# Relation NC

## Actual FW

#### Ethics cannot be born in solitude but rather must occur with a relation to the other, Thus the I think is not the I am but rather a solipsistic subject. Instead all conceptions of identity must begin in the space between us and those who are unknowable.

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Thinking, questioning, are often taken as a demonstration of the indubitable existence of the ego (as in Descartes’ famous methodic doubt). Sometimes this is even developed into a solipsist position (I can be sure that I exist because I am thinking, but I don’t know if anyone else exists). However, Watsuji reads these acts in the complete opposite way: questioning shows how our individuality is fundamentally connected to others through shared language and concerns.1 He writes: “No matter how much we concern ourselves with the consciousness of I, this concern itself implies our going beyond the consciousness of I and being connected with others.”2 What we see here is a completely different starting point: We take our departure not from the intentional consciousness of “I” but [is] from “betweenness.” The essential feature of betweenness lies in this, that the intentionality of the I is from the outset prescribed by its counterpart, which is also conversely prescribed by the former.3 This betweenness as a starting point applies not only to asking ethical questions but also to all our acts as human beings. For example, right now, I am writing. But my writing is always determined by possible readers—what kind of people would read my book? What parts might they find unclear? In the same way, the reader is perhaps at this point wondering what I am thinking, and what ideas I am trying to convey. The author is always determined by readers, and a reader is always determined by authors in a reciprocal[y] determination and mutual dependency. Therefore, Watsuji does not even start with an independent author and an independent reader, who then have a relationship. Rather, “This relationship is constructed through and through in the betweenness between an author and his readers. Neither can exist prior to and independent of the other. They exist only by depending on one another.”4

#### **Thus in order to overcome this ethics must be centered around our relations with the other. Once we acknowledge a relation exists there are two types of relations we can engage in, I-It relations where the subject reduces the other to a one dimensional object reconstituting the solipstic condition, and I-Thou relations where the other is constituted in a religious experience as an unknowable object, giving meaning to the subject.**

EMMANUEL LEVINAS, yall ready know who this mans is, Summarizes, "Martin Buber and the, Theory of Knowledge, 1967 ,///AHS PB

The I-Thou relation is one in which the self is no longer a subject who always remains alone and is for this reason Relation par excellence, for it extends beyond the boundaries of the self (404-409) (although it is questionable what these boundaries mean for Buber, for he never described positively the isolation and the limitation of the I). The relation is the very essence of the I: whenever the I truly affirms itself, its affirmation is inconceivable without the presence of the Thou. (23, 40, passim) The Thou, as index of the dimension in which the I seeks (and therefore in a measure already finds) another being, the Thou as the indeterminate horizon of the encounter, is a priori or innate. (39) The I is the term of a relation which cannot be expressed in terms of thought, for the latter only acts to dissolve the relation. Furthermore, I, in the relation, rediscovers "its original community with the totality of being." (443-445) The allegiance of the primitive mind to the law of participation, according to Buber, testifies to the original nature of the relation and the primacy of the I-Thou to the I-It. (30-33) The distinction between the experience of an object and a meeting in which one being confronts another -- a difference which concerns the nature of the relation itself and not merely of its terms, and which implies consequences whose scope Feuerbach, the first to formulate the I-Thou relation, could not foresee; a concern to base human experience on the meeting-these are the fundamental contributions of Buber to theory of knowledge. It is of spiritual significance that this relation to being underlying all of our objective knowledge does not involve an impersonal, neutral unity -- the Sein des Seiendes of Heidegger-but a Seiendes which is the being of the other, and hence implies a social communion considered as the primary act of being. Finally, we may observe the phenomenological character of Buber's descriptions: they are all based on the concrete reality of perception and do not require any appeal to abstract principle for their justification; the non-theoretical modes of existence are themselves ascriptive of meaning and the ontological structures with which they are associated, are not separable from these. IV. The Ontology of the Interval, or the "Between" The Relation cannot be identified with a "subjective" event because the I does not represent the Thou but meets it. The meeting, moreover, is to be distinguished from the silent dialogue the mind has with itself (204-205); the I-Thou meeting does not take place in the subject but in the realm of being. (26-27) However, we must avoid an interpretation of the meeting as something objectively apprehended by the I, for the ontological realm is not a block universe but an occurrence. The interval between the I and Thou, the Zwischen, is the locus where being is being realized. (27) The interval between the I and Thou cannot be conceived as a kind of stellar space existing independently of the two terms which it separates. For the dimension itself of the interval opens uniquely to the I and to the Thou which enter into each meeting, (458) and the utmost transcendence is bound to the utmost particularity of the terms. Buber has made an effort to do more than merely define a kind of being which may be distinguished from the being of nature or of things, as, for instance, the process of becoming is distinguished from the Eleatic being. The interval between the I and Thou is inseparable from the adventure in which the individual himself participates, yet is more objective than any other type of objectivity, precisely because of that personal adventure. The Zwischen is reconstituted in each fresh meeting and is therefore always novel in the same sense as are the moments of Bergsonian duration. If the notion of "betweenness" functions as the fundamental category of being, however, man is the locus where the act of being is being acted. (455) Man must not be construed as a subject constituting reality but rather as the articulation itself of the meeting. The personality is for Buber not merely a being among other beings, but is a category, in Kant's sense of the term, and it is Nietzsche who has compelled our acceptance of this. (387) Man does not meet, he is the meeting. He is something that distances itself and in this distancing the anonymous existence of the world of things affirms itself by the various uses we make of it, and in that distancing we can also enter into relations with this alien world. 3 By this double movement, Man is situated at the center of being and philosophy is identifiable with anthropology. But he is not at the center in so far as he is a thinking subject, but with respect to his whole being, since only a total commitment can be the realization of his fundamental situation. That situation underlies his thought and already implies a transcendence. "Only when we try to understand the human person in his whole situation, in the possibilities of his relation to all that is not himself, do we understand man." "Man can become whole not by virtue of a relation to himself but only by virtue of a relation to another self." 4

#### However in order for ethical relations to be relevant and relate the I to the thou, they need to contain reciprocal recognition. This is not a unilateral infinite obligation to the other, but an equal encounter that requires mutual confirmation. Such reciprocity is key to any conception of linguistic and moral truth.

EMMANUEL LEVINAS, yall ready know who this mans is, Summarizes, "Martin Buber and the, Theory of Knowledge, 1967 , 2 ///AHS PB

Verbundenheit characterizes the reciprocity of the I-Thou relation and of the dialogue where I commit myself to the Thou just because it is absolutely other. The essence of the 'word' does not initially consist in its objective meaning or descriptive possibilities, but in the response that it elicits. The assertion is not true because the thought that it expresses corresponds to the thing or because it is revelatory of being. It is true only when it derives from the I-Thou relation identical with the ontological process itself. The assertion is true [but] when it realizes the reciprocity of the relation by eliciting a response and singling out an individual who alone is capable of responding. This conception of the truth has nothing in common with the static notion of truth as an expressible content. But it is not to be assumed that a Heraclitian or Bergsonian becoming, also inexpressible because the word is necessarily a changeless entity and cannot apply to what is always changing, is the sole reality that may be opposed to immutable being. For Buber describes a sphere of being which cannot be told because it is a living dialogue between individuals who are not related as objective contents to one another: one individual has nothing to say about the other. The sensitivity of the I-Thou relation lies in its completely formal nature. To apprehend the other as a content is tantamount to relating oneself to him as an object and is to enter into an I-It relation instead. The notion of truth (with respect to which Buber's language is insufficiently didactic) is determinated by the I-Thou relation construed as the fundamental relation to being. We must distinguish Truth possessed, Truth as an impersonal result, called also objective Truth (283) from the Truth as a "way of being," a manner of truly being which denotes God. But truth also signifies a "concrete attitude towards being," "Realverhältnis zum Seienden" (198-199) and the living test which verifies it (BewAhrung). "To know signifies for the creature to fulfill a relation with being, for everyone in his own particular way, sincerely (wahrhaft) and with complete responsibility, accepting it on faith in all its various manifestations and therefore open to its real possibilities, integrating these experiences according to its own nature. It is only in this way that the living truth emerges and can be preserved." (283)

#### Thus the Standard is Promoting Reciprocal Relations With The Other

#### Impact calc and reasons to prefer:

#### **[1] Circularity: Other theories are circular because they presuppose a you who creates themselves through reflection.**

#### **[2] My offense hijacks your framework: when we reduce others to monomial ideas we A) make actual interaction with others impossible which is important under any ethical theory B) devolve our subjectivity, solely to the realm of the self, which does the same to others who cannot engage with us and makes the resolution incoherent because reporters are defined by their relations with the world.**

#### **[3] Controls the internal link to accessing your offense through a double-bind, either the self can come in contact and be affected by others in which case we care about preserving legitimate relations, or it is untouchable making affirming incoherent and solipsistic.**

#### **[4] Performativity: by positing an ethical theory to me and the judges in this round, you presuppose that values are created through discussions with others and that relations exist where we can do that.**

### Offense

#### Now Negate:

#### [1] Relations can only exist when the other is someone with a concrete identity to relate too. Anonymous others isolate the subject and make anything outside it impossible.

EMMANUEL LEVINAS, yall ready know who this mans is, Summarizes, "Martin Buber and the, Theory of Knowledge, 1967 , 3 ///AHS PB

Human beings when we speak of them in the third person, "he," "she," "they," as well as my own private psychological states, belong to the sphere of the It. The I experiences these; but only explores their surface without committing its whole being (15-16), and its experiences do not extend beyond itself. (17) The It is neutral. The neuter gender suggests, moreover, that in the It, individuals do not enter into the type of unifying relation in which their otherness is distinctive, where they are, so to speak, other than the others. The individual is rather [they are] regarded as that which one may dispose of, what is significant only with respect to the actions of its physical being. Thus the actual purpose of all knowing, i.e., the effort to grasp what is independent of it, what is completely other, is not fulfilled in this case. Being is cast in the role, as the need may be, of an anonymous article of exchange, a funded past, or else is experienced in the actual moment of enjoyment, and cannot be properly interpreted as a real presence. (25)

#### And this is reciprocal, when a source attempts to become anonymous they A) alienate themselves from the world, becoming solipsistic and B) can only engage in corrupted one dimensional relations, comprising their ability to foster any ethical action.

#### [2] The phrase “The identity” in the resolution implies that sources have one definitive identity however A) its non-relational and textually illogical to devolve multiple sources to one identity and B) a source doesn’t have one static identity but rather has their identity redefined with every legitimate engagement with the other. This is not an argument why identity doesn’t exist but rather that confining someone to static preconceived one reduces the other to an it.

#### [3] The 1ACs relations lack the reciprocity to be transformative: A) Reporters are granted exclusive rights to effect the relations with the source, reducing the source to an it to be controlled and acted towards rather than respected B) Even if this right was reciprocal, rights are defined by ones ability to choose to exercise them, meaning obligating a reporter to have one forces a inflexible, thus I-It relation, and is illogical. C) When one tries to protect something, the prevent themselves from engaging in open relations with the world, thereby loosing meaning.

## Stuff

This is A summary of the author: Buber begins these lectures by asserting that man only becomes a problem to himself and asks “What is man?” in periods of social and cosmic homelessness. Targeting Kant and Hegel, he argues that while this questioning begins in solitude, in order for man to find who he is, he must overcome solitude and the whole way of conceiving of knowledge and reality that is based on solitude. Buber accuses Hegel of denigrating the concrete human person and community in favor of universal reason and argues that man will never be at home or overcome his solitude in the universe that Hegel postulates. With its emphasis on history, Hegel locates perfection in time rather than in space. This type of future-oriented perfection, Buber argues, can be thought, but it cannot be imagined, felt or lived. Our relationship to this type of perfection can only rest on faith in a guarantor for the future.  
  
Instead, Buber locates realization in relations between creatures. Overcoming our solitude, which tends to oscillate between conceiving of the self as absorbed in the all (collectivism) and the all as absorbed into the self (solipsistic mysticism), we realize that we always exist in the presence of other selves, and that the self is a part of reality only insofar as it is relational. In contrast to the traditional philosophic answers to “What is man?” that fixate on reason, self-consciousness or free will, Buber argues that man is the being who faces an “other”, and a human home is built from relations of mutual confirmation.

Where are in a position of universal solitude, all conceptions at self reason collapse to sollipsism, our relations to others are key

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In experience, we experience something that is not us, like the world, the objects and other in its mode of givenness. Notwithstanding, such modes of givenness are implicated in our concrete Ego (Husserl 1973, §48, 136). In spite of the transcendental Ego being the endower of meaning, it is not arrested in a transcendental solipsism. The static analysis (thematised, the constituted) is confronted with the flux genesis of the world, the other, and of our consciousness (the thematising, the constituting). Under these circumstances, the solipsistic Ego is split in its concreteness by the very temporal flux. This means that the other, the world, and the objects are included/implicated in the sphere of our ownness. Now, the surrounding world is just constituted/constituting together with others. Thus, a transcendental subjectivity can be only conceived as transcendental intersubjetivity, in other words, the objects, the others, the world, and even ourselves are only understood intersubjectively.  
What is excluded from our Ego (Husserl 1973, §49, 137), to wit, what is not our Ego, is included, implicated transcendentally. Despite the fact that we have our own originality as Egos, such Egos live in a kind of harmony (Husserl 1973, §49, 138) with the world due to the fact that there is a thereness for everyone in it. Thus, the noetic/noematic constitution process carries with it the sense of harmony and transformation. We, as original Egos, live in a community of Egos harmonically. The process of experiencing the other, lacks the access in relation to its originality which is peculiar of each one. The disclosure of the other will just be possible through appresentation (Husserl 1973, §50, 139), whereby my relation with other reveals its openness. This appresentation will go beyond the manifestation of the physical body, done as an object, but as a lived body which motivated us differently, in a deep and more challenged way, bringing a diversity of new possibility to our concrete Ego.  
The alter Ego is presented as accessible of what is not originally accessible (Husserl 1973, §53, 144). Here, Husserl is trying to avoid any identification between us and the other, instead, he tries to reveal a kind of association, analogy which motivates the sphere of our ownness. This motivation is done due to the appresentation of the other, whereby it is seen as accessible, because it is in front of me, already there to be analysed, but at same time, it is inaccessible, because of his/her own originality. The other cannot be seen as a duplicate of us, but, we can objectively conceive that we can do what the other Ego can, and, also, we can be at the place of the other if we want. In Husserl’s words, our Ego is constituted as Here (in relation to our psychophysical body) and the other as There (in relation to his/her psychophysical body). Thus, we are able to transfer every There into a Here (Husserl 1973, §53, 146), but we are not able to uncover its originality, its temporal flux structure. Therefore, we draw the conclusion that, in spite of our objectification characteristic, we are not able to grasp the temporal flux. This means that an original presence will be always ungraspable, although, by perception, it is lived by our transcendental subjectivity.  
What is primordially incompatible, in simultaneous coexistence, becomes compatible: because our primordial Ego constitutes the Ego who is other for us by an appresentative apperception, which, according to its intrinsic nature, never demands and never is open to fulfilment by presentation (Husserl 1973, §54, 147). It is impossible a transcendental solipsism, because of two basic factors: the surrounding world and the other. The surrounding-world, due to the fact that it is already there in advance, sustaining our cogitations, the other by breaking our pretention of objectifications. The accessibility/inaccessibility of the other allows a challenge for the openness of our consciousness. The world is given to us and to everyone only as a cultural world, and as having the sense: accessible to everyone (Husserl 1973, § 58, 160). Such world for everyone has an ontological, a priori structure, which is natural, psychophysical, social and cultural (Husserl 1975, §59, 164).  
Despite the fact that the transcendental subjectivity endows meaning, such meaning is constituted in a togetherness of monads (community of Egos) in relation to a common world. For Husserl, it is inconceivable (Husserl 1973, § 60, 167-168) to create a second world, instead, even our fantasies are related to the original world, whereby all senses are based. Therefore, the psychology cannot lose its implication with the world, and with the other, because it would be closed into a solipsistic noematic objectivity. Husserl draws the conclusion that phenomenological explication does nothing but explicate the sense that this world has for us all, prior to any philosophizing

Everything collapses into relativetity

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What is the basic logic of the assumption that relativity is primary, not absoluteness? Again, we have the simplest, clearest kind of rationality. The concept of the non-relative is parasitic on that of the relative. Given the concept of relatedness, we can then by negation (itself an example of relativity) arrive at that of non-relatedness. Relativity means that the thing said to be relative depends for being what it is upon some relation to another. It means that if you attempt to assume alternative relations of the thing to alternative relata, you find that the thing itself must be supposed somehow different. Relativity is, to speak somewhat metaphorically, sensitivity to relational alternatives. Absoluteness is neutrality to such alternatives. But neutrality presupposes what we have termed sensitivity. "The alternatives make no difference" (to the absolute) has meaning only in terms of the concept of "making a difference," that is, relativity.

Individual values are constructed by relativity, no action is just kind or just rational, but only in relation to other things

We need to overcome this by entering it relationships of mutual recognition, else we shift between only perciieving the self as part of the all or the all as part of the self, we strike a balance.

Possible relativity standard card

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Let us begin our analysis by pointing out the fact that through the notion of dialogical life or dialogical form Buber aims at the assessment of the primacy of the relation within the human scope. In the course of his development Buber introduced several terms for the description of the phenomenon, such as, dialogue, essential relation, the "between." Though there is a slight shift in emphasis in these various terms, the main idea has been retained. Following his own description, we may say that the sphere of the interhuman is that of being vis-a-vis one to the other while the explication of this sphere is called the dialogical form ( 'das Dialogische). 1 To be embedded in the vis-a-vis situation is to be embedded in mutuality or "entering into mutuality." 2 The very partners of a situation of mutuality, those usually described and termed as I and Thou, are established through the relation of mutuality: "I become through my relations with the Thou; as I become I, I say Thou. 3Though a possible interpretation of this statement might be that the whole comprising the interrelated human beings is more than its components, Buber actually wants to place the emphasis not just on the independence of the whole but on the independence of the relation between the components, as against the individual components. "Each, considered by itself, is a mighty abstraction. The individual is a fact of existence insofar as he steps into a living relation with other individuals . . . the fundamental fact of human existence is man with man." 4 This sphere of "between" is not simply given and established once and forever. Though it is created time and again in the course of human life, it is still not just an outcome of those creating it, because the very creation of the mutual contact between human beings presupposes a kind of instinct toward this creation, an instinct inherent in the human beings.  
'Between' is not an auxiliary construction, but the real place and bearer of what happens between men; it has received no specific attention because, in distinction from the individual soul and its context, it does not exhibit a smooth continuity, but is ever and again re-constituted in accordance with men's meetings with one another. 5  
This double face of the sphere of "between," being as it were both real and atmospheric, is the most characteristic feature of the interhuman scope and therefore, because of the combination of the two aspects, very difficult to be conceptually established, let alone analysed. Since there is, at least in our age, a prevailing tendency towards an analysis of wholes and relationships, an analysis which amounts to reductions, the assessment of the independence of the sphere of "between" faces difficulties connected with the bias of the prevailing systematic forms of philosophical thought.6Since Buber himself uses in this context the expression of "mysterium" he even admittedly enhances the difficulty of a morphological, let alone conceptual, establishment of the sphere of "between."  
Yet the essential relationship between two human beings is, speaking in cosmic terms, the new phenomenon introduced into the cosmos by the appearance of man. From this point of view, Buber talks about the primordial chance of being as it comes to appear through and because of the fact that there are human beings. 7 It might be proper to add at this juncture that sometimes Buber does not confine his description and analysis to the human sphere proper as for instance when he says, describing the emergence of answer or response: "a dog has looked at you." 8 And yet his main concern is with the nature of relationship within the human sphere proper and the hints at what is beyond this sphere are only in nature or an expansion of his main findings about the character of the human sphere.  
Actually, one of the main concrete expressions of the existence of the sphere of "between" is the phenomenon of answer: ". . . a word demanding an answer has happened to me." 9 It might be proper at this juncture to suggest that the fact that Buber takes advantage of the term "dialogue" is related to the experience of an answer as pointing to a dialogical situation, though Buber himself transcends, as we shall see, the sphere of linguistic expressions. Still, it might be said that the experience of being addressed and answering "a word and response" 10 is the focus of the sphere of "between" or, to put it differently, the living appearance of the living essence of the mutual "between." The living contract established in the situation of an address and response to it leads Buber to a further step: that of stressing the phenomenon of responsibility in its two senses -- the one sense is that of responding to a call and the other is that of being supposed to respond. The second sense approaches responsibility as it has been discussed in the philosophic and juristic literature, that is to say, responsibility qua accountability. Yet because Buber places responsibility even in its second sense not in the narrow field of one's being supposed to account for deeds, omissions and so on, but being supposed to live up to the real and essential level of human lifethat of responding to a fellow man -- responsibility ceases to have a narrow meaning or a moralistic one, for that matter. He suggests that it is rooted in the fundamental features of human life and manifesting them. To put it differently, responsibility has a broad meaning because it is not put in an impersonal domain of one's acting, on the one hand, and as serving a standard idea of what one is supposed to perform in his actings, on the other; for example, in the case where one is supposed to be honest according to an idea of honesty. Responsibility is put in the realm of responding to an independent human being or, in Buber's own words: "Responsibility presupposes one who addresses me primarily, that is, from a realm independent of myself, and to whom I am answerable."11 The fact that Buber uses here the expression "answerable" points to what has been introduced above as a second sense of responsibility, that is to say, that I am supposed to act in a certain way according to what the essence of human life is, and this means according to mutuality focused in responsibility. Taking advantage of the modern idiom, we might say that Buber has to use here the "dispositional" expression in order to stress that one can demand from the human being that he behave in a certain way. Yet he formulates the dispositional aspect through his main idea, that it is in the essence of human beings to respond because responsibility is ultimately rooted in the nature of the human sphere.  
It has been said that the dialogue is the focus of the sphere of "between." We may now add that responsibility is the focus of dialogue. As responsibility is rooted in the dialogue, the dialogue is rooted in the very essence of human life. Thus, unless I am wrong, this might be a possible interpretation: Buber strives for an ontological or anthropological warrant for the ethical aspect of responsibility. This is what he actually says: "The idea of responsibility is to be brought back from the province of specialised ethics, of an 'ought" that swings free in the air, into that of lived life. Genuine responsibility exists only where there is real responding." 12 This striving for the ontological warrant for ethics amounts actually to the attempt to ethicise the human sphere altogether. The scholastic idea of "ens et bonum convertuntur" is realized within the human sphere.  
It is because of this inherent ethical aspect of the sphere of "between" that the human beings embedded in the relationship of mutuality are persons in the terminological sense of the word. Human beings are unities of their experiences and not only thinking things behind and beyond what they actually experience. This description taken from Scheler can be applied to what Buber says in spite of the differences in his view and that of Scheler: "The I of the primary word I-Thou makes its appearance as person and becomes conscious of itself as subjectivity." 13 We may suggest an interpretation of this by saying that the unity of experience is established only in the actual meeting with a fellow human being, because the unity of experience is established in experience itself, and this is a living actuality only in the sphere of "between." Hence to be a person or a personality is not to be a unity outside experience but precisely within it. Hence the status and character of personality itself is established in the sphere of human mutuality. Buber himself does not talk the language of the ontological warrant for the ethics of mutuality; yet this idea is implied in various expressions present in his writings which aim at establishing the primacy of mutuality. For instance: "In the beginning is relationas category of being, readiness, grasping form, mould for the soul, it is the a priori of relation, the inborn Thou." 14 There is no point in discussing the contamination of two philosophical traditions expressed in the synonymous use of inborn and a priori as we find it in the above quotation. But it has to be stressed that Buber, while searching for a foundation for making mutuality the essence of human existence, takes refuge in epistemological terms like a priori or inborn. What he actually wants to present is the idea that mutual relations between human beings are an irreducible fact or a sphere sui generis. He expresses this by saying that "The inborn Thou is realised in the lived relations with that which meets it. The fact that this Thou can be known as what is over against the child . . . is based on the a priori of relation." 15 To be sure, this statement carries with itself some difficulty because of the duality hidden in it: there is the inborn Thou and there is the Thou as realized. Is there really a duality in Buber's morphology of human existence? Buber wants to escape duality because the actual facts encountered in the human scope are those of mutuality. Mutuality is irreducible, incapable of being analysed in its components. Yet if once it is said that the Thou is inborn it is saliently said that the mutuality can be dismembered, that is to say, there is an I with his inborn Thou on the one hand and the Thou on the other, and there is the realization of that relation within the actual sphere of human existence. This hidden duality is but an outcome of Buber's drive to base mutuality on a fundamental datum, sometimes assuming that mutuality itself is this fundamental datum and sometimes rooting it in the inborn capacities of the individual human being. Yet it might be said in spite of this shadowy duality, that the main idea is that in the beginning there is relation and that relation cannot be explained even by an a priori or inborn Thou. Even in a later stage of his thought, Buber uses the term "innate (italics mine) capacity in man to confirm his fellow man." 16 The oscillation between the primacy of relation and the innateness of the approach to the fellow man has some bearing on philosophical problems implied in Buber's thought; but these have to be dealt with separately in what follows.  
A slightly different way of putting the primacy of the relationship with the fellow man is indicated by the employment of the term instinct in this context: "what teaches us the saying of Thou is not the originative instinct but the instinct for communion." 17 Here again one may argue that Buber introduces a term in order to provide justification for the reality of the mutual relationship to human beings as an ultimate fact. The status of an ultimate fact is expressed through the term instinct, but still one may doubt whether the instinct of communion as it is introduced here gives an adequate account of what Buber himself tries to convey. It is not just a given fact or inherited instinct of human nature to communicate or to be in communion. Such an explanation connotes in a way a very subjective approach, that of rooting the factual and even overt reality of human life in an instinctive urge of human beings. If relation is the primary sphere, even the individual human being is created in and through relation. Hence the instinct for communion cannot be independent of the actual communion as a primary fact. If the employment of terms a priori and inborn was in a way a tribute paid to the epistemological vogue, the introduction of the term "instinct" is in a way a tribute paid to the psychological trend. This can be clearly seen from the following statement:  
This instinct is something greater than the believers in the 'libido' realize: it is a longing for the world to become present to us as a person, which goes out to us as we to it, which chooses and recognizes us as we do it, which is confirmed in us as we in it. 18  
The idea of longing conveys again a kind of subjective urge and might be a trace of some romanticism; it might be doubtful whether it represents the findings of Buber's own phenomenology of human existence. This can be seen clearly from the fact that Buber wants to show that the sphere of "between" overcomes subjectivity, as he himself puts it: "A transfusion has taken place after which a mere elaboration of subjectivity is never again possible or tolerable to him." 19 As long as we use terms like "longing," we retain the subjective touch. As Buber wants to overcome subjectivity, precisely through mutuality, one may wonder whether traces of a subjective terminology do give an adequate account of what he tries to convey.  
Now, surveying the advantages of the primacy of mutuality, according to Buber, one may say that in the first place the dichotomy of collectivism and individualism is overcome, as in parallel fashion subjectivism was supposed to be overcome:  
I am speaking of living actions, but it is vital knowledge alone which incites them. Its first step must be to smash the false alternative with which the thought of our epoch is shot through -- that of 'individualism or collectivism.' Its first question must be about a genuine third alternative. 20 Individualism sees man only in relation to himself, but collectivism does not see man at all, it sees only 'society.' With the former man's face is distorted, with the latter it is masked. 21  
The third alternative is obviously, according to Buber, that of "between" where man is not related to himself only and still not submerged in an anonymous society. Further still: ". . . as there is a Thou so there is a We." 22 "Only men who are capable of truly saying Thou to one another can truly say We with one another." 23 "Marx did not take up into his concept of society the real relation between the really different I and Thou." 24 It is because of this distinction that in the most recent presentations of Buber's thought he is careful to make the distinction between social life and the sphere of "between." Buber assumes that he transcends the already traditional sociological distinction between Society and Community. The real alternative would not be that between Society and Commu-nity but that between Society as the mutual aggregation of particular and isolated human beings and that of the We, thus presenting the plurality of human beings through the grammatical form of the first person plural. The point is that We is not primarily given as I and Thou in their mutual relation are. We is an outcome of the factual relationship. To be sure, what is traditionally called Community might be considered as a nearer realization of the reality of We than society is, but still they are not identical because We is ontologically closer to the proper realm of human existence, that of mutual relationship.

Dope ass shorter relationality card

The I-Thou relation is one in which the self is no longer a subject who always remains alone and is for this reason Relation par excellence, for it extends beyond the boundaries of the self (404-409) (although it is questionable what these boundaries mean for Buber, for he never described positively the isolation and the limitation of the I). The relation is the very essence of the I: whenever the I truly affirms itself, its affirmation is inconceivable without the presence of the Thou. (23, 40, passim) The Thou, as index of the dimension in which the I seeks (and therefore in a measure already finds) another being, the Thou as the indeterminate horizon of the encounter, is a priori or innate. (39) The I is the term of a relation which cannot be expressed in terms of thought, for the latter only acts to dissolve the relation. Furthermore, I, in the relation, rediscovers "its original community with the totality of being." (443-445) The allegiance of the primitive mind to the law of participation, according to Buber, testifies to the original nature of the relation and the primacy of the I-Thou to the I-It. (30-33)  
The distinction between the experience of an object and a meeting in which one being confronts another -- a difference which concerns the nature of the relation itself and not merely of its terms, and which implies consequences whose scope Feuerbach, the first to formulate the I-Thou relation, could not foresee; a concern to base human experience on the meeting-these are the fundamental contributions of Buber to theory of knowledge. It is of spiritual significance that this relation to being underlying all of our objective knowledge does not involve an impersonal, neutral unity -- the Sein des Seiendes of Heidegger-but a Seiendes which is the being of the other, and hence implies a social communion considered as the primary act of being.  
Finally, we may observe the phenomenological character of Buber's descriptions: they are all based on the concrete reality of perception and do not require any appeal to abstract principle for their justification; the non-theoretical modes of existence are themselves ascriptive of meaning and the ontological structures with which they are associated, are not separable from these.  
IV. The Ontology of the Interval, or the "Between"  
The Relation cannot be identified with a "subjective" event because the I does not represent the Thou but meets it. The meeting, moreover, is to be distinguished from the silent dialogue the mind has with itself (204-205); the I-Thou meeting does not take place in the subject but in the realm of being. (26-27) However, we must avoid an interpretation of the meeting as something objectively apprehended by the I, for the ontological realm is not a block universe but an occurrence. The interval between the I and Thou, the Zwischen, is the locus where being is being realized. (27)  
The interval between the I and Thou cannot be conceived as a kind of stellar space existing independently of the two terms which it separates. For the dimension itself of the interval opens uniquely to the I and to the Thou which enter into each meeting, (458) and the utmost transcendence is bound to the utmost particularity of the terms. Buber has made an effort to do more than merely define a kind of being which may be distinguished from the being of nature or of things, as, for instance, the process of becoming is distinguished from the Eleatic being. The interval between the I and Thou is inseparable from the adventure in which the individual himself participates, yet is more objective than any other type of objectivity, precisely because of that personal adventure. The Zwischen is reconstituted in each  
fresh meeting and is therefore always novel in the same sense as are the moments of Bergsonian duration.  
If the notion of "betweenness" functions as the fundamental category of being, however, man is the locus where the act of being is being acted. (455) Man must not be construed as a subject constituting reality but rather as the articulation itself of the meeting. The personality is for Buber not merely a being among other beings, but is a category, in Kant's sense of the term, and it is Nietzsche who has compelled our acceptance of this. (387) Man does not meet, he is the meeting. He is something that distances itself and in this distancing the anonymous existence of the world of things affirms itself by the various uses we make of it, and in that distancing we can also enter into relations with this alien world. 3 By this double movement, Man is situated at the center of being and philosophy is identifiable with anthropology. But he is not at the center in so far as he is a thinking subject, but with respect to his whole being, since only a total commitment can be the realization of his fundamental situation. That situation underlies his thought and already implies a transcendence. "Only when we try to understand the human person in his whole situation, in the possibilities of his relation to all that is not himself, do we understand man." "Man can become whole not by virtue of a relation to himself but only by virtue of a relation to another self." 4

Relations must reciprocal, controls the internal link to linguistic meaning

[http://www.metajournal.org//articles\_pdf/716-736-lunglos-meta-techno.pdf](http://www.metajournal.org/articles_pdf/716-736-lunglos-meta-techno.pdf)

Verbundenheit characterizes the reciprocity of the I-Thou relation and of the dialogue where I commit myself to the Thou just because it is absolutely other. The essence of the 'word' does not initially consist in its objective meaning or descriptive possibilities, but in the response that it elicits. The assertion is not true because the thought that it expresses corresponds to the thing or because it is revelatory of being. It is true only when it derives from the I-Thou relation identical with the ontological process itself. The assertion is truewhen it realizes the reciprocity of the relation by eliciting a response and singling out an individual who alone is capable of responding. This conception of the truth has nothing in common with the static notion of truth as an expressible content. But it is not to be assumed that a Heraclitian or Bergsonian becoming, also inexpressible because the word is necessarily a changeless entity and cannot apply to what is always changing, is the sole reality that may be opposed to immutable being. For Buber describes a sphere of being which cannot be told because it is a living dialogue between individuals who are not related as objective contents to one another: one individual has nothing to say about the other. The sensitivity of the I-Thou relation lies in its completely formal nature. To apprehend the other as a content is tantamount to relating oneself to him as an object and is to enter into an I-It relation instead.  
The notion of truth (with respect to which Buber's language is insufficiently didactic) is determinated by the I-Thou relation construed as the fundamental relation to being. We must distinguish Truth possessed, Truth as an impersonal result, called also objective Truth (283) from the Truth as a "way of being," a manner of truly being which denotes God. But truth also signifies a "concrete attitude towards being," "Realverhältnis zum Seienden" (198-199) and the living test which verifies it (BewAhrung). "To know signifies for the creature to fulfill a relation with being, for everyone in his own particular way, sincerely (wahrhaft) and with complete responsibility, accepting it on faith in all its various manifestations and therefore open to its real possibilities, integrating these experiences according to its own nature. It is only in this way that the living truth emerges and can be preserved." (283)

Resolution isn’t reciprocal recognition

Anonymity is only surface level engagement

EMMANUEL LEVINAS, "Martin Buber and the, Theory of Knowledge, 1967

Human beings when we speak of them in the third person, "he," "she," "they," as well as my own private psychological states, belong to the sphere of the It. The I experiences these; but only explores their surface without committing its whole being (15-16), and its experiences do not extend beyond itself. (17) The It is neutral. The neuter gender suggests, moreover, that in the It, individuals do not enter into the type of unifying relation in which their otherness is distinctive, where they are, so to speak, other than the others. The individual is rather regarded as that which one may dispose of, what is significant only with respect to the actions of its physical being. Thus the actual purpose of all knowing, i.e., the effort to grasp what is independent of it, what is completely other, is not fulfilled in this case. Being is cast in the role, as the need may be, of an anonymous article of exchange, a funded past, or else is experienced in the actual moment of enjoyment, and cannot be properly interpreted as a real presence. (25)

Independent reasons

Institutional Coherence

Furthermore, Watsuji’s view of institutions is centered around rela- tionships, and at the same time, relationships always form and participate in institutions. For example, we can examine the school.  
A school is represented by the existence of a group of buildings and other facilities. But they are not the school itself. Even when a school is abolished, the buildings that belonged to it can still remain intact. And even without buildings, it could be possible for a school to be established. A school consists of human relationships that are given expression to, by, and within these buildings.5

Moreover, there is no temporal priority between the school and the students and teachers. Without students and teachers, there can be no school. Even when a school is first conceived, it operates consider- ing possible students and teachers in a future-oriented relationship with them. Also, teachers become teachers and students become students within the context of the school. Just as the existence of teachers is simultaneous with that of students, schools exist simultaneously with the body of teachers and students.  
An essential part of relationships that form and are formed by institu- tions is that they involve roles:  
We can now confirm an obvious everyday fact, that we always act with a certain capacity (shikaku) and that this capacity is prescribed by something whole, further that this whole is the relationship we construct by means of possessing a certain capacity. Simply speaking, we exist in our daily life in the being in betweenness.6  
The idea of “capacity” has a key role in Watsuji’s argument: A capac- ity/role is the meeting point between the individuals and the totality. Relational being (aidagarateki sonzai) means being constantly situated in these capacities, as both a singular member, and as a part of the whole in one’s “plural” existence.

Elaborate on this arg, presupposed by communication

For Watsuji, we do not communicate in order to understand each other. We communicate because we already understand each other. Hence, a lot of communication is much more subtle than Habermasian rational discourse. For instance, Watsuji gives the examples of finishing each oth- er’s sentences, leaving things unsaid, subtle hints, gestures and glances, and so on. But what about all the times when we do not understand each other? Or, not uncommonly, when we pretend to understand each other even though we have completely lost each other’s train of thought? Watsuji says that while many works of art and literature depict the trag- edies that arise from a failure to have an intuitive understanding of the other, the fact that these are seen as tragedies means that mutual under- standing is primordial, and the subjective states of persons are visible to the other to a considerable extent.39  
Again, in this view of language, we see what Sueki warned us about— a world of mutual understanding in which there is no room for the incomprehensible other.

A2 Util Death Hijacks

Death opens up the individual to the undying totality, the “we” (ware ware) in which the individual finds its eternal significance. It is not about going beyond being, but about going beyond individual being into collective being. And this is by no means a mere wartime expediency: Watsuji was consistent on this point ever since Milieu. He writes, People die; their relations change: but through this unending death and change, people live and their relations continue. These continue incessantly through ending incessantly. In the individual’s eyes, it is a case of “being- toward-death,” but from the standpoint of society it is “being-toward- life.”57

Bad metaphysics card

Sevilla A.L. (2017) Relationality vs. Singularity: Between Care Ethics and Poststructuralism. In: Watsuji Tetsurô’s Global Ethics of Emptiness. Global Political Thinkers. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58353-2_2> ///AHS PB

Thinking, questioning, are often taken as a demonstration of the indubitable existence of the ego (as in Descartes’ famous methodic doubt). Sometimes this is even developed into a solipsist position (I can be sure that I exist because I am thinking, but I don’t know if anyone else exists). However, Watsuji reads these acts in the complete opposite way: questioning shows how our individuality is fundamentally con- nected to others through shared language and concerns.1 He writes: “No matter how much we concern ourselves with the consciousness of I, this concern itself implies our going beyond the consciousness of I and being connected with others.”2  
What we see here is a completely different starting point:  
We take our departure not from the intentional consciousness of “I” but from “betweenness.” The essential feature of betweenness lies in this, that the intentionality of the I is from the outset prescribed by its counterpart, which is also conversely prescribed by the former.3  
This betweenness as a starting point applies not only to asking ethical questions but also to all our acts as human beings. For example, right now, I am writing. But my writing is always determined by possible readers—what kind of people would read my book? What parts might they find unclear? In the same way, the reader is perhaps at this point wondering what I am thinking, and what ideas I am trying to convey. The author is always determined by readers, and a reader is always deter- mined by authors in a reciprocal determination and mutual dependency. Therefore, Watsuji does not even start with an independent author and an independent reader, who then have a relationship. Rather, “This rela- tionship is constructed through and through in the betweenness between an author and his readers. Neither can exist prior to and independent of the other. They exist only by depending on one another.”4

Random shit

http://dl4.libgen.io/get.php?md5=9D729BB8083004656DAB98FDD8799EDB&key=B4WSV20DJ0XSWZYH

#### Metaphysics of solitude

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In experience, we experience something that is not us, like the world, the objects and other in its mode of givenness. Notwithstanding, such modes of givenness are implicated in our concrete Ego (Husserl 1973, §48, 136). In spite of the transcendental Ego being the endower of meaning, it is not arrested in a transcendental solipsism. The static analysis (thematised, the constituted) is confronted with the flux genesis of the world, the other, and of our consciousness (the thematising, the constituting). Under these circumstances, the solipsistic Ego is split in its concreteness by the very temporal flux. This means that the other, the world, and the objects are included/implicated in the sphere of our ownness. Now, the surrounding world is just constituted/constituting together with others. Thus, a transcendental subjectivity can be only conceived as transcendental intersubjetivity, in other words, the objects, the others, the world, and even ourselves are only understood intersubjectively. What is excluded from our Ego (Husserl 1973, §49, 137), to wit, what is not our Ego, is included, implicated transcendentally. Despite the fact that we have our own originality as Egos, such Egos live in a kind of harmony (Husserl 1973, §49, 138) with the world due to the fact that there is a thereness for everyone in it. Thus, the noetic/noematic constitution process carries with it the sense of harmony and transformation. We, as original Egos, live in a community of Egos harmonically. The process of experiencing the other, lacks the access in relation to its originality which is peculiar of each one. The disclosure of the other will just be possible through appresentation (Husserl 1973, §50, 139), whereby my relation with other reveals its openness. This appresentation will go beyond the manifestation of the physical body, done as an object, but as a lived body which motivated us differently, in a deep and more challenged way, bringing a diversity of new possibility to our concrete Ego. The alter Ego is presented as accessible of what is not originally accessible (Husserl 1973, §53, 144). Here, Husserl is trying to avoid any identification between us and the other, instead, he tries to reveal a kind of association, analogy which motivates the sphere of our ownness. This motivation is done due to the appresentation of the other, whereby it is seen as accessible, because it is in front of me, already there to be analysed, but at same time, it is inaccessible, because of his/her own originality. The other cannot be seen as a duplicate of us, but, we can objectively conceive that we can do what the other Ego can, and, also, we can be at the place of the other if we want. In Husserl’s words, our Ego is constituted as Here (in relation to our psychophysical body) and the other as There (in relation to his/her psychophysical body). Thus, we are able to transfer every There into a Here (Husserl 1973, §53, 146), but we are not able to uncover its originality, its temporal flux structure. Therefore, we draw the conclusion that, in spite of our objectification characteristic, we are not able to grasp the temporal flux. This means that an original presence will be always ungraspable, although, by perception, it is lived by our transcendental subjectivity. What is primordially incompatible, in simultaneous coexistence, becomes compatible: because our primordial Ego constitutes the Ego who is other for us by an appresentative apperception, which, according to its intrinsic nature, never demands and never is open to fulfilment by presentation (Husserl 1973, §54, 147). It is impossible a transcendental solipsism, because of two basic factors: the surrounding world and the other. The surrounding-world, due to the fact that it is already there in advance, [by] sustaining our cogitations, the other by [and] breaking our pretention of objectifications. The accessibility/inaccessibility of the other allows a challenge for the openness of our consciousness. The world is given to us and to everyone only as a cultural world, and as having the sense: accessible to everyone (Husserl 1973, § 58, 160). Such world for everyone has an ontological, a priori structure, which is natural, psychophysical, social and cultural (Husserl 1975, §59, 164). Despite the fact that the transcendental subjectivity endows meaning, such meaning is constituted in a togetherness of monads (community of Egos) in relation to a common world. For Husserl, it is inconceivable (Husserl 1973, § 60, 167-168) to create a second world, instead, even our fantasies are related to the original world, whereby all senses are based. Therefore, the psychology cannot lose its implication with the world, and with the other, because it would be closed into a solipsistic noematic objectivity. Husserl draws the conclusion that phenomenological explication does nothing but explicate the sense that this world has for us all, prior to any philosophizing

# 2nr

### A2 Theory

#### Cross ap Levians summarizes buber 2: A) need mutual confirmation for lingusitice meaning needs ot be recipracl B) undermines nay linguistic rules because subject not static

#### You reduce me to an I it relation