# SO20 – NC – Kant (2:10)

#### Permissibility and Presumption negate: A] “Ought” in the resolution mean that you need to prove an obligation to do the aff – permissibility means that aff isn’t an obligation, I prove it false so vote neg B] Probability – There are infinite number of ways to prove a statement false and only one way to prove it true – means res is more likely to be false.

#### The metaethic is practical reason. Prefer:

#### [1] Regress – Ethical theories must have a basis. We can always ask why we should follow the basis of a theory, so they aren’t morally binding because they don’t have a starting point. Practical reason solves – When we ask why we should follow reason, we demand a reason, which concedes to the authority of reason itself, so it’s the only thing we can follow

#### [2] Action Theory – Every action can be broken down to infinite amounts of movements, i.e. me moving my arm can be broken down to the infinite moments of every state my arm is in. Only reason can unify these movements because we use practical reason to achieve our goals, means all actions collapse to reason

#### Now, practical reason means we all have a unified perspective: What can be justified to me can be justified to everyone who is a practical reasoner. If I can conclude that 2+2 is 4, then I understand not only that I know 2+2 is 4, but that everyone around me can arrive at the same conclusion. These things are temporally consistent: I know that me adding two numbers now and taking that sum will not result in me adding the same two numbers in the future and getting a different sum. Our unified perspective does not change but rather stays consistent.

#### But, willing an action that violates the freedom of others is a contradiction: If I decide to kill someone, that action is not universalizable because that would justify other people killing me too. If I die, I cannot exercise my freedom to kill someone else. This is a contradiction: I both justify extending my freedom to kill others and limiting my own freedom.

#### Thus, the standard is respecting freedom.

#### Prefer additionally:

#### [1] Performativity – Argumentation presupposes a priori truth in trying to prove claims as valid. Being able to objectively decide between arguments and evaluate them necessitates a higher framework that is a priori knowledge. Refuting this claim concedes to the authority of the argument, as you rely on an external framework to prove it false.

#### Negate:

#### [1] The welfare state violates the freedom of citizens by treating them as a mere means to achieve the monetary ends of the beneficiaries. Transactions need to have value for both parties – a FJG violates that. Jones.

[Jones, Harold B. “The Kantian Ethic of Capitalism.” Mercer University. <http://journal.apee.org/index.php?title=Fall2006_3> Published Fall 2006.] SHS ZS

Kant would say **redistribution is immoral because** **the maxim** upon which it is based **cannot be** **universally applied without running into** the law of **non-contradiction**. The welfare state is immoral also because **it allows the recipient to make demands upon** **the taxpayer without providing the taxpayer an equivalent value in return**. Redistribution is immoral, more generally, because **it allows one person to treat another as no more than a means to the first person's ends**. "Act so that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the same time as end and never merely as means," Kant (2002, 46-47) said this is another way to formulate the Categorical Imperative. The earlier formulation had been the result of his conviction that human rationality can demonstrate the results of any maxim's having become a universal principle of action. The individual human mind is therefore the only thing in the universe that is capable of distinguishing between right and wrong and as such demands ultimate respect: "Rational nature exists as an end in itself and must never be treated merely as a means to some other end. In terms of the Categorical Imperative's first formulation, if the maxim that one could treat others as no more than means to one's own ends were universa1i7ed, each person would seek to treat every other as no more than a means. In this situation, every rational mind would be preoccupied with defending itself from the onslaught of every other rational mind, and society would disintegrate. Kant did not deny we must sometimes treat other persons as means to our own ends. Moral problems arise only if we attempt to treat them as means without treating them also as ends in themselves (Copleston, 1967, VI, ii, 20). The natural end of all human beings is their own happiness, so a person can treat humanity as an end in itself by seeking, "as much as he can, to further the ends of others"; the ends of the people with whom I come into contact "must as far as possible be my ends" (Kant, 2002, 48). This is what happens in free markets. Adam Smith's famously self-interested butcher and **[The] baker** (Smith, 1937, 14) **could reach their own ends only** **through a conscious and deliberate effort to serve the purposes of their customers**. **The customers**, equally self-interested**, had to provide something the businessmen wanted** in order **to obtain the requested services**. **On one side** of the transaction, there was **a desire for money** to replenish inventories, provide for the needs of Mrs. Butcher, Mrs. Baker and all the little Butchers and Bakers, and perhaps (a century before the appearance of the welfare state) set something aside for retirement. **On the other side**, there was **a desire for meat**, bread, and perhaps a bit of cake for the evening meal. **On both sides** of the transaction, **individuals were using others as a means to their own ends** by becoming one means to the ends of those with whom they were doing business. **The immorality of redistribution lies in the elimination of** this **mutuality**. **The voter seeks to use the taxpayer as a means to the** **voter's financial security** **without** at the same time deliberately **choosing to do something that will serve the taxpayer**. The politician attempts to use both the taxpayer and the voter as a means to the politician's goals of power and tenure. **The fact that the voter, the taxpayer, and perhaps even the politician may be the same person does not raise the scheme to the level of morality.** It indicates only, as Herbert Schlossberg (1990, 281) has pointed out, that the person in question believes he can enrich himself by picking his own pocket. Trade restrictions also fall short of the Kantian standard. In an attempt to use their limited resources as efficiently as possible, consumers purchase the products and services of foreign vendors. This interferes with domestic producers' desire to maintain the high prices upon which their wage levels and profits depend. In limiting customers to the purchase of domestic products, producers are seeking to serve their own ends without at the same time serving the ends of their customers. Domestic producers are seeking to use domestic consumers simply as means to the producers' ends. Trade restrictions fail as well when tested by the Categorical Imperative's first formulation. The maxim seems to be that it is acceptable to hinder free exchanges. If this were true, then all exchanges would be prevented, there would be no division of labor, and every economy would come to a grinding halt. Those who seek protection would find they have nothing to protect. The policy would destroy itself. The Role of the State The Categorical Imperative is a Kmtian formula but not a uniquely Kantian insight. To will the universalization of the principle underlying your choices is to will (perhaps among other things) that others should treat you as you treat them. Kanes American contemporary Benjamin Franklin offered this as the first of his four precepts for a rational morality (Smith, 1934, 522). Early in the third century, Alexander Severus had these words engraved on the walls of his palace and public buildings: "What you do not wish a man to do to you, do not do to him." Two and a half centuries earlier, Hillel was asked for a brief summary of the Jewish Law and replied, "What is hateful to thyself do not do to another" (Durant, 1944, p539, 626). Jesus agreed; his summary went like this: "So whatever you wish men that men would do to you, do so to them" (Matthew 7:12, RSV). Five centuries before that, Confucius said a gentleman would practice shu, "altruism, reciprocity," which is summed up in the Analects as "not doing to others what you do not like yourself" (Reischauer & Fairbank, 1958, 71). If the Kant's first principle of morality seems thus to enjoy an almost universal endorsement, it may be said also to suffer from an almost universal neglect. "If it were a thing obvious and easy for every man to know himself;" Plutarch (2001,11, 389) observed, "the precept had not passed for an oracle." Just so, if people usually treated others as hey would themselves prefer to be treated, the maxim would never have gained such a wide popularity. In describing a person as being in favor of "a free market for everyone else, while regarding himself as deserving of special treatment," Friedman (2002, 68) is pointing to a universal tendency. We all recognize the validity of the Categorical Imperative, Kant (2002, 42) says, "yet we take the liberty of making an exceptionfor ourselves." We are rational beings, yet our "pathological affections" (Kant, 1996a, 48) often get in the way. We seek to live by standards we would find reprehensible in the behavior of others and to impose on those about us rules we would be reluctant to accept for ourselves. In a state of nature, this human flaw creates a condition in which no one's freedom and property can be permanently secure. Drawing again on the law of non-contradiction, Kant (1996b, 44-45) argues that he is "not under obligation to leave external objects belonging to others untouched unless everyone else provides me assurance that he will behave in accordance with the same principle." This line of reasoning should not be taken too literally in the case of Kant himself, who stood under 5'4" and weighed less than 100 pounds, but his point is clear: social stability requires assurances of some kind with regard to the protection of property. "So only in a civil condition can something external be mine or yours." To this statement Kant (1996b, 45) attaches the corollary that property is impossible unless its owner is in a position "to constrain everyone else with whom he comes into conflict about whether an external object is his or another's." It is from this necessity that the coercive power of the state arises. Given the fact of humanity's universally flawed character, **freedom and property cannot survive in the absence of some authority** with the power to protect them. In practice, "human rights and the authorization to use coercion mean one and the same thing" (26). **Governments are necessary**, Kant (1996b, 24-26, 89-91) said, primarily **to secure citizens against violence and to protect their property.** **A government has no right to pass laws "contrary to the natural laws of freedom."** It is appropriate to use external constraint in the enforcement of a voluntarily contracted obligation because the individual's own rational and moral analysis should have impelled him to carry out the terms of the contract. The power of government does no more than back up the dictates of reason. On the other hand, **no government has the right to pass laws that demand disobedience to the Categorical Imperative. As soon as the state attempts to do more than protect freedom and property, it has gone too far.** Kant could never have conceived of government as being responsible for the welfare and happiness of each individual citizen (Sullivan, 1996, xiv). "Freedom," he said (1996b, 30) "is the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity." Human beings naturally desire and happiness (151) and may be expected to use their freedom, however imperfectly, in the pursuit of it**. The just state will therefore treat its citizens "in accordance with the laws of their own independence: each is in possession of himself and is not dependent upon the absolute will of another alongside him or above him" (94).**

#### A federal jobs guarantee is supported by high taxes. Reidl 18.

[Reidl 18 {Brian Riedl 18, 5-1-2018, "Fantasyland Economics," City Journal, <https://www.city-journal.org/html/fantasyland-economics-15877.html>)] SHS AK

Despite a rapidly improving job market, senators such as Bernie Sanders, Cory Booker, and Kirsten Gillibrand have called for **a** new program in which the federal government would provide a full-time job to every American adult who wants one. Their proposal differs from programs like the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) or Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC), which partially subsidize private-sector jobs, not government jobs. And unlike the public-works programs of the New Deal, this **taxpayer-funded federal job program**—details to come—would be permanent. Universal employment is a worthy goal. Chronic joblessness depresses lifetime earnings substantially (even after the joblessness ends), damages relationships, and leads to serious health problems. But the new proposal is unworkable and implausible. Advocates estimate that 10.7 million currently unemployed and under-employed Americans would sign up. Yet the guaranteed wage of $15 per hour, plus benefits—which exceeds the current compensation levels for 40 percent of all workers—would induce millions of working Americans to quit their jobs and join the new program. Millions of others not currently looking for work, including retirees, would find the benefit package irresistible. Advocates estimate that the cost of salary, health care, child care, transportation, supplies, and capital goods would total $56,000 per employee. If participation rises to 20 to 35 million—which seems likely—the annual cost would swell to between $1 trillion to $2 trillion. An accompanying reduction in welfare benefits for these workers would offset only a small fraction of this cost. Even the low-end estimate of $1 trillion would create the largest federal program, exceeding even Social Security. It would be five times as expensive as the recent tax cuts and 12 times costlier than the recent defense-spending boost. Raising $1 trillion annually **would require 70-to-80 percent federal income tax rates** for single adults earning over $80,000 and couples earning more than $160,000. **State and payroll taxes would leave** these **families paying** total tax rates in the **80 to 90 percent range**.

#### [2] FJG restricts the freedom of business owners to hire the type of employees they want because it makes the market more competitive with workers advocating for publicly owned jobs – under a Kantian conception of freedom the markets should be unconditionally free and unregulated by the government.

#### [3] A job guarantee coerces those who don’t want to work to work due to public perception of them.

Coelho 17 Andre Coelho 2-2-2017 "Basic income is superior to the job guarantee" <https://basicincome.org/news/2017/02/basic-income-superior-job-guarantee/> //Elmer

The **JG will only be beneficial to those searching for jobs** – any job, we can assume in desperation – and cannot find them. For those currently and comfortably employed it would be innocuous, and for those who actually choose not to be employed (whether presently employed or not), in order to have time to pursue their passions and talents, **it would only cause suffering and would be a waste of time**. On the other hand, BI is beneficial for all those who prefer not to be formally employed, are currently unhappily employed, or are indifferent, such as those individuals who are satisfied with their job at the moment. Moreover, BI will benefit the presently unemployed, offering them the chance to informally contribute to society and/or develop their capacities in order to be fit for jobs they see as more adequate to their profiles and preferences. On a finer assessment, it seems that BI can be the strategy that will enhance people’s happiness, in respect to their relation to work. It’s also worth noting the potentially more complex and policing nature of the EG structure. To guarantee employment, the state will have to create it first, since apparently the marketplace is destroying it; To do that, these jobs must first be invented, and then distributed to people who will, supposedly, be willing to take them. There will have to be an effort to categorize each person’s abilities in order to establish a match between them and the jobs being created. It seems to be an enormous task, and a potentially highly bureaucratic one (more than we already have in our present welfare states). Even on the assumption that the state would be able to create all these jobs and to get people on them, it would still be necessary to have some system that would guarantee that the latter would stick to the former. Or at least have a way to generate new jobs for all those who want one or for some other reason had to change jobs. But maybe all this is unnecessary. Alternatively, because basic income allows everyone to work creates conditions for each person to initiate his/her activity. If, for any reason, that person cannot do it (or does not want to do it that way), BI gives him/her the possibility to pursue education and/or skills to apply for the job he/she really craves. In time, BI will effectively put everyone to work. That’s because, one way or another, everyone wants to contribute to society, given the chance. Unfortunately, our current system prevents many people from working, precisely (and ironically) **due to the coercive effect of needing a job** – any job, even if the person gets actually sick from doing it – in order to survive. To work in something meaningful and aligned with one’s values will render a completely different social environment than what we have today. To **trust people to do what they think is best** for their lives will completely change work, for the better. Unlike the JG, which will only **mean more coercion** and entrenchment of the present day job culture.

# Frontlines

## Extensions

### Overview

#### Extend the framework – the metaethic is practical reason, which means that all people are rational agents that set and pursue their own ends when acting. Since all practical reasoners have access to a priori knowledge, that means that actions must be universalizable to all since we are all practical reasoners. That means violations of freedom are not universalizable, because in violating somebody else’s freedom, you would be restricting your own freedom in the first place. That justifies a libertarian state which protects the freedom of all of its citizens.

#### Extend Jones – a federal jobs guarantee coerces citizens into paying taxes for the welfare state, but they get no transactional benefit in return. That violates the categorical imperative as it treats citizens as a means to the end of another citizen’s wealth. This card explicitly justifies how the ONLY role of a Kantian government can be to support the natural laws of freedom of citizens but must not go beyond.