## Mary Elizabeth Bartowski AC

### Interpretations

#### Ought is defined a decisive reason which means equal or greater reason to act. Parfit

Parfit, Derek. "On what matters (Vol. 1)." Oxford: Oxford University Press 410 (2011): 16-17. PH

What we should or ought to do. Like the concept of a reason, the concept expressed by these uses of ‘should’ and ‘ought’ cannot, I believe, be helpfully defined. Some people suggest that, when we claim that we ought to do something, we mean that we have decisive reasons to do this thing. But this seems to be only part of what we mean, or imply. The word ‘ought’ seems to add something. Others try to define the concept of a reason by appealing to the concept ought. I doubt whether such definitions could succeed. But even if these concepts are both indefinable, they are very closely related, in ways that do something to explain them both. We can partly identify this version of the concept should and ought by saying that this concept applies to some act just when, and because, we have decisive reasons, or most reason, to act in this way.

This means if the neg goes permissibility it flows aff since living wage is intrinsically valuable since it provides wage to sustain them.

#### Maloney and Gilbertson 13 defines living wage

[Tim Maloney (Auckland University of Technology), Amanda Gilbertson (Research, Investigations and Monitoring Unit, Auckland Council). “A Literature Review on the Effects of Living Wage Policies.” Auckland Council Technical report, TR2013/034. August 2013]PH

The living wage is often defined as the wage necessary to provide a full-time, year-round worker and his or her family with the sufficient income to ensure an adequate standard of living and the ability to fully participate in society.

#### He Continues:

There are a number of common features of living wage laws around the world. Firstly, they have limited coverage. Unlike minimum wage laws that provide a universal wage floor, living wage ordinances cover specific groups of workers often within narrow geographic boundaries. Secondly, they set relatively high wage floors, often 30% or more above the national minimum wage. Thirdly, they are motivated by an explicit attempt to reduce poverty rates by setting a wage consistent with a minimum standard of living. Not all living wage laws are the same. They vary primarily in terms of worker coverage. For example, the vast majority of living wage ordinances in the U.S. cover only city government contractors, or both contractors and employers receiving some form of business assistance. Very few cities have living wage provisions that cover their own employees, and attempts to extend living wage laws to all workers within a metropolitan area have thus far been unsuccessful. This is an important consideration in understanding how the overseas empirical evidence on living wage effects might be applicable in New Zealand. The London Living Wage, that contains the same voluntary elements of some New Zealand proposals, has not been subject to the same level of analysis as the U.S. laws.

### Framework

#### Morality must be universalizable. Only consequentialism can meet this constraint. Universalizing anything else results in a conflict in normative reasons. Pettit:

[Laurance S. Rockefeller University Professor of Politics and Human Values at Princeton University]. The Cost of Non-Consequentialism. February 5, 1999. <http://www.philo.umontreal.ca/documents/cahiers/Pettit\_Non-Consequentialism.pdf>

Every prescription as to what an agent ought to do should be capable of being universalised, so that it applies not just to that particular agent, and not just to that particular place or time or context or whatever. So at any rate we generally assume in our moral reasoning. If we think that it is right for one agent in one circumstance to act in a certain way, but wrong for another, then we commit ourselves to there being some further descriptive difference between the two cases, in particular a difference of a non-particular or universal kind. Thus, if we say that an agent A ought to choose option O in circumstances C — these may bear on the character of the agent, the behaviour of others, the sorts of consequences on offer, and the like — then we assumethat something similar would hold for any similarly placed agent. We do not think that the particular identity of agent A is relevant to what A ought to do, any more than we think that the particular location or date is relevant to that issue. In making an assumption about what holds for any agent in C-type circumstances, of course, we may not be committing ourselves to anything of very general import. It may be, for all the universalisability constraint requires, that C-type circumstances are highly specific: so specific, indeed, that no other agent is ever likely to confront them.There is no difficulty in seeing how the universalisability challenge is supposed to be met under consequentialist doctrine. **Suppose** that I accept**consequentialis[m]**t doctrine and believe of an agent that in their particular circumstances, C, he or she ought to choose an option O. For simplicity, suppose that I am myself that agent and that as a believer in consequentialism I think of myself that I ought to do O in C. If that option really **is right** by my consequentialist lights, **then that will be because of the neutral values that it promotes. But if those neutral values make O**the **right** option **for me** in those circumstances, **so they will make it** the **right** option**for any other agent** in such circumstances. Thus I can readily square the prescription to which my belief in consequentialism leads with my belief in universalisability. I can happily universalise my self-prescription to a prescription for any arbitrary agent in similar circumstances. In passing, a comment on the form of the prescription that the universalisability challenge will force me to endorse. I need not think that it is right that in the relevant circumstances every agent do O; that suggests a commitment to a collective pattern of behaviour. I will only be forced to think, in a person-by-person or distributive way, that for every agent it is right that in those circumstances he or she do O. Let doing O in C amount to swimming to the help of a child in trouble. Universalisability would not force me to think that everyone ought to swim to the help of a child in such a situation; undoubtedly they would frustrate one another’s efforts. It only requires me to think, as we colloquially put it, that anyone ought to swim to the help of the child; it only requires a person-by-person prescription, not a collective one.So much for the straightforward way in which consequentialism can make room for universalisability. But how is the universalisability challenge supposed to be met under non-consequentialist theories? According to **[Suppose a] non-consequentialist theory, [where] the right choice for any agent is to instantiate a certain pattern, P;** this may be the pattern of conforming to the categorical imperative, manifesting virtue, respecting rights, honouring their special obligations, or whatever. Suppose that I accept such a theory and that it leads me to say of an agent — again, let us suppose, myself — that I ought to choose O in these circumstances, C, or that O is the right choice for me in these circumstances. Can I straightforwardly say, as I could under consequentialist doctrine, that just for the reasons that O is the right choice for me — in this case, that it involves instantiating pattern, P — so it will be the right choice for any agent in C-type circumstances? I shall argue that there are difficulties in the path of such a straightforward response and that these raise a problem for non-consequentialism. The problem Suppose that I do say, in the straightforward way, **that** pattern P**requires, not just that I do O in C, but also**, for any agent whatsoever,**that [any] agent should do O in C as well.** Suppose I say, in effect, that it is right for me to do O in C only if it would be right for any agent X to do O in C. Whatever makes it right that I do O in C makes it right, so the response goes, that any agent do O in C. This response is going to lead me, as a non-consequentialist thinker, into trouble. Judging that something is right gives one a normative reason to prefer it; the judgment of rightness must provide such a reason if it is to have an action-guiding role. When I think that it is right that I do O in C, therefore, then I commit myself to there being a normative reason for me to prefer that I do O. And when I assert that it is right that anyone should do O in C-type circumstances, then I commit myself — again, because of the reason-giving force of the notion of rightness — to there being a normative reason for holding a broader preference. I commit myself to there being a normative reason for me to prefer, with any agent whatsoever, that in C-type circumstances that [any] agent do O. The problem with these reasons and these commitments, **however,** is that they may come apart. For it is often going to be possible**that**, perversely, **the best way** for me **to ensure** or increase the chance **that** for **any**arbitrary **agent**, X, that agent **does O in C**-type circumstances**, is to choose non-O myself in** those **C**ircumstances. The best way to satisfy the preference as to what the arbitrarily chosen agent should do may be to go against the preference as to what one should do oneself. The best way to get people to renounce violence may be to take it up oneself; the best way to get people to help their own children may be not to press for the advantage of one’s own; the best way to minimise murder may to commit a murder; and so on. More generally, the best way to promote the instantiation of pattern, P, where this is the basic pattern to which one swears non-consequentialist allegiance, may be to flout that pattern oneself. The best way to increase the chance that for any arbitrary agent, X, that agent instantiates P may be not to instantiate P oneself. How can I avoid the conclusion that in such a perverse situation I ought to promote the overall instantiation of my cherished pattern, even at the cost of not instantiating it myself? How, in other words, am I to keep faith with the non-consequentialist commitment to the rightness of instantiating P, even where this means that the overall realisation of the pattern falls short of what it might have been? It is hardly going to be plausible for me to say that normative reasons bearing on preferences over my own choices trump normative reasons bearing on preferences over how other people behave. Both sorts of reasons are supported in the common language of what is the right choice or of what ought to be done. And it would surely run against the spirit of universalisability — the spirit in which I deny that my own particular identity is important to the prescription defended — to say that a reasoned preference as to what I do myself should not be responsive to a similarly reasoned preference as to what people in general do — what arbitrary agent, X, does — in the sorts of circumstances in question. The upshot is that **if as a non-consequentialist** theorist**I** straightforwardly **universalise** the prescription that in a certain situation I should instantiate **a** favoured**pattern, P, then** the prescription to which I thereby commit myself — that in that situation any X ought to instantiate pattern, P — may force me to revise my original self-prescription. **I have equal reason to prefer both that I instantiate P and that any agent instantiate P** — this reason is expressed by the use of the word ‘right’ or ‘ought’ in each case — **and** the spirit of **universalizability blocks me from treating myself as** in any way **special**. **Thus,** if the preferences are inconsistent in a certain situation — if the choice is between my instantiating P alone, for example, or my acting so that many others instantiate P instead — then **I will have reason not to instantiate P myself.** As a would-be non-consequentialist thinker, my initial claim must have been that the point is to instantiate P in my own life, not promote it generally. But I countenance the general claims of the P-pattern **when I universalize** in the straightforward way: **I prescribe general conformity to that pattern, not just conformity in my own case. Thus** it now seems that what I must think is that this general conformity is to be promoted, even if that means not myself instantiating the pattern in my own behaviour or psychology or relationships. It seems that what **I must embrace**, in effect, is a**consequentialism** in which conformity to pattern P is the ultimate value to be promoted.

Implications:

A. I O/W on coherence- Most theory assume a form of equality by only the universalizability constraint ensures it by getting agents equal moral status.

B. No generic universalizability indicts because Petit is not talking about wiling a certain maxim but rather universalizing general conformity to the maxim of consequentialism

C. Coopt appeals to practical rationality since we use decisive reason to analyze consequences.

The standard is minimizing death

Impact Calculus: I defend total utilitarianism, which mandates taking action that which will the result in the preservation in the most amounts of lives. This means

1. No Hedonic Indicts- I’m not concerned with how much pain or pleasure each individual feels but rather maximizing the amount of existence so they can have the potential for more pleasure.
2. Extinction comes first- we have different subjective experiences so it doesn’t make sense to compare harms like psychological harms rather we weigh in terms of death count.
3. No Death Good Arguments- My framework says death is bad because it reduces the total sum of well-being possible- there’s a possibility of existence being better than a status of non-existence.
4. Turns appeals to a priori reason since absent examination of a postori knowledge agents would will a maxim that would preclude the maxim-willing process since that would render a contradiction.

Prefer it for actor specificity – collective action results in tradeoffs that only rule util can resolve. Side constraints paralyze state action – it's impossible to compare tradeoffs involving opportunity costs. States lack intentionality or internal motivation since they're composed of multiple individuals – there is no act-omission distinction for them since they create permissions and prohibitions in terms of policies so authorizing action could never be considered an omission since the state assumes culpability in regulating the public domain. This also implies that actor specificity means no permissibility or presumption since the state always has obligations. I’m the most germane to the resolution. And:

#### 1. Governments empirically use my framework – I outweigh defense on probability. Goodin

Robert Goodin, Fellow in Philosophy @ Australian National Defense University, THE UTILITARIAN RESPONSE

My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals. Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first, the argument from necessity. **Public officials** are obliged to **make** their **choices under uncertainty**, and uncertainty **of a** very **special sort** at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, **private individuals** will usually **have more** complete **information on** the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on **the ramifications** that alternative possible **choices might have** for them. **Public officials**, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do **know** are generalities: **averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people** as a result of their various possible choices, but that is all. **That** is enough to **allow** public **policy-makers to use** the **util**itarian **calculus** – assuming they want to.

#### 2. Means no infinite regress claims since the state always makes reasonably reliable predictions.

#### 3. Moral uncertainty means we should preserve our existence to determine value. Bostrom 11

[“Existential Risk Prevention As the Most Important Task for Humanity”, 2011, Faculty of Philosophy at Oxford]

These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest[s] an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk. Let me elaborate. Our [that our] present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know—at least not in concrete detail—what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving—and ideally improving—our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value

-This means indicts to AC fw supercharge the link since we need to act in accordance with the rule of preventing total death so there’s more people to determine and act on the NC ethic. Also, outweighs on epistemology since we need as many perspectives as possible to accurately deduce a conclusion. Avoids begging the question since our discussion of ethics concedes the desire to reach moral truth. Also, means they need to win 100% certainty of their theory to exclude my calculus. And, any risk of consequentialism being true means extinction is bad for the purposes of decision-making. Bostrom 01

Nick Bostrom, 2001 Professor of Philosophy, Oxford University [Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, March 2002. First version: 2001 March, JStor PH

There will be some types of putative existential risks for which the main uncertainty is evaluative and others where the main uncertainty is descriptive (e.g., how likely an event is to occur or what consequences it would have). With regard to descriptive uncertainty, we saw earlier that if something is not known to be objectively safe, it is risky, at least in the subjective sense relevant to decision making. We can make a parallel move with regard to normative uncertainty. Suppose that some event X would reduce biodiversity. Suppose (for the sake of illustration) it is known that X would have no other significant consequences and that the reduced biodiversity would not affect humans or any other morally considerable beings. Now, we may be uncertain whether biodiversity has final value (is valuable “for its own sake”). Hence we may be uncertain about whether or not X would really be bad. But we can say that if we are not sure whether or not X would really be bad (but we are sure that X would not be good), then X is bad in at least the subjective sense relevant to decision making.

-This means even if the NC is normatively true, in instances of forced choice like the rez conflict, life comes first since it’s intrinsically valuable while all other maxims are instrumentally valuable since even if we don’t value life as most important it is necessary for us to act on more important values.

#### 4. There’s no stable conception of personal identity, which means we use util. Shoemaker

The Journal of Value Inquiry 33: 183–199, 1999. UTILITARIANISM AND PERSONAL IDENTITY © 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. ￼183 Utilitarianism and Personal Identity DAVID W. SHOEMAKER Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, 327 Clement Hall, Memphis, TN 38152, USA

Doing so has a number of significant implications for rationality and morality. For one thing, the unity of our lives is no longer guaranteed. Our lives may be more or less unified, given the degree to which psychological connectedness holds. For instance, **I am** presently **strongly connected to** that stage of **myself** that existed **yesterday, but** I amfairly **weakly connected to that** long-ago existing **ten-year-old stage of myself**. Parfit suggeststhe language of successive selves to illuminate the different degrees to which this relation might hold. We might use the word “self,” then, to refer to a collection of person-stages united by strong psychological connectedness, such that my ten-year-old self could be viewed as a past self, while my eighty- year-old self would presumably be a future self. The parts of my life with which I am strongly psychologically connected are united as my present self.7 In this way, different selves occasionally resemble different persons, and Parfit indicates that, at certain times and places, selves might be thought of as the appropriate objects of moral concern.8 But this notion also implies that **our lives may not be unified** in certain important respects.Psychological connectedness is certainly not guaranteed to unify our entire lives, and **so the reductionist view** itself **implies** at least the partial **disintegration of persons**.93. Utilitarianism and Reductionism Utilitarianism is an ethical theory for ranking various outcomes from an impersonal standpoint. **Utilitarians hold that the best state of affairs** among relevant alternatives **contains** the greatest net balance of **aggregate** individual **welfare**. Utilitarianism is impersonal insofar as it involves a focus solely on the total amounts of utility at stake in various outcomes, and “[i]t makes no moral difference [not] how these amounts are distributed as between different people.”10 Many utilitarians claim that the impersonality of the theory is entailed by a close analogy that obtains between cases of intrapersonal and interpersonal maximization. As Parfit remarks: “Since their attitude to sets of lives is like ours to single lives, [u]tilitarians ignore the boundaries between lives.”11 Parfit further believes that utilitarians accept this analogy **because they accept a reductionis[m]**t view about personal identity. If a person’s life is less deeply integrated than it would be on a non-reductionist view, then while principles of distributive justice central to non-utilitarian views ought to be given greater scope, targeting past, present, and future selves, they nevertheless ought to be given less weight. After all, if a person’s life is less unified than we normally think, and this undermines the hard and fast boundaries between lives as well, then distributive **principles relying on the separateness of persons** and the individual unity of a person’s life as deep facts **will have far less moral importance** than they would on a non-reductionist view. Some critics have claimed that utilitarians ignore the boundaries between lives because they think of all people as together constituting a collective super-person, but this charge is false, according to Parfit. Because of the partial disintegration of persons suggested by reductionism,utilitarians “may be treating benefits and burdens, not as if they all came within the same life, but as if it made no moral difference where they came.”12 Thus, Parfit suggests that reductionism may lend significant support to utilitarianism, simply because*utilitarians can claim to be treating sets of lives like single lives, given that single lives are not deeply unified and are, in fact, metaphysically like sets of lives.*

#### 5. Empiricism – All knowledge stems from experience. We know nothing before sensory experience since we must know a feeling to be able to perceive it, just as you cannot reason color to a blind man. The natural world imposes limits upon non-natural epistemologies. This implies an obligation to maximize utility since our desire to seek out certain experiences and avoid others collapses into pleasure maximization.

#### I defend the expansion of living wage in the U.S. Evidence clarifies intent- willing to clarify

### Poverty Advantage

#### A. Poverty is on the rise in the U.S. because of wage disparities- it’s try or die. Devinatz 13

**Devinatz, Victor G. "The Significance of the Living Wage for US Workers in the Early Twenty-First Century." Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal25.2 (2013): 125-134. PH**

Wage inequality has been rapidly increasing in the United States over the last 40 years. From 1973 to 2007, for example, the average income of the top one-hundredth of the top 1 % climbed in excess of $30 million or a startling 758 %. The bottom 90 % of the wage distribution was much less fortunate. This group’s average income over these 34 years rose only $286 or under 1 %. This means that their average yearly increase amounted to a measly $8.41 (Johnston 2009). In addition to this widening wage inequality, during the Great Recession of 2007 to 2009, which was made substantially worse by the Financial Crisis of 2008, 40 % of the jobs that vanished were in high-wage industries, characterized as positions that compensated employees, on average, from $19.05 to $31.40 per hour (National Employment Law Project 2011, p. 1). Over the last 3 years, jobs have slowly been returning to the U.S. economy after the hemorrhaging of hundreds of thousands of jobs throughout the latter part of 2008 and the first few months of 2009. Many of these newly-created positions, however, are found in low-wage industries (ranging in pay on average from $9.03 to $12.91 per hour) which comprise 49 % of recent job growth (National Employment Law Project 2011, p. 1). And with the current unemployment rate of 7.9 % (February 2013), it is still difficult to land any job, much less one that pays well. One major problem is that many of these recently-created jobs [don't] do not pay enough to cover their employees’ living expenses. Based on a Wider Opportunities for Women report from 2011, single workers need at least $30,000 a year to meet the required cost of living. With regards to single parents who have two children and for two-income households, the yearly salaries needed to meet necessary expenditures, including childcare, rises to $58,000 and $68,000, respectively (Wider Opportunities for Women 2011, p. 5). Given that the U.S. minimum wage is currently at $7.25 per hour, working 40 h per week for the entire year grosses $15,080 annually which is far below the amount that even single workers require for the basic necessities. Combining these employment and wage statistics with the fact that, **according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics,** in 2011 approximately 48 % of Americans were classified as poor or low income (Seales 2011), it is little wonder that so many people are experiencing a high level of insecurity in a land of accelerating economic inequality. Since the minimum wage, as has been demonstrated, is far from adequate in serving as a wage floor, a modest alternative, the living wage, can play this role for many US workers early in the twenty-first century’s second decade. Defined as a wage based on a calculation of the official poverty threshold for a family of four, the living wage is centered on the concept that people who work full-time jobs, and their families, should not be forced to live in poverty. Although the struggle for a living wage has its historical roots in the fight for the establishment of minimum wage laws in the early decades of the 20th century, the first success of the present-day living wage movement dates to 1994 with its implementation in Baltimore (Levin-Waldman 2005, pp. 3–4). Economic changes in the latter part of the twentieth century have contributed to the growth of living wage movements and the passage of corresponding statutes within the last 20 years. Over the last several decades, federal and state minimum wages have failed to match increases in the cost of living, resulting in these poorly paid workers falling well below the poverty line. Additionally, beginning in the 1990s, many public services once provided by municipal governments have been privatized and outsourced. This has resulted in the transfer of thousands of government jobs to private- sector contractors who are able to pay their employees considerably less because they are neither bound by civil service rules nor union contracts (Pollin et al. 2008, p. 16; Levin- Waldman 2005, p. 4). In addition to the dramatic decline in the purchasing power of low-wage workers over the last 40 years, the movement has resonated with citizens and public officials due to a corresponding quickening in wage and income inequality in the United States. For example, although average US labor productivity expanded by approximately 80 % from 1968 to 2001, the minimum wage failed to keep pace with such rapid growth. The minimum wage’s real value peaked in 1968 when it was $1.65 per hour (or $8.39 in constant 2001 dollars or $10.74 in constant 2012 dollars). At the 1968 level, the minimum wage approximated the accepted poverty threshold for a four-person family. However, by 2001, its purchasing power had plummeted some 37 % when it was $5.15 per hour. At this wage level, a full- time worker employed for 52 weeks a year earned $10,712 annually, some 12.2 % below the 2001 national poverty level for a family of two (one adult and one child). However, many researchers argue that the officially determined poverty rates are established at a rate of 25 to 50 % too low (Pollin 2005, p. 4).

#### B. Empirics prove- living wage reduces poverty. Adams and Neumark 05

Adams, Scott, and David Neumark. "The effects of living wage laws: Evidence from failed and derailed living wage campaigns." Journal of Urban Economics 58.2 (2005): 177-202. PH

The results confirm the findings of positive wage effects and negative employment effects of enacted living wages on low-wage, low-skill workers. **In fact, the findings are generally very similar to the previous results using a broader control group.** The evidence also suggests that there is no detectable impact of living wage campaigns themselves, apart from the legislation that results.

#### And, there’s a spillover effect that allows living wage solve independent of its effectiveness. Niedt et al 99

Niedt, Christopher, et al. The effects of the living wage in Baltimore. Economic Policy Institute, 1999. PH 12/2/14

Some contractors that provide minimum wage labor also employ other low-wage workers above the federally mandated minimum wage. This second group may include workers with more skills, seniority, or responsibil- ity than those at the bottom of the pay ladder. When the federal minimum wage is raised to the living wage, the new wage floor may approach or even exceed the prevailing wage within this second group, putting pressure on employers to increase wages for these workers. This phenomenon is referred to as a wage spillover. As a result, the living wage may have significant effects outside of the lowest-paid category of workers. In the case of the public pupil bus transportation contract, for example, the prevailing wage of a special needs bus aide has begun to put pressure on the wages of special needs bus drivers. Contracts bid after July 1, 1997 must pay aides $7.10 an hour; this amount rose to $7.70 an hour the following year. The current midrange for bus drivers is roughly $7.85 to $8.50 an hour. According to BUILD staff, drivers have begun to demand increases to maintain the traditional wage differential with bus aides, while contractors have com- plained that the contract prices are too low to accommodate both the living wage for bus aides and higher wages for drivers. This is an emerging issue that will require further research.

#### B. Solving income inequality is key to sustained economic growth, and political effectiveness. Harkinson 11

Harkinson, Josh. [Staff reporter at Mother Jones.]"Study: Income Inequality Kills Economic Growth." Mother Jones. Mother Jones and the Foundation for National Progress., 4 Oct. 2011. Web. 14 Dec. 2014. PH

Corporate chieftains often claim that fixing the US economy requires signing new free trade deals, lowering government debt, and attracting lots of foreign investment. But a major new study has found that those things matter less than an economic driver that CEOs hate talking about: equality."Countries where income was more equally distributed tended to have longer growth spells," says economist Andrew Berg, whose study appears in the current issue of Finance & Development, the quarterly magazine of the International Monetary Fund. Comparing six major economic variables across the world's economies, Berg found that equality of incomes was the most important factor in preventing a major downturn. (See top chart.) In their study, Berg and coauthor Jonathan Ostry were less interested in looking at how to spark economic growth than how to sustain it. "Getting growth going is not that difficult; it's keeping it going that is hard," Berg explains. For example, the bailouts and stimulus pulled the US economy out of recession but haven't been enough to fuel a steady recovery. Berg's research suggests that sky-high income inequality in the United States could be partly to blame. So how important is equality? According to the study, making an economy's income distribution 10 percent more equitable prolongs its typical growth spell by 50 percent. In one case study, Berg looked at Latin America, which is historically much more economically stratified than emerging Asia and also has shorter periods of growth. He found that closing half of the inequality gap between Latin America and Asia would more than double the expected length of Latin America's growth spells. Increasing income inequality has the opposite effect: "We find that more inequality lowers growth," Berg says. (See bottom chart.) Berg and Ostry aren't the first economists to suggest that income inequality can torpedo the economy. Marriner Eccles, the Depression-era chairman of the Federal Reserve (and an architect of the New Deal), blamed the Great Crash on the nation's wealth gap. "A giant suction pump had by 1929-1930 drawn into a few hands an increasing portion of currently produced wealth," Eccles recalled in his memoirs. "In consequence, as in a poker game where the chips were concentrated in fewer and fewer hands, the other fellows could stay in the game only by borrowing. When the credit ran out, the game stopped." Many economists believe a similar process has unfolded over the past decade. Median wages grew too little over the past 30 years to drive the kind of spending necessary to sustain the consumer economy. Instead, increasingly exotic forms of credit filled the gap, as the wealthy offered the middle class alluring credit card deals and variable-interest subprime loans. This allowed rich investors to keep making money and everyone else to feel like they were keeping up—until the whole system imploded. Income inequality has other economic downsides. Research suggests that unequal societies have a harder time getting their citizens to support government spending because they believe that it will only benefit elites. A population where many lack access to health care, education, and bank loans can't contribute as much to the economy. And, of course, income inequality goes hand-in-hand with crippling political instability, as we've seen during the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. History shows that "sustainable reforms are only possible when the benefits are widely shared," Berg says. "We hope that we don't have to relearn that the hard way."

#### The U.S. is on the edge of getting passed up as economic leader- sustainability is uniquely key. Pethokoukis 14

Pethokoukis, James. [Columnist and blogger at the American Enterprise Institute.] "Sorry, China, the US Is Still the World's Leading Economic Power." AEI. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 30 Apr. 2014. Web. 14 Dec. 2014. PH

The US economy has been the world largest since 1872 when it overtook the UK’s. A heckuva run, no doubt. But that may end this year, according to the Financial Times: The US is on the brink of losing its status as the world’s largest economy, and is likely to slip behind China this year, sooner than widely anticipated, according to the world’s leading statistical agencies. Both economies will have gross domestic products of around $16 trillion when you adjust for “purchasing power parity,” or the much cheaper cost of living in China. Economists previously thought China would pull ahead by 2019, but the glacial US recovery has allowed the gap to narrow more quickly. (All this analysis, of course, depends on the accuracy of Chinese economic statistics.) Some important context here: on a per person basis, PPP GDP is $51,000 in the US vs. $11,000 in China. Anyway you slice the data, China is still a much poorer nation than America. (More than 30 million Chinese, basically the population of Texas, live in caves.) And at market rates, the US economy is about twice as large as China’s. Also note that within two decades or so, China will have an older population than the United States. The Middle Kingdom has become old before it has become rich. In addition to demographic problems, China is still trying to transition to a sustainable, consumer-driven growth model. So the other team has its problems, too. Now here is what the FT’s headline, “China poised to pass US as world’s leading economic power this year,” really gets wrong. The US remains the world’s leading economic power due to its technological innovation. Most global innovation surveys put the US at or near the top. For instance, the World Economic Forum ranks the US as the 7th most innovative economy, China the 32nd. Bloomberg puts the US at third, while China did not make the top 30. And which global economy is most critical to expanding the technological frontier, say, Sweden, Bloomberg’s #2 ranked economy with a population of 9.5 million and a $400 billion economy, or the #3 US with its 315 million people and $16 trillion economy. Pound for pound, no nation innovates like America. It’s our deep magic, and a competitive advantage we should be careful not to squander.

#### C. US econ is key to world economy. IMF 13

IMF 13 [“Strong U.S. Economy, Strong Global Economy—Two Sides of Same Coin.” September 19, 2013. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2013/new091913a.htm>] AJ

In a world of increasing economic interconnections, the United States’s stake in the global recovery is greater than ever, IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde said in a speech to business leaders at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Washington, D.C. “What happens elsewhere in the world—be it the success of recovery in Europe or the continued smooth functioning of supply chains in Asia—matters increasingly for the United States,” Lagarde said. “The converse is also true. What happens here matters increasingly for the global economy.” Her remarks, which focused on the interplay between the global economy and the U.S. economy, also highlighted the need to find joint solutions to secure a lasting, balanced and widely shared global recovery. “Job creation is a critical ingredient of any economic recovery, domestic or global,” she emphasized. Businesses have a key role to play, Lagarde said, but at the same time, policymakers have an important responsibility to help “shape the environment in which businesses and citizens can thrive—and jobs can be created.” Changing global picture Lagarde said that global growth remains subdued, while acknowledging that the global economic environment is changing. She emphasized that economies are moving at different speeds and that the fruits of growth are not evenly shared, both in the United States and other countries. The U.S. economy is growing and, after a long time, so is the Euro Area. In Japan, aggressive policy support and the ongoing reform process is helping to spur growth. The emerging market economies, on the other hand, are slowing. “For some, this may be a shift toward more balanced and sustainable growth,” Lagarde told the audience. “For others, it reflects the need to address imbalances that have made them more vulnerable to the recent market turbulence.” Reinforcing the point about global interconnections, Lagarde cited the IMF’s recent “spillover” analysis, which suggests that if the world’s five major economies were to work together to adopt a more rigorous, comprehensive, and compatible set of policies, it could boost global GDP by about 3 percent over the longer run. U.S. recovery gaining strength Lagarde noted that the U.S. economy is gaining strength, calling this good news for America—and good news for the world economy. Although growth is still modest—well under 2 percent—it should accelerate by a full percentage point next year, Lagarde said, adding that the private sector is playing a key role as the engine of growth and job creation. Despite signs of strengthening, the latest jobs data present a mixed picture, with employment remaining well below pre-crisis levels. “The issue of jobs remains paramount,” said Lagarde, noting that jobs and growth is an increasingly important component of the IMF’s policy advice. Lagarde highlighted three key recommendations for U.S. policymakers, drawn from the IMF’s most recent assessment of the U.S. economy. • Fix public finances. Fiscal consolidation could be slower in the short run, but more action is needed to reduce long-run pressures on the budget. Lagarde also warned that political uncertainty over the budget and debt ceiling were not helpful to the recovery. “It is essential to resolve this, and the earlier the better,” she said, “for confidence, for markets, and for the real economy.” • Appropriately calibrate monetary policy. When the time comes, exit from unconventional monetary policy should be gradual, tied to progress in economic recovery and unemployment, and should be clearly communicated and in a dialogue. • Complete financial sector reform. While there has been progress on this front, attention needs to focus on the outstanding “danger zones,” such as derivatives and shadow banking. Global interconnections and role of IMF Lagarde underscored the unique role of the U.S. in the global economy, noting that the economy accounts for 11 percent of global trade and 20 percent of global manufacturing. The country’s global financial ties run deep too, she said. Foreign banks hold about $5.5 trillion of U.S. assets, and U.S. banks hold $3 trillion of foreign assets. While these interconnections have great benefits for the United States, they are not without risks, Lagarde cautioned, referring to the collapse of Lehman Brothers five years ago that ushered in “a harsh new reality” across sectors, countries, and the world. That is why an effective IMF is important for the global membership. “Our policy advice, for example—including in core areas like exchange rates or external imbalances—has helped to prevent or to ease the hardship of crises around the world,” said Lagarde. “That, in turn, has helped reduce the possible negative fallout for the U.S. and for all countries.” An effective IMF must also continue to evolve and anticipate what lies ahead. In this connection, the IMF has placed greater emphasis on global interconnections—the economic spillovers between countries and the financial sector. Lagarde also highlighted the set of governance reforms that the IMF is working toward that will help strengthen its capacity to prevent and resolve crises, and at the same time, help broaden its representation to better reflect the changing dynamics of the global economy. “These quota reforms need the support of all our member countries—including the United States,” she said. The IMF is grounded in the principle of good global citizenship. “If countries work together to serve the common interests, everybody wins,” she concluded. “We all have a large stake in these interconnections.” over time. So, soft power is hard to accrue and not easily lost. It is also increasingly obvious that the US will need to husband and grow its soft power to maximize the cooperation with others to thwart the long-term challenge of the global terrorist threat. The Changing Nature of Global Threats New post-Cold War threats illustrate that the new enemies are very largely not sovereign states nor their armies, but increasingly failed states, terrorists, local warlords, petty tyrants, ad hoc militias, drug traffickers, organized and transnational crime syndicates, and even cyber outlaws. Unlike the traditional and conventional warfare threats of earlier decades, these new challenges often defy borders, and are characteristically dynamic, diverse, fluid, networked, and often unpredictable. Most cannot be subdued, or even controlled, by a single state, not even the remaining superpower. The more prominent characteristics of contemporary terrorism point to its transnational (not country specific) nature, reflecting loosely organized networks with spin offs and look-a-likes, increasingly inspired by deep religious convictions (mostly but not exclusively Islamist), often millenarian in philosophy (hastening end-of-the-world judgment), aimed to kill as many victims as possible, with some groups seeking weapons of mass destruction, and with victims very indiscriminately targeted (often including their own co-religionists and countrymen). This threat profile poses a very different genre than earlier 20 th century adversaries

#### It’s Try-or-Die: Collapse is inevitable in squo. 5000 years of historical analysis shows that inequality destroys the global economy- The aff is key to solve. Ahmed 14

[Nafeez Ahmed, executive director of the Institute for Policy Research & Development. “Nasa-funded study: industrial civilisation headed for 'irreversible collapse'?” 3/14/2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2014/mar/14/nasa-civilisation-irreversible-collapse-study-scientists>] CT

A new study partly-sponsored by Nasa's Goddard Space Flight Center has highlighted the prospect that global industrial civilisation could collapse in coming decades due to unsustainable resource exploitation and increasingly unequal wealth distribution.¶ Noting that warnings of 'collapse' are often seen to be fringe or controversial, the study attempts to make sense of compelling historical data showing that "the process of rise-and-collapse is actually a recurrent cycle found throughout history." Cases of severe civilisational disruption due to "precipitous collapse - often lasting centuries - have been quite common."¶ The independent research project is based on a new cross-disciplinary 'Human And Nature DYnamical' (HANDY) model, led by applied mathematician Safa Motesharrei of the US National Science Foundation-supported National Socio-Environmental Synthesis Center, in association with a team of natural and social scientists. The HANDY model was created using a minor Nasa grant, but the study based on it was conducted independently. The study based on the HANDY model has been accepted for publication in the peer-reviewed Elsevier journal, Ecological Economics.¶ It finds that according to the historical record even advanced, complex civilisations are susceptible to collapse, raising questions about the sustainability of modern civilisation:¶ "The fall of the Roman Empire, and the equally (if not more) advanced Han, Mauryan, and Gupta Empires, as well as so many advanced Mesopotamian Empires, are all testimony to the fact that advanced, sophisticated, complex, and creative civilizations can be both fragile and impermanent."¶ By investigating the human-nature dynamics of these past cases of collapse, the project identifies the most salient interrelated factors which explain civilisational decline, and which may help determine the risk of collapse today: namely, Population, Climate, Water, Agriculture, and Energy.¶ These factors can lead to collapse when they converge to generate two crucial social features: "the stretching of resources due to the strain placed on the ecological carrying capacity"; and "the economic stratification of society into Elites [rich] and Masses (or "Commoners") [poor]" These social phenomena have played "a central role in the character or in the process of the collapse," in all such cases over "the last five thousand years."¶ Currently, high levels of economic stratification are linked directly to overconsumption of resources, with "Elites" based largely in industrialised countries responsible for both:¶ "... accumulated surplus is not evenly distributed throughout society, but rather has been controlled by an elite. The mass of the population, while producing the wealth, is only allocated a small portion of it by elites, usually at or just above subsistence levels."¶ The study challenges those who argue that technology will resolve these challenges by increasing efficiency:¶ "Technological change can raise the efficiency of resource use, but it also tends to raise both per capita resource consumption and the scale of resource extraction, so that, absent policy effects, the increases in consumption often compensate for the increased efficiency of resource use."¶ Productivity increases in agriculture and industry over the last two centuries has come from "increased (rather than decreased) resource throughput," despite dramatic efficiency gains over the same period.¶ Modelling a range of different scenarios, Motesharrei and his colleagues conclude that under conditions "closely reflecting the reality of the world today... we find that collapse is difficult to avoid." In the first of these scenarios, civilisation:¶ ".... appears to be on a sustainable path for quite a long time, but even using an optimal depletion rate and starting with a very small number of Elites, the Elites eventually consume too much, resulting in a famine among Commoners that eventually causes the collapse of society. It is important to note that this Type-L collapse is due to an inequality-induced famine that causes a loss of workers, rather than a collapse of Nature."¶ Another scenario focuses on the role of continued resource exploitation, finding that "with a larger depletion rate, the decline of the Commoners occurs faster, while the Elites are still thriving, but eventually the Commoners collapse completely, followed by the Elites."¶ In both scenarios, Elite wealth monopolies mean that they are buffered from the most "detrimental effects of the environmental collapse until much later than the Commoners", allowing them to "continue 'business as usual' despite the impending catastrophe." The same mechanism, they argue, could explain how "historical collapses were allowed to occur by elites who appear to be oblivious to the catastrophic trajectory (most clearly apparent in the Roman and Mayan cases)."¶ Applying this lesson to our contemporary predicament, the study warns that:¶ "While some members of society might raise the alarm that the system is moving towards an impending collapse and therefore advocate structural changes to society in order to avoid it, Elites and their supporters, who opposed making these changes, could point to the long sustainable trajectory 'so far' in support of doing nothing."¶ However, the scientists point out that the worst-case scenarios are by no means inevitable, and suggest that appropriate policy and structural changes could avoid collapse, if not pave the way toward a more stable civilisation.¶ The two key solutions are to reduce economic inequality so as to ensure fairer distribution of resources, and to dramatically reduce resource consumption by relying on less intensive renewable resources and reducing population growth:¶ "Collapse can be avoided and population can reach equilibrium if the per capita rate of depletion of nature is reduced to a sustainable level, and if resources are distributed in a reasonably equitable fashion."¶ The NASA-funded HANDY model offers a highly credible wake-up call to governments, corporations and business - and consumers - to recognise that 'business as usual' cannot be sustained, and that policy and structural changes are required immediately.¶ Although the study based on HANDY is largely theoretical - a 'thought-experiment' - a number of other more empirically-focused studies - by KPMG and the UK Government Office of Science for instance - have warned that the convergence of food, water and energy crises could create a 'perfect storm' within about fifteen years. But these 'business as usual' forecasts could be very conservative.

#### D. Economic collapse will spark wars that cause extinction. Lewis 2000

Lewis 00 – Instructor in American Studies Program at University of Colorado-Boulder [Chris H., “The Paradox of Global Development and the Necessary Collapse of Global Industrial Civilization,” Jun, <http://www.cross-x.com/archives/LewisParadox.pdf>] PH

Of course, most critics would argue, probably correctly, that instead of allowing underdeveloped countries to withdraw from the global economy and undermine the economies of the developed world, the [US] United States, Europe, and Japan and others will fight neo-colonial wars to force these countries to remain within this collapsing global economy. These neocolonial wars will result in mass-death, suffering, and even regional nuclear wars. If First World countries choose military confrontation and political repression to maintain the global economy, then we may see mass- death and genocide at a global scale that will make the deaths of World War II pale in comparison. However, these neo-colonial wars, fought to maintain the developed nations' economic and political hegemony, will cause the final collapse of global industrial civilization. These wars will so damage the complex economic and trading networks and squander material, biological, and energy and human resources that they will undermine the global economy and its ability to support the Earth's six to eight billion people. This would be the worst-case scenario for the collapse of global civilization. This is the kind of global nightmare world that would have been created by a full-scale global nuclear war during the days of the Cold War. A civilization that prepared for such a global holocaust can’t entirely be trusted to manage a soft landing after the collapse of global industrial civilization. This is the nightmare that haunts many concerned intellectuals, who really understand the brutality and inhumanity demonstrated by 20th century global industrial civilization. Recent estimates suggest that more people were killed in this century by other people, over 160 million, than all thepeople killed by other people in recorded history.

Extinction turns the NC since it’s the worst violation of the standard.

### Frontlines

### Solvency Weighing

#### 1. Aff solvency evidence comes first- They conceded U.S. spec which is damning because there’s a significant distinction between minimum wage policies and living wage- NONE of their offense links- Maloney 13 explains that LW is implemented within cities for city workers only

Empirics prove the distinction- LW reduces poverty but Minimum wage doesn’t. Clain 08

Clain, Suzanne Heller. "How living wage legislation affects US poverty rates." Journal of Labor Research 29.3 (2008): 205-218. PH The most noteworthy results concern how state and local wage policies affect poverty rates. In particular, the variable reflecting the presence of local living wage legislation has a significant negative impact on the poverty rate.22,23 This result support[ing]s the findings of Neumark and Adams (2003a) and Adams and Neumark (2005a).24 By contrast, the presence of a state minimum wage law has a negative, but insignificant, effect on the poverty rate. Here, as found elsewhere, there is “no compelling evidence supporting the view that minimum wages [it] help[s] in the fight against poverty” (Neumark and Wascher 2002: 333). Statistical significance aside, the absolute magnitude of these effects is modest. For the average ACS county with a population of 720,273 (in 2000), for example, living wage legislation would lift [6 to 7 times as much poverty than minimum wage]between 13,115 and 14,155 individuals out of poverty. By contrast, a statewide minimum wage would reduce the number of individuals living below the poverty line by only 1,880 to 1,975.

This means that the DA impacts that would also differ.

#### 2. The Adams and Neumarks study is the best on this issue:

A. It uses a counterfactual method of comparing failing or derailing living wage campaigns, which is better- 3 warrants. Adams and Neumark 3

Adams, Scott, and David Neumark. "The effects of living wage laws: Evidence from failed and derailed living wage campaigns." Journal of Urban Economics 58.2 (2005): 177-202. PH

Specifically, the cities with unsuccessful living wage campaigns offer three advantages relative to earlier research. First, these cities arguably provide a better control group for comparison with the cities that passed living wage laws, as underlying changes in low-wage labor markets that may have been associated with living wage laws are more likely to have been similar in cities where living wage campaigns arose. Second, the cities with failed or derailed living wage campaigns allow us to estimate the effects of living wages more directly, by netting out the possible consequences of changes that accompany living wage campaigns, stemming from influences such as increased organizing among lowwage workers and increased public focus on their conditions and wages. With respect to both of these points, it might be expected that smaller living wage effects on wages and employment would result, compared with evidence based on comparisons with the broader set of cities that simply did not pass living wage laws—irrespective of whether a living wage campaign occurred. And third, our approach yields estimates of the effects of living wage campaigns themselves.

Other studies compare the effects of living wage to places without it, which allows for a litany of confounding variable, which is especially bad since living wage varies in rate geographically, in legislation, and in practice- that’s the Maloney evidence.

B. Uses cross-sectional analysis that accounts for data in multiple cities over several years. Clain 08

Clain, Suzanne Heller. "How living wage legislation affects US poverty rates." Journal of Labor Research 29.3 (2008): 205-218. PH

The the effects of living wage legislation, Neumark and Adams (2003b) conducted a cross-sectional analysis of the living wage legislation in 21 cities using the Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group files, pooled across five years (1996–2000). They conclude[ing]ed that living wage ordinances that specify relatively broad coverage have sizable effects on the wages of low-wage workers in cities with these ordinances. In analyzing the legislation’s effect on the probability of employment, they generally found point estimates suggesting disemployment effects, with significance in only a few of their estimated specifications. In an extension of this investigation, Neumark and Adams (2003a) estimated how living wage legislation affected a family’s probability of having earnings (income) below the poverty line. Their findings include some evidence that living wage ordinances result in [of] modest reductions in the likelihood that urban families live in poverty.2

My study is most comprehensive since it looks at 21 different cities, your study only shows isolated exception since it doesn’t look at enough U.S. cities to generate a constant trend.

C. Best Conservative Estimate- Adam and Neumark are least biased since they’re not trying to defend living wage rather just examine the effects. They survey other studies as well as conduct their own to draw a definitive conclusion on poverty reduction. They even state uncertainty in employment effects which shows that neg evidence is over-claimed.

### Harkinson Ext

Extend Harkinson- Equalizing income distribution is the KEY factor to maintaining economic sustainability and support for the political system.

O/W A. Study looks at 15 nations over a 56-year period and concludes that income inequality is one of the causal factors of econ instability. B. His own potion of the study shows that income distribution has about 10% more of an impact sustainability looking at long growth periods more so than trade openness or competitiveness.

### 1AR Impact Turns vs. Warming

#### CO2 key to avert the coming ice age—causes extinction, comparatively worse than warming. Rawls 08

Rawls, board of directors – The Stanford Review, editor and climate science writer – Error Theory, 11/28/’8

(Alec, “An economic analysis of the external value of CO2 shows an unambiguously high positive value: we should be encouraging, not deterring, CO2 emissions,” <http://errortheory.blogspot.com/2008/11/my-comment-on-epas-proposed-rulemaking.html>) PH

From our current warm-earth conditions, additional greenhouse gases have little capacity to cause additional warming, but could have substantial capacity to mitigate cooling. Briefly, pretty much all the heat trapping work that CO2 can do is already being done by the CO2 already in the atmosphere, and by the much more abundant water vapor, which traps most of the wavelengths of infrared that CO2 does. The warmer the Earth is, the more water vapor there is an atmosphere, and the more irrelevant additional CO2 becomes. The situation changes dramatically as the Earth cools. A colder atmosphere does not hold as much water vapor, leaving more heat trapping work for CO2 to do. The colder the climate becomes, the more we rely on CO2 to provide the greenhouse warming that keeps the earth from becoming an ice ball. A doubling of the tiny CO2 component the atmosphere has only a tiny warming effect when the Earth is already warm, but has a magnified warming effect when the Earth turns cold. Good stuff. Sitting on what may be the brink of the next Little Ice Age, we should be trying to raise the floor on the likely cooling by pumping out CO2. In sum, CO2 presents little downside risk (only a tiny warming effect in the event that natural variation continues in the warming direction), but a relatively large upside risk (possibly significant raising of the floor on global cooling, in the event that natural variation heads in the cooling direction). 2. Warming appears to be self-limiting. Cooling is not (at least not until we are buried under mountains of ice). A couple different physical processes are at work here. Roy Spencer theorizes that the increasing efficiency of the rain cycle as temperatures warm constitutes a natural thermostat. The more efficient rain cycle means that precipitation more completely removes moisture from the air. These efficient cloudbursts open up a column of dry air in the sky through which the heat produced by precipitation (opposite of the cold produced by evaporation) escapes into space. The warmer the earth gets, the more efficient the rain cycle, the more heat gets vented through cloudbursts, making warming self-limiting. In contrast , the geological record proves that cooling is not self-limiting, as the Earth regularly descends into hundred thousand year-long ice ages. One of the lopsided mechanisms at work is the albedo effect. Cooling causes increased snow cover, which reflects away more sunlight than bare ground or open ocean does. This causes more cooling, causing snow and ice to grow still further, etcetera. What makes the albedo effect lopsided in its operation is the fact that as snow and ice descend to lower latitudes, the change in territory covered grows rapidly. Also, the lower latitudes recieve sunlight more directly than the higher latitudes do, so when sun gets reflected away from the lower latitudes, more energy is lost per square mile of snow and ice than at higher latitudes. Cooling causes snow and ice to descend towards the temperate regions, where most of the earth's landmass resides. Thus relatively direct sunlight gets bounced away from progressively larger swaths of the earth's surface, causing the marginal albedo effect to grow rapidly. By the same token, the marginal albedo effect shrinks as the earth warms. Starting from a warm period like the present, warming causes our relatively mild ice and snow coverage to retreat towards higher latitudes. The amount of territory involved keeps getting smaller, and it only recieves sunlight at a shallow angle anyway, so that the marginal decrease in albedo keeps getting smaller. 3. Specific to this point in time, the likely direction of natural temperature variation is very lopsided in the cooling direction. Solar activity was at “grand maximum” levels from 1940 to 2000, and ALL the geological evidence points to solar activity is the primary driver of global climate. (There is literally NO evidence that global climate change has EVER been driven by CO2, unless you go way back to before there was plant life to suck the CO2 out of the atmosphere. We know in theory that marginal changes in CO2 should have SOME warming effect, but they are apparently too small to detect.) From this “grand maximum” level of solar activity, there was nowhere to go but down, and if the past is any guide, that meant it was going to get cold, which is just what is happening. Since 2000 solar activity has dropped off dramatically, with the transition from solar cycle 23 to solar cycle 24 now dawdling along in an extended solar minimum. Concomitantly, global temperatures stopped rising in 1998, and fell dramatically last year. Solar cycle 24 still could fire up strong, in which case the expected global cooling could be put off, but in all likelihood it is coming. Solar activity has nowhere to go but down from its recent high levels, and all the evidence says that the result is going to be a period of global cooling. In an expected value calculation, that boost to the likelihood of cooling gets applied as a weighting factor to the extra high value of CO2 in the event of a cooling episode. Warming is more important the cooler gets, and the amount of warming work that CO2 does increase is the cooler it gets (and the less water vapor there is in the atmosphere). In short, all of these different lopsided risk profiles are getting multiplied together to create a super lopsided risk profile, where down side risks are tiny while upside risks are relatively huge. They still aren’t big, because CO2 effects in general are small. But in relative terms they are gigantic, implying that the positive net external value of CO2 is unambiguously positive. Actually there aren't ANY effects that have a negative value, given that a modicum of warming is a benefit, even if natural temperature variation is already headed in the warming direction. Unless warming has somehow gotten out of control, warming is good. The more the better. We have NEVER had too much warming. Since the claim that warming HAS somehow gotten out of control are based on the most blatant statistical fraud, is no reason to get any weight to that radical idea. Not that CO2 has to be all benefits and no costs in order for it to have been unambiguously positive value. That only requires that the benefits unambiguously outweigh the costs. The actual result is turns out to go even further. There are no costs. CO2 is nothing but benefits. And we can throw in a few more too, like the fact that CO2 is plant food. A doubling of CO2 has substantial effect positive affect on agricultural productivity. That the EPA, and governments all over the world, are looking at CO2 as a pollutant that needs to be dramatically suppressed is truly a form of madness. Disregard for truth creates divorce from reality That's the theme of this blog. Error theory examines the consequences of failure to think straight, which usually is driven, not by an inability to think straight, but from attempts to gain advantage by avoiding or suppressing inconvenient truths. The global warming alarmists are an extreme example. All of these trained climatologists (those who got their funding from Al Gore) have managed to convince themselves that human economic activity is such a threat to the environment that anything they can do to stop it, no matter how dishonest, is justified. Their conviction that shutting off the oil economy is necessary for saving the natural world natural world has nothing to do with global temperature, which was just a convenient pretext. The consequence is that by not caring about the truth, they have become divorced from reality. They are committing the greatest scientific fraud in history, and pursuing a course that is utterly destructive to both mankind and the environment.Global cooling is not just destructive to humanity, but if it proceeds very far, will dramatically shrink the planet’s living space for all of us: plants, animals and humanity. We should be doing everything we can to counter that eventuality, and one of the things we can do, which will do no harm in the event that natural variation turns in the other direction, is to keep on pumping out the CO2

#### CO2 boosts plant performance and prevents mass starvation—avoids extinction. Singer 11

Singer, PhD physics – Princeton University and professor of environmental science – UVA, consultant – NASA, GAO, DOE, NASA, Carter, PhD paleontology – University of Cambridge, adjunct research professor – Marine Geophysical Laboratory @ James Cook University, and Idso, PhD Geography – ASU, ’11 (S. Fred, Robert M. and Craig, “Climate Change Reconsidered,” 2011 Interim Report of the Nongovernmental Panel on Climate Change) PH

Regarding the first of these requirements, Tilman et al. note that in many parts of the world the historical rate of increase in crop yields is declining, as the genetic ceiling for maximal yield potential is being approached. This observation, in their words, ―highlights the need for efforts to steadily increase the yield potential ceiling.‖ With respect to the second requirement, they indicate, ―without the use of synthetic fertilizers, world food production could not have increased at the rate it did [in the past] and more natural ecosystems would have been converted to agriculture.‖ Hence, they state the solution ―will require significant increases in nutrient use efficiency, that is, in cereal production per unit of added nitrogen, phosphorus,‖ and so forth. Finally, as to the third requirement, Tilman et al. remind us ―water is regionally scarce,‖ and ―many countries in a band from China through India and Pakistan, and the Middle East to North Africa either currently or will soon fail to have adequate water to maintain per capita food production from irrigated land.‖ Increasing crop water use efficiency, therefore, is also a must. Although the impending biological crisis and several important elements of its potential solution are thus well defined, Tilman et al. (2001) noted ―even the best available technologies, fully deployed, cannot prevent many of the forecasted problems.‖ This was also the conclusion of Idso and Idso (2000), who stated that although ―expected advances in agricultural technology and expertise will significantly increase the food production potential of many countries and regions,‖ these advances ―will not increase production fast enough to meet the demands of the even faster-growing human population of the planet.‖ Fortunately, we have a powerful ally in the ongoing rise in the air‘s CO2 content that can provide what we can‘t. Since atmospheric CO2 is the basic ―food of essentially all plants, the more of it there is in the air, the bigger and better they grow. For a nominal doubling of the air‘s CO2 concentration, for example, the productivity of Earth‘s herbaceous plants rises by 30 to 50 percent (Kimball, 1983; Idso and Idso, 1994), and the productivity of its woody plants rises by 50 to 80 percent or more (Saxe et al. 1998; Idso and Kimball, 2001). Hence, as the air‘s CO2 content continues to rise, the land use efficiency of the planet will rise right along with it. In addition, atmospheric CO2 enrichment typically increases plant nutrient use efficiency and plant water use efficiency. Thus, with respect to all three of the major needs identified by Tilman et al. (2002), increases in the air‘s CO2 content pay huge dividends, helping to increase agricultural output without the taking of new land and water from nature. Many other researchers have broached this subject. In a paper recently published in the Annual Review of Plant Biology, three scientists associated with the Institute of Genomic Biology at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (USA) write that meeting the global increase in agricultural demand during this century ―is predicted to require a doubling of global production,‖ but ―the world has limited capacity to sustainably expand cropland,‖ and this capacity is actually ―shrinking in many developed countries.‖ Thus, Zhu et al. (2010) state, ―meeting future increases in demand will have to come from a near doubling of productivity on a land area basis,‖ and they conclude ―a large contribution will have to come from improved photosynthetic conversion efficiency,‖ estimating ―at least a 50% improvement will be required to double global production.‖ The researchers‘ reason for focusing on photosynthetic conversion efficiency derives from the experimentally observed facts that increases in the atmosphere‘s CO2 concentration increase the photosynthetic rates of nearly all plants, and those rate increases generally lead to equivalent—or only slightly smaller—increases in plant productivity on a land area basis. That provides a solid foundation for their enthusiasm in this regard. In their review of the matter, however, they examine the prospects for boosting photosynthetic conversion efficiency in an entirely different way: genetically, without increasing the air‘s CO2 content. ―Improving photosynthetic conversion efficiency will require,‖ the three scientists state, ―a full suite of tools including breeding, gene transfer, and synthetic biology in bringing about the designed alteration to photosynthesis.‖ For some of these ―near-term‖ endeavors, they indicate ―implementation is limited by technical issues that can be overcome by sufficient investment,‖ meaning they can ―be bought.‖ But several ―mid-term‖ goals could take 20 years or more to achieve; and they state ―even when these improvements are achieved, it may take an additional 10–20 years to bring such innovations to farms in commercial cultivars at adequate scale.‖ And if that is not bad enough, they say of still longer-term goals that ―too little of the science has been undertaken to identify what needs to be altered to effect an increase in yield,‖ while in some cases they acknowledge that what they envision may not even be possible, as in developing a form of RuBisCO that exhibits a significant decrease in oxygenation activity, or in designing C3 crops to utilize the C4 form of photosynthetic metabolism. Clearly, we do not have the time to gamble on our ability to accomplish what needs to be done in order to forestall massive human starvation of global dimensions within the current century. Therefore—in addition to trying what Zhu et al. suggest—we must rely on the ―tested and true: the CO2-induced stimulation of plant photosynthesis and crop yield production. And all we need to do in this regard is to refrain from interfering with the natural evolution of the Industrial Revolution, which is destined to be carried for some time yet on the backs of fossil-fuel-driven enterprises that can provide the atmosphere with the extra carbon dioxide that will be needed to provide the extra increase in crop growth that may mean the difference between global food sufficiency and human starvation on a massive scale a mere few decades from now. Another take on the matter has been provided by Hanjra and Qureshi (2010). They begin their treatment of the subject by quoting Benjamin Franklin‘s well-known homily, ―When the well is dry, we know the worth of water,‖ and they write we ―must not lose sight of surging water scarcity.‖ Noting ―population and income growth will increase the demand for food and water,‖ they contend ―irrigation will be the first sector to lose water, as water competition by non-agricultural uses increases and water scarcity intensifies.‖ As ―increasing water scarcity will have implications for food security, hunger, poverty, and ecosystem health and services,‖ they report ―feeding the 2050 population will require some 12,400 km3 of water, up from 6800 km3 used today.‖ This huge increase, they continue, ―will leave a water gap of about 3300 km3 even after improving efficiency in irrigated agriculture, improving water management, and upgrading of rainfed agriculture,‖ as per the findings of de Fraiture et al. (2007), Molden (2007), and Molden et al. (2010). This water deficiency, according to Hanjra and Qureshi, ―will lead to a food gap unless concerted actions are taken today.‖ Some of the measures they propose are to conserve water and energy resources, develop and adopt climate-resilient crop varieties, modernize irrigation, shore up domestic food supplies, reengage in agriculture for further development, and reform the global food and trade markets. To achieve these goals, they write, ―unprecedented global cooperation is required,‖ which by the looks of today‘s world is an exceedingly remote possibility. What, then, can we do to defuse the ticking time-bomb of this looming food and water crisis? One option is to do nothing: don‘t mess with the normal, unforced evolution of civilization‘s means of acquiring energy. This is because on top of everything else we may try to do to conserve both land and freshwater resources, we will still fall short of what is needed to be achieved unless the air‘s CO2 content rises significantly and thereby boosts the water use efficiency of Earth‘s crop plants and that of the plants that provide food and habitat for what could be called ―wild nature,‖ enabling both sets of plants to produce more biomass per unit of water used. To ensure this happens, we will need all of the CO2 that will be produced by the burning of fossil fuels, until other forms of energy truly become more cost-efficient than coal, gas, and oil. In fact, these other energy sources will have to become much more cost-efficient before fossil fuels are phased out, because the positive externality of the CO2-induced increase in plant water use efficiency provided by the steady rise in the atmosphere‘s CO2 concentration due to the burning of fossil fuels will be providing a most important service in helping us feed and sustain our own species without totally decimating what yet remains of wild nature. In yet another paper to address this important issue—this one published in the Journal of Proteome Research—Sarkar et al. (2010) write, ―increasing population and unsustainable exploitation of nature and natural resources have made ‗food security‘ a burning issue in the 21st century,‖ echoing the sentiments expressed by Farrell (2009), who noted ―the alarming increase in biofuel production, the projected demand for livestock products, and the estimated food to feed the additional 700 million people who will arrive here by 2016, will have unprecedented consequences,‖ among which are likely to be that ―arable land, the environment, water supply and sustainability of the agricultural system will all be affected,‖ and not in a positive way. Furthermore, when the human population of the globe reaches 8.7–11.3 billion by the year 2050 (Bengtsson et al., 2006), the situation will become truly intolerable, unless something is done, far in advance of that date, to mitigate the situation dramatically. Thus, as Sarkar et al. suggest, ―a normal approach for any nation/region is to strengthen its agricultural production for meeting future demands and provide food security.‖ But a major difficulty, which could spoil mankind‘s ability to do so, is the ongoing rise in the atmosphere‘s ozone concentration. This is the subject of Sarkar et al.‘s new paper. In a study designed to elucidate the many ways in which ozone (O3) is harmful to plants, the eight researchers grew two high-yielding cultivars (Sonalika and HUW 510) of wheat (Triticum aestivum L.) outdoors at the Agriculture Research Farm of India‘s Banaras Hindu University. This was done within open-top chambers maintained at the ambient O3 concentration and at elevated O3 concentrations of 25 percent and 50 percent above ambient during the peak O3 period of the day (10:00 to 15:00 hours local time) for a total of 50 days, during which time they measured numerous responses of the plants to the two levels of ozone enrichment. Sarkar et al. determined, among several other things, that the moderate increases in the air‘s O3 concentration resulted in higher foliar injury, a reduction in photosynthetic efficiency, induced inhibition in photochemical efficacy of photosystem II, lowered concentrations of photosynthetic pigments and proteins, and what they describe as ―drastic reductions‖ in RuBisCO large and small subunits, while noting major leaf photosynthetic proteins and important energy metabolism proteins were also ―drastically reduced.‖ Discussing the results, the scientists from India, Japan, and Nepal remark that anthropogenic activities have made ozone a ―major environmental pollutant of our time,‖ while noting some are predicting it to be an even ―greater problem for the future.‖ Adding this dilemma to the problem of feeding the world over the next few decades and beyond makes humanity‘s future look incredibly bleak. Thus, Sarkar et al. suggest we focus on ―engineering crops for future high O3,‖ concentrating on maintaining ―effective stomatal conductance of plants which can avoid O3 entry but not hamper their productivity.‖ We agree. But not knowing to what extent we will be successful in this endeavor, we also need to do something we know will work: allowing the air‘s CO2 content to rise, unimpeded by the misguided efforts of those who would curtail anthropogenic CO2 emissions in the guise of fighting what they claim is anthropogenic-induced global warming. This contention is largely theoretical and wholly unproven, but we know, as a result of literally hundreds, if not thousands, of real-world experiments, that atmospheric CO2 enrichment increases both the productivity and water-use efficiency of nearly all plants, and that it often more than compensates for the negative effects of O3 pollution. Introducing another review of food security studies pertinent to the challenge of feeding 9 billion people just four decades from now, Godfray et al. (2010) note ―more than one in seven people today still do not have access to sufficient protein and energy from their diet and even more suffer some form of micronutrient malnourishment,‖ citing the FAO (2009). Although ―increases in production will have an important part to play‖ in correcting this problem and keeping it from worsening in the future, mankind ―will be constrained by the finite resources provided by the earth‘s lands, oceans and atmosphere,‖ This set of difficulties they describe at the end of their review as constituting a ―perfect storm.‖ In considering ways to mitigate these problems, the first question they ask is: ―How can more food be produced sustainably?‖ They state the primary solution to food shortages of the past was ―to bring more land into agriculture and to exploit new fish stocks,‖ but they note there is precious little remaining of either of these pristine resources. Thus, they conclude ―the most likely scenario is that more food will need to be produced from the same or less land.‖ As they suggest, ―we must avoid the temptation to sacrifice further the earth‘s already hugely depleted biodiversity for easy gains in food production, not only because biodiversity provides many of the public goods upon which mankind relies, but also because we do not have the right to deprive future generations of its economic and cultural benefits.‖ And, we might add, because we should be enlightened enough to realize we have a moral responsibility to drive no more species to extinction than we already have sent to that sorry state. So how can these diverse requirements all be met simultaneously? A clue comes from Godfray et al.‘s statement that ―greater water and nutrient use efficiency, as well as tolerance of abiotic stress, are likely to become of increasing importance.‖ And what is there that can bring about these changes in mankind‘s crops? You guessed it: carbon dioxide. Rising concentrations of atmospheric CO2 increase the photosynthetic prowess of essentially all of the Earth‘s plants, while generally reducing the rate at which they transfer water from the soil to the air. In addition, more CO2 in the air tends to enhance the efficiency with which plants utilize nutrients in constructing their tissues and producing the edible portions that we and all of Earth‘s animals depend upon for our very existence. Focusing on the water scarcity aspect of the food shortage problem, Kummu et al. (2010) write, ―due to the rapidly increasing population and water use per capita in many areas of the world, around one third of the world‘s population currently lives under physical water scarcity (e.g. Vorosmarty et al., 2000; Alcamo et al., 2003; Oki and Kanae, 2006).‖ But despite the large number of water scarcity studies conducted over the years, ―no global assessment is available of how this trend has evolved over the past several centuries to millennia.‖ Thus they conducted a study covering AD 0 to 2005. This analysis was carried out for ten different time slices, defined as those times at which the human population of the globe was approximately double the population of the previous time slice. Global population data for these analyses were derived from the 5‘ latitude x 5‘ longitude-resolution global HYDE dataset of Klein Goldewijk (2005) and Klein Goldewijk et al. (2010), while evaluation of water resources availability over the same period was based on monthly temperature and precipitation output from the climate model ECBilt-CLIO-VECODE, as calculated by Renssen et al. (2005). After completing these assessments, the four researchers found ―moderate water shortage first appeared around 1800, but it commenced in earnest from about 1900, when 9% of the world population experienced water shortage, of which 2% was under chronic water shortage (<1000 m3/capita/year).‖ Thereafter, from 1960 onwards, they write, ―water shortage increased extremely rapidly, with the proportion of global population living under chronic water shortage increasing from 9% (280 million people) in 1960 to 35% (2300 million) in 2005.‖ And currently, they continue, ―the most widespread water shortage is in South Asia, where 91% of the population experiences some form of water shortage,‖ while ―the most severe shortage is in North Africa and the Middle East, where 77% and 52% of the total population lives under extreme water shortage (<500 m3/capita/year), respectively.‖ To alleviate these freshwater shortages, Kummu et al. state measures generally have been taken to increase water availability, such as building dams and extracting groundwater. But they note ―there are already several regions in which such measures are no longer sufficient, as there is simply not enough water available in some regions.‖ In addition, they observe, ―this problem is expected to increase in the future due to increasing population pressure (e.g. United Nations, 2009), higher welfare (e.g. Grubler et al., 2007) [and] production of water intensive biofuels (e.g. Varis, 2007, Berndes, 2008).‖ Hence, they conclude there will be an increasing need for many nonstructural measures, the first and foremost of which they indicate to be ―increasing the efficiency of water use.‖ This characteristic of nearly all of Earth‘s plants is almost universally promoted by atmospheric CO2 enrichment.

#### No extinction. Stampf 07

Stampf 7 [(Olaf Stampf, journalist for Spiegel. Cites Hans von Storch, prominent climate researcher, director of the Institute for Coastal Research at the GKSS Research Center in Geesthacht; Josef Reichholf, Munich zoologist; Richard Tol, an environmental economist; Jochem Marotzke, director of the Hamburg-based Max Planck Institute for Meteorology) “Not the End of the World as We Know It,” Spiegel Online 5/7/2007] PH

The truth is probably somewhere between these two extremes. Climate change will undoubtedly have losers -- but it will also have winners. There will be a reshuffling of climate zones on earth. And there is something else that we can already say with certainty: The end of the world isn't coming any time soon. Largely unnoticed by the public, climate researchers are currently embroiled in their own struggle over who owns the truth. While some have always seen themselves as environmental activists aiming to shake humanity out of its complacency, others argue for a calmer and more rational approach to the unavoidable. One member of the levelheaded camp is Hans von Storch, 57, a prominent climate researcher who is director of the Institute for Coastal Research at the GKSS Research Center in Geesthacht in northern Germany. "We have to take away people's fear of climate change," Storch told DER SPIEGEL in a recent interview. "Unfortunately many scientists see themselves too much as priests whose job it is to preach moralistic sermons to people." Keeping a cool head is a good idea because, for one thing, we can no longer completely prevent climate change. No matter how much governments try to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, it will only be possible to limit the rise in global temperatures to about 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) by the end of the century. But even this moderate warming would likely have far fewer apocalyptic consequences than many a prophet of doom would have us believe. For one thing, the more paleontologists and geologists study the history of the earth's climate, the more clearly do they recognize just how much temperatures have fluctuated in both directions in the past. Even major fluctuations appear to be completely natural phenomena. Additionally, some environmentalists doubt that the large-scale extinction of animals and plants some have predicted will in fact come about. "A warmer climate helps promote species diversity," says Munich zoologist Josef Reichholf. Also, more detailed simulations have allowed climate researchers to paint a considerably less dire picture than in the past -- gone is the talk of giant storms, the melting of the Antarctic ice shield and flooding of major cities. Improved regionalized models also show that climate change can bring not only drawbacks, but also significant benefits, especially in northern regions of the world where it has been too cold and uncomfortable for human activity to flourish in the past. However it is still a taboo to express this idea in public. For example, countries like Canada and Russia can look forward to better harvests and a blossoming tourism industry, and the only distress the Scandinavians will face is the guilty conscience that could come with benefiting from global warming. Palm Trees in Germany There is no doubt that there will be droughts in other parts of the world, especially in subtropical regions. But the widespread assumption that it is developing countries -- that is, the world's poor -- who will, as always, be the ones to suffer is incorrect. According to current predictions, precipitation in large parts of Africa will hardly decrease at all, except in the southern part of the continent. In fact, these same forecasts show the Sahel, traditionally a region beset by drought and famine, actually becoming wetter. By contrast, some wealthy industrialized nations -- in fact, those principally responsible for climate change -- will likely face growing problems related to drought. The world's new drought zones lie in the southern United States and Australia, but also in Mediterranean countries like Spain, Italy and Greece. All of this will lead to a major shift within Europe, potentially leading to tough times for southern Spain's mega-resorts and boom times for hotels along the North Sea and Baltic Sea coasts. While the bulk of summer vacationers will eventually lose interest in roasting on Spain's Costa del Sol, Mediterranean conditions could prevail between the German North Sea island of Sylt and Bavaria's Lake Starnberg. The last few weeks of spring in Germany offered a taste of what's to come, as sun-loving crowds packed Berlin's urban beach bars and Munich's beer gardens. The predicted temperature increase of 3 degrees Celsius would mean that summers in Hamburg, not far from the North Sea coast, would be as warm as they are today in the southwestern city of Freiburg, while conditions in Freiburg would be more like those in Marseille today. Germany will undoubtedly be one of the beneficiaries of climate change. Perhaps palm trees will be growing on the island of Helgoland in the North Sea soon, and German citizens will be saving billions in heating costs -- which in turn would lead to a reduction in CO2 emissions. But climate change will also have its drawbacks. While German summers will be less rainy, fall and winter rainfall in the country's north will increase by up to 30 percent -- and snow will be a thing of the past. Heavy downpours will also become more common. To avoid flooding, steps will have to be taken to provide better drainage for fields and farmlands, as well as to restore natural flood plains. Meanwhile, the Kiel Institute for World Economics warns that higher temperatures could mean thousands of heat-related deaths every year. But the extrapolations that lead to this dire prediction are based on the mortality rate in the unusually hot summer of 2003, for which Germans were wholly unprepared. But if hot summer days do become the norm, people will simply adjust by taking siestas and installing air-conditioning. The medical benefits of higher average temperatures have also been ignored. According to Richard Tol, an environmental economist, "warming temperatures will mean that in 2050 there will be about 40,000 fewer deaths in Germany attributable to cold-related illnesses like the flu.” Another widespread fear about global warming -- that it will cause super-storms that could devastate towns and villages with unprecedented fury -- also appears to be unfounded. Current long-term simulations, at any rate, do not suggest that such a trend will in fact materialize. "According to our computer model, neither the number nor intensity of storms is increasing," says Jochem Marotzke, director of the Hamburg-based Max Planck Institute for Meteorology, one of the world's leading climate research centers. "Only the boundaries of low-pressure zones are changing slightly, meaning that weather is becoming more severe in Scandinavia and less so in the Mediterranean." According to another persistent greenhouse legend, massive flooding will strike major coastal cities, raising horrific scenarios of New York, London and Shanghai sinking into the tide. However this horror story is a relic of the late 1980s, when climate simulations were far less precise than they are today. At the time, some experts believed that the Antarctic ice shield could melt, which would in fact lead to a dramatic 60-meter (197-foot) rise in sea levels. The nuclear industry quickly seized upon and publicized the scenario, which it recognized as an argument in favor of its emissions-free power plants. But it quickly became apparent that the horrific tale of a melting South Pole was nothing but fiction. The average temperature in the Antarctic is -30 degrees Celsius. Humanity cannot possibly burn enough oil and coal to melt this giant block of ice. On the contrary, current climate models suggest that the Antarctic will even increase in mass: Global warming will cause more water to evaporate, and part of that moisture will fall as snow over Antarctica, causing the ice shield to grow. As a result, the total rise in sea levels would in fact be reduced by about 5 cm (2 inches). It's a different story in the warmer regions surrounding the North Pole. According to an American study published last week, the Arctic could be melting even faster than previously assumed. But because the Arctic sea ice already floats in the water, its melting will have virtually no effect on sea levels. 'We Still Have Enough Time to React' Nevertheless, sea levels will rise worldwide as higher temperatures cause the water in the oceans to expand. In addition, more water will flow into the ocean with the gradual thawing of the Greenland ice sheet. All things considered, however, in the current IPCC report climatologists are predicting a rise in sea levels of only about 40 centimeters (16 inches) -- compared with the previous estimate of about one meter (more than three feet). A 40-centimeter rise in sea levels will hardly result in more catastrophic flooding. "We have more computer models and better ones today, and the prognoses have become more precise as a result," explains Peter Lemke of the Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research in the northern German port city of Bremerhaven. Some researchers do, however, estimate that regional effects could produce an 80-centimeter (31-inch) rise in the sea level along Germany's North Sea coast. This will lead to higher storm surges -- a problem the local population, already accustomed to severe weather, could easily address by building taller dikes. Another comforting factor -- especially for poorer countries like Bangladesh -- is that none of these changes will happen overnight, but gradually over several decades. "We still have enough time to react," says Storch. In short, the longer researchers allow their supercomputers to crunch the numbers, the more does the expected deluge dissipate. A rise in sea levels of several meters could only occur if Greenland were largely ice-free, but this is something scientists don't expect to happen for at least a few more centuries or even millennia. This lengthy timeframe raises the question of whether the current prognoses are even reliable.

### A2 Must Be Consistent with Conclusion

I meet: The conclusion say that Living Wage is consistent with literature consensus on reducing poverty but campaigns have the potential to reduce poverty also. Adams and Neumark

Adams, Scott, and David Neumark. "The effects of living wage laws: Evidence from failed and derailed living wage campaigns." Journal of Urban Economics 58.2 (2005): 177-202. PH

The findings have some implications for the evolving literature on living wages. First, as just noted, the relatively large effects of living wages that we have found receive further confirmation from this paper, suggesting that the question of why these effects appear larger than expected based on factors such as contractor coverage continues to merit investigation. In our view, one promising avenue of research that may prove informative is the development of research using firm-level data to gain better insight into the behavioral responses of firms to legislation (Brenner [16] and Fairris [17]). As for living wage movements, the evidence in this paper does not point to discernable impacts of living wage campaigns per se. At the same time, our approach to this question represents a first stab; a particular limitation arises from the difficulty of trying to “date” when the effects of derailed living wage campaigns would have arisen. In addition, more study of the development and dynamics of living wage campaigns—including why they arise and why they succeed or fail—would likely prove insightful, and might point to some sources of variation in whether or not living wage campaigns have more persistent effects, as well as possible differences among living wage campaigns that result in different types of living wage laws.

### A2 T-Living Wage

A. Counter-Interp: Extend Maloney 13-

### A2 T-Ought=Obligation

OV: This interpretation isn’t completely competitive with mine, my interp means that we take action that we have the most reason to do so I coopt their benefits of their interp but avoid the harms.

1. Counter-Interp: Extend Parfit- He says there’s difficulty in defining evaluative terms like “ought” and “should” but the concept behind “ought” is sufficient reason to act which is equal or more.
2. I meet
3. Standards:

Philosophical Education- I coopt all the benefits of philosophical education since we can talk about normative implications of our actions. I turn their phil education argument because obligation debate limits the scope of philosophical discussion since not every philosopher takes a definitive stance on applied issues like the resolutional conflict. I also o/w on literature consensus since parfit looks at the way other political philosophers use the term and draws the most modest conclusion.

Checks back structural skews- Obligation-based interps allow for deflationary arguments like permissibility or skepticism which a) structurally favors the neg since they definitionally flow neg under this interpretations b) encourages the neg to be a moving target that can collapse to any independent layer of offense in the 2NR- like turns, the NC, or Skep and c) gives them a 2-1 structural advantage that requires me to prove the existence of morality and an obligation when they can deny just one to win. Reciprocity encompasses all structural fairness claims since they assume competitive equity which reciprocity rectifies.

### A2 Bostrom Bad

I meet: My argument isn’t that extinction comes first under any framework, it’s that extinction is the only impact relevant under my framework.

I meet: I didn’t say extinction comes first under your framework- I just said that it constitutes as turn under your framework. You can still weigh the strength of the offense.

I meet: Bostrom just says that we should preserve the ability to have value, you just need to explain why a) we don’t want to preserve value or b) why there’s no uncertainty in this round.