# 1NC

#### Use truth testing: Under truth testing, aff proves truth, neg proves falsity-it’s a 1:1 burden structure. Comparing worlds gives the negative a structural advantage since they can argue either a) it is not the case that we should act as though the resolution is true, b) we could not act as though the resolution is true, or c) we should act as though the resolution is untrue. Kills fairness since a) neg has more ways to win than b) neg can shift between different interpretations in round skewing strategy.

#### I negate—Ought is defined as expressing moral obligation[[1]](#footnote-1) which means that the resolution statement is false if states have to make voting compulsory

#### There are two kinds of moral actors. Moral agents who deliberately choose to act in a certain way in accordance with principles and moral patients who are incapable of rationally justified action. Only Moral agents are culpable for actions since they intentionally brought those conditions upon themselves with regard to right and wrong—we wouldn’t say a tiger was immoral for eating someone, but we would say a person is.

Monica L. Gerrek, PHD in Philosophy from University of Kansas, NORMATIVE SENTIMENTALISM AND ANIMAL ETHICS, published 2007, <https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/bitstream/handle/1808/3984/umi-ku-2289_1.pdf;jsessionid=315B535176031E1F0D0A7582466688FE?sequence=1> ///AHS PB

As stated above, only the actions of moral agents can be judged as morally wrong. Moral agents are those who can be harmed and who can understand which motives are approved of (and which are not), which consequences are liked (and which are not), and can choose whether to act (or not act) accordingly. Moral patients are those who can be harmed but who cannot understand which motives are approved of (and which are not), which consequences are liked (and which are not), or cannot choose to act (or not act) accordingly.32 It is necessary to distinguish between moral agents and moral patients, and to do so in the way I have done, because it is absurd to hold moral patients morally accountable for their actions. If a moral patient harms another, for any reason, including selfishness, she will do something that the impartial spectator will dislike and perhaps disapprove of, but this is not to say that she has done something morally wrong. I think this is in harmony, at least for the most part, with our considered judgments regarding such matters. Although we discourage moral patients, whether we classify them as I have or in some other way, from harming others and although we often punish them for harming others, I think we would be hard pressed to say that they do something morally wrong when they commit acts that have consequences that are disliked when they do not understand what they have done or when they do not intentionally choose to act from motives that are disapproved of.33

#### That negates, states are not moral agents so they can’t have an obligation to enforce compulsory voting and treating states as agents prevents holding other agents accountable.

Jan Narveson, Professor of philosophy emeritus at the University of Waterloo, Collective Responsibility, The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 6, No. 2, Collective Responsibility (2002), pp. 179-198, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25115724> ///AHS PB

Thus I think that we must reject, firmly, theses about "collective responsibility" entailing that collectives are irreducibly responsible for their acts. Consider, for instance, genocide of one group by another, as in the Tutsis and the Hutus, or the Nazis and the Jews. Is it in any interesting way true that responsibility for either of these is irreducibly collective? Is it true that the act in question is collective in that sense? No. Genocide involves thousands or millions of individual murders. The fact that all of the victims belonged to one group, G, and all the killers to another, F, does not mean that the genocide is irreducible. In making this point, I have in mind an argument for the contrary view, advanced by a recent writer,2 who proposes as an example of a group act not reducible to acts of its members a hockey game. Individual players make goals or prevent them, and so on, yet the game can only be won by the team. We must agree with the latter, of course. In like manner, World War II is an example: it was declared by certain collective entities, Germany, England, and so on, and it was fought among those nations, and not among particular individuals or subgroups within them. But that is because war is a gamelike notion, in that institutions and their formative rules are part of the notion as frequently, and I think usually, used. Nevertheless, genocide is not like war, or it is more like the informal notion of "gang warfare" or "mob rule." No group "declares genocide": even if someone in the government of F orders F's army to get on it and kill all those people, nevertheless it has not "declared genocide." It has, rather, initiated a series of individual actions which amount, given their numbers and character, to genocide. The actors act with certain common motivations, and it will be an extremely important question to what extent, if any, those motivations tend to aggravate or alleviate the heinousness of their acts. But on any reasonable view, the answer will surely be variable from one individual to another. Some will have done much more than others. What about wars? Even though wars are fought between nations, which are collectives, yet individual leaders must do things - give orders, say - that make it true that a nation is at war, and individual soldiers, sailors, or other military personnel must fight it, else there is no war. And again, some do more than others. The sense in which some state is "guilty" in a war is important, but if it is true it can only be because the war was wrongful on its side, or that various violations of the rules of just war occurred. If the latter is so, individual people did it, and individual leaders ordered them, and to hold up a shadowy "collective" as being the true responsible agent is to deflect responsibility from the only entities that can genuinely have it, namely "... if the collective's act is not coherently reducible to the acts of the individuals that made the collective act possible it makes no sense to suddenly view the act as reducible in distributing the punishment. As such, the punishment must be borne equally by all members of the collective in virtue of their membership in the collective." Here an inference is made that not only does not follow, but really subverts the premise of the analysis. If the guilt is strictly collective, then you cannot punish anyone in the collective for it, equally or otherwise; irreducibility precludes this. In punishing this man, that woman, this other man, this child, and so on, all equally, we would be behaving as if each of those individuals was equally guilty. But if the action for which they are being punished is that of an irreducible collective, then that is false. You cannot reduce the irreducible - that is the whole point. Irreducibility means that you cannot reduce, rather than that reduction must be carried through in a particular way And that is what is wrong with collective responsibility. Precisely because it will not reduce, it precludes you from getting at anybody - all you can do is wave flags and write poems. But in fact, it was this person's grandfather who was brutally murdered by that soldier and his buddies, this other person's sister who was raped and tossed down a well, these people over here who were herded into a gas chamber, by these particular soldiers. Only individual agents can do such things - this grandfather and that sister were not murdered by an irreducible entity. And neither was anyone else who was in any way harmed. But absent such harms, there is no genocide

#### Additionally, prefer this interpretation of politics: 1] States actions are affected by things like internal laws and external pressures, so even if they were continuous individuals policies wouldn’t be an direct expression of their will 2] Causality means no action can be an uninfluenced directive since something cannot come from[[2]](#footnote-2) nothing so an action not constituted by a prior cause is impossible. Fiat is illusory the affirmative has falsely assumed that voting affirmative is somehow causally connected to plan passage, but it isn’t. And double bind in fighting the Narveson card either A] This is terminal defense on the aff’s solvency since fiat is illusory they win none of the offense on case or B]They have to no longer defend a single state which is instant drop the debater because severing out of the original plan in the 1ar makes it impossible to negate since they are a moving target. NC voters come on top because neg abuse is done as a reactive measure.

1. <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/ought> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. <https://www2.estrellamountain.edu/faculty/farabee/biobk/BioBookEner1.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-2)