# JanFeb Kant NC File

## 1NC Shell

#### Negate means to deny the truth of. Permissibility and presumption negate – a] we presume statements to be false without empirical facts, is the basis of passcodes on logins and recognition technology. Outweighs presume statements true – we always presume false with issues of extreme importance b] Science is in the business of disproving, not proving which means that it is empirically impossible to prove something c] The aff is an action and the neg is an omission, and an omission is more permissible than an action under side-constraint theories like Kant due to the lack of moral culpability for an omission

#### The metaethic is practical reason:

#### Bindingness – you cannot deny reason without using reason – all arguments against reason inherently concede its authority. Moral obligations based in empirical reality are inconclusive and generate infinite obligations and none of them permanent because consequences and empirical observations can be wrong or subject to change – only reason is immutable and relies only on reason to understand its value

#### Action Theory – individual actions rely on reason to connect them – for example if I want to do action x, but it relies on a, b, and c to be performed – reason connects those actions by allowing us to understand them as a whole – otherwise actions have infinite parts of them and become irresolvable. Moral actions rely on reason to choose what the action ought to be which means reason is a necessary prerequisite

#### That justifies universalizable ends since there’s no distinction between individuals – a priori principles like reason apply to everyone since they’re independent of human experience – it’s incoherent to say 2+2=4 for me but not for you.

#### Absent universal ethics morality becomes arbitrary and fails to guide action, making ethics useless.

#### It’s impossible to will a violation of freedom since deciding to do would will incompatible ends since it logically entails willing a violation of your own freedom. Constraints are necessary to retain the value of freedom which implies that one cannot hinder the freedom of others.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with a Kantian system of equal and outer freedom. Prefer additionally:

#### Performativity—freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place. Thus, it is logically incoherent to justify a standard without first willing that we can pursue ends free from others.

#### Universal ethis is best to combat oppression.

Farr 02 [Arnold Farr (prof of Phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, spring 2002, 17–32. JDN.]

Whereas most criticisms are aimed at the formulation of universal law and the formula of autonomy, our analysis here will focus on the formula of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends, since we have already addressed the problem of universality. The latter will be discussed ﬁrst. At issue here is what Kant means by “kingdom of ends.” Kant writes: “By ‘kingdom’ I understand a systematic union of different rational beings through common laws.”32 The above passage indicates that Kant recognizes different, perhaps different kinds, of rational beings; however, the problem for most critics of Kant lies in the assumption that Kant suggests that the “kingdom of ends” requires that we abstract from personal differences and content of private ends. The Kantian conception of rational beings requires such an abstraction. **Some feminists and philosophers of race have found this abstract notion of rational beings problematic because they take it to mean that rationality is necessarily white, male, and European.**33 Hence, the systematic union of rational beings can mean only the systematic union of white, European males. **I ﬁnd this interpretation of Kant’s moral theory quite puzzling.** Surely another interpretation is available. That is, the implication that in Kant’s philosophy, rationality can only apply to white, European males does not seem to be the only alternative. The problem seems to lie in the requirement of abstraction. **There are two ways of looking at the abstraction requirement that I think are faithful to Kant’s text and that overcome the criticisms of this requirement. First, the abstraction requirement may be best understood as a demand for intersubjectivity or recognition. Second, it may be understood as an attempt to avoid ethical egoism in determining maxims for our actions.** It is unfortunate that Kant never worked out a theory of intersubjectivity, as did his successors Fichte and Hegel. However, this is not to say that there is not in Kant’s philosophy a tacit theory of intersubjectivity or recognition. **The abstraction requirement simply demands that in the midst of our concrete differences we recognize ourselves in the other and the other in ourselves.** That is, **we recognize in others the humanity that we have in common.** Recognition of our common humanity is at the same time recognition of rationality in the other. We recognize in the other the capacity for selfdetermination and the capacity to legislate for a kingdom of ends. This brings us to the second interpretation of the abstraction requirement. **To avoid ethical egoism one must abstract from** (think beyond) **one’s own personal interest** and subjective maxims. That is, the categorical imperative requires that I recognize that I am a member of the realm of rational beings. **Hence, I organize my maxims in consideration of other rational beings.** Under such a principle other people cannot be treated merely as a means for my end but must be treated as ends in themselves. **The merit of the categorical imperative for a philosophy of race is that it contravenes racist ideology to the extent that racist ideology is based on the use of persons of a different race as a means to an end rather than as ends in themselves.** Embedded in the formulation of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends is the recognition of the common hope for humanity. That is, maxims ought to be chosen on the basis of an ideal, a hope for the amelioration of humanity. This ideal or ethical commonwealth (as Kant calls it in the Religion) is the kingdom of ends.34 although the merits of Kant’s moral theory may be recognizable at this point, we are still in a bit of a bind. It still seems problematic that the moral theory of a racist is essentially an antiracist theory. Further, what shall we do with Henry Louis Gates’s suggestion that we use the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime to deconstruct the Grounding? What I have tried to suggest is that **instead of abandoning the categorical imperative we should attempt to deepen our understanding of it and its place in Kant’s critical philosophy.** A deeper reading of the Grounding and Kant’s philosophy in general may produce the deconstruction35 suggested by Gates. However, a text is not necessarily deconstructed by reading it against another. Texts often deconstruct themselves if read properly. To be sure, the best way to understand a text is to read it in context. **Hence, if the Grounding is read within the context of the critical philosophy, the tools for a deconstruction of the text are provided by its context and the tensions within the text.** Gates is right to suggest that the Grounding must be deconstructed. However, this deconstruction requires much more than reading the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime against the Grounding. It requires a complete engagement with the critical philosophy. Such an engagement discloses some of Kant’s very signiﬁcant claims about humanity and the practical role of reason. With this disclosure, deconstruction of the Grounding can begin. **What deconstruction will reveal is not necessarily the inconsistency of Kant’s moral philosophy or the racist or sexist nature of the categorical imperative, but rather**, it will disclose **the disunity between Kant’s theory and his own feelings about blacks and women. Although the theory is consistent and emancipatory and should apply to all persons, Kant the man has his own personal** and moral **problems. Although Kant’s attitude toward people of African descent was deplorable, it would be equally deplorable to reject the categorical imperative without ﬁrst exploring its emancipatory potential.**

#### Now Negate

#### 1] Nations have a de facto right to guarantee self preservation – that entails the possession of nuclear weapons

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As I read Kant, a state’s right to go to war entails the right to threaten to go to war. It follows, first of all, that officials have the right to form the corresponding intentions necessary to wage or threaten war. Second, they have the right to acquire the armaments needed for warfare or for making their threats credible. But, living in the 18th century, Kant could not have conceived that states would become capable of creating, stockpiling, or using nuclear weapons to prevent or respond to the kind of aggression experienced in the 20th and 21st centuries. Yet, if it can be shown that Kantian nonideal theory permits nuclear deterrence under certain conditions, the prima facie right to acquire nuclear weapons can also be shown.

To make the following discussion appropriately general and yet applicable to contemporary cases (e.g. Iran), I shall refer to two hypothetical states that coexist in the kind of anarchy that corresponds to today’s international system. Let us call them ‘Aspirant’ and ‘Rival’. Aspirant is a nuclear threshold state in a ‘troubled’ or insecure region and Rival is their antagonist that also has nuclear weapons aspirations (e.g. Syria), actually has nuclear weapons (e.g. the United States), or is allied with an economically developed and nuclear-armed state (e.g. Israel). For our purposes, Aspirant and Rival are signatories to the NPT. Admittedly, Aspirant’s pursuit of nuclear weapons by itself says nothing explicitly about their intentions. But this does not mean that Aspirant’s intentions are entirely opaque, especially if their pursuits are accompanied by publicly advanced reasons or threats against Rival. A valid Kantian assessment of Aspirant’s nuclear pursuits therefore depends a great deal (but not exclusively) on the intentions that motivate their deterrence threats against Rival.

It is important at this point to distinguish two kinds of target for Aspirant’s deterrent threats: Rival’s military centers and government/ population centers. It is equally important to distinguish two kinds of corresponding intentions: an intention to carry out the threat should deterrence fail and one to never carry out the threat. Table 1 depicts the conceptual territory of targets and intentions:

Each number in Table 1 specifies a policy option for Aspirant that pairs a threat target with a threat intention. Option (1) pairs the reprisal threat against military centers with the intention to carry it out if deterrence fails. Option (2) pairs the threat against military centers with the intention to never carry it out. Option (3) pairs the threat against population/ government centers with the intention never to carry out the threat. And option (4) pairs the threat against population/government centers with the intention to carry it out. One should note that Table 1 does not relate a game theoretic matrix of choices with associated payoffs. Its purpose is to map the range of policy options available to Aspirant. Specifically, Aspirant can undertake any of the four options individually or a limited set of combined options: (1) and (4), (2) and (3), or (2) and (4). Two combined options – (1) and (2) and (3) and (4) – are excluded inasmuch as they are contradictory and could not be implemented at the same time. And, one combined option – (1) and (3) – is equivalent to (1) only.

Now, an intention to carry out nuclear deterrent threats in the context of deterrence failure is an intention to engage in nuclear war. Analysis of this category obviates the need to apply the Kantian view on lying in self defense, since Aspirant means to make good on retaliatory threats. Let us evaluate the only three options. The first is Aspirant’s policy to carry out deterrent threats on military and population/government centers. This choice is tantamount to desiring Rival’s annihilation, which violates the doctrine of right (MM, 6: 235) as well as the nonideal proscriptions against enmity and vengeance in LE. On Kantian terms, the Formula of Universal Law would not pass any maxim that corresponds to a policy of comprehensive nuclear reprisal. To see why, let us assess two varied formulations.

One might be called a maxim of overkill: ‘In all instances of nuclear deterrence failure, the victim of aggression must retaliate by means of nuclear strikes against the aggressor’s military, political, and population centers’. This maxim is easily rejected, for it is the clearest case of state annihilation, that Kant prohibits absolutely. However, it might be compared to a maxim of strict nuclear reciprocity: ‘In all instances of nuclear first strikes, it is the duty of the victim to retaliate in kind’. One of the most challenging cases would be where Aspirant suffers a nuclear first strike on one military center and one industrial center. The maxim dictates that the retaliatory nuclear strike must hit one of Rival’s military and industrial centers. In many cases, acting on this maxim falls significantly short of state annihilation, even though it probably involves high levels of civilian casualties. It might even promote the re-establishment of deterrence in as much as it reinforces the expectation that nuclear escalation will be punished and de-escalation will be rewarded (Gauthier, 1984). However, a Kantian assessment of this maxim is largely independent of these consequentialist concerns. Recall that the Formula of Universal Law draws an uncompromising bottom line where even Rival’s wrongdoing cannot justify Aspirant’s maxim of strict nuclear reciprocity. The indiscriminate destruction of human life, even when Aspirant and Rival destroy only one military and industrial center apiece, cannot be willed as a universal law of nature. And if Aspirant really intended to allow strict nuclear reciprocity only for themselves and no one else, such partiality cannot be reconciled with the Formula of Universal Law’s requirement to transform a maxim into a law that obligates all relevant actors.

The same analysis applies to any policy of carrying out deterrent threats solely against population/government centers. However, for Aspirant to carry out deterrent threats solely against military centers seems prima facie consistent with Kant’s view on the right of national defense, and it parallels some applications of just war theory on the problem of limited nuclear warfighting (Ramsey, 1962; Orend, 2000). Once acquired, a lowyield nuclear device might annihilate one or more of Rival’s army divisions, naval task forces, or air-force bases, severely crippling its capacity to continue to aggress. More importantly, a maxim that corresponds to this intention appears to pass the universality test. Aspirant could in principle assent to a rule that permits all nuclear-armed states to threaten and carry out exclusively counterforce nuclear reprisals, much in the same way that nationalist morality permits all states to use conventional force in selfdefense.23 This isn’t to say that Rival can read off Aspirant’s intentions from its nuclear procurement behavior. And this is not to say that in the process of nuclear miniaturization required to produce these weapons that Aspirant might not retain its larger nuclear devices. It is to say, though, that Aspirant’s maxim on this point can be imagined without formal contradiction. Moreover, were Aspirant to miniaturize its arsenal and then verifiably decommission or destroy its larger devices, Rival might come to behave that Aspirant had abandoned any policy of mutually assured destruction in favor of a policy of severely limited counterforce warfare.

There are, however, significant constraints on this nuclear defense right. Intending to carry out threats against counterforce targets would be impermissible on Kantian nonideal principles if they led to countervalue strikes or a counterforce escalation that entailed massive collateral damage. In conventional warfighting, the just-war doctrine of double effect permits unintended and limited killing of noncombatants on grounds of military necessity. However, at some point an escalation of counterforce strikes cannot avoid ruining the surrounding eco-systems and in turn injuring or destroying innocent human life. It would then be false to claim that Aspirant only intended to do good by undertaking counterforce strikes of this kind. It would also be false to claim these counterforce strikes were necessary evils, and that the goodness of the outcome made the cost of the counterforce strikes worth it (Orend, 2000: 164).

Barring these prohibiting conditions, though, my reading of Kantian nonideal theory suggests that Aspirant’s choice to carry out deterrent threats strictly against military centers of Rival is permissible. Given the special nature of the nuclear threat environment, Kantian nonideal theory permits Aspirant to do all that is consistent with the reciprocity corollary to defend itself. And if Aspirant truly faces a nuclear threat from Rival, their NPT commitments do not clearly over-ride their national defense obligations. Indeed, the inclusion of Article X into the NPT is evidence that states parties are already committed to this position.

What of the other policy options? The most salient options are that Aspirant might levy deterrent threats against Rival’s military or/and their government and population centers but never intend to actually strike any target or never intend to strike any population or government centers. The important practical difference between this set of possibilities and those already considered is that Aspirant expresses a threat against both military and government/population centers. The important moral difference is that this latter set of options embodies the intent to deceive. What moral assessments now follow on the basis of Kant’s views on lying in self-defense and the Formula of Universal Law?

First, we recall that the purpose of lying to criminal aggressors is to deflect or avoid aggression and that lying to liars or assailants is not an injustice to them. If, for instance, North Korea’s nuclear threats are bluffs, they nevertheless are regarded by some to have helped dissuade America (i.e. the Bush Administration) from launching anticipatory military strikes against Pyonyang (Smith, 2006: Ch. 4). This kind of deterrent threat by itself then appears at first glance to be permissible within the bounds of reciprocity. That said, the lie told to the criminal aggressor in Kant’s example does not include a threat of harm. In contrast, the promise of harm that the threat conveys – which is an attitude Aspirant intends to cultivate even though he does not actually intend to carry out the threat – activates Rival’s hostility and the corresponding difficulty in trust building. Such threats are inconsistent with Kant’s nonideal Sixth Preliminary Article that proscribes acts of hostility ‘as would have to make mutual trust impossible during a future peacey’ (PP, 8: 346). In plain terms, a persuasive nuclear deterrent threat that Aspirant secretly intends to never carry out still inflicts a determinate harm that mere deflection or avoidance of aggression does not, namely the construction of an existential insecurity in the threatened state and, to the extent the threat is made public, the creation of existential fear among people that are ‘ends in themselves’.24

Still, given the kind of anarchy that is in today’s world, it would be a mistake to think that Kant would absolutely forbid the practice of using deception in nuclear deterrent threats. Assuming that Rival previously uttered a credible existential threat to Aspirant, and assuming that Aspirant is not an ally of a country with a nuclear umbrella of its own, a nuclear deterrent lie told to Rival is not unjust, even if it generally increases the tendency to not believe statements of this kind. A credible deterrent lie prevents or deflects aggression without causing further injury. In the same fashion, the reciprocity corollary advanced in fourth Section establishes the possibility that, given a world of nuclear-armed states that have already instituted nuclear deterrent regimes and have made hostile threats of their own, Aspirant might reasonably conclude that advancing persuasive nuclear deterrent lies is necessary for national defense. And to establish the credibility of those threats, it would be morally permissible for Aspirant to acquire nuclear weapons even though the NPT forbids it.

#### **No aff offense**

#### 1] There’s nothing intrinsic about nukes that make them immoral – it’s all about the agent and the situation in which they are used. I could make a pencil “evil” if I threw it at you, but that wouldn’t mean that pencils are evil.

#### 2] Hostage-holding contentions are a joke and don’t affirm – 1] Nuclear weapons don’t intrinsically violate the will of citizens, I still go get ice cream if NoKo’s pointing nukes at us. Again, it’s all about the situation. 2] Lack of deterrence credibility doesn’t take out the NC, even the hypothetical possibility of deterrence working means that we ought to allow states to defend themselves through deterrence.

#### Use epistemic confidence—modesty invites arbitrary judge intervention because there’s no way to determine the magnitude of an impact back to a framework and even if you use it our offense outweighs because any contradiction is infinite

## 2NR

### 2NR – Framing Overview

#### [1] Reason is apriori to any decision-making process – extend the bindingness warrant that concedes that reason is unavoidable and cannot be objected. Asking why we would act for reasons implicitly concedes that we need reasons for why we shouldn’t act for reasons. There for, any action needs to be an effect of reason – that’s the action theory warrant under the metaethics. So if reason is conclusive as an ethical model of acting, then reason is essential for action. This takes out any other source of action – even your role of the ballot requires that we accept the reasoning behind it, which means the metaethics precludes your framing.

#### [2] AND, universalizable ethics are justified under reason. There is no distinction between individuals because universal maxims will be the same regardless of experiences. The sky will always be blue, regardless of my experiences. In the same way, there exist universal maxims that don’t change with human experience. First, without universal ethics morality becomes arbitrary, meaning we have no metric as to what is right and what is wrong. Precludes any other framing warrants because they all rely on a distinction between right and wrong. Second, universal constraints are required to protect freedom, as it’s impossible to will a violation of freedom since doing so would will a violation of your freedom.

#### [3] Extend performativity – it precludes any framing claims as we must have practical agency before we will others to abide by a maxim. Our framing is the only one that allows us to pursue ends free of constraint, while the aff limits freedom by forcing us to debate the way they want. A role of the ballot is confining by shutting down offense garnered outside of it.

#### AND, Kant is not racist – any criticism about Kant’s past actions don’t take into account his paradigm shift on the issue of race.

**KLEINGELD**[[1]](#footnote-1)**:** **Kant radically revised his views on race** during the 1790s. He gives no indication of when or why he changed his views. He makes no mention of a racial hierarchy anywhere in his published writings of the 1790s, however, and what he does say about related issues contradicts his earlier views on a racial hierarchy and a plan of Nature designed to restrict human migration (after their initial dispersal across the globe). I ﬁrst discuss evidence for the thesis that Kant dropped his hierarchical view of the races, and then turn to the status of the concept of race as such in his later work. In Toward Perpetual Peace and the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant clearly departs from his earlier position in a number of ways. First of all, he becomes more egalitarian with regard to race.28 He now grants a full juridical status to non-whites, a status irreconcilable with his earlier defence of slavery. For example, **his concept of cosmopolitan right**, as introduced in Toward Perpetual Peace (: ), **explicitly prohibits** the **colonial conquest** of foreign lands: If one compares with this [viz the idea of cosmopolitan right] the inhospitable behaviour of the civilized states in our part of the world, especially the commercial ones, the injustice that the latter show when visiting foreign lands and peoples (which to them is one and the same as conquering those lands and peoples) takes on terrifying propor- tions. America, the negro countries, the Spice Islands, the Cape, etc., were at the time of their discovery lands that they regarded as belonging to no one, for the native inhabitants counted as nothing to them. **Any European settlement requires contractual agreement** with the existing population, says Kant, unless the settlement takes place so far from other people that there is no encroachment on anyone’s use of land. In the section on cosmopolitan right in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant speciﬁcally stipulates **that** such a contract **should not take advantage of** the ignorance of **the inhabitants** with regard to the terms of the contract (MM : ), a stipulation which presupposes a concern not found in the 1780s texts. The very fact that Kant regards Native Americans, Africans and Asians as (equally) capable of signing contracts, and as persons whose interests and claims present a normative constraint on the behaviour of European powers, indicates a shift in perspective. After all, as long as Kant regarded slavery as appropriate for Native Americans and Africans, he did not con- sider their consent to be important at all. The same can be said about the fact that he now defends hunting and shepherding peoples against en- croachment by Europeans, instead of highlighting their failure to develop agriculture as he did earlier. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant rejects con- sequentialist justiﬁcations for colonialism (the alleged ‘civilizing’ eﬀects on the ‘savages’) (MM : ). He also rejects the argument that the European colonists are justiﬁed in claiming ownership over foreign lands and their inhabitants by the fact they ‘establish a new civil union with them and bring these human beings (savages) into a rightful condition’. Instead, Kant main- tains that the latter have the right of ﬁrst possession, and that this right is violated by the European ownership claims (MM : ). Importantly, Kant has now become unambiguously opposed to chattel slavery. Robert Bernasconi has claimed that Kant was ‘silent on the slave trade in Africans’ and ‘failed to speak out against chattel slavery’, and that he is ‘aware of no direct statement by Kant calling for the abolition of either African slavery or the slave trade, even if only in principle’.29 Such state- ments do exist, however. In his notes for Toward Perpetual Peace (–), **Kant repeatedly and explicitly criticizes slavery** of non-Europeans in the strongest terms, as a grave violation of cosmopolitan right (: –). He formulates a scathing critique of the conduct of European powers elsewhere in the world. He sharply criticizes ‘the civilized countries bordering the seas’, whom he accuses of recognizing no normative constraints in their behaviour towards people on other continents and of regarding the ‘possess- ions and even the person of the stranger as a loot given to them by Nature’. Kant censures the slave trade (‘trade in Negroes’), not as an excessive form of an otherwise acceptable institution, but as in itself a ‘violation’ of the cosmopolitan right of blacks (: ). Similarly, he criticizes the fact that the inhabitants of America were treated as objects belonging to no one, and ‘were displaced or enslaved’ soon after Europeans reached the continent (: –). After having discussed European behaviour in Africa, America and Asia, he concludes (: ): The principles underlying the supposed lawfulness of appropriating newly discovered and purportedly barbaric or irreligious lands, as goods belonging to no one, without the consent of the inhabitants and even subjugating them as well, are absolutely contrary to cosmopolitan right. In the published version of Toward Perpetual Peace, Kant repeats this judge- ment. He criticizes the ‘very most gruesome and most calculated slavery’30 on the Sugar Islands (PP : ). In the Metaphysics of Morals too (MM : , , ), he categorically and repeatedly condemns chattel slavery.31 These passages show that Kant changed his earlier views on the status of non-whites. The oft-defended thesis that Kant’s racism remained constant thus needs correction, and one should not use evidence from the 1780s in support of claims about his views in the 1790s. For example, his statements from the mid-1790s contradict the view that the role of the ‘idle races’ in Kant’s cosmopolitan theory was merely that of a contrast against which Europeans could measure their own progress,32 as well as the view that for Kant, the non-white races counted as a ‘waste’ of nature.33 These inter- pretations are based on Kant’s earlier texts, and therefore they are at most defensible as interpretations of his earlier views, not of his later views on the races. Kant not only became more egalitarian with regard to race, he also revised his view of the role of race in connection with intercontinental migration. In some of his earlier writings he called racial diﬀerentiation ‘necessary’ for the preservation of the species during its initial dispersal across the globe (DCHR : ), and claimed that Nature discouraged sub- sequent migrations. As Mark Larrimore has shown, however, these claims were in tension with Kant’s repeated declarations, often in the same writings, that whites are able to live anywhere on earth,34 for they imply that racial diﬀerentiation (or, more precisely, the development of non-whites) is not really necessary for the preservation of the species after all. Kant’s later position simply does not attribute any special role to racial diﬀerentiation (let alone racial hierarchy) for the purpose of global migration. In his 1795 description of what Nature has done to enable humans to live everywhere on earth, Kant omits any mention of predispositions for diﬀer- ent races (PP : –). He now claims that Nature has organized the earth in such a way that humans can and will live everywhere, and that they will eventually use the surface of the earth for interacting peacefully (PP : ). The new category of cosmopolitan right, introduced in Toward Perpetual Peace, is premised on increasing and continuing movement and interaction across borders. He concludes his exposition of cosmopolitan right (which includes his critique of colonialism and slavery) with the hope that In this way, remote parts of the world can establish relations peacefully with one another, relations which ultimately become regulated by public laws and can thus ﬁnally bring the human species ever closer to a cosmopolitan constitution (PP : ). Instead of his earlier claim that blacks and Native Americans cannot govern themselves (: ) and that Europe ‘will probably eventually legislate for all other continents’ (IUH : ), Kant now envisages a world in which people of diﬀerent colours and on diﬀerent continents establish peaceful relations with each other that honour the normative principles laid down in his exposition of cosmopolitan right. Finally, Kant’s ascription of mental characteristics to the diﬀerent races has changed. For example, **he ascribes** the ideal of **military courage equally to Native Americans and** mediaeval **European knights** (PP : ). This stands **in** marked **contrast with his earlier insistence** on the weakness and inertia of Native Americans.

### 2NR – Ideal Theory

#### 1] Ideals are necessary and inevitable to any human project – what’s most dangerous is avoiding the project of defining ideals altogether. We should engage in philosophical investigations as training.

Chesterton: (Gilbert K. Chesterton, “HERETICS,” John Lane Company, 1905//FT) \*\***Could also work with deep thinking argument - as the flip side – i.e. the lack of deep thinking. [bracketed for gendered language]**

There are people, however, who dig somewhat deeper than this into the possible evils of dogma. It is felt by many that strong philosophical conviction, while it does not (as they perceive) produce that sluggish and fundamentally frivolous condition which we call bigotry, does produce a certain concentration, exaggeration, and moral impatience, which we may agree to call fanaticism. They say, in brief, that ideas are dangerous things. In politics, for example, it is commonly urged against a man like Mr. Balfour, or against a man like Mr. John Morley, that a wealth of ideas is dangerous. The true doctrine on this point, again, is surely not very difficult to state. Ideas are dangerous, but the man to whom they are least dangerous [to] is the [person] man of ideas. He is acquainted with ideas, and moves among them like a lion-tamer. Ideas are dangerous, but the man to whom they are most dangerous is the man of no ideas. The [person] man of no ideas will find the first idea fly to his head like wine to the head of a teetotaller. It is a common error, I think, among the Radical idealists of my own party and period to suggest that financiers and business men are a danger to the empire because they are so sordid or so materialistic. The truth is that financiers and business men are a danger to the empire because they can be sentimental about any sentiment, and idealistic about any ideal, any ideal that they find lying about. just as a boy who has not known much of women is apt too easily to take a woman for the woman, so these practical men, unaccustomed to causes, are always inclined to think that if a thing is proved to be an ideal it is proved to be the ideal. Many, for example, avowedly followed Cecil Rhodes because he had a vision. They might as well have followed him because he had a nose; a man without some kind of dream of perfection is quite as much of a monstrosity as a noseless man. People say of such a figure, in almost feverish whispers, "He knows his own mind," which is exactly like saying in equally feverish whispers, "He blows his own nose." Human nature simply cannot subsist without a hope and aim of some kind; as the sanity of the Old Testament truly said, where there is no vision the people perisheth. But it is precisely because an ideal is necessary to man that the [person] man without ideals is in permanent danger of fanaticism. There is nothing which is so likely to leave a man open to the sudden and irresistible inroad of an unbalanced vision as the cultivation of business habits. All of us know angular business men who think that the earth is flat, or that Mr. Kruger was at the head of a great military despotism, or that men are graminivorous, or that Bacon wrote Shakespeare. Religious and philosophical beliefs are, indeed, as dangerous as fire, and nothing can take from them that beauty of danger. But there is only one way of really guarding ourselves against the excessive danger of them, and that is to be steeped in philosophy and soaked in religion

### 2NR – Kant is Racist

#### 1. Cross apply Farr- 2 net benefits:

#### A. Starting from an ideal theory is necessary to determine what counts as a violation of racism rather than authorities definining it for you- incorporating abstraction is necessary to develop a starting point

#### B. The Kantian subject is the embodied subject- universalizability is essential to mutual recognition of tohers.

#### 2. Kantian ethics is key to challenge a lifestyle grounded in materialism which causes their impacts

**Boxhill**[[2]](#footnote-2)**:** Third, although the last point is significant, **it should not be confused with** a more general **condemnation of Kant’s rationalism**. In particular, **his insistence on crucial role of reason** in moral deliberation and finding solutions to social problems is separable from the previous objection, and it **seems quite right**. **Kant argued, rightly** we think, **that the development of deliberative reason is** crucially **important for groups, as well as individuals, to develop solutions to the problems of social justice. Although more than reason is required** for moral living and decent communities, **Kant seems right that people who tried to life** as he (no doubt falsely) portrayed the Tahitian, without the use of reason and only for enjoyment, **would be ill equipped to handle the social and moral problems inevitably presented by the hard realities of human life.** Thus, while he arguably inflated the value of the lifestyle devoted to perfecting reason, **his main message**, the need for the use (and so adequate development of) deliberative reason, **is still much needed.**

#### No link- There is nothing good or bad about endorsing certain ideas. All ideas have been misused or applied to do horrible things. Ideas are not good or bad; it’s how they are utilized. Ideas aren’t racist; people are racist. My endorsement of certain Kantian ideals is not an endorsement of the person, but the concept.

### 2NR/1NC – A2 Foreseen Harms First

#### [1] Intended harms outweigh foreseen impacts: (Extinction)

#### A) Foreseen harms aren’t part of the will because they’re harms that are caused regardless what an agent wills. You could take the same action and it could have the same foreseen harms even if the intention was different, so foreseen harms are arbitrary. It’s key to motivation because if we were responsible for all harms then we’d never be able to pursue any ends as foreseen harms are over demanding.

#### B) Questions of the existing ethical communities preclude discussions of future ones – historical and present wrongs inhibit our ability to achieve ends now while foreseen impacts only preclude an ethical community from existing in the future. However, we only take action in order to promote the ethical community so basing action on foreseen impacts leads to paralysis.

#### C) All the warrants in the framework presume the intention of action is more important – for example, the first argument in the framework says that the unity of action is the best action theory which would result in intentions coming first so winning my framework implicitly assumes the truth of this argument.

#### The standard evaluates actions based upon their intrinsic nature, not foreseen consequences: [A] To account for all foreseen impacts would prevent action because individuals would become morally culpable for all actions and states of affairs not just those that factor into the will [B] Induction is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform and we could only reach that conclusion through inductive reasoning based on observation of past events [C] Otherwise ethical theories hold agents responsible for consequences external to their will which removes any reason to be moral because agents cannot control what they are being punished for [D] Anybody can invent positive or negative consequences out of all the potential impacts that an action will have, so consequentialism can easily be taken advantage of by the powerful, who can claim that the consequences happen to favor whatever they desire.

### 1NC Module – Util on Case

#### 1] Util makes action impossible – you would have to calculate how much time you calculations would take and so on – makes policymaking impossible because we would always be calculating.

#### 2] Util is bad moral metric – can come to some obscene conclusions to maximize utility. Things like slavery and genocide were calculated to be “moral” by utilitarian institutions, which means we should be skeptical of Util’s moral framing.

#### 3] Problem of induction

Vickers 14, John Vickers, 2014, The Problem of Induction, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/

The original problem of induction can be simply put. It concerns the support or justification of inductive methods; methods that predict or infer, in Hume's words, that “instances of which we have had no experience resemble those of which we have had experience” (THN, 89). Such methods are clearly essential in scientific reasoning as well as in the conduct of our everyday affairs. The problem is how to support or justify them and it leads to a dilemma: the principle cannot be proved deductively, for it is contingent, and only necessary truths can be proved deductively. Nor can it be supported inductively—by arguing that it has always or usually been reliable in the past—for that would beg the question by assuming just what is to be proved.

#### **4]** Util triggers permissibility Bostrom ’02:

Bostrom, Nick (2002) Are Cosmological Theories Compatible with All Possible Evidence: A Missing Methodological Link.

In the standard Big Bang model, assuming the simplest topology (i.e., that space is singly connected), there are three basic possibilities: the universe can be open, flat, or closed. Current data suggests a flat or open universe, although the final verdict is pending. If the universe is either open or flat, then it is spatially infinite at every point in time and the model entails that it contains an infinite number of galaxies, stars, and planets. There exists a common misconception which confuses the universe with the (finite) ‘observable universe’. But the observable part—the part that could causally affect us—would be just an infinitesimal fraction of the whole. Statements about the “mass of the universe” or the “number of protons in the universe” generally refer to the content of this observable part; see e.g. [1]. Many cosmologists [also] believe that our universe is just one in an infinite ensemble of universes (a multiverse), and this adds to the probability that the world is canonically infinite; for a popular review, see [2].” Recent cosmological evidence suggests that the world is probably infinite. Moreover, [I]f the totality of physical existence [it] is indeed infinite, in the kind of way that modern cosmology suggests it is, then it contains an infinite number of galaxies, stars, and planets. If there [is] an infinite number of planets then there is, with probability one, a number of people. Infinitely many of these people are happy, infinitely many are unhappy. Likewise for other local properties that are plausible candidates for having value, pertaining to person‐states, lives, or entire societies, ecosystems, or civilizations—there are infinitely many democratic states, and infinitely many that are ruled by despots, etc.  Suppose the world contains an infinite number of people and a corresponding infinity of joys and sorrows, preference satisfactions and frustrations, instances of virtue and depravation, and other such local phenomena at least some of which have positive or negative value. More precisely, suppose that there is some finite value ε such that there exists an infinite number of local phenomena (this could be a subset of e.g. persons, experiences, characters, virtuous acts, lives, relationships, civilizations, or ecosystems) each of which has a value ≥ ε and also an infinite number of local phenomena each of which has a value ≤ (‒ ε). Call such a world canonically infinite. Ethical theories that hold that value is aggregative imply that a canonically [an] infinite world contains an infinite quantity of [both] positive value and an infinite quantity of negative value. This gives rise to a peculiar predicament. We can do only a finite amount of good or bad. Yet in cardinal arithmetic, adding or subtracting a finite quantity does not change an infinite quantity. Every possible act of ours therefore has the same net effect on the total amount of good and bad in a canonically infinite world: none whatsoever. Aggregative consequentialist theories threatened by infinitarian paralysis: they seem to imply that if the world is canonically infinite then it is always ethically indifferent what we do.

#### **TJF’s –**

#### A. Resource disparities—a focus on evidence and statistics privileges debaters with the most preround prep which excludes lone-wolfs who lack huge evidence files. A Kantian debate can easily be won without any prep since only analytical arguments are required. That controls the internal link to other voters because a pre-req to debating is access to the activity.

#### B. Real world education—an understanding of Kantianism is key to understanding the law in the real world because most states abide by inviolable side-constraints in their constitutions—Germany proves.

**Ripstein**, Arthur. Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy. Harvard University Press, 2009. \*bracketed for clarity and grammar\*

Strictly speaking, the right to dignity is not an enumerated right in **the German Basic Law [says]**, but the organizing principle under which all enumerated rights—ranging from life and security of the person through freedom of expression, movement, association, and employment and the right to a fair trial to equality before the law—are organized. It appears as Art. I.1: **“Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.”** Art. I.3 explains that the enumerated rights follow: “**The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary as directly applicable law.”** Other, enumerated rights are subject to proportionality analysis, through which they can be restricted in light of each other so as to give effect to a consistent system of rights. **The right to dignity is the basis of the state’s power to legislate and so is not subject to any limitation,** even in light of the enumerated rights falling under it, **because—to put it in explicitly Kantian terms—citizens could not give themselves a law that turned them into mere objects.**

#### TJF’s come first – even if a theory is ethically correct we should only debate it if it can theoretically make for a fair and educational debate.

1. Pauline Kleingeld (Professor at the University of Groningen). “KANT’S SECOND THOUGHTS ON RACE.” Philosophical Quarterly. 2007. <http://www.rug.nl/staff/pauline.kleingeld/kleingeld-kant-on-race-pq.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Kant and Race. Thomas Hill, Jr. and Bernard Boxhill. Chapter 18 of “Race and Racism.” [↑](#footnote-ref-2)