# JF-NCM AC

## Part 1 is Framing

#### Every Claim is constrained by the law of non-contradiction which holds that a given claim cannot be both true and false

Mark Sainsbury, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas Austin, Paradoxes, 1988 ///AHS PB

The meaning or content of a declarative sentence can be thought of in terms of which states of affairs would make it true, and which states of affairs would make it false. To understand a sentence, we must find out what it rules out, and what would rule it out. There are limiting cases: tautologies rule out nothing, and some sentences, ones which cannot be true, rule out everything. However, were there a sentence which is both true and false, there could be no coherent understanding of it, for there would be no determinate fact concerning what it ruled out, and what ruled it out. One would have to say: there is a state of affairs which the sentence both rules in and rules out. But this is like saying that the state of affairs both is and is not determined by the content of the sentence, which shows that the sentence has no coherent content at all. These considerations are certainly not decisive. One way to bring this out is to rework them in terms of possible worlds semantics, as follows. The content of a declarative sentence is given by two disjoint sets: the set of worlds at which it is true, and the set of worlds at which it is false. (This is one way of expressing a version of the view that the meaning of a sentence consists in the conditions under which it is true.) Suppose, for some sentence, the actual world belongs to the set of worlds at which it is true. Then it is not the case that the actual world belongs to the set of worlds at which it is false, since the set of worlds at which it is false is, by hypothesis, disjoint from the set of those at which it is true.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the law of non-contradiction- 6 warrants

#### [1] Non-Contradiction is a side constraint on argumentation.

Enrico Berti, Italian philosopher, Professor emeritus of the history of philosophy , honorary president of the International Institute of Philosophy, Objections to Aristotle’s Defence of the Principle of Non-Contradiction, in E. Ficara (ed.), Contradictions: Logic, History, Berlin-Boston, W. de Gruyter, 2014, pp. 97-108 ///AHS PB

My aim in this presentation is not to discuss the value of the PNC and of the objections which have been addressed to it: I am not a specialist of logic and I do not have the necessary competence to evaluate, from a logical point of view, the paraconsistent logics and the dialetheism. My aim is to compare the Aristotelian theory of refutation in particular with dialetheism, in order to decide whether from a dialetheist point of view the refutation is still possible. At first sight I should say that it is possible no more, because it implies the falsity of the contradiction, while the dialetheism [one who] admits that at least some contradictions can be true. This could mean that a dialetheist can never refute an interlocutor with whom he is discussing, and, as the refutation is the best instrument to criticize a theory, he cannot criticize any theory. This was already remarked by Karl Popper in his famous paper What is Dialectic?, where, speaking about the Hegelian dialecticians, he writes: They observe, correctly, that contradictions are of the greatest importance in the history of thought – precisely as important as is criticism. For criticism invariably consists in pointing out some contradiction; either a contradiction within the theory criticized, or a contradiction between the theory and another theory which we have some reason to accept, or a contradiction between the theory and certain facts – or more precisely, between the theory and certain statements of facts. Criticism can never do anything except either point out some such contradiction, or, perhaps, simply contradict the theory (i.e. criticism may be simply the statement of an antithesis). But criticism is, in a very important sense, the main motive force of any intellectual development. Without contradictions, without criticism, there would be no rational motive for changing our theories: there would be no intellectual progress.²³ And afterwards: If we [... ] decide to put up with contradictions, then contradictions must at once lose any kind of fertility. They would be no longer productive of intellectual progress. For if we were prepared to put up with contradictions, pointing out contradictions in our theories could no longer induce us to change them. In other words, all criticism (which consists in pointing out contradictions) would lose its force. Criticism would be answered by ‘And why not?’ or perhaps even by an enthusiastic ‘There you are!’; that is, by welcoming the contradictions which have been pointed out to us. But this means that if we are prepared to welcome contradictions, criticism, and with it all intellectual progress, must come to an end.²⁴ To these observations it could be added that, if the contradiction were not a sign of falsity, and not of truth, we should not have a criterion to distinguish truth from falsity, true theories from false theories, therefore all theories would have the same value, and we should be infallible.

#### [2] Indexed reasons are the only way to avoid contradictions.

**Reichardt,** Reichardt, Bastian. "Studies in Logic, Grammar, and Rhetoric." University Bonn (n.d.): n. pag. Print.//Scopa Second-Order Moral Relativism is a statement about the indexicality of moral truth. **A sentence like “Polygamy is morally wrong” is not true *simpliciter* but rather** **true relative to a given moral frame** of reference and false relative to another one. By **indexing moral truth** relativists **do[es] not assume that moral disagreements are contradictions.** If a moral sentence is true relative to one frame of reference and false to another one, then people from these different cultures do not contradict each other. **Just like the sentence that an object is moving might be true relative to one frame of reference and false to another one is not a contradiction but a valid consequence** from the special theory of relativity.

#### [3] Metaphysics: The Law of Non-Contradiction is both a prerequisite for any concrete objects to exist, as well as precondition for reliable knowledge about the world.

Tuomas E. Tahko, Reader in Metaphysics of Science Department of Philosophy University of Bristol and guest professor at Durham University, The Law of Non-Contradiction as a Metaphysical, Published June 11, 2009 Principle, <https://philarchive.org/archive/TAHTLO> ///AHS PB

The metaphysical reading of the law of non-contradiction suggests an an- swer to the question why our observations conform to the principle: because is a true metaphysical principle concerning the world. Let us trace the route from our observations of the world to the mind-independent reality which supposedly conforms to . Basically, you can insert any kind of meta- physically realist ontology here, it makes little difference for our purposes. What we need to agree about is that whatever the organisation of the enti- ties in the world is, it does not violate . Our observations suggest that an electric charge is a property that an entity can have in two different varieties: the positive and the negative. What sug- gests that this is a universal (and actual) condition—apart from the fact that we have never observed an entity that both has and does not have a charge at the same time—is that the causal powers associated with electric charges could not arise if the same entity could both have and not have a charge at the same time. For instance, atoms would not hold together. Perhaps one might suggest that if the same entity both did and did not have a charge at the same time, it would follow that atoms both would hold and would not hold together. But how could this be the case? If atoms both would hold and would not hold together, then it seems that all macrophysical objects both would and would not exist. No: macrophysical existence requires stability, and atoms that both hold together and do not hold together would certainly be quite unstable. It might be that it is not a metaphysically necessary condition for the existence of macrophysical objects that electric charges have the particular causal powers that they do; however, all that matters here is that in the actual world electric charges have the particular causal powers that they have and these powers emerge because electric charges act consistently. In other words, in the actual world the laws of physics require that one and the same particle either has or does not have an electric charge at any one time—otherwise this particular macrophysical con- struction would not be possible. The law of non-contradiction, if it is true, is perhaps the most fundamental condition of this type. Let it be noted that the above example concerns all macrophysical objects, that is, we are dealing with the existence conditions of all macrophysical ob- jects, and I wish to suggest that one of those preconditions is consistency. If we take this condition away, the result is trivialism, at least regarding the existence of macrophysical objects. There might still be a worry that even if our experience conforms to LNC, this tells us nothing about the world, but rather only about the concepts we use in describing it. But consider what would happen if there really were a fundamental discontinuity between the world and the concepts that we use in describing it, namely, if the world did not conform to [it] LNC. How would we be able to express anything about the world if this were the case? Perhaps there is a sceptical worry here which cannot be overcome, but anyone who takes this path would be on a slippery slope towards solipsism: if the consistency of the world is only an illusion, then you cannot trust any of your interactions with it, including your interactions with other people. Surely this is an infeasible po- sition. It is certainly more likely that the concepts we use in experiencing the world have developed through our interaction with the world and thus corre- spond with it at least to a moderate degree.7 Admittedly, no one holds the view that all contradictions are true, but rather just some of them, so the problem would then be restricted to the issues that these contradictions concern, but this hardly removes the problem.

#### [4] Interpretation: If the affirmative reads a standard of consistency with the law of non-contradiction the negative must concede to the aff standard. The Violation is preemptive: You link if you respond to or contest the framework. The standard is resolvability. Answering the framework would prove that contradictions are good which makes the round irresolvable since it allows for contradictory arguments and makes the evaluation of competing claims impossible. Resolvability is an independent voter since every debate taking the decision out of control of the debaters kills all fairness and education- it’s drop the debater on this interp, it’s the only way to resolve the violation.

#### [5] It is a constitutive feature of all statements to not be contradictory. To have a statement of truth value the constitutive aim is to not be contradictory otherwise the statement would logically hold no truth- and constitutive aims are non-optional since they are intrinsic properties.

#### [6] Rejection of the framework is impossible- because if the framework is true and your indicts are true that creates a contradiction which means fw is irresolvable- this cedes the validity of the AC framing in the first place to be able to resolve framing. If the AC framework is false and the indicts are true, the AC framework has to be true because that means it proves the law of non-contradiction true, which means the AC standard is still true.

## Part 2 is Offense

#### I defend the resolution as a general principle. I’ll spec to whatever you want in cross as long as I don’t have to abandon my maxim. I’ll defend implementation. I contend nukes are inconsistent with the law of non-contradiction thus we should eliminate them.

#### [1] Nuclear weapons are an inescapable contradiction, as their existence is dependent upon the paradox of ultimate destruction and their non-use.

**Basrur 2k,** Rajesh M. “Enduring Contradictions: Deterrence Theory and Draft Nuclear Doctrine.” *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 35, no. 8/9, 2000, pp. 610–613. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/4408955.//Scopa

**On the one hand, nuclear weapons are military instruments of state power with an operational meaning in terms of their mode of deployment**, readiness, accuracy, speed of delivery, reliability, and so on. These are characteristics of usability. **On the other hand, because of their cataclysmic potential, they carry an opposite political meaning in that the primary objective of those who possess them is not to use them**. Ironically, **the two meanings are inextricably linked: the non-usable char- acter of nuclear weapons** (the political component of deterrence) **is the direct consequence of their usability.** Of course, nuclear weapons were used by the US against Japan, but once he had grasped the true horror of their character, President Harry Truman argued for their non- usability. As he told David Lilienthal, a close advisor. You have got to understand this isn't a military weapon. It is used to wipe out women, children and unarmed people, and not for military use [cited in Freedman 1989: 52]. Similarly, president Dwight Eisenhower, who publicly espoused a strategy that envisaged the massive use of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union, warned senior military officials against thinking of winning a nuclear war: Gain such a victory and what would you do about it? ...I ask you, what would the civilised world do about it? I repeat, there is no victory in any war except through our imaginations, through our dedication and through our work to avoid it [cited in Gaddis, 1982:135n]. **The contradiction between the opera- tional and political components of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence is essen- tially unresolvable**. Nonetheless, they can be prioritised, and the way they are prio- ritised has enormous consequences for nuclear strategy. If the operational con- stituent is accorded primacy, it follows that considerations of a practical character related to the usability of nuclear weapons powerfully influence strategy. This results in a strong focus on weapon charac- teristics, modes of deployment, vulner- ability, reliability, and so on. Such con- siderations propel strategy towards a maxi- malist position. On the other hand, where the political meaning of deterrence takes precedence, nuclear weapons, regardless of their operational characteristics, are treated as uniformly dangerous, and the emphasis is on war-avoidance. This per- spective induces a minimalist strategy. In practice, there is no evidence as yet that this complex and contradictory char- acter of nuclear deterrence has been ad- equately grasped by policy-makers and strategic thinkers. In consequence, both components of deterrence coexist un- comfortably, as is evident from the con- tradictory positions taken by Truman and Eisenhower. Actual variations in nuclear strategy can be explained with reference to a quite different set of variables. The pushes and pulls of political and economic interests notedby many analysts are played out over more deeply embedded causal factors: national, economic and techno- logical capabilities, historical experience (especially that preceding the time of acquisition of nuclear weapons), and the symbolic value placed on nuclear weapons by strategic elites. A brief review of ex- isting deterrence strategies is instructive [Arkin and Mazarr 1996; Freedman 1989; Hopkins and Hu 1995; Rogov 1994].

#### [2] Sovereign exceptionalism is the pinnacle of paradox – enabled by the threat of nuclear power, the nuclear nations simultaneously preach democracy and practice unilateral exceptionalism.

**Leitch 07,** Vincent. Late Derrida: The Politics of Sovereignty. University of Chicago, 2007, users.clas.ufl.edu/burt/Critical%20Inquiry%20late%20derrida%20/late%20derrida%20sovereignty.pdf. //Scopa This much is clear about the book’s title and topic from the preface: **the rogue state “does not respect its state duties before the law of the world community and the obligations of international law; the state scoffs at the law—and mocks the condition of law**.”A footnote to this definition immediately questions: “Does the reason of state always submit to the condition of law? Does sovereignty itself relieve it of the condition of law? Or else does it exceed and betray it, always as an exception, at the very moment it claims precisely to establish it?” (V, p. 12n). Derrida puts the concept of sovereignty in question at the outset, and the rogue state has everything to do with it. What happens in contemporary politics plays a leading role here, as Derrida illustrates in this and a dozen other late texts. Citing Noam Chomsky’s Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World Affairs (2000), Robert Litwak’s Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy (2000), and William Blum’s The Rogue State (2001), Derrida confirms “**the most perverse, violent, and destructive of rogue states would thus be, first, the United States** and occasionally its allies” (V, p. 139). **Insofar as this nuclear state stands arrogantly above and disregards international laws and treaties, often in the name of a supremacist nation-state sovereignty, this hegemon simultaneously relies on and yet undermines the concept of sovereignty**. Can there be several hundred fully sovereign nations in the world? Are limitations necessary? How do things stand with the politics of sovereignty? Usually defined as supreme authority within a territory, linked with a historical sequence of sovereigns (God, king, people, nation, will), sovereignty among nation-states dates from the time of the Peace of Westphalia (1648), when interference in other states’ governing prerogatives became unacceptable. Following Carl Schmitt, Derrida points out that “**a sovereign is defined by his capacity to decide the exception [and he has] the right to suspend the law**.” During modern democratic times **this ontotheological right passes to the governing body or leader. In the U.S., for instance, it manifests itself in the right of the president** to grant amnesty from judicial judgments. Moreover, **a state’s “monopoly on violence is of a piece with the motif of sovereignty**. It is also what will always have grounded the death penalty, the right of the state, the right of the sovereign to punish by death. In addition to the death penalty, sovereignty enables a state to control its borders and exclude noncitizens as well as to protect itself from outside threats (today that includes forces of globalization and terrorism). **In its practice, sovereignty remains connected with the use of force and the principle that might is right. There are paradoxical nondemocratic features of sovereignty, as Derrida’s various deconstructions strikingly demonstrate**. Consider the contradictory idea of a sovereign (one over many), the concept of exception (being above the law), the notion of the death penalty (contravening the right to life of the citizen), and the fact that “only small states ever see their sovereignty contested and disputed by powerful states… **Powerful states never allow their own sovereignty to be challenged.” Additionally, the U.S. in special nondemocratic, contradictory ways not only “plays a virtually sovereign role among sovereign states” but dominates the elite inner circle of the United Nations (the nondemocratic Security Council), exercising there a sovereign unilateralism: As always, these two principles, democracy and sovereignty, are at once and by turns indissociable and in contradiction with each other**. For democracy to be real, in order to grant space to a right to assert its idea, and to become actual, it requires the cratie[power] of the demos[people]—in this case of the global demos. Thus, it requires a sovereignty, namely a force stronger than all others in the world. But if the constitution of this force is indeed destined in principle to represent and protect this global democracy, it in fact betrays and threatens it at the outset. [V, p. 143] **Despite the terrible aporias of sovereignty in its modern democratic forms, Derrida aimed to preserve it, but in limited and shared forms**.

## Part 3 is the Ballot

#### The Roll of the Ballot is to test the truth or falsity of the resolution-3 warrants Aff Fairness is a meta-constraint on truth

#### [1] Textuality- 5 Dictionaries define to affirm as to prove true and negate as to deny the truth of. This has a few implications [A] Grammar- Grammar outweighs since it’s literally what structures our language and argumentation. Double bind- either they reject all grammatical arguments and thus reject communication and the debate itself or they accept grammatical arguments and accept truth testing. [B] Jurisdiction—Truth testing is a constitutive feature of debate, meaning that the judge only has the jurisdiction to arguments that assert the truth or falsity of the resolution

#### [2] Necessity- All statements assert implicit truth value i.e. if I say “I smell violets” that is the same as saying “It is true that I smell violets.” This has a few implications. [A] Double bind—either my you assert the truth value of your indicts to truth testing meaning you implicitly accept truth testing as a paradigm or you don’t assert the truth value of your indicts which means that they are false and truth testing is true anyways [B] Even if we’re losing on the framework debate, their ROTB is going to collapse to truth testing anyways

#### [3] Inclusion: [A] other ROBs open the door for personal lives of debaters to factor into decisions and compare who is more oppressed which causes violence in a space where some people go to escape. [B] Anything can function under truth testing insofar as it proves the resolution either true or false. Specific role of the ballots exclude all offense besides those that follow from their framework which shuts out people without the technical skill or resources to prep for it.

## Part 4 is the Underview

#### [1] Aff gets 1AR theory—they can be infinitely abusive in the NC because I will have no ability to call them out on it. This outweighs any other arguments because there is literally no way for me to win the round without 1ar theory. Also, 1AC and 1AR theory is a reason to drop the debater because the speech is too short to be able to win substance and theory. Also, no neg RVI or new 2nr paradigm issues because it would be impossible to check NC abuse since the 6 min 2N could go all in on theory, disincentivizing 1AR theory. Reject theory and indicts on the aff underview since it would be a contradiction since they indict each other, but prefer mine since they are lexically prior. This means all contradiction flow aff since I spoke first which makes any contradictions their fault. Also no 1NC theory because of the 13-7 skew on theory and they can sandbag in the 1 and 2n. Also, all k links must explicitly quote lines from the 1AC doc in the 1NC because there are an infinite number of things the 1AC can implicitly justify this irreciprocally explodes neg ground. Drop the arg. AFF fairness issues come prior to NC arguments [A] The 1ar can’t engage on multiple layers if there is a skew since the speech is already time-crunched [B] Sets up an invincible 2n since there are a million of unfair things you can collapse to to win every round. Use competing interpretations [A]Reasonability invites judge intervention because there is no set definition for what reasonability is. [B] Reasonability creates a race to the bottom; it incentivizes debaters to become more abusive and put defense on theory.

#### [2] use epistemic modesty- that means compare the probability of the framework times the magnitude of the impact under a framework [A] Substantively true since it maximizes the probability of achieving net most moral value—beating a framework acts as mitigation to their impacts but the strength of that mitigation is contingent. [B] Clash—disincentives debaters from going all in for framework which means we get the ideal balance between topic ed and phil ed—it’s important to talk about contention-level offense

#### [3] The NEG must only gain offense from one piece of unconditional offense on a single layer—they may not read multiple positions or conditional positions. Three warrants. [A] strat skew—the NEG being able to kick multiple positions and collapse to the layer the 1AR inevitably undercovers. [B] Allowing the NEG to read multiple positions spreads my time even thinner worsening time skew. [C] Reciprocity- we only get 1 case position, you should too- links to fairness, b/c it’s the very definition of fairness “Drop the debater” on this interp

#### [4] Permissibility affirms: [A] All obligatory acts are permissible, but no prohibited acts are permissible, so it’s more likely to affirm than negate. [B] The Law of Excluded Middles: if something is not false, it must be true, which means that if something is not prohibited, it must be obligatory, and permissibility is the same as obligatory. [C] Negating an obligation requires a prohibition so neg has to have offense.

Timmons 02 [Mark Timmons. “Moral Theory: An Introduction.” Pg. 8. 2002.] Samuel Azbel

When the term is used broadly, **right action is the opposite of wrong action: an action is right**, in the broad sense of the term, **when it is not wrong. For instance, to say of someone that what she did was right conveys the idea that her act was morally in the clear---that it was alright for her to do,** that what she did was not wrong**. Since actions that are not wrong include the categories of both the obligatory and the optional, talk of right action** (in the broad sense) **covers both of these categories.**

#### [5] To prove a statement false means all possibilities of the statement must be proven false – absent reasons to vote negative, you affirm, because the statement becomes contextually apriori.

Ebbs [Ebbs, Gary. "Putnam and the Contextually A Priori."]

When is it reasonable for us to accept a statement without evidence and hold it immune from disconfirmation? This question lies at the heart of Hilary Putnam's philosophy. He emphasizes that **our beliefs and theories sometimes prevent us from being able to specify how a statement may actually be false, in a sense of “specify” that goes beyond merely negating the statement.** (To save words, from here on I will assume that to specify how a statement may actually be false, one must do more than just negate it.) In the 18th century, for instance, scientists did not have the theoretical understanding necessary to specify how the statement that physical space is Euclidean could be false. Today, however, after Lobachevsky and Riemann discovered non-Euclidean geometries, and Einstein developed his general theory of relativity, scientists believe that physical space is non-Euclidean, and they can specify in rich detail why the statement that physical space is Euclidean is false. This shows that our current inability to specify how a statement may actually be false does not guarantee that we will never be able to **do so.** Nevertheless, when we cannot **specify how a statement may actually be false** it has a special methodological status for us, according to Putnam—it is contextually a priori. **In these circumstances,** he suggests, it is epistemically reasonable for us to accept the statement without evidence and hold it immune from disconfirmation

#### [6] If I win one layer vote aff- [A} The NC is reactive and has the ability to uplayer to exclude or preclude the layer I spend half the round justifying what makes mooting that layer extremely unfair [B] I don’t have time to win multiple layers since I have to preclude your 2n responses, answer nc arguments, and extend my own in a 4 min speech which is near impossible. And, Time skew first a) we can’t make arguments if we don’t have time b) its structural so it frames substantive evaluation

#### [7] All negative arguments presuppose the aff being true. All arguments against the affirmative begin with a descriptive premise about the affirmative, (for example the aff does X), and then justify what is bad. However, if the first premise doesn’t have truth value since the aff is false, this entails that arguing against the aff produces a contradiction.

# 1AR

## Overview [:15]

#### Nukes violate the law of non-contradiction and that’s why we eliminate them- Nukes were meant to be shot and deployed, that’s why ICBMS exist, but their primary objective is to never be shot. They are inextricably linked- their non-usability is because of the consequence of their usability- a contradiction which means we remove them. Furthermore, countries use nukes as a way of maintain sovereignty while at the same time dominating other countries sovereignty using force which is a contradiction- that means you affirm under the standard.

## Indexicals-Framing

#### You’ve conceded Indexicals, the 2-point in framing. It says that even if you win your framing negates you can still vote aff independently on our framing mechanism because they operate logically separate. For example, if I am a Kantian and you are a Utilitarian I can still act under my belief a particular thing is true under Kant even if you claim util is true and it negates because I use a different ethical theory. This means that even if you prove the aff is bad under your framing. We can still have an obligation to do it under the law of non-contradiction which makes the rez true and affirms independently. Also extend that turns and NC offense logically affirm because they are consistent with a standard of the opposite of our or their framework. The opposite of a standard is still a standard and affirms because it proves there exists an obligation under a standard.

## Berti-Framing (presumption trigger)

#### You’ve conceded the Berti evidence- it’s game over. The Law of non-contradiction is a side constraint on argumentation. This is because you can’t have p and not p both be true at the same time. Anybody that accepts contradictions cannot make criticism on other frameworks because that involves using contradictions. Implication is that if contradictions are good/true that means every framework is infallible because contradictions would hold 0 weight in proving the falsity of a framework- impact to this is that both the AC and NC are true at the same time, this means you can’t resolve the round since both are true so vote aff on presumption.

## One Layer

#### IT’S GAME OVER! Extend the 6th spike interp: if I win one-layer vote AFF. there’s two warrants here a.) Reactivity—The NC can up layer the AFF based on what I say meaning I’ll always be at a disadvantage and b.) Time skew- 4 minute 1ar means I’ll never be able to win multiple layers since I have to preempt the 2NR, answer nc arguments, and extend my own arguments. And time skew outweighs because 1. Time is a precondition to argumentation and 2. Time skew is a structural argument meaning it applies more broadly- Even if they are winning on the highest layer, we just have to win one layer and it’s an aff ballot.

## Epistemic Modesty [:25]

#### Extend epistemic modesty, the second spike- we outweigh every time. Violations under the AC standard are infinitely bad and should never be committed as we have to uphold the law of non-contradiction at all times because it’s a precondition for knowledge and concrete objects to exist, that’s the Takho evidence. And since every violation is equally and infinitely bad that means the impact of the 1AC offense is literally infinite. Which means even if we prove a risk of our fw being true, we win under modesty because infinity times any non-zero probability that the framework is true is infinity which means we outweigh in every scenario- easy aff ballot on substance.

## Permissibility [:09]

#### Extend the 3rd spike that says permissibility flows aff. We are going for the Timmons evidence that says negating an obligation requires a prohibition which means all we need to be able to take an action is for it to be is obligated or optional thus actions are right if they are permissible, which means permissibility affirms- that’s the Timmons evidence.

## Presumption [:12]

#### Extend the 4th spike that says presumption flows aff, that’s the ebbs evidence which states that when a statement cannot be fully negated it’s in a state of being contextually apriori which means it can be true in the future which means if you should presume aff- comes lexically prior to any other presumption arguments because it’s a question of epistemology of knowledge- epistemology comes first because it determines how we know what we know.

## Aff Fairness First [:10]

#### Extend the 1st spike, this is a layering argument that says Aff fairness issues come prior to NC arguments because [1] the 1ar can’t engage on multiple layers because of time skew and [2] sets up an invincible 2n where they can sand bag for 6 minutes. This outweighs all NC fairness and education claims which means you evaluate our interps at a higher layer.

## Uncondo [:25]

#### Now, extend the 5th spike that says the neg can only read one unconditional layer. Since this is an Aff fairness issue it comes at the highest layer of the debate. Extend the violation: You read multiple offs, case turns count too since they are another layer of offense you can win on. Extend the 3 standards- [A] they can kick and collapse to one layer that I undercover because of the time crunched 1ar-causes strat skew which links to fairness [B] spreads my time even thinner worsening time skew- which o/w everything because we can’t make arguments without time and [C]one uncondo off is reciprocal because we both get 1 case position- which is the very definition of fairness, proves our interp is net better. Extend drop the debater on this interp. Drop the arg makes no sense, b/c we drop the entire NC which means you still lose. No 2nr responses b/c it violates the contradictions spike which means it’ll be drop the arg on those indicts.

## Metaphysics (work)

#### You’ve conceded the metaphysics warrant for the standard. The AC standard is a prerequisite to concrete material objects and knowledge. Matter is literally constrained by the law of non-contradiction which means the AC standard has to be true, absent that there is no matter or knowledge so just presume affirmative.

## AFC

#### Extend the 4 point on framing: If the affirmative reads a standard of consistency with the law of non-contradiction the negative must concede to the aff standard. It’s game over- you violated the interp by contesting the AC framework, extend the standard which is resolvability. Answering the framework would prove contradictions good which means that the judge can’t evaluate the round since it becomes incoherent. Resolvability accesses a higher layer than fairness or education because we can’t get those absent the judge making a decision- which means the standard outweighs and comes lexically prior. Extend drop the debater- they conceded we get drop the debater on 1AC theory from the Underview because the 1AR is too short to win on substance and theory- easy aff ballot on this top level issue.

## Contradictions [:18]

#### Extend the 1st spike that says reject all indicts and theory on the aff underview because it creates a contradiction. You indict the spikes, but this interp indicts those indictments so it’s contradiction. And, contradiction flows aff because I spoke first which makes the contradiction their fault. Now extend the fact that you prefer my interp because it comes lexically prior- which takes out all their indicts on the Underview. Extend drop the arg. Also, no new 2NR responses, [1] time crunches my 2ar, causes time skew [2] it’s your duty to answer arguments in the 1st speech [3] the implication was clear in the 1AC so nothing was unclear [4] contradictions would take out those new responses.

## A2 K

#### Let me weigh the aff against the K – anything else moots 6 minutes of offense causing a 13-7 skew, and shifts the goalposts, preventing me from rearticulating offense in the round.

#### [1] No link- Cross Apply the 1st spike. All K links must quote explicit lines from the 1AC in the 1NC b/c the 1AC implicitly justifies a bajillion things. It’s drop the K on this spike. No 2NR responses or extrapolations of even the link story b/c it [1] time crunches my 2AR worsening time skew and that outweighs because we can’t make arguments without time and [2] still doesn’t meet the interp b/c you didn’t do it in the 1NC.

#### [2] The K can’t operate without the AC framing- that’s the Takho evidence. If material objects exists like how the K talks about \_\_\_\_\_, that can only be true insofar as the AC standard is true. We can’t have or accept contradictions because that would mean that concrete objects wouldn’t exist and neither would knowledge writ at large- means we are the internal link to the K- If the aff is false, the K has to be false which means you should affirm on presumption

## A2 Comp Worlds

#### I don’t have to win truth testing for my offense to function. Contradictions are a side constraint to the existence of a preferable world since a. living in a world with contradictions justifies anything (ie saying racism bad and practicing slavery) b. contradictions are net worse in any world since it prevents the creation of some form of knowledge or coherent action which means any reason the neg produces a contradiction in conception is sufficient to affirm even absent truth testing.

## A2 I get new responses

#### [1] Reject new responses- Time crunches my 2ar and makes collapsing infintely harder because you can spend way more time in the 2n responding to arguments you dropped- time skew outweighs because time is a pre-condition to argumentation and It causes strat-skew making the 2ar having to split between collapsing and making new interactions with your responses- they conceded aff fairness issues come prior to nc arguments so fairness and strat skew outweigh and come lexically prior.

## A2 New Affs Bad

#### Counter Interpretation: Affs can read New affirmatives if they disclose the standard text

#### Innovation – New affs are key to actual debates, having to fully disclose kills incentive to read new arguments

# Truth Testing

## Overview

#### The Roll of the Ballot is to test the truth or falsity of the resolution. First is a weighing argument. Descriptive arguments precede and outweigh all normative arguments because the normative claim doesn’t matter if its descriptive nature is false. It’s epistemologically useless. That means if I win any descriptive reasons as to why truth testing is true it moots all normative offense on truth testing.

### Grammar

#### Extend the 1st grammar warrant which says that we are textually bound to truth testing because that’s what we are definitionally entailed to do. Thus, rejecting truth testing is rejecting grammar which is the basis for language and argumentation-the impact is not being able to communicate and thus you extricate yourself from the debate because communication is a prerequisite. That’s an independent voter and you should automatically affirm because they aren’t truth testing the rez. Grammar Outweighs everything b/c we can’t have debate without it- implication is that you don’t evaluate the 1nc and 2nr because they extricated themselves from the round. Also extend the jurisdiction argument- we are textually bound to truth test because it’s what we are jurisdictionally tied to- outweighs on predictability since we know what our roles are before the round starts- anything is else is arbitrary and self serving.

### Necessity

#### Extend the necessity warrant which says that all statements collapse to truth or falsity. A couple massive implications. When you assert indicts against truth testing you implicitly assert a truth value. This means your indicts to truth testing cede the validity of truth testing, hijacks your ROTB and indicts. OR you don’t assert the truth value of your indicts which mean your indicts are false. This takes out ALL offense on truth testing.

### Inclusion

#### Extend the Inclusion warrant- TT doesn’t require debaters to speak from personal identity or positions they don’t know or understand or have an outside perspective on since any offense can function under it and thus you can do what your good at and I can do what I can---inclusion turns your ROB since if I can’t engage in the debate there’s no value to your ROB

## Frontlines

### A2 Judge vote on Non-T aff

#### [1] literally proves nothing. This argument just shows that it’s possible to break jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is not something that is impossible to break. Police Officers break jurisdiction but at that point they aren't acting like officers- it’s a question of what you are allowed to do in the debate space.

#### [2] that means you weren’t even debating LD, that round was defective. You haven’t met the constitutive aim of LD. It’s intrinsic to the activity.

### A2 Allows for NIBS

#### [1] Non-Uq. Debate already has a bunch of Nibs. Speaking, being topical, being present.

#### [3] Appeals to education/fairness don’t outweigh the rules of the game as they are absolute. Just because you think being able to move a pawn 3 spaces forward is better for education/fairness and makes the game more fair doesn’t mean anything, the rules are absolute.

### A2 Reciprocity

#### [1] Maximizes ground for both sides – aff just has to prove one instance of moral obligation neg just has to prove this instance false.

#### [2] No sidestepping of offense – we are literally just proving the rez true

### A2 Clash

#### [1] Nonunique: Clash is still present in TT: we just debate on the truth or falsity of the resolution doesn’t incentivize less clash we still have to clash on the framework debate

#### [2] Turn Clash: Comparative Worlds kills any clash that we have because you just weigh risk of offense off some impossible extinction scenario which avoids real discussion- empirically proven by debaters reading a crapload of disads.

#### [3] Turn education: TT is key to education it allows us to have discussions about moral obligations which enforces strong phil debates by proving the truth or falsity of the rez, phil debates outweighs – it’s the only constitutive feature of debate i.e. the ought in the res

### A2 N-Word

#### [1] Non-Uq, Comparative worlds is only post-fiat which means it can’t indict in round actions

#### [2] Fairness is a meta-constraint on truth, so that solves for the rhetoric argument.

#### [3] Non-Uq- you win in basketball by scoring more points, but if Anthony Davis beats Kawhi he’s getting DQ’d. Means we can still use truth testing, and if someone decides to be an ass we take them out of the round which means they logically auto-drop- solves all their offense on truth testing

### CW Bad

#### [1] Education- excludes all but consequentialist positions, means you exclude a bunch of educational phil their- Truth Testing allows for any argument, means we are more inclusive and educational. Also- they are more inaccessible- ew debate phil analytically whereas with larp big schools can afford to bypass firewalls and have a crap ton more evidence- means we are key to inclusion which means we are normatively better.

### Overing

#### [1] Nonsense- your ROB can’t account for what judges do when a competitor punches their opponent. It’s impossible to account for everything

#### [2] TT accounts- You’d lose because exclusion doesn’t say the res is a good idea- just that you