# 1NC v Harker

## K

#### Our thesis is that disability is an caught in an ontological antagonism due to disgust, psychogenesis, and the disability drive. The 1ACs attempt at progress and very placement within civil society is a way to export disgust based violence. You should ask yourself why are down syndrome fetuses being aborted to the point where they are extinct?

Hughes 12’ -Disability and Social Theory pp 17-32 | Civilising Modernity and the Ontological Invalidation of Disabled People Authors Authors and affiliations Bill Hughes-

Elimination and/or correction have been the primary social response to disabled people in modernity. The primary form of experience (of disability), during the same period, has been one of invalidation. Invalidation carries a ‘dual meaning’ as both ‘confinement through incapacity’ and ‘deficit of credibility’ (Hughes, 2000: 558). This (latter and more crucial) claim is based on the view that in the non-disabled imaginary disability is an ‘ontological deficit’ – a reduction of ‘leib’ to ‘korpor’, human to animal, subjectivity to flesh, identity to excessive corporeal presence. It is this deficit of credibility that provides the spurious rationale for the disposal of disabled bodies by means of elimination (inter alia extermination or segregation) or correction (inter alia sterilisation or rehabilitation). These are the social practices that have been used to erase both the psychological aversion and the problematic social difference that disability has come to represent. In this chapter, I will argue – using Norbert Elias as a touchstone – that the treatment of disabled people in the modern period is a barbaric sideshow in the long march of the ‘civilising process’ (Elias, 2000). The ‘personality structure’ ableism (see Kumari Campbell (2001) and in this volume) in modernity transforms its own ontological precariousness into aversion for and disposal of disability. The negative response to biological and intellectual difference in modernity is strongly influenced by the tendency embedded in the ‘civilising process’ to incrementally deride the value of physical and intellectual difference and promote a sanitised norm of human behaviour and appearance (Elias, 2000). The social and social policy response to disability in the modern period cannot be separated from the emotional aversion to impairment characteristic of non-disabled hegemony. I will utilise Elias’s concepts of psychogenesis and sociogenesis1 to explain that the story of disability in modernity is one that develops towards the social and ontological invalidation of disabled people’s lives. The sociogenisis of disability is, in practice, twofold: it can be ‘anthropoemic’ or ‘anthropophagic’. The first refers to social processes that rootout and eliminate people: if error and imperfection are the anti-heroes of modernity, then one might expect to find examples in which the desire for truth and purity is exercised through the root and branch elimination of those who offend against this moral universe. Locking disabled people into a ‘zone of exception’ (Agamben, 2004) in which they are subjected to the eugenic gaze and categorised as inhuman or sub-human is one strategy for dealing with disability (Reave, 2008). ‘The real solution to heresy’ suggested George Canguilhem in his discussion of the normal and the pathological (1991: 280) ‘is extirpation’, meaning to destroy totally or exterminate. In modernity medical ideas and practices have been a fertile source of radical solutions to impairment. Medical solutions also embrace anthropophagic strategies. They deal in the correction and rehabilitation of ‘abnormal bodies’. Cure/rehabilitation stands at the heart of the medical doctrine of salvation (soteriology) and it is a prospect often held up to disabled people by optimists who fetishise scientific progress and promote biological solutions to impairment. Both strategies – to kill or to cure – transmit the same core cultural message: disabled people represent ‘what not to be’ and are, therefore, ontologically invalid or ‘uncivilised’. Social responses to impairment, in modernity, are underpinned by the processes that constitute the psychogenisis of disability. These include the emotional aversions and intolerances of impairment that derive from the civilising process. The ontological invalidation that disabled people experience in their everyday encounters is mediated primarily by the emotion of disgust (with fear and pity in tow). At an existential level the presence of the disabled body is unsettling for non-disabled people who are often in denial about their own vulnerability. This is the psychological and emotional component of what disability scholars call ableism. The standard resolution to this ‘problem’ of non-disability in modernity has been to have the object of discomfort – the disabled person – removed or corrected. The sociogenesis of anthropoemic and anthropophagic strategies for dealing with impairment are rooted in the emotional dispositions of non-disabled people as they develop their civilised protocols for behaviour and bodily comportment. In what follows, I will focus on the ways in which the ‘civilising process’ invalidates impairment and demonstrate how opportunities to escape this ontological dead-end usually require the erasure of disabled identity. In the first section that follows I will give some examples of the way in which one can read disability as a product of the civilising process. In the section, thereafter, I will examine the psychogenesis of disability relating it to the disgust response to impairment and to the development of ableism, the complex of processes that exclude disabled people from the ‘psychic habitus’ (Elias, 2000: 367) of modernity.

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best methodologically challenges ableism. Assumptions of ableism is always already inherent in any system of knowledge production thus ableism is *always* a prior question. Evaluate the 1ACs scholarship and assumptions – anything else allows for ableist norms to be replicated – they *do not* get to weigh the case.

Campbell 13 (Fiona Kumari Campbell, Adjunct Professor in the Department of Disability Studies at Griffith University. Wednesday 27 November 2013. Problematizing Vulnerability: Engaging Studies in Ableism and Disability Jurisprudence. Keynote speech at Disability at the Margins: Vulnerability, Empowerment and the Criminal Law)

What is meant by the concept of ableism? The literature suggests that the term is often used fluidly with limited definitional or conceptual specificity. The work of Carlson (2001)5 and Campbell (2001) represented a turning point in bringing attention to this new site of subordination not just in terms of disablement but also ableism’s application to other devalued groups. **Ableism is deeply seeded at the level of knowledge systems of life, personhood and liveability.** Ableism is not just a matter of ignorance or negative attitudes towards disabled people; **it is a schema of perfection, a deep way of thinking about bodies, wholeness and permeability.**6 As such integrating ableism into social research and advocacy strategies represents a significant challenge to practice as ableism moves beyond the more familiar territory of social inclusion and usual indices of exclusion to the very divisions of life. Bringing together the study of existence and knowledge systems, ableism is difficult to pin down. Ableism is a set of processes and practices that arise and decline through sequences of causal convergences influenced by the elements of time, space, bodily inflections and circumstance. Ability and the corresponding notion of ableism are intertwined. **Compulsory ablebodiedness is implicated in the very foundations of social theory,** therapeutic jurisprudence, advocacy, **medicine and law; or in the mappings of human anatomy.** Summarised by Campbell (2001, 44) Ableism refers to; …A network of beliefs processes and practices that produces a particular kind of self and body (the bodily standard) that is projected as the perfect, speciestypical and therefore essential and fully human. Disability then is cast as a diminished state of being human. Writing today (2013) I add an addition to this definition: ‘The ableist bodily configuration is immutable, permanent and laden with qualities of perfectionism or the enhancement imperative orientated towards a self-contained improvability’. Sentiency applies to not just the human but the ‘animal’ world. As a category to differentiate the normal from the pathological, **the concept of abledness is predicated on some preexisting notion about the nature of typical species functioning that is beyond culture and historical context**. Ableism does not just stop at propagating what is typical for each species. An ableist imaginary tells us what a healthy body means – a normal mind, the pace, the tenor of thinking and the kinds of emotions and affect that are suitable to express. Of course these ‘fictional’ characteristics then are promoted as a natural ideal. **This abled imaginary relies upon the existence of an unacknowledged imagined shared community of able-bodied/minded people held together by a common ableist world view that asserts the preferability** and compulsoriness **of the norms of ableism.** Such ableist schemas erase differences in the ways humans express our emotions, use our thinking and bodies in different cultures and in different situations. This in turn enacts bodily Otherness rendered sometimes as the ‘disabled’, ‘perverted’ or ‘abnormal body’, clearly demarcating the boundaries of normal and pathological. A critical feature of an ableist orientation is a belief that impairment or disability is inherently negative and at its essence is a form of harm in need of improvement, cure or indeed eradication. **Studies in Ableism** (SiA)inverts traditional approaches, by shifting our concentration to what the study of disability **tells us about the production, operation and maintenance of ableism.** In not looking solely at disability,we can focus on how the abled able-bodied, non-disabled identity is maintained and privileged. Disability does not even need to be in the picture. SiA’s interest in abledness means that the theoretical foundations are readily applicable to the study of difference and the dividing practices of race, gender, location and sexual orientation. Reframing our focus from disability to ableism prompts different preoccupations: • What does the study of the politics of ‘vulnerability’ tells us about what it means to be ‘non-vulnerable’? • Indeed how is the very conceptualisation of ‘autonomy’ framed in the light of discourses of ‘vulnerability’? • In representing vulnerability as universal does this detract from the specificity of disability experiences? **SiA examines the ways that concepts of** wellbeing, **vulnerability and deficiency circulate throughout society and impact** upon economic, social, **legal and ethical choices**. Principally SiA focuses on the limits of tolerance and possessive individualism. Extending the theorization of disability, **studies in ableism can enrich our understanding of the production of vulnerability and the terms of engagement in civic life and the possibilities of social inclusion.** I now turn to unpacking the nuances and structure of a theory of ableism.

Access

#### Vote affirmative to affirm the heuristic of the crip child that fails to cure – to affirm the idea that disability is something that is beautiful which is in opposition to the current biopolitical portrayal of the disgusting crip child.

Campbell 2012 (Fiona Kumari Campbell, Associate Professor in Law for Griffith Law School, and a Adjunct Professor in Disability Studies at the University of Kelaniya. "Stalking Ableism: Using Disability to Expose 'Abled' Narcissism." In the book "Disability and Social Theory: New Developments and Directions." Chapter 13. Palgrave McMillan, 2012. Brackets in article) BL

Difference can be a vexed issue even within modern liberal societies. The tendency for many people is still to emulate or at least appear to refashion normative ways of being. Much of the intellectual traffic for the rethinking of disability in terms of anti-sociality has emerged through debates about the merits of social inclusion and liberal notions of equality and resilience strategies to break the abled stranglehold. Legal theorists like Ruth Colker who argues that anti-subordination rather than integration should be the measure of equality are the exception (Colker, 2006). There is limited work within disability studies, especially in approaches influenced by the social model of disability or social role valorisation theory, that take a trans-integration or post-normalisation perspective. What if we turned our backs on ‘fitting in’ – what would be the opportunities, the consequences and maybe dangers, to give ‘attention to the lived intricacies of embodiment offer[ing] alternatives to normalization efforts aimed at homogenizing social outsiders (Snyder & Mitchell, 2010, 113)’? For this imaginative undertaking it is necessary to turn to the theoretical work by other ‘outsider’ groups – queer theorists. Spearheading the critique of the ‘different but same’ stance of social justice formulations are ‘anti-social’ queer theorists (Bersani, 1986, 1996; Edelman, 2004; Halberstam, 2005, 2008; Muñoz, 2007). This section will outline some of the conceptual drivers of the anti-social argument and their adoption for developing an anti-sociality posture of disability. Leo Bersani’s seminal work (1986, 1996) formulated an anti-social, negative and anti-relational theory of sexuality. These works along with the writings of Edelman (2004), Halberstam (2005, 2008) and Muñoz (2007) set the stage for the decoupling of queer marginality from the liberal projects of tolerance and social inclusion. Before moving into a consideration of how certain conceptual renderings may be applied to the disability situation, it is useful to familiarise ourselves with how the neologism queer is understood by anti-social theorists. Lee Edelman’s No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive does not indicate the parameters of queer, but concludes that ‘queerness can never define an identity; it can only ever disturb one’ (2004: 17). Queer, while originating from the purview of diverse sexualities, easily extends to other kindred forms of ontological and corporeal aberrancies and ambiguities (such as disability). So it is right for Halberstam (2005: 6) to embrace a more elastic connotation of queer which refers to ‘non-normative logics and organizations of community, sexual identity, embodiment and activity in space and time’. From this reckoning, the disabled person is already queered. Queer, then is antitheoretical to the regime of ableist translation. In a world that makes claims to integrity using the argument based on equality as sameness (we are normal, we are everyday people), it would seem a bit bold or offensive to suggest that people with disability are different from the run-of-mill ableist norm emulators. Ahmed (2006) points to an alternate prism, a ‘migrant orientation’ to capture a disorientation faced by queer folk which I extend to include disabled people. The disorientation, a form of radical estrangement propels a lived experience of facing at least two directions: towards a home that has been lost (the desire to emulate ableist norms), and to a place that is not yet home. Regimes of ableism have produced a depth of disability negation that reaches into the caverns of collective subjectivity to the extent that disability negativity is seen as a ‘naturalized’ reaction to an aberration. Not negating queerness or disability can cultivate alternate kinds of liberty that de-identify with the rhetoric of social inclusion. A key marker of the anti-social turn is temporality – contemporarity and futurity – an explication of the current marginal stance and the vision for future. It is this orientation of predicament and utopianism that can speak to the disability realm. For disability, utopianism is a conflicted zone – there is no future existence, disability dreaming is expunged and the utopian drive is a device for promise (of curability), hence extinction of the impairment state. Jose Esteban Muñoz (2007: 453) in speculating about the absence of a queer imagination elicits a desire to engage in a queer horizon, a utopian hermeneutics where re-imagining futurity requires that ‘the not quite conscious is the realm of potentiality that must be called upon’. The distance between imagination and potentiality means that ‘queerness is not quite here’. Our imaginations are not yet exhausted. Muñoz explains: to argue that we are not quite queer yet, that queerness, what we will know as queerness, does not yet exist. I suggest that holding queerness, in a sort of ontologically humble state, under a conceptual grid wherein we do not claim to always already know queerness in the world, potentially staves off the ossifying effects of neoliberal ideology. (Muñoz, 2007: 454) How does an alternative horizon for disabled people come to be formulated? Living in the now and not yet, as outsiders, not quite inside, requires a disposition or habit of contemporariness. Contemporariness signifies a relationship with the present but also a distance, a critical space from it. As Agamben explains: Those who are truly contemporary, who truly belong to their time, are those who neither perfectly coincide with it nor adjust themselves to its demands. They are in this sense irrelevant [inattuale]. But precisely because of this condition, precisely through this disconnection and this anachronism, they are more capable than others of perceiving and grasping their own time. (2009: 40) Disabled people are called to live as contemporaries. The queering or cripping of contemporariness is the grasping and holding tight to ambivalence and obscurity so fundamental to the alternate lifestyle which is obtained through fixing the gaze not on our era’s light but the underbelly, or in Agamben’s language ‘darkness’ – which shines into the staree. In this sense, the contemporary queered and cripped person, in touching an elusive imaginary, sees the now and the emergent not as a death drive, but in terms of unlivedness: The present is nothing other than this unlived element in everything that is lived. That which impedes access to the present is precisely the mass of what for some reason … we have not managed to live. The attention to this ‘unlived’ is the life of the contemporary. (Agamben, 2009: 51) The matter of re-imagining a disability or cripped horizon, a future without the stain of ableism, although elusive and out of grasp, is nonetheless fundamental in order to move to hopefulness and capture that unlived possibility in the lives of many with disability. Can the so-called shadows of a disabled life be sites of invigoration? What is ‘unlived’ in our lives? Crippin’ the human involves a differential gaze – where sometimes signs and gestures predominate, where there is a different mind style such as Tourette’s syndrome or autism, or a centring on visuality or tactility. A grounded earthiness can be ‘different’ through echolocation and waist heightedness. Halberstam (2008) speaks of acts of unbecoming. Through what she describes as ‘wilfully eccentric modes of being’, it is worth conjuring and queering concepts of passivity held against disabled people, as a refusal to live up to ableist expectations of performativity: [I]n a performance of radical passivity, we witness the willingness of the subject to actually come undone, to dramatise unbecoming for the other so that the viewer does not have to witness unbecoming as a function of her own body. (Halberstam, 2008: 151) This radical passivity, for disabled people, would indeed have to be radical, as disabled people already live under the enormous weight of being characterised as passive. It is a tough ask to claw back and produce a cripped notion of passivity. Sunny Taylor does this in her quest for the right not to work: I have a confession to make: I do not work. I am on SSI [social security benefit]. I have very little work value (if any), and I am a drain on our country’s welfare system. I have another confession to make: I do not think this is wrong, and to be honest, I am very happy not working. Instead I spend the majority of my time doing the activity I find the most rewarding and valuable, painting. (Taylor, 2004: 30) Such strange temporalities, imaginative life schedules present alternative temporalities which disability studies scholars have all along known, disrupt the parameters of the human (Halberstam, 2005; Campbell, 2009; McRuer, 2006). Having said this, it is all the more extraordinary that disabled people have not yielded to this repression but have resisted docility and engaged in transgressive ways of living disability. Ableism is founded on a utopian hermeneutics of the desirable and the disgusting and therefore it is, as Halberstam (2008: 153) puts it, necessary to inculcate alternative political imaginaries. McRuer (2008) drew my attention to the way Halberstam’s perspective can incorporate disability as also outside the lifecycle: I try to use the concept of queer time to make clear how respectability, and notions of the normal on which it depends, may be upheld by a middle-class logic of reproductive temporality. And so, in Western cultures, we chart the emergence of the adult from the dangerous and unruly period of adolescence as a desired process of maturation; and we create longevity as the most desirable future, applaud the pursuit of long life (under any circumstances), and pathologize modes of living that show little or no concern for longevity. Within the life cycle of the Western human subject, long periods of stability are considered to be desirable, and people who live in rapid bursts (drug addicts, for example) are characterized as immature and even dangerous. (Halberstam, 2005: 4–5) Cripped time can be staggered, frenzied, coded, meandering and be the distance between two events. Some of our time is shaped according to another’s doing – service time – the segmenting and waiting on assistive agencies. Aside from service time, there is a transient time whereby our cripped selves rub up against biology, environmental barriers and relationality. Like queerness, the lifecycle refuses patterning – there is a different vision with localised goals. Instead of proposing argument based on normalisation and similarity to the heteronormative (and by extension ableist normativity), Edelman (2004) proposes a politics of negativity, on the basis that queers, as outsiders, are embodied differently having counter-intuitive, queered forms of negative knowing (Halberstam, 2008: 141). Edelman implores queers to be norm resisters, to come out from normative shadows and fess up to futurist ‘inability’: ‘instead of fighting this characterization by dragging queerness into recognition, he proposes that we embrace the negativity’ (Halberstam, 2008: 141). Relinquishing the norm as a lost cause enables an outlaw flowering of beingness that is anti-social.

## Case

Fiat illusory

Double bind

VNOP VTLL

#### The world is governed by the ‘disability drive’ - the psychic force governing the subjectivities of both disabled and nondisabled folk. Disability drive is fear and fascination of the temporariness of one’s ability status.

Mollow 15 (The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015) BL

This is why I have proposed that the “death drive”—a force that has less to do with literal death than with a strange persistence of life in death, or of death in life (perhaps like the “life not worth living” of which disability is often supposed to consist)—would more accurately be termed the “disability drive.” Writing of the contingency of disability as an identity category, Michael Bérubé observes: Any of us who identify as “nondisabled” must know that our self-designation is inevitably temporary, and that a car crash, a virus, a degenerative genetic disease, or a precedent-setting legal decision could change our status in ways over which we have no control whatsoever. If it is obvious why most nondisabled people resist this line of thinking, it should be equally obvious why that resistance must somehow be overcome. (viii) Could part of this resistance be attributable to a fear that, in the car crash or other identityshattering event, it might be the driver‟s own hand that makes that disabling turn, that is, that the driver might be driven by an impulse, unwanted and unconscious, toward something beyond the principles of pleasure and health? Applying the name “the disability drive” to this “beyond” affords insight into the reasons that images of disability so powerfully excite and repel, becoming, as Tobin Siebers writes, “sources of fear and fascination for able-bodied people, who cannot bear to look at the unruly sight before them but also cannot bear not to look” (178). Later in this chapter, I will define the affect that Siebers references here as “primary pity.” For now, though, I simply want to point out that Siebers‟s important observation can be extended by noting that it is not only nondisabled people who react to images of disability with a mixture of aversion and attraction. Disabled people may also respond in this way, especially when contemplating impairments other than those that currently disable us.116 Building on Douglas Baynton‟s famous assertion that “disability is everywhere,…once you begin looking for it,” I suggest that the same may be true in regard to the disability drive: this ego-undoing psychic force shapes the subjectivities of disabled and nondisabled subjects alike (52). Manifestations of the disability drive may be present in Edelman‟s discussion of Tiny Tim. Take, for example, Edelman‟s contention that “the pleasurable fantasy of survival” in Dickens‟s story requires the survival of the fantasy that Tiny Tim “does not excite an ardent fear (or is it a fearful ardor?) to see him . . . at last cash in his chips” (45). It‟s a familiar cultural fantasy: cure ‟em (as Dickens might hope) or kill ‟em (as Edelman suggests readers must secretly wish).117 But in this unacknowledged wish, there may be more at stake than either killing or curing. In the chapter that follows his reading of A Christmas Carol, Edelman adduces Lacan‟s discussion of the legend of Saint Martin, who was said to have cut his own cloak in two in order to give half of it to a beggar. “Perhaps,” Lacan suggests, “over and above that need to be clothed, [the beggar] was begging for something else, namely that Saint Martin either kill him or fuck him” (qtd. in Edelman 83). Drawing upon this passage in his analysis of North by Northwest, Edelman proposes that as Leonard attempts to push Roger Thornhill to his death from atop Mount Rushmore, he “enacts . . . the one [killing] as displacement of the other [fucking]” (85). Killing as displacement of fucking: might a similar displacement be at work in Edelman‟s attribution, to Dickens‟s readers, of a “fearful ardor” to see Tiny Tim “at last cash in his chips” (45)? As evidence for this suggestion, take the mode by which Edelman introduces his discussion of A Christmas Carol: “Take Tiny Tim, please!,” “with a nod to the spirit of the late Henny Youngman” renders Tiny Tim wifelike—clearly undesirable in this context, but not wholly uneroticized (41). And then there is the word “take,” which, particularly when followed by the word “please,” has a meaning other than the ones Edelman seems deliberately to invoke: “take” means “fuck,” and so Edelman‟s directive to “take Tiny Tim, please!,” which echoes his earlier injunction to “fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net,” seems to authorize an additional imperative: fuck Tiny Tim. “Fuck” here means, of course, “remove” or “the hell with,” but it also means fuck.118 Arguably, these two ways in which No Future says “fuck Tiny Tim” coincide with what disability studies most ardently desires. “Fuck Tiny Tim, please!” disability scholars beg: rid us, please, of this most reviled textual creation. And also: if it is our cultural mandate to embody this pitiable, platitude-issuing, infantilized, and irritating figure—well, then fuck us, every one. Fuck us because figuratively, we are already “so fucked” by our culture‟s insistence, through this figure, that the disabled are not fuckable. This insistence must be understood as a form of reactive reinforcement: propelling every cultural representation of disability as undesirable, there may be a “fearful ardor,” an unacknowledged drive. Such representations include Edelman‟s abjection of Tiny Tim. And, I will argue, they also pertain to a similar abjection of Tiny Tim in the field of disability studies. As we shall soon see, the drive that infuses affective reactions to disability with ardor is often expressed through the emotion of pity. In taking account of the various forms that pity can take, we will be led to pose a question to disability studies and to queer antisocial theory together: are we sure that we want to take Tiny Tim out of the cultural text?

#### Disability drives invokes a two tiered affective response of pity between the non disabled subject and the disabled object. Primary pity removes the ego’s ability to distinguish itself from the disabled other by forcing the self to reconcile with the fact that ability status is temporary. The temporariness of ability status exists in opposition to the egos investment in healthiness and control invoking secondary pity - a distancing of the ego from disability by invoking emotions of superiority through sadness and a desire to eliminate disability from social consciousness through medicalization or institutionalization.

Mollow 15 (The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015) BL

A great deal of the pain and pleasure of primary pity center on questions about what, or who, this fallen self is. When most people think about pity, we refer to an affect in which, to adopt Edelman‟s phrase, we purport to “feel for the other.” But as with primary narcissism, in which the self has not yet been constituted, and therefore cannot be said to enter into intersubjective relations with an “other,” primary pity entails a mixing up of self and other such that the ego, in becoming permeable to pain that may properly belong to “someone else,” is profoundly threatened in its integrity. Primary pity is that intense pain-pleasure complex that is provoked by the image of a suffering other who, it seems momentarily, both is and is not one‟s self. This affective response can feel unbearable, as seen in Siebers‟s formulation: one “cannot bear to look…but also cannot bear not to look.” Primary pity is difficult to bear because it involves a drive toward disability (one cannot bear not to look), which menaces the ego‟s investments in health, pleasure, and control—because to contemplate another person‟s suffering is to confront the question, **“Could this happen to me?”** Such a prospect, although frightening, may also be compelling; in this way, primary pity replicates the self-rupturing aspects of sexuality. Indeed, the unbearability of primary pity reflects its coextensiveness with sexuality. Sex, or the Unbearable, a book coauthored by Edelman and by Lauren Berlant, argues that sex “unleashes unbearable contradictions that we nonetheless struggle to bear” (back cover). This claim accords with Freud‟s account of sexuality as a “pleasurable” “unpleasure” that the ego can never fully master or control (Three 49,75). As Leo Bersani puts it in his reading of Freud, “the pleasurable unpleasurable tension of sexual enjoyment occurs when the body‟s „normal‟ range of sensation is exceeded, and when the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed”; thus, “sexuality would be that which is intolerable to the structured self” (Freudian 38). Primary pity is also intolerable to the structured self, because it entails a fascination with the fantasy of a self in a state of disintegration or disablement. Secondary pity is something else, although it cannot wholly be differentiated from primary pity. Secondary pity attempts to heal primary pity‟s self-rupturing effects by converting primary pity into a feeling that is bearable. As with secondary narcissism, secondary pity involves both an attempt to get back to that ego-shattering state of painfully pleasurable primary pity, and at the same time to defend against that threat to the ego by aggrandizing oneself at someone else‟s expense. Secondary pity refers to all those ego-bolstering behaviors that most people think of when they talk about pity. Disabled people are all too familiar with these behaviors: the saccharin sympathy, the telethon rituals of “conspicuous contribution,” the insistence that “they” (i.e., nondisabled people) could never endure such suffering. More commonly known in our culture simply as “pity,” secondary pity encompasses our culture‟s most clichéd reactions to disability: charity, tears, and calls for a cure. Correlatives of these commonplace manifestations of secondary pity are the obligatory claims that disabled people‟s suffering is “inspiring.” Indeed, the speed with which conventional cultural representations of disability segue from overt expressions of pity to celebrations of “the triumph of the human spirit” highlights the ways in which secondary pity, as a defense against primary pity‟s incursions, reinforces the ego‟s fantasy of sovereignty. Secondary pity, in other words, can be seen as a variation of secondary narcissism: these affects enlarge the ego of the pitier or the narcissist at the expense of someone else. But primary pity is not the same as either primary narcissism, secondary narcissism, or secondary pity. Unlike primary narcissism, a feeling that emerges out of a relation to the world in which notions of “self” and “other” do not obtain, primary pity does depend upon the constructs of self and other, although these constructions are unstable and are continually threatening to come undone. Primary pity can thus be envisioned as a threshold category occupying a liminal position between the total denial of the other that is inherent to primary narcissism and the rigid structure of (superior) self and (inferior) other that constitutes secondary narcissism and secondary pity. My concept of primary versus secondary pity also differs from Freud‟s primarysecondary narcissism distinction at the level of genealogy. Like Freud‟s account of primary and secondary narcissisms, my model of primary and secondary pities involves a temporal transition; but whereas Freud imagines the movement from primary to secondary narcissism as a passage from an earlier to a later stage of an individual‟s development, the temporal shift from primary to secondary pity happens much more quickly than this. It happens in an instant: that moment in which we feel primary pity and then, almost before we can blink, deny that we feel or have felt it. The denial is understandable: who wants to admit that one gets pleasure from the sight of another person‟s suffering—or, to make matters worse, that this pleasure derives in part from the specter of disability‟s transferability, the possibility that this suffering could be—and, fantasmatically, perhaps already is—an image of one‟s own self undone? Indeed, the model of primary pity that I have been constructing may sound a bit too close to sadism for some people‟s liking. Pity does come close to sadism, and at the same time, to masochism, which Freud theorizes as sadism‟s obverse. In “Mourning and Melancholia,” an essay that can be read as a sequel to “On Narcissism,” Freud approaches a distinction between primary and secondary masochism, which accords with my primary-secondary pity heuristic.122 If the story that I traced in “On Narcissism” could be summarized as “child gets breast; child loses breast; child gets breast back, albeit in a secondary, adulterated form,” the tale that Freud tells about masochism takes much the same form. In this story, subject loves object; subject loses object; and subject tries to get object back by becoming object, that is, by identifying with the object in such a way that object starts to seem—and perhaps in some ways is—part of subject‟s self. This last phase is a dysfunctional and disabling form of identification, Freud makes clear. Subject is still angry at object for having left it, and it takes out that anger on the object that is now part of itself. This is the reason that people suffering from melancholia are so hard on themselves, Freud says; the “diminution in…self-regard” that typically accompanies melancholia results from the subject‟s attacks on the loved-and-lost object that the subject has incorporated into its ego (“Mourning” 246). Freud had not wanted there to be such a thing as primary masochism; for a long time, he had insisted that sadism, or “aggression,” was the primary instinct, and that masochism was only a turning-inward of this originary aggression. But in “Mourning and Melancholia,” although Freud does not yet use the term “primary masochism,” he nonetheless gets at this concept. The problem of suicide, Freud notes in this essay, raises the possibility that the ego “can treat itself as an object” that it wants to destroy (252). When it comes to such an extreme act as suicide, the possibility of carrying “such a purpose through to execution” must, Freud surmises, involve more than a sadistic wish to punish others. Perhaps, then, there is an innate desire to destroy one‟s own self, Freud hypothesizes. If so, this self would not be a single thing: it would be “me” and at the same time, the lost object whose image “I” have internalized. Freud‟s notion of a primary masochism is tied very closely to his conceptualization of the drive. Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the text in which Freud first used the term “death drive,” was published three years after “Mourning and Melancholia.” In the later text, Freud‟s speculations about the death drive lead him to acknowledge that “there might be such a thing as primary masochism” (66). After all, Freud points out, the idea that either sadism or masochism definitively takes precedence over the other does not ultimately make much sense, as “there is no difference in principle between an instinct turning from the object to the ego and its turning from the ego to an object” (66). If sadism and masochism are ultimately indistinguishable obverses of each other, then pity, in both its primary and its secondary forms, would have to be both sadistic and masochistic. This is a deeply troubling possibility, but I suggest that trying to overcome pity will only make matters worse. There are many ways of trying to overcome primary pity, and each one ultimately aggravates the violence of primary pity. One way is the “pitiless” refusal of compassion that Edelman advocates (70). Another is the disability activist “No pity” injunction. A third example is secondary pity, as in the query, commonly addressed to disabled people, “Have you ever thought of killing yourself?”123 In this question, disabled people correctly hear the wish, “I‟d like to kill you.” Indeed, primary pity is so unsettling that our culture has been driven to “mercifully” kill people in the name of secondary pity. We have also been driven to lock people in institutions, to let them languish on the streets, to stare, to punish, and to sentimentalize—all, I would suggest, in the interest of not owning, not naming, not acknowledging that self-shattering, ego-dissolving, instantaneous and intolerable moment of primary pity. Because primary pity is tied up with the disability drive, it must, like the drive itself, be regarded as unrepresentable. However, I will quote at length from a passage of writing that comes close not only to representing primary pity but also perhaps to producing it. In his memoir, One More Theory About Happiness, Paul Guest describes an experience that he had in the hospital after sustaining a spinal cord injury when he was twelve years old: My stomach still roiled and it was hard to keep anything down. Late one night, a doctor came to my bedside, leaning over me, his hands knotted together. He seemed vexed, not quite ready to say anything. Used to the look, I waited. And then he began. “The acids in your stomach, Paul, because of everything you‟re going through, it‟s like your body, everything about it, is upset. That‟s why you feel so nauseous all the time. We‟re going to treat that by putting a tube into your nose and down into your stomach, so we can give you medicine, OK?” When he walked away, I felt something begin to give way inside me. Up until then, I‟d faced more misery and indignity than I would have thought possible. I lay there, numb and sick in a diaper, helpless. It was too much to bear, too frightening, a last invasion I could experience and not break, utterly. When he returned with nurses, I was already sobbing. Anyone so limited could hardly fight, but I tried. I tried. The neck collar prevented much movement, and any was dangerous, but I turned my head side to side, just slightly, a pitiful, unacceptable range. Fat tears rolled down my face like marbles. I begged them all, no, no, no, please no. “Hold him, hold him still,” the doctor said. Nurses gripped my head on either side. From a sterile pack, the doctor fished out a long transparent tube and dabbed its head in a clear lubricant. He paused almost as if to warn me but then said nothing.

#### **The 1acs constant attempt to eradicate death reveals their subconscious desire to eradicate the sick subject**

Hughes 12 Disability and Social Theory pp 17-32 | Civilising Modernity and the Ontological Invalidation of Disabled People Authors Authors and affiliations Bill Hughes-

Ableism rests on the effort to eliminate from awareness, chaos, abjection, animality and death: all that civilisation seeks to repress. It encourages us to live in the false hope that we will not suffer and die, to adopt a perspective of invulnerability, to confuse morality with beauty and to see death, pain and disability as the repulsive woes of mortality rather than as the existen- tial basis for community and communication. Kolnai (2004: 74) reminds us that, ‘in its full intention, it is death ... that announces itself to us in the phenomenon of disgust’. Disability, in modernity, has been produced in the ontological household of the abject, as the antithesis of communica- tion and community, in a place that we might on occasion peer into only to ‘choke’ on the unsavoury sights that greet us. Disability is put out, put away, hidden, segregated or transformed into its opposite, covered up by whatever medical or aesthetic techniques are available to achieve this end. Any opportunity that disability might have to take its place at the heart of communication and community is thwarted by the ablest sensibilities that push it back down among the disgusting, the sick, the dead and the dying. In fact, as Elias (2000) suggested, the making of ‘civilised’ community and communication in modernity proceeds by exclusion and interdiction, by cutting out and hiding away whatever causes or might come to inspire angar (choking) or anguista (tightness).

#### **The 1ACs politics are a strategical tool to make disabled folk more visible and subsequently governable also to systematically exclude certain forms of deviance.**

Campbell No Date (Date is unclear on website, see last portion of the cite for earlier versions of the paper - PhD Candidate, Faculty of Creative Industries, Queensland University of Technology and Sessional Lecturer, School of Human Services, Griffith University. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Australian Law and Society Conference, Brisbane, December 2000 and 'Disability with Attitude: Critical Issues 20 years after IYDP' international conference, Sydney, February 2001.https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b065/3abd4718ac4dce9a21d0645d72a1886d3364.pdf)

Let us consider what this means for understandings of disability and the way those figurings are mediated in law. The working model of inclusion is really only successful to the extent that people with disabilities are able to 'opt in' or be assimilated. For those who don't, it is assumed they will developmentally progress towards autonomy over time. The governing of liberal unfreedom responds to the problem of what is to be done with 'governing the remainder, with those it identifies as being less than fully autonomous'. 24 Hindess suggests three approaches: (1) a clearing away; (2) the compulsion towards disciplinary techniques (eg Social Role Valorisation Theory); and (3) targeting external causes by creating welfare safety nets. Legal intersections/interventions assist in the activity of government by allocating and regulating populations into distinct ontological categories such as 'disability' so that they are visible, calculable and therefore governable. The management of disability is possible through the partitioning and ranking of disability (high, medium, low support needs), and by instituting guardianship and programmatic arrangements based on sets of competency standards. The fixity of disability within both legislative and case law not only establishes the boundaries of permissible inquiry, but also establishes the legal fiction of 'disability'. It is this hardening of disability - based more often than not on bio-medical technologies and ascriptions - that enforces the centrality of the ableist body and the terms of its negotiation. The formulations often engaged by disability activists and enshrined in disability-related law end up discursively entrenching and thus reinscribing, the very oppressive ontological figurings of disability many of us would like to escape.26 Alternative renderings of disability, if they are not able to 'fit' such prescribed 'fictions', are barred from entry. Consider the instructions in a recent staff survey produced by the Equity section of Queensland University of Technology and its banishment of certain 'kinds' of disability: You should answer 'yes' to question 2 only if you are a person with a disability which is likely to last, or has lasted two or more years. Please note that if you use spectacles, contact lenses or other aids to fully correct your vision or hearing, you do not need to indicate that you are a person with a disability, and would answer no,.27

#### The US is irrelevant in the coal debate – other countries existing infrastructure is enough - our evidence is stellar and is significantly more recent

Mooney 18 (Chris Mooney Washington, D.C. Reporter covering climate change, energy and the environment. Education: Yale University, BA in English Chris Mooney writes about energy and the environment at The Washington Post. He previously worked at Mother Jones, where he wrote about science and the environment and hosted a weekly podcast.)

The much-heralded demise of the coal industry may be overstated, a new scientific analysis asserts — finding that if all planned plants were constructed, the world would have little chance of meeting its climate change goals. The new study, by Ottmar Edenhofer of the Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change in Berlin, and three colleagues, finds that nations including Turkey, Vietnam and Indonesia could increase their emissions from coal dramatically between now and 2030, based on current plans. In combination with already existing infrastructure, these planned or in-construction plants, if run for a standard plant lifetime, could burn up much of the remaining carbon budget for holding Earth’s temperature increase below two degrees Celsius, or 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit, the research concludes. “The main message is that when we continue with the existing coal fired power plants, and build the new ones, we are closing the door to the 2 degree target,” Edenhofer said. The research was published in Environmental Research Letters, with co-authors from the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and the Technical University of Berlin. The study is based on a concept of “lock-in” or “committed” emissions: Once a coal plant is completed and put into service, the thinking goes, it’s likely to operate for long time to justify the cost of the investment. And based on an analysis of global coal plans, the research finds that five countries — India, China, Turkey, Vietnam and Indonesia — are home to “nearly three quarters (73 percent) of the global coal-fired capacity that is currently under construction or planned.” Vietnam, if plans are carried forward, could see 948 percent growth in coal emissions, the research asserts, by 2030. But even as this is happening, the study notes that we have only about 700 billion tons of carbon dioxide that can still be emitted, after the year 2016, to preserve good odds of holding the temperature increase below two degrees Celsius. Existing coal plants and other infrastructure are capable of consuming 500 billion tons on their own, assuming we use them until they are worn out. New coal plants that are underway or planned, meanwhile, could consume another 150 billion tons, the research finds, during their lifetimes. That pretty much accounts for the two degrees Celsius budget right there. Here’s a figure from the study showing these calculations: And if we want to hold warming to just 1.5 degrees Celsius … well. The numbers suggest there’s not much chance of that happening, even with the existing infrastructure alone. “There is a real risk that the inertia of fossil fuel infrastructure will drag us past where we want to be,” said Steven Davis, an energy researcher at the University of California at Irvine, in a comment on the study. “However, the retirement of power plants is ultimately an economic decision, and one that gets easier as non-fossil energy sources get cheaper,” Davis added. “And of all coal plants proposed in recent years, only about half have historically been built, and that fraction has been trending down in key places like China and India.” That highlights the key challenge with the study — it’s one thing to say that coal plants are planned, and quite another to say that they will be completed and used throughout their full potential lifetimes. The research is based on a database by CoalSwarm, a project of the Earth Island Institute, which carefully tracks coal plants in varying stages of completion across the globe, in collaboration with Greenpeace and the Sierra Club. The group makes is clear that it opposes the new coal plants that it is tracking. Christine Shearer, a researcher with CoalSwarm, said it’s important to bear in mind that not all coal plants are actually completed. “Since we started doing this work, since 2010, only about a third of proposed coal plants ever begin construction or are commissioned,” she said. “Stranding or divesting from coal power plants is an outcome that is in reach also,” added Peter Erickson, an expert with the Stockholm Environment Institute, who reviewed the study but was not involved with it. “Coal financing and political and social norms around coal are also rapidly changing.” Edenhofer, the study author, countered that the current building plans are important information. “This does not mean we are doomed, but these announcements are announcements which should be taken into account very seriously,” he said. “These are not just paper plants, these are real plants.” It’s important to consider the implications of the new study in terms of equity, experts say. It’s not fair to say that developing nations should cancel coal plans when major industrialized countries, like Germany and the United States, continue to burn large amounts of coal. “Higher-income countries have by far the greatest coal power — U.S., Germany, China, Russia, Japan — and so the phaseout in these countries is even more important in the big picture and, also, more equitable,” Erickson said. Edenhofer doesn’t disagree. He cited Germany as one example of a developed nation set to miss climate targets because it is burning a lot of coal. “I can see a fairness issue,” Edenhofer said. “But when we want to be fair, this means that we have to support the developing countries in building up a new infrastructure.” The ultimate conclusion, though, is that operating and future coal plants alike are in tension with the Paris climate agreement and widely accepted climate goals. “If we don’t stop building coal plants now, we will have four unpalatable options,” said Cameron Hepburn, a researcher at the University of Oxford, in a comment sent by email. “We either (1) shut down coal plants early, (2) retrofit expensive carbon capture technologies, (3) suck even more CO2 out of the atmosphere, potentially at high cost, or (4) burn through the 2 degree C target.”

#### We’re past the tipping point

Glikson, 16 – Earth and Paleo-climate Scientist, Visiting Fellow at the Australian National University, Research School of Earth Science, the School of Archaeology and Anthropology, and the Planetary Science Institute, and a member of the ANU Climate Change Institute (Andrew, “Global heating and the dilemma of climate scientists”, ABC, 1/28/16, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-01-29/glikson-the-dilemma-of-a-climate-scientist/7123246)

For one, they do. A number of prominent climate scientists, mostly representing the scientific consensus on climate change documented by the IPCC, have tried their best to convey the message in public forums. These scientists are mostly shunned by the conservative media which commonly offers platforms for those who do not accept the scientific evidence and the basic laws of nature.

A sizable group of climate scientists tends to regard the IPCC-based climate consensus as too optimistic.

However, mostly these scientists tend to be shunned by the media, as stated by Chomsky:

It's interesting that these (public climate) debates leave out almost entirely a third part of the debate, namely, a very substantial number of scientists, competent scientists, who think that the scientific consensus is much too optimistic. A group of scientists at MIT came out with a report about a year ago describing what they called the most comprehensive modelling of the climate that had ever been done. Their conclusion, which was unreported in public media as far as I know, was that the major scientific consensus of the international commission is just way off, it's much too optimistic ... their own conclusion was that unless we terminate use of fossil fuels almost immediately, it's finished. We'll never be able to overcome the consequences. That's not part of the debate.

#### The aff does nothing to effect global warming – it’s miniscule

Rapier 12—Chief Technology Officer at Merica International—a Renewable Energy Company, Master’s in Chemical Engineering from Texas A&M University [March 15, 2012, Robert Rapier, Study: Eliminating Coal-Fired Power is Worth 0.2 Degrees in 100 Years, http://www.consumerenergyreport.com/2012/03/05/study-eliminating-coal-fired-power-is-worth-0-2-degrees-in-100-years/]

Who could have dreamed solving climate change would be so easy? A new paper in Environmental Research Letters called “Greenhouse gases, climate change and the transition from coal to low-carbon electricity” concludes that replacement of all of the world’s currently operating coal-fired power plants — which produce about 40% of the world’s electricity — and replacing them with renewable energy would have an impact of 0.2 degrees Celsius 100 years from now.

Cherry-Picking Conclusions According to One’s Viewpoint

However, a number of climate change websites took away a very different message than I took away from the paper. Here is Joe Romm’s view:

Bombshell: You Can’t Slow Projected Warming With Gas, You Need ‘Rapid and Massive Deployment’ of Zero-Carbon Power

I seem to recall another “bombshell” that he recently reported upon on the same theme: Natural Gas Bombshell: Switching From Coal to Gas Increases Warming for Decades, Has Minimal Benefit Even in 2100. I debunked that by showing that in that particular study, every possible alternative — including wind power, solar power, and even simply shutting down all of the coal plants — was projected to increase global warming in the short term: BOMBSHELL: Solar and Wind Power Would Speed Up, Not Reduce, Global Warming.

But Joe is back with the hyperbolic titles and exaggerations (which I get into below), and he missed the biggest story in the paper.

Coal and Sunlight-Reflecting Pollutants

The subject of Romm’s earlier “natural gas bombshell” was a paper written by Tom Wigley that concluded that shutting down coal-fired power plants would cause the global temperature to increase in the short term because of the loss of sunlight-reflecting pollutants.

In that particular paper, Dr. Wigley modeled what would happen if coal-fired power was replaced with natural gas. He did indeed project short-term warming in that scenario, yet it was a result of the air becoming cleaner and allowing sunlight through as the coal was phased out. Thus, the media really got that story wrong, which was not about a deficiency of natural gas, but rather about the peculiarity of burning coal — that the particulate emissions reflect sunlight. Those who fixated on natural gas as the culprit could have written the same story about solar power — which the study’s author confirmed for me. Hence, I made that my “Bombshell” to illustrate the point.

However, that particular study didn’t actually model the temperature impact of shutting down coal plants and replacing them with anything other than natural gas. So, I posed the following question to Dr. Wigley:

What does the graph look like in 2100 if all coal-fired plants were replaced with zero emission sources (as the idealized study)? I am just wondering what the potential actually is. Are we talking about 1 or 2 degrees lower? I just have no idea of the relative context.

We had several email exchanges over his paper, and he said that my questions were intriguing and he would look into them. I never heard back from him on that, but this new paper answers the question.

Shuttering All the World’s Coal Plants Wouldn’t Do Much

The authors of this newest study modeled the replacement of coal-fired power plants with either natural gas, coal with carbon capture and storage, hydropower, solar PV, solar thermal, wind power, or nuclear power. You can see from Joe Romm’s headline how the story is being spun, but let’s break it down in a more objective fashion.

The following graphic from the paper tells the story. Pay particular attention to the temperature scale.

The graphic indicates — as Tom Wigley’s previous paper indicated but which was only reported relative to natural gas — that in every single case, it doesn’t matter what coal-fired power plants are replaced with, the temperature is projected to increase for almost the next 40 years. This is true even in the baseline “Conservation” case, which involves merely idling the coal-fired plants and not replacing them with anything.

The paper projects that if coal-fired power plants continue to operate, the expected temperature rise relative to the baseline (i.e., relative to the expected temperature increase from other sources) in 50 years is 0.15 degrees C, and in 100 years is about 0.33 degrees C. If coal is phased out and replaced with natural gas, the relative 50 and 100 year temperature rise is projected to be 0.14 degrees C and 0.24 degrees C, respectively. So the paper shows slightly less warming when natural gas is used, which Climate Progress Tweeted as “Switch from coal to natural gas would have zero effect on global temperatures by 2100” and included a link to Joe’s “bombshell.” That is obviously an exaggeration, as the graphic clearly shows that the effect is not zero. If it was, the natural gas line would overlay the coal line.

Shocking Implications

One shocking implication from the paper was the projection that hydropower would be worse than coal for the next 60 years. The study’s authors cited methane emissions from organic matter buried under water as the reason for this apparent anomaly. But that’s not the really shocking thing about the study for me.

The most shocking conclusion was the magnitude of the numbers we are talking about. Even if you could in theory shut down all of the coal-fired power plants in the world and replace them with wind, solar, and hydropower — in 50 years the projected temperature is only one-twentieth of a degree C cooler than the base case of continuing to use coal. In 100 years, if I could replace all global coal-fired power plants with firm, renewable power — the temperature is only projected to be about 0.2 degrees cooler than under the coal base case. And the way this is being spun is that the 0.09 degree reduction from switching to natural gas is equivalent to an effect of “zero”, but the 0.2 degree reduction in hypothetically replacing everything with wind and solar power 100 years from now is significant. About the natural gas case, Romm literally said the 0.09 degree lower temperature in switching to natural gas means that “natural gas is a bridge fuel to nowhere”, but the 0.2 degree lower temperature in switching to renewables is “the world’s only plausible hope to avert catastrophic temperature rise.”

Nuclear & Natural Gas to the Rescue — But Most Environmentalists Hate Them

A big irony here is that there are only two power sources that are today capable of achieving the study’s conclusion that we must rapidly replace coal-fired power plants: Nuclear power and natural gas. If people really believe that we must urgently address this issue — and they don’t believe that the change from going to natural gas is enough — that leaves nuclear power as the only option capable of achieving a rapid replacement.

Bear in mind that this is for a global replacement of coal — most of which is used in Asia. Good luck trying to sell China and India on a 0.2 degree temperature difference in 100 years if they quickly abandon their coal-fired power plants and replace them with wind power.

Conclusion: Study is a Major Downer for Activists Battling Climate Change

To be honest, if I was devoting my life to fighting against the threat of climate change, this would be one of the most depressing papers I have ever read. If we could convince everyone in the world to shut down their coal-fired power plants — which we can’t — and replace them with renewable power — which isn’t available in quantities sufficient to replace coal-fired power — then by the end of my life there would still be no statistically significant temperature change to even be able to tell if my life’s work was successful.

But let’s be realistic, shall we? The people who are concerned about global warming have dug in their heels over natural gas, and they are generally opposed to nuclear power. Because of the sheer impossibility that we will rapidly replace coal with wind and solar power (especially since “we” is the world), then we will in all likelihood be left with the status quo. As I have said before, emissions are much higher in Asia Pacific than they are in the U.S. and Europe combined, and they are rising rapidly. Unless we can figure out a way to convince them to develop without fossil fuels — something no country has done — then global carbon emissions will continue to rise. This is why — even though I accept the science behind climate change — it isn’ t my focus. I just don’t see how the West can possibly do anything about it.

#### **Military alt cause**

Neslen 15 (Arthur Neslen is the Europe environment correspondent at the Guardian. He has previously worked for the BBC, the Economist, Al Jazeera, and EurActiv, where his journalism won environmental awards. 12-14-2015, "Pentagon to lose emissions exemption under Paris climate deal," Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/14/pentagon-to-lose-emissions-exemption-under-paris-climate-deal>)

Although the US never ratified the Kyoto protocol, it won an opt-out from having to fully report or act on its armed forces’ greenhouse gas emissions, which was then double-locked by a House national defence authorisation bill in 1999. Under the Paris agreement, countries would not be obliged to cut their military emissions but, equally, there would be no automatic exemption for them either. US officials privately say that the deal adopted on Saturday has no provisions covering military compliance one way or another, leaving decisions up to nation states as to which national sectors should make emissions cuts before 2030. “If we’re going to win on climate we have to make sure we are counting carbon completely, not exempting different things like military emissions because it is politically inconvenient to count them,” Stephen Kretzmann, Oil Change International’s director told the Guardian. “The atmosphere certainly counts the carbon from the military, therefore we must as well.” The US military is widely thought to be the world’s biggest institutional consumer of crudeoil**,** but its emissions reporting exemptions mean it is hard to be sure. According to Department of Defence figures, the US army emitted more than 70m tonnes of CO2 equivalent per year in 2014. But the figure omits facilities including hundreds of military bases overseas, as well as equipment and vehicles. Activities including intelligence work, law enforcement, emergency response, tactical fleets and areas classified as national security interests are also exempted from reporting obligations. The US military requested the original Kyoto exemption on national security grounds. While the Obama administration is not looking to the military for emissions cuts before 2030, US republicans argue that future presidents, such as the socialist candidate Bernie Sanders for the Democrats, could. “Lets face it, vast swathes of our military are big carbon emitters – tanks, Jeeps, humvees, jet planes – and of course much of our navy is not nuclear-powered, so [the Paris agreement] could be used as a trojan horse,” said Steven Groves, a senior research fellow at the US thinktank the Heritage Foundation. He added: “This might be a good opportunity for people concerned with national security to go to congress and get some type of legislative exemption in the same way as was done during the Kyoto time period.” One of the first advocates of the House double-lock on the Kyoto exemption was Dick Cheney, according to a book called ‘The greening of the US military’ by Terry Lee Anderson, a senior fellow at Stanford University. Cheney argued that the Kyoto clause would not cover US unilateral actions in a letter, which was also signed by other former security officials. The Iraq war was responsible for 141m tonnes of carbon releases in its first four years, according to an Oil Change International report. On an annual basis, this was more than the emissions from 139 countries in this period, or about the same as putting an extra 25m cars on to US roads for a year. The paper found that projected US spending on the Iraq war could cover all global investments in renewable energy needed to halt global warming trends in the period to 2030.