## Framing (2:20)

#### First, I experience the world radically beyond my comprehension and take in meaning from a multitude of perspectives. These other perspectives are defined by not being mine, so I have an obligation to respect them; I cannot justify anything else because the nature of the Other is beyond my experience. Blum

[Blum, Peter C. "Overcoming Relativism? Levinas's Return to Platonism." Journal of Religious Ethics 28.1 (2000): 91-117.] SHS ZS

The experience of transcendence is, at bottom, the experience of having my interiority brought into question ontologically, epistemologically, and morally. **Ontologically**, I find that **I am not the only** possible **source of reality**. **Although I am capable of creating**, **I experience a presence** within the world **that so overflows and escapes from my experience that I could not have created it**. Epistemologically, I find that **my perspective on the world is not the only possible perspective**. **There is a point of view that I can never occupy**, **because** the only way of defining it relative to my point of view is that **it is not mine**. Because **the Other** so radically escapes my cognition, it **simultaneously threatens my freedom** (to such a degree that I am inclined to murder) **and awakens my desire** (to such a degree that I am inclined to awe, and even to worship). The Other is at once the mysterium tremendum and the mysterium fascinans. If morality is understood as arising in the context of sociation, then the insight that the limits of my understanding become apparent precisely in this context would seem necessarily to have moral implications. Inasmuch as **the Other fundamentally escapes my understanding**, the forced totalization of the Other murder, in the extreme case is an imposition of my will for which a justification is, in principle, unavailable. As Levinas puts it, **murder is impossible**- not physically speaking, of course, but morally speaking (Levinas 1961/1969, 198-99). **If I kill someone**, **it is** fundamentally **because I wish to be rid of the limits that are imposed by his or her presence**. **The** cognitive and **moral limits** that are illuminated by the face, however, **are not eliminated by removing the face from the purview** of sensibility. **The infinite distance between myself and the Other**, once opened in my experience by the Other's epiphany, **will remain open**. My responsibility, once illuminated, is seen as a part of what I am. The commandment that was initially inscribed on the face of the Other is now inscribed on the heart of the same.19

#### Second, recognition of the Other forms the basis for subjectivity.

#### All agents are defined by their interactions with the Other. The “I” only comes into existence when the Other gives it a capacity to respond. Gehrke.

[Pat J Gehrke (associate professor in the Speech Communication and Rhetoric Program and the Department of English at the University of South Carolina), "Being for the Other-to-the-Other: Justice and Communication in Levinasian Ethics." Review of Communication 10.1 (2010): 5-19] SHS ZS

Levinas inverts Hegel by arguing that **the otherness of the Other**, her/his alterity, or most simply the fact that we are not one being and can never become one being, **is** both **essential to the possibility of the emergence of any** **will** and already bears one’s responsibility to and for the Other. **The very possibility for subjectivity** and individuality **comes in the approach of the Other**; **I become an “I”** only **in response to the Other’s approach**. The first event of will is always, for Levinas, to respond, and will exists only as response. Thus, in the Other giving to me my subjectivity, **I** already **find myself in a relationship of obligation and debt**. Unlike a Hegelian understanding of the will that exists and then encounters the world and another will, for Levinas **there is no possibility for will except as a response to** having **been approached by an Other**, and every moment of will or choice is due to (“due to” meaning both “because of” and “owed to”) this Other in front of me at this specific moment. **The first fact of the possibility of being**, then, **is a relationship of obligation**, **and that relationship precedes** (and exceeds) not only desire but **even the possibility of thought or language**. Preceding cognition and subjectivity, giving the possibility of cognition and subjectivity, means that b**oth the Other and my responsibility to the Other are beyond containing or schematizing in thought**. This is one reason why our study of Levinas\*and ethics generally\*can never yield a stable system or code of communication ethics The Gift of the Other The difference between the capitalized Other and the uncapitalized other is significant in reading Levinas. In the original French, Levinas uses two different terms, both of which are translated as other. The capitalized Other is used for autrui, which might best be described as “the personal other, the you,” whereas the uncapitalized other is used for autre, which simply means the common usage of other, such as another (Lingis, 1991, pp. 24􏴠25). The capitalization is significant, for Levinas does not mean that the Other is a collective or a generalized other, but this singular and unique Other before me: you as an individual, different from all other individuals, in this specific moment of appearance, different from every other moment, ultimately exceeding every attempt I might make to organize you into a system of meanings or responses**. I do not exist prior to this relation**. Rather, **I only come to be as an “I” when the Other approaches me**. This approach of the Other places me in a capacity to respond, which Levinas might call my responsibility. Thus, the self is constituted by and of responsibility. “For Levinas there can be no such thing as a self-constituting subjectivity. Instead **subjectivity is the accomplishment of a movement**\*a movement not within an I but **between an I and a thou**, whereby the thou is the locus from which the constitution of the I springs” (Vetlesen, 1995, p. 374). To be a free individual “does not mean to claim authorship for oneself, to be autonomous, to be the archaic principle of one’s life, but rather to respond (or not to respond) to an appeal coming from the exterior” (Benso, 1996, p. 136). In all these explications what becomes clear is that **subjectivity is a gift from the Other** that bears with it an obligation that cannot be declined.

#### Third, since the Other is inherently unknowable, we cannot attempt to define or totalize them. We must recognize that the Other is a complex being that demands a continual quest to understand them. Peperzak.

[Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak, Dutch Philosopher, To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, 1993, ///AHS PB] SHS ZS

Another comes to the fore as other if and only if his or her “appearance” breaks, pierces, destroys the horizon of my egocentric monism, that is, when **the other**’s invasion of my world **destroys the empire in** **which all phenomena are**, from the outset, **a priori**, condemned to function as moments of my universe. **The other’s face** (i.e., any other’s facing me) or the other’s **speech** (i.e., any other’s speaking to me) interrupts and **disturbs the order of my**, ego’s **world**; it makes a hole in it by disarraying my arrangements without ever permitting me to restore the previous order. For even if I kill the other or chase the other away in order to be safe from the intrusion, nothing will ever be the same as before. When Levinas meditates on the significance of the face, he does not describe the complex figure that could be portrayed by a picture or painting; rather, he tries to make us “experience” or “realize” what we see, feel, “know” when another, by looking at me, “touches” me: autrui me vise; the other’s visage looks at me, “regards” me. Similarly the word “language,” often used in this context, evokes the speech addressed to me by some living man or woman and not the linguistic structures or anonymous meanings that can be studied objectively or practiced by a style-con- scious author. Autrui me parle” primordially, it is not important what is said; even if the words are nonsensical, there is still their being addressed. Neither is it relevant who speaks to me; any other is the revelation of the Other, and peculiar features deserving special attention would only lead me away from the “absolute otherness” that is at stake. IN order to concentrate on the other’s otherness, Levinas often stresses the nakedness of the other’s face: if I am touched, if I am conscious of being concerned, it is not becau se of the other’s beauty, talents, performances, roles, or functions but only by the other’s (human) otherness. **As disrupting the horizon of** my egological—and thus, **ontological**—**ways of handling** and seeing **the world, the others resist a description that** would **present** **them as a** particular sort of phenomenon among other **phenomena within a universal order of beings**. Since **they “show”** and “present” precisely those **realities that do not fit into** the **universal openness** of consciousness, **they cannot be seized by the usual categories and models of phenomenology**. the other transcends the limits of (self-)consciousness and its horizon; the look and the voice that surprise me are “too much” for my capacity of assimilation. In this sense, **the other comes toward me as a total stranger** and from a dimension that surpasses me. The otherness of the other reveals a dimension of “height” (hauteur): he/she comes “from ons high.” Husserl’s theory of intentionality, based on an adequate and symmetric correlation between noésis and noéma, no longer fits. A forgotten element of Descartes’s analysis of consciousness, however, offers a formal structure much closer to the relation meant by Levinas. According to Descartes’ third Metaphysical Meditation, **all human consciousness** **contains** not only and not primarily the idea of itself but also and precedingly **the** irreducible “**idea of the infinite**,” that is, **an immediate** and a priori given relation of the conscious subject to a **reality** **that can neither be constituted nor embraced by this subject**. This means that the cogito from the outset is structured by a bipolarity other than the bipolarity of the noetico-noematic relation of phenomenology, in which an idea and its ideatum fit one another adequately. Descartes still knew (as all great metaphysicians before him) that consciousness “thinks more than [or beyond] that which it can think.” The infinite is different from any noéma or cogitatum, for it essentially surpasses our capacity for conception and embracing. Although Descartes identifies “the infinite” with “God” (i.e., the God of the traditional, late scholastic philosophy), we can consider the formal structure he discovers to be the structure of my relation to the other in the form of another human being. When I am confronted with another, I experience myself as an instance that tries to appropriate the world by labor, language, and experience, whereas this other instance does not permit me to monopolize the world because **the Other’s greatness does not fit into any enclosure**—**not even** that of **theoretical comprehension**. This resistance to all integration is not founded on the other’s will; before any possibility of choice and before all psychological considerations, **the mere** fact of another’s **existence is a “surplus**” **that cannot be reduced** to becoming a part or moment of the Same. The Other cannot be captured or grasped and is therefore, in the most literal sense of the word, incomprehensible. In all his works, Levinas has endeavored to show that the (human) other radically differs from all other beings in the world. The other’s coming to the fore cannot be seen as a variation of the general way of appearance by which **all other beings are phenomenal**. This is the reason why Levinas reserves the word “phenomenon” for realities that fit into the totality of beings ruled by egological understanding. Since the other cannot become a moment of such a totality, it is not a phenomenon but rather an “enigma.” However, if an enigma cannot be defined in phenomenological terms, we must ask: can it be defined at all? If “visibility,” in a broad and metaphorical sense, is a feature of every being that can become a phenomenon, one may even call the enigmatic other “invisible.”47 The other imposes its exceptional and enigmatic otherness on me by way of a command and a prohibition: you are not allowed to kill me; you must accord me a place under the sun and everything that is necessary to live a truly human life! Your facing me or your speaking to me—whatever form your addressing me might take—forbids me to suppress, enslave, or damage you; on the contrary, it obligates me to dedicate myself to your well-being. It is not your will or want or wish that makes me yours truly, but your emerging, your being there, as such. Independently of your or my desires, your presence reveals to me that I am “for you,” responsible for your life. We meet here an exceptional, extraordinary, and absolute fact: a fact that is and exists simultaneously and necessarily as a fact and as a command or norm. By seeing another looking at me, or by hearing someone’s voice, I “know” myself to be obliged. The scission between factuality (is) and normativity (ought)—a scission many philosophers since Hume have believed in—has not yet had the time to emerge here. The **immediate experience of another’s emergence contains the root of all possible ethics** as well as the source from which all insights of theoretical philosophy must start. **The other’s existence** as such **reveals to me the basis** and primary sense **of** my **obligations**.

#### Thus, the standard is rejecting the totalization of the other.

#### Impact calculus:

#### [1] Death is not a biological end but an inevitable reality of life. Death doesn’t foreclose the possibility of a relationship with the other but instead allows for more meaning. In fact, we only value death by having a coherent relation to the Other otherwise agents would not feel a moral obligation to prevent it. Peperzak.

[Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak, Dutch Philosopher, To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, 1993, ///AHS PB] SHS ZS

'Having shown that **the will**, as a free body, **is a** vulnerable **consciousness between** the immunity of **independent initiative and** the weaknesses of its exposition to **the forces of nature** and seduction, Levinas elaborates in a third subsection, “The Will and Death" (208-13/232-36), on its **mortality [is] as a typically human mode of temporality**. As a postponement of the last event, **the will is met by the inexorability of its disappearance**. **We are afraid of death because it puts an end to any further delay**. **The annihilation whereby death threatens a human life cannot be explained in terms of the categorical pair being versus nothingness**, as if they formed the ultimate horizon of the world. For **death is neither a being nor nothing; rather, we experience its threat as that of a murder coming from some sort of enemy. It comes from a dimension** beyond life and world: from the dimension of invisibility and otherness **over which we do not have any power**. Therefore, **death is not our last or ultimate possibility**, and we are not able to accept, to anticipate, or to welcome it. **Our fear originates in the will as still having** (some) **time by delaying the ultimate and absolute impossibility ofall possibilities**, but **the inexorability of death refutes any view on human** being according to which it is primarily an “l can," a possibility of possibilities. The invisibility of death does not lie in the nothingness with which it confronts us but in its not permitting us to grasp it, fight with it, and protect ourselves against it. **Death always comes too early and as a nonwelcomed murderer**. Since we cannot conceive of it as a possibility of our own, we cannot want it. And yet, **this enemy can receive a meaning precisely because it is not a moment of the world or any other totality composed ofbeings and their negations**. The absolute passivity revealed in our ultimate impossibility belongs to a life that is directed to a meaning beyond its own destruction. This meaning cannot be found in a life “after death" of some immortal soul, since this idea itself sticks to the ultimacy of the categories being and nothingness as constituting world and time. To live for a time beyond one's own life is to live for the other(s), and this is made possible by mortality; the necessity of losing one's life belongs to the structure of being-for-other(s). Thus, **the egoism of a fearful life can be converted into the obedience of having time for others**; the absolute violence from which nobody can escape can become the source of indestructible goodness. To lose one's life for the other(s) is to be meaningful in living for a time after one's own life. If death-and suffering-were a purely individual event, it would' be meaningless; its having a place within the horizon of the metaphysical (i.e., intersubjective) relation saves it from absurdity. HThe supreme ordeal of freedom" (or cCof the will") His not death, but suffering" (216/239). For whereas **death terminates the ambiguity of humanity's finite freedom**, suffering is the extreme experience of the discordance discovered in mortality as human temporality. This is shown in subsection 4, cCTime and the Will: Patience" (213-17/236-40). Since time is the ability of free consciousness (or CCthe will") to postpone death, it is also the possibility of keeping a distance from all fixations that would identify the will with a certain instant or present. **As long as there is time, nothing is definitive**; the will can always take or change its position with regard to what the subject has done, thought, become until now. **Ithas a distance toward the presence thanks to the many possibilities for a future that are still open.** The future is not a prolongation of the present but rather.the possibility of having a distance from it **Suffering reduces this distance and the difference between present and future**-as well as between fact and possibility or between fixation andfreedom-to a minimum. In itwe are backed up and glued to what we are, without possibility of fleeing it; a feared future has caught us, annulled our capacity of withdrawal, almosttakenaway our distance, and submitted ourconsciousness to utter passivity, without permitting it to die. A heroic will is a will that Ustands" this uimpossible" situation without giving in. It conquers by patience, i.e., by a disengagement within its forced engagement, thus still saving an ultimate mastery in the midst of almost total passivity. Patience is the experience of the limit of our will**. Suffering, much more so than death, reveals the ambivalence of finite freedom and self-consciousness**. But **suffering**, too, **receives its meaning from** the order ofdiscourse," that is, from its being endured for **the Other**. Even hate, as expressed, for instance, in torture or persecution, is better than complete isolation because it frees us from the egoistic absurdity of suffering for nobody, and without such a deliverance desire and goodness remain empty words.

#### Prefer additionally:

#### [1] Substitutability – All ethics are rooted in the recognition of the Other. Substitution or the ability to see oneself in the place of the other is a necessary feature of moral frameworks. Absent substitution, we have no reason to care about other agents and derive any form of ethical theory. Beavers

[Anthony F. Beavers. Introducing Levinas to Undergraduate Philosophers <http://faculty.evansville.edu/tb2/PDFs/UndergradPhil.pdf>] SHS ZS

**Substitution** then **is recognizing myself in the place of the other**, not with the force of a conceptual recognition, but in the sense of finding myself in the place of the other as a hostage for the other. **Substitution is the conversion of my being as a subjection by the other into a subjection for the other**.To get a sense of how powerful Levinas' notion of substitution is, let me depart from the vocabulary of his language for a moment and cast the discussion into concrete terms. **Suppose** for a moment that **you are walking down the street and the person in front of you pushes a garbage can** into the street. You might pick up the garbage can, you might not— but, certainly **you will not feel like an injustice has been done to** [it] **the garbage can**. **Now suppose** that in the same situation, **the person in front of you** **pushes another person** into the street. **Suppose** further that **this person**, while lying on the ground **looks up at you**. Do **you "feel" the need to respond**? Levinas says that at this moment, the ethical command has been waged. **You are obligated to respond**. If the desire to respond does not, at first, present itself as a command, and **you respond because you want to respond**, then **you have just been** **witness to the depth that substitution has taken** in your own being. The desire to respond is already a responsiveness to the command of the other. Some ethicists find that if we respond to the person because we feel a personal need to do so, then we are really satisfying our own desire, and, as such, our action does not have true moral worth. Levinas' point is more profound on this score. He notes that **there is a metaphysical explanation for why we have this desire to respond**. The explanation is rooted, once again, in substitution. First of all, **the person has a transcendence that the garbage can does not** have, and secondly, **we have**, in fact, **already substituted ourselves for the other**.23 **Within Levinas' framework, the desire to help the other emerges because I am held hostage by the other to the core of my being**, and, in substitution, I am made to stand for the other, before freedom and reason comes on the scene.

#### [2] Performativity – Only through the application of Levinasian Ethics in educational spaces like debate can we learn how to respect the infinitely unknowable Other. Krall 14.

 [Krall, Leo. “The Pedagogy of Relationship: Applying Levinasian Ethics to the Classroom.” Levinas Seminar Paper Archive, 2014, pp. 10–13., seattleu, [www.seattleu.edu/media/college-of-arts-and-sciences/graduate-degrees/masterofartsinpsychology/documents/levinas-documents/Krall,-L.-Final-2014.pdf](http://www.seattleu.edu/media/college-of-arts-and-sciences/graduate-degrees/masterofartsinpsychology/documents/levinas-documents/Krall%2C-L.-Final-2014.pdf). // WHSRS] SHS ZS

In My Experience: Finding Levinas in the Classroom. Upon reflection there are elements of my own pedagogy that have Levinasian ethics. I believe **the relationship and connection** **with** the **students is** perhaps **the most important part of the** whole **educational process**. An example that I have attempted in my classroom to facilitate a Levinasian encounter is in our ‘introductions’ class activity at the beginning of the semester (or quarter), sometimes done with a follow up throughout the term. **I have students interview one classmate** and attempt **to be an ‘historian**.’ They conduct an oral interview of the person and then introduce the other person to the class. While I used to used my cliched quote from the Dalai Lama (which I still love) that “all human beings have at least one thing in common,” since encountering Levinas **I also want students to highlight the differences and the uniqueness between them**, or as Levinas would stress- **their alterity**. I have come to see this exercise as a rehearsal for a discussion of respect, but also one of alterity. I believe in having students see their classmates as unique Others, and I encourage their marveling at each other, and I might ask, “what were you surprised to learn about your partner in this exercise? Do you feel like you know enough about this person to say that fully know them?” This ismy somewhat subtle attempt at **letting them consider that their classmate is beyond their comprehension** (that is, Levinasian interruption); I want them to grow beyond a passive respect of their peers. This is not always easy, but I have felt the closest to it usually in this first week exercise. Levinas writes, “**the Other is a stranger I welcome into my home**” (Levinas 182). I like this exercise because it models welcoming and receiving. Of course the lesson is (in terms of curriculum) built around our discussion of primary and secondary sources and the ambiguity and challenge of gathering information in historical studies; I remind students about what is in fact knowable. Here incorporating Levinasian ethics fits naturally into pedagogy. The activity in and of itself is not new or perhaps remarkable, but **when the pedagogical approach is framed within Levinasian ethics it puts a certain twist and intention on the assignment** that makes it far more valuable. Although Levinasian concepts are embedded and highlighted in the exercise in fairly subtle ways (without any student knowledge of Levinas), this is an example of Levinasian pedagogy. I wonder how students would respond if I asked them if their classmates are infinite. Perhaps they would totalize me. Another example of an assignment that in retrospect had a Levinasian ethic underscoring it was a political survey assignment. **I had** my **8th graders** many years ago **go to three homes in their neighborhood** (safely, during the afternoon and with an adult) **to conduct their own political survey**. It was a presidential election year 2004, the election for Bush’s second term. **Students asked their neighbors about** their **primary concerns for America** as well as for the person’s definition of freedom. While this asignment centered on valuable socio-political research (albeit conducted by my precocious 8th graders), **it afforded students the opportunity to be ‘interrupted.’** **The classroom can be a stale and repititious place**, and **when students went** out **to encounter the Other, they had very personal encounters. Some were turned away or refused**, but many shared with the class about the degree to which people opened up to them, the humor they used to connect, and how they loved how the classroom ‘existed’ outside of school. Interestingly, **one student** (without their knowing) **interviewed Steve Lopez,** a fairly well-known journalist from the L.A. Times (writer of the movie The Soloist). **Lopez then wrote about the assignment in the L.A. Times saying how much he loved that there was ‘community’ in Pasadena** and that there was an ‘agora-like’ quality to students discussing politics and freedom in the neighborhood. I was thrilled that the student had this encounter; **he unknowingly touched this journalist and inspired a ripple of dialogue that was** perhaps in the end **read by thousands of students and readers**. I believe this happened because **the student and the reporter both saw the Face of the Other**, and that an unlikely encounter surprises us. One last example of Levinasian ethics was **leading a “Mix-it-up Day” at the high school** I taught at five years ago. **One ambitous senior wanted to take part in the national movement to have students mix up their lunch for the day**, eating with students they had never talked to and sharing about their backgrounds and interests. In the end we received mixed reviews, and it was quite an ordeal to plan (with over 500 students); however, **some students said that it opened up their little nuclear world, that they even forgot to ever talk to students outside of their circle of friends.** This to me was one of the better examples of interruption in my teaching career. It was an enforced encounter with students to meet the Other (and some did complain about this), but it was modeling a skill for students of Levinasian ethics, which is to be able to recognize that there is an Other and how that invisible Other is linked to each of us whether we acknowledge it or not. **It celebrated diversity, not simply forcing students to admit they are all in the same boat, trapped in a world of high school and awkwardness** (one of their favorite words), there was a growing sense of alterity. **Alterity was appreciated and the day’s theme was clearly about respect.** Those seniors were remarkable to model that to the student body. Some students resisted the exercise; I can only imagine that they were in fear of encountering the Other, or perhaps just feeling forced to do so. This can be a challenge for teenagers. That is why I was so glad that this event was student led and exemplified their own agency. Conclusion Levinas is clearly not only relevant to, but is needed in modern pedagogy. We as teachers are as Sousa wrote, “changing the brain daily,” and what better way to affect students’ brains than to have them more consciously encounter the Other? Empathy is a tough skill to teach, and while few dispute its value, it can be challenging to teach; however, I think **Levinasian pedagogy is not simply a discussion about empathy**. **Levinasian pedagogy rests** on **and begins with the teacher** and is about the teacher consciously incorporating it into the method in which they teach. As Joldersma suggested, **it starts with the teacher recognizing the “I” within the student, and from that a chain reaction will hopefully ensue.** **Levinasian** **pedagogy** is valuable because it **is epistemological**. Levinas is not simply saying to ‘feel’ other’s experience and suffering, **he’s asking us to acknowledge that the Other is beyond our ability to know**. **It’s a humble philosophy, one that has an incredible value to the classroom; teachers and students can ask and ponder the question of what is ‘knowable’ and what is worth knowing, and as they do so, they build relationship. This is education**, connection and relationship. Levinasian pedagogy is the nurturing of the quality relationships; it is a paradigmatic shift towards service and to a style of teaching which recognizes the infinitude of all students. Levinasian pedagogy is challenging, and perhaps will never show up on the standardized state exams, but it speaks to the essence of what education should be about- the joy of connection. together” (Todd 45).

#### [3] Consequences fail – Ethical theories have to always guide action. Even if they work 99% of the time that is not sufficient because there would be instances where agents do not know what to do. A. Induction fails – the logic of looking to the past to predict the future is all premised in the past, so it’s circular. B. Aggregation fails – there’s no way to weigh between different forms of pain and pleasure. C. Butterfly effect – no way to know when we cut off looking at consequences. D. Culpability – there are an infinite number of pretenses for actions which means assigning culpability is impossible which is necessary for a moral theory to ascribe blame for actions.

## Offense (0:40)

#### I affirm the resolution, Resolved: States ought to ban Lethal Autonomous Weapons.

#### First, some definitions.

#### [A] Lethal Autonomous Weapons systems are defined by CRS.

[Congressional Research Service. “Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems.” Published 25 June 2020] SHS ZS

Lethal autonomous weapon systems (**LAWS**) **are a** special **class of weapon systems that use** sensor suites and **computer algorithms to independently identify a target and employ an onboard weapon system to engage and destroy the target without** manual **human control of the system**. Although **these systems generally do not yet exist**, it is believed they would enable military operations in communications-degraded or -denied environments in which traditional systems may not be able to operate.

#### Now, affirm:

#### [1] Totalization – LAWS presuppose choosing targets based on predefined characteristics – the definition of totalization. Danckwardt.

[Danckwardt, Petter. “Increasing De-personalization in Warfare.” Published 2015] SHS ZS

Returning to the question of targeting, there are clearly, in the Levinasian sense, some problematic implications. One of them is that the **targeting of LAWS presupposes categoriza- tion**. **LAWS**, being able to autonomously target and kill human beings, **always find its human “trace” in its code**. **This presupposes a thematization of a target**; depending on the software and procedural protocols, the other is reduced to parts of algorithms. The **LAWS analyses the information available and, based on a set of fundamental algorithms target and destroy** the target. **This refusal of the alterity** or proximity of the other **is** depersonalizing and **also dehu- manizing**. Here, the dehumanization being discussed in the debates I illustrated on LAWS receives a deeper meaning: that of **forcing upon the other a certain essence by categorizing the Other** which then becomes "the friend" or "the enemy". This is not unique to LAWS; dehu- manizing and depersonalization occur all the time. But regarding LAWS **it is essential for the very functioning of the weapon**; **it cannot function** or be meaningful **without reducing alterity to numbers, codes and images**. This is what makes the weapon purely rationalistic in the sense that feelings and perception are out of the grid. By distinguishing the absolute sincerity of saying, (saying as Communication in my passivity before passivity in my relation to others) and the congealing of such saying in the said, Levinas is able to show the priority of the pri- mordial ethical relation of saying over the saying understood as situated in the said (which is at work when robots are “behaving ethically” by means of categorization). What is problemat- ic when saying is congealed to the said? It implies we have forgotten about the surplus of meaning that is carried by the saying; one has become insensitive to another. This could have many reasons, but it is the insensitiveness that is of issue here. **Categorization implies thematization**. **Thematization is exhausting** on, and inflicting vio- lence on what it is tries to conceptualize. **There is violence already at work in categorization**. What, then, is at stake regarding LAWS? What are the implications for the relation between me and the Other when robots autonomously and deliberately target and destroy human be- ings? I stated previously how **LAWS do not constitute a radical break** between the signature and the author; **it is the current peak of a radical development** of weapons technology. I showed why the question of making robots “behave ethically” misses the point–”the Good can not enter into a present nor be put into a representation” (OB 15). **Programming humani- tarian law** (jus in bello) into a computer **does not alter in any way the** ethical situation. There is the human trace, which leads us back to a face looming over the LAWS itself. This human trace is represented through LAWS, reducing the other to **thematization, which results in de- personalization, dehumanization**. The generalized point of view that is adopted through LAWS is structured around a structure trying to grasp, understand, appropriate and assimilate that to which is beyond, otherwise than being. However, **it is a human being doing so through the rationality and effectiveness of the robotic**; it is the human trace appearing as the robot and not the other way around: robots not becoming human but a human trace becoming robot- ic. This relation between the human being behind the LAWS and the thematized and dehu- manized “enemy”, in which the same dominates or absorbs the other, is in radical contrast with the ethical relation, substitution-proximity-responsibility, which Levinas in an interview describes as “no fusion: the relation to the other is envisioned as alterity... the other is alteri- ty” (Levinas 1995, 103).

#### [2] Dehumanization – LAWS dehumanize others by treating them as a target to be destroyed, not a fellow human to be respected. Danckwardt.

[Danckwardt, Petter. “Increasing De-personalization in Warfare.” Published 2015] SHS ZS

One could then say: dehumanization and flagrant violations of human dignity have been 56 going on as far back as one can remember. European history; both his family and Levinas himself were direct victims of National Social- ism. Indeed, the possibility of ethics is the possibility of murder; by saying, “do not kill me” you imply there is a possibility of violation. The command “Thou shalt not kill” would other- wise be meaningless–“the face is that possibility of murder” (ibid, 104). In Peace and Prox- imity and Totality and Infinity, Levinas discusses how it is possible to murder someone. This is a delicate question: if the face is the site of our relation to the other, if responsibility is in- 57 Levinas was of course aware of the darkness of how is murder, then, even possible? His answer is that murder cumbent on me exclusively, is one possible enactment of the ethical relationship: to murder is not to actually dominate or assimilate someone, but **murder is first presupposing a relationship with the Other; murder is one’s choice of action in response to this** (TI 198-9.). The impossibility of refusing the ethical relationship and the impossibility of a complete appropriating or domination of the other or to dominate can end up in me destroying the other. As I have showed, Levinas argues that **the self is self through the other**, where the other is not a mere negation of the self or the ego, but as alterity as such. The Other: unknown and non-representable. In this sense, the Other is inassimilable and also indestructible. So what does it mean, then, when robots are deliberately targeting and killing human be- ings? What seems to **be a technological effect of LAWS**–and perhaps also with drones–as a weapon **is the presupposition of de-personalization**. To function properly, LA**WS require a de-personalisation already made**; de-personalization is produced, however not in LAWS due to the fact that robots cannot be in proximity with the other, but some place else. One could also argue that better categorization and appropriation of the Other, implies a more well func- tioning LAWS; **one becomes a target even before being targeted, a defined enemy before hos- tilities**, deprived before deprivation. In fact, **the whole point of LAWS is not the actual de- struction** and targeting of the Other, **but instead, how LAWS can effectively do it without me being** **involved**. It is not the distance or separation from actions per se that contributes to this sort of de-personalization, but **the fact that the weapons systems are dependent on de- personalization to begin with**. This de-personalization cannot come from pilots or soldiers like in, for example, World War II, but necessarily from the military, technological or political structure behind the weapon/warrior itself. This is the consequence of arbitrarily blending “warrior” and “weapon” into a technical artefact.