt backlash against military operations in North Waziristan.48 Although, such improvements are not expected to completely eliminate the use of civilian targeting by governments, they will reduce the need to do so if governments are better able to locate legitimate targets. It should also be noted that military aid compared to development aid is less fungible, and thus less susceptible to leakage through rent-seeking behavior and corruption. And because it is provided for a specific purpose such as targeting and capturing rebels rather than being STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 781 linked to broad development goals, its threatened withdrawal by the donor is also a more realistic threat for recipients. U.S. military aid flows can thus enhance recipient states’ military capability to use force in a way, which is in line with their overall moderately coercive objectives of countering internal rebel activity. Overall, military aid not only increases the political will of governments to increase efforts against rebel strongholds, it also enhances the capacity of governments to target rebels and avoid civilian killings. This leads to the following hypothesis: H1a: Higher levels of U.S. military aid flows will be associated with lower levels of civilian killings by recipient state actors Alternatively, it may be argued that recipient governments may reduce their use of civilian targeting to ensure continued flows of U.S. military aid. This would be likely if the United States was willing to withhold aid on the basis of human rights violations or civilian killings by governments, despite its security objectives. However, prior research provides strong evidence that the United States largely provides military aid on the basis of its own national security interests, despite human rights violations within states.49 Studies have shown a lack of a relationship between recipients’ human rights records and the allocation of U.S. aid or the magnitude of assistance provided.50 Indeed, Sandholtz has recently shown that U.S. military assistance in 150 countries over thirty years links with worse performance on human rights.51 Although, the Leah Law requires the United States to suspend military assistance flows in cases of civilian abuses by military units, it does not technically require an end to extrajudicial killings or a suspension of overall aid. Instead, it requires the recipient to take effective measures to hold accountable the specific military units responsible for civilian abuses. In practice, there are numerous examples where recipients have continued to receive U.S. aid despite civilian killings. In Colombia, 30,000 extrajudicial killings have been committed since 2000, but U.S. officials did not freeze its assistance under the Leah Law52 and military assistance continues at high levels. The Philippines is another case in point. The Philippines is a close U.S. ally, and received more than $507 million in U.S. military assistance between 2001–2010. International efforts to raise awareness regarding human rights violations and extrajudicial killings have largely been ineffective in severing aid, with aid flows rising to $30 million in 2012.53 Human rights violations by the Philippines military have not affected the regularity or scale of U.S. aid flows. Other countries, which continued to receive comparable levels of military assistance or increased levels despite civilian killings, include Burma (2002–2006), Brazil (2005–2006), Guatemala (1989 and 1995), Haiti (1991–1994), Indonesia (1996–1999), Jordan (1992–1993), Kenya (2007–2009), Mali (1990–1992), Niger (1989–1990), Sri Lanka (1989–1991), and Uganda (1990–1991). Such examples provide support that the United States rarely suspends military assistance in the face of its security imperatives. The potential reverse causality between military aid and onesided violence is further discussed and tested in the empirical section of the article.

### Alt Causes

#### So many alt causes– empirics prove the US funnel other forms of aid TO the receiving countries military

Kono and Montinola 12Daniel Yuichi Kono (University of California-Davis) and Gabriella R. Montinola (University of California-Davis). “The Uses and Abuses of Foreign Aid: Development Aid and Military Spending.” Political Research Quarterly 66(3) 615–629. 2012. JDN. h ps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1065912912456097

Between 1960 and 2010, rich countries gave poor ones more than three trillion dollars in development aid.1 The return on this investment has been poor: on average, foreign aid has failed to promote savings, investment, and growth in recipient countries (Doucou-liagos and Paldam 2009). For example, while sub-Saharan Africa received $714 billion in development aid from 1960 to 2006 (Easterly 2008, 14), its per capita income grew by less than 1 percent per year over this period,2 and its poverty rate has scarcely changed (Chen and Ravallion 2004). These grim statistics beg the question: Why has develop-ment aid failed to achieve its goals? One possible answer is that it is simply not used for its intended purpose. Research shows that aid is fungible (Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu 1998): that is, aid given for one purpose allows governments to shift resources to other uses. If these other uses do not encourage economic growth or development, neither will aid. A recent New York Times article on Uganda illustrates this point.3 Although Uganda has received considerable foreign aid designated for health care, its hospitals remain starved for resources. This is because foreign aid has allowed the government to cut its own health care spending: specifically, for each additional aid dollar received, Uganda cut its health care spending by 57 cents (IHME 2010). Although it is not clear where the budgetary savings went, a concurrent rise in military spending suggests that Uganda exploited its development aid to reallocate funds from health care to the mili-tary. If so, it is no surprise that this aid did li le to improve the lives of Uganda’s people. The Uganda example suggests that governments may, more generally, divert aid funds from developmental uses to military spending. This would be disturbing in at least two ways. First, military spending does not promote development: studies show that its impact on growth is nonexistent at best and negative at worst (Dunne and Uye 2009). Second, military resources are often used to repress domestic dissent. For example, in the “Arab Spring” of 2011, governments across the Middle East and North Africa used their armed forces to intimidate prodemocracy protesters. If development aid is gener-ally diverted to military spending, it could thus have pernicious economic and political eﬀects.

### Russia Fill In

#### Russia fills in

Barmin 18 Yuri Barmin**.** 3/08/2018. [Yuri Barmin is an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, covering the Middle East and North Africa, Moscow’s policy towards the region, as well as the conflicts in Syria and Libya. He regularly contributes his analysis to Al Monitor, the Middle East Institute, Al Sharq Forum and FARAS Center. Mr. Barmin holds an MPhil in International Relations from the University of Cambridge], Russia in the Middle East Until 2024: From Hard Power to Sustainable Influence, The Jamestown Foundation. https://jamestown.org/program/russia-middle-east-2024-hard-power-sustainable-influence/.

Vladimir Putin’s return to power in Russia in 2012 signified a dramatic change in the country’s foreign policy and military strategy. Scrapping the achievements of the Dmitry Medvedev era in the Kremlin, which was characterized by a thaw in relations with the West, Vladimir Putin opted for a more aggressive approach toward positioning the country in the international arena. Experts still argue what prompted this review of the country’s foreign policy strategy, but the developments that likely had a major impact on Vladimir Putin’s policy planning in 2012 included the war with Georgia in 2008, the Arab Spring protests, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) infamous military campaign in Libya, which brought down Russia’s long-time ally Muammar Qaddafi. Contours of the new policy approach to the region started to emerge when Russia updated two of its key documents, the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, in 2013 and 2014, respectively.[i] The documents pronounced strategies based on protecting Russian national interests abroad, including militarily if need be, and increasing Moscow’s role in maintaining global security. Quite notably, a more recent edition of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, signed by President Putin in November 2016, has a specific focus on the Middle East and names foreign meddling there as one of the causes of instability and extremism in the region that directly affect Russia.[ii] The statement that serves as de facto justification for the Russian military campaign in Syria became the first official document to elucidate the country’s ambition to play a bigger role in the Middle East and North Africa. In the three years that divide the two concepts, Vladimir Putin’s approach to foreign policy experienced an evolution and increasing securitization (the word “terrorism” figures 15 times in the 2013 Concept and 35 in its 2016 edition). The Foreign Policy Concept also spells out the Russian president’s growing ambition to deal with instability where it originates before it reaches Russian borders. The rationale behind Russia’s re-emergence as one of the leading powers in the Middle East was of a defensive nature and largely reactionary. The Arab Spring movement in the region was a painful reminder of the Color Revolutions that broke out across several post-Soviet states in the first half of the 2000s and, according to the Kremlin, led to the 2014 EuroMaidan revolution in Ukraine. Vladimir Putin himself is of the belief that that the Arab Spring is a continuation of those Color Revolutions and that both are foreign-instigated.[iii] Coupled with a forced revolution in Libya and the removal of Qaddafi in what Russia declared was a violation of international law, this episode is often cited as a watershed in Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy thinking.[iv] A wave of revolutions across Eurasia convinced the Russian leadership that the apparent domino effect of regime change would eventually target Russia. It is not a coincidence that the Russian president likens Color Revolutions and the Arab Spring protests to each other and often makes no distinction between them. Commenting on anti-corruption protests in Russia in March 2017, he went as far as to call them “an instrument of the Arab Spring.”[v] Vladimir Putin sees Russia as a legitimate actor in designing a new power balance in the Middle East and as its integral part since security challenges originating in the region reverberate across the former Soviet space as well as in Russia. The United States, on the other hand, is an outsider in this region in the view of Russian officials. Criticism of the White House over its “destructive” role in the Middle East is a central theme of many of Vladimir Putin’s speeches, including the one he delivered at the UN General Assembly prior to launching his military campaign in Syria in September 2015. In those remarks, the Russian president accused the United States of being the source of problems in the Middle East.[vi] A gradual withdrawal of the United States from the Middle East under Barack Obama among other things meant that the region’s “policeman” was no longer interested in maintaining order there, which arguably presented Moscow with numerous security challenges. Russia’s re-emergence in the Middle East to a large extent happened to fill some of the void left by the retreating Obama administration. In some cases it happened effortlessly, such as in Egypt, where the US decision to cut aid to Cairo in 2013 led to the emergence of a budding Russia-Egypt alliance. In other contexts, most prominently in Syria, Russia had to invest significant diplomatic and military resources to marginalize the US in the war and in the peace process. What started out as an attempt to replace the United States where it was no longer interested in playing a leading role later transformed into an ambition to challenge the US even where it had no intention of retreating, for instance in the Gulf region. Russia’s return to the Middle East differs from the Soviet experience: Today, Moscow is extending its reach without the baggage of Soviet ideology. The idea of using its arms exports to the Middle East in the ideological struggle against the West evaporated as soon as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) disintegrated and was replaced with the idea of making a profit for the cash-strapped budget. The Kremlin is looking to support its geopolitical claims with a strong pragmatic dimension. In the Middle East, Moscow to reinforce its influence there as well as offset the burden upon the Russian federal budget associated with the expenses of the Syrian campaign. Following in the footsteps of the Soviet Union, Russia has used arms deals to reach out to Cold War–era allies in Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Syria to consolidate a new power balance. During the Cold War, Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gilbert wrote that as more countries became recipients of Soviet military aid programs, there was a tendency for these countries to become greater political allies of the Soviet Union.[vii] And it seems that this argument is increasingly relevant today. According to SIPRI, in 2015 $5.5 billion in Russian arms exports were destined for clients in the Middle East, which was ten times more than all Russian experts to the region for all of the 1990s.[viii] With Vladimir Putin declaring victory over the Islamic State during his December 2017 visit to Syria, Russia is faced with a number of opportunities as well as challenges. Its military operation in Syria may have put Russia back on the radar in the Middle East; but in all certainty, it essentially solidified its position in the region. As Vladimir Putin is eyeing re-election as president in March 2018, foreign policy achievements, chiefly in the Middle East and North Africa, figure prominently in his election campaign rhetoric. One of the effects of Russia’s assertive foreign policy has become an expectation from regional partners and opponents alike that Moscow will be active in the Middle East. However, the hard power that brought Russia to prominence in the region will not be a helpful tool to support long-term influence there and could, in fact, produce a negative impact for Russia’s international standing. As a result, during his next term in office, Vladimir Putin will be faced with a challenge to depart from hard power, his preferred modus operandi, to embrace a spectrum of other tools in order to make Russia’s presence in the region lasting and sustainable.

#### That turns case and offers no chance of reform

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Experts who had argued that authoritarianism in the Middle East would maintain stability and keep extremism at bay were proven wrong by the events of the Arab Spring.[xxxv] The Russian leadership, however, still projects its vision of “autocratic stability” onto the region. And even though Moscow repeatedly insists that it is up to the Syrian people to decide through a presidential election who will lead the nation into the post-war period, the Russian government is unlikely to become a supporter of democracy movements in the Middle East. After all, elections have been a crucial legitimization tool of Russia’s own “managed democracy.” The consolidation of power in the hands of the national leader as well as the securitization of the political agenda have characterized the Russian political system throughout the last 17 years Vladimir Putin has been in power. And they continue to guide him in how he sees regimes in the Middle East. Some of these authoritarian Arab regimes share a long history with Russia: during the Cold War, they proved their ability to maintain order for longer than any democratic regime could sustain it, not least due to Moscow’s financial and military support. The fact that Bashar al-Assad survived throughout the bloody Syrian conflict, to a large extent due to Russia’s aid, solidifies the idea that authoritarianism in the Middle East guarantees stability and puts a cap on “toxic” democratic values imposed from the outside. In Moscow’s view, authoritarian tendencies are indigenous to the region, much like they are to Russia, which is why they need not be battled but rather be correctly managed. Russia’s idea of “authoritarian stability” in the Middle East may find a potential supporter in Donald Trump, who notoriously dropped America’s agenda for promoting democracy in the Middle East. The distinct security focus of Donald Trump’s strategy toward the region has emboldened his allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel, and convinced them that the regional policeman will no longer restrain their geopolitical ambitions. The position of both Russia and the United States is, thus, likely to resonate with many governments in the region that previously had to put on airs of civil society engagement and liberalization just to have international political and diplomatic backing. Egypt and Turkey are the two cases in point: the 2017 Human Rights Watch World Report specifically points to them to illustrate how the tide of new authoritarianism is sweeping through the Middle East.[xxxvi] In Turkey, the attempted coup in July 2016 was used by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) as an excuse to crack down not only on suspected plotters but also on wider circles critical of the government’s policies. Western powers sharply rebuked Erdoğan over his suspension of the rule of law in the country and mass detentions—but Russia pointedly did not. Putin was the one world leader who gave a call to Erdoğan to tell him Moscow supports his campaign to root out dissent, which the Turkish president described as “anti-constitutional.”[xxxvii] Furthermore Putin hosted his Turkish counterpart in St. Petersburg less than a month after the failed coup, during which Erdoğan explained that Vladimir Putin’s call to him was an important move, “a kind of moral support and display of Russia-Turkey solidarity,” as the Turkish president described the situation.[xxxviii] All this occurred just weeks after Erdoğan’s late June apology to Russia for the November 2015 downing of a Russian Su-24 jet over Syria; and it goes to show how masterfully Vladimir Putin uses authoritarian movements to his own political benefit. Egypt is going through a similar wave of authoritarianism, with President Abdel Fattah El Sisi cracking down on dissent that is not necessarily associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. That government campaign is happening against the backdrop of economic instability, currency devaluation and increased poverty rates. However, the army’s grip on power and full control over the public sphere give a semblance of stability in the country. Sisi’s fight to eradicate extremism in the Sinai as well as his crackdown on dissent find support in Moscow, which is reflected in official statements coming from the Kremlin. Egypt reemerged as Russia’s key partner in the Middle East, including in crucial spheres of military-technical cooperation. The two countries signed a protocol on military cooperation in March 2015, significantly ramped up joint military exercises, and are looking to green light an agreement that would allow Russian military aircraft to use Egyptian airspace and infrastructure.[xxxix] With the turmoil and regular attacks in the Sinai Peninsula, counter-terrorism cooperation has become a distinct characteristic of the bilateral relationship. A security-heavy agenda acts as a glue between Moscow and Cairo, not least due to the military and security background of the political elites of the two countries. Both Russians and Egyptians will head to the polls in March 2018 to elect their respective heads of state, while presidential elections in Turkey are to take place in November 2019. The outcome is already known in all three countries; Putin, Sisi and Erdoğan will almost certainly serve out their next terms into the first half of the 2020s, meaning that we are unlikely to witness a disruption in the security-comes-first policy employed by Moscow in its bilateral relations with both Cairo and Ankara. The cases of Egypt and Turkey illustrate that Vladimir Putin is likely to encourage authoritarian “stability” across the region through skewed security-heavy policies. Putin’s support for autocratic tendencies will hardly find any resistance among other powers in the region and will almost certainly be embraced. Syria’s recovery from the seven-year war is unlikely to happen through the emergence of democratic institutions and freedom, but will probably lead to the creation of a strong regime with an inflated security apparatus to shield a fragile government and keep extremist tendencies at bay. Iraq’s increasingly sectarian policies hint at a similar trend. And as Libya’s internationally recognized government fails to establish control over much of the country’s territory, Libyan National Army Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar represents the type of leader the Kremlin would presumably like to see for a post–civil war Libya. If Russia’s Syria policy is any indication, a highly centralized system will be Moscow’s remedy for extremism throughout the wider region. The fear of a new wave of extremism will push many regimes to seek more control over the population, and a lack of incentives to democratize may bring about new repressive regimes. In other words Russia’s leadership in the Middle East may significantly lengthen and reinforce the era of authoritarianism there.

#### Russia fill in sucks

**Saunders 15** (Paul was a State Department senior adviser during the George W. Bush administration, “US, Russia face off in Middle East,” Al-Monitor, 7/7/15, <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/07/military-strategy-us-russia-direct-conflict-threat-assessmen.html>, accessed 1/19/19) KED

Moreover, as the United States and Russia consider direct conflict to be increasingly possible, even if still very unlikely, they impose this new context on their existing relationships around the world, intensifying existing competition for influence. Russia’s efforts to court Egypt, for example, have a different meaning in the White House and the Kremlin if the risk of a US-Russia conflict is “growing,” as does Moscow’s new naval access agreement with Cyprus. Russia’s arms sales to Iran — and US pursuit of the nuclear agreement — similarly take on additional flavor. Over time, this dynamic could increasingly lead Washington to lobby its partners in the Middle East to choose sides by limiting their cooperation with Moscow. (Since Russia is the weaker party and has comparatively limited leverage, it has little to gain from this approach and would more probably continue its attempts to exploit frustration with America to cultivate individual governments.) The United States would be in the strongest position to discourage interaction with Russia in dealing with the governments most dependent on its protection, for example, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. That said, if the United States looks less willing to exercise its power, its partners will be less dependent and less subject to such pressure. Conversely, as US military planners see a greater risk of conflict with Russia, they will generate pressure inside the US government to place greater value on existing alliance relationships and partnerships around the world. Here, governments hosting major military bases might find that they have new influence in dealing with Washington. In the Middle East, this would apply especially to countries with US naval and air bases that would be necessary to interdict Russian forces in any conflict (also the Arab Gulf nations) — again, recognizing that this is currently a remote possibility. During the Cold War, this dynamic generally reduced official US scrutiny of its partners’ domestic practices, something both President Barack Obama and former President George W. Bush have denounced. Perhaps perversely, an environment in which Washington and Moscow see a growing possibility of conflict — but still consider it to be unlikely — can actually be more dangerous than many might think, in that it encourages intensified rivalry (to create the most favorable possible balance of power in advance of any potential confrontation) while maintaining the sense that actual conflict is very improbable (thus reducing incentives for self-restraint to avoid unnecessary risks). From this perspective, it is worth considering that the Middle East is already more than sufficiently volatile based strictly on tensions within and among regional states. Reigniting major power competition could pose even greater dangers to peace and stability.

### China

#### China is expanding its guns-for-resources engagement with brutal dictatorships – the aff allows an ethically unconstrained China to fill in the vacuum

Okoye ‘17 Uju Okoye, is a Toronto-based researcher and freelance journalist focused on African politics. Diplomatic Courier, 4/29/2017, ["In Africa, China’s Human Rights Concerns Don’t Apply", https://www.diplomaticourier.com/2017/04/29/africa-chinas-human-rights-concerns-dont-apply/] bcr 12-4-2018

When Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi condemned the ongoing absence of a Palestinian state as “a terrible injustice” after a meeting with his Palestinian counterpart on April 13, he continued a long and proud tradition of cynically criticizing rights abuses abroad to distract from the Chinese government’s misdeeds at home. With its poor record on human rights and ongoing crackdowns on rights activists in the name of national security, China is hardly in a position to lecture others on injustice: under Xi Jinping’s heavy thumb, torture remains a commonly used interrogation method, civil society organizations are being dismantled at a rapid pace, and freedom of the press is at an all-time low. It should come as no surprise that, at least for people whose human rights have been violated by Beijing and its partners, Wang’s statement rang hollow. Unfortunately, China’s hypocrisy is not limited to its own territory: Beijing has no scruple maintaining relationships with some of the most repressive regimes on the planet, empowering them to crush their own dissenters with its help. While Beijing’s partnership with North Korea and Kim Jong-un is currently in the international spotlight, China has long gotten away with backing dictators in Africa with far less attention. The calculus is simple: in exchange for the resources required for China’s sustained economic growth, the Chinese government provides cash, weapons, and even diplomatic cover for its oppressive African partners. All the while, Chinese government rhetoric claims to stand for historical justice and the betterment of third countries through development. Robert Mugabe is a trademark example of this dynamic at work. Despite Mugabe’s appalling human rights record and repeated calls for him to stand trial for crimes against humanity in Zimbabwe, China has sought to foster a strong relationship with his regime. Beijing chooses to cozy up to the nonagenarian on account of his country’s plentiful reserves of copper, platinum and diamonds. Given Mugabe’s economic isolation and poisonous reputation among Western countries, this outside support could not be more vital to his regime. China invested $4 billion in Zimbabwe last year, and was Harare’s largest trading partner in 2015. Meanwhile, Mugabe’s policies have destroyed the economy and the living standards of average citizens. The poverty rate in Zimbabwe now stands at 63% but it can go as high as 90% among rural farming communities. While more than happy to highlight the plight of the Palestinians, Beijing has been suspiciously silent about the suffering of Zimbabweans. In fact, China describes itself as Zimbabwe’s “all weather friend.” On top of its steadfast support, China even has sought to stroke Mugabe’s ego by awarding him the Confucius Prize, the Middle Kingdom’s own bizarre version of the Nobel Peace Prize, in 2015. The Chinese government responds to accusations that it enables Mugabe’s oppression with its trademark cynicism. By claiming to be “apolitical”—not getting involved in other countries’ internal affairs—Beijing absolves itself of all guilt. Indeed, China’s foreign policy decisions are apparently guided solely by economic self-interest. Beijing’s aid and investment model seeks to maximize profits by taking norms and values out of the equation. Unburdened by ethical concerns, China is happy to disregard crimes committed by the regimes it does business with, so long as the returns are substantial. This position was infamously epitomized by former Deputy Foreign Minister Zhou Wenzhong, who stated “business is business” in response to international criticism that China’s aid and investments in Africa only help to strengthen dictatorial regimes. Unsurprisingly, a growing number of African leaders look on the Chinese approach to aid and investment with relish. Even those who have established lucrative relationships with the West, like Djibouti, are willing to sign up for Chinese monetary incentives and collaborate with its geostrategic goals. Beijing has built its first military base abroad in Djibouti, choosing real estate in close proximity to an existing American naval facility. US concerns over this proximity have been ignored, perhaps because of China’s conveniently-timed investment in a new $4 billion railway linkbetween Djibouti and Ethiopia. Washington is worried Beijing could use its base in the country to freeze out other powers and cement its strategic and economic foothold in the region, but China’s generosity has already won over longtime leader Ismail Omar Guelleh. In addition to investing billions in Djibouti, China is the country’s primary lender at non-concessional rates. With China’s support, the autocratic President Guelleh has been emboldened to curb the democratic process and basic civil freedoms, attacking his political rivals with lethal force or otherwise forcing them into exile to maintain a firm grip on power. Thus far, things have gone well: with his opponents silenced, Guelleh was able to win a fourth term last year. Across Africa, this is becoming a pattern. By prioritizing profit and political expediency, Chinese government investments and partnerships actively enable democratic failures and rights abuses. As Western leaders debate how to handle China’s growing footprint in West Africa, the examples of Zimbabwe and Djibouti should provide a roadmap for what matters to Beijing and what does not. Given its own contempt for popular sovereignty and human rights, it is only logical that China regards these African dictators as natural allies. After all, they look at the world the same way.

#### The West might not be perfect, but China is worse – there are no rights conditions attached to aid

Windsor & Moens ‘16 Brooke Smith-Windsor, Deputy Head and Founding Member of the NATO Defense College (NDC) Research Division, and Alexander Moens, Professor of Political Science at the Simon Fraser University in Canada, Discussion Paper, Fall 2016 ["EUROPE, CHINA AND AFRICA NEW THINKING FOR A SECURE CENTURY", https://www.friendsofeurope.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/2016/11/EU-CHINA\_Africa\_DP\_WEB.pdf] bcr 12-4-2018

‘Chinese military aid does not come with lectures about human rights the way the West’s does … Chinese foreign policy, without being in any way extreme or bellicose, nevertheless represents the bleakest form of realism. It indicates a new bipolarity in the world: between those states that employ human rights as part of their policy calculations and those that do not.’90 So, while Beijing will have no qualms about engaging with any African regime – despotic or democratic, the most brutal violator of human rights or the most peaceful – NATO will, by virtue of its founding principles, be more discerning. Governments committed to the rule of law and individual liberty – and the AU, with its 2000 Constitutive Act, is no exception in this regard – will assume pride of place. As these authors have argued elsewhere, the Alliance’s common principles do not put NATO’s foreign and security policy beyond criticism. Its members are also selfinterested states pursing material benefits. However, restraint is a key and regular feature of military policy and action. The rule of law guides domestic and foreign decisions91. Kaplan chooses to refer to this as ‘Realpolitik with a conscience’92. Simply put, China may engage with some African regimes that NATO will not countenance.

### State Department

#### State Department fills in for Pentagon military aid delivery

Bryan Bender POLITICO 3/23/2016 ["Pentagon muscles out State Dept. on foreign aid available online at: http://www.politico.com/story/2016/03/general-diplomats-tussle-over-pentagons-growing-military-aid-portfolio-221177 accessed - 10-28-2016]cdm

Washington's newest arms race pits the State Department against the Pentagon, which are feuding over who should make the decisions on supplying military aid to foreign nations. And to the consternation of the diplomats, the generals are on a winning streak. The Pentagon is steering a growing pot of money, equipment and training to help countries fight terrorism, stem the drug trade and deter a rising China and resurgent Russia. Congress is poised to further expand the military's ability to ship arms overseas — causing the State Department and its supporters on Capitol Hill to warn that some of the aid may contradict broader U.S. interests, such as promoting human rights.

#### State Department delivery turns the case – their form of expansion is worse

Tony Cartalucci, a geopolitical researcher and writer, Land Destroyer Report, originally posted March 2011, edited and updated October 26, 2012 “US Department of Imperial Expansion Deeper down the rabbit hole of US-backed color revolutions.” [http://landdestroyer.blogspot.com/2011/03/us-department-of-imperial-expansion.html, accessed 9/16/16] SAO

A far and treasonous cry from the original purpose of the State Department - which was to maintain communications and formal relations with foreign countries - and a radical departure from historical norms that have defined foreign ministries throughout the world, it could just as well now be called the "Department of Imperial Expansion." Because indeed, that is its primary purpose now, the expansion of Anglo-American corporate hegemony worldwide under the guise of "democracy" and "human rights." That a US government department should state its goal as to build a world of "well-governed states" within the "international system" betrays not only America's sovereignty but the sovereignty of all nations entangled by this offensive mission statement and its execution. The illegitimacy of the current US State Department fits in well with the overall Constitution-circumventing empire that the American Republic has degenerated into. The current Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, gives a daily affirmation of this illegitimacy every time she bellies up to the podium to make a statement. Recently she issued a dangerously irresponsible "warning" to Venezuela and Bolivia regarding their stately relations with Iran. While America has the right to mediate its own associations with foreign nations, one is confounded trying to understand what gives America the right to dictate such associations to other sovereign nations. Of course, the self-declared imperial mandate the US State Department bestowed upon itself brings such "warnings" into perspective with the realization that the globalists view no nation as sovereign and all nations beholden to their unipolar "international system." If only the US State Department's meddling was confined to hubris-filled statements given behind podiums attempting to fulfill outlandish mission statements, we could all rest easier. However, the US State Department actively bolsters its meddling rhetoric with very real measures. The centerpiece of this meddling is the vast and ever-expanding network being built to recruit, train, and support various "color revolutions" worldwide. While the corporate owned media attempts to portray the various revolutions consuming Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, and now Northern Africa and the Middle East as indigenous, spontaneous, and organic, the reality is that these protesters represent what may be considered a "fifth-branch" of US power projection.

### Sanctions

#### Removal of military assistance opens up the floodgates for sanctions – empirics prove.

Nielsen ’13 Richard A. Nielsen Massachusetts Institute of Technology International Studies Quarterly (2013) 57, 791–803 “Rewarding Human Rights? Selective Aid Sanctions against Repressive States” doi: 10.1111/isqu.12049 2013 International Studies Association http://www.mit.edu/~rnielsen/isqu12049.pdf

The empirical confusion in the existing literature results primarily from two misunderstandings about aid sanctions against repressive states. Following the rhetorical claims of donors, most studies assume that donors will sanction all repressive states equally. In reality, aid sanctions are applied selectively to some human rights violators but not to others. Aid sanctions are rarely if ever applied to countries that are donor allies or have other strong political connections to donor countries. The theoretical literature has recognized that some **states** might **avoid** aid **sanctions because of their connections to donors** (Tomasevski 1997:21) but this insight has not informed quantitative studies of aid sanctions (for an exception, see Barratt 2008). The second misconception of the existing studies is that donors impose blanket sanctions that reduce all types of aid. Past scholarship has overlooked sanctions episodes by failing to recognize that **donors typically withdraw aid for economic sectors** but continue to extend aid for basic social services and human rights protection. The remainder of this section describes these two points in more detail. I start from a simple set of state-centered, rationalist assumptions to argue that **aid donors will apply** aid **sanctions selectively.** The literature linking human rights and foreign aid has largely avoided reference to the dominant theoretical trends of IR theory (for exceptions, see Lai 2003; Barratt 2008). Breaking with this tradition, I explicitly develop a rationalist theory of selective aid sanctions and contrast it to alternative explanations inspired by Constructivism. Starting from the assumption that **aid donors are allocating aid in ways that serve their self-interest and security**, I first identify situations where aid recipients will not face aid sanctions when they violate human rights. Most obviously, **donors rarely apply aid sanctions to states with which they have important strategic ties, such as military alliances**. The reason for this is intuitive; **aid is often used to buy influence abroad** (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009) and **withdrawing aid puts these important strategic relationships in jeopardy.** Less formal political ties also protect some repressive states from aid sanctions, including the willingness of developing countries to trade United Nations votes for aid (Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland 2009). **States that rotate onto the UN Security Council receive roughly 60% more US aid relative to other countries, presumably because of their enhanced ability to assist US interests** (Kuziemko and Werker 2006). There are even circumstances where donors might increase aid to repressive allies. **Regimes often violate human rights because they face increased pressure from political opposition** (Davenport 2000; Vreeland 2008) so donors friendly to the regime may increase aid flows to help the allied regime stay in power. This leads to the first hypothesis.

#### Sanctions cause further state repression and endless human rights abuses – takes out aff solvency and outweighs.

Choi and James ’17 Seung-Whan Choi and Patrick James Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Institute of Modern International Relations, Tsinghua University The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2017, 331–356 doi: 10.1093/cjip/pox010 Seung-Whan Choi is Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Chicago and Patrick James is Dornsife Dean’s Professor at the School of International Relations, University of Southern California.“Are US Foreign Policy Tools Effective in Improving Human Rights Conditions?”

With regard to economic threats and punishments, interest converges on the utility of sanctions. Yet, policy-oriented reflections on the record of sanctions turn out to be discouraging. **Economic sanctions do not produce regime change, and entail** certain potential and acknowledged disadvantages.23 **Suffering** as a result of economic sanctions could contribute to **labour unrest, further repression** and the like. Moreover, informed leaders, at various times, have expressed scepticism about sanctions. A prominent example is the opposition of President George H.W. Bush to economic sanctions against China in the aftermath of Tian’anmen Square in 1989, on the grounds of their probable ineffectiveness.24 Consider the US’s rate of success (i.e., change in policy by a target government) from applying sanctions: 1980–1989—14%; 1990–1999—26%.25 The figures for unilateral US implementation of economic sanctions are even lower. Longstanding cases like Cuba, Iran, and North Korea demonstrate that, whether regime change specifically or human rights in general are deemed most relevant, economic **sanctions remain ineffective.** Hufbauer and Oegg observe in particular that arms embargoes are ‘debatable’ as a means towards ending conflict. With a focus on state repression and economic sanctions, Wood analyses annual data for 157 states from 1976 to 2001,26 and finds that **sanctions implemented by the US are associated with higher levels of government repression.** Results from Peksen and Drury, meanwhile, link economic **sanctions to lower levels of government respect for physical integrity rights and higher levels of repression** over comparable periods.27 In short, it is difficult to envision economic sanctions, by the US alone or in conjunction with others, as an appropriate means towards greater respect for human rights abroad.

### PMCs

#### The aff causes a shift to PMCs

Whitehead 12. John W. Whitehead is an attorney and author who has written, debated and practiced widely in the area of constitutional law and human rights. Whitehead’s aggressive, pioneering approach to civil liberties has earned him numerous accolades and accomplishments, including the Hungarian Medal of Freedom. His concern for the persecuted and oppressed led him, in 1982, to establish The Rutherford Institute, a nonprofit civil liberties and human rights organization in Charlottesville, Va. Whitehead serves as the Institute’s president and spokesperson. His thought-provoking commentaries call people to action and address a wide range of contemporary issues from faith to politics and television to constitutional rights. He is also a frequent commentator on a variety of issues in the national media. Whitehead's book "Battlefield America: The War on the American People" is available now, online and in stores. Whitehead's daily alerts, commentaries, podcasts and vodcasts are available at www.rutherford.org., 1-17-2012, "Privatizing the War on Terror: America's Military Contractors," HuffPost, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-w-whitehead/privatizing-the-war-on-te_1_b_1209086.html> //RS

America’s troops may be returning home from Iraq, but contrary to [President Obama’s assertion](http://costsofwar.org/) that “the tide of war is receding,” we’re far from done paying the costs of war. In fact, at the same time that Obama is reducing the number of troops in Iraq, he’s [replacing them](http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/07/iraq-merc-army/) with military contractors at far greater expense to the taxpayer and redeploying American troops to other parts of the globe, including [Africa](http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/central/Obama-Deploys-Troops-to-Central-Africa--131895118.html), [Australia](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/world/asia/obama-and-gillard-expand-us-australia-military-ties.html?pagewanted=all) and [Israel](http://rt.com/usa/news/us-troops-israel-iran-257/). In this way, the war on terror is privatized, the American economy is bled dry, and the military-security industrial complex makes a killing — literally and figuratively speaking. The war effort in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan has already cost taxpayers [more than $2 trillion](http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/29/us-usa-war-idUSTRE75S25320110629) and could go as high as $4.4 trillion before it’s all over. At least $31 billion (and as much as $60 billion or more) of that $2 trillion was [lost to waste and fraud](http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_NR-49.pdf) by military contractors, who do everything from janitorial and food service work to construction, security and intelligence — jobs that used to be handled by the military. That translates to a loss of [$12 million a day](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/585dadcc-d3f1-11e0-b7eb-00144feab49a.html#axzz1jdvJ8CDV) since the U.S. first invaded Afghanistan. To put it another way, the government is spending more on war than all 50 states combined spend on health, education, welfare, and safety. Over the past [two decades](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/585dadcc-d3f1-11e0-b7eb-00144feab49a.html#axzz1jdvJ8CDV), America has become increasingly dependent on military contractors in order to carry out military operations abroad (in fact, the government’s extensive use of private security contractors has [surged under Obama](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/28/wartime-contractors-waste-billions_n_829251.html)). According to the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States [can no longer conduct large or sustained military operations](http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local_news/article/Soldiers-gone-but-contractors-remain-in-Iraq-2426228.php#ixzz1jNcP4ZcG) or respond to major disasters without heavy support from contractors. As a result, the U.S. employs at a minimum [one contractor to support every soldier](http://thinkprogress.org/security/2011/06/29/256726/afghanistan-contractors-surge/?mobile=nc) deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq (that number increases dramatically when U.S. troop numbers decrease). For those signing on for contractor work, many of whom are hired by private contracting firms after serving stints in the military, it is a lucrative, albeit dangerous, career path (private contractors are 2.75 times [more likely to die](http://www.salon.com/2011/02/24/afghanistan_private_contractors/singleton/) than troops). Incredibly, while base pay for an American soldier hovers somewhere around $19,000 per year, contractors are reportedly pulling in between [$150,000 - $250,000 per year](http://www.redrat.net/BUSH_WAR/mercenaries/index.htm). The exact number of military contractors on the U.S. payroll is hard to pin down, thanks to sleight-of-hand accounting by the Department of Defense and its contractors. However, according to a Wartime Contracting Commission report released in August 2011, there are [more than 260,000 private contractors](http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=7650159) in Iraq and Afghanistan, more than the number of ground troops [in both countries](http://www.laboreducator.org/lt110706.htm). As noted, **that number increases dramatically when troops are withdrawn from an area**, as we currently see happening in Iraq. Pratap Chatterjee of the Center for American Progress [estimates](http://thinkprogress.org/security/2011/06/29/256726/afghanistan-contractors-surge/?mobile=nc) that “if the Obama administration draws down to 68,000 troops in Afghanistan by September 2012, they will need 88,400 contractors at the very least, but potentially as many as 95,880.” With paid contractors often [outnumbering enlisted combat troops](http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jul/04/nation/na-private4), the American war effort dubbed by George W. Bush as the “coalition of the willing” has since evolved into the “coalition of the billing.” The Pentagon’s Central Command [counts](http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/12/19) 225,000 contractors working in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Between December 2008 and December 2010, the total number of private security contractors in Afghanistan [increased](http://www.salon.com/2011/02/24/afghanistan_private_contractors/singleton/) by 413% while troop levels increased 200%. Private contractors provide a number of services, including transport, construction, drone operation, and security. One military contractor, [Blackbird](http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/12/19), is composed of former CIA operatives who go on secret missions to recover missing and captured US soldiers. Then there is the [Lincoln Group](http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/12/19) which became famous for engaging in covert psychological operations by planting stories in the Iraqi press that glorified the U.S. mission. [Global Strategies Group](http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/obama-iraq-eternal/) guards the consulate in Basra for $401 million. [SOC Inc.](http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/obama-iraq-eternal/) protects the US embassy for $974 million. Unfortunately, fraud, mismanagement and corruption have become synonymous with the U.S. government’s use of military contractors. [McClatchy News](http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/01/12/106681/troubled-us-afghan-projects-mushroom.html) “found that U.S. government funding for at least 15 large-scale programs and projects [in Afghanistan] grew from just over $1 billion to nearly $3 billion despite the government’s questions about their effectiveness or cost.” One program started off as a modest wheat program and “ballooned into one of America’s biggest counterinsurgency projects in southern Afghanistan despite misgivings about its impact.” Another multi-billion-dollar program resulted in the construction of schools, clinics and other public buildings that were so poorly built that they might not withstand a serious earthquake and will have to be rebuilt. Then there was the $300 million diesel power plant that was built despite the fact that it wouldn’t be used regularly “because its fuel cost more than the Afghan government could afford to run it regularly.” RWA, a group of three Afghan contractors, was selected to build a 17.5 mile paved road in Ghazni province. They were paid $4 million between 2008 and 2010 before the [contract was terminated](http://www.stripes.com/news/failed-afghan-road-project-shows-pitfalls-of-u-s-efforts-1.160547)with only 2/3 of a mile of road paved. Mind you, with the U.S. spending more than $2 billion a week in Afghanistan, these examples of ineptitude and waste represent only a fraction of what is being funded by American taxpayer dollars. (Investigative [reports](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/30/billions-down-the-drain-i_n_790043.html#s195062&title=Countless_Dollars_Literally) reveal that large amounts of cash derived from U.S. aid and logistics spending are being flown out of the country on a regular basis by Afghan officials, including $52 million by the Afghan vice president, who was allowed to keep the money.) Yet what most Americans fail to realize is that we’re funding the very individuals we claim to be fighting. The war effort has become so corrupt that U.S. taxpayers are not only being bilked by military contractors but are also being forced to [indirectly fund insurgents](http://www.salon.com/2010/07/28/protection_payments_to_taliban/singleton/) and warlords in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the Taliban, which receives money from military contractors [in exchange for protection](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/30/billions-down-the-drain-i_n_790043.html#s195056&title=Funding_Our_Enemies). This is rationalized away as a “[cost of doing business](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/585dadcc-d3f1-11e0-b7eb-00144feab49a.html#axzz1jdvJ8CDV)“ in those countries. As the [Financial Times](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/585dadcc-d3f1-11e0-b7eb-00144feab49a.html#axzz1jdvJ8CDV) reports, the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan “found that extortion of funds from US construction and transportation projects was the second-biggest funding source for insurgent groups

#### PMCs are immune and cause way more civilian casualties – turns case

Del Prado 8., Jose L (Jose L. Gomez del Prado Is a member of the United Nations Working Group on Mercenaries ). "Impact on Human Rights of Private Military and Security Companies’ Activities." Center for Research on Globalization. N.p., 11 Oct. 2008. Web. 4 July 2017. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/impact-on-human-rights-of-private-military-and-security-companies-activities/10523>.

PMSC personnel in Iraq are involved in exchange of fire with insurgents on a daily basis. Security provisions necessarily involve military engagement. There is no perceptible difference between regular soldiers and the private contractors protecting convoys (transporting ammunitions and fuel), material, buildings or persons. Providing security in such an environment necessitates being armed and ready to shoot, often under uncertain circumstances where combatants and civilians are difficult to separate. As observed in many incidents, PMSC employees can use excessive force and shoot indiscriminately resulting in civilian casualties. There are cases where PMSC employees have used forbidden arms or experimental ammunition prohibited by international law2. Private contractors often circulate without identification and drive in unidentified sport utility vehicles (SUVs) with tinted glasses and no plates, behaving similarly to the infamous death squads. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the two countries with the largest presence of PMSC staff, the population is confused and finds it extremely difficult to distinguish employees of different companies from state forces. Reports indicate erratic behavior of PMSCs employees in Iraq with mottos such as: “what happens here to-day, stays with us today”. It has also been alleged that “private security guards” would also detain Iraqis without authorization.

#### Aff gets circumvented and causes PMC shift

Gul 06 (Saad Gul, 5-17-06, Law Clerk to The Hon. John C. Martin, Chief Judge, North Carolina Court of Appeals. JD Wake Forest University School of Law, BA Davidson College., THE SECRETARY WILL DENY ALL KNOWLEDGE OF YOUR ACTIONS: THE USE OF PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, <https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/9635-lcb102gulpdf>, JKS)

The use of innovative financial procedures to utilize PMC services in furtherance of U.S. foreign policy is particularly ominous, because Congress has often relied on its power of the purse to define the permissible parameters of the nation’s policy, e.g. in Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans, and Rwanda.116 Indeed, Congressional use of the appropriations power is one of the last meaningful constraints on virtually unbridled Presidential authority as Commander in Chief in the arena of military affairs—the utilization of financial smoke and mirrors to evade Congress effectively eviscerates this power. 117 The use of contractors to escape legal constraints is hardly a recent innovation. During the Vietnam era, a Pentagon official described one contractor, Vinnell, as “our own little army in Vietnam,” explaining that “we used them to do things we either didn’t have the manpower to do ourselves, or because of legal problems.” 118 Worse still, the ostensibly private status of PMCs means that they can be used to skirt Congressional mandates; the Pentagon used them in the Balkans to stage an end run around the Congressionally imposed cap on U.S. troop deployments in the region.119 Similarly, the United States has been able to evade statutory prohibitions on offering military assistance to certain nations by routing such aid through PMCs.120 Congressional oversight becomes an even more distant prospect when PMC contracts are routed through a variety of channels, including the Commerce, Interior, and State Departments.121 For instance, many of CACI’s contractors at Abu Ghraib were funded through a Department of the Interior Contract for Information Technology Services.122 With such bureaucratic sleights of hand, meaningful oversight is impossible. Even if technically legal, such actions serve to significantly dilute Congressional oversight of U.S. military activity around the globe.12

### Leverage

#### Military Aid causes dependence and US leverage – creates opportunities to minimize conflict and human rights abuses – Saudi Arabia Proves.

#### Tabatabi and Wasser 11/18 Ariane M. Tabatabai and Becca Wasser, November 15, 2018, "Could America Use Its Leverage to Alter the Saudis' Behavior?", https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/11/could-america-use-its-leverage-to-alter-the-saudis.html

At the same time, Saudi Arabia has become more reliant on the United States than when President Obama was in office. Riyadh's contentious policies—like the war in Yemen and the rift with its neighbors—have constrained its options and inadvertently reinforced Saudi Arabia's need for U.S. military and political support, including security cooperation and intelligence sharing. Prince Mohammed's legacy and perhaps even power is presently tied to two initiatives: The Yemen war and Vision 2030—an ambitious program of social and economic reforms that Riyadh plans to institute to diversify its economy. Neither objective is apparently proceeding as the crown prince had hoped. And to succeed, they will likely require continued U.S. support. Until recently, President Trump was not inclined to use these developments as leverage. Instead, he stood by the crown prince even as U.S. military support to Saudi forces in Yemen—including aerial refueling and advising on intelligence sharing and targeting procedures—have come under attack in Congress and by international rights groups. Some have argued that the administration has emboldened Riyadh, giving it carte blanche to pursue its more assertive policies. New details pertaining to Khashoggi's murder have emerged, ostensibly tying the young Saudi monarch to the incident and leading to mounting congressional pressure. But the Trump administration has been willing to give the Saudis only a mere slap on the wrist without fundamentally altering the dynamics of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. The Trump administration is unlikely to end its support for Saudi regional efforts or radically change its approach. But it could consider using its influence to encourage the Saudi leadership to moderate its assertive and damaging policies abroad. Rather than providing its assistance freely to Saudi Arabia, Washington could utilize it to extract concessions from the Saudi leadership to alter its behavior. Making U.S. support conditional to initiatives tied to Prince Mohammed's success provides Washington with a degree of sway over the brash monarch, who increasingly needs to produce a “win” in light of the reputational harm the Khashoggi affair has done to the kingdom, his legacy and perhaps even his hold on power. This approach is not without risk—the Saudi government could, for example, reduce intelligence sharing, or switch off the proverbial oil tap, like the OPEC states did in 1973. But 2018 is not 1973, and the United States is no longer as reliant on Saudi oil. More so, the Saudi government's assertive actions also pose operational and reputational risks to important U.S. interests, as the Khashoggi affair demonstrated, and therefore the benefits of this approach are likely to outweigh any costs Riyadh may seek to impose. On the surface, making U.S. support provisory may appear to be an unpalatable approach, one that legitimizes the crown prince. But wielded correctly, the White House can use this leverage to recalibrate the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Blanket support need not be granted in a way that emboldens Saudi behavior, leading to actions that are damaging to U.S. interests. Instead, the administration could consider also making conditional its support for the Saudi government's priority programs with the goal of altering and shaping its behavior. This includes making the Saudis take responsibility for Khashoggi's brutal death, putting an end to indiscriminate targeting practices in Yemen, altering the government's harsh response to opposition inside and outside of the Kingdom, and ending the rift with Qatar. Naysayers of such an approach might claim that it only deepens the transactionalism on which the U.S.-Saudi relationship is presently based. But it is worth recognizing that the partnership was founded on an explicit alignment of interests, not values. By acknowledging this, the United States would be better positioned to adopt an approach that best serves its own interests. At this point, the Saudi government needs U.S. support more than the White House needs Saudi Arabia.

## Soft Power

#### Soft power cause US-China and US-Russia conflict – “soft” revolutions and encirclement

**Marshall 09** Andrew Gavin Marshall @ Global Research Canada. He is also a researcher and writer based in Montreal, Canada. He is project manager of The People’s Book Project, chair of the geopolitics division of The Hampton Institute, research director for Occupy.com’s Global Power Project and World of Resistance (WoR) Report, and hosts a weekly podcast show with BoilingFrogsPost. “Colour-Coded Revolutions and the Origins of World War III Part 2”Global Research, November 03, 2009 http://www.globalresearch.ca/colour-coded-revolutions-and-the-origins-of-world-war-iii/15767

Following US geo-strategy in what Brzezinski termed the “global Balkans,” the US government has worked closely with major NGOs to **“promote democracy” and “freedom”** in former Soviet republics, playing a role behind the scenes in fomenting what are termed “colour revolutions,” which install US and Western-friendly puppet leaders to advance the interests of the West, both economically and strategically. Part 2 of this essay on “The Origins of World War III” analyzes the colour revolutions as being a key stratagem in imposing the US-led New World Order. **The** “colour revolution” or **“soft” revolution strategy is a covert political tactic of expanding** NATO and **US influence to the borders of Russia and even China**; following in line with one of the primary aims of US strategy in the New World Order: to contain China and Russia and prevent the rise of any challenge to US power in the region. These revolutions are portrayed in the western media as popular democratic revolutions, in which the people of these respective nations demand democratic accountability and governance from their despotic leaders and archaic political systems. However, **the reality is far from what this utopian imagery suggests**. Western NGOs and media heavily finance and organize opposition groups and protest movements, and in the midst of an election, create a public perception of vote fraud in order to mobilize the mass protest movements to demand “their” candidate be put into power. It just so happens that “their” candidate is always the Western US-favoured candidate, whose campaign is often heavily financed by Washington; and who proposes US-friendly policies and neoliberal economic conditions. In the end, it is the people who lose out, as their genuine hope for change and accountability is denied by the influence the US wields over their political leaders. **The soft revolutions** also **have the effect of antagonizing China and Russia**, specifically, as it places US protectorates on their borders, and drives many of the former Warsaw Pact nations to seek closer political, economic and military cooperation**. This then exacerbates tensions between the west and China and Russia; which ultimately leads the world closer to a potential conflict between the two blocs**.

#### Causes World War 3

**Lukin 14** Artyom Lukin, Professor Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok, Russia “Sino-Russian Entente Would Move the World a Step Closer to 1914” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/artyom-lukin/china-russia-world-war-three\_b\_5625485.html

Artyom Lukin says the U.S. policy of containment is pushing China and Russia ever closer to forming a powerful anti-Western alliance, greatly **raising the possibility of a Third World War** VLADIVOSTOCK -- Whereas the first two world wars broke out and were fought mainly in Europe, the Third World War, if it is not avoided, **will** most probably **erupt in the Asia-Pacific region**. Quite a few scholars and political leaders have found striking similarities between what took place in Europe before the **First World War and what we are now witnessing in Asia**. The current security situation in the Asia-Pacific -- with competing sovereignty claims, the rise of nationalism among both major and lesser countries, and great power rivalry -- increasingly resembles Europe a century ago. A world war is a very special kind of military conflict -- one which features a clash of two mighty coalitions led by great powers and possessing roughly comparable strategic resources, so that one side will not easily and swiftly prevail over the other. Are we going to see this sort of war breaking out in the Asia-Pacific? China is, of course, the rising power whose growing ambitions put it straight on a collision course with the incumbent hegemon -- the United States -- much like Anglo-German antagonism set the stage for the First World War. However, even if China becomes, as widely predicted, the No 1 economy and manages to close the military gap with the U.S., this will not be nearly enough to mount a viable challenge to U.S. hegemony. For China would have to confront not the U.S. alone but the U.S.-led bloc, counting, among others, Japan, Canada, Australia, and perhaps India. Beijing currently has just one formal ally -- North Korea, while Pakistan can be viewed as something of a de facto ally, at least vis-à-vis India. Although valuable to China, these countries can hardly be regarded as huge strategic assets. China lacks a dependable ally of a truly great power standing. The only plausible candidate is Russia. **An alliance with Moscow would no doubt embolden Beijing**. With Moscow as a close friend, China could be confident about the security of its northern borders and could count on unimpeded access to Russia's natural resources. Thus, Beijing would be much **less vulnerable** to naval blockades that the U.S. and its maritime allies would be sure to use in case of a serious confrontation. Should they form an entente, Moscow and Beijing could have Central Asia, as well as Mongolia, to themselves, effectively shutting out all external powers from the heart of Eurasia. An alliance with Moscow would also **put Russia's military-industrial complex and its vast military infrastructure in Eurasia at Beijing's service**. What might ultimately emerge is a Eurasian league, which, in controlling the continental heartland, would be reminiscent of the Central Powers alliance formed in the middle of Europe by Imperial Germany and the Habsburg empire. There is a strong tendency in the West to underestimate the potential for a Russia-China entente. A Sino-Russian strategic partnership is often portrayed as an "axis of convenience" founded on a shaky basis. Moscow, the argument goes, will be loath to form an alliance with Beijing because it distrusts and fears a rising China. The main problem with such thinking is that the U.S.-led West is seen by Moscow as **a much bigger threat than China**.

## Forrest’s Aff

### For Sophia

#### Overview: The entirety of the affirmative is contingent on them winning the warrant in the Modrowski evidence, call for it after the round, the evidence explicitly cites FOREIGN FINANCIAL AID, NOT MILITARY AID, them winning any impacts in their first and second contention means they need to win that MILITARY AID IS CAUSING THESE HARMS WHICH IT ISN’T.

#### Line by line:

#### First, on their securitization aid contention -

#### Their link between giving military aid and Indo-Pak war IS NOT EVEN CARDED. They literally only say that it makes the military more hegemonic WHICH WE HAVE DISPROVEN because the entire NC proves that military aid HAS WORKED. That means they don’t access their impacts.

#### All of the reasons why Pakistan is bad is NOT because the US gives them aid, it’s just because Pakistan is bad. Their Modrowski evidence doesn’t cite any reason why giving military aid MAKES ANYTHING WORSE which is also a reason why their first contention has no impact.

#### On their Plan Columbia argument –

#### There is no link between the US providing aid and Columbia doing bad things, the negative also proves that status quo aid SOLVES ALL OF THESE ISSUES BECAUSE AID IS CONDITIONED ON REFORM. If we win the history lesson of this debate, you vote negative

#### The examples it gives is not MILITARY AID, it’s just funding VIA the military, if they can’t cite SPECIFICALLY what we gave to Columbia, you shouldn’t buy their offense

#### On their Foucault contention –

#### If anything, their argument is a contradiction with the first part of your aff – Foucault says that we should stop securitizing rhetoric, but YOU READ A NUCLEAR WAR SCENARIO AND SAY THAT WE NEED TO PREVENT THIS CONFLICT.

#### This argument is ALSO contingent on them winning the Modrowski evidence – I have already done that work above and proven that it doesn’t even have a warrant.

#### Russia fills in if the US pulls out

Barmin 18 Yuri Barmin**.** 3/08/2018. [Yuri Barmin is an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, covering the Middle East and North Africa, Moscow’s policy towards the region, as well as the conflicts in Syria and Libya. He regularly contributes his analysis to Al Monitor, the Middle East Institute, Al Sharq Forum and FARAS Center. Mr. Barmin holds an MPhil in International Relations from the University of Cambridge], Russia in the Middle East Until 2024: From Hard Power to Sustainable Influence, The Jamestown Foundation. https://jamestown.org/program/russia-middle-east-2024-hard-power-sustainable-influence/.

Vladimir Putin’s return to power in Russia in 2012 signified a dramatic change in the country’s foreign policy and military strategy. Scrapping the achievements of the Dmitry Medvedev era in the Kremlin, which was characterized by a thaw in relations with the West, Vladimir Putin opted for a more aggressive approach toward positioning the country in the international arena. Experts still argue what prompted this review of the country’s foreign policy strategy, but the developments that likely had a major impact on Vladimir Putin’s policy planning in 2012 included the war with Georgia in 2008, the Arab Spring protests, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) infamous military campaign in Libya, which brought down Russia’s long-time ally Muammar Qaddafi. Contours of the new policy approach to the region started to emerge when Russia updated two of its key documents, the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, in 2013 and 2014, respectively.[i] The documents pronounced strategies based on protecting Russian national interests abroad, including militarily if need be, and increasing Moscow’s role in maintaining global security. Quite notably, a more recent edition of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, signed by President Putin in November 2016, has a specific focus on the Middle East and names foreign meddling there as one of the causes of instability and extremism in the region that directly affect Russia.[ii] The statement that serves as de facto justification for the Russian military campaign in Syria became the first official document to elucidate the country’s ambition to play a bigger role in the Middle East and North Africa. In the three years that divide the two concepts, Vladimir Putin’s approach to foreign policy experienced an evolution and increasing securitization (the word “terrorism” figures 15 times in the 2013 Concept and 35 in its 2016 edition). The Foreign Policy Concept also spells out the Russian president’s growing ambition to deal with instability where it originates before it reaches Russian borders. The rationale behind Russia’s re-emergence as one of the leading powers in the Middle East was of a defensive nature and largely reactionary. The Arab Spring movement in the region was a painful reminder of the Color Revolutions that broke out across several post-Soviet states in the first half of the 2000s and, according to the Kremlin, led to the 2014 EuroMaidan revolution in Ukraine. Vladimir Putin himself is of the belief that that the Arab Spring is a continuation of those Color Revolutions and that both are foreign-instigated.[iii] Coupled with a forced revolution in Libya and the removal of Qaddafi in what Russia declared was a violation of international law, this episode is often cited as a watershed in Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy thinking.[iv] A wave of revolutions across Eurasia convinced the Russian leadership that the apparent domino effect of regime change would eventually target Russia. It is not a coincidence that the Russian president likens Color Revolutions and the Arab Spring protests to each other and often makes no distinction between them. Commenting on anti-corruption protests in Russia in March 2017, he went as far as to call them “an instrument of the Arab Spring.”[v] Vladimir Putin sees Russia as a legitimate actor in designing a new power balance in the Middle East and as its integral part since security challenges originating in the region reverberate across the former Soviet space as well as in Russia. The United States, on the other hand, is an outsider in this region in the view of Russian officials. Criticism of the White House over its “destructive” role in the Middle East is a central theme of many of Vladimir Putin’s speeches, including the one he delivered at the UN General Assembly prior to launching his military campaign in Syria in September 2015. In those remarks, the Russian president accused the United States of being the source of problems in the Middle East.[vi] A gradual withdrawal of the United States from the Middle East under Barack Obama among other things meant that the region’s “policeman” was no longer interested in maintaining order there, which arguably presented Moscow with numerous security challenges. Russia’s re-emergence in the Middle East to a large extent happened to fill some of the void left by the retreating Obama administration. In some cases it happened effortlessly, such as in Egypt, where the US decision to cut aid to Cairo in 2013 led to the emergence of a budding Russia-Egypt alliance. In other contexts, most prominently in Syria, Russia had to invest significant diplomatic and military resources to marginalize the US in the war and in the peace process. What started out as an attempt to replace the United States where it was no longer interested in playing a leading role later transformed into an ambition to challenge the US even where it had no intention of retreating, for instance in the Gulf region. Russia’s return to the Middle East differs from the Soviet experience: Today, Moscow is extending its reach without the baggage of Soviet ideology. The idea of using its arms exports to the Middle East in the ideological struggle against the West evaporated as soon as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) disintegrated and was replaced with the idea of making a profit for the cash-strapped budget. The Kremlin is looking to support its geopolitical claims with a strong pragmatic dimension. In the Middle East, Moscow to reinforce its influence there as well as offset the burden upon the Russian federal budget associated with the expenses of the Syrian campaign. Following in the footsteps of the Soviet Union, Russia has used arms deals to reach out to Cold War–era allies in Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Syria to consolidate a new power balance. During the Cold War, Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gilbert wrote that as more countries became recipients of Soviet military aid programs, there was a tendency for these countries to become greater political allies of the Soviet Union.[vii] And it seems that this argument is increasingly relevant today. According to SIPRI, in 2015 $5.5 billion in Russian arms exports were destined for clients in the Middle East, which was ten times more than all Russian experts to the region for all of the 1990s.[viii] With Vladimir Putin declaring victory over the Islamic State during his December 2017 visit to Syria, Russia is faced with a number of opportunities as well as challenges. Its military operation in Syria may have put Russia back on the radar in the Middle East; but in all certainty, it essentially solidified its position in the region. As Vladimir Putin is eyeing re-election as president in March 2018, foreign policy achievements, chiefly in the Middle East and North Africa, figure prominently in his election campaign rhetoric. One of the effects of Russia’s assertive foreign policy has become an expectation from regional partners and opponents alike that Moscow will be active in the Middle East. However, the hard power that brought Russia to prominence in the region will not be a helpful tool to support long-term influence there and could, in fact, produce a negative impact for Russia’s international standing. As a result, during his next term in office, Vladimir Putin will be faced with a challenge to depart from hard power, his preferred modus operandi, to embrace a spectrum of other tools in order to make Russia’s presence in the region lasting and sustainable.

#### That spreads authoritarianism and turns case

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Experts who had argued that authoritarianism in the Middle East would maintain stability and keep extremism at bay were proven wrong by the events of the Arab Spring.[xxxv] The Russian leadership, however, still projects its vision of “autocratic stability” onto the region. And even though Moscow repeatedly insists that it is up to the Syrian people to decide through a presidential election who will lead the nation into the post-war period, the Russian government is unlikely to become a supporter of democracy movements in the Middle East. After all, elections have been a crucial legitimization tool of Russia’s own “managed democracy.” The consolidation of power in the hands of the national leader as well as the securitization of the political agenda have characterized the Russian political system throughout the last 17 years Vladimir Putin has been in power. And they continue to guide him in how he sees regimes in the Middle East. Some of these authoritarian Arab regimes share a long history with Russia: during the Cold War, they proved their ability to maintain order for longer than any democratic regime could sustain it, not least due to Moscow’s financial and military support. The fact that Bashar al-Assad survived throughout the bloody Syrian conflict, to a large extent due to Russia’s aid, solidifies the idea that authoritarianism in the Middle East guarantees stability and puts a cap on “toxic” democratic values imposed from the outside. In Moscow’s view, authoritarian tendencies are indigenous to the region, much like they are to Russia, which is why they need not be battled but rather be correctly managed. Russia’s idea of “authoritarian stability” in the Middle East may find a potential supporter in Donald Trump, who notoriously dropped America’s agenda for promoting democracy in the Middle East. The distinct security focus of Donald Trump’s strategy toward the region has emboldened his allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel, and convinced them that the regional policeman will no longer restrain their geopolitical ambitions. The position of both Russia and the United States is, thus, likely to resonate with many governments in the region that previously had to put on airs of civil society engagement and liberalization just to have international political and diplomatic backing. Egypt and Turkey are the two cases in point: the 2017 Human Rights Watch World Report specifically points to them to illustrate how the tide of new authoritarianism is sweeping through the Middle East.[xxxvi] In Turkey, the attempted coup in July 2016 was used by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) as an excuse to crack down not only on suspected plotters but also on wider circles critical of the government’s policies. Western powers sharply rebuked Erdoğan over his suspension of the rule of law in the country and mass detentions—but Russia pointedly did not. Putin was the one world leader who gave a call to Erdoğan to tell him Moscow supports his campaign to root out dissent, which the Turkish president described as “anti-constitutional.”[xxxvii] Furthermore Putin hosted his Turkish counterpart in St. Petersburg less than a month after the failed coup, during which Erdoğan explained that Vladimir Putin’s call to him was an important move, “a kind of moral support and display of Russia-Turkey solidarity,” as the Turkish president described the situation.[xxxviii] All this occurred just weeks after Erdoğan’s late June apology to Russia for the November 2015 downing of a Russian Su-24 jet over Syria; and it goes to show how masterfully Vladimir Putin uses authoritarian movements to his own political benefit. Egypt is going through a similar wave of authoritarianism, with President Abdel Fattah El Sisi cracking down on dissent that is not necessarily associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. That government campaign is happening against the backdrop of economic instability, currency devaluation and increased poverty rates. However, the army’s grip on power and full control over the public sphere give a semblance of stability in the country. Sisi’s fight to eradicate extremism in the Sinai as well as his crackdown on dissent find support in Moscow, which is reflected in official statements coming from the Kremlin. Egypt reemerged as Russia’s key partner in the Middle East, including in crucial spheres of military-technical cooperation. The two countries signed a protocol on military cooperation in March 2015, significantly ramped up joint military exercises, and are looking to green light an agreement that would allow Russian military aircraft to use Egyptian airspace and infrastructure.[xxxix] With the turmoil and regular attacks in the Sinai Peninsula, counter-terrorism cooperation has become a distinct characteristic of the bilateral relationship. A security-heavy agenda acts as a glue between Moscow and Cairo, not least due to the military and security background of the political elites of the two countries. Both Russians and Egyptians will head to the polls in March 2018 to elect their respective heads of state, while presidential elections in Turkey are to take place in November 2019. The outcome is already known in all three countries; Putin, Sisi and Erdoğan will almost certainly serve out their next terms into the first half of the 2020s, meaning that we are unlikely to witness a disruption in the security-comes-first policy employed by Moscow in its bilateral relations with both Cairo and Ankara. The cases of Egypt and Turkey illustrate that Vladimir Putin is likely to encourage authoritarian “stability” across the region through skewed security-heavy policies. Putin’s support for autocratic tendencies will hardly find any resistance among other powers in the region and will almost certainly be embraced. Syria’s recovery from the seven-year war is unlikely to happen through the emergence of democratic institutions and freedom, but will probably lead to the creation of a strong regime with an inflated security apparatus to shield a fragile government and keep extremist tendencies at bay. Iraq’s increasingly sectarian policies hint at a similar trend. And as Libya’s internationally recognized government fails to establish control over much of the country’s territory, Libyan National Army Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar represents the type of leader the Kremlin would presumably like to see for a post–civil war Libya. If Russia’s Syria policy is any indication, a highly centralized system will be Moscow’s remedy for extremism throughout the wider region. The fear of a new wave of extremism will push many regimes to seek more control over the population, and a lack of incentives to democratize may bring about new repressive regimes. In other words Russia’s leadership in the Middle East may significantly lengthen and reinforce the era of authoritarianism there.

#### Military aid decreases civilian violence and increases states’ ability to target rebels effectively – leaving them hopeless is way worse than some degree of control

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Development and military aid constitute tools of persuasion; attempts to alter the behavior of another state by changing its costs and benefits through carrots or sticks.27 Although both types of aid may persuade recipients to act more in line with donor demands, the unique characteristics of military and development aid have different impacts on state actors’ use of one-sided violence. I argue that the effects of U.S. military aid and international development aid to states can be better understood in terms of two distinct effects on state actors—persuasion and predation. U.S. military aid has a persuasion effect on state actors, which decreases states’ incentives and necessity to target civilians while enhancing their capacity to identify and target rebels more precisely. In contrast, development aid flows have a predation effect on state actors. Development aid flows create adverse incentives for resource capturing in recipient states, which exacerbate conflict and governments’ use of collective violence. Framing the effects as persuasion and predation is useful to draw out the causal mechanisms by which recipient states’ existing motivations to target civilians interact with donors’ security objectives and the effects of aid, to result in observable changes in state perpetrated civilian killings. U.S. Military aid and One-Sided Violence The United States frequently uses military aid to pressure governments in counterinsurgency efforts, and to influence the “behavior and capabilities of their partners to achieve a specific outcome.” 28 I argue that military aid results in states’ decreased use of one-sided violence STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 779 due to a persuasion effect. This is rooted in its effectiveness to incentivize governments as well as boost their capacity to conduct more targeted military operations. Examples from Pakistan are particularly useful in illustrating the persuasion effects of U.S. military aid. They help in drawing out theoretically how military aid can shape state actors’ behavior in underdeveloped and conflict-ridden states where there is a presence of rebels that pose both a domestic and international security concern. Pakistan also represents a political environment where external states are likely to intervene through foreign aid than direct intervention. It exemplifies situations where recipient governments must balance external pressure with domestic objectives and where local militants hold strategic utility for recipient governments in proxy wars, as is the case in many ungoverned spaces in the Middle East and Africa. Given that Pakistan has been receiving U.S. military aid over an extended period of time, it’s a particularly useful case to examine closely. Incentivizing Recipients In terms of incentives, provision of military aid increases a recipient’s political will to comply, first in order to avoid becoming a victim of other coercive policies by the donor. Second, it signals an alliance between donors and recipients that can enhance the recipient’s international standing and legitimacy. Thus, as supported by previous studies, U.S. military aid can induce governments to cooperate.29 For example, after 9/11, Pakistan opted to assist the United States in overthrowing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan over the alternative of becoming a target of the United States.30 Pakistan’s Musharraf was portrayed as an international hero on various media outlets, with inflows of aid indicating that Pakistan was no longer a pariah state.30 Subsequently, Pakistan arrested militants on its soil especially targeting Al Qaeda and foreign fighters who posed the biggest threats to the United States32 as well as rebels that threatened the Pakistani government in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). While Pakistan frequently turns a blind eye to many militant groups for its own interests, many of its counterterrorism efforts have been prompted by U.S. assistance to Pakistan’s national security agencies.33 Donor-Recipient Security Objectives Additionally, where donors seek to counter nonstate actors located in another state through military assistance, there is likely to be some overlap in the security objectives of both donors and recipients. Militant groups in Pakistan pose a security threat not just to the United States and other countries, but also to Pakistan itself, which saw a 48 percent increase in domestic terrorist attacks between 2008 and 2009.34 Even though Pakistan is rightly criticized for not targeting all rebels, it’s still conducting operations against rebels that have directly challenged the writ of the state such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP). Therefore, the higher levels of congruence in the security objectives of donors and recipients of military aid, as far as addressing domestic security threats is concerned, is generally suggestive of a more cooperative approach. Governments that increase military operations against internal security threats have their own strong incentives to avoid use of collective punishment. Targeting civilians is likely to be counterproductive if the government has coercive objectives as opposed to brute force objectives.35 The goal of suppressing internal opposition in a state is a “moderately coercive” objective implying that the state requires its target to acquiesce to prevail. It must use force persuasively to establish peace within its territorial borders especially to increase popular 780 A. JADOON support.36 This is precisely why the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan were encouraged by leaders in 2009 to exercise “courageous restraint” to achieve strategic success.37 Thus, in asymmetric conflicts, information flows, collaboration, and support of civilians are key for success from a utilitarian perspective. In the absence of sufficient capability though, governments may resort to civilian targeting as a cheaper mechanism to fight guerilla warfare. Indeed, weaker governments are more likely to employ tactics of civilian targeting to undermine their opponent’s capacity.38 In the Pakistan case, where the army made use of collective violence in targeting local and foreign fighters by demolishing private residences (e.g., in Operation Kalosha II), it triggered multiple attacks against army bases and enraged locals.39 Similarly, where government militias in Iraq have engaged in revenge killings, many civilians have lost trust in them and prefer the ISIS despite disagreeing with the latter’s brutality and interpretation of Islam.40 Governments will lose legitimacy if their penetration is associated with increased civilian victimization and will reinforce civilian support for rebels.41 Military aid can thus provide governments with the means to maintain their legitimacy while conducting internal security operations, and offset costs associated with minimizing reliance on civilian targeting. Building Coercive Capacity Beyond enhancing incentives, U.S. military aid’s persuasion effect is also rooted in its capacity effect. Military aid includes a wide variety of military support including weapons, technology, and intelligence capability. Governments use collective punishment against communities perceived to be supportive of rebel groups, or to counter guerrilla warfare that is more difficult and expensive to tackle through conventional means.42 Strategic explanations of one-sided violence argue that armed actors employ violence against civilians to change their strategic environment43 and that shifts in the capability balance between actors triggers changes in actors’ tactics in war. For example, the Pakistani army relied on the use of excessive force for counterinsurgency operations where it lacked logistical and precision abilities and had shortcomings in technical intelligence.44 General Tarik Khan, who has led the fight against the TTP, has said, “any kind of military operation that seeks to take out individuals is an intelligence-driven operation that requires a lot of technology, a lot of surveillance capacity.” 45 As such, military aid will help states overcome the capability deficiencies that previously may have necessitated the use of collective violence. Improved counterinsurgency ability allows governments to target rebels more precisely, offset costs of increased efforts against rebels, harden soft targets and thus engage in more selective violence. U.S. military funding to Pakistan has identified priority areas such as precision strike capability, air mobility, combat search and rescue, counter improvised explosive device and survivability, battlefield communications and night operations.46 The Pakistani military has used F-16s for precise targeting of rebels in civilian areas47 and intelligence-based operations have helped the state preempt backlash against military operations in North Waziristan.48 Although, such improvements are not expected to completely eliminate the use of civilian targeting by governments, they will reduce the need to do so if governments are better able to locate legitimate targets. It should also be noted that military aid compared to development aid is less fungible, and thus less susceptible to leakage through rent-seeking behavior and corruption. And because it is provided for a specific purpose such as targeting and capturing rebels rather than being STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 781 linked to broad development goals, its threatened withdrawal by the donor is also a more realistic threat for recipients. U.S. military aid flows can thus enhance recipient states’ military capability to use force in a way, which is in line with their overall moderately coercive objectives of countering internal rebel activity. Overall, military aid not only increases the political will of governments to increase efforts against rebel strongholds, it also enhances the capacity of governments to target rebels and avoid civilian killings. This leads to the following hypothesis: H1a: Higher levels of U.S. military aid flows will be associated with lower levels of civilian killings by recipient state actors Alternatively, it may be argued that recipient governments may reduce their use of civilian targeting to ensure continued flows of U.S. military aid. This would be likely if the United States was willing to withhold aid on the basis of human rights violations or civilian killings by governments, despite its security objectives. However, prior research provides strong evidence that the United States largely provides military aid on the basis of its own national security interests, despite human rights violations within states.49 Studies have shown a lack of a relationship between recipients’ human rights records and the allocation of U.S. aid or the magnitude of assistance provided.50 Indeed, Sandholtz has recently shown that U.S. military assistance in 150 countries over thirty years links with worse performance on human rights.51 Although, the Leah Law requires the United States to suspend military assistance flows in cases of civilian abuses by military units, it does not technically require an end to extrajudicial killings or a suspension of overall aid. Instead, it requires the recipient to take effective measures to hold accountable the specific military units responsible for civilian abuses. In practice, there are numerous examples where recipients have continued to receive U.S. aid despite civilian killings. In Colombia, 30,000 extrajudicial killings have been committed since 2000, but U.S. officials did not freeze its assistance under the Leah Law52 and military assistance continues at high levels. The Philippines is another case in point. The Philippines is a close U.S. ally, and received more than $507 million in U.S. military assistance between 2001–2010. International efforts to raise awareness regarding human rights violations and extrajudicial killings have largely been ineffective in severing aid, with aid flows rising to $30 million in 2012.53 Human rights violations by the Philippines military have not affected the regularity or scale of U.S. aid flows. Other countries, which continued to receive comparable levels of military assistance or increased levels despite civilian killings, include Burma (2002–2006), Brazil (2005–2006), Guatemala (1989 and 1995), Haiti (1991–1994), Indonesia (1996–1999), Jordan (1992–1993), Kenya (2007–2009), Mali (1990–1992), Niger (1989–1990), Sri Lanka (1989–1991), and Uganda (1990–1991). Such examples provide support that the United States rarely suspends military assistance in the face of its security imperatives. The potential reverse causality between military aid and onesided violence is further discussed and tested in the empirical section of the article.

## Saudi Arabia

### Top Level

#### UAE primed for Russia

Karasik and Cafiero 17Karasik, Theodore; Cafiero, Giorgio. 4 April 17. *Middle East Institute*. “Geopolitics Drive Russia and the U.A.E. Closer.” https://www.mei.edu/publications/geopolitics-drive-russia-and-uae-closer [Cafiero is the CEO and founder of Gulf State Analytics, a geopolitical risk consultancy based in Washington, DC. His research interests include geopolitical and security trends in the Arabian Peninsula and the broader Middle East. Karasik is a Senior Advisor to Gulf State Analytics, a geo-strategic consultancy based in Washington, DC. Karasik was a senior political scientist in the International Policy and Security Group at RAND Corporation. he served as director of research for the RAND Center for Middle East Public Policy. He is a specialist in geopolitics and geoeconomics for the MENA and Eurasia regions and frequently conducts studies and assessments of future trajectories.] BM recut MM

Russia and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) are developing a unique bilateral relationship. The latest manifestation of growing ties occurred at the biennial International Defense Exhibition & Conference (IDEX) in February when Russia and the U.A.E. announced a deal to co-produce a fifth-generation jet fighter in the Emirates. Although Moscow and Abu Dhabi have been cooperating on a range of economic and security issues for years, this was an unprecedented move. In many instances, the U.A.E. and Russia share similar perceptions of the Middle East’s problems. These range from terrorism and radicalization of Muslim youth to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as ideas for bringing the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds closer together. Sharing common concerns about Islamists fighting in Syria, the country’s six-year civil war has not fueled tensions in U.A.E.-Russia relations as it has in Moscow’s ties with Saudi Arabia and Qatar. In fact, last June, the U.A.E.’s Federal National Council speaker hailed Moscow’s efforts to promote peaceful negotiations in Syria. The U.A.E.’s leadership has also signaled its willingness, in principle, to accept a resolution to the country’s civil war involving Bashar al-Assad, highlighting some distance between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh’s positions. At the International Aviation and Space Salon in August 2015, held in Moscow one month before Russia launched its direct military intervention in Syria, Emirati and Russian officials coordinated meetings with their Egyptian and Jordanian counterparts to discuss regional security solutions. This year, with respect to Syria, Abu Dhabi certainly recognizes that the Kremlin is leading the negotiations while Moscow can open lines of communication between the Arab Gulf states and Tehran. In Egypt, the U.A.E. has joined Russia in backing President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s crackdown on Islamist groups. In Iraq, Abu Dhabi and Moscow have coordinated in the counterterrorism sphere by equipping Iraq’s security forces in their fight against the Islamic State (ISIS). Libya is important for both countries, which are jointly concerned about the shattered country’s future and are providing support to Field Marshal Khalifa Hifter, who is aligned with the Egyptian-backed secular-learning government based in the eastern city of Tobruk, which rivals Libya’s internationally-recognized Government of National Accord based in Tripoli. The U.A.E.’s ambassador to Russia, Omar Ghobash, who deeply understands the Kremlin’s interests, is a key player in this relationship. Ghobash has been vocal about the need for Russia’s participation in settling regional issues and promoting stability. He often calls for Moscow’s stepped up participation in confronting Middle Eastern security crises and promoting regional stability. Since 2008, Ghobash has been the vital interlocutor between Abu Dhabi and Moscow. U.A.E. investment in Russia has grown by $8 billion over the past few years, in no small part due to the ambassador’s work. Russia sees Ghobash’s ideas for fighting ISIS narratives as useful. He argues that combatting these extremists is a global responsibility and participation from all countries is necessary, particularly with regards to ideas, which resonates well with Russian scholars well-versed in Islam in Arab societies. Ghobash’s view of Russia as a great Christian civilization fits Abu Dhabi’s view of moderation, especially with the plight of ancient Christian minorities across the MENA region. His book, Letters to a Young Muslim, is generating considerable attention for boosting the fight against Islamist radicalization. The U.A.E. and Russia have also built a robust economic relationship. Russian exports to the Emirates are mainly commodities, such as precious metals and stones, steel, as well as ferrous metal products, machinery, equipment, vehicles, chemicals, food, wood, paper, and cardboard. Since the mid-2000s, Russian state-owned giants and private firms have done business in the Emirates and compete for some of the country’s project tenders. For Russia, the U.A.E. represents an attractive business hub for Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Tourism has also strengthened bilateral relations with over 600,000 Russian tourists visiting the U.A.E. over the past two years. Meanwhile, the Gulf state has invested in Russia’s gas, oil, real estate, infrastructure, and logistics sectors, and seeks to boost its presence in Russia’s food production sector. Additionally, these two countries share natural resource extraction and are emerging trade centers in diamonds. Russian knowledge of strategic metals, and the untapped resources of Siberia, may benefit from U.A.E. investment. D.P. World is already exploring potential opportunities in Russia’s Far East.

#### That turns case and offers no chance of reform

Barmin 18 Yuri Barmin**.** 3/08/2018. [Yuri Barmin is an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, covering the Middle East and North Africa, Moscow’s policy towards the region, as well as the conflicts in Syria and Libya. He regularly contributes his analysis to Al Monitor, the Middle East Institute, Al Sharq Forum and FARAS Center. Mr. Barmin holds an MPhil in International Relations from the University of Cambridge], Russia in the Middle East Until 2024: From Hard Power to Sustainable Influence, The Jamestown Foundation. <https://jamestown.org/program/russia-middle-east-2024-hard-power-sustainable-influence/> / MM

Experts who had argued that authoritarianism in the Middle East would maintain stability and keep extremism at bay were proven wrong by the events of the Arab Spring.[xxxv] The Russian leadership, however, still projects its vision of “autocratic stability” onto the region. And even though Moscow repeatedly insists that it is up to the Syrian people to decide through a presidential election who will lead the nation into the post-war period, the Russian government is unlikely to become a supporter of democracy movements in the Middle East. After all, elections have been a crucial legitimization tool of Russia’s own “managed democracy.” The consolidation of power in the hands of the national leader as well as the securitization of the political agenda have characterized the Russian political system throughout the last 17 years Vladimir Putin has been in power. And they continue to guide him in how he sees regimes in the Middle East. Some of these authoritarian Arab regimes share a long history with Russia: during the Cold War, they proved their ability to maintain order for longer than any democratic regime could sustain it, not least due to Moscow’s financial and military support. The fact that Bashar al-Assad survived throughout the bloody Syrian conflict, to a large extent due to Russia’s aid, solidifies the idea that authoritarianism in the Middle East guarantees stability and puts a cap on “toxic” democratic values imposed from the outside. In Moscow’s view, authoritarian tendencies are indigenous to the region, much like they are to Russia, which is why they need not be battled but rather be correctly managed. Russia’s idea of “authoritarian stability” in the Middle East may find a potential supporter in Donald Trump, who notoriously dropped America’s agenda for promoting democracy in the Middle East. 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Egypt is going through a similar wave of authoritarianism, with President Abdel Fattah El Sisi cracking down on dissent that is not necessarily associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. That government campaign is happening against the backdrop of economic instability, currency devaluation and increased poverty rates. However, the army’s grip on power and full control over the public sphere give a semblance of stability in the country. Sisi’s fight to eradicate extremism in the Sinai as well as his crackdown on dissent find support in Moscow, which is reflected in official statements coming from the Kremlin. Egypt reemerged as Russia’s key partner in the Middle East, including in crucial spheres of military-technical cooperation. The two countries signed a protocol on military cooperation in March 2015, significantly ramped up joint military exercises, and are looking to green light an agreement that would allow Russian military aircraft to use Egyptian airspace and infrastructure.[xxxix] With the turmoil and regular attacks in the Sinai Peninsula, counter-terrorism cooperation has become a distinct characteristic of the bilateral relationship. A security-heavy agenda acts as a glue between Moscow and Cairo, not least due to the military and security background of the political elites of the two countries. Both Russians and Egyptians will head to the polls in March 2018 to elect their respective heads of state, while presidential elections in Turkey are to take place in November 2019. The outcome is already known in all three countries; Putin, Sisi and Erdoğan will almost certainly serve out their next terms into the first half of the 2020s, meaning that we are unlikely to witness a disruption in the security-comes-first policy employed by Moscow in its bilateral relations with both Cairo and Ankara. The cases of Egypt and Turkey illustrate that Vladimir Putin is likely to encourage authoritarian “stability” across the region through skewed security-heavy policies. Putin’s support for autocratic tendencies will hardly find any resistance among other powers in the region and will almost certainly be embraced. Syria’s recovery from the seven-year war is unlikely to happen through the emergence of democratic institutions and freedom, but will probably lead to the creation of a strong regime with an inflated security apparatus to shield a fragile government and keep extremist tendencies at bay. Iraq’s increasingly sectarian policies hint at a similar trend. And as Libya’s internationally recognized government fails to establish control over much of the country’s territory, Libyan National Army Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar represents the type of leader the Kremlin would presumably like to see for a post–civil war Libya. If Russia’s Syria policy is any indication, a highly centralized system will be Moscow’s remedy for extremism throughout the wider region. The fear of a new wave of extremism will push many regimes to seek more control over the population, and a lack of incentives to democratize may bring about new repressive regimes. In other words Russia’s leadership in the Middle East may significantly lengthen and reinforce the era of authoritarianism there.

#### The status quo is better than any other solution - pulling aid only worsens the humanitarian crisis

Posey and Phillips 18 Madyson Hutchinson Posey [Research and Administrative Assistant] James Phillips [Senior Research Fellow], The Heritage Foundation, "Ending U.S. Military Support for Saudi Arabia in Yemen Would Trigger Dangerous Consequences," Heritage Foundation, [https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/ending-us-military-support-saudi-arabia-yemen-would-trigger-dangerous /](https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/ending-us-military-support-saudi-arabia-yemen-would-trigger-dangerous%20/) MM

The killing of Khashoggi was certainly abhorrent, but ending U.S. support for the multinational coalition in Yemen is not the proper solution. It risks dangerously conflating two separate issues and would inevitably trigger unintended consequences that would undermine U.S. national security interests in the region. Senators must remember that Saudi Arabia is not the only belligerent in Yemen. A cutoff of U.S. support would also hurt the elected and internationally recognized government of Yemen, which was ousted by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in 2015 in a bloody coup that violated a [U.N.-brokered ceasefire](https://www.cnn.com/2014/09/21/world/meast/yemen-prime-minister-resigns/index.html). Withdrawing U.S. support would also harm the interests of other U.S. allies fighting in Yemen, including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. The war in Yemen is complex. Those who rush to blame Saudi Arabia entirely for the suffering of the Yemeni people ignore the war crimes and heavy-handed treatment meted out by the Houthis to their opponents and the ruthless role that Iran plays in supporting the Houthi Ansar Allah (“Supporters of Allah”) movement, a Shia Islamist extremist group. The Saudis are rightly criticized for not doing more to prevent civilian casualties as they target Ansar Allah positions. But the Houthis should not be given a free pass for deliberately targeting civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with increasingly sophisticated Iranian ballistic missiles. Ansar Allah also deserves criticism for its violent role in destabilizing Yemen and creating the conditions that led to the current humanitarian disaster. Ansar Allah regularly attacks the Saudi border, launches missiles strikes into Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and diverts international medical and food aid to favor its own supporters and sell on the black market. Ansar Allah also has targeted U.S. Navy vessels, those of allied nations, and civilian shipping in the [Red Sea](https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/bab-el-mandeb-the-us-ignores-the-most-dangerous-strait-the-world-its-peril) with Iranian-supplied missiles, gunboat attacks, and boat bombs. Undermining the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen risks exacerbating this threat to international shipping and giving Iran the opportunity to threaten oil shipments through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, just as it has threatened to do in the Strait of Hormuz. Those who advocate withdrawing support for Saudi Arabia apparently believe that they can somehow end the current conflict in Yemen through a one-sided strategy that penalizes allies and boosts Ansar Allah, a group that chants “Death to America” and looks more like Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy group, every day. Never mind that Saudi Arabia is supporting the internationally recognized government of Yemen in this effort. Never mind that leaving Ansar Allah to run amuck will not bring an end to the humanitarian suffering, but only prolong it. The U.S. currently extends only limited support to Saudi Arabia in Yemen centered on intelligence and information sharing. There are no U.S. troops involved in combat operations, except for occasional commando raids and air strikes against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, a Sunni terrorist group that continues to target the U.S. homeland, as well as Saudi Arabia, France, and other countries. The Trump administration already has stopped the aerial refueling of Saudi warplanes involved in the Yemen conflict and called for a negotiated settlement. But the United States cannot afford to abandon its allies and hope for the best. Undermining the Yemeni government and the Saudi-led coalition would make an acceptable political settlement impossible. The Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia will continue to fight this war with or without U.S. support. Those who would connect two unrelated issues, condemn Saudi involvement, and ignore Iran’s hostile role inside Yemen will only do more harm to innocent Yemeni civilians and empower Iran and its Yemeni proxies.

#### Iran views Yemen as key to their regional strategy

Ghavami 18 Raman Ghavami, 11-21-2018, [Middle East commentator and campaigner for Kurdish rights] "Opinion: We will not achieve peace in Yemen until we stop blaming Saudi Arabia for the war," Independent, [https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/yemen-war-saudi-arabia-iran-houthi-rebels-un-peace-talks-ceasefire-conflict-a8644681.html /](https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/yemen-war-saudi-arabia-iran-houthi-rebels-un-peace-talks-ceasefire-conflict-a8644681.html%20/) MM

But from the Iranian perspective, a ceasefire in Yemen is only crucial for the time being because it needs to focus on domestic economic challenges as the country hopes to ease US sanctions. It is hard to imagine they are truly seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflict, as it remains a key part of their wider regional strategy of expanding their influence. Indeed, look at other countries where Iran has sought to impose its influence – namely Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, which are extremely divided and unstable. There is little reason to assume Iran’s intentions are different in Yemen. This suggests the main reason behind Houthi rebels announcing halting attacks on the Saudi-led coalition is linked to Iran’s current domestic problems, as opposed to a genuine willingness to find peace in the region. Yemen is not an isolated war but intrinsically linked to Iran’s wider regional strategy. Unless this aspect begins to be highlighted more insistently, it is difficult to see any lasting peace in Yemen – a treaty could be signed, but as Iran faces other problems it could return to destabilising Yemen because it is a crucial part of Iran’s Shia Crescent into Saudi Arabia. It is highly unlikely Iran will stop pursuing its belligerent efforts to establish its Shia Crescent in the long run because that is the very essence and purpose of the Islamic regime of Iran. This poses a great threat to the stability in the region, and threatens Saudi Arabia and Bahrain which have significant Shia population in their countries. In relation to this, James Mattis, US defence secretary, recently [stated](https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1674583/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-at-international-institute-for-strategic-studies-ma/) that the US has significant evidence which indicates Iran has been transferring a significant amount of weapons into Bahrain. Such evidence is an indication of how serious Iran’s destabilizing role in the region is, and how determined it is to establish a Shia Crescent, which must be taken into consideration by the international community. It is crucial to put pressure on Iran to dismantle its Quds forces because herein lies the key to peace in the region and in Yemen. The wars in the [Middle East](https://www.independent.co.uk/topic/MiddleEast) are part of wider geopolitical tensions, and Yemen cannot be dealt with in isolation of the rest of the region’s instability, which the Quds forces have a lot to answer for

#### Saudi can’t stop won’t stop – US checks are key

Goldenberg and Thomas 18 Ilan Goldenberg 12-5-18 [Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for a New American Security’s (CNAS) Middle East Security Program and formerly served as the Iran Team Chief in the Office of the Secretary of Defense] Kaleigh Thomas [Research Assistant for the program] "Give Saudi Arabia a Take It or Leave It Deal," National Interest, [https://nationalinterest.org/feature/give-saudi-arabia-take-it-or-leave-it-deal-37902](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/give-saudi-arabia-take-it-or-leave-it-deal-37902%20/)

President Donald Trump released a statement on November 20 in which he supported Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s (MBS) claim that he had nothing to do with the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, directly contradicting a leaked CIA assessment that MBS ordered the killing. Vowing to stand with U.S. ally Saudi Arabia, Trump cited lucrative foreign military sales and Iranian aggression among the reasons for his support. Saudi Arabia’s disastrous war in Yemen has been met with a similar absence of criticism from the administration. However, **the U**nited **S**tates **should do more than wring its hands about this war** that has killed thousands and brought many more to the brink of starvation, by applying pressure on Saudi Arabia to change its course. The question is how? Walking away from supporting the Saudi-led warin Yemen and ending U.S. mid-air refueling might give Washington the moral high ground, but it will do little to stop the killing. The Saudis view **the threat in** Yemen as crucial to their interests, **so** U.S. pressure to end the war altogether will fall short **of causing real change**. To the Saudis, the threat of Iran establishing a foothold on their southern border is much more vital to their interests than procuring U.S. weapons. **Rather than walk away** from Yemen, **they will buy Russian bombs or use less sophisticated weapons** and tactics that will kill even more civilians. Americans will have washed our hands of a morally unacceptable situation, but civilian deaths and the threat of famine will actually get worse, and the world will look on and do nothing. The only approach worse than walking away is what the United States is currently doing—giving the Saudis a blank check. Supporting the Saudis with intelligence, refueling, weaponry and minimal guidance on protecting civilians has failed at preventing civilian casualties. This policy was started by the Obama administration and put on steroids in the age of Trump. The theory was that by remaining engaged and involved, the United States could exercise some influence on Saudi Arabia and drive more responsible targeting and decision-making in Riyadh. It has not worked out this way. The Saudis continue to conduct the Yemeni war with insufficient regard for civilian lives and are contributing to a worsening humanitarian crisis. Unfortunately, there’s no end to the war in sight. The U.S. administration had made clear there will be no consequences for this behavior when in September it certified to Congress that Saudis are doing everything they can to avoid civilian casualties, despite obvious evidence to the contrary. Moreover, that certification was done despite objections from most of the State Department officials involved in the policy. Trump’s full support of Saudi Arabia even after the Khashoggi murder highlights why America has been stuck with these terrible policy options in Yemen and why have Washington continued to support this quagmire. American support has not only led to a human catastrophe but also has done nothing to advance U.S. interests. The view inside the U.S. government has been that Saudi Arabia is too important to alienate and the United States does not have the leverage to change its behavior. Saudi Arabia is the largest global producer of oil in the world after the United States, a major investor in the U.S. economy, a purchaser of billions of dollars of weapons, and one of the most powerful countries in the Middle East—a region where all of America’s friends are imperfect. The Saudis know that even if Washington threatened and tried to convince them otherwise, America is unlikely to walk away from them over Yemen. But even if President Trump is unwilling to put additional pressure on the Kingdom, Saudi Arabia is still facing the real possibility that domestic political pressure in the West will lead other governments to walk away from them. Also, international businesses may curb their investments, and in the U.S. Congress—many members of which disagree with Trump’s support of Saudi Arabia—could put harsh new restrictions on the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Moreover, many inside the Saudi royal family have balked at MBS’s governing approach and may try to use this moment to sideline him, putting additional pressure on him to find a way out of the current diplomatic crisis that he and the people around him have created. The United States should use this moment to offer Saudi Arabia a take-it-or-leave-it deal that they may conceivably accept. Rather than suddenly withdrawing U.S. support for the conflict in Yemen, **Washington should offer to** remain in or even become more engaged but only if the Saudis change their approach entirely andbring the United **S**tates **into the decisionmaking process**. This starts with the Saudis sharing their strategic plans with the United States and taking on board American recommendations for how to shift to a strategy that is more viable and less dependent on airstrikes that harm civilians.Saudi Arabia must also mitigate some of the worst humanitarian impacts. Under closer guidance, the air war will be carried out similarly to how the United States conducted the air war against ISIS in Syria and Iraq. American military personnel will have a seat at the table with their Saudi partners and an ability to veto strikes based on humanitarian or civilian casualty concerns. In exchange for being made a greater stakeholder, the United States will provide more support and get more engaged. This could potentially even include conducting certain air strikes and putting a limited number of military advisors on the ground. This will further ensure the Saudis meet a much higher standard when it comes to the laws of war. This approach is not without its tradeoffs. It comes with the real risk of further entangling America in the conflict in Yemen. Washington also has to accept the reality that the U.S. campaign in Iraq and Syria caused significant civilian casualties, and the United States will be blamed for similar casualties in Yemen. However, **the approach we recommend and the one the United States has pursued elsewhere is more effective and humane than what the Saudis are doing in Yemen. American involvement could make a** meaningful difference. Americans should also have realistic expectations**.** The Saudis are likely not to take Washington up on this offer, in which case the United States should suspend military aid and distance itself from the war in Yemen until the Saudis change their minds or take clear steps to end the war. But given the scrutiny they are under, the likelihood of a more flexible approach from the Crown Prince is much higher than it was two months ago. Even if Saudi **Arabia is a key ally in the Middle East,** the United **S**tates **should not give it a blank check** of support. **America should use the heightened global scrutiny on the Kingdom to take** a realistic shot at getting Saudi Arabia to change its behavior **in Yemen and save thousands of lives**. Such an approach is far wiser than continuing to give the Saudis a blank check or walking away in a fit of moral indignation.

#### Pulling away military aid leaves the oppressed hopeless – US intervention creates the ONLY possibility of change

Jadoon 17 (Amira Jadoon is an assistant professor at the Combating Terrorism Center and the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point as well as the CTC’s General John P. Abizaid Research Associate. Dr. Jadoon holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy at the University at Albany, an M.Sc. in Economic Development from the London School of Economics, and a B.A. in Economics and in Journalism from the University of Iowa, "Persuasion And Predation: The Effects Of U.S. Military Aid And International Development Aid On Civilian Killings", 8-1-2017, Taylor & Francis Online, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2017.1353355?scroll=top&needAccess=true) KS

Development and military aid constitute tools of persuasion; attempts to alter the behavior of another state by changing its costs and benefits through carrots or sticks.27 Although both types of aid may persuade recipients to act more in line with donor demands, the unique characteristics of military and development aid have different impacts on state actors’ use of one-sided violence. I argue that the effects of U.S. military aid and international development aid to states can be better understood in terms of two distinct effects on state actors—persuasion and predation. U.S. military aid has a persuasion effect on state actors, which decreases states’ incentives and necessity to target civilians while enhancing their capacity to identify and target rebels more precisely. In contrast, development aid flows have a predation effect on state actors. Development aid flows create adverse incentives for resource capturing in recipient states, which exacerbate conflict and governments’ use of collective violence. Framing the effects as persuasion and predation is useful to draw out the causal mechanisms by which recipient states’ existing motivations to target civilians interact with donors’ security objectives and the effects of aid, to result in observable changes in state perpetrated civilian killings. U.S. Military aid and One-Sided Violence The United States frequently uses military aid to pressure governments in counterinsurgency efforts, and to influence the “behavior and capabilities of their partners to achieve a specific outcome.” 28 I argue that military aid results in states’ decreased use of one-sided violence STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 779 due to a persuasion effect. This is rooted in its effectiveness to incentivize governments as well as boost their capacity to conduct more targeted military operations. Examples from Pakistan are particularly useful in illustrating the persuasion effects of U.S. military aid. They help in drawing out theoretically how military aid can shape state actors’ behavior in underdeveloped and conflict-ridden states where there is a presence of rebels that pose both a domestic and international security concern. Pakistan also represents a political environment where external states are likely to intervene through foreign aid than direct intervention. It exemplifies situations where recipient governments must balance external pressure with domestic objectives and where local militants hold strategic utility for recipient governments in proxy wars, as is the case in many ungoverned spaces in the Middle East and Africa. Given that Pakistan has been receiving U.S. military aid over an extended period of time, it’s a particularly useful case to examine closely. Incentivizing Recipients In terms of incentives, provision of military aid increases a recipient’s political will to comply, first in order to avoid becoming a victim of other coercive policies by the donor. Second, it signals an alliance between donors and recipients that can enhance the recipient’s international standing and legitimacy. Thus, as supported by previous studies, U.S. military aid can induce governments to cooperate.29 For example, after 9/11, Pakistan opted to assist the United States in overthrowing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan over the alternative of becoming a target of the United States.30 Pakistan’s Musharraf was portrayed as an international hero on various media outlets, with inflows of aid indicating that Pakistan was no longer a pariah state.30 Subsequently, Pakistan arrested militants on its soil especially targeting Al Qaeda and foreign fighters who posed the biggest threats to the United States32 as well as rebels that threatened the Pakistani government in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). While Pakistan frequently turns a blind eye to many militant groups for its own interests, many of its counterterrorism efforts have been prompted by U.S. assistance to Pakistan’s national security agencies.33 Donor-Recipient Security Objectives Additionally, where donors seek to counter nonstate actors located in another state through military assistance, there is likely to be some overlap in the security objectives of both donors and recipients. Militant groups in Pakistan pose a security threat not just to the United States and other countries, but also to Pakistan itself, which saw a 48 percent increase in domestic terrorist attacks between 2008 and 2009.34 Even though Pakistan is rightly criticized for not targeting all rebels, it’s still conducting operations against rebels that have directly challenged the writ of the state such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP). Therefore, the higher levels of congruence in the security objectives of donors and recipients of military aid, as far as addressing domestic security threats is concerned, is generally suggestive of a more cooperative approach. Governments that increase military operations against internal security threats have their own strong incentives to avoid use of collective punishment. Targeting civilians is likely to be counterproductive if the government has coercive objectives as opposed to brute force objectives.35 The goal of suppressing internal opposition in a state is a “moderately coercive” objective implying that the state requires its target to acquiesce to prevail. It must use force persuasively to establish peace within its territorial borders especially to increase popular 780 A. JADOON support.36 This is precisely why the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan were encouraged by leaders in 2009 to exercise “courageous restraint” to achieve strategic success.37 Thus, in asymmetric conflicts, information flows, collaboration, and support of civilians are key for success from a utilitarian perspective. In the absence of sufficient capability though, governments may resort to civilian targeting as a cheaper mechanism to fight guerilla warfare. Indeed, weaker governments are more likely to employ tactics of civilian targeting to undermine their opponent’s capacity.38 In the Pakistan case, where the army made use of collective violence in targeting local and foreign fighters by demolishing private residences (e.g., in Operation Kalosha II), it triggered multiple attacks against army bases and enraged locals.39 Similarly, where government militias in Iraq have engaged in revenge killings, many civilians have lost trust in them and prefer the ISIS despite disagreeing with the latter’s brutality and interpretation of Islam.40 Governments will lose legitimacy if their penetration is associated with increased civilian victimization and will reinforce civilian support for rebels.41 Military aid can thus provide governments with the means to maintain their legitimacy while conducting internal security operations, and offset costs associated with minimizing reliance on civilian targeting. Building Coercive Capacity Beyond enhancing incentives, U.S. military aid’s persuasion effect is also rooted in its capacity effect. Military aid includes a wide variety of military support including weapons, technology, and intelligence capability. Governments use collective punishment against communities perceived to be supportive of rebel groups, or to counter guerrilla warfare that is more difficult and expensive to tackle through conventional means.42 Strategic explanations of one-sided violence argue that armed actors employ violence against civilians to change their strategic environment43 and that shifts in the capability balance between actors triggers changes in actors’ tactics in war. For example, the Pakistani army relied on the use of excessive force for counterinsurgency operations where it lacked logistical and precision abilities and had shortcomings in technical intelligence.44 General Tarik Khan, who has led the fight against the TTP, has said, “any kind of military operation that seeks to take out individuals is an intelligence-driven operation that requires a lot of technology, a lot of surveillance capacity.” 45 As such, military aid will help states overcome the capability deficiencies that previously may have necessitated the use of collective violence. Improved counterinsurgency ability allows governments to target rebels more precisely, offset costs of increased efforts against rebels, harden soft targets and thus engage in more selective violence. U.S. military funding to Pakistan has identified priority areas such as precision strike capability, air mobility, combat search and rescue, counter improvised explosive device and survivability, battlefield communications and night operations.46 The Pakistani military has used F-16s for precise targeting of rebels in civilian areas47 and intelligence-based operations have helped the state preempt backlash against military operations in North Waziristan.48 Although, such improvements are not expected to completely eliminate the use of civilian targeting by governments, they will reduce the need to do so if governments are better able to locate legitimate targets. It should also be noted that military aid compared to development aid is less fungible, and thus less susceptible to leakage through rent-seeking behavior and corruption. And because it is provided for a specific purpose such as targeting and capturing rebels rather than being STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 781 linked to broad development goals, its threatened withdrawal by the donor is also a more realistic threat for recipients. U.S. military aid flows can thus enhance recipient states’ military capability to use force in a way, which is in line with their overall moderately coercive objectives of countering internal rebel activity. Overall, military aid not only increases the political will of governments to increase efforts against rebel strongholds, it also enhances the capacity of governments to target rebels and avoid civilian killings. This leads to the following hypothesis: H1a: Higher levels of U.S. military aid flows will be associated with lower levels of civilian killings by recipient state actors Alternatively, it may be argued that recipient governments may reduce their use of civilian targeting to ensure continued flows of U.S. military aid. This would be likely if the United States was willing to withhold aid on the basis of human rights violations or civilian killings by governments, despite its security objectives. However, prior research provides strong evidence that the United States largely provides military aid on the basis of its own national security interests, despite human rights violations within states.49 Studies have shown a lack of a relationship between recipients’ human rights records and the allocation of U.S. aid or the magnitude of assistance provided.50 Indeed, Sandholtz has recently shown that U.S. military assistance in 150 countries over thirty years links with worse performance on human rights.51 Although, the Leah Law requires the United States to suspend military assistance flows in cases of civilian abuses by military units, it does not technically require an end to extrajudicial killings or a suspension of overall aid. Instead, it requires the recipient to take effective measures to hold accountable the specific military units responsible for civilian abuses. In practice, there are numerous examples where recipients have continued to receive U.S. aid despite civilian killings. In Colombia, 30,000 extrajudicial killings have been committed since 2000, but U.S. officials did not freeze its assistance under the Leah Law52 and military assistance continues at high levels. The Philippines is another case in point. The Philippines is a close U.S. ally, and received more than $507 million in U.S. military assistance between 2001–2010. International efforts to raise awareness regarding human rights violations and extrajudicial killings have largely been ineffective in severing aid, with aid flows rising to $30 million in 2012.53 Human rights violations by the Philippines military have not affected the regularity or scale of U.S. aid flows. Other countries, which continued to receive comparable levels of military assistance or increased levels despite civilian killings, include Burma (2002–2006), Brazil (2005–2006), Guatemala (1989 and 1995), Haiti (1991–1994), Indonesia (1996–1999), Jordan (1992–1993), Kenya (2007–2009), Mali (1990–1992), Niger (1989–1990), Sri Lanka (1989–1991), and Uganda (1990–1991). Such examples provide support that the United States rarely suspends military assistance in the face of its security imperatives. The potential reverse causality between military aid and onesided violence is further discussed and tested in the empirical section of the article.

### Other Cards

#### They just agreed to a cease-fire and American coercion through military aid was necessary

**Bloomberg 18** Editorial Board, 12-14-2018, "Yemen Gets Much-Needed Good News," Bloomberg, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-12-14/yemen-ceasefire-is-welcome-saudi-arabia-and-iran-must-do-more>

The limited cease-fire agreed to by Yemen’s warring sides promises relief for a war-torn country in the grip of famine. After difficult negotiations in Sweden, this week the Yemeni government in exile and the Houthi rebels who control much of the country have agreed to a truce in two key cities, Hodeidah and Taiz. The airport in Sana’a, the capital, may also be opened before the next talks in January, and thousands of prisoners are to be exchanged. The most important of these steps is the reopening of Hodeidah, the Red Sea port that handles 80 percent of Yemen’s food imports. International agencies can now rush vital humanitarian aid into the country, not a moment too soon for the millions facing starvation. The United Nations deserves praise for brokering the cease-fire. But the deal would not have been possible without the American coercion of Saudi Arabia, which has for most of the past four years led a coalition of Arab states in a sustained bombing campaign against the Houthis. While the Saudis support the Yemeni government, their main goal is to repulse Iran’s growing support for the Houthis. Any hope of a lasting peace in Yemen rests on ending this proxy war.

#### The status quo is better than any other solution. Pulling aid only worsens the humanitarian crisis in Yemen.

Posey and Phillips 18Madyson Hutchinson Posey [Research and Administrative Assistant] James Phillips [Senior Research Fellow], The Heritage Foundation, "Ending U.S. Military Support for Saudi Arabia in Yemen Would Trigger Dangerous Consequences," Heritage Foundation, [https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/ending-us-military-support-saudi-arabia-yemen-would-trigger-dangerous /](https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/ending-us-military-support-saudi-arabia-yemen-would-trigger-dangerous%20/) MM

The killing of Khashoggi was certainly abhorrent, but ending U.S. support for the multinational coalition in Yemen is not the proper solution. It risks dangerously conflating two separate issues and would inevitably trigger unintended consequences that would undermine U.S. national security interests in the region. Senators must remember that Saudi Arabia is not the only belligerent in Yemen. A cutoff of U.S. support would also hurt the elected and internationally recognized government of Yemen, which was ousted by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in 2015 in a bloody coup that violated a [U.N.-brokered ceasefire](https://www.cnn.com/2014/09/21/world/meast/yemen-prime-minister-resigns/index.html). Withdrawing U.S. support would also harm the interests of other U.S. allies fighting in Yemen, including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. The war in Yemen is complex. Those who rush to blame Saudi Arabia entirely for the suffering of the Yemeni people ignore the war crimes and heavy-handed treatment meted out by the Houthis to their opponents and the ruthless role that Iran plays in supporting the Houthi Ansar Allah (“Supporters of Allah”) movement, a Shia Islamist extremist group. The Saudis are rightly criticized for not doing more to prevent civilian casualties as they target Ansar Allah positions. But the Houthis should not be given a free pass for deliberately targeting civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with increasingly sophisticated Iranian ballistic missiles. Ansar Allah also deserves criticism for its violent role in destabilizing Yemen and creating the conditions that led to the current humanitarian disaster. Ansar Allah regularly attacks the Saudi border, launches missiles strikes into Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and diverts international medical and food aid to favor its own supporters and sell on the black market. Ansar Allah also has targeted U.S. Navy vessels, those of allied nations, and civilian shipping in the [Red Sea](https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/bab-el-mandeb-the-us-ignores-the-most-dangerous-strait-the-world-its-peril) with Iranian-supplied missiles, gunboat attacks, and boat bombs. Undermining the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen risks exacerbating this threat to international shipping and giving Iran the opportunity to threaten oil shipments through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, just as it has threatened to do in the Strait of Hormuz. Those who advocate withdrawing support for Saudi Arabia apparently believe that they can somehow end the current conflict in Yemen through a one-sided strategy that penalizes allies and boosts Ansar Allah, a group that chants “Death to America” and looks more like Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy group, every day. Never mind that Saudi Arabia is supporting the internationally recognized government of Yemen in this effort. Never mind that leaving Ansar Allah to run amuck will not bring an end to the humanitarian suffering, but only prolong it. The U.S. currently extends only limited support to Saudi Arabia in Yemen centered on intelligence and information sharing. There are no U.S. troops involved in combat operations, except for occasional commando raids and air strikes against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, a Sunni terrorist group that continues to target the U.S. homeland, as well as Saudi Arabia, France, and other countries. The Trump administration already has stopped the aerial refueling of Saudi warplanes involved in the Yemen conflict and called for a negotiated settlement. But the United States cannot afford to abandon its allies and hope for the best. Undermining the Yemeni government and the Saudi-led coalition would make an acceptable political settlement impossible. The Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia will continue to fight this war with or without U.S. support. Those who would connect two unrelated issues, condemn Saudi involvement, and ignore Iran’s hostile role inside Yemen will only do more harm to innocent Yemeni civilians and empower Iran and its Yemeni proxies.

#### No solvency – Iran views Yemen as key to their regional strategy. Empirics prove– when the US pulls out Iran fills in regional hegemony and destabilizes the region

Ghavami 18 Raman Ghavami, 11-21-2018, [Middle East commentator and campaigner for Kurdish rights] "Opinion: We will not achieve peace in Yemen until we stop blaming Saudi Arabia for the war," Independent, [https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/yemen-war-saudi-arabia-iran-houthi-rebels-un-peace-talks-ceasefire-conflict-a8644681.html /](https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/yemen-war-saudi-arabia-iran-houthi-rebels-un-peace-talks-ceasefire-conflict-a8644681.html%20/) MM

But from the Iranian perspective, a ceasefire in Yemen is only crucial for the time being because it needs to focus on domestic economic challenges as the country hopes to ease US sanctions. It is hard to imagine they are truly seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflict, as it remains a key part of their wider regional strategy of expanding their influence. Indeed, look at other countries where Iran has sought to impose its influence – namely Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, which are extremely divided and unstable. There is little reason to assume Iran’s intentions are different in Yemen. This suggests the main reason behind Houthi rebels announcing halting attacks on the Saudi-led coalition is linked to Iran’s current domestic problems, as opposed to a genuine willingness to find peace in the region. Yemen is not an isolated war but intrinsically linked to Iran’s wider regional strategy. Unless this aspect begins to be highlighted more insistently, it is difficult to see any lasting peace in Yemen – a treaty could be signed, but as Iran faces other problems it could return to destabilising Yemen because it is a crucial part of Iran’s Shia Crescent into Saudi Arabia. It is highly unlikely Iran will stop pursuing its belligerent efforts to establish its Shia Crescent in the long run because that is the very essence and purpose of the Islamic regime of Iran. This poses a great threat to the stability in the region, and threatens Saudi Arabia and Bahrain which have significant Shia population in their countries. In relation to this, James Mattis, US defence secretary, recently [stated](https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1674583/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-at-international-institute-for-strategic-studies-ma/) that the US has significant evidence which indicates Iran has been transferring a significant amount of weapons into Bahrain. Such evidence is an indication of how serious Iran’s destabilizing role in the region is, and how determined it is to establish a Shia Crescent, which must be taken into consideration by the international community. It is crucial to put pressure on Iran to dismantle its Quds forces because herein lies the key to peace in the region and in Yemen. The wars in the [Middle East](https://www.independent.co.uk/topic/MiddleEast) are part of wider geopolitical tensions, and Yemen cannot be dealt with in isolation of the rest of the region’s instability, which the Quds forces have a lot to answer for

#### Cutting military aid kills US-Saudi Arabia relationship – they’ve already expressed anger towards the Senate vote even when it won’t become law

BBC 18 (BBC News is a British free-to-air television news network., “Saudi Arabia condemns US Senate 'interference'”, 12/17/18, *BBC*, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-46588036>, Date Accessed: 12/20/18) / MM

Saudi Arabia has reacted angrily after the US Senate voted to withdraw military aid for the war in Yemen, where the Saudis are leading a coalition fighting rebels. The Senate also blamed the Saudi crown prince for the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, a US resident. Saudi Arabia described the vote as "interference" based on "untrue allegations". Thursday's Senate resolution was mostly symbolic and is unlikely to become law. However, it is seen as a rebuke to Donald Trump's Saudi policies. It was the first time a chamber of the US Congress had agreed to pull US forces from a military conflict under the 1973 War Powers Act. Saudi Arabia is leading a coalition fighting Houthi rebels in Yemen, and has received logistical and intelligence support from the US. The kingdom has also come under pressure since Khashoggi, a US resident and columnist for the Washington Post, was killed while visiting the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in Turkey on 2 October. Why is Saudi Arabia unhappy? In a statement carried by the official Saudi Press Agency, the foreign ministry said: "The kingdom condemns the latest position of the US Senate." It said that such a position "was built on untrue allegations", and that Saudi Arabia rejected "any interference in its internal affairs". Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman is Saudi Arabia's de facto leader, and the Saudi government has insisted that he knew nothing about Khashoggi's killing. "The Kingdom has previously asserted that the murder of Saudi citizen Jamal Khashoggi is a deplorable crime that does not reflect the Kingdom's policy nor its institutions and reaffirms its rejection of any attempts to take the case out of the path of justice in the Kingdom," the foreign ministry said. The US has so far not publicly responded to the Saudi statement

#### Fear of US abandonment drives reckless Saudi behavior - cutting off sales will magnify it

Bromund 18, PhD, 10-21-18 (Theodore R., Senior Research Fellow in Anglo-American Relations@Heritage, https://www.newsday.com/opinion/commentary/what-not-to-do-about-khashoggi-1.22136012)

The death of Jamal Khashoggi at the hands of Saudi Arabia offers a terrible temptation to the United States: We can indulge our outrage at the expense of our interests. We have few good options, but giving in to that temptation would be the worst thing to do. Everyone involved in this scandal has performed poorly, if not disgracefully. Saudi Arabia has been caught lying about Khashoggi’s death. President Donald Trump has sided both with and against the Saudis, thereby earning brickbats from all sides. Turkey pretends to care about Khashoggi but imprisons more journalists than any other nation. And then there is Khashoggi himself. It’s awkward to speak ill of the dead, but Khashoggi’s relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood was not a mere youthful flirtation. Just a year ago, he called on the Saudi leadership to cooperate with them, and to lead a unified Arab world to support the Palestinians in their fight against Israel. That doesn’t justify killing him. Of the region’s four major Muslim powers, Turkey has slid away from the West, Egypt just signed a strategic partnership with Russia, and the Islamic Republic of Iran has hated the United States since 1979. That leaves only Saudi Arabia as a possible U.S. ally. Which is why Khashoggi’s death has caused such a stir. Revealingly, at about the same time as the writer disappeared, France disrupted an Iranian bomb plot that would have killed tens, if not hundreds, of people in Paris. And yet it’s Khashoggi’s killing that has grabbed the headlines. That’s because Khashoggi isn’t just a victim; he’s a proxy for a debate about U.S. policy. Obama-era veterans from Ben Rhodes to Michael McFaul have argued that Khashoggi’s death proves that President Barack Obama’s desire to sidle up to Iran at the expense of the Saudis was correct. This is nonsense. Obama’s policy isn’t the answer, it’s a significant part of the problem. As I have written in this column before, most U.S. alliances are as much about restraining our allies as they are about deterring our enemies. When Obama tilted toward Tehran, he gave Saudi Arabia a reason to start writing its own insurance policy against Iran, its regional enemy. Predictably, the Saudis have made a mess of it. They wanted to secure their flanks, but their war in Yemen is endless and profitless, and their blockade of Qatar, though driven by understandable concern over Iranian influence, has achieved little. At home, the regime’s so-called drive against corruption — like the parallel ones in Russia and China — is about centralizing power by eliminating opponents. The killing of Khashoggi, whether it was deliberate or a panicked bungle, is part of that drive — and it has backfired spectacularly. The problem for the United States is that Saudi behavior is destructive. But leaving the Saudis to go it alone would merely be more of the same policy that got us where we are today. Since 2011, when most U.S. forces left Iraq, declining U.S. influence has paralleled rising regional violence — and Iranian power. That violence isn’t our fault — but given how rotten the regimes in the region are, we shouldn’t have expected them to behave any better. Kicking Saudi Arabia to the curb now is tempting, but it will only quicken the descent by making it clear to the Saudis that they’re on their own against the Iranians. Breaking this spiral won’t be easy. It may not be possible. Yet we have to try to convince the Saudis that their actions, far from enhancing their security, are undermining it. Ironically, Khashoggi was right about that; the reaction to his death is proof of it. Our response to it should be guided not by self-righteous outrage, but by our interest in talking the Saudis down from their ledge.

#### Cutting aid to Saudi Arabia prevents the United States from checking Iran, increases violence in Yemen and opens the door to more Saudi abuses – turns case

Cordesman 18 Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke chair in strategy at the [Center for Strategic and International Studies](https://www.csis.org/) in Washington, D.C. He has served as a consultant on Afghanistan to the [U.S. Department of Defense](https://www.defense.gov/)and the [U.S. Department of State](https://www.state.gov/). Saudi Arabia is a critical American security partner in the Middle East BY ANTHONY CORDESMAN, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR — 03/21/18 02:00 PM EDT https://thehill.com/opinion/international/379542-saudi-arabia-is-a-critical-american-security-partner-in-the-middle-east

Somewhere along the line, we seem to have forgotten that our strategy in the Middle East is dependent on Saudi Arabia as our most important single security partner. Israel’s security is certainly a key American concern, but it does not play an active role in most of America’s ongoing military engagements in the region, in dealing with Iran, or in a direct fight against violent extremist movements like ISIS and Al Qaeda. Saudi Arabia’s role as a strategic partner has also been enhanced by the fact that Egypt and Algeria are focused on their own internal stability and their roles in the region have sharply diminished, and Iraq and Syria both must deal with major instability problems and are at war. Our European allies have declining power projection capabilities, and Turkey’s role in the region is increasingly problematic. It is certainly true that Saudi Arabia needs the United States as much or more than the United States needs Saudi Arabia. Saudi military forces are steadily improving, but it is the U.S. presence in the region that create a balance of forces that firmly deters Iran and has helped Saudi Arabia defeat its own terrorist threats from groups like Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. U.S. arms shipments, advisory efforts and exercises also play a critical role in improving Saudi forces. But the United States needs Saudi Arabia as well. Saudi Arabia is now the most critical single security partner in ensuring the stable flow of petroleum out of the Gulf region. While the United States is largely eliminating its need for direct petroleum imports, it is steadily increasing its dependence on the health and growth of the global economy and imports from Asian states like China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, which are critically dependent on Gulf petroleum exports. The end result is that U.S. strategic interests in the region continue to increase in spite of the steady cut in U.S. direct oil imports. This is why focusing on more U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia and Saudi investment in the United States, ignoring the growing role Saudi Arabia has played in fight terrorism since 2003, down playing the need to cooperate in checking Iran, and treating the war in Yemen as is if Saudi Arabia does not face real threats is not the way the United States should deal with Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman’s visit to the White House. Saudi Arabia’s reform and economic development plans are critical to its stability and the region’s security. The kingdom needs U.S. encouragement and an understanding that Saudi Arabia cannot implement these plans effectively without outside support. The burden sharing argument has become absurd. Saudi Arabia cannot be treated as a source of ready money every time the United States has a need. It is already spending more than 10 percent of its economy on security, which is three times the economic burden security places on the United States. This spending is too high given the kingdom’s other needs, and the United States should be focusing on better ways to make its security partnerships with Saudi Arabia, as well as the other Gulf states and Jordan more efficient and less costly, not simply on spending more. At the same time, Iran is all too real a threat. Effective joint action in dealing with Iran’s nuclear programs, its ballistic and cruise missile programs, its asymmetric threats to Gulf shipping, and expending military influence in the region are all critical common U.S. and Saudi priorities. The United States also badly needs to find some common approach to dealing with Iraq and Syria that will move both towards recovery and lasting stability, limit Iranian and Russian influence as much as possible, and help stabilize relations with Turkey. There are no easy options in either case, but Saudi Arabia is the key potential Arab partner any such efforts. The United States, especially members of Congress, needs to remember that we have had at least as many military problems in fighting the Iraq and Syria wars as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have faced in fighting in Yemen. Cutting U.S. arms shipments to Saudi Arabia may do little more that lead the Saudis to ignore the systems that the United States has helped set up to limit targeting of civilians and using unguided and more damaging air munitions. It raises a whole new round of questions about the U.S commitment to its partners in the region. We need to forge a common solution in Yemen, not a decoupling that leaves Saudi Arabia exposed. This would fail in both military and human rights terms, and leaves both the United States and Saudi Arabia with no options for dealing with the Houthi or Iran, seeking ways to end the war, dealing with Al Qaida or the other terrorist movements in Yemen, and without any means to help Yemen back to some form of stability and development. These challenges are also are reasons why the United States should do as much as possible to persuade Mohammed Bin Salman to end the divisions that have led Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to split with Qatar, and to rising tensions with Oman. More unity between the southern Gulf states in dealing with Iran and terrorism can do far more to help the United states than more arms sales. Finally, more interoperability, common facilities and cooperation are key to countering Iran. We need to take this visit seriously, and stop focusing on pomp and deals. The United States is highly unlikely to find a better Saudi leader for reform and change in Saudi Arabia during the next decade, or one more committed to improving Saudi security in ways that serve the common interests of both the United States and Saudi Arabia.

#### Ending US aid prevents an end to the war in Yemen by encouraging the Houthis to avoid peace-talks – turns their case

Phillips and Posey 18 James Phillips [Senior Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation] and Madyson Hutchinson Posey [Research assistant], "Ending US Military Support to Saudi Arabia in Yemen Would Trigger Dangerous Consequences.” The Heritage Foundation Blog. December 6, 2018.

Advocates of the arms cutoff apparently believe that they can somehow “end” the war through a one-sided strategy of depriving America’s allies of U.S.-provided weapons. But this is not a one-sided war. Iran and its Yemeni allies have a vote, and clearly intend to keep fighting against Yemen’s government. It is delusional to think that the Yemenis, who have been fighting for years, will end the bloodletting because Bahrain, a minor member of the Saudi-led coalition, has been singled out for a humiliating arms cutoff. The war will go on, with or without U.S. weapons. But depriving Bahrain of arms that it requires for its own defense will undermine U.S. national interests by weakening ties to a major non-NATO ally, giving a psychological boost to Iran, and encouraging the Houthis to continue to drag their feet on peace talks.

## MBS

### Solvency – HW

#### Top Level –

#### Vote neg on presumption - Mohammad Bin Salman doesn’t run the regime, King Salman does. This isn’t the MbS regime, it’s the King Salman regime. They can’t solve their offense because their own evidence says that MbS has be shunned by the king WHICH PROVES that he’s not the one calling the shots.

#### 1AR will go for “we resume aid after since plan text says MBS” but they don’t read ev that sales would resume and precedent would have been set – if they do that’s extra T which is a voting issue for predictable limits since it allows them to tack on various planks to spike out of neg DAs.

#### Their first piece of solvency evidence is an op ed by Lindsey Graham talking about the importance of the resolution about the conflict in Yemen and how it needs to pass through Congress – that resolution passed last week and proves that the status quo solves the impact and that it has no effect on MbS

#### The Drehele evidence says nothing about US military aid changing succession - CSM evidence is about security aid, not military aid AND says it’s too late to remove him from power – and the Hearst evidence doesn’t say the plan causes them to sideline MbS, it says that US policy means we should sideline the crown prince, nothing about military aid tho – NO POINT IN SOLVENCY MAKES A CLAIM ABOUT MILITARY AID CAUSING jMBS GETTING PUSHED OFF THE THRONE.

#### The aff doesn’t get rid of the bromance between US diplomats and the royal family – can’t solve any of your offense

### Advantage – HW

#### Here are the hard facts – MbS is NOT leaving the Throne – their evidence is all from anonymous Western sources that can’t be verified, this card will END the debate

Joplin 4/9 Ty Joplin, Ty Joplin is a researcher focused on geopolitical developments and humanitarian crises in the Middle East. He lives in Amman, Jordan, 4-9-2019, "Why You Should Be Skeptical of Mohammed bin Salman’s Disappearing Act," Al Bawaba, <https://www.albawaba.com/news/why-you-should-be-skeptical-mohammed-bin-salman%E2%80%99s-disappearing-act-1278066?fbclid=IwAR1UHQhYb6xnIwTBSx58vaLZAIcEIsIQzIrnig-k7leUEWf2dElaU8i78x0> / MM

The Bitter truth: Bin Salman is here to stay Mohammed bin Salman still has hands on Saudi’s levers of power, and his absence from certain meetings may simply be to continue with a strategy of PR damage control. “The reality of the matter is that MbS is solidified in his position as the al-Saud [regime] has rallied around MbS,” Theodore Karasik, a Gulf expert who is now a Senior Adviser at Gulf State Analytics, told Al Bawaba. Mohammed bin Salman is still the head of Saudi’s Ministry of Defense, which gives him control of the state’s military apparatus and aspects of its foreign policy, while also effectively leading the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), which is an internal military force dedicated solely to protecting the royal family from coup attempts. Karasik also noted that MbS still has strong support from the country’s technocrats, who back MbS’ reform efforts. These positions, and not his presence at diplomatic meetings, are likely to be more accurate measurements of MbS’ political power inside Saudi Arabia. “MbS doesn't disappear if you keep track of the Arabic press. Ever since MBS became Deputy Crown Prince there has been a steady stream of Western reporting on major internal problems and Disappearing Acts as a sign of problems at the top of the Saudi hierarchy,” Karasik added. Domestically, according to Karasik, MbS still appears to be a popular figure among those who support his plan to open the country up to foreign investment while leashing the country’s notorious religious police. For his lack of high-profile public appearances, Saudi may simply be making a strategic calculation to limit his exposure. “I don't think anyone can say anything with certainty but it may be that Mohammed bin Salman is keeping a lower public profile as he continues to consolidate power domestically and attempts to contain the fallout from the murder of Jamal Khashoggi,” explained Kristian Ulrichsen, a Middle East fellow at the Baker Institute based out of Rice University. On a supposed internal rift between the king and MbS, Ulrichsen points out several occasions where MbS and the king have been seen together: “I think it is safe to assume that Mohammed bin Salman retains the support of King Salman,” he said. When it comes to anonymous sources with purported insider knowledge claiming MbS is on his way out or that the royal court is scheduling is replacement, there is reason to be skeptical. “If anyone is leaking information about the Crown Prince's position I would imagine it might be coming from members of Western intelligence communities who are alarmed at the volatility and unpredictability in aspects of Saudi regional and foreign policymaking,” Ulrichsen argued, though Al Bawaba could not independently verify this claim. Karasik further explained that the anonymous leaks may be politically driven attempts to try and influence who becomes the next king. The country’s current ruler, King Salman, has suffered from dementia for years and is likely to pass the reigns of the country on soon. “Some sources want MbS out so bad that they will manipulate the press and leak articles almost to the minute in order to keep fake narratives alive,” Karasik added. A protester wears a mask depicting MbS’ face while demonstrating outside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey (AFP/FILE) Understanding how Mohammed bin Salman is able to hold onto power in spite of global backlash is just as important to knowing how he abuses that power in the first place. That he ordered the hit on a famous American journalist speaks to one level of power he commands: to know how he can order such hits with impunity is similarly vital information, which speaks to another type of power he has captured. There is a real risk this information could get lost under the stampede of recurrent speculations by some media outlets regarding his supposedly ailing grasp on Saudi. Thinking he is vulnerable from the negative media coverage betrays the amount of power he actually has. As it appears now, he is withstanding the negative media coverage of his rule while he continues the Saudi’s war in Yemen that he ordered in 2015 and tortures more dissidents and women’s activists. The rumors that the royal court is grooming a replacement have so far not panned out. The underlying reason why he is able to persist as the country’s de facto leader is because he has centralized power more effectively than any other Saudi leader: he has personalized the state’s institutions around him while becoming the face of a fast-changing kingdom, all the while brutalizing those who stand in his way and exacerbating the world’s worst humanitarian crisis in Yemen. The Saudi state is not quietly holding him to account, because he is the Saudi state.

#### Even if the US cuts ties MbS is glued

Shihabi 18 Ali Shihabi, Founder of the Arabia Foundation, 10-24-2018, "Mohammed bin Salman Is Here to Stay," Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/11/mohammed-bin-salman-is-here-to-stay/?fbclid=IwAR2_9NOG-uRx8VPqnpr3b624ATfqVwYHzlm73dJkh5BG5DmAjw8mYFv0kTs> / MM

On Oct. 2, 2018, the Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi was killed in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul. After his disappearance, politicians and pundits called on the United States and its allies to hold Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman responsible for the crime. “It should be United States policy,” former National Security Advisor Susan Rice wrote in the New York Times, “in conjunction with our allies, to sideline the crown prince in order to increase pressure on the royal family to find a steadier replacement.” The Washington Post’s editorial board, meanwhile, was optimistic that such a strategy could work. “It is entirely possible,” the board wrote, “to sanction and shun the Saudi leader while still doing business with his regime.” After all, it continued, “[t]he Saudi royal family cannot afford and will not allow a rupture with the United States.” U.S. Sen. Chris Murphy went further. Trump officials, he warned, “must quickly reorient their policy toward Saudi Arabia or Congress will do it for them.” There is no question that Khashoggi’s killing was a crime perpetrated by agents of the Saudi government. But the idea that the United States can magically disentangle Saudi Arabia from its crown prince is fanciful. If Mohammed bin Salman stays, Washington will not be able to sideline him without harming its own vital interests. First, King Salman took a huge step in appointing Mohammed bin Salman as crown prince in 2017. He promoted his son not just over many other candidates in the second and third generation of the Saud family but also over three of his older brothers, all of whom have impressive résumés. The king, an astute practitioner of royal politics since the early 1950s, would not have come to this decision lightly. All previous successions had followed a clear pattern of age and seniority among the sons of the founder. Having taken the momentous step of overturning that order, it would be inconceivable for the king to change his mind. Doing so would reopen the Pandora’s box of intergenerational succession, which would destabilize the entire monarchy. Second, Mohammed bin Salman has proved a quick study of power politics himself. Since his appointment as crown prince, he has moved swiftly to consolidate power by bringing the most important internal security organs, including the domestic intelligence service and elite special forces, under his direct control. In the past, these bodies had been parceled out among several royal figures. Mohammed bin Salman also installed a loyalist as the head of the national guard and recently appointed his brother as vice minister of defense, which gives him effective control of all the kingdom’s security institutions. Meanwhile, he has replaced many key royal governors with close allies. His control over so much of the Saudi state means that it would be virtually impossible for any faction within the royal family to organize against him, even if the United States did threaten to cut ties. Moreover, during times of crisis, the royal family has consistently rallied to—not against—the throne. Given that Saudi Arabia is an important ally of the United States, shunning Mohammed bin Salman won’t likely serve U.S. interests. The crown prince’s succession is thus virtually assured; his future and the future of Saudi Arabia are indissolubly intertwined. Given that Saudi Arabia is an important ally of the United States in terms of regulating global energy markets, security cooperation, and pushing back against Iranian expansionism, shunning Mohammed bin Salman won’t likely serve U.S. interests. After all, for all the talk of the crown prince’s brashness (former State Department officials Aaron David Miller and Richard Sokolsky described the crown prince as a “ruthless, reckless, and impulsive leader”), some of the changes he has brought to his country have benefitted the United States. Not least among them are his efforts to drastically curtail Wahhabi clerical influence at home by detaining dozens of radical clerics and drastically limiting the power of the religious police and to empower Saudi women by better integrating them into the workforce.

#### Saudi isn’t the internal link to the US striking Iran– the NSC is filled with hawks

Ward 19 Alex Ward, Staff writer covering international security and defense issues, as well as a co-host of Vox's "Worldly" podcast. Before joining Vox, Alex was an associate director in the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security where he worked on military issues and US foreign policy. 1-14-2019, "Bolton asked the Pentagon for plans to attack Iran," Vox, <https://www.vox.com/world/2019/1/14/18181962/iran-news-bolton-strike-pentagon-trump-mattis?fbclid=IwAR2HLXnSWZAfQQov_KQ5kVlA7m6A8j7cjgxdOdtUlmMErznni6cMky25KRA> / MM

National Security Adviser John Bolton had his team request options from the Pentagon to strike Iran late last year — a move that worried top defense officials that a possible new war in the Middle East was imminent. On September 6, Iranian-backed militants in Iraq shot three mortars into Baghdad’s massive diplomatic compound, which is home to the US Embassy. Two days later, rockets shot by unknown attackers streaked toward the US consulate in Basra during anti-Iran protests in the city. Those strikes, which injured no one, led Bolton to have the National Security Council (NSC) ask the Defense Department for military plans to attack Iran, according to US officials and people familiar with the request — although it’s unclear how close the US came to bombing the country. The sequence of events, which the Wall Street Journal first reported over the weekend, shows how seriously the Trump administration has considered escalating its policy toward Iran. Yet multiple US officials, including NSC spokesperson Garrett Marquis, told me Bolton’s request was merely meant to ensure the president had all options presented to him — a key part of his job. “The NSC coordinates policy and provides the President with options to anticipate and respond to a variety of threats,” Marquis said in an email. Still, the request caused some controversy in the Pentagon. Then-Defense Secretary James Mattis didn’t even want to respond to the attacks with a strongly worded statement (let alone a military strike), alarming US officials across the government, a senior administration official told me. The White House eventually did issue a statement on September 11 declaring that “the United States will hold the regime in Tehran accountable for any attack that results in injury to our personnel or damage to United States Government facilities.” And Mattis had “deep concerns” about Bolton’s strike request, one US official told Axios on Sunday. The Pentagon eventually provided some military options to the White House — such as a strike on an Iranian military facility — but Mattis and other officials rejected the idea of a large-scale retaliatory attack. Mattis declined to comment for this article. Some US officials say Bolton’s request is another example of his long-held animus toward Tehran. Both in and out of government, the top Trump aide has made clear his desire to see the current Iranian regime fall. But one person familiar with how the NSC operates told me that Bolton is using the council to bend US foreign policy to his will — and especially toward a much harder stance against Iran — all under President Trump’s nose. “They do what they want,” this person, who like others spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters, said. “In any other administration they would be fired.” That’s troubling. While Bolton in this case may have just been doing his job, it still brings up the question about just how much he’s using his power to pursue one his long-term objectives — regime change in Iran. How the Iran request came about The group Bolton leads — the National Security Council — coordinates national security policy across the sprawling US government. It collects input on major topics from the State Department, the Treasury Department, the Pentagon, and other agencies to provide the president with the best options at his disposal. On the Sunday after the attack on the Baghdad compound, the NSC’s deputies committee, comprised mainly of No. 2s from the various bureaucracies, met to discuss those options. Mira Ricardel, then Bolton’s deputy before a spat with first lady Melania Trump led to her ouster, at one point reportedly called the attacks “an act of war.” What’s unclear, though, is if the idea to strike Iran with force came from those meetings or if Bolton singlehandedly wanted the Pentagon to draw up some military options. Either way, one Pentagon official I spoke to didn’t seem bothered by the ask. “We always have and discuss military options based on new circumstances,” the official said. “The question of how close we were to striking — that no one knows.” The White House, of course, agrees. “This incident showed the NSC process led by Bolton works,” a senior administration official told me. Top Trump advisers — especially Bolton — are avid Iran hawks There are concerns that the NSC works in just the way Bolton wants it to — pursuing his own policy objectives, mainly an aggressive anti-Iran stance. Bolton has staffed up the NSC with people who share his views. Last week, he hired Richard Goldberg, a noted Iran hawk, to run the administration’s pressure campaign against the country. He also added Charles Kupperman, a former Boeing executive and long-time confidante, to serve as his deputy. Together, they will help Bolton run America’s foreign policy with little input from the president, some say. Kupperman “is the logical choice for someone who is fiercely loyal to Ambassador Bolton,” Mark Groombridge, formerly a top Bolton adviser at the State Department and United Nations, told me. “They are completely simpatico in terms of their views on foreign policy. The problem, of course, is their views are not simpatico with the person they are advising, President Trump.” It’s not so surprising Bolton may be using his power to pursue his anti-Iran objectives. In March 2015, he wrote an article suggesting the US and/or Israel should bomb Iran to keep it from obtaining a nuclear weapon. “Time is terribly short, but a strike can still succeed,” he wrote. “Such action should be combined with vigorous American support for Iran’s opposition, aimed at regime change in Tehran.” And two years later, Bolton gave a speech in which he hoped Iran’s regime would fall before the end of 2018.

#### Alt causes – pulling out of Iran deal, regional actors seeking nuclear energy, and ongoing nuclear energy sales to Saudi Arabia cause regional prolif – THEIR EV

Saab 18, 9/25/18 (Bilal Y. Saab is senior fellow and director of the Defense and Security Program at the Middle East Institute, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University, The coming Middle East missile arms race, <https://thebulletin.org/2018/09/the-coming-middle-east-missile-arms-race/>) KED

As if that were not scary enough, the nuclear future of the Middle East is also increasingly uncertain, now that the United States has withdrawn from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the deal that limited Iran’s nuclear development in exchange for sanctions relief. At the same time, at least half a dozen regional powers including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and Qatar see peaceful nuclear energy as a long-term solution to their fossil-fuel dependence. The growth of nuclear power generation in the region could [exacerbate](https://tcf.org/content/report/atomic-bonds-age-entropy/) the risk of nuclear proliferation, as the same technologies and materials are required to develop both nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. Should Middle East civilian nuclear development become militarized, possession of fleets of offensive missiles—arguably the most effective delivery vehicle for nuclear warheads—could magnify the potential danger.

#### Their Riedel evidence concludes that Saudi prolif is inevitable – the US doesn’t ignite the fire; the gas is the US pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal

Riedel 18, MA Harvard/PHD Royal Defense College, (Bruce, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/09/saudi-arabia-stability-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman.html#ixzz5d6Eyh8hP, 4-24) / MM

King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud and his son are pursuing the most virulent anti-Iran and anti-Shiite policy in modern Saudi history. This approach has deep roots in Wahhabi history. Mixed with Iran’s expansive regional meddling, the combination is dangerous and explosive. Washington needs to exercise great care and not inflame the situation. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the kingdom’s unique form of Islam, spent time in Basra in the middle of the 18th century. His exposure to Iraq’s most Shiite city was formative to his ideas, according to Michael Crawford, the premier Western biographer of Wahhab. He became an extreme critic of Shiism, branding them polytheists and infidels. Saudi armies sacked Shiite cities in Iraq, destroyed Shiite shrines in Mecca and invaded Yemen to try to defeat its Zaydi Shiite tribes. Modern Saudi monarchs have had antagonistic relationships with Iran, both with the shah and the ayatollahs, but they have avoided direct confrontation and always kept communication channels open. King Faysal (who ruled from 1964-1975) detested the shah as an egomaniac, but worked with him to create the Organization of the Islamic Conference (now known as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation). King Fahd (who ruled from 1982-2005) backed Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War, but he used the Saudi power of the purse to force Saddam to accept a cease-fire to end the war. King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud (who ruled from 2005-2015) appointed a Saudi Shiite as ambassador to Tehran and kept open dialogue even as he sent troops across the King Fahd causeway to smash Shiite majority dissent in Bahrain seven years ago. The troops are still there. King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have followed a much more confrontational approach. Their signature foreign policy initiative is the 3-year-old war in Yemen, which they portray as a necessary war to prevent the Iranians from taking over Yemen with the Zaydi Houthi rebels. The war has been marked by humanitarian disasters, like the bombing of a wedding party by the Saudi coalition April 22 and the mass starvation of the Yemeni people by the Saudi blockade. It is a sectarian conflict overplayed by a regional struggle for power by the Saudis and Iranians. The war costs the kingdom a fortune and the ayatollahs a pittance, but it’s very popular with the Wahhabi establishment. At home, King Salman and Prince Mohammed have led a ruthless crackdown on Saudi Shiite dissidents in the Eastern Province of the kingdom. The city of Awamiyah has been pounded into rubble by the Saudi authorities. Satellite imagery shows whole neighborhoods destroyed. The execution of prominent Shiite cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr led to the Saudis breaking of diplomatic relations with Iran. This, too, is popular with the Wahhabi clerical establishment. In Syria and Lebanon, the Saudis have sought to weaken the Bashar al-Assad regime and Hezbollah, but neither effort has worked. Iran is more firmly embedded in both states than ever before. The determination of the Donald Trump administration to pull America out of Syria has alarmed Riyadh. Its offer to send Saudi and other Arab troops, an old proposal repackaged, is hollow given the performance of Saudi ground forces in Yemen. Iraq is the exception that proves the rule. For a decade after the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003, Saudi Arabia backed Sunni Arab resistance to the elected Shiite majority governments. The Wahhabi clerical establishment enthusiastically backed this approach, even as it benefited al-Qaeda in Iraq and ultimately the Islamic State. It was a bankrupt and counterproductive policy. It also became increasingly irrelevant, as the Sunni Arab community in Iraq lost its power and influence. So now the Saudis are trying to develop a positive relationship with Iraq’s Shiites. The Saudis have belatedly opened an embassy in Baghdad, and they seek to open consulates in Basra and Najaf to add to one in Erbil. There is talk of the crown prince visiting Iraq. The border is opening up for trade; sporting events are underway. The Saudi policy initiative is a bright spot for Iraq and the kingdom. But there are still limits. Iraq is not a member of the Saudi-led Islamic Military Alliance, which is intended to confront Iran by the Saudis. The Iranians have many more assets in Iraq than the Saudis, and they are determined to maintain their hegemony. The Saudis have no counter to the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The optimal solution to de-escalate the sectarian conflict in the region is to start in Yemen. The existing United Nations process is a nonstarter because it is based on a UN Security Council resolution that is tilted deliberately toward Riyadh. Washington, London and Paris have tremendous influence as the suppliers of arms to Saudi Arabia. They should work together to help find a face-saving way for the king and crown prince to end the war. It will take tough love. Iran is unlikely to help. The war in Yemen is a major strategic advantage for Tehran. It bogs the Saudis down at little cost to Iran. But it is also dangerous, especially now that the Iranians have helped the Houthis’ missile capabilities. Riyadh is literally under fire. This is playing arsonist during a wildfire. The Iranians are particularly eager to humiliate Prince Mohammed, who has called Ayatollah Ali Khamenei a 21st-century Hitler. Iran calls the crown prince infantile. In this toxic environment, it makes no sense for the Trump administration to jettison the multinational nuclear agreement with Iran. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action can be criticized for its shortcomings, but it is keeping Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state. Prince Mohammed has made it publicly clear that if Iran returns to active development of a nuclear arsenal, Saudi Arabia will do the same. The United States should not add gasoline to the fire in Saudi Arabia.

## Egypt

### Top Level

#### I’m boutta end this man’s whole career, vote neg on presumption –

#### There is not a SINGLE internal link in the aff that US military aid causes the Egyptian government to do bad stuff – if symbolic condemnation is good, you can vote on the counterplan to promote good objectives in Egypt without endorsing the government

#### The internal link in the HR advantage isn’t even about Egypt and the internal link in the Instability advantage flows neg because it says that US services are at risk BECAUSE of Egyptian collapse

#### Internal reform fails in Egypt - empirics

Walsh 18 Declan Walsh**.** 7/26/18 {Declan Walsh is the Cairo bureau chief, covering Egypt and the Middle East. He was previously based in Pakistan. He spent five months in the United States during the 2016 presidential campaign to write a column, Abroad in America, that considered the election from the perspective of a foreign correspondent,}], “Despite Egypt’s Dismal Human Rights Record, U.S. Restores Military aid” The New York Times [https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/26/world/middleeast/egypt-human-rights-us-aid.html /](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/26/world/middleeast/egypt-human-rights-us-aid.html%20/) MM

CAIRO — Egypt’s jail population has swelled. New prisoners include a Lebanese tourist who complained about Egypt on Facebook; a democracy activist who spoke out about sexual harassment; and a visiting grad student from an American university who [was arrested](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/world/middleeast/egypt-italy-regeni.html?module=inline)as he researched the judiciary. In Sinai, human rights activists say the army has [demolished the houses](https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/22/egypt-army-intensifies-sinai-home-demolitions) of 3,000 families as part of operations against the Islamic State. The State Department’s take on Egypt’s human rights progress? A thumbs up. This week, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo lifted [restrictions on $195 million in military aid that was frozen last year](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/us/politics/us-aid-egypt-human-rights-north-korea.html?module=inline) to protest Egypt’s dire human rights record and its relationship with North Korea, a State Department official said. The aid had been reinstated in response to steps taken by Egypt on specific U.S. concerns, the official said, without specifying what they were. Human rights groups slammed Mr. Pompeo’s decision, saying he had squandered valuable leverage over President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi at a time when his human rights record seems to be only getting worse. “Repression is breeding resentment, and in some cases radicalization,” said Brian Dooley of Human Rights First, an American advocacy group. “That will ultimately further destabilize Egypt and undermine American interests.” American officials say they withheld the $195 million in aid to press Egypt over a narrow set of issues. The Trump administration wants Mr. Sisi to overturn the 2013 conviction of 43 employees of international groups that promote democracy, including 17 American citizens. And it wants Mr. Sisi to rescind a draconian law regulating aid agencies that he signed last year, which could make it virtually impossible for many international aid groups to work in Egypt. But those demands were made in private, and experts said it was unclear how much the Egyptians had conceded. It seems probable that Mr. Sisi will seize on the resumption of aid as a validation of his actions so far, and perhaps will feel emboldened to step up his repression. “It’s highly debatable whether Egypt has fully met any one of those conditions,” said Andrew Miller of the Project on Middle East Democracy. “But the Egyptians will present this decision as an American blessing of their policies.” The aid decision reflects the new tenor of American foreign policy under Mr. Pompeo and the national security adviser, John R. Bolton, who have shown a willingness to trade American leadership on human rights for an embrace of friendly autocrats like Mr. Sisi who share their hostility toward political Islam. Mr. Sisi has long enjoyed a warm relationship with President Trump, who hailed the Egyptian leader as a “fantastic guy” and even publicly complimented his taste in shoes. But the Egyptian leader had a tougher time from the previous secretary of state, Rex W. Tillerson, who last August denied Egypt $96 million in aid and suspended $195 million. Egyptian officials were shocked at the rebuke from the United States, which over the past 40 years has given Egypt $47 billion in military aid and $24 billion in economic assistance. Mr. Tillerson was said to be angry that Mr. Sisi had broken a private promise, made in Washington, that he would not sign the harsh law on aid agency regulations. In May 2017, Mr. Sisi went ahead and [enacted the law](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/29/world/middleeast/egypt-sisi-ngo-crackdown-activists.html?module=inline) anyway. Mr. Tillerson also sought to press Egypt over its relationship with North Korea, which operates a large embassy in Cairo that it uses to [carry out illicit arms sales](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/03/world/middleeast/egypt-north-korea-sanctions-arms-dealing.html?module=inline) across the Middle East, according to United Nations inspectors. Mr. Sisi’s government has partly addressed some American concerns. A retrial of the case involving the 43 foreign aid workers, many of whom were convicted in absentia, is scheduled to start this year. Egyptian media reports say that Mr. Sisi has forced North Korea to cut the number of diplomats stationed at its embassy in Cairo. But such restrictions can be easily circumvented through the use of accounting measures, like counting diplomats as spouses, said Mr. Miller, the analyst, who worked on Egypt at the State Department until last year. “If past is prologue, we will see that as soon as the U.S. looks the other way, the Egyptians will start up their relationship with North Korea again,” he said. On most other fronts, things have gotten markedly worse in Egypt. Since Mr. Sisi’s re-election in May, after a carefully managed vote, the president has redoubled his efforts to lock up even relatively mild critics. Sami Anan, a former army chief who was thrown in jail when he dared to stand against Mr. Sisi for election in April, recently suffered a stroke that has incapacitated him, a close relative said in an interview. His military captors denied requests for emergency surgery abroad, the relative said. Shady el-Ghazaly Harb, a surgeon and activist who was imprisoned in May for critical comments he made against Mr. Sisi on social media, is being held in solitary confinement, his wife, Fatma Mourad, said in an interview. “Shady thinks that Sisi wants to punish him,” she said. Even tourists are not safe. This month a Lebanese woman, Mona el-Mazbouh, was arrested after releasing a 10-minute video in which she complained, in lurid terms, about being sexually harassed on the streets of Cairo. A court convicted her of spreading rumors and [sentenced her to eight years](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/07/world/africa/egypt-sentences-lebanese-tourist.html?module=inline) in prison. An appeal is scheduled to be heard on July 29. Critics say Egypt squanders much of the military aid it receives, splurging on expensive tanks and warplanes rather than on less glamorous, but more useful, counterinsurgency training for its army. But others argue that full American engagement is essential to help Mr. Sisi combat the Islamist extremists based in Sinai who carried out numerous bombings of churches and mosques across Egypt last year. “Egypt cannot be simply ignored by the United States,” Samuel Tadros of the Hudson Institute’s Center for Religious Freedom said at a congressional hearing this week. “Abandonment is not a strategy nor will imaginary solutions of cutting U.S. aid result in Egypt’s transformation into a liberal democracy,” Mr. Tadros said.

#### US military aid is key to counter ISIS *specifically* in Egypt that spills over to destabilize the middle east

Soliman 18(Mohamed, Mohamed Soliman is a Huffington Fellow at the Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, where he focuses on US strategy in the Middle East. He appears frequently on television interviews to provide expert commentary on unfolding current events in the Middle East. Soliman has published in several media outlets, including Foreign Affairs, ​Open Democracy and La Stampa, as well as analysis for the Middle East Institute, 4/27/18, “How America Can Help Egypt in its War On Terror,” The Washington Institute, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/how-america-can-help-egypt-in-its-war-on-terror>, accessed 1/19/19) KED

Faced with a stubborn common terrorist enemy, the United States should expand its military support for the Egyptian army’s capabilities, focusing more on training and equipping it to counter the Islamic State (IS) in Sinai. Without increased U.S. military aid, Egypt will be ill-equipped to counter the threat of IS, which will gain a crucial foothold that can expand into other parts of the Middle East. For its part, Egypt must integrate modern counter-terrorism techniques into its military doctrine. In the past year, IS has lost most of its territories in Iraq and Syria. But having established a powerful base in Egypt since 2013, IS shifted its attention from Iraq and Syria to Egypt. There has been a continuous Islamist insurgency in Northern Sinai led by more than 1,000 IS fighters. The Sinai insurgency has had drastic consequences: the take-down of a Russian passenger plane in 2015 that killed all 224 people on board; the attacks on the Multinational Force of Observers (MFO), including American personnel Task Force of Sinai; the killing of more than 250 people in the al-Rawda mosque bombing of November 2017, and the targeting of Egypt’s Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior during their visit to al-Arish airport in December 2017. In February 2018, Egypt’s military started Operation Sinai, involving land, naval and air forces, plus police and border guards, to target terrorist organizations in northern and southern Sinai. After two weeks of military operations, Mohamed Farid, chief of staff of the armed forces, asked President Sisi to extend the campaign by at least three months. Farid justified his request by noting the terrorist organizations’ extensive possession of explosives and the hardships that Egypt’s forces face in residential areas. In fact, the Egyptian Army has been incapable of countering IS expansion because it lacks advanced relevant training for its aircrews and enhanced ground forces training in urban combat. Current American aid to Egypt has strengthened Egypt’s ability for conventional warfare, but has not enhanced the capabilities necessary to defeat IS in Sinai. The Egyptian army’s failure underscores the need to re-evaluate the effectiveness of the $1.3 billion in annual U.S. military support. This aid started as compensation for Egypt’s peace deal with Israel, by providing an alternative arms supplier to Cairo, and establishing a semi-military deterrence between Egypt and Israel. Today, however, the United States cannot and should not shoulder this responsibility alone. European nations, NATO, and Israel also have a vested interest in countering IS threats in this region, and should play an active role in increasing Egyptian counter-terrorism capability. To be sure, the United States finds it challenging to convince the Egyptian government to accept counter-terrorism training and its integration into its military doctrine. Nevertheless, the U.S. should reorient its military relations with Egypt and build more international support to counter the growing Islamist insurgency in Sinai. The U.S. should also persuade the European counterparts to conduct counter-insurgency training for the Egyptian ground and air forces. Egyptian-European military exercises are still limited to naval operations, which have historically played a role in Egypt’s patrol of the southern Mediterranean Sea and the prevention of illegal immigration to Europe. In light of IS expansion into Northern Sinai, such naval cooperation is insufficient and broader cooperation is needed immediately. The Egyptian army has been skeptical of any pressure from the U.S. regarding Egypt’s military operations. Egypt has always perceived U.S. military aid in its current form as compensation for the peace treaty with Israel, and would perceive any revision of U.S. military aid as an unfriendly act. But the current landscape offers the most opportune moment to restructure the Egyptian army for fighting the IS insurgency in Sinai, due to the Sisi regime’s need for a quick win to reinvigorate its legitimacy among Egyptians. The U.S. can still pressure the Egyptian leadership to change its arm deals priorities to include the needed counter-terrorism tools.(Instead, to cite but two examples, Egypt has recently bought German submarines and two French amphibious helicopter landing vehicles last year, from national funds.) Finally, on the non-military side, the Egyptian priorities towards Sinai should include a development plan providing basic infrastructure and creating job opportunities for the local Sinai Bedouin, who were marginalized for decades.

#### Russia is trying to find an ally in Egypt to leverage its influence – they WILL fill in if the US leaves

Aziz 18 Ramy Aziz**.** 5/24/18 [Ramy Aziz is a PhD candidate at University of Rome and a research fellow at The Institute for The Study of Global Anti-Semitism and Policy], “Russia’s Alarming Attemps to Establish Influence in Egypt” The Washington Institute [https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/russias-alarming-attempts-to-establish-influence-in-egypt /](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/russias-alarming-attempts-to-establish-influence-in-egypt%20/) SM

Russia is challenging the West, including through its current efforts to gain a foothold in Syria and in a number of countries throughout the Middle East and North Africa. The situation in Syria serves as a clear example of Russian meddling, but the actual challenge does not stop there. To take but one striking recent example: in December 2017, after signing the final contracts to establish the El Dabaa nuclear plant at a summit with the Egyptian president in Cairo, Putin stated that he was trying to create greater cooperation with Egypt and described the country as an old and reliable partner in the region. The relationship between Russia and Egypt revived after President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi overthrew the Muslim Brotherhood regime in July 2013. Putin had viewed the Brotherhood regime with some suspicion and anxiety due to the Brotherhood’s relations with Islamist groups in the northern Caucasus. However, while the Russian Supreme Court had included the Brotherhood on its terrorist list since 2006, this had not prevented Putin from searching for ways to cooperate with the Muslim Brotherhood in an attempt to resecure some role for Russia in Egypt. This was clearly demonstrated by Putin’s support for Mohamed Morsi’s role during the 2012 Gaza war, as well as by Putin's April 2013 reception of Morsi in Moscow. However, the situation has undoubtedly improved with Sisi’s rise. In Sisi, Putin believes that he had found the right match for a military partnership. Sisi represents what Putin seeks in an ally: a military man who had risen up in politics and is trying to rule in difficult circumstances, in need of support and ready to offer concessions. Putin has not missed this opportunity to turn Egypt into a country revolving within the new Russian orbit. The most important aspects of this effort have been military, economic, and political. **The Military Aspect:** The overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood and the decline of democracy and human rights in Egypt created a sharp disagreement between the Sisi government and the former U.S. administration led by President Obama. As a result of this dispute, Washington suspended some military aid to Egypt and blocked delivery of military equipment and aircraft that had been in the United States for maintenance. In response, Russia immediately exploited this situation, sending both the foreign minister and defense minister to Cairo at the head of a high-level military delegation that also included the president of the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation and the president of the Russian weapons export firm, Rosoboronexport. The delegation arrived ready to discuss a Russian arms deals for the Egyptian army, which depends in large part on American armaments. After this meeting, Field Marshal Abdel Fattah el-Sisi—also the defense minister at the time—and Egyptian foreign minister Nabil Fahmy traveled to Moscow to continue discussions with their Russian counterparts in what were known as the "2+2" meetings. The result was a Russian arms deal for Egypt with a value of more than three billion dollars, backed by Saudi and Emirati funding. Full deliveries, however, remain to be seen. It is worth noting that the Egyptian army currently obtains annual military aid from the United States of 1.3 billion dollars, in addition to economic aid, which totals hundreds of millions of dollars. Since this aid was first approved in the late 1970s, Egypt has obtained about 76 billion dollars from the United States. Within the military context, Russian and Egyptian forces carried out military exercises known as “Protectors of Friendship” in September 2017. Earlier the same year, some Russian special forces were deployed at a military base in the western region adjacent to the Libyan border in order to carry out operations and offer assistance to Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan militias, which enjoy both Egyptian and Russian backing. Recently, the two sides agreed to prepare a cooperation document allowing Russia to use Egyptian skies and military bases for military operations. This level of military cooperation between the two sides was unprecedented in recent decades. The current situation almost calls to mind the cooperation that existed between Egypt and the Soviet Union in the 1960s before President Sadat expelled his Russian advisers in the summer of 1972. However, despite all the progress in terms of military cooperation, Russia cannot serve as an alternative to the United States in Egypt's military field because it cannot match the volume of support given generously and regularly by the United States. Russia sees Egypt only as a purchaser and appears uninterested in supplying the sort of support the United States has provided for decades.

#### Russia fill in SPECIFICALLY in Egypt sucks

**Saunders 15** (Paul was a State Department senior adviser during the George W. Bush administration, “US, Russia face off in Middle East,” Al-Monitor, 7/7/15, <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/07/military-strategy-us-russia-direct-conflict-threat-assessmen.html>, accessed 1/19/19) KED

Moreover, as the United States and Russia consider direct conflict to be increasingly possible, even if still very unlikely, they impose this new context on their existing relationships around the world, intensifying existing competition for influence. Russia’s efforts to court Egypt, for example, have a different meaning in the White House and the Kremlin if the risk of a US-Russia conflict is “growing,” as does Moscow’s new naval access agreement with Cyprus. Russia’s arms sales to Iran — and US pursuit of the nuclear agreement — similarly take on additional flavor. Over time, this dynamic could increasingly lead Washington to lobby its partners in the Middle East to choose sides by limiting their cooperation with Moscow. (Since Russia is the weaker party and has comparatively limited leverage, it has little to gain from this approach and would more probably continue its attempts to exploit frustration with America to cultivate individual governments.) The United States would be in the strongest position to discourage interaction with Russia in dealing with the governments most dependent on its protection, for example, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. That said, if the United States looks less willing to exercise its power, its partners will be less dependent and less subject to such pressure. Conversely, as US military planners see a greater risk of conflict with Russia, they will generate pressure inside the US government to place greater value on existing alliance relationships and partnerships around the world. Here, governments hosting major military bases might find that they have new influence in dealing with Washington. In the Middle East, this would apply especially to countries with US naval and air bases that would be necessary to interdict Russian forces in any conflict (also the Arab Gulf nations) — again, recognizing that this is currently a remote possibility. During the Cold War, this dynamic generally reduced official US scrutiny of its partners’ domestic practices, something both President Barack Obama and former President George W. Bush have denounced. Perhaps perversely, an environment in which Washington and Moscow see a growing possibility of conflict — but still consider it to be unlikely — can actually be more dangerous than many might think, in that it encourages intensified rivalry (to create the most favorable possible balance of power in advance of any potential confrontation) while maintaining the sense that actual conflict is very improbable (thus reducing incentives for self-restraint to avoid unnecessary risks). From this perspective, it is worth considering that the Middle East is already more than sufficiently volatile based strictly on tensions within and among regional states. Reigniting major power competition could pose even greater dangers to peace and stability.

### Case – New Trier

#### I’m boutta end this man’s whole career, vote neg on presumption –

#### There is not a SINGLE internal link in the aff that US military aid causes the Egyptian government to do bad stuff – if symbolic condemnation is good, you can vote on the counterplan to promote good objectives in Egypt without endorsing the government

#### Their evidence is taken out of context – it does not say that all aid to Egypt is bad but that resuming aid without ensuring proper checks/standards is greenlighting oppression – All their authors are writing in context to the congressional release of aid in August and do not dismiss the value of U.S. influence and are concerned that human rights rhetoric is superficial which the counterplan resolves

#### They don’t solve all repression, just US military aid which doesn’t resolve all the other bad stuff Sisi is doing independent of aid, which means they don’t access their impact

#### Aff gets circumvented through PMCs

Whitehead 12. John W. Whitehead is an attorney and author who has written, debated and practiced widely in the area of constitutional law and human rights. Whitehead’s aggressive, pioneering approach to civil liberties has earned him numerous accolades and accomplishments, including the Hungarian Medal of Freedom. His concern for the persecuted and oppressed led him, in 1982, to establish The Rutherford Institute, a nonprofit civil liberties and human rights organization in Charlottesville, Va. Whitehead serves as the Institute’s president and spokesperson. His thought-provoking commentaries call people to action and address a wide range of contemporary issues from faith to politics and television to constitutional rights. He is also a frequent commentator on a variety of issues in the national media. Whitehead's book "Battlefield America: The War on the American People" is available now, online and in stores. Whitehead's daily alerts, commentaries, podcasts and vodcasts are available at www.rutherford.org., 1-17-2012, "Privatizing the War on Terror: America's Military Contractors," HuffPost, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-w-whitehead/privatizing-the-war-on-te_1_b_1209086.html> //RS

America’s troops may be returning home from Iraq, but contrary to [President Obama’s assertion](http://costsofwar.org/) that “the tide of war is receding,” we’re far from done paying the costs of war. In fact, at the same time that Obama is reducing the number of troops in Iraq, he’s [replacing them](http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/07/iraq-merc-army/) with military contractors at far greater expense to the taxpayer and redeploying American troops to other parts of the globe, including [Africa](http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/central/Obama-Deploys-Troops-to-Central-Africa--131895118.html), [Australia](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/world/asia/obama-and-gillard-expand-us-australia-military-ties.html?pagewanted=all) and [Israel](http://rt.com/usa/news/us-troops-israel-iran-257/). In this way, the war on terror is privatized, the American economy is bled dry, and the military-security industrial complex makes a killing — literally and figuratively speaking. The war effort in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan has already cost taxpayers [more than $2 trillion](http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/29/us-usa-war-idUSTRE75S25320110629) and could go as high as $4.4 trillion before it’s all over. At least $31 billion (and as much as $60 billion or more) of that $2 trillion was [lost to waste and fraud](http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_NR-49.pdf) by military contractors, who do everything from janitorial and food service work to construction, security and intelligence — jobs that used to be handled by the military. That translates to a loss of [$12 million a day](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/585dadcc-d3f1-11e0-b7eb-00144feab49a.html#axzz1jdvJ8CDV) since the U.S. first invaded Afghanistan. To put it another way, the government is spending more on war than all 50 states combined spend on health, education, welfare, and safety. Over the past [two decades](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/585dadcc-d3f1-11e0-b7eb-00144feab49a.html#axzz1jdvJ8CDV), America has become increasingly dependent on military contractors in order to carry out military operations abroad (in fact, the government’s extensive use of private security contractors has [surged under Obama](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/28/wartime-contractors-waste-billions_n_829251.html)). According to the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States [can no longer conduct large or sustained military operations](http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local_news/article/Soldiers-gone-but-contractors-remain-in-Iraq-2426228.php#ixzz1jNcP4ZcG) or respond to major disasters without heavy support from contractors. As a result, the U.S. employs at a minimum [one contractor to support every soldier](http://thinkprogress.org/security/2011/06/29/256726/afghanistan-contractors-surge/?mobile=nc) deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq (that number increases dramatically when U.S. troop numbers decrease). For those signing on for contractor work, many of whom are hired by private contracting firms after serving stints in the military, it is a lucrative, albeit dangerous, career path (private contractors are 2.75 times [more likely to die](http://www.salon.com/2011/02/24/afghanistan_private_contractors/singleton/) than troops). Incredibly, while base pay for an American soldier hovers somewhere around $19,000 per year, contractors are reportedly pulling in between [$150,000 - $250,000 per year](http://www.redrat.net/BUSH_WAR/mercenaries/index.htm). The exact number of military contractors on the U.S. payroll is hard to pin down, thanks to sleight-of-hand accounting by the Department of Defense and its contractors. However, according to a Wartime Contracting Commission report released in August 2011, there are [more than 260,000 private contractors](http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=7650159) in Iraq and Afghanistan, more than the number of ground troops [in both countries](http://www.laboreducator.org/lt110706.htm). As noted, **that number increases dramatically when troops are withdrawn from an area**, as we currently see happening in Iraq. Pratap Chatterjee of the Center for American Progress [estimates](http://thinkprogress.org/security/2011/06/29/256726/afghanistan-contractors-surge/?mobile=nc) that “if the Obama administration draws down to 68,000 troops in Afghanistan by September 2012, they will need 88,400 contractors at the very least, but potentially as many as 95,880.” With paid contractors often [outnumbering enlisted combat troops](http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jul/04/nation/na-private4), the American war effort dubbed by George W. Bush as the “coalition of the willing” has since evolved into the “coalition of the billing.” The Pentagon’s Central Command [counts](http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/12/19) 225,000 contractors working in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Between December 2008 and December 2010, the total number of private security contractors in Afghanistan [increased](http://www.salon.com/2011/02/24/afghanistan_private_contractors/singleton/) by 413% while troop levels increased 200%. Private contractors provide a number of services, including transport, construction, drone operation, and security. One military contractor, [Blackbird](http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/12/19), is composed of former CIA operatives who go on secret missions to recover missing and captured US soldiers. Then there is the [Lincoln Group](http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/12/19) which became famous for engaging in covert psychological operations by planting stories in the Iraqi press that glorified the U.S. mission. [Global Strategies Group](http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/obama-iraq-eternal/) guards the consulate in Basra for $401 million. [SOC Inc.](http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/obama-iraq-eternal/) protects the US embassy for $974 million. Unfortunately, fraud, mismanagement and corruption have become synonymous with the U.S. government’s use of military contractors. [McClatchy News](http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/01/12/106681/troubled-us-afghan-projects-mushroom.html) “found that U.S. government funding for at least 15 large-scale programs and projects [in Afghanistan] grew from just over $1 billion to nearly $3 billion despite the government’s questions about their effectiveness or cost.” One program started off as a modest wheat program and “ballooned into one of America’s biggest counterinsurgency projects in southern Afghanistan despite misgivings about its impact.” Another multi-billion-dollar program resulted in the construction of schools, clinics and other public buildings that were so poorly built that they might not withstand a serious earthquake and will have to be rebuilt. Then there was the $300 million diesel power plant that was built despite the fact that it wouldn’t be used regularly “because its fuel cost more than the Afghan government could afford to run it regularly.” RWA, a group of three Afghan contractors, was selected to build a 17.5 mile paved road in Ghazni province. They were paid $4 million between 2008 and 2010 before the [contract was terminated](http://www.stripes.com/news/failed-afghan-road-project-shows-pitfalls-of-u-s-efforts-1.160547)with only 2/3 of a mile of road paved. Mind you, with the U.S. spending more than $2 billion a week in Afghanistan, these examples of ineptitude and waste represent only a fraction of what is being funded by American taxpayer dollars. (Investigative [reports](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/30/billions-down-the-drain-i_n_790043.html#s195062&title=Countless_Dollars_Literally) reveal that large amounts of cash derived from U.S. aid and logistics spending are being flown out of the country on a regular basis by Afghan officials, including $52 million by the Afghan vice president, who was allowed to keep the money.) Yet what most Americans fail to realize is that we’re funding the very individuals we claim to be fighting. The war effort has become so corrupt that U.S. taxpayers are not only being bilked by military contractors but are also being forced to [indirectly fund insurgents](http://www.salon.com/2010/07/28/protection_payments_to_taliban/singleton/) and warlords in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the Taliban, which receives money from military contractors [in exchange for protection](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/30/billions-down-the-drain-i_n_790043.html#s195056&title=Funding_Our_Enemies). This is rationalized away as a “[cost of doing business](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/585dadcc-d3f1-11e0-b7eb-00144feab49a.html#axzz1jdvJ8CDV)“ in those countries. As the [Financial Times](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/585dadcc-d3f1-11e0-b7eb-00144feab49a.html#axzz1jdvJ8CDV) reports, the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan “found that extortion of funds from US construction and transportation projects was the second-biggest funding source for insurgent groups

#### HR Adv –

#### Younis evidence isn’t just Egypt – be skeptical on link extrapolation – they need to prove Egypt is uniquely key – they can’t solve their HR cred impact because it says there are also issues in Bahrain, Qatar, and Turkey which the aff doesn’t end aid to

#### Counterterror disproves the link – just because things are bad in one region doesn’t mean that a. it’s the US’ fault or b. we can’t do good things elsewhere

#### Impact should’ve been triggered –are like 3 Middle East wars occurring now that haven’t escalated

#### No outlining on how great power war happens means be skeptical on the probability of war

#### Internal reform fails in Egypt – this evidence post-dates yours and ACTUALLY has empirics

Walsh 18 Declan Walsh**.** 7/26/18 {Declan Walsh is the Cairo bureau chief, covering Egypt and the Middle East. He was previously based in Pakistan. He spent five months in the United States during the 2016 presidential campaign to write a column, Abroad in America, that considered the election from the perspective of a foreign correspondent,}], “Despite Egypt’s Dismal Human Rights Record, U.S. Restores Military aid” The New York Times [https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/26/world/middleeast/egypt-human-rights-us-aid.html /](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/26/world/middleeast/egypt-human-rights-us-aid.html%20/) MM

CAIRO — Egypt’s jail population has swelled. New prisoners include a Lebanese tourist who complained about Egypt on Facebook; a democracy activist who spoke out about sexual harassment; and a visiting grad student from an American university who [was arrested](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/world/middleeast/egypt-italy-regeni.html?module=inline)as he researched the judiciary. In Sinai, human rights activists say the army has [demolished the houses](https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/22/egypt-army-intensifies-sinai-home-demolitions) of 3,000 families as part of operations against the Islamic State. The State Department’s take on Egypt’s human rights progress? A thumbs up. This week, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo lifted [restrictions on $195 million in military aid that was frozen last year](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/us/politics/us-aid-egypt-human-rights-north-korea.html?module=inline) to protest Egypt’s dire human rights record and its relationship with North Korea, a State Department official said. The aid had been reinstated in response to steps taken by Egypt on specific U.S. concerns, the official said, without specifying what they were. Human rights groups slammed Mr. Pompeo’s decision, saying he had squandered valuable leverage over President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi at a time when his human rights record seems to be only getting worse. “Repression is breeding resentment, and in some cases radicalization,” said Brian Dooley of Human Rights First, an American advocacy group. “That will ultimately further destabilize Egypt and undermine American interests.” American officials say they withheld the $195 million in aid to press Egypt over a narrow set of issues. The Trump administration wants Mr. Sisi to overturn the 2013 conviction of 43 employees of international groups that promote democracy, including 17 American citizens. And it wants Mr. Sisi to rescind a draconian law regulating aid agencies that he signed last year, which could make it virtually impossible for many international aid groups to work in Egypt. But those demands were made in private, and experts said it was unclear how much the Egyptians had conceded. It seems probable that Mr. Sisi will seize on the resumption of aid as a validation of his actions so far, and perhaps will feel emboldened to step up his repression. “It’s highly debatable whether Egypt has fully met any one of those conditions,” said Andrew Miller of the Project on Middle East Democracy. “But the Egyptians will present this decision as an American blessing of their policies.” The aid decision reflects the new tenor of American foreign policy under Mr. Pompeo and the national security adviser, John R. Bolton, who have shown a willingness to trade American leadership on human rights for an embrace of friendly autocrats like Mr. Sisi who share their hostility toward political Islam. Mr. Sisi has long enjoyed a warm relationship with President Trump, who hailed the Egyptian leader as a “fantastic guy” and even publicly complimented his taste in shoes. But the Egyptian leader had a tougher time from the previous secretary of state, Rex W. Tillerson, who last August denied Egypt $96 million in aid and suspended $195 million. Egyptian officials were shocked at the rebuke from the United States, which over the past 40 years has given Egypt $47 billion in military aid and $24 billion in economic assistance. Mr. Tillerson was said to be angry that Mr. Sisi had broken a private promise, made in Washington, that he would not sign the harsh law on aid agency regulations. In May 2017, Mr. Sisi went ahead and [enacted the law](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/29/world/middleeast/egypt-sisi-ngo-crackdown-activists.html?module=inline) anyway. Mr. Tillerson also sought to press Egypt over its relationship with North Korea, which operates a large embassy in Cairo that it uses to [carry out illicit arms sales](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/03/world/middleeast/egypt-north-korea-sanctions-arms-dealing.html?module=inline) across the Middle East, according to United Nations inspectors. Mr. Sisi’s government has partly addressed some American concerns. A retrial of the case involving the 43 foreign aid workers, many of whom were convicted in absentia, is scheduled to start this year. Egyptian media reports say that Mr. Sisi has forced North Korea to cut the number of diplomats stationed at its embassy in Cairo. But such restrictions can be easily circumvented through the use of accounting measures, like counting diplomats as spouses, said Mr. Miller, the analyst, who worked on Egypt at the State Department until last year. “If past is prologue, we will see that as soon as the U.S. looks the other way, the Egyptians will start up their relationship with North Korea again,” he said. On most other fronts, things have gotten markedly worse in Egypt. Since Mr. Sisi’s re-election in May, after a carefully managed vote, the president has redoubled his efforts to lock up even relatively mild critics. Sami Anan, a former army chief who was thrown in jail when he dared to stand against Mr. Sisi for election in April, recently suffered a stroke that has incapacitated him, a close relative said in an interview. His military captors denied requests for emergency surgery abroad, the relative said. Shady el-Ghazaly Harb, a surgeon and activist who was imprisoned in May for critical comments he made against Mr. Sisi on social media, is being held in solitary confinement, his wife, Fatma Mourad, said in an interview. “Shady thinks that Sisi wants to punish him,” she said. Even tourists are not safe. This month a Lebanese woman, Mona el-Mazbouh, was arrested after releasing a 10-minute video in which she complained, in lurid terms, about being sexually harassed on the streets of Cairo. A court convicted her of spreading rumors and [sentenced her to eight years](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/07/world/africa/egypt-sentences-lebanese-tourist.html?module=inline) in prison. An appeal is scheduled to be heard on July 29. Critics say Egypt squanders much of the military aid it receives, splurging on expensive tanks and warplanes rather than on less glamorous, but more useful, counterinsurgency training for its army. But others argue that full American engagement is essential to help Mr. Sisi combat the Islamist extremists based in Sinai who carried out numerous bombings of churches and mosques across Egypt last year. “Egypt cannot be simply ignored by the United States,” Samuel Tadros of the Hudson Institute’s Center for Religious Freedom said at a congressional hearing this week. “Abandonment is not a strategy nor will imaginary solutions of cutting U.S. aid result in Egypt’s transformation into a liberal democracy,” Mr. Tadros said.

#### Power projection solves great power war

Royal 17 Todd Royal, Todd Royal, M.P.P. is the Managing Partner for Energy development, Oil & Gas, and Renewables for Ascendance Strategies, a global threat assessment and political consulting firm that is based in Los Angeles, California, Deterrence Works and We Need to Get It Back, January 17, 2017, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/deterrence-works-and-we-need-to-get-it-back/

During the Cold War and World War II (WW II), the world was safe because of deterrence. A balance of power existed between aligned nations cloaked in vibrant, robust militaries ready to defend their countries. The enemies of peaceful nations knew the costs, as President John F. Kennedy echoed that sentiment during his famous inaugural address about defending freedom and defeating foes. Those days are now gone, however, they can be revived again using deterrence that keeps worldwide war at bay. We are living in treacherous times, and war could break out anywhere on the seven continents across the world. Our current predicaments are beginning to make the early 1930s look pale in comparison to what is happening today, because deterrence has been allowed to linger and stall since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Collectively, we seem to have thought that history has stopped since the East and West German divide came down; but instead, we are witnessing a sharp upticks in wars, constant belligerence from the Middle East, the South China Sea dispute, and Mexico’s unending drug war. New threats are doing away with the resources to cope with refugee problems, the spread of terrorism, but most importantly the embrace of negative constructivism to resolve conflict. Foreign Affairs magazine describe ten hotspots for 2017, or flashpoints globally that if not dealt with swiftly and even harshly could lead to war. Interestingly enough, Foreign Affairs didn’t mention China, North Korea, Russia or Iran. It can be argued that North Korea claiming they can fire an ICBM anytime and outgoing Secretary Kerry saying, “the U.S. may need more forceful ways of dealing with North Korea,” is a hotter spot than Ukraine. Deterrence is the best answer for dealing with those nations. The type of deterrence at the forefront of the Cold War, which had far-reaching geopolitical implications, otherwise the future is cloaked in profoundly destabilizing actions by those four nations. Gambling with the four above-mentioned nations without proper deterrence won’t work, but if done forcefully, then the other ten described foreign policy unknowns can be solved. If not, then jittery states from Europe to East Asia will begin to parse out safe real estate for their citizens if someone doesn’t step up. Historically that has been the United States (U.S.) since World War II. The U.S. structured a system based upon mutually agreed upon principles between major powers to keep World War III at bay. Certainly that order has been was in flux recently, and disagreements rage about how this new discombobulating order began. There isn’t a correct answer. Moreover, add in the Rwanda genocide, the Yugoslavia breakup, and leaving Iraq after a brutal, tentative victory was achieved, and still there aren’t answers, which is the problem. But this cooperative, championed order, leading to unprecedented prosperity and peace, is suffering its share of dire crisis unless deterrence is restored. And Washington’s and NATO’s retrenchment is only leading to what will eventually see Japan, South Korea, and the Sunni coalition led by the Saudis join the nuclear club. Let’s also not forget about India and Pakistan, who play a daily nuclear cat and mouse game in Kashmir. If Kashmir explodes, then does the U.S. intervene? China has an interest, and believes they can overtake India quickly. If China commits troops would other countries in the region follow suit? Another dangerous tightrope situation without a net while the basics of geopolitics continue forward wondering who will do the heavy lifting to sustain the international system. Furthermore, will it be U.S. hard power or European soft power that restores deterrence? The perceived threats that the Iran nuclear deal were supposed to buffer haven’t kept the Islamic Republic from buying uranium and keeping oil prices low by taking advantage of OPEC’s weakness to boost their market share. The Russians have seen fit to meddle in U.S., European, and former Soviet satellite elections at will while still threatening Ukraine. If Ukraine goes back to the Russians and out of NATO’s orbit then Europe will have to grow NATO and American troop presence more than it has in recent years. The echoes of Russian aggression will have returned to Cold War levels, but it’s the correct move for deterrence to work, moving troops into Poland and Norway. The world wants peace, and this is a perfect example of military moves bolstering deterrence without a single shot being fired. The European structure is being shaken as never before, and while some see a messy Brexit, that’s not what the facts say. Recently it was reported Britain has the number one growing advanced economy in the world. Yet what happens if Germany, the Netherlands and France leave the EU based upon these facts? Can the world afford to lose the European voice, its large economy, and its reliance upon soft power? Will Europe become splintered and fractured at best, and at worst, allow regional historical rivalries to return, sparking conflicts that could make the proxy wars taking place in Syria, Iraq and Yemen seem tame. The balance Europe brings can’t afford to be lost. Here’s why the international system needs robust deterrence without war. Terrorism is the pretense of a common enemy, but that model can’t sustain itself. It is an illusion for nations to endlessly fight without a tactic to define a strategy. World War II was decisive, because there was a common, definable enemy that allowed for tactics and strategy leading to victory. Today’s terrorism fight has none of those modalities in place. Thriving on chaos will not lead to building blocks for a stable future. This type of tactical bargaining has no long-term strategy or common values within their policies. Maybe a Turkish-Russian rapprochement holds promise, but historical enmity more than likely will win over long-term solutions being offered in Syria through this false promise. Considering Beijing’s war-like posture towards East Asia, the incoming Trump administration, Africa, and Latin America – what the world needs is overwhelming deterrence when dealing with China. Chaos can be managed, but only through deterrence. Realpolitik and deal-making isn’t a guide to stable long-term solutions. Economic sanctions were crippling Iran until they were removed, and can work again if world powers have the vision to do what is necessary. That is a great example of soft power deterrence backed by hard power. Yet deals, like fluid relationships, can be broken, and our world is now made up of diverse states with globalized, vested interests. It can’t be stated enough that someone has to step up and keep the order with military-powered deterrence or with crippling economic sanctions to pull these nonstate actors and proxies off the world stage. Many would say no single power could have singularity when it comes to controlling major powers or events. Manipulation can take place in the case of Libya when NATO, led somewhat by the U.S., bombed them into a fractured society. But real deterrence with military hard power had brought Gadhafi to his senses. He was working with the Americans, Europeans, and democratized Asian countries to denounce his nuclear program and terrorism. That only came about because he saw what happened to Saddam Hussein. That was lethal deterrence in force, and not a sanitized environment that brought Gadhafi to his senses. Here’s what should immediately happen for deterrence to be restored. First, build a large, lethal blue-water navy, as the incoming U.S. administration is proposing. Iran, Russia, China, and North Korea have to be checked globally, and a fully equipped naval presence from freedom-loving nations accomplishes that task. Next, other NATO alliance members should follow the example of Norway, and their policy of burden sharing toward Europe’s collective defense. They pay their fair share when so many others don’t. NATO led by the U.S. has to demand every alliance member dedicates 2% of their budget to their military, which assists keeping the NATO alliance intact. Economically, push infrastructure and energy portfolios led by fossil fuel with renewables in the background while they overcome their problems. If developing nations pushed natural gas as soft power deterrence, and worked on infrastructure bottlenecks delivering inexpensive natural gas from the Marcellus shale in the U.S. to exporting LNG across the globe then the most basic component of modern life – cheap, scalable energy – is secured. Nations that thrive economically are less willing to interrupt their prosperity with war and hostility towards other nations. Not every deterrence-issue has to have the big impact of a weapon to be effective. No major, world power, such as the U.S., or China can single-handedly control world events. NATO, the U.S., the IMF, World Bank, and other post WW II conflict-negating entities can’t contain every fire,but with deterrence they can keep sparks from igniting into flames. Our globalized, messy world is now a fact, and deterrence is the best tool to keep our world from entering World War III.

#### Regardless, spillover is dumb

Cook 07(fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations Steven A., and Ray Takeyh (fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations), Suzanne Maloney (senior fellow at Saban Center) Brookings Institution, International Herald Tribune, “Why the Iraq war won't engulf the Mideast,” 6-28, www.iht.com/articles/2007/06/28/opinion/edtakeyh.php)

It is abundantly clear that major outside powers like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey are heavily involved in Iraq. These countries have so much at stake in the future of Iraq that it is natural they would seek to influence political developments in the country. Yet, **the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war** either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand **in Iraq**. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, **Middle Eastern leaders**, like politicians everywhere, **are primarily interested in** one thing: **self-preservation**. **Committing forces to Iraq** is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, **could threaten domestic political stability**. Moreover, **most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power** and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, **there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved**. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, **Arab countries** other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, **never committed forces** either **to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese**. **The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight**. Indeed, **this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq**. **To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is** worrisome, but in the end it is **an Iraqi and American fight**. As far as **Iranian mullahs** are concerned, they **have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement**. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, **a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary**. So Iraqis will remain locked in a **sectarian and ethnic struggle** that outside powers may abet, but **will remain within the borders of Iraq**. **The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars**. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, **the region has** also **developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East**.

#### Instability Adv –

#### They don’t turn all disads—it’s about squo instability affecting aid effectiveness not the aid itself being bad, and it relies on them resolving the entirety of instability

#### This impact scenario is laughable – there is Z E R O WARRANT in the Ghafar evidence about why instability in Egypt creates instability OR escalation in Syria, their geopolitics are different, they don’t just copy each other

#### No warrant as to who Syria would escalate with – they’re missing an internal link, if anything US pullout of Syria thumps because they would’ve lashed out at us

#### Russia is trying to find an ally in Egypt to leverage its influence – they WILL fill in if the US leaves

Aziz 18 Ramy Aziz**.** 5/24/18 [Ramy Aziz is a PhD candidate at University of Rome and a research fellow at The Institute for The Study of Global Anti-Semitism and Policy], “Russia’s Alarming Attemps to Establish Influence in Egypt” The Washington Institute [https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/russias-alarming-attempts-to-establish-influence-in-egypt /](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/russias-alarming-attempts-to-establish-influence-in-egypt%20/) SM

Russia is challenging the West, including through its current efforts to gain a foothold in Syria and in a number of countries throughout the Middle East and North Africa. The situation in Syria serves as a clear example of Russian meddling, but the actual challenge does not stop there. To take but one striking recent example: in December 2017, after signing the final contracts to establish the El Dabaa nuclear plant at a summit with the Egyptian president in Cairo, Putin stated that he was trying to create greater cooperation with Egypt and described the country as an old and reliable partner in the region. The relationship between Russia and Egypt revived after President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi overthrew the Muslim Brotherhood regime in July 2013. Putin had viewed the Brotherhood regime with some suspicion and anxiety due to the Brotherhood’s relations with Islamist groups in the northern Caucasus. However, while the Russian Supreme Court had included the Brotherhood on its terrorist list since 2006, this had not prevented Putin from searching for ways to cooperate with the Muslim Brotherhood in an attempt to resecure some role for Russia in Egypt. This was clearly demonstrated by Putin’s support for Mohamed Morsi’s role during the 2012 Gaza war, as well as by Putin's April 2013 reception of Morsi in Moscow. However, the situation has undoubtedly improved with Sisi’s rise. In Sisi, Putin believes that he had found the right match for a military partnership. Sisi represents what Putin seeks in an ally: a military man who had risen up in politics and is trying to rule in difficult circumstances, in need of support and ready to offer concessions. Putin has not missed this opportunity to turn Egypt into a country revolving within the new Russian orbit. The most important aspects of this effort have been military, economic, and political. **The Military Aspect:** The overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood and the decline of democracy and human rights in Egypt created a sharp disagreement between the Sisi government and the former U.S. administration led by President Obama. As a result of this dispute, Washington suspended some military aid to Egypt and blocked delivery of military equipment and aircraft that had been in the United States for maintenance. In response, Russia immediately exploited this situation, sending both the foreign minister and defense minister to Cairo at the head of a high-level military delegation that also included the president of the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation and the president of the Russian weapons export firm, Rosoboronexport. The delegation arrived ready to discuss a Russian arms deals for the Egyptian army, which depends in large part on American armaments. After this meeting, Field Marshal Abdel Fattah el-Sisi—also the defense minister at the time—and Egyptian foreign minister Nabil Fahmy traveled to Moscow to continue discussions with their Russian counterparts in what were known as the "2+2" meetings. The result was a Russian arms deal for Egypt with a value of more than three billion dollars, backed by Saudi and Emirati funding. Full deliveries, however, remain to be seen. It is worth noting that the Egyptian army currently obtains annual military aid from the United States of 1.3 billion dollars, in addition to economic aid, which totals hundreds of millions of dollars. Since this aid was first approved in the late 1970s, Egypt has obtained about 76 billion dollars from the United States. Within the military context, Russian and Egyptian forces carried out military exercises known as “Protectors of Friendship” in September 2017. Earlier the same year, some Russian special forces were deployed at a military base in the western region adjacent to the Libyan border in order to carry out operations and offer assistance to Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan militias, which enjoy both Egyptian and Russian backing. Recently, the two sides agreed to prepare a cooperation document allowing Russia to use Egyptian skies and military bases for military operations. This level of military cooperation between the two sides was unprecedented in recent decades. The current situation almost calls to mind the cooperation that existed between Egypt and the Soviet Union in the 1960s before President Sadat expelled his Russian advisers in the summer of 1972. However, despite all the progress in terms of military cooperation, Russia cannot serve as an alternative to the United States in Egypt's military field because it cannot match the volume of support given generously and regularly by the United States. Russia sees Egypt only as a purchaser and appears uninterested in supplying the sort of support the United States has provided for decades.

#### Russia fill in SPECIFICALLY in Egypt sucks

**Saunders 15** (Paul was a State Department senior adviser during the George W. Bush administration, “US, Russia face off in Middle East,” Al-Monitor, 7/7/15, <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/07/military-strategy-us-russia-direct-conflict-threat-assessmen.html>, accessed 1/19/19) KED

Moreover, as the United States and Russia consider direct conflict to be increasingly possible, even if still very unlikely, they impose this new context on their existing relationships around the world, intensifying existing competition for influence. Russia’s efforts to court Egypt, for example, have a different meaning in the White House and the Kremlin if the risk of a US-Russia conflict is “growing,” as does Moscow’s new naval access agreement with Cyprus. Russia’s arms sales to Iran — and US pursuit of the nuclear agreement — similarly take on additional flavor. Over time, this dynamic could increasingly lead Washington to lobby its partners in the Middle East to choose sides by limiting their cooperation with Moscow. (Since Russia is the weaker party and has comparatively limited leverage, it has little to gain from this approach and would more probably continue its attempts to exploit frustration with America to cultivate individual governments.) The United States would be in the strongest position to discourage interaction with Russia in dealing with the governments most dependent on its protection, for example, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. That said, if the United States looks less willing to exercise its power, its partners will be less dependent and less subject to such pressure. Conversely, as US military planners see a greater risk of conflict with Russia, they will generate pressure inside the US government to place greater value on existing alliance relationships and partnerships around the world. Here, governments hosting major military bases might find that they have new influence in dealing with Washington. In the Middle East, this would apply especially to countries with US naval and air bases that would be necessary to interdict Russian forces in any conflict (also the Arab Gulf nations) — again, recognizing that this is currently a remote possibility. During the Cold War, this dynamic generally reduced official US scrutiny of its partners’ domestic practices, something both President Barack Obama and former President George W. Bush have denounced. Perhaps perversely, an environment in which Washington and Moscow see a growing possibility of conflict — but still consider it to be unlikely — can actually be more dangerous than many might think, in that it encourages intensified rivalry (to create the most favorable possible balance of power in advance of any potential confrontation) while maintaining the sense that actual conflict is very improbable (thus reducing incentives for self-restraint to avoid unnecessary risks). From this perspective, it is worth considering that the Middle East is already more than sufficiently volatile based strictly on tensions within and among regional states. Reigniting major power competition could pose even greater dangers to peace and stability.

#### Status quo is goldilocks – pulling out leaves the oppressed hopeless as they pray for internal reform

Jadoon 17 (Amira Jadoon is an assistant professor at the Combating Terrorism Center and the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point as well as the CTC’s General John P. Abizaid Research Associate. Dr. Jadoon holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy at the University at Albany, an M.Sc. in Economic Development from the London School of Economics, and a B.A. in Economics and in Journalism from the University of Iowa, "Persuasion And Predation: The Effects Of U.S. Military Aid And International Development Aid On Civilian Killings", 8-1-2017, Taylor & Francis Online, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2017.1353355?scroll=top&needAccess=true) KS

Development and military aid constitute tools of persuasion; attempts to alter the behavior of another state by changing its costs and benefits through carrots or sticks.27 Although both types of aid may persuade recipients to act more in line with donor demands, the unique characteristics of military and development aid have different impacts on state actors’ use of one-sided violence. I argue that the effects of U.S. military aid and international development aid to states can be better understood in terms of two distinct effects on state actors—persuasion and predation. U.S. military aid has a persuasion effect on state actors, which decreases states’ incentives and necessity to target civilians while enhancing their capacity to identify and target rebels more precisely. In contrast, development aid flows have a predation effect on state actors. Development aid flows create adverse incentives for resource capturing in recipient states, which exacerbate conflict and governments’ use of collective violence. Framing the effects as persuasion and predation is useful to draw out the causal mechanisms by which recipient states’ existing motivations to target civilians interact with donors’ security objectives and the effects of aid, to result in observable changes in state perpetrated civilian killings. U.S. Military aid and One-Sided Violence The United States frequently uses military aid to pressure governments in counterinsurgency efforts, and to influence the “behavior and capabilities of their partners to achieve a specific outcome.” 28 I argue that military aid results in states’ decreased use of one-sided violence STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 779 due to a persuasion effect. This is rooted in its effectiveness to incentivize governments as well as boost their capacity to conduct more targeted military operations. Examples from Pakistan are particularly useful in illustrating the persuasion effects of U.S. military aid. They help in drawing out theoretically how military aid can shape state actors’ behavior in underdeveloped and conflict-ridden states where there is a presence of rebels that pose both a domestic and international security concern. Pakistan also represents a political environment where external states are likely to intervene through foreign aid than direct intervention. It exemplifies situations where recipient governments must balance external pressure with domestic objectives and where local militants hold strategic utility for recipient governments in proxy wars, as is the case in many ungoverned spaces in the Middle East and Africa. Given that Pakistan has been receiving U.S. military aid over an extended period of time, it’s a particularly useful case to examine closely. Incentivizing Recipients In terms of incentives, provision of military aid increases a recipient’s political will to comply, first in order to avoid becoming a victim of other coercive policies by the donor. Second, it signals an alliance between donors and recipients that can enhance the recipient’s international standing and legitimacy. Thus, as supported by previous studies, U.S. military aid can induce governments to cooperate.29 For example, after 9/11, Pakistan opted to assist the United States in overthrowing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan over the alternative of becoming a target of the United States.30 Pakistan’s Musharraf was portrayed as an international hero on various media outlets, with inflows of aid indicating that Pakistan was no longer a pariah state.30 Subsequently, Pakistan arrested militants on its soil especially targeting Al Qaeda and foreign fighters who posed the biggest threats to the United States32 as well as rebels that threatened the Pakistani government in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). While Pakistan frequently turns a blind eye to many militant groups for its own interests, many of its counterterrorism efforts have been prompted by U.S. assistance to Pakistan’s national security agencies.33 Donor-Recipient Security Objectives Additionally, where donors seek to counter nonstate actors located in another state through military assistance, there is likely to be some overlap in the security objectives of both donors and recipients. Militant groups in Pakistan pose a security threat not just to the United States and other countries, but also to Pakistan itself, which saw a 48 percent increase in domestic terrorist attacks between 2008 and 2009.34 Even though Pakistan is rightly criticized for not targeting all rebels, it’s still conducting operations against rebels that have directly challenged the writ of the state such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP). Therefore, the higher levels of congruence in the security objectives of donors and recipients of military aid, as far as addressing domestic security threats is concerned, is generally suggestive of a more cooperative approach. Governments that increase military operations against internal security threats have their own strong incentives to avoid use of collective punishment. Targeting civilians is likely to be counterproductive if the government has coercive objectives as opposed to brute force objectives.35 The goal of suppressing internal opposition in a state is a “moderately coercive” objective implying that the state requires its target to acquiesce to prevail. It must use force persuasively to establish peace within its territorial borders especially to increase popular 780 A. JADOON support.36 This is precisely why the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan were encouraged by leaders in 2009 to exercise “courageous restraint” to achieve strategic success.37 Thus, in asymmetric conflicts, information flows, collaboration, and support of civilians are key for success from a utilitarian perspective. In the absence of sufficient capability though, governments may resort to civilian targeting as a cheaper mechanism to fight guerilla warfare. Indeed, weaker governments are more likely to employ tactics of civilian targeting to undermine their opponent’s capacity.38 In the Pakistan case, where the army made use of collective violence in targeting local and foreign fighters by demolishing private residences (e.g., in Operation Kalosha II), it triggered multiple attacks against army bases and enraged locals.39 Similarly, where government militias in Iraq have engaged in revenge killings, many civilians have lost trust in them and prefer the ISIS despite disagreeing with the latter’s brutality and interpretation of Islam.40 Governments will lose legitimacy if their penetration is associated with increased civilian victimization and will reinforce civilian support for rebels.41 Military aid can thus provide governments with the means to maintain their legitimacy while conducting internal security operations, and offset costs associated with minimizing reliance on civilian targeting. Building Coercive Capacity Beyond enhancing incentives, U.S. military aid’s persuasion effect is also rooted in its capacity effect. Military aid includes a wide variety of military support including weapons, technology, and intelligence capability. Governments use collective punishment against communities perceived to be supportive of rebel groups, or to counter guerrilla warfare that is more difficult and expensive to tackle through conventional means.42 Strategic explanations of one-sided violence argue that armed actors employ violence against civilians to change their strategic environment43 and that shifts in the capability balance between actors triggers changes in actors’ tactics in war. For example, the Pakistani army relied on the use of excessive force for counterinsurgency operations where it lacked logistical and precision abilities and had shortcomings in technical intelligence.44 General Tarik Khan, who has led the fight against the TTP, has said, “any kind of military operation that seeks to take out individuals is an intelligence-driven operation that requires a lot of technology, a lot of surveillance capacity.” 45 As such, military aid will help states overcome the capability deficiencies that previously may have necessitated the use of collective violence. Improved counterinsurgency ability allows governments to target rebels more precisely, offset costs of increased efforts against rebels, harden soft targets and thus engage in more selective violence. U.S. military funding to Pakistan has identified priority areas such as precision strike capability, air mobility, combat search and rescue, counter improvised explosive device and survivability, battlefield communications and night operations.46 The Pakistani military has used F-16s for precise targeting of rebels in civilian areas47 and intelligence-based operations have helped the state preempt backlash against military operations in North Waziristan.48 Although, such improvements are not expected to completely eliminate the use of civilian targeting by governments, they will reduce the need to do so if governments are better able to locate legitimate targets. It should also be noted that military aid compared to development aid is less fungible, and thus less susceptible to leakage through rent-seeking behavior and corruption. And because it is provided for a specific purpose such as targeting and capturing rebels rather than being STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 781 linked to broad development goals, its threatened withdrawal by the donor is also a more realistic threat for recipients. U.S. military aid flows can thus enhance recipient states’ military capability to use force in a way, which is in line with their overall moderately coercive objectives of countering internal rebel activity. Overall, military aid not only increases the political will of governments to increase efforts against rebel strongholds, it also enhances the capacity of governments to target rebels and avoid civilian killings. This leads to the following hypothesis: H1a: Higher levels of U.S. military aid flows will be associated with lower levels of civilian killings by recipient state actors Alternatively, it may be argued that recipient governments may reduce their use of civilian targeting to ensure continued flows of U.S. military aid. This would be likely if the United States was willing to withhold aid on the basis of human rights violations or civilian killings by governments, despite its security objectives. However, prior research provides strong evidence that the United States largely provides military aid on the basis of its own national security interests, despite human rights violations within states.49 Studies have shown a lack of a relationship between recipients’ human rights records and the allocation of U.S. aid or the magnitude of assistance provided.50 Indeed, Sandholtz has recently shown that U.S. military assistance in 150 countries over thirty years links with worse performance on human rights.51 Although, the Leah Law requires the United States to suspend military assistance flows in cases of civilian abuses by military units, it does not technically require an end to extrajudicial killings or a suspension of overall aid. Instead, it requires the recipient to take effective measures to hold accountable the specific military units responsible for civilian abuses. In practice, there are numerous examples where recipients have continued to receive U.S. aid despite civilian killings. In Colombia, 30,000 extrajudicial killings have been committed since 2000, but U.S. officials did not freeze its assistance under the Leah Law52 and military assistance continues at high levels. The Philippines is another case in point. The Philippines is a close U.S. ally, and received more than $507 million in U.S. military assistance between 2001–2010. International efforts to raise awareness regarding human rights violations and extrajudicial killings have largely been ineffective in severing aid, with aid flows rising to $30 million in 2012.53 Human rights violations by the Philippines military have not affected the regularity or scale of U.S. aid flows. Other countries, which continued to receive comparable levels of military assistance or increased levels despite civilian killings, include Burma (2002–2006), Brazil (2005–2006), Guatemala (1989 and 1995), Haiti (1991–1994), Indonesia (1996–1999), Jordan (1992–1993), Kenya (2007–2009), Mali (1990–1992), Niger (1989–1990), Sri Lanka (1989–1991), and Uganda (1990–1991). Such examples provide support that the United States rarely suspends military assistance in the face of its security imperatives. The potential reverse causality between military aid and onesided violence is further discussed and tested in the empirical section of the article.

## Israel

### Top Level - Greenhill

#### Vote neg on presumption—

#### 1) all of their evidence says that the ONLY way to resolve violence against Palestinians is to end Israeli settlements and given Palestine their land back—the aff doesn’t solve that

#### 2) the aff is insufficient—we give more than just military aid to Israel- we have trade agreements, economic aid, bilateral agreements- all of which solidify the violent US-Israel relationship

#### 3) the aff is a double turn - the United States is also stolen land and they use the USFG to try and resolve setterlerism - the aff is a settler apology to ease America's guilt

#### Aff gets circumvented – counterterror aid is included in economic aid, not military aid

Wells 13(Jeremy L. Wells, Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, "Power and purpose : U.S. foreign aid and development" (2013). LSU Doctoral Dissertations. 3449. <https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/3449>, JKS)

This is not to say that U.S. aid is not affected by the geostrategic landscape. The end of the Cold War ushered in a new commitment to supporting democratic transitions, and the War on Terror has rejuvenated interest in this goal. Whether the effects of the September 11, 2001, attacks have led Americans to oppose economic assistance for Arab countries experiencing transitions in recent years remains to be seen, while the jury remains out on the effects of counterterrorism aid—included in economic aid packages—on reducing the threats of organized terror both at home and abroad (Bandyopadhyay, Sandlery and Younas 2011).

#### UK is an alt cause- they are selling record amounts of arms to Israel to be used against Palestinians

Doward 18(Jamie Doward, 5-27-2018, "British arms exports to Israel reach record level," Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/27/british-arms-exports-israel-new-record>, JKS)

**British defence contractors are selling record amounts of arms to Israel**, new figures reveal, just days after it was confirmed that Prince William will represent the UK government on a visit to the country next month. Figures from the Campaign Against Arms Trade reveal that last year **the UK issued £221m worth of arms licences to defence companies exporting to Israel. This made Israel the UK’s eighth largest market for UK arms companies,** a huge increase on the previous year’s figure of £86m, itself a substantial rise on the £20m worth of arms licensed in 2015. In total, over the past five years, Israel has bought more than £350m worth of UK military hardware. **Licences issued to UK defence contractors exporting to Israel last year include those for targeting equipment, small arms ammunition, missiles, weapon sights and sniper rifles**. In **2016 the UK issued licences for anti-armour ammunition, gun mountings, components for air-to-air missiles, targeting equipment, components for assault rifles, components for grenade-launchers and anti-riot shields.** Human rights groups have questioned the wisdom of sending a senior royal to a country whose use of lethal force last month has been the subject of concern from the UK government. “After the appallingly excessive response of the Israeli security forces at the Gaza border, tensions in the occupied Palestinian territories are likely to be close to boiling point when Prince William makes this historic visit,” said Kerry Moscogiuri, Amnesty International UK’s campaigns director. The Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, defended Israel’s response, saying “every country has an obligation to defend its borders”. But Theresa May backed calls for an independent inquiry into the violence, which reportedly left 58 Palestinians dead. The British prime minister said the use of live rounds by Israeli forces was “deeply troubling” and called for greater restraint. **Now the UK government faces questions as to whether UK-made weapons were used by the Israelis last month**. A **review by government found the UK had issued 12 licences for arms it believed were likely to have been used in the 2014 war**. In 2010 the then foreign secretary, David Miliband, said **Israeli equipment used in an attack on Gaza “almost certainly” contained British-supplied components**. Andrew Smith of Campaign Against Arms Trade said: “The shootings we have seen over recent weeks have been an awful reminder of the appalling collective punishment and oppression that has been inflicted on the people of Gaza. **By the government’s own admission, UK arms have been used time and again against Palestinians. Yet the arms sales have continued unabated**. There must be a full investigation into if any UK arms have been used in the atrocities we have seen over recent months.”

#### Withdrawing aid re-entrenches Israeli militarism

Solomon 13 - Lawrence Solomon (Staff @ Financial Post), 2013, Lawrence, “Lawrence Solomon: Israel can live without U.S. aid,” Financial Post, http://business.financialpost.com/fp-comment/israel-can-live-without-u-s-aid WJ

To the delight of Israel’s enemies and the dismay of its supporters, libertarian Senator Rand Paul, a potential Republican contender for the United States presidency, argued while in Israel this week that the U.S. should phase out the $3-billion per year in aid that it provides Israel’s military. Ending this aid along with U.S. aid to all foreign countries — call it the Rand Paul Doctrine — would actually leave Israel better off, he claimed to raised eyebrows. Criticism was quick, especially from Israel’s supporters in the U.S. Said Senator Bill Nelson: “Israel needs the full assistance of the U.S. It’s the only way Israel can remain secure.” Said the National Jewish Democratic Council: “Senator Paul’s misguided views on aid to Israel are plain wrong.” In fact, the Rand Paul Doctrine is eminently sensible and should be seen as such, including to Israel’s supporters. Paul’s assessment that U.S. “aid hampers Israel’s ability to make its own decisions as it sees fit” is indisputable, as is his assessment that the U.S. gift of military hardware represents lost contracts for Israel’s defence industries. Fresh eyes on Israel’s need for U.S. help would be salutary. For starters, let’s dispense with the myth that, but for the grace of the U.S. government, Israel could never have survived against its much more populous and better-armed enemies. In the first decades following Israel’s creation in 1948, the U.S was less friend than foe, generally siding with Israel’s Arab neighbours, whom the U.S courted for their oil wealth and to keep them out of the Soviet sphere. The U.S. not only gave Israel little economic and no military aid in the early years — the first military grant wouldn’t come until 1974, a quarter century after Israel’s founding — it refused to even sell arms to help the fledgling state defend itself. Meanwhile, the U.S. not only sold arms to Israel’s enemies, it also lavished them with economic and military aid through a Marshall-type plan for the Middle East. Worse, the U.S. used the full force of its diplomacy to undermine Israel’s ability to defend itself. In 1956, after Egypt blockaded shipping into Israel and seized the Suez Canal, an international waterway owned by the U.K. and France, the three countries jointly invaded Egypt to restore their rights. Although U.S. president Eisenhower acknowledged that Egypt’s “grave and repeated provocations” had led to the invasion, he decided to curry friendship with the Arab world by forcing the invaders to withdraw. To bring to heel a resistant U.K., which was still destitute after its losses during World War II, Eisenhower threatened to financially cripple it, by selling U.K. bonds to devalue the pound and blocking a $1-billion IMF loan that the U.K. desperately needed. To get Israel to withdraw from territories captured in the war, which it refused to do without guarantees that Egypt would cease attacking its civilians and its ships, Eisenhower threatened Israel with expulsion from the UN, adding gravitas to his demands by making them in a radio and television address to the American people from the White House. The U.S. attitude toward Israel changed, and the military aid began, only after the U.S. realized that Israel had built a potent military that it could enlist in thwarting Soviet ambitions in the Middle East. Even then, from Israel’s perspective the U.S. aid often amounted to compensation, to persuade Israel to act in what would otherwise have been against its own interests. For example, after Israel won the Sinai peninsula from Egypt in the 1967 Six Day War, the Sinai became a valuable asset of Israel’s, partly because it served as a buffer to thwart future Egyptian attacks, partly because Israel discovered oil there, a commodity needed by both its military and economy. When Egypt failed to get the Sinai back in its 1973 Yom Kippur War against Israel, it decided to cut a deal with the U.S. — it would switch sides in the Cold War, abandoning the U.S.S.R. for the U.S., if the U.S. could persuade Israel to abandon the Sinai, along with the oil and military bases it had built there. The U.S. agreed to the deal, and obtained Israel’s agreement by providing it with partial compensation. Subsequent large military grants were also tied to Israel’s agreement to serve some U.S. geopolitical interest. In recent decades the U.S. has been more friend than foe, the two countries having developed a strong alliance, and U.S. military aid to Israel has grown to its current $3- billion per year level (Israel now receives no economic aid). But the common view by Israel’s supporters and haters alike that Israel needs a $3-billion handout for its survival is nonsense. Israel has a powerhouse economy — the best performing in the developed world — that could easily absorb a $3-billion hit, which amounts to about 1% of its GDP. When Israel was poor, its military absorbed a whopping one-third of its GDP. As Israel became affluent and its military more efficient over the decades, the cost steadily dropped to 25% of GDP, then 20%, then 10%, then 7.5% and now approximately 6.5% of GDP. If Israel needed to assume the full cost of its military, the cost would merely revert to 7.5% temporarily before resuming its downward trajectory. That downward trajectory would likely speed up under a Rand Paul doctrine, which would also deny aid to Israel’s neighbours. With Egypt and the Palestinians shorn of U.S. arms, Israel would be able to shrug off much of its defence burden, which today remains more than three times the Western world’s average. Israel’s defence spending would also drop because it wouldn’t be as reliant on expensive U.S. arms — under terms of its military aid agreement with the U.S., about $2.25- billion of the $3-billion must be spent on U.S. arms suppliers, whose merchandise often needs to be retrofitted to meet Israeli needs. Paul’s other arguments — that Israel’s military industries would benefit once the Israeli government wasn’t tied to buying American and that “our money sometimes clouds the sovereignty of Israel” — are, if anything, understatements. Although Israel’s arms industry is one of the world’s largest, it has been thwarted on numerous occasions by the U.S., which blocked Israeli arms sales to China and Russia, and stopped Israel from building military jets that could compete with America’s. A freed Israeli military economy, the single biggest factor in Israel’s phenomenal economic growth, would only propel its economy to new heights.

#### Israel is worse without aid

Lake 14 - Eli Lake (staff @ The Daily Beast), “Some of Israel’s Top Defenders Say It’s Time to End U.S. Aid,” The Daily Beast, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/07/18/some-of-israel-s-top-defenders-say-it-s-time-to-end-u- s-aid.html WJ

Ironically, the United States may ultimately want to give Israel the military aid more than the Israelis want it themselves. Oren said Obama’s policy since 2009 has been “no daylight on the security field and daylight on the diplomatic field.” In practice, that policy meant that as Obama lavished the Jewish state with high-tech radars, missile defense batteries, and bunker buster bombs, he also asked Israel publicly to end settlement construction in East Jerusalem and the West Bank as an inducement to bring the Palestinian Authority to the negotiating table. Put another way, the subsidy gives the United States leverage over the decision-making of an important ally. “Some of this is long-standing policy that can be traced back to Richard Nixon,” Oren said of Obama’s approach. “He believed the more you aided Israel militarily, the more flexible they would be diplomatically.”

#### Turn--US aid being removed would lead to a massive ramp up of settlement building

Pinfold 15 [Pinfold, Rob (former researcher at Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and a [freelance explainer](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/11239290/Synagogue-axe-attack-why-has-violence-surged-in-Jerusalem.html) of Israeli politics.), 3-5-2015, "We Asked a Military Expert What Would Happen if the US Stopped Giving Money to Israel," Vice, https://www.vice.com/en\_us/article/dpwnkm/what-would-happen-if-the-us-stopped-giving-money-to-israel-305]//LC

Rob Pinfold: I think it would be a mess for Israel basically. Would it be good for the US? The US would have a lot less traction over Israel. It would be a downside for the US, and it would also be a downside for the [Middle East]. For a long time the US has been trying to use its aid politically to change Israel's behavior. What behaviors wouldn't the US be able to control? I think any end to this aid would mean that Israel would be much more likely to take radical moves that would not necessarily have the support of the international community. I think it would be dangerous. What are the likely events in the short term? I think that the big difference you'd see straightaway is an escalation in settlement building because the Israeli right would really be able to unleash it. You see a lot, the Israeli government in particular, they've announced some big settlement-building initiatives of several thousand homes in East Jerusalem over the green line. And then the Americans say, "Na-uh, sorry, this is not happening," and then the idea is quieted for another five years, and then it happens again, ad nauseam. But without any American influence over Israel, especially with this aid, I think you would see a drastic exploration in settlement building.

#### Status quo is goldilocks – pulling out leaves the oppressed hopeless as they pray for internal reform

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Indeed, weaker governments are more likely to employ tactics of civilian targeting to undermine their opponent’s capacity.38 In the Pakistan case, where the army made use of collective violence in targeting local and foreign fighters by demolishing private residences (e.g., in Operation Kalosha II), it triggered multiple attacks against army bases and enraged locals.39 Similarly, where government militias in Iraq have engaged in revenge killings, many civilians have lost trust in them and prefer the ISIS despite disagreeing with the latter’s brutality and interpretation of Islam.40 Governments will lose legitimacy if their penetration is associated with increased civilian victimization and will reinforce civilian support for rebels.41 Military aid can thus provide governments with the means to maintain their legitimacy while conducting internal security operations, and offset costs associated with minimizing reliance on civilian targeting. Building Coercive Capacity Beyond enhancing incentives, U.S. military aid’s persuasion effect is also rooted in its capacity effect. Military aid includes a wide variety of military support including weapons, technology, and intelligence capability. Governments use collective punishment against communities perceived to be supportive of rebel groups, or to counter guerrilla warfare that is more difficult and expensive to tackle through conventional means.42 Strategic explanations of one-sided violence argue that armed actors employ violence against civilians to change their strategic environment43 and that shifts in the capability balance between actors triggers changes in actors’ tactics in war. For example, the Pakistani army relied on the use of excessive force for counterinsurgency operations where it lacked logistical and precision abilities and had shortcomings in technical intelligence.44 General Tarik Khan, who has led the fight against the TTP, has said, “any kind of military operation that seeks to take out individuals is an intelligence-driven operation that requires a lot of technology, a lot of surveillance capacity.” 45 As such, military aid will help states overcome the capability deficiencies that previously may have necessitated the use of collective violence. Improved counterinsurgency ability allows governments to target rebels more precisely, offset costs of increased efforts against rebels, harden soft targets and thus engage in more selective violence. U.S. military funding to Pakistan has identified priority areas such as precision strike capability, air mobility, combat search and rescue, counter improvised explosive device and survivability, battlefield communications and night operations.46 The Pakistani military has used F-16s for precise targeting of rebels in civilian areas47 and intelligence-based operations have helped the state preempt backlash against military operations in North Waziristan.48 Although, such improvements are not expected to completely eliminate the use of civilian targeting by governments, they will reduce the need to do so if governments are better able to locate legitimate targets. It should also be noted that military aid compared to development aid is less fungible, and thus less susceptible to leakage through rent-seeking behavior and corruption. And because it is provided for a specific purpose such as targeting and capturing rebels rather than being STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 781 linked to broad development goals, its threatened withdrawal by the donor is also a more realistic threat for recipients. U.S. military aid flows can thus enhance recipient states’ military capability to use force in a way, which is in line with their overall moderately coercive objectives of countering internal rebel activity. Overall, military aid not only increases the political will of governments to increase efforts against rebel strongholds, it also enhances the capacity of governments to target rebels and avoid civilian killings. This leads to the following hypothesis: H1a: Higher levels of U.S. military aid flows will be associated with lower levels of civilian killings by recipient state actors Alternatively, it may be argued that recipient governments may reduce their use of civilian targeting to ensure continued flows of U.S. military aid. This would be likely if the United States was willing to withhold aid on the basis of human rights violations or civilian killings by governments, despite its security objectives. However, prior research provides strong evidence that the United States largely provides military aid on the basis of its own national security interests, despite human rights violations within states.49 Studies have shown a lack of a relationship between recipients’ human rights records and the allocation of U.S. aid or the magnitude of assistance provided.50 Indeed, Sandholtz has recently shown that U.S. military assistance in 150 countries over thirty years links with worse performance on human rights.51 Although, the Leah Law requires the United States to suspend military assistance flows in cases of civilian abuses by military units, it does not technically require an end to extrajudicial killings or a suspension of overall aid. Instead, it requires the recipient to take effective measures to hold accountable the specific military units responsible for civilian abuses. In practice, there are numerous examples where recipients have continued to receive U.S. aid despite civilian killings. In Colombia, 30,000 extrajudicial killings have been committed since 2000, but U.S. officials did not freeze its assistance under the Leah Law52 and military assistance continues at high levels. The Philippines is another case in point. The Philippines is a close U.S. ally, and received more than $507 million in U.S. military assistance between 2001–2010. International efforts to raise awareness regarding human rights violations and extrajudicial killings have largely been ineffective in severing aid, with aid flows rising to $30 million in 2012.53 Human rights violations by the Philippines military have not affected the regularity or scale of U.S. aid flows. Other countries, which continued to receive comparable levels of military assistance or increased levels despite civilian killings, include Burma (2002–2006), Brazil (2005–2006), Guatemala (1989 and 1995), Haiti (1991–1994), Indonesia (1996–1999), Jordan (1992–1993), Kenya (2007–2009), Mali (1990–1992), Niger (1989–1990), Sri Lanka (1989–1991), and Uganda (1990–1991). Such examples provide support that the United States rarely suspends military assistance in the face of its security imperatives. The potential reverse causality between military aid and onesided violence is further discussed and tested in the empirical section of the article.

## Chad

## Democracy

### Top Level - Lay

#### Our democracy contention turns their offense – all of their examples are outdated and can’t apply to modern examples that our evidence takes into account. Aid is conditioned on democratic reform which solves all of their offense and has empirical examples.

#### The aff doesn’t solve – when we pull military aid, other aid is just directed towards helping the receiving countries military

Kono and Montinola writeDaniel Yuichi Kono (University of California-Davis) and Gabriella R. Montinola (University of California-Davis). “The Uses and Abuses of Foreign Aid: Development Aid and Military Spending.” Political Research Quarterly 66(3) 615–629. 2012. JDN. h ps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1065912912456097

Between 1960 and 2010, rich countries gave poor ones more than three trillion dollars in development aid.1 The return on this investment has been poor: on average, foreign aid has failed to promote savings, investment, and growth in recipient countries (Doucou-liagos and Paldam 2009). For example, while sub-Saharan Africa received $714 billion in development aid from 1960 to 2006 (Easterly 2008, 14), its per capita income grew by less than 1 percent per year over this period,2 and its poverty rate has scarcely changed (Chen and Ravallion 2004). These grim statistics beg the question: Why has develop-ment aid failed to achieve its goals? One possible answer is that it is simply not used for its intended purpose. Research shows that aid is fungible (Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu 1998): that is, aid given for one purpose allows governments to shift resources to other uses. If these other uses do not encourage economic growth or development, neither will aid. A recent New York Times article on Uganda illustrates this point.3 Although Uganda has received considerable foreign aid designated for health care, its hospitals remain starved for resources. This is because foreign aid has allowed the government to cut its own health care spending: specifically, for each additional aid dollar received, Uganda cut its health care spending by 57 cents (IHME 2010). Although it is not clear where the budgetary savings went, a concurrent rise in military spending suggests that Uganda exploited its development aid to reallocate funds from health care to the mili-tary. If so, it is no surprise that this aid did li le to improve the lives of Uganda’s people. The Uganda example suggests that governments may, more generally, divert aid funds from developmental uses to military spending. This would be disturbing in at least two ways. First, military spending does not promote development: studies show that its impact on growth is nonexistent at best and negative at worst (Dunne and Uye 2009). Second, military resources are often used to repress domestic dissent. For example, in the “Arab Spring” of 2011, governments across the Middle East and North Africa used their armed forces to intimidate prodemocracy protesters. If development aid is gener-ally diverted to military spending, it could thus have pernicious economic and political eﬀects.

#### Removal of military assistance opens up the floodgates for sanctions – empirics prove.

Nielsen writes- Richard A. Nielsen Massachusetts Institute of Technology International Studies Quarterly (2013) 57, 791–803 “Rewarding Human Rights? Selective Aid Sanctions against Repressive States” doi: 10.1111/isqu.12049 2013 International Studies Association http://www.mit.edu/~rnielsen/isqu12049.pdf

The empirical confusion in the existing literature results primarily from two misunderstandings about aid sanctions against repressive states. Following the rhetorical claims of donors, most studies assume that donors will sanction all repressive states equally. In reality, aid sanctions are applied selectively to some human rights violators but not to others. Aid sanctions are rarely if ever applied to countries that are donor allies or have other strong political connections to donor countries. The theoretical literature has recognized that some **states** might **avoid** aid **sanctions because of their connections to donors** (Tomasevski 1997:21) but this insight has not informed quantitative studies of aid sanctions (for an exception, see Barratt 2008). The second misconception of the existing studies is that donors impose blanket sanctions that reduce all types of aid. Past scholarship has overlooked sanctions episodes by failing to recognize that **donors typically withdraw aid for economic sectors** but continue to extend aid for basic social services and human rights protection. The remainder of this section describes these two points in more detail. I start from a simple set of state-centered, rationalist assumptions to argue that **aid donors will apply** aid **sanctions selectively.** The literature linking human rights and foreign aid has largely avoided reference to the dominant theoretical trends of IR theory (for exceptions, see Lai 2003; Barratt 2008). Breaking with this tradition, I explicitly develop a rationalist theory of selective aid sanctions and contrast it to alternative explanations inspired by Constructivism. Starting from the assumption that **aid donors are allocating aid in ways that serve their self-interest and security**, I first identify situations where aid recipients will not face aid sanctions when they violate human rights. Most obviously, **donors rarely apply aid sanctions to states with which they have important strategic ties, such as military alliances**. The reason for this is intuitive; **aid is often used to buy influence abroad** (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009) and **withdrawing aid puts these important strategic relationships in jeopardy.** Less formal political ties also protect some repressive states from aid sanctions, including the willingness of developing countries to trade United Nations votes for aid (Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland 2009). **States that rotate onto the UN Security Council receive roughly 60% more US aid relative to other countries, presumably because of their enhanced ability to assist US interests** (Kuziemko and Werker 2006). There are even circumstances where donors might increase aid to repressive allies. **Regimes often violate human rights because they face increased pressure from political opposition** (Davenport 2000; Vreeland 2008) so donors friendly to the regime may increase aid flows to help the allied regime stay in power. This leads to the first hypothesis.

#### Sanctions cause further state repression and endless human rights abuses – turns all of their offense

Choi and James write Seung-Whan Choi and Patrick James Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Institute of Modern International Relations, Tsinghua University The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2017, 331–356 doi: 10.1093/cjip/pox010 Seung-Whan Choi is Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Chicago and Patrick James is Dornsife Dean’s Professor at the School of International Relations, University of Southern California.“Are US Foreign Policy Tools Effective in Improving Human Rights Conditions?”

With regard to economic threats and punishments, interest converges on the utility of sanctions. Yet, policy-oriented reflections on the record of sanctions turn out to be discouraging. **Economic sanctions do not produce regime change, and entail** certain potential and acknowledged disadvantages.23 **Suffering** as a result of economic sanctions could contribute to **labour unrest, further repression** and the like. Moreover, informed leaders, at various times, have expressed scepticism about sanctions. A prominent example is the opposition of President George H.W. Bush to economic sanctions against China in the aftermath of Tian’anmen Square in 1989, on the grounds of their probable ineffectiveness.24 Consider the US’s rate of success (i.e., change in policy by a target government) from applying sanctions: 1980–1989—14%; 1990–1999—26%.25 The figures for unilateral US implementation of economic sanctions are even lower. Longstanding cases like Cuba, Iran, and North Korea demonstrate that, whether regime change specifically or human rights in general are deemed most relevant, economic **sanctions remain ineffective.** Hufbauer and Oegg observe in particular that arms embargoes are ‘debatable’ as a means towards ending conflict. With a focus on state repression and economic sanctions, Wood analyses annual data for 157 states from 1976 to 2001,26 and finds that **sanctions implemented by the US are associated with higher levels of government repression.** Results from Peksen and Drury, meanwhile, link economic **sanctions to lower levels of government respect for physical integrity rights and higher levels of repression** over comparable periods.27 In short, it is difficult to envision economic sanctions, by the US alone or in conjunction with others, as an appropriate means towards greater respect for human rights abroad.

## Bahrain

### Advantage – Bahrain

#### The entire aff is about initially removing aid in 2011/2012 due to human rights abuses – but then we just reinstated aid anyways – they don’t have a unique reason in the aff why things have changed

#### Their ev that says they will reform because they are dependent on the US is a quote from the Bahranian king in 2006 – they didn’t xD

#### The executive just uses loopholes to continue sales – their ev

Abrams 15 ELLIOTT ABRAMS FEBRUARY 27, 2015 "How Obama Caved on Bahrain", https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/27/how-obama-caved-on-bahrain-manama-human-rights/

The United States maintains considerable leverage in Manama. Even a small drawdown of U.S. military personnel would reverberate loudly there, as would moving — or even announcing a study of moving — any piece of the U.S. military presence out of Bahrain. Perhaps more important, there’s a great struggle over whose “narrative” will prevail in Bahrain: the government’s, arguing that its crackdown is designed to oppose terrorism and maintain stability; or that of the opposition, arguing that the country is becoming increasingly repressive toward peaceful protests and human rights. If the United States were to side publicly, and loudly, with the opposition, the outcome of the argument would be affected. More public pressure might well force the royals to think harder about compromises, and strengthen the hand of those who are privately arguing for reform. Instead, the United States has not only remained largely silent on human rights abuses, but has acted in ways that can only convince the Bahraini government to ignore any quiet protests that are actually made. In 2012, when Congress objected to arms sales to Bahrain because of the repression there, the Obama administration used a loophole to continue the sales. As Foreign Policy reported, the State Department is required to formally notify Congress of any arms sales over $1 million. According to a congressional source, rather than going through the notification process, the administration divided up an arms sales package into multiple sales, each of which was less than $1 million — thereby dodging congressional oversight. That was 2012. In 2013, the Navy announced that it was adding five more coastal patrol ships to American forces in Bahrain. Last year, the Obama administration went forward with a more than half-billion-dollar expansion of the U.S. presence in Bahrain, which will cement the U.S. presence in the country for decades to come. Now, what signal does that send the royals? “With each passing day, the Bahrain government’s self-fulfilling prophecy of a sectarian war is becoming more and more the reality,” Reza Aslan wrote in 2013. “If that happens — if the Bahrain uprising descends into the kind of regional holy war between Sunni and [Shiite] — the United States will not be able to avoid the consequences.” That message holds true for the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, which makes one wonder why it is smart to assume that the facilities the United States has in Bahrain will in fact be available — or safe to use — in the coming decades. Meanwhile, the announcement of the expansion can only be read one way by the Bahraini authorities: The American protests about human rights conditions are not serious. It didn’t have to be this way — nobody forced the United States to turn a blind eye to Bahrain’s explosive domestic situation. Consider an alternative path: Suppose a top-level messenger, such as the chief of naval operations or chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had been sent to Bahrain to say, “Look, I personally would like this base expansion. But there’s no way it’s going to happen until the repression stops. In fact, we are going to announce that naval facilities elsewhere in the Gulf will be examined for future expansion to replace Bahrain, because Bahrain is viewed as increasingly unstable. Guys, you’ve got three months to start showing us something.” Such a message — and if necessary, a public statement a few months later — would have had a huge impact. It would have shown the Bahraini government and its supporters the risks they face; it would have made the business community nervous, and perhaps more supportive of reform; and above all, it might have given additional ammunition to those in the royal family who favor reconciliation over repression. Instead, the Obama administration is sending the clear message that its loud protests are over, the president won’t speak about Bahrain, and the monarchy can relax. In fact, no one should relax about Bahrain. It is on a path toward increasing instability, featuring growing Sunni extremism, growing Shiite outrage, and ever-widening sectarian divisions. The Fifth Fleet is a hostage, and the Obama administration is spending hundreds of millions of dollars there as if America’s welcome will be permanent. That’s a suspect assumption: As the majority of Bahrainis conclude that the United States is indifferent to the crackdown and siding with the most regressive elements of the royal family, support for the Fifth Fleet’s presence will start to disappear. As will Bahrain’s very sovereignty, as it is caught up in the regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Once upon a time, Bahrain was an outpost of civility and moderation in the Middle East. Now, it is coming to share the pathologies of its neighbors. That’s tragic, and it is in part the result of weak American policy. By placing security matters — Bahrain’s minuscule participation in the anti-Islamic State coalition and its hosting of the Fifth Fleet — above all other considerations, the Obama administration is putting that very security relationship at risk. Once upon a time, Bahrain was also an example of a sensible Obama human rights policy. Today, one can sadly say that it’s a good example of how that human rights policy has vanished into thin air.

#### Plan gets circumvented – no this isn’t the generic PMCs card

Rogin 12 Josh Rogin [covers national security and foreign policy @ Foreign Policy], "Obama administration using loophole to quietly sell arms package to Bahrain," Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/01/27/obama-administration-using-loophole-to-quietly-sell-arms-package-to-bahrain/> / MM

President Barack Obama‘s administration has been delaying its planned $53 million arms sale to Bahrain due to human rights concerns and congressional opposition, but this week administration officials told several congressional offices that they will move forward with a new and different package of arms sales — without any formal notification to the public. The congressional offices that led the charge to oppose the original Bahrain arms sales package are upset that the State Department has decided to move forward with the new package. The opposition to Bahrain arms sales is led by Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Rep. Jim McGovern (D-MA), and also includes Senate Foreign Relations Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee chairman Robert Casey (D-PA), Senate Majority Whip Richard Durbin (D-IL), and Sens. Robert Menendez (D-NJ), Benjamin Cardin (D-MD), and Marco Rubio (R-FL). Wyden and Rep. Jim McGovern (D-MA) have each introduced a resolution in their respective chambers to prevent the U.S. government from going through with the original sale, which would have included 44 armored, high-mobility Humvees and over 300 advanced missiles. The State Department has not released details of the new sale, and Congress has not been notified through the regular process, which requires posting the information on the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) website. The State Department simply briefed a few congressional offices and is going ahead with the new sale, arguing it didn’t meet the threshold that would require more formal notifications and a public explanation. At today’s State Department press briefing, The Cable asked spokeswoman Victoria Nuland about the new sale. She acknowledged the new package but didn’t have any details handy. Our congressional sources said that State is using a legal loophole to avoid formally notifying Congress and the public about the new arms sale. The administration can sell anything to anyone without formal notification if the sale is under $1 million. If the total package is over $1 million, State can treat each item as an individual sale, creating multiple sales of less than $1 million and avoiding the burden of notification, which would allow Congress to object and possibly block the deal. We’re further told that State is keeping the exact items in the sale secret, but is claiming they are for Bahrain’s "external defense" and therefore couldn’t be used against protesters.

**Military aid to Bahrain is good – Naval supremacy, Iranian influence, and terrorism. Folley et al 16** William A. Foley et al. [PhD American History, Senior Lecturer @ Indiana’s School of Public and Environmental Affairs, other authors are Amanda Horner, Danny Enciso, Brian Guenthenspberger, Christina Owens, Alsksander Cholewa, Evan Meyer, Lauren Johnson, Angela Rice, Alison Sinadinos, Sam Toma, Abbie Gruwell, and Dakota Dubbs, all of whom have a Graduate Certificate in Homeland Security and Emergency Management, and Staci Paquet, Denise Shelton, and David Smith, all of whom have an MSc in Criminal Justice and Public Safety] “"Evaluating U.S. Security Assistance in the Middle East and North Africa,” Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, 2016, https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/bitstream/handle/1805/12527/Project\_70\_report.pdf?sequence=3 The tiny Kingdom of **Bahrain has been of strategic importance to the U**nited **S**tates in varying forms **since 1948, when a small US Navy depot opened on the island**. Over the next decades, **that evolved into a much larger presence, with Bahrain eventually becoming the host for the headquarters of the United States Navy’s Fifth Fleet**. The United Kingdom also had a military presence in Bahrain, but that ended in 1971, which is also the year that the United States established a diplomatic presence in the tiny Kingdom. The strategic interests that this island nation presents to the United States are quite significant. **Geographically, it contains** some **ideal port facilities for the U.S. Navy to use as a strategic base for pursuing security interests throughout the region. Geo-politically, Bahrain is a worthy partner nation** for the United States **for a number of reasons. Due to its stature as a member of the** Gulf Cooperation Council (**GCC**), **Bahrain remains a very important ally for U.S. security interests in the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf**. Second, **Bahrain is a sectarian flash point between** the Sunni-dominated and fellow-GCC members as **Saudi Arabia, and** Shia-dominated **Iran**, which exerts her influence in the region from across the waters of the gulf. **Bahrain is ruled by a Sunni monarchy** that is allied with its fellow Sunni monarchies in the GCC, **but the majority of the population is Shia, raining great concern among its GCC partners and U.S. allies for the potential of Iranian influence and intrigue**. 4 Security Assistance **The U.S. provides security assistance to Bahrain through military training. Small amounts of I**nternational **M**ilitary **E**ducation and **T**raining **funds** (IMET) **are provided to Bahrain. Along with improving Bahrain’s defenses and their interoperability with US forces, other US goals are to inculcate principles of civilian control of the military and democracy. Bahrain was also part of the U.S. led allied coalition that ousted Iraq from Kuwait in 1991. It allowed the stationing of 17,500 U.S. troops and 250 U.S. combat aircraft** at Shaikh Isa Air Base **that participated in the** 1991 **“Desert Storm” offensive** against Iraqi forces. In March 2002, President George W. **Bush designated Bahrain a “major non-NATO-ally”**. That designation qualifies Bahrain to purchase certain U.S. arms, receive excess defense articles (EDA), and engage in defense research cooperation with the U.S. for which that it would not otherwise qualify.5 In recent years, **the U**nited **S**tates **has continued to sell military arms to Bahrain. Most U.S. military assistance to Bahrain is F**oreign **M**ilitary **F**inancing (FMF). In 2007, the United States sold Bahrain several hundred “Javelin” anti-armor missiles, 9 UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters, and 6 Bell search and recovery helicopters. In September 2011, the United States announced a sale to the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) and Bahrain National Guard of 44 Humvee armored vehicles, and several hundred TOW missiles, including 50 “bunker busters.” In 2012, the United States announced the release of additional U.S. arms to the BDF, Ministry of Interior (MOI), and Bahrain’s National Guard. Accordingly **about 85% of Bahrain’s defense equipment is of U.S.-origin. The United States also provides training to Bahrain’s military** and Ministry of Interior (MI).6 Security Cooperation According to the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, **Bahrain supports the U**nited **S**tates **operationally and logistically through its hosting of their Naval Forces Central Command. This enables the U**nited **S**tates **to lead a 30 nation military coalition that counters piracy and terrorism**, and helps maintain the free flow of commerce and energy resources through the Strait of Hormuz. **Bahrain supports U.S.-led military coalitions, including the current international effort against** the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (**ISIL**) (2016).7

#### Russia will fill in if the US leaves and Bahrain makes it worse for everyone - they act as a mediator for bettering Russian relations with other Arab states.

Smagin 17 (Nikita, author at Russian Council and expert on international relations and foreign policy analysis, Russian Council, “Middle East pressure point: Why Russia needs Bahrain” <https://www.rbth.com/international/2017/03/10/middle-east-russia-bahrain-716863>) NE

At a time when the U.S., which was the main guarantor of security in the Middle East for a long time, is losing is reputation as a reliable ally, Russia is trying to leverage its influence in the region. Bahrain can become one of Moscow’s strongest allies in the region. The latest developments in the Middle East suggest that Moscow is trying to play on the changing attitudes of the countries in the region towards the United States. The behavior of the U.S. during the events of the Arab Spring, when Washington supported the protesters instead of its ally Hosni Mubarak, is pushing local countries to seek a more stable guarantor of security, which totally meets the interests of Moscow. In this situation, a small Bahrain can become a ‘pressure point’ for Russia vis-à-vis its rivals in the region. U.S. loses ground Bahrain is the main base for the U.S. Navy’s 5th fleet. This naturally means that Washington has a major impact on decision-making in the wealthy country. Meanwhile, the U.S.’s actions in recent years have forced Bahrain to start a review of its previous approaches to cooperation. The changing point was 2011, when during the Arab Spring Washington [openly supported](http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/02/10/egypt.protests.us.reax/) the protesters in Egypt and refused to help its ally President Hosni Mubarak. [How Russia managed to double its exports to Iran in 2016](https://www.rbth.com/business/2017/02/17/russia-exports-iran-704108) This fact combined with [criticism of human rights](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/04/2013425113054409997.html) in Bahrain raises a concern that in a crisis, Washington may abandon support for the current government in the island state. In addition, the United States in recent years has embarked on reducing its involvement in the Middle East. Therefore, not only Bahrain, even other Arab monarchies in the Persian Gulf are losing confidence in Washington’s ability and willingness to help resolve the Iranian problem. Russia, on the other hand, significantly increased its involvement in the region in the last two years. And since, unlike the White House, the Kremlin does not require compliance with human rights in exchange for the supply of weapons, for Bahrain relations with Russia are an alternative way of ensuring its own security. A mediator role For Russia, Bahrain is important because Manama is ready to become a mediator in Russia’s negotiations with other Arab countries and particularly with Saudi Arabia over the handling of the Iranian problem. The willingness of Bahrain to become a mediator is confirmed by the fact that, according to the Ambassador of Bahrain to Russia this year Manama [will host](https://ria.ru/politics/20170306/1489388362.html) a meeting of foreign ministers of Arab monarchies and Russia. This also suggests that the Arab States of the Persian Gulf [believe](http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/bahrain-russia-replace-washington-influence-iran.html#ixzz4Zk6xg3Ek) that Russia is today a force to be reckoned with in the region. Arab Spring Russia and Bahrain began a new kind of relationship with the rise of the Arab Spring in 2011. After the suppression of mass demonstrations in the kingdom led to casualties, France and the UK [cancelled](https://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/02/19/138283.html) their license for the supply of arms to Bahrain. In response, Manama [signed](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-08-25/russia-strikes-first-bahrain-arms-deal-after-u-k-french-bans) an agreement with Moscow for the supply of AK-103 assault rifles, and has launched a program to train the military of Bahrain. [Kremlin’s game: What Moscow is looking to achieve in Libya](https://www.rbth.com/international/2017/02/28/kremlins-game-what-moscow-libya-710741) The next step was in 2014, when Bahrain, despite the sanctions of Brussels and Washington against the Kremlin, [signed](http://www.reuters.com/article/bahrain-russia-funds-idUSL6N0NL68B20140429) an investment agreement with Russia. In the same year, direct flights [were launched](http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/640114) between Moscow and Manama. Washington [did not hide](http://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-usa-bahrain-idUSL6N0NM77J20140430) this irritation and regarded these actions as a disregard for their interests. In 2016, when the international community accused the Kremlin of war crimes in Syria, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa [visited](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/washingtons-dilemma-as-bahrain-snuggles-up-to-putin_us_58519231e4b0320ed05a9a84) Russia twice. During these visits, the parties discussed the development of trade and political relations, and [signed](http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2016/09/05/Why-Russia-sees-Bahrain-as-a-partner-in-the-Middle-East.html) a military agreement. Moreover, in November 2016 the King of Bahrain [invited](https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201610311046908015-bahrain-russia-putin-visit/) Vladimir Putin to visit Bahrain, and in December 2016 the Russian state news agency Sputnik [reported](https://sputniknews.com/business/201612081048323912-bahrain-crimea-business/) that there is a list of companies from Bahrain ready to invest in Crimea. There have also been some positive developments in beginning of 2017. At the end of February Manama [hosted](http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/771884) the first ever Bahrain-Russian Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation. On Mar. 6, the Bahraini Ambassador in Russia [confirmed](https://ria.ru/politics/20170306/1489388362.html) that Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalif will arrive in Russia on Mar. 24. These developments suggest that, despite the complicated relations of Moscow with Manama’s allies, Bahrain and Russia continue to strengthen their relationship. Access to the arms market Despite a well-developed infrastructure, the most liberal legislation in the region and high level of economic development, the small size of Bahrain means it is not a big target for Russian businesses. At the same time, the country can be a convenient place to launch economic and political penetration in the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. [Russia and the UAE will develop a fifth-generation fighter jet](https://www.rbth.com/defence/2017/03/03/russia-and-the-uae-will-develop-a-fifth-generation-fighter-jet_712678) First of all, in terms of sanctions and low oil prices, Russia [is experiencing](http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2016/09/05/Why-Russia-sees-Bahrain-as-a-partner-in-the-Middle-East.html) a lack of investment, so the Gulf countries are of direct interest. Bahrain [has invested](http://minpromtorg.gov.ru/press-centre/news/#!rossiya_i_bahreyn_obsudili_potencial_uvelicheniya_investiciy_i_tovarooborota) more than $50 million in retail, commercial real estate, mining and logistics services in Russia. Working with Manama demonstrates Russia's desire to enter the weapons market on the Arabian Peninsula. Today, in addition to supplying machines Moscow is executing a contract for the provision of the Kornet anti-tank complexes to Bahrain. According to Kommersant, even such a modest result [may be considered](http://kommersant.ru/doc/3083667) a success for Russia, since Bahrain, as all the monarchies of the Persian Gulf traditionally focus on buying arms from the United States. In addition, during the Bahrain-Russian intergovernmental commission meeting the sides [agreed](http://www.fsvps.ru/fsvps/news/20220.html)to start the supplies of Russian meat products, and held talks about the possibilities of grain exports, and the [simplification](https://ria.ru/world/20170222/1488570775.html) of the visa regime. The successful implementation of such plans can be used an example of beneficial cooperation with Russia for other Arab monarchies.

#### That spreads authoritarianism – turns repression and violence

Barmin 18 Yuri Barmin**.** 3/08/2018. [Yuri Barmin is an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, covering the Middle East and North Africa, Moscow’s policy towards the region, as well as the conflicts in Syria and Libya. He regularly contributes his analysis to Al Monitor, the Middle East Institute, Al Sharq Forum and FARAS Center. Mr. Barmin holds an MPhil in International Relations from the University of Cambridge], Russia in the Middle East Until 2024: From Hard Power to Sustainable Influence, The Jamestown Foundation. https://jamestown.org/program/russia-middle-east-2024-hard-power-sustainable-influence/

Experts who had argued that authoritarianism in the Middle East would maintain stability and keep extremism at bay were proven wrong by the events of the Arab Spring.[xxxv] The Russian leadership, however, still projects its vision of “autocratic stability” onto the region. And even though Moscow repeatedly insists that it is up to the Syrian people to decide through a presidential election who will lead the nation into the post-war period, the Russian government is unlikely to become a supporter of democracy movements in the Middle East. After all, elections have been a crucial legitimization tool of Russia’s own “managed democracy.” The consolidation of power in the hands of the national leader as well as the securitization of the political agenda have characterized the Russian political system throughout the last 17 years Vladimir Putin has been in power. And they continue to guide him in how he sees regimes in the Middle East. Some of these authoritarian Arab regimes share a long history with Russia: during the Cold War, they proved their ability to maintain order for longer than any democratic regime could sustain it, not least due to Moscow’s financial and military support. The fact that Bashar al-Assad survived throughout the bloody Syrian conflict, to a large extent due to Russia’s aid, solidifies the idea that authoritarianism in the Middle East guarantees stability and puts a cap on “toxic” democratic values imposed from the outside. In Moscow’s view, authoritarian tendencies are indigenous to the region, much like they are to Russia, which is why they need not be battled but rather be correctly managed. Russia’s idea of “authoritarian stability” in the Middle East may find a potential supporter in Donald Trump, who notoriously dropped America’s agenda for promoting democracy in the Middle East. The distinct security focus of Donald Trump’s strategy toward the region has emboldened his allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel, and convinced them that the regional policeman will no longer restrain their geopolitical ambitions. The position of both Russia and the United States is, thus, likely to resonate with many governments in the region that previously had to put on airs of civil society engagement and liberalization just to have international political and diplomatic backing. Egypt and Turkey are the two cases in point: the 2017 Human Rights Watch World Report specifically points to them to illustrate how the tide of new authoritarianism is sweeping through the Middle East.[xxxvi] In Turkey, the attempted coup in July 2016 was used by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) as an excuse to crack down not only on suspected plotters but also on wider circles critical of the government’s policies. Western powers sharply rebuked Erdoğan over his suspension of the rule of law in the country and mass detentions—but Russia pointedly did not. Putin was the one world leader who gave a call to Erdoğan to tell him Moscow supports his campaign to root out dissent, which the Turkish president described as “anti-constitutional.”[xxxvii] Furthermore Putin hosted his Turkish counterpart in St. Petersburg less than a month after the failed coup, during which Erdoğan explained that Vladimir Putin’s call to him was an important move, “a kind of moral support and display of Russia-Turkey solidarity,” as the Turkish president described the situation.[xxxviii] All this occurred just weeks after Erdoğan’s late June apology to Russia for the November 2015 downing of a Russian Su-24 jet over Syria; and it goes to show how masterfully Vladimir Putin uses authoritarian movements to his own political benefit. Egypt is going through a similar wave of authoritarianism, with President Abdel Fattah El Sisi cracking down on dissent that is not necessarily associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. That government campaign is happening against the backdrop of economic instability, currency devaluation and increased poverty rates. However, the army’s grip on power and full control over the public sphere give a semblance of stability in the country. Sisi’s fight to eradicate extremism in the Sinai as well as his crackdown on dissent find support in Moscow, which is reflected in official statements coming from the Kremlin. Egypt reemerged as Russia’s key partner in the Middle East, including in crucial spheres of military-technical cooperation. The two countries signed a protocol on military cooperation in March 2015, significantly ramped up joint military exercises, and are looking to green light an agreement that would allow Russian military aircraft to use Egyptian airspace and infrastructure.[xxxix] With the turmoil and regular attacks in the Sinai Peninsula, counter-terrorism cooperation has become a distinct characteristic of the bilateral relationship. A security-heavy agenda acts as a glue between Moscow and Cairo, not least due to the military and security background of the political elites of the two countries. Both Russians and Egyptians will head to the polls in March 2018 to elect their respective heads of state, while presidential elections in Turkey are to take place in November 2019. The outcome is already known in all three countries; Putin, Sisi and Erdoğan will almost certainly serve out their next terms into the first half of the 2020s, meaning that we are unlikely to witness a disruption in the security-comes-first policy employed by Moscow in its bilateral relations with both Cairo and Ankara. The cases of Egypt and Turkey illustrate that Vladimir Putin is likely to encourage authoritarian “stability” across the region through skewed security-heavy policies. Putin’s support for autocratic tendencies will hardly find any resistance among other powers in the region and will almost certainly be embraced. Syria’s recovery from the seven-year war is unlikely to happen through the emergence of democratic institutions and freedom, but will probably lead to the creation of a strong regime with an inflated security apparatus to shield a fragile government and keep extremist tendencies at bay. Iraq’s increasingly sectarian policies hint at a similar trend. And as Libya’s internationally recognized government fails to establish control over much of the country’s territory, Libyan National Army Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar represents the type of leader the Kremlin would presumably like to see for a post–civil war Libya. If Russia’s Syria policy is any indication, a highly centralized system will be Moscow’s remedy for extremism throughout the wider region. The fear of a new wave of extremism will push many regimes to seek more control over the population, and a lack of incentives to democratize may bring about new repressive regimes. In other words Russia’s leadership in the Middle East may significantly lengthen and reinforce the era of authoritarianism there.

## Afghan Counternarcotics

### Adv – Harker

#### The aff got passed like two months ago xD #NegOnPresumption

Hennigan 2/21/19 (W.J. Hennigan covers the Pentagon and national security issues in Washington, D.C. He has reported from more than two dozen countries across five continents, covering war, counter-terrorism, and the lives of U.S. service members. Time. “The U.S. Sent Its Most Advanced Fighter Jets to Blow Up Cheap Opium Labs. Now It's Canceling the Program” <http://time.com/5534783/iron-tempest-afghanistan-opium/>)

After hundreds of airstrikes failed to curtail the Taliban’s $200 million-a-year opium trade, the U.S. military quietly ended a yearlong campaign that targeted drug labs and networks laced around the Afghan countryside. The end of the operation, code-named Iron Tempest, comes as Trump Administration officials engage in direct peace talks with Taliban leaders that could end the 17-year-old war. The U.S. military first began targeting Taliban narcotics facilities with airstrikes and Special Operations raids in November 2017 when opium production jumped to record highs in Afghanistan. At the time, U.S. commanders estimated the Taliban operated up to 500 drug labs, which helped fuel their nearly two-decade long insurgency. Since then, U.S. and Afghan warplanes have launched more than 200 strikes aimed at disabling Taliban narcotics production, processing, trading and transportation networks. Yet the drug trade thrived. So, over time, the U.S. halted the number of air raids. Only two strikes took place over the last three months of 2018, which marked the end of the campaign, according to the latest Defense Department Inspector General’s report.

#### Afghanistan is already unstable – this debate is a question of who can better get Afghanistan out of that crisis – THEIR AUTHOR

Bandow 17 (Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, I also am a Senior Fellow in International Religious Persecution with the Institute on Religion and Public Policy. I am the author and editor of numerous books, including Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire, The Politics of Plunder: Misgovernment in Washington, and Beyond Good Intentions: A Biblical View of Politics. I am a graduate of Florida State University and Stanford Law School., “The Nation-Building Experiment That Failed: Time For U.S. To Leave Afghanistan“, Forbes, 3-1-2017, Available Online at <https://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2017/03/01/the-nation-building-experiment-that-failed-time-for-u-s-to-leave-afghanistan>) / MM

Gen. Nicholson recently told the Senate that it was essential to stay in that country, “critical to our national security” and part of America’s “enduring counterterrorism platform.” If the Afghan government has its way Washington will be stuck for the 200 years that President Trump feared. President Ashraf Ghani congratulated Trump on his victory, explaining that America is an “essential and important strategic partner” and Kabul hopes for “close cooperation” with the new administration. Unfortunately, the Afghan government is losing despite such cooperation. Last month Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction John Sopko cited the challenge of “continued insecurity.” Although Washington has spent tens of billions of dollars so far on Afghan security forces, the latter are “basically playing whack-a-mole following the Taliban around Afghanistan.” The Kabul government controls less territory; its armed forces abandoned rural outposts to protect provincial capitals; and road connections between major cities are tenuous. It wasn’t just the quantity of cash. Noted SIGAR, “The United States currently lacks a comprehensive strategy to guide its reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. It also lacks overarching plans with clearly defined metrics to guide its work in a number of key areas such as anticorruption, counternarcotics, health, education, gender, rule of law, and water. The lack of planning and related strategies means the U.S. military and civilian agencies are at risk of working at cross purposes, spending money on nonessential endeavors, or failing to coordinate efforts in Afghanistan.” Moreover, the DOD acknowledged, noted SIGAR, that “U.S. forces in Afghanistan lacked the capacity to administer, oversee, and close contracts to ensure proper performance.” Oversight has become increasingly difficult as security has deteriorated. Yet “the Afghan government cannot survive without continued donor financial assistance.”

#### Their Blank evidence concedes fill in

**Blank 12** (Stephen Blank Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College- he studies this stuff, January 27, “Whither the new great game in Central Asia?”, pdf)

Afghanistan makes them a prime target for insurgency in¶ the future. Especially in the light of fears for the stability of¶ the Karzai government and the overall region in the light of¶ a US withdrawal, every state, large or small, is jockeying for greater capability and power in the region and some, like¶ Uzbekistan, clearly expect both to have to project power¶ and that they will be asked to project power to neighbors to¶ preserve stability in the area after 2014. Second, as Emelian¶ Kavalski has observed, the nature of what we call the “new¶ great game,” the proliferation of actors in a continuous¶ multi-dimensional struggle for influence in Central Asia¶ precludes any one actor obtaining previous levels of¶ imperial or neo-imperial domination, though Russia still¶ tries for it, and has led to a situation where, given the¶ concurrent proliferation of actors and agents operating in¶ Central Asia,¶ The simultaneity of these two dynamics reveals that the¶ agency of external actors is distinguished not by an¶ imperial desire for the control of territory, but by the¶ establishment of ‘niches of influence.’ Consequently, the¶ notion of the ‘new great game’ comes to characterize the¶ dynamics of processing, selection and internalization of¶ some externally promoted ideas and not others. (Rashid,¶ 2009, p. xxxix).¶ Third, in view of the impending US military withdrawal¶ ssit is not clear that Washington, confronted by wrenching¶ fiscal stresses, either has the vision or the means to develop¶ or implement a coherent post-Afghanistan Central Asian¶ strategy, a vacuum could well develop there with regard to¶ the US position that will inevitably be filled by other actors.¶ Certainly there is no sign yet of what will replace the US¶ military presence after 2014 and no sign of a formal¶ document worked out with Afghanistan that delineates the¶ extent to which a US presence in the region will look like. In¶ the absence of such a policy statement every regional actor is hedging its bets and preparing for the worst in the future,¶ a trend that most likely means intensified competition¶ among the great, regional, and local powers for influence in¶ Central Asia.¶

#### Russia is looking for more partners and views counternarcotics as key

Stratfor 12 (Stratfor Worldview, “Russian Counternarcotics Strategy in Central Asia” <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russian-counternarcotics-strategy-central-asia/>) / MM

Officials seized 67 kilograms (147.7 pounds) of synthetic drugs in Tajikistan on May 22, one week after the head of Russia's Federal Drug Control Service, Viktor Ivanov, called drug production and trafficking in Central Asia a pressing issue. Ivanov said that up to 40 percent of Central Asian gross domestic product comes from criminal activities, especially from narcotics, and that Russia should fight the problem more actively. He added that Russia plans to implement 22 new counternarcotics programs in Central Asia to help protect its interests in the region. The flow of drugs from Central Asia into Russia is a significant problem for Moscow. Though completely eradicating drug trafficking is impossible, Moscow would like to gain as much control as it can over the illicit trade. This would let Moscow justify increasing its presence and influence in Central Asia, allowing it to counter U.S. activity there and preparing Russia for increased volatility in the region following the U.S. exit from Afghanistan. Several major drug trafficking routes begin in Afghanistan and enter Central Asia before moving north into Russia, northwest into Europe and east into China. Ninety percent of the drugs bound for Russia from Central Asia are not cultivated in the region, but rather in Afghanistan. Rampant drug abuse in Russia contributes to an already poor demographic situation and relatively low life expectancy. Significant numbers of men also fail to qualify for military duty due to failed drug tests and addiction. The government hopes to gain as much control of the trafficking networks as possible by removing organized criminal gangs that operate against Russian interests. Given the money to be made from drug trafficking, Moscow stands to profit from getting involved, something that the blurred lines between the Kremlin and Russian organized crime will facilitate. Counternarcotics efforts in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan offer Russia more than just money. Russia already wields significant influence in this crucial buffer zone, influence it would like to expand to offset the power of outside actors like the United States. U.S. activity in the region increased before and following the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, when several Central Asian countries provided military bases for logistical assistance. While the United States has scaled back its military presence, Washington recently has become more active in counternarcotics efforts in Central Asia. Some of these efforts have been undertaken jointly with Russia. However, Russia did not respond warmly to a new joint program, the Central Asian Counternarcotics Initiative (CACI), which the United States proposed in February. CACI called for task forces in all five Central Asian countries to combat drug trafficking and share information with U.S. forces in Afghanistan, but Moscow reportedly convinced the Central Asian countries not to participate. Ivanov said that while Washington and regional governments may welcome the program, Moscow considers it inconvenient. It is not that Russia objects to specific programs, though Moscow typically opposes any initiative not coordinated in advance with Russia. Instead, Moscow fears the programs could serve as a springboard for greater U.S. involvement in the region. An unnamed Russian official hinted at this in an interview with Kommersant, calling the CACI plan a new tool for infiltration into Central Asia and a means of strengthening U.S. military and political influence in the region. Greater involvement in counternarcotics efforts gives Russia a reason to expand its own presence in the region and to curb the power of other players such as the United States, which sometimes embeds intelligence assets in counternarcotics programs. Though Russia is set to increase its already sizable military and security presence in the region, particularly in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, this does not mean everything has gone Russia's way. For example, individual countries, especially Kyrgyzstan, continue to engage in bilateral counternarcotics cooperation with the United States. As recently as May 23, a counternarcotics checkpoint funded by the United States was set up on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. Tajikistan has also rebuffed Russia's requests to let the Russian military resume patrolling the Tajik-Afghan border after the Tajik military replaced it in 2005. Even so, Russian advisers are still active on the border — a crucial crossing for regional smuggling routes — and Tajikistan has cooperated with Russia on border control in other areas, such as the Tajik-Uzbek border. Moscow also has assisted Dushanbe with security and counternarcotics sweeps within Tajikistan. Though increasing its counternarcotic efforts allows Russia to check outside powers and prepare for regional volatility following the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan, going too far in these efforts carries risks, including angering traffickers and creating friction with regional governments. Given that Central Asia is seeing rising instability due to regional tensions and growing Islamist militancy, Russia will pursue its counternarcotics efforts with caution.

#### **That triggers all of their impacts and turns case**

Seldin 18 (Jeff Seldin, Seldin works out of VOA’s Washington headquarters and is national security correspondent specializing in Middle East peace negotiations. September 01, 2018 4:47 PM, “US General: Russia Trying to 'Undercut' Progress in Afghanistan.” <https://www.voanews.com/a/us-general-russia-trying-to-undercut-progress-in-afghanistan/4554004.html>) / MM

Russia is not giving up on efforts to destabilize Afghanistan and drive divisions between the United States and its coalition partners, according to the outgoing commander of U.S. forces in the country. The commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan and of Operation Resolute Support, General John Nicholson, is scheduled to step down Sunday after serving in the position for more than two years. But before relinquishing command, he took time to cast doubts on Russia's intentions in the region, despite recent overtures from Moscow to help the Taliban reconcile with the Afghan government. "We know that Russia is attempting to undercut our military gains and years of military progress in Afghanistan, and make partners question Afghanistan's stability," Nicholson said in an email to Voice of America, following on questions from his August 22 briefing with Pentagon reporters. "It is no secret that Russia seeks any opportunity it can find to drive a wedge between the United States and our Central Asian partners, including Afghanistan," Nicholson added. Aid to Taliban U.S. and Afghan officials have previously accused Russia of meddling in Afghanistan by providing Taliban insurgents with both weapons and training. Moscow has rejected the allegations, saying it has only political ties with the Taliban. Still, Russia has faced growing suspicion from the U.S. and its allies, who say the Kremlin has been increasingly working to expand its influence in Afghanistan and beyond. Most recently, the U.S. and Russia have been competing over efforts to kick-start peace negotiations between the Taliban and the U.S.-backed Afghan government. Russia was set to host both parties, along with the U.S. and other countries, for talks starting September 4, but was forced to postpone after Afghan President Ashraf Ghani declined the invitation. The U.S. also has been hoping for talks between the government and the Taliban. "We talk about an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned reconciliation process," U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis said during a briefing with reporters this past week. "We believe that the best way to get there is to ensure Taliban recognizes they can't win on the battlefield, they must negotiate." But while U.S. officials have touted what they see are signs of progress, including increased support for a peace process from various sectors of the Afghan population, the government's recent cease-fire offer to the Taliban appears to have fallen on deaf ears. Meanwhile, U.S. officials have been angered by what they see as Russian efforts to derail peace and stabilization efforts with disinformation campaigns.

### Solvency – Harker

#### On the Cherbanich card – pulling US aid doesn’t stop the UNODC from actively pursuing counternarcotics measures. They conflate the US with the UNODC and nothing in their plan text says the UNODC should do so. Further, they read no US key warrant so don’t grant them US cuts to funding lead to other nations cutting funding as well.(it’s also probably extra-topical but that’s for another time)

#### Their McCoy evidence flows neg – Great Britain and the UN will still continue their counternarcotics - the US at least provides some semblance of benefit while the UN’s efforts have writ large failed

Mccoy 17 (Alfred Mccoy, McCoy is the J.R.W. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. A TomDispatch regular, he is the author of In the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise and Decline of US Global Power and Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State, “America Is Losing Yet Another Drug War—in Afghanistan“, Nation, 11-13-2017, Available Online at https://www.thenation.com/article/america-is-losing-yet-another-drug-war-in-afghanistan/)

Over the past 15 years, all counter-narcotics efforts by the United States, Great Britain, and the UN have failed to slow the country’s drug production. “Opium remains the country’s most valuable cash crop,” says Sopko, “worth around $3 billion per year at border prices.” It provides, he adds, “up to 411,000 full time equivalent jobs, more than the number of people employed by the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces.” Despite the expenditure of nearly $9 billion on its counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan, Washington has presided over what Sopko calls a “dramatic expansion of opium poppy cultivation from less than 8,000 hectares grown in 2001 to 200,000 hectares in 2016.” By then, the opium crop represented morethan two-thirds of the country’s agricultural output. Meanwhile, 11 percent of the population is now estimated to be using illicit drugs, one of the world’s highest addiction rates. The UN’s crop survey for 2016, compiled by hundreds of Afghan enumerators who regularly walked through the poppy fields—and corroborated by sophisticated satellite imagery—adds yet more somber strokes to this picture. That year, at 5,600 tons the opium harvest was again up substantially (by 43 percent). In the same period, opium eradication efforts fell by 91 percent to a mere 355 hectares of the crop destroyed, or less than 2 percent of all illegal poppy fields in the country. Since the start of its intervention in 2001, Washington and its drug war allies have tried every possible counter-narcotics option. All, without exception, have failed. The bulk of the US budget ($4.3 billion) was allocated to interdiction efforts, but ample funds were left for more experimental approaches, none of which seem to have worked. As much as Washington’s drug policies failed, the UN efforts were, in Inspector Sopko’s view, even less effective. During the first decade following its 2001 invasion, Washington was obsessed with counterterror operations and so outsourced the drug war to others. It delegated opium suppression to the British and police training for interdiction to the Germans. In this critical period, the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) maneuvered to fill the leadership void.

#### **Their Carpenter and Preble evidence wins the debate for us – it says that nothing that the US does can solve the problem and gives us alt causes**

**Carpenter and Preble 14** -- Ted Galen Carpenter, a senior fellow in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor at the National Interest, is the author of 10 books and more than 700 articles on international affairs. His books include Bad Neighbor Policy : Washington’s Futile War on Drugs in Latin America (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) and The Fire Next Door : Mexico’s Drug Violence and the Danger to America (Cato Institute, 2012). Christopher Preble is the vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and blogs for The Skeptics at The National Interest. [Ted Galen Carpenter and Christopher Preble, "Just Say "No": Time to End the War on Drugs in Afghanistan", 11-3-2014, National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/just-say-no-time-end-the-war-drugs-afghanistan-11592, Accessed 1-20-2019

The Department of Defense harbors no such illusions about the Kabul regime’s commitment or competence regarding the drug war. Indeed, the letter by Michael D. Lumpkin, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict, strongly implies that DoD has effectively declared the counternarcotics effort lost and not worth fighting any longer. In a direct contradiction to what the Embassy had concluded, Lumpkin writes that “ the failure to reduce poppy cultivation and increase eradication is due to the lack of Afghan government support for the effort .” In addition, he notes that “poverty, corruption, the terrorism nexus to the narcotics trade, and access to alternative livelihood opportunities that provide an equal or greater profit than poppy cultivation are all contributors to the Afghan drug problem.” In other words, all things that the U.S. government doesn’t control and can’t control. Taking up Sopko’s charge that those responsible for U.S. policy apply lessons learned, Lumpkin’s response boils down to this: We have done as you have asked, and decided that we don’t wish to be involved at all. “Since DoD does not conduct eradication activities in Afghanistan and the report provides no new information related to our Department, we respectfully request you remove Secretary Hagel as an addressee.”

#### Their Bandow evidence ALSO brutally flows neg

Bandow 17 — (Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, I also am a Senior Fellow in International Religious Persecution with the Institute on Religion and Public Policy. I am the author and editor of numerous books, including Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire, The Politics of Plunder: Misgovernment in Washington, and Beyond Good Intentions: A Biblical View of Politics. I am a graduate of Florida State University and Stanford Law School., “The Nation-Building Experiment That Failed: Time For U.S. To Leave Afghanistan“, Forbes, 3-1-2017, Available Online at https://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2017/03/01/the-nation-building-experiment-that-failed-time-for-u-s-to-leave-afghanistan/, accessed 1-10-2019, HKR-AM) / MM

The United Nations reported that the land under drug production in Afghanistan was up 10 percent in 2016 over the year before. Opium production jumped 43 percent over 2015, and that may underestimate total output, since farmers may be making more than one harvest a year. Moreover, the UN was unable to survey every province because of security problems. The total value of opium produced increased 57 percent. The number of poppy-free provinces dropped. Eradication, always a tiny share of production, was down an astonishing 91 percent last year, coming in the lowest in a decade. The U.S. provided “$8.5 billion for counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan since 2002. Nonetheless, Afghanistan remains the world’s leading producer of opium, providing 80 percent of the global output over the past decade,” reported SIGAR. Alas, “a poor security environment has impeded counternarcotics operations.” On most major measures, interdiction results have fallen over the last decade. Although the U.S. government reportedly was working on a new strategy, there is no solution in sight and the issue has received decreasing attention in recent years. Indeed, one wonders why the U.S. even bothers. SIGAR concluded that “Eradication efforts have had minimal impact and sometimes fostered resentment among farmers.” Moreover, “seizures are negligible compared to current production estimates.” Ironically, some “reconstruction projects such as improved irrigation, roads, and agricultural assistance can actually lead to increased opium cultivation.” Alternative-livelihood programs have had only “mixed results.**”** Deteriorating security has made the effort to reduce drug production even more difficult. Overall, “The agency’s work, coupled with the sobering assessments of poppy cultivation, raise serious questions about the efficacy of U.S.-funded counternarcotics programs.”

## Latin America Counternarcotics

### Advantage - Fumigation

#### Ctrl + f the doc – nothing in there says that the US providing MILITARY AID is key to conducting fumigations – Trump pressuring Santos to resume fumigation would happen regardless because the US and Colombia have extensive economic ties and soft power interests in the region.

#### And the current government won’t abide by the FARC peace deal regardless – Military Aid isn’t key, it’s the new President. Duque is way different than Santos

Felbab-Brown 18 (Vanda, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence for the Brookings Institute. “Can Colombia eradicate coca by drones? The illusion of a technological fix” Brookings Institute. July 24, 2018. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/24/can-colombia-eradicate-coca-by-drones-the-illusion-of-a-technological-fix/>) NE

As old-fashioned drug warriors still embracing forced eradication, President Donald Trump and Attorney General Jeff Sessions have found an eager eradication proponent in Colombia’s President-elect Iván Duque. Duque has vociferously criticized the counternarcotics sections of the FARC peace accords, arguing against cutting deals with coca farmers. He has not rejected altogether the peace accords’ formulation that forced eradication would be employed where coca farmers failed to sign crop substitution agreements and “voluntarily” eradicate their crops in order to qualify for assistance. But his proclivities, like those of his mentor, former President Álvaro Uribe, lie squarely with eradication. Moreover, the process of negotiating voluntary eradication and substitution deals with local cocaleros has been laborious and often difficult, with many cocaleros distrustful of the Colombian government and the proposed deals. Such skepticism is warranted: Colombia’s history is littered with failed crop substitution deals and unmet alternative livelihoods expectations. The Duque administration may well confirm the skepticism by not putting in the necessary commitment and patience to strike such deals with local communities, rapidly starting the forced eradication engine.

#### Drones are WAY safer - their article is referring to manned aircrafts that were used to spray glyphosate - low-flying drones solve the health concerns and ensure that they only target illicit drugs

Felbab-Brown 18 (Vanda, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence for the Brookings Institute. “Can Colombia eradicate coca by drones? The illusion of a technological fix” Brookings Institute. July 24, 2018. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/24/can-colombia-eradicate-coca-by-drones-the-illusion-of-a-technological-fix/>) NE

The Duque administration will probably deploy drones to undertake the aerial spraying. The idea is not new: Outgoing President Santos approved the resurrection of aerial spraying by low-flying drones in late June 2018. By flying low and close to the coca plants, the process is presumed to eliminate health dangers associated with the herbicides and avoid destroying legal crops by accident. But with or without drones, eradicating illicit crops needs to overcome several sets of challenges: identifying where illicit drug plants are grown, gaining access to the areas of cultivation, and political opposition. Technological innovations can help in overcoming the first two challenges, but not the political ones. Like aerial photography and satellite coverage, drones can be deployed to identify where drug crops are grown. Small drones in particular have a significant advantage over other forms of remote reconnaissance, since they can fly very low to identify drug crops grown under the cover of trees or interspersed with other plants. Drones can provide such intelligence in real time, and can be deployed over an area for a significant amount of time and thus monitor, for example, which drug traders are visiting the area to interact with which drug farmers. Another advantage of using drones for eradication instead of piloted airplanes is that there is no physical danger to the operating crew. Small drones that can maneuver among plants and distinguish between drug plants and legal crops promise precision of delivery and minimization of collateral damage. But even so, drug farmers and drug traffickers will seek to shoot down or otherwise disable the drones. Eventually, anti-drone defenses, such as geo-fencing and drones to destroy other drones—which governments are currently exploring—will proliferate to non-state actors as well.

### Advantage – Counternarcotics

#### The entire advantage is from literally 15 years ago and even their evidence from 2016 references programs from the early 2000’s, err neg if we win any semblance of uniqueness

#### Counternarcotics have made everything better – significantly postdates your ev

Wyler et al. 12 (Liana, Congressional Research Service fellow specializing in illicit trade and counternarcotics. Congressional Research Service. “Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs” March 19, 2012. <https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20120319_R41215_44d35e7f08b596e5162b7d20e428270ed1d0f495.pdf>) NE

The Andean region has been the focus of intense counterdrug efforts by the United States for three decades. The major components of U.S. strategy have been coca crop eradication, interdiction of cocaine, and alternative development programs, all with an eye to reducing the drug supply at its source. Successful eradication and interdiction efforts in the 1980s and 1990s in Peru and Bolivia—then the largest suppliers—inadvertently pushed cultivation to Colombia. Colombia has been the largest producer of both coca leaf and cocaine for more than a decade, but Colombia's portion of the world's coca cultivation declined from about 74% in 2000 to 43% in 2009, and continued to decline in 2010.45 As Colombia's coca cultivation has declined, however, the number of hectares under cultivation in Bolivia and particularly Peru has increased. Indeed, Peru's potential cocaine production of raw cocaine surpassed that of Colombia in 2010.46 These changes in production from one country back to another appear to provide evidence of the aforementioned balloon effect. Colombia's success in reducing its cultivation of coca and production of cocaine, with significant U.S. support, merits a close look. The framework for the current enforcement regime dates to 1999 when the government of President Andrés Pastrana unveiled "Plan Colombia." Plan Colombia was a strategy forged by Colombians in collaboration with U.S. advisors to end Colombia's decades-long armed conflict,47 combat drug trafficking, and promote economic development. Plan Colombia also aimed to reduce cultivation, processing, and distribution of illicit drugs by 50% over six years—a goal not met for coca and cocaine,48 but met for opium and heroin, a newer, smaller, less entrenched component of the Colombian drug trade.49 More recent gains have brought down coca yields and estimates of potential production.50 Between FY2000 and FY2012, Congress provided more than $8 billion in support of Plan Colombia and its follow on plans through the U.S. State Department and DOD accounts. The Obama Administration asked for an additional $332 million in State Department funding for these programs in its FY2013 budget request. Aid to the Colombian military and police has been conditioned upon vetting requirements for trainees and meeting human rights conditions. The U.S.-Colombian partnership, initially focused on counternarcotics, shifted in 2002. Because narcotics trafficking and the guerrilla insurgency had become intertwined problems, the U.S. Congress granted the State Department and DOD flexibility to use U.S. counterdrug funds for a unified campaign to fight drug trafficking and terrorist groups. Congress capped the number of U.S. military personnel and civilian contractors that could be stationed in Colombia in support of that effort. President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) aggressively embraced Plan Colombia, and his "democratic security" policy successfully pushed back the FARC and ELN insurgencies. Uribe also negotiated an agreement with Colombia's rightwing paramilitaries organized under the AUC that led to the group's disbandment in 2006 after more than 31,000 of its members demobilized. The leftwing insurgencies were further weakened by numerous military, police, and intelligence operations, many of which were carried out with U.S. support. U.S. assistance also led to greater professionalization of the Colombian National Police and armed forces.51President Uribe modified Plan Colombia in 2007, with a strategy to consolidate state presence in marginal areas where violence by illegal armed groups, poverty, and illicit crop cultivation had historically converged. In 2009, this "whole-of-government" approach was modified and renamed the National Consolidation Plan (NCP). It is a sequenced process that integrates security, eradication, interdiction, and development. The parallel U.S. program, the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI), supports Colombia's initiative in remote, but strategically important, areas by increasing the presence of civilian state development institutions. The National Consolidation Plan was re-launched by President Juan Manuel Santos after his inauguration in August 2010 to focus on fewer municipalities and to increase the integration of the newly consolidated areas into Colombia's overall development plans. In 2008, the United States began turning over operational and financial responsibility for Plan Colombia programs to the Colombians in a process of nationalization. Over the last four years, as U.S. funding for Plan Colombia has gradually declined, several programs were successfully nationalized, including the Air Bridge Denial Program52 and several police and military aviation operations. The nationalization efforts are not intended to end U.S. assistance, but rather reduce it to pre-Plan Colombia levels adjusted for inflation.53 Most analysts agree that Plan Colombia has significantly improved security conditions in Colombia. Proponents and U.S. officials say that Plan Colombia dramatically reduced violence that once threatened to undermine the state, rolled back the power of the illegally armed groups that are funded by drug profits, and reduced the role of illegal narcotics in the Colombian economy.54 However, some observers, while acknowledging the gains made through manual eradication and advances against the FARC, maintain that aerial spraying has had detrimental effects. Those include the displacement of vulnerable populations, environmental damage, and the dispersal of coca cultivation.55 Critics also argue that the strategy has not rigorously promoted human rights, provided sustainable economic alternatives for drug crop farmers, or reduced the amount of drugs available in the United States. According to the State Department, Colombia still produces more than 95% of the cocaine seized in the United States.56

#### Their Brown evidence is about PMCs which the plan doesn’t end – it also says that conditions worsened as drug trade increased so if the CP has a chance of solving the aff sign your ballot –

#### The US has been taking action to improve assault reporting rates – US leverage for accountability is key

Fatima 18 (Quratulain, Flight Lieutenant Quratulain Fatima is a policy practitioner working extensively in rural and conflict-ridden areas of Pakistan with a focus on gender inclusive development and conflict prevention. She is a 2018 Aspen New Voices Fellow. “Across the world, militaries have a sexual violence problem” Al Jazeera. <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/world-militaries-sexual-violence-problem-180501103623616.html>) NE

In 2003, I was a young Flying Officer in the Pakistan Air Force, training under a supervisor who was notorious for making advances on women. He lived up to his reputation. During my one year at the airbase, he inappropriately touched and made indecent comments and sexually explicit jokes to me and my female colleagues. Although I was not physically assaulted, the psychological trauma from these experiences was unbearable. It is never easy to speak of sexual abuse, and I never reported him. Instead, I tried to erase this traumatic episode of my life from my memory - until recently. Last year, the revelations of pervasive sexual harassment and assault in the US film industry, and the consequent rise of the #MeToo movement, brought back these painful memories. Like other women across different industries and countries, I found the courage to speak out. Because armies are male-dominated - across the world men account for more than 90 percent of military staff - and are intrinsically associated with certain notions of masculinity and aggression, they are difficult workplaces for women to navigate. Furthermore, for centuries, armies have used rape as a weapon of war and some continue to do so. In recent years, there has also been growing evidence of the pervasiveness of sexual violence perpetrated by peacekeeping forces and of sexual assault committed within the military ranks across the world. Despite increasing media attention on sexual crimes perpetrated by troops, information and statistics on sexual crimes within the military are still difficult to come by. Few countries around the world publish official data on the subject, and what is publicly available often underrepresents the true extent of the problem. Israel, which mandates military service for both men and women, had 893 cases of sexual assault reported in the last year. The Pentagon estimates that 15,000 members of the US military have been sexually assaulted. In the British military, four in 10 military women are victims of sexual violence. A 2016 survey estimated that 27 percent of women in the Canadian armed forces face sexual abuse during their career. Official reports on sexual violence in the military are even harder to find in developing countries. In my country, Pakistan, there have not been any reports released by the military on sexual crimes committed within its ranks. In countries like India, Peru, North Korea, Eritrea and Syria, there have been only occasional media reports on sexual assault committed by troops or anecdotal evidence published in human rights reports. Across the world, sexual violence is very difficult for women in the military to address. Victims are often blamed for "provoking" the sexual abuse with their behaviour or dress. Reporting sexual harassment and assault can mean that the victim is labelled as a person of "loose morals" or as "a liar". In more conservative settings, virginity and notions of honour make reporting sexual violence even more difficult, as women fear bringing shame to their families and losing their chances of marriage. At times, military women also trivialise sexual harassment to fit into the masculine setting. They may also discourage other women from reporting their experiences. One of the biggest challenges in addressing sexual violence in the army is that military laws and procedures are different from civilian ones. Speaking to the media is prohibited and military institutions can hide behind legal loopholes or national security legislation to dodge accountability for crimes. Sexual violence cases are heard in male-dominated military courts that operate under military law, which makes it difficult for militaries to try abusive people in top leadership positions. Often perpetrators sit in the same chain of command that is supposed to act on the complaint, leaving survivors of sexual violence fearing retaliation if they report. There is a gap in evidence-based studies on the issue, but data from the US military suggest that more than 48 percent of survivors refuse to proceed with trial after reporting sexual violence. Solutions to the problem of sexual violence vary. Countries like Pakistan follow a strict policy of gender segregation to minimise interaction between men and women in the military. This is effective to an extent, given the conservative culture in the country. Norway has taken the exact opposite route of putting men and women together in dorms and this strategy also seems to be working in reducing sexual assault rate. Countries like the US, France, UK, Israel and Canada have made some efforts to reform reporting and response mechanisms for sexual violence crimes to ensure protection for the victims and a higher likelihood for the perpetrators to be held accountable. None of these efforts has been enough, however. To truly address sexual violence within the military, comprehensive changes must be implemented. These include: adapting practices to combat sexual harassment while keeping victims safe; developing action plans to prevent sexual harassment; training troops to report sexual harassment both as victims and as witnesses; creating safe and private channels of reporting sex crimes without fear of retaliation; amending military laws in countries that don't already classify sexual harassment as a specific crime to make it one; publicising the sexual harassment data and actions taken on them; and making provisions for victims to take sexual harassment cases to civil courts.

### Solvency – LA Counternarcotics

#### Their Rosenblum evidence – it’s old as heck, our Wyler et. al. 12 evidence is significantly better - US counternarcotics has been a crucial part in maintaining security, building “civilian state development institutions,” and reducing human rights violations.

#### Their Hesselroth and Alsema evidence - governments circumvent military aid for social programs already - US military funds are flexible to allow for the state building that is required – THEIR EVIDENCE

Alsema ’15 (Adriaan is the founder and editor-in-chief of Colombia Reports. Born and raised a Dutchman, Adriaan has been living in Colombia since 2008. “US agrees to redirect counternarcotics aid to Colombia post-conflict programs.” 10/2/15. Colombia Reports. https://colombiareports.com/us-agrees-to-redirect-counternarcotics-aid-to-colombia-post-conflict-programs/)-JJN

Colombia and the United States agreed on Thursday that Washington aid to fight drug trafficking will be used for peace building in the event the administration of President Juan Manuel Santos signs peace with FARC rebels. The decision was announced after Santos visited US Secretary of State John Kerry in Washington D.C. The US over the past 15 years has invested billions of dollars in the fighting of narcotics. The majority of the funds in “Plan Colombia” were for military aid that supported the Colombian state’s fight against leftist rebel groups like the FARC and the much smaller ELN. “We are working to give a new direction to those plans,” Kerry told press after his meeting with the Colombian president. Both the FARC and ELN are heavily reliant on the drug trade to finance their attempted revolution and have promised to abandon the illicit trade in the event of peace. Colombia’s peace deals in depth: Illicit drugs According to the Colombian head of state, the US aid used currently to fight the drug trafficking rebels will be reallocated to support social programs to support peacebuilding in the country that has had an internal armed conflict since 1964. “The United States has just offered to contribute funds for the post-conflict” projects that include crop restitution programs for farmers who depend on coca, the main ingredient for the production of cocaine. Other post-conflict projects that according to Santos can count on US support are social and environmental conservation programs, Reuters reported. Santos and FARC leader “Timochenko” last week announced to sign a final peace agreement within six months while talks with the ELN are expected to be formalized soon.

## Algeria

### Adv – Dougherty Valley

#### No impact – their internal link is that Russia would use nukes if they’re losing a conventional war

#### If conventional war with Russia started or was imminent, the US would use nukes first – small attacks go nuclear FAST and the US isn’t afriad

Tong Zhao et al 18, fellow @ Carnegie, PhD in Science, Technology, and International Affairs @ Georgia Institute of Technology, MA in International Relations @ Tsinghua University, “Reducing the Risks of Nuclear Entanglement”, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/09/12/reducing-risks-of-nuclear-entanglement-pub-77236

Chinese or Russian non-nuclear strikes against the United States could also spark escalation—a risk that has been overlooked since the Cold War—for reasons other than crisis instability. The risk would be most acute if China or Russia launched non-nuclear attacks against dual-use U.S. C3I assets (including early-warning and communication satellites, as well as ground-based radars and transmitters). Even if conducted exclusively for the purpose of winning (or at least not losing) a conventional war, such non-nuclear attacks could be misinterpreted by Washington as preparations for nuclear use. As a result, Washington might come to believe (wrongly) that it was about to become the victim of a nuclear attack—an effect termed misinterpreted warning. For example, China or Russia might attack U.S. early-warning satellites to enable their regional non-nuclear ballistic missiles (or, perhaps, non-nuclear ICBMs or boost-glide weapons in the future) to penetrate U.S. missile defenses. However, such an attack might be misinterpreted by the United States as an attempt to disable missile defenses designed to protect the homeland against limited nuclear strikes. Even if the United States did not believe that nuclear use by an adversary was imminent, it might still worry that non-nuclear strikes against its dual-use C3I assets could compromise its ability to limit the damage it would suffer if the war turned nuclear at some later point. Such damage-limitation operations, which are an acknowledged part of U.S. nuclear strategy, would probably involve nuclear or non-nuclear attacks on the adversary’s nuclear forces backed up by missile defenses. To have any chance of success, these operations would require very sophisticated C3I capabilities (to target mobile missiles, for example). Attacks on—or even perceived threats to—these C3I assets (many of which are dual use) could lead to concerns in Washington that, unless it took action now, effective damage limitation might be impossible—that is, the damage-limitation window might already have closed—if the war turned nuclear. The United States might respond to either of these concerns in ways that could further escalate the crisis. Washington would probably take steps to protect surviving C3I capabilities. It might, for example, attack anti-satellite weapons that were seen as particularly threatening. Such strikes could prove especially escalatory if they were conducted deeper inside the adversary’s borders than the United States had previously struck. Alternatively, or additionally, Washington might issue explicit or implicit nuclear threats against nuclear use or further attacks on C3I assets. In fact, the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review even goes so far as to threaten to use nuclear weapons in response to attacks on C3I assets. Risk mitigation will likely prove challenging. China may not want to disentangle its nuclear and non-nuclear forces because doing so might weaken its ability to deter U.S. attacks against the latter and because such disentanglement might prove challenging organizationally for the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (which operates China’s land-based nuclear forces). For Russia, the financial costs associated with disentanglement are likely to be a significant barrier. Moreover, inadvertent escalation is not generally regarded as a serious risk in China or Russia. Unfortunately, the belief that inadvertent escalation is unlikely actually makes it more probable because it leaves political and military leaders less inclined, in peacetime, to take steps that could mitigate the risks and more inclined, in wartime, to interpret ambiguous events in the worst possible light. Although there is more acceptance of the possibility of inadvertent escalation in the United States, there is little evidence that the U.S. government and military have fully factored the risks of entanglement into procurement policies and war planning. There is also little evidence that the administration of President Donald Trump is willing to invest significant political capital in reducing the risk of inadvertent escalation.

#### That initial strike will completely destroy their nuclear arsenal – solves the impact.

Hans Kristensen et al 17, Associate Senior Fellow with the SIPRI Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme, director of the Nuclear Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists, co-author to the world nuclear forces overview in the SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford University Press) and a frequent adviser to the news media on nuclear weapons policy and operations, "How US nuclear force modernization is undermining strategic stability: The burst-height compensating super-fuze", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2017/03/how-us-nuclear-force-modernization-is-undermining-strategic-stability-the-burst-height-compensating-super-fuze/

The US nuclear forces modernization program has been portrayed to the public as an effort to ensure the reliability and safety of warheads in the US nuclear arsenal, rather than to enhance their military capabilities. In reality, however, that program has implemented revolutionary new technologies that will vastly increase the targeting capability of the US ballistic missile arsenal. This increase in capability is astonishing—boosting the overall killing power of existing US ballistic missile forces by a factor of roughly three—and it creates exactly what one would expect to see, if a nuclear-armed state were planning to have the capacity to fight and win a nuclear war by disarming enemies with a surprise first strike. Because of improvements in the killing power of US submarine-launched ballistic missiles, those submarines now patrol with more than three times the number of warheads needed to destroy the entire fleet of Russian land-based missiles in their silos. US submarine-based missiles can carry multiple warheads, so hundreds of others, now in storage, could be added to the submarine-based missile force, making it all the more lethal. The revolutionary increase in the lethality of submarine-borne US nuclear forces comes from a “super-fuze” device that since 2009 has been incorporated into the Navy’s W76-1/Mk4A warhead as part of a decade-long life-extension program. We estimate that all warheads deployed on US ballistic missile submarines now have this fuzing capability. Because the innovations in the super-fuze appear, to the non-technical eye, to be minor, policymakers outside of the US government (and probably inside the government as well) have completely missed its revolutionary impact on military capabilities and its important implications for global security. Before the invention of this new fuzing mechanism, even the most accurate ballistic missile warheads might not detonate close enough to targets hardened against nuclear attack to destroy them. But the new super-fuze is designed to destroy fixed targets by detonating above and around a target in a much more effective way. Warheads that would otherwise overfly a target and land too far away will now, because of the new fuzing system, detonate above the target. FIGURE 1. The deployment of the new MC4700 arming, fuzing, and firing system on the W76-1/Mk4A significantly increases the number of hard target kill-capable warheads on US ballistic missile submarines. The result of this fuzing scheme is a significant increase in the probability that a warhead will explode close enough to destroy the target even though the accuracy of the missile-warhead system has itself not improved. As a consequence, the US submarine force today is much more capable than it was previously against hardened targets such as Russian ICBM silos. A decade ago, only about 20 percent of US submarine warheads had hard-target kill capability; today they all do. (See Figure 1.) This vast increase in US nuclear targeting capability, which has largely been concealed from the general public, has serious implications for strategic stability and perceptions of US nuclear strategy and intentions. Russian planners will almost surely see the advance in fuzing capability as empowering an increasingly feasible US preemptive nuclear strike capability—a capability that would require Russia to undertake countermeasures that would further increase the already dangerously high readiness of Russian nuclear forces. Tense nuclear postures based on worst-case planning assumptions already pose the possibility of a nuclear response to false warning of attack. The new kill capability created by super-fuzing increases the tension and the risk that US or Russian nuclear forces will be used in response to early warning of an attack—even when an attack has not occurred. The increased capability of the US submarine force will likely be seen as even more threatening because Russia does not have a functioning space-based infrared early warning system but relies primarily on ground-based early warning radars to detect a US missile attack. Since these radars cannot see over the horizon, Russia has less than half as much early-warning time as the United States. (The United States has about 30 minutes, Russia 15 minutes or less.) The inability of Russia to globally monitor missile launches from space means that Russian military and political leaders would have no “situational awareness” to help them assess whether an early-warning radar indication of a surprise attack is real or the result of a technical error. The combination of this lack of Russian situational awareness, dangerously short warning times, high-readiness alert postures, and the increasing US strike capacity has created a deeply destabilizing and dangerous strategic nuclear situation. When viewed in the alarming context of deteriorating political relations between Russia and the West, and the threats and counter-threats that are now becoming the norm for both sides in this evolving standoff, it may well be that the danger of an accident leading to nuclear war is as high now as it was in periods of peak crisis during the Cold War. How the new accuracy-enhancing fuze works. The significant increase in the ability of the W76-1/Mk4A warhead to destroy hardened targets—including Russian silo-based ICBMs—derives from a simple physical fact: Explosions that occur near and above the ground over a target can be lethal to it. This above-target area is known as a “lethal volume”; the detonation of a warhead of appropriate yield in this volume will result in the destruction of the target. The recognition that the killing power of the W76 warhead could be vastly increased by equipping it with a new fuze was discussed in a 1994 alternate warhead study conducted by the Defense and Energy departments. The study calculated the number of warheads that would be needed for the W76 to attack the Russian target base, if START II were implemented. At the time, W76/Mk4 warheads had a fixed height-of-burst fuze (meaning the fuze could not adjust its detonation at an optimal location if it were falling short or long of a target). With those fixed-height fuzes, submarine-launched nuclear missiles were mainly aimed at softer targets such as military bases. But the study found that an enhanced Mk4A reentry-body with a new fuze that provided for an adjustable height-of-burst as it arrives would have significant capabilities against harder targets, compared to warheads with the earlier fuzes. The study assumed that a smaller number of Mk4 nuclear warheads with higher killing power per warhead could cover the Russian target base and be more effective than multiple attacks on targets with less destructive warheads. In other words, an enhanced fuze would allow the United States to reduce the number of warheads on its ballistic missile submarines, but increase the targeting effectiveness of the fleet. Figure 2 illustrates the kill distribution of US submarine-launched nuclear missiles equipped with the earlier, fixed height-of-burst fuzes. The dome-shaped volume outlined in gray shows the lethal volume within which a 100-kiloton nuclear explosion will generate 10,000 pounds per square inch or more of blast pressure on the ground. In other words, if a target on the ground cannot survive a blast of 10,000 pounds per square inch or more, it will be destroyed if a 100-kt nuclear weapon detonates anywhere within that dome-shaped volume. To show the physical relationship of the lethal volume for a particular ground target of interest—in this case a Russian SS-18 ICBM silo—Figure 2 was drawn to scale. Also shown to scale is the approximate spread of warhead trajectories that correspond to a missile that is accurate to 100 meters, a miss distance roughly the same as what is achieved by the Trident II sea-launched ballistic missile. Miss distances are typically characterized in terms of a quantity called the “circular error probable,” or CEP, which is defined as the radius of a circle around the aim point within which half of the warheads aimed at a target are expected to impact. In the case of a Trident II 100-kt W76-1 ballistic missile warhead, the lethal distance on the ground and the CEP are roughly equal. As a result, roughly half of the warheads equipped with the old, fixed-height fuze system could be expected to fall close enough to detonate on the ground within the lethal range. The new super-fuze for W76-1/Mk4A has a flexible height-of-burst capability that enables it to detonate at any height within the lethal volume over a target. Figure 3 shows how the new fuze vastly increases the chances that the target will be destroyed, even though the arriving warheads have essentially the same ballistic accuracy. The super-fuze is designed to measure its altitude well before it arrives near the target and while it is still outside the atmosphere. This measurement would typically be taken at an altitude of 60 to 80 kilometers, where the effects of atmospheric drag are very small. At this point, the intended trajectory is known to very high precision before the warhead begins to substantially slow from atmospheric drag. If the warhead altitude measured by the super-fuze at that time were exactly equal to the altitude expected for the intended trajectory, the warhead would be exactly on target. But if the altitude were higher than expected, the warhead could be expected to hit beyond the intended aim point. Likewise, if the altitude is lower than that expected, the warhead would likely hit short of the intended aim point. Testing has established the statistical shape and orientation of the expected spread of warhead locations as they fly towards the target. In the case of Trident II, the spread of trajectories around the intended trajectory is so small that the best way to increase the chances of detonating inside the lethal volume is to intentionally shift the aim point slightly beyond the location of the target. (Note that the intended trajectory in Figure 3 is shifted slightly down range.) By shifting the aim point down range by a distance roughly equal to a CEP, warheads that would otherwise fall short or long of the target using the conventional Mk4 fuze instead will detonate—at different heights dictated by the super fuze—within the lethal volume above a target. This shift in the down-range aim point will result in a very high percentage of warheads that overfly the target detonating in the lethal volume. The end result is that with the new Mk4A super-fuze, a substantially higher percentage of launched warheads detonate inside the lethal volume, resulting in a considerable increase in the likelihood that the target is destroyed. The ultimate effect of the super fuze’s flexible burst-height capability is a significantly increased target kill probability of the new W76-1/Mk4A warhead compared with the conventional warhead of the same type. Figure 4 shows the probability that warheads will detonate close enough to destroy the ground-target for both the conventional fuze and the super-fuze. As can be seen from figure 4, the probability of kill using a submarine-launched warhead with the new super-fuze (W76-1/Mk4A) is about 0.86. This 86 percent probability is very close to what could be achieved using three warheads with conventional fuzes to attack the same target. To put it differently: In the case of the 100-kt Trident II warhead, the super fuze triples the killing power of the nuclear force it has been applied to. Many Russian targets are not hardened to 10,000 pounds per square inch blast overpressure. Figure 5 shows the same probability of kill curves for the case of a target that is only hard to 2,000 pounds per square inch or more of blast overpressure, which is the actual case for almost all targets hardened to nuclear attack—ICBMs and supporting command posts, hardened structures at strategic airbases, submarines at pierside or in protected tunnels, hardened command posts at road mobile missile bases and elsewhere, etc. In this case, the super-fuze achieves a probability of kill of about 0.99—or very near certainty. This case also is equivalent to achieving a probability of kill associated with using three warheads with a 0.83 probability to achieve a 0.99 probability of kill. The probability of kills revealed by figures 4 and 5 have enormous security ramifications. The US military assumes that Russian SS-18 and TOPOL missile silos are hardened to withstand a pressure of 10,000 pounds per square inch or more. Since with the new super-fuze, the probability of kill against these silos is near 0.9, the entire force of 100-kt W76-1/Mk4A Trident II warheads now “qualifies” for use against the hardest of Russian silos. This, in turn, means that essentially all of the higher-yield nuclear weapons (such as the W88/Mk5) that were formerly assigned to these Russian hard targets can now be focused on other, more demanding missions, including attacks against deeply-buried underground command facilities. In effect, the significant increase in the killing power of the W76 warhead allows the United States to use its submarine-based weapons more decisively in a wider range of missions than was the case before the introduction of this fuze. The history of the US super-fuze program. The super-fuze is officially known as the arming, fuzing and firing (AF&F) system. It consists of a fuze, an arming subsystem (which includes the radar), a firing subsystem, and a thermal battery that powers the system. The AF&F is located in the tip of the cone-shaped reentry body above the nuclear explosive package itself. The AF&F developed for the new W76-1/Mk4A is known as MC4700 and forms part of the W76 life-extension program intended to extend the service life of the W76—the most numerous warhead in the US stockpile—out to the time period 2040-2050. The new super-fuze uses a technology first deployed on the high-yield W88/Mk5 Trident II warhead. The Navy’s Strategic Systems Program contracted with the Lockheed Missile and Space Corporation in the early 1980s to develop a new fuze that included “a radar-updated, path-length compensating fuze … that could adjust for trajectory errors and significantly improve the ability to destroy a target. This was an early and sophisticated use of artificial intelligence in a weapon.” It was the radar-updated, path-length compensating fuze—combined with the increased accuracy of the Trident II missile—that gave an SLBM the ability to hold a hardened target at risk. Efforts to incorporate the W88/Mk5 fuze capability into the W76/Mk4 was part of the Energy Department’s Warhead Protection Program in the mid-1990s to permit “Mk5 fuzing functionality (including radar-updated path length fuzing, and radar proximity fuzing) as an option to replacement of the much smaller Mk4 AF&F,” according to the partially declassified 1996 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (emphasis added). Apart from the inherent drive to improve military capabilities whenever possible, the motivation for increasing the target kill capability of the submarine-borne W76 was that the Air Force’s hard-target killer, the MX Peacekeeper ICBM, was scheduled to be retired under the START II treaty. The Navy only had 400 W88 hard-target kill warheads, so a decision was made to add the capability to the W76. In an article in April 1997, Strategic Systems Program director Rear Adm. George P. Nanos publicly explained that “just by changing the fuze in the Mk4 reentry body, you get a significant improvement. The Mk4, with a modified fuze and Trident II accuracy, can meet the original D5 [submarine-borne missile] hard target requirement,” [Nanos stated](https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/W76nanos.pdf). Later that same year, the Energy Department’s Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan formally described the objective of the fuze modernization program “to enable W76 to take advantage of [the] higher accuracy of [the] D5 missile.” By 1998, the fuze modernization effort became a formal project, with five SLBM flight tests planned for 2001-2008. Full-scale production of the super-fuze equipped W76-1/Mk4A began in September 2008, with the first warhead delivered to the Navy in February 2009. By the end of 2016, roughly 1,200 of an estimated 1,600 planned W76-1/Mk4As had been produced, of which about 506 are currently deployed on ballistic missile submarines. The implications. The newly created capability to destroy Russian silo-based nuclear forces with 100-kt W76-1/Mk4A warheads—the most numerous in the US stockpile—vastly expands the nuclear warfighting capabilities of US nuclear forces. Since only part of the W76 force would be needed to eliminate Russia’s silo-based ICBMs, the United States will be left with an enormous number of higher-yield warheads that would then be available to be reprogrammed for other missions. Approximately 890 warheads are deployed on US ballistic missile submarines (506 W76-1/Mk4A and 384 W88/Mk5). Assuming that the 506 deployed W76-1s equipped with the super-fuze were used against Russian silo-based ICBMs, essentially all 136 Russian silo-based ICBMs could be potentially eliminated by attacking each silo with two W76-1 warheads—a total of 272 warheads. This would consume only 54 percent of the deployed W76-1 warheads, leaving roughly 234 of the 500 warheads free to be targeted on yet other installations. And hundreds of additional submarine warheads are in storage for increasing the missile warhead loading if so ordered. The Trident II missiles that are deployed today carry an average of four to five W76-1 warheads each. However, each missile could carry eight such warheads if the US were to suddenly decide to carry a maximum load of W76 warheads on its deployed Trident II ballistic missiles. And the missile was tested with up to 12 warheads. Essentially all the 384 W88 “heavy” Trident II warheads, with yields of 455 kt, would also be available for use against deeply-buried targets. In addition, about 400 Minuteman III warheads, with yields of about 300 kt, could be used to target hardened Russian targets. In all, the entire Russian silo-based forces could potentially be destroyed while leaving the US with 79 percent of its ballistic missile warheads unused. Even after Russia’s silo-based missiles were attacked, the US nuclear firepower remaining would be staggering—and certainly of concern to Russia or any other country worried about a US first strike. Because of the new kill capabilities of US submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the United States would be able to target huge portions of its nuclear force against non-hardened targets, the destruction of which would be crucial to a “successful” first strike. One such mission would likely involve the destruction of road-mobile ICBMs that had left their garrisons to hide in Russia’s vast forests in anticipation of attack. The garrisons and their support facilities would probably be destroyed quickly, and some of the dispersed road-mobile launchers would also be quickly destroyed as they were in the process of dispersing. To destroy or expose the remaining launchers, United States planners would have the nuclear forces needed to undertake truly scorched-earth tactics: Just 125 US Minuteman III warheads could set fire to some 8,000 square miles of forest area where the road-mobile missiles are most likely to be deployed. This would be the equivalent of a circular area with a diameter of 100 miles. Such an attack would be potentially aimed at destroying all road-mobile launchers either as they disperse or after they have taken up position some short distance from roads that give them access to forested areas. Many of the nearly 300 remaining deployed W76 warheads could be used to attack all command posts associated with Russian ICBMs. A very small number of Russia’s major leadership command posts are deeply buried, to protect them from direct destruction by nuclear attack. The US military would likely reserve the highest-yield warheads for those targets. Figure 7 below shows an example of a structure that is roughly the size of the US Capitol building that is postulated to have rooms and tunnels as deep as 800 feet or more. Shelters that have rooms and tunnels at even greater depths could be sealed by using multiple nuclear warheads to crater every location where an entrance or exit might conceivably have been built.

#### Successful preemptive strike forces a surrender – solves further escalation.

Sarah Johnson 17, "U.S. Nuclear First Strike Policy; Be Afraid", Bill Track 50, https://www.billtrack50.com/blog/in-the-news/u-s-nuclear-first-strike-policy-be-afraid/

The second situation is a [preemptive strike](http://www.dictionary.com/browse/preemptive-strike) — a first-strike attack with nuclear weapons carried out to destroy an enemy’s capacity to respond. Preemptive strikes can be based on the assumption that the enemy is planning an imminent attack, but don’t have to be. The methodology behind a preemptive nuclear strike is to attack the enemy’s strategic nuclear weapon facilities (missile silos, submarine bases, bomber airfields), command and control sites and storage depots first. By hitting these targets first the enemy will be so wounded with so little of their resources left that they will be forced to surrender with minimal damage to the attacking party.

#### Otherwise, Russia will broadly scale up military AI – extinction.

Mike Rogers 17, former US Representative from Michigan, chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Artificial intelligence — the arms race we may not be able to control", TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/351725-artificial-intelligence-is-the-new-arms-race-we-may-not-be-able-to-control

“Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become ruler of the world,” [said](https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/4/16251226/russia-ai-putin-rule-the-world) Vladimir Putin. The sphere the President of Russia is referring to is artificial intelligence (AI) and his comments should give you a moment of pause. Addressing students at the beginning of our Labor Day weekend, Putin remarked “Artificial intelligence is the future, not only for Russia, but for all humankind,” adding, “It comes with colossal opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to predict.” For once, I find myself in agreement with the President of Russia, but just this once. Artificial Intelligence offers incredible promise and peril. Nowhere is this clearer than in the realm of national security. Today un-crewed systems are a fact of modern warfare. Nearly every country is adopting systems where personnel are far removed from the conflict and wage war by remote control. AI [stands](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/26/us/pentagon-artificial-intelligence-terminator.html) to sever that ground connection. Imagine a fully autonomous Predator or Reaper drone. Managed by an AI system, the drone could identify targets, determine their legitimacy, and conduct a strike all without human intervention. Indeed, the Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom issued a press [statement](https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/12/16286580/uk-government-killer-robots-drones-weapons) in September that the country “does not possess fully autonomous weapon systems and has no intention of developing them,” and that its weapons systems “will always be under control as an absolute guarantee of human oversight and authority and accountability.” Let’s think smaller. Imagine a tiny insect-sized drone loaded with explosive. Guided by a [pre-programmed AI](https://www.amazon.com/Life-3-0-Being-Artificial-Intelligence/dp/1101946598), it could hunt down a specific target — a politician, a general, or an opposition figure — determine when to strike, how to strike, and if to strike based on its own learning. Howard Hughes Medical Center [recently](https://qz.com/1000011/scientists-attached-an-electronic-backpack-to-a-genetically-modified-dragonfly-and-turned-it-into-a-drone/) attached a backpack to a genetically modified dragonfly and flew it remotely. These examples are, however, where humans are involved and largely control the left and right limits of AI. Yet, there are examples of AI purposely and independently going beyond programed parameters. Rogue algorithms led to a [flash crash](http://gizmodo.com/rogue-algorithm-blamed-for-historic-crash-of-the-britis-1787523587) of the British Pound. In 2016, in-game AIs created super AIs weapons and [hunted down](http://www.kotaku.co.uk/2016/06/03/elites-ai-created-super-weapons-and-started-hunting-players-skynet-is-here) human players, and AIs have [created](https://www.forbes.com/sites/tonybradley/2017/07/31/facebook-ai-creates-its-own-language-in-creepy-preview-of-our-potential-future/#1cf69787292c) their own languages that were indecipherable to humans. AIs proved more effective than their human counterparts in producing and catching users in spear phishing programs. Not only did the AIs create more content, they successfully [captured](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Seymour-Tully-Weaponizing-Data-Science-For-Social-Engineering-Automated-E2E-Spear-Phishing-On-Twitter.pdf) more users with their deception. While seemingly simple and low stakes in nature, extrapolate these scenarios into more significant and risky areas and the consequences become much greater. Cybersecurity is no different. Today we are focused on the hackers, trolls, and cyber criminals (officially sanctioned and otherwise) who seek to penetrate our networks, steal our intellectual property, and leave behind malicious code for activation in the event of a conflict. Replace the individual with an AI and imagine how fast hacking takes place; networks against networks, at machine speed all without a human in the loop. Sound far-fetched? It’s not. In 2016, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency held an AI on AI capture the flag contest called the [Cyber Grand Challenge](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qSgYu3w3DMM) at the DEF CON event. AI networks against AI networks. In August of this year the founders of 116 AI and robotics companies signed a letter petitioning the United Nations [to ban](https://www.theverge.com/2017/8/21/16177828/killer-robots-ban-elon-musk-un-petition) lethal autonomous systems. Signatories to this letter included Google DeepMind’s co-founder Mustafa Suleyman and Elon Musk who, in response to Putin’s quote [tweeted](https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/904638455761612800), “Competition for AI superiority at national level most likely cause of WW3 imo (sic)”. AI is not some far off future challenge. It is a challenge today and one with which we must grapple. I am in favor of fielding any system that enhances our national security, but we must have an open and honest conversation about the implications of AI, the consequences of which we do not, and may not, fully understand. This is not a new type of bullet or missile. This is a potentially fully autonomous system that even with human oversight and guidance will make its own decisions on the battlefield and in cyberspace. How can we ensure that the system does not escape our control? How can we prevent such systems from falling into the hands of terrorists or insurgents? Who controls the source code? How and can we build in so-called impenetrable kill switches? AI and AI-like systems are slowly being introduced into our arsenal. Our adversaries, China, Russia, and others are also introducing AI systems into their arsenals as well. Implementation is happening faster than our ability to fully comprehend the consequences. Putin’s new call spells out a new arms race. Rushing to AI weapon systems without guiding principles is a dangerous. It risks an escalation that we do not fully understand and may not be able to control. The cost of limiting AI intelligence being weaponized [could vastly exceed](https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/AI%20NatSec%20-%20final.pdf) all of our nuclear proliferation efforts to date. More troubling, the consequences of failure are equally existential.

## Azerbaijan

### Adv – Northwood

#### No war – NATO destroys Russia

Robert Farley 17, 5-24-2017, "The U.S. Military's Greatest Fear: A War Against Russia AND China," National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-us-militarys-greatest-fear-war-against-russia-china-20819?page=2

The United States discarded its oft-misunderstood “two war” doctrine, intended as a template for providing the means to fight two regional wars simultaneously, late last decade. Designed to deter North Korea from launching a war while the United States was involved in fighting against Iran or Iraq (or vice versa,) the idea helped give form to the Department of Defense’s procurement, logistical and basing strategies in the post–Cold War, when the United States no longer needed to face down the Soviet threat. The United States backed away from the doctrine because of changes in the international system, including the rising power of China and the proliferation of highly effective terrorist networks. But what if the United States had to fight two wars today, and not against states like North Korea and Iran? What if China and Russia sufficiently coordinated with one another to engage in simultaneous hostilities in the Pacific and in Europe? Political Coordination Could Beijing and Moscow coordinate a pair of crises that would drive two separate U.S. military responses? Maybe, but probably not. Each country has its own goals, and works on its own timeline. More likely, one of the two would opportunistically take advantage of an existing crisis to further its regional claims. For example, Moscow might well decide to push the Baltic States if the United States became involved in a major skirmish in the South China Sea. In any case, the war would start on the initiative of either Moscow or Beijing. The United States enjoys the benefits of the status quo in both areas, and generally (at least where great powers are concerned) prefers to use diplomatic and economic means to pursue its political ends. While the U.S. might create the conditions for war, Russia or China would pull the trigger. Flexibility On the upside, only some of the requirements for fighting in Europe and the Pacific overlap. As was the case in World War II, the U.S. Army would bear the brunt of defending Europe, while the Navy would concentrate on the Pacific. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) would play a supporting role in both theaters. Russia lacks the ability to fight NATO in the North Atlantic, and probably has no political interest in trying. This means that while the United States and its NATO allies can allocate some resources to threatening Russia’s maritime space (and providing insurance against a Russian naval sortie,) the U.S. Navy (USN) can concentrate its forces in the Pacific. Depending on the length of the conflict and the degree of warning provided, the United States could transport considerable U.S. Army assets to Europe to assist with any serious fighting. The bulk of American carriers, submarines and surface vessels would concentrate in the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, fighting directly against China’s A2/AD system and sitting astride China’s maritime transit lanes. Long range aviation, including stealth bombers and similar assets, would operate in both theaters as needed. The U.S. military would be under strong pressure to deliver decisive victory in at least one theater as quickly as possible. This might push the United States to lean heavily in one direction with air, space and cyber assets, hoping to achieve a strategic and political victory that would allow the remainder of its weight to shift to the other theater. Given the strength of U.S. allies in Europe, the United States might initially focus on the conflict in the Pacific. Alliance Structure U.S. alliance structure in the Pacific differs dramatically from that of Europe. Notwithstanding concern over the commitment of specific U.S. allies in Europe, the United States has no reason to fight Russia apart from maintaining the integrity of the NATO alliance. If the United States fights, then Germany, France, Poland and the United Kingdom will follow. In most conventional scenarios, even the European allies alone would give NATO a tremendous medium term advantage over the Russians; Russia might take parts of the Baltics, but it would suffer heavily under NATO airpower, and likely couldn’t hold stolen territory for long. In this context, the USN and USAF would largely play support and coordinative roles, giving the NATO allies the advantage they needed to soundly defeat the Russians. The U.S. nuclear force would provide insurance against a Russian decision to employ tactical or strategic nuclear weapons. The United States faces more difficult problems in the Pacific. Japan or India might have an interest in the South China Sea, but this hardly guarantees their participation in a war (or even the degree of benevolence of their neutrality.) The alliance structure of any given conflict would depend on the particulars of that conflict; any of the Philippines, Vietnam, South Korea, Japan or Taiwan could become China’s primary target. The rest, U.S. pressure aside, might well prefer to sit on the sidelines. This would put extra pressure on the United States to establish dominance in the Western Pacific with its own assets. Parting Shots The United States can still fight and win two major wars at the same time,

#### No negative impact on high prices

Rapier 18 Robert Rapier [Chemical engineer in the energy industry, contributor to Forbes], "Mr. President, High Oil Prices Are Actually Not That Bad For U.S. Anymore," Forbes, 4-20-2018 https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2018/04/20/mr-president-high-oil-prices-are-no-longer-that-bad-for-u-s/

Earlier today, President Trump tweeted: "Looks like OPEC is at it again. With record amounts of Oil all over the place, including the fully loaded ships at sea, Oil prices are artificially Very High! No good and will not be accepted!" The President might need reminding that the top three oil-producing states in the country -- Texas, North Dakota, and Alaska -- all voted for him. Of the Top 25 oil-producing states, only California, New Mexico, Colorado, and Illinois (at No. 16) voted against him. Oil country is Trump country, and I would imagine he will hear from some constituents that they like high oil prices. Rising oil prices have enabled U.S. shale oil production to rebound from the decline it suffered in 2016. Further, it isn't true that there is still record amounts of oil "all over the place." A couple of years ago, global inventories were indeed at record highs. There was also a tremendous amount of oil in floating storage -- the "fully loaded ships at sea." That's no longer the case. The production cuts from OPEC have reduced crude oil inventories back into a normal range. This can be seen in the most recent Oil Market Report from the International Energy Agency: Once upon a time, when the U.S. imported 10 million barrels per day of crude oil, high oil prices were a serious drag on the U.S. economy. But with U.S. net exports plummeting toward zero, this situation is changing. If the U.S. ultimately becomes a net exporter of crude oil and petroleum products, then higher crude oil prices will bring more revenue into the U.S. This is a very different situation from the days when the U.S. was sending record amounts of cash overseas to purchase foreign oil. Yes, there are certain sectors that will be harmed by higher oil prices, but the net impact on the economy should start to improve as U.S. net exports increase. As a result, the notion that high oil prices are necessarily bad for the U.S. should be re-evaluated.

#### Shocks cause a shift to renewables without damaging the world economy

Warner 18 (Warner, Jeremy, award-winning economics expert. “We are heading for a new oil shock – but it will be the last hurrah”. The Telegraph. May 24, 2018. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2018/05/24/price-oil-soaring-rise-renewables-may-last-hurrah/>) BW

**Yet the possibility of Middle Eastern war is already very much in the mix,** and in the event of outright hostilities the price would sky-rocket to $100 and beyond. **Saudi Arabia could theoretically compensate for the loss of Iranian production by boosting its own supply. Yet if the effect of war is to disrupt shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, then it may be in no position to do so.** Besides, Saudi is by no means averse to the current upward trajectory; it needs an $80 plus oil price just to break even fiscally on current expenditures. On the other side of the fence, an economically struggling Russia would also very much welcome a much higher oil price. **Fortunately, the world economy is no longer as sensitive to oil price shocks as it used to be. Oil intensity in the global economy** - the amount of oil needed to produce a single unit of output - **has long been in steep decline,** having fallen by more than a half in advanced economies since the 1960s. What is more, **all those warnings of “peak oil” - the idea that the oil would run out before alternatives are found - have turned out to be so much poppycock. The shale revolution has created an abundance of supply,** such that peak world demand for oil will be reached - probably around fifteen years from now - long before the reserves begin to dwindle. **The rapid advance of renewables makes it highly likely that a large part of these reserves will never be used at all.** Happily, the shale revolution has in any case transformed the world’s largest economy, the US, into a net beneficiary of a high oil price, a complete reversal of the position it has found itself in during previous oil price spikes. **The world over, economies are weaning themselves off oil.** Even so, **oil still has the power to shock.** The macro-economic impact of a rising oil price is both inflationary and deflationary at the same time. It raises general price inflation, and by taking money out of consumers' pockets, depresses wider economic demand. As a general rule of thumb, a 10 percent rise in the oil price knocks around 0.1 percent off global output. It doesn’t sound much, and certainly the price would need to rise a lot to in itself derail the current global recovery. Nonetheless, combined with the knock to confidence from an all embracing Middle East conflict, the effect would be quite bad enough, especially on oil poor regions such as China. **Yet there is also a longer term bonus to be had from higher oil prices, the effect of which is to incentivise the development of alternative sources of energy. These are coming on in leaps and bounds, such that some of them are already cheaper than traditional hydrocarbons. We are at a tipping point, where the march of renewables starts to render older forms of energy production obsolete. Oil producers should enjoy the price spike while it lasts.** They’ve got a few decades left in them yet, but this may be their last hurrah.

#### Renewables prevent extinction

Wood 10, PhD, (Duncan, PoliticalStudies@Queens, https://www.csgwest.org/programs/documents/USMexico\_Cooperation\_Renewable\_Energies.pdf)

It is by now common knowledge that **the world is facing a climate change crisis caused by the effects of fossil fuel driven industrializatio**n. **A significant rise in global temperatures, combined with more severe weather conditions, more frequent floods and droughts**, are bringing a paradigm shift to the way we think about our relationship with the planet. For the first time in over 150 years policy makers are thinking seriously about decreasing dependency on fossil fuels and looking for alternatives that may be more expensive in the short and medium terms, but ultimately more sustainable. 7 All of this has happened at the same time as two other, related phenomena. The first is that the global population is reaching new highs and by 2040‐50 will total over 9 billion people. Experts predict that 85% of the world’s population will be located in the developing world, which will mean a rapidly growing demand for goods and for energy. Both of these factors will result in a **need to increase energy efficiency as well as find new sources of energy**. What’s more, this massive jump in population will coincide not only with climate change but also with increasingly difficult conditions for hydrocarbons exploration and production. **As most of the world’s “easy” oil has already been discovered, oil companies and nation states are turning to alternatives such a non‐conventional oil reserves (tar sands, complex fields) and reserves that in the past would have been considered unrecoverable, such as in very deep ocean waters.** Furthermore, **political conditions in many of the world’s oil rich regions are uncertain, unstable and often unfriendly to private oil companies and to the countries of the West.** Climate change and natural disasters The **urgency of finding alternatives to fossil fuels has been confirmed in recent years by mounting scientific evidence that we are undergoing a noticeable anthropogenic shift in the world’s weather and temperature**. Not only are a **range of indicators showing that the planet is warming, but the retreat of the polar ice caps, the melting of glaciers, and most importantly in the short term extreme weather conditions and increased incidence of natural disasters** have highlighted the consequences of maintaining the status quo in our patterns of energy consumption and industrial development. It is estimated that **we have experienced a 1 degree Celsius rise in global temperatures over the past 100 years and that by the end of the current century global temperatures may have risen by as much 7 or 8 degrees.** Even with the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions that is contemplated by the most ambitious mitigation strategies, **global temperatures may rise by as much as 6%.** This would have a **dramatic and disastrous impact on both developed and developing nations and will threaten the existence of both humans and animal and plant species**. **Though the connection between man‐made greenhouse gases and global warming was denied for many years by industry and governments alike, it has now been accepted that something must be done to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere.** Given that 86% of all global energy comes from fossil fuels, and that these fossil fuels produce 27,000,000,000 tons of CO2 emissions annually**, finding alternative sources of energy is a crucial component of climate change mitigation strategies**

#### Low oil prices lead to Venezuelan instability

Hargreaves 13 — Steve Hargreaves, reporter for CNN, 7/18/13, CNN Money, “Falling oil prices could spark global turmoil” <http://money.cnn.com/2013/07/18/news/economy/opec-oil/> / MM

The pain won't be evenly spread. Iran, Venezuela and Nigeria are already thought to be exceeding spending relative to what oil revenues bring in and are particularly vulnerable to a fall in oil prices in the next few years. "In Iran, it could be a factor in regime change," said Steffen Hertog, an assistant professor of Middle East policy and economy at the London School of Economics. "It could certainly instigate a wave of popular unrest." In Venezuela, where previous attempts to bring pennies-a-gallon gas prices closer to market rates preceded deadly riots and the toppling of the government, falling oil revenue could also bring about a change in regime, according to Hertog -- although he thinks the change would probably occur at the ballot box instead of the streets

#### Venezualan instability is a jumping off point for US-Russia conflict – prefer specific evidence

Brands 19 (Hal Brands is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist and the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, “South America is a battlefield in the new cold war,” <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/02/12/commentary/world-commentary/south-america-battlefield-new-cold-war/>, 2/12/2019, 2/28/2019) DG

The political crisis in Venezuela has pitted the United States against a dictator who refuses to leave office. But the crisis has a broader significance: It shows that Latin America has again become an arena in which rival great powers struggle for influence and advantage. As the U.S. faces surging geopolitical rivalry around the world, its position is also coming under pressure in its own backyard. The region has been the focus of global competition before, of course, from the Spanish-Portuguese rivalry of the 15th and 16th centuries to the Cold War between Washington and Moscow. But after the fall of the Soviet Union, Latin America seemed — for a time, at least — to have become a geopolitics-free zone. The retreat and disintegration of the Soviet Union left the U.S. with no challenger for predominant regional influence. Fidel Castro’s Cuba turned inward, consumed by a profound economic crisis. As countries democratized and embraced free markets, the region became essentially unipolar in an ideological sense, as well. By the early 2000s, however, the climate was shifting. First came a new generation of leaders who viewed neoliberal economics as the source of the region’s persistent poverty and inequality. Governments led by the likes of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador coupled populist political appeals and economic programs with a penchant for illiberalism and, in some cases, outright authoritarianism. They challenged the U.S. diplomatically and rhetorically, while establishing close ties with Cuba. This created a bloc of regional actors that opposed American power — just as outside actors were beginning to assert, or reassert, their own influence in the region. As China’s economy has boomed over the last two decades, its presence in Latin America has grown as well. Chinese trade and investment has surged nearly everywhere, not just countries run by radical populists. Chinese commerce and loans have provided a lifeline to illiberal rulers such as Chavez and now Nicolas Maduro by reducing their vulnerability to U.S. and Western pressure. Chinese military engagement followed, creating fears that Beijing may be trying to establish a strategic foothold in the Western Hemisphere. Although aspects of China’s relationship with Latin American countries remain controversial — some Chinese infrastructure projects have been criticized because they often employ Chinese rather than Latin American workers, for instance — Beijing has undoubtedly become a player in the Western Hemisphere. Russia has provided economic and diplomatic support to Chavez, Maduro and other autocratic rulers such as Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega. It has sold jets, tanks and other weapons to populist governments, and resumed providing military technology and oil to Cuba. Much to the concern of the U.S. government, the Kremlin has also been working to establish a significant intelligence presence in Nicaragua. As the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace observes, “Moscow’s approach to Latin America today echoes Soviet outreach in the 1960s through 1980s.” Russian and Chinese relations with Latin American countries are often described as simply transactional, and it is true that both Moscow and Beijing can drive hard bargains for their support. One price of Russia’s continued backing of the Maduro regime has been a significant ownership stake in the Venezuelan oil industry. China, too, has seen Venezuela as an energy source, and its economic growth would have driven enhanced involvement in Latin America even in the absence of any geopolitical design. But for both countries, that involvement also has a deeply competitive logic. Reaching into Latin America is a way of keeping the U.S. off-balance by exerting influence in Washington’s “near abroad.” It helps augment Beijing’s and Moscow’s global influence and stature at a time of intensifying rivalry with Washington. Finally, supporting autocratic regimes such as those in Caracas and Managua — whether quietly, as in China’s case, or more vocally, as in Russia’s — is a way of making sure that the world remains ideologically safe for authoritarianism in Beijing and Moscow, as well. All this constitutes the backdrop to the Venezuelan crisis. The growth of Russian and Chinese influence in Latin America broadly, and Venezuela specifically, is a key reason the Trump administration has so uncharacteristically taken up the banner of human rights and democracy. By imposing harsh economic sanctions, calling for the military to desert Maduro, and backing the political opposition led by Juan Guiado, the Trump administration is seeking to deprive Moscow, Beijing and Havana of a critical partner in Latin America. And while Russia and China have responded very differently to this crisis, both are working, in their own ways, to protect that partner. The Chinese government has registered its opposition to the international campaign against Maduro’s government; it has continued to recognize his embattled government even as dozens of democratic countries have thrown their support behind Guiado. Russia has been far more assertive, denouncing Washington for trying to “engineer a coup d’etat,” in the words of its United Nations representative. It has warned against American military intervention, and symbolically dispatched two nuclear-capable strategic bombers to Venezuela. More concretely, Moscow has reportedly dispatched 400 mercenaries to reinforce Maduro’s praetorian guard and pledged additional economic support. There is thus a certain Cold War feel to the current crisis, with the U.S. and its rivals lining up on opposite sides of a conflict over who should rule a key Latin American country. To be sure, there is an element of bluff in Moscow’s position. It can project only very limited military power into Venezuela or any other part of Latin America. Still, by providing Maduro with moral and material support that he would otherwise lack, both Russia and China are making the current crisis more difficult to resolve. Is the U.S. ready for this new environment where local crises and global tensions once again interact in challenging ways? The Trump administration deserves some credit here. It has spoken candidly about the dangers Chinese and Russian influence present to both Latin America and the U.S. It has also worked closely with other Latin American governments — including Brazil’s new and admittedly problematic president, Jair Bolsonaro — to coordinate the diplomatic pressure campaign against Maduro. There are also less helpful tendencies in U.S. policy. Trump’s earlier hostility to NAFTA gave Mexico and other Latin American countries incentive to diversify their economic relations, with China a willing target. The administration has warned about the threats posed by Chinese investment in dire tones, without making clear where else Latin American countries should turn for resources. Then there are the president’s offensive comments toward people of Hispanic descent, which have done little to endear him to Latin American audiences. In a 2015 Pew Research Center poll, a median of 66 percent of Latin Americans from seven different countries viewed the U.S. positively. Under Donald Trump, the number has fallen to 47 percent. Finally, developing a comprehensive strategy for dealing with Chinese and Russian influence will require consistent policies and cultivating key relationships — talents this administration has rarely displayed. Washington is increasingly waking up to the new struggle for advantage in Latin America. The outcome in Venezuela will be an early indicator of whether U.S. policy is up to the task.

#### U.S.-Russian war causes extinction.

Nielsen et al, 17 - Nielsen, senior research associate at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and NonProliferation, postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Queensland; Malygina, associate professor at the School of International Relations at St. Petersburg State University; Fikenscher, expert rapporteur with the Global Relations Forum’s International Task Force on the Future of the Nuclear Deal with Iran (Jenny Nielsen, Anastasia Malygina, Sven-Eric Fikenscher, "Amid High Tensions, an Urgent Need for Nuclear Restraint," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 5-12-2017, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00963402.2017.1338049?journalCode=rbul20)

Moscow is thought to have about 7,000 nuclear warheads and the United States about 6,800. The nation with the third-biggest nuclear stockpile, France, has “only” 300 or so (Kristensen and Norris 2017). If Russia and the United States fought an all-out nuclear war, it would upend human civilization. So it makes sense to begin any assessment of prospects for nuclear arms control and reduction measures at the bilateral level. But Washington and Moscow’s bilateral process of gradual nuclear disarmament has been in serious disarray since 2014. With the two sides at loggerheads over Crimea, Ukraine more broadly, and Syria, the bilateral atmosphere has deteriorated badly. Indeed, the danger of military escalation between Washington and Moscow has increased significantly. US and Russian armed forces are operating in close proximity around Russia’s Western border, especially in the Baltic region. The same is true in Syria – where, after the recent US airstrike against Syrian forces, Russia suspended an agreement (Filipov and Gearan 2017) that the two sides had reached regarding limited communications measures to reduce the risk of unintentional conflict. In Europe, risk reduction measures are still insufficient – even as the number of close military encounters has been disturbingly high (Task Force on Cooperation in Greater Europe 2015). Moreover, Washington and Moscow have expressed clearly divergent nuclear priorities over the last several years. Under the Obama administration, the United States proposed that each side cut its strategic arsenal by one-third – and bring tactical weapons into the bargain too. Moscow rebuffed this offer, calling instead for limits on US missile defense. It remains to be seen how the Trump administration will position itself, but it is safe to say that further bilateral nuclear reductions seem unlikely in the foreseeable future. Neither side can have an interest in allowing a conventional conflict to escalate to the nuclear level, but such escalation is nonetheless possible. In the last several years, both Moscow and Washington have engaged in some quite alarming rhetoric – as demonstrated by the Russian ambassador’s language, quoted earlier, regarding Denmark. In the United States, when then– presidential candidate Donald Trump was asked whether he would consider using nuclear weapons in parts of Europe, he gave an extremely vague answer – saying that “Europe is a big place” and alluding to the possibility of “very deep, very difficult, very horrible negotiation[s]” (Legum 2016). Such statements imply that a nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia is a possibility. The two sides’ nuclear strategy and posture increase the risk of war. Russia, concerned about its inferiority in conventional arms, began in 2000 to maintain a national security strategy that explicitly contemplated using nuclear weapons if Russia were on the losing side in a conventional military confrontation (Russian Federation 2000). The wording was watered down somewhat in documents released in 2010 and 2014, but the nuclear option was still on the table for Moscow in case of “a military conflict involving the utilization of conventional means of attack” that might imperil “the very existence of the state” (Colby 2016). This element of Russian nuclear doctrine is dangerously ambiguous – though, encouragingly, the declassified version of the 2015 national security strategy does not allude to such scenarios. Meanwhile, both sides keep their strategic nuclear systems on hair-trigger alert, which leaves leaders very little time to make “rational” decisions about using nuclear weapons during a crisis. This problem is compounded by the questionable reliability of early warning systems. Early warning depends on the reliable performance of satellites, radar systems, communications systems, and computers – but nuclear history is full of false alarms and misinterpretations (Lewis, et al. 2014). Between 1977 and 1984 there were more than 1,100 “moderately serious” false alarms in the United States alone (Cirincione 2013). All in all, the current climate is not conducive to further bilateral nuclear reductions. More worryingly, increased tensions between Moscow and Washington risk unintended escalation and may weaken the nuclear taboo. This suggests an increased need for multilateral nuclear disarmament efforts. Unfortunately, the situation at the multilateral level is more complicated than ever.

#### High oil prices are key to the Russian economy

Feifer 11 Gregory, Editor and Senior Correspondent for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, *Russia's Image as Energy Superpower Benefitting from Middle East Crisis*, [http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Russia-s-Image-as-Energy-Superpower-Benefitting-from-Middle-East-Crisis.html /](http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Russia-s-Image-as-Energy-Superpower-Benefitting-from-Middle-East-Crisis.html%20/) MM

With U.S.-led fighter jets pounding military assets in oil-rich Libya, and Japan still struggling to contain radiation at its stricken Fukushima nuclear plant, concerns are rising around the world about the future of energy supplies. But not in Russia. As the unrest in the Middle East bites into supplies, prices for crude approached $105 a barrel this week. That's helping drive windfall profits that are enabling the world's biggest energy exporter to finally emerge from recession triggered by the global financial crisis in 2008. But while that's good news for **Russia's economy**, Kremlin critics say rising energy prices are again shoring up the country's authoritarian **government** -- and that's bad for politics. Energy Savior Russia is using the crises in the Middle East and Japan to burnish its image as the world's energy superpower. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin -- who has predicted that Russia's GDP will equal its precrisis level by next year -- exchanged his usually stern demeanor for an uncharacteristically friendly manner last week and promised to help Japan, where the nuclear crisis has forced electricity blackouts. He predicted the effects of the earthquake and tsunami to energy supplies there will be long-term. "In that regard, we have to think of accelerating our plans to develop hydrocarbon-extraction projects -- particularly gas extraction -- in the Far East," he said. Putin offered to pump more gas to Europe by pipeline, freeing shipments of liquefied natural gas for Japan. He also proposed laying an electricity cable to Japan and offered Japanese companies stakes in Siberian gas fields. Moscow has issued more offers since, including encouragement for Japanese companies to invest in Russia's coal industry. But some analysts are warning Russia's heightened focus on its global energy role is eroding any -- already distant -- hopes the government would enact economic reform. The Kremlin vowed to diversify the country's economy after plummeting oil prices dealt the economy a body blow during the global financial crisis. Anti-Westernism Rising Political analyst Andrei Piontkovsky says the latest events in the Middle East are instead helping speed a return to Russia's precrisis situation, when peak oil prices flooded the country with cash. "We're returning to the golden era of 2006 and 2007, with official propaganda slogans extolling a 'great energy power,'" Piontkovsky says. "It's very good for a very limited group of people for a very short time period, but certainly it's very bad for the country." Piontkovsky says the developments are reinforcing the "general mentality" of Russia's leaders, reflected in a return to the kind of strident anti-Western rhetoric that was especially loud during the precrisis oil boom. He points to President Dmitry Medvedev's comments this month in which he blamed Western countries for prompting the Middle East unrest, adding that "they have prepared such a scenario for us." But it's **Putin** who's seen as Russia's supreme leader. He lashed out on March 22 in his strongest anti-Western comments in years, condemning the UN Security Council for authorizing force against Libya. He said last week's resolution enabled Western countries to take action against a sovereign state "under the guise of protecting the civilian population." "It actually resembles medieval calls for crusades when someone called on others to go to a certain place and liberate it," Putin said. Redefining Foreign Policy But the atmosphere in Moscow is more nuanced then the rhetoric suggests. Medvedev rejected Putin's comments, calling them "unacceptable." And despite Putin's displeasure, Russia declined to veto the resolution when it came to a vote last week, instead choosing to abstain. Fyodr Lukyanov, editor of the journal "Russia in Global Affairs," sees that decision as more significant than the tough talk. "It's not typical," he says. "Russia used to take stands for or against, particularly when it comes to issues such as intervention in other countries." He says foreign policy isn't being driven by rising oil prices. "It's about the gradual refocusing of Russian interests and redefining of Russian foreign-policy identity from a global one to a more regional one." That change, he says, reflects a "much more rational calculation of priorities." "It doesn't mean Russia is more pro-Western," Lukyanov says. "Russia is becoming less global, which means that, for example, the idea to challenge Washington everywhere and over everything isn't relevant anymore." Russia's Resources Card Boosting energy exports is among the priorities, as Putin's latest salesmanship reflects. But maintaining current levels won't be as easy as it may appear. Economist Clifford Gaddy of the Brookings Institution says the key question for Russia's future economic success will be how it responds to demand in resource-hungry China. Whatever the rhetoric coming out of the Kremlin, he says, Russia has little chance of competing in any other sector. "You can dream all you want about diversification and blame Putin or whoever for not diversifying or praise them because they want to diversify," Gaddy says, "but it doesn’t make very much sense. Russia's comparative, competitive advantage is not in anything except resources, so the smart thing to do is play that card." For now, Gaddy sees few long-term effects for Russia from the Middle East unrest, saying oil prices were predicted to rise to $105 to $108 this year even before it began, while commodity prices are expected to continue rising for the foreseeable future. That's depressing news for Putin's critics. Many believe the prime minister plans to return to the presidency in an election next year, and -- if elected again -- he could remain in office for the next 12 years.

#### Russian economic decline causes extinction

Filger 9 — Sheldon, Columnist and Founder – Global EconomicCrisis.com, “Russian Economy Faces Disasterous Free Fall Contraction”, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheldon-filger/russian-economy-faces-dis\_b\_201147.html /](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheldon-filger/russian-economy-faces-dis_b_201147.html%20/) MM

In Russia, historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation's history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

#### Saudi perception will cause them to release spare capacity — crashing prices and forcing out alternative energies for decades

Meyer and Swartz 8 — Gregory Meyer and Spencer Swartz, Adjunct Professor @ [University of Phoenix](http://www.phoenix.edu) + staff writer for the Wall Street Journal, 5/5/2008, “ENERGY MATTERS: Saudi Fears Of High Oil Prices Fade With Demand,” now available at http://snuffysmithsblog.blogspot.com/2008/05/saudi-fears-of-high-oil-prices-fade.html)

Saudi Arabia's role in the global oil market has sometimes been likened to the Federal Reserve, calibrating its output depending on market signals. Critical to this unique standing has been Saudi maintenance of a cushion of "spare capacity," now estimated at about two million barrels a day. For much of the recent period, the kingdom has refrained from tapping into all or most of its spare capacity. Within oil industry circles in places like Houston, the Saudi power has also carried a somewhat ominous connotation. Faced with growing production from the U.K., Mexico and other non-OPEC countries in the mid-1980s, Saudi Arabia flooded the market in an effort to drive out high-cost production and reassert its dominant market share. The 1986 oil price crash ushered in more than 15 years of mostly-lower crude prices, instilling a memory of economic hardship on the western oil industry that continues to be reflected in Big Oil's caution during these heady times. The shift to lower petroleum prices also impeded the development of renewable energy for about two decades. In his book, The Prize, Daniel Yergin compared the Saudi tactic in the 1980s to power plays by John Rockefeller and other heavyweights in the history of oil who have used a "good sweating" to drive out competitors. "No one is worrying about over-supply," Yergin said in an interview. Instead, the market is preoccupied with meeting growth in China, India and other fast-developing economies. "What (the Saudis) have discovered is that the tolerance level in consumers is higher than they thought," said Thomas Lippman, an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute, a Washington research institute. Given the specter of higher demand in Asia and the increased cost of bringing on new oil production, many analysts believe the long-term price of oil is in the $45-$60 a barrel range. Recent comments by Naimi suggest the Saudi official sees an even higher floor than that. "A line has been drawn now below which prices will not fall," Naimi said in March in an interview with PetroStrategies, a French energy publication. Citing the marginal costs of biofuels and Canadian tar-sands, Naimi defined the floor as "probably between $60 or $70." Naimi in April said Saudi Arabia was putting off a plan to expand oil capacity beyond 12.5 million barrels because of concerns about demand growth. "Unless we see really genuine demand, we have to pause right now and see what happens," Naimi told Petroleum Argus. Some energy analysts say the Saudi move suggested a more sober outlook on oil prices. "If they see a lot of risk on the demand side then you could see very low prices and potentially a lot of underutilized capacity down the road," said Ken Medlock, a fellow at Rice's Baker Institute.

## Cameroon

### Inherency – Cameroon

#### xD the aff already happened - #NegOnPresumption

AP 2/6/19 (The Military Times, I would hope y’all know who the Associated Press are. “US cuts military aid to Cameroon over human rights concerns” <https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2019/02/07/us-cuts-military-aid-to-cameroon-over-human-rights-concerns/>) / MM

The United States said Wednesday it is cutting some military aid to Cameroon over human rights concerns after growing allegations of abuses by security forces, a significant step against a solid ally in central Africa that is gripped by fighting between the government and Anglophone separatists. The U.S. decision comes after videos circulated online last year showing Cameroonian security forces shooting and killing civilians, including women with small children strapped to their backs. The videos were documented by Amnesty International and global media outlets. The top U.S. diplomat for Africa, Tibor Nagy, said in December that he feared the separatist crisis could get “much, much” worse and warned against a “brutal response” to extremism, saying it could lead to radicalization. Cameroon also faces a deadly threat from fighters with the Boko Haram extremist group based in neighboring Nigeria. The United Nations has said some 430,000 people in Cameroon's Southwest and Northwest regions have fled the fighting between security forces and English-speaking separatists who seek independence from the largely French-speaking country. There was no immediate comment from Cameroon's government on the U.S. action. The operations focus on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations against both ISIS and al-Qaida. The Pentagon and State Department said the reduced U.S. support involves armored vehicles, boats, aircraft upkeep and parts, helicopter training and an invitation to a partnership program.

#### More evidence – post-dates yours

Madden 3/30/19 (Payce, Masters in Public Policy and Analysis from Carnegie Mellon University, Research Analyst for The Brookings Institute’s African Growth Initiative. “Africa in the news: Disputed election in Comoros, US sanctions on Cameroon, and attack on Mali villages” Brookings Institute, 3/30/19. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2019/03/30/africa-in-news-disputed-election-in-comoros-us-sanctions-on-cameroon-and-attack-on-mali-villages/>) / MM

On Thursday, March 28, Human Rights Watch reported that at least 170 civilians have been killed since October in the escalating violence in Cameroon. The violence has occurred primarily along linguistic lines between Cameroon’s Anglophone and Francophone populations. The ethno-linguistic tension stems from perceived discrimination against the minority Anglophone Cameroonians: The government operates primarily in French, courts have ostracized Anglophones, and Anglophones are unable to hold civil service jobs. As a result, many Anglophones feel like second-class citizens, and ties between the two communities continue to fray while trust in government, especially in Anglophone regions, has plummeted. Both the government and separatists are accused of atrocities. According to the report, “government forces in Cameroon’s Anglophone regions have killed scores of civilians, used indiscriminate force, and torched hundreds of homes over the past six months.” The separatists, however, have also contributed to the violence through kidnappings—including of at least 300 children under age 18 years old—and two executions, says the report. Over 430,000 have fled in response to the violence. The violence is also compounding poverty in the country, as farmers have been forced to abandon their crops and exports are in decline. As a result of the violence, earlier this week, the U.S. placed sanctions on over 20 military personnel, civilian actors, and government ministers in Cameroon. Aid programs and military training by the U.S. have been withdrawn.

### Adv – HR

#### There isn’t a single place in the advantage that says military aid – proves US doesn’t trigger the impacts

#### They don’t solve and kill leverage—Cameroon can commit those abuses regardless of us support—none of their evidence says us training them and providing military aid causes worse abuses – Cameroon has no incentive to stop without US encouragement

#### Their Fraser and Moussou evidence in solvency flows negative so hard – it doesn’t say anything about abolition which proves that conditions aren’t key, if anything the ev is garbage anyways because it’s about forestation and not military aid

#### Their Feldstein evidence about Nigeria solving terror says that Cameroon co-op was key which proves our link – it doesn’t solve also because the “US hesitation” arg in the evidence is about sharing intelligence with Nigeria, not Cameroon

#### China fills in and alt causes

DefenceWeb 18, 7-19-2018, "China, Cameroon sign military assistance agreement”, http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com\_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=52447:china-cameroon-signs-military-assistance-agreement&amp;catid=56:diplomacy-a-peace&amp;Itemid=111 RE

China and Cameroon have signed a military assistance agreement that includes China providing $8 million for the acquisition of military equipment. Cameroon’s Ministry of Defence on 18 July said the Chinese Ambassador to Cameroon, Wang Yingwu on behalf of the Chinese government and Cameroon’s Minister of Defence Beti Assomo Joseph signed an agreement on military assistance in the Hall of Acts of the ministry of defence. “Bilateral military cooperation is being reinforced once more between the government of Cameroon and the People’s Republic of China as the Chinese Ambassador to Cameroon Wang Yingwu and the Minister Delegate at the Presidency in Charge of Defence signed a convention worth 4.5 billion francs CFA [$7.9 million] to assist the Cameroon defence forces acquire some military equipment,” the Ministry said. It added that the objective of the agreement is to promoting peace and security in Cameroon particularly as the country is facing numerous threats as emphasized by Yingwu. “It should be recalled that this is the 5th time the People’s Republic of China is exhibiting a benevolent gesture to the Cameroon Defence Forces. This convention merely comes to reaffirm the fruitful bilateral military cooperation existing between Beijing and Yaounde not only security wise but in diverse domains,” the Ministry said. Cameroon’s armed forces have acquired a variety of weaponry from China, including infantry fighting vehicles and tank destroyers. Since 2010 Cameroon has received from China two P-108 patrol craft, two MA60 twin turboprop aircraft, 50 FN-16 surface-to-air missile launchers, 12 Type-90 (PG-99) 35 mm anti-aircraft guns, two Type-07 armoured personnel carriers, 18 Type-07P/VN-1 infantry fighting vehicles, 12 WMA-301 Assaulter armoured combat vehicles, two P-108 patrol craft and four Z-9WE helicopters that can be armed with Red Arrow-8 missiles, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s arms transfers database. Other arms suppliers to Cameroon include the United States, South Africa, Spain, Serbia, Russia, Israel and France, which have supplied armoured vehicles, transport and combat helicopters, mortars, unmanned aerial vehicles and light and transport aircraft.

#### China is worse – no conditions on aid and kills HR

Windsor and Moens 16 Brooke Smith-Windsor, Deputy Head and Founding Member of the NATO Defense College (NDC) Research Division, and Alexander Moens, Professor of Political Science at the Simon Fraser University in Canada, Discussion Paper, Fall 2016 ["EUROPE, CHINA AND AFRICA NEW THINKING FOR A SECURE CENTURY", https://www.friendsofeurope.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/2016/11/EU-CHINA\_Africa\_DP\_WEB.pdf] bcr 12-4-2018

‘Chinese military aid does not come with lectures about human rights the way the West’s does … Chinese foreign policy, without being in any way extreme or bellicose, nevertheless represents the bleakest form of realism. It indicates a new bipolarity in the world: between those states that employ human rights as part of their policy calculations and those that do not.’90 So, while Beijing will have no qualms about engaging with any African regime – despotic or democratic, the most brutal violator of human rights or the most peaceful **–** NATO will,by virtue of its founding principles**,** be more discerning. Governments committed to the rule of law and individual liberty – and the AU, with its 2000 Constitutive Act, is no exception in this regard – will assume pride of place. As these authors have argued elsewhere, the Alliance’s common principles do not put NATO’s foreign and security policy beyond criticism. Its members are also selfinterested states pursing material benefits. However, restraint is a key and regular feature of military policy and action. The rule of law guides domestic and foreign decisions91. Kaplan chooses to refer to this as ‘Realpolitik with a conscience’92. Simply put**,** China may engage with some African regimes that NATO will not countenance.

## Tajikistan

### Advantage – Narcotics

#### Case doesn’t solve – $29m dollars from the US is less than ¼ of their total budget – Tajikistan just gets support from other actors or continues the relationship between the state and criminals

#### Don’t let them say the CP isn’t competitive because of the plan text – view it in a vacuum – they generate offense off of all kinds of aid that go towards counternarcotics efforts.

#### Their DeDaneli evidence proves Russia fill in and alt causes

De Danieli 11, [Filippo De Danieli is an independent scholar] “Counter-narcotics policies in Tajikistan and their impact on state building” Central Asian Survey Vol. 30, No. 1, March 2011, 129 –145 DOI: 10.1080/02634937.2011.554067 Taylor and Francis Online <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02634937.2011.554067> SLHS-RR

The growth of the drug economy and the rise of drug mafias in Tajikistan were, in many respects, unchallenged. The process of consolidation of the regime has been long and tortuous, and probably is not yet concluded; the central government lacks the resources to impose an effective control over the whole national territory and order in the peripheral region is maintained through informal deals with local strongmen and powerbrokers. Drug mafias, as we have seen, are powerful political-economic actors, and president Rahmon cannot take the risk of starting an open conflict against them. Together with these interdependencies between the central regime and peripheral strongman, the poor capacities of Tajik law-enforcement agencies is another key factor which has contributed to the expansion of the drug business in post-conflict Tajikistan. The reorganization of the security sector has been an extremely difficult task for all post-Soviet states. After 1991 their rulers had to nationalize law-enforcement agencies and army structures, and to take control of borders, which during Soviet times were mere administrative divisions among units of the same state. In Tajikistan, the civil war complicated and slowed down these processes. Inadequate resources have been allocated for the reform and renovation of the security sector, and as a result law-enforcement agencies and border troops lack the equipment and skills to tackle the activities of criminal groups. In addition, their staff is underpaid, so that it is easy for mafias to bribe officials. Five different bodies carry out counter-narcotics activities in Tajikistan: the Ministry of Interior, the National Security Committee (Security Services), the Customs department of the 132 F. De Danieli Ministry for State Revenues and Taxation, the Drug Control Agency (DCA), and the State Border Protection Committee (the border troops). Most of these agencies are severely underfunded. Their equipment is obsolete, and the personnel lack training in modern interdiction techniques. As I was told by an official of the Drug Control Agency, ‘not only do police and militaries not have at their disposal specialized equipment such as night-viewers, passport readers, x-ray devices, but they are also running short of basic equipment such as vehicles, gasoline or winter clothes’.12 At the same time, collaboration and coordination between different law-enforcement agencies is very weak, as competences are not clearly defined, and specific interests of single agencies often prevail over national priorities.13 Lack of coordination between central headquarters and peripheral outposts is another major problem.14 Corruption also seriously hinders the effectiveness of counter-narcotics measures. On the one hand top politicians are colluding with criminal networks, while on the other soldiers and policemen earn very low salaries and thus they have every incentive to turn a blind eye on criminal activities in exchange for a reward. A number of drug scandals which involved high-profile figures of the regime suggest that there are close connections between criminal and institutional actors in Tajikistan. The Tajik ambassador to Kazakhstan and his staff were implicated in the most sensational of such scandals, when, in May 2000, Kazakh authorities discovered 62 kg of heroin concealed in secret compartments of the ambassador’s car.15 Similarly, in 2005, the commander and two senior officials of the State Border Protection Committee unit deployed in Shurobod District, one of the major entry points along the Tajik –Afghan border, were detained for drug trafficking.16 However, in order to give a comprehensive picture, we need to stress how in parallel with high-profile collusions, petty corruption is also widespread. Tajik policemen, soldiers and civil servants earn very small salaries, ranging from US$10 to US$30 a month, hence they have every incentive to accept a bribe and turn a blind eye when they discover a drug shipment.17 According to official sources, 800 civil servants were arrested on charges of drug trafficking between 2000 and 2005.18 Thus the political backing that drug mafias enjoy, together with their actual power to bribe individual soldiers and civil servants, have allowed them to continue their illegal business with impunity throughout the post-conflict period. Problems of under-funding for law-enforcement agencies, lack of coordination and corruption have precluded the development of a coherent national counter-narcotic policy in Tajikistan. Some operations against drug traffickers have been carried out in the last 10 years, but no major smuggling network has been brought to trial so far. International counter-narcotics assistance: donors, implementing agencies and beneficiaries Security assistance is one of the major fields of commitment for foreign donors in Tajikistan. Neighbouring states, regional powers and Western countries are involved in a multiplicity of initiatives aimed at assisting the Tajik government in its control and border-management efforts. Between 1996 and 2003 17 international treaties and agreements (six multilateral and 11 bilateral) have been signed by the Tajik government on drug-related issues.19 Russia was the main partner of the Tajik government in the field of security during the first phase of the country’s independence. When the civil war broke out Moscow decided that it would have to keep its soldiers on the borders of Tajikistan with China and Afghanistan. Between 11,000 and 16,500 Russian soldiers remained deployed along those frontiers. The decision to maintain a large contingent of armed forces in Tajikistan was taken mainly for broader geopolitical reasons. Given the situation of instability in Tajikistan, Moscow could not risk that those former USSR external borders remained un-patrolled (Jonson 1998, 2006). Central Asian Survey 133 Thus, also in the security sector, Russia maintained its role as major partner of the Tajik government during the 1990s. But after 9/11, Central Asia has also become an area of key strategic interest for Western governments. Since 2001 the US and its allies have sought to increase their commitment in the region, and, as they recognized the drug trade as a major security threat to regional stability, funding for counter-narcotics and border-management assistance has considerably augmented. For example in 2007, of the US$45.2 million of total assistance by the US government to Tajikistan, 20.34 million were destined for law enforcement and security assistance.20 Projects funded by the US are carried out both at bilateral and multilateral level. The Department of State is the main contributor in terms of bilateral assistance, while at the multilateral level the United Nations Office for Drug and Crime (UNODC), the International Organization for Migrations (IOM), and the Open Society Institute (OSI) receive funding from Washington for narcotics interdiction, border management and drug-demand-reduction projects.21 The European Union is also directly involved in counter-narcotics assistance: two major projects, the Border Mangement in Central Asia (BOMCA) programme, and the Central Asia Drug Addiction Programme (CADAP) were launched in 2003. Between 2003 and 2007 the European Commission committed E43 million for the implementation of these two projects.22

#### That turns case and offers no chance of reform

Barmin 18 Yuri Barmin**.** 3/08/2018. [Yuri Barmin is an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, covering the Middle East and North Africa, Moscow’s policy towards the region, as well as the conflicts in Syria and Libya. He regularly contributes his analysis to Al Monitor, the Middle East Institute, Al Sharq Forum and FARAS Center. Mr. Barmin holds an MPhil in International Relations from the University of Cambridge], Russia in the Middle East Until 2024: From Hard Power to Sustainable Influence, The Jamestown Foundation. <https://jamestown.org/program/russia-middle-east-2024-hard-power-sustainable-influence/> / MM

Experts who had argued that authoritarianism in the Middle East would maintain stability and keep extremism at bay were proven wrong by the events of the Arab Spring.[xxxv] The Russian leadership, however, still projects its vision of “autocratic stability” onto the region. And even though Moscow repeatedly insists that it is up to the Syrian people to decide through a presidential election who will lead the nation into the post-war period, the Russian government is unlikely to become a supporter of democracy movements in the Middle East. After all, elections have been a crucial legitimization tool of Russia’s own “managed democracy.” The consolidation of power in the hands of the national leader as well as the securitization of the political agenda have characterized the Russian political system throughout the last 17 years Vladimir Putin has been in power. And they continue to guide him in how he sees regimes in the Middle East. Some of these authoritarian Arab regimes share a long history with Russia: during the Cold War, they proved their ability to maintain order for longer than any democratic regime could sustain it, not least due to Moscow’s financial and military support. The fact that Bashar al-Assad survived throughout the bloody Syrian conflict, to a large extent due to Russia’s aid, solidifies the idea that authoritarianism in the Middle East guarantees stability and puts a cap on “toxic” democratic values imposed from the outside. In Moscow’s view, authoritarian tendencies are indigenous to the region, much like they are to Russia, which is why they need not be battled but rather be correctly managed. Russia’s idea of “authoritarian stability” in the Middle East may find a potential supporter in Donald Trump, who notoriously dropped America’s agenda for promoting democracy in the Middle East. The distinct security focus of Donald Trump’s strategy toward the region has emboldened his allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel, and convinced them that the regional policeman will no longer restrain their geopolitical ambitions. The position of both Russia and the United States is, thus, likely to resonate with many governments in the region that previously had to put on airs of civil society engagement and liberalization just to have international political and diplomatic backing. Egypt and Turkey are the two cases in point: the 2017 Human Rights Watch World Report specifically points to them to illustrate how the tide of new authoritarianism is sweeping through the Middle East.[xxxvi] In Turkey, the attempted coup in July 2016 was used by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) as an excuse to crack down not only on suspected plotters but also on wider circles critical of the government’s policies. Western powers sharply rebuked Erdoğan over his suspension of the rule of law in the country and mass detentions—but Russia pointedly did not. Putin was the one world leader who gave a call to Erdoğan to tell him Moscow supports his campaign to root out dissent, which the Turkish president described as “anti-constitutional.”[xxxvii] Furthermore Putin hosted his Turkish counterpart in St. Petersburg less than a month after the failed coup, during which Erdoğan explained that Vladimir Putin’s call to him was an important move, “a kind of moral support and display of Russia-Turkey solidarity,” as the Turkish president described the situation.[xxxviii] All this occurred just weeks after Erdoğan’s late June apology to Russia for the November 2015 downing of a Russian Su-24 jet over Syria; and it goes to show how masterfully Vladimir Putin uses authoritarian movements to his own political benefit. Egypt is going through a similar wave of authoritarianism, with President Abdel Fattah El Sisi cracking down on dissent that is not necessarily associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. That government campaign is happening against the backdrop of economic instability, currency devaluation and increased poverty rates. However, the army’s grip on power and full control over the public sphere give a semblance of stability in the country. Sisi’s fight to eradicate extremism in the Sinai as well as his crackdown on dissent find support in Moscow, which is reflected in official statements coming from the Kremlin. Egypt reemerged as Russia’s key partner in the Middle East, including in crucial spheres of military-technical cooperation. The two countries signed a protocol on military cooperation in March 2015, significantly ramped up joint military exercises, and are looking to green light an agreement that would allow Russian military aircraft to use Egyptian airspace and infrastructure.[xxxix] With the turmoil and regular attacks in the Sinai Peninsula, counter-terrorism cooperation has become a distinct characteristic of the bilateral relationship. A security-heavy agenda acts as a glue between Moscow and Cairo, not least due to the military and security background of the political elites of the two countries. Both Russians and Egyptians will head to the polls in March 2018 to elect their respective heads of state, while presidential elections in Turkey are to take place in November 2019. The outcome is already known in all three countries; Putin, Sisi and Erdoğan will almost certainly serve out their next terms into the first half of the 2020s, meaning that we are unlikely to witness a disruption in the security-comes-first policy employed by Moscow in its bilateral relations with both Cairo and Ankara. The cases of Egypt and Turkey illustrate that Vladimir Putin is likely to encourage authoritarian “stability” across the region through skewed security-heavy policies. Putin’s support for autocratic tendencies will hardly find any resistance among other powers in the region and will almost certainly be embraced. Syria’s recovery from the seven-year war is unlikely to happen through the emergence of democratic institutions and freedom, but will probably lead to the creation of a strong regime with an inflated security apparatus to shield a fragile government and keep extremist tendencies at bay. Iraq’s increasingly sectarian policies hint at a similar trend. And as Libya’s internationally recognized government fails to establish control over much of the country’s territory, Libyan National Army Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar represents the type of leader the Kremlin would presumably like to see for a post–civil war Libya. If Russia’s Syria policy is any indication, a highly centralized system will be Moscow’s remedy for extremism throughout the wider region. The fear of a new wave of extremism will push many regimes to seek more control over the population, and a lack of incentives to democratize may bring about new repressive regimes. In other words Russia’s leadership in the Middle East may significantly lengthen and reinforce the era of authoritarianism there.

#### The alt causes are too long to ignore

Peyrouse 18 (Sebastien, Sebastien Peyrouse, PhD, is a research professor at the Central Asia Program in the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (George Washington University) and a senior fellow at the East West Institute. His main areas of expertise are political systems in Central Asia, economic and social issues, Islam and religious minorities, and Central Asia’s geopolitical positioning toward China, India and South Asia. “Drug Trafficking in Tajikistan: A very deep but not incurable evil” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. March 1, 2018. https://www.georgetownjournalofinternationalaffairs.org/online-edition/2018/3/1/drug-trafficking-in-tajikistan-a-very-deep-but-not-incurable-evil)

For many years, Tajikistan has been gravely affected by drug trafficking. At least 15-20 tons of opium and between 75 and 80 metric tons of heroin are smuggled into the country each year from Afghanistan either for local consumption or for transfer to Russia and Europe. Despite an official Tajik government policy to fight illicit drug trafficking in cooperation with foreign governments and international organizations, trafficking continues to increase. The volume of drug transit through Tajikistan is now equivalent to 30 percent of the country’s GDP. So far, the success of domestic Tajik policies and international assistance has been minimal. Trafficking is a product of numerous complex factors, including large-scale opium production in Afghanistan, a growing economic and social crisis in Tajikistan, and complicity within the Tajik administration. Faced with these realities, the international community must revise its anti-drug policy in Tajikistan and better calibrate it to domestic Tajik issues in two ways. First, it must attack illicit drug trade and distribution networks by reducing corruption and poverty; second, it must reduce drug use through prevention and treatment programs. In the fifteen years since NATO forces committed to combating drug production in Afghanistan, drug production in the country has increased. This has had a significant impact on Tajikistan, one of the main export routes. It is estimated that at least 20 percent of Afghan drugs move through the country. Traffickers increasingly exploit the Central Asian route through Tajikistan to reach Russia and China, where drug use has been steadily increasing in recent years. Moreover, the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in 2014 has opened up the region by loosening the borders between its member states and made it easier for drug traffickers to reach Europe once they make it past the porous, 810-mile-long Afghan-Tajik border and through Tajikistan. Should Tajikistan join the EEU, which has no border controls among its member states — comprised of Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan — traffickers will have an even easier time moving drugs through the country. Since the 1990s, the international community has consistently invested in the fight against drug trafficking into and through Tajikistan. China and Russia have engaged in bilateral and multilateral cooperation under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The United States has spent nearly $200 million since 2001 on security assistance for Tajikistan, focused on training and equipping special military and police units. The EU-funded Border Management for Central Asia program, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Border Management Staff College, and the UN International Organization for Migration border projects together spent $83 million between 2005 and 2013 in this effort. Many individual donor nations also continue to invest in border facilities, outposts, and equipment. Responsibility for the increase in drug trafficking has often been assigned to Afghanistan, Islamist groups such as the Taliban, and local and regional Islamist networks, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan**. This** narrative, favored by Tajik authorities, makes it easier for them to raise anti-trafficking funding by emphasizing the links to terrorism. However, other factors also contribute to the problem. While the growth of production in Afghanistan continues to feed drug trafficking in Tajikistan, the trafficking increase also stems from the internal political, economic and social context in Tajikistan. Drug trafficking has developed in Tajikistan partly through the efforts of small traffickers, for whom it provides a means of daily survival. For the past several years, Tajikistan has also been experiencing a serious social crisis caused by dwindling economic resources, government resistance to reform, corruption and misappropriation of revenues. More recently, this difficult economic situation has been compounded by the economic crisis in Russia, a country which has been a major destination for at least 1.15 million Tajik migrant workers. Their remittances, making up approximately 49 percent of Tajikistan's GDP, have declined considerably in the last three years. Arrest statistics in Tajikistan show an increasing number of individuals who have been willing to transport drugs to meet their basic needs. However, most of the drug trafficking is organized by criminal groups. These are usually run by local drug barons and are often indirectly supported by parts of the local population. These groups step in where the government has failed, providing social welfare in poor regions of the country. Furthermore, some government officials allow local drug barons or local administrative officials – who are sometimes one and the same – to develop illicit drug rings that permit them to get rich in exchange for political allegiance and assistance in maintaining social stability. Official involvement is one of the main difficulties international organizations face in fighting drug trafficking in Tajikistan. On-site research shows that some law enforcement officials oversee trafficking, provide traffickers with drugs seized during arrests, protect allied dealers and arrest their competitors. This system exists quite openly, with dealers operating in full view of state structures. The presidential family and its close circles are believed to be among the main beneficiaries of these activities. President Emomali Rahmon has steadily consolidated his financial base by placing family members in key government positions. In particular, his eldest son Rustam has held several official positions, including head of the customs service, and is suspected of taking bribes to allow cross-border traffic. Beyond the President's official speeches at international summits or meetings, Tajik authorities have shown little initiative in implementing the many programs proposed by international organizations, as they may reduce the profits that some officials derive from trafficking. The complicity of these local officials explains in part why less than 5 percent of the drugs passing through Tajikistan are seized by law enforcement, and why few major traffickers are arrested. On the rare occasions when large-scale trafficking is uncovered, it typically settles a score amongst elite commercial and political rivals. The main targets of the security services are small traffickers, whose arrests allow authorities to inflate the statistics of seizures they provide to international organizations, and to exculpate themselves from their complicity. In this way, the international community sometimes helps corrupt officials eliminate their drug-trafficking competition. There is no easy solution to the problem of drug trafficking in Tajikistan. First and foremost, as long there is no real willingness on the part of state structures to fight drug trafficking, border security and training initiatives will not have a serious impact. Moreover, the international community's commitment to Tajikistan cannot be truly effective unless it places greater emphasis on concrete implementation of programs, as opposed to allowing their use as public relations rhetoric by political authorities. Secondly, international and regional cooperation has erroneously focused on upstream security and border issues, and neglected downstream development and health factors. Meanwhile, domestic drug use has increased steadily over the past decade in Tajikistan; it is estimated that between 20,000 and 30,000 people inject drugs. Treatment centers are poorly equipped and oriented towards abstinence. Moreover, the tendency to criminalize drug addicts complicates the implementation of effective prevention strategies. International efforts to combat drug trafficking from Afghanistan could be more effective if they focused more on demand reduction, treatment and prevention campaigns. Finally, serious social and governance problems in Tajikistan will continue to feed drug trafficking in a society that publicly criticizes, but practically accepts, corruption and trafficking. The impact of the international community will remain limited as long as state officials fighting this illicit trade receive low wages, which are often less than $150 per month. In Tajikistan, wealthy traffickers have become objects of admiration for an increasing number of idle youth. Drug trafficking will not significantly decrease without socio-economic development and poverty reduction. Such a long-term perspective calls for strong commitment from the international community, matched by local political authorities determined to end corruption, nepotism and cronyism.

### Advantage – Police Violence

## Uganda

### Adv – Human Rights

#### Framing issues -

#### Their York evidence never draws an internal link between US aid and rights abuses – it says that the government should consider what it’s doing, but doesn’t warrant the connection or say that it should be stopped

#### No internal link between US aid and increased violence against protestors – the McCormick and HRW evidence both say that Ugandan security forces are committing acts of violence, without the US key internal link they’ll continue with or without the US

#### Status quo reforms solve

KP 19 Reports on Ugandan News, 2-11-2019 "Checking Human Rights Violations: Police Launch Human Rights Policy," Kampala Post, [https://kampalapost.com/content/news/checking-human-rights-violations-police-launch-human-rights-policy /](https://kampalapost.com/content/news/checking-human-rights-violations-police-launch-human-rights-policy%20/) MM

The Uganda Police Force is due to launch the Human Rights Policy as the security agency strives to uphold the protection and respect for human rights. According to a message sent out to the media by Kampala Metropolitan Police Spokesperson, Patrick Onyango, the Uganda Police Force Human Rights Policy will be launched by the Inspector General of Police, Martin Okoth Ochola on Monday.The function will take place at the Police Senior Command and Staff College Bwebajja. “You are invited to cover the launching of UPF Human Rights Policy and the opening ceremony of the retreat of RPCs (Regional Police Commanders) and Heads of Department at Senior Command and Staff College, Bwebajja,” the message read in part. Details of the policy were scanty at the time of publication, however its launch comes at the time when the law enforcement agency is continuously being ranked among top human rights violators in the country.In the recent rankings, the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC), a government human rights agency in its 20th report released in June last year, Uganda Police topped the list of human rights violators. The Police had 419 cases recorded against it in 2017, followed by private individuals with 210 complaints and Uganda People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) with 44.The cases against the police, however, presented a decline in violations from the 620 that were recorded the previous year. According to the report the rights violations against the Police relate to the deprivation of rights to personal liberty, deprivation of the right to life, and deprivation of property. Meanwhile the decline in cases registered against the Police is a clear show of the Force’s commitment to address the problem and putting in place the human rights policy comes in handy.

#### Russia fills in

Neethling 18 Theo Neethling, Professor and Head: Political Studies and Governance in the Humanities Faculty, University of the Free State, 7-26-2018, "Russia is expanding its strategic influence in Africa," Quartz Africa, <https://qz.com/africa/1546037/russia-is-expanding-its-strategic-influence-in-africa/> / MM

Much has been made about China’s role and profile in Africa and the factors underlying its activities on the continent. Less debated is the spread and depth of Russia’s contemporary presence and profile in Africa. There was a strong Russian influence in Africa during the heyday of the Soviet Union. The post-independence governments of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Somalia, Ethiopia, Uganda and Benin at some point all received diplomatic or military support from the Soviet Union. But this began to change after the superpower started to collapse in December 1991. More than a quarter of a century later Russia’s president Vladimir Putin seems to have new aspirations in Africa. This is in line with his desire to restore Russia to great power status. Trade and investment between Russia and Africa has grown exponentially by 185% from 2005 to 2015. Putin places a high premium on geopolitical relations and the pursuit of Russian assertiveness in the global arena. This includes reestablishing Russia’s sphere of influence, which extends to the African continent. Like Beijing, Moscow’s method of trade and investment in Africa is without the prescriptions or conditionalities of actors like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Russia is gradually increasing its influence in Africa through strategic investment in energy and minerals. It’s also using military muscle and soft power. Increasingly, the pressing question is: is the relationship between China and Africa as good for Africa as it is for China? The same question applies to Russia-Africa relations. Energy and minerals Interaction between Russia and Africa has grown exponentially this century, with trade and investment growing by 185% between 2005 and 2015. Economically, much of Russia’s focus in Africa centers on energy. Key Russian investments in Africa are in the oil, gas and nuclear power sectors. The fact that 620 million people in Africa don’t have electricity provides Russia’s nuclear power industry with potential markets. Several Russian companies, such as Gazprom, Lukoil, Rostec and Rosatom are active in Africa. Most activity is in Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Nigeria and Uganda. In Egypt, negotiations have already been finalized with Moscow for the building of the country’s first nuclear plant . These companies are mostly state-run, with investments often linked to military and diplomatic interests.

#### It’s especially true of arms sales

Barmin 18 Yuri Barmin**.** 3/08/2018. [Yuri Barmin is an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, covering the Middle East and North Africa, Moscow’s policy towards the region, as well as the conflicts in Syria and Libya. He regularly contributes his analysis to Al Monitor, the Middle East Institute, Al Sharq Forum and FARAS Center. Mr. Barmin holds an MPhil in International Relations from the University of Cambridge], Russia in the Middle East Until 2024: From Hard Power to Sustainable Influence, The Jamestown Foundation. https://jamestown.org/program/russia-middle-east-2024-hard-power-sustainable-influence/.

Vladimir Putin’s return to power in Russia in 2012 signified a dramatic change in the country’s foreign policy and military strategy. Scrapping the achievements of the Dmitry Medvedev era in the Kremlin, which was characterized by a thaw in relations with the West, Vladimir Putin opted for a more aggressive approach toward positioning the country in the international arena. Experts still argue what prompted this review of the country’s foreign policy strategy, but the developments that likely had a major impact on Vladimir Putin’s policy planning in 2012 included the war with Georgia in 2008, the Arab Spring protests, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) infamous military campaign in Libya, which brought down Russia’s long-time ally Muammar Qaddafi. Contours of the new policy approach to the region started to emerge when Russia updated two of its key documents, the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, in 2013 and 2014, respectively.[i] The documents pronounced strategies based on protecting Russian national interests abroad, including militarily if need be, and increasing Moscow’s role in maintaining global security. Quite notably, a more recent edition of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, signed by President Putin in November 2016, has a specific focus on the Middle East and names foreign meddling there as one of the causes of instability and extremism in the region that directly affect Russia.[ii] The statement that serves as de facto justification for the Russian military campaign in Syria became the first official document to elucidate the country’s ambition to play a bigger role in the Middle East and North Africa. In the three years that divide the two concepts, Vladimir Putin’s approach to foreign policy experienced an evolution and increasing securitization (the word “terrorism” figures 15 times in the 2013 Concept and 35 in its 2016 edition). The Foreign Policy Concept also spells out the Russian president’s growing ambition to deal with instability where it originates before it reaches Russian borders. The rationale behind Russia’s re-emergence as one of the leading powers in the Middle East was of a defensive nature and largely reactionary. The Arab Spring movement in the region was a painful reminder of the Color Revolutions that broke out across several post-Soviet states in the first half of the 2000s and, according to the Kremlin, led to the 2014 EuroMaidan revolution in Ukraine. Vladimir Putin himself is of the belief that that the Arab Spring is a continuation of those Color Revolutions and that both are foreign-instigated.[iii] Coupled with a forced revolution in Libya and the removal of Qaddafi in what Russia declared was a violation of international law, this episode is often cited as a watershed in Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy thinking.[iv] A wave of revolutions across Eurasia convinced the Russian leadership that the apparent domino effect of regime change would eventually target Russia. It is not a coincidence that the Russian president likens Color Revolutions and the Arab Spring protests to each other and often makes no distinction between them. Commenting on anti-corruption protests in Russia in March 2017, he went as far as to call them “an instrument of the Arab Spring.”[v] Vladimir Putin sees Russia as a legitimate actor in designing a new power balance in the Middle East and as its integral part since security challenges originating in the region reverberate across the former Soviet space as well as in Russia. The United States, on the other hand, is an outsider in this region in the view of Russian officials. Criticism of the White House over its “destructive” role in the Middle East is a central theme of many of Vladimir Putin’s speeches, including the one he delivered at the UN General Assembly prior to launching his military campaign in Syria in September 2015. In those remarks, the Russian president accused the United States of being the source of problems in the Middle East.[vi] A gradual withdrawal of the United States from the Middle East under Barack Obama among other things meant that the region’s “policeman” was no longer interested in maintaining order there, which arguably presented Moscow with numerous security challenges. Russia’s re-emergence in the Middle East to a large extent happened to fill some of the void left by the retreating Obama administration. In some cases it happened effortlessly, such as in Egypt, where the US decision to cut aid to Cairo in 2013 led to the emergence of a budding Russia-Egypt alliance. In other contexts, most prominently in Syria, Russia had to invest significant diplomatic and military resources to marginalize the US in the war and in the peace process. What started out as an attempt to replace the United States where it was no longer interested in playing a leading role later transformed into an ambition to challenge the US even where it had no intention of retreating, for instance in the Gulf region. Russia’s return to the Middle East differs from the Soviet experience: Today, Moscow is extending its reach without the baggage of Soviet ideology. The idea of using its arms exports to the Middle East in the ideological struggle against the West evaporated as soon as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) disintegrated and was replaced with the idea of making a profit for the cash-strapped budget. The Kremlin is looking to support its geopolitical claims with a strong pragmatic dimension. In the Middle East, Moscow to reinforce its influence there as well as offset the burden upon the Russian federal budget associated with the expenses of the Syrian campaign. Following in the footsteps of the Soviet Union, Russia has used arms deals to reach out to Cold War–era allies in Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Syria to consolidate a new power balance. During the Cold War, Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gilbert wrote that as more countries became recipients of Soviet military aid programs, there was a tendency for these countries to become greater political allies of the Soviet Union.[vii] And it seems that this argument is increasingly relevant today. According to SIPRI, in 2015 $5.5 billion in Russian arms exports were destined for clients in the Middle East, which was ten times more than all Russian experts to the region for all of the 1990s.[viii] With Vladimir Putin declaring victory over the Islamic State during his December 2017 visit to Syria, Russia is faced with a number of opportunities as well as challenges. Its military operation in Syria may have put Russia back on the radar in the Middle East; but in all certainty, it essentially solidified its position in the region. As Vladimir Putin is eyeing re-election as president in March 2018, foreign policy achievements, chiefly in the Middle East and North Africa, figure prominently in his election campaign rhetoric. One of the effects of Russia’s assertive foreign policy has become an expectation from regional partners and opponents alike that Moscow will be active in the Middle East. However, the hard power that brought Russia to prominence in the region will not be a helpful tool to support long-term influence there and could, in fact, produce a negative impact for Russia’s international standing. As a result, during his next term in office, Vladimir Putin will be faced with a challenge to depart from hard power, his preferred modus operandi, to embrace a spectrum of other tools in order to make Russia’s presence in the region lasting and sustainable.

#### That turns case and offers no chance of reform

Barmin 18 Yuri Barmin**.** 3/08/2018. [Yuri Barmin is an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, covering the Middle East and North Africa, Moscow’s policy towards the region, as well as the conflicts in Syria and Libya. He regularly contributes his analysis to Al Monitor, the Middle East Institute, Al Sharq Forum and FARAS Center. Mr. Barmin holds an MPhil in International Relations from the University of Cambridge], Russia in the Middle East Until 2024: From Hard Power to Sustainable Influence, The Jamestown Foundation. <https://jamestown.org/program/russia-middle-east-2024-hard-power-sustainable-influence/> / MM

Experts who had argued that authoritarianism in the Middle East would maintain stability and keep extremism at bay were proven wrong by the events of the Arab Spring.[xxxv] The Russian leadership, however, still projects its vision of “autocratic stability” onto the region. And even though Moscow repeatedly insists that it is up to the Syrian people to decide through a presidential election who will lead the nation into the post-war period, the Russian government is unlikely to become a supporter of democracy movements in the Middle East. After all, elections have been a crucial legitimization tool of Russia’s own “managed democracy.” The consolidation of power in the hands of the national leader as well as the securitization of the political agenda have characterized the Russian political system throughout the last 17 years Vladimir Putin has been in power. And they continue to guide him in how he sees regimes in the Middle East. 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### Adv – Adventurism

#### Framing issues -

#### Aff doesn’t solve adventurism – none of your evidence puts an internal link between US aid being provided and that aid CAUSING adventurism – the aid we give to their military isn’t being used against their population and NOWHERE in the aff says it does – if anything, billions of dollars of sales will still occur post-plan and their military already has U.S. training and weapons – their ideological reasons to crackdown are not attached to military aid

#### Only piece of evidence that says “aid” in this advantage is the first piece of evidence, they don’t win their internal link to adventurism if we win that even that one use of military aid is out of context

#### No brightline on ANY of their impact scenarios – their Glick evidence just says it can “escalate” but provides no scenario and their Deutsch evidence is a 2025 prediction and a racist rant where he calls African people “rabid tigers” – if anything it should’ve been triggered already because there have been conflicts and adventurism since at least 2012.

#### No impact – there are conflicts going on all the time

McGroarty 12 Patrick McGroarty 1-23-2012; Covers South Africa and the region for The Wall Street Journal and Dow Jones Newswires. “Rising Nigeria's Violence Imperils Stability” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204624204577176902128726344.html

Nigeria's recent religious conflicts are occurring even as many Africans are experiencing broader economic pain. Violence has buffeted the Muslim-led nation of Sudan and mostly Christian and animist South Sudan, the world's newest independent state. Humanitarian agencies say that clashes since South Sudan asserted its independence have led more than 350,000 Sudanese to flee into the new country from the Khartoum-administrated north. Media reports say thousands have been killed there. There are also simmering disputes between the countries over oil revenue. Increased fighting in Somalia after an incursion by Kenya aimed at subduing Al-Shabaab militants has displaced tens of thousands of Somalis, disrupted the movement of goods and delayed planting of staple crops. Meanwhile inside Kenya, frequent security sweeps and strident rhetoric by Kenyan leaders about suspected Al-Shabaab militants in their midst has led to intense scrutiny of Somali immigrant communities like Eastleigh, a predominately Muslim enclave of Nairobi. The Islamic militant group has long used Kenya as a base, and strong ties exist between the armed group and Somali immigrants. A series of kidnappings and grenade attacks against Kenyan civilians since the invasion has heightened tensions. "The Kenyan intervention may itself sow seeds of radicalization if every Somali immigrant is accused of terrorism or if it attempts to create a Kenyan colony in Somalia," said Comfort Ero, the Africa Program director for the International Crisis Group in Nairobi. The recent clashes in Nigeria, as well as in Sudan and Somalia, also have spotlighted the risk of some of the more sophisticated militant groups joining forces. As the U.S. withdraws troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, security officials say the Horn of Africa is emerging as the next battleground in the fight against al Qaeda and its affiliates. In a Friday speech, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said al Qaeda no longer has the capability to stage a 9/11-style attack and that its leadership has been "decimated." "But we need to continue that pressure," he said. "We need to keep going after them wherever they go, whether it's Yemen or Somalia or North Africa." Ms. Ero, of International Crisis Group, said sectarian tensions have risen in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Islamist groups in Egypt and Libya have come to the fore in the political and economic upheaval of those revolutions. As in the Middle East and North Africa, sub-Saharan African nations share the same volatile mix of booming youth populations, low employment, and decades of ineffectual governance.

#### Wars will stay small

Straus 13 (Scott Straus for African Arguments, part of the Guardian Africa Network, Scott Straus is a professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, “Africa is becoming more peaceful, despite the war in Mali”, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/30/africa-peaceful-mali-war>, January 30, 2013)

The bigger point is that we may be witnessing significant shifts in the nature of political violence on the continent. Wars are on the decline since the 1990s, but the character of warfare is also changing. Today there are fewer big wars fought for state control in which insurgents maintain substantial control of territory and put up well-structured armies to fight their counterparts in the state – Mali not withstanding. Such wars were modal into the 1990s. From southern Africa in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and even Zimbabwe to the long wars in the Horn in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan to the Great Lakes wars in Rwanda and Uganda, the typical armed conflict in Africa involved two major, territory-holding armies fighting each other for state control. Today's wars typically are smaller. They most often involve small insurgencies of factionalised rebels on the peripheries of states. Today's wars also play out differently. They exhibit cross-border dimensions, and rather than drawing funding from big external states they depend on illicit trade, banditry, and international terrorist networks. Typical of today's wars are the rebels in Casamance, in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, various armed groups in Darfur, and the Lord's Resistance Army. The latter typifies an emerging trend of trans-national insurgents. The LRA moves across multiple states in the Great Lakes region. Northern Mali is another case in point – prior to seizing control of the north, the Islamists moved across multiple countries in the Sahel. Once they gained territorial control in 2012, they attracted fighters from Nigeria and across North Africa. Moreover, these are not non-ideological wars, as Gettleman claims. The jihadis in Mali and Somalia, the separatists in Casamance, and the rebels in Darfur are certainly fighting for a cause.

### Solvency – Immaculate Heart

#### No solvency - a single card is reverse causal and says ending aid will stop abuses - it just says past aid enabled them. Since the fiat of the plan is permanent Uganda has nothing to gain by reducing crackdowns

#### Military aid isn’t key, the case can’t solve, and gets circumvented through humanitarian aid – your ev

**Epstein 18** [Helen Epstein (Writer for the Nation) “The US Turns a Blind Eye to Uganda’s Assault on Democracy” The Nation. 8/20/18] LM recut MM

Few Americans know much about Uganda, but it is almost certainly America’s closest military ally in Africa. For years, its army has served as a proxy force for the US War on Terror in Eastern and Central Africa. During the 1990s, the Ugandan military, with US support, fought dirty wars in Sudan, Rwanda, and Zaire in order to ensure Central Africa’s estimated $24 trillion in coltan, uranium, gold, and other mineral riches remained in the West’s sphere of influence. Today, more than 6,000 US-supported Ugandan troops are battling the Islamist group Al Shabaab in Somalia and thousands more serve as guards in Iraq. President Donald Trump’s Arab allies are now reportedly negotiating the recruitment of thousands of Ugandans to join the ghastly quagmire in Yemen. In exchange for Uganda’s military favors, Washington has long turned a blind eye to grave human-rights abuses committed by its leader Yoweri Museveni—who has held power for 32 years through brute force, election rigging, and corruption. But with Museveni’s most recent attacks on opposition figures, the United States is now ignoring one of the most evil and blatant recent assaults on democracy anywhere in the world. In February 2016, Museveni was declared winner of Uganda’s seventh presidential election. The poll had been marred, like others, by police raids on opposition rallies, the arrest of opposition candidates, the killing of unarmed opposition supporters, and electoral fraud. At the time, Uganda’s Constitution limited the age of presidential candidates to 75, making Museveni, who claims to be 73, ineligible to run in the next election, scheduled for 2021. However, during the summer of 2017, a back-bencher from Museveni’s party named Raphael Magyezi began drafting a bill to remove the age limit from the Constitution. If passed, it would enable Museveni to rule indefinitely. Reputable polls found some 80 percent of Ugandans opposed lifting the age limit, but all Museveni needed was the support of a two-thirds majority of Uganda’s 427 MPs. **Museveni’s political machine runs on a war chest of** hundreds of millions of dollars, much of it stolen from the Treasury and foreign-aid programs. **This ensures his party has a comfortable parliamentary majority,** so that if Magyezi’s bill were to be voted on, it would surely pass. Nevertheless, MPs like Nambooze who opposed the amendment were emboldened by the knowledge that Uganda’s people were behind them and launched a campaign to block it. Known as Togikwatako, or “Don’t touch it!”—a common parental warning to Ugandan children—the campaign organized demonstrations against the age-limit amendment around the country. Museveni’s forces responded by shooting student demonstrators and arresting activists passing out Togikwatako leaflets and MPs making Togikwatako speeches. On September 19, the day Magyezi’s bill was to be introduced, tanks were deployed around Parliament and police carrying military-grade weapons closed off surrounding streets to prevent demonstrations. But as soon as the session was called to order, Togikwatako MPs donned red headbands—the symbol of their campaign—and began trying to filibuster the bill by singing Uganda’s national anthem over and over while waving copies of the Constitution. Uganda’s formidable Parliamentary Speaker Rebecca Kadaga, in black robes and white-horsehair judicial wig glared down at them from the dais and closed the session without introducing Magyezi’s bill. Afterward, the Togikwatako MPS danced and sang in the hallways, punching their fists in the air in triumph. Nambooze received the “they will break your back” threat from her colleague the following Monday. Since joining politics in 2000, she’d been arrested numerous times and even breastfed two of her children in jail. Though worried, she attended the sitting the next day anyway. The filibuster stunts resumed under Speaker Kadaga’s expressionless gaze. At one point, a scuffle broke out when Museveni loyalist Ronald Kibuule brandished a gun at Togikwatako MP Ibrahim Ssemujju Nganda, and, according to Ssemujju, told him to prepare for a bullet in his nervous system. Again the session ended without the introduction of Magyezi’s bill. That night, operatives from Museveni’s elite special forces snuck into Parliament, checking the routes in and out of the central chamber and identifying the locations of security cameras. Speaker Kadaga opened Parliament the following afternoon by announcing the suspension of 25 mostly Togikwatako MPs, including Nambooze. Kadaga then departed the chamber as dozens of operatives in business attire streamed in via Museveni’s private entrance and began violently arresting the MPs Kadaga had named. Images of what looked like MPs throwing chairs, fencing with microphone stands, pirouetting on tables, and waving the Ugandan flag like toreadors were broadcast on the Internet and even evoked merriment on Trevor Noah’s The Daily Show. But off camera, something horrible was happening. While attempting to assist a fellow MP who had been slugged by an army officer, Nambooze found herself face to face with about six of the burly intruders. They led her to a small room without security cameras where two of them grabbed her from behind and began squeezing her shoulders and arms together. Then one of them shoved a knee into her back, and Nambooze felt something break. The pain was so intense, she thought she might die. Her assailants were dressed like women, but she told a local reporter that she had her doubts: “I could not see them, because they held me from behind but the hands were so hairy and I doubt that they were actually women.” Nambooze was rescued when a female member of the Parliamentary police force that routinely patrols the building burst in. “Why are you killing Hon Nambooze?” she recalled the officer shouting. Her tormentors released her, but she was no longer able to stand unaided and fell to the ground. In November she was flown to India where surgeons performed a six-hour operation in which metal implants were inserted in her spine so she could walk again. After the raid, attendance at Parliament dwindled and the filibusters ceased. But Togikwatako demonstrations continued around the country, and in October, police shot dead three unarmed demonstrators. Several NGOs that had been supporting community education about the age-limit amendment were shut down by the police, and explosives were thrown at the homes of some Togikwatako MPs. The presidential-age-limit amendment passed on December 20, 2017. Early in the New Year, Nambooze’s health began deteriorating, and by spring the pain had become unbearable. She arranged to travel to India to consult her surgeon, planning to fly out on June 15. But on June 8, masked men on motorcycles gunned down Ibrahim Abiriga, a ruling-party MP whom Nambooze had once teased for always wearing yellow—signifying his loyalty to Museveni. Such drive-by motorcycle murders have become increasingly frequent in Uganda; a police commander, a senior prosecutor, several Muslim sheiks, and many others have been killed in this way in recent years. While Abiriga’s killers are not known, his constituents rioted before his burial, shouting, “We don’t want yellow!” and blamed the government for his death. In a Facebook message of condolence to Abiriga’s family, Nambooze wrote, “Uganda will be better not through elimination of those we don’t agree with, but because of our effort to put up systems that will work for us all irrespective of our political beliefs. Every life must be respected and every murder must be condemned.” Her message also lamented that Abiriga had allowed himself to become a “loud speaker” for Museveni and his henchmen—“who have chosen to love power more than the future of our Uganda”—a sentiment shared by thousands of Ugandans on Twitter. Three days later, Nambooze was arrested on charges of “offensive communication,” in connection with the Facebook post. She paid bail and was released, but during a budget speech the next day, Museveni announced that bail for murder suspects would be scrapped. Nambooze was immediately rearrested, and for two days she lay in a bare jail cell on a wooden bench, unable to sit up or stand. She was then taken to a hospital, but on the way a police vehicle rammed into the ambulance, further damaging her spine and severely injuring her knee. While it’s impossible to prove, Nambooze suspects the collision was deliberate and intended to further physically traumatize her. Doctors later determined that one of the metal screws implanted in her back had been dislodged and was pressing on a major nerve. Demonstrations broke out around the country, and she was finally released on bond and flown to India for another round of surgery on July 4. In recent years, Uganda’s security forces have manipulated elections, tortured nonviolent political activists, and shot dead roughly 100 unarmed people—including 14 children in a traditional palace in western Uganda. Government security forces have also thrown countless peasants off their land to make way for politically connected investors such as Total, which is constructing an oil pipeline, and General Electric, which is building a refinery in western Uganda As Uganda’s largest foreign-aid donor—with over $500 million in grants per year, plus an unknown amount of classified military aid—the US government has the leverage to rein Museveni in.Much of our aid pays for medical and other humanitarian projects, which should continue, but US tax dollars also flow through the World Bank directly into Uganda’s treasury, where much of it is looted to fund Museveni’s repression. Suspending aid to Museveni might also help quell tensions in Uganda’s war-torn neighborhood. For far too long, gullible US national-security officials have relied on Museveni to interpret Central Africa’s complex regional conflicts, including the wars in South Sudan and Congo, even as Museveni himself has exacerbated those conflicts by arming one side or the other, while pretending to be a peacemaker. Uganda-backed rebel groups now appear to be emerging in Burundi and Congo, and Uganda may soon be embroiled in a new war—this time with Rwanda.

## Honduras

### Advantage – Honduras

#### xD the aff already happened - #NegOnPresumption

Sheridan and Sieff 3-30-19 (Mary Beth and Kevin; Mary Beth Sheridan is a correspondent covering Mexico and Central America for The Washington Post. She came to The Post in 2001 after 11 years as a foreign correspondent for the Associated Press, Miami Herald and Los Angeles Times. She served as deputy foreign editor from 2016 to 2018. Kevin Sieff has been The Washington Post’s Latin America correspondent since 2018. “Trump plans to cut U.S. aid to 3 Central American countries in fight over U.S.-bound migrants” Washington Post. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/trump-plans-us-aid-cut-to-3-central-american-countries-as-fight-widens-over-us-bound-migrants/2019/03/30/d6814b42-52ff-11e9-bdb7-44f948cc0605_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.fd1bb26d7e0a>) /MM

President Trump plans to slash hundreds of millions of dollars in aid to three Central American countries in retaliation for what he called their lack of help in reducing the flow of migrants to the U.S. border. The move was one of Trump’s harshest yet as he escalates a confrontation with Mexico and Central America over a surge in irregular migration, largely involving children and families seeking asylum. Trump has already warned that he could close the U.S.-Mexico border — or at least large stretches of it — in the coming week unless Mexico takes further steps to halt the northward flow of migrants. The State Department said in a statement Saturday that it would be “ending . . . foreign assistance programs for the Northern Triangle” — a region encompassing El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. The move would affect nearly $500 million in 2018 funds and millions more left over from the prior fiscal year. The money was destined for Central America but has not yet been spent. Trump’s action was the culmination of a months-long battle in the U.S. government over the aid program, which grew substantially under the Obama administration and was intended to address the root causes of migration — violence, a lack of jobs and poverty. Some Trump administration officials thought the program had failed to achieve enough results and in recent months have been looking into alternatives. But the president’s decision to cut off the remaining funds appeared to take many people by surprise. It came just a day after Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen signed what the department called a “historic” memorandum of cooperation on border security in Central America. One former U.S. official said there was “chaos” in the State Department and U.S. embassies as officials tried to figure out whether they had to cancel existing contracts or simply not renew them. He spoke on the condition of anonymity because of diplomatic sensitivities. The number of apprehensions along the U.S.-Mexico border has been soaring, with more than 76,000 migrants taken into U.S. custody in February, most of them from Central America. On Friday night, during a trip to Florida, Trump faulted governments in the region for the increase. “I’ve ended payments to Guatemala, to Honduras and El Salvador. No more money is going there anymore,” Trump told reporters. “We were giving them $500 million. We were paying them tremendous amounts of money, and we’re not paying them anymore because they haven’t done a thing for us.” Democratic officials, aid groups and former officials said Trump’s action could boomerang by shrinking or eliminating some of the very programs keeping would-be migrants in Central America.

#### Your evidence concedes that the police were already rebelling

Barnes 17 [Barnes, Luke. Luke Barnes is a reporter at ThinkProgress. He previously worked at MailOnline in the U.K., where he was sent to cover Belfast, Northern Ireland and Glasgow, Scotland. He graduated in 2015 from Columbia University with a degree in Political Science. He has also interned at Talking Points Memo, the Santa Cruz Sentinel, and Narratively. “Honduras is coming apart, and the State Department’s response is utterly nonsensical,” ThinkProgress. Dec 12, 2017, 4:25 pm. https://thinkprogress.org/honduras-is-coming-apart-the-u-s-response-more-military-aid-e462f6712bcb/] MT

To make matters worse, it appears that the security forces are now beginning to split into rival factions. Last Tuesday, hundreds of members of the elite riot police unit known as the Cobras said that they were no longer willing to face down protesters. “We are rebelling. We call on all the police nationally to act with their conscience”, one masked officer told Reuters. Other police units around the country have reportedly followed suit to the elation of Hondurans. However, according to a recent report, the Army has now begun clearing the streets of barricades, and Amnesty International reports that at least 14 people have died in clashes.

#### Double bind – either US MILITARY aid is the key internal link and we will win that it’s the key to leverage OR military aid ISN’T the key internal link and you vote neg on presumption because they can’t solve their impacts

#### Honduras is improving and withdrawing aid wrecks all progress – postdates your evidence

Ver Beek and Nealon 18, 12-10-18 (Kurt Alan and James D.; Kurt Ver Beek joined the faculty at Calvin College in 1996, after completing a Ph.D. in Development Sociology from Cornell University and worked for 4 years in Honduras. Kurt was the Honduras Country Representative and was responsible for project evaluations, staff training and supervision of funds for Honduran grass-roots organizations. James D. Nealon was confirmed by the United States Senate as Ambassador to the Republic of Honduras on July 15, 2014. He was sworn in on August 11, 2014. “Don't Give Up on Honduras” Woodrow Wilson Center. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/dont-give-honduras>) NE

For months, thousands of Central Americans have been traveling north toward the U.S. border, their numbers increasing as word of the “caravan” spread along with hopes of gaining entry into the United States. President Donald Trump’s response to the caravan has been to militarize the border, attempt to change the laws regulating asylum seeking, and threaten that “no more money or aid will be given to Honduras, effective immediately” if the group is not turned back. These responses are additional examples of the U.S. government’s increasingly hardline but shortsighted stance to the problems faced by Central America. In the last year, the United States has pushed for increased criminal prosecution of immigration offenses, including the separation of children from their parents at the border. We have also seen the elimination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras, and repeated threats to cut foreign aid to the region. These policies are intended to curb illegal immigration, but could in fact do the opposite. Honduras faces serious challenges, including a high homicide rate, weak rule of law, and limited employment opportunities. This migrant caravan demonstrates Hondurans’ frustration with those problems. Although Honduras remains a difficult place for many, progress has been made in Honduras in important areas such as education, health, violence reduction, and corruption. This progress is significant but fragile, as political and economic elites who have pushed back. Without firm and sustained international support, hard-won advances in Honduras could quickly be overturned. Threats to cut foreign aid put both reform efforts and those who promote them at risk. Now is not the time for the United States to blink, to cut off aid to Honduras, or to try to double our defense on the one-yard line. Now is the time to increase support for the real progress that has been made both in reducing violence and corruption. Fragile Progress in Violence and Organized Crime In 2011 Honduras’ homicide rate was 86.5 per 100,000—the highest in the world. Six years later, in 2017, it was 43.6 per 100,000, nearly a 50 percent drop in just six years. This drop can be attributed to a concerted effort of civil society, international donors, and government actors. For example, the Coalition against Impunity, comprised mostly of human rights organizations, has fiercely critiqued government inaction on anti-corruption and human rights matters, thereby holding judicial officials’ feet to the fire. The Alliance for Peace and Justice offers critiques of the government but is also willing to work with officials who show good faith. Both the Coalition and the Alliance serve as civil society’s version of a carrot and stick, to incentivize authorities to improve the justice system. In 2016, after the New York Times released the names of Honduran police officers accused of colluding with drug traffickers, President Juan Orlando Hernández appointed a police purge commission made up of members of civil society. This commission has removed over 5,000 individuals from the 11,000-member force, replacing them with 8,000 new recruits trained through a year-long, rigorous program that relies on important investments from the United States, Switzerland, and the Inter-American Development Bank. Both local and international organizations have worked closely with the Attorney General’s office helping to build capacity to fight drugs, organized crime, and corruption. An extradition agreement with the United States signed in 2012 was used for the first time in 2014, and since then 43 drug traffickers have been extradited or have turned themselves in to U.S. law enforcement, dismantling major criminal organizations in the country. Since 2015, the Honduran Attorney General’s office has seized over $1.5 billion in assets following arrests for drug trafficking and organized crime. There is much more to be done in Honduras, and many significant challenges. Corruption remains an issue in the police, the courts, and the Attorney General’s office. Homicides have dropped but they remain high, and issues like gang extortion and domestic violence still are drastically underreported. But progress is being made. Honduras’ President and Attorney General have put their support behind these positive changes because of both pressure and support from civil society and the international community. Foreign aid helps to tip the cost-benefit analysis for politicians and leaders, showing them that if they do the right thing, the United States will have their back. Cutting aid to Honduras not only halts the positive change we are beginning to see; such a move also leaves those who have bravely taken on substantial risk to bring about change without the protection and international support that this aid provides. Fragile Progress in Corruption and Transparency Civil society involvement has also led to significant but fragile change in the arenas of anti-corruption and transparency, including important reforms in public education, medicine procurement in the public health sector, and the establishment of an international anti-corruption body. Transformemos Honduras, a coalition of religious and nonprofit organizations, has exposed corruption in teachers’ unions and substantially reduced corruption and clientelism in the hiring of teachers and education administrators. Transformemos Honduras released evidence that 26 percent of Honduran teachers on the payroll were not in their assigned classrooms, and that Honduran schools managed just 125 class days per year. Those investigations led to reforms that resulted in returning teachers to their classrooms and increasing the school year to more than 200 days. Transformemos Honduras also uncovered serious corruption in government procurement of medicine that resulted in the theft of an estimated 30–40 percent of the government budget for medicine. Their report led the Honduran government to create a system under which the United Nations Office of Project Services now purchases all medicines through a Honduran government trust fund, reducing loss and corruption in the purchasing process. In 2015, the National Anti-Corruption Council, another civil society anti-corruption organization, began working on a corruption case involving over $300 million stolen from the Honduran social security system. The scandal spawned massive protests. One result of these protests was the establishment of the Support Mission against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH, in Spanish), part of the OAS’s secretariat for political affairs and special missions, and comprised of international experts brought in to investigate emblematic corruption cases in Honduras. The MACCIH has spearheaded several key corruption investigations, including one against former First Lady Rosa Elena de Lobo, and the “Pandora” case, which implicates high-ranking members of Congress in acts of corruption. These cases have prompted fierce pushback by members of the elite, including a challenge to the constitutionality of the MACCIH, and legal reforms making it significantly more difficult to prosecute corruption. Extradition, asset seizure, and preventative detention had previously been applied to drug traffickers and gang members without much pushback from Honduran elites, but once the MACCIH and Attorney General’s office began to focus on well-connected officials, prominent political and business elites reacted with force. One law approved by Congress in the wake of MACCIH’s cases required corruption cases to be first handled by an administrative auditing commission with a 7–10 year backlog of audits. This law virtually assures that new corruption cases will not make it to criminal court. While the political pushback is frustrating, it is, ironically, an encouraging sign of progress. Corrupt government officials clearly feel threatened by the coordinated anti-corruption work led by civil society and supported by the international community and key government actors, such as the Attorney General’s office, the Anti-Corruption Unit of the Attorney General’s office (UFECIC), and the MACCIH. Sustained Support Is Needed Honduras’ progress against violence and corruption is currently in a vulnerable place. Civil society has lost some battles against corruption and violence, minority groups and activists continue to be in serious danger, and threats to human rights continue. The MACCIH survived this last fight to be eliminated but did not emerge unscathed; it continues its work under some burdensome new requirements. It needs support, nationally and internationally, so that it can continue to battle the corruption of powerful elites. The United Nations is leading the country in a dialogue process after a controversial election in November 2017, but the process has been bogged down by political infighting and has made little progress. Meanwhile, under President Hernández, the executive branch has concentrated power and the country’s military continues to grow, with a budget increase of approximately 660 percent in five years, compared to a judiciary budget increase of only 160 percent.[2] Despite these challenges, there is good news in Honduras. Brave civil society groups are advocating for and seeing institutional reforms which have resulted in real-life changes: halving the homicide rate, nearly doubling the days of school, and improving transparency in the purchase of medicines. Civil society leaders are putting themselves at risk. And they need international support as they work for advances that are in the best interest of both Honduras and the United States – confronting drug trafficking and criminal groups, and improving the lives and livelihoods of Hondurans who are so desperate that they would walk across a continent to try to make a better life elsewhere. We can achieve a safer and more just Honduras. But this requires sustained investment in rule of law, anti-corruption, and systemic reform measures. Making progress toward these objectives requires international interest and accountability as well as a sign from the United States that it will stand by those who work on behalf of these reforms.

#### US military aid reduces corruption

Ver Beek and Nealon 18, 8-15-18 (Kurt Alan and James D.; Kurt Ver Beek joined the faculty at Calvin College in 1996, after completing a Ph.D. in Development Sociology from Cornell University and worked for 4 years in Honduras. Kurt was the Honduras Country Representative and was responsible for project evaluations, staff training and supervision of funds for Honduran grass-roots organizations. James D. Nealon was confirmed by the United States Senate as Ambassador to the Republic of Honduras on July 15, 2014. He was sworn in on August 11, 2014. “How U.S. Aid Is Contributing to Anti-Corruption Efforts in Honduras” Woodrow Wilson Center.https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/how-us-aid-contributing-to-anti-corruption-efforts-honduras) NE

In April, as a caravan of mostly Honduran migrants neared the U.S. border, and as President Trump deployed the National Guard, threatened to cut off aid, and separated minor children migrants from their parents, we argued in favor of maintaining U.S. assistance to Honduras. Not because we’re a great and magnanimous country, though we are; but rather because helping Hondurans mitigate the push factors of migration is manifestly in the U.S. interest. In our April article we made the case that, with the help of international and especially U.S. assistance and a vibrant civil society, things are slowly getting better in Honduras. The murder rate has been more than halved; progress has been made on addressing impunity and corruption; and drug traffickers continue to be arrested and extradited to the United States. But, we warned, an unholy alliance of corrupt politicians and criminal elements were fighting back against reform, seeking to take Honduras backwards into lawlessness and dysfunction. In short, the empire was striking back. Since then, through sustained effort by Honduran leaders and their civil society and international partners, some of these threats to progress have been beaten back. The MACCIH, an Organization of American States-sponsored body that fights corruption, was on the verge of being declared unconstitutional by the Honduran Supreme Court, for obvious reasons. In the end, under strong pressure from Hondurans backed by the weight of the international community, particularly the United States, the Court backed down and declared the MACCIH constitutional. And the appointment of a new head for MACCIH, stalled for months, was approved earlier this month. Four years ago the Honduran Congress approved an asset seizure law and it has been successfully used against dozens of drug traffickers and gang kingpins. But when it was used against the former First Lady and congressmen, the Honduran Congress tried to eliminate the law. Again, under heavy pressure from civil society and the international community, President Hernández vetoed the change. Meanwhile, the same former First Lady, from the ruling National Party, has been jailed for corruption. Five members of the National Congress have been indicted and another 140 former and sitting members are under investigation, an extraordinary number given that the Honduran Congress has 128 representatives. In the last month, 38 government officials have been indicted for the theft of 11 million dollars from the Ministry of Agriculture. Last week, two more Members of Congress and a national party mayor were indicted in the United States on drug trafficking charges, and the number of those already extradited or self-surrendered in the last four years is over 40. The Government of Honduras continues to cooperate closely with the United States on narcotrafficking and corruption investigations. And finally, and perhaps most importantly, a cynical attempt by politicians to elect a corruption-friendly Attorney General to replace incumbent Oscar Chinchilla was defeated, again in part due to pressure from civil society and the international community. Some argue that the process by which Chinchilla was re-elected was irregular, but it is very hard to argue that he hasn’t been the most effective Attorney General in Honduras’ history and the authority behind the investigations and indictments of corrupt politicians, and that his re-election sends a strong message regarding impunity and corruption.

#### **China fills in**

Reuters 9/24 Reuters, 9-24-2018, "Honduras President Laments US Aid Cuts, Eyes Role of China," VOA, <https://www.voanews.com/a/honduras-president-laments-us-aid-cuts-eyes-role-of-china/4585898.html> NE

NEW YORK — The president of Honduras said on Monday cuts in U.S. support for Central America would hinder efforts to stem illegal immigration as he welcomed China's growing diplomatic presence in the region as an "opportunity." In an interview, President Juan Orlando Hernandez expressed regret that prior U.S. commitments to step up investment in Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador had been scaled back since his U.S. counterpart Donald Trump took office. The U.S. president has pledged to build a wall along the Mexico-U.S. border to curb illegal immigration. The bulk of migrants stopped trying to cross the border are now from those three violent and impoverished Central American nations. Since Trump became president, Hernandez said the United States had shown great willingness to work on combating street gangs known as maras that have menaced Central America. But it was less ready to support the region financially, he noted. Under a scheme to strengthen Central America launched in 2014 known as the Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle, the United States pledged to put forward a dollar for every four invested by Honduras, Hernandez said. But that commitment has not materialized, he added. "That will obviously have repercussions," he told Reuters. "Because the whole idea of the Alliance for Prosperity ... was to attack the migration problem at the root." Between 2016 and 2018, combined U.S. foreign aid for Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador declined by more than one third to $195 million, according to official U.S. data. Adding to the challenges facing the region, the Trump administration announced earlier this year it would end temporary immigration protection for tens of thousands of Hondurans and Salvadorans living in the United States. Meanwhile, China is strengthening ties with Central America. Last month, El Salvador broke off diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favor of China, citing economic reasons and following on the heels of Panama in 2017. Honduras is one of a dwindling number of countries that still has formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Hernandez said China's growing diplomatic presence posed a "quandary" for the region, but also "an opportunity for all," provided there are "clear rules." Other countries would likely follow the lead of El Salvador and Panama soon, he added. "We see that things are changing in Central America. I think the United States has been a bit late to see it," he said. When asked whether Honduras would switch to China, the president gave a careful answer on what the future held. "We're still with Taiwan. Each country follows the principle of self-determination, that it can make its own decisions," he said. "For the time being, we're betting on a commercial relationship with Taiwan, a window to enter the Asian market."

#### Turns case

Kishi and Raleigh 15 Roudabeh Kishi and Clionadh Raleigh, 12-2-2015, "When China gives aid to African governments, they become more violent," Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/12/02/when-china-gives-aid-to-african-governments-they-become-more-violent/?noredirect=on&amp;utm_term=.6b0730ddfa57> NE

In a new working paper on [Chinese Aid and Africa’s Pariah States](http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ACLED_Working-Paper_Chinese-Aid-paper_final.pdf), we find that Chinese aid to African states increase the risk of civilian abuse by giving state leaders and politicians access to funds with which to carry out this violence. As a nation receives more Chinese aid, its military increases its violence against civilians (including bombing them). State leaders and regimes further use this aid to finance their hold on power by repressing political competitors, such as other political parties and opponents, through tactics such as increased [surveillance](http://peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/7880fd6b12b93bdd18eddcbd4f4e207f.pdf), [detaining and jailing individuals](http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/11/oil-prices-drop-repression-angola-rise/), [suppressing peaceful protests](http://blog.amnestyusa.org/africa/angola-where-peaceful-protest-is-a-crime/), and [forced displacement](https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/18/ethiopia-pastoralists-forced-their-land-sugar-plantations). In countries that receive different and varying levels of Chinese and Western aid, receipt of Chinese aid is followed by increases in police and military violence. Western aid is not followed by any such increase in violence. That’s not because China funds countries that were already violent. Chinese aid does not disproportionately go to countries that typically have high rates of repression, such as dictatorships or countries well-endowed with natural resources. China’s political agenda shapes who gets aid. For example, African states that recognize Taiwan will not receive any aid from China. How do we study Chinese aid and violence against civilians? We use conflict data from the [Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project](http://www.acleddata.com/), which makes it possible to distinguish the different rates, types and perpetrators of violence. We then compare those rates between states with different combinations of Western and Chinese aid flows. ACLED is the most comprehensive public collection of real-time political violence data for developing states, and is intended for policy, academic, and media users. Because it produces information on the specific dates and locations of political violence, the types of events, the groups involved, fatalities, and changes in territorial control, it is flexible to make comparisons across countries and aid types. The frequency of conflict and different types are mapped over the levels of Chinese aid to African states in the figure below (Chinese Aid data extend to 2011). So why does Chinese aid increase violence? To understand why Chinese aid increases African conflict while Western aid does not, it’s important to understand who perpetrates political violence. When countries receive large amounts of unrestricted aid, that may attract opponents who want to get their hands on those funds. How a government distributes aid can be unequal and biased. If groups and regions believe they have not received a fair share, they can riot or attack their rivals for those funds. But while greedy opposition forces may be a problem, the most critical issue is, how a government and its security forces respond to aid. [Consider Ethiopia](https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/18/ethiopia-pastoralists-forced-their-land-sugar-plantations), which has been criticized for human rights abuses and for forcing the migration of people living in the Eastern area. The government is insisting on that exodus so it can develop large infrastructure for solar, wind, and water energy projects, with the goal of positioning itself as a major power producer. Aid from the West comes with specific conditions on not moving communities and on continually assessing the environment and social well-being. But Chinese aid requires no such thing — and so when the Chinese send money to Ethiopia more civilians are harmed. Or consider the country President Xi is visiting: Zimbabwe. President Robert Mugabe has long upset traditional donors; he has been accused of [human rights abuses against opposition supporters](http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/countries/africa/zimbabwe) and oversaw [a controversial land transfer program](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/10/robert-mugabe-land-reform). In response to international uproar over his national economic and political mismanagement, Mugabe has been courting aid from China. Mugabe has reportedly used [Chinese aid to build Zimbabwe’s surveillance capacity](http://peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/7880fd6b12b93bdd18eddcbd4f4e207f.pdf), so that he can watch and repress other political parties, journalists, civil society, and opposition supporters. Finally, consider Uganda. When its traditional donors revolted because of the country’s draconian laws on homosexuality, including [Scandinavian states](http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/feb/25/uganda-donors-cut-aid-anti-gay-law) as well as [the United States](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/06/us-cuts-aid-uganda-over-anti-gay-law-201462052127734317.html), [Uganda began to focus more on encouraging Chinese aid](http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/uganda-looks-to-china/).

#### **That destabilizes the region and has effects all over Latin America**

JF 09 Jamestown Foundation, 10-7-2009, "Strategic Implications of Chinese Aid and Investment in Latin America," <https://jamestown.org/program/strategic-implications-of-chinese-aid-and-investment-in-latin-america/> NE

In addition to contributions as a resource provider and customer, China is also playing an expanding role as an alternative provider of technology and military goods. China has helped Venezuela to create a factory to assemble drilling rigs to develop its oil, as well as other joint ventures for producing cars and cell phones. The PRC has also launched a telecommunication satellite for Venezuela in 2008, and has become an important telecom infrastructure provider. In addition, the PRC sells the country [Venezuela] increasingly sophisticated military end items, including air surveillance radars and military aircraft [2]. Ecuador and Bolivia have followed Venezuela’s lead with respect to military purchases from the PRC. Ecuador, which had previously leased two MA-60 transport aircraft from the Chinese in 2007, is negotiating to purchase four more (El Universo, August 23), as well as taking delivery of two Chinese radars for evaluation, and purchasing four more, to be delivered by the first quarter of 2011 (El Universo, August 23). Bolivia, which previously received trucks, small boats and night vision goggles from the PRC, is now working with them to launch a satellite (Los Tiempos [Bolivia], July 22) and purchasing six K-8 aircraft for counter-narcotics missions after being denied access to U.S. and European planes (El Universo, October 2). In addition to providing resources, technical support and military goods that have contributed to the survival of the “caudillo socialist block,” the PRC has also been contributing to Brazil’s ascendancy as a regional power broker. Brazilian economic performance has been driven, in part, by its export-oriented iron and soy industries, for which China is a key customer. Indeed, the global recession emphasized and magnified the importance of China to Brazil. While Brazilian exports to the United States fell 37.8 percent in the first quarter of 2009, exports to the PRC increased by 62.7 percent (La Jornada [Nicaragua], May 4) thanks in part to a Chinese stimulus package that included $740 billion in infrastructure projects (Brazzil Magazine [Brazil], January 15), thus maintaining high levels of Chinese demand for factor inputs such as iron, purchased from Brazilian suppliers such as CVRD. Consequently, in the first half of 2009, China became Brazil’s number one export destination (Xinhua News Agency [China], April 3). China has also emerged as a key financier as Brazil reaches out for the $174 billion that it requires to develop newly discovered deepwater oil reserves in the Campos and Santos basins. In discussing a $10 billion loan from China Development Bank to Brazil (La Nacion [Argentina], May 28), the president of Petrobras, Sergio Gabrielli, noted, “There isn’t [sic] someone in the U.S. government that we can sit down with and have the kinds of discussions we’re having with the Chinese” (The Wall Street Journal, May 18). The PRC is also an increasingly important partner in technology transfer for Brazil. The two nations are pursuing a range of important joint ventures, including joint production of mid-sized business jets, the China-Brazil Earth Research Satellite (CBERS) program and other space cooperation programs (Xinhua News Agency, May 19). Brazil’s expanding trade with China is also giving Brasilia reasons to become more interested in the affairs of its neighbors. In cities such as Manaus in the interior of Brazil, the economics of importing factory inputs from the PRC is greatly facilitated by routes linking the Brazilian Amazon to Pacific ports. Projects currently underway include highway corridors from the Amazon River over the Andes Mountains to the Peruvian ports of Paita and Ilo, as well as a possible multimodal corridor linking the Brazilian city of Manus, with its free trade zone, to the Ecuadorian port of Manta. In a similar fashion, Brazil’s growing commerce with China also heightens its stake in the trade policy and political stability of its pacific neighbors, as well as major infrastructure projects affecting the economics of that trade such as the expansion of the Panama Canal. In addition to sustaining the caudillo socialist block and contributing to the rise of Brazil, in a broader sense, Chinese investment and aid in Latin America is undermining the primacy of the United States’ role as an economic and social actor in the region. This can be seen in the re-orientation of Latin America’s trade structure away from the United States, Latin American efforts to either please or avoid offending China, and in the declining power of the United States as a “reference model” for economic development and democracy. With respect to trade structure, PRC financial deals to facilitate commerce, such as the $10.2 billion debt swap with Argentina in March 2009 (La Nacion, March 31), represent an expanding challenge to the primacy of the dollar as an international reserve currency (Nacion [Costa Rica], March 31). Brazilian President Lula explicitly argued for working with China to move away from the dollar during his trip to China in May 2009 (Xinhua News Agency, May 22). Even before such challenges to the primacy of the dollar, however, the lure of China as a market was arguably one factor that helped to permanently derail the proposed “Free Trade Area of the Americas.” Chinese bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with Chile and Peru, and FTA negotiations with Costa Rica can have the effect of moving the region away from a structure of trade relationships and incentives focusing the region on the United States, to a world in which Latin American states are more independent global actors. At the individual country level, such influence can be seen in Chile, the foreign economic policy of which focuses on positioning the country as a gateway between Asia and Latin America. A similar enthusiasm can be seen in Peru, which hosted the 2008 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, and in which the PRC has made important investment commitments in the oil and gas sector, purchases of fishing fleets and fishmeal processing facilities, and mines in Toromocho, Rio Blanco and Maracona. It is also evidenced in the desire of countries such as Colombia and Costa Rica to tie themselves more closely to the Pacific economic community by joining APEC. In the realm of what has been called “soft power,” the United States is also losing influence in the region where U.S. initiatives conflict with Latin America’s desires to maintain a positive relationship with the PRC for economic reasons. The decision by the Ecuadorian regime of Rafael Correa not to renew the agreement giving the U.S. access to Manta was a necessary step in inviting the Chinese to develop the airport into a hub for trans-pacific flights, even though the two were probably never explicitly connected by the Chinese. In the future, as Latin American regimes contemplate whether to allow potentially intrusive cooperation with U.S. law enforcement in areas such as counternarcotics, telecommunications, or banking, the impact of such cooperation on attracting investment from partners such as the Chinese will cast a growing shadow over their decisions. The desire of Latin American leaders to court, please, or avoid offending the PRC, is becoming increasingly evident. When Costa Rican President Oscar Arias switched his country’s diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in May 2007, a key factor was his belief that the emergence of the PRC as a global power made being on the “right side” of the China/Taiwan issue in Costa Rica’s interest [3]. The importance that Latin American leaders place on China can be discerned by the number of its presidents who have led delegations to the PRC in recent years: in addition to the six trips to China by Hugo Chavez (La Estrella [Panama], April 6) and multiple trips by Rafael Correa and Evo Morales, virtually all the rest, including President Lula of Brazil, Alvaro Uribe, Felipe Calderon, Tabaré Vásquez, and Oscar Arias. To date, the PRC has limited its attempts to exert influence over its Latin American partners to areas tied to core Chinese interests, such as their recognition of Taiwan or Tibet, the opening of their markets to Chinese goods, and favorable or neutral positions with respect to China in forums such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Trade Organization. As China sinks more investment in Latin America, and becomes more dependent on the region as a market and a source of supply, it is logical that China would seek to motivate Latin American leaders to protect these interests. Although it is difficult to imagine the PRC demanding that a Latin American state not cooperate with the United States on police and security matters, it is increasingly easy to imagine that such a state might think twice, if it believes that a U.S. presence could jeopardize a major PRC purchase or investment in the country.

## PMCs

### Top Level – Greenhill

#### The issue is not abolition – the issue is that they are stuck in a “grey area” of the legal system which the CP makes clear – their evidence

Douglas-Bowers 11, [Devon Douglas-Bowers, The Threat of Private Military Companies By Devon DB Global Research, May 22, 2011 The Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG) is an independent research and media organization based in Montreal. The CRG is a registered non-profit organization in the province of Quebec, Canada. In addition to the Global Research websites, the Centre is involved in book publishing, support to humanitarian projects as well as educational outreach activities including the organization of public conferences and lectures. The Centre also acts as a think tank on crucial economic and geopolitical issues. http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-threat-of-private-military-companies/24896 Brackets in original text //ghs-am]

Legality Issues There are major problems with the legality of private companies and how they operate in countries where they are deployed. One example pertains to Iraq in 2004 when Blackwater employees entered into the city of Fallujah and “under the pretense of looking for terrorists, [they] had carried out nighttime raids, mistreated women and children, and tortured and murdered local men and teenage boys.” [4] Due to this, the local Iraqis took the law into their own hands and killed the Blackwater employees. However, whether one agrees with what the Iraqi people did or not, what occurred would have been the only justice the employees received for their crimes. It is extremely hard to investigate PMCs due to the secrecy that is guaranteed by government contracts, as well as the fact that they are not accountable to the US military and “receive their orders directly from the Pentagon, and both the Department of Defense and the headquarters of the companies concerned keep their lips strictly sealed.” [5] The secrecy begins with the contracts themselves where the government leaves out certain legal passages that specify exactly what the companies are supposed to do, how they are supposed to go about doing it, and if they will be held legally responsible for anything that occurs under their watch. Uesseler cites an example of this, one that should be quoted at length: DynCorp received a contract for more than a million dollars from the US State Department to organize the Iraqi criminal justice system. In June 2004, four of their employees, heavily armed and in battle gear, led Iraqi police on a raid of the former Iraqi leader in exile, Ahmed Chalabi. It is doubtful whether this action was in keeping with the spirit of the original contract. But that fact that DynCorp did not receive an official warning suggests that the contract is vague enough to allow for such “violations.” [6] The fact that the contracts are so vague as to the point where companies can virtually decide what they want to do has the potential to create serious problems, one example private companies doing night raids which result in the deaths of civilians and thus aggravating the local population and whipping up anti-American sentiment. That would make the job of US solders that much harder because they would bear the brunt of the backlash, not the employees that created the situation in the first place. The situation gets worse, however, when one goes to the national levels. In the United States, no one is able to hold any private companies accountable. The parties that “issue the contracts are barely capable of doing much in the way of monitoring, because, for example, they are tied down in Washington, and the state military, which would have the capabilities, has little interest in babysitting private soldiers that aren’t part of its chain of command.” [7] Thus the military cannot do it and Congress isn’t much better as they don’t allocate funds to the oversight of private companies. This allows them to “exist in a state of near anarchy and arbitrariness.” Private companies and their personnel are not “subject to strict regulations that determine to whom they are ultimately accountable.” Private corporations only have to go as far as declarations of intent in which they “maintain that they instruct their personnel to respect national laws and international human rights standards.” [8] Even if major crimes are done, the state cannot do anything as mercenaries enjoy significant protection. “In passing Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17 of June 2003, the Iraqi provisional government granted exemption from prosecution to all personnel action on behalf of the coalition- including PMC employees.” [9] This allows for PMCs to go about and do literally whatever they please, without fear of any consequences whatsoever and could potentially have the employees do things that they wouldn’t have done so before if they were under the law, like torturing and killing civilians for example. Internationally, things have the potential to get complicated quickly. The Geneva Convention clearly distinguishes between civilians and armed combatants. However, the employees of private companies aren’t civilians “since they are involved in the machinery of war, are employed by governments, and frequently carry arms.” Combatants are defined by the Geneva Convention “as people directly and actively involved in hostilities,” yet new forms of warfare muddle this definition. “To take an illustrative question: Is a private solider in Florida who presses a button launching a carpet bomb attack in Afghanistan only indirectly involved in war, while a regular soldier delivering supplies there is directly engaged in hostilities?” [10] The legality issues of private soldiers need to be solved on an international level as they currently occupy a gray area in the legal system. However, the US government needs to hold these companies accountable for any crimes that their employees are involved in, if not, then situations like the one mentioned at the beginning of this topic will continue.

## Fem IR

### Framework – HW

#### The role of the ballot is to evaluate consequeuces– any other framing mechanism is arbitrary, impact self-serving, and kills topic education

#### Biological death comes first – it forecloses the ability for their theory to take action and is a lexical pre-requisite

Paterson 03 – Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, http://sce.sagepub.com)

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81 In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

#### Attempts to resolve singular causes of warfare lock in aggressive government policy – strategic changes are key

Moore 04, Director Center for Security Law @ University of Virginia, 7-time Presidential appointee, & Honorary Editor of the American Journal of International Law, 2004 (John N., *Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace*, pg. 41-42).

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of **specific disputes** between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty or social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, and perceptions of "honor," or many other such factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or in serving as a means for generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these may have more potential to contribute to war than others, **there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors**, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war **but rather the** circumstances **permitting or** encouraging high risk decisions **leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling war.** And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents.I1 Certainly **if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so.** Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies **that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress.** The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation **with any of these "traditional" causes of war as is reflected in the "democratic peace."** Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may be to doom us to war for generations to come.

#### Preventing our impacts is best to reduce gendered violence – no root cause

Goldstein 1 (Joshua, Int’l Rel Prof @ American U, War and Gender, p. 412)

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book **s**uggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.9 So,”if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, **i**f you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

#### Political strategies are a pre-requisite - your authors agree

Enloe 05 (Cynthia, Feminist and Women Studies, “Of Arms and the Women” <http://feminism.eserver.org/of-arms-and-the-woman.txt>)

The first thing that must be said about the feminist critique of realism is that it is by no means incompatible with realism, properly understood. In fact, realist theory can hardly be recognized in the feminist caricature of it. Take the idea of the innate human propensity for conflict. Although some realist thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau have confused the matter (often under the influence of Reinhold Niebuhr) with misleading talk of "original sin," the controlling idea of realism is that there is an ineradicable potential for conflict between human beings--"men" in the inclusive, gender-neutral sense-- when they are organized in groups. Realism is not about conflict between individual men, that is, males; if it were, it would be a theory of barroom brawls or adolescent male crime. It is about conflict between rival communities, and those communities include women and men alike. Feminist critics of realism, then, begin by attacking a straw man, or a straw male. Even worse, they tend to indulge in the stereotypes that they otherwise abhor: aggression is "male," conciliation is "female." To their credit, most feminist theorists are aware of this danger, ever mindful of their dogma that all sexual identity is socially constructed, ever fearful that they will hear the cry of "Essentialist!" raised against them. Thus Enloe, in an earlier book called Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics, struggles with how to answer what she calls "the `What about Margaret Thatcher?' taunt." Her answer is that women like Margaret Thatcher and Jeane Kirkpatrick reinforce the patriarchy by making international conflict look "less man-made, more people-made and thus more legitimate and harder to reverse." Enloe applies this analysis consistently--right-wing women like Phyllis Schlafly are pawns of the patriarchal-militarist power structure, while left-wing women like the Greenham Common Women are disinterested proponents of the good of humanity. Still, Enloe is troubled enough to return to the question: "some women's class aspirations and their racist fears lured them into the role of controlling other women for the sake of imperial rule." Admit that, however, and you are close to conceding the point about collective human behavior made by realists. Then there is "the state." Here, too, there is nothing in realism that cannot accommodate many feminine observations about the particular patriarchal features of particular historic states. The realist definition of "the state" as a sovereign entity with an existence and a strategy distinct from that of individuals is very broad, including medieval duchies and ancient empires-- and, perhaps, female biker gangs. Realist theory holds no preference for the modern nation-state, though a word might be spoken in its defense. Again and again in feminist writings one encounters the claim that the modern nation- state is inherently "gendered," as though its predecessors--feudal dynastic regimes, theocratic empires, city-states, tribal amphictyonies--were not even more rigidly patriarchal. Completely missing from such an analysis is any acknowledgement that the successes of feminism have been largely based on appeals to the universal norms governing citizens of the impersonal, bureaucratic nation-state. Those appeals would have made no sense in any previous political system. Notwithstanding this, feminist scholars tend to join free marketeers, multiculturalists and Wilsonians in their approval of the (mostly imaginary) dissolution of the nation-state in a new world order. If the nation-state is "gendered," Enloe reasons, then perhaps the post-national nonstate need not be: "Perhaps effective u.n. soldiering will call for a new kind of masculinity, one less reliant on misogyny, less insecure about heterosexual credentials." (If the recent "peacekeeping" of u.n. forces in Bosnia and Somalia shows anything, however, it is that a little more of the old masculinity may be necessary to prevent mass slaughter--and mass rape, too.) Though realist theory can survive, and perhaps even accommodate, many of the arguments of feminism with respect to collective conflict and state sovereignty, realism must reject the third aspect of the feminist criticism: the redefinition of security to mean social justice. From the Marxist left, feminists have picked up the argument that interstate violence is just one genre of "structural violence," which includes the economic oppression of lower classes by upper classes (Marxism) and the subordination of women to men by custom and by violence (feminism). But this notion merely disguises a change of subject as a change of approach. To say that mass rape by soldiers in wartime and wife-beating in societies at peace (excuse me, at "peace") are parts of the same phenomenon is to abandon any pretense of engaging in serious thinking about international relations. The result may be feminist theory, but it is not a theory of world politics. It is a theory of human society in general. When, as in "ecofeminism," the mistreatment of women by men in all societies, in peace and at war, is fused, as a subject of analysis, with the mistreatment of the ecosystem by humanity, one has a theory of everything, and a theory of everything is usually not very much. If you don't know where you are going, as the old saw has it, any road will get you there. Hence Enloe's decision to understand the Gulf war by beginning with the experiences of Filipina maids in Kuwait. "I might get back to George Bush, Fran�ois Mitterrand, King Fahd and Saddam Hussein eventually." Or maybe not. The results of combining an abandonment of the idea of international politics as something that can be understood by abstracting certain aspects of reality from the blooming, buzzing confusion of fact with an abandonment of a "positivist" effort to establish chains of causation are amply on display in The Morning After, as in the earlier Bananas, Beaches and Bases. These rambling exercises in free association have less in common with a monograph on a diplomatic or military subject than with the associative and politicized writings of, say, Adrienne Rich; they amount to a compendium of vignettes linked only by vague humanitarian sentiment and the writer's consciousness. Enloe is grandiose in her employment of "I": "I've become aware now of the ways in which men have used nationalism to silence women...." "Those like myself who believe that militarism is separable from masculinity are especially interested in conscription...." "For instance, I realize now that I know nothing--nothing--about Kurdish women." (Such personal observations, one must admit, are refreshing compared to sentences like these: "Sexual practice is one of the sites of masculinity's--and femininity's--daily construction. That construction is international. It has been so for generations." Or: "Thinking about militarism in this way reminds us that we all can be militarized, as girlfriends, fathers, factory workers or candidates.") Resolutely ignoring the world of high politics--dictators, presidents, chanceries, general staffs--Enloe devotes attention to various feminist political groupuscles far out of proportion to their actual significance in shaping events. Thus she dwells on a Serbian women's party that "called for respect for cultural diversity within Yugoslavia." She salutes Danish women for voting against Maastricht and coalitiian women for working to depose the Shah. "Women Against Fundamentalism is a group formed in Britain by women who included Jews, Arab and Asian Muslims, Hindus, white and Afro-Caribbean Protestants and Irish Catholics. It was formed in 1989, in the turbulently gendered wake of the threats against Salman Rushdie's life...." "The first National Conference of Nicaraguan Women was held in January 1992...." This recurrent focus on little sisterhoods, mobilizing against "gendered" nation-states, multinational capitalism and racial and religious prejudice, owes a lot to the Marxist dream of a transnational fraternity of workers (in a new form, as a transnational sorority of feminists) and even more to the hope of early twentieth-century peace crusaders such as Jane Addams that the women of the world can unite and put an end to war and exploitation. Enloe tries to justify the attention paid to quite different groups of women in various countries with the claim that "no national movement can be militarized"--or demilitarized?--"without changing the ways in which femininity and masculinity infuse daily life." Even if "militarization," however defined, does result in certain kinds of gender relations, it does not follow that altering masculine and feminine roles will, in itself, do much to reverse the process. Something may, after all, be an effect without being a cause. Rejecting the feminist approach to international relations does not mean rejecting the subjects or the political values of feminist scholars. Differing notions of masculinity and femininity in different societies, the treatment of women and homosexuals of both sexes in the armed forces, the exploitation of prostitutes by American soldiers deployed abroad, the sexual division of labor both in advanced and developing countries: all of these are important topics that deserve the attention that Enloe awards them. She shows journalistic flair as well as scholarly insight in detailing what abstractions like the Caribbean Basin Initiative mean in the lives of women in particular Third World countries. Still, such case studies, however interesting, do not support the claim of feminist international relations theorists that theirs is a new and superior approach. One thing should be clear: commitment to a feminist political agenda need not entail commitment to a radical epistemological agenda. Ideas do not have genders, just as they do not have races or classes. In a century in which physics has been denounced as "Jewish" and biology denounced as "bourgeois," it should be embarrassing to denounce the study of international relations as "masculinist." Such a denunciation, of course, will not have serious consequences in politics, but it does violence to the life of the mind. The feminist enemies of empiricism would be well-advised to heed their own counsel and study war no more.

### Advantage – HW

#### Vote neg on presumption –

#### The aff doesn’t get rid of the military – there is a difference between reform and abolition and the aff is the former. They can’t solve ANY of their offense because the aff still gives humanitarian aid and military aid to non-authoritarian regimes like Argentina which your evidence cites.

#### No internal link between aid and government oppression – the aff can’t solve the ideologies that all authoritarian regimes have

#### Not a single card in the aff says the word “authoritarian” or “military aid”. The alt causes to their aff are overwhelming and prove that their structures will continue. Scholarship isn’t distinct from action – holding the aff to their “scholarship” requires their advocacy to solve their offense. If the aff can’t resolve the impacts they have presented, you can’t vote on it regardless of if they win their framework or not.

#### Russia fills in

Barmin 18 Yuri Barmin**.** 3/08/2018. [Yuri Barmin is an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, covering the Middle East and North Africa, Moscow’s policy towards the region, as well as the conflicts in Syria and Libya. He regularly contributes his analysis to Al Monitor, the Middle East Institute, Al Sharq Forum and FARAS Center. Mr. Barmin holds an MPhil in International Relations from the University of Cambridge], Russia in the Middle East Until 2024: From Hard Power to Sustainable Influence, The Jamestown Foundation. https://jamestown.org/program/russia-middle-east-2024-hard-power-sustainable-influence/.

Vladimir Putin’s return to power in Russia in 2012 signified a dramatic change in the country’s foreign policy and military strategy. Scrapping the achievements of the Dmitry Medvedev era in the Kremlin, which was characterized by a thaw in relations with the West, Vladimir Putin opted for a more aggressive approach toward positioning the country in the international arena. Experts still argue what prompted this review of the country’s foreign policy strategy, but the developments that likely had a major impact on Vladimir Putin’s policy planning in 2012 included the war with Georgia in 2008, the Arab Spring protests, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) infamous military campaign in Libya, which brought down Russia’s long-time ally Muammar Qaddafi. Contours of the new policy approach to the region started to emerge when Russia updated two of its key documents, the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, in 2013 and 2014, respectively.[i] The documents pronounced strategies based on protecting Russian national interests abroad, including militarily if need be, and increasing Moscow’s role in maintaining global security. Quite notably, a more recent edition of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, signed by President Putin in November 2016, has a specific focus on the Middle East and names foreign meddling there as one of the causes of instability and extremism in the region that directly affect Russia.[ii] The statement that serves as de facto justification for the Russian military campaign in Syria became the first official document to elucidate the country’s ambition to play a bigger role in the Middle East and North Africa. In the three years that divide the two concepts, Vladimir Putin’s approach to foreign policy experienced an evolution and increasing securitization (the word “terrorism” figures 15 times in the 2013 Concept and 35 in its 2016 edition). The Foreign Policy Concept also spells out the Russian president’s growing ambition to deal with instability where it originates before it reaches Russian borders. The rationale behind Russia’s re-emergence as one of the leading powers in the Middle East was of a defensive nature and largely reactionary. The Arab Spring movement in the region was a painful reminder of the Color Revolutions that broke out across several post-Soviet states in the first half of the 2000s and, according to the Kremlin, led to the 2014 EuroMaidan revolution in Ukraine. Vladimir Putin himself is of the belief that that the Arab Spring is a continuation of those Color Revolutions and that both are foreign-instigated.[iii] Coupled with a forced revolution in Libya and the removal of Qaddafi in what Russia declared was a violation of international law, this episode is often cited as a watershed in Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy thinking.[iv] A wave of revolutions across Eurasia convinced the Russian leadership that the apparent domino effect of regime change would eventually target Russia. It is not a coincidence that the Russian president likens Color Revolutions and the Arab Spring protests to each other and often makes no distinction between them. Commenting on anti-corruption protests in Russia in March 2017, he went as far as to call them “an instrument of the Arab Spring.”[v] Vladimir Putin sees Russia as a legitimate actor in designing a new power balance in the Middle East and as its integral part since security challenges originating in the region reverberate across the former Soviet space as well as in Russia. The United States, on the other hand, is an outsider in this region in the view of Russian officials. Criticism of the White House over its “destructive” role in the Middle East is a central theme of many of Vladimir Putin’s speeches, including the one he delivered at the UN General Assembly prior to launching his military campaign in Syria in September 2015. In those remarks, the Russian president accused the United States of being the source of problems in the Middle East.[vi] A gradual withdrawal of the United States from the Middle East under Barack Obama among other things meant that the region’s “policeman” was no longer interested in maintaining order there, which arguably presented Moscow with numerous security challenges. Russia’s re-emergence in the Middle East to a large extent happened to fill some of the void left by the retreating Obama administration. In some cases it happened effortlessly, such as in Egypt, where the US decision to cut aid to Cairo in 2013 led to the emergence of a budding Russia-Egypt alliance. In other contexts, most prominently in Syria, Russia had to invest significant diplomatic and military resources to marginalize the US in the war and in the peace process. What started out as an attempt to replace the United States where it was no longer interested in playing a leading role later transformed into an ambition to challenge the US even where it had no intention of retreating, for instance in the Gulf region. Russia’s return to the Middle East differs from the Soviet experience: Today, Moscow is extending its reach without the baggage of Soviet ideology. The idea of using its arms exports to the Middle East in the ideological struggle against the West evaporated as soon as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) disintegrated and was replaced with the idea of making a profit for the cash-strapped budget. The Kremlin is looking to support its geopolitical claims with a strong pragmatic dimension. In the Middle East, Moscow to reinforce its influence there as well as offset the burden upon the Russian federal budget associated with the expenses of the Syrian campaign. Following in the footsteps of the Soviet Union, Russia has used arms deals to reach out to Cold War–era allies in Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Syria to consolidate a new power balance. During the Cold War, Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gilbert wrote that as more countries became recipients of Soviet military aid programs, there was a tendency for these countries to become greater political allies of the Soviet Union.[vii] And it seems that this argument is increasingly relevant today. According to SIPRI, in 2015 $5.5 billion in Russian arms exports were destined for clients in the Middle East, which was ten times more than all Russian experts to the region for all of the 1990s.[viii] With Vladimir Putin declaring victory over the Islamic State during his December 2017 visit to Syria, Russia is faced with a number of opportunities as well as challenges. Its military operation in Syria may have put Russia back on the radar in the Middle East; but in all certainty, it essentially solidified its position in the region. As Vladimir Putin is eyeing re-election as president in March 2018, foreign policy achievements, chiefly in the Middle East and North Africa, figure prominently in his election campaign rhetoric. One of the effects of Russia’s assertive foreign policy has become an expectation from regional partners and opponents alike that Moscow will be active in the Middle East. However, the hard power that brought Russia to prominence in the region will not be a helpful tool to support long-term influence there and could, in fact, produce a negative impact for Russia’s international standing. As a result, during his next term in office, Vladimir Putin will be faced with a challenge to depart from hard power, his preferred modus operandi, to embrace a spectrum of other tools in order to make Russia’s presence in the region lasting and sustainable.

#### That turns case and offers no chance of reform

Barmin 18 Yuri Barmin**.** 3/08/2018. [Yuri Barmin is an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, covering the Middle East and North Africa, Moscow’s policy towards the region, as well as the conflicts in Syria and Libya. He regularly contributes his analysis to Al Monitor, the Middle East Institute, Al Sharq Forum and FARAS Center. Mr. Barmin holds an MPhil in International Relations from the University of Cambridge], Russia in the Middle East Until 2024: From Hard Power to Sustainable Influence, The Jamestown Foundation. <https://jamestown.org/program/russia-middle-east-2024-hard-power-sustainable-influence/> / MM

Experts who had argued that authoritarianism in the Middle East would maintain stability and keep extremism at bay were proven wrong by the events of the Arab Spring.[xxxv] The Russian leadership, however, still projects its vision of “autocratic stability” onto the region. And even though Moscow repeatedly insists that it is up to the Syrian people to decide through a presidential election who will lead the nation into the post-war period, the Russian government is unlikely to become a supporter of democracy movements in the Middle East. After all, elections have been a crucial legitimization tool of Russia’s own “managed democracy.” The consolidation of power in the hands of the national leader as well as the securitization of the political agenda have characterized the Russian political system throughout the last 17 years Vladimir Putin has been in power. And they continue to guide him in how he sees regimes in the Middle East. Some of these authoritarian Arab regimes share a long history with Russia: during the Cold War, they proved their ability to maintain order for longer than any democratic regime could sustain it, not least due to Moscow’s financial and military support. The fact that Bashar al-Assad survived throughout the bloody Syrian conflict, to a large extent due to Russia’s aid, solidifies the idea that authoritarianism in the Middle East guarantees stability and puts a cap on “toxic” democratic values imposed from the outside. In Moscow’s view, authoritarian tendencies are indigenous to the region, much like they are to Russia, which is why they need not be battled but rather be correctly managed. Russia’s idea of “authoritarian stability” in the Middle East may find a potential supporter in Donald Trump, who notoriously dropped America’s agenda for promoting democracy in the Middle East. The distinct security focus of Donald Trump’s strategy toward the region has emboldened his allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel, and convinced them that the regional policeman will no longer restrain their geopolitical ambitions. The position of both Russia and the United States is, thus, likely to resonate with many governments in the region that previously had to put on airs of civil society engagement and liberalization just to have international political and diplomatic backing. Egypt and Turkey are the two cases in point: the 2017 Human Rights Watch World Report specifically points to them to illustrate how the tide of new authoritarianism is sweeping through the Middle East.[xxxvi] In Turkey, the attempted coup in July 2016 was used by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) as an excuse to crack down not only on suspected plotters but also on wider circles critical of the government’s policies. Western powers sharply rebuked Erdoğan over his suspension of the rule of law in the country and mass detentions—but Russia pointedly did not. Putin was the one world leader who gave a call to Erdoğan to tell him Moscow supports his campaign to root out dissent, which the Turkish president described as “anti-constitutional.”[xxxvii] Furthermore Putin hosted his Turkish counterpart in St. Petersburg less than a month after the failed coup, during which Erdoğan explained that Vladimir Putin’s call to him was an important move, “a kind of moral support and display of Russia-Turkey solidarity,” as the Turkish president described the situation.[xxxviii] All this occurred just weeks after Erdoğan’s late June apology to Russia for the November 2015 downing of a Russian Su-24 jet over Syria; and it goes to show how masterfully Vladimir Putin uses authoritarian movements to his own political benefit. Egypt is going through a similar wave of authoritarianism, with President Abdel Fattah El Sisi cracking down on dissent that is not necessarily associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. That government campaign is happening against the backdrop of economic instability, currency devaluation and increased poverty rates. However, the army’s grip on power and full control over the public sphere give a semblance of stability in the country. Sisi’s fight to eradicate extremism in the Sinai as well as his crackdown on dissent find support in Moscow, which is reflected in official statements coming from the Kremlin. Egypt reemerged as Russia’s key partner in the Middle East, including in crucial spheres of military-technical cooperation. The two countries signed a protocol on military cooperation in March 2015, significantly ramped up joint military exercises, and are looking to green light an agreement that would allow Russian military aircraft to use Egyptian airspace and infrastructure.[xxxix] With the turmoil and regular attacks in the Sinai Peninsula, counter-terrorism cooperation has become a distinct characteristic of the bilateral relationship. A security-heavy agenda acts as a glue between Moscow and Cairo, not least due to the military and security background of the political elites of the two countries. Both Russians and Egyptians will head to the polls in March 2018 to elect their respective heads of state, while presidential elections in Turkey are to take place in November 2019. The outcome is already known in all three countries; Putin, Sisi and Erdoğan will almost certainly serve out their next terms into the first half of the 2020s, meaning that we are unlikely to witness a disruption in the security-comes-first policy employed by Moscow in its bilateral relations with both Cairo and Ankara. The cases of Egypt and Turkey illustrate that Vladimir Putin is likely to encourage authoritarian “stability” across the region through skewed security-heavy policies. Putin’s support for autocratic tendencies will hardly find any resistance among other powers in the region and will almost certainly be embraced. Syria’s recovery from the seven-year war is unlikely to happen through the emergence of democratic institutions and freedom, but will probably lead to the creation of a strong regime with an inflated security apparatus to shield a fragile government and keep extremist tendencies at bay. Iraq’s increasingly sectarian policies hint at a similar trend. And as Libya’s internationally recognized government fails to establish control over much of the country’s territory, Libyan National Army Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar represents the type of leader the Kremlin would presumably like to see for a post–civil war Libya. If Russia’s Syria policy is any indication, a highly centralized system will be Moscow’s remedy for extremism throughout the wider region. The fear of a new wave of extremism will push many regimes to seek more control over the population, and a lack of incentives to democratize may bring about new repressive regimes. In other words Russia’s leadership in the Middle East may significantly lengthen and reinforce the era of authoritarianism there.

#### Pulling out leaves the oppressed hopeless as they pray for internal reform

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Development and military aid constitute tools of persuasion; attempts to alter the behavior of another state by changing its costs and benefits through carrots or sticks.27 Although both types of aid may persuade recipients to act more in line with donor demands, the unique characteristics of military and development aid have different impacts on state actors’ use of one-sided violence. I argue that the effects of U.S. military aid and international development aid to states can be better understood in terms of two distinct effects on state actors—persuasion and predation. U.S. military aid has a persuasion effect on state actors, which decreases states’ incentives and necessity to target civilians while enhancing their capacity to identify and target rebels more precisely. In contrast, development aid flows have a predation effect on state actors. Development aid flows create adverse incentives for resource capturing in recipient states, which exacerbate conflict and governments’ use of collective violence. Framing the effects as persuasion and predation is useful to draw out the causal mechanisms by which recipient states’ existing motivations to target civilians interact with donors’ security objectives and the effects of aid, to result in observable changes in state perpetrated civilian killings. U.S. Military aid and One-Sided Violence The United States frequently uses military aid to pressure governments in counterinsurgency efforts, and to influence the “behavior and capabilities of their partners to achieve a specific outcome.” 28 I argue that military aid results in states’ decreased use of one-sided violence STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 779 due to a persuasion effect. This is rooted in its effectiveness to incentivize governments as well as boost their capacity to conduct more targeted military operations. Examples from Pakistan are particularly useful in illustrating the persuasion effects of U.S. military aid. They help in drawing out theoretically how military aid can shape state actors’ behavior in underdeveloped and conflict-ridden states where there is a presence of rebels that pose both a domestic and international security concern. Pakistan also represents a political environment where external states are likely to intervene through foreign aid than direct intervention. It exemplifies situations where recipient governments must balance external pressure with domestic objectives and where local militants hold strategic utility for recipient governments in proxy wars, as is the case in many ungoverned spaces in the Middle East and Africa. Given that Pakistan has been receiving U.S. military aid over an extended period of time, it’s a particularly useful case to examine closely. Incentivizing Recipients In terms of incentives, provision of military aid increases a recipient’s political will to comply, first in order to avoid becoming a victim of other coercive policies by the donor. Second, it signals an alliance between donors and recipients that can enhance the recipient’s international standing and legitimacy. Thus, as supported by previous studies, U.S. military aid can induce governments to cooperate.29 For example, after 9/11, Pakistan opted to assist the United States in overthrowing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan over the alternative of becoming a target of the United States.30 Pakistan’s Musharraf was portrayed as an international hero on various media outlets, with inflows of aid indicating that Pakistan was no longer a pariah state.30 Subsequently, Pakistan arrested militants on its soil especially targeting Al Qaeda and foreign fighters who posed the biggest threats to the United States32 as well as rebels that threatened the Pakistani government in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). While Pakistan frequently turns a blind eye to many militant groups for its own interests, many of its counterterrorism efforts have been prompted by U.S. assistance to Pakistan’s national security agencies.33 Donor-Recipient Security Objectives Additionally, where donors seek to counter nonstate actors located in another state through military assistance, there is likely to be some overlap in the security objectives of both donors and recipients. Militant groups in Pakistan pose a security threat not just to the United States and other countries, but also to Pakistan itself, which saw a 48 percent increase in domestic terrorist attacks between 2008 and 2009.34 Even though Pakistan is rightly criticized for not targeting all rebels, it’s still conducting operations against rebels that have directly challenged the writ of the state such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP). Therefore, the higher levels of congruence in the security objectives of donors and recipients of military aid, as far as addressing domestic security threats is concerned, is generally suggestive of a more cooperative approach. Governments that increase military operations against internal security threats have their own strong incentives to avoid use of collective punishment. Targeting civilians is likely to be counterproductive if the government has coercive objectives as opposed to brute force objectives.35 The goal of suppressing internal opposition in a state is a “moderately coercive” objective implying that the state requires its target to acquiesce to prevail. It must use force persuasively to establish peace within its territorial borders especially to increase popular 780 A. JADOON support.36 This is precisely why the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan were encouraged by leaders in 2009 to exercise “courageous restraint” to achieve strategic success.37 Thus, in asymmetric conflicts, information flows, collaboration, and support of civilians are key for success from a utilitarian perspective. In the absence of sufficient capability though, governments may resort to civilian targeting as a cheaper mechanism to fight guerilla warfare. Indeed, weaker governments are more likely to employ tactics of civilian targeting to undermine their opponent’s capacity.38 In the Pakistan case, where the army made use of collective violence in targeting local and foreign fighters by demolishing private residences (e.g., in Operation Kalosha II), it triggered multiple attacks against army bases and enraged locals.39 Similarly, where government militias in Iraq have engaged in revenge killings, many civilians have lost trust in them and prefer the ISIS despite disagreeing with the latter’s brutality and interpretation of Islam.40 Governments will lose legitimacy if their penetration is associated with increased civilian victimization and will reinforce civilian support for rebels.41 Military aid can thus provide governments with the means to maintain their legitimacy while conducting internal security operations, and offset costs associated with minimizing reliance on civilian targeting. Building Coercive Capacity Beyond enhancing incentives, U.S. military aid’s persuasion effect is also rooted in its capacity effect. Military aid includes a wide variety of military support including weapons, technology, and intelligence capability. Governments use collective punishment against communities perceived to be supportive of rebel groups, or to counter guerrilla warfare that is more difficult and expensive to tackle through conventional means.42 Strategic explanations of one-sided violence argue that armed actors employ violence against civilians to change their strategic environment43 and that shifts in the capability balance between actors triggers changes in actors’ tactics in war. For example, the Pakistani army relied on the use of excessive force for counterinsurgency operations where it lacked logistical and precision abilities and had shortcomings in technical intelligence.44 General Tarik Khan, who has led the fight against the TTP, has said, “any kind of military operation that seeks to take out individuals is an intelligence-driven operation that requires a lot of technology, a lot of surveillance capacity.” 45 As such, military aid will help states overcome the capability deficiencies that previously may have necessitated the use of collective violence. Improved counterinsurgency ability allows governments to target rebels more precisely, offset costs of increased efforts against rebels, harden soft targets and thus engage in more selective violence. U.S. military funding to Pakistan has identified priority areas such as precision strike capability, air mobility, combat search and rescue, counter improvised explosive device and survivability, battlefield communications and night operations.46 The Pakistani military has used F-16s for precise targeting of rebels in civilian areas47 and intelligence-based operations have helped the state preempt backlash against military operations in North Waziristan.48 Although, such improvements are not expected to completely eliminate the use of civilian targeting by governments, they will reduce the need to do so if governments are better able to locate legitimate targets. It should also be noted that military aid compared to development aid is less fungible, and thus less susceptible to leakage through rent-seeking behavior and corruption. And because it is provided for a specific purpose such as targeting and capturing rebels rather than being STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 781 linked to broad development goals, its threatened withdrawal by the donor is also a more realistic threat for recipients. U.S. military aid flows can thus enhance recipient states’ military capability to use force in a way, which is in line with their overall moderately coercive objectives of countering internal rebel activity. Overall, military aid not only increases the political will of governments to increase efforts against rebel strongholds, it also enhances the capacity of governments to target rebels and avoid civilian killings. This leads to the following hypothesis: H1a: Higher levels of U.S. military aid flows will be associated with lower levels of civilian killings by recipient state actors Alternatively, it may be argued that recipient governments may reduce their use of civilian targeting to ensure continued flows of U.S. military aid. This would be likely if the United States was willing to withhold aid on the basis of human rights violations or civilian killings by governments, despite its security objectives. However, prior research provides strong evidence that the United States largely provides military aid on the basis of its own national security interests, despite human rights violations within states.49 Studies have shown a lack of a relationship between recipients’ human rights records and the allocation of U.S. aid or the magnitude of assistance provided.50 Indeed, Sandholtz has recently shown that U.S. military assistance in 150 countries over thirty years links with worse performance on human rights.51 Although, the Leah Law requires the United States to suspend military assistance flows in cases of civilian abuses by military units, it does not technically require an end to extrajudicial killings or a suspension of overall aid. Instead, it requires the recipient to take effective measures to hold accountable the specific military units responsible for civilian abuses. In practice, there are numerous examples where recipients have continued to receive U.S. aid despite civilian killings. In Colombia, 30,000 extrajudicial killings have been committed since 2000, but U.S. officials did not freeze its assistance under the Leah Law52 and military assistance continues at high levels. The Philippines is another case in point. The Philippines is a close U.S. ally, and received more than $507 million in U.S. military assistance between 2001–2010. International efforts to raise awareness regarding human rights violations and extrajudicial killings have largely been ineffective in severing aid, with aid flows rising to $30 million in 2012.53 Human rights violations by the Philippines military have not affected the regularity or scale of U.S. aid flows. Other countries, which continued to receive comparable levels of military assistance or increased levels despite civilian killings, include Burma (2002–2006), Brazil (2005–2006), Guatemala (1989 and 1995), Haiti (1991–1994), Indonesia (1996–1999), Jordan (1992–1993), Kenya (2007–2009), Mali (1990–1992), Niger (1989–1990), Sri Lanka (1989–1991), and Uganda (1990–1991). Such examples provide support that the United States rarely suspends military assistance in the face of its security imperatives. The potential reverse causality between military aid and onesided violence is further discussed and tested in the empirical section of the article.

#### The aff causes a shift to PMCs

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America’s troops may be returning home from Iraq, but contrary to [President Obama’s assertion](http://costsofwar.org/) that “the tide of war is receding,” we’re far from done paying the costs of war. In fact, at the same time that Obama is reducing the number of troops in Iraq, he’s [replacing them](http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/07/iraq-merc-army/) with military contractors at far greater expense to the taxpayer and redeploying American troops to other parts of the globe, including [Africa](http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/central/Obama-Deploys-Troops-to-Central-Africa--131895118.html), [Australia](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/world/asia/obama-and-gillard-expand-us-australia-military-ties.html?pagewanted=all) and [Israel](http://rt.com/usa/news/us-troops-israel-iran-257/). In this way, the war on terror is privatized, the American economy is bled dry, and the military-security industrial complex makes a killing — literally and figuratively speaking. The war effort in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan has already cost taxpayers [more than $2 trillion](http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/29/us-usa-war-idUSTRE75S25320110629) and could go as high as $4.4 trillion before it’s all over. At least $31 billion (and as much as $60 billion or more) of that $2 trillion was [lost to waste and fraud](http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_NR-49.pdf) by military contractors, who do everything from janitorial and food service work to construction, security and intelligence — jobs that used to be handled by the military. That translates to a loss of [$12 million a day](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/585dadcc-d3f1-11e0-b7eb-00144feab49a.html#axzz1jdvJ8CDV) since the U.S. first invaded Afghanistan. To put it another way, the government is spending more on war than all 50 states combined spend on health, education, welfare, and safety. Over the past [two decades](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/585dadcc-d3f1-11e0-b7eb-00144feab49a.html#axzz1jdvJ8CDV), America has become increasingly dependent on military contractors in order to carry out military operations abroad (in fact, the government’s extensive use of private security contractors has [surged under Obama](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/28/wartime-contractors-waste-billions_n_829251.html)). According to the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States [can no longer conduct large or sustained military operations](http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local_news/article/Soldiers-gone-but-contractors-remain-in-Iraq-2426228.php#ixzz1jNcP4ZcG) or respond to major disasters without heavy support from contractors. As a result, the U.S. employs at a minimum [one contractor to support every soldier](http://thinkprogress.org/security/2011/06/29/256726/afghanistan-contractors-surge/?mobile=nc) deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq (that number increases dramatically when U.S. troop numbers decrease). For those signing on for contractor work, many of whom are hired by private contracting firms after serving stints in the military, it is a lucrative, albeit dangerous, career path (private contractors are 2.75 times [more likely to die](http://www.salon.com/2011/02/24/afghanistan_private_contractors/singleton/) than troops). Incredibly, while base pay for an American soldier hovers somewhere around $19,000 per year, contractors are reportedly pulling in between [$150,000 - $250,000 per year](http://www.redrat.net/BUSH_WAR/mercenaries/index.htm). The exact number of military contractors on the U.S. payroll is hard to pin down, thanks to sleight-of-hand accounting by the Department of Defense and its contractors. However, according to a Wartime Contracting Commission report released in August 2011, there are [more than 260,000 private contractors](http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=7650159) in Iraq and Afghanistan, more than the number of ground troops [in both countries](http://www.laboreducator.org/lt110706.htm). As noted, **that number increases dramatically when troops are withdrawn from an area**, as we currently see happening in Iraq. Pratap Chatterjee of the Center for American Progress [estimates](http://thinkprogress.org/security/2011/06/29/256726/afghanistan-contractors-surge/?mobile=nc) that “if the Obama administration draws down to 68,000 troops in Afghanistan by September 2012, they will need 88,400 contractors at the very least, but potentially as many as 95,880.” With paid contractors often [outnumbering enlisted combat troops](http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jul/04/nation/na-private4), the American war effort dubbed by George W. Bush as the “coalition of the willing” has since evolved into the “coalition of the billing.” The Pentagon’s Central Command [counts](http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/12/19) 225,000 contractors working in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Between December 2008 and December 2010, the total number of private security contractors in Afghanistan [increased](http://www.salon.com/2011/02/24/afghanistan_private_contractors/singleton/) by 413% while troop levels increased 200%. Private contractors provide a number of services, including transport, construction, drone operation, and security. One military contractor, [Blackbird](http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/12/19), is composed of former CIA operatives who go on secret missions to recover missing and captured US soldiers. Then there is the [Lincoln Group](http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/12/19) which became famous for engaging in covert psychological operations by planting stories in the Iraqi press that glorified the U.S. mission. [Global Strategies Group](http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/obama-iraq-eternal/) guards the consulate in Basra for $401 million. [SOC Inc.](http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/obama-iraq-eternal/) protects the US embassy for $974 million. Unfortunately, fraud, mismanagement and corruption have become synonymous with the U.S. government’s use of military contractors. [McClatchy News](http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/01/12/106681/troubled-us-afghan-projects-mushroom.html) “found that U.S. government funding for at least 15 large-scale programs and projects [in Afghanistan] grew from just over $1 billion to nearly $3 billion despite the government’s questions about their effectiveness or cost.” One program started off as a modest wheat program and “ballooned into one of America’s biggest counterinsurgency projects in southern Afghanistan despite misgivings about its impact.” Another multi-billion-dollar program resulted in the construction of schools, clinics and other public buildings that were so poorly built that they might not withstand a serious earthquake and will have to be rebuilt. Then there was the $300 million diesel power plant that was built despite the fact that it wouldn’t be used regularly “because its fuel cost more than the Afghan government could afford to run it regularly.” RWA, a group of three Afghan contractors, was selected to build a 17.5 mile paved road in Ghazni province. They were paid $4 million between 2008 and 2010 before the [contract was terminated](http://www.stripes.com/news/failed-afghan-road-project-shows-pitfalls-of-u-s-efforts-1.160547)with only 2/3 of a mile of road paved. Mind you, with the U.S. spending more than $2 billion a week in Afghanistan, these examples of ineptitude and waste represent only a fraction of what is being funded by American taxpayer dollars. (Investigative [reports](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/30/billions-down-the-drain-i_n_790043.html#s195062&title=Countless_Dollars_Literally) reveal that large amounts of cash derived from U.S. aid and logistics spending are being flown out of the country on a regular basis by Afghan officials, including $52 million by the Afghan vice president, who was allowed to keep the money.) Yet what most Americans fail to realize is that we’re funding the very individuals we claim to be fighting. The war effort has become so corrupt that U.S. taxpayers are not only being bilked by military contractors but are also being forced to [indirectly fund insurgents](http://www.salon.com/2010/07/28/protection_payments_to_taliban/singleton/) and warlords in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the Taliban, which receives money from military contractors [in exchange for protection](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/30/billions-down-the-drain-i_n_790043.html#s195056&title=Funding_Our_Enemies). This is rationalized away as a “[cost of doing business](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/585dadcc-d3f1-11e0-b7eb-00144feab49a.html#axzz1jdvJ8CDV)“ in those countries. As the [Financial Times](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/585dadcc-d3f1-11e0-b7eb-00144feab49a.html#axzz1jdvJ8CDV) reports, the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan “found that extortion of funds from US construction and transportation projects was the second-biggest funding source for insurgent groups

#### PMCs are immune and cause way more civilian casualties – turns case

Del Prado 8., Jose L (Jose L. Gomez del Prado Is a member of the United Nations Working Group on Mercenaries ). "Impact on Human Rights of Private Military and Security Companies’ Activities." Center for Research on Globalization. N.p., 11 Oct. 2008. Web. 4 July 2017. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/impact-on-human-rights-of-private-military-and-security-companies-activities/10523>.

PMSC personnel in Iraq are involved in exchange of fire with insurgents on a daily basis. Security provisions necessarily involve military engagement. There is no perceptible difference between regular soldiers and the private contractors protecting convoys (transporting ammunitions and fuel), material, buildings or persons. Providing security in such an environment necessitates being armed and ready to shoot, often under uncertain circumstances where combatants and civilians are difficult to separate. As observed in many incidents, PMSC employees can use excessive force and shoot indiscriminately resulting in civilian casualties. There are cases where PMSC employees have used forbidden arms or experimental ammunition prohibited by international law2. Private contractors often circulate without identification and drive in unidentified sport utility vehicles (SUVs) with tinted glasses and no plates, behaving similarly to the infamous death squads. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the two countries with the largest presence of PMSC staff, the population is confused and finds it extremely difficult to distinguish employees of different companies from state forces. Reports indicate erratic behavior of PMSCs employees in Iraq with mottos such as: “what happens here to-day, stays with us today”. It has also been alleged that “private security guards” would also detain Iraqis without authorization

## Black Lives Matter

### FW – BLM

#### The role of the ballot is to evaluate consequences in a vacuum – any other framing mechanism is arbitrary, impact self-serving, and kills topic education

#### Preventing extinction is a priori

MacAskill 14, William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014 / MM

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be [over 20 quadrillion]. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

#### Don’t conflate high magnitude with low probability – it’s good to keep our eyes open

Clarke 08[Lee, member of a National Academy of Science committee that considered decision-making models, Anschutz Distinguished Scholar at Princeton University, Fellow of AAAS, Professor Sociology (Rutgers), Ph.D. (SUNY), “Possibilistic Thinking: A New Conceptual Tool for Thinking about Extreme Events,” Fall, Social Research 75.3, JSTOR]

In scholarly work, the subfield of disasters is often seen as narrow. One reason for this is that a lot of scholarship on disasters is practically oriented, for obvious reasons, and the social sciences have a deep-seated suspicion of practical work. This is especially true in sociology. Tierney (2007b) has treated this topic at length, so there is no reason to repeat the point here. There is another, somewhat unappreciated reason that **work on disaster is seen as narrow**, a reason that holds some irony **for** the main thrust of my argument here: **disasters are unusual and** the **social sciences are** generally **biased toward phenomena that are frequent. Methods textbooks caution against** using case stud- ies as representative of anything, and **articles** in mainstreams journals that are **not based on** **probability samples** must issue similar obligatory caveats. **The premise, itself narrow, is that the only way to be certain** that we know something about the social world, and the only way to control for subjective influences in data acquisition, **is to follow** the tenets of **probabilistic sampling**. This view is a correlate of the central way of defining rational action and rational policy in academic work of all varieties and also in much practical work, which is to say in terms of probabilities. **The irony is that probabilistic thinking has its own biases, which, if unacknowledged and uncorrected** for, **lead to a conceptual neglect of extreme events**. This leaves us, as scholars, paying attention to disasters only when they happen and doing that makes the accumulation of good ideas about disaster vulnerable to issue-attention cycles (Birkland, 2007). **These conceptual blinders lead to a neglect of disasters** **as "strategic research sites**" (Merton, 1987), **which results in learning less about disaster than we could** and in missing opportunities to use disaster to learn about society (cf. Sorokin, 1942). **We need new conceptual tools** **because of an upward trend in frequency and severity of disaster** since 1970 (Perrow, 2007), and because of a growing intellectual attention to the idea of worst cases (Clarke, 2006b; Clarke, in press). For instance, the chief scientist in charge of studying earthquakes for the US Geological Service, Lucile Jones, has worked on the combination of events that could happen in California that would constitute a "give up scenario": a very long-shaking earthquake in southern California just when the Santa Anna winds are making everything dry and likely to burn. In such conditions, meaningful response to the fires would be impossible and recovery would take an extraordinarily long time. There are other similar pockets of scholarly interest in extreme events, some spurred by September 11 and many catalyzed by Katrina. The **consequences** of disasters **are also becoming more severe**, both in terms of lives lost and property damaged. **People** and their places **are becoming more vulnerable. The most important reason** that vulnerabilities are increasing **is population concentration** (Clarke, 2006b). This is a general phenomenon and includes, for example, flying in jumbo jets, working in tall buildings, and attending events in large capacity sports arenas. **Considering** disasters whose origin is **a natural hazard, the** specific **cause** of increased vulnerability **is** that **people** are **moving** **to where hazards originate**, and most especially to where the water is. In some places, this makes them vulnerable to hurricanes that can create devastating storm surges; in others it makes them vulnerable to earthquakes that can create tsunamis. **In any case, the general problem is that people concentrate themselves in dangerous places, so when the hazard comes disasters are intensified.** More than one-half of Florida's population lives within 20 miles of the sea. Additionally, Florida's population grows every year, along with increasing development along the coasts. The risk of exposure to a devastating hurricane is obviously high in Florida. No one should be surprised if during the next hurricane season Florida becomes the scene of great tragedy. The **demographic pressures and attendant development are wide- spread. People are concentrating along** the **coasts** of the United States, **and**, like Florida, **this puts people at risk** of water-related hazards. Or consider the Pacific Rim, the coastline down the west coasts of North and South America, south to Oceania, and then up the eastern coast- line of Asia. There the hazards are particularly threatening. Maps of population concentration around the Pacific Rim should be seen as target maps, because along those shorelines are some of the most active tectonic plates in the world. The 2004 Indonesian earthquake and tsunami, which killed at least 250,000 people, demonstrated the kind of damage that issues from the movement of tectonic plates. (Few in the United States recognize that there is a subduction zone just off the coast of Oregon and Washington that is quite similar to the one in Indonesia.) Additionally, volcanoes reside atop the meeting of tectonic plates; the typhoons that originate in the Pacific Ocean generate furiously fatal winds. **Perrow** (2007) **has generalized** the point about **concentration, arguing** not only that **we increase vulnerabilities by increasing the breadth and depth of exposure to hazards but also by concentrating industrial facilities with catastrophic potentia**l. Some of Perrow's most important **examples concern chemical production** facilities. These are facilities that bring together in a single place multiple stages of production used in the production of toxic substances. Key to Perrow's argument is that there is no technically necessary reason for such concentration, although there may be good economic reasons for it. **The general point is that we can expect more disasters,** whether their origins are **"natural" or "technological."** We can also expect **more death and destruction** from them. **I predict we will continue to be poorly prepared to deal with disaster**. **People** around the world **were appalled with the incompetence of** America's **leaders** and orga**-** nizations **in** the wake of Hurricanes **Katrina** and Rita. Day after day we watched people suffering unnecessarily. Leaders were slow to grasp the importance of the event. With a few notable exceptions, organi- zations lumbered to a late rescue. Setting aside our moral reaction to the official neglect, perhaps **we ought to ask why we should have expected a competent response at all**? Are US leaders and organiza- tions particularly attuned to the suffering of people in disasters? Is the political economy of the United States organized so that people, espe- cially poor people, are attended to quickly and effectively in noncri- sis situations? The answers to these questions are obvious. If social systems are not arranged to ensure people's well-being in normal times, there is no good reason to expect them to be so inclined in disastrous times. Still, **if we are ever going to be reasonably well prepared to avoid or respond to the next Katrina-like event, we need to identify the barriers to effective thinking about,** and effective response to, **disasters**. **One of those barriers is that we do not have a set of concepts that would help us think rigorously about out-sized events. The chief toolkit of concepts that we have** for thinking about important social events **comes from probability theory**. There are good reasons for this, as probability theory has obviously served social research well. Still, **the toolkit is incomplete** when it comes to extreme events, **especially when it is used as a base whence to make normative judgments about what** people, organizations, and **governments should** and should not **do**. **As a complement** to probabilistic thinking I propose that **we need possibilistic thinking**. In this paper I explicate the notion of possibilistic thinking. I first discuss the equation of probabilism with rationality in scholarly thought, followed by a section that shows the ubiquity of possibilis- tic thinking in everyday life. Demonstrating the latter will provide an opportunity to explore the limits of the probabilistic approach: that **possibilistic thinking** is widespread suggests it **could be used more rigorously** in social research. I will then address the most vexing prob- lem with advancing and employing possibilistic thinking: the prob- lem of infinite imagination. I argue that **possibilism can be used with discipline, and** that **we can be smarter about responding** to disasters **by doing so**.

#### Reject moral tunnel visions – it undermines effective strategies to prevent violence

Issac 02, professor of political science at Indiana University, 2002 (Jeffrey, Dissent, Spring, ebsco)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### Suffering comes first – reject other framing mechanism

Paterson 03 – Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, http://sce.sagepub.com)

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81 In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

### Adv – Proxy Wars

### Adv – Militarism

### Adv – Domestic Antiblackness

#### **The third advantage does not have an independent impact scenario without the extra plank of the plan**

#### We already know that military aid to authoritarian regimes hasn't always been used for absolute good via the previous two advantages, but spending on military aid abroad isn't what their ev claims is directly causing harm to black folks - rather their claim is that the money spent on military aid abroad SHOULD be used instead to focus on domestic priorities - not that it WOULD be reallocated there absent fiat

#### The Rodriguez evidence talking about the establishment left's unwillingness to take on these domestic harms is probably a reason why funds wouldn’t be allocated there

## Human Rights

### Top Level - Lay

#### Military aid is effective to prevent human rights – human rights abuses increase after the US leaves

Meernik 06 James D. Meernik**.** 5/2/2006 [Professor; Coordinator, Divison of Social Sciences; Director, Castleberry Peace Institute], “Military force to promote human rights” Conflict Prevention and Peace-building in Post-War Societies Pg 169 <https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=hf6SAgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA160&dq=The+Use+of+Military+Force+to+Promote+Human+Right&ots=OKuO9DLUtY&sig=pOW0HFh4bjPTBQ1RndQYC7rLg5s#v=onepage&q&f=false> / SM

The yield results in which we can have more confidence, we employ a more sophisticated statistical model. We also employ a set of control variables derived from prior research on human rights (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe at al. 1999) including: (1) level of democracy; (2) per capita GNP; (3) logged population; (4) leftist government dummy variable; (5) military dictatorship dummy variable; (6) British colonial influence; (7) involvement in international war; (8) involvement in civil war; (9) organized nonviolent rebellion; and (10) organized violent rebellion. The results are available upon request. Here we simply describe the relationships we find between the use of force and human rights. We use three different measures of the US use of force. The first is measured simply as the occurrence of any US use of military force. The second is measured as a major level US use of force. The third is measured as a use of military force involving deployment of US ground forces. We employ the latter two variables to determine if a stronger commitment of the US military is needed to affect human rights. Major military actions are those that involve multiple units of air, land and/or sea forces that would be expected to provide a more visible and assertive US military presence. We would also expect that in instances where presidents ordered the deployment of US ground forces that the US government would possess greater leverage over the policies of the target regime. Ground forces are in a much stronger position to affect change in a target country when they are used to secure a peace, patrol, and protect lives and property. Therefore, we expect that the more force used and the deployment of ground forces would be more associated with an increase in the protection of human rights, Each of these three, binary variables was lagged one-year, two-years and three-years to determine the length of time needed for force to actually influence, if at all, respect for human rights. The effects of the three measures of uses of force on human rights are largely negligible. In the first set of measures we examined the effects of all uses of force irrespective of size or type. Regardless of how many years we lag the occurrence of a use of force(to allow time for human rights practices to change within a country), the coefficients for the use of force variables never attain statistical significance. Interestingly, the coeffects at two- and three-year lags are positive. The impact of uses of force would appear to change over time. At first, the use of force may lead to an increase in respect for human rights, but later and perhaps after US forces have departed the scene, the target nation experiences increasing violations. One could imagine several possible scenarios associated with a use of force. If US forces have left the target nation, that regime may be returning to its previous and poor human rights policies, which may have triggered the use of force. Whatever positive influence US military forces may have on human rights may depend entirely on their continuing presence.

#### Russia fills in if the US pulls out

Barmin writes Yuri Barmin**.** 3/08/2018. [Yuri Barmin is an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, covering the Middle East and North Africa, Moscow’s policy towards the region, as well as the conflicts in Syria and Libya. He regularly contributes his analysis to Al Monitor, the Middle East Institute, Al Sharq Forum and FARAS Center. Mr. Barmin holds an MPhil in International Relations from the University of Cambridge], Russia in the Middle East Until 2024: From Hard Power to Sustainable Influence, The Jamestown Foundation. https://jamestown.org/program/russia-middle-east-2024-hard-power-sustainable-influence/. SHS TG

Vladimir Putin’s return to power in Russia in 2012 signified a dramatic change in the country’s foreign policy and military strategy. Scrapping the achievements of the Dmitry Medvedev era in the Kremlin, which was characterized by a thaw in relations with the West, Vladimir Putin opted for a more aggressive approach toward positioning the country in the international arena. Experts still argue what prompted this review of the country’s foreign policy strategy, but the developments that likely had a major impact on Vladimir Putin’s policy planning in 2012 included the war with Georgia in 2008, the Arab Spring protests, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) infamous military campaign in Libya, which brought down Russia’s long-time ally Muammar Qaddafi. Contours of the new policy approach to the region started to emerge when Russia updated two of its key documents, the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, in 2013 and 2014, respectively.[i] The documents pronounced strategies based on protecting Russian national interests abroad, including militarily if need be, and increasing Moscow’s role in maintaining global security. Quite notably, a more recent edition of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, signed by President Putin in November 2016, has a specific focus on the Middle East and names foreign meddling there as one of the causes of instability and extremism in the region that directly affect Russia.[ii] The statement that serves as de facto justification for the Russian military campaign in Syria became the first official document to elucidate the country’s ambition to play a bigger role in the Middle East and North Africa. In the three years that divide the two concepts, Vladimir Putin’s approach to foreign policy experienced an evolution and increasing securitization (the word “terrorism” figures 15 times in the 2013 Concept and 35 in its 2016 edition). The Foreign Policy Concept also spells out the Russian president’s growing ambition to deal with instability where it originates before it reaches Russian borders. The rationale behind Russia’s re-emergence as one of the leading powers in the Middle East was of a defensive nature and largely reactionary. The Arab Spring movement in the region was a painful reminder of the Color Revolutions that broke out across several post-Soviet states in the first half of the 2000s and, according to the Kremlin, led to the 2014 EuroMaidan revolution in Ukraine. Vladimir Putin himself is of the belief that that the Arab Spring is a continuation of those Color Revolutions and that both are foreign-instigated.[iii] Coupled with a forced revolution in Libya and the removal of Qaddafi in what Russia declared was a violation of international law, this episode is often cited as a watershed in Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy thinking.[iv] A wave of revolutions across Eurasia convinced the Russian leadership that the apparent domino effect of regime change would eventually target Russia. It is not a coincidence that the Russian president likens Color Revolutions and the Arab Spring protests to each other and often makes no distinction between them. Commenting on anti-corruption protests in Russia in March 2017, he went as far as to call them “an instrument of the Arab Spring.”[v] Vladimir Putin sees Russia as a legitimate actor in designing a new power balance in the Middle East and as its integral part since security challenges originating in the region reverberate across the former Soviet space as well as in Russia. The United States, on the other hand, is an outsider in this region in the view of Russian officials. Criticism of the White House over its “destructive” role in the Middle East is a central theme of many of Vladimir Putin’s speeches, including the one he delivered at the UN General Assembly prior to launching his military campaign in Syria in September 2015. In those remarks, the Russian president accused the United States of being the source of problems in the Middle East.[vi] A gradual withdrawal of the United States from the Middle East under Barack Obama among other things meant that the region’s “policeman” was no longer interested in maintaining order there, which arguably presented Moscow with numerous security challenges. Russia’s re-emergence in the Middle East to a large extent happened to fill some of the void left by the retreating Obama administration. In some cases it happened effortlessly, such as in Egypt, where the US decision to cut aid to Cairo in 2013 led to the emergence of a budding Russia-Egypt alliance. In other contexts, most prominently in Syria, Russia had to invest significant diplomatic and military resources to marginalize the US in the war and in the peace process. What started out as an attempt to replace the United States where it was no longer interested in playing a leading role later transformed into an ambition to challenge the US even where it had no intention of retreating, for instance in the Gulf region. Russia’s return to the Middle East differs from the Soviet experience: Today, Moscow is extending its reach without the baggage of Soviet ideology. The idea of using its arms exports to the Middle East in the ideological struggle against the West evaporated as soon as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) disintegrated and was replaced with the idea of making a profit for the cash-strapped budget. The Kremlin is looking to support its geopolitical claims with a strong pragmatic dimension. In the Middle East, Moscow to reinforce its influence there as well as offset the burden upon the Russian federal budget associated with the expenses of the Syrian campaign. Following in the footsteps of the Soviet Union, Russia has used arms deals to reach out to Cold War–era allies in Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Syria to consolidate a new power balance. During the Cold War, Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gilbert wrote that as more countries became recipients of Soviet military aid programs, there was a tendency for these countries to become greater political allies of the Soviet Union.[vii] And it seems that this argument is increasingly relevant today. According to SIPRI, in 2015 $5.5 billion in Russian arms exports were destined for clients in the Middle East, which was ten times more than all Russian experts to the region for all of the 1990s.[viii] With Vladimir Putin declaring victory over the Islamic State during his December 2017 visit to Syria, Russia is faced with a number of opportunities as well as challenges. Its military operation in Syria may have put Russia back on the radar in the Middle East; but in all certainty, it essentially solidified its position in the region. As Vladimir Putin is eyeing re-election as president in March 2018, foreign policy achievements, chiefly in the Middle East and North Africa, figure prominently in his election campaign rhetoric. One of the effects of Russia’s assertive foreign policy has become an expectation from regional partners and opponents alike that Moscow will be active in the Middle East. However, the hard power that brought Russia to prominence in the region will not be a helpful tool to support long-term influence there and could, in fact, produce a negative impact for Russia’s international standing. As a result, during his next term in office, Vladimir Putin will be faced with a challenge to depart from hard power, his preferred modus operandi, to embrace a spectrum of other tools in order to make Russia’s presence in the region lasting and sustainable.

#### That spreads authoritarianism – it turns all of their offense and things get infinitely worse

Barmin writes Yuri Barmin**.** 3/08/2018. [Yuri Barmin is an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, covering the Middle East and North Africa, Moscow’s policy towards the region, as well as the conflicts in Syria and Libya. He regularly contributes his analysis to Al Monitor, the Middle East Institute, Al Sharq Forum and FARAS Center. Mr. Barmin holds an MPhil in International Relations from the University of Cambridge], Russia in the Middle East Until 2024: From Hard Power to Sustainable Influence, The Jamestown Foundation. https://jamestown.org/program/russia-middle-east-2024-hard-power-sustainable-influence/. SHS TG

Experts who had argued that authoritarianism in the Middle East would maintain stability and keep extremism at bay were proven wrong by the events of the Arab Spring.[xxxv] The Russian leadership, however, still projects its vision of “autocratic stability” onto the region. And even though Moscow repeatedly insists that it is up to the Syrian people to decide through a presidential election who will lead the nation into the post-war period, the Russian government is unlikely to become a supporter of democracy movements in the Middle East. After all, elections have been a crucial legitimization tool of Russia’s own “managed democracy.” The consolidation of power in the hands of the national leader as well as the securitization of the political agenda have characterized the Russian political system throughout the last 17 years Vladimir Putin has been in power. And they continue to guide him in how he sees regimes in the Middle East. Some of these authoritarian Arab regimes share a long history with Russia: during the Cold War, they proved their ability to maintain order for longer than any democratic regime could sustain it, not least due to Moscow’s financial and military support. The fact that Bashar al-Assad survived throughout the bloody Syrian conflict, to a large extent due to Russia’s aid, solidifies the idea that authoritarianism in the Middle East guarantees stability and puts a cap on “toxic” democratic values imposed from the outside. In Moscow’s view, authoritarian tendencies are indigenous to the region, much like they are to Russia, which is why they need not be battled but rather be correctly managed. Russia’s idea of “authoritarian stability” in the Middle East may find a potential supporter in Donald Trump, who notoriously dropped America’s agenda for promoting democracy in the Middle East. The distinct security focus of Donald Trump’s strategy toward the region has emboldened his allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel, and convinced them that the regional policeman will no longer restrain their geopolitical ambitions. The position of both Russia and the United States is, thus, likely to resonate with many governments in the region that previously had to put on airs of civil society engagement and liberalization just to have international political and diplomatic backing. Egypt and Turkey are the two cases in point: the 2017 Human Rights Watch World Report specifically points to them to illustrate how the tide of new authoritarianism is sweeping through the Middle East.[xxxvi] In Turkey, the attempted coup in July 2016 was used by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) as an excuse to crack down not only on suspected plotters but also on wider circles critical of the government’s policies. Western powers sharply rebuked Erdoğan over his suspension of the rule of law in the country and mass detentions—but Russia pointedly did not. Putin was the one world leader who gave a call to Erdoğan to tell him Moscow supports his campaign to root out dissent, which the Turkish president described as “anti-constitutional.”[xxxvii] Furthermore Putin hosted his Turkish counterpart in St. Petersburg less than a month after the failed coup, during which Erdoğan explained that Vladimir Putin’s call to him was an important move, “a kind of moral support and display of Russia-Turkey solidarity,” as the Turkish president described the situation.[xxxviii] All this occurred just weeks after Erdoğan’s late June apology to Russia for the November 2015 downing of a Russian Su-24 jet over Syria; and it goes to show how masterfully Vladimir Putin uses authoritarian movements to his own political benefit. Egypt is going through a similar wave of authoritarianism, with President Abdel Fattah El Sisi cracking down on dissent that is not necessarily associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. That government campaign is happening against the backdrop of economic instability, currency devaluation and increased poverty rates. However, the army’s grip on power and full control over the public sphere give a semblance of stability in the country. Sisi’s fight to eradicate extremism in the Sinai as well as his crackdown on dissent find support in Moscow, which is reflected in official statements coming from the Kremlin. Egypt reemerged as Russia’s key partner in the Middle East, including in crucial spheres of military-technical cooperation. The two countries signed a protocol on military cooperation in March 2015, significantly ramped up joint military exercises, and are looking to green light an agreement that would allow Russian military aircraft to use Egyptian airspace and infrastructure.[xxxix] With the turmoil and regular attacks in the Sinai Peninsula, counter-terrorism cooperation has become a distinct characteristic of the bilateral relationship. A security-heavy agenda acts as a glue between Moscow and Cairo, not least due to the military and security background of the political elites of the two countries. Both Russians and Egyptians will head to the polls in March 2018 to elect their respective heads of state, while presidential elections in Turkey are to take place in November 2019. The outcome is already known in all three countries; Putin, Sisi and Erdoğan will almost certainly serve out their next terms into the first half of the 2020s, meaning that we are unlikely to witness a disruption in the security-comes-first policy employed by Moscow in its bilateral relations with both Cairo and Ankara. The cases of Egypt and Turkey illustrate that Vladimir Putin is likely to encourage authoritarian “stability” across the region through skewed security-heavy policies. Putin’s support for autocratic tendencies will hardly find any resistance among other powers in the region and will almost certainly be embraced. Syria’s recovery from the seven-year war is unlikely to happen through the emergence of democratic institutions and freedom, but will probably lead to the creation of a strong regime with an inflated security apparatus to shield a fragile government and keep extremist tendencies at bay. Iraq’s increasingly sectarian policies hint at a similar trend. And as Libya’s internationally recognized government fails to establish control over much of the country’s territory, Libyan National Army Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar represents the type of leader the Kremlin would presumably like to see for a post–civil war Libya. If Russia’s Syria policy is any indication, a highly centralized system will be Moscow’s remedy for extremism throughout the wider region. The fear of a new wave of extremism will push many regimes to seek more control over the population, and a lack of incentives to democratize may bring about new repressive regimes. In other words Russia’s leadership in the Middle East may significantly lengthen and reinforce the era of authoritarianism there.

## Terror

### Top Level

#### Military aid decreases civilian violence and increases states’ ability to target rebels effectively.

Jadoon 17 (Amira Jadoon is an assistant professor at the Combating Terrorism Center and the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point as well as the CTC’s General John P. Abizaid Research Associate. Dr. Jadoon holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy at the University at Albany, an M.Sc. in Economic Development from the London School of Economics, and a B.A. in Economics and in Journalism from the University of Iowa, "Persuasion And Predation: The Effects Of U.S. Military Aid And International Development Aid On Civilian Killings", 8-1-2017, Taylor & Francis Online, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2017.1353355?scroll=top&needAccess=true)k> KED

Development and military aid constitute tools of persuasion; attempts to alter the behavior of another state by changing its costs and benefits through carrots or sticks.27 Although both types of aid may persuade recipients to act more in line with donor demands, the unique characteristics of military and development aid have different impacts on state actors’ use of one-sided violence. I argue that the effects of U.S. military aid and international development aid to states can be better understood in terms of two distinct effects on state actors—persuasion and predation. U.S. military aid has a persuasion effect on state actors, which decreases states’ incentives and necessity to target civilians while enhancing their capacity to identify and target rebels more precisely. In contrast, development aid flows have a predation effect on state actors. Development aid flows create adverse incentives for resource capturing in recipient states, which exacerbate conflict and governments’ use of collective violence. Framing the effects as persuasion and predation is useful to draw out the causal mechanisms by which recipient states’ existing motivations to target civilians interact with donors’ security objectives and the effects of aid, to result in observable changes in state perpetrated civilian killings. U.S. Military aid and One-Sided Violence The United States frequently uses military aid to pressure governments in counterinsurgency efforts, and to influence the “behavior and capabilities of their partners to achieve a specific outcome.” 28 I argue that military aid results in states’ decreased use of one-sided violence STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 779 due to a persuasion effect. This is rooted in its effectiveness to incentivize governments as well as boost their capacity to conduct more targeted military operations. Examples from Pakistan are particularly useful in illustrating the persuasion effects of U.S. military aid. They help in drawing out theoretically how military aid can shape state actors’ behavior in underdeveloped and conflict-ridden states where there is a presence of rebels that pose both a domestic and international security concern. Pakistan also represents a political environment where external states are likely to intervene through foreign aid than direct intervention. It exemplifies situations where recipient governments must balance external pressure with domestic objectives and where local militants hold strategic utility for recipient governments in proxy wars, as is the case in many ungoverned spaces in the Middle East and Africa. Given that Pakistan has been receiving U.S. military aid over an extended period of time, it’s a particularly useful case to examine closely. Incentivizing Recipients In terms of incentives, provision of military aid increases a recipient’s political will to comply, first in order to avoid becoming a victim of other coercive policies by the donor. Second, it signals an alliance between donors and recipients that can enhance the recipient’s international standing and legitimacy. Thus, as supported by previous studies, U.S. military aid can induce governments to cooperate.29 For example, after 9/11, Pakistan opted to assist the United States in overthrowing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan over the alternative of becoming a target of the United States.30 Pakistan’s Musharraf was portrayed as an international hero on various media outlets, with inflows of aid indicating that Pakistan was no longer a pariah state.30 Subsequently, Pakistan arrested militants on its soil especially targeting Al Qaeda and foreign fighters who posed the biggest threats to the United States32 as well as rebels that threatened the Pakistani government in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). While Pakistan frequently turns a blind eye to many militant groups for its own interests, many of its counterterrorism efforts have been prompted by U.S. assistance to Pakistan’s national security agencies.33 Donor-Recipient Security Objectives Additionally, where donors seek to counter nonstate actors located in another state through military assistance, there is likely to be some overlap in the security objectives of both donors and recipients. Militant groups in Pakistan pose a security threat not just to the United States and other countries, but also to Pakistan itself, which saw a 48 percent increase in domestic terrorist attacks between 2008 and 2009.34 Even though Pakistan is rightly criticized for not targeting all rebels, it’s still conducting operations against rebels that have directly challenged the writ of the state such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP). Therefore, the higher levels of congruence in the security objectives of donors and recipients of military aid, as far as addressing domestic security threats is concerned, is generally suggestive of a more cooperative approach. Governments that increase military operations against internal security threats have their own strong incentives to avoid use of collective punishment. Targeting civilians is likely to be counterproductive if the government has coercive objectives as opposed to brute force objectives.35 The goal of suppressing internal opposition in a state is a “moderately coercive” objective implying that the state requires its target to acquiesce to prevail. It must use force persuasively to establish peace within its territorial borders especially to increase popular 780 A. JADOON support.36 This is precisely why the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan were encouraged by leaders in 2009 to exercise “courageous restraint” to achieve strategic success.37 Thus, in asymmetric conflicts, information flows, collaboration, and support of civilians are key for success from a utilitarian perspective. In the absence of sufficient capability though, governments may resort to civilian targeting as a cheaper mechanism to fight guerilla warfare. Indeed, weaker governments are more likely to employ tactics of civilian targeting to undermine their opponent’s capacity.38 In the Pakistan case, where the army made use of collective violence in targeting local and foreign fighters by demolishing private residences (e.g., in Operation Kalosha II), it triggered multiple attacks against army bases and enraged locals.39 Similarly, where government militias in Iraq have engaged in revenge killings, many civilians have lost trust in them and prefer the ISIS despite disagreeing with the latter’s brutality and interpretation of Islam.40 Governments will lose legitimacy if their penetration is associated with increased civilian victimization and will reinforce civilian support for rebels.41 Military aid can thus provide governments with the means to maintain their legitimacy while conducting internal security operations, and offset costs associated with minimizing reliance on civilian targeting. Building Coercive Capacity Beyond enhancing incentives, U.S. military aid’s persuasion effect is also rooted in its capacity effect. Military aid includes a wide variety of military support including weapons, technology, and intelligence capability. Governments use collective punishment against communities perceived to be supportive of rebel groups, or to counter guerrilla warfare that is more difficult and expensive to tackle through conventional means.42 Strategic explanations of one-sided violence argue that armed actors employ violence against civilians to change their strategic environment43 and that shifts in the capability balance between actors triggers changes in actors’ tactics in war. For example, the Pakistani army relied on the use of excessive force for counterinsurgency operations where it lacked logistical and precision abilities and had shortcomings in technical intelligence.44 General Tarik Khan, who has led the fight against the TTP, has said, “any kind of military operation that seeks to take out individuals is an intelligence-driven operation that requires a lot of technology, a lot of surveillance capacity.” 45 As such, military aid will help states overcome the capability deficiencies that previously may have necessitated the use of collective violence. Improved counterinsurgency ability allows governments to target rebels more precisely, offset costs of increased efforts against rebels, harden soft targets and thus engage in more selective violence. U.S. military funding to Pakistan has identified priority areas such as precision strike capability, air mobility, combat search and rescue, counter improvised explosive device and survivability, battlefield communications and night operations.46 The Pakistani military has used F-16s for precise targeting of rebels in civilian areas47 and intelligence-based operations have helped the state preempt backlash against military operations in North Waziristan.48 Although, such improvements are not expected to completely eliminate the use of civilian targeting by governments, they will reduce the need to do so if governments are better able to locate legitimate targets. It should also be noted that military aid compared to development aid is less fungible, and thus less susceptible to leakage through rent-seeking behavior and corruption. And because it is provided for a specific purpose such as targeting and capturing rebels rather than being STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 781 linked to broad development goals, its threatened withdrawal by the donor is also a more realistic threat for recipients. U.S. military aid flows can thus enhance recipient states’ military capability to use force in a way, which is in line with their overall moderately coercive objectives of countering internal rebel activity. Overall, military aid not only increases the political will of governments to increase efforts against rebel strongholds, it also enhances the capacity of governments to target rebels and avoid civilian killings. This leads to the following hypothesis: H1a: Higher levels of U.S. military aid flows will be associated with lower levels of civilian killings by recipient state actors Alternatively, it may be argued that recipient governments may reduce their use of civilian targeting to ensure continued flows of U.S. military aid. This would be likely if the United States was willing to withhold aid on the basis of human rights violations or civilian killings by governments, despite its security objectives. However, prior research provides strong evidence that the United States largely provides military aid on the basis of its own national security interests, despite human rights violations within states.49 Studies have shown a lack of a relationship between recipients’ human rights records and the allocation of U.S. aid or the magnitude of assistance provided.50 Indeed, Sandholtz has recently shown that U.S. military assistance in 150 countries over thirty years links with worse performance on human rights.51 Although, the Leah Law requires the United States to suspend military assistance flows in cases of civilian abuses by military units, it does not technically require an end to extrajudicial killings or a suspension of overall aid. Instead, it requires the recipient to take effective measures to hold accountable the specific military units responsible for civilian abuses. In practice, there are numerous examples where recipients have continued to receive U.S. aid despite civilian killings. In Colombia, 30,000 extrajudicial killings have been committed since 2000, but U.S. officials did not freeze its assistance under the Leah Law52 and military assistance continues at high levels. The Philippines is another case in point. The Philippines is a close U.S. ally, and received more than $507 million in U.S. military assistance between 2001–2010. International efforts to raise awareness regarding human rights violations and extrajudicial killings have largely been ineffective in severing aid, with aid flows rising to $30 million in 2012.53 Human rights violations by the Philippines military have not affected the regularity or scale of U.S. aid flows. Other countries, which continued to receive comparable levels of military assistance or increased levels despite civilian killings, include Burma (2002–2006), Brazil (2005–2006), Guatemala (1989 and 1995), Haiti (1991–1994), Indonesia (1996–1999), Jordan (1992–1993), Kenya (2007–2009), Mali (1990–1992), Niger (1989–1990), Sri Lanka (1989–1991), and Uganda (1990–1991). Such examples provide support that the United States rarely suspends military assistance in the face of its security imperatives. The potential reverse causality between military aid and onesided violence is further discussed and tested in the empirical section of the article.

#### Terror low now – steady declines will stay on track

Taylor writes Adam Taylor, 8-14-2018, "Analysis," Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/08/15/terrorist-attacks-are-quietly-declining-around-world/> / MM

Despite such high-profile attacks and responses, however, statistics released this month by the University of Maryland suggest that 2017 was the third consecutive year that the number of terrorist attacks around the world — and the deaths caused by them — had dropped. So far, 2018 looks on track to be lower still. The university’s Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) program found there were 10,900 terrorist attacks around the world last year, which killed a total of 26,400 people, including perpetrators. That was a drop from 2016, which was in turn a drop from 2015. Right now, the number of terrorist attacks and deaths from terrorism appears to have peaked in 2014, when there were nearly 17,000 attacks and more than 45,000 victims. What explains the downward trend? In Western Europe, where the number of attacks increased slightly in 2017 — but the number of victims dropped by 65 percent — it may be matters of policing and counterintelligence. British Prime Minister Theresa May said Tuesday that the country had foiled 13 Islamist terrorism plots and four far-right plots since March 2017, when last year’s attack near the Houses of Parliament occurred. On a global scale, however, the answer is clear. Though there was a surge in terrorist attacks in Europe in recent years, most attacks still occur in the Middle East and Africa, and those regions saw a big decline in 2017. The number of terrorist attacks in the Middle East and North Africa dropped by 38 percent year on year according to START; the number of victims declined by 44 percent. That can largely be attributed to the Islamic States' loss of territory and military defeats throughout 2017. Without a stable base, the number of attacks the jihadist group could stage in countries like Iraq and Syria dropped sharply, as did the damage it could inflict on civilian populations.

#### Military aid key to counter-terror.

Heinrech writes [Tobias, University of Southern California, Carla Martinez Machain, Kansas State University, Jared Oestman, Rice University, “Does counterterrorism militarize foreign aid? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa”, published 2017, accessible online at <https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Tobias_Heinrich3/publication/313835806_Does_counterterrorism_militarize_foreign_aid_Evidence_from_sub-Saharan_Africa/links/5a0efd52a6fdccd95db7290d/Does-counterterrorism-militarize-foreign-aid-Evidence-from-sub-Saharan-Africa.pdf>] // BBM

When aid is used as a counterterrorism tool, it can either be used to bolster the capabilities of a state that is fighting terrorists or to buy counterterrorism cooperation from states that are located in key regions (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2009). In our theory, we address how a change in the security concerns of the United States in a region can lead to aid being used as a counterterrorism tool through the aforementioned channels. Once aid takes on this form, we then expect the composition of aid to shift as well. When terrorist groups either initiate or expand operations in a new region, states in that area will increase in salience to the United States (Aning, 2010; Bell, Clay & Martinez Machain, 2016). This is particularly true in the case of al-Qaeda and its affiliate groups, which explicitly aim to target the United States and its allies and pose a threat to the interests of the United States (Elworthy & Rogers, 2002; Aning, 2010). These groups have wider aims than other terrorists organizations that seek independence, for example (Cronin, 2006). Thus, as al-Qaeda increases its presence in one state, the United States will have an incentive to bolster the counterterror**ism** efforts of not only that state, but its neighbors as well. We argue that because these terrorist groups are not necessarily identified with a particular state, but rather move into areas that provide them the opportunity to operate more freely, security concerns will have a geographical spillover effect (Drakos & Gofas, 2006). This may happen either because the United States will be concerned that the terrorists will move into neighboring countries or because the United States will find that it is most effective to fight the terrorist group by increasing the counterterrorism efforts of neighboring countries (Drakos & Gofas, 2006). Figure 1 presents the (log-scaled) relative magnitude of the different types of aid that the United States gives to sub-Saharan Africa. In the post-9/11 era, there has been a clear upward trend of increases in not only military aid, but also civil society and total development aid.6 Figure 1 about here These trends are reflective of the increased prominence of sub-Saharan Africa when it comes to US foreign aid allocation. We will begin by focusing on military aid. When foreign aid is used as a tool of counterterrorism, it is more likely to be channeled directly through to the executive branch of the recipient country, which generally controls military operations, intelligence gathering, and law enforcement and is able to implement the preferred policies of the donor, in exchange for the resources received (Scahill, 2013). Other actors in the recipient state, such as foreign non-governmental organizations, the news media, or civil society associations that do not have control over the state’s security forces clearly lack the capacity to actually carry out counterterrorism operations.7 We thus argue that when the United States wants the recipient state to engage in counterterrorism, it will **give more foreign aid** that takes the form of military aid that will actually carry out the counterterrorism policy. Our first hypothesis suggests that states that experience direct attacks by al-Qaeda or affiliates will receive increased military aid: Hypothesis 1: As al-Qaeda carries out attacks in a state, the recipient state will receive more military aid.

### Navya Targeted Killing Thing

#### Targeted killing is obviously not military aid – it’s an act done by the US for the benefit OF THE US, not the receiving country, military aid is aid direct towards benefiting the recipients armed forces

USAID writes <https://explorer.usaid.gov/about.html#tab-methodology> / MM

Military assistance is defined as foreign aid for programs primarily for the benefit of recipient government armed forces, or aid which subsidizes or substantially enhances military capability. Military assistance excludes humanitarian and non-military development programs funded by the U.S. Department of Defense; these programs are categorized as 'Economic Assistance'.

## Enviro

#### Global coordination is key to solving environmental crisis’ – only economic growth and democratic cooperation can achieve this

Roberts writes David Roberts, writer on energy and climate change for Vox, formerly of Grist, citing Robert Keohane and David Victor, “The argument for incrementalism in international climate negotiations,” 5/26/16, <http://www.vox.com/2016/5/26/11766252/international-climate-incrementalism>

But most people (some more grudgingly and despairingly than others) are coming around to the realization that a binding global treaty just isn't in the cards, and the quest to achieve it is standing in the way of more small-scale, concrete steps.¶ The clearest articulation I've seen of the latter school of thought was just published in Nature Climate Change by Robert Keohane of Princeton and David Victor of UC San Diego, in a paper entitled "Cooperation and discord in global climate policy."¶ It's part of a larger package of papers on "the role of society in energy transitions," which is an overdue focus for academic attention. There's tons of great stuff in it, but it's all behind a paywall, which is really a damn shame. So I'll just briefly summarize the Keohane-Victor argument.¶ The structure of climate change resists collective action¶ Climate change is a global commons problem. The costs of action are localized, but the benefits accrue globally, over long time periods. A safe climate is a public good, and "public goods are typically underprovided in the absence of a governing authority," write Keohane and Victor, "because each actor has an incentive to free-ride — to gain a beneficial climate while failing to pay its share."¶ Because of this malign incentive structure, it has proven extremely difficult to achieve the deep cooperation that will be required to solve the problem. To get beyond shallow coordination requires more trust, reciprocity, and international governing authority than currently exists.¶ Coordination is easy, cooperation is hard¶ Keohane and Victor's analysis turns on a distinction between coordination and cooperation. They explain the distinction this way:¶ Collaboration can take many forms along a continuum from coordination to cooperation. In situations of coordination, agreements are self-enforcing, that is, once an agreement has been made, the parties do not have incentives to defect from it. For instance, once everyone in the United States understands that Americans drive on the right-hand side of the road, no rational driver has an incentive to drive on the left, and vice versa for drivers in the United Kingdom. Cooperation, by contrast, is not self-enforcing. In the famous game of ‘Prisoners’ Dilemma’, for instance, each player has an incentive to confess, implicating his partner in crime in return for a lighter sentence. The deep coordination needed between states to provide public goods has a similar structure.¶ Moving from coordination to cooperation requires relationships of trust and institutions that can counter this incentive to free-ride, through rewards or punishments. And for a global public good like climate mitigation, the problem is particularly severe, since there are dozens of big emitters, which all have strong domestic incentives to free-ride. Success is only possible with near-universal cooperation, and there is, as yet, no central authority for global governance. (The UNFCCC itself has virtually no power to sanction or reward its members.)¶ Keohane and Victor offer this simple matrix to divide international agreements into four types, based on two variables. One is whether the level of agreement is self-reinforcing (coordination) or not (cooperation). The other is the level of "joint gains" that could potentially be achieved through agreements. Here's a chart:¶ They run through examples of international agreements that fit in all four boxes. For our purposes, the problem is that international climate action has long been stuck in the lower left box — because collaboration is relatively shallow, only a modest amount of joint gains are being achieved. Last year's US-China climate accord and the Paris agreement are good examples; both amount to codifying their respective members' national interests. There's little to push countries beyond their immediate interests, so the joint gains (in terms of climate mitigation) remain far lower than what's possible. International climate change agreements need to be lifted to the upper-left box.¶ As an example of international collaboration that has made that ascent, Keohane and Victor cite trade. More open trade began with smaller, bi- and multi-lateral agreements to lower or remove the worst, costliest tariffs, actions clearly in participating countries' interests. As countries worked together and developed reciprocal relationships, they built up the trust needed to create institutions like the WTO, which provided a level of central governance that enabled greater cooperation and greater joint gains.¶ In other words, it was not enough merely to agree on the abstract desirability of more trade. There was a long, deliberate process of ratcheting up, building trust, and forming institutions.

## Eco-Fem

### Top Level - BFE

#### Overview: There are a few framing issues that should affect the way you evaluate the rest of this debate

#### There is no warrant as to why the US needs to remove aid – if we prove a benefit to the US keeping aid it’s sufficient to vote neg

#### There is no warrant as to why removing aid to authoritarian regimes is uniquely key – the US provides aid to a ton of other countries that aren’t authoritarian which should’ve triggered all of your impacts

#### The aff doesn’t remove the military, just a minimal amount of aid to authoritarian regimes – that also should’ve triggered all of your impacts

#### All of their aff is just about discourse, not the act of removing aid – means you can immediately vote negative because the act of them reading the 1AC should be sufficient to make us aware of hypermasculinity in the military

#### Turn - Ecofeminism perpetuates patriarchy by affirming the very dualisms you criticize

Sandilands writes Sandilands, published author and professor at York University with a PhD in Sociology, 1999 [Catriona, The Good-natured Feminist: Ecofeminism and the Quest for Democracy, 53] / MM

The combination of a continued reliance on an analytic frame that pri-¶ oritized sexual dualism with a growing search for an ecofeminist stand-¶ point on the margins of capitalist patriarchy created some acute problems¶ in ecofeminist analyses, especially (and ironically) in those that attempted¶ to take seriously issues of racism and colonialism. First, there was a contradictory logic of reversal at work: if ecofeminists argue that patriarchal dualism is the cause of the problem for women and nature because it mar-¶ ginalizes a crucial set of experiences, doesn't the affirmation of precisely that marginalization seem odd? For Shiva, the dualistic separation of the world into positive masculine and negative feminine principles is a fundamentally false and oppressive creation of Western patriarchy, yet it is by¶ believing and embracing precisely this dualism that a transformative con-¶ sciousness can be discovered. This presents an interesting irony: only be appropriating dualism can dualism be opposed.Second, as evident in early ecofeminist writings and later in Shiva's, the¶ ideal standpoint for ecofeminism was constructed in a way that focused¶ on dualized characteristics considered feminine in contemporary white¶ Western middle-class heterosexual discursive ideals and on experiences¶ understood as generally shared among white Western middle-class hetero-¶ sexual women (which was, of course, not Shiva's intent). The reliance on images of nurturance, healing, and empathy supposedly grounded in a par-¶ ticular experience of reproductive labor was especially telling; even if these images are the product of a particularly Western patriarchy, they are somehow real and valuable and relatively universal women's experiences of nature throughout the world. Again, this set of assumptions clearly finds its roots in cultural feminism.

#### Global coordination is key to solving environmental crisis’ – only economic growth and democratic cooperation can achieve this

Roberts writes David Roberts, writer on energy and climate change for Vox, formerly of Grist, citing Robert Keohane and David Victor, “The argument for incrementalism in international climate negotiations,” 5/26/16, [http://www.vox.com/2016/5/26/11766252/international-climate-incrementalism /](http://www.vox.com/2016/5/26/11766252/international-climate-incrementalism%20/) MM

But most people (some more grudgingly and despairingly than others) are coming around to the realization that a binding global treaty just isn't in the cards, and the quest to achieve it is standing in the way of more small-scale, concrete steps.¶ The clearest articulation I've seen of the latter school of thought was just published in Nature Climate Change by Robert Keohane of Princeton and David Victor of UC San Diego, in a paper entitled "Cooperation and discord in global climate policy."¶ It's part of a larger package of papers on "the role of society in energy transitions," which is an overdue focus for academic attention. There's tons of great stuff in it, but it's all behind a paywall, which is really a damn shame. So I'll just briefly summarize the Keohane-Victor argument.¶ The structure of climate change resists collective action¶ Climate change is a global commons problem. The costs of action are localized, but the benefits accrue globally, over long time periods. A safe climate is a public good, and "public goods are typically underprovided in the absence of a governing authority," write Keohane and Victor, "because each actor has an incentive to free-ride — to gain a beneficial climate while failing to pay its share."¶ Because of this malign incentive structure, it has proven extremely difficult to achieve the deep cooperation that will be required to solve the problem. To get beyond shallow coordination requires more trust, reciprocity, and international governing authority than currently exists.¶ Coordination is easy, cooperation is hard¶ Keohane and Victor's analysis turns on a distinction between coordination and cooperation. They explain the distinction this way:¶ Collaboration can take many forms along a continuum from coordination to cooperation. In situations of coordination, agreements are self-enforcing, that is, once an agreement has been made, the parties do not have incentives to defect from it. For instance, once everyone in the United States understands that Americans drive on the right-hand side of the road, no rational driver has an incentive to drive on the left, and vice versa for drivers in the United Kingdom. Cooperation, by contrast, is not self-enforcing. In the famous game of ‘Prisoners’ Dilemma’, for instance, each player has an incentive to confess, implicating his partner in crime in return for a lighter sentence. The deep coordination needed between states to provide public goods has a similar structure.¶ Moving from coordination to cooperation requires relationships of trust and institutions that can counter this incentive to free-ride, through rewards or punishments. And for a global public good like climate mitigation, the problem is particularly severe, since there are dozens of big emitters, which all have strong domestic incentives to free-ride. Success is only possible with near-universal cooperation, and there is, as yet, no central authority for global governance. (The UNFCCC itself has virtually no power to sanction or reward its members.)¶ Keohane and Victor offer this simple matrix to divide international agreements into four types, based on two variables. One is whether the level of agreement is self-reinforcing (coordination) or not (cooperation). The other is the level of "joint gains" that could potentially be achieved through agreements. Here's a chart:¶ They run through examples of international agreements that fit in all four boxes. For our purposes, the problem is that international climate action has long been stuck in the lower left box — because collaboration is relatively shallow, only a modest amount of joint gains are being achieved. Last year's US-China climate accord and the Paris agreement are good examples; both amount to codifying their respective members' national interests. There's little to push countries beyond their immediate interests, so the joint gains (in terms of climate mitigation) remain far lower than what's possible. International climate change agreements need to be lifted to the upper-left box.¶ As an example of international collaboration that has made that ascent, Keohane and Victor cite trade. More open trade began with smaller, bi- and multi-lateral agreements to lower or remove the worst, costliest tariffs, actions clearly in participating countries' interests. As countries worked together and developed reciprocal relationships, they built up the trust needed to create institutions like the WTO, which provided a level of central governance that enabled greater cooperation and greater joint gains.¶ In other words, it was not enough merely to agree on the abstract desirability of more trade. There was a long, deliberate process of ratcheting up, building trust, and forming institutions.

### Extra

#### Ecofeminism isn’t intersectional – it reinforces patriarchal structures because of separate movements that refuse to cooperate with each other

Lewis 95 (Martin, Assistant Professor in the School of Environment and the Center for International Studies @ Duke, “Green Delusions,” pg. 35-36, 1995) /MM

In more pragmatic ways as well, radical eco-feminism and, to a lesser extent, marxist eco-feminism have profoundly antifeminist implications in practice. The former movement advises women to turn away from existing means of wielding public power. Since large-scale institutions are, by definition, irredeemably patriarchal and exploitative, women are called away from existing positions of public power (Plant 1989:187). Instead, all feminists (men as well as women) are enjoined to retreat into separatist, autonomous communities. Marxist eco-feminists do not de­mand such hermetic exclusion, but their philosophy too calls ultimately for struggle against rather than participation within capitalist society. Since institutional science, corporations, and large public institutions are, despite radicals’ fondest hopes, well entrenched, such withdrawal risks disempowering women still further. A refusal to seek positions in such imperfect institutions as presently exist would relegate women to the role of sideline critics, undermining their opportunity to be partici­pants—and indeed leaders—in the ongoing restructuring of society. In its effort to avoid the appearance of cultural imperialism, radical eco-feminism also flirts with an ethical relativism that could conceivably undermine the feminist agenda at the global scale. To posit that "[what counts as sexism, racism, or classism may vary cross-culturally" (K. Warren r990:139) is to ignore a huge array of deeply sexist practices existing in numerous non-Western cultures. Finally, the successful realization of the radical eco-feminist dream would threaten women in a very immediate sense. In the anarchic world they envision, men—who are certainly more physically powerful than women and appear to be more inclined toward violence as well—could easily arrogate power at the local level and devise neo-patriarchies. Anarchists argue that humankind's inherent good would prevent this—a view accessible only to those wearing the deepest of psychological blinders. As will be shown in chapter three, many primal societies, contrary to eco-romantic fantasies, were unabashedly patriarchal.

## Neenah Fem

### Top Level

#### Overview: There are a few framing issues that should affect the way you evaluate the rest of this debate

#### There is no warrant as to why the US needs to remove aid – if we prove a benefit to the US keeping aid it’s sufficient to vote neg

#### There is no warrant as to why removing aid to authoritarian regimes is uniquely key – the US provides aid to a ton of other countries that aren’t authoritarian which should’ve triggered all of your impacts

#### The aff doesn’t remove ALL aid, just a minimal amount of military aid to authoritarian regimes – the aff can’t solve because authoritarian regimes still receive humanitarian aid

#### There is no warrant as to why ALL of this violence ends when we remove aid – if anything, it makes it more likely that they commit even MORE of these harms because there is no one to check it

#### All of their aff is just about discourse, not the act of removing aid – means you can immediately vote negative because the act of them reading the 1AC should be sufficient to make us aware of the harms they have presented

#### On the line by line -

#### Military aid is the only option – leaving these countries just leaves the oppressed hopeless as there is no check on the government

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Development and military aid constitute tools of persuasion; attempts to alter the behavior of another state by changing its costs and benefits through carrots or sticks.27 Although both types of aid may persuade recipients to act more in line with donor demands, the unique characteristics of military and development aid have different impacts on state actors’ use of one-sided violence. I argue that the effects of U.S. military aid and international development aid to states can be better understood in terms of two distinct effects on state actors—persuasion and predation. U.S. military aid has a persuasion effect on state actors, which decreases states’ incentives and necessity to target civilians while enhancing their capacity to identify and target rebels more precisely. In contrast, development aid flows have a predation effect on state actors. Development aid flows create adverse incentives for resource capturing in recipient states, which exacerbate conflict and governments’ use of collective violence. Framing the effects as persuasion and predation is useful to draw out the causal mechanisms by which recipient states’ existing motivations to target civilians interact with donors’ security objectives and the effects of aid, to result in observable changes in state perpetrated civilian killings. U.S. Military aid and One-Sided Violence The United States frequently uses military aid to pressure governments in counterinsurgency efforts, and to influence the “behavior and capabilities of their partners to achieve a specific outcome.” 28 I argue that military aid results in states’ decreased use of one-sided violence STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 779 due to a persuasion effect. This is rooted in its effectiveness to incentivize governments as well as boost their capacity to conduct more targeted military operations. Examples from Pakistan are particularly useful in illustrating the persuasion effects of U.S. military aid. They help in drawing out theoretically how military aid can shape state actors’ behavior in underdeveloped and conflict-ridden states where there is a presence of rebels that pose both a domestic and international security concern. Pakistan also represents a political environment where external states are likely to intervene through foreign aid than direct intervention. It exemplifies situations where recipient governments must balance external pressure with domestic objectives and where local militants hold strategic utility for recipient governments in proxy wars, as is the case in many ungoverned spaces in the Middle East and Africa. Given that Pakistan has been receiving U.S. military aid over an extended period of time, it’s a particularly useful case to examine closely. Incentivizing Recipients In terms of incentives, provision of military aid increases a recipient’s political will to comply, first in order to avoid becoming a victim of other coercive policies by the donor. Second, it signals an alliance between donors and recipients that can enhance the recipient’s international standing and legitimacy. Thus, as supported by previous studies, U.S. military aid can induce governments to cooperate.29 For example, after 9/11, Pakistan opted to assist the United States in overthrowing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan over the alternative of becoming a target of the United States.30 Pakistan’s Musharraf was portrayed as an international hero on various media outlets, with inflows of aid indicating that Pakistan was no longer a pariah state.30 Subsequently, Pakistan arrested militants on its soil especially targeting Al Qaeda and foreign fighters who posed the biggest threats to the United States32 as well as rebels that threatened the Pakistani government in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). While Pakistan frequently turns a blind eye to many militant groups for its own interests, many of its counterterrorism efforts have been prompted by U.S. assistance to Pakistan’s national security agencies.33 Donor-Recipient Security Objectives Additionally, where donors seek to counter nonstate actors located in another state through military assistance, there is likely to be some overlap in the security objectives of both donors and recipients. Militant groups in Pakistan pose a security threat not just to the United States and other countries, but also to Pakistan itself, which saw a 48 percent increase in domestic terrorist attacks between 2008 and 2009.34 Even though Pakistan is rightly criticized for not targeting all rebels, it’s still conducting operations against rebels that have directly challenged the writ of the state such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP). Therefore, the higher levels of congruence in the security objectives of donors and recipients of military aid, as far as addressing domestic security threats is concerned, is generally suggestive of a more cooperative approach. Governments that increase military operations against internal security threats have their own strong incentives to avoid use of collective punishment. Targeting civilians is likely to be counterproductive if the government has coercive objectives as opposed to brute force objectives.35 The goal of suppressing internal opposition in a state is a “moderately coercive” objective implying that the state requires its target to acquiesce to prevail. It must use force persuasively to establish peace within its territorial borders especially to increase popular 780 A. JADOON support.36 This is precisely why the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan were encouraged by leaders in 2009 to exercise “courageous restraint” to achieve strategic success.37 Thus, in asymmetric conflicts, information flows, collaboration, and support of civilians are key for success from a utilitarian perspective. In the absence of sufficient capability though, governments may resort to civilian targeting as a cheaper mechanism to fight guerilla warfare. Indeed, weaker governments are more likely to employ tactics of civilian targeting to undermine their opponent’s capacity.38 In the Pakistan case, where the army made use of collective violence in targeting local and foreign fighters by demolishing private residences (e.g., in Operation Kalosha II), it triggered multiple attacks against army bases and enraged locals.39 Similarly, where government militias in Iraq have engaged in revenge killings, many civilians have lost trust in them and prefer the ISIS despite disagreeing with the latter’s brutality and interpretation of Islam.40 Governments will lose legitimacy if their penetration is associated with increased civilian victimization and will reinforce civilian support for rebels.41 Military aid can thus provide governments with the means to maintain their legitimacy while conducting internal security operations, and offset costs associated with minimizing reliance on civilian targeting. Building Coercive Capacity Beyond enhancing incentives, U.S. military aid’s persuasion effect is also rooted in its capacity effect. Military aid includes a wide variety of military support including weapons, technology, and intelligence capability. Governments use collective punishment against communities perceived to be supportive of rebel groups, or to counter guerrilla warfare that is more difficult and expensive to tackle through conventional means.42 Strategic explanations of one-sided violence argue that armed actors employ violence against civilians to change their strategic environment43 and that shifts in the capability balance between actors triggers changes in actors’ tactics in war. For example, the Pakistani army relied on the use of excessive force for counterinsurgency operations where it lacked logistical and precision abilities and had shortcomings in technical intelligence.44 General Tarik Khan, who has led the fight against the TTP, has said, “any kind of military operation that seeks to take out individuals is an intelligence-driven operation that requires a lot of technology, a lot of surveillance capacity.” 45 As such, military aid will help states overcome the capability deficiencies that previously may have necessitated the use of collective violence. Improved counterinsurgency ability allows governments to target rebels more precisely, offset costs of increased efforts against rebels, harden soft targets and thus engage in more selective violence. U.S. military funding to Pakistan has identified priority areas such as precision strike capability, air mobility, combat search and rescue, counter improvised explosive device and survivability, battlefield communications and night operations.46 The Pakistani military has used F-16s for precise targeting of rebels in civilian areas47 and intelligence-based operations have helped the state preempt backlash against military operations in North Waziristan.48 Although, such improvements are not expected to completely eliminate the use of civilian targeting by governments, they will reduce the need to do so if governments are better able to locate legitimate targets. It should also be noted that military aid compared to development aid is less fungible, and thus less susceptible to leakage through rent-seeking behavior and corruption. And because it is provided for a specific purpose such as targeting and capturing rebels rather than being STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 781 linked to broad development goals, its threatened withdrawal by the donor is also a more realistic threat for recipients. U.S. military aid flows can thus enhance recipient states’ military capability to use force in a way, which is in line with their overall moderately coercive objectives of countering internal rebel activity. Overall, military aid not only increases the political will of governments to increase efforts against rebel strongholds, it also enhances the capacity of governments to target rebels and avoid civilian killings. This leads to the following hypothesis: H1a: Higher levels of U.S. military aid flows will be associated with lower levels of civilian killings by recipient state actors Alternatively, it may be argued that recipient governments may reduce their use of civilian targeting to ensure continued flows of U.S. military aid. This would be likely if the United States was willing to withhold aid on the basis of human rights violations or civilian killings by governments, despite its security objectives. However, prior research provides strong evidence that the United States largely provides military aid on the basis of its own national security interests, despite human rights violations within states.49 Studies have shown a lack of a relationship between recipients’ human rights records and the allocation of U.S. aid or the magnitude of assistance provided.50 Indeed, Sandholtz has recently shown that U.S. military assistance in 150 countries over thirty years links with worse performance on human rights.51 Although, the Leah Law requires the United States to suspend military assistance flows in cases of civilian abuses by military units, it does not technically require an end to extrajudicial killings or a suspension of overall aid. Instead, it requires the recipient to take effective measures to hold accountable the specific military units responsible for civilian abuses. In practice, there are numerous examples where recipients have continued to receive U.S. aid despite civilian killings. In Colombia, 30,000 extrajudicial killings have been committed since 2000, but U.S. officials did not freeze its assistance under the Leah Law52 and military assistance continues at high levels. The Philippines is another case in point. The Philippines is a close U.S. ally, and received more than $507 million in U.S. military assistance between 2001–2010. International efforts to raise awareness regarding human rights violations and extrajudicial killings have largely been ineffective in severing aid, with aid flows rising to $30 million in 2012.53 Human rights violations by the Philippines military have not affected the regularity or scale of U.S. aid flows. Other countries, which continued to receive comparable levels of military assistance or increased levels despite civilian killings, include Burma (2002–2006), Brazil (2005–2006), Guatemala (1989 and 1995), Haiti (1991–1994), Indonesia (1996–1999), Jordan (1992–1993), Kenya (2007–2009), Mali (1990–1992), Niger (1989–1990), Sri Lanka (1989–1991), and Uganda (1990–1991). Such examples provide support that the United States rarely suspends military assistance in the face of its security imperatives. The potential reverse causality between military aid and onesided violence is further discussed and tested in the empirical section of the article.

#### Russia fills in if the US pulls out

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Vladimir Putin’s return to power in Russia in 2012 signified a dramatic change in the country’s foreign policy and military strategy. Scrapping the achievements of the Dmitry Medvedev era in the Kremlin, which was characterized by a thaw in relations with the West, Vladimir Putin opted for a more aggressive approach toward positioning the country in the international arena. Experts still argue what prompted this review of the country’s foreign policy strategy, but the developments that likely had a major impact on Vladimir Putin’s policy planning in 2012 included the war with Georgia in 2008, the Arab Spring protests, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) infamous military campaign in Libya, which brought down Russia’s long-time ally Muammar Qaddafi. Contours of the new policy approach to the region started to emerge when Russia updated two of its key documents, the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, in 2013 and 2014, respectively.[i] The documents pronounced strategies based on protecting Russian national interests abroad, including militarily if need be, and increasing Moscow’s role in maintaining global security. Quite notably, a more recent edition of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, signed by President Putin in November 2016, has a specific focus on the Middle East and names foreign meddling there as one of the causes of instability and extremism in the region that directly affect Russia.[ii] The statement that serves as de facto justification for the Russian military campaign in Syria became the first official document to elucidate the country’s ambition to play a bigger role in the Middle East and North Africa. In the three years that divide the two concepts, Vladimir Putin’s approach to foreign policy experienced an evolution and increasing securitization (the word “terrorism” figures 15 times in the 2013 Concept and 35 in its 2016 edition). The Foreign Policy Concept also spells out the Russian president’s growing ambition to deal with instability where it originates before it reaches Russian borders. The rationale behind Russia’s re-emergence as one of the leading powers in the Middle East was of a defensive nature and largely reactionary. The Arab Spring movement in the region was a painful reminder of the Color Revolutions that broke out across several post-Soviet states in the first half of the 2000s and, according to the Kremlin, led to the 2014 EuroMaidan revolution in Ukraine. Vladimir Putin himself is of the belief that that the Arab Spring is a continuation of those Color Revolutions and that both are foreign-instigated.[iii] Coupled with a forced revolution in Libya and the removal of Qaddafi in what Russia declared was a violation of international law, this episode is often cited as a watershed in Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy thinking.[iv] A wave of revolutions across Eurasia convinced the Russian leadership that the apparent domino effect of regime change would eventually target Russia. It is not a coincidence that the Russian president likens Color Revolutions and the Arab Spring protests to each other and often makes no distinction between them. Commenting on anti-corruption protests in Russia in March 2017, he went as far as to call them “an instrument of the Arab Spring.”[v] Vladimir Putin sees Russia as a legitimate actor in designing a new power balance in the Middle East and as its integral part since security challenges originating in the region reverberate across the former Soviet space as well as in Russia. The United States, on the other hand, is an outsider in this region in the view of Russian officials. Criticism of the White House over its “destructive” role in the Middle East is a central theme of many of Vladimir Putin’s speeches, including the one he delivered at the UN General Assembly prior to launching his military campaign in Syria in September 2015. In those remarks, the Russian president accused the United States of being the source of problems in the Middle East.[vi] A gradual withdrawal of the United States from the Middle East under Barack Obama among other things meant that the region’s “policeman” was no longer interested in maintaining order there, which arguably presented Moscow with numerous security challenges. Russia’s re-emergence in the Middle East to a large extent happened to fill some of the void left by the retreating Obama administration. In some cases it happened effortlessly, such as in Egypt, where the US decision to cut aid to Cairo in 2013 led to the emergence of a budding Russia-Egypt alliance. In other contexts, most prominently in Syria, Russia had to invest significant diplomatic and military resources to marginalize the US in the war and in the peace process. What started out as an attempt to replace the United States where it was no longer interested in playing a leading role later transformed into an ambition to challenge the US even where it had no intention of retreating, for instance in the Gulf region. Russia’s return to the Middle East differs from the Soviet experience: Today, Moscow is extending its reach without the baggage of Soviet ideology. The idea of using its arms exports to the Middle East in the ideological struggle against the West evaporated as soon as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) disintegrated and was replaced with the idea of making a profit for the cash-strapped budget. The Kremlin is looking to support its geopolitical claims with a strong pragmatic dimension. In the Middle East, Moscow to reinforce its influence there as well as offset the burden upon the Russian federal budget associated with the expenses of the Syrian campaign. Following in the footsteps of the Soviet Union, Russia has used arms deals to reach out to Cold War–era allies in Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Syria to consolidate a new power balance. During the Cold War, Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gilbert wrote that as more countries became recipients of Soviet military aid programs, there was a tendency for these countries to become greater political allies of the Soviet Union.[vii] And it seems that this argument is increasingly relevant today. According to SIPRI, in 2015 $5.5 billion in Russian arms exports were destined for clients in the Middle East, which was ten times more than all Russian experts to the region for all of the 1990s.[viii] With Vladimir Putin declaring victory over the Islamic State during his December 2017 visit to Syria, Russia is faced with a number of opportunities as well as challenges. Its military operation in Syria may have put Russia back on the radar in the Middle East; but in all certainty, it essentially solidified its position in the region. As Vladimir Putin is eyeing re-election as president in March 2018, foreign policy achievements, chiefly in the Middle East and North Africa, figure prominently in his election campaign rhetoric. One of the effects of Russia’s assertive foreign policy has become an expectation from regional partners and opponents alike that Moscow will be active in the Middle East. However, the hard power that brought Russia to prominence in the region will not be a helpful tool to support long-term influence there and could, in fact, produce a negative impact for Russia’s international standing. As a result, during his next term in office, Vladimir Putin will be faced with a challenge to depart from hard power, his preferred modus operandi, to embrace a spectrum of other tools in order to make Russia’s presence in the region lasting and sustainable.

#### Russia turns all of your impacts – they offer ZERO chance of reform

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Experts who had argued that authoritarianism in the Middle East would maintain stability and keep extremism at bay were proven wrong by the events of the Arab Spring.[xxxv] The Russian leadership, however, still projects its vision of “autocratic stability” onto the region. And even though Moscow repeatedly insists that it is up to the Syrian people to decide through a presidential election who will lead the nation into the post-war period, the Russian government is unlikely to become a supporter of democracy movements in the Middle East. After all, elections have been a crucial legitimization tool of Russia’s own “managed democracy.” The consolidation of power in the hands of the national leader as well as the securitization of the political agenda have characterized the Russian political system throughout the last 17 years Vladimir Putin has been in power. And they continue to guide him in how he sees regimes in the Middle East. Some of these authoritarian Arab regimes share a long history with Russia: during the Cold War, they proved their ability to maintain order for longer than any democratic regime could sustain it, not least due to Moscow’s financial and military support. The fact that Bashar al-Assad survived throughout the bloody Syrian conflict, to a large extent due to Russia’s aid, solidifies the idea that authoritarianism in the Middle East guarantees stability and puts a cap on “toxic” democratic values imposed from the outside. In Moscow’s view, authoritarian tendencies are indigenous to the region, much like they are to Russia, which is why they need not be battled but rather be correctly managed. Russia’s idea of “authoritarian stability” in the Middle East may find a potential supporter in Donald Trump, who notoriously dropped America’s agenda for promoting democracy in the Middle East. The distinct security focus of Donald Trump’s strategy toward the region has emboldened his allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel, and convinced them that the regional policeman will no longer restrain their geopolitical ambitions. The position of both Russia and the United States is, thus, likely to resonate with many governments in the region that previously had to put on airs of civil society engagement and liberalization just to have international political and diplomatic backing. Egypt and Turkey are the two cases in point: the 2017 Human Rights Watch World Report specifically points to them to illustrate how the tide of new authoritarianism is sweeping through the Middle East.[xxxvi] In Turkey, the attempted coup in July 2016 was used by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) as an excuse to crack down not only on suspected plotters but also on wider circles critical of the government’s policies. Western powers sharply rebuked Erdoğan over his suspension of the rule of law in the country and mass detentions—but Russia pointedly did not. Putin was the one world leader who gave a call to Erdoğan to tell him Moscow supports his campaign to root out dissent, which the Turkish president described as “anti-constitutional.”[xxxvii] Furthermore Putin hosted his Turkish counterpart in St. Petersburg less than a month after the failed coup, during which Erdoğan explained that Vladimir Putin’s call to him was an important move, “a kind of moral support and display of Russia-Turkey solidarity,” as the Turkish president described the situation.[xxxviii] All this occurred just weeks after Erdoğan’s late June apology to Russia for the November 2015 downing of a Russian Su-24 jet over Syria; and it goes to show how masterfully Vladimir Putin uses authoritarian movements to his own political benefit. Egypt is going through a similar wave of authoritarianism, with President Abdel Fattah El Sisi cracking down on dissent that is not necessarily associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. That government campaign is happening against the backdrop of economic instability, currency devaluation and increased poverty rates. However, the army’s grip on power and full control over the public sphere give a semblance of stability in the country. Sisi’s fight to eradicate extremism in the Sinai as well as his crackdown on dissent find support in Moscow, which is reflected in official statements coming from the Kremlin. Egypt reemerged as Russia’s key partner in the Middle East, including in crucial spheres of military-technical cooperation. The two countries signed a protocol on military cooperation in March 2015, significantly ramped up joint military exercises, and are looking to green light an agreement that would allow Russian military aircraft to use Egyptian airspace and infrastructure.[xxxix] With the turmoil and regular attacks in the Sinai Peninsula, counter-terrorism cooperation has become a distinct characteristic of the bilateral relationship. A security-heavy agenda acts as a glue between Moscow and Cairo, not least due to the military and security background of the political elites of the two countries. Both Russians and Egyptians will head to the polls in March 2018 to elect their respective heads of state, while presidential elections in Turkey are to take place in November 2019. The outcome is already known in all three countries; Putin, Sisi and Erdoğan will almost certainly serve out their next terms into the first half of the 2020s, meaning that we are unlikely to witness a disruption in the security-comes-first policy employed by Moscow in its bilateral relations with both Cairo and Ankara. The cases of Egypt and Turkey illustrate that Vladimir Putin is likely to encourage authoritarian “stability” across the region through skewed security-heavy policies. Putin’s support for autocratic tendencies will hardly find any resistance among other powers in the region and will almost certainly be embraced. Syria’s recovery from the seven-year war is unlikely to happen through the emergence of democratic institutions and freedom, but will probably lead to the creation of a strong regime with an inflated security apparatus to shield a fragile government and keep extremist tendencies at bay. Iraq’s increasingly sectarian policies hint at a similar trend. And as Libya’s internationally recognized government fails to establish control over much of the country’s territory, Libyan National Army Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar represents the type of leader the Kremlin would presumably like to see for a post–civil war Libya. If Russia’s Syria policy is any indication, a highly centralized system will be Moscow’s remedy for extremism throughout the wider region. The fear of a new wave of extremism will push many regimes to seek more control over the population, and a lack of incentives to democratize may bring about new repressive regimes. In other words Russia’s leadership in the Middle East may significantly lengthen and reinforce the era of authoritarianism there.

## Just War Theory

### Framework (1:35)

#### Overview: Arjun’s framework is morally repugnant, placing outdated prescriptive conditions on war justifies horrible historical injustices like the Holocaust because countries would not be allowed to invade if one of the conditions was even SLIGHTLY not met.

#### Here is an example of how their theory justifies repugnant outcomes using their 3 requirements that they say need to be met for a country to go to war:

#### They say that the countries populace needs to approve of them going into war - but the US did not agree with going into World War 2 to fight Nazi Germany

#### They say it needs to have the right intention and that it can’t be used to support the invading country, but

#### There is no brightline on what is considered “the right intention”, independently, that proves that consequences matter because they provide a metric on whether our intentions are right or not.

#### This would also justify not fighting Germany because if it would even SOMEWHAT benefit the US it would not be just, i.e. because World War 2 stimulated the economy in the US, fighting it would not be just under your framework

#### They say that it needs to have probable success to end conflict – but Nazi Germany was one of the stronger powerhouses on the global stage and we know it would get some of the other powerhouses like Italy and Japan even more upset.

#### Their framework also ultimately collapses down to evaluating consequences – just war theory prescribes that ALL actions that don’t fit these three conditions are inherently bad but can’t provide a way to evaluate individual circumstances. Our example above proves this, invading Nazi Germany would’ve violated all three conditions, but invading Nazi Germany was obviously a good thing because it prevented horrible human rights violations like the Holocaust.

### Contention

#### On their contention level offense:

#### They say the US populace isn’t approving with giving military aid –

#### This evidence has to do with BOOTS ON GROUND WAR, not military aid – military aid obviously includes things that isn’t just sending troops

#### Our argument on framing applies here as well – there are historical examples where the US populace doesn’t approve, but it’s necessary to prevent massive suffering

#### They say that 80% of the aid being given isn’t helping people –

#### Our Democracy contention directly disproves this – every single historical circumstance of US encouraged democratization comes from pressure via military aid

#### Military Aid creates opportunities of leverage to minimize conflict and human rights abuses – Saudi Arabia Proves.

#### Tabatabi and Wasser writes Ariane M. Tabatabai and Becca Wasser, November 15, 2018, "Could America Use Its Leverage to Alter the Saudis' Behavior?", https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/11/could-america-use-its-leverage-to-alter-the-saudis.html

At the same time, Saudi Arabia has become more reliant on the United States than when President Obama was in office. Riyadh's contentious policies—like the war in Yemen and the rift with its neighbors—have constrained its options and inadvertently reinforced Saudi Arabia's need for U.S. military and political support, including security cooperation and intelligence sharing. Prince Mohammed's legacy and perhaps even power is presently tied to two initiatives: The Yemen war and Vision 2030—an ambitious program of social and economic reforms that Riyadh plans to institute to diversify its economy. Neither objective is apparently proceeding as the crown prince had hoped. And to succeed, they will likely require continued U.S. support. Until recently, President Trump was not inclined to use these developments as leverage. Instead, he stood by the crown prince even as U.S. military support to Saudi forces in Yemen—including aerial refueling and advising on intelligence sharing and targeting procedures—have come under attack in Congress and by international rights groups. Some have argued that the administration has emboldened Riyadh, giving it carte blanche to pursue its more assertive policies. New details pertaining to Khashoggi's murder have emerged, ostensibly tying the young Saudi monarch to the incident and leading to mounting congressional pressure. But the Trump administration has been willing to give the Saudis only a mere slap on the wrist without fundamentally altering the dynamics of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. The Trump administration is unlikely to end its support for Saudi regional efforts or radically change its approach. But it could consider using its influence to encourage the Saudi leadership to moderate its assertive and damaging policies abroad. Rather than providing its assistance freely to Saudi Arabia, Washington could utilize it to extract concessions from the Saudi leadership to alter its behavior. Making U.S. support conditional to initiatives tied to Prince Mohammed's success provides Washington with a degree of sway over the brash monarch, who increasingly needs to produce a “win” in light of the reputational harm the Khashoggi affair has done to the kingdom, his legacy and perhaps even his hold on power. This approach is not without risk—the Saudi government could, for example, reduce intelligence sharing, or switch off the proverbial oil tap, like the OPEC states did in 1973. But 2018 is not 1973, and the United States is no longer as reliant on Saudi oil. More so, the Saudi government's assertive actions also pose operational and reputational risks to important U.S. interests, as the Khashoggi affair demonstrated, and therefore the benefits of this approach are likely to outweigh any costs Riyadh may seek to impose. On the surface, making U.S. support provisory may appear to be an unpalatable approach, one that legitimizes the crown prince. But wielded correctly, the White House can use this leverage to recalibrate the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Blanket support need not be granted in a way that emboldens Saudi behavior, leading to actions that are damaging to U.S. interests. Instead, the administration could consider also making conditional its support for the Saudi government's priority programs with the goal of altering and shaping its behavior. This includes making the Saudis take responsibility for Khashoggi's brutal death, putting an end to indiscriminate targeting practices in Yemen, altering the government's harsh response to opposition inside and outside of the Kingdom, and ending the rift with Qatar. Naysayers of such an approach might claim that it only deepens the transactionalism on which the U.S.-Saudi relationship is presently based. But it is worth recognizing that the partnership was founded on an explicit alignment of interests, not values. By acknowledging this, the United States would be better positioned to adopt an approach that best serves its own interests. At this point, the Saudi government needs U.S. support more than the White House needs Saudi Arabia.

#### They say military aid increases terror, but military aid is key to counter-terror operations.

Heinrech writes [Tobias, University of Southern California, Carla Martinez Machain, Kansas State University, Jared Oestman, Rice University, “Does counterterrorism militarize foreign aid? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa”, published 2017, accessible online at <https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Tobias_Heinrich3/publication/313835806_Does_counterterrorism_militarize_foreign_aid_Evidence_from_sub-Saharan_Africa/links/5a0efd52a6fdccd95db7290d/Does-counterterrorism-militarize-foreign-aid-Evidence-from-sub-Saharan-Africa.pdf>] // BBM

When aid is used as a counterterrorism tool, it can either be used to bolster the capabilities of a state that is fighting terrorists or to buy counterterrorism cooperation from states that are located in key regions (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2009). In our theory, we address how a change in the security concerns of the United States in a region can lead to aid being used as a counterterrorism tool through the aforementioned channels. Once aid takes on this form, we then expect the composition of aid to shift as well. When terrorist groups either initiate or expand operations in a new region, states in that area will increase in salience to the United States (Aning, 2010; Bell, Clay & Martinez Machain, 2016). This is particularly true in the case of al-Qaeda and its affiliate groups, which explicitly aim to target the United States and its allies and pose a threat to the interests of the United States (Elworthy & Rogers, 2002; Aning, 2010). These groups have wider aims than other terrorists organizations that seek independence, for example (Cronin, 2006). Thus, as al-Qaeda increases its presence in one state, the United States will have an incentive to bolster the counterterror**ism** efforts of not only that state, but its neighbors as well. We argue that because these terrorist groups are not necessarily identified with a particular state, but rather move into areas that provide them the opportunity to operate more freely, security concerns will have a geographical spillover effect (Drakos & Gofas, 2006). This may happen either because the United States will be concerned that the terrorists will move into neighboring countries or because the United States will find that it is most effective to fight the terrorist group by increasing the counterterrorism efforts of neighboring countries (Drakos & Gofas, 2006). Figure 1 presents the (log-scaled) relative magnitude of the different types of aid that the United States gives to sub-Saharan Africa. In the post-9/11 era, there has been a clear upward trend of increases in not only military aid, but also civil society and total development aid.6 Figure 1 about here These trends are reflective of the increased prominence of sub-Saharan Africa when it comes to US foreign aid allocation. We will begin by focusing on military aid. When foreign aid is used as a tool of counterterrorism, it is more likely to be channeled directly through to the executive branch of the recipient country, which generally controls military operations, intelligence gathering, and law enforcement and is able to implement the preferred policies of the donor, in exchange for the resources received (Scahill, 2013). Other actors in the recipient state, such as foreign non-governmental organizations, the news media, or civil society associations that do not have control over the state’s security forces clearly lack the capacity to actually carry out counterterrorism operations.7 We thus argue that when the United States wants the recipient state to engage in counterterrorism, it will **give more foreign aid** that takes the form of military aid that will actually carry out the counterterrorism policy. Our first hypothesis suggests that states that experience direct attacks by al-Qaeda or affiliates will receive increased military aid: Hypothesis 1: As al-Qaeda carries out attacks in a state, the recipient state will receive more military aid.

## Kant

### Framework - Kant

#### Top Level – either intentions are the only thing that matter, and their framework justifies the Holocaust and the worst human rights abuses in history because it was their intent OR consequences matter to some degree and their framework collapses to evaluating the consequences of actions

#### Under their framework it makes the most sense to evaluate consequences – everyone views pain as bad, but no actor can pursue ends if they are under a state of crisis

#### Freedom violations are inevitable – imagining a world of perfection discourages material reform to ACTUALLY stop freedom violations

Kidner 2k professor of psychology at Nottingham Trent University and internationally renowned scholar on nature-culture relationships.(nature and psyche p. 65-7) / MM

In addition, the deconstructive bent of discursive approaches limits their capacity to challenge the structure of modern industrialism. Just as science has been reluctant to recognize the holistic qualities of nature, so we have been slow to appreciate that the power of industrialism and its resultant near-hegemony in the modern world is largely the result of its ability to integrate science, politics, and everyday social life within a structure that appears complete and self-sufficient. This structure cannot be challenged without reference to alternative structures. To celebrate choice and free play without also celebrating the frames of meaning within which they take place is simply to guarantee our assimilation to and absorption within industrialism, and so represents a philosophy of surrender. For example, “freedom” has little meaning in the absence of a framework of democratic laws which protect the vulnerable against the “freedom” of the powerful to exploit, intimidate, and mislead. Similarly, my freedom to explore an area of wilderness is negated if energy companies and off-road vehicle clubs also have the freedom to use the area as they see fit. Freedom is all to often interpreted as the absence of structure; and structure gives meaning and implies responsibilities and limitations. One of the most insidious aspects of the colonization of the world is industrialism's silent but lethal elimination of structures that could challenge it. The widespread lack of appreciation within academia of the way in which postmodern approaches involving deconstruction promote this insidious *conceptual* assimilation to industrialism is an index of the urgent need to develop a psychocultural dimension to our environmental understanding. Finally, we should not ignore the possibility that an emphasis on language serves particular defensive functions for the social scientist. Noam Chomsky has noted that it”it's too hard to deal with real problems,” some academics tend to “go off on wild goose chases that don't matter . . . [or] get involved in academic cults that are very divorced from any reality and that provide a defense against dealing with the world as it actually is.”71 An emphasis on language can serve this sort of defensive function; for the study of discourse enables one to stand aside from issues and avoid any commitment to a cause or idea, simply presenting all sides of a debate and pointing out the discursive strategies involved. As the physical world appears to fade into mere discourse, so it comes to seem less real than the language used to describe it; and environmental issues lose the dimensions of urgency and tragedy and become instead the proving grounds for ideas and attitudes. Rather than walking in what Aldo Leopold described as a “world of wounds,” the discursive theorist can study this world dispassionately, safely insulated from the emotional and ecological havoc that is taking place elsewhere. Like experimentalism, this is a schizoid stance that exemplifies rather than challenges the characteristic social pathology of out time; and it is one that supports Melanie Klein's thesis that the internal object world can serve as a psychotic substitute for an external “real” world that is either absent or unsatisfying.72 Ian Craib's description of social construction as a “social psychosis”73 therefore seems entirely apt. But what object relations theorists such as Klein fail to point out is the other side of this dialectic: that withdrawing from the external world and substituting an internal world of words or fantasies, because of the actions that follow from this state of affairs, makes the former even less satisfying and more psychologically distant, so contributing to the vicious spiral that severs the “human from the “natural” and abandons nature to industrialism.

#### There is a difference between being held culpable for all actions and preventing violence that we are directly involved in – i.e. it wouldn’t be logical for me to give my computer to someone else because they don’t have one, but if I take someone’s computer I should be responsible for giving it back

#### Util doesn’t make every action permissible – we don’t make prescriptive claims about the way to evaluate all circumstances, but instead say that we should evaluate consequences – the same applies to your framework because it says we should never take a non-unverbalizable action which justifies horrible shit like not lying to prevent death

### Adv – Kant

#### This shit is mad repugnant – it would justify never interfering in things like the Holocaust or not doing the Underground Railroad because we couldn’t interfere in nations decision-making or choices

#### Aff can’t prevent freedom violations – FMF exists to non-authoritarian regimes and the aff doesn’t end all foreign assistance

#### Aff causes PMC shift

Whitehead 12. John W. Whitehead is an attorney and author who has written, debated and practiced widely in the area of constitutional law and human rights. Whitehead’s aggressive, pioneering approach to civil liberties has earned him numerous accolades and accomplishments, including the Hungarian Medal of Freedom. His concern for the persecuted and oppressed led him, in 1982, to establish The Rutherford Institute, a nonprofit civil liberties and human rights organization in Charlottesville, Va. Whitehead serves as the Institute’s president and spokesperson. His thought-provoking commentaries call people to action and address a wide range of contemporary issues from faith to politics and television to constitutional rights. He is also a frequent commentator on a variety of issues in the national media. Whitehead's book "Battlefield America: The War on the American People" is available now, online and in stores. Whitehead's daily alerts, commentaries, podcasts and vodcasts are available at www.rutherford.org., 1-17-2012, "Privatizing the War on Terror: America's Military Contractors," HuffPost, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-w-whitehead/privatizing-the-war-on-te_1_b_1209086.html> //RS

America’s troops may be returning home from Iraq, but contrary to [President Obama’s assertion](http://costsofwar.org/) that “the tide of war is receding,” we’re far from done paying the costs of war. In fact, at the same time that Obama is reducing the number of troops in Iraq, he’s [replacing them](http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/07/iraq-merc-army/) with military contractors at far greater expense to the taxpayer and redeploying American troops to other parts of the globe, including [Africa](http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/central/Obama-Deploys-Troops-to-Central-Africa--131895118.html), [Australia](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/world/asia/obama-and-gillard-expand-us-australia-military-ties.html?pagewanted=all) and [Israel](http://rt.com/usa/news/us-troops-israel-iran-257/). In this way, the war on terror is privatized, the American economy is bled dry, and the military-security industrial complex makes a killing — literally and figuratively speaking. The war effort in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan has already cost taxpayers [more than $2 trillion](http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/29/us-usa-war-idUSTRE75S25320110629) and could go as high as $4.4 trillion before it’s all over. At least $31 billion (and as much as $60 billion or more) of that $2 trillion was [lost to waste and fraud](http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_NR-49.pdf) by military contractors, who do everything from janitorial and food service work to construction, security and intelligence — jobs that used to be handled by the military. That translates to a loss of [$12 million a day](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/585dadcc-d3f1-11e0-b7eb-00144feab49a.html#axzz1jdvJ8CDV) since the U.S. first invaded Afghanistan. To put it another way, the government is spending more on war than all 50 states combined spend on health, education, welfare, and safety. Over the past [two decades](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/585dadcc-d3f1-11e0-b7eb-00144feab49a.html#axzz1jdvJ8CDV), America has become increasingly dependent on military contractors in order to carry out military operations abroad (in fact, the government’s extensive use of private security contractors has [surged under Obama](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/28/wartime-contractors-waste-billions_n_829251.html)). According to the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States [can no longer conduct large or sustained military operations](http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local_news/article/Soldiers-gone-but-contractors-remain-in-Iraq-2426228.php#ixzz1jNcP4ZcG) or respond to major disasters without heavy support from contractors. As a result, the U.S. employs at a minimum [one contractor to support every soldier](http://thinkprogress.org/security/2011/06/29/256726/afghanistan-contractors-surge/?mobile=nc) deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq (that number increases dramatically when U.S. troop numbers decrease). For those signing on for contractor work, many of whom are hired by private contracting firms after serving stints in the military, it is a lucrative, albeit dangerous, career path (private contractors are 2.75 times [more likely to die](http://www.salon.com/2011/02/24/afghanistan_private_contractors/singleton/) than troops). Incredibly, while base pay for an American soldier hovers somewhere around $19,000 per year, contractors are reportedly pulling in between [$150,000 - $250,000 per year](http://www.redrat.net/BUSH_WAR/mercenaries/index.htm). The exact number of military contractors on the U.S. payroll is hard to pin down, thanks to sleight-of-hand accounting by the Department of Defense and its contractors. However, according to a Wartime Contracting Commission report released in August 2011, there are [more than 260,000 private contractors](http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=7650159) in Iraq and Afghanistan, more than the number of ground troops [in both countries](http://www.laboreducator.org/lt110706.htm). As noted, **that number increases dramatically when troops are withdrawn from an area**, as we currently see happening in Iraq. Pratap Chatterjee of the Center for American Progress [estimates](http://thinkprogress.org/security/2011/06/29/256726/afghanistan-contractors-surge/?mobile=nc) that “if the Obama administration draws down to 68,000 troops in Afghanistan by September 2012, they will need 88,400 contractors at the very least, but potentially as many as 95,880.” With paid contractors often [outnumbering enlisted combat troops](http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jul/04/nation/na-private4), the American war effort dubbed by George W. Bush as the “coalition of the willing” has since evolved into the “coalition of the billing.” The Pentagon’s Central Command [counts](http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/12/19) 225,000 contractors working in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Between December 2008 and December 2010, the total number of private security contractors in Afghanistan [increased](http://www.salon.com/2011/02/24/afghanistan_private_contractors/singleton/) by 413% while troop levels increased 200%. Private contractors provide a number of services, including transport, construction, drone operation, and security. One military contractor, [Blackbird](http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/12/19), is composed of former CIA operatives who go on secret missions to recover missing and captured US soldiers. Then there is the [Lincoln Group](http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/12/19) which became famous for engaging in covert psychological operations by planting stories in the Iraqi press that glorified the U.S. mission. [Global Strategies Group](http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/obama-iraq-eternal/) guards the consulate in Basra for $401 million. [SOC Inc.](http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/obama-iraq-eternal/) protects the US embassy for $974 million. Unfortunately, fraud, mismanagement and corruption have become synonymous with the U.S. government’s use of military contractors. [McClatchy News](http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/01/12/106681/troubled-us-afghan-projects-mushroom.html) “found that U.S. government funding for at least 15 large-scale programs and projects [in Afghanistan] grew from just over $1 billion to nearly $3 billion despite the government’s questions about their effectiveness or cost.” One program started off as a modest wheat program and “ballooned into one of America’s biggest counterinsurgency projects in southern Afghanistan despite misgivings about its impact.” Another multi-billion-dollar program resulted in the construction of schools, clinics and other public buildings that were so poorly built that they might not withstand a serious earthquake and will have to be rebuilt. Then there was the $300 million diesel power plant that was built despite the fact that it wouldn’t be used regularly “because its fuel cost more than the Afghan government could afford to run it regularly.” RWA, a group of three Afghan contractors, was selected to build a 17.5 mile paved road in Ghazni province. They were paid $4 million between 2008 and 2010 before the [contract was terminated](http://www.stripes.com/news/failed-afghan-road-project-shows-pitfalls-of-u-s-efforts-1.160547)with only 2/3 of a mile of road paved. Mind you, with the U.S. spending more than $2 billion a week in Afghanistan, these examples of ineptitude and waste represent only a fraction of what is being funded by American taxpayer dollars. (Investigative [reports](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/30/billions-down-the-drain-i_n_790043.html#s195062&title=Countless_Dollars_Literally) reveal that large amounts of cash derived from U.S. aid and logistics spending are being flown out of the country on a regular basis by Afghan officials, including $52 million by the Afghan vice president, who was allowed to keep the money.) Yet what most Americans fail to realize is that we’re funding the very individuals we claim to be fighting. The war effort has become so corrupt that U.S. taxpayers are not only being bilked by military contractors but are also being forced to [indirectly fund insurgents](http://www.salon.com/2010/07/28/protection_payments_to_taliban/singleton/) and warlords in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the Taliban, which receives money from military contractors [in exchange for protection](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/30/billions-down-the-drain-i_n_790043.html#s195056&title=Funding_Our_Enemies). This is rationalized away as a “[cost of doing business](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/585dadcc-d3f1-11e0-b7eb-00144feab49a.html#axzz1jdvJ8CDV)“ in those countries. As the [Financial Times](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/585dadcc-d3f1-11e0-b7eb-00144feab49a.html#axzz1jdvJ8CDV) reports, the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan “found that extortion of funds from US construction and transportation projects was the second-biggest funding source for insurgent groups

#### Turns case and causes more freedom violations

Del Prado 8., Jose L (Jose L. Gomez del Prado Is a member of the United Nations Working Group on Mercenaries ). "Impact on Human Rights of Private Military and Security Companies’ Activities." Center for Research on Globalization. N.p., 11 Oct. 2008. Web. 4 July 2017. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/impact-on-human-rights-of-private-military-and-security-companies-activities/10523>.

PMSC personnel in Iraq are involved in exchange of fire with insurgents on a daily basis. Security provisions necessarily involve military engagement. There is no perceptible difference between regular soldiers and the private contractors protecting convoys (transporting ammunitions and fuel), material, buildings or persons. Providing security in such an environment necessitates being armed and ready to shoot, often under uncertain circumstances where combatants and civilians are difficult to separate. As observed in many incidents, PMSC employees can use excessive force and shoot indiscriminately resulting in civilian casualties. There are cases where PMSC employees have used forbidden arms or experimental ammunition prohibited by international law2. Private contractors often circulate without identification and drive in unidentified sport utility vehicles (SUVs) with tinted glasses and no plates, behaving similarly to the infamous death squads. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the two countries with the largest presence of PMSC staff, the population is confused and finds it extremely difficult to distinguish employees of different companies from state forces. Reports indicate erratic behavior of PMSCs employees in Iraq with mottos such as: “what happens here to-day, stays with us today”. It has also been alleged that “private security guards” would also detain Iraqis without authorization.

#### Russia fills in

Barmin 18 Yuri Barmin**.** 3/08/2018. [Yuri Barmin is an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, covering the Middle East and North Africa, Moscow’s policy towards the region, as well as the conflicts in Syria and Libya. He regularly contributes his analysis to Al Monitor, the Middle East Institute, Al Sharq Forum and FARAS Center. Mr. Barmin holds an MPhil in International Relations from the University of Cambridge], Russia in the Middle East Until 2024: From Hard Power to Sustainable Influence, The Jamestown Foundation. https://jamestown.org/program/russia-middle-east-2024-hard-power-sustainable-influence/.

Vladimir Putin’s return to power in Russia in 2012 signified a dramatic change in the country’s foreign policy and military strategy. Scrapping the achievements of the Dmitry Medvedev era in the Kremlin, which was characterized by a thaw in relations with the West, Vladimir Putin opted for a more aggressive approach toward positioning the country in the international arena. Experts still argue what prompted this review of the country’s foreign policy strategy, but the developments that likely had a major impact on Vladimir Putin’s policy planning in 2012 included the war with Georgia in 2008, the Arab Spring protests, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) infamous military campaign in Libya, which brought down Russia’s long-time ally Muammar Qaddafi. Contours of the new policy approach to the region started to emerge when Russia updated two of its key documents, the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, in 2013 and 2014, respectively.[i] The documents pronounced strategies based on protecting Russian national interests abroad, including militarily if need be, and increasing Moscow’s role in maintaining global security. Quite notably, a more recent edition of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, signed by President Putin in November 2016, has a specific focus on the Middle East and names foreign meddling there as one of the causes of instability and extremism in the region that directly affect Russia.[ii] The statement that serves as de facto justification for the Russian military campaign in Syria became the first official document to elucidate the country’s ambition to play a bigger role in the Middle East and North Africa. In the three years that divide the two concepts, Vladimir Putin’s approach to foreign policy experienced an evolution and increasing securitization (the word “terrorism” figures 15 times in the 2013 Concept and 35 in its 2016 edition). The Foreign Policy Concept also spells out the Russian president’s growing ambition to deal with instability where it originates before it reaches Russian borders. The rationale behind Russia’s re-emergence as one of the leading powers in the Middle East was of a defensive nature and largely reactionary. The Arab Spring movement in the region was a painful reminder of the Color Revolutions that broke out across several post-Soviet states in the first half of the 2000s and, according to the Kremlin, led to the 2014 EuroMaidan revolution in Ukraine. Vladimir Putin himself is of the belief that that the Arab Spring is a continuation of those Color Revolutions and that both are foreign-instigated.[iii] Coupled with a forced revolution in Libya and the removal of Qaddafi in what Russia declared was a violation of international law, this episode is often cited as a watershed in Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy thinking.[iv] A wave of revolutions across Eurasia convinced the Russian leadership that the apparent domino effect of regime change would eventually target Russia. It is not a coincidence that the Russian president likens Color Revolutions and the Arab Spring protests to each other and often makes no distinction between them. Commenting on anti-corruption protests in Russia in March 2017, he went as far as to call them “an instrument of the Arab Spring.”[v] Vladimir Putin sees Russia as a legitimate actor in designing a new power balance in the Middle East and as its integral part since security challenges originating in the region reverberate across the former Soviet space as well as in Russia. The United States, on the other hand, is an outsider in this region in the view of Russian officials. Criticism of the White House over its “destructive” role in the Middle East is a central theme of many of Vladimir Putin’s speeches, including the one he delivered at the UN General Assembly prior to launching his military campaign in Syria in September 2015. In those remarks, the Russian president accused the United States of being the source of problems in the Middle East.[vi] A gradual withdrawal of the United States from the Middle East under Barack Obama among other things meant that the region’s “policeman” was no longer interested in maintaining order there, which arguably presented Moscow with numerous security challenges. Russia’s re-emergence in the Middle East to a large extent happened to fill some of the void left by the retreating Obama administration. In some cases it happened effortlessly, such as in Egypt, where the US decision to cut aid to Cairo in 2013 led to the emergence of a budding Russia-Egypt alliance. In other contexts, most prominently in Syria, Russia had to invest significant diplomatic and military resources to marginalize the US in the war and in the peace process. What started out as an attempt to replace the United States where it was no longer interested in playing a leading role later transformed into an ambition to challenge the US even where it had no intention of retreating, for instance in the Gulf region. Russia’s return to the Middle East differs from the Soviet experience: Today, Moscow is extending its reach without the baggage of Soviet ideology. The idea of using its arms exports to the Middle East in the ideological struggle against the West evaporated as soon as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) disintegrated and was replaced with the idea of making a profit for the cash-strapped budget. The Kremlin is looking to support its geopolitical claims with a strong pragmatic dimension. In the Middle East, Moscow to reinforce its influence there as well as offset the burden upon the Russian federal budget associated with the expenses of the Syrian campaign. Following in the footsteps of the Soviet Union, Russia has used arms deals to reach out to Cold War–era allies in Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Syria to consolidate a new power balance. During the Cold War, Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gilbert wrote that as more countries became recipients of Soviet military aid programs, there was a tendency for these countries to become greater political allies of the Soviet Union.[vii] And it seems that this argument is increasingly relevant today. According to SIPRI, in 2015 $5.5 billion in Russian arms exports were destined for clients in the Middle East, which was ten times more than all Russian experts to the region for all of the 1990s.[viii] With Vladimir Putin declaring victory over the Islamic State during his December 2017 visit to Syria, Russia is faced with a number of opportunities as well as challenges. Its military operation in Syria may have put Russia back on the radar in the Middle East; but in all certainty, it essentially solidified its position in the region. As Vladimir Putin is eyeing re-election as president in March 2018, foreign policy achievements, chiefly in the Middle East and North Africa, figure prominently in his election campaign rhetoric. One of the effects of Russia’s assertive foreign policy has become an expectation from regional partners and opponents alike that Moscow will be active in the Middle East. However, the hard power that brought Russia to prominence in the region will not be a helpful tool to support long-term influence there and could, in fact, produce a negative impact for Russia’s international standing. As a result, during his next term in office, Vladimir Putin will be faced with a challenge to depart from hard power, his preferred modus operandi, to embrace a spectrum of other tools in order to make Russia’s presence in the region lasting and sustainable.

#### That turns case and offers no chance of reform

Barmin 18 Yuri Barmin**.** 3/08/2018. [Yuri Barmin is an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, covering the Middle East and North Africa, Moscow’s policy towards the region, as well as the conflicts in Syria and Libya. He regularly contributes his analysis to Al Monitor, the Middle East Institute, Al Sharq Forum and FARAS Center. Mr. Barmin holds an MPhil in International Relations from the University of Cambridge], Russia in the Middle East Until 2024: From Hard Power to Sustainable Influence, The Jamestown Foundation. <https://jamestown.org/program/russia-middle-east-2024-hard-power-sustainable-influence/> / MM

Experts who had argued that authoritarianism in the Middle East would maintain stability and keep extremism at bay were proven wrong by the events of the Arab Spring.[xxxv] The Russian leadership, however, still projects its vision of “autocratic stability” onto the region. And even though Moscow repeatedly insists that it is up to the Syrian people to decide through a presidential election who will lead the nation into the post-war period, the Russian government is unlikely to become a supporter of democracy movements in the Middle East. After all, elections have been a crucial legitimization tool of Russia’s own “managed democracy.” The consolidation of power in the hands of the national leader as well as the securitization of the political agenda have characterized the Russian political system throughout the last 17 years Vladimir Putin has been in power. And they continue to guide him in how he sees regimes in the Middle East. Some of these authoritarian Arab regimes share a long history with Russia: during the Cold War, they proved their ability to maintain order for longer than any democratic regime could sustain it, not least due to Moscow’s financial and military support. The fact that Bashar al-Assad survived throughout the bloody Syrian conflict, to a large extent due to Russia’s aid, solidifies the idea that authoritarianism in the Middle East guarantees stability and puts a cap on “toxic” democratic values imposed from the outside. In Moscow’s view, authoritarian tendencies are indigenous to the region, much like they are to Russia, which is why they need not be battled but rather be correctly managed. Russia’s idea of “authoritarian stability” in the Middle East may find a potential supporter in Donald Trump, who notoriously dropped America’s agenda for promoting democracy in the Middle East. The distinct security focus of Donald Trump’s strategy toward the region has emboldened his allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel, and convinced them that the regional policeman will no longer restrain their geopolitical ambitions. The position of both Russia and the United States is, thus, likely to resonate with many governments in the region that previously had to put on airs of civil society engagement and liberalization just to have international political and diplomatic backing. Egypt and Turkey are the two cases in point: the 2017 Human Rights Watch World Report specifically points to them to illustrate how the tide of new authoritarianism is sweeping through the Middle East.[xxxvi] In Turkey, the attempted coup in July 2016 was used by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) as an excuse to crack down not only on suspected plotters but also on wider circles critical of the government’s policies. Western powers sharply rebuked Erdoğan over his suspension of the rule of law in the country and mass detentions—but Russia pointedly did not. Putin was the one world leader who gave a call to Erdoğan to tell him Moscow supports his campaign to root out dissent, which the Turkish president described as “anti-constitutional.”[xxxvii] Furthermore Putin hosted his Turkish counterpart in St. Petersburg less than a month after the failed coup, during which Erdoğan explained that Vladimir Putin’s call to him was an important move, “a kind of moral support and display of Russia-Turkey solidarity,” as the Turkish president described the situation.[xxxviii] All this occurred just weeks after Erdoğan’s late June apology to Russia for the November 2015 downing of a Russian Su-24 jet over Syria; and it goes to show how masterfully Vladimir Putin uses authoritarian movements to his own political benefit. Egypt is going through a similar wave of authoritarianism, with President Abdel Fattah El Sisi cracking down on dissent that is not necessarily associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. That government campaign is happening against the backdrop of economic instability, currency devaluation and increased poverty rates. However, the army’s grip on power and full control over the public sphere give a semblance of stability in the country. Sisi’s fight to eradicate extremism in the Sinai as well as his crackdown on dissent find support in Moscow, which is reflected in official statements coming from the Kremlin. Egypt reemerged as Russia’s key partner in the Middle East, including in crucial spheres of military-technical cooperation. The two countries signed a protocol on military cooperation in March 2015, significantly ramped up joint military exercises, and are looking to green light an agreement that would allow Russian military aircraft to use Egyptian airspace and infrastructure.[xxxix] With the turmoil and regular attacks in the Sinai Peninsula, counter-terrorism cooperation has become a distinct characteristic of the bilateral relationship. A security-heavy agenda acts as a glue between Moscow and Cairo, not least due to the military and security background of the political elites of the two countries. Both Russians and Egyptians will head to the polls in March 2018 to elect their respective heads of state, while presidential elections in Turkey are to take place in November 2019. The outcome is already known in all three countries; Putin, Sisi and Erdoğan will almost certainly serve out their next terms into the first half of the 2020s, meaning that we are unlikely to witness a disruption in the security-comes-first policy employed by Moscow in its bilateral relations with both Cairo and Ankara. The cases of Egypt and Turkey illustrate that Vladimir Putin is likely to encourage authoritarian “stability” across the region through skewed security-heavy policies. Putin’s support for autocratic tendencies will hardly find any resistance among other powers in the region and will almost certainly be embraced. Syria’s recovery from the seven-year war is unlikely to happen through the emergence of democratic institutions and freedom, but will probably lead to the creation of a strong regime with an inflated security apparatus to shield a fragile government and keep extremist tendencies at bay. Iraq’s increasingly sectarian policies hint at a similar trend. And as Libya’s internationally recognized government fails to establish control over much of the country’s territory, Libyan National Army Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar represents the type of leader the Kremlin would presumably like to see for a post–civil war Libya. If Russia’s Syria policy is any indication, a highly centralized system will be Moscow’s remedy for extremism throughout the wider region. The fear of a new wave of extremism will push many regimes to seek more control over the population, and a lack of incentives to democratize may bring about new repressive regimes. In other words Russia’s leadership in the Middle East may significantly lengthen and reinforce the era of authoritarianism there.

## Paternalism/Colonialism

### Top Level

#### Overview: There is a massive framing issue with the aff - while they may remove military aid, they don’t remove the systems that they claim are so oppressive. The military still exists, aid still exists, the US is still going to give aid to countries that are in worse states than we are. They link right back into what they say is bad because they actively avoid discussions about oppression by claiming that the US is ALWAYS paternalist or colonialist. Instead, we should look at historical instances to understand whether the US giving aid has led to good outcomes, the entirety of the negative case PROVES THAT IT HAS. Making paternalist claims by saying that we should NEVER assert our advice and control over another country justifies the worst historical atrocities like the Holocaust because we wouldn’t have active reasons to prevent those conflicts.

#### On the framework debate:

#### Your framework collapses to ours

#### All evaluations ultimately collapse to analyzing whether actions will lead to more or worse consequences, we shouldn’t deny what has happened in the past and should realize that if something has empirically led to a negative outcome, we should not take that action

#### Our framework can account for the violence that the 1AC seeks to prevent while also understanding the violence that they ultimately paper over

#### Military aid isn’t colonialist – it empirically decreases civilian violence and increases states’ ability to target rebels effectively - leaving the oppressed hopeless as we pull away is terrible and something that should be prevented

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Development and military aid constitute tools of persuasion; attempts to alter the behavior of another state by changing its costs and benefits through carrots or sticks.27 Although both types of aid may persuade recipients to act more in line with donor demands, the unique characteristics of military and development aid have different impacts on state actors’ use of one-sided violence. I argue that the effects of U.S. military aid and international development aid to states can be better understood in terms of two distinct effects on state actors—persuasion and predation. U.S. military aid has a persuasion effect on state actors, which decreases states’ incentives and necessity to target civilians while enhancing their capacity to identify and target rebels more precisely. In contrast, development aid flows have a predation effect on state actors. Development aid flows create adverse incentives for resource capturing in recipient states, which exacerbate conflict and governments’ use of collective violence. Framing the effects as persuasion and predation is useful to draw out the causal mechanisms by which recipient states’ existing motivations to target civilians interact with donors’ security objectives and the effects of aid, to result in observable changes in state perpetrated civilian killings. U.S. Military aid and One-Sided Violence The United States frequently uses military aid to pressure governments in counterinsurgency efforts, and to influence the “behavior and capabilities of their partners to achieve a specific outcome.” 28 I argue that military aid results in states’ decreased use of one-sided violence STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 779 due to a persuasion effect. This is rooted in its effectiveness to incentivize governments as well as boost their capacity to conduct more targeted military operations. Examples from Pakistan are particularly useful in illustrating the persuasion effects of U.S. military aid. They help in drawing out theoretically how military aid can shape state actors’ behavior in underdeveloped and conflict-ridden states where there is a presence of rebels that pose both a domestic and international security concern. Pakistan also represents a political environment where external states are likely to intervene through foreign aid than direct intervention. It exemplifies situations where recipient governments must balance external pressure with domestic objectives and where local militants hold strategic utility for recipient governments in proxy wars, as is the case in many ungoverned spaces in the Middle East and Africa. Given that Pakistan has been receiving U.S. military aid over an extended period of time, it’s a particularly useful case to examine closely. Incentivizing Recipients In terms of incentives, provision of military aid increases a recipient’s political will to comply, first in order to avoid becoming a victim of other coercive policies by the donor. Second, it signals an alliance between donors and recipients that can enhance the recipient’s international standing and legitimacy. Thus, as supported by previous studies, U.S. military aid can induce governments to cooperate.29 For example, after 9/11, Pakistan opted to assist the United States in overthrowing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan over the alternative of becoming a target of the United States.30 Pakistan’s Musharraf was portrayed as an international hero on various media outlets, with inflows of aid indicating that Pakistan was no longer a pariah state.30 Subsequently, Pakistan arrested militants on its soil especially targeting Al Qaeda and foreign fighters who posed the biggest threats to the United States32 as well as rebels that threatened the Pakistani government in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). While Pakistan frequently turns a blind eye to many militant groups for its own interests, many of its counterterrorism efforts have been prompted by U.S. assistance to Pakistan’s national security agencies.33 Donor-Recipient Security Objectives Additionally, where donors seek to counter nonstate actors located in another state through military assistance, there is likely to be some overlap in the security objectives of both donors and recipients. Militant groups in Pakistan pose a security threat not just to the United States and other countries, but also to Pakistan itself, which saw a 48 percent increase in domestic terrorist attacks between 2008 and 2009.34 Even though Pakistan is rightly criticized for not targeting all rebels, it’s still conducting operations against rebels that have directly challenged the writ of the state such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP). Therefore, the higher levels of congruence in the security objectives of donors and recipients of military aid, as far as addressing domestic security threats is concerned, is generally suggestive of a more cooperative approach. Governments that increase military operations against internal security threats have their own strong incentives to avoid use of collective punishment. Targeting civilians is likely to be counterproductive if the government has coercive objectives as opposed to brute force objectives.35 The goal of suppressing internal opposition in a state is a “moderately coercive” objective implying that the state requires its target to acquiesce to prevail. It must use force persuasively to establish peace within its territorial borders especially to increase popular 780 A. JADOON support.36 This is precisely why the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan were encouraged by leaders in 2009 to exercise “courageous restraint” to achieve strategic success.37 Thus, in asymmetric conflicts, information flows, collaboration, and support of civilians are key for success from a utilitarian perspective. In the absence of sufficient capability though, governments may resort to civilian targeting as a cheaper mechanism to fight guerilla warfare. Indeed, weaker governments are more likely to employ tactics of civilian targeting to undermine their opponent’s capacity.38 In the Pakistan case, where the army made use of collective violence in targeting local and foreign fighters by demolishing private residences (e.g., in Operation Kalosha II), it triggered multiple attacks against army bases and enraged locals.39 Similarly, where government militias in Iraq have engaged in revenge killings, many civilians have lost trust in them and prefer the ISIS despite disagreeing with the latter’s brutality and interpretation of Islam.40 Governments will lose legitimacy if their penetration is associated with increased civilian victimization and will reinforce civilian support for rebels.41 Military aid can thus provide governments with the means to maintain their legitimacy while conducting internal security operations, and offset costs associated with minimizing reliance on civilian targeting. Building Coercive Capacity Beyond enhancing incentives, U.S. military aid’s persuasion effect is also rooted in its capacity effect. Military aid includes a wide variety of military support including weapons, technology, and intelligence capability. Governments use collective punishment against communities perceived to be supportive of rebel groups, or to counter guerrilla warfare that is more difficult and expensive to tackle through conventional means.42 Strategic explanations of one-sided violence argue that armed actors employ violence against civilians to change their strategic environment43 and that shifts in the capability balance between actors triggers changes in actors’ tactics in war. For example, the Pakistani army relied on the use of excessive force for counterinsurgency operations where it lacked logistical and precision abilities and had shortcomings in technical intelligence.44 General Tarik Khan, who has led the fight against the TTP, has said, “any kind of military operation that seeks to take out individuals is an intelligence-driven operation that requires a lot of technology, a lot of surveillance capacity.” 45 As such, military aid will help states overcome the capability deficiencies that previously may have necessitated the use of collective violence. Improved counterinsurgency ability allows governments to target rebels more precisely, offset costs of increased efforts against rebels, harden soft targets and thus engage in more selective violence. U.S. military funding to Pakistan has identified priority areas such as precision strike capability, air mobility, combat search and rescue, counter improvised explosive device and survivability, battlefield communications and night operations.46 The Pakistani military has used F-16s for precise targeting of rebels in civilian areas47 and intelligence-based operations have helped the state preempt backlash against military operations in North Waziristan.48 Although, such improvements are not expected to completely eliminate the use of civilian targeting by governments, they will reduce the need to do so if governments are better able to locate legitimate targets. It should also be noted that military aid compared to development aid is less fungible, and thus less susceptible to leakage through rent-seeking behavior and corruption. And because it is provided for a specific purpose such as targeting and capturing rebels rather than being STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 781 linked to broad development goals, its threatened withdrawal by the donor is also a more realistic threat for recipients. U.S. military aid flows can thus enhance recipient states’ military capability to use force in a way, which is in line with their overall moderately coercive objectives of countering internal rebel activity. Overall, military aid not only increases the political will of governments to increase efforts against rebel strongholds, it also enhances the capacity of governments to target rebels and avoid civilian killings. This leads to the following hypothesis: H1a: Higher levels of U.S. military aid flows will be associated with lower levels of civilian killings by recipient state actors Alternatively, it may be argued that recipient governments may reduce their use of civilian targeting to ensure continued flows of U.S. military aid. This would be likely if the United States was willing to withhold aid on the basis of human rights violations or civilian killings by governments, despite its security objectives. However, prior research provides strong evidence that the United States largely provides military aid on the basis of its own national security interests, despite human rights violations within states.49 Studies have shown a lack of a relationship between recipients’ human rights records and the allocation of U.S. aid or the magnitude of assistance provided.50 Indeed, Sandholtz has recently shown that U.S. military assistance in 150 countries over thirty years links with worse performance on human rights.51 Although, the Leah Law requires the United States to suspend military assistance flows in cases of civilian abuses by military units, it does not technically require an end to extrajudicial killings or a suspension of overall aid. Instead, it requires the recipient to take effective measures to hold accountable the specific military units responsible for civilian abuses. In practice, there are numerous examples where recipients have continued to receive U.S. aid despite civilian killings. In Colombia, 30,000 extrajudicial killings have been committed since 2000, but U.S. officials did not freeze its assistance under the Leah Law52 and military assistance continues at high levels. The Philippines is another case in point. The Philippines is a close U.S. ally, and received more than $507 million in U.S. military assistance between 2001–2010. International efforts to raise awareness regarding human rights violations and extrajudicial killings have largely been ineffective in severing aid, with aid flows rising to $30 million in 2012.53 Human rights violations by the Philippines military have not affected the regularity or scale of U.S. aid flows. Other countries, which continued to receive comparable levels of military assistance or increased levels despite civilian killings, include Burma (2002–2006), Brazil (2005–2006), Guatemala (1989 and 1995), Haiti (1991–1994), Indonesia (1996–1999), Jordan (1992–1993), Kenya (2007–2009), Mali (1990–1992), Niger (1989–1990), Sri Lanka (1989–1991), and Uganda (1990–1991). Such examples provide support that the United States rarely suspends military assistance in the face of its security imperatives. The potential reverse causality between military aid and onesided violence is further discussed and tested in the empirical section of the article.

#### Russia fills in if the US pulls out

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Vladimir Putin’s return to power in Russia in 2012 signified a dramatic change in the country’s foreign policy and military strategy. Scrapping the achievements of the Dmitry Medvedev era in the Kremlin, which was characterized by a thaw in relations with the West, Vladimir Putin opted for a more aggressive approach toward positioning the country in the international arena. Experts still argue what prompted this review of the country’s foreign policy strategy, but the developments that likely had a major impact on Vladimir Putin’s policy planning in 2012 included the war with Georgia in 2008, the Arab Spring protests, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) infamous military campaign in Libya, which brought down Russia’s long-time ally Muammar Qaddafi. Contours of the new policy approach to the region started to emerge when Russia updated two of its key documents, the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, in 2013 and 2014, respectively.[i] The documents pronounced strategies based on protecting Russian national interests abroad, including militarily if need be, and increasing Moscow’s role in maintaining global security. Quite notably, a more recent edition of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, signed by President Putin in November 2016, has a specific focus on the Middle East and names foreign meddling there as one of the causes of instability and extremism in the region that directly affect Russia.[ii] The statement that serves as de facto justification for the Russian military campaign in Syria became the first official document to elucidate the country’s ambition to play a bigger role in the Middle East and North Africa. In the three years that divide the two concepts, Vladimir Putin’s approach to foreign policy experienced an evolution and increasing securitization (the word “terrorism” figures 15 times in the 2013 Concept and 35 in its 2016 edition). The Foreign Policy Concept also spells out the Russian president’s growing ambition to deal with instability where it originates before it reaches Russian borders. The rationale behind Russia’s re-emergence as one of the leading powers in the Middle East was of a defensive nature and largely reactionary. The Arab Spring movement in the region was a painful reminder of the Color Revolutions that broke out across several post-Soviet states in the first half of the 2000s and, according to the Kremlin, led to the 2014 EuroMaidan revolution in Ukraine. Vladimir Putin himself is of the belief that that the Arab Spring is a continuation of those Color Revolutions and that both are foreign-instigated.[iii] Coupled with a forced revolution in Libya and the removal of Qaddafi in what Russia declared was a violation of international law, this episode is often cited as a watershed in Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy thinking.[iv] A wave of revolutions across Eurasia convinced the Russian leadership that the apparent domino effect of regime change would eventually target Russia. It is not a coincidence that the Russian president likens Color Revolutions and the Arab Spring protests to each other and often makes no distinction between them. Commenting on anti-corruption protests in Russia in March 2017, he went as far as to call them “an instrument of the Arab Spring.”[v] Vladimir Putin sees Russia as a legitimate actor in designing a new power balance in the Middle East and as its integral part since security challenges originating in the region reverberate across the former Soviet space as well as in Russia. The United States, on the other hand, is an outsider in this region in the view of Russian officials. Criticism of the White House over its “destructive” role in the Middle East is a central theme of many of Vladimir Putin’s speeches, including the one he delivered at the UN General Assembly prior to launching his military campaign in Syria in September 2015. In those remarks, the Russian president accused the United States of being the source of problems in the Middle East.[vi] A gradual withdrawal of the United States from the Middle East under Barack Obama among other things meant that the region’s “policeman” was no longer interested in maintaining order there, which arguably presented Moscow with numerous security challenges. Russia’s re-emergence in the Middle East to a large extent happened to fill some of the void left by the retreating Obama administration. In some cases it happened effortlessly, such as in Egypt, where the US decision to cut aid to Cairo in 2013 led to the emergence of a budding Russia-Egypt alliance. In other contexts, most prominently in Syria, Russia had to invest significant diplomatic and military resources to marginalize the US in the war and in the peace process. What started out as an attempt to replace the United States where it was no longer interested in playing a leading role later transformed into an ambition to challenge the US even where it had no intention of retreating, for instance in the Gulf region. Russia’s return to the Middle East differs from the Soviet experience: Today, Moscow is extending its reach without the baggage of Soviet ideology. The idea of using its arms exports to the Middle East in the ideological struggle against the West evaporated as soon as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) disintegrated and was replaced with the idea of making a profit for the cash-strapped budget. The Kremlin is looking to support its geopolitical claims with a strong pragmatic dimension. In the Middle East, Moscow to reinforce its influence there as well as offset the burden upon the Russian federal budget associated with the expenses of the Syrian campaign. 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As a result, during his next term in office, Vladimir Putin will be faced with a challenge to depart from hard power, his preferred modus operandi, to embrace a spectrum of other tools in order to make Russia’s presence in the region lasting and sustainable.

#### That makes all your impacts worse – Russia tortures their own citizens and fuels authoritarian policies

Barmin 18 Yuri Barmin**.** 3/08/2018. [Yuri Barmin is an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, covering the Middle East and North Africa, Moscow’s policy towards the region, as well as the conflicts in Syria and Libya. He regularly contributes his analysis to Al Monitor, the Middle East Institute, Al Sharq Forum and FARAS Center. Mr. Barmin holds an MPhil in International Relations from the University of Cambridge], Russia in the Middle East Until 2024: From Hard Power to Sustainable Influence, The Jamestown Foundation. https://jamestown.org/program/russia-middle-east-2024-hard-power-sustainable-influence/

Experts who had argued that authoritarianism in the Middle East would maintain stability and keep extremism at bay were proven wrong by the events of the Arab Spring.[xxxv] The Russian leadership, however, still projects its vision of “autocratic stability” onto the region. And even though Moscow repeatedly insists that it is up to the Syrian people to decide through a presidential election who will lead the nation into the post-war period, the Russian government is unlikely to become a supporter of democracy movements in the Middle East. After all, elections have been a crucial legitimization tool of Russia’s own “managed democracy.” The consolidation of power in the hands of the national leader as well as the securitization of the political agenda have characterized the Russian political system throughout the last 17 years Vladimir Putin has been in power. And they continue to guide him in how he sees regimes in the Middle East. Some of these authoritarian Arab regimes share a long history with Russia: during the Cold War, they proved their ability to maintain order for longer than any democratic regime could sustain it, not least due to Moscow’s financial and military support. The fact that Bashar al-Assad survived throughout the bloody Syrian conflict, to a large extent due to Russia’s aid, solidifies the idea that authoritarianism in the Middle East guarantees stability and puts a cap on “toxic” democratic values imposed from the outside. In Moscow’s view, authoritarian tendencies are indigenous to the region, much like they are to Russia, which is why they need not be battled but rather be correctly managed. Russia’s idea of “authoritarian stability” in the Middle East may find a potential supporter in Donald Trump, who notoriously dropped America’s agenda for promoting democracy in the Middle East. The distinct security focus of Donald Trump’s strategy toward the region has emboldened his allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel, and convinced them that the regional policeman will no longer restrain their geopolitical ambitions. The position of both Russia and the United States is, thus, likely to resonate with many governments in the region that previously had to put on airs of civil society engagement and liberalization just to have international political and diplomatic backing. Egypt and Turkey are the two cases in point: the 2017 Human Rights Watch World Report specifically points to them to illustrate how the tide of new authoritarianism is sweeping through the Middle East.[xxxvi] In Turkey, the attempted coup in July 2016 was used by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) as an excuse to crack down not only on suspected plotters but also on wider circles critical of the government’s policies. Western powers sharply rebuked Erdoğan over his suspension of the rule of law in the country and mass detentions—but Russia pointedly did not. Putin was the one world leader who gave a call to Erdoğan to tell him Moscow supports his campaign to root out dissent, which the Turkish president described as “anti-constitutional.”[xxxvii] Furthermore Putin hosted his Turkish counterpart in St. Petersburg less than a month after the failed coup, during which Erdoğan explained that Vladimir Putin’s call to him was an important move, “a kind of moral support and display of Russia-Turkey solidarity,” as the Turkish president described the situation.[xxxviii] All this occurred just weeks after Erdoğan’s late June apology to Russia for the November 2015 downing of a Russian Su-24 jet over Syria; and it goes to show how masterfully Vladimir Putin uses authoritarian movements to his own political benefit. Egypt is going through a similar wave of authoritarianism, with President Abdel Fattah El Sisi cracking down on dissent that is not necessarily associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. That government campaign is happening against the backdrop of economic instability, currency devaluation and increased poverty rates. However, the army’s grip on power and full control over the public sphere give a semblance of stability in the country. Sisi’s fight to eradicate extremism in the Sinai as well as his crackdown on dissent find support in Moscow, which is reflected in official statements coming from the Kremlin. Egypt reemerged as Russia’s key partner in the Middle East, including in crucial spheres of military-technical cooperation. The two countries signed a protocol on military cooperation in March 2015, significantly ramped up joint military exercises, and are looking to green light an agreement that would allow Russian military aircraft to use Egyptian airspace and infrastructure.[xxxix] With the turmoil and regular attacks in the Sinai Peninsula, counter-terrorism cooperation has become a distinct characteristic of the bilateral relationship. A security-heavy agenda acts as a glue between Moscow and Cairo, not least due to the military and security background of the political elites of the two countries. Both Russians and Egyptians will head to the polls in March 2018 to elect their respective heads of state, while presidential elections in Turkey are to take place in November 2019. The outcome is already known in all three countries; Putin, Sisi and Erdoğan will almost certainly serve out their next terms into the first half of the 2020s, meaning that we are unlikely to witness a disruption in the security-comes-first policy employed by Moscow in its bilateral relations with both Cairo and Ankara. The cases of Egypt and Turkey illustrate that Vladimir Putin is likely to encourage authoritarian “stability” across the region through skewed security-heavy policies. Putin’s support for autocratic tendencies will hardly find any resistance among other powers in the region and will almost certainly be embraced. Syria’s recovery from the seven-year war is unlikely to happen through the emergence of democratic institutions and freedom, but will probably lead to the creation of a strong regime with an inflated security apparatus to shield a fragile government and keep extremist tendencies at bay. Iraq’s increasingly sectarian policies hint at a similar trend. And as Libya’s internationally recognized government fails to establish control over much of the country’s territory, Libyan National Army Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar represents the type of leader the Kremlin would presumably like to see for a post–civil war Libya. If Russia’s Syria policy is any indication, a highly centralized system will be Moscow’s remedy for extremism throughout the wider region. The fear of a new wave of extremism will push many regimes to seek more control over the population, and a lack of incentives to democratize may bring about new repressive regimes. In other words Russia’s leadership in the Middle East may significantly lengthen and reinforce the era of authoritarianism there.

## Heg Bad

#### Hegemony under Trump scares everyone off

Twining 4/18 (Daniel, Counselor and Asia Director at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. As director of the Asia Program, he leads a 15-member team working on the rise of Asia and its implications for the West through a program of convening and research spanning East, South, and Southeast Asia. Dr. Twining previously served as a Member of the U.S. Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff, as the Foreign Policy Advisor to U.S. Senator John McCain, and as a staff member of the U.S. Trade Representative. He is an Associate of the U.S. National Intelligence Council, has taught at Georgetown University, and served as a military instructor associated with the Naval Postgraduate School. He holds a BA with Highest Distinction from the University of Virginia and MPhil & DPhil degrees from Oxford University, where he was the Fulbright/Oxford Scholar from 2004-07. He writes regular columns for Nikkei and Foreign Policy and has served as an advisor to six presidential campaigns. foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/18/trump-might-be-a-traditional-president-after-all/)

Trump may seem an odd champion of some of these causes. But his national security Cabinet, which now seems to be finding its feet, is in keeping with American foreign-policy traditions. In international affairs, Trump relies on two of the leading general officers of their generation, James Mattis and H.R. McMaster; a pillar of America’s globalist-corporate establishment, former ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson; and the former president of Goldman Sachs, Gary Cohn, who has led a so-far-successful effort to check the mercantilist instincts of White House advisers Steve Bannon and Peter Navarro. The internationalists have an ally in Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and key adviser, who takes a pragmatic view of U.S. policy priorities. For all the focus on Trump’s personality, his unorthodox presidency may yield a more traditional focus on deploying American power for broader ends. Obama decried American exceptionalism, emphasized “nation-building at home,” and pursued a dedicated policy of retracting American power from pivotal theaters like the Middle East, enabling revisionist regional powers to go on the offensive. He did not do enough as the humanitarian tragedy of Syria played out in slow motion, destabilizing not only the Middle East but also Europe, dividing and weakening Washington’s closest ally in world affairs. His rhetorical “pivot” to Asia left U.S. allies wanting more American presence and leadership than they got. Trump remains at odds with much of Washington’s bipartisan foreign-policy establishment. He has yet to embrace the trade leadership that makes the world’s biggest economy more competitive and dynamic, and Americans more prosperous. But his willingness to employ limited military force — including ramping up military action against the Islamic State in Syria and Afghanistan — and to stand up to the regional power plays of revisionist states, creates opportunities to more effectively manage complex conflicts, from the Levant to the Korean Peninsula. It is telling that a modest set of missile strikes against a remote Syrian airbase represents the boldest use of American military power against the murderous regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. It is also telling that the tangible threat of U.S. military action against North Korea is on the table after eight years of a policy the Obama administration termed “strategic patience,” which created a window of opportunity that Pyongyang used to continue to perfect its intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons programs while America looked away. Even China and Russia look off-balance after early fears in Washington that an inexperienced president would appease the leaders of these countries. Chinese President Xi Jinping came to Trump’s Mar-a-Lago estate bearing concessions designed to fend off an American trade war. At their inaugural summit, Trump was clear with Xi that the quality of U.S.-China relations would be tied to Beijing’s cooperation in tightening economic pressure on North Korea. Having secured strategic gains during the Obama presidency, and given the five-year leadership plenum approaching this fall, Xi would be wise to exercise strategic restraint during Trump’s first term, and demonstrate China’s utility by tightening the pressure on its ally North Korea to deter further nuclear tests. Given that Trump wants to manage trade with what he sees as a mercantilist superpower that does not play by the rules, China would also be prudent to pursue the kind of voluntary export restraint agreements that Japan struck with the Ronald Reagan administration in the 1980s, when trade frictions with Tokyo peaked. Trump’s threat to use trade barriers as leverage to move China to assume a tougher posture with its client in Pyongyang clearly has gotten Beijing’s attention and may even yield dividends. Ironically, Trump is likely to be the first American president since the end of the Cold War not to pursue a “reset” in relations with Russia. The ongoing investigations into the Trump campaign’s dealings with Russian agents of influence severely restrict the ability of this administration to pursue any kind of improvement in relations with a regime that invades democratic neighbors, threatens NATO allies with nuclear attack, attempts as a matter of state policy to subvert Western elections, and murders political opponents. Indeed, the mounting domestic opposition to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s autocratic rule — as manifested in popular protests in cities across Russia — creates a new pressure point that the United States could leverage through a heightened force posture in Europe and more robust campaign for Russia to conform to international law by severing dealings with the outlaw Syrian regime. As Tillerson pointed out on his way to Moscow to meet Putin, Assad has become a liability rather than an asset to Russia’s geopolitical ambitions. The Trump administration is still in its first 100 days. It has not been subjected to the kind of international crisis that tests every administration, and which will call into question not only its statecraft but the judgment of the commander-in-chief. There remain reasons to be concerned, particularly about the administration’s trade agenda. But anxious allies are breathing a sigh of relief that American power is back as a force to be reckoned with in a dangerous world, after what many see as Obama’s abdication of the U.S. role as global guarantor and following a political campaign in which America was presented as a victim of globalization rather than as its engine. In Asia in particular, friends of the United States seek a robust commitment to U.S. military and diplomatic leadership as well as skill in stewarding the pivotal U.S.-China relationship in ways that preclude both condominium and conflict. North Korea poses a harder test than Syria: Asian allies will want to see that the Trump administration is as adept at diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula as it is at projecting military power in the Middle East. The White House will also need to be willing to risk an increase in tensions with Beijing by imposing secondary sanctions on Chinese banks and businesses that are the lifeline of the North Korean economy.

#### Heg decline creates global instability – causes war and prevents international cooperation on all issues.

Brzezinski 12 [Zbigniew Brzezinski, former presidential national security advisor, 1-3-2012, "After America," Foreign Policy, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/01/03/after-america/>]

Not so long ago, a high-ranking Chinese official, who obviously had concluded that America's decline and China's rise were both inevitable, noted in a burst of candor to a senior U.S. official: "But, please, let America not decline too quickly." Although the inevitability of the Chinese leader's expectation is still far from certain, he was right to be cautious when looking forward to America's demise. For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes. While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue. The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role. China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership. At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents. Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability**. In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because** the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict. **None of this will necessarily come to pass. Nor is the concern that America's decline would generate global insecurity, endanger some vulnerable states, and produce a more troubled North American neighborhood an argument for U.S. global supremacy. In fact, the strategic complexities of the world in the 21st century make such supremacy unattainable. But those dreaming today of America's collapse would probably come to regret it. And as** the world after America would be increasingly complicated and chaotic, it is imperative that the United States pursue a new, timely strategic vision for its foreign policy -- or start bracing itself for a dangerous slide into global turmoil.

#### Hegemonic transition wars are highly probable and cause extinction.

Chase-Dunn and Podobnik 95 [Christopher Chase-Dunn, and Bruce Podobnik. "The next world war: world-system cycles and trends." *Journal of World-Systems Research* 1.1 (1995): 295-326.]//SJ

This essay places the contemporary period of global development in long-run historical perspective, elaborates a model of world-system cycles and trends, and discusses the main structural forces influencing the probability of future war among core powers. The possible continuation of the cycle of hegemonic rivalry is discussed in terms of the similarities and differences between the coming three decades and earlier periods in which a declining hegemon was challenged by upwardly mobile states. Possible bids for economic and political hegemony by Japan, Germany, China and the United States are discussed, as are the possibilities for different coalitions in East Asia and Europe. The phenomenon of bloc formation is discussed in a long-term perspective that includes earlier periods of colonial empire and "commonwealth." We conclude that there is a **significantly high probability** that **warfare among core states** could **occur in the 2020s**. The prospects for global state formation within the next three decades are considered. We recommend a combination of the build-up of U.N. peace-keeping forces and the continuation of U.S. military strength as the least worst and most feasible solution to the problem of avoiding **nuclear holocaust in the 2020s**. The continuing globalization of the world capitalist system, and, more recently, the apparent triumph of global liberalism following the collapse or restructuring of most socialist states, have led a number of scholars to claim that a fundamentally new era has begun in which economic rather than military competition will become the sole basis of geopolitics (e.g. Fukuyama, 1992). While assorted regional bloodbaths (as in the Persian Gulf, the Balkans, Somalia, Rwanda, and Chechnya) will, of course, continue to occur, unrivaled U.S. military dominance, the strengthening of international institutions, and the continuing consolidation of a world capitalist class are all seen as promoting peace and stability within the core of the world-system. For many contemporary analysts, therefore, it appears to be increasingly unlikely that an all-out shooting war among core states will occur in the future. Certain new and historically-unique characteristics of the contemporary era are frequently cited as serving to dampen military conflict among core powers. The existence of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear, biological, chemical, and unknown possible future variants) have led some scholars to argue that the very idea of core warfare has become obsolete, as it implies the **total destruction of the contending states and probably most of the world**. Keohane (1984:49) and Goldstein and Rapkin (1991:957), for example, independently conclude that while **U.S. hegemony will continue to decline**, no rising contender will be willing to risk nuclear annihilation by undertaking a military bid for dominance. Instead of the traditional pattern of hegemonic transition, in which one core power emerges victorious from **a world war**, these scholars foresee the gradual consolidation of international institutions with the capability of coordinating a multipolar, "post-hegemonic" world.

#### Foreign military aid is key to US power projection—countries we abandon will turn to Russia and China

Goure 16

Daniel Goure, Ph.D. “Foreign Military Sales Remain An Important Tool Of U.S. National Security.” Lexington Institute. February 26, 2016. https://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/foreign-military-sales-remain-an-important-tool-of-u-s-national-security/

As still the world’s sole superpower, the United States possesses an unequaled array of instruments to support its foreign and defense strategies. With so much attention being focused on the conflicts in the Middle East, Russian aggression in Eastern Europe and Chinese efforts to assert its hegemony in the Western Pacific, the fact that the United States employs a wide range of non-military, or at least non-kinetic tools in pursuing its national interests is lost. Most recently, for example, the United States and China agreed on the imposition of new trade sanctions on North Korea in response to that country’s test of a long-range ballistic missile. One of the most important of these tools is foreign military sales (FMS). The complex role of FMS is reflected, in part, in the fact that the program is run by the Department of State and not the Department of Defense. One reason for this unusual management approach is that the FMS program involves sales by the U.S. government of U.S. arms, defense equipment, defense services, and military training to foreign governments. As a result, such sales reflect the views of the U.S. government with respect to the recipient country, its relationships with others in the region and the overall approach this country takes to mitigating the threat of regional or global conflict. The FMS program serves many other purposes. The sales of U.S. arms and related items to foreign countries helps reduce the cost of those systems to our own military. FMS sales help to ensure the ability of U.S. allies to defend themselves and support the maintenance of stable regional military balances. Equally important, FMS sales over time establish enduring relationships between foreign governments and their militaries and the U.S. When the U.S. military trains alongside those of allies equipped with the same hardware, it helps to cement the bonds between our countries. Moreover, it improves communications and understanding among these militaries, often helping to inculcate U.S. values related to the use of military force. Foreign militaries dependent on access to U.S. hardware, spare parts, software upgrades and training are more likely to listen to this country when there is a dispute regarding regional politics or defense issues. FMS has been particularly important as an instrument for influencing foreign governments and shaping regional balances of power in the Middle East. Following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the United States completely reequipped the Egyptian military. The Egyptian-Israeli border has been remarkably stable ever since. Sales of military aircraft, missile defense systems and precision munitions to the nations of the Persian Gulf have been instrumental in ensuring a stable balance of forces in that area. Pakistan has been a recipient of U.S. arms. FMS sales have been extremely important to U.S. efforts to ensure Pakistan’s reliability as an ally in the war on terror. Congress has appropriated about $3.6 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Pakistan since 2001. The kind of equipment provided ranges from radios, transport aircraft and unmanned systems to F-16 fighters. Recently, the State Department approved the sale of eight F-16s to Pakistan. Pakistan intends to use these aircraft in its fight against domestic terrorists. The U.S. and other regional allies have found the F-16 to be an effective platform for conducting precision strikes against terrorist targets. In addition, India is pursuing a major Air Force modernization program. The sale of F-16s to Pakistan would help to maintain the balance of power in the subcontinent. Unfortunately, Senator Rand Paul has filed a Joint Resolution of Disapproval for this sale, something that hasn’t happened since the 1980s. The effort to block this sale is a mistake. It will serve only to weaken the relationship between our two countries even as the fight against the Taliban continues and intensifies in Afghanistan. In addition, it leaves the way open for Pakistan to acquire aircraft from other suppliers, such as China or Russia. The only practical effect that disapproval of this sale will have is to weaken Washington’s hand at a time when it needs all the policy instruments it can muster.

#### Heg stops global nuclear war

Zalmay Khalilzad 16, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, counselor at the CSIS, 3/23/16, “4 Lessons about America's Role in the World,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/4-lessons-about-americas-role-the-world-15574?page=show

Ultimately, however, we concluded that the United States has a strong interest in precluding the emergence of another bipolar world—as in the Cold War—or a world of many great powers, as existed before the two world wars. Multipolarity led to two world wars and bipolarity resulted in a protracted worldwide struggle with the risk of nuclear annihilation. To avoid a return such circumstances, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney ultimately agreed that our objective must be to prevent a hostile power to dominate a “critical region,” which would give it the resources, industrial capabilities and population to pose a global challenge. This insight has guided U.S. defense policy throughout the post–Cold War era. Giving major powers the green light to establish spheres of influence would produce a multipolar world and risk the return of war between the major powers. Without a stabilizing U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf and U.S. relationships with Jordan and the Gulf States, Iran could shut down oil shipments in its supposed sphere of influence. A similar scenario in fact played out during the 1987 “tanker war” of the Iran-Iraq war, which eventually escalated into a direct military conflict between the United States and Iran. Iran’s nuclear program makes these scenarios even more dangerous. The United States can manage the rise and resurgence of great powers like China, Russia and Iran at an acceptable cost without ceding entire spheres of influence. The key is to focus on normalizing the geopolitics of the Middle East, Europe and the Asia-Pacific, which the United States can do by strengthening its transatlantic and transpacific alliances and adapting them to the new, dangerous circumstances on the horizon. The United States should promote a balance of power in key regions while seeking opportunities to reconcile differences among major actors.

## Method-Heavy

#### Calls for the ballot with the phrase “role of the ballot” rigs the educational process in favor of the impact rather than the method

Batterman 14 Bill Batterman is the Associate Director of Debate at Woodward Academy in Atlanta. He is a past recipient of the Wisconsin Debate Coaches’ Association Coach of the Year Award, the St. Mark’s School of Texas Acolyte Award, the National Debate Coaches Association Service Award, and the National Debate Coaches Association Educator of the Year Award. He has previously served as President of the WDCA, Secretary of the Georgia Forensic Coaches Association, a Member of the Tournament of Champions Advisory Committee, and a Board Member of the NDCA. During the summer, he teaches in the Hoya-Spartan Scholars program at Georgetown University and Michigan State University. <https://the3nr.com/2011/02/24/going-for-framework-on-the-aff-its-hip-to-be-square-pt-1/> AL 2-14-17

**The phrase “role of the ballot” is peppered throughout** the 2NC- most role of the **ballot claims are arbitrary and self serving-** things like the iron chef example above seem extreme, but **why is Iron Chef [ballot] any more arbitrary than “who is the least imperialist” or “who is the least capitalist**” etc. **These ROB’s all try to rig the game in favor of the** neg’s **impact,** so you have to go for a theory argument about why that rigging should not be allowed. ROB is distinct from impact calculus (X o/w) because it is not a comparative claim (X is the worst), **it is a procedural claim (x is all that should be considered).**

#### That transforms the ballot into a symbol of a prize of Otherness while erasing the subaltern

Spivak 88 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Indian literary theorist, philosopher and University Professor at Columbia University, Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, 1988 “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” Online, azp

\\\\SOME OF THE most [R]adical criticism coming out of the West today is the result of an interested desire onserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. **The theory of pluralized ‘subject-effects’ gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while** often **providing a cover for this subject of knowledge**. Although the history of Europe as Subject is narrativized by the law, political economy, and ideology of the West, **this concealed Subject pretends it has ‘no geo-political determinations.’** **The** much publicized **critique of the sovereign subject** thus actually **inaugurates a Subject**. . . . **This S/subject**, curiously **sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side** of the international division of labor. **It is impossible for** contemporary French **intellectuals to imagine the**kind of **Power and Desire that would inhabit the** unnamed **subject of the Other** of Europe. **It is not only that everything they read, critical or uncritical, is caught within the debate of the production of that Other**, supporting or critiquing the constitution of the Subject as Europe. It is also that, in the constitution of that Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could cathect, could occupy (invest?) its itinerary — not only by ideological and scientiﬁc production, but also by the institution of the law. . . . In the face of the possibility that the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow, a possibility of political practice for the intel- lectual would be to put the economic ‘under erasure,’ to see the economic factor as irreducible as it reinscribes the social text, even as it is erased, however imperfectly, when it claims to be the ﬁnal determinant or the transcendental signiﬁed. The clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated, fareflung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other. This project is also the asymetrical obliteration of the trace of that Other in its precarious Subjectivity. It is well known that Foucault locates epistemic violence, a complete overhaul of the episteme, in the redeﬁnition of sanity at the end of the European eighteenth century. But what if that particular redeﬁnition was only a part of the narrative of history in Europe as well as in the colonies? What if the two projects of epistemic overhaul worked as dislocated and unacknowledged pans ofa vast two-handed engine? Perhaps it is no more than to ask that the subtext of the palimpsestic narra- tive of imperialism be recognized as ‘subjugated knowledge,’ ‘a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualiﬁed as inadequate to their task or insufﬁ- ciently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientiﬁcity‘ (Foucault I980: 82). This is not to describe ‘the way things really were’ or to privilege the narrative of history as imperialism as the best version of history. It is, rather, to offer an account of how an explanation and narrative of reality was established as the normative one. . . . Let us now move to consider the margins (one can just as well say the silent, silenced center) of the circuit marked out by this epistemic violence, men and women among the illiterate peasantry, the tribals, the lowest strata of the urban subproletariat. According to Foucault and Deleuze (in the First World, under the standardization and regimentation of socialized capital, though they do not seem to recognize this) the oppressed, if given the chance (the problem of representation cannot be bypassed here), and on the way to solidarity through alliance politics (a Marxist thematic is at work here) can speak and know their conditions. We must now confront the following question: On the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier economic text, can the subaltern speak? . . .

## Trigger Warnings

#### Aff’s failure to provide a content warning causes psychological violence that dooms the aff – providing one is crucial to having productive discussion

**Johnston ’14** (Angus, “Why I’ll Add a Trigger Warning,” 5/29/14, <https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2014/05/29/essay-why-professor-adding-trigger-warning-his-syllabus#sthash.3AiFHg3f.dpbs>, accessed 1/19/19) KED

Part of the confusion arises from the word “trigger” itself. Originating in the psychological literature, the term can be misleading in a non-clinical context, and indeed many people who favor such warnings prefer to call them “content warnings” for that reason. It’s not just trauma survivors who may be distracted or derailed by shocking or troubling material, after all. It’s any of us, and a significant part of the distraction comes not from the material itself but from the context in which it’s presented. In the original cut of the 1933 version of the film "King Kong," there was a scene (depicting an attack by a giant spider) that was so graphic that the director removed it before release. He took it out, it’s said, not because of concerns about excessive violence, but because the intensity of the scene ruined the movie — once you saw the sailors get eaten by the spider, the rest of the film passed by you in a haze. A similar concern provides a big part of the impetus for content warnings. These warnings prepare the reader for what’s coming, so their attention isn’t hijacked when it arrives. Even a pleasant surprise can be distracting, and if the surprise is unpleasant the distraction will be that much more severe. I write quite a bit online, and I hardly ever use content warnings myself. I respect the impulse to provide them, but in my experience a well-written title and lead paragraph can usually do the job more effectively and less obtrusively. A classroom environment is different, though, for a few reasons. First, it’s a shared space — for the 75 minutes of the class session and the 15 weeks of the semester, we’re pretty much all stuck with one another, and that fact imposes interpersonal obligations on us that don’t exist between writer and reader. Second, it’s an interactive space — it’s a conversation, not a monologue, and I have a responsibility to encourage that conversation as best I can. Finally, it’s an unpredictable space — a lot of my students have never previously encountered some of the material we cover in my classes, or haven’t encountered it in the way it’s taught at the college level, and don’t have any clear sense of what to expect. For all these reasons, I’ve concluded that it would be sound pedagogy for me to give my students notice about some of the challenging material we’ll be covering in class — material relating to racial and sexual oppression, for instance, and to ethnic and religious conflict — as well as some information about their rights and responsibilities in responding to it. Starting with the summer semester, as a result, I’ll be discussing these issues during the first class meeting and including a notice about them in the syllabus.

#### Research proves warnings reduce distress for survivors

**Boysen 17** (Boysen, G. A. (2017). Evidence-based answers to questions about trigger warnings for clinically-based distress: A review for teachers. *Scholarship of Teaching and Learning in Psychology, 3*(2), 163–177. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/stl0000084>, accessed 1/19/19) KED

Some of the assumptions behind trigger warnings are clearly supported by research. There is no doubt that people with PTSD do face distressing and automatic symptoms in which they reexperience their trauma. These "intrusion" symptoms are common in PTSD, and they are frequently caused by external reminders, some of which might occur in a classroom. Research also suggests that warnings could help students reduce distress. Intrusion symptoms, such as having vivid memories of trauma, are more distressing if they occur without warning than if the person with PTSD intentionally thinks about their trauma. So, making reminders of trauma more predictable and controllable with trigger warnings could reduce distress.

## Tricks

#### Appeals to fairness are attempts to avoid the discussion and are shaped in hegemonic power structures

Delgado 92 (Richard Delgado [Richard, “Shadowboxing: An Essay On Power,” In Cornell Law Review, May)

**We have** cleverly **built power's view of** the **appropriate** standard of **conduct into the** very **term fair**.4l Thus, **the stronger party is able to have his way and see himself as principled at the same time**.42 Imagine, for example, a man's likely reaction to the suggestion that subjective considerations-a woman's mood, her sense of pressure or intimidation, how she felt about the man, her unexpressed fear of reprisals if she did not go ahead 4 3 -ought to play a part in determining whether the man is guilty of rape. Most men find this suggestion offensive; it requires them to do something they are not accustomed to doing. "Why," they say, "I'd have to be a mind reader before I could have sex with anybody!" 44 "Who knows, any- -way, what internal inhibitions the woman might have been harboring?" And "what if the woman simply changed her mind later and charged me with rape?" 45 What we never notice is that women can "read" men's minds perfectly well. The male perspective is right out there in the world, plain as day, inscribed in culture, song, and myth-in all the prevailing narratives. 46 These narratives tell us that men want and are entitled to sex, that it is a prime function of women to give it to them,47 and that unless something unusual happens, the act of sex is ordinary and blameless. 48 We believe these things because that is the way we have constructed women, men, and "normal" sexual intercourse. 49 Notice what the objective standard renders irrelevant: a downcast look;50 ambivalence; 5 1 the question, "Do you really think we should?"; slowness in following the man's lead;52 a reputation for sexual selectivity;53 virginity; youth; and innocence. 54 Indeed, only a loud firm "no" counts, and probably only if it is repeated several times, overheard by others, and accompanied by forceful body language such as pushing the man and walking away briskly.55 Yet society and law accept only this latter message (or something like it), and not the former, more nuanced ones, to mean refusal. Why? **The "objective" approach is not inherently better or more fair.** Rather, it is accepted because **it embodies the sense of the stronger party, who centuries ago found himself in a position to dictate what permission meant.**56 **Allowing ourselves to be drawn into reflexive, predictable arguments about administrability, fairness**, stability, and ease of determination **points us away from what really counts:** the way in which **stronger parties have managed to inscribe their views and interests into "external" culture,** so that we are now enamored with that way of judging action.57 First, we read our values and preferences into the culture;58 then we pretend to consult that culture meekly and humbly in order to judge our own acts. 5

#### Procedural requirements to bracket off criticism are ignorant

Prosise 96 Theodore O., Greg R. Miller, and Jordan P. Mills. "Argument fields as arenas of discursive struggle." Argumentation and Advocacy 32.3 (1996): 111.

A central aspect of argument field theory left unexamined has been the role of power in the establishment of argumentative authority in fields. The importance of the **discursive struggles over** the standards that distinguish legitimate and illegitimate **forms of expression has** also **eluded thorough analysis.** Critical theorists must recognize the practical discursive struggles of social agents. The actual symbolic practices of **agents must** be understood if we are to **analyze how logical types become invested with authority**. The establishment of authority may preclude participation in the field and marginalize those who could or should have a say. Field theory is better conceptualized by considering argument fields as social arenas of struggle, accounting for the key elements and factors that make fields dynamic. Toulmin, while recognizing the role of argumentative conflict in the establishment of authority, originally employed an evolutionary model in his explanation of the development of disciplinary fields. In Human Understanding, he argues that forums of competition allow the best warrants of a field to become accepted. The dominant war rants, he believes, did not develop from an “arbitrary authority or contest for power.” His evolutionary perspective embraces the metaphor of change as progress. Condensing this, Robert Rowland explains, “The theories which best meet a discipline’s needs will survive.” The work of Thomas Kuhn, however, amply demonstrates the limits of such an evolutionary perspective of epistemic development. And although Toulmin now would not embrace the container model of knowledge accumulation, the original discussion of fields lacked an emphasis on the dynamics of social struggles for symbolic legitimacy, which may explain the current limitations in understanding how authority is produced and articulated in social space. The shared purposes of social agents also has been offered as a useful descriptor of argument fields Rowland argues a conception of fields based on the shared purpose of the agents operating within the field. Zarefsky summarizes this notion, indicating that “two arguers are in the same field if they share a common purpose, and … the arguments they produce will differ in important ways from arguments which derive from a different purpose.” In short, participants argue over what constitute the “best way” to engage in activities within the area of inquiry. This conception of fields begins to define a social arena based on an agent’s participation in a struggle over the instrumental means and terminal states of a social field. It should be recognized that participants also share in the struggle for scarce resources-be they economic, cultural, political or symbolic. These agents argue over the legitimate perspective on what should constitute a claim to know, so they share in a struggle for epistemic legitimacy. The resolution of this struggle determines what types of argumentative proof are legitimated in the field. Extending from Toulmin’s work, many scholars recognize that the symbolic negotiation of authority within social fields is ongoing. Such negotiation requires **a discursive struggle in which arguments are** presented and then **accepted or rejected** by the community of participants.Charles Kneuper notes that “social fields are strongly influenced by rhetorical practice in both their continuation and change.” Furthermore, James Klumpp suggests that “when a community encounter an experience there are normally multiple understandings of it. Through communication the community works out its choice of ways to respond (that is, its definition of the situation) and then sanctions … appropriate action.” Social actors categorize events in order to respond to those events in appropriate ways. This categorization is based, primarily, on the language practices of the social field. For example, welfare policies frame cultural myths of an “underclass” and may exacerbate the problems of social members of lower economic status. The connotations associated with the term “underclass,” such as chronic laziness, stigmatize members of the group. The policies that are formulated, therefore, are based on the perceived “character” of the members of the underclass, rather than the larger social, historical, and economic causes of their economic status. The implication is that action is often based on the successful symbolic struggles which categorize events, rather than on “good reasons.” Since new ideas are filtered through taken-for-granted social assumptions, there is a general conservative social orientation toward argument. This helps explain how argument fields are maintained. Craig Dudezak, while recognizing that struggles take place within disciplines, claims that overall participants “maintain general disciplinary assumptions.” Wenzel writes that “argument fields exhibit a persistence over time” and for Charles Willard “fields exist … through the ongoing defining activities” and the “recurring themes in a group’s practices.” In other words, certain symbolic forms of authority are reproduced and others are limited socially. Certain forms of argumentative support are celebrated and other forms are dismissed based on the social forms of authority previously established by the agents participating in the field. But fields are not always stable. Postmodern scholars remind us that **diversity and differences are the norm.** Hence, **attention must be paid to** the diversity of **discursive struggles that challenge traditional forms of social authority.** Communities of memory, necessary for social negotiation, are partially established through discursive practices. But within the community, conflict is ever-present. So, what is the relationship between the community and the conflict within the field? Furthermore, what are the implications of the struggle? Hanson argues that the **forums** of field disputes can serve to **“exclude” an individual “from further discussions.”** He is certainly correct; However. It is more than just a forum that excludes individuals and perspectives from participation and consideration in social fields. Despite these contributions, there has been insufficient discussion of the pragmatic struggles in which agents are engaged. The community of argument scholars will be served by a general theory of social fields in order to evaluate particular examples. Over a decade ago, Zarefsky contended that “we need an account of the growth and demuse of fields against which we can check individual claims.” What the current discussion lacks, specifically, is a consideration of the role that symbolic struggles of categorization of “appropriate” and “inappropriate” forms of authority plays in the stability and change of a social field’s assumptions, which serve as the basis for the subsequent social structuring of practices. Current field theory fails to account adequately for social power and the conflict over scarce symbolic resources at the base of that social power. The study of such **struggle** is important because it **relates to the stability and legitimacy of the dominant forms of discourse.** Subsequently, **there has been little attention to the real world implications of marginalizing** alternative **arguments** within fields. For example, Nancy Fraser argues that the conceptual framing of social welfare policies excludes meaningful interpretation of social needs from a feminist perspective. The social forms of authority surrounding the welfare debate are defined by political “professionals.” Consequently, the interpretation of a welfare recipient’s “needs” and “interests” are considered primarily from the dominant political perspective. Excluded from the political debate are alternative voices and arguments. **Lack of attention to the symbolic means of exclusion**, such as this, **is troubling**. Rhetorical scholars need a theory which can help explain how and why certain arbitrary expressions are celebrated, while others are excluded altogether due to discursive struggles within dynamic social fields. Furthermore, **scholars should be** encouraged to explore the symbolic means agents employ to **challenge traditionally dominant forms of argumentative authority.**

#### A priori reasoning reinforces whiteness

Curry 13Dr. Tommy Curry, In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical, Academia.edu, 2013. NS

**The potentiality of whiteness**—the proleptic call of white anti-racist consciousness— **is nothing more than the fiat of an ahistorical dream.** A command ushered before thought engages racism, **before awareness of the world becomes aware of what is actual.** This is forced upon accounts of racism where **whiteness is morally obscured from being seen as is**. Whiteness as is partly **determined by what could be**, since what is was a past potentiality—a could be. **The appeal to the** sentimentality, morality, the **moral abstraction**/distraction **of equality**—both as a political command and its anthropological requisite—**complicate** the most obvious consequence of **anti-Black racism, namely violence. This moral apriorism urges the Black thinker to conceptualize racism as an activist project rooted in the potential of a world filled with non-racists**, a world where the white racist is transformed by Black activity into the white anti-racist. **But this project supposes an erroneous view of the white racist which occludes the reality of white supremacy** and anti-Black racism. As Robert F. Williams argues in Negroes with Guns, “the racist is a man crazed by hysteria at the idea of coming into equal contact with Negroes. And this mass mental illness called racism is very much a part of the ‘American way of Life.’” The white racist is not seen as the delusional individual ostracized from society as a result of their abhorrent social pathologies of racist hate. Rather the white racist is normal—the extended family, the spouse, the sibling, the friend of the white individual—the very same entities upon which the inter/intrasubjectivity nexus of the white self is founded. The white [he] experiences no punishment for his longing for Black servitude and his need to exploit and divest the Black worker here and then of [his] wealth. The white [she] has no uneasiness about her raping of—the destruction of generations of Black selves—mothers, children, and men—and today usurps the historical imagery of “the nigger,” to politically vacate Blackness and demonize niggers as beyond political consideration. She rewrites history, pens morality, and embodies the post-racial civil rights subject. As such, racism, the milieu of the white racist is not the exposed pathological existence of the white race, but rather valorized in white individuality, the individuality that conceptualizes their racism as a normative aspiration of what the world should look like, and even more damning, an aspiration that can be supported and propagated in the world. The white racist recognizes the deliberateness of the structures, relations, and systems in a white supremacist society and seeks like their colonial foreparents to claim them as their own.

## Ideal Theory

#### Intent-based frameworks ignore material oppression

Kidner 2k professor of psychology at Nottingham Trent University and internationally renowned scholar on nature-culture relationships.(nature and psyche p. 65-7) / MM

In addition, the deconstructive bent of discursive approaches limits their capacity to challenge the structure of modern industrialism. Just as science has been reluctant to recognize the holistic qualities of nature, so we have been slow to appreciate that the power of industrialism and its resultant near-hegemony in the modern world is largely the result of its ability to integrate science, politics, and everyday social life within a structure that appears complete and self-sufficient. This structure cannot be challenged without reference to alternative structures. To celebrate choice and free play without also celebrating the frames of meaning within which they take place is simply to guarantee our assimilation to and absorption within industrialism, and so represents a philosophy of surrender. For example, “freedom” has little meaning in the absence of a framework of democratic laws which protect the vulnerable against the “freedom” of the powerful to exploit, intimidate, and mislead. Similarly, my freedom to explore an area of wilderness is negated if energy companies and off-road vehicle clubs also have the freedom to use the area as they see fit. Freedom is all to often interpreted as the absence of structure; and structure gives meaning and implies responsibilities and limitations. One of the most insidious aspects of the colonization of the world is industrialism's silent but lethal elimination of structures that could challenge it. The widespread lack of appreciation within academia of the way in which postmodern approaches involving deconstruction promote this insidious *conceptual* assimilation to industrialism is an index of the urgent need to develop a psychocultural dimension to our environmental understanding. Finally, we should not ignore the possibility that an emphasis on language serves particular defensive functions for the social scientist. Noam Chomsky has noted that it”it's too hard to deal with real problems,” some academics tend to “go off on wild goose chases that don't matter . . . [or] get involved in academic cults that are very divorced from any reality and that provide a defense against dealing with the world as it actually is.”71 An emphasis on language can serve this sort of defensive function; for the study of discourse enables one to stand aside from issues and avoid any commitment to a cause or idea, simply presenting all sides of a debate and pointing out the discursive strategies involved. As the physical world appears to fade into mere discourse, so it comes to seem less real than the language used to describe it; and environmental issues lose the dimensions of urgency and tragedy and become instead the proving grounds for ideas and attitudes. Rather than walking in what Aldo Leopold described as a “world of wounds,” the discursive theorist can study this world dispassionately, safely insulated from the emotional and ecological havoc that is taking place elsewhere. Like experimentalism, this is a schizoid stance that exemplifies rather than challenges the characteristic social pathology of out time; and it is one that supports Melanie Klein's thesis that the internal object world can serve as a psychotic substitute for an external “real” world that is either absent or unsatisfying.72 Ian Craib's description of social construction as a “social psychosis”73 therefore seems entirely apt. But what object relations theorists such as Klein fail to point out is the other side of this dialectic: that withdrawing from the external world and substituting an internal world of words or fantasies, because of the actions that follow from this state of affairs, makes the former even less satisfying and more psychologically distant, so contributing to the vicious spiral that severs the “human from the “natural” and abandons nature to industrialism.

#### Debate should deal with discussions of real-world oppression, and the aff avoids that

Curry 14 Dr. Tommy J.CurryThe Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century. 2014

Despite the pronouncement of **debate** as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue, thinking, and (personal) politics when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which **sees the adjudication of material disparities** and sociological realities **as the conquest of one ideal theory over the other**. In “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that “ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics); [s]ince ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, [it is set] against factual/descriptive issues.”At the most general level, **the** conceptual **chasm between** what emerges as ***actual* problems** in the world **(e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems** *theoretically*—the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy “problem” by an audience—is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observablesocial phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one “necessarily has to abstract away from certain features” of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. **This gap** between what is actual(in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds **threatens any real discussions about the** concrete nature **of oppression** and the racist economic structures which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations. As Mills states: “What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual,” so what we are seeking to resolve on the basis of “thought” is in fact incomplete, incorrect, or ultimately irrelevant to the actual problems which our “theories” seek to address. Our attempts to situate social disparity cannot simply appeal to the ontologization of social phenomenon—meaning **we cannot suggest that** the **various complexities of social problems** (which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we observe) **are totalizable by** any one **set of theories within an ideological frame** be it our most cherished notions of Afro-pessimism, feminism, Marxism, or the like. At best, theoretical endorsements make us aware of sets of actions to address ever developing problems in our empirical world, but even this awareness does not command us to *only* do X, but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the material conditions addressed by the action X. As a whole, debate (policy and LD) neglects the need to do X in order to remedy our cast-away-ness among our ideological tendencies and politics. How then do we pull ourselves from this seeming ir-recoverability of thought in general and in our endorsement of socially actualizable values like that of the living wage? It is my position thatDr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s thinking about the need for a living wage was a unique, and remains an underappreciated, resource in our attempts to impose value reorientation be it through critique or normative gestures) upon the actual world. In other words, King aims to reformulate the values which deny the legitimacy of the living wage, and those values predicated on the flawed views of the worker, Blacks, and the colonized (dignity, justice, fairness, rights, etc.) used to currently justify the living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters.

# Disads

## Base

#### Trump’s base is still strong but post-midterm puts it on the brink – pay attention to his foreign policy

-Don’t be certain we’ve hit peak-Trump – author admits he’s uncertain and cites high polling among the base – don’t buy absolutist non-uniques

-Trump will look to FoPo to transcend fiascos, but he’s losing his edge – makes the impact scenario probable

Ferguson 11/26 Niall Ferguson is a British historian and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, BostonGlobe, 11-26-2018, ["Has Trump peaked?", https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2018/11/26/has-trump-peaked/O5hgSLNpAOfU2QcY4DVPmJ/story.html] bcr 12-5-2018

Thanksgiving is a wonderful festivity. Unlike Christmas, it has somehow eluded commercialization. The formula remains the time-honoured one: Get your family together, eat turkey, count your blessings. Asked on Thursday what he was thankful for, President Trump replied: “For having a great family and for having made a tremendous difference in this country. . . . This country is so much stronger now than it was when I took office that you wouldn’t believe it.” Now, not everyone thinks this ludicrous. In the most recent Economist/YouGov poll, 40 percent of respondents said they approved of the way Trump is handling his job as president, of whom 24 percent said they “strongly approved” of his performance. Among Republican voters in the same poll, 62 percent expressed strong approval. He still has his base. Yet it is impossible not to sense a change in the air. On the day that Brett Kavanaugh was confirmed by the Senate as the newest Supreme Court justice — a day many Republicans celebrated as a tremendous victory over their Democratic opponents — I offered the following thought to my wife: “This is peak Trump.” That was on Oct. 6. Nothing that has happened in the intervening seven weeks has led me to change my mind. Since then, it has been all downhill. First, take another look at the results of the congressional midterm elections. Now that all but a handful of races have been settled, it is clear that this was a serious defeat for the president’s party. In the House of Representatives, the Democrats gained 37 seats, more than enough to give them control for the next two years. The most concerning trends for Republican strategists must be their poor performance with women voters, particularly those with college degrees, and with younger voters. According to exit polls, college-educated women preferred Democratic candidates by a margin of 59 to 39. Clear majorities of voters ages 18 to 29 (67 percent) and 30 to 44 (58 percent) favored the Democrats. Partly because of these demographic differentials, Republican candidates lost in key districts in two of the states that decided the 2016 presidential election in Trump’s favour: Michigan and Pennsylvania. Second, let’s talk about the economy. By most standard measures, it’s in robust health. The International Monetary Fund expects that growth this year will be just under 3 percent, the highest since 2005. The official unemployment rate is 3.7 percent, the lowest since December 1969, when Richard Nixon was president. (More about him later.) Yet only Republican voters give Trump any credit for the economy’s strength. According to the polls, around 70 percent of Democrats disapprove of his handling of the economy. That helps explain why the economy didn’t help Republican candidates in the midterms. Immediately prior to the vote, pollsters found that health care beat the economy into second place as the most important issue. You may recall the Republicans’ epic failure to reform or repeal Obamacare. Now ask yourself what would happen if the economy took a turn for the worse. For investors in both stocks and bonds, that has already happened. On the day before Thanksgiving, the S&P closed at just under 2,650, 1.3 percent below where it began the year. Bond yields have risen significantly this year, from below 2.5 percent to above 3 percent, inflicting losses on bondholders. It is hard to see where respite could come from. The Federal Reserve seems on course to keep raising interest rates and unwinding the expansion of its balance sheet that occurred in response to the financial crisis. The Republicans gave the economy the fiscal equivalent of a sugar rush with the tax cuts they passed this time last year. The glucose level in the bloodstream is now falling and the full scale of the fiscal irresponsibility is beginning to sink in. Third, President Trump and his inner circle are about to be hit not just by the report of special counsel Robert Mueller, but also by a barrage of attacks from congressional committees soon to be chaired by Democrats. Control of the House gives Trump’s political foes two powerful weapons. First, congressional committees have an arsenal of investigative tools that the majority party can wield. The most important is Congress’s subpoena power to compel the production of documents or the sworn testimony of witnesses in furtherance of a congressional investigation. Second, Congress has the power to make public the results of any investigation. In short, you can expect 2019 to feel a lot like 1973, as every liberal legislator and journalist sets out to reenact Watergate, casting Trump in the role of Nixon. For a time, it seemed to me that Trump might be able to transcend all these threats with foreign policy successes based on his primal, intuitive grasp of the relative weaknesses of America’s foes. I no longer believe he has the discipline or patience necessary to exploit this advantage. Policy on North Korea is a mess: Kim Jong Un now openly flouts the constraints that were supposedly placed on him in Singapore. Policy on Iran is an even bigger mess: The administration’s cack-handed defense of its Saudi ally’s murder of Jamal Khashoggi has been shameful. And policy on China may well become a mess if the president opts for a photo opportunity rather than meaningful concessions on trade when he meets Xi Jinping in Buenos Aires on Wednesday. Finally, a caveat. I have called “peak Trump” before and been wrong. In January 2016, I foolishly predicted that he would flop in the Republican primaries. So I could be wrong again. One of the things that make me thankful to live in America is that this country is so wildly unpredictable. Except, that is, on Thanksgiving.

#### Strong support for the military and its mission maintains his base, specifically hawks and vets – plan is perceived as backtracking towards “America first”

-Trump has done the opposite of America first by boosting spending and deployments – no thumpers

-Trump symbolically supports vets, which is backed by concrete policies empowering the DoD and global presence – no link defense

Graham ‘18 Michael Graham, is an American talk radio host, writer, and conservative political commentator. He also appears on George Hook's The Right Hook on Mondays in Ireland on Newstalk.[2] Graham is the author of several books and is a columnist for the Boston Herald and CBS News. CBS News, 5-28-2018, ["Commentary: America's military and Donald Trump", https://www.cbsnews.com/news/commentary-americas-military-and-donald-trump/] bcr 12-5-2018

Memorial Day, as veterans are quick to point out, is a day to remember America's fallen warriors—not the former ones. (That's Veteran's Day). But it turns out America's military has quite a bit to celebrate this year—in large part thanks to President Trump. When Donald Trump first took office, "Americans really didn't know if this guy was going to get us into a war," says Real Clear Politics pollster Sean Trende. "There was real worry about how risky it was to elect him president." Among military hawks, the concern was Trump's "America First" rhetoric leading to U.S. withdrawal from the world, with less support for the Defense Department and its mission. Instead, this Memorial Day America's military's budget is bursting at its seams, soldiers' paychecks are getting bigger, its Special Forces are deployed in record numbers, and U.S. troops are on the ground in significant numbers in Afghanistan and Syria. For a foreign policy establishment that once worried Mr. Trump might abandon NATO and pull troops from abroad, this is a major turnaround. When asked to describe the mood at the Pentagon thus far during the Trump presidency, longtime DOD reporter Jamie McIntyre says "they're keeping their heads down, but they're happy." McIntyre, now the author of the Daily on Defense newsletter, says the DoD is "very happy with the budget President Trump signed -- they feel like that was absolutely vital. And they're also happy with the role he has given [Defense] Secretary Mattis on the world stage." That budget deal pumped an additional $165 billion into the Defense Department over the next two years, a "huge win for defense hawks," according to Mackenzie Eaglen of the American Enterprise Institute. And it seems to signal a solid shift by President Trump into the defense-policy mainstream. Voters who wanted a Trump presidency to usher in a Rand Paul foreign policy are clearly disappointed. Enthusiastic Trump fan Ann Coulter, for example, criticized Trump's decision earlier this year to bomb Syria-- "a country 7k miles away and of zero strategic interest"—in response to the Assad regime's use of chemical weapons. Trump's support for the military makes sense given how they've supported him. Veterans supported Mr. Trump over Hillary Clinton 60-34 percent in 2016, and, according to polling, continue to support the president at far higher numbers than the overall electorate. And while polling of active-duty military members is rare, one such poll last October found 44 percent have a favorable view of the president at a time when his overall approval rating was around 38 percent. Interestingly, Trump's approval was highest among the rank-and-file soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines (48 percent), and lowest among officers (30 percent). Still, President Trump has had his share of stumbles on military and veterans, most notably the failed nomination of would-be VA Secretary Dr. Ronny Jackson. And some complain that President Trump has not moved as swiftly on veterans' issues as he promised, even as problems like long wait times remain. And according to McIntyre, the lack of public DoD briefings during the Trump era reflects concerns by the Pentagon brass of being caught up in the president's political slipstream. "Press briefings with generals used to happen all the time," McIntyre said. "Not anymore. Nobody wants to see their name in the president's Twitter feed at 6 in the morning." Overall, however, the president remains relatively popular. His pick of acting VA Secretary Robert Wilkie has been met with approval by the American Legion and AMVETS, and Mr. Trump is about to sign a sweeping new VA reform bill, the MISSION Act, expanding private-sector healthcare access to veterans, a move also backed by veterans groups. Veterans are key part of Trump's base and, like his evangelical and Second-Amendment supporters, Trump treats them with special care. Is it really a coincidence that President Trump has focused on the NFL protests? While kneeling during the national anthem is unpopular among all Americans, veterans are even more offended. At the same time, video of President Trump shaking the hand of every one of this year's 1,042 Naval Academy graduates went viral on the Right. This may be mere symbolism, but symbolism is often simply smart politics. According to a Zogby poll from last year, veterans are part of what he calls the "hidden Trump vote," almost half saying they are reluctant to admit their support for the president. In other words, President Trump's margin among vets may be even higher than it appears. Memorial Day may not belong to America's veterans, but this president certainly does.

#### Loss of base support from aid revocation will push Trump to diversionary war resulting in nuclear annihilation.

Street ‘16 Tim Street, is Senior Programme Officer on the Sustainable Security programme at ORG and has worked for many years on the politics of nuclear disarmament and the arms trade. Oxford Research Group Briefing, November 2016, ["President Trump: Successor to the Nuclear Throne", http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ORG-President%20Trump-Successor%20to%20the%20Nuclear%20Throne.pdf] bcr 12-5-2018

With the former, Trump’s recent [comment](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-idUSKBN13H1DZ) that he now has an ‘open mind’ about the importance of the Paris climate agreement—having previously said climate change is a ‘hoax’—is unlikely to assuage fears that he will seek to dramatically expand the US’s extraction and reliance on fossil fuels. With the latter, strong doubts have been raised over whether the new President is capable of responsibly handling the incredible power that will be at his fingertips. Moreover, several commentators are already raising concerns that a **Trump** administration will pursue **policies that** will **aggravate and disappoint his supporters**, a situation that could increase the possibility of the US engaging in a ‘diversionary’ war. In order to consider what we can expect from a Trump presidency, as well as noting whom Trump empowers as members of his cabinet and those whom he draws on for advice, it is vital to study the track record of recent administrations and appreciate the powers Trump will inherit. In doing so this briefing focuses on the question of what a Trump presidency might mean for international relations with a focus on nuclear arms, including doctrine and disarmament. This means reviewing policies relevant to the US’s nuclear arsenal and pressing international challenges such as non-proliferation, including in East Asia and the Middle East, as well as the US’s relationship with Russia and its role in NATO. The power and responsibilities of the nuclear monarch The US President is solely responsible for the decision to use the near-unimaginably destructive power of the nation’s nuclear arsenal. Thus, as Bruce Blair—a former intercontinental ballistic missile launch control officer—makes [clear](http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/11/trump-north-korea-nuclear-crises-214457), ‘Trump will have the sole authority to launch nuclear weapons whenever he chooses with a single phone call.’ The wider political meaning of the bomb for the world is aptly [summarised](https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Bounding_Power.html?id=3XUp-TaG26UC&redir_esc=y) by Daniel Deudney, who describes nuclear weapons as ‘intrinsically despotic’ so that they have created ‘nuclear monarchies’ in all nuclear-armed states. Deudney identifies three related reasons for this development: ‘the speed of nuclear use decisions; the concentration of nuclear use decision into the hands of one individual; and the lack of accountability stemming from the inability of affected groups to have their interests represented at the moment of nuclear use’. Similarly, Elaine Scarry has [explained](https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=YgTGAgAAQBAJ&pg=PP1&lpg=PP1&dq=Thermonuclear+Monarchy:+Choosing+between+Democracy+and+Doom&source=bl&ots=FEUjd5cNWx&sig=j46RxuVMZVlVo0KGYxxTb52lLCo&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjAv-KAqLrQAhViJMAKHbf1C5A4ChDoAQgtMAM) in stark terms in her 2014 book Thermonuclear Monarchy: Choosing between Democracy and Doom, how the possession of nuclear weapons has converted the US government into ‘a monarchic form of rule that places all defense in the executive branch of government’ leaving the population ‘incapacitated’. In response to this situation, Scarry argues that the American people must use the Constitution as a tool to dismantle the US nuclear weapons system, thereby revitalising democratic participation and control over decision-making. Scarry also outlines the incredible might the president wields, with each of the US’s fourteen nuclear-armed submarines alone carrying ‘enough power to destroy the people of an entire continent’, equivalent to ‘eight times the full-blast power expended by Allied and Axis countries in World War II’. Nuclear specialist Hans Kristensen has [described](https://fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/publications1/WarPlanIssueBrief2010.pdf) how the US’s strategic. Overall, the gap between the public’s will and the government’s inaction on nuclear issues is alarming and redolent of the wider democratic deficit in the US. On a more positive note, the fact that the citizenry supports such measures suggests that groups advocating arms control and disarmament initiatives should continue to engage with and understand the public’s positions in order to effectively harness their support. Stepping back from the brink In terms of priorities for the incoming administration in the US, stepping back from military confrontation with Russia and pushing the threat of nuclear war to the margins must be at the top of the list. Whilst much has been made of a potential rapprochement between Trump and Putin, the two have, [reportedly](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/14/vladimir-putin-donald-trump-phone-call), only just spoken for the first time on the phone and still need to actually meet in person to discuss strategic issues and deal with inevitable international events and crises, including in relation to Ukraine and Syria. As of now, whilst the mood music from both sides might suggest a warming of relations, as has been seen with previous administrations, unless cooperation is rooted in a real willingness to resolve problems (which for Russia includes US ballistic missile defense deployments in Eastern Europe and NATO expansion) then tensions can quickly re-emerge. Another related question concerns how Trump will conduct himself during any potential crisis or conflict with Russia or another major power, given the stakes and risks involved, as highlighted above. Whilst we must wait to find out precisely what the new administration’s approach to international affairs will be, in the past week, NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg [told](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-nato-alliance-strongly-committed-u-turn-jens-stoltenberg-obsolete-a7435966.html) the BBC that he had been personally informed by Donald Trump, following the election, that the US remains ‘strongly committed to NATO, and that the security guarantees to Europe stand’. **Trump had previously shaken sections of** the defence and foreign policy **establishment by** [**suggesting**](http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2016/03/29/full-rush-transcript-donald-trump-cnn-milwaukee-republican-presidential-town-hall/) that NATO was ‘obsolete’ and that **countries such as** Japan (and by extension others such as South Korea and **Saudi Arabia)** **‘have to pay** us or we have to let them protect themselves’, which could include them acquiring the bomb. One reason why some in Washington have, in the past, not wanted their regional allies to develop their own nuclear weapons is because the US might then become dragged into an escalating conflict. Moreover, if an ally in one region seeks the bomb, this may cause others elsewhere to pursue their own capabilities- an act of strategic independence that might make these states harder to influence and control. The US’s key relationships in East Asia and the Middle East illustrate why, if a future US President wishes to take meaningful moves towards a world free of nuclear weapons, then developing alternative regional political agreements, including strategic cooperation with China and Russia, will be necessary. As Nancy Gallagher rightly [notes](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10736700.2011.583121), the ‘weaknesses of existing international organizations’ thus requires ‘more inclusive, cooperative security institutions’ to be constructed regionally ‘to complement and someday, perhaps, to replace exclusive military alliances’, alongside progressive demilitarisation. Such confidence-building measures would also support efforts to halt missile and nuclear tests by states such as North Korea, which may soon be [capable](http://www.iiss.org/en/politics%20and%20strategy/blogsections/2016-d1f9/november-b3f2/on-trump-and-north-korea-762c#.WDhZZfh9rS4.twitter) of striking the US mainland. Imagining the next enemy As well as mapping out the US’s current nuclear weapons policies and its regional relationships, it is important to reflect upon how domestic political dynamics under a Trump presidency might drive Washington’s behaviour internationally, particularly given the nuclear shadow that always hangs over conflicts involving the US. For example, in the near-term, Trump’s economic plan and the great expectations amongst the American working class that have been generated, may have particularly dangerous consequences if, as seems likely, the primary beneficiaries are the very wealthy. Reviewing Trump’s economic plans, Martin Wolf of the Financial Times [concludes](https://www.ft.com/content/31b062e8-a842-11e6-8898-79a99e2a4de6) that ‘the longer-term consequences are likely to be grim, not least for his angry, but fooled, supporters. Next time, they might be even angrier. Where that might lead is terrifying’. Gillian Tett has also [highlighted](https://www.ft.com/content/606db7bc-acb5-11e6-9cb3-bb8207902122) the ‘real risks’ that Trump’s policies could ‘spark US social unrest or geopolitical uncertainty’. Elsewhere, George Monbiot in the Guardian, makes the stark [assertion](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/23/donald-trump-climate-change-war) that the inability of the US and other governments to respond effectively to public anger means he now believes that ‘we will see war between the major powers within my lifetime’. If these warnings weren’t troubling enough, no less a figure than Henry Kissinger [argued](http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b082r9wx/newsnight-trumps-america-a-newsnight-special) on BBC’s Newsnight that ‘the more likely reaction’ to a Trump presidency from terror groups ‘will be to do something that evokes a reaction’ from Washington in order to ‘widen the split’ between it and Europe and damage the US’s image around the world. Given that Trump has already vowed to ‘bomb the shit out of ISIS’ and [refused](http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/290538-nuke-fears-grow-over-trump) to rule out the use of nuclear weapons against the group, it goes without saying that such a scenario could have the gravest consequences and must be avoided so that the US does not play into the terrorists’ hands. Looking more widely, President-elect Trump’s existing and potential cabinet appointments, which Glenn Greenwald has [summarised](https://theintercept.com/2016/11/12/dissecting-a-trump-presidency/) as ‘empowering…by and large…the traditional, hard, hawkish right-wing members of the Republican Party’ also point to the US engaging in future overseas conflicts, rather than the isolationism which many in the foreign policy establishment criticised Trump for [proposing](http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/oct/26/donald-trumps-isolationist-foreign-policy-attacked/) during the presidential campaign. William Hartung and Todd Harrison have drawn [attention](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-hartung/trumps-pentagon-plan-coul_b_12085172.html) to the fact that defence spending under Trump could be almost $1trillion (spread over ten years) more than Obama’s most recent budget request. Such projections, alongside Trump’s election [rhetoric](http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2015/jun/18/donald-trump/donald-trump-says-our-nuclear-arsenal-doesnt-work/), suggest that the new nuclear monarch will try to push wide open the door to more spending on nuclear weapons and missile defense, a situation made possible, as we have seen, by Obama’s inability to implement progressive change in this area at a time of persistent Republican obstruction. Conclusion The problem now, for the US and the world, is that if Trump does make good on his campaign promises then this will have several damaging consequences for international peace and security and that **if Trump does not** sufficiently satisfy his supporters then this will likely pour fuel on the flames at home, which may then quickly spread abroad. The people of the US and the world thus now have a huge responsibility to act as a restraining influence and ensure that the US retains an accountable, transparent and democratic government. This responsibility will only grow if crises or shocks take place in or outside the US which ambitious and extremist figures take advantage of, framing them as threats to national security in order to protect their interests and power. If such scenarios emerge **the** next administration and its **untried and untested President will find** themselves with **a range of extremely powerful tools** and institutional experience at their disposal, including nuclear weapons, which may prove too tempting to resist when figuring out how to respond to widespread anger, confusion and unrest, both at home and abroad.

## China and Russia

#### Foreign military aid is key to US power projection—countries we abandon will turn to Russia and China

Goure 16 Daniel Goure, Ph.D. “Foreign Military Sales Remain An Important Tool Of U.S. National Security.” Lexington Institute. February 26, 2016. https://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/foreign-military-sales-remain-an-important-tool-of-u-s-national-security/

As still the world’s sole superpower, the United States possesses an unequaled array of instruments to support its foreign and defense strategies. With so much attention being focused on the conflicts in the Middle East, Russian aggression in Eastern Europe and Chinese efforts to assert its hegemony in the Western Pacific, the fact that the United States employs a wide range of non-military, or at least non-kinetic tools in pursuing its national interests is lost. Most recently, for example, the United States and China agreed on the imposition of new trade sanctions on North Korea in response to that country’s test of a long-range ballistic missile. One of the most important of these tools is foreign military sales (FMS). The complex role of FMS is reflected, in part, in the fact that the program is run by the Department of State and not the Department of Defense. One reason for this unusual management approach is that the FMS program involves sales by the U.S. government of U.S. arms, defense equipment, defense services, and military training to foreign governments. As a result, such sales reflect the views of the U.S. government with respect to the recipient country, its relationships with others in the region and the overall approach this country takes to mitigating the threat of regional or global conflict. The FMS program serves many other purposes. The sales of U.S. arms and related items to foreign countries helps reduce the cost of those systems to our own military. FMS sales help to ensure the ability of U.S. allies to defend themselves and support the maintenance of stable regional military balances. Equally important, FMS sales over time establish enduring relationships between foreign governments and their militaries and the U.S. When the U.S. military trains alongside those of allies equipped with the same hardware, it helps to cement the bonds between our countries. Moreover, it improves communications and understanding among these militaries, often helping to inculcate U.S. values related to the use of military force. Foreign militaries dependent on access to U.S. hardware, spare parts, software upgrades and training are more likely to listen to this country when there is a dispute regarding regional politics or defense issues. FMS has been particularly important as an instrument for influencing foreign governments and shaping regional balances of power in the Middle East. Following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the United States completely reequipped the Egyptian military. The Egyptian-Israeli border has been remarkably stable ever since. Sales of military aircraft, missile defense systems and precision munitions to the nations of the Persian Gulf have been instrumental in ensuring a stable balance of forces in that area. Pakistan has been a recipient of U.S. arms. FMS sales have been extremely important to U.S. efforts to ensure Pakistan’s reliability as an ally in the war on terror. Congress has appropriated about $3.6 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Pakistan since 2001. The kind of equipment provided ranges from radios, transport aircraft and unmanned systems to F-16 fighters. Recently, the State Department approved the sale of eight F-16s to Pakistan. Pakistan intends to use these aircraft in its fight against domestic terrorists. The U.S. and other regional allies have found the F-16 to be an effective platform for conducting precision strikes against terrorist targets. In addition, India is pursuing a major Air Force modernization program. The sale of F-16s to Pakistan would help to maintain the balance of power in the subcontinent. Unfortunately, Senator Rand Paul has filed a Joint Resolution of Disapproval for this sale, something that hasn’t happened since the 1980s. The effort to block this sale is a mistake. It will serve only to weaken the relationship between our two countries even as the fight against the Taliban continues and intensifies in Afghanistan. In addition, it leaves the way open for Pakistan to acquire aircraft from other suppliers, such as China or Russia. The only practical effect that disapproval of this sale will have is to weaken Washington’s hand at a time when it needs all the policy instruments it can muster.

#### Russia and China reshape the US-led international order

Seldin 18 Jeff Seldin, VOA National Security Correspondent, “US Wary as Russia, China Set Sights on South, Central America,” VOA. June 7, 2018. https://www.voanews.com/a/us-wary-russia-china-south-central-america/4429832.html//RJP

Russia and China are making steady progress in reshaping the current international order, worrying the United States and its regional allies. Concerns that Moscow and Beijing are actively trying to reshape the balance of power are not new and have been a focus of the new U.S. national security and defense strategies. But while top military officials have repeatedly sounded the alarm about Russian and Chinese activities in other parts of the world, from Europe to Asia to Africa, there is a sense that not enough attention has been paid to what both countries have been able to do in South and Central America. "We can't just pay attention to what they're doing in Europe or in the South China Sea," warned Admiral Kurt Tidd, the commander of U.S. Southern Command. "Right here, far closer to home, there is competition going on," Tidd told reporters Thursday in Washington. "It's competition for influence and the single-most important thing we can do is compete ourselves." Russia, in particular, has been increasingly aggressive in re-establishing a military presence, sending ships to the region to make port calls while also boosting its intelligence-gathering platforms and operations, according to officials. Defense ties Moscow has also worked to repair or cement defense ties with former allies in the region, selling them advanced weaponry like military jets and air defense systems. "The country that has benefited most from Russian military sales has been Venezuela, a significant number of high-tech systems that clearly are not warranted from the security threats in the area," Tidd said. U.S. Southern Command points to Nicaragua as another beneficiary of the Russian military push, saying the country recently took delivery of refurbished tanks. Other countries looking to modernize or upgrade their military capabilities are also being targeted, often being lured with lower prices. In January, during a visit by Argentinian President Mauricio Macri to Moscow, the counties signed a memorandum of understanding to boost uranium production in Argentina, and Russian President Vladimir Putin offered to sell Macri rocket engines. Russia has also been exploring deals with Brazil, which bought Russian-made MANPADS [man-portable air defense systems] last year and has expressed interest in Russia's Pantsir surface-to-air missile system. Yet U.S. officials also accuse Russia of using information campaigns to gain an advantage, in one case scuttling a possible sale of U.S. armored vehicles to Peru. "Some, I think, very unhelpful propaganda came out of Russia talking about undercutting and underselling the ability of the [U.S.-made] Stryker to do its job," Tidd said. "And then they roll in with some refurbished BTR's [armored personnel carriers] at a cut-rate price." But some analysts think the concern may be overstated. "Two, three years ago you saw that sort of propaganda," Stratfor Latin America Analyst Paulo Gregoire told VOA. "You do not see that sort of propaganda lately." Lack money for military A big reason, Gregoire said, is that countries across Latin America do not have the money to spend on military hardware like they did even a few years ago. That is not to say that Russia does not have other advantages. "Governments in Latin America like to deal with other governments directly and get things done government-to-government," Gregoire said, something they can do more easily with Russia and China. "With the U.S., you talk to the government but actually have to talk to [defense] companies," he said, adding there are persistent concerns that any arms deal could be blocked by the U.S. Congress. China's inroads in South and Central America, while equally worrisome to U.S. officials, have focused less on military sales and more on economic development. One country of particular concern is Panama. China is already the world's second-largest user of the Panama Canal, according to Panamanian officials, and the two countries are set to begin a new round of trade negotiations next month. While U.S. military officials are not yet worried Beijing's efforts will have any immediate impact on the ability of the U.S. to move military vessels and materiel through the region, they are wary given China's ability to move quickly from economic ventures to military ones. "I'm thinking of Djibouti," U.S. Southern Command's Tidd told reporters Thursday, referencing China's first foreign military base in Africa. "How quickly they've ramped that up and established a fairly major presence."

#### Russian and Chinese revisionism sparks great power war --- only the liberal order solves it

**Kagan 17** Robert Kagan, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Project on International Order and Strategy, PhD in American history from American University, Brookings, January 24, 2017, “The twilight of the liberal world order”, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-twilight-of-the-liberal-world-order/

However, it is the two great powers, China and Russia, that pose the greatest challenge to the relatively peaceful and prosperous international order created and sustained by the **U**nited **S**tates**. If they were to accomplish their aims of establishing hegemony** in their desired spheres of influence, **the world would return to** the condition it was in at the end of **the 19th century, with competing great powers clashing over inevitably intersecting and overlapping spheres of interest**. **These** were the unsettled, disordered **conditions** that **produced** the **fertile ground for** the **two destructive world wars** of the first half of the 20th century. The collapse of the British-dominated world order on the oceans, the disruption of the uneasy balance of power on the European continent due to the rise of a powerful unified Germany, combined with the rise of Japanese power in East Asia all contributed to a highly competitive international environment in which dissatisfied great powers took the opportunity to pursue their ambitions in the absence of any power or group of powers to unite in checking them. **The result was** an **unprecedented global calamity. It has been the great accomplishment of the U.S.-led world order in the 70 years** since the end of the Second World War **that this kind of competition has been held in check and great power conflicts have been avoided.** **The role of the U**nited **S**tates, however, **has been critical**. Until recently, the **dissatisfied great** and medium-size **powers have faced** considerable and indeed almost **insuperable obstacles to achieving their objectives. The chief obstacle has been the power and coherence of the order itself and** of **its principal promoter and defender**. **The American-led system** of political and military alliances, especially in the two critical regions of Europe and East Asia, **has presented China and Russia with** what Dean Acheson once referred to as **“situations of strength”** in their regions that have required them to pursue their ambitions cautiously and in most respects to defer serious efforts to disrupt the international system. The system has served as a check on their ambitions in both positive and negative ways. They have been participants in and for the most part beneficiaries of the open international economic system the United States created and helped sustain and, so long as that system was functioning, have had more to gain by playing in it than by challenging and overturning it. The same cannot be said of the political and strategic aspects of the order, both of which have worked to their detriment. The growth and vibrancy of democratic government in the two decades following the collapse of Soviet communism have posed a continual threat to the ability of rulers in Beijing and Moscow to maintain control, and since the end of the Cold War they have regarded every advance of democratic institutions, including especially the geographical advance close to their borders, as an existential threat—and with reason. The continual threat to the basis of their rule posed by the U.S.-supported order has made them hostile both to the order and to the United States. However, it has also been a source of weakness and vulnerability. Chinese rulers in particular have had to worry about what an unsuccessful confrontation with the **U**nited **S**tates might do to their sources of legitimacy at home. And **although** Vladimir **Putin has** to some extent **used** a **calculated** foreign **adventurism to maintain** his hold on **domestic power, he has taken a more cautious approach when met with determined U.S.** and European **opposition**, as in the case of Ukraine, and pushed forward, as in Syria, only when invited to do so by U.S. and Western passivity. Autocratic rulers in a liberal democratic world have had to be careful. **The greatest check on Chinese and Russian ambitions**, however, **has come from the** combined **military power of the U**nited **S**tates and its allies in Europe and Asia. China, although increasingly powerful itself, has had to contemplate facing the combined military strength of the world’s superpower and some very formidable regional powers linked by alliance or common strategic interest, including Japan, India, and South Korea, as well as smaller but still potent nations like Vietnam and Australia. Russia has had to face the **U**nited **S**tates and its NATO allies. When united, **these military powers present a daunting challenge to a revisionist power** that can call on no allies of its own for assistance. Even were the Chinese to score an early victory in a conflict, they would have to contend over time with the combined industrial productive capacities of some of the world’s richest and most technologically advanced nations. A weaker Russia would face an even greater challenge. Faced with these obstacles, the two great powers, as well as the lesser dissatisfied powers, have had to hope for or if possible engineer a weakening of the U.S.-supported world order from within. This could come about either by separating the United States from its allies, raising doubts about the U.S. commitment to defend its allies militarily in the event of a conflict, or by various means wooing American allies out from within the liberal world order’s strategic structure. For most of the past decade, the reaction of American allies to greater aggressiveness on the part of China and Russia in their respective regions, and to Iran in the Middle East, has been to seek more reassurance from the United States. Russian actions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria; Chinese actions in the East and South China seas; Iranian actions in Syria, Iraq, and along the littoral of the Persian Gulf—all have led to calls by American allies and partners for a greater commitment. In this respect, **the system has worked as it was supposed to.** What the political scientist William Wohlforth once described as the inherent stability of the unipolar order reflected this dynamic—as dissatisfied regional powers sought to challenge the status quo, their alarmed neighbors turned to the distant American superpower to contain their ambitions.

## Democratization

#### Democracy is low now – recovery is essential

Muggah 1/12 Robert Muggah, 1-12-2018, "The global liberal democratic order might be down, but it's not out," World Economic Forum, [https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/the-global-liberal-democratic-order-might-be-down-but-its-not-out /](https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/the-global-liberal-democratic-order-might-be-down-but-its-not-out%20/) MM

For the first time in over half a century liberal democracy is in retreat. The democratic waves that ebbed and flowed between the 19th and 20th centuries appear to be receding once more. The signs of pushback against liberal values and democratic institutions are not just visible in parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America, but also in the strongholds of Western Europe and North America. After triumphantly declaring the "end of history" in 1989, scholars like Francis Fukuyama now fear that the world is moving from a "democratic recession" toward a "democratic depression." With illiberalism on the rise, there are fears that this could be the year the global liberal order dies. The order consists of a dense network of international agreements, trade arrangements and military alliances. Drawing on enlightenment era values of liberty and reason, it was constructed by U.S. President Roosevelt and the Western allies in 1945. Its express purpose was to prevent the recurrence of war and the economic nationalism that inspired conflict to begin with. While the order has come under criticism in the past, it has never experienced anything quite like the assault of the present. At the centre of the global liberal order are a clutch of organizations designed to defend democratic governance, open economies and common security. Among them are the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (all founded in 1945), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that later became the World Trade Organization (in 1995), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (in 1949) and others. Taken together, their express goal is to generate positive sum, or win-win, solutions. While critics routinely grumbled about their legitimacy, effectiveness and overstretch, on balance, they have helped preserve stability, extend democracy and expand economic opportunity. While the global liberal democratic order is most certainly down, it is far from out. According to the Polity Project which tracks trends in autocracy and democracy, democratic governance is still spreading. In 1989, at the time of Mr. Fukuyama's pronouncement, there were 52 democracies. By 2009, at the start of the Obama administration, the number had risen to 87. Today there are at least 103, accounting for over 60 per cent of the world's population. Even China and Russia are less repressive to their own populations than in the past. It is true that some democracies in parts of Western and Eastern Europe have experienced set-backs and a spike in reactionary nationalism, but these are nevertheless remarkable achievements. So what explains the fears of a democratic deficit and the decline of the global liberal order? According to columnist Edward Luce, a big part of the story has to do with the spectacular rise of China. The country's economic growth is nothing short of breathtaking: Its GDP grew from $950-billion (U.S.) in 2000 to $22-trillion in 2016. What's more, China benefited from three geopolitical windfalls over this period – the Iraq War in 2003, the 2008 global financial meltdown and the 2016 election of Donald Trump. Each of these developments bolstered the appeal of China's alternative, and authoritarian, pathway to development, emboldening autocrats who may have previously been swayed by the political and economic dividends of liberalism.

#### Aid provides an incentive to democratize which is a stronger internal link to the aff – empirics go neg.

Schenoni and Mainwaring 18 [Luis, University of Notre Dame, Scott, Harvard University, “US Hegemony and regime change in Latin America, published 2018, accessible online at <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2018.1516754>] / MM

This section aims to show that US foreign policy on the ground as proxied by foreign aid had a significant impact in the probability of a democratic transition, controlling for other relevant variables. We use survival analysis to test for the impact of US foreign aid policy in the average Latin American country. We replicate the main models in Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán,57 replacing their measure of US support for democracy (Figure 1) with a country specific measure of US foreign economic and military aid. Two observations are pertinent regarding the way in which Mainwaring and PérezLiñán coded US support for democracy in Latin America. First, their variable provides one value per year for the whole region. It therefore fails to reflect the US stance vis-à-vis specific Latin American countries, which probably biases the regression results in a conservative way by overlooking country-to-country variation. Second, measuring public statements may raise validity issues because actual policies, which are the result of complex political and bureaucratic processes, can be at odds with the statements of individual officials. Country-specific statements could be used to proxy signals, but not agency on the ground.58 We look at foreign aid instead. Almost all cases of effective US pressure on behalf of democracy involved the use of foreign aid, so it should provide a good proxy for US support for regime change. We look at both economic and military aid channelled by any US government agency, department, and office (US Overseas Loans and Grants Greenbook) as a per capita measure. We consider broader trends in aid to capture a larger set of uses. For instance, US support for authoritarian coups was often channelled through military assistance, and USAID was only one among many agencies and organizations through which pro-democratic funding was channelled.59 This variable ranges from zero to 210 US dollars per capita, with over 95% of the observations concentrating below the 100 US dollars per capita threshold. In Tables 1 and 2, we analyse the correlation of US foreign assistance with the probability of a democratic transition among authoritarian regimes (Table 1) and of a democratic breakdown among democracies (Table 2) for the 1945–2005 period. We replicate the main survival models in Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, using their models 4.4.5 and 4.2.5 as a baseline (first column) that we then modify by introducing the variable for US aid.60 The **positive coefficients** for US foreign assistance are consistent with the case studies. The US offered aid to authoritarian governments on the condition that they were making progress toward democratization. The US cut aid to authoritarian regimes that were not moving toward democracy. Thus, greater US aid is associated with a greater probability of a transition to democracy. The second column in Table 1 shows that when US foreign assistance proxies for US pro-democracy policies, the association between regional diffusion and US policy preferences, on the one hand, and democratic transitions, on the other, disappears. As measured by the p-value, US policy as proxied by foreign aid has a stronger association with democratic transitions than the regional diffusion variable. In column 3, we take out the variables for regional diffusion and US policy preferences and retain US foreign assistance. Compared to the original model (column 1), the model in column 3 slightly increases explanatory power despite being a bit more parsimonious. Finally, column 4 shows that, as measured by the p-value, the US aid variable was statistically more significant than domestic actors’ preferences in the 1977–2005 period. Table 2 applies the same procedure to the survival of democracy. In line with the qualitative findings in the last section, the association of US policy with democratic breakdowns is less impressive. The second column shows that the predictive power of regional diffusion per se is not overcome by adding the variable for US aid. Column 3 shows that overall (1945–2005) greater US foreign assistance is associated with a reduced probability of a democratic breakdown. The US did not consistently support democracy in the 1948–76 period, so in Column 4 there is more variance in the association of foreign aid with democratic breakdown, resulting in much larger standard errors. The conclusion from these tables is that US foreign assistance is strongly associated with the third wave of **democratization** in Latin America. US aid or its lack thereof did not cause regime change by itself, but it served as a proxy for US support for democracy and opposition to authoritarianism. Using this proxy, from 1977 to 2005 hegemonic effects were significantly associated with authoritarian breakdown and democratic stability in Latin America. Conversely, results for 1948–1976 do not support the idea that the US systematically bolstered authoritarian regimes. Although it goes beyond the goals of this article to explain the waves of authoritarianism from 1948 to 1954 and 1964 to 1977, the polarizing effects of the Cold War, especially after the Cuban revolution, loom large in any understanding of these regional trends. The US was the main actor in the Guatemalan coup of 1954 and it strongly influenced other outcomes, but the evidence suggests that it did not unleash the waves of authoritarianism that began in 1948 and 1964.

#### Democracy solves a laundry list of impacts – independently an alt cause to the aff.

**Kasparov 17** [Garry Kasparov, Chairman of the Human Rights Foundation, former World Chess Champion, “Democracy and Human Rights: The Case for U.S. Leadership,” Testimony Before The Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's Issues of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 16th, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/021617\_Kasparov\_%20Testimony.pdf]

As one of the countless millions of people who were freed or protected from totalitarianism by the United States of America, it is easy for me to talk about the past. To talk about the belief of the American people and their leaders that this country was exceptional, and had special responsibilities to match its tremendous power. That a nation founded on freedom was bound to defend freedom everywhere. I could talk about the bipartisan legacy of this most American principle, from the Founding Fathers, to Democrats like Harry Truman, to Republicans like Ronald Reagan. I could talk about how the American people used to care deeply about human rights and dissidents in far-off places, and how this is what made America a beacon of hope, a shining city on a hill. America led by example and set a high standard, a standard that exposed the hypocrisy and cruelty of dictatorships around the world. But there is no time for nostalgia. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War, Americans, and America, have retreated from those principles, and the world has become much worse off as a result. American skepticism about America’s role in the world deepened in the long, painful wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and their aftermaths. Instead of applying the lessons learned about how to do better, lessons about faulty intelligence and working with native populations, the main outcome was to stop trying. This result has been a tragedy for the billions of people still living under authoritarian regimes around the world, and it is based on faulty analysis. You can never guarantee a positive outcome— not in chess, not in war, and certainly not in politics. The best you can do is to do what you know is right and to try your best. I speak from experience when I say that the citizens of unfree states do not expect guarantees. They want a reason to hope and a fighting chance. People living under dictatorships want the opportunity for freedom, the opportunity to live in peace and to follow their dreams. From the Iraq War to the Arab Spring to the current battles for liberty from Venezuela to Eastern Ukraine, people are fighting for that opportunity, giving up their lives for freedom. The United States must not abandon them. The United States and the rest of the free world has an unprecedented advantage in economic and military strength today. What is lacking is the will. The will to make the case to the American people, the will to take risks and invest in the long-term security of the country, and the world. This will require investments in aid, in education, in security that allow countries to attain the stability their people so badly need. Such investment is far more moral and far cheaper than the cycle of terror, war, refugees, and military intervention that results when America leaves a vacuum of power. The best way to help refugees is to prevent them from becoming refugees in the first place. The Soviet Union was an existential threat, and this focused the attention of the world, and the American people. There existential threat today is not found on a map, but it is very real. The forces of the past are making steady progress against the modern world order. Terrorist movements in the Middle East, extremist parties across Europe, a paranoid tyrant in North Korea threatening nuclear blackmail, and, at the center of the web, an aggressive KGB dictator in Russia. They all want to turn the world back to a dark past because their survival is threatened by the values of the free world, epitomized by the United States. And they are thriving as the U.S. has retreated. The global freedom index has declined for ten consecutive years. No one like to talk about the United States as a global policeman, but this is what happens when there is no cop on the beat. American leadership begins at home, right here. America cannot lead the world on democracy and human rights if there is no unity on the meaning and importance of these things. Leadership is required to make that case clearly and powerfully. Right now, Americans are engaged in politics at a level not seen in decades. It is an opportunity for them to rediscover that making America great begins with believing America can be great. The Cold War was won on American values that were shared by both parties and nearly every American. Institutions that were created by a Democrat, Truman, were triumphant forty years later thanks to the courage of a Republican, Reagan. This bipartisan consistency created the decades of strategic stability that is the great strength of democracies. Strong institutions that outlast politicians allow for long-range planning. In contrast, dictators can operate only tactically, not strategically, because they are not constrained by the balance of powers, but cannot afford to think beyond their own survival. This is why a dictator like Putin has an advantage in chaos, the ability to move quickly. This can only be met by strategy, by long-term goals that are based on shared values, not on polls and cable news. The fear of making things worse has paralyzed the United States from trying to make things better. There will always be setbacks, but the United States cannot quit. The spread of democracy is the only proven remedy for nearly every crisis that plagues the world today. War, famine, poverty, terrorism–all are generated and exacerbated by authoritarian regimes. A policy of America First inevitably puts American security last. American leadership is required because there is no one else, and because it is good for America. There is no weapon or wall that is more powerful for security than America being envied, imitated, and admired around the world. Admired not for being perfect, but for having the exceptional courage to always try to be better. Thank you.

## Econ

#### Global econ low now – successes are necessary

Miller 11/28 Guy Miller, 11-28-2018, "As growth slows, we must be ready for the next economic crisis," World Economic Forum, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/11/growth-is-running-out-of-steam-how-do-we-prepare-for-the-next-crisis/> / MM

As the end of the year beckons and we ponder what the world will look like in 2019, the World Economic Forum’s latest report on Regional Risks for Doing Business, gives food for thought. It is notable that economic challenges remain at the forefront for the private sector, despite the buoyant global growth environment. It certainly resonates with the view that many vulnerabilities still exist – the good times have not been used as productively as they might to address these issues, leaving the global economy exposed to the next cyclical downturn. Regional challenges vary, but most intriguing is that unemployment was identified in the report as the single biggest risk on a global basis. At first glance this seems somewhat counterintuitive. Unemployment has, after all, been falling in most regions, with the US now at a 49-year low, UK at a 43-year low, Japan a 25-year low and even the euro zone now at a cycle low. What this means, however, is that it is increasingly difficult to find qualified recruits. And while companies may see low unemployment as a risk to their hiring plans, low unemployment also masks the fear and discontentment that pervades the workforce in most regions. Clearly the combination of glacial wage growth, automation and outsourcing have eroded worker morale and helped fuel populism. Though Amazon has hit the headlines by boosting their minimum wage to $15 an hour, income inequality remains a key concern in most regions and needs to be addressed more comprehensively to help bolster economic and social resilience. 'Fiscal crises' was also ranked among the top five risks of highest concern globally, with many regions highlighting it as a pertinent threat. This relates to the pressing issue of excessive debt. Global indebtedness at the household, corporate and government levels continue to rise, and dependencies within the financial system have not been addressed.

#### Aid incentivizes the adoption of economic reforms that promote free trade.

Whang et al. 18 [Taehee, Tonsei University, Youngwan Kim, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Jung Taek Han, Yonsei University, Hannah June Kim, University of California, “US foreign aid and economic policy concession”, published 2018, accessible online at <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01442872.2018.1533111>] / MM

What are the types of policy concessions donor countries hope to obtain? Policy concessions can be considered in areas ranging from security and politics to diplomacy and the economy. In this study, we focus on **economic policy concessions**. We argue that the United States provides most of its aid to recipient countries willing to accept policy concessions that increase business and economic freedom. In other words, recipient countries must be willing to open up their economy, maintain sound budget spending, and create an environment that is business friendly for international investors. This set of policies is often called the Washington Consensus, which is consistent with policy prescriptions that primary aid donor institutions, such as the World Bank or International Monetary Fund, recommend for recipient countries; the promotion of economic and business freedom by the United States is in line with the Washington Consensus. These policies are sometimes designed as an official condition for aid and are believed to be the foundation in creating a “**first-stage policy reform**” and enhancing both stability and integration in the world economy (Williamson 1990). The United States continues to emphasize business and economic freedom through the Washington Consensus by encouraging policies such as liberalization in finance and trade. It is believed that these neoliberal reforms can enhance the interests of the United States as a whole, especially during the last several decades.2 For potential recipient countries, whose policy concessions American firms or certain interest groups consider lucrative, foreign aid is disbursed as side payments. Although the amount of aid is typically small, it is **generally sufficient** for the recipient countries to **adopt the first-stage policy reform** (Tarnoff and Lawson 2011). It remains debatable whether economic growth is realized as a result of such policy concessions as proponents of Washington Consensus would anticipate. However, it is clear that aid programmes that are tied to economic policy concessions can produce economic and political winners in the United States. Such policy reforms may directly lead to an increase in American exports or indirectly improve the trade and investment environment for the United States. Unless the aid amount is small and there are other ways to domestically use aid money – public goods to voters or private or club goods to interest groups – helping poor countries can work as a “bang-for-the-buck” policy. This way, foreign aid can serve as a useful instrument for domestic political support.3 Furthermore, evidence shows that the United States promotes **economic freedom** through **foreign aid**, for example, in the guidelines of Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC): “MCC evaluates performance in three areas – Ruling Justly, Investing in People, and Encouraging Economic Freedom” (MCC 2013). While MCC is a specific form of US foreign aid, it reflects whether recipient countries accept specific economic policies that the United States has attempted to expand on the pretext of economic freedom. In sum, we argue that economic policy concessions desired by a donor country influences which country receives aid and how much. This implies that foreign aid allows donor countries to maximize their interests and extract valuable policy concessions from recipient countries, although whether recipient countries effectively use aid for their development remains a different question to ask. The amount of foreign aid primarily depends on the recipients’ policy salience and the actual need for foreign aid might be secondary. Finally, our theory leads us to construct the following hypothesis.4 Donor hypothesis: The United States is likely to increase the amount of foreign aid if the recipient country makes policy concessions that increase economic and business freedom.

#### Economic growth key to check every world crisis

**Ferrara 14** [Peter, Director of Entitlement for the Heartland Institute, “Why economic growth is exponentially more important than income inequality”, published 2014, accessible online at <https://www.forbes.com/sites/peterferrara/2014/01/14/why-economic-growth-is-exponentially-more-important-than-income-inequality/#4b4f36b91483>] // BBM

Such economic growth has produced dramatic improvements in personal health as well. Throughout most of human history, a typical lifespan was 25 to 30 years, as Moore and Simon report. But “from the mid-18th century to today, life spans in the advanced countries jumped from less than 30 years to about 75 years.” Average life expectancy in the U.S. has grown by more than 50% since 1900. Infant mortality declined from 1 in 10 back then to 1 in 150 today. Children under 15 are at least 10 times less likely to die, as one in four did during the 19th century, with their death rate reduced by 95%. The maternal death rate from pregnancy and childbirth was also 100 times greater back then than today. Moore and Simon further recount, “Just three infectious diseases – tuberculosis, pneumonia, and diarrhea – accounted for almost half of all deaths in 1900.” Today, we have virtually eliminated or drastically reduced these and other scourges of infectious disease that have killed or crippled billions throughout human history, such as typhoid fever, cholera, typhus, plague, smallpox, diphtheria, polio, influenza, bronchitis, whooping cough, malaria, and others. Besides the advances in the development and application of modern health sciences, this has resulted from the drastic reduction in filthy and unsanitary living conditions that econ**omic** growth has made possible as well. More recently, great progress is being made against heart disease and cancer. Also greatly contributing to the well-being of working people, the middle class, and the poor in America has been the dramatically declining cost of food resulting from economic growth and soaring productivity in agriculture. As Moore and Simon report, “Americans devoted almost 50 percent of their incomes to putting food on the table in the early 1900s compared with 10 percent in the late 1900s.” While most of human history has involved a struggle against starvation, today in America the battle is against obesity, even more so among the poor. Moore and Simon quote Robert Rector of the Heritage Foundation, “The average consumption of protein, minerals, and vitamins is virtually the same for poor and middle income children, and in most cases is well above recommended norms for all children. Most poor children today are in fact overnourished.” That cited data comes from the U.S. Census Bureau. As a result, poor children in America today “grow up to be about 1 inch taller and 10 pounds heavier than the GIs who stormed the beaches of Normandy in World War II.” That has resulted from a U.S. agricultural sector that required 75% of all American workers in 1800, 40% in 1900, and just 2.5% today, to “grow more than enough food for the entire nation and then enough to make the United States the world’s breadbasket.” Indeed, today, “The United States feeds three times as many people with one-third as many total farmers on one-third less farmland than in 1900,” in the process producing “almost 25 percent of the world’s food.” Moreover, it is economic growth that has provided the resources enabling us to dramatically reduce pollution and improve the environment, without trashing our standard of living. Moore and Simon write that at the beginning of the last century, “Industrial cities typically were enveloped in clouds of black soot and smoke. At this stage of the industrial revolution, factories belched poisons into the air—and this was proudly regarded as a sign of prosperity and progress. Streets were smelly and garbage-filled before the era of modern sewage systems and plumbing.” Not any of these truly dramatic advances for the poor, working people and the middle class could have been achieved by redistribution from “the rich.”Only economic growth could achieve these results**.** Nor would it have been worth sacrificing any of these world shattering gains for greater economic “equality.” And Barack Obama’s leftist protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, economists have long recognized the conflict between economic equality and maximizing economic growth. Put most simply, penalizing investors, successful entrepreneurs, and job creators with higher taxes, to reward the less productive with government handouts, to make everyone more equal, is a sure fire way to get less productivity, fewer jobs, lower wages, and reduced economic growth. The above history, and the future prospects below, are why to most benefit the poor, working people, and the middle class, our nation’s overriding goal must be to maximize economic growth. Consider, if total real compensation, wages and benefits, grow at just 1% a year, after 20 years the real incomes of working people would be only 22% greater. After 40 years, a generation, real incomes would be 50% more. But with sustained real compensation growth of 2%, after just 20 years the real incomes and living standards of working people would be nearly 50% greater, and after 40 years they would be 120% greater, more than doubled. At sustained 3% growth in wages and benefits, after 20 years the living standards of working people will have almost doubled, and after 40 years they will have more than tripled. The U.S. economy sustained a real rate of economic growth of 3.3% from 1945 to 1973, and achieved the same 3.3% sustained real growth from 1982 to 2007. (Note that this 3.3% growth rate for the entire economy includes population growth. Real wages and benefits discussed above is a per worker concept). It was only during the stagflation decade of 1973 to 1982, reflecting the same Keynesian economics that President Obama is pursuing today, that real growth fell to only half long term trends. If we could revive and sustain that same 3.3% real growth for 20 years, our total economic production (GDP) would double in that time. After 30 years, our economic output would grow by 2 and two-thirds. After 40 years, our prosperity bounty would grow by 3 and two-thirds. If we are truly following growth maximizing policies, we could conceivably do even better than we have in the past. At sustained real growth of 4% per year, our economic production would more than double after 20 years. After 30 years, GDP would more than triple. After 40 years, a generation, total U.S. economic output would nearly quadruple. America would by then have leapfrogged another generation ahead of the rest of the world. **Achieving and** sustaining **such** economic growthshould be the **central focus** of national economic policy**,** for it **would solve every problem** that plagues and threatens us today. Such booming economic growth would produce surging revenues that would make balancing the budget so much more feasible. Surging GDP would reduce the national debt as a percent of GDP relatively quickly, particularly with balanced budgets not adding any further to the debt. Sustained, rapid economic growth is also the ultimate solution to poverty, as after a couple of decades or so of such growth, the poor would climb to the same living standards as the middle class of today. **W**ith sustained, robust, economic growth, maintaining the most powerful military in the world, and thereby ensuring our nation’s security and national defense, will require a smaller and smaller percentage of GDP over time. That **security itself** will promote **capital investment and economic growth** in America. The booming economy will produce new technological marvels that will make our defenses all the more advanced. **With the economy rapidly advancing, there will be more than enough funds for education**. There will also be more than enough to clean up and maintain a healthy environment.

#### Free trade solves extinction – restrictive policies magnify the risk of conflict.

Roubini 17 [Nouriel, New York University, ““America First” and Global Conflict Next”, published 2017, accessible online at <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/trump-isolationism-undermines-peace-worldwide-by-nouriel-roubini-2017-01>] // BBM

Trump, however, may pursue populist, anti-globalization, and protectionist policies that hinder trade and restrict the movement of labor and capital. And he has cast doubt on existing US security guarantees by suggesting that he will force America’s allies to pay for more of their own defense. If Trump is serious about putting “America first,” his administration will shift US geopolitical strategy toward isolationism and unilateralism, pursuing only the national interests of the homeland. When the US pursued similar policies in the 1920s and 1930s, it helped sow the seeds of World War II. Protectionism – starting with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, which affected thousands of imported goods – triggered retaliatory trade and currency wars that worsened the Great Depression. More important, American isolationism – based on a false belief that the US was safely protected by two oceans – allowed Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan to wage aggressive war and threaten the entire world. With the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the US was finally forced to take its head out of the sand. Today, too, a US turn to isolationism and the pursuit of strictly US national interests may eventually lead to a global conflict. Even without the prospect of American disengagement from Europe, the European Union and the eurozone already appear to be disintegrating, particularly in the wake of the United Kingdom’s June Brexit vote and Italy’s failed referendum on constitutional reforms in December. Moreover, in 2017, extreme anti-Europe left- or right-wing populist parties could come to power in France and Italy, and possibly in other parts of Europe. Without active US engagement in Europe, an aggressively revanchist Russia will step in. Russia is already challenging the US and the EU in Ukraine, Syria, the Baltics, and the Balkans, and it may capitalize on the EU’s looming collapse by reasserting its influence in the former Soviet bloc countries, and supporting pro-Russia movements within Europe. If Europe gradually loses its US security umbrella, no one stands to benefit more than Russian President Vladimir Putin. Trump’s proposals also threaten to exacerbate the situation in the Middle East. He has said that he will make America energy independent, which entails abandoning US interests in the region and becoming more reliant on domestically produced greenhouse-gas-emitting fossil fuels. And he has maintained his position that Islam itself, rather than just radical militant Islam, is dangerous. This view, shared by Trump’s incoming National Security Adviser, General Michael Flynn, plays directly into Islamist militants’ own narrative of a clash of civilizations. Meanwhile, an “America first” approach under Trump will likely worsen the longstanding Sunni-Shia proxy wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran. And if the US no longer guarantees its Sunni allies’ security, all regional powers – including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt – might decide that they can defend themselves only by acquiring nuclear weapons, and even more deadly conflict will ensue. In Asia, US economic and military primacy has provided decades of stability; but a rising China is now challenging the status quo. US President Barack Obama’s strategic “pivot” to Asia depended primarily on enacting the 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership, which Trump has promised to scrap on his first day in office. Meanwhile, China is quickly strengthening its own economic ties in Asia, the Pacific, and Latin America through its “one belt, one road” policy, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank (formerly known as the BRICS bank), and its own regional free-trade proposal to rival the TPP. If the US gives up on its Asian allies such as the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan, those countries may have no choice but to prostrate themselves before China; and other US allies, such as Japan and India, may be forced to militarize and challenge China openly. Thus, an American withdrawal from the region could very well eventually precipitate a military conflict there. As in the 1930s, when protectionist and isolationist US policies hampered global economic growth and trade and created the conditions for rising revisionist powers to start a world war, similar policy impulses could set the stage for new powers to challenge and undermine the American-led international order. An isolationist Trump administration may see the wide oceans to its east and west, and think that increasingly ambitious powers such as Russia, China, and Iran pose no direct threat to the homeland. But the US is still a global economic and financial power in a deeply interconnected world. If left unchecked, these countries will eventually be able to threaten core US economic and security interests – at home and abroad – especially if they expand their nuclear and cyberwarfare capacities. The historical record is clear: protectionism, isolationism, and “America first” policies are a recipe for economic and military disaster**.**

## Infrastructure PTX

### 1NC - Heg Scenario

#### Enthusiastic bipartisanship on infrastructure now – that’s key to kickstarting economic growth

Skoutelas 4/23 Paul P. Skoutelas is president and CEO of the American Public Transportation Association., HoustonChronicle, 4-23-2019, ["Infrastructure: A thing Republicans and Democrats can agree on [Opinion]", https://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/outlook/article/Infrastructure-A-thing-Republicans-and-Democrats-13789980.php] bcr 4-25-2019

Bipartisan collaboration between the new Congress and the Trump administration seems a daunting challenge. But one issue could bring Democrats and Republicans together: infrastructure. A bipartisan bill that invests in our nation’s infrastructure, especially its public transit systems, would have wide-ranging benefits for workers, businesses and the economy. For U.S. commuters and communities, underfunded roads, bridges and public transit systems aren’t a matter of political opinion — they’re a fact of life. In its latest Infrastructure Report Card, the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) graded the nation’s bridges a meager C+. In fact, for every 27 miles of U.S. highway, there is one structurally deficient bridge. Americans cross faulty interstate bridges 60 million times a day. Our roads are in even worse shape, earning a D from the civil engineers. One in every five miles of U.S. highway is crumbling. These poorly maintained roads are one reason why Americans spend 6.9 billion **hours** a year **sitting in traffic at a cost of** $160 billion in wasted time and fuel. But **the most urgent** transportation **crisis involves** our **public transit** systems. Years of underinvestment have resulted in an inadequate public transit infrastructure that garnered a D-, the lowest grade received in any category. **Thirty-seven percent of** public transportation **stations need to be modernized**. The same is true of 35 percent of track and fixed guideways. Add it all up, and America faces a public transit maintenance backlog of more than $90 billion, according to the U.S. Department of Transportation. That’s just for modernization. It doesn’t include investment in the new public transportation services and facilities that our growing country needs. And because of these underfunded public transit systems, chronic commuting **delays** have **made workers less productive, suppressing** economic **growth** in the process. Indeed, **the** public transit **maintenance backlog is expected to cost** the country $**180 billion in lost** gross national product **through 2023**. . Fortunately, Congress and the administration have both expressed interest in addressing our nation’s infrastructure. In March 2017, President Donald J. Trump called for a $1 trillion infrastructure package. He has since increased that figure to $1.7 trillion. The American Public Transportation Association has identified at least $232 billion in projects that could be addressed through a new infrastructure bill. Democrats are just as enthusiastic. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer have called infrastructure a top priority for the new Congress. And new House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman Rep. Peter DeFazio, D-Ore., is pushing for “real money, real investment” to address infrastructure issues by July. **Republicans** in Congress **are also on board.** Rep. Sam **Graves**, R-Mo., **ranking member of** the House **Transportation** and Infrastructure Committee, **said** last November that **he’s willing to find a** bipartisan **solution** to America’s infrastructure woes. Investing in America’s crumbling infrastructure is one of the few areas where the administration and Congress can find common ground. It will take bipartisanship to deliver better roads, bridges, and public transit systems. To achieve the long-overdue infrastructure improvements America needs, Congressional lawmakers and the administration will need to do some traveling of their own—across the aisle.

#### Revising military spending fractures democrats, crushes GOP bipart, and incurs Trump’s wrath – makes smaller spending wins impossible.

Blanc 18 Jarrett Blanc, is a senior fellow in the Geoeconomics and Strategy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 11/30/2018, ["Congressional-Executive Relations After the Midterms", https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/11/29/congressional-executive-relations-after-midterms-pub-77833] bcr 12-5-2018

THE POWER OF THE PURSE One of the Congress’ core functions in the U.S. Constitution is to appropriate funds for the functions of the Federal Government. This is the area, though, where the change in House majority may give the Democrats the fewest realistic opportunities. Because of the fractious nature of the Republican caucus in recent years, the Republican leadership has never been confident in their ability to pass spending bills without substantial Democratic support. Too many “Tea Party” or “Freedom Caucus” Republican members have been unwilling to accept compromise outcomes pulling them off their ideological starting points on issues like defense spending, funding for Obamacare and other entitlement programs, and appropriations related to immigration and enforcement, including President Trump’s promised wall on the U.S.-Mexico border. As a result, Democrats have been relatively successful in protecting core appropriations interests from the minority. It is likely the President who sees the most improved tactical opportunities with the flip of the House. For the first two budget cycles of his Presidency, he has been unable to deliver on campaign promises including funding the wall and defunding Obamacare despite Republican majorities in both houses of Congress. He has often been happy to disparage members and even other leaders of his own party and even triggered a very brief and partial government shutdown in 2018, but the stark fact of Republican majorities has limited his ability to pass blame for unfulfilled promises. With Democrats now in control of the House, he may see advantages in taking hard line positions and risking more severe shutdowns, banking on conventional wisdom that the legislative party fares worse in the politics of failed budget negotiations. President Trump may also have openings to highlight divisions within the Democratic majority on national security issues. While some Democrats look for cuts to defense budgets, others will not want to be seen as weak on defense or unsupportive of the military. In a different vein, while there has historically been broad bipartisan support for recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, Democrats have been critical of the reckless way Trump did it. Trump may be able to use proposals for funding Embassy construction to claim a bipartisan mantle for the move. Democrats will likely look to do three things to address the conundrum of having new apparent responsibility with little new real power on budgetary issues. First, they will focus on their most important priorities. Most of these will be domestic, related to protecting entitlement spending. The priorities most closely related to foreign affairs will involve immigration, and especially limiting funds available for President Trump to pursue policies the Democrats see as anathema to American values, such as family separations at the border and the border wall. Second, they will play defense against Republican charges of extremism and intransigence, carefully building a public case that their desired budget outcomes better reflect public desires than Trump’s unpopular priorities, like defunding Obamacare. At the same time, they will want to document their willingness to compromise on less existential issues in order to deflect blame for failed budget bills, government shutdowns, and other dramas voters tend to find distasteful. Finally, they will look for chances to use their control of the budget drafting process to score smaller wins. For example, the budget passed in September 2018 includes $65 million for a new low-yield nuclear weapons system despised by most progressive experts. Democrats may try to defund this kind of program in a broader campaign to highlight public concerns about President Trump’s trustworthiness in managing his nuclear weapons authorities. Similarly, the House is likely to try to use budgetary and oversight powers to press the Administration to spend appropriations the Administration does not want, like fully staffing the State Department and providing traditional levels of support for international organizations.

#### Infrastructure update is key to competitiveness

Collins 18 Michael Collins, IndustryWeek 10-29-2018 ["As Infrastructure Crumbles, So Does US Manufacturing available online at: https://www.industryweek.com/economy/infrastructure-crumbles-so-does-us-manufacturing accessed - 11-8-2018]cdm

America is essentially in an infrastructure collapse that is having dire effects on manufacturing. Crumbling water systems that are unreliable can shut down production lines. Congested highways mean late deliveries, production loss, increased fuel and wage costs and excessive wear on assets. Port congestion, lock delays and the penalty associated with not having infrastructure in place to handle larger ships make American products more expensive. Before I address the benefits of an infrastructure upgrade, let’s take a look at the state of our aging infrastructure: Water and Sewer Beneath most major cities, our current water and sewer distribution systems are from 50 to 150 years old—mostly beyond their design life and in need of replacement. The old systems are leaking an estimated 20 to 25% of our public water every year. Washington D.C. alone sees an average of 400 to 500 water main breaks per year, and an estimated 240,000 water main breaks occur every year in the U.S. The EPA estimates that upgrading the public water system will require $335 billion over 20 years, and upgrading the sewer systems will require $298 billion over 20 years. Bridges According to the Society of Civil Engineers, more than 9% of U.S. bridges are structurally deficient. There have been 600 bridge failures in the U.S. since 1989, several of them deadly. The federal government estimates the cost of a backlog of planned bridge rehabilitation projects at $123 billion per year. Highways The U.S. Department of Transportation says that over two thirds of our roads are in “dire need of repair and upgrades.” Traffic jams and congestion cost commuters 4.2 billion hours and about 2.8 million gallons of gasoline per year. In the past, we relied mostly on the Highway Trust Fund—which supplies 80% of highway funds—but the highway fund is running out of money. The gas tax has not been increased since 1973 and since 2008, the trust fund has spent $103 billion more than it has collected. Spending in 2018 alone is expected to exceed revenues by $9 billion. In addition, the 2017 American Society of Civil Engineers’ Infrastructure Report Card shows funding gaps for airports, inland waterways, dams, electricity, schools, rail, public parks, levees and hazardous waste. This adds up to a whopping $3.5 trillion in unfunded infrastructure costs. “Doing nothing on infrastructure," says the ASCE, would mean a loss of $3.9 trillion in GDP and the loss of 2.5 million jobs by 2025”. Public/Private Investment In a 2017 speech to Congress, President Trump said he wanted a $1.5 trillion investment in infrastructure rebuilding because it would create "millions of new jobs". His plan is to use federal funding for 20% of project costs. An additional $1.3 trillion would come from the states and private investors. “For too long, lawmakers have invested in infrastructure inefficiently, ignored critical needs, and allowed it to deteriorate,” Trump said. “As a result, the United States has fallen further and further behind other countries.” This public/private funding plan is still very vague and could include purchasing public assets. It would allow private investors to build, own and operate airports, bridges, tunnels, treatment plants, drinking water systems, highway rest stops, and dams. It could also increase highway tolls, and, of course, the private firms would be able to increase fees to the consumers to cover their costs. Trump has also said that any infrastructure plan must be revenue-neutral, meaning it cannot add to the federal deficit, and not require a tax increase. That raises the question: Where will the public money come from? Depending on private funds is also not especially practical. In our current economic trend toward financialization of the economy and short-term profits, the financial sector does not look favorably on investing in long-term profits. Some of these projects are very large and could take 10 to 15 years to complete. Financial investors do not like waiting years to get their money back. Plus, there is a question about project risks if something goes wrong with the project. Many private investors will want their projects underwritten by the government and have assurance that the U.S. taxpayers will bail them out, just like they bailed out the big banks in 2007. One idea being bounced around by administration is the idea of offering private investor tax credits. This has never been tried before and comes with significant risks. Wilbur Ross, secretary of commerce, and Peter Navarro, head of the national Trade Council, have recommended that the government allocate $137 million in tax credits for private investors to underwrite infrastructure projects. They estimated that these credits would spur $1 trillion in investment. But, there is considerable skepticism from free-market-oriented investors who want quicker returns and revenue streams during the project. Business and labor executives told a House transportation committee in February of 2017 that “private investment won’t provide nearly enough to address America’s infrastructure woes.” What might help get infrastructure rebuilding off the ground would be to raise the gas tax. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a business lobby, would like to see a 25-cent increase in the gas tax, which has not increased since 1993. This tax increase would generate $394 billion in new revenue. But the Koch brothers and other hard-right GOP leaders in Congress are against any tax increases. So if the Trump infrastructure plan cannot raise taxes and must be revenue-neutral, where will the money come from? So far, the Trump infrastructure rebuilding program does not have a funding solution and does not yet offer specifics or priorities in infrastructure spending. Trump wants $1.5 trillion in new spending on infrastructure, and Congress has, so far, only allocated $21 billion. This is about 1% of the president’s request. So Trump’s proposed public/private infrastructure plan has become fake news. Infrastructure Investment Is a Big Opportunity Despite the political and economic backsliding, rebuilding our infrastructure is perhaps the best economic investment we could make in the 21st Century. In no other major economic investment could we achieve the number of new jobs, increased GDP growth, and immediate safety gains. Dan DiMicco, chairman emeritus of Nucor steel and a trade advisor to President Trump during his 2016 presidential campaign, said it best a few years ago. “I know that Americans are worried about the national debt I know they worry about government waste,” DiMicco said. “But infrastructure is not waste. In the context of competing globally, the supposed costs are quickly overshadowed by the benefits. The investment is going to pay off not just 5 to 19 years from now, but 30 or 40 years from now as well.” A 2014 study by the University of Maryland for the National Association of Manufacturers concluded that an “$83 billion infrastructure investment package—the equivalent of approximately 0.6 percent of GDP—would create 1.7 million jobs in the first three years, accounting for both direct and indirect employment effects.” In the shorter term, the manufacturing sector would directly benefit from supplying the materials for the infrastructure upgrade: concrete and asphalt for highways, pipes for drinking and wastewater, new towers for electrical grids, etc. A study by the Economic Policy Institute suggests that a debt-financed $250 billion annual investment in infrastructure would boost GDP by $400 billion and overall employment by 3 million net new jobs by the end of the first year. Now that Congress has just increased the Federal deficit by passing corporate tax cuts, there will be pushback against any kind of government spending. But we need to ask ourselves, why is it that we had enough money to fund the corporate tax cut in 2018 ($1.5 trillion), the Iraq War ($2. 4 trillion), and bank bailout ($4.4 trillion), but do not have the money to invest in our own country? This is an opportunity to modernize the country for all citizens, businesses, and economic sectors. By committing to a multi-trillion-dollar program of investment, we can achieve massive multiplier affects during and after the construction phase. If we want to be a competitive economy, we cannot afford not to invest in our infrastructure.The Real National Security Threat: America’s Debt

#### Economic weakness crushes US global leadership – leads to prolif, power wars, runaway warming, ruined middle east, and unchecked poverty

O’Hanlon 12 Dr. Kenneth Lieberthal and, senior fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at Brookings. From 2009 to 2012 served as the director of the John L. Thornton China Center - was a professor at the University of Michigan from 1983 to 2009 Michael E. O’Hanlon Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence Director of Research - Foreign Policy Co-Director - Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence The Sydney Stein, Jr. Chair. Brookings Institution, 7/10/2012 [“The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt”, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon>] bcr

Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our **purported decline**. If this **perception** becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline **becomes more persuasive**, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America’s future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; **adversaries will** sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely. When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America’s breach with the Muslim world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing global poverty through development aid, moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now a much more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is really possible if that fundamental prerequisite to effective foreign policy is not reestablished.

### 1NC - Warming Scenario

#### Enthusiastic bipartisanship on infrastructure now – that’s key to kickstarting economic growth

SKOUTELAS 4/23 Paul P. Skoutelas is president and CEO of the American Public Transportation Association., HoustonChronicle, 4-23-2019, ["Infrastructure: A thing Republicans and Democrats can agree on [Opinion]", https://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/outlook/article/Infrastructure-A-thing-Republicans-and-Democrats-13789980.php] bcr 4-25-2019

Bipartisan collaboration between the new Congress and the Trump administration seems a daunting challenge. But one issue could bring Democrats and Republicans together: infrastructure. A bipartisan bill that invests in our nation’s infrastructure, especially its public transit systems, would have wide-ranging benefits for workers, businesses and the economy. For U.S. commuters and communities, underfunded roads, bridges and public transit systems aren’t a matter of political opinion — they’re a fact of life. In its latest Infrastructure Report Card, the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) graded the nation’s bridges a meager C+. In fact, for every 27 miles of U.S. highway, there is one structurally deficient bridge. Americans cross faulty interstate bridges 60 million times a day. Our roads are in even worse shape, earning a D from the civil engineers. One in every five miles of U.S. highway is crumbling. These poorly maintained roads are one reason why Americans spend 6.9 billion hours a year sitting in traffic at a cost of $160 billion in wasted time and fuel. But the most urgent transportation crisis involves our public transit systems. Years of underinvestment have resulted in an inadequate public transit infrastructure that garnered a D-, the lowest grade received in any category. Thirty-seven percent of public transportation stations need to be modernized. The same is true of 35 percent of track and fixed guideways. Add it all up, and America faces a public transit maintenance backlog of more than $90 billion, according to the U.S. Department of Transportation. That’s just for modernization. It doesn’t include investment in the new public transportation services and facilities that our growing country needs. And because of these underfunded public transit systems, chronic commuting delays have made workers less productive, suppressing economic growth in the process. Indeed, the public transit maintenance backlog is expected to cost the country $180 billion in lost gross national product through 2023. . Fortunately, Congress and the administration have both expressed interest in addressing our nation’s infrastructure. In March 2017, President Donald J. Trump called for a $1 trillion infrastructure package. He has since increased that figure to $1.7 trillion. The American Public Transportation Association has identified at least $232 billion in projects that could be addressed through a new infrastructure bill. Democrats are just as enthusiastic. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer have called infrastructure a top priority for the new Congress. And new House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman Rep. Peter DeFazio, D-Ore., is pushing for “real money, real investment” to address infrastructure issues by July. Republicans in Congress are also on board. Rep. Sam Graves, R-Mo., ranking member of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, said last November that he’s willing to find a bipartisan solution to America’s infrastructure woes. Investing in America’s crumbling infrastructure is one of the few areas where the administration and Congress can find common ground. It will take bipartisanship to deliver better roads, bridges, and public transit systems. To achieve the long-overdue infrastructure improvements America needs, Congressional lawmakers and the administration will need to do some traveling of their own—across the aisle.

#### Revising military spending fractures democrats, crushes GOP bipart, and incurs Trump’s wrath – makes smaller spending wins impossible.

BLANC 18 Jarrett Blanc, is a senior fellow in the Geoeconomics and Strategy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 11/30/2018, ["Congressional-Executive Relations After the Midterms", https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/11/29/congressional-executive-relations-after-midterms-pub-77833] bcr 12-5-2018

THE POWER OF THE PURSE One of the Congress’ core functions in the U.S. Constitution is to appropriate funds for the functions of the Federal Government. This is the area, though, where the change in House majority may give the Democrats the fewest realistic opportunities. Because of the fractious nature of the Republican caucus in recent years, the Republican leadership has never been confident in their ability to pass spending bills without substantial Democratic support. Too many “Tea Party” or “Freedom Caucus” Republican members have been unwilling to accept compromise outcomes pulling them off their ideological starting points on issues like defense spending, funding for Obamacare and other entitlement programs, and appropriations related to immigration and enforcement, including President Trump’s promised wall on the U.S.-Mexico border. As a result, Democrats have been relatively successful in protecting core appropriations interests from the minority. It is likely the President who sees the most improved tactical opportunities with the flip of the House. For the first two budget cycles of his Presidency, he has been unable to deliver on campaign promises including funding the wall and defunding Obamacare despite Republican majorities in both houses of Congress. He has often been happy to disparage members and even other leaders of his own party and even triggered a very brief and partial government shutdown in 2018, but the stark fact of Republican majorities has limited his ability to pass blame for unfulfilled promises. With Democrats now in control of the House, he may see advantages in taking hard line positions and risking more severe shutdowns, banking on conventional wisdom that the legislative party fares worse in the politics of failed budget negotiations. President Trump may also have openings to highlight divisions within the Democratic majority on national security issues. While some Democrats look for cuts to defense budgets, others will not want to be seen as weak on defense or unsupportive of the military. In a different vein, while there has historically been broad bipartisan support for recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, Democrats have been critical of the reckless way Trump did it. Trump may be able to use proposals for funding Embassy construction to claim a bipartisan mantle for the move. Democrats will likely look to do three things to address the conundrum of having new apparent responsibility with little new real power on budgetary issues. First, they will focus on their most important priorities. Most of these will be domestic, related to protecting entitlement spending. The priorities most closely related to foreign affairs will involve immigration, and especially limiting funds available for President Trump to pursue policies the Democrats see as anathema to American values, such as family separations at the border and the border wall. Second, they will play defense against Republican charges of extremism and intransigence, carefully building a public case that their desired budget outcomes better reflect public desires than Trump’s unpopular priorities, like defunding Obamacare. At the same time, they will want to document their willingness to compromise on less existential issues in order to deflect blame for failed budget bills, government shutdowns, and other dramas voters tend to find distasteful. Finally, they will look for chances to use their control of the budget drafting process to score smaller wins. For example, the budget passed in September 2018 includes $65 million for a new low-yield nuclear weapons system despised by most progressive experts. Democrats may try to defund this kind of program in a broader campaign to highlight public concerns about President Trump’s trustworthiness in managing his nuclear weapons authorities. Similarly, the House is likely to try to use budgetary and oversight powers to press the Administration to spend appropriations the Administration does not want, like fully staffing the State Department and providing traditional levels of support for international organizations.

#### Maintaining bipart is key – folds warming-resiliency efforts into the infrastructure package uncontested

YOUNG 2/6 By Colin A. Young reporter for the STATE HOUSE NEWS SERVICE, Greenfield Recorder, 2-6-2019, ["Baker urges Congress to adopt emissions targets", https://www.recorder.com/APPeter-adopt-targets-23314421] bcr 4-21-2019

Aside from the emission reduction targets, Baker also urged Congress to shift from making certain federal aid available only after a disaster and to try an approach similar to the Massachusetts Municipal Vulnerability Preparedness program, which funds projects intended to prepare for climate change, in order to “help communities address resiliency issues before the next disaster.” Baker said the idea of a bipartisan federal infrastructure bill – something that’s been discussed but not advanced for about two years – “holds tremendous promise to not only repair and modernize our deteriorating infrastructure, but also make it resilient to changes in weather.” He pitched lawmakers on considering climate change, vulnerability and new design standards when, or if, Congress takes up an infrastructure bill. “We should be thinking about infrastructure, going forward, in terms of what the consequences will be for bridges, for culverts, for dams, for all of that stuff based on what people anticipate the significant issues they’ll be dealing with will look like,” he said. Baker’s testimony came at the beginning of what some Democrats touted as the first congressional hearing on climate change in more than eight years. The portion of the hearing with Baker and Cooper was free of any real partisan squabbles, though the ranking Republican member U.S. Rep. Rob Bishop questioned the purpose of the hearing and asked if they were “for that group [of reporters] sitting over there at that table so they can write cute stories?“

#### Climate resiliency is the only chance to survive warming – It’s inevitable, only innovative adaptation solves

MILLER 9 Henry I. Miller, MS, MD, is the Robert Wesson Fellow in Scientific Philosophy and Public Policy at the Hoover Institution. His research focuses on public policy toward science and technology, encompassing a number of areas, including pharmaceutical development, genetic engineering in agriculture, models for regulatory reform, and the emergence of new viral diseases. Forbes, 12-9-2009 ["Survival Of The Fittest", http://www.forbes.com/2009/12/09/global-warming-copenhagen-flood-opinions-columnists-henry-i-miller.html] bcr 8-15-2016

From the earth’s poles to the tropics, from the oceans to the planet’s most fertile farming regions, **global warming could present daunting challenges**. If it’s real, that is. I was trained as a physician and molecular biologist, and I have no idea which models or measures of temperature trends to trust. What I do know is that even if the earth is warming, and even if it’s due to human activities, any significant lowering of emissions will be too costly, too little and too late. Reductions in the burning of fossil fuels sufficient to have even a modest impact would stifle economic growth and plunge the world into chaos. In any case, discernible effects on warming would be decades away. Actions to reduce emissions should only be undertaken if they’re likely to be cost-effective, and they should be limited to measures that have desirable secondary effects as well; an example would be a shift from fossil fuels to nuclear power. Often **it’s wiser to try to adapt to or mitigate a problem than to try to remove its causes**. Consider, for example, the solution that the U.K. adopted to prevent the flooding of London by surge tides that occur under certain meteorological conditions and because tide levels have been rising two feet per century. Rather than trying to eliminate the source of these tides, between 1974 and 1984 the U.K. constructed the Thames Barrier, an innovative monumental system of movable floodgates that prevents the flooding. Similarly, in the short term, **we should focus our efforts and resources on becoming more resilient and adaptive**. An insightful article in the journal Nature by University of Colorado Environmental Studies Professor Roger Pielke Jr. and his collaborators pointed out that “vulnerability to climate-related impacts on society is increasing for reasons that have nothing to do with greenhouse-gas emissions, such as rapid population growth along coasts and in areas with limited water supplies.” Nevertheless, the authors observe that many activists regard adaptation as being necessary only because we aren’t sufficiently aggressive in preventing greenhouse-gas emissions. And they are completely correct in saying that because “most projected impacts of anthropogenic climate change are marginal increases on already huge losses,” applying adaptation only to that narrow margin makes no sense. They cite the example of the Philippines, where policymakers are wringing their hands about a possible gradual climate-change-mediated rise in sea level from 1 to 3 millimeters per year while ignoring the primary cause of enhanced flood risk. The reason for the rise in sea level: “excessive groundwater extraction, which is lowering the land surface by several centimeters to more than a decimeter [about 4 inches] per year.” Perhaps more attention should be paid to ways to reduce groundwater extraction, such as desalination, wastewater treatment and recycling, collection of rainwater and the cultivation of crops that require less irrigation.In a similar vein, the authors observe that “non-climate factors are by far the most important drivers of increased risk to tropical disease,” although such risk “is repeatedly invoked by climate-mitigation advocates as a key reason to curb emissions.” They cite a study that found that without factoring in the effects of climate change, “the global population at risk from malaria would increase by 100% by 2080, whereas the effect of climate change would increase the risk of malaria by at most 7%.”Pielke and his colleagues criticize “the political obsession with the idea that climate risks can be reduced by cutting emissions,” because it “distracts attention” from other, more cost-effective approaches. (They might have added that the economic and humanitarian costs would be astronomical, perhaps unprecedented in history.) However, for many activists, emissions reduction has become an article of faith in the church of radical environmentalism: Al Gore dismissed adaptation as “a kind of laziness, an arrogant faith in our ability to react in time to save our skins.He couldn’t be more wrong. For example, a cheap, highly effective, timely–and adaptive–approach to malaria (and other mosquito-borne diseases) is available. The key is the elimination of the mosquito, but fundamental shortcomings in public policy have made unavailable the most potent weapon in our arsenal: DDT, an inexpensive and effective pesticide once widely deployed to kill disease-carrying insects. In 1972, on the basis of data on toxicity to fish and migrating birds (but not to humans), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency banned virtually all uses of DDT.Not only did government regulators underplay scientific evidence of the effectiveness and relative safety of DDT, they also failed to appreciate the distinction between its large-scale use in agriculture and more limited application for controlling carriers of human disease. Although DDT is a (modestly) toxic substance, there is a world of difference between applying large amounts of it in the environment–as farmers did before it was banned–and applying it carefully and sparingly to fight mosquitoes and other disease-carrying insects.Doctrinaire activism and command-and-control policymaking are inimical to resilience; they jeopardize our survival as individuals and our success as a society. There is plenty of blame to go around. Politicians tend to be short-term thinkers, their purview often limited to the next election, and many of them seem to care less about the public interest than about scoring political points. Moreover, many of them are just not very smart, and they’re particularly challenged in the realms of science and logic. If individually and collectively we are to meet **economic, environmental and public health challenges**, we need plenty of options and opportunities for innovation–and the wealth to pursue them. In society, as in biology, **survival demands adaptation**. But in large and small ways, unimaginative, shortsighted politicians and venal activists have conspired to limit our options, constrain economic growth and make real solutions elusive. Delegates in Copenhagen, take note.

### 1NC – Exec Link

#### Plan has to go through congress – otherwise it’s neg on presumption since the executive can’t unilaterally cut aid absent NMS

Adams and Lopez 18— David Adams and Jose Fernando Lopez, 10-22-2018, "Trump says he will cut foreign aid to Central America. But can he?" Univision, https://www.univision.com/univision-news/politics/trump-says-he-will-cut-foreign-aid-to-central-america-but-can-he

President Donald Trump said on Monday the US will "begin cutting off" foreign aid to Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador after he accused them of allowing people to leave the region and come "illegally" to the US in the migrant caravan. Lea este artículo en español However, cutting US aid may not be as easy as Trump thinks, according to experts, as Congress controls the U.S. purse strings, not the White House. Trump cut U.S. aid to the Northern Triangle countries of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador by 30% in in his foreign aid budget requests for 2017 and 2018, but Congress reinstated most of the money, said Adam Isacson, who monitors U.S. aid to Latin America for the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), a Washington DC policy watchdog. In 2017, Guatemala received over $177 million in U.S. aid. The same year, Honduras received $181 million and El Salvador $149 million, according to WOLA. The Foreign Assistance Act limits the president's power of the purse and only allows him to transfer up to 10 percent between accounts, WOLA points out. A separate law, prohibits the president from withholding money that Congress has appropriated.

### \*\*\*Bipart Now/Pelosi-Trump Uqx – Top

#### Bipart on infrastructure is still high and the exception – Pelosi maintaining Trump relationship to pass

BISCOTTI 4/21 Caroline Biscotti, Staff Reporter - Hermann Herald, 4-21-2019, ["Will Democratic Rebels Dethrone Nancy?", https://hermannherald.com/will-democratic-rebels-dethrone-nancy/32234/] bcr 4-21-2019

What, then, does the new year promise? As it becomes apparent that there is little common ground for bipartisan legislation on Capitol Hill — except perhaps on infrastructure, and that would take a long time to enact — the cable news channels will look elsewhere for the type of action that causes ratings to soar. That action will inevitably come in the clashes between Trump and his enemies and the media that sustain them. Out of the House — with Adam Schiff, Elijah Cummings, Maxine Waters and Jerrold Nadler as new chairs — will come a blizzard of subpoenas and a series of confrontations with witnesses. From special counsel Robert Mueller‘s office will almost surely come new indictments, trials and the long-anticipated report, which will go to the Justice Department, where Matthew Whitaker is acting attorney general. Then there is the presidential race of 2020, where the Democratic Party has yet another gerontocracy problem. By spring, there could be 20 Democrats who will have announced for president. And five of the most prominent mentioned — Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders, John Kerry, Joe Biden and Mike Bloomberg — are also over 70, with Elizabeth Warren turning 70 in June. While some candidates will be granted airtime because they are famous, the lesser-known will follow the single sure path to the cable studios and the weekend TV shows — the trashing of Trump. Trading barbs is not Nancy Pelosi‘s kind of fight.

### Needs to Pass Now

#### Passage now is essential – it dies by summer

Mulero 4/17 Eugene Mulero, Staff Reporter, Transport Topics 4-17-2019 ["Infrastructure Policy On Tap When Trump, Pelosi Meet Again available online at: https://www.ttnews.com/articles/infrastructure-policy-tap-when-trump-pelosi-meet-again accessed - 4-18-2019]cdm

Amid growing pressure from the transportation community, President Donald Trump and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi intend to meet again soon to discuss infrastructure policy. Their objective is to ultimately agree on the terms of a measure to arrive on the president’s desk ideally by this summer. “The president wants a bipartisan infrastructure package that rebuilds crumbling infrastructure, invests in the projects and industries of tomorrow, and promotes permitting efficiency,” White House Deputy Press Secretary Judd Deere said in a statement April 17. While neither side has shared details of their recent talks on the subject, each leader has acknowledged a need for advancing a policy update in the near-term. Trump has repeatedly emphasized the potential benefits that a long-term infrastructure package could bring to freight mobility. Pelosi has said her caucus is prepared to legislate on an infrastructure package possibly as large as $2 trillion. The comprehensive package has the capacity of garnering bipartisan support, the speaker said during an interview with CBS News’ “60 Minutes.” “Let’s figure out the places, figure out where we can find common ground,” Pelosi told the network about working with the White House for the segment that aired April 14. “There’s always been bipartisan support for [immigration] Dreamers, bipartisan support for gun safety, bipartisan support for infrastructure.” At issue, however, is how policymakers will achieve their topline goals for an infrastructure bill amid lingering funding disputes. The inability to agree on a long-term funding fix at the federal level has prompted many state officials to raise their revenues in recent years. The funding question was recently raised by Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, a Kentucky Republican. “We’ve all been talking about infrastructure, including the president, for a couple of years now,” McConnell told Fox News on April 10. “If you want to do a really significant large infrastructure bill, we need to have a lot of straight talk from everybody on both sides about how you’re going to pay for it.” Various funding options have been talked about recently. Senior Democrats in the House are not ruling out increasing the federal 24.4 cents-per-gallon diesel tax and 18.4 cents-per-gallon gas tax to back the legislation. Their Republican counterparts are suggesting closely exploring options, such as fees for miles traveled. House policymakers say they hope to consider legislation as early as May. When their legislation arrives in the Senate, Republicans there are expected to debate the policy for part of the summer. Key policymakers and most congressional observers point to August as the deadline for clearing an infrastructure bill for the president’s desk. The fall calendar will be tied up with annual funding bills, while presidential politics will dominate 2020. Aware of the time crunch, stakeholders have intensified their calls for action. American Trucking Associations launched a national media campaign highlighting the economic and personal effects stemming from traffic congestion. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce will sound the alarm loudly during Infrastructure Week in May as the group continues to pledge to support candidates who would favor raising fuel taxes. This month the National Governors Association unveiled a list of principles for infrastructure investment, such as ensuring long-term funding, investing in future projects and streamlining project delivery. Specifically, the governors noted a federal freight strategy “must provide flexibility for states to designate freight corridors within their borders, unconstrained by mileage limits, to connect to the national and international economy and to address states’ unique needs and geographic interests.” Federal fuel taxes were raised in 1993. Dwindling revenue from the taxes supports the Highway Trust Fund, an account that assists states with big-ticket projects. Analysts estimate the fund will be unable to meet its obligations in about two years.

### Will Pass

#### Infrastructure has committed bipartisan push by party leadership and stakeholders –it’s a time crunch because the stage is being set for a summer deal – after summer there’s no deal.

Eugene Mulero, Staff Reporter, Transport Topics 4-17-2019 ["Infrastructure Policy On Tap When Trump, Pelosi Meet Again available online at: https://www.ttnews.com/articles/infrastructure-policy-tap-when-trump-pelosi-meet-again accessed - 4-18-2019]cdm

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### Uniqueness Wall

#### Infrastructure is likely

#### A – Divided government doesn’t kill legislation. Empirically divided government has produced transformative bills – the highway system, civil rights legislation, social security reform, and tax reform are all examples.

#### B – Hyper partisanship can exist while leaders from both parties find common ground. Infrastructure is the issue that unites Democrats and Republicans.

Joe Lieberman, Real Clear Politics, 11-7-2018 ["An Agenda for a Divided Congress available online at: https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2018/11/07/an\_agenda\_for\_a\_divided\_congress\_138572.html accessed - 11-7-2018]cdm

As we wake up this morning, America knows it will soon have a divided government – a Republican-controlled Senate and a Democratic-controlled House of Representatives. That new reality naturally conjures up painful thoughts of two more years of fighting rather than fixing, two more years of partisan acrimony, and two more years of gridlock. But none of that has to be the case. In fact, Congress has operated well in the past when its power was divided between the two major political parties. After all, checks and balances are what the Founders desired. The reason may be that a divided Congress forces the parties to work together and share responsibility. Some of the most impactful legislation enacted by Congress in our lifetimes – the Cold War response to the Soviet threat, our federal highway system, civil rights legislation, tax reform, Social Security reform, welfare reform, the post-9/11 response to terror -- came from bipartisan leadership. In fact, one could argue that enduring legislation is unlikely without bipartisan support. So to those who argue that Congress will inevitably slide down a rut of inaction, remember that inaction/gridlock is a choice – and for Congress, it’s the worst one. Congress – regardless of who controls it – is today less popular than the flu. The reason is simple: It routinely fails to address the nation’s priorities because it consistently chooses party and ideology over problem-solving. We the people have grown numb to Congress failing to fulfill its basic responsibilities – not passing budgets, not working together on national security and intelligence matters and not discharging its responsibilities in a fair and thoughtful way. If the 116th Congress wants to succeed, it will have to prove to voters it can do the basic work entrusted to it by the Constitution, and address the intractable problems of the nation. Where is the agenda that will stimulate and animate a respected, responsible and productive Congress? Look first for areas where there is real agreement between the parties, even though they don’t acknowledge it. For example, our nation’s infrastructure is a mess – roads, bridges, rail, airports and seaports are overstressed and under-capitalized. We need an infrastructure overhaul, and both parties have good reasons to support one. The incoming Congress could also take on the issue of privacy and technology – an area where most Americans and both parties are right to demand more accountability from big technology companies. Congress could also produce sensible and bipartisan immigration reform, if the majority of members have the will. For too long, the extremes in both parties have defined the debate over immigration for their political benefit. And yet, majorities in both parties support a balanced package that could pass. The details will matter, and there will be many moments when emotions will rule the day, but this much is clear: Most Americans are tired of our broken immigration and citizenship system and would welcome reform. None of this is possible without leadership, beginning with the White House. President Trump will have to play a mediating role – tamping down the harsh rhetoric he has deployed against political opponents. Can he do it? That’s up to him. But I’ve never met a president preparing for a tough re-election who didn’t care what the public wants [ -- and if exit polls are to be believed, the independents who sided with Democratic candidates want a softening of his rhetoric at the very least]. If Americans demand a productive, bipartisan Congress, the president can help make it happen. President Trump is not the only one who has to change. For too long, leaders in both parties have grown accustomed to hyper-partisanship. It can seem from the sound of things that our nation’s political leaders are trained to achieve one goal – to hurt the other side. That’s not what they were chosen to do. There are whole armies of enablers to this culture of dislike – not just members of Congress, but their staff, single-issue partisans and the many media pundits. There’s good money to be made from Washington’s civil wars, even though it comes at the expense of the entire nation. But I am confident that the president, working with leaders at the top of each party, can build a new culture in Washington, if they want to. That culture would make room for debate and disagreement, but ultimately would lead to collaboration and coordination on important issues that matter to all Americans. We need a Congress that takes seriously, for example, its Constitutional responsibility to provide for the common defense, to hold committee hearings on judicial nominees that don’t devolve into screaming matches, and to hold discussions of new problems that afflict our nation, such as the opioid epidemic. The future of America depends on constructive action on these important problems. We can expect differences of opinion but we cannot accept partisan and mutual denigration. Americans have seen Congress function reasonably well in the past, so we know there is a better way to do the people’s business. It’s time for Congress – both parties – to do it.

### A2 Dedev

#### Growth is inevitable and good – no evidence that anyone will WANT to collapse the economy means err neg on empirics

#### No empirical examples of collapse solving – short term collapse leads to outlash of dirty fascists and sparks EVEN MORE GROWTH

Kassiola 90 (Joel, Prof of Poli-Sci @ Brooklyn College, “The death of industrial civilization,” p. 194, jam)

Moreover, as a result of disappointment, Wildean tragedy, and value erosion, the postindustrial elite (the current members of the beneficiary class within the dominant, postindustrial social paradigm and structure) might come to a realization unique in history. The elite, postindustrial consciousness may be shocked into change by increasingly conspicuous limits to growth as well as by the profoundly challenging nature of the limits-to-growth literature: the futility, insecurity, and disaster looming in our foreseeable future (unlike the predicted long-range disaster of our sun burning up in several billion years), and a future filled with the preoccupation of seeking to maintain their relative advantages and ceaselessly fend off all of the others seeking to replace them. The enjoyment of the elite’s present success seems short-lived, unstable, and increasingly inadequate relative to both the concern and effort expended in attaining such “success” in the first place, and the rising costs of maintaining their celebrated position on top.

#### Dedev fails – fascist industrialists take over – the left won’t want control

Lewis 92 (Martin, prof in the School of the Environment and the Center for International Studies at Duke U, “Green Delusions”, p.170-171, jam)

While an explosive socioeconomic crisis in the near term is hardly likely the possibility certainly cannot be dismissed. Capitalism is an inherently unstable economic system, and periodic crises of some magnitude are inevitable. An outbreak of jingoistic economic nationalism throughout the world, moreover, could quickly result in virtual economic collapse. Under such circumstances we could indeed enter an epoch of revolutionary social turmoil. Yet I believe that there are good reasons to believe that the victors in such a struggle would be radicals not of the left but rather of the right. The extreme left, for all its intellectual strength, notably lacks the kind of power necessary to emerge victorious from a real revolution. A few old street radicals may still retain their militant ethos, but today’s college professors and their graduate students, the core marxist contingent, would be ineffective. The radical right, on the other hand, would present a very real threat. Populist right-wing paramilitary groups are well armed and well trained, while establishment-minded fascists probably have links with the American military, wherein lies the greatest concentration of destructive power this planet knows. Should a crisis strike so savagely as to splinter the American center and its political institutions, we could well experience a revolutionary movement similar to that of Germany in the 1930.

### A2 Yemen Coalition No Link

#### 1 – Timeframe issue – our evidence assumes a post anti-Saudi push. It was contentious which proves more drastic action now would reproduce partnership.

#### 2 – Scope – total withdrawal is way more likely to invoke defensive fundamentals – it makes Republican’s reconsider and go back to their values – the Yemen war was an issue of withdrawing from the war, not completely from Saudi

#### 3 – It’s a war powers question, not an NDAA question – funding matters more than localized concerns about Trumps powers in response to the Yemen conflict

### A2 Wont Agree

#### Infrastructure bipartisan cooperation likely and it ensures economic growth – it’s the only place Pelosi, McConnell and Trump can agree

Chris Mills Rodrigo, The Hill 11-7-2018 ["Pelosi touts bipartisan potential of infrastructure available online at: https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/415561-nancy-pelosi-touts-bipartisan-potential-of-infrastructure accessed - 11-8-2018]cdm

House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), who appears poised to become Speaker once again, on Wednesday touted the bipartisan potential of infrastructure development while speaking at a press conference. Pelosi mentioned speaking with President Trump on Tuesday night after it became clear that the Democrats were going to take back the House. “Last night I had a conversation with President Trump about how we could work together, one of the issues that came up was ... building infrastructure for America, and I hope that we can achieve that," Pelosi said. “He talked about it during his campaign and really didn’t come through with it in his first two years in office. But that issue has not been a partisan issue in the Congress of the United States.” Pelosi highlighted the potential jobs that could be created in "surface transportation, water systems ... broadband ... schools, housing and the rest.” “Those initiatives will create good paying jobs and will also generate other economic growth in their regions. Hopefully, we can work in a bipartisan way,” she noted. Pelosi previously served as Speaker the last time the Democrats had the majority, from 2007-2011. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) earlier on Wednesday said he and Pelosi spoke and identified infrastructure as an issue where they may be able to find common ground, but he predicted that areas of legislative cooperation would be limited. “The one issue that Leader Pelosi and I discussed this morning, where there could be a possible bipartisan agreement, is something on infrastructure,” he said. Trump, speaking to reporters at the White House later Wednesday, also identified infrastructure as a possible subject of future bipartisan negotiations. “We have a lot of things in common on infrastructure,” the president said.\

### A2 Won’t Occur

#### DeFazio will push infrastructure hard – expects a bill in the first 6 months of 2019 – even has a funding measure.

Tom Ichniowski, Engineering News-Record, 11-7 2018 [“DeFazio Aims for $500B-Plus Infrastructure Plan in 2019” available online at: <https://www.enr.com/articles/45824-defazio-starts-planning-infrastructure-funding-plan>, accessed 11-8-2018]cdm

Rep. Peter DeFazio (D-Ore.), who is expected to chair the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee when Democrats assume the House majority next year, has a goal: producing a major infrastructure bill providing $500 billion for highways and transit, plus additional funding for airports and water projects. Democrats’ gains in the Nov. 6 elections have quickly revived talk about infrastructure legislation. President Trump and Senate Democrats both floated big infrastructure investment plans early this year but Congress didn't act on them. But House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), who is seeking to be the next House Speaker, has said she wants to pursue a significant infrastructure measure in the new Congress. President Trump has said infrastructure might be one area that both political parties can agree on. As the head of the “T&I” committee, which has jurisdiction a wide range of types of infrastructure, DeFazio is likely to be a key player in such legislation. “Infrastructure has been delayed too long,” said DeFazio, a 31-year T&I member. “We’ve got to get it done. We’ve got to maintain it. We’ve got to modernize it and we’ve got to move people and goods more efficiently.” DeFazio wants to get an infrastructure package through the House in the first six months of 2019. But the key to advancing any major infrastructure measure is finding a way to pay for it that Congress can agree to. DeFazio noted that it would be up to the Ways and Means Committee to come up with a revenue plan. But in March 2017, he did introduce a plan of his own, the “Penny for Progress” bill, which would provide $500 billion for surface transportation over 13 years. Under the proposal, the Treasury would raise the $500 billion by issuing a new type of 30-year bonds. They would be repaid by increasing the federal gasoline and diesel taxes to account for highway construction cost inflation and from lower fuel usage because of federal fuel-economy standards. The bill hasn’t moved in the current Congress. DeFazio isn’t wedded to the Penny for Progress approach. “I’m open to any and all options on how we get real funds for infrastructure,” he said. “But it has to be real money.” By "real money," he means direct federal revenue, not private-sector dollars, which were a major element of Trump's plan.

### A2 Gridlock Thumps

#### Gridlock doesn’t thump infrastructure – Democrat and Trump priorities align, it’s one thing that can get done.

Zachary Halaschak, Washington Examiner 4-14-2019 ["Trump, Pelosi agree to huddle on bipartisan infrastructure package available online at: https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/trump-pelosi-agree-to-huddle-on-bipartisan-infrastructure-package accessed - 4-17-2019]cdm

In a political climate thick with gridlock, there might be some compromise in the near future. White House deputy press secretary Judd Deere tells the Washington Examiner that President Trump and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., have agreed to meet for a discussion on a bipartisan effort to improve infrastructure across the United States. “The President and Speaker did speak last week and have agreed to meet soon to discuss working together on infrastructure,” Deere said. “The President wants a bipartisan infrastructure package that rebuilds crumbling infrastructure, invests in the projects and industries of tomorrow, and promotes permitting efficiency.” Pelosi has been vocal about her desire for an infrastructure package, saying at a recent Democratic retreat that she hopes to pass bipartisan legislation worth between $1 trillion and $2 trillion for the nation’s infrastructure. Pelosi said she thinks Trump would be receptive to a deal. “I think we can work together,” Pelosi said. “I’m optimistic. Left to his own devices, I think the president would be agreeable to these things.”

### A2 Ldrship =/= matter

#### Bipartisanship reaches down to the base of congresspeople on infrastructure

DOWNARD 4/18 Whitney Downard, The Associated Press Media Editors named reporter Whitney Downard of The Meridian Star as the Mississippi Newsperson of the Year Meridian Star, 4-18-2019, ["Michael Guest addresses learning curve in first 100 days in Congress", https://www.meridianstar.com/news/local\_news/michael-guest-addresses-learning-curve-in-first-days-in-congress/article\_6ddd0507-95b7-5ea4-9534-59aad8c2280a.html] bcr 4-21-2019

Moving forward, Guest said Congress still needed to address infrastructure improvements nationwide for roads, bridges and sewer systems. "I'd like to see us pass legislation where the federal government would partner with state and local governments," Guest said. Guest said he would vote for a model where the federal government earmarked money for states and the states could prioritize their own projects and best determine how to spend the money. However, he wouldn't support a plan with only a 20 percent federal contribution and 80 percent local match. "There's going to be many municipalities that won't be able to access that funding," Guest said, noting the small, rural towns in his district. Still, despite the partisanship that seems to split the Congress, Guest remained hopeful about the work ahead. "Within in the leadership of both parties there does seem to be that unwillingness to work together," Guest said. "But I will tell you that on a grassroots level, you've got Congressmen who are willing to work across the aisle."

### A2 Trump/Pelosi Fight

#### Pelosi and Trump’s relationship is tenuous, but it hasn’t knocked infrastructure off the table. If anything it proves the brink – because the coming months are key to fragile talks which keep cooperation alive.

Mike Lillis and Brett Samuels, The Hill 4-17-2019 ["Trump shifts gears, launches attacks on Pelosi available online at: https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/439228-trump-shifts-gears-launches-attacks-on-pelosi accessed - 4-18-2019]cdm

The potential implications of the soured Trump-Pelosi relationship are yet unclear. Democrats are expected to move quickly in the coming weeks on legislation to tackle the rising cost of prescription drugs and bolster the nation’s infrastructure — two issues where Trump is viewed as a potential ally. “We haven’t taken this to a place that he hasn’t professed to have an interest,” Pelosi said Friday during the Democrats’ annual retreat in the Washington suburbs. Pelosi said last week that she called Trump and requested a meeting to discuss infrastructure. The two are planning to meet, she told The Associated Press. Top White House economic adviser Larry Kudlow said Monday that the administration has been in touch with representatives on Capitol Hill about a possible infrastructure package. “We’re looking. We’re talking. We’ll feel out what’s available,” Kudlow said on Fox News. “We’d love to do business with the Democratic House, absolutely.”

### A2 Trump Thumps

#### Infrastructure is absolutely possible – Trump’s willing to reach across the aisle for a legislative victory

Kiran Stacey and Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Financial Review 11-8-2018["Infrastructure spending rises up US political agenda available online at: https://www.afr.com/news/politics/world/infrastructure-spending-rises-up-us-political-agenda-20181108-h17oib accessed - 11-8-2018]cdm

Infrastructure spending and drug-price reform have risen up the US political agenda, as legislators look for policy proposals that can be salvaged from Tuesday's divisive midterm elections. Speaking on Thursday (AEDT), President Donald Trump identified those two issues as potential areas for collaboration as he switched from attacking his Democratic opponents to speaking warmly — at times — of a "beautiful bipartisan type of situation". Despite the fact that the two houses of Congress will be controlled by different parties, some are hoping that the president's self-professed dealmaking skills might help avoid legislative stasis over the next two years. "The one good thing as far as legislative progress goes is that Mr Trump does not have any deep philosophical policy principles that would prevent him striking a deal if he thought it was good for him," said Mark Peterson, professor of public policy at the University of California, Los Angeles. One of the possibilities for Mr Trump would be to resurrect proposed legislation that would allow for a huge increase in public spending on infrastructure such as rail and roads. Under plans he unveiled this year, the government would spend more than $US200 billion over the next 10 years repairing parks, building roads and improving public transport. That bill died as campaign politics took over, with the administration becoming distracted by other matters and the Democrats unwilling to give the president a victory so close to the vote. Joshua Bolten, chief executive of the Business Roundtable, said: "Divided government sometimes creates opportunities that were not as substantial as during one-party government, and I think infrastructure would be at the top of the list." Agreeing funding for the plan, however, is likely to be the biggest hurdle, with fiscal hawks in the Republican party already concerned about the rapidly rising federal deficit. While Mr Trump has advocated public-private partnerships and user payments as a way to help fund his plans, experts say the government would still have to commit to tens of billions of dollars in funding to make them happen.

### A2 Immig./Pharma Thumps

#### Bipartisanship is high right now - house democrats are ready to reach across the aisle on immigration, drug pricing, and infrastructure

Lindsey Mcpherson, Senior House Reporter, Roll Call 4-11-2019 ["‘I’m not giving up on the president’: Pelosi hopes to find common ground on immigration available online at: [https://www.rollcall.com/news/congress/im-not-giving-up-on-the-president-pelosi-says-of-finding-common-ground-on-immigration accessed - 4-18-2019](https://www.rollcall.com/news/congress/im-not-giving-up-on-the-president-pelosi-says-of-finding-common-ground-on-immigration%20accessed%20-%204-18-2019)] BH

EESBURG, Va. — The morning after President Donald Trump accused Democrats of treason for not taking action to restrict border crossings, Speaker Nancy Pelosi expressed optimism that her party can work with the president on a comprehensive immigration overhaul. “It’s complicated, but it isn’t hard to do if you have good intentions,” Pelosi said.“And I’m not giving up on the president on this.” Trump wants to overhaul immigration laws as well, but he and Democrats have vastly different goals. Pelosi, at a press conference during the Democrats’2019 Issues Conference, said she hopes to find common ground with Trump on immigration as well as Infrastructure spending and prescription drug pricing. The president wants to deport illegal immigrants, further restrict access to asylum seekers and cut down categories of family-based visas available for immigrants to enter the country legally. Democrats want to continue to welcome migrants seeking refuge into the country and find a path for the roughly 11 million undocumented immigrants already in the country to stay here legally. It’s a wide gap to bridge on a topic that Trump clearly wants to use to highlight differences between him and his eventual Democratic opponent in the 2020 presidential contest. There’s little reason to believe Republicans and Democrats could work together on even the smallest of immigration matters — let alone a massive overhaul — before then. But Pelosi believes it’s possible. “I’m always optimistic,” the speaker said. “And this has to happen. It’s inevitable. Again, it’s inevitable to some, inconceivable to others. We have to shorten the distance between the inevitable and the inconceivable.” Despite expressing hope that the president will come to the table for bipartisan immigration talks, Pelosi also acknowledged that he’s used the topic for political purposes. “The president is a fearmonger. He fueled the flame of insecurity about globalization, about immigration in the campaign. … But if the economy is better for some of these people, I think that fear tactic will be diminished,” she said. Democrats’ strategy in the 2018 midterms was to largely ignore the GOP’s immigration fearmongering and to focus on economic issues like health care, infrastructure and job creation. Pelosi says that’s all part of laying the groundwork for a comprehensive immigration overhaul, which she noted is the “best thing we can do to grow the economy.” “Our view of how we go forward is if we can change people’s financial security … if we can give people confidence, end some of their insecurities about their own economic situation, I think there will be a better atmosphere among some who are opposed to immigration in the country,” she said. The speaker said that the bipartisan, bicameral fiscal 2019 spending package Congress passed and Trump signed in February contained the formula for the president to “bring order to the border.” But she contends he’s not tapped those financial resources, much of them were focused on the humanitarian challenges stemming from the growing number of asylum seekers and other migrants trying to cross the border. “He has not utilized what is in that specifically to the border,” Pelosi said. Trump recently threatened to close the border because of his frustration about the influx of migrants, but he backed off that amid broad, bipartisan opposition to the idea. ‘Of course there’s room’ The president has continued his harsh rhetoric about immigrants. Last week, as he visited the border, Trump said the system was too full to accept anyone new. “We don’t have room,” he said. Pelosi was aghast at that remark. “My God, I thought it was Mary and Joseph at Christmas,” she said. “We have no room. There is no room at the inn. What is this? Of course there’s room.” One of the largest obstacles to Democrats and Republicans finding common ground on immigration is Trump’s insistence on building out a wall along the southern border, which Democrats object to as immoral. Trump walked out of a meeting with congressional leaders during the shutdown when Pelosi told him bluntly that Democrats wouldn’t provide any funding for a wall. Pelosi says she has spoken to Trump about immigration since then, but just to say “that we have to do comprehensive immigration reform.” She did not characterize his response. What Pelosi and Trump have spoken more frequently about is working together to lower prescription drug prices and invest in the nation’s infrastructure. “Left to his own devices, I think sometimes the president would be agreeable to these things,” Pelosi said. Although the speaker noted, she “poo-pooed” his $200 billion proposed federal investment for an infrastructure package. Pelosi is looking for a minimum of five times that amount, saying an infrastructure package “has to be at least $1 trillion” of federal funding. “I’d like it to be closer to $2 trillion,” she said, but noted it’s all about how you leverage the money. “Whatever number is agreed upon, we have to stretch it to the limit.”

### A2 Cyber Thumps

#### Bipart over cybersecurity is high right now – DHS

Jack Corrigan, Nextgov 4-9-2019 ["Lawmakers Want to Fund Cyber Upgrades for State and Local Governments available online at: https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2019/04/lawmakers-want-fund-cyber-upgrades-state-and-local-governments/156196/ accessed - 4-18-2019] BH

A bipartisan bill introduced on Monday would require the Homeland Security Department to fund efforts by state and local governments to boost their cyber defenses. The Cyber Resiliency Act would create a federal grant program to support cybersecurity upgrades for governments that often lack the resources to fund their own endeavors. It would also mandate states that participate in the program work to improve recruitment and retention in their cyber workforce. “As cyberattacks increase in frequency and gravity, we must ensure that our nation—from our local governments on up—is adequately prepared to protect public safety and combat cyber threats,” said Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., who cosponsored the bill with Sen. Cory Gardner, R-Colo. “Nearly 70 percent of states have reported that they lack adequate funding to develop sufficient cybersecurity. This bill will aim to mitigate that need by providing grants to state and local jurisdictions so that they are better prepared to take on these emerging challenges.” Reps. Derek Kilmer, D-Wash., and Michael McCaul, R-Texas, introduced companion legislation in the House. A similar bill was introduced during the last Congress but never made it out of committee. Under the legislation, states would be eligible for up to two grants to create a holistic cyber resiliency plan that touches on issues like network security, continuous vulnerability checks, workforce development and critical infrastructure protection. Once the strategy is approved by the Homeland Security secretary, states could receive another two grants to put it into practice. States awarded implementation grants would be able to funnel funding to specific local and tribal governments. The legislation would also create a 15-person committee to review grants and resiliency plans, and keep tabs on how states are spending the grants. The committee would help states craft effective cyber improvement policies and submit annual reports on the program to Congress. If passed, the bill would fund the program through fiscal 2025. Lawmakers didn’t specify how much money would be allocated.

### A2 Mueller Thumps

#### No partisanship on Mueller – congressional dems are backing down.

HABERKORN 4/18 Jennifer Haberkorn, covers Congress in Washington, D.C., for the Los Angeles Times. latimes, 4-18-2019, ["Democrats investigating Trump see Mueller report as a roadmap", https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-congress-mueller-report-democrats-redactions-subpoena-20190418-story.html] bcr 4-18-2019

The idea of impeachment has largely subsided because Mueller did not find evidence that would prompt bipartisan calls to remove the president, something Pelosi said would be needed for her to pursue it. Nadler on Thursday said impeachment was merely “one possibility” of where Congress’ investigations may lead. “It’s too early to talk about that,” he said. “We will have to go follow the evidence where it leads, and I don’t know exactly where it leads.” House Intelligence Committee Chairman Adam B. Schiff (D-Burbank) said impeachment should not be the only standard.

### A2 Weed Bills Thump

#### Weed Banking is bipartisan

GANGITANO 4/19 Alex Gangitano – writer/editor, Lobby Reporter @ The Hill, TheHill, 4-19-2019, ["Dem says marijuana banking bill will get House vote this spring", https://thehill.com/homenews/house/439796-dem-says-marijuana-banking-bill-will-get-house-vote-this-spring] bcr 4-20-2019

Rep. Earl Blumenauer (D-Ore.) said Friday that the House will vote later this spring on legislation allowing banks to work with marijuana businesses in certain states. Blumenauer, who has long pushed cannabis legislation in Congress, said he has been in touch with Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) on timing for the bill, which was approved by the House Financial Services Committee in a 45-15 vote last month. “Nancy Pelosi has always been supportive of cannabis reform,” he told reporters on a call. “There’s no doubt in my mind what is coming out of the Financial Services Committee will be given the opportunity to proceed to the floor in regular order.” When asked about timing for the bill, Pelosi spokesman Drew Hammill noted the strong bipartisan vote in committee and that conversations would continue as the panel's work wraps up. The bill is expected to pass the House if it receives a vote, but it faces less-than-certain prospects in the GOP-controlled Senate. Blumenauer acknowledged on Friday that bipartisan support for the bill in the Senate is “not quite as robust as the situation in the House.” “The situation in the Senate is more fluid. I’m not quite as optimistic but I’m not pessimistic about movement in the Senate,” he said. “We find more people who are outspoken in support of it.” He noted that Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) played a key role in legislation of hemp. He also spoke about another prominent Republican in the cannabis community: former Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio). Boehner has worked as a marijuana advocate and sits on the board of the cannabis corporation Acreage Holdings, which owns legalized marijuana licenses in several states. He also is honorary chairman of the National Cannabis Roundtable, an organization to lobby for pro-marijuana policy. The promotion by Blumenauer comes a day before April 20, or 4/20, which refers to the date and time –– 4:20 p.m. –– when cannabis users consume marijuana to celebrate the cannabis culture. Blumenauer said that when he talked to Boehner about supporting cannabis after leaving Congress, the former Speaker said he had evolved on the issue. “There are other people who are evolving on the cannabis issue,” Blumenauer said.

### A2 Bipart Historic Low

#### Don’t buy abstract bipart thumpers – overall cooperation is increasing, albeit with lingering animosity

Journal-Gazette 3/26 Journal-Gazette Editorial Board, 3-26-2019, ["Across the aisle", http://www.journalgazette.net/opinion/editorials/20190326/across-the-aisle] bcr 3-28-2019

Former U.S. Sen. Richard Lugar sees subtle signs Congress may be turning away from the bitter confrontationalism that has so poorly served America in recent years. If so, two other senators from his home state deserve some credit. The Lugar Center and Georgetown University's McCourt School of Public Policy last week released their latest consensus-building report card for the 115th Congress – covering the years 2017 and 2018. As they were in the previous survey, which covered only the 2017 session, Republican Sen. Todd Young and former Democratic Sen. Joe Donnelly were rated among the top 10 senators for bipartisanship. Even through two government shutdowns and other “serious failures of governance,” Lugar said in a release, Congress showed continued improvement in cooperation as measured by the introduction of bills. “Overall Bipartisan Index scores improved for the third straight Congress after bottoming out in 2011-2012,” he wrote. “The new Index scores show that even as the rhetoric and overall atmosphere in Washington remains partisan, there is an appetite among many lawmakers for bipartisan problem solving.” Ranked fourth among the 100 senators, Donnelly was defeated by Republican Mike Braun last November. It's too soon to know whether Braun will carry on his predecessor's tradition of reaching across the aisle. It's no surprise, though, that Young was ninth in the Lugar/McCourt Senate rankings. Though he has customarily lined up with his party and President Donald Trump during his first two years in the Senate, Young on occasion takes on causes that transcend political parties and ideologies. Most notably, Young has helped lead the effort to rein in U.S. support for Saudi Arabia's brutal war in Yemen. Recently, he joined three Democratic senators to send a letter to administration officials urging more sanctions against Burmese leaders for atrocities committed against the Rohingya people. U.S. Rep. Jim Banks doesn't fare as well in the study, which measures the amount of bipartisan legislation a lawmaker writes or co-sponsors. Among 436 House members whose records during the 115th Congress were evaluated, Banks ranked 343rd. But it's to be hoped Young and now Braun will continue in the tradition of Lugar, who served as an Indiana senator for 36 years and was respected by lawmakers in both parties. “Hoosiers sent me to Washington to address the issues that matter to them,” Young said in a tweet Sunday. “The only way to do that effectively is to reach across the aisle and work to build consensus.” The senator from Bloomington is right

### \*\*\*L – Syria/Menendez Proves

#### Trump reversal on Syria aid proves the link – assistance is bipartisan, and usurping congress pisses off both parties, especially democrats

HARRIS & HUBBARD 18 Gardiner Harris covers international diplomacy for The New York Times. He previously served as a White House, South Asia, public health and pharmaceutical reporter for The Times. Mr. Harris graduated from Yale University and currently lives in Chevy Chase, Md. and Ben Hubbard is a Middle East correspondent for The New York Times. An Arabic speaker with more than a decade in the Middle East, he has covered coups, civil wars, protests, jihadist groups, rotten fish as cuisine, religion and pop culture from more than a dozen countries, including Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Yemen., Before becoming a journalist, Mr. Hubbard studied history in Chicago, Arabic in Cairo and journalism in Berkeley, and served as a Peace Corps volunteer in Togo, West Africa. New York Times, 8-17-2018, ["U.S. Will Not Spend $230 Million Allocated to Repair Devastated Syrian Cities", https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/17/us/politics/syria-stabilization-foreign-aid.html] bcr 12-5-2018

WASHINGTON — The Trump administration announced Friday that it had decided against spending $230 million earmarked to help stabilize Syria, the United States’ latest step back from a seven-year war that has been largely won by a brutal government and its Russian and Iranian backers. Administration officials said they would alert Congress that the money, which had already been approved, would not be spent to fix water systems, clear rubble or dig up unexploded mines in Syrian cities and towns that have been devastated by the war. Those repairs were seen as vital to persuading hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees to return home — people the Trump administration has largely barred from resettling in the United States. The unspent funds are part of nearly $3 billion in foreign aid — money allocated last year by Congress with broad bipartisan support — that the administration has so far refused to spend and could rescind or send back to the Treasury. In the case of the Syria money, the administration has decided to spend it on other yet-to-be-determined priorities, not return it to the Treasury, officials said. The languishing billions are a reflection of President Trump’s belief that the rest of the world needs to be weaned off its reliance on aid from the United States. The decision on the Syria money will disappoint European and Persian Gulf allies, and the dominant position of Russia and Iran in Syria will be strengthened by a reduced American commitment. Pentagon officials have quietly expressed exasperation over the decision, fearing that any failure to stabilize Syria will leave fertile ground for the Islamic State or other extremists to return. The administration said that the move did not represent any pullback on American goals in Syria, and emphasized that other countries had committed $300 million to the Syrian stabilization effort, including $100 million from Saudi Arabia. “The president has made clear that we are prepared to remain in Syria until the enduring defeat of ISIS, and we remain focused on ensuring the withdrawal of Iranian forces and their proxies,” said the State Department’s spokeswoman, Heather Nauert. The diversion of the money seemed sure to anger Democrats and some Republicans on Capitol Hill, particularly because the timing of the announcement, only weeks before the end of the fiscal year, all but ensures that Congress cannot reverse the decision. “This message of U.S. retreat and abandonment is an embarrassment,” Senator Robert Menendez of New Jersey, the senior Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said in a statement on Friday.

### L – A2 Dems Hate Mil. Spending

#### Dems are drifting right on defense spending and military – don’t buy their link indicts

BEINART 18 Peter Beinart is a contributing editor at The Atlantic and an associate professor of journalism and political science at the City University of New York., Atlantic, 2/18/2018, ["The Democrats Keep Capitulating on Defense Spending", https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/democrats-defense-spending/553670/] bcr 12-5-2018

Despite all this, many Democrats agreed to boost defense spending by more than what Bernie Sanders estimates it would cost to make every four-year public college and university in America tuition-free and by more than what Andrew Kolodny, the co-director of opioid policy research at Brandeis University, estimates it would cost to end the opioid crisis. The vote illustrates how strange a beast the contemporary Democratic Party has become. On domestic policy—immigration, criminal justice, health care—the party is moving left. On foreign and defense policy, the party barely exists. This month’s budget deal was a perfect example. Some Democrats voted for it because the agreement boosted domestic spending. Others voted against it because it didn’t take care of immigrant “dreamers.” The huge increase in military spending didn’t matter much one way or the other. No wonder Pentagon leaders are happy. The one party that might be ideologically inclined to question their spending habits has decided it doesn’t care.

### L – A2 GOP Hates Dem. FoPo

#### Dem FoPo agenda is benign – they are sticking to issue that have republican support and backing off those that don’t

PLITNICK 18 Mitchell Plitnick is a political analyst and writer. He is the former vice president of the Foundation for Middle East Peace and former director of the US Office of B’Tselem: The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories. His writing has appeared in the New Republic, San Francisco Chronicle, New York Daily News, Haaretz, Times of Israel, +972 Magazine, Jordan Times, UN Observer, Middle East Report, Global Dialogue, Die Blaetter Fuer Deutsche Und Internationale Politik, among other outlets. He also published regular columns in Tikkun, Zeek, and Souciant Magazines, as well as his own blog, Rethinking Foreign Policy, at www.mitchellplitnick.com. He has appeared in many news outlets including PBS News Hour, the O’Reilly Factor, i24 (Israel), Pacifica Radio, and CNBC Asia. Plitnick graduated with honors from UC Berkeley in Middle Eastern Studies and wrote his thesis on Israeli and Jewish historiography. He earned his Masters Degree from the University of Maryland, College Park's School of Public Policy., LobeLog, 11/9/2018, ["What Do the Midterms Mean for U.S. Mideast Policy?", https://lobelog.com/what-do-the-midterms-mean-for-u-s-mideast-policy/] bcr 12-5-2018

In foreign policy, the gains will be more meager and harder to gauge. Congress still holds considerably more power over domestic affairs than foreign, and that is even more true for the opposition party in a divided Congress. House Democrats will certainly try to press Trump to mend fences with longstanding allies in Europe and Canada, will call for stronger support for NATO, and will push for a more contentious stance toward Russia. In all of these arenas, they have a decent chance for success, especially since they could get notable Republican support on those issues. In the Middle East, the prospects of a Democratic House leading to a substantial change in course are much more dubious. In some areas, there are some real, even important, possibilities for change. In others, there are some possibilities to moderate some of Trump’s harsher policies, but no chance at all for fundamental change.

### IL – Econ Uqx

#### Economy is levelling out now – tensions remain so stability is key

SCHOLTES 4/22 Cedric Scholtes Co-Head Inflation, Rates Committee Chair, BNP Paribas Asset Management, Investors' Corner, 4/22/2019, ["US growth – slightly slower but more stable", https://investors-corner.bnpparibas-am.com/markets-strategy/insight-on-market-events/us-growth-slower-stable/] bcr 4-22-2019

Developments in the first quarter of 2019 confirm that the US economy is transitioning from a (temporary) above-trend growth phase – in which growth was super-charged by fiscal stimulus, lower corporate tax rates and deregulation – to a more sustainable growth phase as fiscal stimulus wanes. Our forecast is that US growth will slow from 2.9% in 2018 to around 2.25% in 2019. Though growth slowed to 2.2% annualised in fourth quarter 2018, and seems set to print 1.5% in first quarter 2019, we anticipate seeing signs of stabilisation and economic green shoots in the second quarter data. The moderation in US growth reflects the influence of both international and domestic factors. On the domestic side, interest rate-sensitive sectors of the economy such as housing and business investment have shown signs of softening. Mortgage rates, which peaked in November, have begun to depress both residential purchases and construction (as evidenced in existing home sales, and building permits), despite the robustness of the labour market. However, the renewed drop in mortgage rates in recent weeks should provide support, and we have recently seen a bounce in the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) index, as well as in the volume of home purchases.

### \*\*\*IL – Bill Key

#### Infrastructure update is key to competitiveness – it’s the biggest internal link.

Michael Collins, IndustryWeek 10-29-2018 ["As Infrastructure Crumbles, So Does US Manufacturing available online at: https://www.industryweek.com/economy/infrastructure-crumbles-so-does-us-manufacturing accessed - 11-8-2018]cdm

America is essentially in an infrastructure collapse that is having dire effects on manufacturing. Crumbling water systems that are unreliable can shut down production lines. Congested highways mean late deliveries, production loss, increased fuel and wage costs and excessive wear on assets. Port congestion, lock delays and the penalty associated with not having infrastructure in place to handle larger ships make American products more expensive. Before I address the benefits of an infrastructure upgrade, let’s take a look at the state of our aging infrastructure: Water and Sewer Beneath most major cities, our current water and sewer distribution systems are from 50 to 150 years old—mostly beyond their design life and in need of replacement. The old systems are leaking an estimated 20 to 25% of our public water every year. Washington D.C. alone sees an average of 400 to 500 water main breaks per year, and an estimated 240,000 water main breaks occur every year in the U.S. The EPA estimates that upgrading the public water system will require $335 billion over 20 years, and upgrading the sewer systems will require $298 billion over 20 years. Bridges According to the Society of Civil Engineers, more than 9% of U.S. bridges are structurally deficient. There have been 600 bridge failures in the U.S. since 1989, several of them deadly. The federal government estimates the cost of a backlog of planned bridge rehabilitation projects at $123 billion per year. Highways The U.S. Department of Transportation says that over two thirds of our roads are in “dire need of repair and upgrades.” Traffic jams and congestion cost commuters 4.2 billion hours and about 2.8 million gallons of gasoline per year. In the past, we relied mostly on the Highway Trust Fund—which supplies 80% of highway funds—but the highway fund is running out of money. The gas tax has not been increased since 1973 and since 2008, the trust fund has spent $103 billion more than it has collected. Spending in 2018 alone is expected to exceed revenues by $9 billion. In addition, the 2017 American Society of Civil Engineers’ Infrastructure Report Card shows funding gaps for airports, inland waterways, dams, electricity, schools, rail, public parks, levees and hazardous waste. This adds up to a whopping $3.5 trillion in unfunded infrastructure costs. “Doing nothing on infrastructure," says the ASCE, would mean a loss of $3.9 trillion in GDP and the loss of 2.5 million jobs by 2025”. Public/Private Investment In a 2017 speech to Congress, President Trump said he wanted a $1.5 trillion investment in infrastructure rebuilding because it would create "millions of new jobs". His plan is to use federal funding for 20% of project costs. An additional $1.3 trillion would come from the states and private investors. “For too long, lawmakers have invested in infrastructure inefficiently, ignored critical needs, and allowed it to deteriorate,” Trump said. “As a result, the United States has fallen further and further behind other countries.” This public/private funding plan is still very vague and could include purchasing public assets. It would allow private investors to build, own and operate airports, bridges, tunnels, treatment plants, drinking water systems, highway rest stops, and dams. It could also increase highway tolls, and, of course, the private firms would be able to increase fees to the consumers to cover their costs. Trump has also said that any infrastructure plan must be revenue-neutral, meaning it cannot add to the federal deficit, and not require a tax increase. That raises the question: Where will the public money come from? Depending on private funds is also not especially practical. In our current economic trend toward financialization of the economy and short-term profits, the financial sector does not look favorably on investing in long-term profits. Some of these projects are very large and could take 10 to 15 years to complete. Financial investors do not like waiting years to get their money back. Plus, there is a question about project risks if something goes wrong with the project. Many private investors will want their projects underwritten by the government and have assurance that the U.S. taxpayers will bail them out, just like they bailed out the big banks in 2007. One idea being bounced around by administration is the idea of offering private investor tax credits. This has never been tried before and comes with significant risks. Wilbur Ross, secretary of commerce, and Peter Navarro, head of the national Trade Council, have recommended that the government allocate $137 million in tax credits for private investors to underwrite infrastructure projects. They estimated that these credits would spur $1 trillion in investment. But, there is considerable skepticism from free-market-oriented investors who want quicker returns and revenue streams during the project. Business and labor executives told a House transportation committee in February of 2017 that “private investment won’t provide nearly enough to address America’s infrastructure woes.” What might help get infrastructure rebuilding off the ground would be to raise the gas tax. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a business lobby, would like to see a 25-cent increase in the gas tax, which has not increased since 1993. This tax increase would generate $394 billion in new revenue. But the Koch brothers and other hard-right GOP leaders in Congress are against any tax increases. So if the Trump infrastructure plan cannot raise taxes and must be revenue-neutral, where will the money come from? So far, the Trump infrastructure rebuilding program does not have a funding solution and does not yet offer specifics or priorities in infrastructure spending. Trump wants $1.5 trillion in new spending on infrastructure, and Congress has, so far, only allocated $21 billion. This is about 1% of the president’s request. So Trump’s proposed public/private infrastructure plan has become fake news. Infrastructure Investment Is a Big Opportunity Despite the political and economic backsliding, rebuilding our infrastructure is perhaps the best economic investment we could make in the 21st Century. In no other major economic investment could we achieve the number of new jobs, increased GDP growth, and immediate safety gains. Dan DiMicco, chairman emeritus of Nucor steel and a trade advisor to President Trump during his 2016 presidential campaign, said it best a few years ago. “I know that Americans are worried about the national debt I know they worry about government waste,” DiMicco said. “But infrastructure is not waste. In the context of competing globally, the supposed costs are quickly overshadowed by the benefits. The investment is going to pay off not just 5 to 19 years from now, but 30 or 40 years from now as well.” A 2014 study by the University of Maryland for the National Association of Manufacturers concluded that an “$83 billion infrastructure investment package—the equivalent of approximately 0.6 percent of GDP—would create 1.7 million jobs in the first three years, accounting for both direct and indirect employment effects.” In the shorter term, the manufacturing sector would directly benefit from supplying the materials for the infrastructure upgrade: concrete and asphalt for highways, pipes for drinking and wastewater, new towers for electrical grids, etc. A study by the Economic Policy Institute suggests that a debt-financed $250 billion annual investment in infrastructure would boost GDP by $400 billion and overall employment by 3 million net new jobs by the end of the first year. Now that Congress has just increased the Federal deficit by passing corporate tax cuts, there will be pushback against any kind of government spending. But we need to ask ourselves, why is it that we had enough money to fund the corporate tax cut in 2018 ($1.5 trillion), the Iraq War ($2. 4 trillion), and bank bailout ($4.4 trillion), but do not have the money to invest in our own country? This is an opportunity to modernize the country for all citizens, businesses, and economic sectors. By committing to a multi-trillion-dollar program of investment, we can achieve massive multiplier affects during and after the construction phase. If we want to be a competitive economy, we cannot afford not to invest in our infrastructure.The Real National Security Threat: America’s Debt

### \*\*\*IL – Econ Hege Brink/Global Collapse

#### Global power via economic strength is feasible but we can’t take a hit now – the alternative is collapse of the global commons and war

Elbridge Colby & Paul Lettow, Foreign Policy, 7/3/2014, the Robert M. Gates fellow at the Center for a New American Security; and Paul Lettow, was senior director for strategic planning on the U.S. National Security Council staff from 2007 to 2009, ["Have We Hit Peak America?", http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/03/have-we-hit-peak-america/] bcr 2-23-2018

Many foreign-policy experts seem to believe that retaining American primacy is largely a matter of will -- of how America chooses to exert its power abroad. Even President Obama, more often accused of being a prophet of decline than a booster of America's future, recently asserted that the United States "has rarely been stronger relative to the rest of the world." The question, he continued, is "not whether America will lead, but how we will lead." But will is unavailing without strength. If the United States wants the international system to continue to reflect its interests and values -- a system, for example, in which the global commons are protected, trade is broad-based and extensive, and armed conflicts among great nations are curtailed -- it needs to sustain not just resolve, but relative power. That, in turn, will require acknowledging the uncomfortable truth that global power and wealth are shifting at an unprecedented pace, with profound implications. Moreover, many of the challenges America faces are exacerbated by vulnerabilities that are largely self-created, chief among them fiscal policy. Much more quickly and comprehensively than is understood, those vulnerabilities are reducing America's freedom of action and its ability to influence others. Preserving America's international position will require it to restore its economic vitality and make policy choices now that pay dividends for decades to come. America has to prioritize and to act. Fortunately, the United States still enjoys greater freedom to determine its future than any other major power, in part because many of its problems are within its ability to address. But this process of renewal must begin with analyzing America's competitive position and understanding the gravity of the situation Americans face.

### IL - Growth Solves Hege/Modelling!

#### Steady US growth is key to global economic recovery & modelling of American liberalism – Failure comes at a steep price – chronic instability, armed conflict, and prolif.

Richard N. Haass, Project Syndicate, 4/30/2013, President of the Council on Foreign Relations ["The World Without America by Richard N. Haass", https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/repairing-the-roots-of-american-power-by-richard-n--haass?barrier=accessreg] bcr 2-23-2018

Let me posit a radical idea: The most critical threat facing the United States now and for the foreseeable future is not a risingChina, a reckless North Korea, a nuclear Iran, modern terrorism, or climate change. Although all of these constitute potential or actual threats, the biggest challenges facing the US are its burgeoning debt, crumbling infrastructure, second-rate primary and secondary schools, outdated immigration system, and slow economic growth – in short, the domestic foundations of American power. Readers in other countries may be tempted to react to this judgment with a dose of schadenfreude, finding more than a little satisfaction in America’s difficulties. Such a response should not be surprising. The US and those representing it have been guilty of hubris (the US may often be the indispensable nation, but it would be better if others pointed this out), and examples of inconsistency between America’s practices and its principles understandably provoke charges of hypocrisy. When America does not adhere to the principles that it preaches to others, it breeds resentment. But, like most temptations, the urge to gloat at America’s imperfections and struggles ought to be resisted. People around the globe should be careful what they wish for. America’s failure to deal with its internal challenges would come at a steep price. Indeed, the rest of the world’s stake in American success is nearly as large as that of the US itself. Part of the reason is economic. The US economy still accounts for about one-quarter of global output. If US growth accelerates, America’s capacity to consume other countries’ goods and services will increase, thereby boosting growth around the world. At a time when Europe is drifting and Asia is slowing, only the US (or, more broadly, North America) has the potential to drive global economic recovery. The US remains a unique source of innovation. Most of the world’s citizens communicate with mobile devices based on technology developed in Silicon Valley; likewise, the Internet was made in America. More recently, new technologies developed in the US greatly increase the ability to extract oil and natural gas from underground formations. This technology is now making its way around the globe, allowing other societies to increase their energy production and decrease both their reliance on costly imports and their carbon emissions. The US is also an invaluable source of ideas. Its world-class universities educate a significant percentage of future world leaders. More fundamentally, the US has long been a leading example of what market economies anddemocratic politics can accomplish. People and governments around the world are far more likely to become more open if the American model is perceived to be succeeding. Finally, the world faces many serious challenges, ranging from the need to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction, fight climate change, and maintain a functioning world economic order that promotes trade and investment to regulating practices incyberspace, improving global health, and preventing armed conflicts. These problems will not simply go away or sort themselves out. While Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” may ensure the success of free markets, it ispowerless in the world of geopolitics. Order requires the visible hand of leadership to formulate and realize global responses to global challenges. Don’t get me wrong: None of this is meant to suggest that the US can deal effectively with the world’s problems on its own. Unilateralism rarely works. It is not just that the US lacks the means; the very nature of contemporary global problems suggests that only collective responses stand a good chance of succeeding. But multilateralism is much easier to advocate than to design and implement. Right now there is only one candidate for this role: the US. No other country has the necessary combination of capability and outlook. This brings me back to the argument that the US must put its house in order – economically, physically, socially, and politically – if it is to have the resources needed to promote order in the world. Everyone should hope that it does: The alternative to a world led by the US is not a world led by China, Europe, Russia, Japan, India, or any other country, but rather a world that is not led at all. Such a world would almost certainly be characterized by chronic crisis and conflict. That would be bad not just for Americans, but for the vast majority of the planet’s inhabitants.

### ! – GPW

#### Economic turmoil upends the global power balance and ignites hotspots – spills up to nuclear exchanges

FREEMAN 14 Chas W. Freeman, Remarks to the 8th International Conference on East Asian Studies, 9/13/14 served in the United States Foreign Service, the State and Defense Departments in many different capacities over the course of thirty years, past president of the Middle East Policy Council, co-chair of the U.S. China Policy Foundation and a Lifetime Director of the Atlantic Council, Remarks to the 8th International Conference on East Asian Studies, 9/13/14, [“A New Set of Great Power Relationships,” <http://chasfreeman.net/a-new-set-of-great-power-relationships/>] bcr 11-13-2016

We live in a time of great strategic fluidity. Borders are shifting. Lines of control are blurring. Long-established spheres of influence are fading away. Some states are decaying and dissolving as others germinate and take root. The global economic order is precarious. New economic and geopolitical fault lines are emerging. ¶ The great powers of North and South America are barely on speaking terms. Europe is again riven by geopolitical antagonisms. Ukraine should be a prosperous, independent borderland between the European Union and Russia. It has instead become a cockpit of strategic contention. The United States and Russia have relapsed into hostility. The post-Ottoman borders of West Asia and North Africa are being erased. Neither Europeans, nor Russians, nor Americans can now protect or direct their longstanding clients in the Middle East. Brazil, China, and India are peacefully competing for the favor of Africa. But, in the Indo-Pacific, China and Japan are at daggers drawn and striving to ostracize each other. Sino-American relations seem to be following US-Russian relations into mutual exasperation and intransigence.¶ No one surveying this scene could disagree that the world would benefit from recrafting the relationships between its great powers. As President Xi Jinping has proposed, new types of relations might enable the great powers to manage their interactions to the common advantage while lowering the risk of armed conflict. This is, after all, the nuclear age. A war could end in the annihilation of all who take part in it. Short of that, unbridled animosity and contention between great powers and their allies and friends have high opportunity costs and foster the tensions inherent in military posturing, arms races, instability, and impoverishment

### ! – Prolif

#### Proliferation guarantees nuclear war

KROENIG 14 Matthew Kroenig Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair Department of Government Georgetown University & Nonresident Senior Fellow Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security The Atlantic Council, Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 38 p. 98-125, February 2014 [“The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?”, <http://www.matthewkroenig.com/The%20History%20of%20Proliferation%20Optimism_Feb2014.pdf>] bcr 11/19/2016

Nuclear War. The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there will be a catastrophic nuclear war. 23 To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the sixty-five-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the great depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting later in the decade and the Great Recession of the late Naughts.49 This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in his lifetime. Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, secondstrike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force.

### ! – Warming

**Now is the key time to reverse, adapt, and prevent extinction.**

Phil Torres, Alternet, 4/10/2016 affiliate scholar at the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies founder of the X-Risks Institute [“We’re Speeding Toward a Climate Change Catastrophe...and That Makes 2016 the Most Important Election Year in a Generation”, <https://www.alternet.org/environment/were-speeding-toward-climate-change-catastropheand-makes-2016-most-important-election>] bcr 1/18/17

But nuclear terrorism probably isn’t the most significant risk that the 45th president of the United States will have to confront. Rather, this title goes to the ongoing, slow-motion catastrophe of anthropogenic climate change — a phenomenon that threatens not just the future prosperity of the U.S., but the **survival of the entire global village**. The fact is that climate change will result in a range of catastrophic consequences, including **extreme heat waves**, the **spread of infectious disease**, **megadroughts**, coastal **flooding**, **desertification**, **food supply disruptions**, **widespread biodiversity loss** (e.g., the sixth mass extinction), **mass migrations**, **social unrest** and **political instability** — to name just a few. And multiple high-ranking U.S. officials have affirmed a causal connection between climate change and terrorism. For example, John Brennan, the current Director of the CIA, recently stated that “the impact of climate change” is one of the “deeper causes of this rising instability” in countries like Syria, Iraq, Ukraine, Yemen and Libya. Similarly, Chuck Hagel, the former secretary of defense, describes climate change as a “threat multiplier” that “has the potential to exacerbate many of the challenges we are dealing with today — from infectious disease to terrorism.” And the Department of Defense notes in a 2015 report that “Global climate change will aggravate problems such as poverty, social tensions, environmental degradation, ineffectual leadership and weak political institutions that threaten stability in a number of countries.” Consider some recent data that underline the fact that climate change is a “clear and present danger.” As of this writing, the hottest month on record was last February. It completely “obliterated” the previous “all-time global temperature record” set by — take a guess — January 2016. And January 2016 beat the previous records set by October, November and December 2015. Similarly, the hottest 16 years on record have all occurred since 2000, with only a single exception (1998). The current record-holder is 2015, followed by 2014, 2010 and 2013, but it appears that 2016 could be even hotter than 2015. This being said, climate change isn’t just a “present” danger with implications for human well-being this century. As a 2016 paper published in Nature points out, the fossil fuels that we’re burning right now could affect **future generations for up to 10,000 years**. We are, in other words, “imposing adverse changes on more humans than have ever existed.” To quote the study, co-authored by more than 20 scientists from around the world, at length: “The next few decades offer **a brief window of opportunity** to minimize **large-scale and** potentially catastrophic climate change that will extend **longer than the entire history of human civilization thus far.** Policy decisions made during this window are likely to result in changes to Earth’s climate system **measured in millennia rather than human lifespans**, with associated socioeconomic and ecological impacts that will exacerbate the risks and damages to society and ecosystems that are projected for the twenty-first century and propagate **into the future for many thousands of years.”**

### IL – Warming/Econ Uqx

#### Green transition is creating economic opportunity -

MARCACCI 4/22 Silvio Marcacci - Silvio is Communications Director at Energy Innovation, where he leads all media relations and communications efforts., Forbes, 4/22/2019, ["Renewable Energy Job Boom Creates Economic Opportunity As Coal Industry Slumps", https://www.forbes.com/sites/energyinnovation/2019/04/22/renewable-energy-job-boom-creating-economic-opportunity-as-coal-industry-slumps/] bcr 4-22-2019

Renewable energy jobs are booming across America, creating stable and high-wage employment for blue-collar workers in some of the country’s most fossil fuel-heavy states, just as the coal industry is poised for another downturn. Economics are driving both sides of this equation: Building new renewable energy is cheaper than running existing coal plants and prices get cheaper every year. By 2025, almost every existing coal plant in the United States will cost more to operate than building replacement wind and solar within 35 miles of each plant. Multiple states and utilities are setting 100% clean energy goals, creating new demand for workers to build solar panels and wind turbines. Planning for the inevitable coal-to-clean economic transition can create new economic opportunities in every corner of the country – and some forward-thinking policymakers are already heeding this lesson. Fast-growing renewable energy jobs offer higher wages The renewable energy industry has become a major U.S. employer. E2’s recent Clean Jobs America report found nearly 3.3 million Americans working in clean energy – outnumbering fossil fuel workers by 3-to-1. Nearly 335,000 people work in the solar industry and more than 111,000 work in the wind industry, compared to 211,000 working in coal mining or other fossil fuel extraction. Clean energy employment grew 3.6% in 2018, adding 110,000 net new jobs (4.2% of all jobs added nationally in 2018), and employers expect 6% job growth in 2019. E2 reports the fastest-growing jobs across 12 states were in renewable energy during 2018, and renewable energy is already the fastest-growing source of new U.S. electricity generation, leading the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics to forecast America’s two fastest-growing jobs through 2026 will be solar installer (105% growth) and wind technician (96% growth).

### IL—Bipart/Bill K2 Warming Resilience

#### The deal makes key gains on climate resiliency – fiscally sustainable and shores up infrastructure

KELLUM 18 Holly Kellum, is the White House correspondent for NTD. She also works as a Washington, D.C. reporter for The Epoch Times. Epoch Times, Pub: 12-25-2018 – Updated: 12-26-2018, ["Democrats to Focus on Green Infrastructure, Campaign Finance, Lower Health Costs, Investigations in 2019", https://www.theepochtimes.com/democrats-to-focus-on-green-infrastructure-campaign-finance-lower-health-costs-and-investigations-in-2019\_2748495.html] bcr 4-21-2019

Infrastructure

While Pelosi and Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) have stopped short of calling for a “green new deal,” as some in their party have, they both want any federal infrastructure investment to go hand-in-hand with raising wages and developing green technology. Schumer even said in a Washington Post op-ed that if Trump wants Senate Democrats to support an infrastructure bill, it will have to include policies and funding “that help transition our country to a clean-energy economy.” Democrats have proposed a $1 trillion infrastructure investment that would be financed by removing tax cuts on multinational corporations and the wealthiest Americans. According to the House leadership website, that would be spent on expanding high-speed internet and renewable energy infrastructure, and shoring up the country’s schools, rail lines, airports, roads, water infrastructure, and waterways. Schumer also has called for tax credits for clean energy production and other green investments that Americans make. Pelosi has said they plan to reinstate the Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming, which was dissolved in 2011. However, the soon-to-be chairman of the Energy and Commerce Committee, which would oversee that committee, has said it’s “not necessary.”

### \*\*\*IL/! – Municipalities Module

#### Strong attention to climate in the infrastructure is key – best bipartisan opportunity to achieve climate paris goals

O’MARA 18 Collin O’Mara is president and CEO of the National Wildlife Federation., TheHill, 11-29-2018, ["4 bipartisan ways to keep National Climate Assessment warnings from coming true", https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/418951-4-bipartisan-ways-to-keep-national-climate-assessment-warnings] bcr 4-21-2019

1. A bipartisan infrastructure package represents the best opportunity for progress. With both the White House and Democratic leadership talking about the importance of infrastructure, a well-crafted package could reduce current emissions by more than 30 percent and make communities across the nation more resilient. Through strategic investments nationwide in industrial and building efficiency; a cleaner power sector; transportation electrification and transit; and carbon sequestration, we can reduce emissions beyond our Paris commitments in a manner that supports well-paying jobs and domestic manufacturing. Such a package must also include investments in natural infrastructure, such as reforestation and improved forest management, agricultural practices, and restoration of wetlands, grasslands, and other essential wildlife habitat, which could ultimately sequester more than 20 percent of current domestic emissions.

#### US municipal action is modelled globally and uniquely key to achieving Paris climate targets – *the alternative is extinction*

MCCARTHY 17 Joe McCarthy, Staff writer, career journalist - BA @ Southern Connecticut State University Global Citizen, 10/17/2017, ["8 Ways Cities Are Fighting Climate Change and Environmental Decay", https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/8-ways-cities-fighting-climate-change/] bcr 2-18-2018

Climate change threatens to make cities all around the world uninhabitable, prompting a level of climate action unparalleled at state and national levels. As federal governments quibble over the big picture details of the Paris climate agreement — aspirational carbon reduction targets, climate adaptation funds, renewable energy investments — city leaders are making change happen on the ground. This is especially true in the US, where the Trump administration plans to withdraw from the Paris agreement and has begun reversing national efforts at climate action. “I think cities have recognized that there are no Democratic and Republican way of collecting the garbage,” Adam Freed, principal of sustainability at Bloomberg Associates, a consulting firm committed to improving quality of life in cities, told Global Citizen. “That’s a lesson that’s being replicated globally. Cities and mayors are the great pragmatists,” he added. “They’re using each other not just as a support network but to accelerate pace of action.”

### !—Adaptation Filter

#### Climate Change is Inevitable- The Question is Adaptation

Natasha Geiling, Climate Expert and Reporter for Think Progress International – An Internal Foundation Focused on the Enviorment, Think Progress, August 28, 2017, “Harvey is an unprecedented disaster made worse by poor planning”, <https://thinkprogress.org/hurricane-harvey-climate-politics-bc26ca7afa9f/>, IKK 01/28/18

Since Friday, Hurricane Harvey has dumped [more than two feet](https://thinkprogress.org/deadly-texas-flooding-is-unprecedented-feds-say-as-waters-continue-to-rise-1375d954f6b1/) of rain in Houston and parts of the Texas Gulf Coast, triggering [unprecedented flooding](https://thinkprogress.org/massive-flooding-houston-a6e94cd141a3/)and causing at least five deaths. The storm, which began as a tropical storm early last week and strengthened to a full-fledged major hurricane by the time it made landfall, has already produced a [one-in-500-year flood](https://qz.com/1063350/actually-houston-also-had-a-disastrous-once-in-500-year-flood-in-2001/) event, with the National Weather Service [calling it](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/27/us/harvey-texas-storm.html?mcubz=0) “unknown and beyond anything experienced.” But while the flooding was unprecedented, it was hardly unexpected. Climate scientists have been [warning for years](https://www.propublica.org/article/hell-and-high-water-text) that the area of the Gulf Coast where Hurricane Harvey hit would be especially vulnerable to a major storm. A combination of a warming climate and poor city planning left Houston especially susceptible to the kind of natural disaster currently unfolding — and showed that we’re not doing nearly enough when it comes to climate adaptation, or mitigation, to avoid similar disasters in the future. Hurricane Harvey is a natural disaster, but it’s also a political issue, one that lays bare the risks associated with denying the threat of climate change while building increasingly vulnerable cities. As with any extreme weather event, the question is not whether climate change caused Hurricane Harvey; the question is whether climate change helped turn what would be an otherwise natural event into the kind of unprecedented disaster now unfolding. In this case, it seems clear that climate change [strengthened Hurricane Harvey](https://thinkprogress.org/warmer-waters-fueling-hurricane-harvey-80c10a5e5c3a/) in two major ways: by intensifying the rainfall associated with the storm, and by creating larger and more dangerous storm surge along the coastline. To start, the waters in the Gulf of Mexico, over which Harvey formed, were five degrees higher than average. Warmer waters both intensify wind speeds associated with the storm, and allow the air to take up more water, which will then eventually fall as rain. Second, climate change fuels sea level rise, which in turn means higher and more dangerous [storm surge.](https://toolkit.climate.gov/topics/coastal/storm-surge) In some areas, Hurricane Harvey produced a storm surge of [six feet](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/2017/live-updates/weather/hurricane-harvey-updates-preparation-evacuations-forecast-storm-latest/six-foot-storm-surge-causes-flooding-at-port-lavaca/?utm_term=.322502970198) above normally dry land. Even in a world without climate change, storms like Hurricane Harvey would form — but climate scientists are clear that human-caused warming certainly makes storms more dangerous. “The storm is a bit more intense, bigger and longer lasting than it otherwise would be,” Kevin Trenberth, a climate researcher with the National Center for Atmospheric Research, said in an email to ThinkProgress. Response to climate change is often divided into two actions: mitigation, or taking steps to reduce the amount of climate-changing greenhouse gas emissions released into the atmosphere, and adaptation, or taking steps to adapt society to the consequences inherent in a changed climate. Harvey is an example of what happens when neither mitigation nor adaptation are implemented effectively. If anything, Houston — a low-lying city with clear vulnerability to intense precipitation events — has done the opposite. Over the last 25 years, the city has [lost almost 50 percent of its wetlands](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/harvey-why-is-houston-so-prone-to-major-flooding/) to development; wetlands traditionally serve as a kind of natural flood barrier, absorbing rainfall. Instead, Houston has become an impenetrable expanse of pavement, with [30 parking spots for every one resident.](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/arts/design/taking-parking-lots-seriously-as-public-spaces.html?mcubz=2&mtrref=undefined) [According to ProPublica](https://projects.propublica.org/houston-cypress/?utm_campaign=sprout&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter&utm_content=1503846942), the city has paved over 166,000 acres — mostly coastal prairie — in just the last decade and a half.

**!/U Warming – T/F Now**

**Now is the key time to reverse, adapt, and prevent extinction.**

Phil Torres, Alternet, 4/10/2016 affiliate scholar at the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies founder of the X-Risks Institute [“We’re Speeding Toward a Climate Change Catastrophe...and That Makes 2016 the Most Important Election Year in a Generation”, <https://www.alternet.org/environment/were-speeding-toward-climate-change-catastropheand-makes-2016-most-important-election>] bcr 1/18/17

But nuclear terrorism probably isn’t the most significant risk that the 45th president of the United States will have to confront. Rather, this title goes to the ongoing, slow-motion catastrophe of anthropogenic climate change — a phenomenon that threatens not just the future prosperity of the U.S., but the **survival of the entire global village**. The fact is that climate change will result in a range of catastrophic consequences, including **extreme heat waves**, the **spread of infectious disease**, **megadroughts**, coastal **flooding**, **desertification**, **food supply disruptions**, **widespread biodiversity loss** (e.g., the sixth mass extinction), **mass migrations**, **social unrest** and **political instability** — to name just a few. And multiple high-ranking U.S. officials have affirmed a causal connection between climate change and terrorism. For example, John Brennan, the current Director of the CIA, recently stated that “the impact of climate change” is one of the “deeper causes of this rising instability” in countries like Syria, Iraq, Ukraine, Yemen and Libya. Similarly, Chuck Hagel, the former secretary of defense, describes climate change as a “threat multiplier” that “has the potential to exacerbate many of the challenges we are dealing with today — from infectious disease to terrorism.” And the Department of Defense notes in a 2015 report that “Global climate change will aggravate problems such as poverty, social tensions, environmental degradation, ineffectual leadership and weak political institutions that threaten stability in a number of countries.” Consider some recent data that underline the fact that climate change is a “clear and present danger.” As of this writing, the hottest month on record was last February. It completely “obliterated” the previous “all-time global temperature record” set by — take a guess — January 2016. And January 2016 beat the previous records set by October, November and December 2015. Similarly, the hottest 16 years on record have all occurred since 2000, with only a single exception (1998). The current record-holder is 2015, followed by 2014, 2010 and 2013, but it appears that 2016 could be even hotter than 2015. This being said, climate change isn’t just a “present” danger with implications for human well-being this century. As a 2016 paper published in Nature points out, the fossil fuels that we’re burning right now could affect **future generations for up to 10,000 years**. We are, in other words, “imposing adverse changes on more humans than have ever existed.” To quote the study, co-authored by more than 20 scientists from around the world, at length: “The next few decades offer **a brief window of opportunity** to minimize **large-scale and** potentially catastrophic climate change that will extend **longer than the entire history of human civilization thus far.** Policy decisions made during this window are likely to result in changes to Earth’s climate system **measured in millennia rather than human lifespans**, with associated socioeconomic and ecological impacts that will exacerbate the risks and damages to society and ecosystems that are projected for the twenty-first century and propagate **into the future for many thousands of years.”**

**! Warming - Real**

**There is scientific consensus that warming is real, anthropogenic, and deadly.**

Nicholas Stern, “Why Are We Waiting?: The Logic, Urgency, and Promise of Tackling Climate Change” pp. 9-10, MIT Press, 4/17/2015, Stern studied the Mathematical Tripos and was awarded a is Bachelor of Arts degree in mathematics at Peterhouse, Cambridge, and his DPhilEcon in economics at Nuffield College, Oxford with thesis on the rate of economic development and the theory of optimum planning in 1971 supervised by James Mirrlees, [https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/why-are-we-waiting] bcr 1/18/18

The increase in concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere to date has corresponded to an average warming across the Earth's surface (combined land and ocean temperature) of around 0.8°C since the late nineteenth century (see figure 1.1 from the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration), the usual period of reference and one that will be used in this book. Similar results are reported by NASA in the US and the Met Office Hadley Centre in the UK. The 2011 Berkeley Earth Surface Temperature study further confirmed the patterns of temperature increase.6 If the world continues to emit GHGs along a "business as usual" path, concentrations of GHGs **could rise to the region of 750 ppm** CO2 by around the end of the century. At these levels of GHG concentrations, some climate models suggest a median temperature increase over the next one or two centuries of about **4°C** or more, with substantial probabilities of well above 4°C.7 The physical and human geography of the planet would likely be transformed with temperature increases of 4°C or more: deserts, coast-lines, rivers, rainfall patterns—the reasons we live where we do—would be redrawn. One way of trying to grasp what might happen with global increases in temperature is to look at past periods of changes in CO2 concentrations or temperature. In the period following the industrial revolution beginning approximately 200 years ago, the **intensifying use of fossil fuels has rapidly increased CO2 concentrations in the atmo-sphere**. Before this, CO2 concentrations were driven according to naturally occurring processes on timescales of many thousands or even millions of years. **The planet has not seen CO2 levels as high as the current 400 ppm for at least 800,000 years'** and likely not for around 3 million years. Global mean temperatures regularly exceeding 4°C above preindustrial have likely not been seen for at least 10 million years, perhaps much more." The last time CO2 levels exceeded 750 ppm, with surface temperatures well beyond 4°C above preindustrial figures, was likely about **35 million years ago** during the Eocene epoch, when the planet was entirely ice-free. Today **that would drive a sea level rise of 70 meters**. Modern Homo sapiens is probably no more than 250,000 years old and **has not experienced anything like this**. Our own civilizations, living in villages and towns, appeared after the last ice age during the Holocene period. The early Holocene, between around 12,000 and 7,000 years ago, saw rapid changes in ice sheets, sea levels, and temperature." Following this transition, over the last seven or eight millennia, temperatures have been remarkably stable, fluctuating in a range of plus or minus 1.5°C around an average.' These Holocene temperatures allowed our societies to develop: grasses were cultivated to become cereals, thus requiring sedentary populations to tend and protect crops until harvest, and allowing both surplus and storage. This provided time and opportunity to develop villages and towns and much of the skills of civilization, culture, and ways of life as we know them. **We are already on the upper edge of that range** of Holocene temperature fluctuation, in large measure as a result of changes brought about by humans. A temperature increase of 3-4°C would be well outside that range. It seems possible that we have not seen sustained temperatures around 3°C above preindustrial for around 3 million years. We appear to be embarked on a massive experiment of which the consequences **are hard to predict and the effects may be irreversible**.

**! Warming – Racism**

#### Minorities suffer disproportionately from the effects of climate change.

Dr. J. Marshall Shepard, Ebony, 2/11/2013, , African American Professor at the University of Georgia (UGA) and Director of its Atmospheric Sciences Program. He is the President of the American Meteorological Society (AMS), only the 2nd African-American to hold this office, ["Are African-Americans More Vulnerable to Climate Change?", http://www.ebony.com/news-views/are-african-americans-more-vulnerable-to-climate-change-352#axzz3Ojn2xYoM] bcr 1-18-2018

This weekend, major urban areas of the northeast United States experienced an epic blizzard. This follows months of challenging weather, which often left devastation in its wake. The past several years have many asking if we are seeing long-predicted results of climate change, partially caused by man-made (anthropogenic) greenhouse gas emissions. Superstorm Sandy devastated major urban centers in the Northeast, including New York City. The Midwest drought continues to stress food prices and barge traffic on the Mississippi River. The summer heatwave of 2012 brought temperatures in excess of 105-110 degrees Fahrenheit to an unprecedented area of the United States, including major urban centers like Chicago, St. Louis, and the I-95 urban corridor. Several recent studies and statements by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the American Meteorological Society (AMS), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) suggest that such seemingly biblical scale events are not necessarily random or attributable to weather variability alone. These groups point out that the natural weather and a backdrop of climate warming and change is now enhancing climate variability. Our climate is essentially on “steroids.” Scientists who study weather and climate generally agree that humans are now altering the climate though some popular media outlets, blogs and political forums may give a different impression. Climate change is one of the greatest environmental challenges we face today and this will not change in the years to come. In 2004, the Congressional Black Congress Foundation (CBCF) issued a report entitled, “African Americans and Climate Change: An Unequal Burden” and more recent studies continue to sound this warning to the African American community. One can only look to Hurricane Katrina and New Orleans to get a glimpse of this reality. But why is climate change affecting African Americans disproportionately? For a few reasons: Where We Live: 2012 was possibly the warmest year in the U.S. record, according to NOAA. The majority of African Americans live in urban areas. The combination of climate warming, heatwaves, and the urban heat island effect (which causes temperatures in major cities to be warmer than suburban and rural areas) renders many Blacks at risk of suffering heat-related health issues. A 2008 study by The Environmental Justice and Climate Change Initiative found heat-related deaths among Blacks occur at a 150 to 200 percent greater rate than for non-Hispanic Whites. Cities also tend to have more air pollution and smog----which leads to an array of health complications like asthma (which affects Blacks at a 36 percent higher rate of incidence than Whites) and other upper respiratory issues. Climate change is one of the greatest environmental challenges we face today and this will not change in the years to come. Social Vulnerability: A number of studies (such as this one) show that socially vulnerable groups such as the elderly, lower income, racial minorities, and women were more likely than other income groups to perceive greater risks from natural disasters but be less likely to respond to warnings about disasters; to suffer disproportionately from the physical and psychological impacts of disasters; experience injuries or higher mortality rates; and find it more difficult to recover after disasters. Water-borne disease, post-traumatic stress, loss of jobs or hours, and infrastructure damage also have lasting effects on the African-American community. Job and Energy Disparities: Market forces responding to climate change (e.g., cap and trade policies, regulation) will drive supply, demand, and price for commodities and services that adversely affect traditionally lower-earning communities. In the South, lower income African-Americans and Hispanics are employed as wage laborers either directly or indirectly in the agricultural industry, which is particularly sensitive to weather and climate variability, especially drought. Energy policy and climate are also linked. African American households are particularly vulnerable to shifts in energy or fuel prices. The CBCF study also pointed out that African-Americans, per capita, have smaller carbon emissions than White populations, even though they are more significantly affected by anthropogenic climate change. Darryl Matthews, Executive Director at the National Medical Association notes “it is clearly evident during these extreme weather events that our communities are extremely vulnerable due to the highly technological developments (power, ATMs, electronic transactions) on which we have come to depend.” Dr. Cassandra Johnson, U.S. Forest Service social scientist, further suggests that “community groups consider actions to help mitigate changing climate like creating more green space.” African-Americans are not strangers to environmental justices issues like brownfields (land with environmental problems that may leave it vacant or underused), industrial pollution, and water pollution. However, like a many people of all races, climate change is often not perceived as an immediate threat or may even be viewed as unsettled or theory. Scientists understand what is at stake; now, our community must as well.

**! Warming – Infra/Ag**

#### Systemic disruption – climate change destroys infrastructure and agricultural which results in widespread famine and chaos.

Ian Johnston, Independent, 6/26/2017, is an Environment Correspondent for the Independent, ["World’s food supplies at risk as climate change threatens international trade, experts warn", http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/world-food-supplies-climate-change-international-trade-global-warming-chatham-house-chokepoints-a7808221.html] bcr 1-18-2018

The world’s food supplies are in danger as climate change and the increasing reliance on global trade threaten to create shortages and sudden, dramatic increases in prices, according to a new report by the leading think tank Chatham House. The report’s authors warned of a “growing risk … to human security” with the potential for “systemic disruption” and so-called Black Swan events – major unexpected changes. They called for an international “emergency response mechanism” to be created to help deal with crises as they arise and an increase in emergency food stocks. Urgent action should also be taken to improve “weak and ageing” infrastructure in major crop-producing regions such as Russia, Ukraine and the US, the report added. Global warming is expected to produce more violent storms and increased flooding in some areas, which could damage roads, railways and ports. And, as the temperature and rainfall change, this could also affect crop yields. The report, called Chokepoints and Vulnerabilities in Global Food Trade, said international trade had enabled certain areas to specialise in certain types of food production, which had maximised productivity and reduced prices, but warned this food system was now “coming under increasing strain”. “While market forces have largely adjusted adequately until now, the capacity of international trade to correct for supply disruptions in a climate-changed world is less certain,” the report said. “Climate change will suppress growth in crop yields and make harvests more variable. “**It will threaten the reliability and integrity of the infrastructure on which international trade depends**. “In addition to more regular and more severe weather-induced damage to roads, railways, ports and inland waterways, climate change will have a multiplying effect on security and political hazards affecting the infrastructural backbone of international trade.” Experts highlighted 14 chokepoints around the world – such as the Panama and Suez canals, the US rail network and its inland waterways, Brazil’s roads and the Turkish Straits – that are vitally important to the continued flow of food. Just three regions, the US, Brazil and the Black Sea area, account for 53 per cent of global exports of wheat, rice, maize and soybean. The first three crops make up 60 per cent of the food we eat, while soybean is 65 per cent of animals’ protein feed. The report said the chokepoints were the “potential epicentres of systemic disruption”. “A serious interruption at one or more of these chokepoints could conceivably lead to supply shortfalls and price spikes, with systemic consequences that could reach beyond food markets,” it said. “In an increasingly unpredictable world, ensuring the resilience of populations and critical infrastructure to compound and cascading supply chain disruptions, and to ‘black swan’ events, will become increasingly vital yet ever more challenging. “Without significant investment in new approaches … food trade chokepoints will pose a material and growing risk to systemic stability and to human security, chiefly in the world’s most food-insecure and politically volatile regions.” The report found 10 per cent of global trade in cereals, soybeans and fertilisers passed through a maritime chokepoint for which there was “no viable alternative”. “Over the past 15 years, all but one of the 14 critical chokepoints has been subject to closure or to restrictions on traffic,” it added. The rapid melting of ice the Arctic is opening up new shipping routes between the northern Atlantic and Pacific but the authors said this was “unlikely to relieve pressure on existing shipping routes before the second half of the century”. One of the authors, Laura Wellesley, said the oil industry had been “mapping this sort of risk for years but it has been woefully overlooked in discussions of food security”. “Past events, including floods in Brazil and the Southern US, and the export bans on wheat from the Black Sea countries that contributed in part to the Arab Spring, give us a flavour of the sort of disruptions that can occur when chokepoints are closed,” she said. She said governments had a tendency to make decisions in their own “short-term, national interests in mind”. But these could “exacerbate the global problem, and undermine systemic resilience”. “We need a new, collaborative approach to mapping and mitigating the growing threat we all face,” Ms Wellesley said. Robin Willoughby, Oxfam head of food and climate policy and campaigns, said climate change was "the single greatest threat to our chances of winning the fight against hunger". And he added: "The global food system is woefully unprepared to cope with its savage impacts. “Small-scale farmers and poor urban consumers are on the front lines of increased weather and food price volatility. “They need major new support to adapt to the changing climate – from improved irrigation schemes, crop insurance and agricultural research and development to stronger social protection. “As the Paris Agreement failed to provide these new resources, responsible leaders in rich and poor countries alike should start to plug the gap immediately.”

**! Warming – War**

**War – Poverty traps and disparate impacts make nuclear war most likely under climate change.**

Julian Cribb, Sydney Morning Herald, 4/2/2014, Canberra science writer ["Human extinction: it is possible?", http://www.smh.com.au/comment/human-extinction-it-is-possible-20140401-zqpln] bcr 1-18-2018

However our own behaviour is liable to be a far more immediate determinant of human survival or extinction. Above two degrees – which we have already locked in – the world’s food harvest is going to become increasingly unreliable, as the **I**ntergovernmental **P**anel on **C**limate **C**hange warned this week. That means **mid-century famines** in places like **India**, **China**, the **Middle East** and **Africa**. But what scientists cannot predict is how humans living in the tropics and subtropics will respond to this form of stress. So let us turn to the strategic and military think tanks, who like to explore such scenarios, instead. The Age of Consequences study by the US Centre for Strategic and International Studies says that under a 2.6 degree rise “nations around the world **will be overwhelmed by the scale of change** and pernicious challenges, such as pandemic disease. The internal cohesion of nations will be under great stress…as a result of a dramatic rise in migration and changes in agricultural patterns and water availability. The flooding of coastal communities around the world… has the potential to challenge regional and even national identities. Armed conflict between nations over resources… is likely and **nuclear war is possible**. The social consequences range from increased religious fervour to outright chaos.” Of five degrees – which the world is on course for by 2100 if present carbon emissions continue – it simply says the consequences are "inconceivable". Eighteen nations currently have nuclear weapons technology or access to it, **raising the stakes on nuclear conflict to the highest level** since the end of the Cold War. At the same time, with more than 4 billion people living in the world’s most vulnerable regions, **scope for refugee tsunamis and pandemic disease is also large**. It is on the basis of scenarios such as these that scientists like Peter Schellnhuber – science advisor to German President Angela Merkel – and Canadian author Gwynne Dyer have warned of the potential **loss of most of the human population** in the conflicts, famines and pandemics spinning out of climate impacts. Whether that adds up to extinction or not rather depends on how many of the world’s 20,000 nukes are let off in the process. These issues all involve assumptions about human, national and religious behaviour and are thus beyond the remit of scientific bodies like the IPCC, which can only hint at what they truly think will happen. So you are not getting the full picture from them.

**! Warming – Acidification**

**Ocean acidification – CO2 emissions cause ocean acidification — unstoppable diseases and ocean deadzones.**

Jeremy B. C. Jackson, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Vo. 105, Supplement 1, 8/12/08, Professor of Oceanography ,Director of the Center for Marine Biodiversity and Conservation, Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California at San Diego, Ph.D. in geology, Yale University ["Ecological extinction and evolution in the brave new ocean", http://www.pnas.org/content/105/Supplement\_1/11458.abstract] bcr 1-18-2018

The overall status of the four major categories of ocean ecosystems and the principal drivers of their degradation are summarized in Table 3. **Coastal ecosystems are endangered to critically endangered on a global scale**. The lesser endangerment of pelagic ecosystems reflects their remoteness from all factors except fishing and climate change, although there are no real baselines for comparison to critically evaluate changes in plankton communities. **This grim assessment begs the question, What are the projected long-term consequences for the ecological condition of the ocean if we continue with business as usual?** Predicting the future is, at best, a highly uncertain enterprise. Nevertheless, I believe we have a sufficient basic understanding of the ecological processes involved to make meaningful qualitative predictions about what will happen in the oceans if humans fail to restrain their style of exploitation and consumption. Failure to stop overfishing will push increasing numbers of species to the brink of extinction—perhaps irreversibly as for Newfoundland cod—except for small, opportunistic species. **Unrestrained runoff of nutrients and toxins, coupled with rising temperatures, will increase the size and abundance of dead zones and toxic blooms that may merge all along the continents. Even farmed seafood will be increasingly toxic and unfit for human consumption** unless grown in isolation from the ocean. **Outbreaks of disease will increase. Failure to cap and reduce emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases will increase ocean temperatures and intensify acidification.** Warmer and lighter surface waters will inhibit vertical mixing of the ocean, eventually leading to hypoxia or anoxia below the thermocline as in the Black Sea. **Biogeochemical cycles will be perturbed in uncertain ways as they have been in the past** (94). **Mass extinction of multicellular life will result in profound loss of animal and plant biodiversity, and microbes will reign supreme.**

### ! Warming – Disease

**Climate change creates extinction level pathogens**

Eric Hoberg & Daniel Brooks, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 370, 2/16/2015, Eric, US National Parasite Collection, Agricultural Research Service, USDA, Beltsville Area Research Center; Daniel, H.W. Manter Laboratory of Parasitology, University of Nebraska State Museum of Natural History, University of Nebraska ["Evolutionary Biology of Emerging Disease", http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/370/1665/20130553] bcr 1-18-2018

**Humanity has tended to react to emerging diseases as they occur**, **using** our understanding of **epidemiology** in an attempt **to mitigate** the damage done. If the Stockholm Paradigm reflects a fundamentally correct explanation of the evolution of inter- specific associations, then **reactive management policies** for dealing with emerging diseases **cannot be** economically **sustainable**. This implies that an additional strategy that could be employed in conjunction with those reactive tactics is being proactive. We can use our knowledge of what has happened in the past to help us anticipate the future. It is a kind of evolutionary risk assessment. Just as we cannot stop climate change, **we cannot stop these emerging diseases**. **We believe**, **however**, **that proactive risk management** [36,62] **is** less expensive and thus more **effective**, than responding after the crisis. A broader macroevolutionary picture for general processes of expansion and invasion is emerging, which links historical and contemporary systems. Historical conservatism is pervasive, and it is evident that equivalent mechanisms have structured faunal assembly in the biosphere and that episodes of expansion and isolation have alternated over time. Fine- scale (landscape) processes as a mosaic within larger events, while important, are idiosyncratic and more strongly influ- enced by chance and founder events. Thus, in contemporary associations, under the influence of accelerating change, we cannot always predict which components of the biota will come into proximity or contact, the duration of these events or the temporal order in which faunal mixing occurs. In these instances, **the importance of adaptation may be diminished, whereas the persistence of parasites and pathogens through broad sloppy fitness space can be seen as the capacity to use rapidly changing resources without narrow restriction to any particular ecological/environmental setting. Climate** and disturbance-driven **taxon pulses coupled with oscillations in host range can be expected to influence the frequency of EID**, because **they create episodes of geographical range shifts and expansions**. **The episodes**, in turn, **increase biotic mixing and the opportunities for EF [ecological fitting] to occur**. **The current EID crisis is ‘new’ only in the sense that this is the first such event that scientists have witnessed directly**. **Previous episodes through earth history of global climate change and ecological perturbation**, broadly defined, **have been associated with environmental disruptions that led to EID** [16,17,62]. From an epidemiological standpoint, episodes of global climate change should be expected to be associated with the origins of new host – parasite associations and bursts of EID. The combination of taxon pulses and EF suggests that host and parasite species with the greatest ability to disperse should be the primary sources of EID [58,62 – 64]. **Palaeontological studies suggest that species with large geographical ranges and with high ability to disperse are most successful at surviving large-scale environmental perturbation and mass extinctions** [65]. **Thus, the species most successful at surviving global climate changes will be the primary sources of EID, so host extinction will not limit the risk of EID**. **The planet is thus an evolutionary and ecological minefield** **of EID through which millions of people, their crops and their livestock wander daily.**

## Peacekeeping

#### Peacekeeping funds counterterror, military ops, and provides training and equipment

SAM 18 [A citizen’s guide to US security and defense assistance]. <http://securityassistance.org/content/Peacekeeping%20Operations>

According to the State Department, the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account funds [support](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR413/RAND_RR413.pdf#page=104) for "multilateral peacekeeping and regional stability operations that are not funded through the UN mechanism." First authorized in 1978, PKO funds are intended to help diminish and resolve conflict, enhance the ability of states to participate in peacekeeping and stability operations, address counterterrorism threats and reform military establishments into professional military forces with respect for the rule of law in the aftermath of conflict. The funded activities range from equipment and training to service for militaries, police, civilian personnel, and international organizations. The PKO account is authorized in Section 551 of the[Foreign Assistance Act of 1961](http://www.house.gov/legcoun/Comps/Foreign%20Assistance%20Act%20Of%201961.pdf), which allows the President to furnish assistance to friendly countries and international organizations “in furtherance of national security interests.” Congress annually appropriates funding to maintain this account, and resources are administered by the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. PKO funding supports numerous initiatives, including the Global Peace Operations Initiative, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counter Terrorism.

#### Pulling US support kills African Peacekeeping regime

Williams 15 Paul D. Williams, associate professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University and nonresident senior adviser at the International Peace Institute in New York, “Four questions – and answers – about U.S. support of peacekeeping in Africa,” The Washington Post, May 15, 2015, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/15/four-questions-and-answers-about-u-s-support-of-peacekeeping-in-africa/?utm_term=.577f0e95b7a5>

The United States is the largest financial supporter of peace operations in Africa. But as I discuss in a new report for the Council on Foreign Relations, the United States makes other multidimensional contributions to peace operations on the continent. Washington exercises influence over the strategic direction of many peace operations; it runs a variety of “train and equip” programs; and some of its personnel participate directly in these missions. I draw on the findings of the report to answer four basic questions about U.S. support for peace operations in Africa: 1. How does the United States support peace operations in Africa? The United States plays a key role in shaping the strategic direction and design of peace operations on the continent. Washington’s permanent seat on the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council grants significant leverage on many issues, including shaping mission mandates and the ability to veto any proposed peace operation it does not support. Likewise, both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations have played leading roles in authorizing the expansion of peace operations in Africa. The United States also used its influence to push for institutional peacekeeping reforms at the United Nations. One major institutional reform is still ongoing: the development of operational standards for U.N. peacekeepers. The United States also supported the Senior Advisory Group process, which in 2012 called for longer troop rotations to preserve institutional memory, reductions in reimbursement to countries whose peacekeepers deploy without necessary equipment, financial premiums for countries providing critical enabling capabilities (such as engineering or aviation units), and provision of danger pay to troops in high-risk areas. 2. What financial assistance does the U.S. provide? The United States is the largest financial supporter of U.N. and African peace operations. It is responsible for 22 percent of the regular U.N. budget (which covers special political missions) and 28.4% of the U.N. peacekeeping budget. Some of these costs are recouped by U.S. businesses, which win a significant portion of contracts supporting U.N. missions. Washington also provides direct financial support to the African Union’s activities as well as contributing countries involved in peace operations. Excluding U.S. contributions to the U.N.’s regular budget, in fiscal year 2013, U.S. financial contributions to peace operations in Africa amounted to approximately $2.6 billion. Some funding comes from Pentagon initiatives including the Defense Institution Building, Building Partner Capacity, and International Education and Training programs. The Pentagon’s Section 1206 program, which trains and equips partners in counterterror and stability operations, has become particularly important, given the overlap between counterterrorism and peacekeeping activities in some countries, notably Mali and Somalia, and perhaps Nigeria.

#### Decks US and UN support for regional counterterror operations

Berthiuame 18 Berthiuame, Lee. “Canada already helping African-led counter-terror force in Mali: Sajjan.” CTV News. April 9, 2018. <https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/canada-already-helping-african-led-counter-terror-force-in-mali-sajjan-1.3878415>

The G5 Sahel, whose members include Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Niger and Mali, has been tasked with fighting jihadists and transnational crime groups across a large swath of West Africa south of the Sahara desert. The force was the brainchild of France, which has been conducting counter-terror operations in Mali and the region since 2012, and enjoys financial backing from France, the U.S., the European Union and others. But the 5,000-strong force's first operation in November was plagued by logistical problems, and it remains very much a work in progress despite political support from a variety of powers including Russia and China. It was in that context that the UN Security Council passed a resolution Dec. 8 emphasizing the G5 Sahel's role in bringing security to the region and authorizing the UN mission in Mali provide support to the African force. An agreement between the UN, EU and G5 Sahel members to provide operational and logistical support to the force through the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, or MINUSMA, was signed in February, a UN spokesperson said. Security Council members specifically authorized the provision of medical evacuations, including those related to combat and other malicious acts, as well as fuel, water and rations and engineering services to the G5 force. Such support is to be restricted to Mali, in accordance with the UN mission's own boundaries, and only when it won't negatively affect the peacekeeping mission's own operations.

#### Incoming terrorist attacks escalate – single attacks kill billions

Myhrvold 14 (Nathan P, chief executive and founder of Intellectual Ventures and a former chief technology officer at Microsoft; Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action; cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/04/Strategic\_Terrorism\_corrected\_II.pdf, 2014) / MM

Technology contains no inherent moral directive—it empowers people, whatever their intent, good or evil. This has always been true: when bronze implements supplanted those made of stone, the ancient world got scythes and awls, but also swords and battle-axes. The novelty of our present situation is that modern technology can provide small groups of people with much greater lethality than ever before. We now have to worry that private parties might gain access to weapons that are as destructive as—or possibly even more destructive than— those held by any nation-state. A handful of people, perhaps even a single individual, could have the ability to kill millions or even billions. Indeed, it is possible, from a technological standpoint, to kill every man, woman, and child on earth. The gravity of the situation is so extreme that getting the concept across without seeming silly or alarmist is challenging. Just thinking about the subject with any degree of seriousness numbs the mind. The goal of this essay is to present the case for making the needed changes before such a catastrophe occurs. The issues described here are too important to ignore. Failing nation-states—like North Korea—which possess nuclear weapons potentially pose a nuclear threat. Each new entrant to the nuclear club increases the possibility this will happen, but this problem is an old one, and one that existing diplomatic and military structures aim to manage. The newer and less understood danger arises from the increasing likelihood that stateless groups, bent on terrorism, will gain access to nuclear weapons, most likely by theft from a nation-state. Should this happen, the danger we now perceive to be coming from rogue states will pale in comparison. The ultimate response to a nuclear attack is a nuclear counterattack. Nation states have an address, and they know that we will retaliate in kind. Stateless groups are much more difficult to find which makes a nuclear counterattack virtually impossible. As a result, they can strike without fear of overwhelming retaliation, and thus they wield much more effective destructive power. Indeed, in many cases the fundamental equation of retaliation has become reversed. Terrorists often hope to provoke reprisal attacks on their own people, swaying popular opinion in their favor. The aftermath of 9/11 is a case in point. While it seems likely that Osama bin Laden and his henchmen hoped for a massive overreaction from the United States, it is unlikely his Taliban hosts anticipated the U.S. would go so far as to invade Afghanistan. Yes, al-Qaeda lost its host state and some personnel. The damage slowed the organization down but did not destroy it. Instead, the stateless al-Qaeda survived and adapted. The United States can claim some success against al-Qaeda in the years since 9/11, but it has hardly delivered a deathblow. Eventually, the world will recognize that stateless groups are more powerful than nation-states because terrorists can wield weapons and mount assaults that no nationstate would dare to attempt. So far, they have limited themselves to dramatic tactical terrorism: events such as 9/11, the butchering of Russian schoolchildren, decapitations broadcast over the internet, and bombings in major cities. Strategic objectives cannot be far behind.

#### Extinction

Myhrvold 13 Nathan MYHRVOLD, PhD in theoretical and mathematical physics from Princeton, former chief technology officer of Microsoft, 13 [July 2013, “Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action,” The Lawfare Research Paper Series No.2, <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Strategic-Terrorism-Myhrvold-7-3-2013.pdf>] / MM

Several powerful trends have aligned to profoundly change the way that the world works. Technology now allows stateless groups to organize, recruit, and fund themselves in an unprecedented fashion. That, coupled with the extreme difficulty of finding and punishing a stateless group, means that stateless groups are positioned to be lead players on the world stage. They may act on their own, or they may act as proxies for nation-states that wish to duck responsibility. Either way, stateless groups are forces to be reckoned with. At the same time, a different set of technology trends means that small numbers of people can obtain incredibly lethal power. Now, for the first time in human history, a small group can be as lethal as the largest superpower. Such a group could execute an attack that could kill millions of people. It is technically feasible for such a group to kill billions of people, to end modern civilization—perhaps even to drive the human race to extinction. Our defense establishment was shaped over decades to address what was, for a long time, the only strategic threat our nation faced: Soviet or Chinese missiles. More recently, it has started retooling to address tactical terror attacks like those launched on the morning of 9/11, but the reform process is incomplete and inconsistent. A real defense will require rebuilding our military and intelligence capabilities from the ground up. Yet, so far, strategic terrorism has received relatively little attention in defense agencies, and the efforts that have been launched to combat this existential threat seem fragmented. History suggests what will happen. The only thing that shakes America out of complacency is a direct threat from a determined adversary that confronts us with our shortcomings by repeatedly attacking us or hectoring us for decades.

## Prolif

### 1NC – Saudi Arabia

#### Saudi prolif at an all-time high – US key to preventing fill-in and nuclear capabilities

Mufson 3/28 Steven Mufson, Yale University, BA in economics and political science, 3-28-2019, "Trump administration authorized nuclear energy companies to share technological information with Saudi Arabia," Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-authorized-nuclear-energy-companies-to-share-technological-information-with-saudi-arabia/2019/03/28/1b5f0816-5180-11e9-8d28-f5149e5a2fda_story.html?noredirect=on> / MM

The Trump administration has kept secret seven authorizations it has issued since November 2017 allowing U.S. nuclear energy companies to share sensitive technological information with Saudi Arabia, even though the kingdom has not yet agreed to anti-proliferation terms required to construct a pair of U.S.-designed civilian nuclear power plants. The Energy Department and State Department have not only kept the authorizations from the public but also refused to share information about them with congressional committees that have jurisdiction over nuclear proliferation and safety. The authorizations, issued to at least six companies, cover “Part 810” information, named for a regulatory clause that allows U.S. companies to divulge some design information to compete for contracts with foreign buyers. The regulations for Part 810 technology-sharing provide a list of “generally authorized destinations.” Saudi Arabia is not on the list. Saudi Arabia has said it wants to build two nuclear power plants, and companies from Russia, China, South Korea, France and the United States have expressed interest in obtaining the contracts. If a U.S. consortium is to build a reactor in Saudi Arabia, the kingdom would have to commit to what is known as a “123 agreement.” Without that, Congress could vote to block. The kingdom so far has refused to give up its right to enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel, both of which can be used to build nuclear weapons. In a “60 Minutes” interview last year, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said that “Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.”

#### US aid stops Saudi prolif

Guzansky 13 Yoel Guzansky, Senior Researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University. Dr. Guzansky is a visiting Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, Israel Institute Postdoctoral Fellow, and a Fulbright Scholar. Before he joined INSS, Spring 2013, "Questioning Riyadh's Nuclear Rationale: Saudi Arabia's Atomic Ambitions," Middle East Forum, <https://www.meforum.org/3512/saudi-arabia-pakistan-nuclear-weapon?fbclid=IwAR1oIlNZneGMj_MJ0dQG6JyQ1AkWUINZYWbU8xjOjCGap_vF6JEmhwxbuds> / MM

According to recent reports, Washington is considering expanding its nuclear cooperation with [Saudi] ~~Riyadh~~ on the basis of a 2008 memorandum of understanding: In exchange for foregoing the operation of nuclear fuel cycles on its soil, Saudi Arabia was to receive nuclear assistance.[33] Such a move, should it come to pass, may be meant to persuade Riyadh to abandon its strategic goals, prevent other players from gaining a foothold in the attractive Saudi market, and challenge Tehran's nuclear policy. The United States is still Saudi Arabia's most effective security support, but if Washington distances itself from regional matters, the gradual entrance of new players into the Gulf is inevitable. The question of Saudi acquisition of a nuclear deterrent is more relevant than ever when both enemies and friends of the United States are looking at a possible regional drawdown on Washington's part as well as a lack of support for the pro-Western regimes that remain in place. If the U.S. government provides Riyadh with formal security guarantees, it would be natural for it to demand that the kingdom forego its strategic goals. But Riyadh's inclusion under a U.S. defense umbrella is not a given and depends both on the quality of relations between the two countries and other Saudi considerations. Riyadh remains skeptical over Washington's willingness to come to its aid and may thus seek to purchase a nuclear deterrent, which would provide it with more freedom vis-à-vis its stronger ally. Under present circumstances, it is not unreasonable for Riyadh to rely on other states for its defense in addition to Washington for the simple reason that it has done so in the past. Likewise, it is more than likely that the Saudis will not act transparently because they have acted in secret previously. After Iran, Saudi Arabia is the number one candidate for further nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Open source evidence remains circumstantial, but perhaps more than any other regional player, Riyadh has the requisite ideological and strategic motives as well as the financial wherewithal to act on the option. The kingdom may conclude that its security constraints as well as the attendant prestige and influence generated by having a bomb outweigh the political and economic costs it will pay. The difficulty in stopping Tehran's dogged quest for a nuclear capability coupled with Riyadh's doubts about the reliability of Washington is liable to encourage Riyadh to shorten timetables for developing an independent nuclear infrastructure, as well as to opt to purchase a turnkey nuclear system, an off-the-shelf product, or to enter into a security compact of one sort with another power. Sunni-majority Pakistan has emerged as the natural candidate for such an arrangement. Heavy U.S. pressure is likely to be brought to bear on the Saudis not to acquire nuclear capabilities. Indeed, it seems that, at present, the price Riyadh is likely to pay should it acquire military nuclear capabilities might outweigh the advantages of such a move. But strategic interest, motivated by considerations of survival, could have the upper hand. Should it seem that the kingdom's vital security interests are threatened, it may prefer to take a series of steps, including obtaining a nonconventional arsenal, to reduce risks and ensure the continuity of the House of Saud.

#### Only US presence in the region solves – American absence allows China and Russia to fill the void and turn the aff – THEIR EVIDENCE

Saab 18, 9/25/18 (Bilal Y. Saab is senior fellow and director of the Defense and Security Program at the Middle East Institute, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University, The coming Middle East missile arms race, <https://thebulletin.org/2018/09/the-coming-middle-east-missile-arms-race/>) KED

The main reason Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have yet to pursue ballistic missiles is that Washington has managed for years to convince them not to. The last thing the United States needs in the Middle East is an offensive missile race, which could quickly lead the antagonists into a deadly military confrontation that drags Washington and Moscow into war. Missiles are inherently destabilizing weapons because of their potential to quickly escalate conflicts. Their flight times can be very short, and new technologies are dramatically improving their accuracy and lethality. As if that were not scary enough, the nuclear future of the Middle East is also increasingly uncertain, now that the United States has withdrawn from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the deal that limited Iran’s nuclear development in exchange for sanctions relief. At the same time, at least half a dozen regional powers including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and Qatar see peaceful nuclear energy as a long-term solution to their fossil-fuel dependence. The growth of nuclear power generation in the region could exacerbate the risk of nuclear proliferation, as the same technologies and materials are required to develop both nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. Should Middle East civilian nuclear development become militarized, possession of fleets of offensive missiles—arguably the most effective delivery vehicle for nuclear warheads—could magnify the potential danger. [**THEIR CARD ENDS HERE**] Like Israel, some Gulf countries are heading toward a stronger deterrent posture—through a broader mix of offensive technologies, including missiles—because missile defense on its own does not seem to be the answer to the Iranian missile problem. Furthermore, missile defense is expensive and comes with its own set of challenges. While the best missile defense system would be one that is regionally integrated, any hope of establishing such a system in the Gulf is now gone because of the ongoing feud Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and Bahrain are having with Qatar. With US influence in the Gulf seemingly declining, it is unlikely that Washington’s preferences will register as strongly in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi as they did in the past. To be sure, the drive for autonomy in national-security decision making has its limits, given the Gulf countries’ military dependence on Wa shington, but US weapons are not the only game in town, with both Russia and China making inroads into the region lately. Saudi Arabia and the Emirates may not be able to buy offensive missiles from the United States and other countries that are members of the Missile Technology Control Regime, but they will find China and Pakistan—who are not part of the regime—to be ready sellers. Saudi Arabia would not have to start from scratch, given that since 1987 it has possessed a (likely small) number of medium-range Chinese ballistic missiles. It paraded them for the first time in 2014, possibly to put Iran on notice and send a message to Washington of displeasure with US policy. It is only a matter of time before Saudi Crown Prince and Defense Minister Mohammed Bin Salman issues an order to build up the country’s Strategic Rocket Force. America has long wished that its partners in the Middle East would step up and share the burden of regional security. But for this approach to end well, one crucial variable is required: American leadership, which currently is uncertain at best and nonexistent at worst. The Middle East is headed into an offensive missile race, and the only actor that can stop or at least manage the situation, by promoting arms control, is the United States. Unfortunately it appears that Washington said goodbye to the region a while ago.

## Russia War Good

### 1NC – Ukraine

#### War is inevitable between Russia and the US – Ukraine and other countries are the first step towards expansionism – sad!

Jenkins 18 [Philip Jenkins, (Philip Jenkins is Distinguished Professor of History at Baylor University, and Co-Director for the Program on Historical Studies of Religion in the Institute for Studies of Religion. His most recent books are Crucible of Faith: The Ancient Revolution That Made Our Modern Religious World and The Great and Holy War: How World War I Became a Religious Crusade.) "The Next Great War: Conflict Between Russia and the United States Seems Inevitable" ABC Religion & Ethics, 1-9-2018, https://www.abc.net.au/religion/the-next-great-war-conflict-between-russia-and-the-united-states/10095064, DOA:3-14-2019 // WWBW]

All of which brings us directly to the three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. From 1919 to 1940, all were independent nations, but in 1940 all were subsumed into the Soviet Union. The Nazis conquered them, but the Soviets took them back and reintegrated them into the USSR. During the process, the Baltic peoples fought a vast and prolonged anti-Communist guerrilla warthat lasted into the mid-1950s, a heroic struggle that remains all but unknown in the West: "Proportionally, the partisan movement in the post-war Baltic states was of a similar size as the Viet Cong movement in South Vietnam." Tens of thousands perished. The Soviets then regained their power, and the Baltic Republics shared the ups and downs of the post-Stalin USSR, During that time, the republics were (by Soviet standards) relatively prosperous and Westernized, and they never lost their national identity. In 1991, all three resumed their independence. Crucially for the present argument, they entered wholesale into Western and European identities. All joined NATO, which means that NATO allies have an obligation to defend them if they are attacked or invaded. They joined the European Union, and accepted the Euro currency, aligning them with the core nations moving towards full European union. To that extent, they are as European as Italy or the Netherlands. It might be useful here to give a sense of the scale of territory we are talking about. If you look at a map of the Baltic sea, you will see the three nations I have mentioned, and also to their west, a small patch of land (to which I shall return shortly), which is the small detached Russian territory of Kaliningrad. Taking the four lands together makes up about 74,000 square miles, roughly the size of Nebraska. About 6.5 million people inhabit these lands. Assume that **Vladimir Putin or a likely successor decides to appropriate some or all of the Baltic states, applying the same methods that worked so swimmingly in Ukraine. The potential for such action is extremely encouraging**, especially in terms of Russian minorities who can be represented as victims in urgent need of protection. During the Soviet years, many ethnic Russians took up residence in the Baltic lands, and their descendants remain - around one million in all. All three nations thus have sizable Russian minorities: Latvia 26%, Estonia 25% and Lithuania 6%. Some of these populations are heavily concentrated in particular regions close to a Russian frontier, as in the far north east of Estonia, and the eastern portions of Latvia, around the nation's second city of Daugavpils. If I were **Vladimir Putin**, I **would be viewing these regions greedily as the core of a future secessionist and pro-Russian land, whose inhabitants were clamouring for reunion with Mother Russia.** The sizable Russian population around the capital of Riga itself poses a special difficulty for Latvia, which would be the obvious target for a Ukraine-style assault. Presumably, we would see the same 2014-style script, of ethnic Russian movements and groups, supported by Little Green Men. We can also more or less write the propaganda surrounding the campaign, which would likely focus on charges of Nazi sympathies among the leadership of the Baltic states. Given the extraordinary technological orientation of nations like Estonia, the Russians might be harder pressed to launch successful cyber-warfare, but they would certainly attempt it. In the non-electronic world, Estonians and other Baltic peoples have formed militias and private armies ready to resist a Soviet occupation, as they did back in the 1940s. What about that mysterious bit of ground called Kaliningrad? It was formerly known as Koenigsberg, best known as the home of Immanuel Kant. When the Baltics seceded in 1991, this area became an oblast, a physical territory belonging to Russia, although separated physically from the nearest Russian soil by some four hundred miles. It thus presently stands between Poland and Lithuania. It matters so enormously because it is the centre of Russia's still potent Baltic Fleet, which has major ice-free ports at Kaliningrad itself, and at Baltiysk. **In the event of a secession crisis in the Baltic republics, Russia has excellent means to intervene directly should it so choose, and** (more likely) to **deny the area to assistance from Western forces.** An awful lot has been written in late years of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD), and the Russians are very good at it. **A Russian move against the Baltic republics would** pay multiple dividends. Most essentially, it would **reassert Putin's most heartfelt goal of restoring the Soviet Union, with himself as unquestioned master**, the heir to Stalin. But **it would also provide a critical strategic test for the two institutions that most conspicuously stand in the way of Russian expansion, namely NATO and the European Union. If the West failed to respond to such a direct attack on a member of both circles, it would effectively leave Europe detached from the United States, and largely dependent on Russian good will.** Always recall the old semi-joke about NATO's chief functions: it is there to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down. The Baltic gambit would defeat two of those goals at a stroke. No less significant, **such a move would pose very limited risks for the Russians.** If the Baltic secessionists won, it would be wonderful news for the Kremlin. If they lost and were suppressed, well, we Russians had nothing to do with them, and they were a purely internal Latvian or Estonian matter. We deny everything. Low risk, high potential gain. Why not try it? **It's a question of when rather than if.** The only slight caveat here is that the Ukraine outcome has been somewhat more time-consuming and difficult than Putin first imagined, which might encourage a degree of caution in the Baltic. Where a Baltic move would be irresistible would be if the United States and NATO were totally focused on some other global confrontation - say, with North Korea or Iran. In that case, the world's media would have little attention to spare on the Baltics. For the sake of argument, imagine that a Ukraine-style crisis developed in Latvia, with intensive use of hybrid warfare. What would NATO do? What would Europe do? This situation would be radically different from Ukraine because now we are dealing with a nation bound to Western nations by close formal ties of treaty and law. Ukraine was not. **Baltic leaders have said repeatedly that they would regard the appearance** of Little Green Men on their territory **as demanding the invocation of the NATO Treaty's Article 5**, so that other nations (including the United States) would be required to come to their defence. At the same time, one could argue that this was not a genuine Article 5 situation, because Latvia was not facing an actual Russian invasion, but rather an entirely spontaneous and autonomous upsurge by disaffected citizens and minority groups. And who really knows who those Little Green Men might really be? (They are of course Russian soldiers and special forces, but let's say that very quietly, or we might end up having to go to war.) Adding to the pressure on Western nations would be the unspoken Russian nuclear threat. In recent exercises, Russian forces have made dummy nuclear runs against Warsaw and Stockholm, while threatening nuclear attacks on Copenhagen. Last year, the Russians moved nuclear-capable Iskander missiles into the Kaliningrad enclave, within easy reach of multiple EU capitals. Ultimately, then, any decision to resist an effective Russian re-annexation of Latvia - and then the other two republics - would be a matter for policymakers and political leaders within the United States, the only nation with the possible ability to face down the Russians.

#### The US wins WW3 without using nukes—first strike with conventional missiles overwhelms Russia in the status quo—war now is key—prevents nuclear escalation.

Plesch 18 [Dan Plesch, (Director of the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy, SOAS, University of London) "Could the US win World War III without using nuclear weapons?" Conversation, 4-19-2018, https://theconversation.com/could-the-us-win-world-war-iii-without-using-nuclear-weapons-94771, DOA:3-14-2019 // WWBW]

As the US, Russia and China test each other’s patience and strategic focus, speculation about the chances of a world war has hit a new high. But many of the people seriously engaged in this weighty discussion often get it wrong. When it comes to estimating military capability, the Western media is principally concerned with the weapons capabilities of weaker states – and it rarely pays much attention to the colossal capability of the US, which still accounts for most of the world’s defence spending. Any sensible discussion of what a hypothetical World War III might look like needs to begin with the sheer size and force of America’s military assets. For all that China and Russia are arming up on various measures, **US commanders have the power to dominate escalating crises and counter opposing forces before they can be used.** Take missile warfare alone. The US Navy already has 4,000 Tomahawk cruise missiles, and the Navy and Air Force are currently taking delivery of 5,000 JASSM conventional cruise missiles with ranges from 200-600 miles. Barely visible to radar, these are designed to destroy “hardened” targets such as nuclear missile silos. Russia and China, by contrast, have nothing of equivalent quantity or quality with which to threaten the US mainland. The same holds true when it comes to maritime forces. While much is made of Russia’s two frigates and smaller vessels stationed off the Syrian coast, France alone has 20 warships and an aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean – and US standing forces in the area include six destroyers equipped with scores of cruise missiles and anti-missile systems. At the other end of Europe, the Russian military is threatening the small Baltic states, but it is rarely noted that the Russian Baltic fleet is the same size as Denmark’s and half the size of Germany’s. Meanwhile, China’s aggressively expansionist behaviour in the South China Sea is reported alongside stories of its first aircraft carrier and long-range ballistic missiles. But for all that the Chinese navy is large and growing, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, it’s still only numerically equivalent to the combined fleets of Japan and Taiwan, while the US boasts 19 aircraft carriers worldwide if its marine assault ships are included. But overhanging all this, of course, is the nuclear factor. Out of the sky The US, Russia and China are all nuclear-armed; Vladimir Putin recently unveiled a new fleet of nuclear-capable missiles which he described as “invincible in the face of all existing and future systems”, and some have suggested that China may be moving away from its no-first-use policy. This is all undeniably disturbing. While it has long been assumed that the threat of nuclear weapons acts as a deterrent to any war between the major powers, it’s also possible that the world may simply have been riding its luck. But once again, the US’s non-nuclear capabilities are all too often overlooked. **US leaders may in fact believe they can remove Russia’s nuclear deterrent with an overwhelming conventional attack backed up by missile defences. This ability was cultivated under the Prompt Global Strike programme, which was initiated before 9/11 and continued during the Obama years. Organised through the US Air Force’s Global Strike Command, it is to use conventional weapons to attack anywhere on Earth in under 60 minutes**. This is not to say the task would be small. In order to destroy Russia’s nuclear missiles before they can be launched, the US military would need to first blind Russian radar and command and communications to incoming attack, probably using both physical and cyber attacks. It would then have to destroy some 200 fixed and 200 mobile missiles on land, a dozen Russian missile submarines, and Russian bombers. It would then need to shoot down any missiles that could still be fired. **Russia is not well positioned to survive such an attack. Its early warning radars, both satellite and land-based, are decaying and will be hard to replace. At the same time, the US has and is developing a range of technologies to carry out anti-satellite and radar missions, and it has been using them for years.** (All the way back in 1985, it shot down a satellite with an F15 jet fighter.) That said, the West is very dependent on satellites too, and Russia and China continue to develop their own anti-satellite systems. The air war **Russia’s bomber aircraft** date back to the Soviet era, so despite the alarm they provoke when they nudge at Western countries’ airspace, **they pose no major threat** in themselves. Were the Russian and US planes to face each other, the Russians would find themselves under attack from planes they couldn’t see and that are any way out of their range. US and British submarine crews claim a perfect record in constantly shadowing Soviet submarines as they left their bases throughout the Cold War. Since then, Russian forces have declined and US anti-submarine warfare has been revived, raising the prospect that **Russian submarines could be taken out before they could even launch their missiles. The core of the Russia’s nuclear forces consists of land-based missiles**, some fixed in silos, others mobile on rail and road. **The silo-based missiles can now be targeted by several types of missiles, carried by US planes almost invisible to radar**; all are designed to destroy targets protected by deep concrete and steel bunkers. But a problem for US war planners is that it might take hours too long for their missile-carrying planes to reach these targets – hence the need to act in minutes. One apparently simple solution to attacking targets very quickly is to **fit quick nuclear ballistic missiles with non-nuclear warheads.** In 2010, Robert Gates, then serving as secretary of defence under Barack Obama, said that **the US had this capability. Intercontinental ballistic missiles take just 30 minutes to fly between the continental US’s Midwest and Siberia; if launched from well-positioned submarines, the Navy’s Tridents can be even quicker, with a launch-to-target time of under ten minutes.** From 2001, the US Navy prepared to fit its Trident missiles with either inert solid warheads – accurate to within ten metres – or vast splinter/shrapnel weapons. Critics have argued that this would leave a potential enemy unable to tell whether they were under nuclear or conventional attack, meaning they would have to assume the worst. According to US Congressional researchers, the development work came close to completion, but apparently ceased in 2013. Nonetheless, the US has continued to develop other technologies across its armed services to attack targets around the world in under an hour – foremost among them hypersonic missiles, which could return to Earth at up to ten times the speed of sound, with China and Russia trying to keep up. Missile envy **The remainder of Russia’s nuclear force consists of missiles transported by rail.** An article on Kremlin-sponsored news outlet Sputnik described how these missile rail cars would be so hard to find that Prompt Global Strike might not be as effective as the US would like – but taken at face value, the article implies that the rest of the Russian nuclear arsenal is in fact relatively vulnerable. Starting with the “Scud hunt” of the First Gulf War**, the US military has spent years improving its proficiency at targeting mobile ground-based missiles. Those skills now use remote sensors to attack small ground targets at short notice in the myriad counter-insurgency operations it’s pursued since 2001.** If the “sword” of Prompt Global Strike doesn’t stop the launch of all Russian missiles, then the US could use the “shield” of its own missile defences. These it deployed after it walked out of a treaty with Russiabanning such weapons in 2002. While some of these post-2002 missile defence systems have been called ineffective, **the US Navy has a more effective system called Aegis, which one former head of the Pentagon’s missile defence programs claims can shoot down intercontinental ballistic missiles.** Some 300 Aegis anti-ballistic missiles now equip 40 US warships; in 2008, one destroyed a satellite as it fell out of orbit. War mentality In advance of the Iraq war, various governments and onlookers cautioned the US and UK about the potential for unforeseen consequences, but the two governments were driven by a mindset impervious to criticism and misgivings. And despite all the lessons that can be learned from the Iraq disaster, there’s an ample risk today that a similarly gung-ho attitude could take hold. Foreign casualties generally have little impact on domestic US politics. The hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians who died under first sanctions and then war did not negatively impact presidents Clinton or George W. Bush. Neither might the prospect of similar casualties in Iran or North Korea or other states, especially if “humanitarian” precision weapons are used. But more than that, an opinion poll run by Stanford University’s Scott Sagan found that the US public would not oppose the preemptive use of even nuclear weapons provided that the US itself was not affected. And nuclear Trident offers that temptation. The control of major conventional weapons as well as WMD needs urgent attention from international civil society, media and political parties. There is still time to galvanise behind the Nobel-winning International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons and the nuclear ban treaty, and to revive and globalise the decaying arms control agenda of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, which played a vital part in bringing the Cold War to a largely peaceful end. Like the Kaiser in 1914, perhaps Trump or one of his successors will express dismay when faced with the reality a major US offensive unleashes. But unlike the Kaiser, who saw his empire first defeated and then dismembered, perhaps a 21st-century US president might get away with it.

#### War now is better than war later—Russia is modernizing and won’t get overwhelmed soon—escalates to nuclear war.

Pifer 16 [Steven Pifer, (Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Center on the United States and Europe, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative) "Pay attention, America: Russia is upgrading its military" Brookings, 2-5-2016, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/pay-attention-america-russia-is-upgrading-its-military/, DOA:3-14-2019 // WWBW]

**Russia is in the midst of a major modernization of its armed forces.** This has been driven by Vladimir Putin’s ambition to restore Russia’s hard power and supported by the revenues that flowed into the Kremlin’s coffers between 2004 and 2014, when the price of oil was high. The modernization programs encompass all parts of the Russian military, including strategic nuclear, nonstrategic nuclear and conventional forces. The United States has to pay attention. Russia may be a power in long-term decline, but it retains the capacity to make significant trouble. Moreover, in recent years the Kremlin has shown a new readiness to use military force. But not all aspects of the modernization program are equally worrisome. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR **Russia is modernizing the three legs of its strategic triad.** It is procuring eight Borei-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and is halfway through a ten-year program to build four hundred intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). It is also updating its Tu-160 Blackjack bombers, and officials have reportedly considered reopening the Blackjack production line. Placed in context, however, the strategic modernization program appears less worrisome. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian economy went into free fall for most of the ensuing decade. The defense budget received little in comparison to Soviet times, and most programs, including strategic nuclear forces, were starved for funds. That only began to change in the mid-2000s. **The strategic modernization program is replacing a lot of old systems**, systems that the Russian military would have preferred to retire earlier had it been able to pay to do so. For example, a large number of Russia’s strategic warheads sit atop SS-18, SS-19 and SS-25 ICBMs, all of which are scheduled to be retired by 2020. If the military had had the resources, it would have retired and replaced the SS-18s and SS-19s years ago. Four hundred ICBMs and SLBMs constitute a major program, but the number seems appropriate for a Russian strategic force that, under the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), looks like it will deploy 400–450 strategic missiles. The Borei-class submarines will replace Delta-class submarines, all of which were built prior to 1991. A combination of reliability and resource concerns has meant that most of the older boats performed deterrence patrols at dockside rather than at sea. That may change as more Boreis become operational. In comparison, the U.S. Navy normally maintains about half of its fourteen Ohio-class SSBNS at sea. The fact that Moscow is considering reopening the production line for its aging Blackjack bomber is interesting. Russia currently flies only a dozen of these aircraft (in addition to some sixty older Bear bombers). A decision to resume production of Blackjacks would indicate problems and delays with the next generation PAK-DA bomber, which was originally scheduled to have its first flight by the end of this decade. NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR Moscow’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons are more worrisome. To begin with, there is Russia’s violation of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty by testing a ground-launched cruise missile to intermediate range. While such a missile likely will not pose a direct threat to the United States, it constitutes a treaty violation and would threaten U.S. allies, as well as other countries, in Europe and Asia. The outside world has less visibility regarding Russia’s nonstrategic arsenal than Russia’s strategic forces. It appears, however, that the military has developed a range of nonstrategic nuclear capabilities, including cruise missiles, short-range ballistic missiles and aircraft. By contrast, the United States has steadily reduced the number and types of weapons in its nonstrategic nuclear arsenal, which now consists solely of the B61 nuclear bomb. **Of particular concern is Russia’s apparent focus on low-yield nuclear weapons—which one official has referred to as a “nuclear scalpel”—coupled with its nuclear “de-escalation” doctrine. That doctrine envisages escalating to de-escalate, that is, using low-yield nuclear weapons as a means to terminate a conventional conflict on terms favorable to the Kremlin. Russia’s unclassified national security strategy says that nuclear weapons would be used only in the event of an attack with weapons of mass destruction on Russia or one of its allies, or in the event of an attack on Russia with conventional forces in which the fate of the state is at stake.** The “de-escalation” doctrine, Putin’s references to nuclear weapons in his public statements and the broad modernization of Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear forces suggest that the classified strategy could envisage use of those weapons in wider circumstances. That risks lowering the nuclear threshold. And **once a nuclear weapon—any nuclear weapon—is used, the possibility of catastrophic escalation would increase dramatically.**

#### Successful preemptive forces surrender and solves future escalation

Johnson 17 Sarah Johnson, "U.S. Nuclear First Strike Policy; Be Afraid", Bill Track 50, https://www.billtrack50.com/blog/in-the-news/u-s-nuclear-first-strike-policy-be-afraid/

The second situation is a [preemptive strike](http://www.dictionary.com/browse/preemptive-strike) — a first-strike attack with nuclear weapons carried out to destroy an enemy’s capacity to respond. Preemptive strikes can be based on the assumption that the enemy is planning an imminent attack, but don’t have to be. The methodology behind a preemptive nuclear strike is to attack the enemy’s strategic nuclear weapon facilities (missile silos, submarine bases, bomber airfields), command and control sites and storage depots first. By hitting these targets first the enemy will be so wounded with so little of their resources left that they will be forced to surrender with minimal damage to the attacking party.

#### A conventional war would not be close

Mizokami 18 Kyle Mizokami, writes on defense and security issues in Asia, particularly Japan, “Russia vs. America: Which Army Would Win a War?”, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russia-vs-america-which-army-would-win-war-26008

The United States and Russia field two of the most powerful armies in the world. Heavily mechanized and salted with combat veterans, the U.S. Army and Russian Ground Forces have spent the better part of the last fifteen years not only chasing guerrillas from Afghanistan to Syria, but also fighting conventional-style wars in Iraq and Georgia. Now, as tensions between the NATO and Russia place U.S. and Russian ground pounders in the same country (Syria) or just across the border from one another (the Baltics), the question is: in a head to head matchup, which side would prevail? The backbone of U.S. Army infantry is the infantry squad. In light infantry—including air assault, airborne and mountain units—a squad consists of nine soldiers that further divide into a squad leader and two fire teams. Each fire team of four soldiers consists of a fire team leader, rifleman, grenadier, and an automatic rifleman equipped with two M4 carbines, an M4 carbine equipped with the  [M320 underbarrel grenade launcher](https://www.militaryfactory.com/smallarms/detail.asp?smallarms_id=329)  and the M249 squad automatic weapon. Individual soldiers will carry single-shot  [AT-4 light antitank weapons](http://www.military-today.com/firearms/at4.htm)  as issued. In mechanized infantry units, the nine-man squad consists of the two- or three-man  [Stryker interim combat vehicle](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-us-army-has-new-weapon-fight-the-next-big-land-war-think-23096)  or [M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/these-vehicles-are-what-make-the-us-army-deadly-fighting-22007)  crew, plus six soldiers that dismount to fight on foot. A mechanized infantry squad can put fewer soldiers on the ground, but it also has the benefit of vastly increased mobility and firepower in the form of the Bradley’s 25mm M242 Bushmaster autocannon, TOW antitank missiles, and 7.62mm coaxial machine gun. Strykers are currently armed with M2 .50 caliber machine guns but Europe-based units are receiving a new turret upgrade that includes a 30mm cannon or  [Javelin antitank missile](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/javelin-the-american-militarys-ultimate-tank-killer-17895) . The mechanized dismount team also has its own M4 carbines, a M320 grenade launcher, one M249 squad automatic weapon and a Javelin shoulder-fired medium range antitank missile, capable of defeating the heaviest Russian armor at ranges of up to 2,187 yards. Mechanized infantry platoons consist of three mechanized squads without additional firepower, although a Stryker platoon will have a weapons squad with two M240B machine guns. Each platoon has four M2s or four Strykers. Light infantry platoons consist of three infantry squads and add additional firepower via a weapons squad. The weapons squad is made up by a squad leader and nine soldiers armed with two M240B machine guns and two Javelin antitank missiles, and allows the platoon commander, typically a lieutenant, to parcel out this firepower to the squads that will likely need it the most. A new addition to the weapons squad is the 84mm  [M3 “Carl Gustav” recoilless rifle](https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2016/06/01/every-army-infantry-platoon-to-get-carl-gustaf/) , versatile antipersonnel, antifortification, and antiarmor weapons system first introduced in 1946. The result: an infantry platoon with two antipersonnel and two antiarmor weapons, and a fifth weapon that can function as both. The Russian fields motor rifle (mechanized) squads and light infantry equivalent squads in the airborne forces. A typical Russian motor rifle squad will consist of a  [BMP-2/3](http://www.army-technology.com/projects/bmp-3/) infantry fighting vehicle or  [BTR-82A](http://www.army-technology.com/projects/btr-82a-armoured-personnel-carrier/) wheeled armored personnel carrier, a three man crew, and a seven man dismount team armed with AK-74M assault rifles, two PKM machine guns and a  [RPG-16 short range antitank weapon](http://www.military-today.com/firearms/rpg_16.htm) . The GP-30 grenade launcher, the Russian equivalent of the M320, is fitted to some AK-74Ms. The PKP “Pecheneg” will eventually replace the PKM but for now the Russian army has plenty of the older weapons. The Russian motor rifle squad is nearly identical to the U.S. Army mechanized infantry squad except it does not have a medium range antitank guided missile launcher in the same category as the Javelin. Just like in American squads, single shot, disposable RPG-18 light antitank weapons are issued as needed. Russian airborne infantry squads are similar to motor rifle squads, built around a [BMD-3](http://www.armyrecognition.com/russia_russian_army_light_armoured_vehicle_uk/bmd-3_airborne_armored_infantry_fighting_vehicle_technical_data_sheet_specifications_pictures_video.html), [BMD-4](http://www.army-technology.com/projects/bmd-4m-infantry-fighting-vehicle/), [BTR-D](https://www.armyrecognition.com/russia_russian_army_light_armoured_vehicle_uk/btr-d_airborne_armoured_vehicle_personnel_carrier_technical_data_sheet_specifications_pictures_video.html) airborne armored vehicles. Airborne squads are smaller owing to the smaller personnel carrying capacity of BMD and BTR-D vehicles. Despite having fewer troops, Russian airborne forces are much more mobile than their American counterparts. The BMD-3, which has a 30mm autocannon and BMD-4, which has a 30mm autocannon and 100mm cannon, are both armed with the  [Konkurs antitank missile system](http://armamentresearch.com/introduction-to-the-9m113-konkurs-atgm/) . At the platoon level, Russian motor rifle forces add no additional firepower except for a single designated marksman armed with a  [SVD rifle](http://www.military-today.com/firearms/svd.htm) , nor does it add additional vehicles. A motor rifle or airborne platoon of three squads consists of three vehicles plus dismounts. Russian infantry have some advantages over their American counterparts. Three vehicle platoons means the Russian Ground Forces, man for man and vehicle for vehicle, can field twenty five percent more platoons than the U.S. Army. Theoretically this gives a commander more tactical options on the battlefield. Russian airborne forces, owing to their mechanization, have much greater tactical mobility than foot-mobile American paratroopers. Moscow’s parachutists can also airdrop farther from their objectives, making their way to them in their vehicles, helping keep vulnerable air transports loaded with soldiers at a distance from lethal enemy air defenses. Still, U.S. Army infantry have a decisive edge over their Russian counterparts. One reason is organizational resiliency: if a Russian platoon loses a vehicle, it loses one third of its combat power. If an American platoon loses a vehicle, it only loses a quarter of its firepower. A Russian platoon that loses two vehicles is reduced to a single vehicle. U.S. mechanized vehicles are also superior to their Russian counterparts. While both the Bradley and the BMP can carry seven soldiers, mount a 25 to 30mm autocannon and are armed with antitank missiles, the Bradley is better armored, has a digital battle management system, and carries twice as many antitank missiles ready to fire. The BMP is inferior in all respects. The American Stryker and Russian BTR-82A wheeled armored vehicles, on the other hand are roughly the same. Both are set to receive updates, the Stryker with a 30mm autocannon or Javelin turret and the BTR-82A a turret with a 57mm gun. Dismounted firepower is where U.S. forces truly shine. Against armored threats, an American platoon can bring three Javelin missiles, a M3 recoilless rifle, and numerous AT4 short-range antitank rockets to bear against enemy armor, engaging enemies at ranges of up to 2,000 yards. Their Russian comrades-in-arms could bring only unguided RPG-16 and RPG-18 rockets against enemies at a maximum effective range of about 300 yards. Against infantry, American forces bring six light and two medium machine guns and a M3 recoilless rifle to bear, versus three medium machine guns and a SVD designated marksman rifle for the Russians. American and Russian infantry would never fight alone. Both would fight as part of an integrated team with armor, mortars, heavy artillery, air support, and electronic warfare all contributing to win the battle. Still, in a matchup between American and Russian infantry forces American forces have a decisive advantage in firepower. Let’s hope the two sides never do meet.

#### Otherwise, Russia will broadly scale up military AI – extinction

Rogers 17 Mike Rogers, former US Representative from Michigan, chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Artificial intelligence — the arms race we may not be able to control", TheHill, [https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/351725-artificial-intelligence-is-the-new-arms-race-we-may-not-be-able-to-control /](https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/351725-artificial-intelligence-is-the-new-arms-race-we-may-not-be-able-to-control%20/) MM

“Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become ruler of the world,” [said](https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/4/16251226/russia-ai-putin-rule-the-world) Vladimir Putin. The sphere the President of Russia is referring to is artificial intelligence (AI) and his comments should give you a moment of pause. Addressing students at the beginning of our Labor Day weekend, Putin remarked “Artificial intelligence is the future, not only for Russia, but for all humankind,” adding, “It comes with colossal opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to predict.” For once, I find myself in agreement with the President of Russia, but just this once. Artificial Intelligence offers incredible promise and peril. Nowhere is this clearer than in the realm of national security. Today un-crewed systems are a fact of modern warfare. Nearly every country is adopting systems where personnel are far removed from the conflict and wage war by remote control. AI [stands](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/26/us/pentagon-artificial-intelligence-terminator.html) to sever that ground connection. Imagine a fully autonomous Predator or Reaper drone. Managed by an AI system, the drone could identify targets, determine their legitimacy, and conduct a strike all without human intervention. Indeed, the Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom issued a press [statement](https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/12/16286580/uk-government-killer-robots-drones-weapons) in September that the country “does not possess fully autonomous weapon systems and has no intention of developing them,” and that its weapons systems “will always be under control as an absolute guarantee of human oversight and authority and accountability.” Let’s think smaller. Imagine a tiny insect-sized drone loaded with explosive. Guided by a [pre-programmed AI](https://www.amazon.com/Life-3-0-Being-Artificial-Intelligence/dp/1101946598), it could hunt down a specific target — a politician, a general, or an opposition figure — determine when to strike, how to strike, and if to strike based on its own learning. Howard Hughes Medical Center [recently](https://qz.com/1000011/scientists-attached-an-electronic-backpack-to-a-genetically-modified-dragonfly-and-turned-it-into-a-drone/) attached a backpack to a genetically modified dragonfly and flew it remotely. These examples are, however, where humans are involved and largely control the left and right limits of AI. Yet, there are examples of AI purposely and independently going beyond programed parameters. Rogue algorithms led to a [flash crash](http://gizmodo.com/rogue-algorithm-blamed-for-historic-crash-of-the-britis-1787523587) of the British Pound. In 2016, in-game AIs created super AIs weapons and [hunted down](http://www.kotaku.co.uk/2016/06/03/elites-ai-created-super-weapons-and-started-hunting-players-skynet-is-here) human players, and AIs have [created](https://www.forbes.com/sites/tonybradley/2017/07/31/facebook-ai-creates-its-own-language-in-creepy-preview-of-our-potential-future/#1cf69787292c) their own languages that were indecipherable to humans. AIs proved more effective than their human counterparts in producing and catching users in spear phishing programs. Not only did the AIs create more content, they successfully [captured](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Seymour-Tully-Weaponizing-Data-Science-For-Social-Engineering-Automated-E2E-Spear-Phishing-On-Twitter.pdf) more users with their deception. While seemingly simple and low stakes in nature, extrapolate these scenarios into more significant and risky areas and the consequences become much greater. Cybersecurity is no different. Today we are focused on the hackers, trolls, and cyber criminals (officially sanctioned and otherwise) who seek to penetrate our networks, steal our intellectual property, and leave behind malicious code for activation in the event of a conflict. Replace the individual with an AI and imagine how fast hacking takes place; networks against networks, at machine speed all without a human in the loop. Sound far-fetched? It’s not. In 2016, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency held an AI on AI capture the flag contest called the [Cyber Grand Challenge](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qSgYu3w3DMM) at the DEF CON event. AI networks against AI networks. In August of this year the founders of 116 AI and robotics companies signed a letter petitioning the United Nations [to ban](https://www.theverge.com/2017/8/21/16177828/killer-robots-ban-elon-musk-un-petition) lethal autonomous systems. Signatories to this letter included Google DeepMind’s co-founder Mustafa Suleyman and Elon Musk who, in response to Putin’s quote [tweeted](https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/904638455761612800), “Competition for AI superiority at national level most likely cause of WW3 imo (sic)”. AI is not some far off future challenge. It is a challenge today and one with which we must grapple. I am in favor of fielding any system that enhances our national security, but we must have an open and honest conversation about the implications of AI, the consequences of which we do not, and may not, fully understand. This is not a new type of bullet or missile. This is a potentially fully autonomous system that even with human oversight and guidance will make its own decisions on the battlefield and in cyberspace. How can we ensure that the system does not escape our control? How can we prevent such systems from falling into the hands of terrorists or insurgents? Who controls the source code? How and can we build in so-called impenetrable kill switches? AI and AI-like systems are slowly being introduced into our arsenal. Our adversaries, China, Russia, and others are also introducing AI systems into their arsenals as well. Implementation is happening faster than our ability to fully comprehend the consequences. Putin’s new call spells out a new arms race. Rushing to AI weapon systems without guiding principles is a dangerous. It risks an escalation that we do not fully understand and may not be able to control. The cost of limiting AI intelligence being weaponized [could vastly exceed](https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/AI%20NatSec%20-%20final.pdf) all of our nuclear proliferation efforts to date. More troubling, the consequences of failure are equally existential.

#### **AI outweighs nuclear war**

Turchin and Dekenberger 18 Alexey Turchin & David Denkenberger. Turchin is a researcher at the Science for Life Extension Foundation; Denkenberger is with the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (GCRI) @ Tennessee State University, Alliance to Feed the Earth in Disasters (ALLFED). 05/03/2018. “Classification of Global Catastrophic Risks Connected with Artificial Intelligence.” AI & SOCIETY, pp. 1–17.

According to Yampolskiy and Spellchecker (2016), the probability and seriousness of AI failures will increase with time. We estimate that they will reach their peak between the appearance of the first self-improving AI and the moment that an AI or group of AIs reach global power, and will later diminish, as late-stage AI halting seems to be a low-probability event. AI is an extremely powerful and completely unpredictable technology, millions of times more powerful than nuclear weapons. Its existence could create multiple individual global risks, most of which we can not currently imagine. We present several dozen separate global risk scenarios connected with AI in this article, but it is likely that some of the most serious are not included. The sheer number of possible failure modes suggests that there are more to come.

#### Greatest existential risk

Talks 16 Martin Talks, has twenty years’ experience in the digital technology and communications sectors, runs the company Matomico, a consultancy that helps companies and organisations with digital transformation and innovation initiatives, and aims to demystify the world of advanced technology, also cites Stephen Hawking, Bill Gates, and Elon Musk, “A Marketer’s Guide to Artificial Intelligence”, March 2016

“Success in creating AI would be the biggest event in human history,” said Stephen Hawking in The Independent in 2014. “Unfortunately, it might also be the last, unless we learn how to avoid the risks.”11 In an interview with the BBC he added: “Humans, limited by slow biological evolution, couldn’t compete and would be superseded by AI.”12 Elon Musk called AI “our greatest existential threat” in a 2014 interview with MIT students at the AeroAstro Centennial Symposium. “I’m increasingly inclined to think that there should be some regulatory oversight, maybe at the national and international level, just to make sure that we don’t do something very foolish.”13 Musk has invested in a number of AI technologies through startups including DeepMind, acquired by Google for the rumoured sum of $400m (£285m) in 201414, and claims this is as a means to “just keep an eye on what’s going on with artificial intelligence”15. Bill Gates has also expressed concerns about AI. During a Q&A session on Reddit in January 2015, Gates said: “I am in the camp that is concerned about super intelligence. First the machines will do a lot of jobs for us and not be super intelligent. That should be positive if we manage it well. A few decades after that though the intelligence is strong enough to be a concern. I agree with Elon Musk and some others on this and don’t understand why some people are not concerned.”16 In July 2015, Stephen Hawking, Musk and more than 1,000 AI and robotics researchers signed a letter asking for a ban on AI warfare, warning of the potential for rampant destruction at the hands of autonomous weapon systems, which can select and engage targets without human intervention. “AI technology has reached a point where the deployment of such systems is — practically if not legally — feasible within years, not decades, and the stakes are high: autonomous weapons have been described as the third revolution in warfare, after gunpowder and nuclear arms,” the letter said.

## Russia Fill In

### 1NC – Latin America CN

#### Russia views counternarcotics efforts in Latin America as key to expanding their soft power– the impact is increases in corruption, drug trafficking, human rights violations, and nuclear prolif

Farah and Babineau 2-26-19 (Douglas and Kathryn; Douglas Farah is the president of national security consulting firm, IBI Consultants, and a Senior Visiting Fellow at National Defense University's Center for Complex Operations. He is an award-winning journalist and author of two critically acclaimed books. Kathryn Babineau (M.P.P. 2013) is a Research Coordinator at IBI Consultants and National Defense University’s Center for Complex Operations, specializing in Latin America. She completed a Master of Philosophy in Latin American Studies at the University of Oxford. “Extra-regional Actors in Latin America: The United States is not the Only Game in Town” PRISM National Defense University. https://cco.ndu.edu/News/Article/1767399/extra-regional-actors-in-latin-america-the-united-states-is-not-the-only-game-i/)

The strategic underpinning of the multi-faceted Russian activities in Latin America is the 2013 “Gerasimov Doctrine,” put forward by General Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, a position that gives him operational control of Russian military intelligence (GRU).6 Gerasimov posited that Russia is in a state of permanent warfare, rather than facing a choice of war or peace. Within the continuum of blurred lines between war and peace is a new form of non-linear, or hybrid, warfare, in which all elements of the state are continually engaged, with greater or lesser emphasis.7 A recent NATO report unpacked this doctrine and the implications for Russia’s new approach to warfare, and in particular hybrid warfare, noting: Such a war, they argue, goes way beyond the frames of the traditional understanding of these wars. They include political intrigues, fights over resources and financial flows, and irreconcilable civilizational conflicts. On the battlefield in these wars, regular forces act alongside a number of new actors—irregular forces of rebels and fighters, criminal gangs, international terrorist networks, private military companies, and legions of foreign mercenaries, units of spetsnaz and intelligence formations from different countries, military contingents of peacekeepers from international organizations, and even non-governmental and humanitarian organizations and structures, representatives from printed and electronic mass media, volunteers, and activists from civil society.8 Viewed through the prism of this doctrine, Russia’s activities in Latin America come into clearer focus. While the U.S. position remains preeminent—due to geographic proximity, cultural ties, and trade ties—Russia has advanced further and faster as a competitive adversary than is often understood. A review of Russia’s activities in the region shows that, despite limited resources, the Gerasimov Doctrine is being implemented through a policy that incorporates multiple elements of soft power, coupled with military training and hardware, to directly displace U.S. influence. This includes counternarcotics and disaster relief, as well as engagement in regional Latin American forums created by the Bolivarian Alliance for the express purpose of excluding the United States and Canada. Diverse Forms of Engagement Russia’s desire to establish a stronger foothold in Latin America is evidenced by the constant high-level government visits with its Latin American allies. In addition to more recent visits by senior officials—including to Ecuador and Suriname—an analysis of visits by senior Russians to Latin American countries from 2015 to 2017, (including a vist from president Putin in November 2016 to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Peru), demonstrates a far greater level of engagement between high-level (the equivalent of an assistant secretary or above) officials of Latin American and Russian governments than that of the United States.9 As demonstrated in news articles and official government statements, Latin American officials from an estimated 20 countries visited Russia 44 times during those three years.10 Additionally, high-ranking Russian officials visited six Latin American countries on 11 occasions. This high-level presence decreased after 2017, with president Putin only visiting Latin America once in 2018, and even then only because the G20 summit was held in Argentina.11 Admittedly, U.S. engagement with the region extends far beyond high-level or state visits, so this record does not suggest that Russian influence now exceeds that of the United States, but it does provide a useful point of reference. Equally important, experts widely agree that Russia’s domestic political and economic troubles will likely prevent it from fully displacing the preeminent position that U.S. economic, security, and aid partnerships currently hold in the region. Nevertheless, these visits indicate that Russia is actively seeking partners in Latin America and is finding many countries in the region that are willing to consider such overtures. Although still dwarfed by weapons sales from the United States and elsewhere, Russia has made significant inroads in recent years throughout Latin America, primarily with friendly countries, to expand its arms sales in the region. A recent NATO report noted the significant military purchases of Russian equipment by the Maduro regime, as well as President Ortega in Nicaragua: Since 2005, Venezuela has purchased $11 billion worth of equipment from Russia, including fighter jets, helicopters and rifles. Moscow provided loans to Caracas to help purchase the S-300VM anti-ballistic missile system to protect Venezuelan waters in 2013. The recent acquisition made Venezuela the second biggest importer of Russian arms between 2012 and 2015, after India. Lately, Russia also sent warships to the Caribbean to perform drug patrols. Colombians were outraged in October 2013, when two Russian supersonic bombers, capable of carrying nuclear warheads, flew from Venezuela to Nicaragua over San Andres, disputed territory between Colombia and Nicaragua. In March 2015, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro ordered the major military exercise “Bolivarian shield,” with Russian participation, as a response to U.S. sanctions against seven Venezuelan officials.12 The Russian news agency TASS recently reported that since 2000, the Russian arms exporter Rosoboronexport has sold $10 billion in weaponry and military equipment to Latin American nations.13 The company is working with Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru to broker deals for both ground and air equipment, in particular Ural trucks and motor vehicles. In addition to Rosoboronexport, the Russian companies Rostec and Irkut Aircraft Corporation are also known to be operating in the region, including attending military expositions in Latin America. Although producing few tangible results, Russia has also publicly expressed its willingness to partner on nuclear projects in Latin America. In October 2016, Russia and Paraguay announced a new Pacific nuclear energy partnership, which begins a new wave of investments and technology sharing between the two countries.14 Similarly, in January 2018 Argentina announced a recent memorandum of understanding with Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom, which covered uranium exploration in Argentina as well as assistance in the construction of nuclear power plants.15 Russia has also made a concerted effort to deepen its partnerships with Bolivia, recently announcing that it would assist Bolivia in building a “nuclear center to research radiation technologies applied in agriculture, medicine and various industries.”16 After announcing that he had met with a number of Russian officials, and was considering additional partnerships in a number of other areas—including lithium production—Bolivian President Evo Morales, who recently visited Russia, commented warmly on the growing Russian presence in the region.17 Organized Crime and Money Laundering Structures In his discussion of Russian foreign policy in June 2018, Admiral Tidd noted that the arrival of a Russian diplomatic presence anywhere in the world is almost immediately followed by the presence of Russian organized crime, which often allies itself with existing transnational criminal networks.18 These criminal activities are often sanctioned by the Russian government and are considered among the tools of statecraft under the Gerasimov Doctrine. There have been several cases in Latin America recently where the Russian state and transnational criminal networks have merged to the mutual benefit and profit of both. Perhaps the most notorious case of such collaboration came to light in February 2018, when Argentine authorities seized approximately 400 kilograms of cocaine destined for Russia, which they discovered housed in an annex of the Russian embassy. Former Russian diplomatic officials, as well as Argentine police, were among those arrested as part of the operation, which aimed to move the cocaine in diplomatic luggage to Moscow.19 The head of the criminal network identified as “Mr. K,” Andrey Kovalchuck, was reported to have a relationship with the Russian ambassador in Argentina.20 He was arrested in Germany in March 2018.21 Testimony from one of the men arrested in the case, Ali Abyanov, indicated that the Russian embassy in Uruguay was heavily involved in the drug smuggling operation, which Abyanov said has been running for years.22

#### Nuclear Power leads to proliferation

Slocum 06 (Ty Slocum is the director of the Public Citizen Energy Program. “Factsheet #5: Proliferation Just the Facts: The Five Fatal Flaws of Nuclear Power,” <http://www.citizen.org/documents/JTF-Proliferation.pdf>)

International treaties leave non-weapons states free to use and develop sensitive nuclear technology such as uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing. While such technologies are ostensibly employed to create fuel in power reactors, they may be easily adjusted or redirected to produce weapons-grade fissile material. Moreover, power reactors themselves produce plutonium, which may be used in bombs. Once the nuclear genie is out of the bottle, it becomes impossible to restrict its use to “peaceful” purposes. In practice, there is no way to segregate nuclear technologies employed for “peaceful” purposes from technologies that may be employed in weapons—the former may be, and have been, transformed into the latter. The myth of the “peaceful atom” is belied by the easy modification of a nuclear energy infrastructure to create the material required for a nuclear bomb.

#### Loose nuclear power with Russian influence means Latin American terrorism goes nuclear

**Pavlich 11** (Katie Pavlich, degree in Broadcast Journalism, award-winning author, “A Growing Terror Threat: Hezbollah in Latin America,” article, Townhall, July 08, 2011, http://townhall.com/columnists/katiepavlich/2011/07/08/a\_growing\_terror\_threat\_hezbollah\_in\_latin\_america/page/full)

In light of Central and South America’s proximity to the United States, both¶ geographically and politically, more attention must be placed on them in the current War on¶ Terror. Central and South America, which shall hereto be referred to as Latin America, are no¶ strangers to terrorist activity on their soil. On the surface, Latin America does not seem as¶ though it is a region that would have to struggle with such subversive activity. After all, Latin¶ states do not have significant Muslim populations for international terrorist networks such as Al¶ Qaida to blend into. Furthermore, unlike Middle Eastern States, their democratically elected¶ leaders will not hesitate to engage them in military confrontations. Lastly, their economies are¶ not as easy to establish faceless financial networks as they are in Europe or the Middle East.¶ However, beneath the surface, **Latin America is** a porous region, **ideal for terrorist activity to**¶ **flourish.**¶ These factors fall in line with the current administration’s policy of keeping nuclear¶ weapons out of the hands of terrorists. It has stated that **although the threat of a nuclear attack by**¶ **sovereign states has gone down, the threat of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists**¶ **has gone up**. **Latin America has** not only **a history of terrorist activity** and stratocracy, **but**¶ **nuclear activity as well**. Although the region is known internationally as a nuclear-free zone,¶ **recent developments have demonstrated** that **a renewed interest in nuclear weapons development**¶ may be on the rise. **This will mean** a risk of **nuclear materials falling into the hands of** domestic¶ or international **terrorists is now a real** concern for the US in the region itself.

## Saudi Arms Deals

#### Pulling aid from Saudi Arabia kills US-Saudi alliance - that creates multiple scenarios for Mideast instability

Phillips 10/19 James Phillips 10-19-2018 Senior Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation Full Investigation Needed Before U.S. Takes Action on the Khashoggi Crisis [https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/full-investigation-needed-us-takes-actionthe- khashoggi-crisis /](https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/full-investigation-needed-us-takes-actionthe-%20khashoggi-crisis%20/) MM

The U.S. Response The Trump administration must make it clear to the Saudis that a failure to come clean on the Khashoggi affair could severely undermine Saudi-American ties. It should disabuse Riyadh of any notion that the White House is willing or able to protect Saudi Arabia from congressionally-imposed sanctions, if the Saudis continue to stonewall international efforts to get to the bottom of the matter. In this context, Thursday􀍛s announcement that Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin had cancelled his participation in next week􀍛s Saudi investment summit is an appropriate and necessary signal. The U.S. cannot turn a blind eye to state-sponsored murder or allow it to pass without consequences. As a matter of principle, Washington should support free speech, a free press, and respect for the rule of law. It cannot give Saudi Arabia a free pass. If guilt is established, then it must hold the Saudis accountable. There must be real consequences for such a horrific act. Saudi officials found responsible for criminal acts should be removed from their positions and prosecuted. But until guilt has been established through a full investigation, it would be premature for U.S. officials to impose punitive measures against Saudi Arabia. Washington should not overreact by torpedoing the alliance , which could trigger even more dangerous actions by Saudi Arabia and play into the hands of U.S. adversaries, such as Iran, Russia, and China. If proven to have occurred, it is likely the murder of Khashoggi was motivated by a sense of insecurity and vulnerability. Washington must take care that its response does not exacerbate that insecurity, leading Riyadh to take further steps that undermine American interests. In any event, the U.S. should try to insulate vital bilateral security cooperation from the fallout of the Khashoggi affair. The worst possible outcome would be a rush to judgement which destroys an important long-term partnership, pushes Saudi Arabia into the arms of Russia or China, and undermines efforts to contain Iran, defeat ISIS , and stabilize the volatile Middle East.

#### Keeping aid increases arms sales

Shapiro 16 Jeremy Shapiro, 10-26-2016, Research Director at the European Council on Foreign Relations. Previously, he was a fellow at the Brookings Institution. Prior to Brookings, he was a member of the U.S. State Department􀍛s policy planning staff, "What a Real Review of U.S. Military Assistance to Saudi Arabia Would Say", War on the Rocks, [https://warontherocks.com/2016/10/what-a-real-review-of-u-s-military-assistance-to-saudiarabia- would-say/ /](https://warontherocks.com/2016/10/what-a-real-review-of-u-s-military-assistance-to-saudiarabia-%20would-say/%20/) MM

A proper review would begin by acknowledging that the sale of U.S. arms to Saudi Arabia is big business. During the span of the Bush and Obama administrations, total U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia increased by nearly 97 percent. The U.S. has offered $115 billion in arms sales to Saudi Arabia during the Obama administration. Over the last three years alone— since the start of negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program — America has sold nearly $36 billion in arms to Saudi Arabia. These sales are certainly in the commercial interests of the United States and the American firms that manufacture the weapons . They create jobs , generatecorporate profits , and improve the U.S. balance of trade. But whether the massive sale of American arms to the Saudis serves U.S. geopolitical interests is a much more debatable proposition. U.S. military assistance to Saudi Arabia is a mere tool of American policy toward the Kingdom, not an end in itself. As such, it should serve broader objectives in the relationship. It should influence the Saudi government to make decisions that support American interests and priorities in the relationship and in the region more broadly. The key question is this: What does the United States want from the Saudis, and how does U.S. military assistance to the Kingdom help or hurt its ability to achieve these goals? For years, the U.S.-Saudi relationship was underpinned by the deal of U.S. security in exchange for Saudi oil. But the United States currently buys very little oil from Saudi Arabia and is no longer dependent on Middle Eastern oil. The increase in U.S. oil and gas production means that Saudi Arabia is no longer even the key swing producer able to stabilize prices. Flexible U.S. producers now fulfill that function, without any government action. While Saudi Arabia is still one of the most important oil producers and continues exert its influence on the price of oil, changes in the energy market combined with Saudi Arabia􀍛s own financial situation mean the Saudi government is no longer able to use the oil price as a strategic weapon to either support or oppose U.S. policy. What remains is the idea that U.S. military assistance buys access to Saudi decision-making, but access is not the same as influence. The Saudis, in a form of reverse leverage, haveoften been able to use the American preoccupation with access to pursue more weapons deals. On the evidence, there is no basis for the belief that U.S. military assistance has led the Saudis to take actions that they would otherwise not have taken. And in the case of Yemen, there is clear evidence that this assistance has empowered the Saudis to take actions that are not in American interests.

#### Arms deals critical to US defense base – Saudi Arabia is a vital market

**Ghoshal 15**--- Debalina, Research Associate, Delhi Policy Group, “The softening of Saudi Arabia towards the Iranian nuclear deal would yield positive results in US-Saudi relations” [http://www.turkishweekly.net/2015/10/15/op-ed/the-softening-of-saudi-arabia-towards-theiranian- nuclear-deal-would-yield-positive-results-in-us-saudi-relations/ /](http://www.turkishweekly.net/2015/10/15/op-ed/the-softening-of-saudi-arabia-towards-theiranian-%20nuclear-deal-would-yield-positive-results-in-us-saudi-relations/%20/) MM

Of course, while the Saudi Arabians might have mellowed down when it comes to the nuclear deal, this does not necessarily mean that they are attempting to improve relations with Iran. Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Adel al Jubeir was quoted as saying that because the nuclear deal assures that Iran would not have easy access to nuclear weapons, it would enable Saudi Arabia to focus more intensely on Iran’s “nefarious” activities in the region. Further, he believes that the deal will “contribute to security and stability”[3] in the region. This softening of the Saudis towards thenuclear deal can only be a step forward on the path to renewing relations between Riyadh and Washington. This relation has been soured not only by the Iranian nuclear deal, but also by the U.S.􀍛s foreign policy on matters pertaining to the Syrian crisis and the fledgling democratic trajectories ofTunisia and Egypt as well as the inability of the U.S. to check Iranian influence in Iraq. Renewed Saudi-U.S. relations would bear positive results**.** Just like Iran, Saudi Arabiahas joined the U nited S tates in its fight againstthe Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Moreover, any discontent with the U.S. on the part of the Saudis could cost the former an important defense export market as Saudi Arabia is one of the leading importers of U.S. weapons. Moreover, the Saudis also know that the nuclear deal is going to be passed by U.S. Congress. Hence, the only solution is to join hands with the U.S. to ensure that the verification mechanisms outlined in the agreement are in place. Also, for the U.S., gaining the Saudi’s confidence is necessary if it is to deploy a regionalTerminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system in the GCCcountries successfully. Estranged relationswith Saudi Arabia could make this effort to deploy a joint missile defense system a difficult task.

#### Defense base is key to deterrence of multiple nuclear wars

**Helprin 15** Mark, senior fellow of the Claremont Institute, Indefensible Defense, 6/22/15 <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/419604/indefensible-defense-mark-helprin> / MM Brackets for a-lang

Continual warfare in the Middle East, a nuclear Iran, electromagnetic-pulse weapons, emerging pathogens, and terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction variously threaten the United States, some with catastrophe on a scale we have not experiencedsince the Civil War. Nevertheless, these are phenomena that bloom and fade, and that, with redirection and augmentation of resources we possess, we are equipped to face, given the wit and will to do so. But underlying the surface chaos that dominates the news cycle are the currents that lead to world war. In governance by tweet, these are insufficiently addressed for being insufficiently immediate. And yet, more than anything else, how we approach the strength of the American military, the nuclear calculus, China, and Russia will determine the security, prosperity, honor, and at long range even the sovereignty and existence of this country. THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR Upon our will to provide for defense, all else rests. Without it, even the most brilliant innovations and trenchant strategies will not suffice. In one form or another, the American way of war and of the deterrence of war has always been reliance on surplus. Even as we barely survived the winter of Valley Forge, we enjoyed immense and forgiving strategic depth, the 3,000-mile barrier of the Atlantic, and the great forests that would later give birth to the Navy. In the Civil War, the North􀍛 s burgeoning industrial and demographic powers meshed with the infancy of America’s technological ascendance to presage superiority in mass industrial — and then scientific — 20th-century warfare. The way we fight is that we do not stint. Subtract the monumental preparations, [hurting] the defense industrial base, and we will fail to deter wars that we will then go on to lose.

## Saudi Oil Relations

#### US-Saudi oil trade flourishing now, but political tensions could damage it. Salvaterra 10/16

[Neanda Salvaterra is an energy reporter for The Wall Street Journal. “U.S. Saudi Tensions Threaten Sweet Oil Deal—Energy Journal,” October 16, 2018. <https://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2018/10/16/energy-journal-u-s-saudi-tensions-threaten-sweet-oil-deal/>] JN

The U.S. Saudi spat over the alleged killing of a journalist may threaten the sweet deal on oil Riyadh has extended to Washington, write the WSJ’s Benoit Faucon and Summer Said. After President Trump demanded on Twitter several times in recent months that oil producers contain prices, the state oil firm Saudi Arabian Oil Co. has kept a lid on the price it charges U.S. customers while raising prices for many other global clients. But the preferential pricing could dry up if tensions over the disappearance of Saudi dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi continue to escalate.

#### Ceasing deals with Saudi Arabia causes oil prices to skyrocket, worsens relations, and shifts Saudi loyalties towards Russia and China.

Aldakhil 18 (Aldakhil, Turki. Saudi journalist and media figure. He is currently the General Manager of Al Arabiya Television News. “US sanctions on Riyadh would mean Washington is stabbing itself.” 14 Oct 2018, <https://english.alarabiya.net/en/features/2018/10/14/US-sanctions-on-Riyadh-would-mean-Washington-is-stabbing-itself.html>. Accessed 4 Dec 2018.)

If US sanctions are imposed on Saudi Arabia, we will be facing an economic disaster that would rock the entire world. Riyadh is the capital of its oil, and touching this would affect oil production before any other vital commodity. It would lead to Saudi Arabia's failure to commit to producing 7.5 million barrels. If the price of oil reaching $80 angered President Trump, no one should rule out the price jumping to $100, or $200, or even double that figure. An oil barrel may be priced in a different currency, Chinese yuan, perhaps, instead of the dollar. And oil is the most important commodity traded by the dollar today. There are simple procedures, that are part of over 30 others, that Riyadh will implement directly, without flinching an eye if sanctions are imposed. All of this will throw the Middle East, the entire Muslim world, into the arms of Iran, which will become closer to Riyadh than Washington. This is all when it comes to oil, but Saudi Arabia is not just about oil, it is a leader in the Muslim world with its standing and geographical importance. And perhaps trusted exchange of information between Riyadh and America and Western countries will be a thing of the past after it had contributed to the protection of millions of Westerners, as testified by senior Western officials themselves. Imposing any type of sanctions on Saudi Arabia by the West will cause the kingdom to resort to other options, US President Donald Trump had said a few days ago, and that Russia and China are ready to fulfill Riyadh’s military needs among others. No one can deny that repercussions of these sanctions will include a Russian military base in Tabuk, northwest of Saudi Arabia, in the heated four corners of Syria, Israel, Lebanon and Iraq. At a time where Hamas and Hezbollah have turned from enemies into friends, getting this close to Russia will lead to a closeness to Iran and maybe even a reconciliation with it. It will not be strange that Riyadh would stop buying weapons from the US. Riyadh is the most important customer of US companies, as Saudi Arabia buys 10 percent of the total weapons that these US companies produce, and buys 85 percent from the US army which means what’s left for the rest of the world is only five percent; in addition to the end of Riyadh’s investments in the US government which reaches $800 billion. The US will also be deprived of the Saudi market which is considered one of the top 20 economies in the world. These are simple procedures that are part of over 30 others that Riyadh will implement directly, without flinching an eye if sanctions are imposed on it, according to Saudi sources who are close to the decision-makers. The truth is thatif Washington imposes sanctions on Riyadh, it will stab its own economy to death, even though it thinks that it is stabbing only Riyadh!

#### This is different from the Oil Crisis – it’s Saudi Arabia using oil as a political weapon through price hikes even if they harm themselves doing it. O’Sullivan 10/19

[Meghan L. O’Sullivan is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. She is a professor of international affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School, and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. She served on the National Security Council from 2004 to 2007. “U.S. Is Forced to See It Is Far From ‘Energy Independent,’” October 19, 2018. <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-10-19/u-s-needs-saudi-oil-despite-talk-of-energy-independence>] JN

Second, in a surprising development, the Saudi Press Agency released a statement some analysts interpreted as a veiled threat that the kingdom was willing to use oil as a political weapon, as it did with other Arab members of OPEC in 1973. I am tempted to dismiss this, as Saudi leaders certainly remember the lessons of the 1970s: high oil prices – particularly ones that are politically driven – push people away from oil. The high prices of the 1970s threw the world into a recession where absolute demand growth for oil did not just slow, but shrunk; global oil demand growth was 7.7 percent in 1972, but this number moved to negative territory in 1974 and 1975, and contracted again by nearly 4 percent in 1980 after the Iranian revolution and Saudi unrest 1979. Particularly at a time when people are actively debating “peak oil demand” and alternative energies are becoming more affordable, the Saudis should be loath to give the world a further strong shove away from oil. Moreover, the reforms of the crown prince are, as would be expected, creating hardship for Saudis who have never had to think about employment or wasting energy. Taking action to cut oil production and, presumably, to accept lower revenues would constrain the ability of the Saudi government to manage its reform agenda and would create more opposition to it than the crown prince is already facing. Nevertheless, Washington policymakers cannot completely dismiss the idea that Saudi Arabia would respond to punitive action for Khashoggi through oil markets. The Saudis do have the capacity to raise prices sharply and abruptly for Americans and the world, if a decision maker – perhaps an impulsive one – decided to do so. With the U.S. still connected to the global market, like it or not, the Saudi leadership has a big say in what prices Americans to fill their cars with gasoline.

#### High oil prices leads to economic downturn

#### Twinrock Partners 18 [Twinrock Partners is a Commercial real estate agency in Newport Beach, California. “WHY THE HIGH PRICE OF OIL IS BAD ECONOMIC NEWS,” May 2, 2018. <https://www.twinrockpartners.com/why-the-high-price-of-oil-is-bad-economic-news/>]

Currently the price of crude oil is hovering at around $70 per barrel – up from about $25 a barrel in February 2016. Even if you own shares in an oil company such as ExxonMobil, BP, or Chevron Corporation, rising oil prices are problematic for the U.S. economy. High oil prices affect all of us, whether you drive a car, use public transit, invest in manufacturing businesses, or even the stock market in general. Rising crude prices quickly put a ceiling on economic growth, something that the U.S. economy can not afford to have happen. Higher crude prices translate into high gasoline and energy prices and boost inflation. In turn, the Federal Reserve will raise interest rates more aggressively than it has been, which causes bond yields to rise (and bond prices to go down), and the cost of financing to increase. We’re beginning to see this happen already: Last week the yield on the 10-year Treasury Note was over 3%, up from 2.1% in September 2017. That’s more than a 40% increase in just seven months. President Trump recently tweeted that oil prices are “artificially Very High!”. Perhaps. But there are several factors occurring in today’s market that are not artificial, and that will likely keep the price of oil – and interest rates – rising: Booming global economy and increasing worldwide oil demand Sanctions on Russia Nullification of the Iran deal Import tariffs on China According to Joseph LaVorgna, Chief Economist for the Americas at the French investment bank Natixis, “Nothing can suck cash flow out of the economy faster that rising oil prices.” It’s hard to argue with that point of view.

## Space Force

### 1NC – Space Force

#### Acting Secretary of Defense is vigorously prioritizing Space Force proposal on a pressed schedule

ERWIN 1/29 Sandra Erwin writes about military space programs, policy, technology and the industry that supports this sector. She has covered the military, the Pentagon, Congress and the defense industry for nearly two decades as editor of NDIA’s National Defense Magazine and Pentagon correspondent for Real Clear Defense., SpaceNews, 1-29-2019, ["Shanahan gearing up for space debate on Capitol Hill", https://spacenews.com/shanahan-gearing-up-for-space-debate-on-capitol-hill/] bcr/RM 2-15-2019

WASHINGTON — Acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan said he anticipates months of debate and negotiations with members of Congress over the standup of a new military branch for space. In his first news conference on Tuesday at the Pentagon as acting defense secretary, Shanahan said he plans to continue to oversee the space reorganization that started last year when he was deputy secretary of defense. He mentioned Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Mike Griffin and Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson as his closest collaborators. “The space effort is one area where I’ll continue to work with Secretary Griffin and Dr. Wilson,” said Shanahan. “I won’t be traveling as much.” A proposal for the establishment of a U.S. Space Force is being finalized and will be sent to the White House for approval before it goes to Capitol Hill along with the budget request for fiscal year 2020. Inside the Pentagon, meanwhile, discussions continue on how to structure a Space Development Agency to be led by Griffin. “Internally, the focus is on ‘How do we go faster with delivering capability?’” Shanahan said. For the first time Shanahan confirmed that the Pentagon is proposing to establish a Space Force within the Department of the Air Force. He suggested that this is the most efficient option to add a new branch without running up overhead costs. “When I go to the Hill to talk to members about where they have concerns or where their interests are, they are very focused on how do we not grow a bureaucracy, how do we not generate unnecessary cost.” A White House policy memo agrees with the Pentagon’s recommendation to place the Space Force in the Department of the Air Force but directs DoD to continue to plan for the creation of a separate Department of the Space Force. Shanahan is expecting some members of Congress to argue that the United States cannot afford the cost of standing up a new military service. “I think about the discussions we’re going to have over the next five to six months,” he said. His response to lawmakers’ concerns will be that the Space Force will be organized in a way that minimizes cost. “It’s going to be small, as small as possible a footprint,” Shanahan said. “That’s why it’s been recommended it sits under the Air Force.” The Pentagon has not revealed any estimates of the potential size or cost of a Space Force. An independent study by the Center for Naval Analyses suggested a Space Force would have 16,000 to 19,000 combined active duty and military personnel. By comparison, the smallest military service today, the Marine Corps, has 186,000 active-duty troops and is organized under the Department of the Navy. The thinking is that the Space Force will be small in size but heavy in technological might. Shanahan has been insistent that his immediate priority is to create a Space Development Agency to help inject innovation into military space programs and speed up the application of commercially available technology. At the press conference, Shanahan did drop a bit of news: A four-star nominee has been selected to lead a new combatant command for space. “We do have a person that we’re going to move through,” he said, although he would not disclose the name of the nominee or the proposed location of the new command. President Trump in a Dec. 18 memo instructed the Pentagon to establish a United States Space Command as a “functional Unified Combatant Command.” In opening remarks, Shanahan said the transition from deputy secretary to acting Pentagon chief has been seamless. After 29 days on the job, he said, “the terrain is not different or new.”

#### Aid termination swamps upper leadership and muddles politics – multiple warrants for tradeoff

SELVA 18 Paul J. Selva – General, USAF, JCS Vice Chairman, Former TRANSCOM commander, graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1980 with a B.S. aeronautical engineering, and completed undergraduate pilot training at Reese AFB, TX. Joint Chiefs of Staff White Paper, 16 March 2018, ["Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning", https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joint\_concept\_integrated\_campaign.pdf?ver=2018-03-28-102833-257] bcr 2-15-2019

In armed conflict, the Joint Force must view military operations and the follow through to secure policy aims as an integrated whole. Tactical and operational successes do not possess intrinsic value but are worthwhile only to 24 the extent that they support larger policy aims. Yet historically the translation of military success into acceptable and sustainable outcomes has been one of the most difficult elements of campaigning. The problem is not merely conceptual. Commanders and their staffs must account for the changes in the political and public atmosphere that commonly take place in the period between the apparent military victory and a true consolidation of gains. In the flush of hard-won triumph, the Joint Force, USG, and American public have in the past experienced some combination of impatience, exuberant optimism, and division about what further aims to pursue. To varying extents, these problems impeded successful follow through in the aftermath of all major conflicts in U.S. history. By their nature, these currents are both unpredictable and largely beyond the control of military commanders. It is possible, however, for the Joint Force to anticipate these shifts and to seek to begin the consolidation of gains as early as possible in order to guard against changes. Commanders and staffs should assume that the withdrawal of resources, imposition of political constraints, and lack of focus will make it more rather than less difficult to achieve acceptable outcomes in the wake of armed conflict. The other consistent theme in history is that by virtue of their size and unique capabilities military forces will continue to play a major role, even if another USG department is in the lead. Wars disrupt political, social, and economic structures, networks, and institutions to the point it is often difficult for them to simply return to their pre-conflict state. The destruction of the old order creates the conditions for intense competitions among various internal, regional, and global actors seeking to retain or gain power, status, or strategic advantage within the new order as it slowly congeals. Even if they remain peaceful these struggles can create difficulties for Joint Force commanders, who are responsible for achieving policy objectives. In the aftermath of war, political, social, and economic competition can often become violent due to the availability of weapons and former fighters.

#### Space Force is key now – threats and leadership decline loom

VIRTS 18 Terry Virts, a retired U.S. Air Force colonel, is a former astronaut who served as commander of the International Space Station. He is a special adviser to Govini, a data and analytics firm based in Arlington. Washington Post. 8/23/2018 [“I was an astronaut. We need a Space Force.”, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/i-was-an-astronaut-we-need-a-space-force/2018/08/23/637667e6-a6fb-11e8-b76b-d513a40042f6_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a80ec49abce0>] bcr 1/25/19

Space has been a hotly contested domain for decades. I can personally attest to this: While I was commander of the International Space Station in 2015, we had to maneuver our spaceship to avoid debris left over from a 2007 Chinese anti-satellite missile demonstration. The threat, however, is only going to get worse. The United States must proactively ensure its ability to operate and defend itself in space — which is why Congress needs to act to finalize the U.S. Space Force as a sixth independent branch of our armed forces. It’s hard to overstate the importance of space in our military operations and civilian life. Though the United States is the world’s leader in space, China and Russia have made it clear they are not willing to accept the status quo. They already have access to weapons that threaten our assets in space, either by destroying them in orbit or by crippling ground control through cyberattacks or radio jamming. Since the Trump administration’s recent announcement of plans to create a Space Force, there has been a fair amount of criticism stemming from a lack of understanding about what such a force would be. It wouldn’t, of course, be a collection of “Star Wars” troops fighting battles in outer space. We cannot even call it a militarization of space — which already occurred in the 1950s when the Soviet army launched Sputnik and the U.S. Navy launched Vanguard. But the Space Force could address serious shortcomings in how effectively our military is organized. As the administration [laid out this month](https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/pence-details-plan-for-creation-of-space-force-in-what-would-be-the-sixth-branch-of-the-military/2018/08/09/0b40b8d0-9bdc-11e8-8d5e-c6c594024954_story.html?utm_term=.d2d31bb704db), the first steps toward creating a Space Force would include creating a subunified Space Command, a Space Operations Force that would initially recruit from the ranks of current military members and a Space Development Agency tasked with procuring space hardware. Though these steps can be taken without major congressional legislation, the final and most important step in creating the Space Force [would require legislators to rewrite Title 10](https://www.defensenews.com/space/2018/06/20/space-force-will-require-legislation-and-a-lot-of-detail-planning-says-mattis/) of the U.S. Code, which outlines the role of armed forces. The last major rewrite was undertaken when the Air Force was created after World War II. Why should Congress make the Space Force a reality? Because space is important and unique enough to deserve its own place at the Defense Department table to ensure rightful allocation of budget resources and power. Our military uses a principle known as “multidomain warfare,” meaning that when tasked with combat, different services all work jointly across the five domains — air, sea, land, space and cyber. However, in peacetime, the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard only “organize, train and equip” by their specific domain. Space as a domain is now mature enough to stand alone. Today, there are officers who “grew up” in Air Force Space Command, beginning as second lieutenants and making their way through the ranks to four-star general. It simply defies logic to keep that domain in the Air Force — akin to having the infantry in the Navy. Air and space are completely unrelated domains, and the equipment, techniques and culture required to operate airplanes are entirely different from those required to launch and operate in space. Though creating a Space Force makes sense from a theoretical point of view, there are legitimate practical concerns. The president wants a Space Force by 2020, a very ambitious timeline. However, the tight deadline serves to light a fire under the sprawling Pentagon bureaucracy, helping to prevent this initiative from floundering over a longer period. There would also be significant initial costs to standing up a new Space Force. In the long run, however, it would become more efficient as duplication across services was reduced. The devil is in the details. What exactly would the Space Force entail? I recommend that such a branch consolidate missions that launch and control satellites in orbit; that develop and procure space-related equipment; and that maintain our land-based nuclear missiles as well as our land-based missile-defense system (for example, to protect us from North Korean missiles). I would also consolidate cyberforces into the Space Force. Though cyber is also its own domain, it is not yet mature enough to warrant a separate Cyber Force. This would also be a sound decision from both an organizational efficiency and a cultural point of view. The 21st century will present continuous challenges to the United States, and we must realize that there is no “manifest destiny” that guarantees our status as world leader. Now is the time to show leadership and vision by properly realigning our military with the reality that space is an essential and unique domain of modern warfare.

#### Deterrence through strength prevents space wars – the impact is societal collapse

PAOLETTA 17 Rae Paoletta, is the Senior Editor at Inverse, overseeing the space science vertical. She previously worked at Gizmodo as a space writer and launched astronomy coverage at MTV News and Revelist. Gizmodo, 3-30-2017, ["Military Officials Say We Need to Prepare for Space War", https://gizmodo.com/military-officials-say-we-need-to-prepare-for-space-war-1793774231] bcr 1-25-2019

What’s old is unfortunately new again: Recently, two military officials said that we should be getting ready for a war in space, a sentence I am ashamed to write in the year 2017. Their advice was seemingly bolstered by a Hill article penned by two national security experts this week, which reminded Americans that North Korea could in theory use a satellite weapon to send an electromagnetic pulse over the United States, triggering widespread blackouts and ultimately, societal collapse. It seems like all those Cold War fears Baby Boomers have repressed for decades are finally getting their chance! “Just as nuclear assets deter aggression by convincing potential adversaries there’s just no benefit to the attack, we have to maintain a space posture that communicates the same strategic message,” US Navy Vice Admiral Charles A. Richard, deputy commander of U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), said on March 22nd during a conference in Washington, D.C., as reported by Space.com. “I submit [that] the best way to prevent war is to be prepared for war, and we’re going to make sure that everyone knows we’re going to be prepared to fight and win wars in all domains, to include space.” As if that wasn’t unsettling enough, a few weeks earlier, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein told Washington Post writer David Ignatius that his branch of military is working toward “space superiority,” which he explained as “freedom from attack and freedom to maneuver.” While Richard and Goldfein’s comments might seem out of the blue, there’s actually a long history of policy—and action—about space as a battleground. In 1967, toward the beginning of the Space Race, the United Nation’s Outer Space Treaty banned the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction from being used anywhere in outer space. But that didn’t stop Cold War powers from propagating the idea that an all-out space war was nigh—in 1983, President Ronald Reagan introduced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), also known as Star Wars, which was a plan to launch an anti-ballistic missile system into space to protect Americans from a Soviet attack. Similarly, Russians entertained the idea of creating “suicide satellites,” which were essentially spacecrafts with rapid-fire cannons attached to them. Like SDI, the idea was eventually scrapped. Then, in the early 2000s under the tenure of President George W. Bush, the notion of bringing our battles beyond Earth resurfaced again. “The idea of ‘space war’ lived primarily in science fiction realms for many years, but became a serious part of US policy discussions with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who talked about the inevitability of space warfare— because war had occurred in other domains of air, land and sea,” Joan Johnson Freese, Professor and former Chair of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College told Gizmodo. “[He talked about] even a ‘space Pearl Harbor.’” Things got a little more real in 2007, when China used an antisatellite weapon from Earth to blow apart one of its own weather satellites in space. Shortly after, the New York Times reported that arms control experts called the test a “troubling development that could foreshadow an antisatellite arms race.” Once president Obama took office, there was a short cooling down period until 2013, when China launched a rocket that was ostensibly for a science mission; reportedly, some researchers were concerned that this was a practice run for future antisatellite weapons. Gizmodo has reached out to the Department of Defense for comment and will update this post if and when we hear back. “With the 2013 Chinese launch the consensus on strategic restraint began to unravel,” Freese said. “The launch, coming soon after both Russia and China testing maneuverable satellites in low Earth orbit—a capability that, until recently, had been demonstrated only by the United States—led to something of a ‘quiet panic’ within the US national space security community.” So while the fear of a space war is nothing new, this perennial anxiety doesn’t get any easier to deal with. While recent comments from military officials might seem aggressive and sort of alarmist, Freese said that all things considered, they’ve dialed it back quite a bit. To be fair, a shooting war in space could be disastrous for astronauts aboard the International Space Station (ISS), communications satellites, and by extension, the rest of us here on Earth. The human toll from an EMP attack that blacks out the electrical grid is also no laughing matter—although claims that such an attack would kill 9 out of every 10 Americans may be a gross exaggeration. “Air Force General and STRATCOM commander John Hyten has toned down that muscular rhetoric, now seemingly advocating deterrence to avoid conflict, because conflict will damage or destroy the space environment critical to US military and civilian daily operations,” Freese said. “This more prudent approach makes much more sense—in terms of achieving US space goals of stability, assured access and protection of the environment—than saber rattling.”

### \*\*\*U – Top

#### Topshelf uniqueness – Shanahan is making tangible strides on the proposal but it’s due in 10 days and congressional support isn’t locked

WEISGERBER 2/12 Marcus Weisgerber, Marcus Weisgerber is the global business editor for Defense One, where he writes about the intersection of business and national security. He has been covering defense and national security issues for more than a decade, previously as Pentagon correspondent for Defense News and chief editor of Inside the Air Force. Defense One, 2-12-2019, ["The US Air Force Has Won Control of the Space Force", https://www.defenseone.com/politics/2019/02/air-force-has-won-control-space-force/154834/?oref=d-river] bcr/RM 2-15-2019

The final version of that proposal is expected to go to lawmakers as soon as Feb. 25, in advance of the White House’s 2020 budget request, which is expected on Capitol Hill in mid-March. A separate space policy directive being prepped for Trump’s signature, known as SPD-4, also describes the Space Force as being part of the Air Force. Under the proposal, Wilson would oversee the Space Force, just as Navy Secretary Richard Spencer oversees the Marine Corps. The proposal also calls for creating a Space Force undersecretary below Wilson, along with two four-star billets: a chief of staff who would be a member of the Joint Chiefs, and a vice chief of staff. Former Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Joe Dunford were also said to share Wilson’s reluctance to create a full separate service. But in the past few months, several defense and administration officials acknowledged a larger embracing of the issues, largely because the proposal limits the creation of new bureaucracy. The officials all spoke on the condition of anonymity to candidly discuss the Space Force proposal, which still hasn’t been completely finalized. “This is the ‘Department of Get Stuff Done’,” Shanahan said during the Jan. 17 release of the administration’s Missile Defense Review as Trump stood just off stage right. The acting secretary called the Space Force part of the missile defense mission. The following week, Shanahan said he would be working on the Space Force planning with Wilson and Mike Griffin, the defense undersecretary for research and engineering who is leading the effort to create a Space Development Agency to oversee the Pentagon’s new satellite projects. The cost of the Space Force remains unclear clear, although the draft legislative proposal calls for $363 million over the next five years, or about $72.5 million per year for the headquarters. On Monday, Space News reported that the total cost for the Space Force headquarters, Space Development Agency and U.S. Space Command, a new warfighting command, would cost $270 million in fiscal 2020. The main remaining question is whether lawmakers will back the proposal — and opposition appears to be softening. Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash., chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, told Politico that the Pentagon’s Space Force proposal is “probably a good template to work off of, and then the devil is in the details. I believe that space needs to be emphasized.”

### U – Brink/Congress

#### Congress is likely to approve in bipartisan fashion but agreement is fragile and the proposal needs to be airtight

ERWIN 1/8 Sandra Erwin, writes about military space programs, policy, technology and the industry that supports this sector. She has covered the military, the Pentagon, Congress and the defense industry for nearly two decades as editor of NDIA’s National Defense Magazine and Pentagon correspondent for Real Clear Defense. SpaceNews, 1-8-2019, ["Thornberry predicts Space Force will have bipartisan support in the House", https://spacenews.com/thornberry-predicts-space-force-will-have-bipartisan-support-in-the-house/] bcr 1-25-2019

WASHINGTON — The outgoing chairman of the House Armed Services Committee predicts there will be bipartisan support for a new military branch for space even in a Democratic-led House of Representatives. But the Trump administration should expect its Space Force proposal to be thoroughly vetted and challenged. “Our job is not to just swallow whatever they send us,” Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-Texas) told reporters on Capitol Hill on Tuesday. Thornberry’s committee passed legislation in 2017 to establish a Space Corps within the Air Force, and the language made it into the House version of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2018. The Space Corps provision was not supported by the Senate and ultimately was removed from the NDAA. “Sometimes I have to remind the folks at DoD that we started this first,” Thornberry said. “It did have large bipartisan support when it came out of the House.” Congress may be more deeply divided but there is still some level of agreement about the need for national security space reforms, Thornberry said. “There has been consistent bipartisan support for greater emphasis on space, including organizational reform.” When the House debated the issue of whether to create a separate organization devoted to space, he added, “we gave all the reasons why that was important for the security of the country.”

### U – SDA Crunch/Key

#### SDA plans are due shortly after and are key to the space force – Shanahan is pushing the DoD

ALBON 1/23 Courtney Albon, is senior editor for aviation and space at Inside Defense. She has covered the Air Force since 2012, reporting largely on space programs and fighter aircraft acquisition, development and budget from inside Capitol Hill, the Pentagon, and from military installations around the United States. She graduated from American University in 2008, where she studied journalism and sociology. InsideDefense, 1-23-2019, ["Shanahan gives USD R&amp;E initial authority over new SDA, orders plan by March 1", https://insidedefense.com/inside-pentagon/shanahan-gives-usd-re-initial-authority-over-new-sda-orders-plan-march-1?destination=node/201686] bcr 1-25-2019

The Pentagon plans to establish a new Space Development Agency under the authority of Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Michael Griffin by the end of March, according to a new memo from acting Defense Secretary Pat Shanahan. The Jan. 19 memo, obtained by Inside Defense, directs Griffin to develop a plan to create the new agency. The plan is due March 1 and the intent is to stand up the agency no later than March 29. The memo notes that SDA would initially reside "under the authority, direction and control" of Griffin's office, but would eventually transition to a new U.S. Space Force if Congress approves the creation of a new service. The Pentagon announced in August its roadmap for a major space reorganization, including the creation of a new military service, a Space Force, and a new space development and acquisition hub, SDA. In his memo, Shanahan writes that the new agency will play a key role in driving innovation. "As the worldwide pace of technological innovation continues to accelerate, the DOD must make changes to our research, development, and acquisition processes to protect U.S. vital interests in space," the memo states. "Key among these changes is the establishment of the Space Development Agency."

### \*\*\*L – Focus

#### Attempted 2019 cuts proves the link – massive changes to pentagon appropriates and foggy prioritization.

DONNELLY 18 John M. Donnelly, CQ Roll Call senior writer John M. Donnelly – won the Everett McKinley Dirksen Award for Distinguished Reporting of Congress for his coverage of national security and foreign policy.Roll Call, 7-19-2018, ["Senate to Weigh Large Cuts to Military Aid", https://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/senate-weigh-large-cuts-military-aid] bcr/RM 2-16-2019

The Senate will soon take up a Defense spending bill that would cut nearly $2.5 billion in military aid to foreign fighting forces, an unusually large budget subtraction some say reflects a fundamental change in lawmakers’ security priorities. At issue is the $675 billion fiscal 2019 Defense money bill, which Senate Appropriations approved late last month and which the chamber may take up later this month. The measure would downsize President Donald Trump’s requests for programs that equip or train militaries and militias that are combating terrorists on America’s behalf in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria and beyond. Some of the proposed cuts are reductions to the president’s fiscal 2019 budget request, and some are so-called rescissions of fiscal 2018 funding that hasn’t yet been spent. The nearly $2.5 billion in recommended cuts is one of the largest changes to any category of defense spending in either the Senate’s Pentagon appropriations bill or the House’s, and it would stand out as one of the heftiest reductions to any single category of defense programs in recent memory, analysts said. “It’s an unusually large amount to cut,” said Mark Cancian, a defense budget expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

### XL - Force Withdrawal

#### Plan distracts DoD leadership – withdrawal and force agreements require difficult and lengthy negotiations

Walter Slocombe et al, senior counsel @ Caplin & Drysale – former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy - graduated summa cum laude from Princeton University, the Harvard Law School, and a Rhodes Scholar International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) - a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide the Department of State with research, January 16 2015 [“Report on Status of Forces Agreements”, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236456.pdf>] bcr 3-15-2017

The effort over the last decade or so to impose the GST as a single standardized model has not been successful. To be sure, in some cases it has been possible to reach agreement on the GST text, and the United States has a legitimate interest in consistency among SOFAs, if only to be able to resist claims by individual host nations for special treatment (or insist on treatment equivalent to that afforded some other country).

However, host countries have in many instances been unwilling to accept our standard terms. Internal U.S. procedures – such as a requirement that all significant variations from the GST form require interagency clearance – make it unnecessarily difficult for our negotiators to reach compromises that involve varying the standard terms. The result is no agreed protection, or, at best long delays in reaching agreements – and either foregoing useful military engagement and activities, or conducting them with no agreed status protections whatever.

### XL – Base Closure

#### Plan distracts DoD leadership – base closure requires in-depth assessment and negotiations

R. Chuck Mason, Legislative Attorney, Legislative Attorney at Library of Congress – educated @ The Catholic University of America, Congressional Research Service, February 28 2013 ["Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC): Transfer and Disposal of Military Property ", https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40476.pdf] bcr 3-15-2017

At this point, BRAC property is subjected to two simultaneous evaluation processes: the redevelopment planning process performed by a local redevelopment authority composed of various interested representatives of the community affected by the BRAC action; and a Department of Defense analysis prepared under the aegis of the National Environmental Policy Act and, eventually, informed by the local redevelopment plan.

As a part of this process, screening of the property must be performed to determine if a homeless assistance use would be appropriate. There are also a variety of “public benefit transfers,” under which the property may be conveyed for various specified public purposes at reduced cost. It is also possible to dispose of BRAC property through the use of a public auction or negotiated sale, for which fair market value or a proxy for fair market value must generally be obtained. Finally the law governing the BRAC process authorizes economic development conveyances, through which a local redevelopment authority may obtain the property for specified purposes, sometimes for no consideration.

### \*\*\*IL/! – (TOP) SF Deters/Deter K2 Survival

#### Space Force is the only effective route to deterrent of space wars – failure means modern life as we know is over – vote neg for victory, vote aff for the dark ages part 2

BELL 18 Larry Bell is an endowed professor of space architecture at the University of Houston where he founded the Sasakawa International Center for Space Architecture (SICSA) and the graduate program in space architecture. He is the author of "Scared Witless: Prophets and Profits of Climate Doom" (2015) and "Climate of Corruption: Politics and Power Behind the Global Warming Hoax" (2012). He is currently working on a new book with Buzz Aldrin, "Beyond Footprints and Flagpoles.", Newsmax, 7-9-2018, ["Trump's Space Force Makes Practical, Strategic Sense", https://www.newsmax.com/larrybell/china-communications-intelligence/2018/07/09/id/870653/] bcr 1-25-2019

NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine recently reminded us, "Our way of life is dependent on space. The way we communicate. Over the horizon communications. The way we produce food. The way we produce energy. "The way we do disaster relief. In fact, the way we do banking in the United States of America, if we lose the GPS signal, there are no interbank transfers. That means there will be no milk in the grocery store. Our way of life shuts down." Echoing this, Rep. Jim Cooper, D-Tenn., who sits on the House Armed Services Committee said at a February Center for Strategic and International Studies Forum, "We could be deaf, dumb and blind within seconds. Seldom has a great nation been so vulnerable. The Space Force would develop and operate the ultimate "eye in the sky" in an ever-expanding theater of national security operations. Just as now, satellites will afford unmatched insight and oversight of enemy and allied positions; will transmit and coordinate data in real-time with intel from ground forces; and will reveal and enable effective target acquisition of hidden weapon and munition depots. As for "space wars," a major threat lies in our adversaries’ capacities to attack our orbital space assets. Russia and China are known to possess dedicated anti-satellite systems which can imperil our vital communications and navigation satellite systems — GPS tracking included. There should be no question that the primary purpose of a space force must be to achieve space superiority which denies any foe the use of, and access to, low Earth orbit and beyond. In doing so, the new military department’s most important role will be to prevent wars — to marshal sufficient U.S. assets and power to make any potential enemy think twice and thrice about making trouble. The legendary Chinese strategist Sun Tzu said nearly 1,500 years ago that the most excellent way to win a war is to do so without fighting. Let’s hope President Xi Jinping, among other international leaders, got that memo.

### IL – SF K2 Presence

#### Only a space force can resolve the systemic issues and create a robust space presence

Todd Harrison, Senior Fellow at the International Security Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10-3-2018 ["Why We Need a Space Force", https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-we-need-space-force, 1-25-2019] JRB

With all of this in mind, I have concluded that only a separate department for space can adequately address the three central problems discussed above. Only a Department of the Space Force can fully integrate all the existing space organizations and personnel in the Services and intelligence agencies into one unified chain of command with one person, the Secretary of the Space Force, in charge of national security space. This would eliminate the fragmented authorities and responsibilities that have plagued national security space for decades; create a robust cadre of space professionals to develop space-centric strategy, doctrine, and policy; and remove the conflicts of interest that have short-changed space programs in the other Services.

### IL – SF Solves/A2 Sqou Solves

#### Scattered space efforts across other branches are eroding space superiority – we need focus on the space domain to maintain it

Joe Pappalardo, editor, Popular Mechanics, 6-19-2018 ["Why Would We Need a U.S. Space Force, Anyway?", https://www.popularmechanics.com/space/satellites/a19433822/us-space-force-reasons/, 1-25-2019] JRB

American forces must “gain and maintain space superiority” as a condition for fighting, he said. This echoes the way the USAF first gains control of the airspace above before engaging in a ground campaign. One reason that superiority may erode is that disparate space-related efforts are scattered across the Army, Air Force, and Navy, not to mention intelligence officers, National Reconnaissance Office and Space and Missile Systems Center. Doug Loverro, a former DoD Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, noted that fighting in space is different than fighting anywhere else, in the same way that the Navy prepares for unique combat at sea. “We lack that focus for space, one of our five main warfighting domains,” he said.

### IL – A2 Decentralization Better

#### Space resources are too fragmented now for any leadership to emerge – this delays and diminishes our capabilities

Todd Harrison, Senior Fellow at the International Security Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10-3-2018 ["Why We Need a Space Force", https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-we-need-space-force, 1-25-2019] JRB

First, authority and responsibility for space is fragmented. A [2016 Government Accountability Office (GAO) study](https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/678697.pdf) found that there are more than 60 different organizations strewn across the Department of Defense (DoD) and the intelligence community with responsibility for space acquisitions. While more than [80 percent](https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/113903/air-force-officials-take-space-budget-acquisition-strategy-to-capitol-hill/) of DoD’s unclassified space funding in a typical year is in the Air Force, key components of the space architecture, such as user terminals, ground control systems, some satellites, and many of the personnel that operate these systems, reside in the Army and Navy. Moreover, classified space funding for the National Reconnaissance Office and other intelligence agencies in the [Military Intelligence Program budget](https://fas.org/irp/budget/mip-fy2016.pdf) may rival the Air Force’s unclassified space funding in magnitude. Real authority in the Pentagon is budget authority. When the budget for national security space is fragmented across so many different organizations, it means that no one has the authority to make enterprise-wide decisions and tradeoffs. As [GAO has noted](https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/675694.pdf), “there is no single individual, office, or entity in place that provides oversight for the overall space program acquisition structure.” The Air Force cannot force the Army to speed up the fielding of next-generation GPS receivers and satellite communications terminals any more than the Army can compel the Air Force to delay launching its next-generation constellation of satellites. This lack of centralized leadership leads to slow decision making, disunity of effort in building new space capabilities, and a lack of accountability when space programs go over budget or fall far behind schedule. As [OMB has noted](https://aerospace.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/FY17-NDAA-1616-OMB-Report.pdf), the net effect of this is “delayed and diminished capabilities for combatant commanders, warfighters, and others.”

### IL – A2 Other Branches Better

#### The other military services like the Air Force can’t solve because space is inherently a secondary domain to them – they will always put space on the backburner

Todd Harrison, Senior Fellow at the International Security Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10-3-2018 ["Why We Need a Space Force", https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-we-need-space-force, 1-25-2019] JRB

The third core problem is that the Services have inherent conflicts of interest when it comes to space. Because the Services are organized around their primary domain of responsibility, space is viewed as a secondary or supporting function. The Air Force has long bemoaned the fact that it funds the vast majority of unclassified space systems and that the other Services place requirements on space systems that the Air Force is expected to fund. Former Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan summed up the Air Force’s institutional view of space aptly, noting in an [interview](http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2003/January%202003/0103space.pdf) that the Air Force “can’t afford to be the bank for all space systems,” and that “space is not a welfare system.” The Air Force would never say the same thing about its aviation programs. When the Services must choose between space and their native domain, one should expect that they will choose what they are organized to do. For example, in the most recent defense budget downturn, Air Force funding for aircraft procurement and space procurement declined by roughly one-third each (adjusting for inflation) from FY 2010 to FY 2014. But once the overall budget started growing again, Air Force aircraft procurement funding rebounded by more than 50 percent while space procurement funding declined by another 17 percent. The Air Force should not be faulted when it chooses air over space—that’s what our domain-centric Services are designed to do. As Carl Builder noted in the[Masks of War](https://www.amazon.com/dp/0801837766/ref%3Drdr_ext_tmb), “the most powerful institutions in the American national security arena are the military services,” and the problem is there is no military Service that consistently advocates for space.

### ! – Try-or-Die Framing

#### The next conflict we engage in will use space, and the only way to be prepared is to have a Space Force to develop those capabilities

Dean Cheng, senior researcher in the Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, Heritage Foundation, n.d. ["Does the United States Need a Space Force?", https://www.heritage.org/space-policy/heritage-explains/does-the-united-states-need-space-force, 1-25-2019] JRB

In the next conflict, if it involves a major power or even a mid-size power increasing, it will have operations in space. And by the way, those operations in space while we tend to focus on the really cool images of a kinetic anti-satellite weapon just colliding with and blowing up into fragments, could also include cyber attacks where the satellite turns itself off for example. And a lot of countries are developing that set of capabilities. So because a lot of people will have the ability to operate in space, because of the importance of space to us, we need to be thinking about that set of capabilities that is encompassed by our space systems. For better or worse, the only way you're going to do that at this point it seems is to have a service, a Space Force if you will, whose job is to be thinking about this. Living, eating, breathing, sleeping space. And thinking about what kinds of systems to acquire and part of that of course is how to pay for it.

### ! – Timeframe Framing

#### Timeframe is key – risks are growing each day and the longer we wait, the worse the transition to a space force will be, risking indefinite partial solutions.

Todd Harrison, Senior Fellow at the International Security Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10-3-2018 ["Why We Need a Space Force", https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-we-need-space-force, 1-25-2019] JRB

I must confess that I was not convinced at first that a separate department for space was the right next step. While I felt that eventually, we would need to create something like a Space Force given the growing economic and military importance of space, it seemed like too much change at once. Ideally, one would gradually transition to a Space Corps within the Air Force and then eventually to an independent Space Force, as previous studies have recommended. But Washington politics is not conducive to multi-phase reorganizations. If Congress passes legislation for an initial reorganization, there is no guarantee it will ever get around to finishing the job. We risk being left with a partial solution indefinitely. The cost of creating the Space Force is also a legitimate concern. In a [leaked memo](https://www.defenseone.com/politics/2018/09/creating-space-force-will-cost-13b-over-5-years-air-force-secretary/151312/), the Air Force estimates it would cost nearly $13 billion over five years to stand up both the Space Force and Space Command. To arrive at such a lofty figure, the Air Force assumed the broadest possible scope for the Space Force, even encompassing parts of NASA and the Department of Commerce. It also threw in a billion-dollar new headquarters building and assumed 13,000 new personnel would be needed. A Space Force that encompasses all of the space-related organizations in DoD and the intel community at the size they are today would likely be [similar in headcount to the Coast Guard](https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/documents/budget/FY%202019%20USCG%20Congressional%20Justification.pdf#page=67) (roughly 50,000 active duty and civilian personnel). It therefore stands to reason that the new personnel needed to staff the Space Force’s headquarters would be similar in size to the Coast Guard’s headquarters staff (roughly 2,600 personnel, or about 5 percent of the total workforce), and all other Space Force personnel would be drawn from the existing space workforce spread across the Services and intel community. Using the same cost assumptions as the Air Force’s estimate, the additional cost of standing up the Space Force would be less than $3 billion over five years. This is a small price to pay for the many problems a Space Force would help address. Space capabilities are already an indispensable component of U.S. military power, and the threats posed to U.S. space systems by China, Russia, and others are growing by the day. While reorganizing will certainly be disruptive in the short-term, it will be even more disruptive the longer we wait. If you believe that the threat environment is becoming more complex and challenging, then it’s better to take the risk of disruption now rather than later. Much like aviation during the interwar period, space and counterspace technologies are rapidly evolving, and these capabilities are likely to play a decisive role in the next major war. I am convinced that the time for a separate military department for space is upon us, and we should not wait for another Pearl Harbor to prove it.

### ! – A2 Militarization

#### Space mil is non-unique and good – the Outer Space Treaty doesn’t forbid it, the space force didn’t suddenly just start the trend, and US military assets in space have saved tens of thousands of lives

Douglas Loverro, writer, SpaceNews, 6-25-2018 ["Why the United States needs a Space Force", https://spacenews.com/why-the-united-states-needs-a-space-force/, 1-25-2019] JRB

President Trump on June 18 ordered the Pentagon to create a separate military service to focus on national security space. Outside a cohort of people who have worked this issue for many years, the announcement was met with a different mixture of reactions — Star Wars humor, political derision and interservice sarcasm. The reactions reveal a broad misunderstanding of what a Space Force would do or what it would look like. The most common critique was that the president had suddenly militarized space. He hadn’t. That process began decades ago under President Eisenhower. In the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, President Eisenhower and the Congress created NASA to control all U.S. space activities except those “peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapons, military space operations, or the defense of the United States.” That military job was handed to the Department of Defense. That same year, DoD created the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA then, Defense ARPA or DARPA now) specifically to prevent the kind of technological surprise that Sputnik represented. ARPA quickly became the lead for all military space activities. While work actually took place in the Army, Navy, and Air Force, ARPA guided it; and over the next decade, just about every military mission we do today in space was birthed and tested. While in a classic sense many of those missions did not appear to be military weapons, they quickly became an integral part of the way the U.S. planned to execute war, specifically nuclear war. And in the nation’s first space policy, National Security Council Planning Board memo 5814, Eisenhower envisioned that “The effective use of outer space…will enhance [our] military capabilities. Military uses of outer space would include anti-ballistic missiles; communications, weather and navigation; defensive outer space vehicles; and even bombardment from space. Space has been militarized from the very beginning. And that’s a good thing. Over the decades, those military space missions have saved tens of thousands of American, allied, and non-combatant lives, led to dramatic decreases in collateral damage, and allowed the U.S. and others to provide swift and timely responses to humanitarian needs and security crises worldwide. Many of the president’s detractors pointed out, incorrectly, that the Outer Space Treaty reserves space for only peaceful purposes, but that’s just not true. It is true that the treaty specifically restricts the Moon or other celestial bodies for peaceful purposes, but it was intentionally silent with regards to outer space — simply because the two major signatories, the United States and the Soviet Union, were already using space for military applications and planned to continue to do so into the future.

## Terror

### 1NC – Terror DA

#### US counterterror working now – continued success key

Schmitt 18 (Eric Schmitt is a senior writer covering terrorism and national security for The New York Times. Since 2007, he has reported on terrorism issues, with assignments to Pakistan, Afghanistan, North Africa, Southeast Asia among others. He is the co-author, with The Times’s Thom Shanker, of “Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America’s Secret Campaign Against Al Qaeda,” 7-6-18, "ISIS May Be Waning, but Global Threats of Terrorism Continue to Spread," New York Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/06/world/middleeast/isis-global-terrorism.html>, JKS)

That spate of action, over the past few weeks alone, illustrates the shifting and enduring threat from Islamic extremism around the world that will last long after the Islamic State, also known as ISIS, is defeated on the battlefield. **From the scheming of lone extremists with no apparent connections to terrorist groups, like the ricin plots, to fighters aligned with the Islamic State or Al Qaeda in more than two dozen countries, terrorist threats are** as **complex** and diverse as ever, American and other Western intelligence officials said in interviews. **The Islamic State**, in particular, **is adapting to setbacks and increasingly using the tools of globalization — including Bitcoin and encrypted communications — to take their fight underground** and rally adherents around the world. “If you look across the globe, the cohesive nature of the enterprise for ISIS has been maintained,” Russell Travers, the acting head of the National Counterterrorism Center, said in an interview. “There’s not been any breaking up, at least not as yet,” Mr. Travers said. “The message continues to resonate with way too many people.” The Pentagon’s latest defense strategy elevates Russia and China above terrorism in the hierarchy of national threats. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis met late last month with the four-star commanders of American Special Operations forces and troops in Africa to discuss options for halving the number of counterterrorism forces on the continent over the next three years, and assigning them new missions. Yet many counterterrorism specialists voiced concern that refocusing resources and political capital could go too far and give violent extremists time and space to regroup and rebound — much as the Islamic State did in 2013, emerging from the ashes of Al Qaeda in Iraq. “**Terrorist networks have spread,” said Christopher P. Costa, a former senior director for counterterrorism** to President Trump’s National Security Council. “I fear that without continuing counterterrorism pressure, where there are ungoverned spaces used as sanctuaries, there will be resurgent threats,” said Mr. Costa, now the executive director of the International Spy Museum in Washington. **American allies are echoing similar fears.** “Europe faces an intense, unrelenting and multidimensional international terrorist threat,” Andrew Parker, the head of Britain’s domestic spy service, MI5, said in a rare address in Berlin in May. The ledger on the Islamic State is a mix of glaring weaknesses and stubborn offsetting strengths. **The Islamic State has lost nearly all of the territory it seized in 2014 in Iraq and Syria, but it still controls about 1,000 square miles**, or roughly twice the size of Los Angeles, according to American officials. “There’s still hard fighting ahead,” Mr. Mattis told reporters last week. **Many of the group’s senior leaders have been killed. But American intelligence and military officials warn that the Islamic State still holds sway with a potent appeal on social media for adherents, from Europe to the Philippines, to carry out attacks wherever they are**. Thousands of the roughly 40,000 fighters from more than 120 countries who joined the Islamic State in battle since 2014 died in Syria and Iraq, American and other Western officials said. But many thousands more probably slipped away to conflicts in Libya, Yemen or the Philippines, or went into hiding in countries like Turkey, the officials said. “I worry about very seasoned fighters who will pop up periodically,” said Mr. Travers, who noted that the continuing turmoil in Syria makes it harder for spy agencies to monitor terrorists on the run. “**Some are being tracked, some aren’t.**” Even Islamic State fighters who have been caught pose a dilemma. The United States military is spending about $1 million to help detain thousands of Islamic State fighters and their family members in makeshift camps run by Kurdish militias in northern Syria, drawing the Pentagon deeper into the war-zone detention operations that it has sought to avoid. Critics fear the facilities could become breeding grounds for extremists and repeat a key security miscue of the Iraq war. The recently resumed offensive in the Middle Euphrates River Valley, called Operation Roundup, has swelled the number of people held in converted schools and office buildings to about 600 Islamic State fighters from more than 40 countries, military officials said. Only one country has agreed to repatriate its citizen-fighters, and American officials have refused to identify it, fearing the publicity would dissuade any other takers. New evidence of Islamic extremism has spread to countries that have not dealt with it before, like Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In the northern Mozambican province of Cabo Delgado, a group that alternates between the names al-Sunnah wa Jama’ah, Swahili Sunna or al‑Shabab, has unleashed a series of attacks on an impoverished region bordering Tanzania. Local officials said the group has no formal links with the Islamic extremist group Shabab in Somalia, but has copied many of their tactics. Since they appeared last October, the Mozambican Shabab have attacked police stations, government buildings and local villages. Last month alone, nearly 40 people died in the brutal attacks and more than 1,000 were displaced as the militants burned homes, stores and other buildings. The group’s motivations for the attacks remain unknown. It has made no public statements, nor has it claimed credit for the attacks. But military and intelligence officials said it was most likely formed in reaction to the extreme poverty in Mozambique’s only predominantly Muslim region. “We are at an inflection point in the broader campaign against terrorism,” said Laith Alkhouri, a senior director at Flashpoint, a business risk intelligence company in New York, assessing the global terrorist threat. Over the past month alone, and armed with new authorities from Mr. Trump, **American Special Operations forces continue to hunt Islamic State and Qaeda operatives.** In June, Mr. Trump nominated a former member of the Navy SEALs, Vice Adm. Joseph Maguire, to be the next director of the National Counterterrorism Center. On June 6, an American Reaper drone killed four Islamic State fighters near Bani Walid, Libya, about 110 miles southeast of Tripoli, Libya’s capital. A week later, another Reaper killed a Qaeda operative 50 miles southeast of Bani Walid. Ten days later, in central Yemen, American airstrikes attacked Qaeda fighters in the contested central Hadramout region. The risks of these missions was laid bare on June 8, when an American Special Operations soldier was killed and four others were wounded in an attack in southwestern Somalia against Shabab fighters. Even away from the battlefield, extremists on social media and the internet are proving to be potent. French authorities foiled a ricin plot by an Egyptian-born student in May after intercepting messages on the secure social media platform Telegram. And in Cologne, Germany, authorities acting on information from American intelligence agencies last month arrested a Tunisian man who tried to buy 1,000 castor bean seeds and a coffee grinder online. The shell of the castor bean is highly poisonous and can be used to make ricin. Plots involving ricin are not new. In 2011, for instance, American counterterrorism officials voiced increasing concern that Al Qaeda’s most dangerous regional affiliate — its branch in Yemen — was trying to produce ricin, to be packed around small explosives for attacks against the United States. The threat never materialized. Now, **officials worry that the know-how from these specialized battlefield plots and operations is seeping into everyday social media conduits, where they are available for aspiring terrorists and even lone actors in their own lethal plans**. Mr. Travers declined to elaborate on the German plot. But, “it does appear that the possibility of this kind of use is growing,” he said, speaking broadly of extremists’ use of chemical weapons and other poisons. “And that is a concern to all of us.”

#### <Insert Link>

#### Terror causes extinction

Jaspal 12 (Zafar Nawaz, Associate Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan; “Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism: Myth or Reality?” Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 19.1, 91-111)

The misperception, miscalculation and above all ignorance of the ruling elite about security puzzles are perilous for the national security of a state. Indeed, in an age of transnational terrorism and unprecedented dissemination of dual-use nuclear technology, **ignoring** nuclear **terrorism** threat **is an imprudent policy choice.** The incapability of terrorist organizations to engineer fissile material does not eliminate completely the possibility of nuclear terrorism. At the same time, the absence of an example or precedent of a nuclear/ radiological terrorism does not qualify the assertion that the nuclear/radiological terrorism ought to be remained a myth. Far~~sighted~~ **rationality obligates that one** should **not miscalculate** transnational terrorist **groups — whose behavior suggests** that they have **a death wish** — of acquiring nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological material producing capabilities. In addition, one could be sensible about the published information that **huge amount of nuclear material is spread around the globe.** According to estimate **it is enough to build more than 120,000** Hiroshima-sized nuclear **bombs** (Fissile Material Working Group, 2010, April 1). The alarming fact is that a few **storage sites** of nuclear/radiological materials **are inadequately secured** and continue to be accumulated **in unstable regions** (Sambaiew, 2010, February). **Attempts** at stealing fissile material **had already been discovered** (Din & Zhiwei, 2003: 18). ¶ Numerous evidences confirm that terrorist groups had aspired to acquire fissile material for their terrorist acts. Late Osama bin Laden, the founder of al Qaeda stated that acquiring nuclear weapons was a “religious duty” (Yusufzai, 1999, January 11). The IAEA also reported that “al-Qaeda was actively seeking an atomic bomb.” Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl, a dissenter of Al Qaeda, in his trial testimony had “revealed his extensive but unsuccessful efforts to acquire enriched uranium for al-Qaeda” (Allison, 2010, January: 11). On November 9, 2001, Osama bin Laden claimed that “we have chemical and nuclear weapons as a deterrent and if America used them against us we reserve the right to use them (Mir, 2001, November 10).” On May 28, 2010, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, a Pakistani nuclear scientist confessed that he met Osama bin Laden. He claimed that “I met Osama bin Laden before 9/11 not to give him nuclear know-how, but to seek funds for establishing a technical college in Kabul (Syed, 2010, May 29).” He was arrested in 2003 and after extensive interrogation by American and Pakistani intelligence agencies he was released (Syed, 2010, May 29). Agreed, Mr. Mahmood did not share nuclear know-how with Al Qaeda, but his meeting with Osama establishes the fact that **the terrorist organization was in contact with nuclear scientists.** Second, **the terrorist group has sympathizers in the nuclear scientific bureaucracies.** It also authenticates bin Laden’s Deputy Ayman Zawahiri’s claim which he made in December 2001: “**If you have $30 million, go to the black market in the central Asia, contact any disgruntled Soviet scientist and a lot of dozens of smart briefcase bombs are available** (Allison, 2010, January: 2).” ¶ The covert meetings between nuclear scientists and al Qaeda members could not be interpreted as idle threats and thereby the threat of nuclear/radiological terrorism is real. The Defense Secretary Robert Gates admitted in 2008 that “what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear (Mueller, 2011, August 2).” Indeed, the nuclear deterrence strategy cannot deter the transnational terrorist syndicate from nuclear/radiological terrorist attacks. Daniel Whiteneck pointed out:¶ **“Evidence suggests, for example, that al Qaeda might not only use WMD simply to demonstrate the magnitude of its capability but that it might actually welcome the escalation of a strong U.S. response, especially** if it included **catalytic effects** on governments and societies in the Muslim world. **An adversary that prefers escalation regardless of the consequences cannot be deterred”** (Whiteneck, 2005, Summer: 187)¶ Since taking office, President Obama has been reiterating that **“nuclear weapons represent the ‘gravest threat’ to United States and international security.”** While realizing that the US could not prevent nuclear/radiological terrorist attacks singlehandedly, he launched 47an international campaign to convince the international community about the increasing threat of nuclear/ radiological terrorism. He stated on April 5, 2009: “Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold (Remarks by President Barack Obama, 2009, April 5).” He added: “**One terrorist with one nuclear weapon could unleash massive destruction. Al Qaeda has said it seeks a bomb and that it would have no problem with using it.** And we know that there is unsecured nuclear material across the globe” (Remarks by President Barack Obama, 2009, April 5). In July 2009, at the G-8 Summit, President Obama announced the convening of a Nuclear Security Summit in 2010 to deliberate on the mechanism to “secure nuclear materials, combat nuclear smuggling, and prevent nuclear terrorism” (Luongo, 2009, November 10). President Obama’s nuclear/radiological threat perceptions were also accentuated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1887 (2009). The UNSC expressed its grave concern regarding ‘the threat of nuclear terrorism.” It also recognized the need for all States “to take effective measures to prevent nuclear material or technical assistance becoming available to terrorists.” The UNSC Resolution called “for universal adherence to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment, and the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.” (UNSC Resolution, 2009)

### Link – General

#### Military aid key to counter-terror.

Heinrech et al. 17 [Tobias, University of Southern California, Carla Martinez Machain, Kansas State University, Jared Oestman, Rice University, “Does counterterrorism militarize foreign aid? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa”, published 2017, accessible online at <https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Tobias_Heinrich3/publication/313835806_Does_counterterrorism_militarize_foreign_aid_Evidence_from_sub-Saharan_Africa/links/5a0efd52a6fdccd95db7290d/Does-counterterrorism-militarize-foreign-aid-Evidence-from-sub-Saharan-Africa.pdf>] // BBM

When aid is used as a counterterrorism tool, it can either be used to bolster the capabilities of a state that is fighting terrorists or to buy counterterrorism cooperation from states that are located in key regions (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2009). In our theory, we address how a change in the security concerns of the United States in a region can lead to aid being used as a counterterrorism tool through the aforementioned channels. Once aid takes on this form, we then expect the composition of aid to shift as well. When terrorist groups either initiate or expand operations in a new region, states in that area will increase in salience to the United States (Aning, 2010; Bell, Clay & Martinez Machain, 2016). This is particularly true in the case of al-Qaeda and its affiliate groups, which explicitly aim to target the United States and its allies and pose a threat to the interests of the United States (Elworthy & Rogers, 2002; Aning, 2010). These groups have wider aims than other terrorists organizations that seek independence, for example (Cronin, 2006). Thus, as al-Qaeda increases its presence in one state, the United States will have an incentive to bolster the counterterror**ism** efforts of not only that state, but its neighbors as well. We argue that because these terrorist groups are not necessarily identified with a particular state, but rather move into areas that provide them the opportunity to operate more freely, security concerns will have a geographical spillover effect (Drakos & Gofas, 2006). This may happen either because the United States will be concerned that the terrorists will move into neighboring countries or because the United States will find that it is most effective to fight the terrorist group by increasing the counterterrorism efforts of neighboring countries (Drakos & Gofas, 2006). Figure 1 presents the (log-scaled) relative magnitude of the different types of aid that the United States gives to sub-Saharan Africa. In the post-9/11 era, there has been a clear upward trend of increases in not only military aid, but also civil society and total development aid.6 Figure 1 about here These trends are reflective of the increased prominence of sub-Saharan Africa when it comes to US foreign aid allocation. We will begin by focusing on military aid. When foreign aid is used as a tool of counterterrorism, it is more likely to be channeled directly through to the executive branch of the recipient country, which generally controls military operations, intelligence gathering, and law enforcement and is able to implement the preferred policies of the donor, in exchange for the resources received (Scahill, 2013). Other actors in the recipient state, such as foreign non-governmental organizations, the news media, or civil society associations that do not have control over the state’s security forces clearly lack the capacity to actually carry out counterterrorism operations.7 We thus argue that when the United States wants the recipient state to engage in counterterrorism, it will **give more foreign aid** that takes the form of military aid that will actually carry out the counterterrorism policy. Our first hypothesis suggests that states that experience direct attacks by al-Qaeda or affiliates will receive increased military aid: Hypothesis 1: As al-Qaeda carries out attacks in a state, the recipient state will receive more military aid.

### Link – Chad

#### Chadian counterterror forces have kept Boko Haram in hiding – pressure is key

Eizenga 18 Daniel Eizenga is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science and a research associate with the Sahel Research Group based at the University of Florida. His research compares electoral authoritarian politics in sub-Saharan Africa focusing on Sahelian countries. He has conducted extensive fieldwork in Burkina Faso and Chad, February 2018, The Unstable Foundations Of Political Stability In Chad, *West African Papers*, No. 12, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://sahelresearch.africa.ufl.edu/files/Eizenga-2018-OECD-chad.pdf WJ recut

Today, the regional role of the Chadian military is perhaps most important in the conflict against Boko Haram. When the group became violent in 2009, the Chadian government viewed it as a Nigerian problem, but inevitably the conflict began to spill over the border. Beginning in 2014, Nigerian refugees began seeking shelter from Boko Haram in Chad’s Lac Region, which comprises the Chadian territory around Lake Chad. Boko Haram targeted these communities of people, connected through ethnicity and a long history of economic trade, as it established its so-called ‘caliphate’ in northeastern Nigeria. The first attack by Boko Haram in Chad took place against Nigerian refugees in the small village of Dubawa (Menner, 2014). Attacks significantly increased in the Lac Region over the course of 2015 resulting in the deaths of hundreds of Chadians (Map 2). In light of the growing instability across the lake in Nigeria, the Chadian military took action to root out Boko Haram from its stronghold in Borno State where Boko Haram had focused a disproportionate number of its attacks (Van Den Hoek, 2017). The Chadian military deployed 2,500 soldiers after Boko Haram massacred the Nigerian village of Baga, during which some 2,000 people were killed (BBC, 2015). The deployment sent Chadian soldiers around Lake Chad crossing into Niger and Cameroon simultaneously to enter Nigeria as part of a co-ordinated operation to remove Boko Haram from an area roughly the size of Belgium. Boko Haram responded to the deployment of the Chadian military by attacking villages throughout the larger region of the Lake Chad Basin destroying Nigerian, Cameroonian, and Chadian villages resulting in over 28 000 deaths from 2009 to 2016 according to ACLED data (ACLED, 2017) and 2.4 million displaced persons as of March 2017 according to the World Food Programme (WFP, 2017). This widespread insecurity in the Lac Region alone caused the Chadian National Assembly to establish a state of emergency in the region, effectively placing it under military administration in November 2015. Since then the state of emergency has been renewed by the National Assembly several times. Boko Haram’s retaliation against Chadian security forces also took place outside of the Lac Region. In June 2015, suicide bombers on motorcycles simultaneously attacked the police headquarters and the national police academy in N’Djamena, killing 37 people and wounding more than 100 others. At least four of the dead were suspected Boko Haram fighters. These co-ordinated suicide bombings were the first of their kind to take place in N’Djamena. The following day, two men tried to detonate suicide bombs outside the central police station but were intercepted and arrested. These attacks spurred a significant crackdown by security forces in N’Djamena, which implemented several checkpoints throughout the city. However, a police operation investigating a suspected Boko Haram cell in N’Djamena resulted in the death of five police officers and six Boko Haram militants who detonated a suicide bomb upon being discovered. In July 2015, another suicide attack claimed the lives of at least 15 people and wounded over 70 others after an explosion took place near the capital’s central market (BBC, 2015b). These deteriorating conditions led the Chadian government to increase its police presence in the capital, ban the burqa, and reinstate the death penalty for terrorist crimes by the end of 2015 (BBC, 2015c). The Chadian military mission against Boko Haram successfully sent the violent extremist organization into hiding around the swamps and islands of Lake Chad as well as in the Mandara Mountains between Nigeria and northern Cameroon. It also led to the rejuvenation of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) with its headquarters based in N’Djamena and which co-ordinates military efforts between Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria and Niger to fight Boko Haram. During 2017, Chadian soldiers continued to play a significant role providing security in the Lake Chad Basin through the MNJTF. The Chadian military also established additional headquarters in Baga Sola to protect refugees in the Lac Region, where a state of emergency, restrictive anti-terror laws and a curfew were established in a bid to restore security for the Chadian region. Initially, the increased presence of the military resulted in a rise in suicide attacks from Boko Haram militants targeting the newly arrived security forces. Recently, however, attacks on Chadian soil appear to be in decline (Dowd, 2018) as Boko Haram seems to have re-focused its targets on Maiduguri and surrounding towns in northern Nigeria. However, many analysts continue to warn against the presence of Boko Haram fighters around Lake Chad and their potential to provoke further insecurity in Chad as well as in neighbouring countries. This is especially the case due to the rising number of civilian victims in the most recent attacks claimed by Boko Haram. In October 2017, Chadian troops providing security against Boko Haram in the Diffa region of northeastern Niger were moved to northwestern Chad near the border with southern Libya following reports of increased Chadian rebel activity in that area. Shortly thereafter, on 19 October 2017, three Chadian rebels were arrested in Agadez, Niger, after crossing the Nigerien border with southern Libya. If conflict in southern Libya were to spill over into Chad or Niger, another counter-terrorism front could open up in this already destabilised region.2

#### The aff cuts key communication networks and kills key alliances

Quist-Arcton 17 - Ofeibea Quist-Arcton (award-winning broadcaster from Ghana and NPR's Africa Correspondent), 4-17-2017, "Amid Aid Uncertainty, U.S. Counterterrorism Cooperation Continues In Africa," NPR.org, https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/04/17/521400443/amid-aid-uncertainty-u-s-counter-terrorism-cooperation-continues-in-africa WJ recut

Along the Chari and Logone rivers separating Cameroon from Chad's capital, four flat-bottomed boats, mounted with machine guns, brimming with Chadian and other special forces, round the curve as they approach the riverbank. Forming an assault force, heavily armed soldiers leap out of the vessels and race up a slope to take up positions while backup forces have their machine guns at the ready. It's all part of a military exercise that simulates going after a high-value target – a leader from the ISIS-affiliated Boko Haram insurgency, who's taken up residence in a huddle of huts on the far side of the riverfront, a terrorist safe haven. The assault force demonstrates crucial military steps before capturing and eliminating him. Three weeks of U.S.-led counterterrorism exercises, known as Flintlock 2017, ended last month in Chad, which, along with surrounding countries, has been targeted in deadly violence by Boko Haram. The Flintlock exercises take place each year in a different African country. Boko Haram's 8-year-old uprising began in northeastern Nigeria, to the west of Chad, and has spilled over its borders, killing thousands of people and driving almost 3 million from their homes across the region. The war left a humanitarian catastrophe in its wake. The Trump administration's budget blueprint pledges to boost U.S. military spending by 10 percent — but also promises deep cuts in foreign aid. It's not yet clear what that might mean for U.S. counterterrorism efforts here or elsewhere in Africa, though the White House has boosted the U.S. military's authority to carry out strikes in Somalia against al-Shabaab militants linked to al-Qaida. At the same time, the U.S. — the biggest donor to the United Nations — is making the case for cuts in U.N. funding and wants to see changes in U.N. peacekeeping operations, most of which take place in Africa. "We need to show results," U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley said earlier this month. "We need to find value." Support for foreign nations' counterterrorism efforts, as opposed to big American deployments, were a key tool of the Obama administration. Last year, the U.S. gave $156 million for military support, training and border security in the region straddling Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon, known as the Lake Chad Basin. The military officer in charge of Flintlock 2017, Brig. Gen. Donald Bolduc, has called this region "Ground Zero" when it comes to fighting extremism in Africa. Bolduc, the Special Operations commander in Africa, says for now, the U.S. military is continuing to pursue its objectives. But the prospect of aid cuts worries many, as the region's humanitarian situation risks deteriorating**.** The U.N. warns there is a risk of famine in Nigeria's northeast, exacerbating a humanitarian disaster that has already seen children, especially those under the age of 5, dying of malnutrition, hunger and starvation. The U.S. has given more than $321 million since last year to help those in the Lake Chad Basin, including more than $175 million in emergency food aid. "Our assistance to this area is critical for promoting stability," said Matt Nims of the U.S. Agency for International Development, speaking at a House subcommittee hearing earlier this month. 'The military can't do it by itself' U.S. special operations troops don't typically deploy in large numbers to help African security forces work together and fight Boko Haram, but local officials say they're useful in serving as the glue that helps everything stick together. For Flintlock 2017, forces from 27 countries took part at seven training sites across west and central Africa. "Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria, Niger – unfortunately, the entire region, we are facing the same reality," said Cameroonian police commander Gilbert Nagassou, in charge of the border post at Kousseri, just across the river separating Chad and Cameroon. "That's why we must join forces and together confront terrorism." When it comes to fighting Boko Haram's threats to the Lake Chad Basin, "The military can't do it by itself," Bolduc told NPR in Ndjamena, Chad's capital. "Regionalize all the efforts, work closely together in an effective military construct ... and then bring in the police, the civil administration, religious leaders and include anybody working to bring the stability necessary to the local villages." A U.S. special forces commander involved in Flintlock, who asked that his name be withheld for security reasons, says the challenges shouldn't be underestimated. "We have a regional issue of Boko Haram, [which] easily exploits the seams between international boundaries – especially when you have something like a river way that separates two nations," he says. "And they currently use islands in this pretty broad [Chari and Logone] river to hide out in. It's an easy area to have ungoverned and hard to police and patrol." Members of U.S. military and, for the first time, law enforcement agencies are working with African security forces to enhance their techniques, said Billy Alfano, a special agent with the State Department's law enforcement arm, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. "Interoperability" – groups and forces working well together — is the current buzzword. "It's critical for our African partner nations to work together and more and more important for police to collaborate with the military, to conduct joint investigations and to truly counter the terrorism threat in the region, with law enforcement in those communities," Alfano said. Law enforcement agents are often first responders after an attack, he explained, so training them in forensics and skills like fingerprinting also helps "attack the terrorist network." Alfano said this year's more broadly focused exercises reflected an emphasis on governance and rule of law, "making a transition from a military-controlled area to training the police to more effectively take over when the military has moved on." And there was what he called "a mass migration training," to teach rural communities how to respond to potential terrorists who may cross porous borders where large numbers of people are already traveling. Cross-border cooperation During Flintlock, training scenarios involved agents from across the region simulating the aftermath of a terrorist bombing, as well as chasing and apprehending hostage-taking terrorist suspects. "Terrorism knows no boundaries or borders," warned Nagassou, the Cameroonian police commander. Deadly Boko Haram bomb blasts and suicide bombing raids have targeted all four countries battling the terrorist network, he said. "Boko Haram has pledged allegiance to Islamic State," he said, "so geographic frontiers mean nothing to this group or other terrorist networks and their regional allies. Borders are simply a joke to them — they have connections and communications." Terrorists, he said, easily slip across. "If there's intelligence from Nigeria and it's relayed to Chad, then Cameroon must also be made aware," said Nagassou. "And Niger also needs to be informed, so that together we can nip Boko Haram's nefarious plans in the bud and stop them attacking our people." Battle-hardened Chadian special forces are already familiar with this problem. For the past few years, they've been taking on Boko Haram extremists since violence spread across the border from northeastern Nigeria. They also were a critical force that helped end the occupation of northern Mali by al-Qaida-linked extremist fighters in 2013. "Chadian military history has demonstrated our experience and know-how. It's not today that the Chadian army is learning how to capture and destroy the enemy. Chadian forces are used to pursuing Boko Haram," said Lt. Col. Brahim Mahamat Dahab, Chad's chief of staff for the Flintlock 2017 exercises. He says the river scenario assault force exercise shows that Chad is capable of working with Americans, Italians "and the military from any given country, as well as our neighbors, reinforcing capacity. That's what we want to demonstrate. We need to share that knowledge with others who are also fighting Boko Haram," Brahim told NPR passionately.

#### Boko Haram can get nukes

Porter 16 Rc Porter, 3-26-2016, "Terrorist Groups Like The Islamic State, Boko Haram, al-Qaeda Have The 'Means, Knowledge, And Information' To Create A Nuclear Bomb Says Head Of U.N.'s Atomic Agency," Fortuna's Corner, <https://fortunascorner.com/2016/03/26/terrorist-groups-like-the-islamic-state-boko-haram-al-qaeda-have-the-means-knowledge-and-information-to-create-a-nuclear-bomb-says-head-of-u-n-s-atomic-agency/> / MM

\*Brackets in original article

Imogen Calderwood writes on the March 25, 2016 website of London’s The Daily Mail Online, that “terrorists have the means, knowledge and information to create a nuclear bomb.” This, according to Yukiya Amano, the Chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). “Terrorism is spreading, and the possibility of [them] using nuclear material in some deadly and malicious way cannot be excluded,” Dr. Amano told Agency France Presse (AFP). “Member states eed to have sustained interest in strengthening nuclear security.” Dr. Amano’s comments come as 50 world leaders are about to gather in Washington D.C. for a summit on March 31, 2016, to discuss ways to address [nuclear security issues at 1,000 atomic facilities worldwide. While stockpiles of nuclear material have been significantly reduced since the fall of the Soviet Union, the International Panel on Fissile Materials recently noted that “enough plutonium and highly enriched uranium still exists, [enough] to make 20,000 [nuclear] weapons of the magnitude that leveled Hiroshima, Japan in 1945.” “A grapefruit-sized amount of plutonium can be fashioned into a nuclear weapon; and according to Dr. Amano, “it is not impossible that extremists could make a primitive device — if they [somehow] got hold [acquired] the material. It is not an old technology; and nowadays, terrorists have the means, knowledge, and information they need,” he added. Dr. Amano acknowledged that the “far greater {and more likely] risk, is terrorists get enough radioactive material to construct a ‘dirty bomb,’ — something which would cause far less collateral damage, but, would likely have a significant psychological impact. As Ms. Calderwood explains, a dirty bomb “is a device using conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material other than uranium or plutonium. Such material can be found in small quantities in universities, hospitals and other facilities the world over — often with little security.” “Dirty bombs will be enough to [drive] any big city in the world into panic,” Dr. Amano said. “And, the psychological, economic, and political implications would be enormous.” “Since the mid-1990s,” Ms. Calderwood writes, “almost 2,800 incidents of illicit trafficking, ‘unauthorized possession,’ or loss of nuclear materials has been recorded in an IAEA database. One such incident occurred in Iraq last year.” In a January 19, 2016 article by Stephen Hummel with the title above; and, posted on the U.S. Military Academy West Point Combating Terrorism Center’s website, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/ posts/the-islamic-state-and- wmd-assessing-the-future- threat, Mr. Hummel warns that “the Islamic State is actively seeking weapons of mass destruction; and, to a limited extent, it has used such weapons in Syria and Iraq. It is also actively seeking personnel with technical expertise capable of expanding its [current] program.” But, Mr. Hummel adds that “the Islamic State’s program faces many challenges and logistical issues that have tempered their ambitions. This means,” he contends, “the group is not yet capable of striking Western nations with WMD, though it cannot be ruled out that the Islamic State could deploy rudimentary chemical devices against the West in the next several years.”

### Link – Saudi

#### Saudi key to bilateral counterterror efforts

Byman 16 Daniel L. Byman, Daniel Byman is a senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, where his research focuses on counterterrorism and Middle East security, 5-24-2016, "The U.S.-Saudi Arabia counterterrorism relationship," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/the-u-s-saudi-arabia-counterterrorism-relationship/> 3/22/18 MM

Much changed in 2003, when Al Qaeda began to attack the Kingdom directly, targeting expatriates there and also security forces. This led to a sustained terrorism campaign that claimed over a hundred lives and hundreds more injured between 2003 and 2006.[8] The current Crown Prince led the campaign against Al Qaeda, ultimately devastating its organization in the Kingdom. As a result of these attacks, the Kingdom embraced intelligence cooperation with the United States and began to see Al Qaeda as a deadly threat. Writing in 2004, the 9/11 Commission declared, “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is now locked in mortal combat with al Qaeda.”[9] Indicative of this change, in 2008 the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a bilateral agreement on technical counterterrorism cooperation. Under the agreement, the United States provides advisors, funded by Saudi Arabia, to assist on security measures. The U.S. military also assists in training Saudi forces.[10] Saudi officials are now vital counterterrorism allies. They are playing a leading role in trying to stop funding to the Islamic State and the Al Qaeda core.[11] The shift in the Saudi approach and the importance of Saudi Arabia’s role in counterterrorism can be seen in several successes against Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). One of the more notable examples of Saudi Arabia’s increasingly important role in combatting terrorism was the foiled 2010 AQAP cargo plane bomb plot. According to a story in the New York Times, Saudi intelligence provided the critical tipoff to the American and European intelligence officials that allowed British and Emirati security personnel to intercept the expertly concealed bombs that were already en route to the United States.[12] The last minute intelligence was the product of long-running Saudi intelligence operations to infiltrate AQAP.[13] The Saudi connection was probably decisive as the concealed explosives had already cleared multiple security screenings before the timely Saudi warning initiated the successful multilateral worldwide search.[14] In addition to these human intelligence capabilities within jihadist circles (not easily matched by Western intelligence), Saudi Arabia also plays a central role in the U.S. campaign against AQAP in Yemen by hosting a base for drone and other attacks in Yemen according to the BBC.[15] The Islamic State, like Al Qaeda, is also considered a top security threat by the Saudi regime. The Islamic State has declared Saudi Arabia to be its enemy, and its propaganda shows its black flag flying above Mecca. Islamic State terrorists have attacked Shi’a Muslim mosques in the Kingdom and Saudi security officials. The Islamic State also called on Saudi subjects to assassinate senior Saudi leaders. More broadly, the Islamic State threatens the regime’s legitimacy, claiming that it – rather than the Kingdom – is the true embodiment of a state under God’s law. It has called the royal family “slaves of the Crusaders and allies of the Jews” and derided them for abandoning Muslims around the world.[16] The Saudi government response to the Islamic State has been strong. The government has taken steps to stop Saudis from travelling abroad to support the Islamic State and other groups, including the arrest of those who traveled abroad to fight with radical groups. In addition, it has arrested more than 1,600 suspected Islamic State supporters in the Kingdom and reportedly foiled several attacks.[17] U.S. Treasury officials have declared the Saudis see “eye to eye” with the United States in stopping Islamic State fundraising, and the Kingdom has stepped up its monitoring of social media.[18] Senior religious officials with close ties to the royal family have also denounced the Islamic State (and Al Qaeda).[19] The Kingdom announced it was forming an “Islamic” military alliance, headquartered in Saudi Arabia, to fight terrorism.

### Link – UAE

#### Aid to UAE is key to the counterterror partnership – Yemen is key.

Karam 18 Joyce Karam [Washington Bureau Chief for Al-Hayat Newspaper], "US-UAE counter-terrorism operations on the rise in Yemen," National, 3-25-2018 https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/us-uae-counter-terrorism-operations-on-the-rise-in-yemen-1.715962

On a visit to Oman this month, US defence secretary James Mattis called **US-UAE joint counter-terrorism operations against Al Qaeda in Yemen** a model **for American troops being present in the war-ravaged country**. He then cited the battle to recapture the southern port of Mukalla, which had been held by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. "**The U**nited **A**rab **E**mirates, **with** some **American help —** intelligence help principally**, had gone in, organized the local tribes to take it away and Mukalla Port fell in 36 hours after being held for a year**. And so we're there to help that sort of an effort," Mr Mattis said. Mukalla was recaptured in April, 2016. **US-UAE efforts against AQAP have since intensified, liberating Shabwa recently, Abyan, Ahwar, and other towns around Hadramawt province**. Experts who spoke to The National credited military effectiveness, strategic alignment and local elements, behind the strengthened US-UAE bond in the war. For the US, **Yemen’s strategic importance is its geographical location "on one of the busiest highways for international maritime trade in the entire world",** said Nicholas Heras, a senior fellow at the Centre for New American Security in Washington, where he focuses on Yemen issues. "Whatever instability that occurs in Yemen has the potential to threaten or jam up vital global trade routes." The importance of Yemen to the US also lies in the recent past. "**Al Qaeda's strongest local branch is located in Yemen and has used this position to plan attacks against the US**," Mr Heras said. **The attack on the USS Cole destroyer in 2000, the attempt of shoe bomber Richard Reid on an American Airlines flight in 2001, the attack on the US embassy in Sanaa in 2008, and the foiled ink cartridges plot in 2010 are examples of Aqap's threat to American interests**.While the Pentagon only admits to "a small number" of American troops being in Yemen, Mr Heras considers the US military to be "deeply involved in the Yemen conflict, in ways that would surprise the American people". "It is not overstating it to say that Yemen is the hottest war being fought by US soldiers in the Middle East that Americans have never heard about," he said. Mr Mattis last week successfully urged Congress to block a bill that would have required any American forces not involved in fighting Al Qaeda in Yemen to leave the country within 30 days. But **when it comes to fighting Aqap and ISIL in Yemen, the level of US-UAE co-operation is now so close that the US military "has agreed to** conduct joint kinetic operations with Emirati forces", according to Mr Heras. **That's something "American generals only sign off on for the most competent partner militaries",** such as Nato, he said. John Arterbury, a Yemen analyst at the Navanti Group, a research and analysis company, told The National that **the narrow focus of the US mission in Yemen is "fighting Aqap and ISIL, while also pushing for a halt to the civil war and an** increase in aid" has helped **its success**. "**Aqap is on the back foot. UAE-backed local forces have systematically driven the group from towns and cities**, and are now pursuing it into more remote areas across south Yemen," Mr Arterbury said, "securing rural valleys over the past month in Hadramawt and Shabwa provinces being prime examples of this." The US sees the UAE as a state with capable armed forces and an abiding interest in southern Yemen, Mr Arterbury said. "These complementary aims and abilities make the US and UAE natural partners in regards to pursuing counter-terrorism efforts in the country’s south." On the ground "the UAE works with tribes and other local networks, providing lucrative incentives to collaborate against Aqap".

### Link – Egypt

#### US military aid is key to counter ISIS *specifically* in Egypt - that spills over to destabilize the middle east

Soliman 18(Mohamed, Mohamed Soliman is a Huffington Fellow at the Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, where he focuses on US strategy in the Middle East. He appears frequently on television interviews to provide expert commentary on unfolding current events in the Middle East. Soliman has published in several media outlets, including Foreign Affairs, ​Open Democracy and La Stampa, as well as analysis for the Middle East Institute, 4/27/18, “How America Can Help Egypt in its War On Terror,” The Washington Institute, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/how-america-can-help-egypt-in-its-war-on-terror>, accessed 1/19/19) KED

Faced with a stubborn common terrorist enemy, the United States should expand its military support for the Egyptian army’s capabilities, focusing more on training and equipping it to counter the Islamic State (IS) in Sinai. Without increased U.S. military aid, Egypt will be ill-equipped to counter the threat of the Islamic State, which will gain a crucial foothold that can expand into other parts of the Middle East. For its part, Egypt must integrate modern counter-terrorism techniques into its military doctrine. In the past year, IS has lost most of its territories in Iraq and Syria. But having established a powerful base in Egypt since 2013, IS shifted its attention from Iraq and Syria to Egypt. There has been a continuous Islamist insurgency in Northern Sinai led by more than 1,000 IS fighters. The Sinai insurgency has had drastic consequences: the take-down of a Russian passenger plane in 2015 that killed all 224 people on board; the attacks on the Multinational Force of Observers (MFO), including American personnel Task Force of Sinai; the killing of more than 250 people in the al-Rawda mosque bombing of November 2017, and the targeting of Egypt’s Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior during their visit to al-Arish airport in December 2017. In February 2018, Egypt’s military started Operation Sinai, involving land, naval and air forces, plus police and border guards, to target terrorist organizations in northern and southern Sinai. After two weeks of military operations, Mohamed Farid, chief of staff of the armed forces, asked President Sisi to extend the campaign by at least three months. Farid justified his request by noting the terrorist organizations’ extensive possession of explosives and the hardships that Egypt’s forces face in residential areas. In fact, the Egyptian Army has been incapable of countering IS expansion because it lacks advanced relevant training for its aircrews and enhanced ground forces training in urban combat.

### Link – Counternarcotics

#### US forces key to Taliban peace talks

Knecht 19 Eric Knecht, 2-26-2019, "U.S., Taliban talk troop withdrawal, counter-terrorism at peace talks," U.S., [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan-talks/u-s-taliban-talk-troop-withdrawal-counter-terrorism-at-peace-talks-idUSKCN1QF1E1 /](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan-talks/u-s-taliban-talk-troop-withdrawal-counter-terrorism-at-peace-talks-idUSKCN1QF1E1%20/) MM

American and Taliban officials looking to end a 17-year war in Afghanistan began their most detailed and high-level discussions yet on foreign troop withdrawals and counter-terrorism on Tuesday, officials close to the peace negotiations said. The talks, which kicked off in Doha on Monday with a meet-and-greet lunch, are seen as the most promising yet between the warring parties after the Taliban’s newly-appointed political chief Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar joined for the first time, flying in from Pakistan. The two sides are looking to hammer out a timeline and logistics for a potential troop withdrawal, as well as guarantees that the Taliban will not host militant groups as the U.S. winds down its presence, sources close to the talks said. “The Taliban knows foreign forces are committed to withdrawal, but we have the responsibility to ensure that Afghanistan does not get used as a base to launch terror attacks on foreign nations,” one of the officials said. Some 14,000 U.S. troops are based in Afghanistan as part of a U.S.-led NATO mission to train, assist and advise Afghan forces. Some U.S. forces also carry out counter-terrorism operations. U.S. military officials have been brought in to join this week’s talks in Doha, a second official said, raising hopes for progress after the last round in January secured a broad framework agreement but few details on critical aspects of a ceasefire and withdrawal. “We have all the right people in the room on both sides,” the second official said. U.S. President Donald Trump told Congress this month he intended to reduce U.S. forces from Afghanistan as negotiators make progress in talks with Taliban insurgents, saying: “Great nations do not fight endless wars.” The U.S. team, led by special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, is also pushing for the Taliban to meet with the Afghan government, which the group has so far snubbed, and to agree a ceasefire ahead of its annual spring offensive, sources said. The hardline Islamist movement considers the Afghan government a puppet regime of the U.S. and has refused direct talks.

#### Their evidence concedes that US forces are key to prevent takeover

Mccoy 17 (Alfred Mccoy, McCoy is the J.R.W. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. A TomDispatch regular, he is the author of In the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise and Decline of US Global Power and Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State, “America Is Losing Yet Another Drug War—in Afghanistan“, Nation, 11-13-2017, Available Online at https://www.thenation.com/article/america-is-losing-yet-another-drug-war-in-afghanistan/, accessed 1-10-2019, HKR-AM) / MM

Within a year, the Taliban were back, stronger than ever. Amid a nationwide offensive, the guerrillas focused, above all, on recapturing the poppy heartlands of Helmand Province, because, as The New York Times put it, “the lucrative opium trade made it crucial to the insurgents’ economic designs.” By December 2015, after overrunning checkpoints and winning back much of the province, they came close to capturing Marjah itself. Had American Special Operations forces and airpower not intervened to relieve “demoralized” Afghan troops and police, the town would undoubtedly have fallen. Farther north, in the fertile poppy fields astride the Helmand River system, insurgents captured most of Sangin district, forcing the retreat of government soldiers who, hobbled by the endemic corruption of their government and military, were reportedly “fighting with lack of ammunition and on empty stomachs.” By 2016, President Obama was forced to reverse his drawdown and launch a mini-surge of hundreds of new US troops to deny insurgents the economic prize of the world’s most productive poppy fields. Despite support from American airpower and 700 Special Operations troops, in February and March 2016 embattled government forces retreated from Musa Qala and Khan Neshin, leaving the Taliban largely in control of 10 of Helmand’s 14 districts. After 3,000 government troops died in that Taliban offensive, the remaining demoralized forces hunkered down inside provincial and district capitals, leaving the countryside and the opium crops that went with it to the heroin-funded guerrillas.

### Link – Azerbaijan

#### Azerbaijan is key to counterterror success in central Asia

Kucera 16 Joshua Kucera [writer and journalist specializing in foreign affairs and international relations], "Azerbaijan Has Advantage Over Armenia In U.S. Military Aid," No Publication, 5-17-2016 <https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-has-advantage-over-armenia-us-military-aid>

**Azerbaijan has gotten $20 million in military aid from the** U.S. **D**epartment **o**f **D**efense over the last ten years, while Armenia has gotten nearly nothing, a review of U.S. government documents shows. While the U.S. State Department has traditionally administered most foreign military aid, since the onset of the "War on Terror" the Defense Department has taken on increasing responsibility for military aid. And although the U.S. State Department for the most part observes a policy of "parity" in aid to the two countries, the Department of Defense has been less cautious in maintaining a balance. Baku has benefited in particular from two Pentagon aid programs, known as Section 1004 and Section 1206, which are subject to less Congressional oversight and less stringent public reporting requirements. **Azerbaijan has gotten** $8.5 million since 2005 in funding from Section 1004, which provides counternarcotics assistance, and **$11.5 million** from Section 1206, **which provides** counterterrorism aid. Armenia, by contrast, has gotten just $41,000 in Section 1004 funding and no Section 1206 money, according to data collected by the Washington advocacy group Security Assistance Monitor, which maintains a database of the various U.S. military assistance programs. Much of the money for Azerbaijan has been targeted toward naval forces, to reduce the risk that it could be used against Armenia (which is landlocked) and because of the U.S.'s interest in protecting Caspian energy infrastructure. The U.S. forces has focused particularly on Azerbaijan's 641st Special Warfare Naval Unit with a curriculum that has included "Diving and Floating Mine Response." But not all of the training went to naval forces. In 2013, **U.S. special forces soldiers conducted two month-long counternarcotics training programs** for 50 members of Azerbaijan's Ministry of National Security counterterrorism unit, at a cost of $916,000. (It's not clear whether the same 50 troops were trained in both programs, or whether it was a new group of soldiers in the second training.) Two years later, that unit would be disbanded along with the entire ministry as part of an internal power struggle that also sent many senior officials to prison. And State Department programs can also benefit soldiers both from Armenia and Azerbaijan who may end up fighting one another. One senior Azerbaijani special forces commander who was killed in the April violence between the two countries known as the "four-day war," Vugar Yusifov, took part in an army intelligence course (run through the State Department) in 2007 at Ft. Huachuca, in Arizona, according to Azerbaijani news reports. According to State Department records, just one Azerbaijani officer took such a course in 2007, which lasted five months and which cost the U.S. $23,582. (Credit goes to journalist/analyst Emil Sanamyan for catching Yusifov's U.S. connection.) **Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have taken part in training in Romania by the U.S. Marine Corps Black Sea Rotational Force where the curriculum includes training ground forces in "close-quarters, combat marksmanship to build proficiency and** develop interoperability in counterinsurgency" and "close quarters combat, marksmanship skills and designated marksmanship training." U.S. policy has been to attempt to be even-handed by restricting aid to Armenia equally. The Departments of State and Defense, in their annual report on military aid to Congress in 2008, wrote that "Section 907 previously prohibited most U.S. assistance to the Government of Azerbaijan and as part of a policy of even-handedness, the previous Administration extended this prohibition to security assistance to Armenia." But the Pentagon aid programs clearly throw off that balance in Azerbaijan's favor. Although **the $20 million that Azerbaijan has gotten** is small even by regional standards -- Kyrgyzstan, for example, has gotten $118 million from the same programs over the same period -- it **does represent a substantial portion of what might be the U.S.'s "hard" military aid (like weapons and training**, as opposed to "softer" programs like counterproliferation and English-language courses). Aid to Armenia and Azerbaijan from the primary State Department "hard" aid program, Foreign Military Financing, has declined steadily over the last ten years but has tended to range between $2 and $4 million per year -- and to be allocated in identical amounts to both countries. Last month's flareup in fighting between the two countries over the disputed territory of Nagorno Karabakh -- the worst violence since a ceasfire was signed in 1994 -- has revived debate about U.S. military aid in the region. U.S. law, in particular another "Section" -- 907 -- has restricted U.S. aid to Azerbaijan since 1992, but since 2001 those restrictions have been waived every year. The most recent waiver was issued April 21, when **the State Department affirmed that U.S. aid to Azerbaijan**: **Is necessary to support United States efforts to** counter international terrorism; Is n**ecessary to support the operational readiness of United States Armed Forces or coalition partners to** counter international terrorism;Is important to Azerbaijan's border security; and Will not undermine or hamper ongoing efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan or be used for offensive purposes against Armenia.

#### That snowballs - ending US support even if it is only in border security results in less cooperation

#### Ramani 16 Samuel Ramani, St. Anthony’s College, University of Oxford (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/01/20/3-reasons-the-u-s-wont-break-with-azerbaijan-over-its-violations-of-human-rights-and-democratic-freedoms/?noredirect=on&utm\_term=.a0dfc85ec4bb) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/01/20/3-reasons-the-u-s-wont-break-with-azerbaijan-over-its-violations-of-human-rights-and-democratic-freedoms/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ddb7b2540be7>

Azerbaijan works with the West against terrorism. The West approves. Since 9/11, Azerbaijan has cooperated with the United States on counterterrorism efforts. Many U.S. allies in Europe and the Middle East opposed the 2003 Iraq War — but Azerbaijan opened its airspace for U.S. planes working to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime. And Azerbaijan was a transit hub for more than one-third of the fuel, food and clothing used by U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan. Azerbaijan has also helped preempt a major terrorist attack against the U.S. and Israeli embassies in Baku in 2012 by arresting 22 Azerbaijanis for alleged cooperation with Sepah, an Iranian terror group. Azerbaijan is a Shia majority state ruled by a secular regime. Aliyev helps out against terrorism in part because he wants to weaken Islamist movements that could undermine his power. In particular, the Aliyev regime has targeted pro-Iranian Shiites, who have opposed the Azerbaijan’s increasingly cordial ties with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait- making it a natural partner for the U.S.’s efforts along the same lines. Azerbaijan is also working against the Islamic State. After hundreds of Azerbaijani jihadists defected to Iraq and Syria to fight for ISIS, Aliyev vigorously repressed Salafist movements, which have criticized the Azerbaijan regime for its secularism and corruption. Azerbaijan is the U.S.’s only partner against ISIS in the Caspian Sea basin, which due to its close proximity to Iran is a potential hotbed for terrorism. That too, makes the U.S. reluctant to alienate Aliyev. In short, America’s reluctance to take action against the Aliyev regime can be explained by Azerbaijan’s cooperation with U.S. strategic objectives. Bringing in energy, combating ISIS and other Islamist terrorism and thwarting Russian aggression are urgent concerns for U.S. policymakers. Human rights aren’t. Smith’s Azerbaijan Democracy Act will have a rough time getting a serious hearing in Congress.

### Link – Cameroon

#### Aid key to Cameroon’s counterterror – checks Boko Haram

Barlerin 18 Peter [U.S. Ambassador to Cameroon. He is a career Foreign Service Officer and a member of the Senior Foreign Service. He recently served as the Senior Bureau Official for the Bureau of African Affairs and as Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary. Prior to this, he was Deputy Assistant Secretary for West Africa and Economic and Regional Affairs, with responsibility for relations with 16 West African countries and the U.S. Mission to the African Union, in Addis Ababa] “Ecole Nationale d’Administration et de Magistrature” Opening Ceremony for the program, Building Good Governance and Counterterrorism Capacity in the Far North Region of Cameroon. May 14, 2018. https://cm.usembassy.gov/building-good-governance-and-counterterrorism-capacity-in-the-far-north-region-of-cameroon/ IB recut

The initiative will support ongoing efforts to develop Cameroon’s institutional capacity to train civilian government officials and law enforcement to meet the needs of communities vulnerable to terrorism and conflict. Today, more countries than ever before have been impacted by the various manifestations of terrorism. Countering this threat is a global effort requiring sustained commitment from us all – this includes the international, regional (in this case, the Lake Chad Basin Region), national, and sub-national leaders. Effective counterterrorism measures and the protection of human rights and the rule of law are complementary and mutually reinforcing goals best achieved through a whole-of-society effort. This initiative focuses on the Far North Region, where Boko Haram has exacted a heavy toll on the ethnically diverse and economically challenged border communities. As we all know, the region has long suffered from a multitude of development deficits. Nearly three quarters of the population lives below the poverty line, double the national average. The region is home to hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons and refugees from neighboring countries. National, regional, and local authorities, security forces, and communities remain locked in a bitter struggle against the group. Despite these challenges, Cameroon and its neighbors are steadily making military gains with the assistance of the Multinational Joint Task Force – and with help from the United States, which advises and assists Cameroonian forces, trains its forces, and provides intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support. Just last week, we were proud to hand over two U.S.-built Cessna aircraft. France, and the United Kingdom are doing their parts as well, as is the World Bank, and the European Union, and others. You are not alone. We know that degrading Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa is only part of the answer to sustained peace and development.

#### Boko Haram can get nukes

Porter 16 Rc Porter, 3-26-2016, "Terrorist Groups Like The Islamic State, Boko Haram, al-Qaeda Have The 'Means, Knowledge, And Information' To Create A Nuclear Bomb Says Head Of U.N.'s Atomic Agency," Fortuna's Corner, <https://fortunascorner.com/2016/03/26/terrorist-groups-like-the-islamic-state-boko-haram-al-qaeda-have-the-means-knowledge-and-information-to-create-a-nuclear-bomb-says-head-of-u-n-s-atomic-agency/> / MM

\*Brackets in original article

Imogen Calderwood writes on the March 25, 2016 website of London’s The Daily Mail Online, that “terrorists have the means, knowledge and information to create a nuclear bomb.” This, according to Yukiya Amano, the Chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). “Terrorism is spreading, and the possibility of [them] using nuclear material in some deadly and malicious way cannot be excluded,” Dr. Amano told Agency France Presse (AFP). “Member states eed to have sustained interest in strengthening nuclear security.” Dr. Amano’s comments come as 50 world leaders are about to gather in Washington D.C. for a summit on March 31, 2016, to discuss ways to address [nuclear security issues at 1,000 atomic facilities worldwide. While stockpiles of nuclear material have been significantly reduced since the fall of the Soviet Union, the International Panel on Fissile Materials recently noted that “enough plutonium and highly enriched uranium still exists, [enough] to make 20,000 [nuclear] weapons of the magnitude that leveled Hiroshima, Japan in 1945.” “A grapefruit-sized amount of plutonium can be fashioned into a nuclear weapon; and according to Dr. Amano, “it is not impossible that extremists could make a primitive device — if they [somehow] got hold [acquired] the material. It is not an old technology; and nowadays, terrorists have the means, knowledge, and information they need,” he added. Dr. Amano acknowledged that the “far greater {and more likely] risk, is terrorists get enough radioactive material to construct a ‘dirty bomb,’ — something which would cause far less collateral damage, but, would likely have a significant psychological impact. As Ms. Calderwood explains, a dirty bomb “is a device using conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material other than uranium or plutonium. Such material can be found in small quantities in universities, hospitals and other facilities the world over — often with little security.” “Dirty bombs will be enough to [drive] any big city in the world into panic,” Dr. Amano said. “And, the psychological, economic, and political implications would be enormous.” “Since the mid-1990s,” Ms. Calderwood writes, “almost 2,800 incidents of illicit trafficking, ‘unauthorized possession,’ or loss of nuclear materials has been recorded in an IAEA database. One such incident occurred in Iraq last year.” In a January 19, 2016 article by Stephen Hummel with the title above; and, posted on the U.S. Military Academy West Point Combating Terrorism Center’s website, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/ posts/the-islamic-state-and- wmd-assessing-the-future- threat, Mr. Hummel warns that “the Islamic State is actively seeking weapons of mass destruction; and, to a limited extent, it has used such weapons in Syria and Iraq. It is also actively seeking personnel with technical expertise capable of expanding its [current] program.” But, Mr. Hummel adds that “the Islamic State’s program faces many challenges and logistical issues that have tempered their ambitions. This means,” he contends, “the group is not yet capable of striking Western nations with WMD, though it cannot be ruled out that the Islamic State could deploy rudimentary chemical devices against the West in the next several years.”

### Link – Tajikistan

#### Tajikistan is the breeding ground for Taliban - only US engagement to limit illicit drug flows that fund the groups can solve.

Hill 1 (Fiona, From 2006 to 2009, she served as national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at The National Intelligence Council. She is a frequent commentator on Russian and Eurasian affairs, and has researched and published extensively on issues related to Russia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, regional conflicts, energy, and strategic issues. “Contributions of Central Asian Nations to the Campaign Against Terrorism” Brookings Institute. December 13, 2001. https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/contributions-of-central-asian-nations-to-the-campaign-against-terrorism/)

The second is bringing long-term stability to Afghanistan, and here Central Asia plays an important role. The war may be over soon, but peace is by no means assured in Afghanistan. There are real short and long-term risks of a resumption of civil war. Other international experience and Afghanistan’s own history suggest that the Taliban will be difficult to eradicate as a fighting force and political influence. Indeed, as we currently see in Afghanistan, many Taliban leaders and rank and file fighters have simply switched sides, reverting to their former “Afghan” rather than “Talib” identities. They have not necessarily shed their beliefs or commitment to a religiously based rather than secular society. Irrespective of the present agreements on the structure of a new government, support for a new project of state building will be thinly rooted and fragile. There will be little tolerance for inevitable mistakes unless there is some appreciable and immediate improvement in the lives of the general population. In addition, many former Mujaheddin fighters and leaders linked with the Northern Alliance have been left out of the new interim government recently formed in Bonn. Some of these leaders, such as General Abdur Rashid Dostum, and former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani, have considerable support in Central Asia. Uzbekistan has served as Dostum’s patron, while Russia has supported Rabbani and other ethnic Tajik leaders, using Tajikistan as a base for contacts. Neither is likely to withdraw this support in the immediate future, thus bolstering their proxies in opposition to the new government and contributing to the fracturing of Afghan politics. This could be particularly difficult in the case of Dostum, who has been restored to power in his former regional stronghold in Mazar-e-Sharif near the border with Uzbekistan. If Dostum’s past conduct is anything to judge by, he will likely govern Mazar-e-Sharif as his personal fiefdom, forging ties with Tashkent rather than Kabul, and encouraging the continued fragmentation rather than consolidation of the Afghan state. If stability is to be ensured in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Russia and other Central Asian actors will have to relinquish their ties to these old leaders and give their full support to the new government in Kabul. The third priority—and closely linked to the second—is “draining the swamp” that has produced and supported radical militant groups in Central and South Asia. This is fostered by weak central government and the disintegration of state institutions, a collapsed economy, crushing poverty and the absence of a social safety net, high birthrates, high unemployment, poor and inadequate education, widespread illiteracy, the erosion of traditional social institutions and the infiltration of radical ideologies, free flows of drugs and illicit weapons, and isolation from all but the most immediate of neighbors. The Central Asian states, particularly Tajikistan, have many of the same elements that Afghanistan possessed in facilitating the rise of the Taliban and ultimately becoming a haven to Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Without an approach to the reconstruction and development of the region that encompasses Central Asia as well as Afghanistan, we may simply see the shift of the current problems from the south to the north, and the emergence of Taliban and Al Qaeda-like movements in Central Asia itself. The second and third priorities point to the importance of long-term U.S. political and economic engagement in Central Asia, even if the dynamic of the current war against terrorism precludes a long-term military presence as other networks outside the region are targeted and tackled.

#### Tajikistan is on the brink of becoming the new terrorism hotspot

Steward 18 Scott Stewart (VP of Tactical Analysis, Stratfor), 8-7-2018, "Why an Attack by Grassroots Jihadists in Tajikistan Matters," Stratfor, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/why-attack-grassroots-jihadists-tajikistan-matters>

For a group of seven international cyclists, the trip through breathtaking Tajikistan following a section of the ancient Silk Road was a dream come true. But that dream turned into a nightmare July 29, when, in a deliberate act, a dark sedan smashed through the group. The men inside got out and attacked the cyclists with knives. Four of the tourists — an American couple, a Swiss citizen and a Dutch national — were killed; the others — one Swiss, one Dutch and one French — were injured. On July 30, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for the assault through its Amaq news service. In a statement, it said the attackers "were soldiers of the Islamic State and carried out the attack in response to calls to target the citizens of the coalition countries." On July 31, Amaq released a video that it claimed featured the five young Tajik attackers claiming allegiance to the Islamic State and its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Although the video made no specific mention of the bicyclists, the youths denounced the Tajik government, said the country was "occupied by unbelievers" and made vows to attack. Tajik authorities played down the Islamic State claim and blamed the attack on the exiled Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan. Authorities say they have found the damaged vehicle and have arrested or killed several suspects. However, the poorly planned and executed attack appears to be the work of grassroots jihadists, and not trained operatives. While Tajikistan appears to be stable on the surface, underlying tensions that are held together by suppression by the government under President Emomali Rakhmon could rupture. However, like the rest of Central Asia, Tajikistan is a country in transition, and it will be important to keep a close eye on jihadism and the threat it poses to the country's shaky peace. Outside their country, Tajiks have been active participants in jihadist struggles and suicide bombings. Tajik officials say that about 1,400 of their citizens have traveled to Iraq or Syria to fight with the Islamic State. And research from the International Center for Counterterrorism at The Hague for 2015-16, indicated that Tajik involvement in suicide bombings was disproportionately high when compared with other nationalities. Tajik jihadists have joined Islamic State's Wilayat Khorasan in Afghanistan and have taken part in suicide bombings in Kabul. They have also been involved in plotting terrorist attacks in Russia and Europe. Despite all this, terrorist acts, especially those directed against foreigners, are relatively rare inside Tajikistan. Indeed, despite its shared border with Afghanistan, the low amount of terrorist activity inside the country has led Stratfor to rate the country as only a medium threat for terrorism. However, Tajikistan remains a fragile and vulnerable state. It is a poor country in a bad neighborhood awash with weaponry and radical ideologies. Of the former Soviet states, it has the lowest per-capita gross domestic product and the highest percentage of people living in poverty. Many Tajiks travel to Russia or elsewhere abroad to find work, and remittances account for over 30 percent of GDP. Drug smuggling is also a significant part of the economy. Tajiks are heavily involved in processing Afghan opium gum into heroin and in smuggling Afghan heroin into Russia and Europe — often working with the Afghan Taliban to do so. On top of this, the country's growing population is skewed heavily toward youth — over half of its people are younger than 25. A map shows the location of Tajikistan in Central Asia. Autocratic President Emomali Rakhmon, who has ruled the country since 1992, has suppressed opposition since the brutal civil war ended in 1997, but significant regional, clan and religious divisions remain. Rakhmon has imposed a degree of stability by applying pressure to keep those divisions from splitting open. But his ability to do so indefinitely remains in doubt. The government's heavy-handed approach to stifling opposition and religious activity has created a strong sense of resentment among certain segments of the population. Many Tajiks, as well as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), have joined the Khorasan Province, the Afghan affiliate of the Islamic State. Meanwhile, the power of the Taliban in Afghanistan is growing. These developments raise concerns about the possibility that militants could take root in Tajikistan, developing into a threat to the government. So, was the July 29 attack a sign of a growing movement? The answer lies in looking closely at the assault itself. The tactics in the assault seem to be consistent with those typically used by grassroot jihadists. Evidence that it was a grassroots effort can also be seen in the wording for the Islamic State's claim for the attack, which said the men were soldiers who had responded to its call. This language is typically used for jihadists inspired by the Islamic State or directed by its members through online forums. The language it uses for operatives from franchise groups or for members sent out to conduct attacks, such as the cell responsible for the Paris and Brussels attacks, is different. In addition, the assault itself had not been planned or executed well. It's hard to imagine a more vulnerable target than a group of bicyclists on a rural stretch of highway. Yet, the attack succeeded in killing only four of them. Furthermore, it was carried out before an array of witnesses, including one who recorded it on a cellphone video. The method of attack, a vehicular assault followed by an armed attack, corresponds exactly to tactics that the Islamic State has encouraged its grassroots supporters to employ. Similar assaults have taken place in London and in Barcelona. The choice to carry out this type of attack in the United Kingdom or Spain, where it is somewhat difficult to get firearms, makes logical sense. But weapons are much easier to obtain in Tajikistan, especially for any professional operative with connections to either the Islamic State or the Taliban. Finally, the assault doesn't reflect the capabilities of trained operatives. Many of the Taliban's older operational leaders have been at war since 1979, and the younger ones have known warfare all their lives. They have survived 17 years of combat with U.S. and NATO troops, probably the best trained and equipped forces on the planet. That combat experience has honed the Taliban's military capabilities, including a sophisticated ability to carry out armed assaults and ambushes. They have also become quite adept at terrorist attacks, including assassinations. The Taliban and Islamic State militants in the region are capable killers and would be able to plan a much more effective attack against a group of foreign cyclists, choosing a moment of greater vulnerability, such as when they were asleep in their tents, to strike. Within Tajikistan, jihadist activity has remained weak for several reasons. First, the Taliban remain focused on Afghanistan and do not have a larger regional agenda. Second, the Tajik government has created a pervasive security apparatus that aggressively pursues any perceived opposition, including religious extremism. Thousands of Russian troops stationed at the 201st military base back up those domestic security forces. Third, Tajikistan's long secular communist tradition also means that jihadism does not hold the same widespread appeal that it does in Afghanistan. These factors make Tajikistan a hostile operating environment for jihadists, especially those operating in formal hierarchical groups. In many ways, this has created an operational environment similar to those seen in Europe or North America — where grassroots terrorists working alone or in small cells are better able to avoid the government's attention than professional cadres linked to groups. In some ways, Tajikistan resembles Libya under Moammar Gadhafi. The strongman was able to suppress dissent, including that by jihadists, and to keep regional and tribal fractures in check through the use of force. Once Gadhafi's control slipped, the country spiraled into civil war. Like Libya, Tajikistan is quite brittle. Government oppression, combined with a young and impoverished population, could eventually result in an increase in jihadist adherents inside the country. And if Tajikistan were to fracture, it could open up another space for extremists to operate in Central Asia.

#### **US military assistance is critical in the fight against terror – unique training and equipment that Russia can’t provide**

Bahrom 17 (Nadin Bahrom, Correspondent for A project of the Center for International Policy. 4-10-2017, "Help from United States bolsters Tajikistan's fight against terrorism," <http://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2017/04/10/feature-01>)

The joint military exercise that the US and Tajikistan conducted last week is the latest manifestation of the help that the US provides its Central Asian partner in the fight against terrorism. From March 27 to April 7, about 100 Tajik and 150 US troops participated in drills that took place at various locations in Tajikistan. Military co-operation with the US is key for Tajikistan, said Saifullo Safarov, first deputy director of the Strategic Research Centre under the President of Tajikistan. "The US is helping Tajikistan in its fight against international terrorism, especially in Afghanistan," Safarov told Caravanserai. "Threats that come out of Afghanistan are also threats to the US. That's why we need to co-ordinate against the Afghan [threat]." "We are unable to ensure our security without US co-operation," he added. The US is committed to help Tajikistan because both are members of the C5+1, a consortium of the US and the five Central Asian states that addresses challenges like terrorism, Dushanbe-based security analyst Abdumannon Azizov told Cararavanserai. "Tajikistan has designated the fight against terrorism ... as a priority," said Azizov, noting that radicalisation of migrant workers and the build-up of Central Asian insurgents in Afghanistan near the Tajik border "are influencing the situation". US trainers can bring Tajik military units up to US standards, he said. Equipment is another avenue of potential US aid, he said. "All of our military equipment is Soviet made," he said. "Given the situation in northern Afghan provinces, it would be beneficial if the US could ... provide military and technical support for border guards," he said. Benefits of cooperation Placed in a dangerous neighbourhood, Tajikistan needs all the help it can get, say observers. Tajikistan co-operates with all countries to fight terrorism, Abdulkhalim Gafforov, an MP affiliated with the Socialist Party, told Caravanserai. "We should take advantage of all opportunities [to co-operate]," he said. "Such co-operation is in the interests of security and national stability." The US has provided more than $260 million (1.7 billion TJS) in security assistance in 25 years of full relations, Dushanbe-based regional security analyst Abdulmalik Kodirov told Caravanserai. Tajikistan used those funds to build border check-points, transport and electrical systems and training grounds, as well as to conduct military training inside and outside the country, he said. "Most of the money the US sends goes to preventing threats from Afghanistan," said Kodirov. "We also run programmes to fight drug trafficking. Tajikistan can't fight these threats alone." He urged more Tajiks in the security sector to learn English. "That will increase the number of Tajik experts who undergo counter-terrorism training in the US," he said. Tajikistan chooses to have an open-door policy, which makes international co-operation necessary for its security, said Shokirjon Khakimov, deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party. "There's no doubt that military co-operation, joint training sessions and joint projects will help us fight trans-national terrorism," he told Caravanserai. "We'll also be able to contribute to fighting international terrorism." Strengthening relations The recent training consisted of previously agreed-upon scenarios, a Tajik security official who requested anonymity told Caravanserai. "Tajik soldiers worked with their American colleagues to develop counter-terrorism tactics," said the source. "They learned how to fight in close quarters with terrorists." Co-operation with the US has been growing, remarked the source. One sign of that tightening bond was the exchange of telegrammes between the countries' presidents in February to mark the 25th anniversary of their diplomatic relations, he added. US President Donald Trump wrote of the countries' "common goals of regional security and stability" in his message, while Tajik President Emomali Rahmon cited his "optimism" about the course of future relations. The exchange of telegrammes attests to shared interest in "security in Central Asia and in Afghanistan", the security sector source told Caravanserai. The US is committed to ensuring regional stability and fighting terrorism, US embassy spokesman Jeff Ridenour told Caravanserai. "We believe that expanding the Tajik armed forces' capabilities is an important step in achieving our goal of fighting terrorism," he said. The two sides participated in scenarios that tested their crisis response, he said, adding that they had a primary goal of developing co-ordination against trans-national terrorism. "Military-to-military engagements are intended to expand levels of co-operation, enhance mutual capabilities, and promote long-term regional stability and joint-operation," said the US embassy in a March statement before the exercises took place.

### Link and Impact – Uganda

#### Aid is key to stopping al-Shabab, their evidence

**McCormick 16** [(Ty McCormick - writer for Foreign Policy) “Is the US Military Propping up Uganda’s Elected Autocrat?” Foreign Policy. 2/18/16] / MM

**The U.S. military** has trained [more troops](https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/15/four-questions-and-answers-about-u-s-support-of-peacekeeping-in-africa/) from Uganda in the last 10 years than from any other nation in sub-Saharan Africa except Burundi. **The Ugandan military** has also **received hundreds of millions of** dollar’s worth of hardware **from the U**nited **S**tates. Its soldiers now have sophisticated communications equipment, night-vision goggles, and small surveillance drones — all from U.S. companies. Ugandan troops deployed to Somalia travel in [mine-resistant vehicles](http://www.stripes.com/news/us-sending-mraps-to-somalia-for-african-union-mission-1.324797) that once ferried American soldiers around Afghanistan, while Ugandan choppers engaged in anti-Kony operations are [powered](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/04/world/africa/africas-elephants-are-being-slaughtered-in-poaching-frenzy.html?_r=0) by fuel paid for by the United States. Compared to the billions of dollars Washington lavishes on its Middle Eastern allies, , the Ugandan partnership comes with a bargain price tag of roughly $170 million per year in military cooperation and assistance, according to Ugandan military officials. Some argue it has also advanced important U.S. interests, including the degradation of al-Shabaab in Somalia and the cheap bolstering of the continent’s peacekeeping capabilities. (Uganda has committed troops to the Eastern Africa Standby Force, a new regional force designed for rapid intervention.) “The U.S. has gotten its money’s worth in the short term at least,” said J. Peter Pham, director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. “We’ve got boots on the ground, literally, in Somalia that have reversed a bad situation. It’s still bad, but it’s a lot better than it was. And the peacekeeping capabilities have come a long way. So it’s benefited in the short term, but I’d say the jury is still out on the behavior of Uganda’s military in the domestic political process.” That’s a big question going into the election, according to Pham: Will the military remain professionally neutral or will it play a role in regime protection?

#### Al-Shabab causes extinction

Roff 17 Peter Roff, U.S. News & World Report contributing editor for opinion and longtime observer of the Washington scene. Formerly senior political writer for United Press International he writes about public policy for a number of publications and for public policy groups including Asian Forum Japan, where he is a visiting scholar, and Frontiers of Freedom, where he is a senior fellow, 4-9-2017, "Rein in Rogue States," US News & World Report, [https://www.usnews.com/opinion/thomas-jefferson-street/articles/2017-09-08/the-us-must-deal-with-north-korea-iran-somalia-and-other-rogue-actors /](https://www.usnews.com/opinion/thomas-jefferson-street/articles/2017-09-08/the-us-must-deal-with-north-korea-iran-somalia-and-other-rogue-actors%20/) MM

THE UNFOLDING CRISIS over North Korean nuclear weapons and missiles is a reminder that the world is an unstable place. **Rogue states** led by sociopaths and religious zealots continually **threaten** the peace and **global stability**, while free nations, led by the United States, continue to dither. For some reason, we have trouble putting it all together. It's nearly impossible to believe Pyongyang developed its nuclear capabilities and missile program all by itself. It had to have help, mostly likely from other regimes whose stated objective is to destroy the United States. Yet policymakers and military planners within the Pentagon continue to employ the same kinds of conventional responses while indicating they are unwilling to back up any tough talk they can muster with force if necessary. Given the 17-year presence in Afghanistan, as well as the continuing commitment to Iraq, that's understandable – but also potentially fatal. New dangers arise every day that America is ill-equipped to face, while few have the courage to propose new ways to fight the next war. The biggest threat of all comes from the so-called radical Islamic terror groups that use – abuse, really – the religious beliefs of the poor and disenfranchised throughout North Africa and the Gulf region to recruit allies to their cause. They're engaged in a holy war that justifies any tactic in the pursuit of victory. The use of nuclear weapons, as far as they are concerned, is not off the table. America's efforts to prevent this, as symbolized by the deal the Obama administration and assorted European powers made with Iran, have been at best half-heartedin attempts to prevent it. How we respond to this threat may determine our future as well as the world's. Meanwhile, the problem gets worse. At the beginning of August, Yusuf-Garaad Omar, the Somali minister of foreign affairs, wrote U.S. Ambassador Stephen Schwartz of the dangers posed by the newly-reconstituted al-Shabaab terror group which, Omar wrote, has now "captured critical surface exposed uranium deposits in the Galmudug region and are strip mining triuranium octoxide **for** transport to Iran." In an accompanying intelligence brief, the Somalis indicated **these** materials **could be extracted** "fairly quickly, without the use of advanced mining equipment" and, because of its inherent stability, can easily be shipped "to Iran, and then on to Iran's suspected customers, notably North Korea." "The potential for nuclear proliferation is real, immediate, and pressing," the analysis said, putting the need to stop it squarely within the zone defining the boundaries of the United States' national security interests. "Only the United States has the capacity to identify and smash al-Shabaab elements operating within our country," Omar wrote Schwartz. "The time for surgical strikes and limited engagement has passed, as Somalia's problems have metastasized into the World's problems. Every day that passes without intervention provides America's enemies with additional material for nuclear weapons." He's not wrong, but clearly the sentiment for doing anything about it does not yet exist in Washington. America was burned badly during its previous intervention in Somalia. The situation on the ground is little improved despite the election of a pro-U.S. president in 2017 and no one is eager to jump a second time into the same fire. The danger of Somali uranium falling into the hands of Iran or North Korea changes the calculation. The U.S. must step up its activities – diplomatic, economic and military – in order to curtail the shipments the diplomatic message indicates are ongoing. This may not require a significant military presence, as has been requested, but may require taking the issue to the United Nations, the formal recognition that Iran may be in violation of the anti-proliferation agreement it just made, and the use of blockades and other interventions to seize materials in the pipeline between Africa and the Gulf. No one can now say we have not been warned. Something must be done, even if not at the level of what the Somalis have apparently asked for. The global terror threat is highly mobile. The United States must develop new strategies to deal with what amounts to a multi-front war where the opposition works in an integrated fashion that prevents traditional tactics from being successful. Somalia is but one piece of a very complex puzzle the enemies of America must never be allowed to fully assemble.

### I/L – Retake Cities

#### US aid key to reclaiming cities and preventing civilian deaths

BBC 19 BBC News, 3-23-2019, "Caliphate defeated but IS remains a threat," [https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45547595 /](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45547595%20/) MM

Key cities were recaptured. Early progress in the US-led campaign against IS included the recapture of the city of Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province in Iraq, by Iraqi pro-government forces in December 2015. The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces alliance has driven IS out of north-eastern Syria The recapture of Iraq's second city of Mosul in July 2017 was seen as a major breakthrough for the coalition, but the 10-month battle left thousands of civilians dead, with more than 800,000 others forced to flee their homes. In October 2017, the Syrian city of Raqqa, so-called capital of the self-styled "caliphate", was re-taken by the SDF with coalition air support, ending three years of rule by IS. The following month, the Syrian army regained full control of the eastern city of Deir al-Zour, and Iraqi forces retook the key border town of al-Qaim. Many thousands have been killed Exact numbers of the casualties for the war against IS are not available. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a UK-based monitoring group, has documented the deaths of 371,000 people, including 112,600 civilians, in Syria since the civil war began in 2011. The UN says at least 30,912 civilians were killed in acts of terrorism, violence and armed conflict in Iraq between 2014 and 2018. But Iraq Body Count, an organization run by academics and peace activists, puts the civilian death toll at more than 70,000. Millions have been displaced At least 6.6 million Syrians have been internally displaced, while another 5.6 million have fled abroad - more than 3.5 million of them have sought refuge in Turkey, and almost one million in Lebanon and almost 700,000 in Jordan.

### UQ – Terror Low

#### Terror low now – steady declines will stay on track

Taylor 18 Adam Taylor, 8-14-2018, "Analysis," Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/08/15/terrorist-attacks-are-quietly-declining-around-world/> / MM

Despite such high-profile attacks and responses, however, statistics released this month by the University of Maryland suggest that 2017 was the third consecutive year that the number of terrorist attacks around the world — and the deaths caused by them — had dropped. So far, 2018 looks on track to be lower still. The university’s Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) program found there were 10,900 terrorist attacks around the world last year, which killed a total of 26,400 people, including perpetrators. That was a drop from 2016, which was in turn a drop from 2015. Right now, the number of terrorist attacks and deaths from terrorism appears to have peaked in 2014, when there were nearly 17,000 attacks and more than 45,000 victims. What explains the downward trend? In Western Europe, where the number of attacks increased slightly in 2017 — but the number of victims dropped by 65 percent — it may be matters of policing and counterintelligence. British Prime Minister Theresa May said Tuesday that the country had foiled 13 Islamist terrorism plots and four far-right plots since March 2017, when last year’s attack near the Houses of Parliament occurred. On a global scale, however, the answer is clear. Though there was a surge in terrorist attacks in Europe in recent years, most attacks still occur in the Middle East and Africa, and those regions saw a big decline in 2017. The number of terrorist attacks in the Middle East and North Africa dropped by 38 percent year on year according to START; the number of victims declined by 44 percent. That can largely be attributed to the Islamic States' loss of territory and military defeats throughout 2017. Without a stable base, the number of attacks the jihadist group could stage in countries like Iraq and Syria dropped sharply, as did the damage it could inflict on civilian populations.

### Impact – Turns Case

#### **Turns case - attacks lead to re-deployment**

Taddeo 10 (Valentina , Summer, earned her Master of Strategic Affairs, Graduate Studies in Strategy and Defence (GSSD), at the Australian National Universit “U.S. Response to Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of the Afghanistan Campaign” <http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1010&context=jss>, JKS)

In his speech soon after 9/11, the U.S. President George W. Bush condemned al-Qaida for the attacks and called upon the Taliban to deliver all the leaders of al-Qaida hidden in Afghanistan, as this was the movement's main base. The United States then declared War on Terror arguing that terrorism was a common enemy to all civilized nations.6 This claim was intended to raise support from all the Western countries and to launch a global crusade against all terrorist movements linked to al-Qaida. It was also aimed at obtaining the United Nation's approval and support for the intervention. However, a war against global terrorism that "will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated"7 is unlikely to be achieved, since there will always be a certain degree of terrorism in the world. Take for example crime, which can be decreased by strong policing but not completely eliminated; so also terrorism can be subdued but not completely defeated.8 The first aim of the War on Terror was, thus, far from being reached even with an effective military campaign. Nevertheless, strikes against al-Qaida training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime began on October 7, 2001 as the Taliban refused to collaborate with the United States.9

### Impact – Lone Wolf Terror

#### Incoming terrorist attacks escalate – single attacks kill billions

Myhrvold 14 (Nathan P, chief executive and founder of Intellectual Ventures and a former chief technology officer at Microsoft; Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action; cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/04/Strategic\_Terrorism\_corrected\_II.pdf, 2014)

Technology contains no inherent moral directive—it empowers people, whatever their intent, good or evil. This has always been true: when bronze implements supplanted those made of stone, the ancient world got scythes and awls, but also swords and battle-axes. The novelty of our present situation is that modern technology can provide small groups of people with much greater lethality than ever before. We now have to worry that private parties might gain access to weapons that are as destructive as—or possibly even more destructive than— those held by any nation-state. A handful of people, perhaps even a single individual, could have the ability to kill millions or even billions. Indeed, it is possible, from a technological standpoint, to kill every man, woman, and child on earth. The gravity of the situation is so extreme that getting the concept across without seeming silly or alarmist is challenging. Just thinking about the subject with any degree of seriousness numbs the mind. The goal of this essay is to present the case for making the needed changes before such a catastrophe occurs. The issues described here are too important to ignore. Failing nation-states—like North Korea—which possess nuclear weapons potentially pose a nuclear threat. Each new entrant to the nuclear club increases the possibility this will happen, but this problem is an old one, and one that existing diplomatic and military structures aim to manage. The newer and less understood danger arises from the increasing likelihood that stateless groups, bent on terrorism, will gain access to nuclear weapons, most likely by theft from a nation-state. Should this happen, the danger we now perceive to be coming from rogue states will pale in comparison. The ultimate response to a nuclear attack is a nuclear counterattack. Nation states have an address, and they know that we will retaliate in kind. Stateless groups are much more difficult to find which makes a nuclear counterattack virtually impossible. As a result, they can strike without fear of overwhelming retaliation, and thus they wield much more effective destructive power. Indeed, in many cases the fundamental equation of retaliation has become reversed. Terrorists often hope to provoke reprisal attacks on their own people, swaying popular opinion in their favor. The aftermath of 9/11 is a case in point. While it seems likely that Osama bin Laden and his henchmen hoped for a massive overreaction from the United States, it is unlikely his Taliban hosts anticipated the U.S. would go so far as to invade Afghanistan. Yes, al-Qaeda lost its host state and some personnel. The damage slowed the organization down but did not destroy it. Instead, the stateless al-Qaeda survived and adapted. The United States can claim some success against al-Qaeda in the years since 9/11, but it has hardly delivered a deathblow. Eventually, the world will recognize that stateless groups are more powerful than nation-states because terrorists can wield weapons and mount assaults that no nationstate would dare to attempt. So far, they have limited themselves to dramatic tactical terrorism: events such as 9/11, the butchering of Russian schoolchildren, decapitations broadcast over the internet, and bombings in major cities. Strategic objectives cannot be far behind.

#### Extinction

Myhrvold 13 Nathan MYHRVOLD, PhD in theoretical and mathematical physics from Princeton, former chief technology officer of Microsoft, 13 [July 2013, “Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action,” The Lawfare Research Paper Series No.2, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Strategic-Terrorism-Myhrvold-7-3-2013.pdf]

Several powerful trends have aligned to profoundly change the way that the world works. Technology now allows stateless groups to organize, recruit, and fund themselves in an unprecedented fashion. That, coupled with the extreme difficulty of finding and punishing a stateless group, means that stateless groups are positioned to be lead players on the world stage. They may act on their own, or they may act as proxies for nation-states that wish to duck responsibility. Either way, stateless groups are forces to be reckoned with. At the same time, a different set of technology trends means that small numbers of people can obtain incredibly lethal power. Now, for the first time in human history, a small group can be as lethal as the largest superpower. Such a group could execute an attack that could kill millions of people. It is technically feasible for such a group to kill billions of people, to end modern civilization—perhaps even to drive the human race to extinction. Our defense establishment was shaped over decades to address what was, for a long time, the only strategic threat our nation faced: Soviet or Chinese missiles. More recently, it has started retooling to address tactical terror attacks like those launched on the morning of 9/11, but the reform process is incomplete and inconsistent. A real defense will require rebuilding our military and intelligence capabilities from the ground up. Yet, so far, strategic terrorism has received relatively little attention in defense agencies, and the efforts that have been launched to combat this existential threat seem fragmented. History suggests what will happen. The only thing that shakes America out of complacency is a direct threat from a determined adversary that confronts us with our shortcomings by repeatedly attacking us or hectoring us for decades.

### Impact – Nuclear Terror

#### Terror cause extinction

Jaspal 12 (Zafar Nawaz, Associate Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan; “Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism: Myth or Reality?” Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 19.1, 91-111)

The misperception, miscalculation and above all ignorance of the ruling elite about security puzzles are perilous for the national security of a state. Indeed, in an age of transnational terrorism and unprecedented dissemination of dual-use nuclear technology, **ignoring** nuclear **terrorism** threat **is an imprudent policy choice.** The incapability of terrorist organizations to engineer fissile material does not eliminate completely the possibility of nuclear terrorism. At the same time, the absence of an example or precedent of a nuclear/ radiological terrorism does not qualify the assertion that the nuclear/radiological terrorism ought to be remained a myth. Far~~sighted~~ **rationality obligates that one** should **not miscalculate** transnational terrorist **groups — whose behavior suggests** that they have **a death wish** — of acquiring nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological material producing capabilities. In addition, one could be sensible about the published information that **huge amount of nuclear material is spread around the globe.** According to estimate **it is enough to build more than 120,000** Hiroshima-sized nuclear **bombs** (Fissile Material Working Group, 2010, April 1). The alarming fact is that a few **storage sites** of nuclear/radiological materials **are inadequately secured** and continue to be accumulated **in unstable regions** (Sambaiew, 2010, February). **Attempts** at stealing fissile material **had already been discovered** (Din & Zhiwei, 2003: 18). ¶ Numerous evidences confirm that terrorist groups had aspired to acquire fissile material for their terrorist acts. Late Osama bin Laden, the founder of al Qaeda stated that acquiring nuclear weapons was a “religious duty” (Yusufzai, 1999, January 11). The IAEA also reported that “al-Qaeda was actively seeking an atomic bomb.” Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl, a dissenter of Al Qaeda, in his trial testimony had “revealed his extensive but unsuccessful efforts to acquire enriched uranium for al-Qaeda” (Allison, 2010, January: 11). On November 9, 2001, Osama bin Laden claimed that “we have chemical and nuclear weapons as a deterrent and if America used them against us we reserve the right to use them (Mir, 2001, November 10).” On May 28, 2010, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, a Pakistani nuclear scientist confessed that he met Osama bin Laden. He claimed that “I met Osama bin Laden before 9/11 not to give him nuclear know-how, but to seek funds for establishing a technical college in Kabul (Syed, 2010, May 29).” He was arrested in 2003 and after extensive interrogation by American and Pakistani intelligence agencies he was released (Syed, 2010, May 29). Agreed, Mr. Mahmood did not share nuclear know-how with Al Qaeda, but his meeting with Osama establishes the fact that **the terrorist organization was in contact with nuclear scientists.** Second, **the terrorist group has sympathizers in the nuclear scientific bureaucracies.** It also authenticates bin Laden’s Deputy Ayman Zawahiri’s claim which he made in December 2001: “**If you have $30 million, go to the black market in the central Asia, contact any disgruntled Soviet scientist and a lot of dozens of smart briefcase bombs are available** (Allison, 2010, January: 2).” ¶ The covert meetings between nuclear scientists and al Qaeda members could not be interpreted as idle threats and thereby the threat of nuclear/radiological terrorism is real. The Defense Secretary Robert Gates admitted in 2008 that “what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear (Mueller, 2011, August 2).” Indeed, the nuclear deterrence strategy cannot deter the transnational terrorist syndicate from nuclear/radiological terrorist attacks. Daniel Whiteneck pointed out:¶ **“Evidence suggests, for example, that al Qaeda might not only use WMD simply to demonstrate the magnitude of its capability but that it might actually welcome the escalation of a strong U.S. response, especially** if it included **catalytic effects** on governments and societies in the Muslim world. **An adversary that prefers escalation regardless of the consequences cannot be deterred”** (Whiteneck, 2005, Summer: 187)¶ Since taking office, President Obama has been reiterating that **“nuclear weapons represent the ‘gravest threat’ to United States and international security.”** While realizing that the US could not prevent nuclear/radiological terrorist attacks singlehandedly, he launched 47an international campaign to convince the international community about the increasing threat of nuclear/ radiological terrorism. He stated on April 5, 2009: “Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold (Remarks by President Barack Obama, 2009, April 5).” He added: “**One terrorist with one nuclear weapon could unleash massive destruction. Al Qaeda has said it seeks a bomb and that it would have no problem with using it.** And we know that there is unsecured nuclear material across the globe” (Remarks by President Barack Obama, 2009, April 5). In July 2009, at the G-8 Summit, President Obama announced the convening of a Nuclear Security Summit in 2010 to deliberate on the mechanism to “secure nuclear materials, combat nuclear smuggling, and prevent nuclear terrorism” (Luongo, 2009, November 10). President Obama’s nuclear/radiological threat perceptions were also accentuated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1887 (2009). The UNSC expressed its grave concern regarding ‘the threat of nuclear terrorism.” It also recognized the need for all States “to take effective measures to prevent nuclear material or technical assistance becoming available to terrorists.” The UNSC Resolution called “for universal adherence to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment, and the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.” (UNSC Resolution, 2009)

### Impact – ME Instability

#### Middle East instability goes nuclear

Rafalovich 18 [Israel Rafalovich, journalist based in Brussel, who has 50 years of experience including international postings in Tel-Aviv, Brussels, Germany and Washington, DC. “The Middle East in Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons Capabilities,” <https://www.offiziere.ch/?p=33413>]

The Middle East is likely to face more instability in the near future and the incentives for maintaining or acquiring nuclear weapons are likely to increase. In this case, Middle East conflicts could easily escalate into nuclear standoffs in a region bereft of tempering international bodies or adequate mechanisms for conflict resolution. A factor that looms large behind Middle East aspirations for nuclear weapons is power and influence in regional and international politics.

# Framework

## Add On’s

### Epistemic Modesty

#### Use epistemic modesty for evaluating the framework debate: that means compare the probability of the framework times the magnitude of the impact under a framework. Prefer:

#### Substantively true since it maximizes the probability of achieving net most moral value—beating a framework acts as mitigation to their impacts but the strength of that mitigation is contingent.

#### Philosophers care about different frameworks – i.e. they recognize intent but also recognize what happens as a result of that intent

#### Clash—disincentives debaters from going all in for framework which means we get the ideal balance between topic ed and phil ed—it’s important to talk about contention-level offense

### Death First

#### Death and suffering come first

Paterson 03 – Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, http://sce.sagepub.com)

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81 In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

### Moral Tunnel Visions Bad

#### Reject moral tunnel visions – it undermines effective strategies to prevent violence

Issac 02, professor of political science at Indiana University, 2002 (Jeffrey, Dissent, Spring, ebsco)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

### Extinction O/W

#### Preventing extinction is a priori

MacAskill 14, William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014 / MM

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be [over 20 quadrillion]. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

#### Don’t conflate high magnitude with low probability – it’s good to keep our eyes open

Clarke 08[Lee, member of a National Academy of Science committee that considered decision-making models, Anschutz Distinguished Scholar at Princeton University, Fellow of AAAS, Professor Sociology (Rutgers), Ph.D. (SUNY), “Possibilistic Thinking: A New Conceptual Tool for Thinking about Extreme Events,” Fall, Social Research 75.3, JSTOR]

In scholarly work, the subfield of disasters is often seen as narrow. One reason for this is that a lot of scholarship on disasters is practically oriented, for obvious reasons, and the social sciences have a deep-seated suspicion of practical work. This is especially true in sociology. Tierney (2007b) has treated this topic at length, so there is no reason to repeat the point here. There is another, somewhat unappreciated reason that **work on disaster is seen as narrow**, a reason that holds some irony **for** the main thrust of my argument here: **disasters are unusual and** the **social sciences are** generally **biased toward phenomena that are frequent. Methods textbooks caution against** using case stud- ies as representative of anything, and **articles** in mainstreams journals that are **not based on** **probability samples** must issue similar obligatory caveats. **The premise, itself narrow, is that the only way to be certain** that we know something about the social world, and the only way to control for subjective influences in data acquisition, **is to follow** the tenets of **probabilistic sampling**. This view is a correlate of the central way of defining rational action and rational policy in academic work of all varieties and also in much practical work, which is to say in terms of probabilities. **The irony is that probabilistic thinking has its own biases, which, if unacknowledged and uncorrected** for, **lead to a conceptual neglect of extreme events**. This leaves us, as scholars, paying attention to disasters only when they happen and doing that makes the accumulation of good ideas about disaster vulnerable to issue-attention cycles (Birkland, 2007). **These conceptual blinders lead to a neglect of disasters** **as "strategic research sites**" (Merton, 1987), **which results in learning less about disaster than we could** and in missing opportunities to use disaster to learn about society (cf. Sorokin, 1942). **We need new conceptual tools** **because of an upward trend in frequency and severity of disaster** since 1970 (Perrow, 2007), and because of a growing intellectual attention to the idea of worst cases (Clarke, 2006b; Clarke, in press). For instance, the chief scientist in charge of studying earthquakes for the US Geological Service, Lucile Jones, has worked on the combination of events that could happen in California that would constitute a "give up scenario": a very long-shaking earthquake in southern California just when the Santa Anna winds are making everything dry and likely to burn. In such conditions, meaningful response to the fires would be impossible and recovery would take an extraordinarily long time. There are other similar pockets of scholarly interest in extreme events, some spurred by September 11 and many catalyzed by Katrina. The **consequences** of disasters **are also becoming more severe**, both in terms of lives lost and property damaged. **People** and their places **are becoming more vulnerable. The most important reason** that vulnerabilities are increasing **is population concentration** (Clarke, 2006b). This is a general phenomenon and includes, for example, flying in jumbo jets, working in tall buildings, and attending events in large capacity sports arenas. **Considering** disasters whose origin is **a natural hazard, the** specific **cause** of increased vulnerability **is** that **people** are **moving** **to where hazards originate**, and most especially to where the water is. In some places, this makes them vulnerable to hurricanes that can create devastating storm surges; in others it makes them vulnerable to earthquakes that can create tsunamis. **In any case, the general problem is that people concentrate themselves in dangerous places, so when the hazard comes disasters are intensified.** More than one-half of Florida's population lives within 20 miles of the sea. Additionally, Florida's population grows every year, along with increasing development along the coasts. The risk of exposure to a devastating hurricane is obviously high in Florida. No one should be surprised if during the next hurricane season Florida becomes the scene of great tragedy. The **demographic pressures and attendant development are wide- spread. People are concentrating along** the **coasts** of the United States, **and**, like Florida, **this puts people at risk** of water-related hazards. Or consider the Pacific Rim, the coastline down the west coasts of North and South America, south to Oceania, and then up the eastern coast- line of Asia. There the hazards are particularly threatening. Maps of population concentration around the Pacific Rim should be seen as target maps, because along those shorelines are some of the most active tectonic plates in the world. The 2004 Indonesian earthquake and tsunami, which killed at least 250,000 people, demonstrated the kind of damage that issues from the movement of tectonic plates. (Few in the United States recognize that there is a subduction zone just off the coast of Oregon and Washington that is quite similar to the one in Indonesia.) Additionally, volcanoes reside atop the meeting of tectonic plates; the typhoons that originate in the Pacific Ocean generate furiously fatal winds. **Perrow** (2007) **has generalized** the point about **concentration, arguing** not only that **we increase vulnerabilities by increasing the breadth and depth of exposure to hazards but also by concentrating industrial facilities with catastrophic potentia**l. Some of Perrow's most important **examples concern chemical production** facilities. These are facilities that bring together in a single place multiple stages of production used in the production of toxic substances. Key to Perrow's argument is that there is no technically necessary reason for such concentration, although there may be good economic reasons for it. **The general point is that we can expect more disasters,** whether their origins are **"natural" or "technological."** We can also expect **more death and destruction** from them. **I predict we will continue to be poorly prepared to deal with disaster**. **People** around the world **were appalled with the incompetence of** America's **leaders** and orga**-** nizations **in** the wake of Hurricanes **Katrina** and Rita. Day after day we watched people suffering unnecessarily. Leaders were slow to grasp the importance of the event. With a few notable exceptions, organi- zations lumbered to a late rescue. Setting aside our moral reaction to the official neglect, perhaps **we ought to ask why we should have expected a competent response at all**? Are US leaders and organiza- tions particularly attuned to the suffering of people in disasters? Is the political economy of the United States organized so that people, espe- cially poor people, are attended to quickly and effectively in noncri- sis situations? The answers to these questions are obvious. If social systems are not arranged to ensure people's well-being in normal times, there is no good reason to expect them to be so inclined in disastrous times. Still, **if we are ever going to be reasonably well prepared to avoid or respond to the next Katrina-like event, we need to identify the barriers to effective thinking about,** and effective response to, **disasters**. **One of those barriers is that we do not have a set of concepts that would help us think rigorously about out-sized events. The chief toolkit of concepts that we have** for thinking about important social events **comes from probability theory**. There are good reasons for this, as probability theory has obviously served social research well. Still, **the toolkit is incomplete** when it comes to extreme events, **especially when it is used as a base whence to make normative judgments about what** people, organizations, and **governments should** and should not **do**. **As a complement** to probabilistic thinking I propose that **we need possibilistic thinking**. In this paper I explicate the notion of possibilistic thinking. I first discuss the equation of probabilism with rationality in scholarly thought, followed by a section that shows the ubiquity of possibilis- tic thinking in everyday life. Demonstrating the latter will provide an opportunity to explore the limits of the probabilistic approach: that **possibilistic thinking** is widespread suggests it **could be used more rigorously** in social research. I will then address the most vexing prob- lem with advancing and employing possibilistic thinking: the prob- lem of infinite imagination. I argue that **possibilism can be used with discipline, and** that **we can be smarter about responding** to disasters **by doing so**.

#### Reject moral tunnel visions – it undermines effective strategies to prevent violence

Issac 02, professor of political science at Indiana University, 2002 (Jeffrey, Dissent, Spring, ebsco)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### War turns structural violence

Mertus 99 (Julie – Professor and co-director of the Ethics and Peace program, American University's School of International Service, “The Role of Racism as a Cause or Factor in Wars and Civil Conflict, International Council on Human Rights Policy,” <http://www.ichrp.org/paper_files/112_w_01.pdf>)

The **war** impacted on national identity in three ways. First, it **accomplished** the complete demonization **of other nations and national groups**. Initially, **state-controlled propaganda** machines **broadcast stories of the “other’s”** inhumanity. Overtime many witnesses and victims of acts of great cruelty began to tell their story – and their neighbours listened. Second, **war hastened** physical **national segregation**. People who had been forced to leave their villages and cities because of their national background now crowded into new cities, **creating new enclaves of “their own people.” Segregation** exploited and reinforced otherness. Finally, war closed the ranks. People throughout the former Yugoslavia were forced to decide who they were among three narrow choices: Serb, Croat, or Muslim. This left four categories of people without an identity: those of mixed parentage or marriage; those who were of another national identity, such as Albanian or Hungarian; those who wanted to identify themselves as something else, either above the nation, such as European, or below the nation, such as a member of a particular neighbourhood or organisation; and those who wanted out of the labelling process altogether. Those who failed to make a choice usually left the country (if they could) or fell silent; a few stubbornly fought back, despite the extreme backlash against anything different and potentially challenging to the nation. II. Characteristics of Conflicts with Racial Dimension: Roles of Racism The above discussion demonstrates a primary characteristic of conflicts with a racial dimension. Political mobilisation linked to real and imagined group differences arises where the state’s administrative structures and legal institutions distribute scarce resources based on ethnic/national differences. The problem is particularly acute where, as in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, lead positions in military and police forces are distributed based on group identity.20 Yugoslavia and Rwanda are textbook examples of cases in which the controlling entity (the state, the party, the colonial entity) “for its own administrative convenience and in order to improve control over local élites, may select certain ethnic élites and organisations as collaborators or channels for the transmission of 7 government patronage.”21 This favouritism based on group identity serves to polarise societies and, additionally, to institutionalise and make acceptable intra-group suspicion and hatred. **In Rwanda and Kosovo**, polarisation and **racism played a role**, not as the root cause **of conflict**, **but** as a tool of élites. In both Rwanda and Kosovo, many of those who participated in the propaganda inciting racism, were intellectuals.22 It is characteristic of conflicts with a racist dimension that **élites have the ability to manipulate racism because of other conditions** in-country, **such as**: structural **poverty**, unmet human development needs, comparative deprivation of one group to another, media manipulation of misunderstandings among the general populace, and the absence of human rights, the rule of law and civil and political institutions encouraging citizen participation. Where a group perceives a threat to its interests and values, rising counter-**élites find** playing **the racist**/nationalist/ chauvinist **card a particularly useful tool to assert a right to rule to protect the “true” national or ethnic interest**. In Rwanda and Kosovo, extremist élites played upon the deep fears and frustrations of the populace.

### Truth Testing Stupid

#### Truth testing makes up rules to constrain relevant discussions and is honestly just stupid

Overing and Scoggin 15 “In Defense of Inclusion”; September 10, 2015; John Scoggin (coach for Loyola in Los Angeles and former debater for the Blake School in Minneapolis. His students have earned 77 bids to the Tournament of Champions in the last 7 years. He’s coached 2 TOC finalists, a TOC quarterfinalist, and champions of many major national tournaments across the country) and Bob Overing (former debater for the USC Trojan Debate Squad, and current student at Yale Law School. As a senior in high school, he was ranked #1, earned 11 bids and took 2nd at TOC. In college, he cleared at CEDA and qualified to the NDT. His students have earned 98 career bids, reached TOC finals, and won many championships.); <http://premierdebatetoday.com/2015/09/10/in-defense-of-inclusion-by-john-scoggin-and-bob-overing/>

In establishing affirmative and negative truth burdens, truth-testing forecloses important discussions even of the resolution itself. Consider the fact that in 1925-1926, there were two college policy topics, one for men and one for women. Men got to debate child labor laws, and women had to debate divorce law. On the truth-testing view, the women debating the women’s topic would be barred from discussing the inherent sexism of the topic choice and the division of topics to begin with. Or consider the retracted 2010 November Public Forum topic, “Resolved: An Islamic cultural center should be built near Ground Zero.” Many debaters would feel uncomfortable arguing that resolution, just like they did on the 2012 January/February LD topic about domestic violence. We both know individuals who felt the domestic violence topic was so triggering that they did not want to compete at all. We can draw two conclusions from examples like these. First, there are good reasons to not debate a particular topic. These reasons have been spelled out over decades of debate scholarship ranging from Broda-Bahm and Murphy (1994) to Varda and Cook (2007) to Vincent (2013). Second, truth-testing prevents either team from making the argument that the topic is offensive or harmful. A hypothetical case, such as a resolution including an offensive racial epithet, makes the problem more obvious. Maybe the idea behind the resolution is good, but there’s something left out by analysis that stops there and ignores the use of a derogatory slur. Truth-testing makes irrelevant the words in the topic and the words used by the debaters. Thus, it fails to capture the reasons that any good person would “negate” or even refuse to debate an offensive topic. Clearly, there are elements of a topical advocacy beyond its truth that are worthy of questioning. Nebel (2015) acknowledges that some past resolutions were potentially harmful to debate (1.2, para. 5). Rather than exclude affected students as ‘not following the rules’ of semantics or truth-testing, we conclude that they should not be required to debate the topic. Nebel grapples with harmful topics in the following passage: I don’t think there is a magic-bullet response to critiques of the topic…I think they must be answered on a case-by-case basis, in their own terms…The question boils down to whether or not the topic is harmful for students to debate, and whether those harms justify breaking, or making an exception to, the topicality rule (1.2, para. 5) This statement is hard to square with Nebel’s thesis that semantic interpretations of the resolution come “lexically prior” (in other words, they always come first). He wants to allow exceptions, but doing so proves that harmfulness concerns can and do trump the topicality rule. As Nebel’s struggle with the critique of topicality illustrates, every article that claims to espouse a comprehensive view of debate must allow some exceptions to comply with our intuitions. The exceptions do not prove the rule. They prove there is a high level of concern in debate for affording dignity and respect to different kinds of arguments and modes of argumentation. There is no one principle of proper debate. Once the door is open for external factors like harmfulness, the inference to the priority of pragmatics is an easy one to make. If we care about the effects of debating the resolution on the students debating it, then other values like exclusion, education, and fairness start to creep in. If we can justify avoiding discussion of a bad topic on pragmatic grounds, we can also justify promoting discussion of a good topic. Any advantage to allowing discursive kritiks, performances, and roles of the ballot further justifies this pragmatic view against truth-testing. NDT champion Elijah Smith (2013) warns that without these argument forms, we “distance the conversation from the material reality that black debaters are forced to deal with every day”. Christopher Vincent (2013) built on that idea, arguing that universal moral theory “drowns out the perspectives of students of color that are historically excluded from the conversation” (para. 3). While we don’t agree wholesale with these authors, their work unequivocally demonstrates the value of departures from pure truth-testing. While we may not convince our opposition that they should presume value in kritik-based strategies, they should remain open to them. In a recent article for the Rostrum, Pittsburgh debate coach Paul Johnson (2015) extolled the ‘hands-off’ approach. Let the debaters test whether the arguments have merit, rather than deciding beforehand: In a debate round, one may argue the impertinence of theses about structural racism with regards to a particular case…But when we explicitly or implicitly suggest such theses have little to no value by deciding in advance that they are inaccurate, we are forswearing the hard, argumentative work of subjecting our own beliefs to rigorous testing and interrogation (p. 90) Suggesting that non-topical, race-based approaches are “vigilantist” and “self-serving” “adventure[s]” is to demean the worth of these arguments before the debate round even starts (Nebel 2015, 1.1, para. 2). The claim that they ‘break the rules’ or exist ‘outside the law’ otherizes the debaters, coaches, and squads that pursue non-traditional styles. Especially given that many of these students are students of color, we should reject the image of them as lawless, self-interested vigilantes. Students work hard on their positions, often incorporating personal elements such as narrative or performance. To defend a view of debate that excludes their arguments from consideration devalues their scholarship and the way they make debate “home.” That’s unacceptable. Branse notes “the motivation for joining the activity substantially varies from person to person” yet excludes some debaters’ motivations while promoting others (5, para. 4). We agree with Smith on the very tangible effects of such exclusion: “If black students do not feel comfortable participating in LD they will lose out on the ability to judge, coach, or to force debate to deal with the truth of their perspectives” (para. 5). Of course, we do not believe that Nebel or Branse intend their views to have these effects, but they are a concern we need to take seriously. III. Changing the Rules In Round One thought is that rejecting truth-testing is the wrong solution. Instead, we should create a better topic-selection process or an NSDA-approved topic change when the resolution is particularly bad. These solutions, however, are not exclusive of a rejection of truth-testing. An offensive topic might be reason to reform the selection process and to stop debating it immediately. Good role of the ballot arguments are the best solution because they pinpoint exactly why a debater finds the resolution inadequate. They highlight the problems of the proposed topic of discussion, and outline reasons why a different approach is preferable. While Branse believes these examples of in-round rule-making are problematic, we think debate rounds are an excellent location for discussing what debate should be. The first reason is the failure of consensus. Because there are a wide variety of supported methods to go about debating, we should be cautious about paradigmatic exclusion. While we don’t defend the relativist conclusion that all styles of debate are equally valuable, there is significant disagreement that our theories must account for. Truth-testing denies a number of ways to debate that many find valuable. The second reason is the internalization of valuable principles. Even people who do not think kritiks are the right way to debate have taken important steps like removing gendered language from their positions. NDT champion Elijah Smith (2013) identified hateful arguments and comments “you expect to hear at a Klan rally” as commonplace in LD rounds and the community (para. 2). We’d like to think those instances are at least reduced by the argumentation he’s encouraged. For instance, the much-maligned “you must prove why oppression is bad” argument now sees little play in high-level circuit rounds. Truth-testing forecloses this kind of learning from the opposition. Roles of the ballot and theory interpretations are examples of how in-round argumentation creates new rules of engagement. We welcome these strategies, and debaters should be prepared to justify their proposed rules against procedural challenges. The arguments we have made thus far are objections to truth-testing as a top-down worldview used to exclude from the get-go, not in-round means of redress against certain practices. There is a major difference between a topicality argument in a high school debate round and a prominent debate coach and camp director’s glib dismissal of non-topical argument as follows: [Y]ou can talk about whatever you want, but if it doesn’t support or deny the resolution, then the judge shouldn’t vote on it (Nebel 2015, 1.2, para. 4) Branse is equally ideological: Within the debate, the judge is bound by the established rules. If the rules are failing their function, that can be a reason to change the rules outside of the round. However, in round acts are out of the judge’s jurisdiction (2, para. 12) We take issue with debate theorists’ attempts to define away arguments that they don’t like. At one point, Jason Baldwin (2009) actually defended truth-testing for its openness, praising the values of the free market of ideas: That’s how the marketplace of ideas is supposed to work. But it is supposed to be a free marketplace where buyers (judges) examine whatever sellers (debaters) offer them with an open mind, not an exclusive marketplace where only the sellers of some officially approved theories are welcome (p. 26) Unfortunately for the truth-tester, debate has changed, and it will change again. What was once a model that allowed all the arguments debaters wanted to make – a prioris, frameworks, and meta-ethics – is now outdated in the context of discursive kritiks, performance, and alternative roles of the ballot. IV. Constitutivism, Authority, and the Nature of Debate Branse’s goal is to derive substantive rules for debate from the ‘constitutive features’ of debate itself and the roles of competitors and judges. We’ll quote him at length here to get a full view of the argument: [P]ragmatic benefits are constrained by the rules of the activity….education should not be promoted at the expense of the rules since the rules are what define the activity. LD is only LD because of the rules governing it – if we changed the activity to promoting practical values, then it would cease to be what it is (2, para. 7) Internal rules of an activity are absolute. From the perspective of the players, the authority of the rules are non-optional. (2, para. 12) The resolution, in fact, offers one of the only constitutive guidelines for debate. Most tournament invitations put a sentence in the rules along the lines of, “we will be using [X Resolution].” Thus, discussion confined to the resolution is non-optional (3, para. 5) [T]he delineation of an “affirmative” and a “negative” establishes a compelling case for a truth testing model…two debaters constrained by the rules of their assignment – to uphold or deny the truth of the resolution…[J]udging the quality of the debaters requires a reference to their roles. The better aff is the debater who is better at proving the resolution true. The better neg is the debater who is better at denying the truth of the resolution. The ballot requests an answer to “who did a comparatively better job fulfilling their role”, and since debaters’ roles dictate a truth-testing model, the judge ought to adjudicate the round under a truth testing model of debate. The judge does not have the jurisdiction to vote on education rather than truth testing (3, para. 7-8) Once a judge commits to a round in accordance with a set of rules…the rules are absolute and non-optional (4, para. 4) Similarly, Nebel uses contractual logic – appealing to the tournament invitation as binding agreement – to justify truth-testing: “The “social contract” argument holds that accepting a tournament invitation constitutes implicit consent to debate the specified topic….given that some proposition must be debated in each round and that the tournament has specified a resolution, no one can reasonably reject a principle that requires everyone to debate the announced resolution as worded. This appeals to Scanlon’s contractualism (1.1, para. 2) This approach is attractive because it seeks to start from principles we all seem to agree on and some very simple definitions. The primary problem is that the starting point is very thin, but the end point includes very robust conclusions. The terms “affirmative” and “negative” are insufficient to produce universal rules for debate, and certainly do not imply truth-testing (Section I, paragraph 3.) Branse does some legwork in footnoting several definitions of “affirm” and “negate,” but does little in the way of linguistic analysis. We won’t defend a particular definition but point out that there are many definitions that vary and do not all lend themselves to truth-testing. On a ballot the words “speaker points” are as prominently displayed as the words “affirmative” or “negative,” but neither Branse nor Nebel attempt to make any constitutive inference from their existence. Further, to find the constitutive role of a thing, one needs to look at what the thing actually is, rather than a few specific words on a ballot. Looking at debates now, we see that they rarely conform to the truth-testing model. It is simply absurd to observe an activity full of plans, counterplans, kritiks, non-topical performances, theory arguments, etc. and claim that its ‘constitutive nature’ is to exclude these arguments. Not only that, but the truth-testing family has been heavily criticized in both the policy and LD communities (Hynes Jr., 1979; Lichtman & Rohrer, 1982; Mangus, 2008; Nelson, 2008; O’Donnell, 2003; O’Krent, 2014; Palmer, 2008; Rowland, 1981; Simon, 1984; Snider, 1994; Ulrich, 1983). The empirical evidence also points toward argumentative inclusion in three important ways. The first is argument trends. The popularity of kritiks, a prioris, meta-ethics, etc. confirm that at different times the community at large has very different views of what constitutes not only a good argument but also a good mode of affirming or negating. The second is argument cycles. An alternate view would suggest that debate evolves and leaves bad arguments by the wayside. Nevertheless, we see lots of arguments pop in and out of the meta-game, suggesting that we have not made a definitive verdict on the best way to debate. The third is judge deference. While people’s views on proper modes of debate shift, we retain a strong deference to a judge’s decision. Judges have different views of debate; if there were some overarching principle that all judges should follow, we would expect tournament directors to enforce such a rule. In sum, there is no way to view debate as a whole and see truth-testing as the general principle underlying our practices. The existence of a judge and a ballot are also insufficient to produce universal rules for debate. Branse thinks “[t]he ballot requests an answer to ‘who did a comparatively better job fulfilling their role.’” While that may be a valid concern, it is dependent on what the judge views the roles of debaters to be. The absence of any sort of instruction other than determining the ‘better debating’ or the ‘winner’ most naturally lends itself to a presumption of openness. In fact, many practices very explicitly deviate from the constitutive roles Branse lays out. Some counterplans (PICs, PCCs, topical CPs and the like) may do more to prove the resolution than disprove it, yet are generally accepted negative arguments. Another type of objection to Branse’s view is an application of David Enoch’s “agency shmagency” argument. Enoch (2011) summarizes in his paper “Shmagency revisited”: [E]ven if you find yourself engaging in a kind of an activity…inescapably…and even if that activity is constitutively governed by some norm or…aim, this does not suffice for you to have a reason to obey that norm or aim at that aim. Rather, what is also needed is that you have a reason to engage in that activity…Even if you somehow find yourself playing chess, and even if checkmating your opponent is a constitutive aim of playing chess, still you may not have a reason to (try to) checkmate your opponent. You may lack such a reason if you lack a reason to play chess. The analogy is clear enough: Even if you find yourself playing the agency game, and even if agency has a constitutive aim, still you may not have a reason to be an agent (for instance, rather than a shmagent) (p. 5-6) The application to chess helps us see the application to debate. Truth-testing may be the constitutive aim of doing debate, but it does not follow that our best reasons tell us to test the truth of the resolution. In fact, you may have no reasons to be a truth-testing debater in the first place. If “affirmative” means “the one who proves the resolution true,” we’ve demonstrated times when it’s better to be “shmaffirmative” than “affirmative.” Finally, we think one of the most important (perhaps constitutive) features of debate is its unique capacity to change the rules while playing within the rules. Education-based arguments and non-topical arguments are just arguments – they’re pieces on the chess board to be manipulated by the players. Branse concedes that in APDA debate, the resolution is “contestable through a formal, in-round mechanism (3, para. 9). LD and policy debate also have this mechanism through theory arguments, kritiks, and alternative roles of the ballot. Branse is right that in soccer and chess, there is no way to kick a ball or move a chess piece that would legitimately change the rules of the game. Debate is different. While soccer and chess have incontrovertible empirical conditions for victory (checkmates, more goals at fulltime), debate does not. In fact, discussing the win conditions is debating! Whenever a debater reads a case, they assume or justify certain win conditions and not others. This deals with Branse’s “self-defeatingness” objection because debate about the rules does not create a “free-for-all” — it creates a debate (6, para. 1). The truth-testing judge does not get to pick and choose what makes a good debate; to do so is necessarily interventionist. This demonstrates truth-testing is more arbitrary and subjective [2] than the education position Branse criticizes (4, para. 4; 5, para. 2, 5). To be truly non-interventionist, we should accept them as permissible arguments until proven otherwise in round. Of course, not all rules are up for debate. There is a distinction between rules like speech times (call these procedural rules) and rules like truth-testing (call these substantive rules). The former are not up for the debate in the sense that the tournament director could intervene if a debater refused to stop talking. The latter are debate-able and have been for some time. No tournament director enforces their pet paradigm. Because the tournament director, not the judge, has ultimate authority, we liken her to the referee in soccer. On this view, the judge is not the referee tasked with enforcing “the rules”; she should decide only on the basis of arguments presented in the debate. Tournaments are not subject to any form of higher authority and are not obligated to follow NSDA rules, TOC guidelines, or anything else to determine a winner. Something is only a procedural rule if it is enforced by the tournament, and truth-testing has not and shouldn’t be enforced in this manner. To our knowledge, no bid tournament director has ever imposed a truth-testing burden on all competitors. If anything is a binding contract, it is the judge paradigm. Judge philosophies or paradigms are explicitly agreed to in writing because each judge establishes their own, and there is no coercion at play. Most tournaments mandate or strongly encourage written paradigms, have time to review them, and accept judge services instead of payment for hiring a judge. These norms establish a clearer contractual agreement in favor of judge deferral than universal truth-testing. We have tested the constitutive and contractual arguments by considering how truth-testing is not a procedural rule like speech times. As such, it cannot accrue the benefits of bindingness, authority, and non-arbitrariness. We can also test the argument in the opposite direction. There are some rules that seem even more “constitutive” of debate than the resolution but are not examples of procedural rules. For instance, every judge and debate theorist would likely reject completely new arguments in the 2AR, but there is nothing within Branse’s constitutive rules (speech times, the resolution, the aff and neg) to justify the norm. The no-new-arguments rule does not need to be written in a rulebook to have a lot of force. V. Pragmatic Justifications for Truth-testing With the priority of pragmatics established and constitutive arguments well addressed, we turn to some hybrid arguments that attempt to justify truth-testing by appealing to pragmatics. Nebel argues that the advantages stemming from truth-testing must be weighed against all exceptions to it and that the advantages of debating the ‘true meaning’ of the topic nearly always outweigh: It would be better if everyone debated the resolution as worded, whatever it is, than if everyone debated whatever subtle variation on the resolution they favored. Affirmatives would unfairly abuse (and have already abused) the entitlement to choose their own unpredictable adventure, and negatives would respond (and have already responded) with strategies that are designed to avoid clash…people are more likely to act on mistaken utility calculations and engage in self-serving violations of useful rules (1.1, para. 2) However, the advantages of topicality for the semantic/truth-testing view hold on the pragmatic view as well. We agree that the reasons to debate the meaning of the topic are strong. The only difference is that the pragmatic theory can explain the possibility of exceptions to the rule without interpretive contortion. It makes much more sense to understand that strict topicality is just a very good practice than to tout it as an absolute, lexically prior, constitutively- and contractually-binding rule. Ultimately, all benefits to topicality and debating something other than the resolution are weighed on the same scale, so we should adopt the theory that explicitly allows that scale. We are unconvinced that direct appeals to pragmatic considerations would be worse on pragmatic grounds than an external and absolute rule like ‘always be topical.’ If topicality is as important and beneficial as Nebel says it is, then it should be easy to defend within a particular debate, avoiding the worst slippery slope scenarios. Nebel also argues that the pragmatic view “justifies debating propositions that are completely irrelevant to the resolution but are much better to debate” (1.1, para. 5). Branse makes the same claim about education: “Education as a voting issue legitimizes reading positions and debating topics that have no association with the resolution” (5, para. 3). This alarmism we’ve answered with our discussion of harmful resolutions. There is no empirical indication of a slippery slope to a world where no one discusses the topic. The disadvantages to one debate round departing from topical debate are quite small, and we have no problem biting the bullet here. Sometimes (and it may be very rare), it’s better not to debate the resolution. There may also be reasons to debate something else even when the resolution is very good. Black students should not have to wait for a reparations topic to talk about race in America. As conversations about racial oppression and police brutality grow louder and louder, it becomes increasingly unreasonable to defend a view of debate that ignores their relevance to the everyday lives of our students. It should be clear that the pragmatic view takes no absolute stance on topicality or burdens. A debate practice may be pragmatic in one context but not another. For that reason, we reject the narrowness of truth-testing.

### TJFs

#### Fairness

#### Ground – util naturally has turn and impact ground on both sides, key to fairness because certain frameworks skew towards one side of the res

#### Topic Lit – util isn’t objectively true on one side of the res, it always has equal availability to topic lit because you just need to prove that it maximizes wellbeing

#### Fairness is good because debate is a competitive activity governed by rules and no one deserves a competitive advantage

## 1NC – Util Normal

#### Reliability means that consequences matter

Nagel 86 Thomas Nagel 86, The View from Nowhere, HUP, 1986: 156-168. / MM BRACKETS FOR GENDERED LANGUAGE\*\*

I shall defend the unsurprising claim that sensory **pleasure is good and pain bad, no matter who** they are. The point of the exercise is to see how the pressures of objectification operate in a simple case. Physical pleasure and pain do not usually depend on activities or desires which themselves raise questions of justification and value. They are just sensory experiences in relation to which we are fairly passive, but toward which we feel involuntary desire or aversion**.** Almost **everyone takes** the **avoidance of** [their] own **pain and** the **promotion of** [their] own **pleasure as subjective reasons for action** in a fairly simpleway; they are not back up by any further reasons. On the other hand if someone pursues pain or avoids pleasure, either it as a means to some end or it is backed up by dark reasons like guilt or sexual masochism**.** What sort of general value, if any, ought to be assigned to pleasure and pain when we consider these facts from an objective standpoint? What kind of judgment can we reasonably make about 2these things when we view them in abstraction from who we are? We can begin by asking why there is no plausibility in the zero position, that pleasure and pain have no value of any kind that can be objectively recognized. That would mean that I have no reason to take aspirin for a severe headache, however I may in fact be motivated; and that looking at it from outside, you couldn't even say that someone had a reason not to put his hand on a hot stove, just because of the pain. Try looking at it from the outside and see whether you can manage to withhold that judgment. If the idea of objective practical reason makes any sense at all, so that there is some judgment to withhold, it does not seem possible. If the general arguments against the reality of objective reasonsare no good, then **it is at least possible that I have a reason**, and not just an inclination, **to refrain from putting my hand on a hot stove.** But given the possibility, it seems meaningless to deny that this is so. Oddly enough, however, we can think of a story that would go with such a denial. It might be suggested that the aversion to pain is a useful phobia—having nothing to do with the intrinsic undesirability of pain itself—which helps us avoid or escape the injuries that are signaled by pain. (The same type of purely instrumental value might be ascribed to sensory pleasure: the pleasures of food, drink, and sex might be regarded as having no value in themselves, though our natural attraction to them assists survival and reproduction.) There would then be nothing wrong with pain in itself, and someone who was never motivated deliberately to do anything just because he knew it would reduce or avoid pain would have nothing the matter with him. [They] **would have involuntary avoidance reactions**, otherwise it would be hard to say that [they] felt pain at all. **And** [they] **would be motivated to reduce pain** for other reasons—**because it was an effective way to avoid** the **danger** being signaled, or because interfered with some physical or mental activity that was important to [them]. He just wouldn't regard the pain as itself something he had any reason to avoid, even though he hated the feeling just as much as the rest of us. (And of course he wouldn't be able to justify the avoidance of pain in the way that we customarily justify avoiding what we hate without reason—that is, on the ground that even an irrational hatred makes its object very unpleasant!) There is nothing self-contradictory in this proposal, but it seems nevertheless insane. Without some positive reason to think there is nothing in itself good or bad about having an experience you intensely like or dislike, we can't seriously regard the common impression to the contrary as a collective illusion. Such things are at least good or bad for us, if anything is. What seems to be going on here is that we cannot from an objective standpoint withhold a certain kind of endorsement of the most direct and immediate subjective value judgments we make concerning the contents of our own consciousness. We regard ourselves as too close to those things to be mistaken in our immediate, nonideological evaluative impressions. **No objective view** we can attain **could possibly overrule our subjective authority** in such cases.There can be no reason to reject the appearances here.

#### Thus, the standard is maximizing wellbeing and minimizing harms

#### Prefer it -

#### Best respects everyone

Cummiskey 90 David, a Philosophy Professor at Bates College “Kantian Consequentialism.” Ethics, Vol. 100, No. 3. 1990. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381810>. / MM

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract “social entity.” It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive “overall social good.” Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that “to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.” But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? **By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to** sufficiently **respect** and take account of **the many other** separate **persons**, each with only one life, **who will bear the cost of our inaction**. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that “rational nature exists as an end in itself”. Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. If one truly believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible. In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1, however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non- value-based rationale. But we have seen that Kant’s normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? If I sacrifice some for the sake of others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have “dignity**, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth” **that transcends any** market **value, but persons also have** a fundamental **equality that dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others.

#### Actor specificity

Goodin 90 Robert Goodin, Professor of Government, University of Essex, Australian National Defense University, “THE UTILITARIAN RESPONSE,” p. 141-2, 1990. / MM

My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is Something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals. Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of util.itarianism. Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty., and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private Individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances. and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices, but that is all. That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus. – assuming they want to use it at all – to choose general rules or conduct.

## 1NC – Util Everything

#### Reliability means that consequences matter

Nagel 86 Thomas Nagel 86, The View from Nowhere, HUP, 1986: 156-168. / MM BRACKETS FOR GENDERED LANGUAGE\*\*

I shall defend the unsurprising claim that sensory **pleasure is good and pain bad, no matter who** they are. The point of the exercise is to see how the pressures of objectification operate in a simple case. Physical pleasure and pain do not usually depend on activities or desires which themselves raise questions of justification and value. They are just sensory experiences in relation to which we are fairly passive, but toward which we feel involuntary desire or aversion**.** Almost **everyone takes** the **avoidance of** [their] own **pain and** the **promotion of** [their] own **pleasure as subjective reasons for action** in a fairly simpleway; they are not back up by any further reasons. On the other hand if someone pursues pain or avoids pleasure, either it as a means to some end or it is backed up by dark reasons like guilt or sexual masochism**.** What sort of general value, if any, ought to be assigned to pleasure and pain when we consider these facts from an objective standpoint? What kind of judgment can we reasonably make about 2these things when we view them in abstraction from who we are? We can begin by asking why there is no plausibility in the zero position, that pleasure and pain have no value of any kind that can be objectively recognized. That would mean that I have no reason to take aspirin for a severe headache, however I may in fact be motivated; and that looking at it from outside, you couldn't even say that someone had a reason not to put his hand on a hot stove, just because of the pain. Try looking at it from the outside and see whether you can manage to withhold that judgment. If the idea of objective practical reason makes any sense at all, so that there is some judgment to withhold, it does not seem possible. If the general arguments against the reality of objective reasonsare no good, then **it is at least possible that I have a reason**, and not just an inclination, **to refrain from putting my hand on a hot stove.** But given the possibility, it seems meaningless to deny that this is so. Oddly enough, however, we can think of a story that would go with such a denial. It might be suggested that the aversion to pain is a useful phobia—having nothing to do with the intrinsic undesirability of pain itself—which helps us avoid or escape the injuries that are signaled by pain. (The same type of purely instrumental value might be ascribed to sensory pleasure: the pleasures of food, drink, and sex might be regarded as having no value in themselves, though our natural attraction to them assists survival and reproduction.) There would then be nothing wrong with pain in itself, and someone who was never motivated deliberately to do anything just because he knew it would reduce or avoid pain would have nothing the matter with him. [They] **would have involuntary avoidance reactions**, otherwise it would be hard to say that [they] felt pain at all. **And** [they] **would be motivated to reduce pain** for other reasons—**because it was an effective way to avoid** the **danger** being signaled, or because interfered with some physical or mental activity that was important to [them]. He just wouldn't regard the pain as itself something he had any reason to avoid, even though he hated the feeling just as much as the rest of us. (And of course he wouldn't be able to justify the avoidance of pain in the way that we customarily justify avoiding what we hate without reason—that is, on the ground that even an irrational hatred makes its object very unpleasant!) There is nothing self-contradictory in this proposal, but it seems nevertheless insane. Without some positive reason to think there is nothing in itself good or bad about having an experience you intensely like or dislike, we can't seriously regard the common impression to the contrary as a collective illusion. Such things are at least good or bad for us, if anything is. What seems to be going on here is that we cannot from an objective standpoint withhold a certain kind of endorsement of the most direct and immediate subjective value judgments we make concerning the contents of our own consciousness. We regard ourselves as too close to those things to be mistaken in our immediate, nonideological evaluative impressions. **No objective view** we can attain **could possibly overrule our subjective authority** in such cases.There can be no reason to reject the appearances here.

#### Thus, the standard is maximizing wellbeing and minimizing harms

#### Prefer it –

#### Only consequences explain degrees of rightness and wrongness for an action – breaking a promise to wear a certain shirt today is less wrong than breaking a promise to bring a dying person to hospital

#### No act-omission distinction

#### Actor specificity

Goodin 90 Robert Goodin, Professor of Government, University of Essex, Australian National Defense University, “THE UTILITARIAN RESPONSE,” p. 141-2, 1990. / MM

My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is Something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals. Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of util.itarianism. Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty., and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private Individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances. and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices, but that is all. That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus. – assuming they want to use it at all – to choose general rules or conduct.

#### Choosing to omit is an act itself – people psychologically decide not to act which means being presented with the aff creates a choice between two actions, neither of which is an omission

#### Lexical Prerequisite – suffering creates lifelong conditions and threats on life that preclude the ability of actors being able to engage in other ethical evaluations since they are in a constant state of crisis.

#### Extinction outweighs

MacAskill 14, William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014 / MM

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be [over 20 quadrillion]. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

#### Use epistemic modesty for evaluating the framework debate: that means compare the probability of the framework times the magnitude of the impact under a framework. Prefer:

#### Substantively true since it maximizes the probability of achieving net most moral value—beating a framework acts as mitigation to their impacts but the strength of that mitigation is contingent.

#### Philosophers care about different frameworks – i.e. they recognize intent but also recognize what happens as a result of that intent

#### Clash—disincentives debaters from going all in for framework which means we get the ideal balance between topic ed and phil ed—it’s important to talk about contention-level offense

## 1NC – Util Phil Debaters

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#### Choosing to omit is an act itself – people psychologically decide not to act which means being presented with the aff creates a choice between two actions, neither of which is an omission

#### Theory

#### Ground – util naturally has turn and impact ground on both sides, key to fairness because certain frameworks skew towards one side of the res

#### Topic Lit – util isn’t objectively true on one side of the res, it always has equal availability to topic lit because you just need to prove that it maximizes wellbeing

#### Lexical Prerequisite – suffering creates lifelong conditions and threats on life that preclude the ability of actors being able to engage in other ethical evaluations since they are in a constant state of crisis.

#### Suffering comes first

Paterson 03 – Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, http://sce.sagepub.com)

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81 In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

#### Extinction outweighs and kills the possibility for moral action

MacAskill 14, William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014 / MM

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be [over 20 quadrillion]. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

#### Use epistemic modesty for evaluating the framework debate: that means compare the probability of the framework times the magnitude of the impact under a framework. To clarify, evaluate impacts under both frameworks, Prefer:

#### Substantively true since it maximizes the probability of achieving net most moral value—beating a framework acts as mitigation to their impacts but the strength of that mitigation is contingent.

#### Philosophers care about different frameworks – i.e. they recognize intent but also recognize what happens as a result of that intent

#### Clash—disincentives debaters from going all in for framework which means we get the ideal balance between topic ed and phil ed—it’s important to talk about contention-level offense

#### Reject blippy 1AC tricks—key to protect the 1NC against the 1AC just throwing out whatever they can and disincentivize blip-storms that aren’t complete arguments – that encourages 1AR blowup which kills strategy and actual topical debate

## 1NC – Comparative Worlds

#### Use a paradigm of comparative worlds where both debaters must prove their world is better than their opponent’s.

#### Topic Ed – excludes dumb shit like NIBs, skep, and a prioris which can be copied and pasted from topic to topic and encourages deep engagement into others positions instead of muddled garbage

#### Excludes repugnant positions which is key to accessibility – truth testing would justify not dropping a white person if they said the N word because it doesn’t prove the truth or falsity of the resolution