# 1NC

I can’t believe I found a topic link either.



## Sad Boi

### 1NC

#### Welcome to Anthropocene where in the words of incredulous hippy Roy Scranton “We’re fucked, the only question is how soon and how badly.” We are far past discussions of prevention the only question left to 21st century politics is that of adaption.

**Scranton 15**, [God this guy is depressing], *Learning to die in the Anthropocene,* [https://aaaaarg.fail/upload/roy-scranton-learning-to-die-in-the-anthropocene-reflections-on-the-end-of-a-civilization.pdf] //GrouchoMarxist

On the civilian side, the World Bank’s 2013 report, Turn Down the Heat: Climate Extremes, Regional Impacts, and the Case for Resilience, and their 2014 follow-up Confronting the New Climate Normal, offer dire prognoses for the effects of global warming, which climatologists now predict will raise global temperatures 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit above pre-industrial levels within a generation and 7.2 degrees Fahrenheit within 90 years. 6 As hotter temperatures liquefy glaciers and ice sheets from Greenland to Antarctica, all that melted ice flows into the sea: Some worst-case estimates suggest we might see seven or eight feet of sea level rise as soon as 2040. 7 The collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet alone, already underway, will eventually raise sea levels by as much as twenty feet. 8 As glaciers and ice sheets melt, so too will carbon and methane long frozen in seabeds and permafrost. As a greenhouse gas, methane is more than twenty times more powerful than carbon dioxide, and thousands of gigatons of the stuff lies locked under the oceans in clathrate hydrates, waiting to be released: “These solid, ice-like structures are stable only under specific conditions,” writes oceanographer John Kessler, “and are estimated to contain a quantity of methane roughly equal in magnitude to the sum of all fossil fuel reservoirs on Earth.” 9 Methane-rich sinkholes have appeared in Siberia and methane bubbles have been tracked leaking from the floor of the Arctic Ocean, possibly signaling the beginning of a massive planetary “belch” capable of generating catastrophic runaway greenhouse effects. 10 As geophysicist David Archer warns, “The potential for planetary devastation posed by the methane hydrate reservoir . . . seems comparable to the destructive potential from nuclear winter or from a comet or asteroid impact.” 11 **We’re fucked. The only questions are how soon and how badly**. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) 2014 report on climate impacts cautions: “Without additional mitigation efforts beyond those in place today, and even with adaptation, warming by the end of the 21st century will lead to high to very high risk of severe, widespread, and irreversible impacts globally.” 12 According to the World Bank, 2.7 degrees Fahrenheit of warming now appears inevitable, even if we were to stop emitting carbon dioxide (CO2 ) worldwide right now. 13 Projections from researchers at the University of Hawai‘i find us dealing with “historically unprecedented” climates as soon as 2047. 14 Climate scientist James Hansen, formerly with NASA, has argued that we face an “apocalyptic” future—a bleak view that is seconded by researchers worldwide. 15 This chorus of Cassandras predicts a radically changing global climate causing widespread upheaval, and their visions of doom are backed by an overwhelming preponderance of hard data. Global warming is not the latest version of a hoary fable of annihilation. It is not hysteria. It is a fact. And we have likely already passed the point where we could have done anything about it. From the perspective of many policy experts, climate scientists, and national security officials, the concern is not whether global warming exists or how we might prevent it, but how we are going to adapt to life in the hot, volatile world we’ve created. There is a name for this new world: the Anthropocene. The word comes from ancient Greek. All the epochs of the most recent geological era (the Cenozoic) end in the suffix “-cene,” from kainós, meaning new. Anthropos means human. The idea behind the term “Anthropocene” is that we have entered a new epoch in Earth’s geological history, one characterized by the advent of the human species as a geological force. 16 The biologist Eugene F. Stoermer and the Nobel-winning chemist Paul Crutzen advanced the term in 2000, and it has gained acceptance as evidence has grown that the changes wrought by global warming will affect not only the world’s climate and biodiversity, but its very geological structure, and not just for centuries, but for millennia. 17 In the prophetic words of William Blake, written at the dawn of the carbon era more than two hundred years ago, “The generations of men run on in the tide of Time / But leave their destin’d lineaments permanent for ever and ever.” 18 The International Commission on Stratigraphy, the geologists responsible for driving the “golden spikes” that demarcate different geological periods, have adopted the Anthropocene as a term deserving further consideration, “significant on the scale of Earth history,” and are discussing what level of geological time-scale it might be and at what date we might say it began. 19 Is it an “epoch” like the Holocene, or merely an “age” like the Calabrian? Did it start with the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, around 1800, or during the Great Acceleration in the middle of the 20th century? With the dawn of agriculture, 12,000 years ago, or on July 16, 1945, with the first atomic bomb? 20 Whenever it began, it is the world we now live in. Within a few generations we will face average temperatures 7 degrees Fahrenheit warmer than they are today, rising seas at least three to ten feet higher, and worldwide shifts in crop belts, growing seasons, and population centers. Unless we stop emitting greenhouse gases wholesale now, humans will within a couple hundred years be living in a climate the Earth hasn’t seen since the Pliocene, three million years ago, when oceans were 75 feet higher. Once the methane hydrates under the oceans and permafrost begin to melt, we may soon find ourselves living in a hothouse climate closer to that of the Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, approximately 56 million years ago, when the planet was ice-free and tropical at the poles. We face the imminent collapse of the agricultural, shipping, and energy networks upon which the global economy depends, a large-scale die-off in the biosphere that’s already well under way, and our own possible extinction as a species. If Homo sapiens survives the next millennium, it will be survival in a world unrecognizably different from the one we have known for the last 200,000 years. In order for us to adapt to this strange new world, we’re going to need more than scientific reports and military policy. We’re going to need new ideas. We’re going to need new myths and new stories, a new conceptual understanding of reality, and a new relationship to the deep polyglot traditions of human culture that carbon-based capitalism has vitiated through commodification and assimilation. Over and against capitalism, we will need a new way of thinking our collective existence. We need a new vision of who “we” are. We need a new humanism—a newly philosophical humanism, undergirded by renewed attention to the humanities. Admittedly, ocean acidification, social upheaval, and species extinction are problems that humanities scholars, with their taste for fine-grained philological analysis, esoteric debates, and archival marginalia, might seem remarkably ill-suited to address. After all, how will thinking about Kant or Frantz Fanon help us trap carbon dioxide? Can arguments between object-oriented ontology and historical materialism protect honeybees from colony collapse disorder? Are ancient Greek philosophers, medieval poets, and contemporary metaphysicians going to save Bangladesh from being inundated by the Indian Ocean? Perhaps not. But the conceptual and existential problems that the Anthropocene poses are precisely those that have always been at the heart of humanistic inquiry: What does it mean to be human? What does it mean to live? What is truth? What is good? In the world of the Anthropocene, the question of individual mortality—What does my life mean in the face of death?—is universalized and framed in scales that boggle the imagination. 21 As environmental philosopher Dale Jamieson puts it, “The Anthropocene presents novel challenges for living a meaningful life.” 22 Historian and theorist Dipesh Chakrabarty has claimed that global warming “calls us to visions of the human that neither rights talk nor the critique of the subject ever contemplated.” 23 Whether we are talking about ethics or politics, ontology or epistemology, confronting the end of the world as we know it dramatically challenges our learned perspectives and ingrained priorities. What does consumer choice mean compared against 100,000 years of ecological catastrophe? What does one life mean in the face of mass death or the collapse of global civilization? How do we make meaningful decisions in the shadow of our inevitable end? These questions have no logical or empirical answers. They cannot be graphed or quantified. They are philosophical problems par excellence. If, as Montaigne asserted, “To philosophize is to learn how to die,” then we have entered humanity’s most philosophical age, for this is precisely the problem of the Anthropocene. 24 The rub now is that we have to learn to die not as individuals, but as a civilization. Learning to die isn’t easy. In Iraq, at the beginning, I was terrified by the idea. Baghdad seemed crazily dangerous, even though statistically I was relatively safe. We got shot at, mortared, and blown up by IEDs, but we wore high-tech ballistic armor, we had great medics, and we were part of the most powerful military the world had ever seen. 25 The odds were good that I would come home, maybe wounded, but probably alive. Yet every day I drove out past the wire on mission, I looked in my Humvee’s mirror and saw a dark, empty hole. “For the soldier death is the future, the future his profession assigns him,” wrote Simone Weil in her 1939 meditation on war, The Iliad, or the Poem of Force. “Yet the idea of man’s having death for a future is abhorrent to nature. Once the experience of war makes visible the possibility of death that lies locked up in each moment, our thoughts cannot travel from one day to the next without meeting death’s face.” 26 I recognized that face in the dark of my Humvee’s mirror. Its gaze almost paralyzed me. I found my way forward through an old book: Yamamoto Tsunetomo’s 18th-century Samurai manual, the Hagakure, which advised: “Meditation on inevitable death should be performed daily.” 27 I took that advice to heart, and instead of fearing my end, I practiced owning it. Every morning, after doing maintenance on my Humvee, I would imagine getting blown up, shot, lit on fire, run over by a tank, torn apart by dogs, captured and beheaded. Then, before we rolled out through the wire, I’d tell myself that I didn’t need to worry anymore because I was already dead. The only thing that mattered was that I did my best to make sure everyone else came back alive. To survive as a soldier, I had to learn to accept the inevitability of my own death. For humanity to survive in the Anthropocene, we need to learn to live with and through the end of our current civilization. Change, risk, conflict, strife, and death are the very processes of life, and we cannot avoid them. We must learn to accept and adapt. The human psyche naturally rebels against the idea of its end. Likewise, civilizations have throughout history marched blindly toward disaster, because humans are wired to believe that tomorrow will be much like today. It is hard work for us to remember that this way of life, this present moment, this order of things is not stable and permanent. Across the world today, our actions testify to our belief that we can go on like we are forever: burning oil, poisoning the seas, killing off other species, pumping carbon into the air, ignoring the ominous silence of our coalmine canaries in favor of the unending robotic tweets of our new digital imaginarium. Yet the reality of global climate change is going to keep intruding on our collective fantasies of perpetual growth, constant innovation, and endless energy, just as the reality of individual mortality shocks our casual faith in permanence. The greatest challenge the Anthropocene poses isn’t how the Department of Defense should plan for resource wars, whether we should put up sea walls to protect Manhattan, or when we should abandon Miami. It won’t be addressed by buying a Prius, turning off the air conditioning, or signing a treaty. The greatest challenge we face is a philosophical one: understanding that this civilization is already dead. The sooner we confront our situation and realize that there is nothing we can do to save ourselves, the sooner we can get down to the difficult task of adapting, with mortal humility, to our new reality.

#### The 1AC is a fantasy created as a substitution for the disappearance of manageable disasters. The process of risk-calculus is overloaded by ecological degradation and therefore demands the hyper-focus on and subsequent purification of individual bodies so the Mega-Machine can justify it’s continued existence.

**Williams & Calnan ’96**, *THE 'LIMITS' OF MEDICALIZATION?: MODERN MEDICINE AND THE LAY POPULACE IN 'LATE' MODERNITY,* (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8783424) //GrouchoMarxist **[BRACKETS IN THE ORIGNAL TEXT]**

In addition to its socially reflexive character, life in late modernity is increasingly organized around the concept of'risk'. Clearly life has always been a 'risky' business, but the nature, scope and dimensions of contemporary risks have all profoundly altered. Whilst misfortunes and disasters in pre-industrial times were attributed to fate(s), God(s) or natural disasters, modern risks are increasingly the product of human interventions of many different sorts-- what Giddens refers to as the "manufactured' risks and uncertainties of modern social life. For example, as Armstrong [36] argues, whilst health risks in the nineteenth century were located in the ~natural environment', today the 'environmental' factors which impinge upon our health, such as acid rain and radiation, are the product of human intervention. In this respect, whilst the risks of the past could be attributed to the under-supply of (hygienic) technology, today they are the product of industrial over-production; something which is systematically intensified as a consequence of the globalizing process [4] (p. 4). Moreover, whilst the nature and extent of modern risks vary, they cannot simply be understood in class terms. Rather, in 'risk' society we are all ultimately confronted with a similar fate from which it is difficult if not impossible to escape. As Beck puts it: 'poverty is hierachic, smog is democratic'. In this sense, risks display a 'boomerang effect' in which even the rich and powerful are ultimately not safe. As a consequence, slowly but surely, a 'victimization by risk' is beginning to take place. Risk, therefore, becomes a fundamental existential parameter of life in late modernity, structuring the way in which experts and lay people alike organize their social worlds. As Beck argues, not only does modernity create risks through our ways of living, working, systems of transportation and the like, it also seeks to compensate for them by means of calculation and political regulation. Indeed, in an increasingly 'decisionist' culture, the profiling of risks becomes an important means of colonizing the future, instilling a sense of calculability in what is fast becoming a 'runaway world'. Yet risk assessment is, by definition, imperfect. As such it contains many imponderables, not least because its central locus lies in the future. Indeed, in many respects, the nature of modern risks--including nuclear, chemical, genetic and **ecological mega-hazards--abolishes the 'calculus of risk'**; there are simply no statistical bases for their calculation. Moreover, not only does the location of blame or culpability become increasingly difficult, but the calculation of single risks fails to take account of their aggregate or multiplicative effects. 'Dangers' lurk everywhere, from the threat of nuclear warfare and ecological catastrophe, to the 'risks' of modern medical technology, coronary heart disease and 'unsafe' sexual contact. This growing sense of risk also contributes to heightened levels of anxiety which are condensed around the body and its boundaries. In this sense, **the 'policing'** and control **of the physical body effect a symbolic** or metaphorical **resolution of threats located in the social body**. Indeed, as Kroker and Kroker [59] argue within the context of AIDS, 'panic' bodies begin to emerge involving a form of'Body McCarthyism' which seeks to distinguish between the 'clean' and 'unclean' according to the 'purity' of bodily fluids. In particular, they note a striking resemblance between medical and military rhetoric in relation to AIDS; drawing parallels between the fear of AIDS and a generalized fear of the breakdown of immunological systems. In short, as Turner argues: The body has once more become apocalyptic given the threat of chemical warfare, the destruction of the natural habitat, the epidemic of HIV and AIDS, the greying of the populations of northern Europe and the apparent inability of national governments to control medical research and technology [60] (p. 24). Given the largely invisible nature of modern risks, knowledge becomes a crucial resource through which the perception of risk is filtered, and the divisions between social and scientific rationality become ever more apparent as social movements raise issues which are not addressed by experts and vice versa. Indeed, as Beck argues, the sciences are incapable of reacting adequately to the risks of late modernity since **they are** prominently involved in **the origin** and growth **of these very risks**. Instead, they become the 'legitimating patrons' of a global industrial pollution and contamination of air, water, foodstuffs and the sickness and death of plants, animals and humans [4] (p. 59). In this sense, lay consciousness and public perceptions of the risks of modernization and modern social institutions, including modern medicine, has established itself against the resistance of scientific rationality. In other words, as Beck suggests; "...the history of the growing consciousness and social recognition of risks coincides with the history of the demystification of science" [4] (p. 59). As such, official pronouncements about risk and safety increasingly fail to allay public anxieties; indeed they may have the very opposite effect. Yet social and scientific rationality are also closely interwoven as technical discussions of risk rely on social expectations and value judgements, whilst social discussions and perceptions of risk increasingly come to depend upon scientific evidence and arguments. In short: "Public criticism and disquiet derive essentially from a dialectic ofexpertize and counter expertize" [4] (p. 59). Certainly, as discussed earlier, there is evidence to suggest an increasing degree of 'ambivalence' amongst the lay populace regarding the risks and benefits of modern medicine. Here common concerns include the danger of side-effects, the problems of addiction and dependence, the risks of technological interventions, and the moral and philosophical issues which are raised by medical 'progress'. At another level, it is also clear that a considerable degree of scepticism exists concerning the the legitimacy and relevance of much so-called 'expert' advice on health and lifestyles. Indeed, as Davison and colleagues [61, 62] have convincingly argued, health promotion advice which is based upon notions of 'predictability', 'regularity' and 'certainty' is likely to be counter-productive as it does not readily fit with the beliefs found in popular culture, nor with observations based upon lay epidemiological reasoning that, to paraphrase, fat smokers live to a 'ripe old age' whilst lithe joggers really do 'drop down dead!' (i.e. the 'prevention paradox'). In this respect it is clear that lay perceptions of risk are part and parcel of complex social processes which are not necessarily 'rational' in the scientific sense of the word. Rather, the perception of what constitutes a 'risk' is intimately bound up with people's cultural beliefs, moral values, personal feelings and the social and material circumstances of their lives. Moreover, not only do lay perceptions of risk differ from those held by professionals (i.e. the asymmetry or dialectic of social and scientific rationality discussed above), they may also vary within different segments of the lay populace and according to the competing priorities and material constraints of everyday life. In short, growing public concern about the risks of modern medicine, as well as more general anxieties about the dangers to health of life in late modernity, look set to continue as the 'balance' between (active) trust and (radical) doubt becomes ever more precarious and faith in (medical) 'experts' is slowly eroded in an increasingly reflexive social order. As Giddens puts it: Widespread lay knowledge of modern risk environments leads to an awareness of the limits of expertise and forms one of the 'public relations' problems that has to be faced by those who seek to sustain lay trust in expert systems...[R]ealisation of the areas of ignorance which confront experts themselves, as individual practitioners and in terms of overall fields of knowledge, may weaken or undermine that faith on the part of lay individuals...[I]n this case what is in question is not only the limits of or gaps in, expert knowledge, but an inadequacy which compromises the very idea of expertise [1] (pp. 130-131).

#### The collapse of the eco-system creates a global panic which demands the creation and subsequent destruction of a feared other. The Mega-Machine traps fear and anxiety within an infinite feedback loop that controls the root cause of modern violence.

**Scranton 1**, [God this guy is depressing], *Learning to die in the Anthropocene,* [https://aaaaarg.fail/upload/roy-scranton-learning-to-die-in-the-anthropocene-reflections-on-the-end-of-a-civilization.pdf] //GrouchoMarxist [We do not endorse anthropocentric language]

When it comes to global warming, differing visions of the human future are already hardening into conflict. Coal and oil companies and their government proxies have made their willingness to use military force to defend themselves and advance their interests spectacularly obvious. The labor wars of the 19th and 20th centuries show this clearly. The brutal decades-long war waged by the Nigerian government against its own people, undertaken with the outright support of Shell and Chevron, is another example, well documented in books such as A Year and a Day and Genocide in Nigeria by Ken Saro-Wiwa, who was executed for his activism. You’ve heard the call: We have to do something. We need to fight. We need to identify the enemy and go after them. Some respond, march, and chant. Some look away, deny what’s happening, and search out escape routes into imaginary tomorrows: a life off the grid, space colonies, immortality in paradise, explicit denial, or consumer satiety in a wireless, robot-staffed, 3D-printed techno-utopia. Meanwhile, the rich take shelter in their fortresses, trusting to their air conditioning, private schools, and well-paid guards. Fight. Flight. Flight. Fight. The threat of death activates our deepest ~~animal~~ drives. The aggression and fear that arise in response to perceived threats are some of the most intense emotions we ever experience. For human society to function at all, these instinctive reactions have to be carefully managed and channeled. Outbreaks of panic and hate are dangerous, but lower levels of aggression and fear help keep a population controllable and productive. Restrained aggression keeps people suspicious of collective action and working hard to overcome their fellows, while constant, generalized anxiety keeps people servile, unwilling to take risks, and yearning for comfort from whatever quarter, whether the dulling sameness of herd thought or the dumb security of consumer goods. Since at least September 11, 2001, people in the United States have been subject to an unprecedented terror campaign—not from Al Qaeda, but from the United States government. National domestic policy transformed “security” into constant fear, threatening its citizens at every turn: first with alarms of explosions and anthrax, then with prison, austerity-produced structural unemployment, and harassment, and finally with torture, SWAT tanks, snipers, drones, and total surveillance. Owing to the racial logic of US politics, in which white/black is the definitive semiotic distinction structuring American society, most of the government’s violence against its own citizens is directed against those with darker skin, but in subtler ways its terror campaign targets every single person who flies coach, watches the news, or uses the Internet. Fear comes to us every day in our encounters with increasingly militarized police and our humiliating interactions at metal detectors and body-scan machines. Fear comes to us in the absence of job security, in our want of appeal when confronted by institutionalized inequality, and in our mistrust of corrupt institutions. Fear comes to us in widespread surveillance, in the form of a homeless woman or a hospitalized friend without adequate financial support, and in the constant nagging worry that we’re not working hard enough, not happy enough, never going to “make it.” Fear comes to us in weather porn, unpredictable shifts in formerly stable climate dynamics, and massive storms. More than in any other way, fear comes to us in images and messages, as social media vibrations, products of cultural technologies that we have interpolated into our lives. Going about our daily business, we receive constant messages of apprehension and danger, ubiquitous warnings, insistent needling jabs to the deep lizard brain. Somebody died. Something blew up. Something might blow up. Somebody attacked somebody. Somebody killed somebody. Guns. Crime. Immigrants. Terrorists. Arabs. Mexicans. White supremacists. Killer cops. Demonic thugs. Rape. Murder. Global warming. Ebola. ISIS. Death. Death. Death. Sociologist Tom Pyszczynski writes: “People will do almost anything to avoid being afraid. When, despite the best efforts, [fear and anxiety] do break through, people go to incredible lengths to shut them down.” 88 Sometimes when these vibrations shake us, we discharge them by passing them on, retweeting the story, reposting the video, hoping that others will validate our reaction, thus assuaging our fear by assuring ourselves that collective attention has been alerted to the threat. Other times we react with aversion, working to dampen the vibrations by searching out positive reinforcements, pleasurable images and videos, something funny, something—anything—to ease the fear. We buy something. We eat food. We pop a pill. We fuck. In either passing on the vibration or reacting against it, we let the fear short circuit our own autonomous desires, diverting us from our goals and loading ever more emotional static into our daily cognitive processing. We become increasingly distracted from our ambitions and increasingly susceptible to such distraction. And whether we retransmit or react, we reinforce channels of thought, perception, behavior, and emotion that, over time, come to shape our habits and our personality. As we train ourselves to resonate fear and aggression, we reinforce patterns of thought and feeling that shape a society that breeds the same. Fight-or-flight is compelling because it serves essential evolutionary purposes. It increases alertness and adrenaline flow, and generally works to keep the human animal alive. As we proceed into the Anthropocene, though, capitalism’s cultural machinery for balancing fear and aggression against desire and pleasure is grinding and sputtering sparks. What cultural theorist Lauren Berlant has identified as the “cruel optimism” of a system sustained by hopes that can never be fulfilled mixes dangerously with an atmosphere of beleaguered anxiety, increasing frustration with working-class and middle-class economic stagnation, and a pervasive sadistic voyeurism that grows by what it feeds on. 89 While America’s fraying social infrastructure holds together, our fear and aggression can be channeled into labor, consumption, and economic competition, with professional sports, hyperviolent television, and occasional protests to let off steam. Once the social fabric begins to tear, though, we risk unleashing not only rioting, rebellion, and civil war, but homicidal politics the likes of which should make our blood run cold. Consider: Once among the most modern, Westernized nations in the Middle East, with a robust, highly educated middle class, Iraq has been blighted for decades by imperialist aggression, criminal gangs, interference in its domestic politics, economic liberalization, and sectarian feuding. Today it is being torn apart between a corrupt petrocracy, a breakaway Kurdish enclave, and a self-declared Islamic fundamentalist caliphate, while a civil war in neighboring Syria spills across its borders. These conflicts have likely been caused in part and exacerbated by the worst drought the Middle East has seen in modern history. Since 2006, Syria has been suffering crippling water shortages that have, in some areas, caused 75 percent crop failure and wiped out 85 percent of livestock, left more than 800,000 Syrians without a livelihood, and sent hundreds of thousands of impoverished young men streaming into Syria’s cities. 90 This drought is part of long-term warming and drying trends that are transforming the Middle East. 91 Not just water but oil, too, is elemental to these conflicts. Iraq sits on the fifth-largest proven oil reserves in the world. Meanwhile, the Islamic State has been able to survive only because it has taken control of most of Syria’s oil and gas production. We tend to think of climate change and violent religious fundamentalism as isolated phenomena, but as Retired Navy Rear Admiral David Titley argues, “you can draw a very credible climate connection to this disaster we call ISIS right now.” 92 A few hundred miles away, Israeli soldiers spent the summer of 2014 killing Palestinians in Gaza. Israel has also been suffering drought, while Gaza has been in the midst of a critical water crisis exacerbated by Israel’s military aggression. The International Committee for the Red Cross reported that during summer 2014, Israeli bombers targeted Palestinian wells and water infrastructure. 93 It’s not water and oil this time, but water and gas: some observers argue that Israel’s “Operation Protective Edge” was intended to establish firmer control over the massive Leviathan natural gas field, discovered off the coast of Gaza in the eastern Mediterranean in 2010. 94 Meanwhile, thousands of miles to the north, Russian-backed separatists fought fascist paramilitary forces defending the elected government of Ukraine, which was also suffering drought. 95 Russia’s role as an oil and gas exporter in the region and the natural gas pipelines running through Ukraine from Russia to Europe cannot but be key issues in the conflict. Elsewhere, droughts in 2014 sent refugees from Guatemala and Honduras north to the US border, devastated crops in California and Australia, and threatened millions of lives in Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Afghanistan, India, Morocco, Pakistan, and parts of China. Across the world, massive protests and riots have swept Bosnia and Herzegovina, Venezuela, Brazil, Turkey, Egypt, and Thailand, while conflicts rage on in Colombia, Libya, the Central African Republic, Sudan, Nigeria, Yemen, and India. And while the world burns, the United States has been playing chicken with Russia over control of Eastern Europe and the melting Arctic, and with China over control of Southeast Asia and the South China Sea, threatening global war on a scale not seen in seventy years. This is our present and future: droughts and hurricanes, refugees and border guards, war for oil, water, gas, and food. We experience this world of strife today in one of two modes: either it is our environment, and we are in it, or it comes to us as images, social excitation, retransmitted fear. People are fighting and dying in ruined cities all over the planet. Neighbors are killing each other. Old women are bleeding to death in bombed rubble and children are being murdered, probably as you read this sentence. To live in that world is horrific. Constant danger strains every nerve. The only things that matter are survival, killing the enemy, reputation, and having a safe place to sleep. The experience of being human narrows to a cutting edge. I remember living in that world many years ago in occupied Baghdad. Today that world seems impossibly distant, yet every day it presses in on me in a never-ending stream of words, images, appeals, and reports. I see videos. I read stories. I see pictures of this or that suffering or injustice and I am moved. To act, perhaps, but more accurately to emote. To react. To feel. To perform. We do not usually ask where these feelings come from or who they serve, but we all know that the cultural technologies transmitting these affective vibrations are not neutral: news outlets shape information to fit their owners’ prejudices, while Facebook, Twitter, and Google shape our perceptions through hidden algorithms. The specialization and demographic targeting of contemporary media tend to narrow the channels of perception to the point that we receive only those images and vibrations which already harmonize with our own prejudices, our own pre-existing desires, thus intensifying our particular emotional reactions along an increasingly limited band, impelling us to discharge our emotions within the same field of ready listeners, for which we are rewarded with “Likes” and “Favorites.” Our consciousness is shaped daily through feedback systems where some post or headline provokes a feeling and we discharge that feeling by provoking it in others. Social media like Facebook crowdsource catharsis, creating self-contained wave pools of aggression and fear, pity and terror, stagnant flows that go nowhere and do nothing. Pictures of children killed by bombs or police, or pictures of the devastation left in the wake of a tropical storm may move me to sadness and horror. Retransmitting such images will pass along that sadness and horror. My act of transmission will mark me as someone who has feelings about these things and who condemns them. I can rationalize my retransmission by saying that I am “raising awareness” or trying to influence public policy: I want my fellow citizens to be as horrified as I am, so they’ll think like I do, or so they’ll vote for a representative who works to prevent such horrors from happening, or maybe so that if enough of us all think the same way and feel the same way, the organs and institutions of power will be forced to hear us and align themselves along our vibrations, **the way a honeybee colony will pick a site for a new hive through the dance of its advance guard scouts**. These are perfectly reasonable human assumptions, because that is how physical human collectives function. Anyone who has been in a crowd, a basketball team, a nightclub, a choir, or a protest knows how bodies resonate together. But politics is the energetic distribution of bodies in systems, and we live in a system of carbon-fueled capitalism that we shouldn’t expect to work in physical human ways for several reasons, especially when it comes to responding to the threat of global warming. First, our political and social media technologies are not neutral, but have been developed to serve particular interests, most notably targeted advertising, concentration of wealth, and ideological control, and the vibrations that seem to resonate most strongly along these channels are envy, adulation, outrage, fear, hatred, and mindless pleasure. Second, the more we pass on or react to social vibrations, the more we strengthen our habits of channeling and the less we practice autonomous reflection or independent critical thought. With every protest chant, retweet, and Facebook post, we become stronger resonators and weaker thinkers. Third, however intense our social vibrations grow, they remain locked within machinery that offers no political leverage: they do not translate into political action, because they do not connect to the flows of power. Finally, while the typical collective human response to threat is to identify an enemy, pick sides, and mobilize to fight, global warming offers no apprehensible foe. That hasn’t stopped people from trying to find one. The Flood Wall Street protesters say the enemy is American corporations. Tanzania’s Jakaya Kikwete and Nauru’s Baron Waqa say the problem is the United States and Great Britain. Shell Oil and the Environmental Defense Fund seem to think that it’s intractable UN bureaucracy that’s holding us up. Barack Obama has implied that it’s China. Tea Party Republicans would blame Barack Obama, I’m sure, if they admitted that global warming was actually happening and caused by human activity. Meanwhile, NPR-listening liberals want to believe that Tea Party Republicans are responsible, so that they can frame the problem as one amenable to solution by moral education and enlightened consumerism, as if it were all a matter of convincing people to eat more kale and drive electric cars. One climate activist has argued that just 90 companies are responsible for almost two-thirds of all historical greenhouse gas emissions, which conveniently absolves billions of automobile drivers, airline passengers, meat eaters, and cellphone users of responsibility. 96 The enemy isn’t out there somewhere—the enemy is ourselves. Not as individuals, but as a collective.

#### The alternative is to learn how to die. Vote neg place mortality at the center of our politics. Learning to die places us within the archive of human history enabling the possibility of a future for humanity by generating obligation to the generations that will surpass us. This isn’t utopian or nihilistic but a necessary precondition for change.

**Scranton 2,** [God this guy is depressing], *Learning to die in the Anthropocene,* [https://aaaaarg.fail/upload/roy-scranton-learning-to-die-in-the-anthropocene-reflections-on-the-end-of-a-civilization.pdf] //GrouchoMarxist [We do not endorse anthropocentric language]

But while dying may be the easiest thing in the world to do, it’s the hardest thing in the world to do well—we are predisposed to avoid, ignore, flee, and fight it till the very last hour. We are impelled in our deepest being to struggle against it. Every time you feel hunger or taste ambition, every time your body tingles with lust or your heart yearns for recognition, every time you shake with anger or tremble in fear, that’s the animal in you striving for life. We fall into the world caught between two necessities, compelled to live, born to die, and reconciling them has forever been one of our most challenging puzzles. The pieces just don’t fit together. Much of our energy is spent in denial. Some argue that denying the fact of death is the root and germ of human culture itself, from our first burial mounds and ancestor-worship to plastic surgery and the space program. 99 “The idea of death, the fear of it, haunts the human animal like nothing else,” wrote anthropologist Ernest Becker in his Pulitzer Prize–winning book The Denial of Death. “It is a mainspring of human activity—activity designed largely to avoid the fatality of death, to overcome it by denying in some way that it is the final destiny for man.” 100 Throughout human history, we have invested innumerable hours of labor in countless luminous visions of the afterlife, both physical and metaphysical: Heaven and Hell, family and nation, capitalism and Star Trek. We have children and pressure our children to give us grandchildren, sending our genes into the future. We build pyramids, cathedrals, temples, mosques, monuments, and skyscrapers to prove to ourselves that some part of us will survive beyond our own end. And when our buildings crumble and our gods grow weak, we distract ourselves with pleasure or rally ourselves to war. As men who have experienced war have testified since the days of Homer, there is “a joyous feeling in the safety of killing” that washes away the bitter taste of death. 101 Accepting the truth of our end is the beginning of wisdom. When Montaigne wrote that “To philosophize is to learn how to die,” he was working in and with a philosophical tradition that was already centuries old. Citing one of his key predecessors, the Roman orator Cicero, Montaigne wrote: “Cicero says that to philosophize is nothing else but to prepare for death. This is because study and contemplation draw our soul out of us to some extent and keep it busy outside the body; which is a sort of apprenticeship and semblance of death. Or else it is because all the wisdom and reasoning in this world boils down finally to this point: to teach us not to be afraid to die.” 102 Cicero was in his turn reworking Plato’s account of the death of Socrates in the Phaedo, where Socrates argues that philosophy is the practice of learning how to separate the soul from the body. 103 Philosophical humanism in its most radical practice is the disciplined interruption of somatic and social flows, the detachment of consciousness from impulse, and the condensation of conceptual truths out of the granular data of experience. It is the study of “dying and being dead,” a divestment from this life in favor of deeper investments in a life beyond ourselves. In recognizing the dominion of death and the transience of individual existences, we affirm a web of being that connects past to future, them to us, me to you. “One is responsible to life,” wrote James Baldwin. “It is the small beacon in that terrifying darkness from which we come and to which we return. One must negotiate this passage as nobly as possible, for the sake of those who are coming after us.” 104 Learning to die is hard. It takes practice. There is no royal road, no first-class lane. Learning to die demands daily cultivation of detachment and daily reminders of mortality. It requires long communion with the dead. And since we can’t ever really know how to do something until we do it, **learning to die** also **means accepting the impossibility of achieving that knowledge** as long as we live. We will always be practicing, failing, trying again and failing again, until our final day. Yet the practice itself is the wisdom. In the words of Zen master Dōgen: “To practice the way single-heartedly is, in itself, Enlightenment.” 105 As I learned in Iraq and have had to learn again and again, the practice of learning to die is the practice of learning to let go: Learning to die means learning to let go of the ego, the idea of the self, the future, certainty, attachment, the pursuit of pleasure, permanence, and stability. Learning to let go of salvation. Learning to let go of hope. Learning to let go of death. It means realizing with the Stoic philosopher Marcus Aurelius that Of human life the time is a point, and the substance is in a flux, and the perception dull, and the composition of the whole body subject to putrefaction, and the soul a whirl, and fortune hard to divine, and fame a thing devoid of judgment. And, to say all in a word, everything which belongs to the body is a stream, and what belongs to the soul is a dream and vapor, and life is a warfare and a stranger’s sojourn, and after-fame is oblivion. 106 Learning to die means realizing along with the German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel that human consciousness operates through a dialectic of negation, and that enlightened self-consciousness is consciousness of one’s own limits—and of one’s own death: The human being is this Night, this empty nothing which contains everything in its simplicity —a wealth of infinitely many representations, images, none of which occur to it directly, and none of which are not present. This is the Night, the interior of human nature, existing here —pure Self—in phantasmagoric representations it is night everywhere: here a bloody head suddenly shoots up and there another white shape, only to disappear as suddenly. We see this Night when we look a human being in the eye, looking into a Night which turns terrifying. For from his eyes the night of the world hangs out toward us. 107 This Night was the face I saw when I confronted the fact of my own mortality. It’s the face we all see sooner or later, because it’s our own face—our own consciousness, our own death mask. It waits for us in the mirror. Accepting this emptiness, letting go of my self, was only the first step in coming to understand my responsibility to and participation in a larger collective self, a kind of human existence transcending any particular place or time, going back to our first moments in Africa 200,000 years ago, and living on in the dim, fraught future of the Anthropocene. We are humanity. We are the dead. They have become us, as we will become the dead of future generations. We are born half-blind, confused, wired into a world we don’t understand. Within the night of this world, we apprehend our future as a field of freedom. We face this freedom as individuals, fully in the present, yet our actions are determined by the past and take on their full meaning only in the future. As we gain in wisdom, individual consciousness reveals its complex entanglements with collective life, history, and the universe. We live in and orient our existence through conceptual and narrative structures that rationalize our impulses, pattern our habits, and connect our behaviors to collective rhythms. These conceptual and narrative structures are the cultural technology through which we make meaning and shape our desires. Facebook shapes desire differently than does the Koran, each of which shapes desire differently than does a West Elm catalog, Emily Dickinson’s poetry, Tai Chi, the Igbo New Yam festival, democracy, Passover, “the market,” or Mexican telenovelas. The only inherent trait of the human ape that differentiates us from other animals is our knack for collective symbolic manipulation. Other species besides Homo sapiens communicate with language, organize socially, build structures, use tools, laugh, and show emotions. Even fire and simple social technologies were part of an inheritance passed down from Homo erectus and the Neanderthal. 108 Sometime in the icy depths of prehistory, though, our species began developing advanced symbolic communication beyond anything that had ever been seen before. We learned how to make the dead speak, and to speak ourselves to the yet unborn. We learned to see into the future. We learned to abstract from the present a conceptual reality transcending time and space. Through the ice ages of the past and into the long summer of the Holocene we carried tools, furs, fire, and our greatest treasure and most potent adaptive technology, the only thing that might save us in the Anthropocene, because it is the only thing that can save those who are already dead: memory. Slightly more than 3,000 years ago, a band of Mycenaean shepherd-warriors raided and burned a walled city on the Anatolian coast. What exactly happened remains a matter of conjecture, since the empirical evidence is sketchy. On the one hand, we have the archaeological remains of a destroyed town, some evidence of fire, and a few arrowheads, all of which was only excavated in the last hundred and thirty years. On the other hand, we have two long poems, probably composed orally and written down about 2,700 years ago, that tell the stories of these shepherd-warriors and their raid. Those two poems, originally recorded on papyrus or parchment rolls, grew to become authoritative texts for the ancient Greek city-states, the Roman empire, Byzantine civilization, and modern European and American literature, helping inspire and influence thinkers from Plato to Milton, Alexander Pope to Thomas Jefferson, Simone Weil to Derek Walcott. These long poems survived by being passed on from family to family, preserved in temples and libraries, and recopied by monks and poets. While hundreds of scraps of Homeric poetry date as far back as 2,300 years ago, the oldest surviving full copy of Homer’s Iliad only dates to the 10th century CE. “The creation of this great book was no routine act of copying but a major scholarly enterprise,” writes classicist Martin West. 109 This book, the “Venetus A” manuscript, is stored in the Public Library of St. Mark in Venice, and has been digitized by Harvard University. 110 You can look at it online. 111 About 400 years after somebody first transcribed the Iliad, an Athenian vintner and war veteran named Aeschylus wrote a quartet of plays for performance in the annual religious festivals honoring Dionysus, the god of wine. Three plays in the quartet tell the bloody tale of the House of Atreus and the origins of Athenian law. In the first play, King Agamemnon returns home from the Trojan War and is murdered by his wife Clytaemnestra, in revenge for an even more heinous crime: years ago, Agamemnon had sacrificed their daughter to secure his army’s passage to Troy. Agamemnon’s wartrophy rape-slave Cassandra prophesied the king’s murder, but no one heard her shouts until they turned to screams, as Clytaemnestra struck her down alongside her captor. The queen got her revenge, but in the second play, The Libation Bearers, Clytaemnestra is murdered in turn by her son, Orestes. These plays give narrative shape to the compulsion of strife, the constant turn and return of violence, blood guilt and blood vengeance, the endless cycle of fear and aggression, desire and death. Yet they also show us a way out of that cycle: In the third play, The Eumenides, Apollo and Athena argue over Orestes’ fate and eventually decide to exonerate him. The Erinyes, the “Furies” who embodied the old law of vengeance and had meant to hound Orestes to death, are transformed by Athena into the Eumenides, the “Kindly Ones,” and made the guardians of Athenian law. Through reflection, justice is transformed from revenge into mercy. The final play of the quartet, the comic satyr play Proteus, is lost. Indeed, the three plays I’ve described are the only extant dramatic trilogy to survive from ancient Greece at all. In total, we have only seven of Aeschylus’s plays, out of an estimated seventy to ninety that he wrote. This is fairly representative. The vast majority of classical Greek culture has disappeared. The little that persists, though, including much of Plato and Aristotle, some plays by Sophocles and Euripedes, fragments of poems by Sappho and Callimachus, and the histories of Xenophon, Herodotus, and Thucydides, is an immensity of riches compared to the rumors and scraps that have endured from Homer’s time, only a few hundred years before, or from the Mycenaean and Hittite cultures that Homer’s poems make legends of. Why even bother with these relics of a savage time? What do Homer and Aeschylus have to do with ISIS or global warming? When we look at them closely, these ancient Greeks grow to seem strange, even barbaric. They didn’t believe in free will like we do, they didn’t believe in progress, and they certainly didn’t believe in universal human rights. The Greek concept of fate is hard to bear. Their ideas about justice seem cruel: kings and gods are capriciously brutal, and transgression is often punished with awesome suffering. Even in familiar stories such as Oedipus Rex and the Iliad, these archaic people act in ways that strike us as not just primitive but irrational, superstitious, even insane. Yet they are us: not only historically, but genetically, technologically. A hairsbreadth of human time separates Aeschylus from the present, and in that moment grows everything we take for modernity. Our language, our thought, our architecture, and our culture carry ancient memories embedded in grammar, vocabularies, and syntax. Our symbolic-epis-temological structures of cognition and discourse not only have histories, but are made of history, are made from words such as “astron” and “nomas,” “ge” and “logos,” “anthropos” and “kainós.” Our thoughts and narratives are built from sedimented archetypes such as Achilles and Cassandra, concepts such as fate, justice, and democracy, and the very idea of an idea (eidos, meaning that which is seen, form, or shape). Attending to the historical and philological genealogies of our current conceptual, symbolic structures of existence helps us recognize who we are, who we have been, and who we might become. The comparative study of human cultures across the world and through time helps us see that our particular way of doing things right here, right now, is a contingent adaptation to particular circumstances, yet at the same time an adaptation built with universal human templates of meaningmaking and symbolic reasoning, with tools and technologies we have inherited from the past. I’ve relied mainly on Greek examples, but the roots of our contemporary global civilization are also Akkadian, Sumerian, Chinese, Indian, Mesoamerican, Judaic, Egyptian, Nubian, Thule, Dorset, and Finno-Ugric. Anywhere humans live, we make meaning. The record of that wisdom, the heritage of the dead, is our most valuable gift to the future. The study of the humanities is nothing less than the patient nurturing of the roots and heirloom varietals of human symbolic life. This nurturing is a practice not strictly of curation, as many seem to think today, but of active attention, cultivation, making and remaking. It is not enough for the archive to be stored, mapped, or digitized. It must be worked. As Hannah Arendt writes: If it is true that all thought begins with remembrance, it is also true that no remembrance remains secure unless it is condensed and distilled into a framework of conceptual notions within which it can further exercise itself. Experiences and even the stories which grow out of what men do and endure, of happenings and events, sink back into the futility inherent in the living world and the living deed unless they are talked about over and over again. What saves the affairs of mortal men from their inherent futility is nothing but this incessant talk about them, which in its turn remains futile unless certain concepts, certain guideposts for future remembrance, and even for sheer reference, arise out of it. 112 Against the futility of life without memory, we have only this delicate accretion. Papyrus rots, paper burns, museums get sacked, hard drives crash. The fragility of our collective cultural enterprise is well illustrated by the epigraph heading this chapter and the long poem it comes from. The Epic of Gilgamesh, one of the oldest works of literature on Earth, was probably first inscribed on clay tablets sometime in the 21st or 20th century BCE, later lost for nearly 2,500 years, then recovered in the middle of the 19th century by an Assyrian archaeologist from Mosul named Hormuzd Rassam. 113 The only reason the Epic survived was because it had been copied out by ancient scribes as rote training for more “important” bureaucratic and commercial work. The Epic tells the story of Gilgamesh, king of Uruk, a “wild bull on the rampage” admired for his strength but resented for his despotism. 114 As the Epic recounts: “The young men of Uruk he harries without warrant, / Gilgamesh lets no son go free to his father. / By day and by night his tyranny grows harsher.” The women of Uruk pray for relief, complaining of Gilgamesh’s insistence on taking the virginity of all the brides in his city. The gods hear the women’s prayer, and one of them makes a wild man to match Gilgamesh, a hair-covered man-beast named Enkidu, the “off-spring of silence.” Sent into the world, Enkidu runs with gazelle herds and sabotages hunters’ traps till Gilgamesh hears of his mischief and sends a woman from Uruk named Shamhat to tame him. She finds Enkidu, seduces him, dresses him in clothes, teaches him how to eat bread and drink ale, and tells him of the wonders of city life. When Enkidu hears about Gilgamesh’s habit of taking other men’s brides on their wedding night, though, “his face pale[s] in anger” and he speeds to Uruk. Once there, Enkidu challenges Gilgamesh, but their fight ends in a draw, with the two men kissing and becoming friends. In classic buddy-movie style, Enkidu and Gilgamesh team up and journey to the Forest of Cedar, “the secret abode of the gods,” where they kill the ogre Humbaba and take his majestic trees. When they return to Uruk, the goddess of love, Ishtar, tries to seduce Gilgamesh. He rejects her, so she sends down the monstrous Bull of Heaven to destroy Uruk and kill Gilgamesh. Enkidu and Gilgamesh turn the tables and slaughter the bull instead. That night, Enkidu has a dream in which the gods declare that the heroes have gone too far, and that one of them will have to die. They name Enkidu. He wakes and recounts his dream, then, after much lamenting, succumbs to a fatal illness. Gilgamesh is overcome with grief. “Afraid of death,” he wanders the Earth weeping for his friend, looking for passage to the Netherworld in the hopes of uncovering the secret of immortality. Gilgamesh finds the gate to the Netherworld and passes through twelve “double-hours” of darkness, emerging in a beautiful garden where he meets Uta-napishti, an immortal elder who had survived the legendary Deluge. Gilgamesh demands the secret of immortality, and Uta-napishti tells the story of how before the Deluge he was ordered by the gods to build a great boat to carry “the beasts of the field, the creatures of the wild, and members of every skill and craft.” One day, as the gods foretold, the rain began to fall. For a day the gale winds flattened the country, quickly they blew, and then came the Deluge. Like a battle the cataclysm passed over the people. . . . For six days and [seven] nights, there blew the wind, the downpour, the gale, the Deluge, it flattened the land. After the rain stopped, Uta-napishti released a dove and a sparrow, both of which came back, and finally a raven, which did not. Once the waters receded, the gods made Uta-napishti and his wife immortal. Uta-napishti tells Gilgamesh that he too can be immortal, if he goes six days and seven nights without sleeping. Gilgamesh tries hard to say awake, but his eyes close the very first night and he sleeps for a week. When Uta-napishti rouses him, Gilgamesh is so distraught that the old man feels bad for him and gives him a miraculous rejuvenating plant. On his way home, though, Gilgamesh loses the plant to a snake, who steals it from him in the night. The mighty king curses the futility of existence: “For whom, Urshanabi, toiled my arms so hard?” he wails. “For whom ran dry the blood of my heart?” We might answer: For us. For the future. Almost four thousand years out of the past, the Epic of Gilgamesh carries forward a story of civilization. Its first main narrative, the taming of the wild man Enkidu, is reiterated in its final act, in which the rampaging Gilgamesh learns to accept the truth of death. Enkidu and Gilgamesh represent two phases of social development, the hunter-gatherer and the agricultural. The absolutist demands of agricultural civilization, embodied in Gilgamesh, are tyrannical without the tempering wisdom of the wild, but when civilization and wildness join forces, they create an all-consuming war machine that disrupts the sacred order. The gods decree the wild man must die and the mighty king submit to human limits. The Epic of Gilgamesh also offers a lesson in the importance of sustaining and recuperating cultural heritage in the wake of catastrophic climate change. As the Epic’s prologue reads, Gilgamesh “saw what was secret, discovered what was hidden, / he brought back a tale of before the Deluge.” Translator and scholar Andrew George explains: “The implication of the prologue of the epic is that Gilgamesh played a key role in restoring the antediluvian order after the Flood, particularly in restoring the cults of the gods to their proper glory. . . . It did not suit the poet’s need to include more than allusions to it, but evidently Gilgamesh was responsible for re-civilizing his country.” 115 Gilgamesh lives on in death as a legend, a symbol, a reflection on ourselves. In this way, the Epic represents not only the fragility of our deep cultural heritage, but its persistence. I saw this firsthand when I talked to the Iraqi heavy metal band Acrassicauda about their first full-length album, which they titled Gilgamesh. 116 Marwan Hussein, the band’s drummer and guiding force, told me that he’d decided to turn to the epic as a template for their album because it connected back to Iraq’s ancient Sumerian roots while at the same time offering a way of understanding the situation there now. “The Epic of Gilgamesh is a very weird story,” Hussein told me, “and in a way very modern. It’s a way to tell the story of what’s happening today in the Middle East: Gilgamesh was a tyrant. He was not a very good king. He was weak. The way I see him, he was a lost soul until the very last, when he comes to terms with his mortality. In the end, it’s a story about rebirth.” Rebirth is a resonant concept for the members of Acrassicauda: they grew up in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, lived through the US invasion in 2003, escaped the country’s brutal sectarian civil war in 2005 and 2006, and, with the help of VICE magazine co-founder Suroosh Alvi and a documentary he made about them (Heavy Metal in Baghdad), made their way through Syria and Turkey to the United States. 117 Fifteen years after they formed a band in Baghdad, teaching themselves to play Metallica and Slayer off bootleg cassettes, they finally released their first album—an album which is at once a testament to their artistic ambitions, a reflection on their unique historical situation, and a remembrance of their heritage. As Hussein told me, “We tried to make a Middle Eastern metal album. We did the whole thing. We did the percussion, we did darbuka, we did the time signature, we did the singing. We wanted the album to be as Arabic as we could make it.” Acrassicauda are doing the hard work of cultivating and remaking our interwoven cultural technologies. They didn’t have to. Their fate could have been completely different. In Iraq, in Syria, even as refugees living in New Jersey, Acrassicauda would have had every excuse to confuse acceptance of their situation with giving up, or to mistake hatred for justice. They might have stayed in Baghdad and fought to free their country from foreign invaders. Many did. Many chose another side, and fought for the Americans, or for Al Qaeda. Instead, Hussein and his bandmates chose music and art. They chose to explore and strengthen the connections between cultures, our shared rhythms and common traditions. They embody for their fans the realized hope of transcending parochialism and strife while staying connected to tradition, the courage of surviving war not by violence but through decency and mutual support, and the lived possibility that we may—like the troubled king Gilgamesh—learn to die and yet be reborn. More than 6,000 years before Homer sang of Achilles’ rage and more than 5,000 years before the Epic of Gilgamesh was written, humans living in what is now China, Serbia, and Iraq began to make marks on bone and clay. Agricultural and astronomical knowledge, relatively stable, had been stored in memorized rhythmic speech, but over time the novel technology of writing allowed us to keep better track of more changeable data: property, grain stores, trade. The practice of writing integrated older social technologies developed for other purposes, and as writing grew in sophistication and importance it absorbed yet more. Ritual song, image-making, mythology, religion, rhymed speech, memorization, metonymic association, metaphoric abstraction— technologies of social attunement, information storage, ideological mapping, emotional regulation, and political organization—were all within a few thousand years intimately wired into graphic representations of language. First through clay and stone, then papyrus, vellum, and paper, writing became the single most important human development after agriculture and before the steam engine, leading to widespread social transformations and enabling the creation of incredible new technologies. From writing, the ancient Sumerians in Uruk developed mathematics, allowing them to abstractly yet accurately model physical relations in the world. Written laws gave concrete form to political and religious authority. Being able to track and compare information allowed observers to adjudicate evidence, which gave rise over centuries to empiricism and the scientific method. The development of the printing press in 1450 and the later proliferation of affordable books (by means of hand presses in the 18th century, then steam and coal-powered industrial presses in the 19th and 20th centuries) meant that vast amounts of stored information could be accessed by anyone able to read. The fullest expression of human life soon came to be seen as synonymous with literacy itself. With the advent of mass-produced sound and image reproduction technologies in the 19th and early 20th centuries (phonograph, radio, film, TV), humanism-as-literacy was superseded, but with the rise of personal computers and the Internet, it has been re-integrated and transformed into humanism-as-digital-literacy, or what we might call photohumanism. A new form of life has become evident: humanity has revealed itself as collective energy, light swarming across a darkened planet, a geological forcing, data and flow. We live in networks, webs, and hives, jacked in to remote-controlled devices and autonomous apps, moments of being in time, out of time. No longer individual subjects or discrete objects, we have become vibrations, channelers, tweeters and followers. By connecting us through our devices, photohumanist technologies enable collective wiring at tremendous speeds, even faster than those offered by radio, print, television, and film. Just as those older technologies offered both great potential and great danger, so too do the newer technologies of photohumanism. Homo sapiens—perhaps now Homo lux— remains biologically reactive, easily panicked, all too quickly stirred to hatred. Jaron Lanier warned in 2006 of what he called “digital Maoism”: “It is at least possible that in the fairly near future enough communication and education will take place through anonymous Internet aggregation that we could become vulnerable to a sudden dangerous empowering of the hive mind. History has shown us again and again that a hive mind is a cruel idiot when it runs on autopilot.” 118 The dangers of collective madness, witch hunts, and totalitarian war exist in new social networks as much as or even more than they did in early 20th-century radio broadcasts, newspaper stories, and cinema reels. Our collective obligation to maintain traditional humanistic study in the photo-humanist era is at once developmental and prophylactic: we must practice interruption to nurture new flows and at the same time to guard against them. As we struggle, awash in social vibrations of fear and aggression, to face the catastrophic selfdestruction of global civilization, the only way to keep alive our long tradition of humanistic inquiry is to learn to die. We must practice suspending stress-semantic chains of social excitation through critical thought, contemplation, philosophical debate, and posing impertinent questions. We must suspend our attachment to the continual press of the present by keeping alive the past, cultivating the info-garden of the archive, reading, interpreting, sorting, nurturing, and, most important, reworking our stock of remembrance. We must keep renovating and innovating perceptual, affective, and conceptual fields through recombination, remixing, translation, transformation, and play. We must inculcate ruminative frequencies in the human animal by teaching slowness, attention to detail, argumentative rigor, careful reading, and meditative reflection. We must keep up our communion with the dead, for they are us, as we are the dead of future generations. Wars begin and end. Empires rise and fall. Buildings collapse, books burn, servers break down, cities sink into the sea. Humanity can survive the demise of fossil-fuel civilization and it can survive whatever despotism or barbarism will arise in its ruins. We may even be able to survive in a greenhouse world. Perhaps our descendents will build new cities on the shores of the Arctic Sea, when the rest of the Earth is scorching deserts and steaming jungles. If being human is to mean anything at all in the Anthropocene, if we are going to refuse to let ourselves sink into the futility of life without memory, then we must not lose our few thousand years of hard-won knowledge, accumulated at great cost and against great odds. We must not abandon the memory of the dead. As biological and cultural diversity is threatened across the world by capitalist monoculture and mass extinction, we must build arks: not just biological arks, to carry forward endangered genetic data, but also cultural arks, to carry forward endangered wisdom. The library of human cultural technologies that is our archive, the concrete record of human thought in all languages that comprises the entirety of our existence as historical beings, is not only the seed stock of our future intellectual growth, but its soil, its source, its womb. The fate of the humanities, as we confront the end of modern civilization, is the fate of humanity itself

## Smol boi

### 1NC

#### The 1AC is a fantasy created as a substitution for the disappearance of manageable disasters. The process of risk-calculus is overloaded by ecological degradation and therefore demands the hyper-focus on and subsequent purification of individual bodies so technological society can justify it’s continued existence.

**Williams & Calnan ’96**, *THE 'LIMITS' OF MEDICALIZATION?: MODERN MEDICINE AND THE LAY POPULACE IN 'LATE' MODERNITY,* (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8783424) //GrouchoMarxist **[BRACKETS IN THE ORIGNAL TEXT]**

In addition to its socially reflexive character, life in late modernity is increasingly organized around the concept of'risk'. Clearly life has always been a 'risky' business, but the nature, scope and dimensions of contemporary risks have all profoundly altered. Whilst misfortunes and disasters in pre-industrial times were attributed to fate(s), God(s) or natural disasters, modern risks are increasingly the product of human interventions of many different sorts-- what Giddens refers to as the "manufactured' risks and uncertainties of modern social life. For example, as Armstrong [36] argues, whilst health risks in the nineteenth century were located in the ~natural environment', today the 'environmental' factors which impinge upon our health, such as acid rain and radiation, are the product of human intervention. In this respect, whilst the risks of the past could be attributed to the under-supply of (hygienic) technology, today they are the product of industrial over-production; something which is systematically intensified as a consequence of the globalizing process [4] (p. 4). Moreover, whilst the nature and extent of modern risks vary, they cannot simply be understood in class terms. Rather, in 'risk' society we are all ultimately confronted with a similar fate from which it is difficult if not impossible to escape. As Beck puts it: 'poverty is hierachic, smog is democratic'. In this sense, risks display a 'boomerang effect' in which even the rich and powerful are ultimately not safe. As a consequence, slowly but surely, a 'victimization by risk' is beginning to take place. Risk, therefore, becomes a fundamental existential parameter of life in late modernity, structuring the way in which experts and lay people alike organize their social worlds. As Beck argues, not only does modernity create risks through our ways of living, working, systems of transportation and the like, it also seeks to compensate for them by means of calculation and political regulation. Indeed, in an increasingly 'decisionist' culture, the profiling of risks becomes an important means of colonizing the future, instilling a sense of calculability in what is fast becoming a 'runaway world'. Yet risk assessment is, by definition, imperfect. As such it contains many imponderables, not least because its central locus lies in the future. Indeed, in many respects, the nature of modern risks--including nuclear, chemical, genetic and **ecological mega-hazards--abolishes the 'calculus of risk'**; there are simply no statistical bases for their calculation. Moreover, not only does the location of blame or culpability become increasingly difficult, but the calculation of single risks fails to take account of their aggregate or multiplicative effects. 'Dangers' lurk everywhere, from the threat of nuclear warfare and ecological catastrophe, to the 'risks' of modern medical technology, coronary heart disease and 'unsafe' sexual contact. This growing sense of risk also contributes to heightened levels of anxiety which are condensed around the body and its boundaries. In this sense, **the 'policing'** and control **of the physical body effect a symbolic** or metaphorical **resolution of threats located in the social body**. Indeed, as Kroker and Kroker [59] argue within the context of AIDS, 'panic' bodies begin to emerge involving a form of'Body McCarthyism' which seeks to distinguish between the 'clean' and 'unclean' according to the 'purity' of bodily fluids. In particular, they note a striking resemblance between medical and military rhetoric in relation to AIDS; drawing parallels between the fear of AIDS and a generalized fear of the breakdown of immunological systems. In short, as Turner argues: The body has once more become apocalyptic given the threat of chemical warfare, the destruction of the natural habitat, the epidemic of HIV and AIDS, the greying of the populations of northern Europe and the apparent inability of national governments to control medical research and technology [60] (p. 24). Given the largely invisible nature of modern risks, knowledge becomes a crucial resource through which the perception of risk is filtered, and the divisions between social and scientific rationality become ever more apparent as social movements raise issues which are not addressed by experts and vice versa. Indeed, as Beck argues, the sciences are incapable of reacting adequately to the risks of late modernity since **they are** prominently involved in **the origin** and growth **of these very risks**. Instead, they become the 'legitimating patrons' of a global industrial pollution and contamination of air, water, foodstuffs and the sickness and death of plants, animals and humans [4] (p. 59). In this sense, lay consciousness and public perceptions of the risks of modernization and modern social institutions, including modern medicine, has established itself against the resistance of scientific rationality. In other words, as Beck suggests; "...the history of the growing consciousness and social recognition of risks coincides with the history of the demystification of science" [4] (p. 59). As such, official pronouncements about risk and safety increasingly fail to allay public anxieties; indeed they may have the very opposite effect. Yet social and scientific rationality are also closely interwoven as technical discussions of risk rely on social expectations and value judgements, whilst social discussions and perceptions of risk increasingly come to depend upon scientific evidence and arguments. In short: "Public criticism and disquiet derive essentially from a dialectic ofexpertize and counter expertize" [4] (p. 59). Certainly, as discussed earlier, there is evidence to suggest an increasing degree of 'ambivalence' amongst the lay populace regarding the risks and benefits of modern medicine. Here common concerns include the danger of side-effects, the problems of addiction and dependence, the risks of technological interventions, and the moral and philosophical issues which are raised by medical 'progress'. At another level, it is also clear that a considerable degree of scepticism exists concerning the the legitimacy and relevance of much so-called 'expert' advice on health and lifestyles. Indeed, as Davison and colleagues [61, 62] have convincingly argued, health promotion advice which is based upon notions of 'predictability', 'regularity' and 'certainty' is likely to be counter-productive as it does not readily fit with the beliefs found in popular culture, nor with observations based upon lay epidemiological reasoning that, to paraphrase, fat smokers live to a 'ripe old age' whilst lithe joggers really do 'drop down dead!' (i.e. the 'prevention paradox'). In this respect it is clear that lay perceptions of risk are part and parcel of complex social processes which are not necessarily 'rational' in the scientific sense of the word. Rather, the perception of what constitutes a 'risk' is intimately bound up with people's cultural beliefs, moral values, personal feelings and the social and material circumstances of their lives. Moreover, not only do lay perceptions of risk differ from those held by professionals (i.e. the asymmetry or dialectic of social and scientific rationality discussed above), they may also vary within different segments of the lay populace and according to the competing priorities and material constraints of everyday life. In short, growing public concern about the risks of modern medicine, as well as more general anxieties about the dangers to health of life in late modernity, look set to continue as the 'balance' between (active) trust and (radical) doubt becomes ever more precarious and faith in (medical) 'experts' is slowly eroded in an increasingly reflexive social order. As Giddens puts it: Widespread lay knowledge of modern risk environments leads to an awareness of the limits of expertise and forms one of the 'public relations' problems that has to be faced by those who seek to sustain lay trust in expert systems...[R]ealisation of the areas of ignorance which confront experts themselves, as individual practitioners and in terms of overall fields of knowledge, may weaken or undermine that faith on the part of lay individuals...[I]n this case what is in question is not only the limits of or gaps in, expert knowledge, but an inadequacy which compromises the very idea of expertise [1] (pp. 130-131).

#### The collapse of the eco-system creates a global panic which demands the creation and subsequent destruction of a feared other. Modern systems of communication trap fear and anxiety within an infinite feedback loop that controls the root cause of modern violence.

**Scranton 15**, [God this guy is depressing], *Learning to die in the Anthropocene,* [https://aaaaarg.fail/upload/roy-scranton-learning-to-die-in-the-anthropocene-reflections-on-the-end-of-a-civilization.pdf] //GrouchoMarxist [We do not endorse anthropocentric language]

When it comes to global warming, differing visions of the human future are already hardening into conflict. Coal and oil companies and their government proxies have made their willingness to use military force to defend themselves and advance their interests spectacularly obvious. The labor wars of the 19th and 20th centuries show this clearly. The brutal decades-long war waged by the Nigerian government against its own people, undertaken with the outright support of Shell and Chevron, is another example, well documented in books such as A Year and a Day and Genocide in Nigeria by Ken Saro-Wiwa, who was executed for his activism. You’ve heard the call: We have to do something. We need to fight. We need to identify the enemy and go after them. Some respond, march, and chant. Some look away, deny what’s happening, and search out escape routes into imaginary tomorrows: a life off the grid, space colonies, immortality in paradise, explicit denial, or consumer satiety in a wireless, robot-staffed, 3D-printed techno-utopia. Meanwhile, the rich take shelter in their fortresses, trusting to their air conditioning, private schools, and well-paid guards. Fight. Flight. Flight. Fight. The threat of death activates our deepest ~~animal~~ drives. The aggression and fear that arise in response to perceived threats are some of the most intense emotions we ever experience. For human society to function at all, these instinctive reactions have to be carefully managed and channeled. Outbreaks of panic and hate are dangerous, but lower levels of aggression and fear help keep a population controllable and productive. Restrained aggression keeps people suspicious of collective action and working hard to overcome their fellows, while constant, generalized anxiety keeps people servile, unwilling to take risks, and yearning for comfort from whatever quarter, whether the dulling sameness of herd thought or the dumb security of consumer goods. Since at least September 11, 2001, people in the United States have been subject to an unprecedented terror campaign—not from Al Qaeda, but from the United States government. National domestic policy transformed “security” into constant fear, threatening its citizens at every turn: first with alarms of explosions and anthrax, then with prison, austerity-produced structural unemployment, and harassment, and finally with torture, SWAT tanks, snipers, drones, and total surveillance. Owing to the racial logic of US politics, in which white/black is the definitive semiotic distinction structuring American society, most of the government’s violence against its own citizens is directed against those with darker skin, but in subtler ways its terror campaign targets every single person who flies coach, watches the news, or uses the Internet. Fear comes to us every day in our encounters with increasingly militarized police and our humiliating interactions at metal detectors and body-scan machines. Fear comes to us in the absence of job security, in our want of appeal when confronted by institutionalized inequality, and in our mistrust of corrupt institutions. Fear comes to us in widespread surveillance, in the form of a homeless woman or a hospitalized friend without adequate financial support, and in the constant nagging worry that we’re not working hard enough, not happy enough, never going to “make it.” Fear comes to us in weather porn, unpredictable shifts in formerly stable climate dynamics, and massive storms. More than in any other way, fear comes to us in images and messages, as social media vibrations, products of cultural technologies that we have interpolated into our lives. Going about our daily business, we receive constant messages of apprehension and danger, ubiquitous warnings, insistent needling jabs to the deep lizard brain. Somebody died. Something blew up. Something might blow up. Somebody attacked somebody. Somebody killed somebody. Guns. Crime. Immigrants. Terrorists. Arabs. Mexicans. White supremacists. Killer cops. Demonic thugs. Rape. Murder. Global warming. Ebola. ISIS. Death. Death. Death. Sociologist Tom Pyszczynski writes: “People will do almost anything to avoid being afraid. When, despite the best efforts, [fear and anxiety] do break through, people go to incredible lengths to shut them down.” 88 Sometimes when these vibrations shake us, we discharge them by passing them on, retweeting the story, reposting the video, hoping that others will validate our reaction, thus assuaging our fear by assuring ourselves that collective attention has been alerted to the threat. Other times we react with aversion, working to dampen the vibrations by searching out positive reinforcements, pleasurable images and videos, something funny, something—anything—to ease the fear. We buy something. We eat food. We pop a pill. We fuck. In either passing on the vibration or reacting against it, we let the fear short circuit our own autonomous desires, diverting us from our goals and loading ever more emotional static into our daily cognitive processing. We become increasingly distracted from our ambitions and increasingly susceptible to such distraction. And whether we retransmit or react, we reinforce channels of thought, perception, behavior, and emotion that, over time, come to shape our habits and our personality. As we train ourselves to resonate fear and aggression, we reinforce patterns of thought and feeling that shape a society that breeds the same. Fight-or-flight is compelling because it serves essential evolutionary purposes. It increases alertness and adrenaline flow, and generally works to keep the human animal alive. As we proceed into the Anthropocene, though, capitalism’s cultural machinery for balancing fear and aggression against desire and pleasure is grinding and sputtering sparks. What cultural theorist Lauren Berlant has identified as the “cruel optimism” of a system sustained by hopes that can never be fulfilled mixes dangerously with an atmosphere of beleaguered anxiety, increasing frustration with working-class and middle-class economic stagnation, and a pervasive sadistic voyeurism that grows by what it feeds on. 89 While America’s fraying social infrastructure holds together, our fear and aggression can be channeled into labor, consumption, and economic competition, with professional sports, hyperviolent television, and occasional protests to let off steam. Once the social fabric begins to tear, though, we risk unleashing not only rioting, rebellion, and civil war, but homicidal politics the likes of which should make our blood run cold. Consider: Once among the most modern, Westernized nations in the Middle East, with a robust, highly educated middle class, Iraq has been blighted for decades by imperialist aggression, criminal gangs, interference in its domestic politics, economic liberalization, and sectarian feuding. Today it is being torn apart between a corrupt petrocracy, a breakaway Kurdish enclave, and a self-declared Islamic fundamentalist caliphate, while a civil war in neighboring Syria spills across its borders. These conflicts have likely been caused in part and exacerbated by the worst drought the Middle East has seen in modern history. Since 2006, Syria has been suffering crippling water shortages that have, in some areas, caused 75 percent crop failure and wiped out 85 percent of livestock, left more than 800,000 Syrians without a livelihood, and sent hundreds of thousands of impoverished young men streaming into Syria’s cities. 90 This drought is part of long-term warming and drying trends that are transforming the Middle East. 91 Not just water but oil, too, is elemental to these conflicts. Iraq sits on the fifth-largest proven oil reserves in the world. Meanwhile, the Islamic State has been able to survive only because it has taken control of most of Syria’s oil and gas production. We tend to think of climate change and violent religious fundamentalism as isolated phenomena, but as Retired Navy Rear Admiral David Titley argues, “you can draw a very credible climate connection to this disaster we call ISIS right now.” 92 A few hundred miles away, Israeli soldiers spent the summer of 2014 killing Palestinians in Gaza. Israel has also been suffering drought, while Gaza has been in the midst of a critical water crisis exacerbated by Israel’s military aggression. The International Committee for the Red Cross reported that during summer 2014, Israeli bombers targeted Palestinian wells and water infrastructure. 93 It’s not water and oil this time, but water and gas: some observers argue that Israel’s “Operation Protective Edge” was intended to establish firmer control over the massive Leviathan natural gas field, discovered off the coast of Gaza in the eastern Mediterranean in 2010. 94 Meanwhile, thousands of miles to the north, Russian-backed separatists fought fascist paramilitary forces defending the elected government of Ukraine, which was also suffering drought. 95 Russia’s role as an oil and gas exporter in the region and the natural gas pipelines running through Ukraine from Russia to Europe cannot but be key issues in the conflict. Elsewhere, droughts in 2014 sent refugees from Guatemala and Honduras north to the US border, devastated crops in California and Australia, and threatened millions of lives in Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Afghanistan, India, Morocco, Pakistan, and parts of China. Across the world, massive protests and riots have swept Bosnia and Herzegovina, Venezuela, Brazil, Turkey, Egypt, and Thailand, while conflicts rage on in Colombia, Libya, the Central African Republic, Sudan, Nigeria, Yemen, and India. And while the world burns, the United States has been playing chicken with Russia over control of Eastern Europe and the melting Arctic, and with China over control of Southeast Asia and the South China Sea, threatening global war on a scale not seen in seventy years. This is our present and future: droughts and hurricanes, refugees and border guards, war for oil, water, gas, and food. We experience this world of strife today in one of two modes: either it is our environment, and we are in it, or it comes to us as images, social excitation, retransmitted fear. People are fighting and dying in ruined cities all over the planet. Neighbors are killing each other. Old women are bleeding to death in bombed rubble and children are being murdered, probably as you read this sentence. To live in that world is horrific. Constant danger strains every nerve. The only things that matter are survival, killing the enemy, reputation, and having a safe place to sleep. The experience of being human narrows to a cutting edge. I remember living in that world many years ago in occupied Baghdad. Today that world seems impossibly distant, yet every day it presses in on me in a never-ending stream of words, images, appeals, and reports. I see videos. I read stories. I see pictures of this or that suffering or injustice and I am moved. To act, perhaps, but more accurately to emote. To react. To feel. To perform. We do not usually ask where these feelings come from or who they serve, but we all know that the cultural technologies transmitting these affective vibrations are not neutral: news outlets shape information to fit their owners’ prejudices, while Facebook, Twitter, and Google shape our perceptions through hidden algorithms. The specialization and demographic targeting of contemporary media tend to narrow the channels of perception to the point that we receive only those images and vibrations which already harmonize with our own prejudices, our own pre-existing desires, thus intensifying our particular emotional reactions along an increasingly limited band, impelling us to discharge our emotions within the same field of ready listeners, for which we are rewarded with “Likes” and “Favorites.” Our consciousness is shaped daily through feedback systems where some post or headline provokes a feeling and we discharge that feeling by provoking it in others. Social media like Facebook crowdsource catharsis, creating self-contained wave pools of aggression and fear, pity and terror, stagnant flows that go nowhere and do nothing. Pictures of children killed by bombs or police, or pictures of the devastation left in the wake of a tropical storm may move me to sadness and horror. Retransmitting such images will pass along that sadness and horror. My act of transmission will mark me as someone who has feelings about these things and who condemns them. I can rationalize my retransmission by saying that I am “raising awareness” or trying to influence public policy: I want my fellow citizens to be as horrified as I am, so they’ll think like I do, or so they’ll vote for a representative who works to prevent such horrors from happening, or maybe so that if enough of us all think the same way and feel the same way, the organs and institutions of power will be forced to hear us and align themselves along our vibrations, **the way a honeybee colony will pick a site for a new hive through the dance of its advance guard scouts**. These are perfectly reasonable human assumptions, because that is how physical human collectives function. Anyone who has been in a crowd, a basketball team, a nightclub, a choir, or a protest knows how bodies resonate together. But politics is the energetic distribution of bodies in systems, and we live in a system of carbon-fueled capitalism that we shouldn’t expect to work in physical human ways for several reasons, especially when it comes to responding to the threat of global warming. First, our political and social media technologies are not neutral, but have been developed to serve particular interests, most notably targeted advertising, concentration of wealth, and ideological control, and the vibrations that seem to resonate most strongly along these channels are envy, adulation, outrage, fear, hatred, and mindless pleasure. Second, the more we pass on or react to social vibrations, the more we strengthen our habits of channeling and the less we practice autonomous reflection or independent critical thought. With every protest chant, retweet, and Facebook post, we become stronger resonators and weaker thinkers. Third, however intense our social vibrations grow, they remain locked within machinery that offers no political leverage: they do not translate into political action, because they do not connect to the flows of power. Finally, while the typical collective human response to threat is to identify an enemy, pick sides, and mobilize to fight, global warming offers no apprehensible foe. That hasn’t stopped people from trying to find one. The Flood Wall Street protesters say the enemy is American corporations. Tanzania’s Jakaya Kikwete and Nauru’s Baron Waqa say the problem is the United States and Great Britain. Shell Oil and the Environmental Defense Fund seem to think that it’s intractable UN bureaucracy that’s holding us up. Barack Obama has implied that it’s China. Tea Party Republicans would blame Barack Obama, I’m sure, if they admitted that global warming was actually happening and caused by human activity. Meanwhile, NPR-listening liberals want to believe that Tea Party Republicans are responsible, so that they can frame the problem as one amenable to solution by moral education and enlightened consumerism, as if it were all a matter of convincing people to eat more kale and drive electric cars. One climate activist has argued that just 90 companies are responsible for almost two-thirds of all historical greenhouse gas emissions, which conveniently absolves billions of automobile drivers, airline passengers, meat eaters, and cellphone users of responsibility. 96 The enemy isn’t out there somewhere—the enemy is ourselves. Not as individuals, but as a collective.

**The alternative is to endorse an ethic of green criminology – we decenter the human subject as victim and open a larger frame of reference to hold humanity accountable for ecocidal practices.**

**Lynch and Stretesky 14** [Michael J. Lynch, professor of criminology at the University of South Florida, and Paul B. Stretesky, senior lecturer in criminological theories, statistics, environmental justice, and environmental crime at Northumbia University. “Exploring Green Criminology: Toward a Green Criminological Revolution.” Routledge, May 2014, pg. 6]

In contrast to this human centered view, green criminology begins by imposing an alternative frame of reference, one based in nature, the environment, or natural ecology. We will discuss this frame of reference and the problems associated with human-centered frames of reference in more detail in a later chapter. For now, it is important to note that by selecting a natural ecology frame of reference, **green criminology is a revolution** in the making; a revolution **that seeks to displace humans and human issues as the sole objects of study.** In doing so, green criminology supplants the traditional criminological interest in personal crimes that, in comparison to environmental harms, are rather minor in their overall impact measured in terms of the scope and amount of harm caused. By **moving away from this human-centered approach,** green criminology points out that there are an extraordinarily wide range of environmentally-related harms that exist in the world, especially compared to the criminal harms to which criminology has been limited. This broader set of crimes that becomes the focus of green criminology is not the set of crimes committed by the poor that attracts so much criminological attention. In drawing attention away from these ordinary, powerless criminal offenses and offenders it is not only possible to view the crimes of the powerful as the most serious offenses that occur in society and as having the broadest scope of effect on human and nonhuman victims, it is also possible to understand the biased view that a criminology anchored to criminal law produces. In short, when criminology excludes an environmental frame of reference, it hides from our vision the vast array of harms perpetuated against and through the victimization of the environment. In the green view, the environmental frame of reference dominates, and the criminological frame of reference becomes secondary and subsumed within the broader environmental frame of reference. We explore this idea more fully later in this work.

## Medium boi

### 1NC

#### Welcome to the Megamachine. A system of organization driven by technology and dependent on humanities depletion of the biosphere. The 1AC is another step towards the techno-future that guarantees endless destruction coupled with an affective cooling that robs interpersonal relationships of all meaning.

**Manicardi ’12,** (doesn’t know how to make good looking book covers, probably smells weird), *Free From Civilization Notes towards a radical critique of the foundations of civilization: domination, culture, fear, economics and technology*, (<https://aaaaarg.fail/upload/enrico-manicardi-free-from-civilization-notes-toward-a-radical-critique-of-civilizations-foundations-domination-culture-fear-economics-and-technology.pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist

Why write an essay that critiques civilization today, when civilization is presented everywhere as the only means of escape from a world that is drifting away? Why stigmatize, down to its foundations, the mix of values that distinguish civil life when these values are elevated on the basis of highsounding propaganda as promises of future welfare and happiness? It would be too easy to answer that we cannot believe such promises anymore, that they are mere propaganda; that a “Better Future” has been pompously heralded for a long time without any celebration following the many announcements. But the problem is certainly more complex. If we look closely at the conditions of the modern world, we see not only a medley of broken promises of happiness, but also a series of perfectly kept promises of unhappiness. When we are told that in order to live better someone else must be worse off, when we are asked to be patient a while longer, to tighten our belts, grit our teeth and accept those sacrifices that will make the sun shine again, we are facing just those sorts of kept promises. Which is exactly what happens when we are asked to work even more, hurry up even more, consume everything and everybody in order to sustain Economy, Progress, Development, Democracy, etc. In the world there are no absolutely negative or positive situations. Even something that makes us extremely happy can cause some suffering (romantic love is perhaps the most illustrative example); on the other hand, what we consider negative can help us grow up and may not be totally unfavorable. Like any human condition, civilization is distinguished by these mixed features. The point is not to judge it as totally disadvantageous (or absolutely free of inconveniences), but to try and understand it in terms of its entrenched patterns, principles, developments and effects, so as to look at civilization from a vantage point that allows us to establish if it can still be worthwhile to follow its path or if it is better to change our route. There is a price we pay everyday to safeguard civilization and to permit it to spread further: this price should be the stake of the game revolving around our willingness to accept all this. Here is a simple example: all of us can acknowledge that a cell phone is a very useful tool. It undoubtedly is, but at what price? We just don’t have to think about the damage it causes to our health due to the noxious waves it emits (by using it, by not using it and even when it is on stand-by). We just don’t have to think about the damage on’t have to think about the relational isolation where it imprisons us all, making face-to-face communication less and less likely as well as, for many young people, the ability to express their opinions (and even their feelings) in person. And we don’t have to think about the financial interests of the entire cell phone industry, about the financial speculation it encourages, about the environmental and human exploitation it brings about (some of the materials cell phones are made of are unearthed from deep mines where still today many enslaved people work and die). Finally, we don’t have to think about the technological and military development programs that are nourished by the mobile phone phenomenon, making social control more and more invasive and wars even crueler. In short, we don’t have to think about all this (and much, much more) if our cell phone is to appear only as a very useful tool. Civilization—just like cell phones—has a really high price, and even if this price is usually carefully concealed and underestimated, it is there nevertheless. Acknowledging this is a first important step towards the evaluation of its acceptability. In this civilized world we have a bad life, and it is getting even worse. Not just because of hunger, or of the excruciating death of children exterminated by disease, famine or lack of drinking water. Our life is bad even in the opulent regions of this planet, in what is generally presented as the land of plenty. Multiplying forms of addiction: tobacco addiction and alcoholism are spreading among the young, together with any kind of more or less legal psychotropic drugs, medications, video games, sex industry, and gambling; the spreading of nervous diseases—anorexia, bulimia, panic attacks, chronic fatigue, sleep disorders; the various obsessive compulsions—to run faster, buy everything, collect anything, to hygienize and sanitize every single item; the exponential increase in violent episodes, from bullying to serial killers; all tell us that where the “national welfare state” has been officially proclaimed, civilization spares no one. Irreparably articulated in the routine on which our dismal everyday life is based, accompanied by a continuous distress and by the isolation that derives from a growing object- and service-mediated existence, this sense of inner emptiness becomes more urgent and looming and submerges us all—whether dissidents, faithful supporters of civilization, or opinionless people. The feeling of stress connected with the agonizing industriousness in which we try to drown our pain, and the boredom that overwhelms us as soon as we come out of these wearing cycles of hyperactivity convey an unmistakable truth: when life is domesticated and subdued to the System, its quality dœs not improve—whatever the GDP indexes, institutional statistics or parliamentary reports may tell us. More and more vehement and contrasting fundamentalisms, and the rise in self-destructive acts in the developed world, seal this bitter statement in a most dramatic way. However, humans are not the only subjects who suffer because of the civilized world. The whole planet is groaning with us. Floods, downpours, typhoons, tropical storms, more and more violent hailstorms, acid rain, nano-particles, a growing number of endangered species, global warming, drought, desertification, deforestation, and overbuilding are turning the Earth into a dead zone—a toxic, inhospitable wasteland whose existence is doomed by the same devastating trajectory guiding the attack on human life. The price we pay for civilization to keep trampling on the planet’s—and its inhabitants’—destinies finds its ideal expression in our increasing “detachment” from life and from the sense of life. In the civilized world, the natural foundations of our existence—our genetic constitution, our multi-sensuousness, the free perception of reality, direct experiences, autonomy, sharing, sympathy, mutual help—are continuously attacked by a techno-mechanized, competitive and calculating universe that is making these aspects unknown even to ourselves—when they are not explicitly suppressed in a laboratory. In our world there are actually categories which we have learned to deem hugely important and that civilization has taught us to consider absolute and neutral. Authority and Bureaucracy, Science and Technology, Economics and Overpopulation, Property and Work, Education and the symbolic forms of culture (Art, Ritual, Myth, Religion, Language, Writing, Number, Time, Money, Law, Social Role) are not universal or unbiased loci. They are conceptual categories that were established together with civilization and have become untouchable. Starting to look critically at these categories means looking without too much awe at our way of living (and of thinking); it means trying to understand what constitutes the high price we are forced to pay for civilization to keep expanding. And it also means trying to trace the causes of the widespread malaise that none of the services marketed by civilization is able to “heal”. Generally, when we try to investigate the causes of the current degradation, we tend to go back by just a few decades or centuries at most: back to the rise of consumer society, of mass organization and of successful industrialization. All these phenomena have undoubtedly contributed to the current situation. But should we really stop at the beginning of the nineteenth century and at the date of birth of industrial capitalism to identify the sources of today’s crisis? The traditional antagonist movement’s answer to this question has always been positive. Personally, I think the opposite is true.

#### The 1AC is a fantasy created as a substitution for the disappearance of manageable disasters. The process of risk-calculus is overloaded by ecological degradation and therefore demands the hyper-focus on and subsequent purification of individual bodies so the Mega-Machine can justify it’s continued existence.

**Williams & Calnan ’96**, *THE 'LIMITS' OF MEDICALIZATION?: MODERN MEDICINE AND THE LAY POPULACE IN 'LATE' MODERNITY,* (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8783424) //GrouchoMarxist **[BRACKETS IN THE ORIGNAL TEXT]**

In addition to its socially reflexive character, life in late modernity is increasingly organized around the concept of'risk'. Clearly life has always been a 'risky' business, but the nature, scope and dimensions of contemporary risks have all profoundly altered. Whilst misfortunes and disasters in pre-industrial times were attributed to fate(s), God(s) or natural disasters, modern risks are increasingly the product of human interventions of many different sorts-- what Giddens refers to as the "manufactured' risks and uncertainties of modern social life. For example, as Armstrong [36] argues, whilst health risks in the nineteenth century were located in the ~natural environment', today the 'environmental' factors which impinge upon our health, such as acid rain and radiation, are the product of human intervention. In this respect, whilst the risks of the past could be attributed to the under-supply of (hygienic) technology, today they are the product of industrial over-production; something which is systematically intensified as a consequence of the globalizing process [4] (p. 4). Moreover, whilst the nature and extent of modern risks vary, they cannot simply be understood in class terms. Rather, in 'risk' society we are all ultimately confronted with a similar fate from which it is difficult if not impossible to escape. As Beck puts it: 'poverty is hierachic, smog is democratic'. In this sense, risks display a 'boomerang effect' in which even the rich and powerful are ultimately not safe. As a consequence, slowly but surely, a 'victimization by risk' is beginning to take place. Risk, therefore, becomes a fundamental existential parameter of life in late modernity, structuring the way in which experts and lay people alike organize their social worlds. As Beck argues, not only does modernity create risks through our ways of living, working, systems of transportation and the like, it also seeks to compensate for them by means of calculation and political regulation. Indeed, in an increasingly 'decisionist' culture, the profiling of risks becomes an important means of colonizing the future, instilling a sense of calculability in what is fast becoming a 'runaway world'. Yet risk assessment is, by definition, imperfect. As such it contains many imponderables, not least because its central locus lies in the future. Indeed, in many respects, the nature of modern risks--including nuclear, chemical, genetic and **ecological mega-hazards--abolishes the 'calculus of risk'**; there are simply no statistical bases for their calculation. Moreover, not only does the location of blame or culpability become increasingly difficult, but the calculation of single risks fails to take account of their aggregate or multiplicative effects. 'Dangers' lurk everywhere, from the threat of nuclear warfare and ecological catastrophe, to the 'risks' of modern medical technology, coronary heart disease and 'unsafe' sexual contact. This growing sense of risk also contributes to heightened levels of anxiety which are condensed around the body and its boundaries. In this sense, **the 'policing'** and control **of the physical body effect a symbolic** or metaphorical **resolution of threats located in the social body**. Indeed, as Kroker and Kroker [59] argue within the context of AIDS, 'panic' bodies begin to emerge involving a form of'Body McCarthyism' which seeks to distinguish between the 'clean' and 'unclean' according to the 'purity' of bodily fluids. In particular, they note a striking resemblance between medical and military rhetoric in relation to AIDS; drawing parallels between the fear of AIDS and a generalized fear of the breakdown of immunological systems. In short, as Turner argues: The body has once more become apocalyptic given the threat of chemical warfare, the destruction of the natural habitat, the epidemic of HIV and AIDS, the greying of the populations of northern Europe and the apparent inability of national governments to control medical research and technology [60] (p. 24). Given the largely invisible nature of modern risks, knowledge becomes a crucial resource through which the perception of risk is filtered, and the divisions between social and scientific rationality become ever more apparent as social movements raise issues which are not addressed by experts and vice versa. Indeed, as Beck argues, the sciences are incapable of reacting adequately to the risks of late modernity since **they are** prominently involved in **the origin** and growth **of these very risks**. Instead, they become the 'legitimating patrons' of a global industrial pollution and contamination of air, water, foodstuffs and the sickness and death of plants, animals and humans [4] (p. 59). In this sense, lay consciousness and public perceptions of the risks of modernization and modern social institutions, including modern medicine, has established itself against the resistance of scientific rationality. In other words, as Beck suggests; "...the history of the growing consciousness and social recognition of risks coincides with the history of the demystification of science" [4] (p. 59). As such, official pronouncements about risk and safety increasingly fail to allay public anxieties; indeed they may have the very opposite effect. Yet social and scientific rationality are also closely interwoven as technical discussions of risk rely on social expectations and value judgements, whilst social discussions and perceptions of risk increasingly come to depend upon scientific evidence and arguments. In short: "Public criticism and disquiet derive essentially from a dialectic ofexpertize and counter expertize" [4] (p. 59). Certainly, as discussed earlier, there is evidence to suggest an increasing degree of 'ambivalence' amongst the lay populace regarding the risks and benefits of modern medicine. Here common concerns include the danger of side-effects, the problems of addiction and dependence, the risks of technological interventions, and the moral and philosophical issues which are raised by medical 'progress'. At another level, it is also clear that a considerable degree of scepticism exists concerning the the legitimacy and relevance of much so-called 'expert' advice on health and lifestyles. Indeed, as Davison and colleagues [61, 62] have convincingly argued, health promotion advice which is based upon notions of 'predictability', 'regularity' and 'certainty' is likely to be counter-productive as it does not readily fit with the beliefs found in popular culture, nor with observations based upon lay epidemiological reasoning that, to paraphrase, fat smokers live to a 'ripe old age' whilst lithe joggers really do 'drop down dead!' (i.e. the 'prevention paradox'). In this respect it is clear that lay perceptions of risk are part and parcel of complex social processes which are not necessarily 'rational' in the scientific sense of the word. Rather, the perception of what constitutes a 'risk' is intimately bound up with people's cultural beliefs, moral values, personal feelings and the social and material circumstances of their lives. Moreover, not only do lay perceptions of risk differ from those held by professionals (i.e. the asymmetry or dialectic of social and scientific rationality discussed above), they may also vary within different segments of the lay populace and according to the competing priorities and material constraints of everyday life. In short, growing public concern about the risks of modern medicine, as well as more general anxieties about the dangers to health of life in late modernity, look set to continue as the 'balance' between (active) trust and (radical) doubt becomes ever more precarious and faith in (medical) 'experts' is slowly eroded in an increasingly reflexive social order. As Giddens puts it: Widespread lay knowledge of modern risk environments leads to an awareness of the limits of expertise and forms one of the 'public relations' problems that has to be faced by those who seek to sustain lay trust in expert systems...[R]ealisation of the areas of ignorance which confront experts themselves, as individual practitioners and in terms of overall fields of knowledge, may weaken or undermine that faith on the part of lay individuals...[I]n this case what is in question is not only the limits of or gaps in, expert knowledge, but an inadequacy which compromises the very idea of expertise [1] (pp. 130-131).

#### The collapse of the eco-system creates a global panic which demands the creation and subsequent destruction of a feared other. The Mega-Machine traps fear and anxiety within an infinite feedback loop that controls the root cause of modern violence.

**Scranton 15**, [God this guy is depressing], *Learning to die in the Anthropocene,* [https://aaaaarg.fail/upload/roy-scranton-learning-to-die-in-the-anthropocene-reflections-on-the-end-of-a-civilization.pdf] //GrouchoMarxist [We do not endorse anthropocentric language]

When it comes to global warming, differing visions of the human future are already hardening into conflict. Coal and oil companies and their government proxies have made their willingness to use military force to defend themselves and advance their interests spectacularly obvious. The labor wars of the 19th and 20th centuries show this clearly. The brutal decades-long war waged by the Nigerian government against its own people, undertaken with the outright support of Shell and Chevron, is another example, well documented in books such as A Year and a Day and Genocide in Nigeria by Ken Saro-Wiwa, who was executed for his activism. You’ve heard the call: We have to do something. We need to fight. We need to identify the enemy and go after them. Some respond, march, and chant. Some look away, deny what’s happening, and search out escape routes into imaginary tomorrows: a life off the grid, space colonies, immortality in paradise, explicit denial, or consumer satiety in a wireless, robot-staffed, 3D-printed techno-utopia. Meanwhile, the rich take shelter in their fortresses, trusting to their air conditioning, private schools, and well-paid guards. Fight. Flight. Flight. Fight. The threat of death activates our deepest ~~animal~~ drives. The aggression and fear that arise in response to perceived threats are some of the most intense emotions we ever experience. For human society to function at all, these instinctive reactions have to be carefully managed and channeled. Outbreaks of panic and hate are dangerous, but lower levels of aggression and fear help keep a population controllable and productive. Restrained aggression keeps people suspicious of collective action and working hard to overcome their fellows, while constant, generalized anxiety keeps people servile, unwilling to take risks, and yearning for comfort from whatever quarter, whether the dulling sameness of herd thought or the dumb security of consumer goods. Since at least September 11, 2001, people in the United States have been subject to an unprecedented terror campaign—not from Al Qaeda, but from the United States government. National domestic policy transformed “security” into constant fear, threatening its citizens at every turn: first with alarms of explosions and anthrax, then with prison, austerity-produced structural unemployment, and harassment, and finally with torture, SWAT tanks, snipers, drones, and total surveillance. Owing to the racial logic of US politics, in which white/black is the definitive semiotic distinction structuring American society, most of the government’s violence against its own citizens is directed against those with darker skin, but in subtler ways its terror campaign targets every single person who flies coach, watches the news, or uses the Internet. Fear comes to us every day in our encounters with increasingly militarized police and our humiliating interactions at metal detectors and body-scan machines. Fear comes to us in the absence of job security, in our want of appeal when confronted by institutionalized inequality, and in our mistrust of corrupt institutions. Fear comes to us in widespread surveillance, in the form of a homeless woman or a hospitalized friend without adequate financial support, and in the constant nagging worry that we’re not working hard enough, not happy enough, never going to “make it.” Fear comes to us in weather porn, unpredictable shifts in formerly stable climate dynamics, and massive storms. More than in any other way, fear comes to us in images and messages, as social media vibrations, products of cultural technologies that we have interpolated into our lives. Going about our daily business, we receive constant messages of apprehension and danger, ubiquitous warnings, insistent needling jabs to the deep lizard brain. Somebody died. Something blew up. Something might blow up. Somebody attacked somebody. Somebody killed somebody. Guns. Crime. Immigrants. Terrorists. Arabs. Mexicans. White supremacists. Killer cops. Demonic thugs. Rape. Murder. Global warming. Ebola. ISIS. Death. Death. Death. Sociologist Tom Pyszczynski writes: “People will do almost anything to avoid being afraid. When, despite the best efforts, [fear and anxiety] do break through, people go to incredible lengths to shut them down.” 88 Sometimes when these vibrations shake us, we discharge them by passing them on, retweeting the story, reposting the video, hoping that others will validate our reaction, thus assuaging our fear by assuring ourselves that collective attention has been alerted to the threat. Other times we react with aversion, working to dampen the vibrations by searching out positive reinforcements, pleasurable images and videos, something funny, something—anything—to ease the fear. We buy something. We eat food. We pop a pill. We fuck. In either passing on the vibration or reacting against it, we let the fear short circuit our own autonomous desires, diverting us from our goals and loading ever more emotional static into our daily cognitive processing. We become increasingly distracted from our ambitions and increasingly susceptible to such distraction. And whether we retransmit or react, we reinforce channels of thought, perception, behavior, and emotion that, over time, come to shape our habits and our personality. As we train ourselves to resonate fear and aggression, we reinforce patterns of thought and feeling that shape a society that breeds the same. Fight-or-flight is compelling because it serves essential evolutionary purposes. It increases alertness and adrenaline flow, and generally works to keep the human animal alive. As we proceed into the Anthropocene, though, capitalism’s cultural machinery for balancing fear and aggression against desire and pleasure is grinding and sputtering sparks. What cultural theorist Lauren Berlant has identified as the “cruel optimism” of a system sustained by hopes that can never be fulfilled mixes dangerously with an atmosphere of beleaguered anxiety, increasing frustration with working-class and middle-class economic stagnation, and a pervasive sadistic voyeurism that grows by what it feeds on. 89 While America’s fraying social infrastructure holds together, our fear and aggression can be channeled into labor, consumption, and economic competition, with professional sports, hyperviolent television, and occasional protests to let off steam. Once the social fabric begins to tear, though, we risk unleashing not only rioting, rebellion, and civil war, but homicidal politics the likes of which should make our blood run cold. Consider: Once among the most modern, Westernized nations in the Middle East, with a robust, highly educated middle class, Iraq has been blighted for decades by imperialist aggression, criminal gangs, interference in its domestic politics, economic liberalization, and sectarian feuding. Today it is being torn apart between a corrupt petrocracy, a breakaway Kurdish enclave, and a self-declared Islamic fundamentalist caliphate, while a civil war in neighboring Syria spills across its borders. These conflicts have likely been caused in part and exacerbated by the worst drought the Middle East has seen in modern history. Since 2006, Syria has been suffering crippling water shortages that have, in some areas, caused 75 percent crop failure and wiped out 85 percent of livestock, left more than 800,000 Syrians without a livelihood, and sent hundreds of thousands of impoverished young men streaming into Syria’s cities. 90 This drought is part of long-term warming and drying trends that are transforming the Middle East. 91 Not just water but oil, too, is elemental to these conflicts. Iraq sits on the fifth-largest proven oil reserves in the world. Meanwhile, the Islamic State has been able to survive only because it has taken control of most of Syria’s oil and gas production. We tend to think of climate change and violent religious fundamentalism as isolated phenomena, but as Retired Navy Rear Admiral David Titley argues, “you can draw a very credible climate connection to this disaster we call ISIS right now.” 92 A few hundred miles away, Israeli soldiers spent the summer of 2014 killing Palestinians in Gaza. Israel has also been suffering drought, while Gaza has been in the midst of a critical water crisis exacerbated by Israel’s military aggression. The International Committee for the Red Cross reported that during summer 2014, Israeli bombers targeted Palestinian wells and water infrastructure. 93 It’s not water and oil this time, but water and gas: some observers argue that Israel’s “Operation Protective Edge” was intended to establish firmer control over the massive Leviathan natural gas field, discovered off the coast of Gaza in the eastern Mediterranean in 2010. 94 Meanwhile, thousands of miles to the north, Russian-backed separatists fought fascist paramilitary forces defending the elected government of Ukraine, which was also suffering drought. 95 Russia’s role as an oil and gas exporter in the region and the natural gas pipelines running through Ukraine from Russia to Europe cannot but be key issues in the conflict. Elsewhere, droughts in 2014 sent refugees from Guatemala and Honduras north to the US border, devastated crops in California and Australia, and threatened millions of lives in Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Afghanistan, India, Morocco, Pakistan, and parts of China. Across the world, massive protests and riots have swept Bosnia and Herzegovina, Venezuela, Brazil, Turkey, Egypt, and Thailand, while conflicts rage on in Colombia, Libya, the Central African Republic, Sudan, Nigeria, Yemen, and India. And while the world burns, the United States has been playing chicken with Russia over control of Eastern Europe and the melting Arctic, and with China over control of Southeast Asia and the South China Sea, threatening global war on a scale not seen in seventy years. This is our present and future: droughts and hurricanes, refugees and border guards, war for oil, water, gas, and food. We experience this world of strife today in one of two modes: either it is our environment, and we are in it, or it comes to us as images, social excitation, retransmitted fear. People are fighting and dying in ruined cities all over the planet. Neighbors are killing each other. Old women are bleeding to death in bombed rubble and children are being murdered, probably as you read this sentence. To live in that world is horrific. Constant danger strains every nerve. The only things that matter are survival, killing the enemy, reputation, and having a safe place to sleep. The experience of being human narrows to a cutting edge. I remember living in that world many years ago in occupied Baghdad. Today that world seems impossibly distant, yet every day it presses in on me in a never-ending stream of words, images, appeals, and reports. I see videos. I read stories. I see pictures of this or that suffering or injustice and I am moved. To act, perhaps, but more accurately to emote. To react. To feel. To perform. We do not usually ask where these feelings come from or who they serve, but we all know that the cultural technologies transmitting these affective vibrations are not neutral: news outlets shape information to fit their owners’ prejudices, while Facebook, Twitter, and Google shape our perceptions through hidden algorithms. The specialization and demographic targeting of contemporary media tend to narrow the channels of perception to the point that we receive only those images and vibrations which already harmonize with our own prejudices, our own pre-existing desires, thus intensifying our particular emotional reactions along an increasingly limited band, impelling us to discharge our emotions within the same field of ready listeners, for which we are rewarded with “Likes” and “Favorites.” Our consciousness is shaped daily through feedback systems where some post or headline provokes a feeling and we discharge that feeling by provoking it in others. Social media like Facebook crowdsource catharsis, creating self-contained wave pools of aggression and fear, pity and terror, stagnant flows that go nowhere and do nothing. Pictures of children killed by bombs or police, or pictures of the devastation left in the wake of a tropical storm may move me to sadness and horror. Retransmitting such images will pass along that sadness and horror. My act of transmission will mark me as someone who has feelings about these things and who condemns them. I can rationalize my retransmission by saying that I am “raising awareness” or trying to influence public policy: I want my fellow citizens to be as horrified as I am, so they’ll think like I do, or so they’ll vote for a representative who works to prevent such horrors from happening, or maybe so that if enough of us all think the same way and feel the same way, the organs and institutions of power will be forced to hear us and align themselves along our vibrations, **the way a honeybee colony will pick a site for a new hive through the dance of its advance guard scouts**. These are perfectly reasonable human assumptions, because that is how physical human collectives function. Anyone who has been in a crowd, a basketball team, a nightclub, a choir, or a protest knows how bodies resonate together. But politics is the energetic distribution of bodies in systems, and we live in a system of carbon-fueled capitalism that we shouldn’t expect to work in physical human ways for several reasons, especially when it comes to responding to the threat of global warming. First, our political and social media technologies are not neutral, but have been developed to serve particular interests, most notably targeted advertising, concentration of wealth, and ideological control, and the vibrations that seem to resonate most strongly along these channels are envy, adulation, outrage, fear, hatred, and mindless pleasure. Second, the more we pass on or react to social vibrations, the more we strengthen our habits of channeling and the less we practice autonomous reflection or independent critical thought. With every protest chant, retweet, and Facebook post, we become stronger resonators and weaker thinkers. Third, however intense our social vibrations grow, they remain locked within machinery that offers no political leverage: they do not translate into political action, because they do not connect to the flows of power. Finally, while the typical collective human response to threat is to identify an enemy, pick sides, and mobilize to fight, global warming offers no apprehensible foe. That hasn’t stopped people from trying to find one. The Flood Wall Street protesters say the enemy is American corporations. Tanzania’s Jakaya Kikwete and Nauru’s Baron Waqa say the problem is the United States and Great Britain. Shell Oil and the Environmental Defense Fund seem to think that it’s intractable UN bureaucracy that’s holding us up. Barack Obama has implied that it’s China. Tea Party Republicans would blame Barack Obama, I’m sure, if they admitted that global warming was actually happening and caused by human activity. Meanwhile, NPR-listening liberals want to believe that Tea Party Republicans are responsible, so that they can frame the problem as one amenable to solution by moral education and enlightened consumerism, as if it were all a matter of convincing people to eat more kale and drive electric cars. One climate activist has argued that just 90 companies are responsible for almost two-thirds of all historical greenhouse gas emissions, which conveniently absolves billions of automobile drivers, airline passengers, meat eaters, and cellphone users of responsibility. 96 The enemy isn’t out there somewhere—the enemy is ourselves. Not as individuals, but as a collective.

#### The alternative is a reorientation of the future towards de-domestication of humanity to re-center the community as the foundation of social structures as a countermovement to the homogenization of life demanding by technological thinking.

**Zerzan ’15** (Hasn’t showered in weeks, doesn’t like Iphones), *Why Hope? The Stand Against Civilization,* (<https://aaaaarg.fail/upload/john-zerzan-why-hope-the-stand-against-civilization-2.pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist

We are certainly as opposed to species loss, habitat destruction, and global warming as anyone else.” But again, **developing the** techno**future is based on the** systematic **destruction of the unbuilt world**, on global industrialization. What else enables it? The call for “increased diversity” is completely hollow. Not only are species, languages, and indigenous cultures being sacrificed. the general cultural homogenization is overtaking diversity. Increasingly, the malls, airports, apartments, et al. become identical in a globalizing world. Techno-industrial life grows flatter, textureless, and standardized. Perhaps most important: technology is the same everywhere. Is it a coincidence that as the techno-culture crowds out everything else, we see growing pathologies in society? In the U.S., tens of millions of people need addictive drugs to sleep, to have sex, to counter anxiety and depression. Meanwhile the shooting sprees––rampage killings in schools, family workplaces, and shopping malls––are daily occurrences. The emptiness and desolation are palpable, bringing continually worsening symptoms. In today’s mass techno-society, community has all but disappeared. And without social bonds and solidarity, anything can and does happen. Virtual “community” is a mockery of actual, face-to-face community, where individuals can be accountable and responsible. Technology is forever promising solutions. We live in an age where technology fills an ideological vacuum, as political ideologies fade in significance. But by and large, the solutions address problems that were created by technology in the first place––a fact we are not supposed to notice. (Think of diseases spread by intercontinental travel, oil spills, or nuclear power disasters, for instance—and even those diseases that did not exist prior to domestication, including virtually all infectious and degenerative diseases.) The German sociologist Ulrich Beck argues in his “risk society” thesis that disasters are a built-in feature of complex society. Global warming, the biggest disaster of all, evidently is a function of the growth of global industry. The more factories, the higher the temperature. Again, just what does onrushing technology rest upon? There is an intimate connection between a mobile phone and the destruction, not of illusory “Next Nature,” but of billions of years’ worth of natural systems that have made life on Earth possible. Fredric Jameson wrote, somewhat famously, that “Postmodernism is what you get when the modernization process is complete and nature is gone for good.” Postmodern culture is indeed, in my opinion, a surrender of this kind: let’s just accept the erasure of the natural world and go on from there. In IBM’s watchword: “Let’s Build a Smarter Planet.” We should accept the inevitable success of the cyber/cyborg/digital/ virtual/ information technology juggernaut, not think about what “advanced” society is really advancing toward. But we know what the fullness of the technological project has brought us. Since Emile Durkheim in the nineteenth century we’ve known, for example, that modern industrial cities breed much higher rates of suicide and madness. Reams of empirical studies and a century or two of social theory have noticed that modernity produces increasingly shallow and instrumental relationships, amid a life-world that is barren and isolating. Recently, a friend who is an emergency medical professional told me of calls received during the holiday season, from those who don’t have a health emergency. “I think I might be having a heart attack,” for example, in order to get a visit––in order to have some human contact. Do we really want to push all this even further? Life, health, freedom, community need a different direction. For thousands of generations we lived in band society. Before tribal ism, this form of community–perhaps the only actual form that has existed–featured the face-to-face society that consisted of fewer than a hundred people. Mass society of course erased this and so much more.  Novelist Kurt Vonnegut, in a 1973 interview, rejected the claims of modern techno-society, in favor of band society. “Human beings will be happier...when they find ways to inhabit primitive communities. That’s my utopia. That’s what I want for me.” I, too, want to go in that direction. We need a new paradigm, a new vision, which would involve a radical decentralization, a move away from the ever more integrating world system. Not alter-globalization, a new catch-phrase on the Left, but anti-globalization based on anti-authoritarian perspectives. More than that we need to start de-domesticating ourselves and reskilling ourselves. Reconnecting with the Earth in a literal sense. All of us are domesticated but we can start the process of transition.

## Lorge boi

### 1NC

#### Welcome to the Megamachine. A system of organization driven by technology and dependent on humanities depletion of the biosphere. The 1AC is another step towards the techno-future that guarantees endless destruction coupled with an affective cooling that robs interpersonal relationships of all meaning.

**Manicardi ’12,** (doesn’t know how to make good looking book covers, probably smells weird), *Free From Civilization Notes towards a radical critique of the foundations of civilization: domination, culture, fear, economics and technology*, (<https://aaaaarg.fail/upload/enrico-manicardi-free-from-civilization-notes-toward-a-radical-critique-of-civilizations-foundations-domination-culture-fear-economics-and-technology.pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist

Why write an essay that critiques civilization today, when civilization is presented everywhere as the only means of escape from a world that is drifting away? Why stigmatize, down to its foundations, the mix of values that distinguish civil life when these values are elevated on the basis of highsounding propaganda as promises of future welfare and happiness? It would be too easy to answer that we cannot believe such promises anymore, that they are mere propaganda; that a “Better Future” has been pompously heralded for a long time without any celebration following the many announcements. But the problem is certainly more complex. If we look closely at the conditions of the modern world, we see not only a medley of broken promises of happiness, but also a series of perfectly kept promises of unhappiness. When we are told that in order to live better someone else must be worse off, when we are asked to be patient a while longer, to tighten our belts, grit our teeth and accept those sacrifices that will make the sun shine again, we are facing just those sorts of kept promises. Which is exactly what happens when we are asked to work even more, hurry up even more, consume everything and everybody in order to sustain Economy, Progress, Development, Democracy, etc. In the world there are no absolutely negative or positive situations. Even something that makes us extremely happy can cause some suffering (romantic love is perhaps the most illustrative example); on the other hand, what we consider negative can help us grow up and may not be totally unfavorable. Like any human condition, civilization is distinguished by these mixed features. The point is not to judge it as totally disadvantageous (or absolutely free of inconveniences), but to try and understand it in terms of its entrenched patterns, principles, developments and effects, so as to look at civilization from a vantage point that allows us to establish if it can still be worthwhile to follow its path or if it is better to change our route. There is a price we pay everyday to safeguard civilization and to permit it to spread further: this price should be the stake of the game revolving around our willingness to accept all this. Here is a simple example: all of us can acknowledge that a cell phone is a very useful tool. It undoubtedly is, but at what price? We just don’t have to think about the damage it causes to our health due to the noxious waves it emits (by using it, by not using it and even when it is on stand-by). We just don’t have to think about the damage on’t have to think about the relational isolation where it imprisons us all, making face-to-face communication less and less likely as well as, for many young people, the ability to express their opinions (and even their feelings) in person. And we don’t have to think about the financial interests of the entire cell phone industry, about the financial speculation it encourages, about the environmental and human exploitation it brings about (some of the materials cell phones are made of are unearthed from deep mines where still today many enslaved people work and die). Finally, we don’t have to think about the technological and military development programs that are nourished by the mobile phone phenomenon, making social control more and more invasive and wars even crueler. In short, we don’t have to think about all this (and much, much more) if our cell phone is to appear only as a very useful tool. Civilization—just like cell phones—has a really high price, and even if this price is usually carefully concealed and underestimated, it is there nevertheless. Acknowledging this is a first important step towards the evaluation of its acceptability. In this civilized world we have a bad life, and it is getting even worse. Not just because of hunger, or of the excruciating death of children exterminated by disease, famine or lack of drinking water. Our life is bad even in the opulent regions of this planet, in what is generally presented as the land of plenty. Multiplying forms of addiction: tobacco addiction and alcoholism are spreading among the young, together with any kind of more or less legal psychotropic drugs, medications, video games, sex industry, and gambling; the spreading of nervous diseases—anorexia, bulimia, panic attacks, chronic fatigue, sleep disorders; the various obsessive compulsions—to run faster, buy everything, collect anything, to hygienize and sanitize every single item; the exponential increase in violent episodes, from bullying to serial killers; all tell us that where the “national welfare state” has been officially proclaimed, civilization spares no one. Irreparably articulated in the routine on which our dismal everyday life is based, accompanied by a continuous distress and by the isolation that derives from a growing object- and service-mediated existence, this sense of inner emptiness becomes more urgent and looming and submerges us all—whether dissidents, faithful supporters of civilization, or opinionless people. The feeling of stress connected with the agonizing industriousness in which we try to drown our pain, and the boredom that overwhelms us as soon as we come out of these wearing cycles of hyperactivity convey an unmistakable truth: when life is domesticated and subdued to the System, its quality dœs not improve—whatever the GDP indexes, institutional statistics or parliamentary reports may tell us. More and more vehement and contrasting fundamentalisms, and the rise in self-destructive acts in the developed world, seal this bitter statement in a most dramatic way. However, humans are not the only subjects who suffer because of the civilized world. The whole planet is groaning with us. Floods, downpours, typhoons, tropical storms, more and more violent hailstorms, acid rain, nano-particles, a growing number of endangered species, global warming, drought, desertification, deforestation, and overbuilding are turning the Earth into a dead zone—a toxic, inhospitable wasteland whose existence is doomed by the same devastating trajectory guiding the attack on human life. The price we pay for civilization to keep trampling on the planet’s—and its inhabitants’—destinies finds its ideal expression in our increasing “detachment” from life and from the sense of life. In the civilized world, the natural foundations of our existence—our genetic constitution, our multi-sensuousness, the free perception of reality, direct experiences, autonomy, sharing, sympathy, mutual help—are continuously attacked by a techno-mechanized, competitive and calculating universe that is making these aspects unknown even to ourselves—when they are not explicitly suppressed in a laboratory. In our world there are actually categories which we have learned to deem hugely important and that civilization has taught us to consider absolute and neutral. Authority and Bureaucracy, Science and Technology, Economics and Overpopulation, Property and Work, Education and the symbolic forms of culture (Art, Ritual, Myth, Religion, Language, Writing, Number, Time, Money, Law, Social Role) are not universal or unbiased loci. They are conceptual categories that were established together with civilization and have become untouchable. Starting to look critically at these categories means looking without too much awe at our way of living (and of thinking); it means trying to understand what constitutes the high price we are forced to pay for civilization to keep expanding. And it also means trying to trace the causes of the widespread malaise that none of the services marketed by civilization is able to “heal”. Generally, when we try to investigate the causes of the current degradation, we tend to go back by just a few decades or centuries at most: back to the rise of consumer society, of mass organization and of successful industrialization. All these phenomena have undoubtedly contributed to the current situation. But should we really stop at the beginning of the nineteenth century and at the date of birth of industrial capitalism to identify the sources of today’s crisis? The traditional antagonist movement’s answer to this question has always been positive. Personally, I think the opposite is true.

#### The 1AC is a fantasy created as a substitution for the disappearance of manageable disasters. The process of risk-calculus is overloaded by ecological degradation and therefore demands the hyper-focus on and subsequent purification of individual bodies so the Mega-Machine can justify it’s continued existence.

**Williams & Calnan ’96**, *THE 'LIMITS' OF MEDICALIZATION?: MODERN MEDICINE AND THE LAY POPULACE IN 'LATE' MODERNITY,* (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8783424) //GrouchoMarxist **[BRACKETS IN THE ORIGNAL TEXT]**

In addition to its socially reflexive character, life in late modernity is increasingly organized around the concept of'risk'. Clearly life has always been a 'risky' business, but the nature, scope and dimensions of contemporary risks have all profoundly altered. Whilst misfortunes and disasters in pre-industrial times were attributed to fate(s), God(s) or natural disasters, modern risks are increasingly the product of human interventions of many different sorts-- what Giddens refers to as the "manufactured' risks and uncertainties of modern social life. For example, as Armstrong [36] argues, whilst health risks in the nineteenth century were located in the ~natural environment', today the 'environmental' factors which impinge upon our health, such as acid rain and radiation, are the product of human intervention. In this respect, whilst the risks of the past could be attributed to the under-supply of (hygienic) technology, today they are the product of industrial over-production; something which is systematically intensified as a consequence of the globalizing process [4] (p. 4). Moreover, whilst the nature and extent of modern risks vary, they cannot simply be understood in class terms. Rather, in 'risk' society we are all ultimately confronted with a similar fate from which it is difficult if not impossible to escape. As Beck puts it: 'poverty is hierachic, smog is democratic'. In this sense, risks display a 'boomerang effect' in which even the rich and powerful are ultimately not safe. As a consequence, slowly but surely, a 'victimization by risk' is beginning to take place. Risk, therefore, becomes a fundamental existential parameter of life in late modernity, structuring the way in which experts and lay people alike organize their social worlds. As Beck argues, not only does modernity create risks through our ways of living, working, systems of transportation and the like, it also seeks to compensate for them by means of calculation and political regulation. Indeed, in an increasingly 'decisionist' culture, the profiling of risks becomes an important means of colonizing the future, instilling a sense of calculability in what is fast becoming a 'runaway world'. Yet risk assessment is, by definition, imperfect. As such it contains many imponderables, not least because its central locus lies in the future. Indeed, in many respects, the nature of modern risks--including nuclear, chemical, genetic and **ecological mega-hazards--abolishes the 'calculus of risk'**; there are simply no statistical bases for their calculation. Moreover, not only does the location of blame or culpability become increasingly difficult, but the calculation of single risks fails to take account of their aggregate or multiplicative effects. 'Dangers' lurk everywhere, from the threat of nuclear warfare and ecological catastrophe, to the 'risks' of modern medical technology, coronary heart disease and 'unsafe' sexual contact. This growing sense of risk also contributes to heightened levels of anxiety which are condensed around the body and its boundaries. In this sense, **the 'policing'** and control **of the physical body effect a symbolic** or metaphorical **resolution of threats located in the social body**. Indeed, as Kroker and Kroker [59] argue within the context of AIDS, 'panic' bodies begin to emerge involving a form of'Body McCarthyism' which seeks to distinguish between the 'clean' and 'unclean' according to the 'purity' of bodily fluids. In particular, they note a striking resemblance between medical and military rhetoric in relation to AIDS; drawing parallels between the fear of AIDS and a generalized fear of the breakdown of immunological systems. In short, as Turner argues: The body has once more become apocalyptic given the threat of chemical warfare, the destruction of the natural habitat, the epidemic of HIV and AIDS, the greying of the populations of northern Europe and the apparent inability of national governments to control medical research and technology [60] (p. 24). Given the largely invisible nature of modern risks, knowledge becomes a crucial resource through which the perception of risk is filtered, and the divisions between social and scientific rationality become ever more apparent as social movements raise issues which are not addressed by experts and vice versa. Indeed, as Beck argues, the sciences are incapable of reacting adequately to the risks of late modernity since **they are** prominently involved in **the origin** and growth **of these very risks**. Instead, they become the 'legitimating patrons' of a global industrial pollution and contamination of air, water, foodstuffs and the sickness and death of plants, animals and humans [4] (p. 59). In this sense, lay consciousness and public perceptions of the risks of modernization and modern social institutions, including modern medicine, has established itself against the resistance of scientific rationality. In other words, as Beck suggests; "...the history of the growing consciousness and social recognition of risks coincides with the history of the demystification of science" [4] (p. 59). As such, official pronouncements about risk and safety increasingly fail to allay public anxieties; indeed they may have the very opposite effect. Yet social and scientific rationality are also closely interwoven as technical discussions of risk rely on social expectations and value judgements, whilst social discussions and perceptions of risk increasingly come to depend upon scientific evidence and arguments. In short: "Public criticism and disquiet derive essentially from a dialectic ofexpertize and counter expertize" [4] (p. 59). Certainly, as discussed earlier, there is evidence to suggest an increasing degree of 'ambivalence' amongst the lay populace regarding the risks and benefits of modern medicine. Here common concerns include the danger of side-effects, the problems of addiction and dependence, the risks of technological interventions, and the moral and philosophical issues which are raised by medical 'progress'. At another level, it is also clear that a considerable degree of scepticism exists concerning the the legitimacy and relevance of much so-called 'expert' advice on health and lifestyles. Indeed, as Davison and colleagues [61, 62] have convincingly argued, health promotion advice which is based upon notions of 'predictability', 'regularity' and 'certainty' is likely to be counter-productive as it does not readily fit with the beliefs found in popular culture, nor with observations based upon lay epidemiological reasoning that, to paraphrase, fat smokers live to a 'ripe old age' whilst lithe joggers really do 'drop down dead!' (i.e. the 'prevention paradox'). In this respect it is clear that lay perceptions of risk are part and parcel of complex social processes which are not necessarily 'rational' in the scientific sense of the word. Rather, the perception of what constitutes a 'risk' is intimately bound up with people's cultural beliefs, moral values, personal feelings and the social and material circumstances of their lives. Moreover, not only do lay perceptions of risk differ from those held by professionals (i.e. the asymmetry or dialectic of social and scientific rationality discussed above), they may also vary within different segments of the lay populace and according to the competing priorities and material constraints of everyday life. In short, growing public concern about the risks of modern medicine, as well as more general anxieties about the dangers to health of life in late modernity, look set to continue as the 'balance' between (active) trust and (radical) doubt becomes ever more precarious and faith in (medical) 'experts' is slowly eroded in an increasingly reflexive social order. As Giddens puts it: Widespread lay knowledge of modern risk environments leads to an awareness of the limits of expertise and forms one of the 'public relations' problems that has to be faced by those who seek to sustain lay trust in expert systems...[R]ealisation of the areas of ignorance which confront experts themselves, as individual practitioners and in terms of overall fields of knowledge, may weaken or undermine that faith on the part of lay individuals...[I]n this case what is in question is not only the limits of or gaps in, expert knowledge, but an inadequacy which compromises the very idea of expertise [1] (pp. 130-131).

#### The 1AC grants legitimacy to structures that are founded upon the destruction of the biosphere Particular instances of positivity will always be revealed as a smokescreen that allows for endless exploitation and destruction.

**Bradford ’89**,[Aye fuck exxon though], *Stopping The Industrial Hydra: Revolution Against The Megamachine,* (<https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/george-bradford-stopping-the-industrial-hydra-revolution-against-the-megamachine.pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist

It should go without saying that Exxon and its allies don’t try their best to protect the environment or human health. Capitalist institutions produce to accumulate power and wealth, not for any social “good”. Thus, predictably, in order to cut costs, Exxon steadily dismantled what emergency safeguards it had throughout the 1980s, pointing to environmental studies showing a major spill as so unlikely that preparation was unnecessary. So when the inevitable came crashing down, the response was complete impotence and negligence. Yet **to focus on disasters as aberrations** resulting from corporate greed **is to mystify the** real **operational character of an entire social and technological system**. The unmitigated disaster of daily, undramatic activities in places like Prudhoe Bay and Bhopal — even before they enter the vocabulary of doom — is irrefutable proof that Valdez was no accident but the norm. Modern industrialism cannot exist without its Prudhoe Bays. Capital must always have a super-exploited colony, a “sacrifice area” of some kind — the sky, a human community, a watershed, the soil, the gene pool, and so on — to expand and extend its lifeless tentacles. The real spillage goes on every day, every minute, when capitalism and mass technics appear to be working more or less according to the Plan. The Exxon Valdez contained some 1.2 million barrels of oil; at any given time 750 million barrels are floating on the world’s waters. In 1979 the amount of oil lost worldwide on land and sea through spillage, fire and sinkings reached a peak of 328 million gallons; since then it has dropped to between 24 and 55 million a year, except for 1983, when tanker accidents and oil blowouts in the Iran-Iraq War brought the total up to 242 million gallons. Most of the oil in the oceans comes not from accidents but municipal and industrial runoff, the cleaning of ship bilges and other routine activity. Industry analysts say that major oil spills have declined, but that “smaller” spills continue to take place all the time, a phenomenon paralleled in the chemical industry by focusing on major leaks to conceal the reality of a slow-moving, low-level, daily Bhopal. And no matter how carefully industry tries to prevent accidents, they are going to occur; the larger and more complicated the system, the more certain the breakdown. As the head of the Cambridge-based Centre for Short-lived Phenomena (!), which keeps track of oil spills, commented after the Valdez spill, because such an event “takes place so infrequently, and the resources are never available in a single location to deal effectively with it” (meaning because booms can’t be stationed every hundred yards along the route, etc.) major spills are inevitable. In any case, mass society is a continuous oil spill just as it is a constant chemical leak. The 11 million gallons lost by the Valdez on Bligh Reef is matched every year in the state of Michigan alone by citizens pouring waste oil down sewers or on the ground. (See related story in box.) And while it is true that more safety measures could be taken through institutional or technological means (or even by revolutionary workers councils or assemblies), industrialism brings inherent consequences of spills, leaks, inadequate response, inadequate “treatment”, and ecological Bust. As petrochemicals are necessary to industrialism whatever the form of management, spills are also integral to petrochemicals. And what chemicals and oil spills are to a society addicted to industrialism, industrialism is to the living fabric of the planet. This observation was raised by writer Bill McKibben in an essay published on the Op-Ed page of the New York Times on April 7. McKibben asked what would have been the result had the Exxon Valdez gotten through without a hitch? If ten million gallons had gotten through to be consumed, they would have released about 60 million pounds of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Carbon dioxide is the major component gas causing the greenhouse effect, in which gases emitted in enormous quantities by industrial civilization will trap heat in the atmosphere and raise global temperatures, disrupting and profoundly transforming the planet’s ecology — capitalism’s 21st century Global Business Climate, so to speak. McKibben writes that in the next century, “There will be twice as much carbon dioxide in the atmosphere as there was before the Industrial Revolution.” The effects are unclear to scientists, but nearly all agree that the burning of fossil fuels combined with the release of chemicals that destroy the planet’s ozone layer in the upper atmosphere, the generation of heat from all sources, deforestation and other factors will bring about massive species extinctions, climate and weather changes, flooding and other havoc. The average car reproduces its own body weight in carbons each year. This is “another oil slick”, McKibben notes, being released every day. And while technological modifications to make “cleanburning” cars may reduce pollutants such as carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons by as much as 96%, such cars will emit as much carbon dioxide as a Model T. Electric cars will pose a similar problem if their energy comes from fossil fuel sources. (See related box insert ‘Never Trust a Techno-Fix’).The production of automobiles, and the production of anti-pollution technology itself, are not even taken into account by this analysis, but the inherent failure of technological reason can be seen. The rate of climate change over the next hundred years may dwarf by thirty times the rate of global warming that followed the last Ice Age. Reducing what comes out of tail pipes won’t even put a slight dent in that problem. “The greenhouse effect,” McKibben observes, “is not the result of something going wrong. It doesn’t stem from drunken sailors, inadequate emergency planning or a reef in the wrong place. It’s harder to deal with than that because it’s just a result of normal life.” Leaving aside the question of whether or not the phrase “normal life” appropriately describes industrial capitalism, if McKibben’s recommendation that “less energy” be used is to meaningfully confront the looming greenhouse crisis, such a reduction in industrial activity will have to be far more dramatic than almost any sectors of society have been willing to ponder so far. It would signal a deconstruction process more profound than any revolutionary transformation of society ever seen previously. Whether or not this prospect is possible is an open question. Whether or not it is necessary is a question that must include the recognition that present environmental effects are the results of activities several decades ago. And since modern science cannot understand thresholds, there is no telling how much time is left, only a certainty that it is running out.

#### The collapse of the eco-system creates a global panic which demands the creation and subsequent destruction of a feared other. The Mega-Machine traps fear and anxiety within an infinite feedback loop that controls the root cause of modern violence.

**Scranton 15**, [God this guy is depressing], *Learning to die in the Anthropocene,* [https://aaaaarg.fail/upload/roy-scranton-learning-to-die-in-the-anthropocene-reflections-on-the-end-of-a-civilization.pdf] //GrouchoMarxist [We do not endorse anthropocentric language]

When it comes to global warming, differing visions of the human future are already hardening into conflict. Coal and oil companies and their government proxies have made their willingness to use military force to defend themselves and advance their interests spectacularly obvious. The labor wars of the 19th and 20th centuries show this clearly. The brutal decades-long war waged by the Nigerian government against its own people, undertaken with the outright support of Shell and Chevron, is another example, well documented in books such as A Year and a Day and Genocide in Nigeria by Ken Saro-Wiwa, who was executed for his activism. You’ve heard the call: We have to do something. We need to fight. We need to identify the enemy and go after them. Some respond, march, and chant. Some look away, deny what’s happening, and search out escape routes into imaginary tomorrows: a life off the grid, space colonies, immortality in paradise, explicit denial, or consumer satiety in a wireless, robot-staffed, 3D-printed techno-utopia. Meanwhile, the rich take shelter in their fortresses, trusting to their air conditioning, private schools, and well-paid guards. Fight. Flight. Flight. Fight. The threat of death activates our deepest ~~animal~~ drives. The aggression and fear that arise in response to perceived threats are some of the most intense emotions we ever experience. For human society to function at all, these instinctive reactions have to be carefully managed and channeled. Outbreaks of panic and hate are dangerous, but lower levels of aggression and fear help keep a population controllable and productive. Restrained aggression keeps people suspicious of collective action and working hard to overcome their fellows, while constant, generalized anxiety keeps people servile, unwilling to take risks, and yearning for comfort from whatever quarter, whether the dulling sameness of herd thought or the dumb security of consumer goods. Since at least September 11, 2001, people in the United States have been subject to an unprecedented terror campaign—not from Al Qaeda, but from the United States government. National domestic policy transformed “security” into constant fear, threatening its citizens at every turn: first with alarms of explosions and anthrax, then with prison, austerity-produced structural unemployment, and harassment, and finally with torture, SWAT tanks, snipers, drones, and total surveillance. Owing to the racial logic of US politics, in which white/black is the definitive semiotic distinction structuring American society, most of the government’s violence against its own citizens is directed against those with darker skin, but in subtler ways its terror campaign targets every single person who flies coach, watches the news, or uses the Internet. Fear comes to us every day in our encounters with increasingly militarized police and our humiliating interactions at metal detectors and body-scan machines. Fear comes to us in the absence of job security, in our want of appeal when confronted by institutionalized inequality, and in our mistrust of corrupt institutions. Fear comes to us in widespread surveillance, in the form of a homeless woman or a hospitalized friend without adequate financial support, and in the constant nagging worry that we’re not working hard enough, not happy enough, never going to “make it.” Fear comes to us in weather porn, unpredictable shifts in formerly stable climate dynamics, and massive storms. More than in any other way, fear comes to us in images and messages, as social media vibrations, products of cultural technologies that we have interpolated into our lives. Going about our daily business, we receive constant messages of apprehension and danger, ubiquitous warnings, insistent needling jabs to the deep lizard brain. Somebody died. Something blew up. Something might blow up. Somebody attacked somebody. Somebody killed somebody. Guns. Crime. Immigrants. Terrorists. Arabs. Mexicans. White supremacists. Killer cops. Demonic thugs. Rape. Murder. Global warming. Ebola. ISIS. Death. Death. Death. Sociologist Tom Pyszczynski writes: “People will do almost anything to avoid being afraid. When, despite the best efforts, [fear and anxiety] do break through, people go to incredible lengths to shut them down.” 88 Sometimes when these vibrations shake us, we discharge them by passing them on, retweeting the story, reposting the video, hoping that others will validate our reaction, thus assuaging our fear by assuring ourselves that collective attention has been alerted to the threat. Other times we react with aversion, working to dampen the vibrations by searching out positive reinforcements, pleasurable images and videos, something funny, something—anything—to ease the fear. We buy something. We eat food. We pop a pill. We fuck. In either passing on the vibration or reacting against it, we let the fear short circuit our own autonomous desires, diverting us from our goals and loading ever more emotional static into our daily cognitive processing. We become increasingly distracted from our ambitions and increasingly susceptible to such distraction. And whether we retransmit or react, we reinforce channels of thought, perception, behavior, and emotion that, over time, come to shape our habits and our personality. As we train ourselves to resonate fear and aggression, we reinforce patterns of thought and feeling that shape a society that breeds the same. Fight-or-flight is compelling because it serves essential evolutionary purposes. It increases alertness and adrenaline flow, and generally works to keep the human animal alive. As we proceed into the Anthropocene, though, capitalism’s cultural machinery for balancing fear and aggression against desire and pleasure is grinding and sputtering sparks. What cultural theorist Lauren Berlant has identified as the “cruel optimism” of a system sustained by hopes that can never be fulfilled mixes dangerously with an atmosphere of beleaguered anxiety, increasing frustration with working-class and middle-class economic stagnation, and a pervasive sadistic voyeurism that grows by what it feeds on. 89 While America’s fraying social infrastructure holds together, our fear and aggression can be channeled into labor, consumption, and economic competition, with professional sports, hyperviolent television, and occasional protests to let off steam. Once the social fabric begins to tear, though, we risk unleashing not only rioting, rebellion, and civil war, but homicidal politics the likes of which should make our blood run cold. Consider: Once among the most modern, Westernized nations in the Middle East, with a robust, highly educated middle class, Iraq has been blighted for decades by imperialist aggression, criminal gangs, interference in its domestic politics, economic liberalization, and sectarian feuding. Today it is being torn apart between a corrupt petrocracy, a breakaway Kurdish enclave, and a self-declared Islamic fundamentalist caliphate, while a civil war in neighboring Syria spills across its borders. These conflicts have likely been caused in part and exacerbated by the worst drought the Middle East has seen in modern history. Since 2006, Syria has been suffering crippling water shortages that have, in some areas, caused 75 percent crop failure and wiped out 85 percent of livestock, left more than 800,000 Syrians without a livelihood, and sent hundreds of thousands of impoverished young men streaming into Syria’s cities. 90 This drought is part of long-term warming and drying trends that are transforming the Middle East. 91 Not just water but oil, too, is elemental to these conflicts. Iraq sits on the fifth-largest proven oil reserves in the world. Meanwhile, the Islamic State has been able to survive only because it has taken control of most of Syria’s oil and gas production. We tend to think of climate change and violent religious fundamentalism as isolated phenomena, but as Retired Navy Rear Admiral David Titley argues, “you can draw a very credible climate connection to this disaster we call ISIS right now.” 92 A few hundred miles away, Israeli soldiers spent the summer of 2014 killing Palestinians in Gaza. Israel has also been suffering drought, while Gaza has been in the midst of a critical water crisis exacerbated by Israel’s military aggression. The International Committee for the Red Cross reported that during summer 2014, Israeli bombers targeted Palestinian wells and water infrastructure. 93 It’s not water and oil this time, but water and gas: some observers argue that Israel’s “Operation Protective Edge” was intended to establish firmer control over the massive Leviathan natural gas field, discovered off the coast of Gaza in the eastern Mediterranean in 2010. 94 Meanwhile, thousands of miles to the north, Russian-backed separatists fought fascist paramilitary forces defending the elected government of Ukraine, which was also suffering drought. 95 Russia’s role as an oil and gas exporter in the region and the natural gas pipelines running through Ukraine from Russia to Europe cannot but be key issues in the conflict. Elsewhere, droughts in 2014 sent refugees from Guatemala and Honduras north to the US border, devastated crops in California and Australia, and threatened millions of lives in Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Afghanistan, India, Morocco, Pakistan, and parts of China. Across the world, massive protests and riots have swept Bosnia and Herzegovina, Venezuela, Brazil, Turkey, Egypt, and Thailand, while conflicts rage on in Colombia, Libya, the Central African Republic, Sudan, Nigeria, Yemen, and India. And while the world burns, the United States has been playing chicken with Russia over control of Eastern Europe and the melting Arctic, and with China over control of Southeast Asia and the South China Sea, threatening global war on a scale not seen in seventy years. This is our present and future: droughts and hurricanes, refugees and border guards, war for oil, water, gas, and food. We experience this world of strife today in one of two modes: either it is our environment, and we are in it, or it comes to us as images, social excitation, retransmitted fear. People are fighting and dying in ruined cities all over the planet. Neighbors are killing each other. Old women are bleeding to death in bombed rubble and children are being murdered, probably as you read this sentence. To live in that world is horrific. Constant danger strains every nerve. The only things that matter are survival, killing the enemy, reputation, and having a safe place to sleep. The experience of being human narrows to a cutting edge. I remember living in that world many years ago in occupied Baghdad. Today that world seems impossibly distant, yet every day it presses in on me in a never-ending stream of words, images, appeals, and reports. I see videos. I read stories. I see pictures of this or that suffering or injustice and I am moved. To act, perhaps, but more accurately to emote. To react. To feel. To perform. We do not usually ask where these feelings come from or who they serve, but we all know that the cultural technologies transmitting these affective vibrations are not neutral: news outlets shape information to fit their owners’ prejudices, while Facebook, Twitter, and Google shape our perceptions through hidden algorithms. The specialization and demographic targeting of contemporary media tend to narrow the channels of perception to the point that we receive only those images and vibrations which already harmonize with our own prejudices, our own pre-existing desires, thus intensifying our particular emotional reactions along an increasingly limited band, impelling us to discharge our emotions within the same field of ready listeners, for which we are rewarded with “Likes” and “Favorites.” Our consciousness is shaped daily through feedback systems where some post or headline provokes a feeling and we discharge that feeling by provoking it in others. Social media like Facebook crowdsource catharsis, creating self-contained wave pools of aggression and fear, pity and terror, stagnant flows that go nowhere and do nothing. Pictures of children killed by bombs or police, or pictures of the devastation left in the wake of a tropical storm may move me to sadness and horror. Retransmitting such images will pass along that sadness and horror. My act of transmission will mark me as someone who has feelings about these things and who condemns them. I can rationalize my retransmission by saying that I am “raising awareness” or trying to influence public policy: I want my fellow citizens to be as horrified as I am, so they’ll think like I do, or so they’ll vote for a representative who works to prevent such horrors from happening, or maybe so that if enough of us all think the same way and feel the same way, the organs and institutions of power will be forced to hear us and align themselves along our vibrations, **the way a honeybee colony will pick a site for a new hive through the dance of its advance guard scouts**. These are perfectly reasonable human assumptions, because that is how physical human collectives function. Anyone who has been in a crowd, a basketball team, a nightclub, a choir, or a protest knows how bodies resonate together. But politics is the energetic distribution of bodies in systems, and we live in a system of carbon-fueled capitalism that we shouldn’t expect to work in physical human ways for several reasons, especially when it comes to responding to the threat of global warming. First, our political and social media technologies are not neutral, but have been developed to serve particular interests, most notably targeted advertising, concentration of wealth, and ideological control, and the vibrations that seem to resonate most strongly along these channels are envy, adulation, outrage, fear, hatred, and mindless pleasure. Second, the more we pass on or react to social vibrations, the more we strengthen our habits of channeling and the less we practice autonomous reflection or independent critical thought. With every protest chant, retweet, and Facebook post, we become stronger resonators and weaker thinkers. Third, however intense our social vibrations grow, they remain locked within machinery that offers no political leverage: they do not translate into political action, because they do not connect to the flows of power. Finally, while the typical collective human response to threat is to identify an enemy, pick sides, and mobilize to fight, global warming offers no apprehensible foe. That hasn’t stopped people from trying to find one. The Flood Wall Street protesters say the enemy is American corporations. Tanzania’s Jakaya Kikwete and Nauru’s Baron Waqa say the problem is the United States and Great Britain. Shell Oil and the Environmental Defense Fund seem to think that it’s intractable UN bureaucracy that’s holding us up. Barack Obama has implied that it’s China. Tea Party Republicans would blame Barack Obama, I’m sure, if they admitted that global warming was actually happening and caused by human activity. Meanwhile, NPR-listening liberals want to believe that Tea Party Republicans are responsible, so that they can frame the problem as one amenable to solution by moral education and enlightened consumerism, as if it were all a matter of convincing people to eat more kale and drive electric cars. One climate activist has argued that just 90 companies are responsible for almost two-thirds of all historical greenhouse gas emissions, which conveniently absolves billions of automobile drivers, airline passengers, meat eaters, and cellphone users of responsibility. 96 The enemy isn’t out there somewhere—the enemy is ourselves. Not as individuals, but as a collective.

#### The alternative is a reorientation of the future towards de-domestication of humanity to re-center the community as the foundation of social structures as a countermovement to the homogenization of life demanding by technological thinking.

**Zerzan ’15** (Hasn’t showered in weeks, doesn’t like Iphones), *Why Hope? The Stand Against Civilization,* (<https://aaaaarg.fail/upload/john-zerzan-why-hope-the-stand-against-civilization-2.pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist

We are certainly as opposed to species loss, habitat destruction, and global warming as anyone else.” But again, **developing the** techno**future is based on the** systematic **destruction of the unbuilt world**, on global industrialization. What else enables it? The call for “increased diversity” is completely hollow. Not only are species, languages, and indigenous cultures being sacrificed. the general cultural homogenization is overtaking diversity. Increasingly, the malls, airports, apartments, et al. become identical in a globalizing world. Techno-industrial life grows flatter, textureless, and standardized. Perhaps most important: technology is the same everywhere. Is it a coincidence that as the techno-culture crowds out everything else, we see growing pathologies in society? In the U.S., tens of millions of people need addictive drugs to sleep, to have sex, to counter anxiety and depression. Meanwhile the shooting sprees––rampage killings in schools, family workplaces, and shopping malls––are daily occurrences. The emptiness and desolation are palpable, bringing continually worsening symptoms. In today’s mass techno-society, community has all but disappeared. And without social bonds and solidarity, anything can and does happen. Virtual “community” is a mockery of actual, face-to-face community, where individuals can be accountable and responsible. Technology is forever promising solutions. We live in an age where technology fills an ideological vacuum, as political ideologies fade in significance. But by and large, the solutions address problems that were created by technology in the first place––a fact we are not supposed to notice. (Think of diseases spread by intercontinental travel, oil spills, or nuclear power disasters, for instance—and even those diseases that did not exist prior to domestication, including virtually all infectious and degenerative diseases.) The German sociologist Ulrich Beck argues in his “risk society” thesis that disasters are a built-in feature of complex society. Global warming, the biggest disaster of all, evidently is a function of the growth of global industry. The more factories, the higher the temperature. Again, just what does onrushing technology rest upon? There is an intimate connection between a mobile phone and the destruction, not of illusory “Next Nature,” but of billions of years’ worth of natural systems that have made life on Earth possible. Fredric Jameson wrote, somewhat famously, that “Postmodernism is what you get when the modernization process is complete and nature is gone for good.” Postmodern culture is indeed, in my opinion, a surrender of this kind: let’s just accept the erasure of the natural world and go on from there. In IBM’s watchword: “Let’s Build a Smarter Planet.” We should accept the inevitable success of the cyber/cyborg/digital/ virtual/ information technology juggernaut, not think about what “advanced” society is really advancing toward. But we know what the fullness of the technological project has brought us. Since Emile Durkheim in the nineteenth century we’ve known, for example, that modern industrial cities breed much higher rates of suicide and madness. Reams of empirical studies and a century or two of social theory have noticed that modernity produces increasingly shallow and instrumental relationships, amid a life-world that is barren and isolating. Recently, a friend who is an emergency medical professional told me of calls received during the holiday season, from those who don’t have a health emergency. “I think I might be having a heart attack,” for example, in order to get a visit––in order to have some human contact. Do we really want to push all this even further? Life, health, freedom, community need a different direction. For thousands of generations we lived in band society. Before tribal ism, this form of community–perhaps the only actual form that has existed–featured the face-to-face society that consisted of fewer than a hundred people. Mass society of course erased this and so much more.  Novelist Kurt Vonnegut, in a 1973 interview, rejected the claims of modern techno-society, in favor of band society. “Human beings will be happier...when they find ways to inhabit primitive communities. That’s my utopia. That’s what I want for me.” I, too, want to go in that direction. We need a new paradigm, a new vision, which would involve a radical decentralization, a move away from the ever more integrating world system. Not alter-globalization, a new catch-phrase on the Left, but anti-globalization based on anti-authoritarian perspectives. More than that we need to start de-domesticating ourselves and reskilling ourselves. Reconnecting with the Earth in a literal sense. All of us are domesticated but we can start the process of transition.

#### Any consideration of the future occurs as pollution fills our lungs and the cries of our nonhuman family drown out the last whisper of hope left in the Techno-Future. As death creeps in from the corner of our eyes the only role of the ballot left is to vote for the debate that provides the best methodology of hope.

[We’ll spec how to weigh specific offense in CX, we can’t clarify everything in 7 minutes.]

**Zerzan ’15** (Yes he brews Kombucha did you even need to ask?) *Why Hope? The Stand Against Civilization,* (<https://aaaaarg.fail/upload/john-zerzan-why-hope-the-stand-against-civilization-2.pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist

It’s pretty fashionable, among anarchists as well, to sneer at the notion of hope, to explicitly rule out any chance of overall victory over domination and oppression. Desert (2011) sports this outlook on its cover: “In our hearts we all know the world will not be  ‘saved’,” and repeats this statement twice more in its opening pages. Civilization will persist. It’s time to give up on “unwinnable battles.” In this way the misery of burnout and disillusionment will be avoided and we’ll all be a lot happier (!) The Mexican Unabombertype group, Individualidades Teniendo a lo Salvaje (ITS), also firmly asserts that there’ll be no winning. “We do not believe this is possible,” they proclaim repeatedly. But it is possible. Our overcoming the disease of civilization is in no way guaranteed, obviously, but clearly it is possible. I prefer what Kierkegaard said of hope: It is “the passion for the possible.” More boldly, whatever became of “Demand the Impossible”? When victory is refused are we not at Game Over? We might recall Herbert Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man, which announced the apparent end of radical possibilities, the definitive triumph of consumerist unfreedom. He was delighted to have been proven wrong within weeks of the book’s 1964 appearance by the beginnings of a global movement that shook the world. And as the global system now shows itself to be failing at every level, shows itself to have no answers at all, there stands every chance of qualitatively surpassing the Movement of the ’60s. But not, needless to say, if we renounce any hope of overcoming. It is well-known that health and recovery from illness is tied not to hopelessness but its opposite. Consider the Serbian Danilo Kis’ last novel, Psalm 44, about a young family’s will to survive and resist in Auschwitz, where visualizing hope is a “necessity.” For us and all life, matters are grave but we are not in Auschwitz. And yet we spurn hope? Egoism and nihilism are evidently in vogue among anarchists and I’m hoping that those who so identify are not without hope. Illusions no, hope yes. I wonder what we have to offer at large, in terms of, say, analysis and inspiration – or whether that’s still being asked much. There are egoists who seem mainly in love with their sacred Egos, where all is judged insofar as it serves the Self. Meanwhile the reigning techno-culture feeds solipsism, narcissism, and isolation the more techno-addicted are its subjects. Did Max Stirner see the natural world as having value only in relation to one’s ego? How much interest does the pure egoist have in mutual aid, social struggles or the disappearance of community? I recommend Stirner’s The Ego and its Own as an important corrective to the appeals of collectivism in its various guises, but tend to agree with Arizona anarchist Dan Todd that Diogenes and the Cynics in the West and Chuang-Tzu and some of the Taoists in the East did an even better job of it centuries earlier. Does nihilism mean that pretty much everything must go for a decent life to be possible? If so then I’m a nihilist. It’s safe to say that nihil-ism isn’t literally nothing-ism or one couldn’t be both a nihilist and an anarchist. If it means the politics of desperation or hopelessness, no thanks. French philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard put the word in a different light: “With the megalopolis, what the West realizes and diffuses is its nihilism. It is called development.” Are there nihilists who take on such institutions and what drives them? There’s more than anti-hope on offer, in any case. Two new books remind us of that. Enrico Manicardi’s Free from Civilization is the first ‘A-Z’ type anti-civ offering in any language (originally Liberi dalla Civiltà) and Paul Cedenec’s The Anarchist Revelation: Being What We’re Meant to Be, the least pessimistic book I can recall reading. It refers to German anarchist Gustav Landauer, for instance, for the idea that we “need not worry that the quantity of those answering the call will not be great enough, when the quality of its [anti-civ] content is beyond question.” It brings anarchist resistance and the spirit together in a very wide-ranging and powerful contribution. Dire times but, as Oscar Wilde had it, “We are all in the gutter but some of us are looking at the stars.”

# Core

## Thesis

### 1NC – Big Machongus

#### Welcome to the Megamachine. A system of organization driven by technology and dependent on humanities depletion of the biosphere. The 1AC is another step towards the techno-future that guarantees endless destruction coupled with an affective cooling that robs interpersonal relationships of all meaning.

**Manicardi ’12,** (doesn’t know how to make good looking book covers, probably smells weird), *Free From Civilization Notes towards a radical critique of the foundations of civilization: domination, culture, fear, economics and technology*, (<https://aaaaarg.fail/upload/enrico-manicardi-free-from-civilization-notes-toward-a-radical-critique-of-civilizations-foundations-domination-culture-fear-economics-and-technology.pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist

Why write an essay that critiques civilization today, when civilization is presented everywhere as the only means of escape from a world that is drifting away? Why stigmatize, down to its foundations, the mix of values that distinguish civil life when these values are elevated on the basis of highsounding propaganda as promises of future welfare and happiness? It would be too easy to answer that we cannot believe such promises anymore, that they are mere propaganda; that a “Better Future” has been pompously heralded for a long time without any celebration following the many announcements. But the problem is certainly more complex. If we look closely at the conditions of the modern world, we see not only a medley of broken promises of happiness, but also a series of perfectly kept promises of unhappiness. When we are told that in order to live better someone else must be worse off, when we are asked to be patient a while longer, to tighten our belts, grit our teeth and accept those sacrifices that will make the sun shine again, we are facing just those sorts of kept promises. Which is exactly what happens when we are asked to work even more, hurry up even more, consume everything and everybody in order to sustain Economy, Progress, Development, Democracy, etc. In the world there are no absolutely negative or positive situations. Even something that makes us extremely happy can cause some suffering (romantic love is perhaps the most illustrative example); on the other hand, what we consider negative can help us grow up and may not be totally unfavorable. Like any human condition, civilization is distinguished by these mixed features. The point is not to judge it as totally disadvantageous (or absolutely free of inconveniences), but to try and understand it in terms of its entrenched patterns, principles, developments and effects, so as to look at civilization from a vantage point that allows us to establish if it can still be worthwhile to follow its path or if it is better to change our route. There is a price we pay everyday to safeguard civilization and to permit it to spread further: this price should be the stake of the game revolving around our willingness to accept all this. Here is a simple example: all of us can acknowledge that a cell phone is a very useful tool. It undoubtedly is, but at what price? We just don’t have to think about the damage it causes to our health due to the noxious waves it emits (by using it, by not using it and even when it is on stand-by). We just don’t have to think about the damage on’t have to think about the relational isolation where it imprisons us all, making face-to-face communication less and less likely as well as, for many young people, the ability to express their opinions (and even their feelings) in person. And we don’t have to think about the financial interests of the entire cell phone industry, about the financial speculation it encourages, about the environmental and human exploitation it brings about (some of the materials cell phones are made of are unearthed from deep mines where still today many enslaved people work and die). Finally, we don’t have to think about the technological and military development programs that are nourished by the mobile phone phenomenon, making social control more and more invasive and wars even crueler. In short, we don’t have to think about all this (and much, much more) if our cell phone is to appear only as a very useful tool. Civilization—just like cell phones—has a really high price, and even if this price is usually carefully concealed and underestimated, it is there nevertheless. Acknowledging this is a first important step towards the evaluation of its acceptability. In this civilized world we have a bad life, and it is getting even worse. Not just because of hunger, or of the excruciating death of children exterminated by disease, famine or lack of drinking water. Our life is bad even in the opulent regions of this planet, in what is generally presented as the land of plenty. Multiplying forms of addiction: tobacco addiction and alcoholism are spreading among the young, together with any kind of more or less legal psychotropic drugs, medications, video games, sex industry, and gambling; the spreading of nervous diseases—anorexia, bulimia, panic attacks, chronic fatigue, sleep disorders; the various obsessive compulsions—to run faster, buy everything, collect anything, to hygienize and sanitize every single item; the exponential increase in violent episodes, from bullying to serial killers; all tell us that where the “national welfare state” has been officially proclaimed, civilization spares no one. Irreparably articulated in the routine on which our dismal everyday life is based, accompanied by a continuous distress and by the isolation that derives from a growing object- and service-mediated existence, this sense of inner emptiness becomes more urgent and looming and submerges us all—whether dissidents, faithful supporters of civilization, or opinionless people. The feeling of stress connected with the agonizing industriousness in which we try to drown our pain, and the boredom that overwhelms us as soon as we come out of these wearing cycles of hyperactivity convey an unmistakable truth: when life is domesticated and subdued to the System, its quality dœs not improve—whatever the GDP indexes, institutional statistics or parliamentary reports may tell us. More and more vehement and contrasting fundamentalisms, and the rise in self-destructive acts in the developed world, seal this bitter statement in a most dramatic way. However, humans are not the only subjects who suffer because of the civilized world. The whole planet is groaning with us. Floods, downpours, typhoons, tropical storms, more and more violent hailstorms, acid rain, nano-particles, a growing number of endangered species, global warming, drought, desertification, deforestation, and overbuilding are turning the Earth into a dead zone—a toxic, inhospitable wasteland whose existence is doomed by the same devastating trajectory guiding the attack on human life. The price we pay for civilization to keep trampling on the planet’s—and its inhabitants’—destinies finds its ideal expression in our increasing “detachment” from life and from the sense of life. In the civilized world, the natural foundations of our existence—our genetic constitution, our multi-sensuousness, the free perception of reality, direct experiences, autonomy, sharing, sympathy, mutual help—are continuously attacked by a techno-mechanized, competitive and calculating universe that is making these aspects unknown even to ourselves—when they are not explicitly suppressed in a laboratory. In our world there are actually categories which we have learned to deem hugely important and that civilization has taught us to consider absolute and neutral. Authority and Bureaucracy, Science and Technology, Economics and Overpopulation, Property and Work, Education and the symbolic forms of culture (Art, Ritual, Myth, Religion, Language, Writing, Number, Time, Money, Law, Social Role) are not universal or unbiased loci. They are conceptual categories that were established together with civilization and have become untouchable. Starting to look critically at these categories means looking without too much awe at our way of living (and of thinking); it means trying to understand what constitutes the high price we are forced to pay for civilization to keep expanding. And it also means trying to trace the causes of the widespread malaise that none of the services marketed by civilization is able to “heal”. Generally, when we try to investigate the causes of the current degradation, we tend to go back by just a few decades or centuries at most: back to the rise of consumer society, of mass organization and of successful industrialization. All these phenomena have undoubtedly contributed to the current situation. But should we really stop at the beginning of the nineteenth century and at the date of birth of industrial capitalism to identify the sources of today’s crisis? The traditional antagonist movement’s answer to this question has always been positive. Personally, I think the opposite is true.

### 2NR - Manicardi ‘12

#### Our era is the era of the Mega-machine. Technology has become an omnipresent force in our lives resulting in more effective forms of social domination and amplification of the environmental destruction that has become the trademark of our species. There are three fundamental claims in our thesis.

#### The forms of social organization which have guided our species through the industrial era ae no longer sufficient to guarantee our survival in the face of an unpreventable environmental collapse.

#### Technology enframes the social consciousness so that we can never conceive of a world without it or fully realize how much of a threat it has become. Like a thief in the night technology has stolen the value from out interpersonal relationships in favor of a homogenous system of productivity.

#### The construction of the future is built upon the depletion of the environment promises of a “better future” operate within the mindset of a technological manifest destiny whereby the world is perceived to have limitless resources to be exploited. This controls the root cause of environmental degradation and destruction.

### 1NC – ImSad.jpg

#### Welcome to Anthropocene where in the words of incredulous hippy Roy Scranton “We’re fucked, the only question is how soon and how badly.” We are far past discussions of prevention the only question left to 21st century politics is that of adaption.

**Scranton 15**, [God this guy is depressing], *Learning to die in the Anthropocene,* [https://aaaaarg.fail/upload/roy-scranton-learning-to-die-in-the-anthropocene-reflections-on-the-end-of-a-civilization.pdf] //GrouchoMarxist

On the civilian side, the World Bank’s 2013 report, Turn Down the Heat: Climate Extremes, Regional Impacts, and the Case for Resilience, and their 2014 follow-up Confronting the New Climate Normal, offer dire prognoses for the effects of global warming, which climatologists now predict will raise global temperatures 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit above pre-industrial levels within a generation and 7.2 degrees Fahrenheit within 90 years. 6 As hotter temperatures liquefy glaciers and ice sheets from Greenland to Antarctica, all that melted ice flows into the sea: Some worst-case estimates suggest we might see seven or eight feet of sea level rise as soon as 2040. 7 The collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet alone, already underway, will eventually raise sea levels by as much as twenty feet. 8 As glaciers and ice sheets melt, so too will carbon and methane long frozen in seabeds and permafrost. As a greenhouse gas, methane is more than twenty times more powerful than carbon dioxide, and thousands of gigatons of the stuff lies locked under the oceans in clathrate hydrates, waiting to be released: “These solid, ice-like structures are stable only under specific conditions,” writes oceanographer John Kessler, “and are estimated to contain a quantity of methane roughly equal in magnitude to the sum of all fossil fuel reservoirs on Earth.” 9 Methane-rich sinkholes have appeared in Siberia and methane bubbles have been tracked leaking from the floor of the Arctic Ocean, possibly signaling the beginning of a massive planetary “belch” capable of generating catastrophic runaway greenhouse effects. 10 As geophysicist David Archer warns, “The potential for planetary devastation posed by the methane hydrate reservoir . . . seems comparable to the destructive potential from nuclear winter or from a comet or asteroid impact.” 11 **We’re fucked. The only questions are how soon and how badly**. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) 2014 report on climate impacts cautions: “Without additional mitigation efforts beyond those in place today, and even with adaptation, warming by the end of the 21st century will lead to high to very high risk of severe, widespread, and irreversible impacts globally.” 12 According to the World Bank, 2.7 degrees Fahrenheit of warming now appears inevitable, even if we were to stop emitting carbon dioxide (CO2 ) worldwide right now. 13 Projections from researchers at the University of Hawai‘i find us dealing with “historically unprecedented” climates as soon as 2047. 14 Climate scientist James Hansen, formerly with NASA, has argued that we face an “apocalyptic” future—a bleak view that is seconded by researchers worldwide. 15 This chorus of Cassandras predicts a radically changing global climate causing widespread upheaval, and their visions of doom are backed by an overwhelming preponderance of hard data. Global warming is not the latest version of a hoary fable of annihilation. It is not hysteria. It is a fact. And we have likely already passed the point where we could have done anything about it. From the perspective of many policy experts, climate scientists, and national security officials, the concern is not whether global warming exists or how we might prevent it, but how we are going to adapt to life in the hot, volatile world we’ve created. There is a name for this new world: the Anthropocene. The word comes from ancient Greek. All the epochs of the most recent geological era (the Cenozoic) end in the suffix “-cene,” from kainós, meaning new. Anthropos means human. The idea behind the term “Anthropocene” is that we have entered a new epoch in Earth’s geological history, one characterized by the advent of the human species as a geological force. 16 The biologist Eugene F. Stoermer and the Nobel-winning chemist Paul Crutzen advanced the term in 2000, and it has gained acceptance as evidence has grown that the changes wrought by global warming will affect not only the world’s climate and biodiversity, but its very geological structure, and not just for centuries, but for millennia. 17 In the prophetic words of William Blake, written at the dawn of the carbon era more than two hundred years ago, “The generations of men run on in the tide of Time / But leave their destin’d lineaments permanent for ever and ever.” 18 The International Commission on Stratigraphy, the geologists responsible for driving the “golden spikes” that demarcate different geological periods, have adopted the Anthropocene as a term deserving further consideration, “significant on the scale of Earth history,” and are discussing what level of geological time-scale it might be and at what date we might say it began. 19 Is it an “epoch” like the Holocene, or merely an “age” like the Calabrian? Did it start with the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, around 1800, or during the Great Acceleration in the middle of the 20th century? With the dawn of agriculture, 12,000 years ago, or on July 16, 1945, with the first atomic bomb? 20 Whenever it began, it is the world we now live in. Within a few generations we will face average temperatures 7 degrees Fahrenheit warmer than they are today, rising seas at least three to ten feet higher, and worldwide shifts in crop belts, growing seasons, and population centers. Unless we stop emitting greenhouse gases wholesale now, humans will within a couple hundred years be living in a climate the Earth hasn’t seen since the Pliocene, three million years ago, when oceans were 75 feet higher. Once the methane hydrates under the oceans and permafrost begin to melt, we may soon find ourselves living in a hothouse climate closer to that of the Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, approximately 56 million years ago, when the planet was ice-free and tropical at the poles. We face the imminent collapse of the agricultural, shipping, and energy networks upon which the global economy depends, a large-scale die-off in the biosphere that’s already well under way, and our own possible extinction as a species. If Homo sapiens survives the next millennium, it will be survival in a world unrecognizably different from the one we have known for the last 200,000 years. In order for us to adapt to this strange new world, we’re going to need more than scientific reports and military policy. We’re going to need new ideas. We’re going to need new myths and new stories, a new conceptual understanding of reality, and a new relationship to the deep polyglot traditions of human culture that carbon-based capitalism has vitiated through commodification and assimilation. Over and against capitalism, we will need a new way of thinking our collective existence. We need a new vision of who “we” are. We need a new humanism—a newly philosophical humanism, undergirded by renewed attention to the humanities. Admittedly, ocean acidification, social upheaval, and species extinction are problems that humanities scholars, with their taste for fine-grained philological analysis, esoteric debates, and archival marginalia, might seem remarkably ill-suited to address. After all, how will thinking about Kant or Frantz Fanon help us trap carbon dioxide? Can arguments between object-oriented ontology and historical materialism protect honeybees from colony collapse disorder? Are ancient Greek philosophers, medieval poets, and contemporary metaphysicians going to save Bangladesh from being inundated by the Indian Ocean? Perhaps not. But the conceptual and existential problems that the Anthropocene poses are precisely those that have always been at the heart of humanistic inquiry: What does it mean to be human? What does it mean to live? What is truth? What is good? In the world of the Anthropocene, the question of individual mortality—What does my life mean in the face of death?—is universalized and framed in scales that boggle the imagination. 21 As environmental philosopher Dale Jamieson puts it, “The Anthropocene presents novel challenges for living a meaningful life.” 22 Historian and theorist Dipesh Chakrabarty has claimed that global warming “calls us to visions of the human that neither rights talk nor the critique of the subject ever contemplated.” 23 Whether we are talking about ethics or politics, ontology or epistemology, confronting the end of the world as we know it dramatically challenges our learned perspectives and ingrained priorities. What does consumer choice mean compared against 100,000 years of ecological catastrophe? What does one life mean in the face of mass death or the collapse of global civilization? How do we make meaningful decisions in the shadow of our inevitable end? These questions have no logical or empirical answers. They cannot be graphed or quantified. They are philosophical problems par excellence. If, as Montaigne asserted, “To philosophize is to learn how to die,” then we have entered humanity’s most philosophical age, for this is precisely the problem of the Anthropocene. 24 The rub now is that we have to learn to die not as individuals, but as a civilization. Learning to die isn’t easy. In Iraq, at the beginning, I was terrified by the idea. Baghdad seemed crazily dangerous, even though statistically I was relatively safe. We got shot at, mortared, and blown up by IEDs, but we wore high-tech ballistic armor, we had great medics, and we were part of the most powerful military the world had ever seen. 25 The odds were good that I would come home, maybe wounded, but probably alive. Yet every day I drove out past the wire on mission, I looked in my Humvee’s mirror and saw a dark, empty hole. “For the soldier death is the future, the future his profession assigns him,” wrote Simone Weil in her 1939 meditation on war, The Iliad, or the Poem of Force. “Yet the idea of man’s having death for a future is abhorrent to nature. Once the experience of war makes visible the possibility of death that lies locked up in each moment, our thoughts cannot travel from one day to the next without meeting death’s face.” 26 I recognized that face in the dark of my Humvee’s mirror. Its gaze almost paralyzed me. I found my way forward through an old book: Yamamoto Tsunetomo’s 18th-century Samurai manual, the Hagakure, which advised: “Meditation on inevitable death should be performed daily.” 27 I took that advice to heart, and instead of fearing my end, I practiced owning it. Every morning, after doing maintenance on my Humvee, I would imagine getting blown up, shot, lit on fire, run over by a tank, torn apart by dogs, captured and beheaded. Then, before we rolled out through the wire, I’d tell myself that I didn’t need to worry anymore because I was already dead. The only thing that mattered was that I did my best to make sure everyone else came back alive. To survive as a soldier, I had to learn to accept the inevitability of my own death. For humanity to survive in the Anthropocene, we need to learn to live with and through the end of our current civilization. Change, risk, conflict, strife, and death are the very processes of life, and we cannot avoid them. We must learn to accept and adapt. The human psyche naturally rebels against the idea of its end. Likewise, civilizations have throughout history marched blindly toward disaster, because humans are wired to believe that tomorrow will be much like today. It is hard work for us to remember that this way of life, this present moment, this order of things is not stable and permanent. Across the world today, our actions testify to our belief that we can go on like we are forever: burning oil, poisoning the seas, killing off other species, pumping carbon into the air, ignoring the ominous silence of our coalmine canaries in favor of the unending robotic tweets of our new digital imaginarium. Yet the reality of global climate change is going to keep intruding on our collective fantasies of perpetual growth, constant innovation, and endless energy, just as the reality of individual mortality shocks our casual faith in permanence. The greatest challenge the Anthropocene poses isn’t how the Department of Defense should plan for resource wars, whether we should put up sea walls to protect Manhattan, or when we should abandon Miami. It won’t be addressed by buying a Prius, turning off the air conditioning, or signing a treaty. The greatest challenge we face is a philosophical one: understanding that this civilization is already dead. The sooner we confront our situation and realize that there is nothing we can do to save ourselves, the sooner we can get down to the difficult task of adapting, with mortal humility, to our new reality.

### \*\*\*2NR – Scranton 15

## Lonks

### 1NC – Risk Calculus

#### The 1AC is a fantasy created as a substitution for the disappearance of manageable disasters. The process of risk-calculus is overloaded by ecological degradation and therefore demands the purification of individual bodies so the Mega-Machine can justify it’s continued existence.

**Williams & Calnan ’96**, *THE 'LIMITS' OF MEDICALIZATION?: MODERN MEDICINE AND THE LAY POPULACE IN 'LATE' MODERNITY,* (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8783424) //GrouchoMarxist

In addition to its socially reflexive character, life in late modernity is increasingly organized around the concept of'risk'. Clearly life has always been a 'risky' business, but the nature, scope and dimensions of contemporary risks have all profoundly altered. Whilst misfortunes and disasters in pre-industrial times were attributed to fate(s), God(s) or natural disasters, modern risks are increasingly the product of human interventions of many different sorts-- what Giddens refers to as the "manufactured' risks and uncertainties of modern social life. For example, as Armstrong [36] argues, whilst health risks in the nineteenth century were located in the ~natural environment', today the 'environmental' factors which impinge upon our health, such as acid rain and radiation, are the product of human intervention. In this respect, whilst the risks of the past could be attributed to the under-supply of (hygienic) technology, today they are the product of industrial over-production; something which is systematically intensified as a consequence of the globalizing process [4] (p. 4). Moreover, whilst the nature and extent of modern risks vary, they cannot simply be understood in class terms. Rather, in 'risk' society we are all ultimately confronted with a similar fate from which it is difficult if not impossible to escape. As Beck puts it: 'poverty is hierachic, smog is democratic'. In this sense, risks display a 'boomerang effect' in which even the rich and powerful are ultimately not safe. As a consequence, slowly but surely, a 'victimization by risk' is beginning to take place. Risk, therefore, becomes a fundamental existential parameter of life in late modernity, structuring the way in which experts and lay people alike organize their social worlds. As Beck argues, not only does modernity create risks through our ways of living, working, systems of transportation and the like, it also seeks to compensate for them by means of calculation and political regulation. Indeed, in an increasingly 'decisionist' culture, the profiling of risks becomes an important means of colonizing the future, instilling a sense of calculability in what is fast becoming a 'runaway world'. Yet risk assessment is, by definition, imperfect. As such it contains many imponderables, not least because its central locus lies in the future. Indeed, in many respects, the nature of modern risks--including nuclear, chemical, genetic and ecological mega-hazards--abolishes the 'calculus of risk'; there are simply no statistical bases for their calculation. Moreover, not only does the location of blame or culpability become increasingly difficult, but the calculation of single risks fails to take account of their aggregate or multiplicative effects. 'Dangers' lurk everywhere, from the threat of nuclear warfare and ecological catastrophe, to the 'risks' of modern medical technology, coronary heart disease and 'unsafe' sexual contact. This growing sense of risk also contributes to heightened levels of anxiety which are condensed around the body and its boundaries. In this sense, the 'policing' and control of the physical body effect a symbolic or metaphorical resolution of threats located in the social body. Indeed, as Kroker and Kroker [59] argue within the context of AIDS, 'panic' bodies begin to emerge involving a form of'Body McCarthyism' which seeks to distinguish between the 'clean' and 'unclean' according to the 'purity' of bodily fluids. In particular, they note a striking resemblance between medical and military rhetoric in relation to AIDS; drawing parallels between the fear of AIDS and a generalized fear of the breakdown of immunological systems. In short, as Turner argues: The body has once more become apocalyptic given the threat of chemical warfare, the destruction of the natural habitat, the epidemic of HIV and AIDS, the greying of the populations of northern Europe and the apparent inability of national governments to control medical research and technology [60] (p. 24). Given the largely invisible nature of modern risks, knowledge becomes a crucial resource through which the perception of risk is filtered, and the divisions between social and scientific rationality become ever more apparent as social movements raise issues which are not addressed by experts and vice versa. Indeed, as Beck argues, the sciences are incapable of reacting adequately to the risks of late modernity since they are prominently involved in the origin and growth of these very risks. Instead, they become the 'legitimating patrons' of a global industrial pollution and contamination of air, water, foodstuffs and the sickness and death of plants, animals and humans [4] (p. 59). In this sense, lay consciousness and public perceptions of the risks of modernization and modern social institutions, including modern medicine, has established itself against the resistance of scientific rationality. In other words, as Beck suggests; "...the history of the growing consciousness and social recognition of risks coincides with the history of the demystification of science" [4] (p. 59). As such, official pronouncements about risk and safety increasingly fail to allay public anxieties; indeed they may have the very opposite effect. Yet social and scientific rationality are also closely interwoven as technical discussions of risk rely on social expectations and value judgements, whilst social discussions and perceptions of risk increasingly come to depend upon scientific evidence and arguments. In short: "Public criticism and disquiet derive essentially from a dialectic ofexpertize and counter expertize" [4] (p. 59). Certainly, as discussed earlier, there is evidence to suggest an increasing degree of 'ambivalence' amongst the lay populace regarding the risks and benefits of modern medicine. Here common concerns include the danger of side-effects, the problems of addiction and dependence, the risks of technological interventions, and the moral and philosophical issues which are raised by medical 'progress'. At another level, it is also clear that a considerable degree of scepticism exists concerning the the legitimacy and relevance of much so-called 'expert' advice on health and lifestyles. Indeed, as Davison and colleagues [61, 62] have convincingly argued, health promotion advice which is based upon notions of 'predictability', 'regularity' and 'certainty' is likely to be counter-productive as it does not readily fit with the beliefs found in popular culture, nor with observations based upon lay epidemiological reasoning that, to paraphrase, fat smokers live to a 'ripe old age' whilst lithe joggers really do 'drop down dead!' (i.e. the 'prevention paradox'). In this respect it is clear that lay perceptions of risk are part and parcel of complex social processes which are not necessarily 'rational' in the scientific sense of the word. Rather, the perception of what constitutes a 'risk' is intimately bound up with people's cultural beliefs, moral values, personal feelings and the social and material circumstances of their lives. Moreover, not only do lay perceptions of risk differ from those held by professionals (i.e. the asymmetry or dialectic of social and scientific rationality discussed above), they may also vary within different segments of the lay populace and according to the competing priorities and material constraints of everyday life. In short, growing public concern about the risks of modern medicine, as well as more general anxieties about the dangers to health of life in late modernity, look set to continue as the 'balance' between (active) trust and (radical) doubt becomes ever more precarious and faith in (medical) 'experts' is slowly eroded in an increasingly reflexive social order. As Giddens puts it: Widespread lay knowledge of modern risk environments leads to an awareness of the limits of expertise and forms one of the 'public relations' problems that has to be faced by those who seek to sustain lay trust in expert systems...[R]ealisation of the areas of ignorance which confront experts themselves, as individual practitioners and in terms of overall fields of knowledge, may weaken or undermine that faith on the part of lay individuals...[I]n this case what is in question is not only the limits of or gaps in, expert knowledge, but an inadequacy which compromises the very idea of expertise [1] (pp. 130-131).

### 2NR – Williams & Canlan ‘96

#### They’ve missed a critical uniqueness question, the 1AC is a coping mechanism that refuses to acknowledge that disaster can no longer be controlled. . The affirmative purifies individual bodies of illness and addiction in a misguided belief that this will save us ignoring the fact that social life within the Mega-Machine is the causes of our ecological strife. [X] implications

#### Medical Gaze DA – Demanding that we focus upon individual bodies hyper-focuses our energy on deviant bodies whereby all alterity is eliminated in the name of purity this culminates in the destruction of minority groups.

#### Footnoting DA – Affirmation of squo systems of power rein-trenches their power making escape more improbable every round they read this aff. The risk of an infinite feedback loops means we outweigh on reversibility.

### 1NC – Government bad

#### The 1AC grants legitimacy to structures that are founded upon the destruction of the biosphere Particular instances of positivity will always be revealed as a smokescreen that allows for endless exploitation and destruction.

**Bradford ’89**,[Aye fuck exxon though], *Stopping The Industrial Hydra: Revolution Against The Megamachine,* (<https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/george-bradford-stopping-the-industrial-hydra-revolution-against-the-megamachine.pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist

It should go without saying that Exxon and its allies don’t try their best to protect the environment or human health. Capitalist institutions produce to accumulate power and wealth, not for any social “good”. Thus, predictably, in order to cut costs, Exxon steadily dismantled what emergency safeguards it had throughout the 1980s, pointing to environmental studies showing a major spill as so unlikely that preparation was unnecessary. So when the inevitable came crashing down, the response was complete impotence and negligence. Yet **to focus on disasters as aberrations** resulting from corporate greed **is to mystify the** real **operational character of an entire social and technological system**. The unmitigated disaster of daily, undramatic activities in places like Prudhoe Bay and Bhopal — even before they enter the vocabulary of doom — is irrefutable proof that Valdez was no accident but the norm. Modern industrialism cannot exist without its Prudhoe Bays. Capital must always have a super-exploited colony, a “sacrifice area” of some kind — the sky, a human community, a watershed, the soil, the gene pool, and so on — to expand and extend its lifeless tentacles. The real spillage goes on every day, every minute, when capitalism and mass technics appear to be working more or less according to the Plan. The Exxon Valdez contained some 1.2 million barrels of oil; at any given time 750 million barrels are floating on the world’s waters. In 1979 the amount of oil lost worldwide on land and sea through spillage, fire and sinkings reached a peak of 328 million gallons; since then it has dropped to between 24 and 55 million a year, except for 1983, when tanker accidents and oil blowouts in the Iran-Iraq War brought the total up to 242 million gallons. Most of the oil in the oceans comes not from accidents but municipal and industrial runoff, the cleaning of ship bilges and other routine activity. Industry analysts say that major oil spills have declined, but that “smaller” spills continue to take place all the time, a phenomenon paralleled in the chemical industry by focusing on major leaks to conceal the reality of a slow-moving, low-level, daily Bhopal. And no matter how carefully industry tries to prevent accidents, they are going to occur; the larger and more complicated the system, the more certain the breakdown. As the head of the Cambridge-based Centre for Short-lived Phenomena (!), which keeps track of oil spills, commented after the Valdez spill, because such an event “takes place so infrequently, and the resources are never available in a single location to deal effectively with it” (meaning because booms can’t be stationed every hundred yards along the route, etc.) major spills are inevitable. In any case, mass society is a continuous oil spill just as it is a constant chemical leak. The 11 million gallons lost by the Valdez on Bligh Reef is matched every year in the state of Michigan alone by citizens pouring waste oil down sewers or on the ground. (See related story in box.) And while it is true that more safety measures could be taken through institutional or technological means (or even by revolutionary workers councils or assemblies), industrialism brings inherent consequences of spills, leaks, inadequate response, inadequate “treatment”, and ecological Bust. As petrochemicals are necessary to industrialism whatever the form of management, spills are also integral to petrochemicals. And what chemicals and oil spills are to a society addicted to industrialism, industrialism is to the living fabric of the planet. This observation was raised by writer Bill McKibben in an essay published on the Op-Ed page of the New York Times on April 7. McKibben asked what would have been the result had the Exxon Valdez gotten through without a hitch? If ten million gallons had gotten through to be consumed, they would have released about 60 million pounds of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Carbon dioxide is the major component gas causing the greenhouse effect, in which gases emitted in enormous quantities by industrial civilization will trap heat in the atmosphere and raise global temperatures, disrupting and profoundly transforming the planet’s ecology — capitalism’s 21st century Global Business Climate, so to speak. McKibben writes that in the next century, “There will be twice as much carbon dioxide in the atmosphere as there was before the Industrial Revolution.” The effects are unclear to scientists, but nearly all agree that the burning of fossil fuels combined with the release of chemicals that destroy the planet’s ozone layer in the upper atmosphere, the generation of heat from all sources, deforestation and other factors will bring about massive species extinctions, climate and weather changes, flooding and other havoc. The average car reproduces its own body weight in carbons each year. This is “another oil slick”, McKibben notes, being released every day. And while technological modifications to make “cleanburning” cars may reduce pollutants such as carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons by as much as 96%, such cars will emit as much carbon dioxide as a Model T. Electric cars will pose a similar problem if their energy comes from fossil fuel sources. (See related box insert ‘Never Trust a Techno-Fix’).The production of automobiles, and the production of anti-pollution technology itself, are not even taken into account by this analysis, but the inherent failure of technological reason can be seen. The rate of climate change over the next hundred years may dwarf by thirty times the rate of global warming that followed the last Ice Age. Reducing what comes out of tail pipes won’t even put a slight dent in that problem. “The greenhouse effect,” McKibben observes, “is not the result of something going wrong. It doesn’t stem from drunken sailors, inadequate emergency planning or a reef in the wrong place. It’s harder to deal with than that because it’s just a result of normal life.” Leaving aside the question of whether or not the phrase “normal life” appropriately describes industrial capitalism, if McKibben’s recommendation that “less energy” be used is to meaningfully confront the looming greenhouse crisis, such a reduction in industrial activity will have to be far more dramatic than almost any sectors of society have been willing to ponder so far. It would signal a deconstruction process more profound than any revolutionary transformation of society ever seen previously. Whether or not this prospect is possible is an open question. Whether or not it is necessary is a question that must include the recognition that present environmental effects are the results of activities several decades ago. And since modern science cannot understand thresholds, there is no telling how much time is left, only a certainty that it is running out.

### 2NR – Bradford ‘89

#### The 1AC imagines itself as a momentary aberration from the status quo that can swoop in and save the world. This thought is based on an ignorance to the constant destruction that is a fundamental character of the mega-machine. To build a house is to cut down a tree is to destroy the home of an animal is to condemn their offspring to death. Destruction is not an unhappy consequence that can be solved by the aff but the underpinning structure upon which the aff is built. Two implications

#### If we win our impact claims that takes out all aff solvency as we control the R/C of violence and destruction. Means you vote neg on presumption

#### Enframing DA: The aff places us within a mindset whereby we can never conceive of alternate modes of being or organization. Working within the structure of the mega-machine is to affirm a technological mindset that cannot be perturbed by its destructive wake.

### 1NC - Species War

#### The 1AC’s attempt to legislate warfare reinscribes the species war as a necessary foundation to state violence. The language of American foreign policy demands the creation of “justified violence” exercised against bare life which dooms nonhumans and the biosphere.

**Kochi 09** [Yes that one alt is a metaphor don’t get hung up on it], *Species war: law, violence, and animals,* (<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1743872109339105>, It’s behind a paywall but the doi is there so you now how to get it you sneaky little devil you.) //GrouchoMarxist

In everyday speech, in the words of the media, politicians, protestors, soldiers and dissidents, the language of war is linked to and intimately bound up with the language of law. That a war might be said to be legal or illegal, just or unjust, or that an act might be called “war” rather than terror or crime, displays aspects of reference, connection, and constitution in which the social meaning of the concepts we use to talk about and understand war and law are organised in particular ways. The manner in which specific terms (i.e. war, terror, murder, slaughter, and genocide) are defined and their meanings ordered has powerful and bloody consequences for those who feel the force and brunt of these words in the realm of human action. In this paper I argue that the juridical language of war contains a hidden foundation – species war. That is, at the foundation of the Law of war resides a species war carried out by humans against non-human animals. At first glance such a claim may sound like it has little to do with law and war. In contemporary public debates the “laws of war” are typically understood as referring to the rules set out by the conventions and customs that define the legality of a state’s right to go to war under international law. However, such a perspective is only a narrow and limited view of what constitutes the Law of war and of the relationship between law and war more generally. Here the “Law” of the “Law of war” needs to be understood as involving something more than the limited sense of positive law. The Law of war denotes a broader category that includes differing historical senses of positive law as well as various ethical conceptions of justice, right and rights. This distinction is clearer in German than it is in English whereby the term Recht denotes a broader ethical and juristic category than that of Gesetz which refers more closely to positive or black letter laws.1 To focus upon the broader category of the Law of war is to put specific (positive law) formulations of the laws of war into a historical, conceptual context. The Law of war contains at its heart arguments about and mechanisms for determining what constitutes legitimate violence. The question of what constitutes legitimate violence lies at the centre of the relationship between war and law, and, the specific historical laws of war are merely different juridical ways of setting-out (positing) a particular answer to this question. In this respect the Law of war (and thus its particular laws of war) involves a practice of normative thinking and rule making concerned with determining answers to such questions as: what types of coercion, violence and killing may be included within the definition of “war,” who may legitimately use coercion, violence and killing, and for what reasons, under what circumstances and to what extent may particular actors use coercion, violence and killing understood as war? When we consider the relationship between war and law in this broader sense then it is not unreasonable to entertain the suggestion that at the foundation of the Law of war resides species war. At present, the Law of war is dominated by two cultural-conceptual formulations or discourses. The Westphalian system of interstate relations and the system of international human rights law are held to be modern foundations of the Law of war. In the West, most people’s conceptions of what constitutes “war” and of what constitutes a “legitimate” act of war are shaped by these two historical traditions. That is to say, these traditions have ordered how we understand the legitimate use of violence.2 These discourses, however, have been heavily criticized. By building upon a particular line of criticism I develop my argument for the foundational significance of species war. Two critiques of sovereignty and humanitarian law are of particular interest: Michel Foucault’s notion of “race war” and Carl Schmitt’s notion of “friend and enemy.” Foucault in Society Must Be Defended set out a particular critique of the Westphalian juridical conception of state sovereignty and state power.3 Within the Westphalian juridical conception, it is commonly argued that sovereign power and legitimacy are grounded upon the ability of an institution to bring an end to internal civil war and create a sphere of domestic peace. Against this Foucault claimed that war is never brought to an end within the domestic sphere, rather, it continues and develops in the form of “race war.” Connected to his account of bio-power, Foucault suggests a historical discourse of constant and perpetual race war that underlies legal and political institutions within modernity.4 In The Concept of the Political, Carl Schmitt offered a critique of the liberal conception of the state grounded upon the notion of the “social contract” and criticized legal and political conceptions of the state in which legitimacy (and the legitimacy of war) was seen to be grounded upon the notion of “humanity.”5 For Schmitt the juridical notion of the state (and international human rights law) presupposes and continually re-instates through violence the distinction and relation between “friend and enemy.” Schmitt claimed that the political emerges from the threatening and warlike struggle between friends and enemies and that all political and legal institutions, and the decisions made therein, are built upon and are guided by this distinction.6 In relation to the issue of war/law these two insights can be taken further. I think Foucault’s notion of race war can be developed by putting at its heart the differing historical and genealogical relationships between human and non-human animals. Thus, beyond race war what should be considered as a primary category within legal and political theory is that of species war. Further, the fundamental political distinction is not as Schmitt would have it, that of friends and enemies, but rather, the violent conflict between human and non-human animals. Race war is an extension of an earlier form of war, species war. The friend-enemy distinction is an extension of a more primary distinction between human and non-human animals. In this respect, what can be seen to lay at the foundation of the Law of war is not the Westphalian notion of civil peace, or the notion of human rights. Neither race war nor the friend-enemy distinction resides at the bottom of the Law of war. Rather, what sits at the foundation of the Law of war is a discourse of species war that over time has become so naturalised within Western legal and political theory that we have almost forgotten about it. Although species war remains largely hidden because it is not seen as war or even violence at all it continues to affect the ways in which juridical mechanisms order the legitimacy of violence. While species war may not be a Western monopoly, in this account I will only examine a Western variant. This variant, however, is one that may well have been imposed upon the rest of the world through colonization and globalization. In what will follow I offer a sketch of species war and show how the juridical mechanisms for determining what constitutes legitimate violence fall back upon the hidden foundation of species war. I try to do this by showing that the various modern juridical mechanisms for determining what counts as legitimate violence are dependent upon a practice of judging the value of forms of life. I argue that contemporary claims about the legitimacy of war are based upon judgements about differential life-value and that these judgements are an extension of an original practice in which the legitimacy of killing is grounded upon the valuation of the human above the non-human. Further, by giving an overview of the ways in which our understanding of the legitimacy of war has changed, I attempt to show how the notion of species war has been continually excluded from the Law of war and of how contemporary historical movements might open a space for its possible re-inclusion. In this sense, the argument I develop here about species war offers a particular way of reflecting upon the nature of law more generally. In a Western juridical tradition, two functions of law are often thought to be: the establishment of order (in the context of the preservation of life, or survival); and, the realization of justice (a thick conception of the “good”). Reflecting upon these in light of the notion of species war helps us to consider that at the heart of both of these functions of law resides a practice of making judgements about the life-value of particular “objects.” These objects are, amongst other things: human individuals, groups of humans, non-human animals, plants, transcendent entities and ideas (the “state,” “community,” etc.). For the law, the practice of making judgements about the relative life value of objects is intimately bound-up with the making of decisions about what objects can be killed. Within our Western conception of the law it is difficult to separate the moment of judgement over life-value from the decision over what constitutes “legitimate violence.” Species war sits within this blurred middle-ground between judgement and decision – it points to a moment at the heart of the law where distinctions of value and acts of violence operate as fundamental to the founding or positing of law. The primary violence of species war then takes place not as something after the establishment of a regime of law (i.e., after the establishment of the city, the state, or international law). Rather, the violence of species war occurs at the beginning of law, at its moment of foundation, as a generator, as a motor.7In J.M. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals 8 the protagonist Elizabeth Costello draws a comparison between the everyday slaughter of non-human animals and the genocide of the Jews of Europe during the twentieth century. “In addressing you on the subject of animals,” she continues, “I will pay you the honour of skipping a recital of the horrors of their lives and deaths. Though I have no reason to believe that you have at the forefront of your minds what is being done to animals at this moment in production facilities (I hesitate to call them farms any longer), in abattoirs, in trawlers, in laboratories, all over the world, I will take it that you concede me the rhetorical power to evoke these horrors and bring them home to you with adequate force, and leave it at that, reminding you only that the horrors I here omit are nevertheless at the center of this lecture.”9 A little while later she states: “Let me say it openly: we are surrounded by an enterprise of degradation, cruelty, and killing which rivals anything that the Third Reich was capable of, indeed dwarfs it, in that ours is an enterprise without end, self-regenerating, bringing rabbits, rats, poultry, livestock ceaselessly into the world for the purpose of killing them.” “And to split hairs, to claim that there is no comparison, that Treblinka was so to speak a metaphysical enterprise dedicated to nothing but death and annihilation while the meat industry is ultimately devoted to life (once its victims are dead, after all, it does not burn them to ash or bury them but on the contrary cuts them up and refrigerates and packs them so that they can be consumed in the comfort of our own homes) is as little consolation to those victims as it would have been – pardon the tastelessness of the following – to ask the dead of Treblinka to excuse their killers because their body fat was needed to make soap and their hair to stuff mattresses with.”10 Similar comparisons have been made before.11 Yet, when most of us think about the term “war” very seldom do we bother to think about non-human animals. The term war commonly evokes images of states, armies, grand weapons, battle lines, tactical stand-offs, and maybe even sometimes guerrilla or partisan violence. Surely the keeping of cattle behind barbed wire fences and butchering them in abattoirs does not count as war? Surely not? Why not? What can be seen to be at stake within Elizabeth Costello’s act of posing the modern project of highly efficient breeding and factory slaughtering of non-human animals beside the Holocaust is a concern with the way in which we order or arrange conceptually and socially the legitimacy of violence and killing. In a “Western” philosophical tradition stretching at least from Augustine and Aquinas, through to Descartes and Kant, the ordering of the relationship between violence and legitimacy is such that, predominantly, non-human animals are considered to be without souls, without reason and without a value that is typically ascribed to humans. For example, for Augustine, animals, together with plants, are exempted from the religious injunction “Thou shalt not kill.” When considering the question of what forms of killing and violence are legitimate, Augustine placed the killing of non-human animals well inside the framework of religious and moral legitimacy.12

### 2NR – Kochi 09

#### The 1AC’s attempt to legislate warfare is a red herring to the structural underpinnings of violence which uphold the mega-machine. Law functions on the distinction between “justified and unjustified” violence which allows war to be allowed or condemned in the first place. The mega-machine functions on the destruction of unqualified life which in the squo are nonhumans and the biosphere. This creates the species war as the constant underpinning of violence inherent to global civilization. 2 implications

#### Bare life DA: Ceding ethical authority to squo structures of power creates a system where those who fall outside of legal protection may be killed without murder and stolen from without theft. This is why prisoners at Guantanamo bay can be toutured without anybody on the global stage really giving a shit.

#### Slaughterhouse DA: Directing social energy towards preventing wars that emerge as an inevitable result of globalization and climate change gives us “ethical license” to ignore the constant murder of nonhuman animals which accounts for unquantifiable amounts of suffering every second it persists.

## Impacts

### 1NC - Vs Big Affs

#### Statist normalization is the root cause of war, violence and oppression – it’s try-or-die for the alt to prevent a laundry list of short-term existential crises including environmental destruction, nuclear war, disease, resource crises, novel forms of biopower, and expanding genocidal neo-imperialism.

Noble 14 (Scott, documentary filmmaker and wage slave “Anarchy and Near Term Extinction,” <https://dissidentvoice.org/2014/06/anarchy-and-near-term-extinction/>) //Lifeguard-BS 2-23-2018 \*\*brackets in original [this card is so good]

According to the theory of Near Term Extinction (NTE) the human race is about to go the way of the Dinosaurs. Though polls on the subject are scarce, it is safe to assume that the majority of humanity disagrees. Most of us remain at least cautiously optimistic about our long term survival prospects. Notable exceptions can be found amongst various apocalyptic cults, whose followers anticipate near term divine intervention, as well as trans-humanists, who anticipate the rise of post-humans due to exotic new technologies. In contrast to these worldviews, NTE is not rooted in religion or science-fiction but a pessimistic reading of the environmental sciences, probability theory and the law of unintended consequences. Nor is NTE limited to the fringe. A growing number of scholars, including highly visible figures like Stephen Hawking and Richard Dawkins, have suggested that near term extinction is plausible, though certainly not inevitable (predictions range from years to decades to centuries). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, environmental crises such as climate change have supplanted global thermonuclear war in the pessimist’s hierarchy of doom. Yet these threats are not mutually exclusive. A leaked 2004 report by the Pentagon on global warming anticipates increased risk of “Nuclear conflict, mega-droughts, famine and widespread rioting…Once again, warfare [will] define human life.”1 Though such predictions are self-serving – environmental crises are deemed yet another threat that can only be contained by militarism – they are also rational. Under state capitalism, competition for diminishing resources may exacerbate violent conflict, creating a feedback loop not unlike global warming itself. This essay will argue that if the human race is to survive, anarchic systems based on participatory democracy must replace top down models of state rule. Realpolitik In his book The McDonaldization of Society, sociologist George Ritzer portrays rationalism as a paradox: highly rational models frequently produce highly irrational outcomes.2 The modern workplace, where we spend most of our waking hours, provides a familiar illustration: rationalist modes of production based on efficiency, calculability, predictability and control have reduced large swathes of humanity to human resources, disposable entities afforded little in the way of self-determination and dignity. In Charlie Chaplin’s Modern Times (1936), the Little Tramp himself becomes part of the assembly line, compelled forward by gears and pulleys, sliding through the bowels of the machine. When it comes to international affairs, rationalist models generally fall under the heading realpolitik, a term used to denote both cynical amorality and unflinching “realism” by political leaders acting for a perceived greater good. Unlike idealist interpretations of the state, which focus extensively on ethics, realpolitik is primarily concerned with power. The Italian philosopher and diplomat Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) wrote, “How we live is so far removed from how we ought to live, that [the ruler] who abandons what is done for what ought to be done, will rather bring about his own ruin rather than his preservation.”3 Since the ruler’s primary objective is to maintain power, immoral behaviour is not only acceptable but necessary. Machiavelli did not usher in in a new political philosophy; he merely articulated what had always been understood by rulers anywhere and everywhere. In 1934, British historian A.J.P. Taylor suggested that the principles we associate with realpolitik are “a series of assumptions, with which statesmen have lived since their earliest years and which they regard as so axiomatic as hardly to be worth stating.”4 Nevertheless, Machiavelli remains scandalous to this day. His brutal practicality is summed up in Chapter 18 of The Prince – people ought either to be “well treated or crushed.”3 The 19th Century anarchist Mikhail Bakunin agreed with Machiavelli’s cynical understanding of power but came to very different conclusions about how humanity should proceed. He bitterly praised the Italian philosopher for exposing the state with “terrible frankness,” and demonstrating that “crime… is the sine qua non of political intelligence and true patriotism,” yet rejected the notion that such crime was inevitable. “We are the sons of the revolution… We believe in the rights of man, in the dignity and necessary emancipation of the human species.”5 The state – as well capitalism – should be abolished. Up until the mid-twentieth century, and with the exception of a few rogue philosophers who advocated world government, self-government or no government at all, near-constant warfare between competing states has been viewed as an unfortunate but necessary byproduct of international relations. The invention of the nuclear bomb changed that – or would have, if the idealists were correct. American military strategist Bernard Brodie was overly optimistic when, in 1946, he wrote, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.”6 The military establishment, soon to be termed the military industrial complex by President Eisenhower, did in fact have another purpose, namely to expand American power through imperialism. Tolstoy was proven correct: not even the creation of the most “terrible weapons of war” would put an end to the state’s quest for dominance. Few people who consider themselves rational would advocate for the disarmament of the state apparatus in which they live. Yet in the age of nuclear weapons, it is precisely this insistence on “national security” through state power that is most likely to kill us. If, as Bakunin argued, “small states are virtuous only because of their weakness,”5 powerful states demonstrate an ineluctable tendency toward dominating others. The result is militarism. MAD The history of civilization is sufficiently blood-soaked that many modern intellectuals, including Albert Einstein, have argued that competitive state frameworks must be abandoned if the human race is to survive. Following the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Einstein implored: A world government must be created which is able to solve conflicts between nations by judicial decision. This government must be based on a clear-cut constitution which is approved by the governments and nations and which gives it the sole disposition of offensive weapons.7 It is doubtful that a world government such as envisioned by Einstein – which allowed for the centralization of “offensive weapons” – would have eliminated the nuclear threat, let alone war, if for no other reason than secessionist movements and other power struggles would have remained a constant concern (we will return to this subject at the essay’s closing). In any case, Churchill, Truman and Stalin would carve up most of Europe at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, creating the foundation for the Cold War. As if to underscore the improbability of world government, the three leaders had an argument over who would enter the Potsdam conference room first; they eventually decided that they would enter at precisely the same time through three separate doors.8 The new paradigm was MAD – Mutually Assured Destruction. Because man is a rational being, he would not risk annihilation by attacking his foe. Game theorists at the Rand Corporation, a Pentagon think tank, provided the theoretical basis. According to the prisoner’s dilemma, both players had to assume the other was rational. While most nuclear strategists took it for granted that the point of the game was to maintain peace between the super-powers, others believed, quite logically, that the point of the game was to win it. Among those who embraced the “winner takes all” view was General Curtis Lemay, purported model for the character “Jack the Ripper” in Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove. Best known for masterminding the massive bombing campaign against Japan during WWII (which resulted in half-a-million dead and about five million homeless), Lemay headed up the Strategic Air Command and served as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force from 1961 to 1965. Lemay drew up a war plan which involved dropping “the entire stockpile of atomic bombs in a single massive attack” on the Soviet Union. The Washington Post later quoted the General as stating, “Every major American city – Washington, New York, Philadelphia, Detroit, Chicago, Los Angeles – will be reduced to rubble. Similarly, the principal cities of the Soviet Union will be destroyed.”9 According to then Defence Secretary Robert McNamara, Lemay was “absolutely certain” that “the US was going to have to fight a nuclear war with the Soviet Union” and that “we should fight it sooner rather than later.”9 Equally disturbing as the super-hawks at the Pentagon were the numerous academics – people who considered themselves highly rational – who advocated a similar strategy. Most found their home at the Rand Corporation. One of Rand’s most notorious strategists was Herman Kahn. He believed that the US atomic arsenal was a wasting resource. So long as the Soviet Union continued to build its own arsenal, America’s would decrease in value. For Kahn, nuclear weapons were like a precious commodity in danger of depreciation on the global marketplace. Though he did not explicitly advocate a first strike, Kahn believed that a nuclear war was “winnable.”10 Breaking the Chain of Command MAD is widely regarded as a triumph of both rationalism and hard-nosed realpolitik. The missiles stayed in their silos. We didn’t go extinct. Starry-eyed idealists who rejected Ronald Reagan’s belligerence and exorbitant military spending were proven wrong. What few realize is that we escaped destruction primarily due to a handful of individuals who rejected the chain of command – and even the logic of their computer screens – in order to embrace the better angels of their being. In my documentary film The Power Principle, I explore several of the biggest “close calls” during the Cold War. The most serious event occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the midst of the conflict, a group of United States Navy Destroyers began dropping practice-depth charges on a Soviet submarine positioned near Cuba in order to force it to the surface. The sub commanders believed WWIII was underway. According to Soviet military protocol, the commanders had previous permission to launch missiles if all three reached consensus. Two said yes – one said no. Then “an argument broke out among the three, in which only Vasili Arkhipov was against the launch.” Thomas Blanton, a director of the National Security Archive, later remarked, “A guy called Vasili Arkhipov saved the world.”11 In 1983, a computer malfunction at a nuclear warning facility near Moscow falsely indicated a nuclear attack by the United States. The probability indicator was at level 1. The man in charge, Stanislav Petrov, did not have the ability to launch a retaliatory strike. However, were he to pass on the information to the top command, the Soviet leadership would have only had a few minutes to decide on whether to launch a counter-attack. According to Bruce Blair, a Cold War nuclear strategist, “the top leadership, given only a couple of minutes to decide, told that an attack had been launched, would [have made] a decision to retaliate.” Petrov broke military protocol, and waited. It turned out that the computer malfunction was caused by “a rare alignment of sunlight on high-altitude clouds and satellites.”12 The third biggest close call occurred in the same year when NATO began a war exercise; the scenario – an all out nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. It was codenamed Able Archer.  When the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union during WWII, they did so under the guise of a war game. Alarmed by Ronald Reagan’s “evil empire” rhetoric, as well as America’s deployment of Pershing II strategic missiles in Europe, hard-liners in the Kremlin became convinced that history was about to repeat itself. In the run up to the exercise, the Soviets secretly mobilized all key components of their military forces, including nuclear submarines. One mistake by either side and a holocaust would have resulted. There are other examples, though not quite as hair-raising. A report by the Nuclear Files Foundation lists over 20 “close calls” during the Cold War.13 The greatest danger has never been a rogue commander in the vein of “Jack the Ripper” – though that threat is real enough – but accidental nuclear war caused by incompetence and/or technical malfunction.14 Former Defence Sectary Robert McNamara, who was present in the Oval Office during the Cuban Missile Crisis, eventually came to a stark conclusion: “It can be confidently predicted that the combination of human fallibility and nuclear arms will inevitably lead to nuclear destruction.”15 Unlike most of the public, US military leaders are well aware of the numerous close calls of the Cold War. The same is presumably true of most men and women who (along with military leaders) formulate current US policy. If their goal was the survival, let alone health, of the human race, the United States would have long since abandoned aggressive war. A fraction of the US military budget could eliminate poverty worldwide,16 and in doing so drain the swamp of resentment and rage that provides the lifeblood of the “terrorist threat.” For critics of American foreign policy, the failure of US leaders to pursue a peaceful path following the collapse of the Soviet Union is often attributed to a uniquely American belligerence or depravity. Yet a cursory glance through the history books shows that the American empire, while exceptional in terms of global reach and technology, is anything but exceptional in terms of base motivation; it is behaving in a remarkably similar fashion to every empire that preceded it. We can only conclude that powerful states – and the people to tend to wield great power within them – share peculiar forms of logic that are alien to most of their citizenry. The Power Principle The dominant view amongst anthropologists is that we have lived in relatively peaceful, cooperative, egalitarian societies for 99% of our history. In the words of anthropologist Christopher Boehm, “Humans were egalitarian for thousands of generations before hierarchical societies began to appear.”17 Many of the behaviours we now celebrate – “success” through the hoarding of wealth, for example – were traditionally considered socially deviant. Ethnographies of extant nomadic foragers reveal that they are “all but obsessively concerned with being free from the authority of others. That is the basic thrust of their political ethos.”18 The Utku in the Canadian Arctic have an extreme intolerance for “displays of anger, aggression, or dominance.”19 The Pintupi Aborigines insist that “One should assert one’s autonomy only in ways that do not threaten the equality and autonomy of others” (Myers).20 Among the Wape tribe in New Guinea, “A man will not tolerate a situation where a neighbour has more than he has. A man should not possess either goods or power to the disadvantage of others” (Mitchell).21 In both egalitarian and hierarchical societies, power is jealously guarded. For egalitarians, the goal is to maximize freedom through group solidarity; for despots, the goal is to maximize the “freedom” of rulers to oppress the majority. Among political philosophers, only anarchists have seriously considered the threat posed by hierarchy in human affairs. For this reason they have been labeled “utopian.” Yet it may be that idealized notions of benevolent hierarchies are not only unrealistic but wildly implausible. Just as systems of domestic law have proven incapable of preventing tyranny, so too have international laws utterly failed to prevent war. For anarchists, the reason for this is self-evident: the logic of power is power. There is no law or principle so compelling that it will not be tossed aside at the first sign that those who hold power are in danger of losing it. Hunter-gatherers are able to prevent social dominance hierarchies because they act in a group wide coalition; under the state apparatus, with its entrenched hierarchies, this ability is severely curtailed. Nevertheless, for the vast majority of political philosophers, the idea that a select minority should rule over the mass is taken for granted. James Madison, the “father of the American constitution,” argued that a primary purpose of government was to “protect the minority of the opulent against the majority.” His great fear was “levelling tendencies,” in other words, real democracy.22 If nation states existed in a vacuum, incapable of waging war against other states, minority rule would perhaps be tolerable, depending on the disposition of the men and women who happen to rule over the majority at a given time. The problem is that states are not content to rest on their laurels. Schopenhauer’s famous quote about wealth – that it is “like sea-water; the more we drink, the thirstier we get” – applies equally to power itself. The anthropologist Gregory Bateson explained the phenomenon in terms of “optima” and “maxima”: “the ethics of optima and the ethics of maxima are totally different ethical systems. The ethics of maxima knows only one rule: more.”23 Egalitarian societies are able to maintain optima due to a low center of gravity. In large hierarchical societies, wherein power becomes centralized, leaders or entire social classes can easily become despotic. Lord Acton’s famous quote that “power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely” was more vividly expressed by the great American novelist Kurt Vonnegut: “Human beings are chimpanzees who become crazy drunk on power.” Austrian political scientist Leopold Kohr, who described himself as a “philosophical anarchist,” regarded powerful states as the most dangerous expression of the maxima principle: There could be no gentler peoples on earth today than the Portuguese, the Swedes, the Norwegians, or the Danes. Yet, when they found themselves in possession of power, they lashed out against any and all comers with such fury that they conquered the world from horizon to horizon. This was not because, at the period of their national expansion, they were more aggressive than others. They were more powerful.24 Great powers may temporarily “check” one another, to the point where – depending on the global power configuration – some powerful states may seem positively benign; nevertheless, by their very nature, states must exist in an environment of perpetual conflict; when a “critical quantity of power” is reached by one state in relation to others, war is a likely result. For these and other reasons, Bakunin believed that international law is always destined to fail. There is no common right, no social contract of any kind between them; otherwise they would cease to be independent states and become the federated members of one great state. But unless this great state were to embrace all of humanity, it would be confronted with other great states, each federated within, each maintaining the same posture of inevitable hostility. War would still remain the supreme law, an unavoidable condition of human survival. Every state, federated or not, would therefore seek to become the most powerful. It must devour lest it be devoured, conquer lest it be conquered, enslave lest it be enslaved, since two powers, similar and yet alien to each other, could not coexist without mutual destruction.5 Universal Hostility When NATO was created in 1949, its ostensible purpose was to protect Europe from the Soviet Union. Yet when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, NATO did not; in fact, it expanded. Speaking in 2005, American military geostrategist Thomas Barnett boasted that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, “demand for our services has increased 4-5 times.”14 Instead of the “peace dividend” promised by Bill Clinton, aggressive war by the United States actually escalated. Twenty years after Perestroika, Gorbachev lamented that his concessions – rather than creating more peace and harmony – had produced a “winner’s complex” among the American political elite.25 Gorbachev had envisioned for post-Soviet Russia a social democracy similar to the Scandinavian nations. What actually followed were a series of brutal “free market” reforms engineered by technocrats from the Chicago school of economics. It took decades for Russia to regain some semblance of stability. Now that it has – and despite the vanished pretext of an ideological battle between capitalism and communism – the Cold War is back with a vengeance. When Gorbachev allowed for the peaceful dismantling of the Soviet Union, he was promised by George H.W. Bush that NATO would not expand “one inch to the east.”14 Instead, NATO has expanded to much of the world – including Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, the Baltic and Central Asia. Coinciding with these aggressive policies of expansion and encirclement, the US has insisted on establishing anti-missile systems in Poland designed to eliminate Russia’s nuclear deterrent. The theoretical basis behind America’s treatment of post-Soviet Russia crosses party lines. Paul Wolfowitz, who served as Deputy Secretary of Defence under George W. Bush, wrote in Defence Planning Guidance (1992): “Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere.”26 Similarly, Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski argued in his 1997 book The Grand Chessboard that control of Eurasia – to the exclusion of Russia – is the key factor in ensuring American primacy: Failure to widen NATO… would shatter the concept of an expanding Europe… Worse, it could reignite dormant Russian political aspirations in Central Europe… Europe is America’s essential geopolitical bridgehead in Eurasia… A wider Europe and an enlarged NATO will serve the short-term and longer-term interests of U.S. policy.27 In February 2014 the democratically elected albeit corrupt government of Ukraine was overthrown in a right-wing putsch supported by the United States, prompting Vladimir Putin to engineer a referendum in Crimea allowing for its annexation into Russia. Long before the crisis, and in response to previous provocations on Russia’s borders, Putin delivered a speech to the Kremlin in which he stated: Their [U.S.] defence budget in absolute figures is almost 25 times bigger than Russia’s. This is what in defence is referred to as ‘their home — their fortress’. Clever… Very clever. But this means that we also need to build our home and make it strong and well protected. We see, after all, what is going on in the world. Comrade Wolf knows whom to eat, as the saying goes. It knows whom to eat and is not about to listen to anyone, it seems.14 In Putin’s portrayal of America as a ravenous wolf we see an echo of Bakunin’s maxim that states must “devour lest [they] be devoured.” The desire by Russian leaders to retain control of their Black Sea port in Crimea and to project power into neighbouring (NATO-affiliated) states is a classic expression of the cordon sanitaire or “quarantine line.” In state-craft, the term is defined as a protective barrier against a potentially aggressive nation or dangerous influence. Putin has not been without his own forays into military violence, such as the brutal subjugation of Chechnya in the mid-90’s (during which the capital, Grozny, was largely reduced to rubble). Nevertheless, the Russian leader has focussed most of his attention on building economic alliances, most notably that of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). Following the first BRICS summit in 2009, member nations called for a new global reserve currency (rather than the US dollar) that would be “diversified, stable and predictable.”28 Apart from the small matter of nuclear weapons, it is in the economic realm that Russia is considered most dangerous. Russia provides the European Union with about a third of its gas, remains one of Germany’s largest trading partners, and has arranged a massive natural gas supply deal with China. In the same way that NATO has attempted to encircle Russia, the Pentagon’s “Asia pivot” seeks to quarantine China militarily. China has responded by announcing a new Air Defence Identification Zone in the East China Sea, overlapping disputed territories with Japan. In April, the US established a new “Defence” pact with the Philippines. Russia and China have repeatedly vetoed US-sponsored Security Council Resolutions that would have allowed for the legal bombing of Syria (which houses one of Russia’s last foreign military bases outside of the former Soviet Union). Yet this has not prevented the United States from attempting to subvert the Syrian government through semi-covert means. The CIA, the British SAS, Saudi Arabia, and NATO member Turkey have been training and supplying Syrian rebels in Jordan and elsewhere since the beginning of the insurgency against Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.29 Syria, in turn, has a mutual defence pact with Iran. As always in the recent history of the Middle East, the wild card is Israel. The destruction of Iran remains Israel’s primary foreign policy objective. Although Hezbollah has sensibly warned that an attack against Iran would “set the entire middle east ablaze.”30 Israeli leaders perceive Iran as a potential counter-check to Zionist power. In addition to geopolitical concerns, Israeli leaders embrace a peculiar military strategy known as the “Mad Dog” doctrine. First articulated by Israeli military leader and politician Moshe Dayan, it calls for Israel to behave “like a mad dog, too dangerous to bother.”31 North Korea seems to have embraced a similar strategy, though to considerably less effect. The most disturbing manifestation of this strategy is the so-called “Samson option.” Named after the biblical character Samson, who pushed apart the pillars of a Philistine temple, thereby killing both himself and his captors, the Samson option calls for destroying much of the world in response to an existential threat to the Jewish state. Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld explains: “We possess several hundred atomic warheads and rockets and can launch them at targets in all directions… We have the capability to take the world down with us.”32 The Samson option, and Israel’s behaviour in general, has led the American political scientist Norman Finkelstein to describe the country as a “lunatic state.”33 In his article “Marching as to War,” American paleoconservative author Pat Buchanan expresses incredulity over American Vice President Joe Biden’s post-Ukraine-coup trip through the former Soviet bloc countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. During the junket, Biden reiterated America’s commitment to “protect” these nations: “our word” is “solemn” and “iron clad.” According to Buchanan, Biden was “affirming war guarantees General Eisenhower would have regarded as insane.”34 Here we may say that while Biden’s actions may have been insane during the Eisenhower administration, they are perfectly logical under the Obama administration. In keeping with the theory of the Power Principle, or Kohr’s notion of “critical quantities of power,” the collapse of the Soviet Union eliminated the primary check to the American empire. The dogs of war could be fully unleashed. Now that Russia is resurgent, and the US declining economically, there is a great deal of barking going on. On April Fool’s Day, 2014, NATO Sectary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated: NATO’s greatest responsibility is to protect and defend our territory and our people. And make no mistake, this is what we will do. We will make sure we have updated military plans, enhanced exercises and appropriate deployments.35 Rasmussen is nothing if not worldly, considering that “his” people evidently include populations from countries as varied as Albania, Croatia, Canada, France, Iceland, Italy, Romania, the UK and the USA. The illegal bombing of Serbia by the Clinton administration may be regarded as the starting point in the New Cold War, for it was during the assault that NATO began its eastward shift. The destruction of Yugoslavia was “rational,” argues historian Michael Parenti, because “Yugoslavia was the one country in Eastern Europe that would not voluntarily overthrow what remained of its socialist system and install a free-market economic order… Yugoslavs were proud of their postwar economic development and of their independence from both the Warsaw pact and NATO.”36 Considerably less rational was the behaviour of US General Wesley Clark during the conflict. According to British pop singer James Blunt (best known for his song “You’re beautiful”), who commanded 30,000 NATO troops in Bosnia, he was instructed by the US General to attack a squadron of Russian soldiers at the Pristina Air Base. The direct command [that] came in from Gen Wesley Clark was to overpower them. Various words were used that seemed unusual to us. Words such as ‘destroy’ came down the radio.37 Like Vasili Arkhipov during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Stanislav Petrov during the 1983 nuclear-warning “computer glitch,” James Blunt disobeyed orders. He was backed up by British General Sir Mike Jackson. Said Jackson: “I’m not going to have my soldiers be responsible for starting World War III.”38 In contravention of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which demands “good-faith” efforts to work toward nuclear disarmament, the United States is projected to spend 1 trillion maintaining and expanding its nuclear weapons systems over the next 30 years39 – assuming we survive that long. Rationalizing War No state, no matter how powerful or totalitarian, is capable of engaging in aggressive war absent ideological justification. These justifications typically take on two forms: a noble cause that the public can relate to and a cause that – though it would seem brutal and even immoral to the public – is deemed rational by members of a particular ruling class. The celebrated American political philosopher Rienhold Neibuhr claimed that “rationality belongs to the cool observers.” Elites should recognize “the stupidity of the average man,” who must be ideologically manipulated via “emotionally potent oversimplifications.”40 Walter Lippmann, the “Father of modern journalism,” agreed, arguing that the “masses” are a “bewildered herd” who should be “spectators” in the affairs of state but not “participants.”40 Very often, a casus belli (or war pretext) will be manufactured by leaders to coerce a peaceful population into accepting war, though intensive propaganda is often sufficient. In the modern age, covert agencies like the CIA have allowed for a more cost-effective and PR-friendly alternative to transparent military aggression. Black operations are especially useful for the United States because the over-arching propaganda narrative (“freedom,” “democracy,” “human rights”) is diametrically opposed to the brutal realities of American foreign policy. Eisenhower’s concept of the Military Industrial Complex is better described as the Military Industrial Intelligence Complex. The vast gulf between propaganda and realpolitik can be seen in various internal memos by figures like US Cold Warrior and State Department official George Kennan. While American leaders publicly warned of an existential threat to democracy posed by the Soviet Union, Kennan’s 1948 memo to the Secretary of State cooly observes: We should cease to talk about vague and unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of living standards, and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts.41 Kennan helped to establish the Office of Policy Coordination inside CIA.42 Despite its intentionally bland title, the OPC specialized in black operations: assassinations, torture, coups, false flags. Its officers did in the dark “what would have never stood the light of day”43 in a self-proclaimed democracy committed to freedom and human rights. After the attacks of 9/11, these tactics were brought out into the open – a dangerous gambit that has undermined America’s moral legitimacy both at home and abroad. According to former CIA analyst Ray McGovern, the “neoconservatives” who would come to dominate the George W. Bush and Obama administrations were described by fellow analysts – in the 1970’s/80’s – as “The Crazies.”44 The neocons openly argued for war as a way of life, and for the projection of American power into every corner of the globe. “Ideas do not succeed in history by virtue of their truth,” writes sociologist Peter Berger, “but by virtue of their relationship to specific social processes.”45 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and coinciding with the increasing power of the Israeli Lobby, the neocon philosophy suddenly became not so crazy after all. It now had utility, and was widely accepted. The philosophical “Godfather” of the neoconservative movement was the philosopher Leo Strauss. Born in Germany of Jewish parents, he emigrated to the United States and took up a teaching political science at the University of Chicago. Despite his lineage, Strauss’ teachings bear a disturbing similarity to those of the Nazis. Shadia Drury, a political scientist at the University of Calgary, writes that Strauss believed in “perpetual war” and “an aggressive, belligerent foreign policy… Following Machiavelli, [Strauss] maintained that if no external threat exists then one has to be manufactured.”46 For liberals and progressives, neoconservatism is the current Bete noir of American politics. In alleged contrast to the realist school, neoconservative are deemed idealistic, irrational, even insane, yet also uniquely ruthless and cunning. In his book Reclaiming Conservatism, Mickey Edwards of the Aspen Institute argues that “Neoconservatives are driven by theoretical objectives, and by a moral or ethical compass that fails to take into account the complexities of world politics, [whereas] adherents to a Realpolitik foreign policy often seem to have no moral compass at all.”47 Apart from different propaganda narratives, the reader can be forgiven for failing to notice a significant difference between the neocons and their alleged ideological opponents in the American power structure. In terms of real world outcomes, what we actually find is a remarkable degree of uniformity between “realists” and “neoconservatives,” Democrats and Republicans, with foreign policy differences amounting to a friendly disagreement over exactly how to go about maintaining and expanding US hegemony. Increasingly, Democratic politicians such as Hillary Clinton are being described as “neocons” despite having no historical attachments to Strauss or his philosophy. This indicates a certain level of cognitive dissonance amongst the party faithful; unable to come to terms with the failure of the state capitalist model, they attribute the American empire not to structural factors but a diabolical clique that has usurped American power from its proper guardians. A much more compelling and historically consistent explanation for the remarkable continuity between Democrat and Republican regimes has already been provided: the logic of power is power. For the half-a-million Iraqi children who perished under the sanctions program of Democrat Bill Clinton, or the similar number who perished under the Republican George W. Bush, the distinctions between philosophies of empire are meaningless. The ideological framework for imperialism may change, but the game remains the same. In Love with Death The Power Principle demands that the class that holds power attempts to retain and expand that power. Therefore, ruling classes within one nation find themselves in conflict not only with domestic populations but other nation states. The greatest fear of those who hold power is Anarchy – the loss of control by those who exercise it. For neoconservatives like Irving Kristol, the 60’s counter-culture was an outbreak of “moral anarchy,” which, if it had been allowed to continue, would have led to the collapse of “ordered liberty.”48 Externally the same principles apply. “Realist” Zbigniew Brzezinski argues: “America’s withdrawal from the world… would produce massive international instability. It would prompt global anarchy.”49 When I asked the late historian Howard Zinn what he thought of the word “anarchy” being used as a synonym for chaos, he suggested that anarchic systems are actually much more stable than hierarchical systems. Anarchism is based on horizontal principles of free association and mutual aid, whereas hierarchical systems demand coercion and violence. “Our political systems are in chaos,” Zinn stated. “International relations are in chaos.”14 In the desire to dominate others in order to prevent chaos, chaos is the result. It is by no means certain that chaos is considered undesirable by military strategists, provided it serves to weaken the opposition. In his “Strategy for Israel in the 1980’s,” Israeli strategic planner Oded Yinon advocated the fomenting of civil war throughout the entire middle east. Arabs would be turned against one another on the basis of nation, religion and ethnicity in order to increase Israel’s relative power.50 In countries like Iraq, Syria and Libya (or indeed Guatemala, El Salvador, Indonesia and Vietnam) we see the fruits of such strategies. Genocidal violence is not merely an unfortunate byproduct of well-intentioned plans for regime change but a goal in and of itself. It weakens competitors, and is therefore deemed justified. Human life has neither a positive nor a negative value, it is simply irrelevant – another number in the calculus of power. Former Defence Secretary Robert McNamara, the so-called “architect of the Vietnam war,” was obsessed with mathematics. “He was so impressed by the logic of statistics that he tried to calculate how many deaths it would take to bring North Vietnam to the bargaining table.”51 Millions of Vietnamese people were slaughtered by bullets and bombs, burnt with napalm, poisoned by Agent Orange; yet for the man who helped design the war, they were little more but numbers on a chalkboard. McNamara argued that US violence in Vietnam was preferable to the “complete anarchy” that might otherwise result.14 The psychologist Eric Fromm suggested that the desire to control and dominate may produce a necrophilous orientation. Such people are “cold, distant, devotees of ‘law and order’”52 who are excited not by love but death. The necrophilous person is driven by the desire to transform the organic into the inorganic, to approach life mechanically, as if all living persons were things… He is deeply afraid of life, because it is disorderly and uncontrollable by its very nature. To the necrophilous person justice means correct division, and they are willing to kill or die for the sake of what they call justice. ‘Law and order’ for them are idols, and everything that threatens law and order is felt as a satanic attack against their supreme values. …People are aware of the possibility of nuclear war; they are aware of the destruction such a war could bring with it – and yet they seemingly make no effort to avoid it. Most of us are puzzled by this behaviour because we start out from the premise that people love life and fear death. Perhaps we should be less puzzled if we questioned this premise. Maybe there are many people who are indifferent to life and many others who do not love life but who do love death.52 That many of our most beloved military figures had or have a necrophilous orientation is plainly evident. Observing the corpses and ruined architecture following a battle during WWII, George Patton remarked, “I love it. God help me I do love it so. I love it more than my life.”53 The actor Richard Burton, who played Sir Winston Churchill in a television drama, became repulsed by the figure: In the course of preparing myself… I realized afresh that I hate Churchill and all of his kind. I hate them virulently. They have stalked down the corridors of endless power all through history… What man of sanity would say on hearing of the atrocities committed by the Japanese against British and Anzac prisoners of war, ‘We shall wipe them out, everyone of them, men, women, and children. There shall not be a Japanese left on the face of earth’? Such simple-minded cravings for revenge leave me with a horrified but reluctant awe for such single-minded and merciless ferocity.54 In Churchill’s desire to “wipe out” the “Japanese race” we sense a sort of mania bordering on sadistic perversion. Indeed, on the other side of the conflict, Imperial Japan took sadistic perversion in warfare to horrifying extremes. Hitler brought sado-masochism into his bedroom; a coprophiliac, he was sexually aroused by having young ladies defecate on his face. In so doing he became, in the words of historian Robert Waite, “the personification of [his own] depraved self, as the persecutor who attacks a part of himself in his victims.”55 Hitler believed that it was in doom that art reached its highest expression. Consumed by sado-masochism and narcissism, hiding at last in his bunker, he devoutly wished for all of Germany to die with him. Afforded the opportunity, Western military leaders may well opt for global conflagration rather than conceding a diminution in their power. The Tyranny of Borders For Cold War General Curtis Lemay and nuclear strategist Herman Khan, it seemed perfectly logical to risk the annihilation of the human race in order to “win” the game against the Soviet Union. Missing in their analysis was that the game itself was insane. The U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change recently concluded that climate change could pose an irreversible, existential threat to civilization.56 Among the few American military strategists who commented on the report was retired Army Brig. Gen Chris King. Echoing the conclusions of the Pentagon’s leaked 2004 report on global warming, King emphasized that increased military conflict would seem to be the inevitable outcome of environmental collapse: “This is like getting embroiled in a war that lasts 100 years… You can see in military history, when they don’t have fixed durations, that’s when you’re most likely to not win.”56 Another American military figure, retired Navy Rear Adm. David Titley, commented on the report: You could imagine a scenario in which both Russia and China have prolonged droughts. China decides to exert rights on foreign contracts and gets assertive in Africa. If you start getting instability in large powers with nuclear weapons, that’s not a good day.56 I began this essay by noting that under the rules of state capitalism, it is rational to regard climate change and other environmental crises as probable force multipliers for interstate conflict. At the same time, militarists make a fundamental error in assuming that current forms of hierarchical organization will continue on indefinitely. Institutional hierarchy has only existed for about 1% of our time on Planet Earth. There is every reason to believe that hierarchical organization, far from being inevitable, is actually unnatural for human beings insofar as it creates massive social dysfunction. In The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better, Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett demonstrate statistically that more equal societies “enjoy better physical and mental health, lower homicide rates, fewer drug problems, fewer teenage births, higher math and literacy scores, higher stands of child wellbeing, less bullying in schools, lower obesity rates, and few people in prison.”57 Equally interesting, the psychological malaise caused by hierarchy extends to the men and women at the top of society’s pyramid. In The Good Life: Wellbeing and the New Science of Altruism, Selfishness and Immorality, psychotherapist Graham Music notes that “The higher up the social-class ranking people are, the less pro-social, charitable and empathetically they behave… Those with more materialistic values consistently have worse relationships, with more conflict.”58 If the assumptions inherent to state capitalism continue to be shared by majorities or large minorities, environmental collapse will likely entail an increase in intra-species violence, exactly as the militarists predict; however, as our rulers are quick to point out in their internal literature, in crisis there is opportunity. Environmental degradation may also force people to examine alternative ways of living, including those currently deemed “utopian.” War, poverty, environmental collapse and other catastrophes of modern existence are inextricably linked. “The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist,” states capitalist ideologue Thomas Friedman. “McDonald’s cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas, the designer of the F-15.”59 “Globalization” has entailed a dual tendency: increased border militarization combined with the growth of powerful supranational institutions. While capital is increasingly liquid – penetrating borders with the mere click of a mouse – 99% of humanity remains confined within nation states. The dominant media has portrayed this process as one of increased border erasure, yet the reality is that borders have never been more militarized. The logic of increased “border security” in the era of elite globalization is explained by the anthropologist David Graeber: If it were not possible to effectively imprison the majority of people in the world in impoverished enclaves, there would be no incentive for Nike or The Gap to move production there to begin with. Given a free movement of people, the whole neoliberal project would collapse. This is another thing to bear in mind when people talk about the decline of ‘sovereignty’ in the contemporary world: the main achievement of the nation-state in the last century has been the establishment of a uniform grid of heavily policed barriers across the world. It is precisely this international system of control that we are fighting against, in the name of genuine globalization.60 Though David Rockefeller is often accused of conspiring to engineer a “world government,” he remarked in a 2007 interview with Benjamin Fulford that be believed states are necessary, and that he does not view World Government as likely nor desirable.61 Nevertheless, in his memoirs, Rockefeller clearly states that he is a proud “internationalist.” Rockefeller’s brand of internationalism is consistent with the rise of supranational institutions like the EU, the IMF and World Bank. The goal is not the elimination of borders but the elimination of any semblance of democratic control over elites. The state has come to function as the ultimate divide and conquer mechanism, reducing the human species to a series of artificial, warring tribes serving a decidedly unpatriotic transnational ruling class. Government as Constant Reconquest Thus far I have conceived of warfare primarily in terms of external competition. But internal competition is at least as important. The American dissident philosopher Randolph Bourne believed that war is not only a primary function of the state but the health of the state. At the outbreak of WWI he wrote: The nation in wartime attains a uniformity of feeling, a hierarchy of values culminating at the undisputed apex of the State ideal, which could not possibly be produced through any other agency than war. Loyalty – or mystic devotion to the State – becomes the major imagined human value. Other values, such as artistic creation, knowledge, reason, beauty, the enhancement of life, are instantly and almost unanimously sacrificed, and the significant classes who have constituted themselves the amateur agents of the State are engaged not only in sacrificing these values for themselves but in coercing all other persons into sacrificing them.62 The domestic repercussions of war are typically regarded as an unintended consequence or happy accident for the ruling class; in the process of engaging in imperialism, or defending a population against imperialism, the state must neutralize subversive elements. Neoconservative philosopher Leo Strauss believed the opposite: domestic control is the imperative, war the effect: Because mankind is intrinsically wicked, he has to be governed… Such governance can only be established, however, when men are united – and they can only be united against other people.46 In 1984, Orwell also conceived of war in terms of domestic utility: In some ways she was far more acute than Winston, and far less susceptible to Party propaganda. Once when he happened in some connection to mention the war against Eurasia, she startled him by saying casually that in her opinion the war was not happening. The rocket bombs which fell daily on London were probably fired by the Government of Oceania itself, ‘just to keep the people frightened.’63 Viewed through a macroscopic lens, the perceived separation between “domestic” and “foreign” is an illusion. There is no race except the human race, no nation except the world. Does this mean we should embrace a world state? Before examining the question, we should ask ourselves exactly what the state is. In contrast to coercion theories of state formation, which argue that the first states were only beneficial to a privileged minority, and were achieved through a process of violence, conservative theories argue that the state was brought about through a process of “mutual benefit” and “consent of the governed.” Though understandably popular amongst apologists for state violence, conservative models are easily dismissed. As noted by the anthropologist James C. Scott: …all ancient states without exception were slave states. The proportion of slaves seldom dropped below 30 per cent of the population in early states, reaching 50 per cent in early South-East Asia (and in Athens and Sparta as much as 70 and 86 per cent)…slaving was at the very centre of state-making.64 The state is a new phenomenon in the human experience. But what of warfare itself? In his book A Terrible Love of War, American psychologist James Hillman argues that war “is the father of all things,” “the first of all norms” and “the ultimate truth of the cosmos.”53 For militarists, this view is a comfortable one: war is inevitable, it has always existed and always will. Another prominent psychologist, Harvard Professor Steven Pinker, has also advanced a “Constant warfare” theory of human evolution, suggesting that civilization and the state have actually diminished war, pacifying our instinctually savage, warlike ways. Like conservative theories of state formation, Pinker’s theories are easily debunked.65 In Archaeology, Cultural Anthropology, and the Origins and Intensification of War, Ferguson analyzes worldwide evidence of violence before 10,000 years ago. He finds that while violence certainly existed, it was comparatively rare, and in no way indicative of war. Thus, a study of all skeletons available from 100,000-10,000 in southwestern France finds that only 2.5% show any signs of fractures – and even these could have been caused by accidental injury. In the Middle East, amongst 370 skeletons from the Natufian (10,800-8,500 BC), only 2 showed signs of trauma.66 Similar patterns are evident throughout the world: Warfare is largely a development of the past 10,000 years. The multiple archaeological indicators of war are absent until the development of a more sedentary existence and/or increasing sociopolitical complexity, usually in combination with some form of ecological crisis and/or steep ecological gradients.67 Ethnographies of extant nomadic hunter-gatherers help to explain why war would have made little sense to our forebears. Anthropologist Douglas P. Fry writes: The very nature of nomadic-band social organization makes warfare, slavery, or despotic rule well-nigh impossible.

### \*\*\*2NR – Nobel ‘14

### 1NC – Death is scary

#### The collapse of the eco-system creates a global panic which demands the creation and subsequent destruction of a feared other. The Mega-Machine traps fear and anxiety within an infinite feedback loop that controls the root cause of modern violence.

**Scranton 15**, [God this guy is depressing], *Learning to die in the Anthropocene,* [https://aaaaarg.fail/upload/roy-scranton-learning-to-die-in-the-anthropocene-reflections-on-the-end-of-a-civilization.pdf] //GrouchoMarxist [We do not endorse anthropocentric language]

When it comes to global warming, differing visions of the human future are already hardening into conflict. Coal and oil companies and their government proxies have made their willingness to use military force to defend themselves and advance their interests spectacularly obvious. The labor wars of the 19th and 20th centuries show this clearly. The brutal decades-long war waged by the Nigerian government against its own people, undertaken with the outright support of Shell and Chevron, is another example, well documented in books such as A Year and a Day and Genocide in Nigeria by Ken Saro-Wiwa, who was executed for his activism. You’ve heard the call: We have to do something. We need to fight. We need to identify the enemy and go after them. Some respond, march, and chant. Some look away, deny what’s happening, and search out escape routes into imaginary tomorrows: a life off the grid, space colonies, immortality in paradise, explicit denial, or consumer satiety in a wireless, robot-staffed, 3D-printed techno-utopia. Meanwhile, the rich take shelter in their fortresses, trusting to their air conditioning, private schools, and well-paid guards. Fight. Flight. Flight. Fight. The threat of death activates our deepest ~~animal~~ drives. The aggression and fear that arise in response to perceived threats are some of the most intense emotions we ever experience. For human society to function at all, these instinctive reactions have to be carefully managed and channeled. Outbreaks of panic and hate are dangerous, but lower levels of aggression and fear help keep a population controllable and productive. Restrained aggression keeps people suspicious of collective action and working hard to overcome their fellows, while constant, generalized anxiety keeps people servile, unwilling to take risks, and yearning for comfort from whatever quarter, whether the dulling sameness of herd thought or the dumb security of consumer goods. Since at least September 11, 2001, people in the United States have been subject to an unprecedented terror campaign—not from Al Qaeda, but from the United States government. National domestic policy transformed “security” into constant fear, threatening its citizens at every turn: first with alarms of explosions and anthrax, then with prison, austerity-produced structural unemployment, and harassment, and finally with torture, SWAT tanks, snipers, drones, and total surveillance. Owing to the racial logic of US politics, in which white/black is the definitive semiotic distinction structuring American society, most of the government’s violence against its own citizens is directed against those with darker skin, but in subtler ways its terror campaign targets every single person who flies coach, watches the news, or uses the Internet. Fear comes to us every day in our encounters with increasingly militarized police and our humiliating interactions at metal detectors and body-scan machines. Fear comes to us in the absence of job security, in our want of appeal when confronted by institutionalized inequality, and in our mistrust of corrupt institutions. Fear comes to us in widespread surveillance, in the form of a homeless woman or a hospitalized friend without adequate financial support, and in the constant nagging worry that we’re not working hard enough, not happy enough, never going to “make it.” Fear comes to us in weather porn, unpredictable shifts in formerly stable climate dynamics, and massive storms. More than in any other way, fear comes to us in images and messages, as social media vibrations, products of cultural technologies that we have interpolated into our lives. Going about our daily business, we receive constant messages of apprehension and danger, ubiquitous warnings, insistent needling jabs to the deep lizard brain. Somebody died. Something blew up. Something might blow up. Somebody attacked somebody. Somebody killed somebody. Guns. Crime. Immigrants. Terrorists. Arabs. Mexicans. White supremacists. Killer cops. Demonic thugs. Rape. Murder. Global warming. Ebola. ISIS. Death. Death. Death. Sociologist Tom Pyszczynski writes: “People will do almost anything to avoid being afraid. When, despite the best efforts, [fear and anxiety] do break through, people go to incredible lengths to shut them down.” 88 Sometimes when these vibrations shake us, we discharge them by passing them on, retweeting the story, reposting the video, hoping that others will validate our reaction, thus assuaging our fear by assuring ourselves that collective attention has been alerted to the threat. Other times we react with aversion, working to dampen the vibrations by searching out positive reinforcements, pleasurable images and videos, something funny, something—anything—to ease the fear. We buy something. We eat food. We pop a pill. We fuck. In either passing on the vibration or reacting against it, we let the fear short circuit our own autonomous desires, diverting us from our goals and loading ever more emotional static into our daily cognitive processing. We become increasingly distracted from our ambitions and increasingly susceptible to such distraction. And whether we retransmit or react, we reinforce channels of thought, perception, behavior, and emotion that, over time, come to shape our habits and our personality. As we train ourselves to resonate fear and aggression, we reinforce patterns of thought and feeling that shape a society that breeds the same. Fight-or-flight is compelling because it serves essential evolutionary purposes. It increases alertness and adrenaline flow, and generally works to keep the human animal alive. As we proceed into the Anthropocene, though, capitalism’s cultural machinery for balancing fear and aggression against desire and pleasure is grinding and sputtering sparks. What cultural theorist Lauren Berlant has identified as the “cruel optimism” of a system sustained by hopes that can never be fulfilled mixes dangerously with an atmosphere of beleaguered anxiety, increasing frustration with working-class and middle-class economic stagnation, and a pervasive sadistic voyeurism that grows by what it feeds on. 89 While America’s fraying social infrastructure holds together, our fear and aggression can be channeled into labor, consumption, and economic competition, with professional sports, hyperviolent television, and occasional protests to let off steam. Once the social fabric begins to tear, though, we risk unleashing not only rioting, rebellion, and civil war, but homicidal politics the likes of which should make our blood run cold. Consider: Once among the most modern, Westernized nations in the Middle East, with a robust, highly educated middle class, Iraq has been blighted for decades by imperialist aggression, criminal gangs, interference in its domestic politics, economic liberalization, and sectarian feuding. Today it is being torn apart between a corrupt petrocracy, a breakaway Kurdish enclave, and a self-declared Islamic fundamentalist caliphate, while a civil war in neighboring Syria spills across its borders. These conflicts have likely been caused in part and exacerbated by the worst drought the Middle East has seen in modern history. Since 2006, Syria has been suffering crippling water shortages that have, in some areas, caused 75 percent crop failure and wiped out 85 percent of livestock, left more than 800,000 Syrians without a livelihood, and sent hundreds of thousands of impoverished young men streaming into Syria’s cities. 90 This drought is part of long-term warming and drying trends that are transforming the Middle East. 91 Not just water but oil, too, is elemental to these conflicts. Iraq sits on the fifth-largest proven oil reserves in the world. Meanwhile, the Islamic State has been able to survive only because it has taken control of most of Syria’s oil and gas production. We tend to think of climate change and violent religious fundamentalism as isolated phenomena, but as Retired Navy Rear Admiral David Titley argues, “you can draw a very credible climate connection to this disaster we call ISIS right now.” 92 A few hundred miles away, Israeli soldiers spent the summer of 2014 killing Palestinians in Gaza. Israel has also been suffering drought, while Gaza has been in the midst of a critical water crisis exacerbated by Israel’s military aggression. The International Committee for the Red Cross reported that during summer 2014, Israeli bombers targeted Palestinian wells and water infrastructure. 93 It’s not water and oil this time, but water and gas: some observers argue that Israel’s “Operation Protective Edge” was intended to establish firmer control over the massive Leviathan natural gas field, discovered off the coast of Gaza in the eastern Mediterranean in 2010. 94 Meanwhile, thousands of miles to the north, Russian-backed separatists fought fascist paramilitary forces defending the elected government of Ukraine, which was also suffering drought. 95 Russia’s role as an oil and gas exporter in the region and the natural gas pipelines running through Ukraine from Russia to Europe cannot but be key issues in the conflict. Elsewhere, droughts in 2014 sent refugees from Guatemala and Honduras north to the US border, devastated crops in California and Australia, and threatened millions of lives in Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Afghanistan, India, Morocco, Pakistan, and parts of China. Across the world, massive protests and riots have swept Bosnia and Herzegovina, Venezuela, Brazil, Turkey, Egypt, and Thailand, while conflicts rage on in Colombia, Libya, the Central African Republic, Sudan, Nigeria, Yemen, and India. And while the world burns, the United States has been playing chicken with Russia over control of Eastern Europe and the melting Arctic, and with China over control of Southeast Asia and the South China Sea, threatening global war on a scale not seen in seventy years. This is our present and future: droughts and hurricanes, refugees and border guards, war for oil, water, gas, and food. We experience this world of strife today in one of two modes: either it is our environment, and we are in it, or it comes to us as images, social excitation, retransmitted fear. People are fighting and dying in ruined cities all over the planet. Neighbors are killing each other. Old women are bleeding to death in bombed rubble and children are being murdered, probably as you read this sentence. To live in that world is horrific. Constant danger strains every nerve. The only things that matter are survival, killing the enemy, reputation, and having a safe place to sleep. The experience of being human narrows to a cutting edge. I remember living in that world many years ago in occupied Baghdad. Today that world seems impossibly distant, yet every day it presses in on me in a never-ending stream of words, images, appeals, and reports. I see videos. I read stories. I see pictures of this or that suffering or injustice and I am moved. To act, perhaps, but more accurately to emote. To react. To feel. To perform. We do not usually ask where these feelings come from or who they serve, but we all know that the cultural technologies transmitting these affective vibrations are not neutral: news outlets shape information to fit their owners’ prejudices, while Facebook, Twitter, and Google shape our perceptions through hidden algorithms. The specialization and demographic targeting of contemporary media tend to narrow the channels of perception to the point that we receive only those images and vibrations which already harmonize with our own prejudices, our own pre-existing desires, thus intensifying our particular emotional reactions along an increasingly limited band, impelling us to discharge our emotions within the same field of ready listeners, for which we are rewarded with “Likes” and “Favorites.” Our consciousness is shaped daily through feedback systems where some post or headline provokes a feeling and we discharge that feeling by provoking it in others. Social media like Facebook crowdsource catharsis, creating self-contained wave pools of aggression and fear, pity and terror, stagnant flows that go nowhere and do nothing. Pictures of children killed by bombs or police, or pictures of the devastation left in the wake of a tropical storm may move me to sadness and horror. Retransmitting such images will pass along that sadness and horror. My act of transmission will mark me as someone who has feelings about these things and who condemns them. I can rationalize my retransmission by saying that I am “raising awareness” or trying to influence public policy: I want my fellow citizens to be as horrified as I am, so they’ll think like I do, or so they’ll vote for a representative who works to prevent such horrors from happening, or maybe so that if enough of us all think the same way and feel the same way, the organs and institutions of power will be forced to hear us and align themselves along our vibrations, **the way a honeybee colony will pick a site for a new hive through the dance of its advance guard scouts**. These are perfectly reasonable human assumptions, because that is how physical human collectives function. Anyone who has been in a crowd, a basketball team, a nightclub, a choir, or a protest knows how bodies resonate together. But politics is the energetic distribution of bodies in systems, and we live in a system of carbon-fueled capitalism that we shouldn’t expect to work in physical human ways for several reasons, especially when it comes to responding to the threat of global warming. First, our political and social media technologies are not neutral, but have been developed to serve particular interests, most notably targeted advertising, concentration of wealth, and ideological control, and the vibrations that seem to resonate most strongly along these channels are envy, adulation, outrage, fear, hatred, and mindless pleasure. Second, the more we pass on or react to social vibrations, the more we strengthen our habits of channeling and the less we practice autonomous reflection or independent critical thought. With every protest chant, retweet, and Facebook post, we become stronger resonators and weaker thinkers. Third, however intense our social vibrations grow, they remain locked within machinery that offers no political leverage: they do not translate into political action, because they do not connect to the flows of power. Finally, while the typical collective human response to threat is to identify an enemy, pick sides, and mobilize to fight, global warming offers no apprehensible foe. That hasn’t stopped people from trying to find one. The Flood Wall Street protesters say the enemy is American corporations. Tanzania’s Jakaya Kikwete and Nauru’s Baron Waqa say the problem is the United States and Great Britain. Shell Oil and the Environmental Defense Fund seem to think that it’s intractable UN bureaucracy that’s holding us up. Barack Obama has implied that it’s China. Tea Party Republicans would blame Barack Obama, I’m sure, if they admitted that global warming was actually happening and caused by human activity. Meanwhile, NPR-listening liberals want to believe that Tea Party Republicans are responsible, so that they can frame the problem as one amenable to solution by moral education and enlightened consumerism, as if it were all a matter of convincing people to eat more kale and drive electric cars. One climate activist has argued that just 90 companies are responsible for almost two-thirds of all historical greenhouse gas emissions, which conveniently absolves billions of automobile drivers, airline passengers, meat eaters, and cellphone users of responsibility. 96 The enemy isn’t out there somewhere—the enemy is ourselves. Not as individuals, but as a collective.

### 2NR – Scranton 15

#### Global warming is a fact and it will lead to the death of society as we know it. This knowledge pushes society into a panic as we are confronted with the destruction of the only life this generation has ever known. This panic leads to the construction of a feared “Other” who can be blamed for the crisis so we can avoid personal responsibility. 3 implications

#### Simulacra DA: Fear within the mega-machine creates a demand for media which creates more fear which creates a greater demand for media. This creates a system of hyperreality which demands constant violence to feed the system.

#### Cruel Optimism DA: Fear create a demand for solutions which are nothing more than token gestures to those suffering. These solutions serve no purpose other than to soothe our own egos while we allow violence to continue. This results in an ineffective politics and domination.

#### Exxon DA: With all this horrible shit going on it distracts micropolitical movements from creating alternate forms of social organization to continue humanities survival after the inevitable social collapse. Corporations use violence and deceptive practices to continue to distract us so they can focus on profits which in turn makes the problem even worse.

## Alt

### 1NC – The Community

#### The alternative is a reorientation of the future towards de-domestication of humanity to re-center the community as the foundation of social structures as a countermovement to the homogenization of life demanding by technological thinking.

**Zerzan ’15** (Hasn’t showered in weeks, doesn’t like Iphones), *Why Hope? The Stand Against Civilization,* (<https://aaaaarg.fail/upload/john-zerzan-why-hope-the-stand-against-civilization-2.pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist

We are certainly as opposed to species loss, habitat destruction, and global warming as anyone else.” But again, **developing the** techno**future is based on the** systematic **destruction of the unbuilt world**, on global industrialization. What else enables it? The call for “increased diversity” is completely hollow. Not only are species, languages, and indigenous cultures being sacrificed. the general cultural homogenization is overtaking diversity. Increasingly, the malls, airports, apartments, et al. become identical in a globalizing world. Techno-industrial life grows flatter, textureless, and standardized. Perhaps most important: technology is the same everywhere. Is it a coincidence that as the techno-culture crowds out everything else, we see growing pathologies in society? In the U.S., tens of millions of people need addictive drugs to sleep, to have sex, to counter anxiety and depression. Meanwhile the shooting sprees––rampage killings in schools, family workplaces, and shopping malls––are daily occurrences. The emptiness and desolation are palpable, bringing continually worsening symptoms. In today’s mass techno-society, community has all but disappeared. And without social bonds and solidarity, anything can and does happen. Virtual “community” is a mockery of actual, face-to-face community, where individuals can be accountable and responsible. Technology is forever promising solutions. We live in an age where technology fills an ideological vacuum, as political ideologies fade in significance. But by and large, the solutions address problems that were created by technology in the first place––a fact we are not supposed to notice. (Think of diseases spread by intercontinental travel, oil spills, or nuclear power disasters, for instance—and even those diseases that did not exist prior to domestication, including virtually all infectious and degenerative diseases.) The German sociologist Ulrich Beck argues in his “risk society” thesis that disasters are a built-in feature of complex society. Global warming, the biggest disaster of all, evidently is a function of the growth of global industry. The more factories, the higher the temperature. Again, just what does onrushing technology rest upon? There is an intimate connection between a mobile phone and the destruction, not of illusory “Next Nature,” but of billions of years’ worth of natural systems that have made life on Earth possible. Fredric Jameson wrote, somewhat famously, that “Postmodernism is what you get when the modernization process is complete and nature is gone for good.” Postmodern culture is indeed, in my opinion, a surrender of this kind: let’s just accept the erasure of the natural world and go on from there. In IBM’s watchword: “Let’s Build a Smarter Planet.” We should accept the inevitable success of the cyber/cyborg/digital/ virtual/ information technology juggernaut, not think about what “advanced” society is really advancing toward. But we know what the fullness of the technological project has brought us. Since Emile Durkheim in the nineteenth century we’ve known, for example, that modern industrial cities breed much higher rates of suicide and madness. Reams of empirical studies and a century or two of social theory have noticed that modernity produces increasingly shallow and instrumental relationships, amid a life-world that is barren and isolating. Recently, a friend who is an emergency medical professional told me of calls received during the holiday season, from those who don’t have a health emergency. “I think I might be having a heart attack,” for example, in order to get a visit––in order to have some human contact. Do we really want to push all this even further? Life, health, freedom, community need a different direction. For thousands of generations we lived in band society. Before tribal ism, this form of community–perhaps the only actual form that has existed–featured the face-to-face society that consisted of fewer than a hundred people. Mass society of course erased this and so much more.  Novelist Kurt Vonnegut, in a 1973 interview, rejected the claims of modern techno-society, in favor of band society. “Human beings will be happier...when they find ways to inhabit primitive communities. That’s my utopia. That’s what I want for me.” I, too, want to go in that direction. We need a new paradigm, a new vision, which would involve a radical decentralization, a move away from the ever more integrating world system. Not alter-globalization, a new catch-phrase on the Left, but anti-globalization based on anti-authoritarian perspectives. More than that we need to start de-domesticating ourselves and reskilling ourselves. Reconnecting with the Earth in a literal sense. All of us are domesticated but we can start the process of transition.

### 2NR – Zerzan 15

#### Therefore the alternative is create a system of social organization that runs counter to the ideology of the mega-machine through an advocacy for de-development and community. The alternative reformulates face to face interaction as the foundation for ethical relationships which solves back for the endless feedback loop which traps fear within the system where it is then used for the continuation of the system. Prefer our methodology

#### Even if they win a DA to the alt we’ve won the alternate modes of social organization are necessary in the face of a climate collapse. They need to win that the alt is unnecessary before they can won off the alt being bad

### 1NC – Learn to die

#### The alternative is to learn how to die. Vote neg place mortality at the center of our politics. Learning to die places us within the archive of human history enabling the possibility of a future for humanity by generating obligation to the generations that will surpass us. This isn’t utopian or nihilistic but a necessary precondition for change.

**Scranton 15,** [God this guy is depressing], *Learning to die in the Anthropocene,* [https://aaaaarg.fail/upload/roy-scranton-learning-to-die-in-the-anthropocene-reflections-on-the-end-of-a-civilization.pdf] //GrouchoMarxist [We do not endorse anthropocentric language]

But while dying may be the easiest thing in the world to do, it’s the hardest thing in the world to do well—we are predisposed to avoid, ignore, flee, and fight it till the very last hour. We are impelled in our deepest being to struggle against it. Every time you feel hunger or taste ambition, every time your body tingles with lust or your heart yearns for recognition, every time you shake with anger or tremble in fear, that’s the animal in you striving for life. We fall into the world caught between two necessities, compelled to live, born to die, and reconciling them has forever been one of our most challenging puzzles. The pieces just don’t fit together. Much of our energy is spent in denial. Some argue that denying the fact of death is the root and germ of human culture itself, from our first burial mounds and ancestor-worship to plastic surgery and the space program. 99 “The idea of death, the fear of it, haunts the human animal like nothing else,” wrote anthropologist Ernest Becker in his Pulitzer Prize–winning book The Denial of Death. “It is a mainspring of human activity—activity designed largely to avoid the fatality of death, to overcome it by denying in some way that it is the final destiny for man.” 100 Throughout human history, we have invested innumerable hours of labor in countless luminous visions of the afterlife, both physical and metaphysical: Heaven and Hell, family and nation, capitalism and Star Trek. We have children and pressure our children to give us grandchildren, sending our genes into the future. We build pyramids, cathedrals, temples, mosques, monuments, and skyscrapers to prove to ourselves that some part of us will survive beyond our own end. And when our buildings crumble and our gods grow weak, we distract ourselves with pleasure or rally ourselves to war. As men who have experienced war have testified since the days of Homer, there is “a joyous feeling in the safety of killing” that washes away the bitter taste of death. 101 Accepting the truth of our end is the beginning of wisdom. When Montaigne wrote that “To philosophize is to learn how to die,” he was working in and with a philosophical tradition that was already centuries old. Citing one of his key predecessors, the Roman orator Cicero, Montaigne wrote: “Cicero says that to philosophize is nothing else but to prepare for death. This is because study and contemplation draw our soul out of us to some extent and keep it busy outside the body; which is a sort of apprenticeship and semblance of death. Or else it is because all the wisdom and reasoning in this world boils down finally to this point: to teach us not to be afraid to die.” 102 Cicero was in his turn reworking Plato’s account of the death of Socrates in the Phaedo, where Socrates argues that philosophy is the practice of learning how to separate the soul from the body. 103 Philosophical humanism in its most radical practice is the disciplined interruption of somatic and social flows, the detachment of consciousness from impulse, and the condensation of conceptual truths out of the granular data of experience. It is the study of “dying and being dead,” a divestment from this life in favor of deeper investments in a life beyond ourselves. In recognizing the dominion of death and the transience of individual existences, we affirm a web of being that connects past to future, them to us, me to you. “One is responsible to life,” wrote James Baldwin. “It is the small beacon in that terrifying darkness from which we come and to which we return. One must negotiate this passage as nobly as possible, for the sake of those who are coming after us.” 104 Learning to die is hard. It takes practice. There is no royal road, no first-class lane. Learning to die demands daily cultivation of detachment and daily reminders of mortality. It requires long communion with the dead. And since we can’t ever really know how to do something until we do it, **learning to die** also **means accepting the impossibility of achieving that knowledge** as long as we live. We will always be practicing, failing, trying again and failing again, until our final day. Yet the practice itself is the wisdom. In the words of Zen master Dōgen: “To practice the way single-heartedly is, in itself, Enlightenment.” 105 As I learned in Iraq and have had to learn again and again, the practice of learning to die is the practice of learning to let go: Learning to die means learning to let go of the ego, the idea of the self, the future, certainty, attachment, the pursuit of pleasure, permanence, and stability. Learning to let go of salvation. Learning to let go of hope. Learning to let go of death. It means realizing with the Stoic philosopher Marcus Aurelius that Of human life the time is a point, and the substance is in a flux, and the perception dull, and the composition of the whole body subject to putrefaction, and the soul a whirl, and fortune hard to divine, and fame a thing devoid of judgment. And, to say all in a word, everything which belongs to the body is a stream, and what belongs to the soul is a dream and vapor, and life is a warfare and a stranger’s sojourn, and after-fame is oblivion. 106 Learning to die means realizing along with the German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel that human consciousness operates through a dialectic of negation, and that enlightened self-consciousness is consciousness of one’s own limits—and of one’s own death: The human being is this Night, this empty nothing which contains everything in its simplicity —a wealth of infinitely many representations, images, none of which occur to it directly, and none of which are not present. This is the Night, the interior of human nature, existing here —pure Self—in phantasmagoric representations it is night everywhere: here a bloody head suddenly shoots up and there another white shape, only to disappear as suddenly. We see this Night when we look a human being in the eye, looking into a Night which turns terrifying. For from his eyes the night of the world hangs out toward us. 107 This Night was the face I saw when I confronted the fact of my own mortality. It’s the face we all see sooner or later, because it’s our own face—our own consciousness, our own death mask. It waits for us in the mirror. Accepting this emptiness, letting go of my self, was only the first step in coming to understand my responsibility to and participation in a larger collective self, a kind of human existence transcending any particular place or time, going back to our first moments in Africa 200,000 years ago, and living on in the dim, fraught future of the Anthropocene. We are humanity. We are the dead. They have become us, as we will become the dead of future generations. We are born half-blind, confused, wired into a world we don’t understand. Within the night of this world, we apprehend our future as a field of freedom. We face this freedom as individuals, fully in the present, yet our actions are determined by the past and take on their full meaning only in the future. As we gain in wisdom, individual consciousness reveals its complex entanglements with collective life, history, and the universe. We live in and orient our existence through conceptual and narrative structures that rationalize our impulses, pattern our habits, and connect our behaviors to collective rhythms. These conceptual and narrative structures are the cultural technology through which we make meaning and shape our desires. Facebook shapes desire differently than does the Koran, each of which shapes desire differently than does a West Elm catalog, Emily Dickinson’s poetry, Tai Chi, the Igbo New Yam festival, democracy, Passover, “the market,” or Mexican telenovelas. The only inherent trait of the human ape that differentiates us from other animals is our knack for collective symbolic manipulation. Other species besides Homo sapiens communicate with language, organize socially, build structures, use tools, laugh, and show emotions. Even fire and simple social technologies were part of an inheritance passed down from Homo erectus and the Neanderthal. 108 Sometime in the icy depths of prehistory, though, our species began developing advanced symbolic communication beyond anything that had ever been seen before. We learned how to make the dead speak, and to speak ourselves to the yet unborn. We learned to see into the future. We learned to abstract from the present a conceptual reality transcending time and space. Through the ice ages of the past and into the long summer of the Holocene we carried tools, furs, fire, and our greatest treasure and most potent adaptive technology, the only thing that might save us in the Anthropocene, because it is the only thing that can save those who are already dead: memory. Slightly more than 3,000 years ago, a band of Mycenaean shepherd-warriors raided and burned a walled city on the Anatolian coast. What exactly happened remains a matter of conjecture, since the empirical evidence is sketchy. On the one hand, we have the archaeological remains of a destroyed town, some evidence of fire, and a few arrowheads, all of which was only excavated in the last hundred and thirty years. On the other hand, we have two long poems, probably composed orally and written down about 2,700 years ago, that tell the stories of these shepherd-warriors and their raid. Those two poems, originally recorded on papyrus or parchment rolls, grew to become authoritative texts for the ancient Greek city-states, the Roman empire, Byzantine civilization, and modern European and American literature, helping inspire and influence thinkers from Plato to Milton, Alexander Pope to Thomas Jefferson, Simone Weil to Derek Walcott. These long poems survived by being passed on from family to family, preserved in temples and libraries, and recopied by monks and poets. While hundreds of scraps of Homeric poetry date as far back as 2,300 years ago, the oldest surviving full copy of Homer’s Iliad only dates to the 10th century CE. “The creation of this great book was no routine act of copying but a major scholarly enterprise,” writes classicist Martin West. 109 This book, the “Venetus A” manuscript, is stored in the Public Library of St. Mark in Venice, and has been digitized by Harvard University. 110 You can look at it online. 111 About 400 years after somebody first transcribed the Iliad, an Athenian vintner and war veteran named Aeschylus wrote a quartet of plays for performance in the annual religious festivals honoring Dionysus, the god of wine. Three plays in the quartet tell the bloody tale of the House of Atreus and the origins of Athenian law. In the first play, King Agamemnon returns home from the Trojan War and is murdered by his wife Clytaemnestra, in revenge for an even more heinous crime: years ago, Agamemnon had sacrificed their daughter to secure his army’s passage to Troy. Agamemnon’s wartrophy rape-slave Cassandra prophesied the king’s murder, but no one heard her shouts until they turned to screams, as Clytaemnestra struck her down alongside her captor. The queen got her revenge, but in the second play, The Libation Bearers, Clytaemnestra is murdered in turn by her son, Orestes. These plays give narrative shape to the compulsion of strife, the constant turn and return of violence, blood guilt and blood vengeance, the endless cycle of fear and aggression, desire and death. Yet they also show us a way out of that cycle: In the third play, The Eumenides, Apollo and Athena argue over Orestes’ fate and eventually decide to exonerate him. The Erinyes, the “Furies” who embodied the old law of vengeance and had meant to hound Orestes to death, are transformed by Athena into the Eumenides, the “Kindly Ones,” and made the guardians of Athenian law. Through reflection, justice is transformed from revenge into mercy. The final play of the quartet, the comic satyr play Proteus, is lost. Indeed, the three plays I’ve described are the only extant dramatic trilogy to survive from ancient Greece at all. In total, we have only seven of Aeschylus’s plays, out of an estimated seventy to ninety that he wrote. This is fairly representative. The vast majority of classical Greek culture has disappeared. The little that persists, though, including much of Plato and Aristotle, some plays by Sophocles and Euripedes, fragments of poems by Sappho and Callimachus, and the histories of Xenophon, Herodotus, and Thucydides, is an immensity of riches compared to the rumors and scraps that have endured from Homer’s time, only a few hundred years before, or from the Mycenaean and Hittite cultures that Homer’s poems make legends of. Why even bother with these relics of a savage time? What do Homer and Aeschylus have to do with ISIS or global warming? When we look at them closely, these ancient Greeks grow to seem strange, even barbaric. They didn’t believe in free will like we do, they didn’t believe in progress, and they certainly didn’t believe in universal human rights. The Greek concept of fate is hard to bear. Their ideas about justice seem cruel: kings and gods are capriciously brutal, and transgression is often punished with awesome suffering. Even in familiar stories such as Oedipus Rex and the Iliad, these archaic people act in ways that strike us as not just primitive but irrational, superstitious, even insane. Yet they are us: not only historically, but genetically, technologically. A hairsbreadth of human time separates Aeschylus from the present, and in that moment grows everything we take for modernity. Our language, our thought, our architecture, and our culture carry ancient memories embedded in grammar, vocabularies, and syntax. Our symbolic-epis-temological structures of cognition and discourse not only have histories, but are made of history, are made from words such as “astron” and “nomas,” “ge” and “logos,” “anthropos” and “kainós.” Our thoughts and narratives are built from sedimented archetypes such as Achilles and Cassandra, concepts such as fate, justice, and democracy, and the very idea of an idea (eidos, meaning that which is seen, form, or shape). Attending to the historical and philological genealogies of our current conceptual, symbolic structures of existence helps us recognize who we are, who we have been, and who we might become. The comparative study of human cultures across the world and through time helps us see that our particular way of doing things right here, right now, is a contingent adaptation to particular circumstances, yet at the same time an adaptation built with universal human templates of meaningmaking and symbolic reasoning, with tools and technologies we have inherited from the past. I’ve relied mainly on Greek examples, but the roots of our contemporary global civilization are also Akkadian, Sumerian, Chinese, Indian, Mesoamerican, Judaic, Egyptian, Nubian, Thule, Dorset, and Finno-Ugric. Anywhere humans live, we make meaning. The record of that wisdom, the heritage of the dead, is our most valuable gift to the future. The study of the humanities is nothing less than the patient nurturing of the roots and heirloom varietals of human symbolic life. This nurturing is a practice not strictly of curation, as many seem to think today, but of active attention, cultivation, making and remaking. It is not enough for the archive to be stored, mapped, or digitized. It must be worked. As Hannah Arendt writes: If it is true that all thought begins with remembrance, it is also true that no remembrance remains secure unless it is condensed and distilled into a framework of conceptual notions within which it can further exercise itself. Experiences and even the stories which grow out of what men do and endure, of happenings and events, sink back into the futility inherent in the living world and the living deed unless they are talked about over and over again. What saves the affairs of mortal men from their inherent futility is nothing but this incessant talk about them, which in its turn remains futile unless certain concepts, certain guideposts for future remembrance, and even for sheer reference, arise out of it. 112 Against the futility of life without memory, we have only this delicate accretion. Papyrus rots, paper burns, museums get sacked, hard drives crash. The fragility of our collective cultural enterprise is well illustrated by the epigraph heading this chapter and the long poem it comes from. The Epic of Gilgamesh, one of the oldest works of literature on Earth, was probably first inscribed on clay tablets sometime in the 21st or 20th century BCE, later lost for nearly 2,500 years, then recovered in the middle of the 19th century by an Assyrian archaeologist from Mosul named Hormuzd Rassam. 113 The only reason the Epic survived was because it had been copied out by ancient scribes as rote training for more “important” bureaucratic and commercial work. The Epic tells the story of Gilgamesh, king of Uruk, a “wild bull on the rampage” admired for his strength but resented for his despotism. 114 As the Epic recounts: “The young men of Uruk he harries without warrant, / Gilgamesh lets no son go free to his father. / By day and by night his tyranny grows harsher.” The women of Uruk pray for relief, complaining of Gilgamesh’s insistence on taking the virginity of all the brides in his city. The gods hear the women’s prayer, and one of them makes a wild man to match Gilgamesh, a hair-covered man-beast named Enkidu, the “off-spring of silence.” Sent into the world, Enkidu runs with gazelle herds and sabotages hunters’ traps till Gilgamesh hears of his mischief and sends a woman from Uruk named Shamhat to tame him. She finds Enkidu, seduces him, dresses him in clothes, teaches him how to eat bread and drink ale, and tells him of the wonders of city life. When Enkidu hears about Gilgamesh’s habit of taking other men’s brides on their wedding night, though, “his face pale[s] in anger” and he speeds to Uruk. Once there, Enkidu challenges Gilgamesh, but their fight ends in a draw, with the two men kissing and becoming friends. In classic buddy-movie style, Enkidu and Gilgamesh team up and journey to the Forest of Cedar, “the secret abode of the gods,” where they kill the ogre Humbaba and take his majestic trees. When they return to Uruk, the goddess of love, Ishtar, tries to seduce Gilgamesh. He rejects her, so she sends down the monstrous Bull of Heaven to destroy Uruk and kill Gilgamesh. Enkidu and Gilgamesh turn the tables and slaughter the bull instead. That night, Enkidu has a dream in which the gods declare that the heroes have gone too far, and that one of them will have to die. They name Enkidu. He wakes and recounts his dream, then, after much lamenting, succumbs to a fatal illness. Gilgamesh is overcome with grief. “Afraid of death,” he wanders the Earth weeping for his friend, looking for passage to the Netherworld in the hopes of uncovering the secret of immortality. Gilgamesh finds the gate to the Netherworld and passes through twelve “double-hours” of darkness, emerging in a beautiful garden where he meets Uta-napishti, an immortal elder who had survived the legendary Deluge. Gilgamesh demands the secret of immortality, and Uta-napishti tells the story of how before the Deluge he was ordered by the gods to build a great boat to carry “the beasts of the field, the creatures of the wild, and members of every skill and craft.” One day, as the gods foretold, the rain began to fall. For a day the gale winds flattened the country, quickly they blew, and then came the Deluge. Like a battle the cataclysm passed over the people. . . . For six days and [seven] nights, there blew the wind, the downpour, the gale, the Deluge, it flattened the land. After the rain stopped, Uta-napishti released a dove and a sparrow, both of which came back, and finally a raven, which did not. Once the waters receded, the gods made Uta-napishti and his wife immortal. Uta-napishti tells Gilgamesh that he too can be immortal, if he goes six days and seven nights without sleeping. Gilgamesh tries hard to say awake, but his eyes close the very first night and he sleeps for a week. When Uta-napishti rouses him, Gilgamesh is so distraught that the old man feels bad for him and gives him a miraculous rejuvenating plant. On his way home, though, Gilgamesh loses the plant to a snake, who steals it from him in the night. The mighty king curses the futility of existence: “For whom, Urshanabi, toiled my arms so hard?” he wails. “For whom ran dry the blood of my heart?” We might answer: For us. For the future. Almost four thousand years out of the past, the Epic of Gilgamesh carries forward a story of civilization. Its first main narrative, the taming of the wild man Enkidu, is reiterated in its final act, in which the rampaging Gilgamesh learns to accept the truth of death. Enkidu and Gilgamesh represent two phases of social development, the hunter-gatherer and the agricultural. The absolutist demands of agricultural civilization, embodied in Gilgamesh, are tyrannical without the tempering wisdom of the wild, but when civilization and wildness join forces, they create an all-consuming war machine that disrupts the sacred order. The gods decree the wild man must die and the mighty king submit to human limits. The Epic of Gilgamesh also offers a lesson in the importance of sustaining and recuperating cultural heritage in the wake of catastrophic climate change. As the Epic’s prologue reads, Gilgamesh “saw what was secret, discovered what was hidden, / he brought back a tale of before the Deluge.” Translator and scholar Andrew George explains: “The implication of the prologue of the epic is that Gilgamesh played a key role in restoring the antediluvian order after the Flood, particularly in restoring the cults of the gods to their proper glory. . . . It did not suit the poet’s need to include more than allusions to it, but evidently Gilgamesh was responsible for re-civilizing his country.” 115 Gilgamesh lives on in death as a legend, a symbol, a reflection on ourselves. In this way, the Epic represents not only the fragility of our deep cultural heritage, but its persistence. I saw this firsthand when I talked to the Iraqi heavy metal band Acrassicauda about their first full-length album, which they titled Gilgamesh. 116 Marwan Hussein, the band’s drummer and guiding force, told me that he’d decided to turn to the epic as a template for their album because it connected back to Iraq’s ancient Sumerian roots while at the same time offering a way of understanding the situation there now. “The Epic of Gilgamesh is a very weird story,” Hussein told me, “and in a way very modern. It’s a way to tell the story of what’s happening today in the Middle East: Gilgamesh was a tyrant. He was not a very good king. He was weak. The way I see him, he was a lost soul until the very last, when he comes to terms with his mortality. In the end, it’s a story about rebirth.” Rebirth is a resonant concept for the members of Acrassicauda: they grew up in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, lived through the US invasion in 2003, escaped the country’s brutal sectarian civil war in 2005 and 2006, and, with the help of VICE magazine co-founder Suroosh Alvi and a documentary he made about them (Heavy Metal in Baghdad), made their way through Syria and Turkey to the United States. 117 Fifteen years after they formed a band in Baghdad, teaching themselves to play Metallica and Slayer off bootleg cassettes, they finally released their first album—an album which is at once a testament to their artistic ambitions, a reflection on their unique historical situation, and a remembrance of their heritage. As Hussein told me, “We tried to make a Middle Eastern metal album. We did the whole thing. We did the percussion, we did darbuka, we did the time signature, we did the singing. We wanted the album to be as Arabic as we could make it.” Acrassicauda are doing the hard work of cultivating and remaking our interwoven cultural technologies. They didn’t have to. Their fate could have been completely different. In Iraq, in Syria, even as refugees living in New Jersey, Acrassicauda would have had every excuse to confuse acceptance of their situation with giving up, or to mistake hatred for justice. They might have stayed in Baghdad and fought to free their country from foreign invaders. Many did. Many chose another side, and fought for the Americans, or for Al Qaeda. Instead, Hussein and his bandmates chose music and art. They chose to explore and strengthen the connections between cultures, our shared rhythms and common traditions. They embody for their fans the realized hope of transcending parochialism and strife while staying connected to tradition, the courage of surviving war not by violence but through decency and mutual support, and the lived possibility that we may—like the troubled king Gilgamesh—learn to die and yet be reborn. More than 6,000 years before Homer sang of Achilles’ rage and more than 5,000 years before the Epic of Gilgamesh was written, humans living in what is now China, Serbia, and Iraq began to make marks on bone and clay. Agricultural and astronomical knowledge, relatively stable, had been stored in memorized rhythmic speech, but over time the novel technology of writing allowed us to keep better track of more changeable data: property, grain stores, trade. The practice of writing integrated older social technologies developed for other purposes, and as writing grew in sophistication and importance it absorbed yet more. Ritual song, image-making, mythology, religion, rhymed speech, memorization, metonymic association, metaphoric abstraction— technologies of social attunement, information storage, ideological mapping, emotional regulation, and political organization—were all within a few thousand years intimately wired into graphic representations of language. First through clay and stone, then papyrus, vellum, and paper, writing became the single most important human development after agriculture and before the steam engine, leading to widespread social transformations and enabling the creation of incredible new technologies. From writing, the ancient Sumerians in Uruk developed mathematics, allowing them to abstractly yet accurately model physical relations in the world. Written laws gave concrete form to political and religious authority. Being able to track and compare information allowed observers to adjudicate evidence, which gave rise over centuries to empiricism and the scientific method. The development of the printing press in 1450 and the later proliferation of affordable books (by means of hand presses in the 18th century, then steam and coal-powered industrial presses in the 19th and 20th centuries) meant that vast amounts of stored information could be accessed by anyone able to read. The fullest expression of human life soon came to be seen as synonymous with literacy itself. With the advent of mass-produced sound and image reproduction technologies in the 19th and early 20th centuries (phonograph, radio, film, TV), humanism-as-literacy was superseded, but with the rise of personal computers and the Internet, it has been re-integrated and transformed into humanism-as-digital-literacy, or what we might call photohumanism. A new form of life has become evident: humanity has revealed itself as collective energy, light swarming across a darkened planet, a geological forcing, data and flow. We live in networks, webs, and hives, jacked in to remote-controlled devices and autonomous apps, moments of being in time, out of time. No longer individual subjects or discrete objects, we have become vibrations, channelers, tweeters and followers. By connecting us through our devices, photohumanist technologies enable collective wiring at tremendous speeds, even faster than those offered by radio, print, television, and film. Just as those older technologies offered both great potential and great danger, so too do the newer technologies of photohumanism. Homo sapiens—perhaps now Homo lux— remains biologically reactive, easily panicked, all too quickly stirred to hatred. Jaron Lanier warned in 2006 of what he called “digital Maoism”: “It is at least possible that in the fairly near future enough communication and education will take place through anonymous Internet aggregation that we could become vulnerable to a sudden dangerous empowering of the hive mind. History has shown us again and again that a hive mind is a cruel idiot when it runs on autopilot.” 118 The dangers of collective madness, witch hunts, and totalitarian war exist in new social networks as much as or even more than they did in early 20th-century radio broadcasts, newspaper stories, and cinema reels. Our collective obligation to maintain traditional humanistic study in the photo-humanist era is at once developmental and prophylactic: we must practice interruption to nurture new flows and at the same time to guard against them. As we struggle, awash in social vibrations of fear and aggression, to face the catastrophic selfdestruction of global civilization, the only way to keep alive our long tradition of humanistic inquiry is to learn to die. We must practice suspending stress-semantic chains of social excitation through critical thought, contemplation, philosophical debate, and posing impertinent questions. We must suspend our attachment to the continual press of the present by keeping alive the past, cultivating the info-garden of the archive, reading, interpreting, sorting, nurturing, and, most important, reworking our stock of remembrance. We must keep renovating and innovating perceptual, affective, and conceptual fields through recombination, remixing, translation, transformation, and play. We must inculcate ruminative frequencies in the human animal by teaching slowness, attention to detail, argumentative rigor, careful reading, and meditative reflection. We must keep up our communion with the dead, for they are us, as we are the dead of future generations. Wars begin and end. Empires rise and fall. Buildings collapse, books burn, servers break down, cities sink into the sea. Humanity can survive the demise of fossil-fuel civilization and it can survive whatever despotism or barbarism will arise in its ruins. We may even be able to survive in a greenhouse world. Perhaps our descendents will build new cities on the shores of the Arctic Sea, when the rest of the Earth is scorching deserts and steaming jungles. If being human is to mean anything at all in the Anthropocene, if we are going to refuse to let ourselves sink into the futility of life without memory, then we must not lose our few thousand years of hard-won knowledge, accumulated at great cost and against great odds. We must not abandon the memory of the dead. As biological and cultural diversity is threatened across the world by capitalist monoculture and mass extinction, we must build arks: not just biological arks, to carry forward endangered genetic data, but also cultural arks, to carry forward endangered wisdom. The library of human cultural technologies that is our archive, the concrete record of human thought in all languages that comprises the entirety of our existence as historical beings, is not only the seed stock of our future intellectual growth, but its soil, its source, its womb. The fate of the humanities, as we confront the end of modern civilization, is the fate of humanity itself

### \*\*\*\*2NR – Scranton 15

### 1NC – Green Criminology

**The alternative is to endorse an ethic of green criminology – we decenter the human subject as victim and open a larger frame of reference to hold humanity accountable for ecocidal practices.**

**Lynch and Stretesky 14** [Michael J. Lynch, professor of criminology at the University of South Florida, and Paul B. Stretesky, senior lecturer in criminological theories, statistics, environmental justice, and environmental crime at Northumbia University. “Exploring Green Criminology: Toward a Green Criminological Revolution.” Routledge, May 2014, pg. 6]

In contrast to this human centered view, green criminology begins by imposing an alternative frame of reference, one based in nature, the environment, or natural ecology. We will discuss this frame of reference and the problems associated with human-centered frames of reference in more detail in a later chapter. For now, it is important to note that by selecting a natural ecology frame of reference, **green criminology is a revolution** in the making; a revolution **that seeks to displace humans and human issues as the sole objects of study.** In doing so, green criminology supplants the traditional criminological interest in personal crimes that, in comparison to environmental harms, are rather minor in their overall impact measured in terms of the scope and amount of harm caused. By **moving away from this human-centered approach,** green criminology points out that there are an extraordinarily wide range of environmentally-related harms that exist in the world, especially compared to the criminal harms to which criminology has been limited. This broader set of crimes that becomes the focus of green criminology is not the set of crimes committed by the poor that attracts so much criminological attention. In drawing attention away from these ordinary, powerless criminal offenses and offenders it is not only possible to view the crimes of the powerful as the most serious offenses that occur in society and as having the broadest scope of effect on human and nonhuman victims, it is also possible to understand the biased view that a criminology anchored to criminal law produces. In short, when criminology excludes an environmental frame of reference, it hides from our vision the vast array of harms perpetuated against and through the victimization of the environment. In the green view, the environmental frame of reference dominates, and the criminological frame of reference becomes secondary and subsumed within the broader environmental frame of reference. We explore this idea more fully later in this work.

### 2NR – Lynch & Stretesky 14

#### The alternative is to adopt an ethics of green criminology this entails a reformation of our thought and research practices to hold humanity to higher standards. When Nietszche proclaimed the death of god humanity no longer became accountability to anything other than ourselves, we reintroduce the metaphor of law and crime to reclaim accountability for our ecocide practices.

#### Green criminology mandates a shift away from all actions and modes of though that have been responsible for the destruction of the biosphere. If we win the link debate any perms they make disappear.

### \*\*\*1NC – Grief

#### The alternative is to grieve the onslaught of the techno-future to come to terms with what has been lost and in anticipation of what is yet to come.

**Zerzan 95**, *Running on emptiness the pathology of civilization: The age of grief,* (<https://aaaaarg.fail/upload/john-zerzan-running-on-emptiness-the-pathology-of-civilization.pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist

A pervasive sense of loss and unease envelops us, a cultural sadness that can justly be compared to the individual who suffers a personal bereavement. A hyper-technologized late capitalism is steadily effacing the living texture of existence, as the world's biggest die-off in 50 million years proceeds apace: 50,000 plant and animal species disappear each year (World Wildlife Fund, 1996). Our grieving takes the form of postmodern exhaustion, with its wasting diet of an anxious, ever-shifting relativism, and that attachment to surface that fears connecting with the fact of staggering loss. The fatal emptiness of ironized consumerism is marked by loss of energy, difficulty in concentrating, feelings of apathy, social withdrawal: precisely those enumerated in the psychological literature of mourning. The falsity of postmodernism consists in its denial of loss, the refusal to mourn. Devoid of hope or vision for the future, the reigning zeitgeist also cuts off, very explicitly, an understanding of what has happened and why. There is a ban on thinking about origins, which is companion to an insistence on the superficial, the fleeting, the ungrounded. Parallels between individual grief and a desolate, grieving common sphere are often striking. Consider the following from therapist Kenneth Doka (1989): "Disenfranchised grief can be defined as the grief that persons experience when they incur a loss that is not or cannot be openly acknowledged, publicly mourned, or socially supported." Denial on an individual level provides an inescapable metaphor for denial at large; personal denial, so often thoroughly understandable, introduces the question of refusal to come to grips with the crisis occurring at every level. Ushering in the millennium are voices whose trademark is opposition to narrative itself, escape from any kind of closure. The modernist project at least made room for the apocalyptic; now we are expected to hover forever—as if much of even survival seems likely—in a world of surfaces and simulation that ensure the "erasure" of the real world and the dispersal of both the self and the social. Baudrillard is of course emblematic of the "end of the end," based on his prefigured "extermination of meaning." We may turn again to the psychological literature for apt descriptive points. Deutsch (1937) examined the absence of expressions of grief that occur following some bereavements and considered this a defensive attempt of the ego to preserve itself in the face of overwhelming anxiety. Fenichel (1945) observed that grief is at first experienced only in very small doses; if it were released full-strength, the subject would feel overwhelming despair. Similarly, Grimspoon (1964) noted that "people cannot risk being overwhelmed by the anxiety which might accompany a full cognitive and affective grasp of the present world situation and its implications for the future." With these counsels and cautions in mind, it is nonetheless obvious that loss must be faced. All the more so in the realm of social existence, where in distinction to, say, the death of a loved one, a crisis of monumental proportions might be turned toward a transformative solution, if no longer denied. Repression, most clearly and presently practiced via postmodern fragmentation and superficiality, does not extinguish the problem. "The repressed," according to Bollas (1995) "signifies the preserved: hidden away in the organized tensions of the unconscious, wishes and their memories are ceaselessly struggling to find some way into gratification in the present— desire refuses annihilation." Grief is the thwarting and deadening of desire and very much resembles depression; in fact, many depressions are precipitated by losses (Klerman, 1981). Both grief and depression may have anger at their root; consider, for example, the cultural association of black with grief and mourning and with anger, as in "black rage." Traditionally, grief has been seen as giving rise to cancer. A contemporary variation of this thesis is Norman Mailer's notion that cancer is the unhealthiness of a deranged society, turned inward, bridging the personal and public spheres. Again, a likely connection among grief, depression, and anger, and testimony, I think, to massive repression. Signs abound concerning weakening immune defenses; along with increasing material toxins, there seems to be an rising level of grief and its concomitants. When meaning and desire are too painful, too unpromising to admit or pursue, the accumulating results only add to the catastrophe now unfolding. To look at narcissism, today's bellwether profile of character, is to see suffering as an ensemble of more and more closely related aspects. Lasch (1979) wrote of such characteristic traits of the narcissistic personality as an inability to feel, protective shallowness, increased repressed hostility, and a sense of unreality and emptiness. Thus narcissism, too, could be subsumed under the heading of grief, and the larger suggestion arises with perhaps greater force: there is something profoundly wrong, something at the heart of all this sorrow, however much it is commonly labeled under various separate categories. In a 1917 exploration, "Mourning and Melancholia," a puzzled Freud asked why the memory of "each single one of the memories and hopes" that is connected to the lost loved one "should be so extraordinarily painful." But tears of grief, it is said, are at base tears for oneself. The intense sorrow at a personal loss, tragic and difficult as it most certainly is, may be in some way also a vulnerability to sorrow over a more general, almost trans-species loss. Walter Benjamin wrote his "Theses on History" a few months before his premature death in 1940 at a sealed frontier that prevented escape from the Nazis. Breaking the constraints of Marxism and literariness, Benjamin achieved a high point of critical thinking. He saw the angel of history blown by a gale out of Paradise. He saw that civilization, from its origin, is that storm evacuating Eden, saw that progress is a single, ongoing catastrophe. Alienation and anguish were once largely, if not entirely, unknown. Today the rate of serious depression, for example, doubles roughly every ten years in the developed nations (Wright, 1995). As Peter Homans (1984) put it very ably, "Mourning does not destroy the past—it reopens relations with it and with the communities of the past." Authentic grieving poses the opportunity to understand what has been lost and why, also to demand the recovery of an innocent state of being, wherein needless loss is banished.

### 2NR – Zerzan 95

## Framing

### 1NC - Generic

#### Debate has become an empty shell of competition, seen as a means of arguing one’s way to trophies. The idea that debate is an institution to apply argumentation into the real world is gone, and now, debate is seen as purely simulation. Therefore the Role of the Ballot is to vote for the debate that best reorients debate towards the practice of hope.

[We’ll spec how to weigh specific offense in CX, we can’t clarify everything in 7 minutes.]
Mitchell 98 (Gordon R. Mitchell is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where he has worked since 1995 (from 1985-1994 he debated and coached at Northwestern, Wake Forest and Louisville). His research program focuses on public argument, rhetoric of science, and social movements, while his feet gravitate toward salsa dancing, stone skipping, and sweep rowing on Pittsburgh's resplendent three rivers.) (<http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/ArgAgency.pdf>) [Ableism is bad y’all]

As two prominent teachers of argumentation point out, "Many scholars and educators term academic debate a laboratory for testing and developing approaches to argumentation" (Hill and Leeman 1997, p. 6). This explanation of academic debate squares with descriptions of the study of argumentation that highlight debate training as preparation for citizenship. As a safe space that permits the controlled "testing" of approaches to argumentation, the academic laboratory, on this account, constitutes a training ground for "future" citizens and leaders to hone their critical thinking and advocacy skills. While an isolated academic space that affords students an opportunity to learn in a protected environment has significant pedagogical value (see e.g. Coverstone 1995, p. 8-9), the notion of the academic debate tournament as a sterile laboratory carries with it some disturbing implications, when the metaphor is extended to its limit. To the extent that the academic space begins to take on characteristics of a laboratory, the barriers demarcating such a space from other spheres of deliberation beyond the school grow taller and less permeable. When such barriers reach insurmountable dimensions, argumentation in the academic setting unfolds on a purely simulated plane, with students practicing critical thinking and advocacy skills in strictly hypothetical thought-spaces. Although they may research and track public argument as it unfolds outside the confines of the laboratory for research purposes, in this approach, students witness argumentation beyond the walls of the academy as spectators, with little or no apparent recourse to directly participate or alter the course of events (see Mitchell 1995; 1998). The sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture is highlighted during episodes of alienation in which debaters cheer news of human suffering or misfortune. Instead of focusing on the visceral negative responses to news accounts of human death and misery, debaters overcome with the competitive zeal of contest round competition show a tendency to concentrate on the meanings that such evidence might hold for the strength of their academic debate arguments. For example, **news reports of mass starvation might tidy up the "uniqueness of a disadvantage" or bolster the "inherency of an affirmative case"** (in the technical parlance of debate-speak). Murchland categorizes cultivation of this "spectator" mentality as one of the most politically [Worst] debilitating failures of contemporary education: "Educational institutions have failed even more grievously to provide the kind of civic forums we need. In fact, one could easily conclude that the principle purposes of our schools is to deprive successor generations of their civic voice, to turn them into mute and uncomprehending spectators in the drama of political life" (1991, p. 8).

### \*\*\*2NR – Mitchell ‘98

### 1NC – Anti Hope

#### Any consideration of the future occurs as pollution fills our lungs and the cries of our nonhuman family drown out the last whisper of hope left in the Techno-Future. As death creeps in from the corner of our eyes the only role of the ballot left is to vote for the debate that provides the best methodology of hope.

[We’ll spec how to weigh specific offense in CX, we can’t clarify everything in 7 minutes.]

**Zerzan ’15** (Yes he brews Kombucha did you even need to ask?) *Why Hope? The Stand Against Civilization,* (<https://aaaaarg.fail/upload/john-zerzan-why-hope-the-stand-against-civilization-2.pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist

It’s pretty fashionable, among anarchists as well, to sneer at the notion of hope, to explicitly rule out any chance of overall victory over domination and oppression. Desert (2011) sports this outlook on its cover: “In our hearts we all know the world will not be  ‘saved’,” and repeats this statement twice more in its opening pages. Civilization will persist. It’s time to give up on “unwinnable battles.” In this way the misery of burnout and disillusionment will be avoided and we’ll all be a lot happier (!) The Mexican Unabombertype group, Individualidades Teniendo a lo Salvaje (ITS), also firmly asserts that there’ll be no winning. “We do not believe this is possible,” they proclaim repeatedly. But it is possible. Our overcoming the disease of civilization is in no way guaranteed, obviously, but clearly it is possible. I prefer what Kierkegaard said of hope: It is “the passion for the possible.” More boldly, whatever became of “Demand the Impossible”? When victory is refused are we not at Game Over? We might recall Herbert Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man, which announced the apparent end of radical possibilities, the definitive triumph of consumerist unfreedom. He was delighted to have been proven wrong within weeks of the book’s 1964 appearance by the beginnings of a global movement that shook the world. And as the global system now shows itself to be failing at every level, shows itself to have no answers at all, there stands every chance of qualitatively surpassing the Movement of the ’60s. But not, needless to say, if we renounce any hope of overcoming. It is well-known that health and recovery from illness is tied not to hopelessness but its opposite. Consider the Serbian Danilo Kis’ last novel, Psalm 44, about a young family’s will to survive and resist in Auschwitz, where visualizing hope is a “necessity.” For us and all life, matters are grave but we are not in Auschwitz. And yet we spurn hope? Egoism and nihilism are evidently in vogue among anarchists and I’m hoping that those who so identify are not without hope. Illusions no, hope yes. I wonder what we have to offer at large, in terms of, say, analysis and inspiration – or whether that’s still being asked much. There are egoists who seem mainly in love with their sacred Egos, where all is judged insofar as it serves the Self. Meanwhile the reigning techno-culture feeds solipsism, narcissism, and isolation the more techno-addicted are its subjects. Did Max Stirner see the natural world as having value only in relation to one’s ego? How much interest does the pure egoist have in mutual aid, social struggles or the disappearance of community? I recommend Stirner’s The Ego and its Own as an important corrective to the appeals of collectivism in its various guises, but tend to agree with Arizona anarchist Dan Todd that Diogenes and the Cynics in the West and Chuang-Tzu and some of the Taoists in the East did an even better job of it centuries earlier. Does nihilism mean that pretty much everything must go for a decent life to be possible? If so then I’m a nihilist. It’s safe to say that nihil-ism isn’t literally nothing-ism or one couldn’t be both a nihilist and an anarchist. If it means the politics of desperation or hopelessness, no thanks. French philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard put the word in a different light: “With the megalopolis, what the West realizes and diffuses is its nihilism. It is called development.” Are there nihilists who take on such institutions and what drives them? There’s more than anti-hope on offer, in any case. Two new books remind us of that. Enrico Manicardi’s Free from Civilization is the first ‘A-Z’ type anti-civ offering in any language (originally Liberi dalla Civiltà) and Paul Cedenec’s The Anarchist Revelation: Being What We’re Meant to Be, the least pessimistic book I can recall reading. It refers to German anarchist Gustav Landauer, for instance, for the idea that we “need not worry that the quantity of those answering the call will not be great enough, when the quality of its [anti-civ] content is beyond question.” It brings anarchist resistance and the spirit together in a very wide-ranging and powerful contribution. Dire times but, as Oscar Wilde had it, “We are all in the gutter but some of us are looking at the stars.”

### 2NR – Zerzan 15

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that provides the best mythology of hope.

#### To give up hope is to forfeit the game. When presented with the violence of the mega-machine we present an alternate mode of social organization that makes hope in the future possible. By casting off our attachment to the technofuture we create a means of justifiying the struggle. Before we evaluate any impacts we need to ask why we give a shit in the first place if the status quo persists then life is meaningless and we may as well go out in a big cloud of smoke. Only the alt solves back for Fear and Hopelessness by reformatting our relationships towards a new future.

## Case offense

### 1NC – Serial Policy Failure

#### The 1AC’s policymaking process ignores the fundamental nature of politics as energy distribution. The interests of the Mega-Machine have trapped the political making process nullifying any attempt at reformism. This culminates in serial policy failure.

**Scranton 15**, [God this guy is depressing], *Learning to die in the Anthropocene,* [https://aaaaarg.fail/upload/roy-scranton-learning-to-die-in-the-anthropocene-reflections-on-the-end-of-a-civilization.pdf] //GrouchoMarxist [We do not endorse anthropocentric language]

Politics, whether for bees or for humans, is the energetic distribution of bodies in systems. This is where the ideas of the vote, the town hall meeting, and the public debate get their power: humans come together to resonate on one frequency or another. Arrangements of bodies in systems don’t arise from ideal notions of how governance should work, but rather emerge out of the vibrating bodies themselves, the systems they inhabit, and the interactions between the two. The key is energy: energy production and social energetics. Just as a beehive is structured around the production of honey, so are human societies structured around labor, horses, wheat, coal, and oil. How bodies harvest, produce, organize, and distribute energy determines how power flows, shaping the political arrangements of a given collective organism behind whatever ideologies the ruling classes may use to manufacture consent, obscure the mechanisms of control, or convince themselves of their infallible omniscience. Humanity has undergone three major revolutions in the political structures of energy production in the past 200,000 years: the Agricultural Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, and the Great Acceleration (the transition from coal to mixed fossil fuels). The Agricultural Revolution shifted human social organization from the pack to the herd, from nomadic life to sedentary life, inaugurating politics as we understand it (meaning the life of the polis, the city, urban existence, “civilization”). With the advent of the farm and the city, humans no longer followed migrating energy stocks, tracking the sweeping herds of ungulates that were once a primary source of food, but cultivated stocks in place: sheep, wheat, einkorn, dates. The distribution of bodies in fields, pastures, canals, and cities gave rise to new forms of social energetics that superseded tribes and tribal confederations. In ancient Uruk, despotism and empire emerged as political technologies to deal with the intricate demands of flood-based irrigation: single farmers or clans couldn’t manage the intensive mass labor required to dredge canals and harvest grain at critical moments in the growing season, so centralized, absolutist systems and ideologies were invented to control production. Elsewhere, as agricultural technologies spread to fertile areas less dependent on annual floods and complex irrigation, less centralized political technologies were developed (such as feudalism). Around 12,000 years after the invention of agriculture, the Industrial Revolution shifted human social organization from photosynthetic stocks to fossilized carbon stocks. This freed us from our dependence on plant and animal energy and opened up incredible new flows of power, while the organization of bodies around coal pits, railroads, and teeming conurbations in the 19th and early 20th centuries gave rise to mass social democracy, state nationalism, and industrial capitalism. As Timothy Mitchell argues in his book Carbon Democracy, the ability of tenacious, highly organized coal miners to interrupt energy flows gave them significant leverage in what had previously been essentially feudal and absolutist systems. 70 Rulers were forced to listen to workers, because coal miners at the forefront of the labor movement could interrupt the operations of an entire country. Through labor unions, general strikes, and sabotage, sustained by the ability of coal miners, railroad workers, teamsters, and longshoremen to paralyze national economies, “working people in the industrialized West acquired a power that would have seemed impossible before the late 19th century.” Mitchell writes: Workers were gradually connected together not so much by the weak ties of a class culture, collective ideology, or political organization, but by the increasing and highly concentrated quantities of carbon energy they mined, loaded, carried, stoked, and put to work. The coordinated acts of interrupting, slowing down, or diverting its movement created a decisive political machinery, a new form of collective capability built out of coalmines, railways, power stations, and their operators. 71 That collective capability waned with the Great Acceleration in the middle of the 20th century, as industrial societies shifted from reliance on coal to the mixed use of coal, oil, and natural gas. Unlike a coal-based economy, which relies on raw labor in numbers, oil and gas production requires relatively few workers. Labor retained vestigial power for decades, but the realignment of energy flows from solid coal to liquid petroleum and natural gas severely weakened the effective political power coal miners and their allies could leverage, substantially undermining mass social democracy as a technology of power. Liquid carbon stocks come to us through decentralized networks managed by small crews of highly trained technicians and owned by a handful of corporations, nations, and individuals. Coal must be physically dug out of the ground and transported by fixed rail lines to distribution centers, but oil and gas are mechanically pumped by pipeline from remote wells to ports, where the liquids are loaded onto tankers that can be sent practically anywhere and rerouted in transit with ease. As Mitchell explains, “whereas the movement of coal tended to follow dendritic networks, with branches at each end but a single main channel, creating potential choke points at several junctures, oil flowed along networks that often had the properties of a grid, like an electricity network, where there is more than one possible path and the flow of energy can switch to avoid blockages or overcome breakdowns.” 72 Populist movements that used to be able to organize around the centralized flows of coal civilization are all but powerless when it comes to interrupting the much more flexible flows of oil and gas (isolated high-profile cases like the Keystone XL pipeline notwithstanding). Growing from and resonating with the flows of material power that sustain them, our political arrangements today are collective organisms of consuming bodies in decentralized systems managed by technicians for the profit of the few.

### 2NR – Scranton 15

#### Serial Policy failure – That’s Scranton 15 - The Mega-Machine has evolved to become independent of any one of it’s constitutive parts. Even if the aff wins they cut one head off we win that two more will take it’s place. As production becomes more automated and power becomes more deterritorialized from government to corporations the ability of any policy maker to effectively enact change dwindles because they can no longer interrupt the flow of power. Only the alt solves back by recentralizing power in the community where individual members have the power to influence flows within small localized power structures.

### 1NC – Try or Die

#### The 1AC is too little to late. Destruction of the biosphere is inevitable rendering all of their impacts pitiful by comparison. It’s try or die for the alt to prevent total extinction.

**Scranton 15**, [God this guy is depressing], *Learning to die in the Anthropocene,* [https://aaaaarg.fail/upload/roy-scranton-learning-to-die-in-the-anthropocene-reflections-on-the-end-of-a-civilization.pdf] //GrouchoMarxist [We do not endorse anthropocentric language]

As glaciers and ice sheets melt, so too will carbon and methane long frozen in seabeds and permafrost. As a greenhouse gas, methane is more than twenty times more powerful than carbon dioxide, and thousands of gigatons of the stuff lies locked under the oceans in clathrate hydrates, waiting to be released: “These solid, ice-like structures are stable only under specific conditions,” writes oceanographer John Kessler, “and are estimated to contain a quantity of methane roughly equal in magnitude to the sum of all fossil fuel reservoirs on Earth.” 9 Methane-rich sinkholes have appeared in Siberia and methane bubbles have been tracked leaking from the floor of the Arctic Ocean, possibly signaling the beginning of a massive planetary “belch” capable of generating catastrophic runaway greenhouse effects. 10 As geophysicist David Archer warns, “The potential for planetary devastation posed by the methane hydrate reservoir . . . seems comparable to the destructive potential from nuclear winter or from a comet or asteroid impact.” 11 We’re fucked. The only questions are how soon and how badly. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) 2014 report on climate impacts cautions: “Without additional mitigation efforts beyond those in place today, and even with adaptation, warming by the end of the 21st century will lead to high to very high risk of severe, widespread, and irreversible impacts globally.” 12 According to the World Bank, 2.7 degrees Fahrenheit of warming now appears inevitable, even if we were to stop emitting carbon dioxide (CO2 ) worldwide right now. 13 Projections from researchers at the University of Hawai‘i find us dealing with “historically unprecedented” climates as soon as 2047. 14 Climate scientist James Hansen, formerly with NASA, has argued that we face an “apocalyptic” future—a bleak view that is seconded by researchers worldwide. 15 This chorus of Cassandras predicts a radically changing global climate causing widespread upheaval, and their visions of doom are backed by an overwhelming preponderance of hard data. Global warming is not the latest version of a hoary fable of annihilation. It is not hysteria. It is a fact. And we have likely already passed the point where we could have done anything about it. From the perspective of many policy experts, climate scientists, and national security officials, the concern is not whether global warming exists or how we might prevent it, but how we are going to adapt to life in the hot, volatile world we’ve created.

### 2NR – Scranton 15

#### Try or die – That’s Scranton ’15 – The release of gigatons of methane trapped in seabeds and permafost snowballs (pardon the pun) into a global catastrophe of warming. We are far past the point where this could be prevented but we still have a choice in how we react. The AC reinforces structures of power that exacerbate the problem and make humanity incapable of adapting but the alt dismantles the mega-machine making humanity more adaptable to the new climate and lessens the effects of warming by destroying modes of mass production. Only the alt prevents total destruction of humanity meaning we outweigh on the highest level.

### 1NC – Green Health-Care

#### Feedback DA – Continual investment into systems of public health exacerbates the environmental crisis which in turn causes more health problems which requires more investment in the health system

**Hancock ’16,** *Governance for health in the Anthropocene,* (<https://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1108/IJHG-08-2016-0041>) [It has the DOI on the webpage so you know how to get it] //GrouchoMarxist

The health care system has to consider and respond to its own contribution to global ecological change. The health care system is an energy and resource intensive system which produces significant amounts of wastes, including toxic wastes. For example, a recent US study found: In 2013, the health care sector was responsible for significant fractions of national air pollution emissions and impacts, including acid rain (12%), greenhouse gas emissions (10%), smog formation (10%) criteria air pollutants (9%), stratospheric ozone depletion (1%), and carcinogenic and non-carcinogenic air toxics (1–2%) (Eckelman and Sherman, 2016, p. 1). Moreover, the authors estimated the health impact of these emissions, concluding that “Health damages from these pollutants are estimated at 470,000 DALYs lost from pollution-related disease, or 405,000 DALYs when adjusted for recent shifts in power generation sector emissions” (Eckelman and Sherman, 2016, p. 1). This leads them to call for national attention to the need for prevention of health sector pollution.

### \*\*\*2NR – Hancock ‘16

# Blox

## General

### “Well you’re using a laptop”

#### No link: Our alt is built off the notion that technology has tried to make itself inescapable. I shouldn’t be punished because I’m practically forced to use a laptop to win in this sport. If anything this supercharges the K, vote neg to live in a world where I’m not forced to use technology.

#### Starting point DA: All movements have to start somewhere. You should evaluate the neg on the epistemic foundation I’ve provided for a social movement. [Grandstand for 10 seconds about eco friendly things you do I.E “I’m vegan to destroy factory farming]

#### We still outweigh: saying that the meaning of life is getting facebook likes is probably worse than me using a laptop in debate. As long as we win links to the aff we prove they cannot operate within an eco-anarchist framework meaning as long as we still access even a little of our offense we win full stop.

# Perm

## General

### Long

#### Links are DA’s to the perm. Every link card is evidence that the aff supports a centralization of power which serves to destroy the biosphere. Aff + the alt results in a self destructive community with no long term benefit.

#### Footnoting DA: I read K’s to try to change the epistemological background of debate. Perms guarantee debaters never have to reconsider the foundational assumptions of their positions. Kills any potential for Change to stem from debate.

#### Can’t sever your reps. The 1AC’s approach to power in relation to nature had an impact as soon as they read the 1AC.

Arieli 84 (Arieli Prof History Hebrew Univ, 1984 Yehoshua, "History as Reality," Images and Reality in International Politics, p. 58-59) [We do not endorse gendered language]

All expressions and dimensions of human life are permeated and shaped by representations (Vorstellungen,) ideas, conceptions beliefs purposes and ages that transform the basic and recurrent biological and psychological needs and behavior patterns into a world dominated by meanings and mental con-structs. images and symbols. Thev are constituent parts of human reality. We can neither conceive nor"understand the individual and society unless we relate to mental constructs and images inherent in their make-up. The units comprising social reality are conscious agents, a myriad of wills, minds, mentalities and behavior patterns held together by semiconscious and conscious relations that contain structures of meanings and images of a meta- natural world. The way to understand this world is by understanding its language and forms of communication; by analyzing the intentions, motives, conceptions and purposes embodied in actions, Institutions and patterns of behavior, as well as the nature and the logic of the relations between individuals and groups; by taking account of material, social and mental resources organized for the satisfaction of needs and the employment of power. While images and representations of nature cannot influence or change nature unless an action taken is based on a correct understanding of its structure, images about nature or the human world can change human reality irrespective of their truth value, as soon as they are translated into actions and patterns of behavior and gain power over the minds of men

#### You can’t switch between biocentrism and anthropocentrism in the span of 45 minutes. This is obviously a shallow attempt at a ballot.

Taylor 98 (Prue Taylor, Senior Lecturer of law and a founding member of the New Zealand Centre for Environmental Law at the University of Auckland,1998 An Ecological Approach to International Law: Responding to the Challenges of Climate Change (Hardcover) p. 39-42, 45-48)

The question 'are ecocentric ethics really necessary?' is frequently asked. Could we not, for example, achieve our environmental goals by more rigorous environmental legislation? Obviously much could be improved as a consequence of tighter controls, but two important limitations would remain. First, the question of 'how clean is clean' would continue to be answered solely by reference to human needs and standards. Thus water quality would he determined by interests such as human welfare, recreation needs and aesthetic values. The interests of nature and the needs of fully functioning ecosystems, which fall below a human‑centred threshold, would be left unprotected. By taking into account a much larger and more complex set of ecocentrically determined interests, tougher environmental standards would he achieved.217 Second, as Bosselmann points out, **decision‑makers would not be able to make the important paradigm jump to protecting nature for its own sake.** Worse, in cases where decision‑makers felt morally committed to such a jump, they would be forced to find constrained logic to justify their decisions. The variety of ethical approaches to environmental decision‑making has raised the question of moral pluralism. Stone, for example, has suggested that situations can be resolved according to either anthropocentric or ecocentric views depending on the nature of the problem. Thus decision makers are able to switch from one value system to another. Such a process is rejected by commentators such as 3. Baird Callicott who believes that ecocentric ethics are 'not only a question of better rational arguments but the expres­sion of a fundamentally changed attitude to nature. Callicott reminds Stone that anthropocentric attitudes and ecocencric ethics represent quite different paradigms. That in reality people do not follow anthropocentric attitudes in the morning, only to switch to ecocentric ethics after lunch.

#### They’ve missed a critical sequencing question. The perm is an ethical compromise which guts any attempt at real reforms.

Lupisella & Logsdon 97 (Mark, masters degree in philosophy of science at university of Maryland and researcher working at the Goddard Space Flight Center, and John, Director, Space Policy Institute The George Washington University, Washington, “DO WE NEED A COSMOCENTRIC ETHIC?” <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.25.7502>)

Steve Gillett has suggested a hybrid view combining homocentrism as applied to terrestrial activity combined with biocentrism towards worlds with indigenous life.32 Invoking such a patchwork of theories to help deal with different domains and circumstances could be considered acceptable and perhaps even desirable especially when dealing with something as varied and complex as ethics. Indeed, it has a certain common sense appeal. However, instead of digging deeply into what is certainly a legitimate epistemological issue, let us consider the words of J. Baird Callicott: “But there is both a rational philosophical demand and a human psychological need for a self-consistent and all-embracing moral theory. We are neither good philosophers nor whole persons if for one purpose we adopt utilitarianism, another deontology, a third animal liberation, a fourth the land ethic, and so on. Such ethical eclecticism is not only rationally intolerable, it is morally suspect as it invites the suspicion of ad hoc rationalizations for merely expedient or self-serving actions.”33

### Short

### Severance shell

#### Interpretation: Debaters may not perm alternatives

#### The standard is Ground.

#### Perms make the aff a moving target which makes neg engagement impossible. As long as we’re winning at least one link we win the alt is functionally different from the aff.

#### If there wasn’t reference to the mega-machine in the 1AC you can infer the aff isn’t a movement against it.

#### Ground is the key internal link to fairness.

#### Your ability to adjudicate the round depends on clash between competing positions, perms gut neg ground by letting them incorporate new positions in the 1AR. The 1AC is a thing and you should hold them to it.

#### Debate is a game structured by wins and losses so fairness but be part of it’s intrinsic structure. If I win an argument was unfair it breaks the structure of debate which justifies drop the argument.

## Specific perms

### Aff then alt

#### Our Scranton evidence indicates that the megmachne taps the collective mind within an infinite feedback loop whereby we are controlled by fear. If we win that the aff centralizes power within the mega-machine that’s our [link ev]. Then we win the alt can never happen if you vote for the aff.

### Alt in all other instances

#### We’re two debaters yelling about things we’ll never change in a high school in central Texas. There are no other instance. This is a critique of your investments into the systems that guarantee our destruction. Until you win the aff actually happens after the round, this perm doesn’t make sense.

#### They’ve missed a sequencing question, our links prove why the aff centralizes power into the mega-machine. Our Scranton ’15 evidence indicates the mega-machine traps resistance into a feedback loop that guarantees it’s continual existence. That guts any possibility of the alt happening.

# Framing

## Kant (Ew who runs Kant anymore)

### You’re wrong

#### The Kantian subject is presumed to influence the world without the world flowing back to shape how rationality fundamentally operates. The TechnoFuture involves an affective chilling that hides agency from it’s own potential.

Kroker 14 [Arthur, Great Value brand Jean Baudrillard. 2014. “Exits to the Posthuman Future.” Best believe I cut this off the paper copy] JCH-PF

Indeed, if it is the case that intimations of the posthuman future are ubiquitous, this implies that we are witness to an almost unprecedented shift of knowledge – to a newly emergent digital generation that is not simply about growing up online, but growing up posthuman. For better or worse, willingly or unwillingly, subjectivity is now deeply shaped by a complex world of social media, mediated by networking technologies, streamed by immersive, innovative, tactile mobile devices, psychologically contoured by a processed world, always present in the data storm, effectively being like a technology that is forever out of bounds to previous versions of (pre-digital) subjectivity based on assumptions concerning enclosed consciousness, private egos, and a bunkered-down central nervous systems with eyes that may see, as the artist Jordan Crandall argues, but definitely do not track. Excluding cell phone use, the generation that has grown up posthuman inhabits the many forms of social media 44.5 hours per week, its skin barrier broken down by deep immersion as a circulating node within increasingly complex loops of information. Its digital subjectivity is actively shaped by flows of data economics, data security, data entertainment; its memory increasingly taking the form of searchable electronic traces in all the waiting digital archives; its relationships mediated by those magical expressions of social networking; its future an open space, still to be determined, but always running parallel to the great scientific and technological discoveries of the contemporary age, from genomics to software. What were only a short while ago novel theoretical concepts being developed in Silicon Valley – relational processing and ubiquitous computing – concerning the challenge of how to migrate the visibly massive, objective processing power of computation to the periphery of human attention are now everyday social practices. The digital generation has had to learn quickly how to navigate creative pathways through the digital haze where the parasocial replaces the social, where fluctuating digital identities substitute for traditional forms of identity formation, and where this the most intensive of technocratic societies is increasingly haunted by the fact that the triumphant epoch of cold, calculative data has opened up a digital imagination that is increasingly fascinated by all the imaginary signs of the abyss. And all this fueled by that most powerful of all forms of technological affectivity – a legible, seductive culture of connectivity where, as the psychologist Sherry Turkle states, we are finally free to be “alone together.” Indeed, it may be that human subjectivity has now become so deeply and inextricably embedded with technology that the “question of technology” has now become the question of the human, that is, the appearance of a new form of being – posthuman being – born at the interstices of data and flesh. Disturbing received interpretations of human subjectivity, throwing into radical doubt boundary lines among the species, casting into sharp relief “vibrant matter” as much as “vibrant data,” applying what can only be described as the shock of the hyperreal into the most practical concerns of economy, politics, culture, and society, trajectories of the posthuman seemingly track everywhere today. We are actually living in a space and time only dreamed of by artists, only speculated upon by writers, only tentatively anticipated by cultural theorists, a time and space of drift culture in which every event – mobile apps, technological devices, economic crises, new media art, drone warfare – represents a potential exit to the posthuman future, simultaneously a doubled moment of departure and arrival. Overstressed by the power of technological innovation, broken apart by the seeming inability of governing institutions to create adequate alternatives in light of accelerating technological change, and fragmented by the eclipse of traditional political narratives, it is as if received orthodoxies no longer hold sway in the popular imagination. In some ways, we might say that we are living in the ruins of the postmodern, that that which was prophesied with such haunting accuracy by theorists from Nietzsche and Heidegger to Lyotard, Baudrillard, and Virilio has now been crystallized in fine granular detail in contemporary culture and society. Consequently, without conscious decision or public debate, we may have already collectively burst out of the skin of the human, entering a strange new world of prosthetic memories, distributive consciousness, cognition unbound, technologically enabled bodies, and all this streamed at the speed of photons through cloud computing, social networking, and mobile technologies. The polar shift of perception required to navigate the fast, complex drift currents of the posthuman condition literally involves a new way of seeing, that is, seeing like a robot, a code-work, an artifact of artificial intelligence, a splice. In a digital universe where perception most of all is the subject of intense technological pressure, duplex vision – seeing simultaneously like a human and like a technological device – increasingly appears to chart the direction of social and cultural adaptability. In this case, drift is the primary ontology of the posthuman scene, the fact that we increasingly inhabit the fracture, the splice, the bifurcation as our permanent state of being digital. Never fully resolvable into a fixed position, always oscillating, ever fluctuating like an electronic frequency, a sense of drift permeates the posthuman condition as both its dominant condition of possibility and its motivating sensibility. Code drift theorizes the momentous evolutionary movement by which the previously separate regimes of biology and digitality unify in a world-picture dominated by the universalization of the code form. In the culture of code drift, the actual contents of networked communication can be fragmentary, diverse, rebellious, playful precisely because the platforms of code are stable, until, that is, the social contents, artistic expressions, and political deployments of code begin to drift. History drift is what is left when material history has been brought under the sway of the technological world hypothesis – a form of history drift in which the concept of history itself splits into three competing hypotheses: hauntological history with its upsurge of the excluded, the negated, the disappeared; the will to history with its fateful metaphysical struggle among the great cosmologies of salvation, order, and freedom; and the precession of history, whereby the empty spectacle of technological society is increasingly inhabited by spectral images of that which has long been remaindered, forgotten, and abandoned by the technological sovereign. Archive drift is what happens when the house of knowledge is quickly undermined by the powerful regime of computation, sometimes set creatively adrift in new currents of imagery and voice and data while, at other times, thrown into radical anxiety about the fatal overcoming of the traditional form of the archive by a digital archive that would be living, incommensurable, fluctuating. And video drift? That is what happens to the society of the (digital) spectacle when the medium of video achieves cultural primacy as the essential embodiment and manifest expression of the drift imagery of contemporary technological society: the fluctuating, random, seductive broken narrative of its suicides, pathos, breakdowns, and sometimes magnificent nervous breakthroughs.

### Constitutivism

#### Reject constitutivism—it begs the question by never justifying why we have to be agents in the first place—we can just be schmagents which sheds requirements of agency

**Enoch ’15**, *Schmagency Revisited,* (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2607070)

To see more clearly how it is relevant, it helps to think of things in dialogical terms. The one putting forward the shmagency challenge asks something like: "Why should I care about self-understanding? Even if you are right about its constitutive status, why should I care about that?". The constitutivist we are now considering answers: "But you do care! You are, after all, an agent, as is evidenced even by your mere asking of these very questions. And it's a necessary condition for being an agent to care about self-understanding. So you do already care about self-understanding!". Notice that this answer – problematic though it may be, as I am about to argue – is different from the kind of answer I explicitly discuss in "Agency, Shmagency" (179), in terms of the imagined dialogue between Korsgaard and the skeptic, where she threatens him that if he doesn't care about morality (or some such) his bodily movements will not merit being called "actions". (I return to this skeptic – and to Korsgaard – in the next section.) **HE CONTINUES:** So much, then, for the implausibility of the but-you-do-care response to the why-should-I-care-about-(e.g.)-self-understanding challenge. What I want to argue now is that even if we ignore this implausibility, still this response cannot possibly work, because it does not even qualify as a response – it fails to address the challenge. The thought here is very simple: Noting that I do [x] is never a good answer to the question whether I should [x]. This is true for actions, and it is just as true for carings. Perhaps I do care about something; but how does noticing this fact count as an answer to the normative question whether I should care about it, or indeed as a reason for caring about it? ,The point is not merely an is-ought-gap kind of point. True, some of us have somehow become very good at convincing ourselves that sometimes, an ought can after all be derived from an is, or that some normative facts or properties just are some natural facts or properties, or some such. But what we are up against here is an especially problematic instance of such a move – it is the move from someone caring about something, immediately to it being the case that she should care about it, or at least that she has a reason to so care. I take it even those of us with the strongest stomach for naturalistic fallacies should not be happy with such a move. When someone asks "Why should I care about self-understanding?" (or whatever else is constitutive of agency), and the response comes "But you do care!", all that is needed by way of counter-response is "So what? I asked whether I should care, not whether I do. You haven't answered my question." The but-you-do-care response is thus no response at all. It is utterly irrelevant.

#### They haven’t proved why we have to be consistent in caring about agency why can’t I care about agency one second and not the next?

### Bindingness

#### People with no empathy often don’t feel morally motivated but we shouldn’t say they have no moral judgment at all. They often say things in interviews like “I knew it was wrong, but I didn’t care.” Your framework can’t explain that

#### It’s often immoral to have a moral motivation. For example, if I see a drowning child and sit and morally deliberate about whether my ethical code permits me to save the child, that’s an immoral thought process. So there is no conceptual requirement for morality to motivate

## Util

### You’re wrong

#### Even if they prove Util is epistemically sound vote neg.

#### There is a direct tradeoff between the technological mindset and our ability to perform a utilitarian calculus. we see everything as batteries waiting to unleash their potential until the planet is fully drained. Their framing prioritizes short term consequences over the long term.

Katz 97, Eric Katz, New Jersey Institute of Technology, 1997 [Nature As Subject: Iluman Obligation and Natural Community]

 argue that Martin’s view is wrong, that utilitarianism in its most basic forms cannot explain or justify the preservationist position in the preservation vs. development debate—although it often appears to do so. In fact, the widespread use of utilitarian arguments to justify policy decisions about the protection of the environment is detrimental to preservation. The essential elements of utilitarianism only provide a justification for the satisfaction of human need, for this satisfaction is the standard by which utilitarianism measures goodness or moral worth. But human needs and the needs of the natural environment are not necessarily similar or in harmony; thus, any ethical theory—such as utilitarianism—which tries to explain the preservation of the natural environment by means of the satisfaction of human wants, need, and desires will be only contingently true: it will depend on the factual circumstances, the actual desires of the human community at any given time. This empirical limitation does not bode well for the security of the preservationist argument.

#### We weigh, we control the root cause of war and violence. The aff never diagnosis where these problems stem from just performs surface level analysis of the effects. Vote for the theory with more explanatory power

# A2 - Method

## Generic

### Zanotti

**[1] assumes that there is some method to the madness of state action – there’s no rational decision calculus that the state uses, so we can’t just cut it off. If the state was rational it would have banned fossil fuels like 50 years ago.**

**[2] the 1AC is just policymaking – if you vote on this argument, then you have to point out the part of the aff which actively finds weak points of the state and attacks those, but your aff is complicit with the operation of the state even if some part of it is bad. If their criticism wasn’t in the 1AC then don’t buy it in the 1AR.**

**[3] turn – as we learn how to map the operation of the state, the state can learn how to map the operation of our micropolitical movements, crushing any chance we, as debaters, have to fight the state.**

### Bryant

#### Turn—we’re the most material since we critique our immediate orientation towards the state—this card is lacking a spillover claim since voting aff has no impact and fiat is illusuory

#### Missing warrant—you have to win that discussing policy is inherently good or that people will advocate for the aff if you win, but if discussions are key, then hearing the aff solves since DA/CP debate isn’t realistic and no one cares if you win the round, we’ll just go about our lives

#### Even if you win that, there’s no reason that this excludes the K—bryant is making claims that our politics has failed in the past, which is an empirical claim with a huge burden of proof on you that the card never warrants—make them win that every micro-political movement like the NC fails

#### Inductive logic—if they win that our politics has failed in the past, they still can’t win this argument—saying that the past can predict the future fails since the only reason we use this reasoning is because it’s worked in the past—that’s like saying the sun will rise tomorrow because it’s risen every since day

#### No brightline for whats abstract. If they didn’t provide a crystal clear brightline in the 1AC don’t buy one in the 1AR, that makes this spike a moving target that makes it impossible to negate.

### Pappas

**[1] impact justified – assumes that policymaking is the only way to have pragmatic changes, meaning it can’t be used to warrant policymaking**

**[2] if we win our root cause claims then this is just an example of induction failing and our root cause claim is the only one which is true**

**[3] this card just says that we need pragmatic approaches to oppression, but the alt is just as pragmatic – it empowers us right here and right now whereas your method can’t influence anything**

#### [4] Every card we read is a warrant why our method is valid in the context of the aff. You would need to win the line by line of the K before this card can do anything.

# A2 – Warming Solvable

## Generic

### \*\*\*Policy bad

**Bond 13**—professor at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (Patrick, “Climate Crisis, Carbon Market Failure, and Market Booster Failure: A Reply to Robin Hahnel's ‘Desperately Seeking Left Unity on International Climate Policy’”, Capitalism Nature Socialism, 24:1, 54-61, dml)

The policy interventions Hahnel says are needed for his argument to succeed—especially effective regulation of current carbon markets, plus profound repression of Wall Street more generally—appear politically impossible at this stage. Even within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) framing, it should be obvious from all recent UNFCCC Conferences of the Parties (COPs) that three major practical problems for the emissions trading strategy persist (there are other conceptual problems I mention below): the negotiators’ emissionscut ambitions are extremely low in part because, as Larry Lohmann (personal email correspondence Nov. 10, 2012) notes, the Kyoto Protocol and successors ‘‘cannot have strict caps because that would defeat the logic of these markets, which is to bribe corporates’’; market mechanisms are still relied upon notwithstanding their repeated failures; and systematic cheating is widespread, with no prospect of sufficiently strict controls given the revolving door between the regulated and regulators. The UN, for example, disqualified one of its own adjudicators of emissions trades in 2009, but problems of fraud persisted; the E.U. scheme has been rife with corruption and theft, resulting in a two-week market shutdown in early 2011; and the now-defunct Chicago Climate Exchange’s founder, Richard Sandor, has been sued for fraud by his hand-picked investors. The futility of contemporary global-scale reform is illustrated by the fact that not since the 1987 Montreal Protocol—which addressed the widening ozone hole by banning (not trading) CFCs—have any initiatives to reverse world crises been adopted with commitment by elite managers from national states. The reason is simple: since the late 1980s, the prevailing balance of forces, heavily influenced by multinational corporations, have favored, in ideological terms, either neoliberalism, neoconservatism, or Barack Obama’s fusion of the two. Moreover, Lohmann (personal email correspondence Nov. 10, 2012) points out, ‘‘The climate crisis is intertwined with structural connections between industrial capitalism and fossil fuels’’—which was not the case for CFCs. This leaves the world without effective, top-down fixes to economic (trading and financial), environmental, geopolitical and social crises. Notwithstanding Millennium Development Goal rhetoric, there is apparently no hope for reviving genuinely expansive projects, such as the prior generation’s Brundtland Commission advocating sustainable development, earlier ‘‘New International Economic Order’’ appeals from the Third World, or the Brandt Commission’s global social democracy. Yet in spite of this global-governance cul de sac, for Hahnel (2012a, 18), ‘‘what must be done to avert climate change in the here and now’’ is to fix the Kyoto Protocol. That strategy died in Copenhagen in December 2009, as nearly everyone involved in multilateral negotiations (or anyone who read WikiLeaks U.S. State Department cables from 20092010) would admit. Washington not only refused to join, it revealed as a fib former Vice President Al Gore’s 1997 claim that the U.S. would endorse Kyoto if carbon trading was included, the lie underscored in 1998 by a 95-0 Senate vote against the Kyoto Protocol. Obama and the U.S. State Department then actively sabotaged Kyoto’s resurrection in 2009 by cajoling Brazil, South Africa, India, and China to replace it with the Copenhagen Accord, a nonbinding promise that would leave the earth warming by at least 4 degrees Celsius. Then, as reported in The New York Times in early 2012 (J. Broder, ‘‘Signs of New Life as UN Searches for a Climate Accord,’’ Jan. 24) U.S. climate negotiations expert and former advisor to Todd Stern, Trevor Hauser, referring to COP17, bragged: The Durban platform was promising because of what it did not say. There is no mention of historic responsibility or per capita emissions. There is no mention of economic development as the priority for developing countries. There is no mention of a difference between developed and developing country action. Hahnel may well reply that there is still a conceptually simple fix: more political will, as if that alone could fix the broken economic tools. After U.S. climate denialism was recently rolled back1 with further consciousness raising by Hurricane Sandy and after Obama’s successful reelection campaign—albeit a campaign remarkably silent about climate—there is renewed ‘‘hope’’ in the U.S., at least for Washington reformers intent on compelling Obama to use his (non-legislative) political-regulatory power to address clean energy, emissions standards, and a few other minor areas of importance. But by all accounts, there is no chance in coming years for a renewed cap-and-trade bill, given that Republicans control the House of Representatives. While California has a new market—justly accused of environmental racism for prolonging polluting industries in communities of color—other regional markets are stagnant or dying.In any case, no reregulation can reverse the power dynamics in which the only real winners in emissions markets are speculators, financiers, consultants (including some in the NGO scene), and energy sector hucksters. As the air itself became privatized and commodified, poor communities across the world suffered from the on-the-ground impact of CDMs,2 while resources and energy were diverted away from real solutions. To reply that more regulation can fix the system is to ignore what may be termed the ‘‘captive regulatory’’ regime that has emerged even at the top of the UNFCCC, whose secretary, Christiana Figueres, is a former carbon trader and whose head of the UN panel mandated to fix the CDM, Valli Moosa, is the former chair of the South African energy giant, Eskom. Moosa was deeply implicated in what a South African government investigator termed ‘‘improper’’ conduct when he chaired Eskom and channeled a vast coal-fired power plant contract to a company linked to his political party at the same time that he served on the party’s finance committee (Bond 2012).

## Geo-engineering

### \*\*\*Framing first

#### [Retag/Cut] Geoengineering inevitable – but how we frame geoengineering determines if it’s corporate-controlled, or if we can sensitize the dynamics of earth systems thresholds and even intentional human geoclimatic agency

**Anshelm and Hansson 14** [Jonas Anshelm, professor in the Unit of Technology and Social Change at Linköping University, Sweden, and Anders Hansson, senior lecturer in the Unit of Technology and Social Change at Linköping University, Sweden, “The Last Chance to Save the Planet? An Analysis of the Geoengineering Advocacy Discourse in the Public Debate,” *Environmental Humanities*, vol. 5, 2014, pp. 101-123]

The point of departure for the storyline of the scientists’ double fear is the claim that climate researchers, who until very recently had rejected geoengineering as “bizarre” or “foolish,” considering the various alternatives “taboo,” “anathema,” or a “distraction” from dealing with climate mitigation, now have re-evaluated the situation and that most of them have started to advocate immediate research into various geoengineering options.26 This shift is claimed to exist because the severity of climate change now justifies the assessment and investigation of all means that might be able to counteract it. Climate scientists have become desperate and reached their “social tipping point.”27 Climate change is depicted as catastrophic in this storyline: the end of the world as we know it is approaching, and scientists are shocked by new scientific findings and observations. The alternatives, as they are presented, are either to inactively wait for the catastrophe or to explore the final option: geoengineering.28 To further emphasize the gravity of the situation, the time constraints, and the pressing need for geoengineering, it is claimed that it might already be too late. The catastrophe is upon us and its negative effects are accumulating in the Earth’s ecosystems. Even though it is too late to prevent all the negative effects, because of the delayed impact of already released greenhouse gases, geoengineering offers the possibility of removing CO2 from the atmosphere and helping create a new balance.29 Fear of the consequences of climate change is therefore an asset in the geoengineering discourse. The more alarmingly global warming is presented, the greater the need for geoengineering and, consequently, the less noteworthy criticism of it becomes. The fear that the geoengineers, popular science journalists, and editors writing and talking in this discourse evoke is their main resource. In some cases, this fear is expanded to include the deployment of geoengineering. The president of the Royal Society’s panel of experts, John Shepherd, declared that he did not favour geoengineering but “feared” that it would likely be needed as a complementary method.30 At the prospect of failure of COP15 in Copenhagen, he declared that it would be “scary” if humanity were obliged to resort to “geoengineering solutions.”31 His coauthor Ken Caldeira stated that, in his personal capacity, he disliked geoengineering because of the substantial environmental risks, but that as a scientist he would prefer sulphur particles in the atmosphere to the drastic melting of Greenland’s ice sheet.32 Another co-author, Jason Blackstock, labelled geoengineering “terrifying,” but added that the scientists did not develop these ideas “because of hubris, but because of fear.”33 The double fear expressed in interviews by these and other researchers is reiterated by journalists and constitutes a powerful rhetorical resource. If the researchers responsible for developing geoengineering admit fear of their creation’s consequences for the environment but, in view of approaching climate catastrophe, also advocate the necessity of geoengineering, how can citizens question their willingness to expose the environment to risks? In line with Clark’s claim, the scientists have already admitted the risks and taken the lead among those warning of the consequences of both geoengineering and climate change. This technocratic “emergency framing” —or “politics of emergency,” as Clark puts it—exerts a “depoliticizing” influence.34 Hamilton extends the argument and even claims that geoengineering advocates seem to approve a world of technocratic control: they apparently believe that a separation can be sustained between pure science and technology, on one hand, and the politics threatening to mar it, on the other, aiming to create a “world without politics” characterized by scientists’ just and objective management of the global climate. This position, Hamilton maintains, is naïve: science cannot be isolated, at least not when political, corporate, and military actors also aspire to exert influence over this powerful tool to regulate the conditions of life.35 These warnings combined with the admitted fear constitute a solid approach to creating legitimacy for these technologies. The more the risks of geoengineering are emphasized, combined with advice to consider geoengineering options, the more inevitable tests and deployment seem. When the problem is formulated, as it is by Stephen Schneider, for example, as a choice of “the lesser of two evils,” who can advocate choosing “the most evil”?36 The implication of these confessed fears is that geoengineers, unlike most other scientists and engineers, have both understood and emphasized the risks and side effects of the technologies they are developing, so they do not need to be criticized by environmentalists. This does not change anything, however, because there exist no alternatives in view of impending climate catastrophe.37 In light of this understanding, a Time journalist’s declaration that “the real disaster” would be to delay developing geoengineering until climate change had assumed catastrophic proportions seems consistent.38 Geoengineering is, unlike other large-scale technologies, not accompanied with promises of a better world. The spokespeople of geoengineering do not offer future prosperity; instead, their legitimacy is based on negative expectations. These negative expectations are, as illustrated, related to both global climate conditions and the direct consequences of geoengineering, in accordance with the logic that the more severe the global climate crisis is expected to become, the more environmental degradation and risks must be accepted as a consequence of geoengineering. In addition, several leading researchers in the field openly affirm the inadequacy of our present and future knowledge of geoengineering. This is seldom made into an objection to these technologies in spite of the repeatedly declared acuteness of the need to come to terms with global warming. On the contrary, this knowledge deficit is used as an argument for intensified efforts to test and evaluate geoengineering, about which researchers know almost nothing apart from its indispensability for saving the planet.39 In this light, contradictory geoengineering stands out in some important respects as the first grand-scale technology with clear postmodern tendencies.40 It differs from CO2 capture and storage, for example, in that it has abandoned linear modernity’s promises of a prosperous future and technological development controlled by the natural sciences. Such promises of progress and objective truth are no longer the legitimation grounds for research into and deployment of the technology. Geoengineering is guided by a promise to attempt, in a situation characterized by despair and uncertainty, but not necessarily to succeed.41 This is also why geoengineering’s proponents do not have to outline the advantages of actual grand-scale deployment, but can restrict themselves to making a case for intensified research into the potential of these technologies, although history indicates that research and deployment are seldom strictly demarcated. However there seems to be a contradiction between the lack of promises and the absent belief in progress on the one hand and the totalizing, modern ambition to manage climate change with the help of grand-scale global deployment of technologies amplifying the notion that scientific engineering carries the only possibility to save the planet. This grand narrative is surely not compatible with the epistemologically humble position that is central to the discourse advocating geoengineering. Accordingly, the storyline about scientists’ double fear includes the vague notion of a solution to the problem.42 The climate situation is described as so alarming that it has become urgent to take “extreme,” “extraordinary,” “risky,” or even “dangerous” measures to make the “survival of civilization” possible. 43 Implicit in this storyline is the notion that climate researchers and geoengineering scientists are the world’s saviours, acting like gods by creating new atmospheric and planetary conditions to benefit all organisms. The notion of humble, selfcritical scientists aware that their knowledge and ability to understand the complexity of the environment are greatly limited stands in sharp contrast to the claim, usually made by journalists, that geoengineers are in a position to save the world, if only they are allowed to develop and deploy the lifesaving technologies they are advocating. This tension is fundamental to the storyline, yet never explicitly touched on. The failure of politics and cynical industrial fatalism The storyline of the failure of international climate negotiations and political initiatives to reduce global CO2 emissions constitutes a point of departure for the geoengineering discourse as important as alarm concerning climate change. Amidst an increasingly pressing climate situation, national governments and international institutions are repeatedly judged unable to implement relevant measures. Accordingly, both scientists and popular science journalists have concluded that international political negotiations have come to the end of the road, and that other options for managing climate change must now be considered. Geoengineering is stressed as the most promising such option. This argument emphasizes that researchers believe that they must develop geoengineering because politics has failed and can no longer reverse the situation. Matthew Watson, the principle investigator of the SPICE project,44 notes that every time the politicians, in the context of international climate negotiations, prioritize economic growth or their own re-election, they also indirectly make intensified geoengineering efforts more necessary. This creates antagonism between political negotiations regarding cuts in CO2 emissions and geoengineering, the latter being assumed to replace the former. Some actors frame geoengineering and its consequences as the price to be paid for political failure.45 It is claimed to be possible to replace political solutions with what are depicted as non-political and purely technical solutions. Politics is seen as obstructing efficient climate change management, while technology and science are depicted as unproven but uncomplicated, although this picture is supplemented by the reservation that geoengineering can only complement reduced CO2 emissions.46 In particular, the Kyoto Treaty and UN processes are described as toothless. The Treaty is seen as not having helped reduce global emissions, as its signatories have not fulfilled their commitments. It is concluded that the Kyoto process is more or less a waste of time and that the international negotiations are far too slow. Even if a new and substantially more ambitious UN climate treaty were agreed on, it would take decades for net global emissions to decrease, so faster-acting measures are needed.47 In particular, this rationale was made explicit before and during the UN negotiations in Copenhagen in December 2009. Before the conference, several sources claimed that the Royal Society had announced a warning that geoengineering was the only alternative if negotiations did not result in a treaty on significant reductions in CO2 emissions.48 Another way to put it was that failure in Copenhagen would result in a “big breakthrough” for geoengineering.49 Logically, in the wake of the vague accord formulated at Copenhagen, some journalists drew the radical conclusion that “we will have to engineer the climate.”50 The resignation evident in this storyline rests on fatalism at the impossibility of changing industrial society’s aspirations for economic growth. Despite the alarming projections of climate change, it is claimed that world electricity use will increase by 50% by 2030, and that 77% of this increased power will be produced by fossil fuels. The International Energy Agency projects that coal and oil use will continue to rise, as if there were no choice despite the greenhouse gas emissions. The governments of the world, it is said, are not prepared to compromise their economic growth rates; in particular, countries such as India and China are claimed to be far from accepting expensive emissions cuts. There are also severe doubts as to what Caldeira calls “the transcendent human capacity for self-sacrifice.”51 All these factors emphasize the need for geoengineering, a solution that does not interfere with the contemporary industrial rationality. Accordingly, the question is not whether geoengineering should be done, but how.52 Given the socio-economic structure of contemporary industrial capitalism, there is really no choice. Ulrich Beck calls this position industrial fatalism, and it is usually combined with an optimistic belief that things will turn out well in the end.53 However, when it comes to the geoengineering discourse, there are no such reassurances. Instead the future is described as insecure and threatening. The discourse is permeated by a cynical industrial fatalism, which claims that there is no other choice than deploying geoengineering, even though such technologies might have environmentally devastating consequences and worsen an already catastrophic situation. The scientists and journalists advocating geoengineering are not forced to describe the future in glowing terms, as proponents of grand-scale technologies usually do, because they benefit from the despair and desperation evoked by climate change. For example, John Shepherd declared that it had become necessary to invest in geoengineering research since there were strong reasons to be “less optimistic” about reducing CO2 levels.54 Geoengineering was a “price” to be paid, not a promise.55 Geoengineering has made the fatalism of industrial society cynical. Pure technology: a bridge to a sustainable future The geoengineering discourse is overflowing with metaphors and figurative language. The development of geoengineering is referred to as “plan B”; 56 it constitutes a “last-ditch” alternative,57 “parachute,”58 “airbag,”59 and “last resort.”60 These expressions and metaphors suggest that there is a technological way out of a political dilemma and that geoengineering is pure technology, unlike carbon emissions cuts, which are complicated political measures that raise severe conflicts of interest. This storyline is also commonly spelled out in the geoengineering discourse, which depicts geoengineering as a technological fix. These strictly technological measures will not solve the problem, but they could “buy time,” which is found to be absolutely necessary, since the international political process is so inefficient.61 This notion is closely related to the idea that geoengineering will serve as a “bridge” to a future carbon-free society based on renewables, buying time for the countries of the world to transform their energy systems. Problems related to this claim that are not touched on concern whether it really will be easier to develop renewables in the future, once geoengineering is deployed, and whether it will be possible to stop geoengineering once these technologies are implemented. Another lacuna in the discourse is the implicit assumption that geoengineering will not generate the same type of political conflicts of interest and deadlocks as the calls for renewables and CO2 emission decreases have. Geoengineering is without argumentation or problematization assumed to be pure technology devoid of all political considerations. The question of political tensions that may arise if geoengineering is deployed is avoided, as if there were any such thing as a politically neutral technology or engineering practice. In rare cases, governance issues are mentioned, but are not considered serious problems.62 This view of technology is dependent on the commonly proclaimed idea that it is possible to test, study, and identify the environmental consequences of geoengineering in advance. At first sight this idea appears to contradict the storyline about the scientists’ double fear and warnings that geoengineering may cause harmful side effects, but intensified research is supposed to ensure that the ecological impacts of geoengineering are understood and under control before deployment, enabling the “fine-tuning” of various technologies. Field tests are said to guarantee this, and grand-scale research programmes are implemented to insure against “unanticipated side effects.”63 The potential risks are cited to underscore the urgent need for considerable research, and carrying out tests in due time will, according to the pure technology storyline, enable the slow and cautious deployment of various geoengineering technologies, while maintaining the possibility of reversing the process if something goes wrong. The alternative of introducing the technology under panic conditions, without careful testing, should be avoided.64 The technological rationality on which this storyline rests is strictly instrumental and presupposes that it is possible to project the complex reactions of global ecosystems over several coming centuries by conducting minor field tests, although at the same time it is repeatedly admitted that such assumptions are highly problematic. Although there is an explicit awareness that the ecological side-effects are unknown, they are not perceived as beyond the scope of contemporary engineering science but as calculable and knowable. However, the discourse also contains some accounts of the new technology that threaten to undermine the image of geoengineering as purely science based. Some journalists enthusiastically speak of their “personal favourite” geoengineering techniques, fascinated by the Blade Runner atmosphere and praising the “beauty of this system.” This “boyish sci-fi feel” reveals that there might be other grounds for developing these “wild ideas” than strictly scientific ones.65 An aesthetics of technology and a fascination with the sublime aspects of the grand-scale enterprise of altering the planet’s climate are echoed in some of the texts advocating geoengineering. This is counteracted by declarations that geoengineering is absolutely not a “science-fiction playground for imaginative scientists and engineers,” although some of the suggestions might evoke a Jules Verne novel or Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein. The need for such demarcations indicates a worry among geoengineering advocates that this new set of technologies might be associated with romantic fantasies and praised for the wrong reasons. This explicit technological romanticism that tries to slip in through the back door is immediately refused entrance and shown away, but is there not a kind of romanticism hidden even in the hard-headed geoengineering schemes chosen to save the planet? We would argue that this is the case and that this is a strong reason to dismiss all aesthetic praise of geoengineering schemes. Is not the idea of a pure and politically unpolluted technology, saving the world from its final destruction in the spirit of Jules Verne, truly romantic at heart, no matter what the scientists and engineers claim? Would not Captain Nemo have felt fairly comfortable in that company?66 Just mimicking nature In the geoengineering discourse, even scientists and journalists advocating the technologies in question highlight the methods’ controversial character. Geoengineering is said to be “rife with controversy” or to involve “highly controversial proposals,” but what the controversy is all about is seldom discussed. Instead, as noted above, the matter of controversy is subordinated to the overwhelming global environmental problems that the technologies are supposed to solve and to the urgency of this task. In this way, the contentiousness of the subject is both recognized and downplayed or disregarded.67 This is why John Shepherd, in sharp contrast to scientists promoting technologies in several other areas, emphasizes that geoengineering is no “silver bullet” or “magical bullet.”68 It will not solve all our problems and it will not be without considerable costs—to use a common expression, it is no “get-out-of-jail-free card.”69 Geoengineers are not forced to promise anything and they can even stress the uncertainties and risks of their technology without losing support. On the contrary, this is a way of gaining credibility. However, the storyline of geoengineering as a way of mimicking nature tends in quite the opposite direction. As early as 2007, Kurt Zenz House declared that some geoengineering technologies just used the “cleaning process that Nature herself uses for greenhouse gas accumulation.”70 In this storyline, scientists artificially made natural processes more efficient, but in principle there was no difference between, for example, volcanic eruptions and human efforts to release huge volumes of sulphur aerosols into the atmosphere.71 The implied meaning of this storyline was that geoengineering was not a hazardous human endeavour.72 How could it be hazardous if nature had used the same processes before humans existed? This storyline stands in sharp contrast to the one emphasizing the double fear of scientists or the contentiousness of geoengineering, downplaying the extraordinary aspects of the actual technologies. In 2009, several journalists, referring to declarations of scientists, argued that the most promising geoengineering technologies obtained their “proof of concept from nature,” explicitly mentioning that the 1991 volcanic eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines had a cooling effect on the planet for more than two years. This leads to the conclusion that injecting sulphur aerosols into the stratosphere is nothing but “mimicking nature,” implying that there is nothing strange, unnatural, or even hazardous about geoengineering.73 Since the end of 2011, this storyline has steadily gained influence. Mimicking nature is repeatedly characterized as a natural and logical scientific activity, as almost inevitable.74 Nature has shown the way and humanity just has to follow.75 Ken Calderia even argues that “geoengineering concepts have been tested by nature,”76 implying that geoengineers have an ally in nature and that technologies that cannot be tested in laboratories can be understood as safe and having been tested in full-scale experiments by nature for eons Accordingly, no other technologies have been as thoroughly tested as have some of the geoengineering technologies that the researchers know so well. If we cannot trust nature, what or who can we trust? Over the last two or three years, this storyline has more or less come to replace the storyline of the scientist’s double fear. The naturalness of and consequent trust in certain geoengineering technologies have increasingly been emphasized, in other words, geoengineering is increasingly depicted as a positive solution, and less as a desperate measure. Concluding Discussion The public debate on geoengineering is dominated by the advocacy discourse, which in turn is dominated by natural scientists and engineers.77 In a previous paper Anshelm and Hansson have demonstrated that the public debate on geoengineering is permeated by an unusual degree of critical reflexivity, and that problems with geoengineering in several cases were highlighted by the advocates before they reached the discourse critical of geoengineering.78 Clark claims that social scientists have been quick to consider this critique akin to their own. As mentioned, Clark explains that, in light of the emergency, there is a risk of retreating from the political. It may be too obvious to state the importance of the environmental humanities’ avoiding too uncritically advancing the depoliticized emergency framings in the storyline or merely reacting to initiatives or arguments made by engineers and natural scientists. A not too obvious step could be, as Clark argues, to use geoengineering to sensitize the dynamics of the geological and earth systems thresholds or even intentional human geoclimatic agency. We do not dismiss that idea but claim that a preceding step should be to scrutinize and understand the present discourse, and as a first step we attempt to find inconsistencies in the storylines. A discourse cannot be expected to be coherent and free of inconsistencies. The aim of analyzing the inconsistencies in the storylines examined here is not to claim that geoengineering advocates’ statements are less trustworthy or more dishonest than statements made in more consistent discourses. Instead, by analyzing these inconsistencies we hope to create a richer understanding of this public discourse. The inconsistencies become more obvious when comparing or combining the different storylines, analyzing what is omitted or marginal in the discourse and making comparisons with what is claimed in other contexts.79

# WIP

## Lonks

### State climate control

#### Scenario planning for climate adaptation is the literally the definition of resilient living, the depoliticizing capitulation to power

**Grove 14** [Kevin, Institute of Geography and Earth Sciences, Llandinam Building, Aberystwyth University, "Agency, affect, and the immunological politics of disaster resilience" *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 32(2): 240–256]

Resilience, agency, and assemblage Resilience is one of a number of what Ben Anderson (2010a) calls anticipatory logics: more or less coherent explanations about the nature of future threats and disorder that render uncertain futures governable. Anticipatory logics such as preemption, precaution, preparedness, and resilience arose in the face of new experiences of insecurity derived from phenomena such as nuclear warfare, global terrorism, and global environmental change. These threats introduced a fundamentally new understanding of life defined in terms of socioecological interconnection and emergence (Cooper, 2008). The problem is no longer that borders may be transgressed, but that emergent life may spiral out of control. For example, the interconnections spawned by the physical and cybernetic infrastructure of global capitalism act as conduits for the international drug trade and terrorist financing, as well as supporting legal flows of financial capital and cheaply manufactured goods (Duffield, 2010; Reid, 2007). Likewise, the environmental transformations these flows produce have created a radically unstable global climatic system that threatens all manner of socioecological disruption, including more intense hurricanes and tropical cyclones (Dalby, 2009). Set against these new insecurities, techniques such as scenarios, vulnerability mapping, simulations, and education and training exercises enable people to visualize potential futures, develop response and risk-mitigating capacities, and ultimately change their action in the present in order to ward off future calamities. Exactly how these techniques govern uncertain futures is determined by their timespecific and place-specific articulation with anticipatory logics (Anderson, 2010a). What sets resilience apart from other anticipatory logics is how it positions the subject in relation to uncertainty. While preparedness, precaution, and preemption all in some way seek to prevent uncertain futures from being realized, resilience seeks to enhance an individual’s or system’s capacity to live with, and indeed prosper from, uncertainty (O’Malley, 2010). Resilience has a unique genealogy that lies in both psychology (O’Malley, 2010) and ecology and complex systems theory (Walker and Cooper, 2011). These divergent roots share a common concern with creating what Lentzos and Rose (2009, page 243) call a “subjective and systematic state to enable each and all to live freely and with confidence in a world of potential risks”. For example, psychology deploys resilience to study how children exposed to traumatic events could nonetheless develop into ‘normal’, psychologically sound adults. This work focuses on the inherent capacities of research subjects to adapt to adverse situations and cope with otherwise debilitating stresses. Similarly, ecology is concerned with the conditions that enable social and ecological systems to adapt to external shocks. Key here is a system’s adaptive capacity, which is determined by the density and quality of relations among a system’s component parts. Proponents distinguish disaster resilience from other approaches such as hazard and vulnerability studies with reference to the former’s emphasis on the agency of people who suffer catastrophes (Brown and Westaway, 2011; Eakin and Leurs, 2006). However, themes of agency are not new to disaster studies. Foundational vulnerability studies drawing on Marxist political economy and Freirian pedagogy emphasized that local people possessed their own knowledge on hazards and vulnerability reduction that technocentric approaches to hazard studies silenced and delegitimized (eg, Hewitt, 1983; Wisner et al, 1977). Here, the ‘agency’ of local peoples became the foundation for participatory disaster mitigation programs that made vulnerability reduction a matter of changing uneven political economic relations that caused vulnerability in the first place (Maskrey, 1989). This is, of course, not the kind of agency that circulates within resilience programming (Gaillard, 2010). Resilience recognizes disaster victims as active agents with inherent self-help capacities that can be strengthened through proper resilience programming, rather than passive victims who require external aid to overcome structural constraints. Proponents define agency as, ““the capacity of an individual to act independently and to make one’s own free choices. One’s agency is one’s independent capability or ability to act on one’s will” (Brown and Westaway 2011, page 325). In turn, this capability is determined ““not only by the physical capacity of an individual but also by the extent to which that is supported by relationships with others and their own perceptions of the extent to which they can exercise agency, in other words, self-efficacy” (Brown and Westaway, 2011, pages 330–331). Accordingly, a growing body of research now maintains that adaptation to climate change and more frequent hazards can be improved by a better understanding of the psychological and sociocultural aspects of adaptive capacity (Grothmann and Patt, 2005). Adaptive capacity is no longer something limited by structural constraints such as race, class, or gender inequalities, it now depends on individuals’ psychological dispositions and the wider cultural belief systems that affect their perceptions of self-efficacy (Aitken et al, 2011; Blennow and Persson, 2009; Frank et al, 2011). Even though resilience downplays, or often ignores, the role political economic relations play in creating vulnerability and constraining adaptability, proponents argue that resilience does not depoliticize vulnerability analysis. Instead, they argue that resilience is a progressive development in research and policy on hazard and vulnerability reduction that seeks to foster self-organizing adaptive capacities in individuals and complex social and ecological systems, and thus to break dependencies on centralized forms of mitigation and relief provision. For example, a recent review of resilience in disaster management asserts that, “a focus on the perceptual and relational is inherently political, as it is about agency” (Brown and Westaway, 2011, pages 331–332). In short, resilience is inherently political and progressive because it seeks to empower people to be agents of their own vulnerability reduction in order to make the proper choices and avoid maladaptations in an emergent environment. My concern is with the limited vision of politics that underpins such assertions. This work relies on an understanding of power in terms of oppression: the action of an external will or force on another will. Empowerment is a matter of freeing this oppressed will through participatory resilience programming, enabling subjects to make their own adaptation decisions and then realize these goals. Politics here becomes little more than a technical pursuit to design and implement the most effective capacity-building initiatives (Grove, forthcoming). However, as Foucault famously demonstrates, empowerment and freedom from oppression constitute their own power relations and systems of subjection (Foucault, 1990). Indeed, critical scholars have begun unpacking the biopolitical effects of techniques of anticipatory action such as resilience. For example, Julian Reid (2012) has argued that resilience creates depoliticized subjects that see their vulnerability and insecurity not as the result of uneven political economic relations that can and should be changed, but rather as unavoidable consequences of living in an emergent and interconnected world. In Mark Duffield’s (2011) provocative phrasing, it is the “official policy response” to the “fabricated uncertainty” of neoliberal development. This work gives us good reason to be sceptical of blanket claims about the inherently empowering nature of resilience programming. While practitioners’ intentions may indeed be sincere, in practice the effect of resilience is often to depoliticize and individualize adaptation, to turn it into a way of merely “surviving the aftereffects of industrial modernization, the green revolution, and the Washington consensus” (Walker and Cooper, 2011, page 155).