# Matrix NC

### Framework

#### I negate: The empirical world does not exist, but rather is constituted in thought. When I think I see a mountain, I am not perceiving something that exists, but instead constructing an idea of it in my mind.

A. K. Rogers, The Neo–Hegelian 'Self' and Subjective Idealism, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Mar., 1901), pp. 139-161, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2176508 ///AHS PB

Now, there cannot of course be any doubt that what is meant by thought is not any mere thinking on the part of a finite indi- vidual, but the thought of a so-called Absolute Self' The former alternative is repudiated so often and so violently by the He- gelian,2 that it would seem that, on this point at any rate, no mis- apprehension ought to exist. However, when one comes to ex- amine the arguments more closely, it becomes apparent that this constant note of warning is not uncalled for. Indeed, the doubt begins to suggest itself whether the denial does not apply rather to the intention of the writers than to their actual performance. I will subscribe a number of passages which I have taken from sev- eral sources: "Certain theories have," says Professor Watson, "the defect that they assume knowable objects to exist quite in- dependently of our intelligence." 3 "Although I distinguish in consciousness objects as external from perceptions as internal, the objects and the perceptions alike exist only for me as a conscious being." 4 " The ordinary view that determinate things are inde- pendent of our consciousness turns out to be [is] a mistake"; and again, the writer speaks of those who "are still unable to rid themselves of the preconception that determinate things exist be- yond consciousness, or independently of our faculty of perception. "When we have denied that external objects are independent of consciousness, there can no longer be any reason for opposing perceptions to objects perceived." 6 "1 I have an apprehension of a brilliant object, but the apprehension is not separate from the object; it is in fact simply the object viewed from the side of the subject." 7 "The philosophical theory that the existence of concrete objects, apart from the activity of intelligence by which they are constituted for us, is an absurdity, does not throw any doubt on scientific truth." ' "1 Supposing known objects to exist only in relation to our faculties of knowledge, intelligence must have certain functions of synthesis, which at once combine into unity the detached differences supplied by the special senses, and enable us to explain how we can have a knowledge of objects other than our own subjective conceptions. For if nature ex-hibits everywhere a system and unity of objects, which have been actively constructed by thought acting upon the manifold of sense, we no longer are perplexed with the essentially unmean-ing riddle: How can we [to] pass from conceptions in the mind to ob- jects without the mind ? for objects as known have no existence except in relation to the intelligence by which they are made real." 2 " The known world develops paripassu with the know- ing subject."3 "The whole fact is the perception by the self- active subject of an object which exists only for that subject." " The thing ' tree' is my various experiences of it in presence of it and in thinking of it, and every word that I use in describing this thing expresses, and must express, my consciousness or ex- perience." 5 " This world is not out of our consciousness." 6 " It shows that external things as we know them, and we are not concerned in any others, are to a very great extent the product of our thinking activities." 7 " To me it seems that this stream (of changes and states) is built up along with, and mostly out of, the experiences of the everyday world. Stream and world are equally psychological constructions, built up by psychological proc- esses." 8 " Misled by the phrase ' idea of a thing,' we fancy that idea and thing have each a separate reality." 9 " I am not merely one object among many other objects in the world of which I am conscious; I am the conscious self without which there would be no world of objects at all."' I do not think that an impartial reader can deny that the natural meaning, almost the necessary meaning, which such pas- sages bear, is that the objective world has no existence beyond its existence in our knowledge or perception-a position which is only verbally to be distinguished from the subjective idealism against which Hegelianism is a continual protest. Since, there- fore, it appears that this is the last thing intended, there must be some ambiguity latent in the argument which requires to be pointed out before we can advance. It is confirmed by resemblecnce when I can compare an imaginary mountain and the image in my mind of a real mountain, which implies they are the same thing becuase two compared last things must be of the same nature.

#### Prefer on linguistics: The fact that talking about rocks isn’t the communication of literal, physical, rocks means that all experiences can be regressed into idea. Additionally flow this as a warrant for performativity, criticizing my framework uses and presupposes that language is possible.

#### Thus the standard is consistency with Subjective Idealism, the view described above.

#### Prefer:

#### [1] Objects cannot exist independent of thought: Even when we imagine a tree sitting alone in the forest unseen by humans we are creating a representation of it in our mind, because its impossible to think or know of something that constitutively cant be thought.

#### [2] In the same way sensory experiences like pleasure and pain are relative to agents, and therefor cannot be reliably observed or compared, its impossible know if or how others experience empirical objects. Even their does exist a correct account of an object, a plurality of un comparable viewpoints make it impossible to know which one is true.

#### [3] Only my framework avoids skep: There is no way to confirm the truth of anything in the outside world making knowledge impossible.

Bishop George Berkeley of Cloyne, Irish Philosopher, Bishop, and namesake of the city Berkeley California, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, 1710, ///AHS PB

From the principles I have laid down, it follows that human knowledge can naturally be classiﬁed under two headings—knowledge of ideas, and of spirits. I shall take these separately. First, as to ideas or unthinking things, our knowledge of these has been very much obscured and confused, and we have been led into very dangerous errors, by supposing a two-fold existence of the objects of sense, •one intelligible, or in the mind, •the other real and outside the mind. The latter has been thought to give unthinking things a natural existence of their own, distinct from being perceived by spirits. This, which I think I have shown to be a most groundless and absurd notion, is the very root of scepticism: as long as men thought that real things existed outside the mind, and that their knowledge was real only to the extent that it conformed to real things, it followed that they couldn’t be certain that they had any real knowledge at all. For how can it be known that the things that are perceived conform to those that aren’t perceived, i.e. that exist outside the mind? 87. Colour, shape, motion, extension, and the like, considered only as so many sensations in the mind, are perfectly known, because there is nothing in them that isn’t perceived. But if they are looked on as signs or images that are meant to copy things existing outside the mind, then we are all involved in scepticism ·through a line of thought that goes like this·: We see only the[ir] appearances of things, not their real qualities. We can’t possibly know what a thing’s size, shape or motion is, really and absolutely, in itself; all we can know is how its size etc. relate to our senses. Our ideas can vary while things remain the same, and which of our ideas—whether indeed any of them— represent the true quality really existing in the thing is something we have no way to discover. For all we know, everything that we see, hear, and feel may be only phantom and empty chimera, and not at all agree with the real things existing in the real world. All this scepticism follows from supposing a difference between things and ideas, and that the former exist outside the mind, or unperceived. It would be easy to expand on this topic and show how the arguments advanced by sceptics in all ages depend on the supposition of external objects.

#### That outweighs: Moral judgement and truth require absolute certainty

Unger, Peter (1975): Ignorance (Oxford: Oxford University Press). ///AHS PB

The very particular idea that knowing entails its being all right to be certain is suggested, further, by the fact that knowing entails, at least, that one is certain. As we saw in section 9 of the preceding chapter, that this is a fact is made quite plain by the inconsistency expressed by sentences like 'He really knew that it was raining, but he wasn't absolutely certain it was.' Such a sentence can express no truth: if he wasn't certain, then he didn't know.

#### Prefer on bindingness, if someone has reason to doubt a moral imperative, they can excuse arbitrarily excuse themselves from any obligation to do it, thus certainty is required for any normative ought.

#### [4] The very conceptions of the Empirical world and an Empirical-Ideal distinction are inherently non empirical abstract ideas, which proves that trying to justify your framework logically regresses to mine.

#### [5] Induction fallacy – every empirical observation presupposes certain facts about the empirical world leading to infinite regress, like gravity existed 1 sec ago because it exist a second before that and so on.

#### [6] Even if Induction and Empirical observations are possible, they confirm that knowledge about empirical objects is impossible.

David Chalmers, Professor of Philosophy and Scientist at Australian National University, Idealism and the Mind-Body Problem, 2017, <https://philpapers.org/archive/CHAIAT-11.pdf> ///AHS PB

One such challenge is the challenge of holism. It is arguable that contemporary physics does not deal in fundamental micro-entities. Instead, fundamental properties (including fields, func- tions, and the like) attach holistically to systems and perhaps ultimately to the universe as a whole. For example, quantum mechanics invokes wave function properties that in general are not pos- sessed by single particles, but rather by systems of particles and perhaps ultimately by the uni- verse as a whole. In addition, it is sometimes suggested (e.g. Schaffer 2003) that there may be no lowest or smallest level of entities in physics, but an infinite chain of ever-smaller entities. If any of these views are correct, there are no fundamental microentities to be realized by microsubjects, and there are no fundamental properties possessed by these entities to be realized by micro experiences. If we take a Russellian panpsychist approach to views of this sort, we will be led toward cosmopsychism and perhaps cosmic idealism rather than micropsychism and micro-idealism.

#### Also means that denying the NC negates on division: being able to go infinitely small justifies an infinite amount of space between objects, making any action impossible.

### Offense

#### Now Negate:

#### [1] Sources identities are always protected because its impossible to transfer identity through communication in a world that doesn’t exist.

#### [2] The Resolution is incoherent: A) It relies on linguistic classifications like reporter and confidential sources which rely on empirical facts to distinguish one agent from another and are therefor incoherent B) It only has meaning “In the United States” however if its impossible to be within the boundaries of an empirical location, the res doesn’t occur anywhere and semantically fails.

#### [3] Rights are meaningless because they A) are only granted to agents based on empirical properties: IE a citizen of the US has a right to free speech but a citizen of North Korea doesn’t. and B) presuppose empirical actions can occur for them to be utilized. Even if rights could exist, the affirmative proscribes an obligation to have a right, which is defined by its ability to be waived, making it incoherent.