# The Intersect

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### Main FW

#### Morality must be universalizable. Only consequentialism can meet this constraint. Universalizing anything else results in a conflict in normative reasons. Pettit:

[Laurance S. Rockefeller University Professor of Politics and Human Values at Princeton University]. The Cost of Non-Consequentialism. February 5, 1999. <http://www.philo.umontreal.ca/documents/cahiers/Pettit\_Non-Consequentialism.pdf>

Every prescription as to what an agent ought to do should be capable of being universalised, so that it applies not just to that particular agent, and not just to that particular place or time or context or whatever. So at any rate we generally assume in our moral reasoning. If we think that it is right for one agent in one circumstance to act in a certain way, but wrong for another, then we commit ourselves to there being some further descriptive difference between the two cases, in particular a difference of a non-particular or universal kind. Thus, if we say that an agent A ought to choose option O in circumstances C — these may bear on the character of the agent, the behaviour of others, the sorts of consequences on offer, and the like — then we assumethat something similar would hold for any similarly placed agent. We do not think that the particular identity of agent A is relevant to what A ought to do, any more than we think that the particular location or date is relevant to that issue. In making an assumption about what holds for any agent in C-type circumstances, of course, we may not be committing ourselves to anything of very general import. It may be, for all the universalisability constraint requires, that C-type circumstances are highly specific: so specific, indeed, that no other agent is ever likely to confront them.There is no difficulty in seeing how the universalisability challenge is supposed to be met under consequentialist doctrine. **Suppose** that I accept**consequentialis[m]**t doctrine and believe of an agent that in their particular circumstances, C, he or she ought to choose an option O. For simplicity, suppose that I am myself that agent and that as a believer in consequentialism I think of myself that I ought to do O in C. If that option really **is right** by my consequentialist lights, **then that will be because of the neutral values that it promotes. But if those neutral values make O**the **right** option **for me** in those circumstances, **so they will make it** the **right** option**for any other agent** in such circumstances. Thus I can readily square the prescription to which my belief in consequentialism leads with my belief in universalisability. I can happily universalise my self-prescription to a prescription for any arbitrary agent in similar circumstances. In passing, a comment on the form of the prescription that the universalisability challenge will force me to endorse. I need not think that it is right that in the relevant circumstances every agent do O; that suggests a commitment to a collective pattern of behaviour. I will only be forced to think, in a person-by-person or distributive way, that for every agent it is right that in those circumstances he or she do O. Let doing O in C amount to swimming to the help of a child in trouble. Universalisability would not force me to think that everyone ought to swim to the help of a child in such a situation; undoubtedly they would frustrate one another’s efforts. It only requires me to think, as we colloquially put it, that anyone ought to swim to the help of the child; it only requires a person-by-person prescription, not a collective one.So much for the straightforward way in which consequentialism can make room for universalisability. But how is the universalisability challenge supposed to be met under non-consequentialist theories? According to **[Suppose a] non-consequentialist theory, [where] the right choice for any agent is to instantiate a certain pattern, P;** this may be the pattern of conforming to the categorical imperative, manifesting virtue, respecting rights, honouring their special obligations, or whatever. Suppose that I accept such a theory and that it leads me to say of an agent — again, let us suppose, myself — that I ought to choose O in these circumstances, C, or that O is the right choice for me in these circumstances. Can I straightforwardly say, as I could under consequentialist doctrine, that just for the reasons that O is the right choice for me — in this case, that it involves instantiating pattern, P — so it will be the right choice for any agent in C-type circumstances? I shall argue that there are difficulties in the path of such a straightforward response and that these raise a problem for non-consequentialism. The problem Suppose that I do say, in the straightforward way, **that** pattern P**requires, not just that I do O in C, but also**, for any agent whatsoever,**that [any] agent should do O in C as well.** Suppose I say, in effect, that it is right for me to do O in C only if it would be right for any agent X to do O in C. Whatever makes it right that I do O in C makes it right, so the response goes, that any agent do O in C. This response is going to lead me, as a non-consequentialist thinker, into trouble. Judging that something is right gives one a normative reason to prefer it; the judgment of rightness must provide such a reason if it is to have an action-guiding role. When I think that it is right that I do O in C, therefore, then I commit myself to there being a normative reason for me to prefer that I do O. And when I assert that it is right that anyone should do O in C-type circumstances, then I commit myself — again, because of the reason-giving force of the notion of rightness — to there being a normative reason for holding a broader preference. I commit myself to there being a normative reason for me to prefer, with any agent whatsoever, that in C-type circumstances that [any] agent do O. The problem with these reasons and these commitments, **however,** is that they may come apart. For it is often going to be possible**that**, perversely, **the best way** for me **to ensure** or increase the chance **that** for **any**arbitrary **agent**, X, that agent **does O in C**-type circumstances**, is to choose non-O myself in** those **C**ircumstances. The best way to satisfy the preference as to what the arbitrarily chosen agent should do may be to go against the preference as to what one should do oneself. The best way to get people to renounce violence may be to take it up oneself; the best way to get people to help their own children may be not to press for the advantage of one’s own; the best way to minimise murder may to commit a murder; and so on. More generally, the best way to promote the instantiation of pattern, P, where this is the basic pattern to which one swears non-consequentialist allegiance, may be to flout that pattern oneself. The best way to increase the chance that for any arbitrary agent, X, that agent instantiates P may be not to instantiate P oneself. How can I avoid the conclusion that in such a perverse situation I ought to promote the overall instantiation of my cherished pattern, even at the cost of not instantiating it myself? How, in other words, am I to keep faith with the non-consequentialist commitment to the rightness of instantiating P, even where this means that the overall realisation of the pattern falls short of what it might have been? It is hardly going to be plausible for me to say that normative reasons bearing on preferences over my own choices trump normative reasons bearing on preferences over how other people behave. Both sorts of reasons are supported in the common language of what is the right choice or of what ought to be done. And it would surely run against the spirit of universalisability — the spirit in which I deny that my own particular identity is important to the prescription defended — to say that a reasoned preference as to what I do myself should not be responsive to a similarly reasoned preference as to what people in general do — what arbitrary agent, X, does — in the sorts of circumstances in question. The upshot is that **if as a non-consequentialist** theorist**I** straightforwardly **universalise** the prescription that in a certain situation I should instantiate **a** favoured**pattern, P, then** the prescription to which I thereby commit myself — that in that situation any X ought to instantiate pattern, P — may force me to revise my original self-prescription. **I have equal reason to prefer both that I instantiate P and that any agent instantiate P** — this reason is expressed by the use of the word ‘right’ or ‘ought’ in each case — **and** the spirit of **universalizability blocks me from treating myself as** in any way **special**. **Thus,** if the preferences are inconsistent in a certain situation — if the choice is between my instantiating P alone, for example, or my acting so that many others instantiate P instead — then **I will have reason not to instantiate P myself.** As a would-be non-consequentialist thinker, my initial claim must have been that the point is to instantiate P in my own life, not promote it generally. But I countenance the general claims of the P-pattern **when I universalize** in the straightforward way: **I prescribe general conformity to that pattern, not just conformity in my own case. Thus** it now seems that what I must think is that this general conformity is to be promoted, even if that means not myself instantiating the pattern in my own behaviour or psychology or relationships. It seems that what **I must embrace**, in effect, is a**consequentialism** in which conformity to pattern P is the ultimate value to be promoted.

Implications:

A. I outweigh on coherence- most theories assume a form of equality by only the universalizability constraint ensures it by getting agents equal moral status.

B. No generic universalizability indicts because Petit is not talking about wiling a certain maxim but rather universalizing general conformity to the maxim of consequentialism.

C. Coopt appeals to practical rationality since we use decisive reason to analyze consequences.

The standard is minimizing death

Impact Calculus: I defend total utilitarianism, which mandates taking action that which will the result in the preservation in the most amounts of lives. This means

1. No Hedonic Indicts- I’m not concerned with how much pain or pleasure each individual feels but rather maximizing the amount of existence so they can have the potential for more pleasure.
2. Extinction comes first- we have disparate experiences which make it impossible to compare forms of pain that are contingent on perspective- death is the only objective metric since we know 5 deaths is greater than 1.
3. No Death Good Arguments- My framework says death is bad because it reduces the total sum of well-being possible- there’s always a possibility of existence being better than a status of non-existence.
4. Turns deont since agents wouldn’t will a maxim that would preclude the maxim-willing process since that would render a contradiction.

Prefer it for actor specificity- collective action results in tradeoffs that only consequentialism can resolve. Side constraints paralyze state action; it's impossible to compare tradeoffs involving opportunity costs. States lack intentionality or internal motivation since they're composed of multiple individuals. This also means no act-omission distinction since they create permissions and prohibitions in terms of policies so authorizing action can’t be considered an omission since the state assumes culpability in regulating the public domain. No permissibility or presumption since the state always has obligations. I’m the most germane to the resolution.

### Extinct FW

The standard is minimizing death. Epistemology comes first since it’s a study of how we acquire knowledge, which means that it’s a prerequisite to determining ethics. Consequentialism is the most epistemically accessible.

1. The only way we can know something is normatively good or bad is by the consequences- we wouldn’t know killing is bad unless we knew the result of death. And, empiricism is true. All knowledge stems from experience; we know nothing prior to sensory experience- that’s why you can’t reason color to a blind man. All experience reduces to pain aversion since it’s the only relevant expression of experience.
2. Actor-specificity is a meta-framing issue. Governments ONLY have access to knowledge towards the general aggregate not specific individuals, which means they must use consequentialism to determine policy action. And, collective action results in trade-off, which means that side constraints paralyze state action. States lack intentionality and internal motivation, which means there can’t be a distinction between acts and omissions since policy-makers consider permissions and prohibition when regulating the public domain. This means NO permissibility or presumption since governments make reasonably reliable predictions.
3. Epistemic uncertainty means we should default to preventing extinction to ensure the future has the possibility of more value. Indicts to the framework mandates it since we need as many perspectives as possible to resolve and act in accordance with the coherent ethical view. Framework contestation concedes the desire to escape uncertainty.
4. Risk analysis means preventing existential risk comes first. Bostrom 05

Bostrom, Nick. [Professor of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School, Director of Future of Humanity Institute Director of Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology, Professor of University of Oxford] "Transcript of "A Philosophical Quest for Our Biggest Problems"" TED. TED Conferences, July 2005. Web. 27 Dec. 2014. PH

Now, if we think about what just reducing the probability of human extinction by just one percentage point -- not very much -- so that's equivalent to 60 million lives saved, if we just count the currently living people, the current generation. Now one percent of six billion people is equivalent to 60 million. So that's a large number. If we were to take into account future generations that will never come into existence if we blow ourselves up, then the figure becomes astronomical. If we could eventually colonize a chunk of the universe -- the Virgo supercluster -- maybe it will take us 100 million years to get there, but if we go extinct we never will. Then, even a one percentage point reduction in the extinction risk could be equivalent to this astronomical number -- 10 to the power of 32. So if you take into account future generations as much as our own, every other moral imperative of philanthropic cost just becomes irrelevant. The only thing you should focus on would be to reduce existential risk because even the tiniest decrease in existential risk would just overwhelm any other benefit you could hope to achieve. And even if you just look at the current people, and ignore the potential that would be lost if we went extinct, it should still have a high priority. Now, let me spend the rest of my time on the third big problem, because it's more subtle and perhaps difficult to grasp. Think about some time in your life -- some people might never have experienced it -- but some people, there are just those moments that you have experienced where life was fantastic.

This means if there were a 1% chance of consequentialism being true, existential risk would be bad for the purpose of decision-making.

### Vs. Framework Debater FW

#### Morality must be universalizable. Only consequentialism can meet this constraint. Universalizing anything else results in a conflict in normative reasons. Pettit:

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Thus, if we say that an agent A ought to choose option O in circumstances C — these may bear on the character of the agent, the behaviour of others, the sorts of consequences on offer, and the like — then we assumethat something similar would hold for any similarly placed agent. We do not think that the particular identity of agent A is relevant to what A ought to do, any more than we think that the particular location or date is relevant to that issue. In making an assumption about what holds for any agent in C-type circumstances, of course, we may not be committing ourselves to anything of very general import. 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Can I straightforwardly say, as I could under consequentialist doctrine, that just for the reasons that O is the right choice for me — in this case, that it involves instantiating pattern, P — so it will be the right choice for any agent in C-type circumstances? I shall argue that there are difficulties in the path of such a straightforward response and that these raise a problem for non-consequentialism. The problem Suppose that I do say, in the straightforward way, **that** pattern P**requires, not just that I do O in C, but also**, for any agent whatsoever,**that [any] agent should do O in C as well.** Suppose I say, in effect, that it is right for me to do O in C only if it would be right for any agent X to do O in C. Whatever makes it right that I do O in C makes it right, so the response goes, that any agent do O in C. This response is going to lead me, as a non-consequentialist thinker, into trouble. Judging that something is right gives one a normative reason to prefer it; the judgment of rightness must provide such a reason if it is to have an action-guiding role. When I think that it is right that I do O in C, therefore, then I commit myself to there being a normative reason for me to prefer that I do O. And when I assert that it is right that anyone should do O in C-type circumstances, then I commit myself — again, because of the reason-giving force of the notion of rightness — to there being a normative reason for holding a broader preference. I commit myself to there being a normative reason for me to prefer, with any agent whatsoever, that in C-type circumstances that [any] agent do O. The problem with these reasons and these commitments, **however,** is that they may come apart. For it is often going to be possible**that**, perversely, **the best way** for me **to ensure** or increase the chance **that** for **any**arbitrary **agent**, X, that agent **does O in C**-type circumstances**, is to choose non-O myself in** those **C**ircumstances. The best way to satisfy the preference as to what the arbitrarily chosen agent should do may be to go against the preference as to what one should do oneself. The best way to get people to renounce violence may be to take it up oneself; the best way to get people to help their own children may be not to press for the advantage of one’s own; the best way to minimise murder may to commit a murder; and so on. More generally, the best way to promote the instantiation of pattern, P, where this is the basic pattern to which one swears non-consequentialist allegiance, may be to flout that pattern oneself. The best way to increase the chance that for any arbitrary agent, X, that agent instantiates P may be not to instantiate P oneself. How can I avoid the conclusion that in such a perverse situation I ought to promote the overall instantiation of my cherished pattern, even at the cost of not instantiating it myself? How, in other words, am I to keep faith with the non-consequentialist commitment to the rightness of instantiating P, even where this means that the overall realisation of the pattern falls short of what it might have been? It is hardly going to be plausible for me to say that normative reasons bearing on preferences over my own choices trump normative reasons bearing on preferences over how other people behave. Both sorts of reasons are supported in the common language of what is the right choice or of what ought to be done. And it would surely run against the spirit of universalisability — the spirit in which I deny that my own particular identity is important to the prescription defended — to say that a reasoned preference as to what I do myself should not be responsive to a similarly reasoned preference as to what people in general do — what arbitrary agent, X, does — in the sorts of circumstances in question. The upshot is that **if as a non-consequentialist** theorist**I** straightforwardly **universalise** the prescription that in a certain situation I should instantiate **a** favoured**pattern, P, then** the prescription to which I thereby commit myself — that in that situation any X ought to instantiate pattern, P — may force me to revise my original self-prescription. **I have equal reason to prefer both that I instantiate P and that any agent instantiate P** — this reason is expressed by the use of the word ‘right’ or ‘ought’ in each case — **and** the spirit of **universalizability blocks me from treating myself as** in any way **special**. **Thus,** if the preferences are inconsistent in a certain situation — if the choice is between my instantiating P alone, for example, or my acting so that many others instantiate P instead — then **I will have reason not to instantiate P myself.** As a would-be non-consequentialist thinker, my initial claim must have been that the point is to instantiate P in my own life, not promote it generally. But I countenance the general claims of the P-pattern **when I universalize** in the straightforward way: **I prescribe general conformity to that pattern, not just conformity in my own case. Thus** it now seems that what I must think is that this general conformity is to be promoted, even if that means not myself instantiating the pattern in my own behaviour or psychology or relationships. It seems that what **I must embrace**, in effect, is a**consequentialism** in which conformity to pattern P is the ultimate value to be promoted.

Impacts:

1. Controls the strongest internal link to equality since universalizability blocks arbitrary moral principles.
2. Escapes threshold indicts since I don’t will a specific maxim rather broad conformity, which avoids maxims with exceptions.
3. This coopts appeals to practical reason since reasons are used to analyze consequences.

The standard is consistency with consequentialism. General indicts of the standard modify consequentialist reasoning but do not defeat it. For example, an infinite calculation argument implies we should stop calculating and prefer foreseen impacts, but not that no consequences matter. Impact Calc:

Extinction comes first under the standard

1. Uncertainty means we should default to preventing extinction to ensure the future has the possibility of more value. Indicts to the framework mandates it since we need as many perspectives as possible to resolve and act in accordance with the coherent ethical view. Framework contestation concedes the desire to escape uncertainty.
2. Risk analysis means preventing existential risk comes first. Bostrom 05

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Now, if we think about what just reducing the probability of human extinction by just one percentage point -- not very much -- so that's equivalent to 60 million lives saved, if we just count the currently living people, the current generation. Now one percent of six billion people is equivalent to 60 million. So that's a large number. If we were to take into account future generations that will never come into existence if we blow ourselves up, then the figure becomes astronomical. If we could eventually colonize a chunk of the universe -- the Virgo supercluster -- maybe it will take us 100 million years to get there, but if we go extinct we never will. Then, even a one percentage point reduction in the extinction risk could be equivalent to this astronomical number -- 10 to the power of 32. So if you take into account future generations as much as our own, every other moral imperative of philanthropic cost just becomes irrelevant. The only thing you should focus on would be to reduce existential risk because even the tiniest decrease in existential risk would just overwhelm any other benefit you could hope to achieve. And even if you just look at the current people, and ignore the potential that would be lost if we went extinct, it should still have a high priority. Now, let me spend the rest of my time on the third big problem, because it's more subtle and perhaps difficult to grasp. Think about some time in your life -- some people might never have experienced it -- but some people, there are just those moments that you have experienced where life was fantastic.

This means if there were a 1% chance of consequentialism being true, existential risk would be bad for the purpose of decision-making.

Prefer for additional reasons

1. Actor-specificity is a meta-framing issue. Governments ONLY have access to knowledge towards the general aggregate not specific individuals, which means they must use consequentialism to determine policy action. Epistemology comes first when examining ethics because it’s a study of how we acquire knowledge making it a prerequisite to the resolution. And, collective action results in trade-off, which means that side constraints paralyze state action. States lack intentionality and internal motivation, which means there can’t be a distinction between acts and omissions since policy-makers consider permissions and prohibition when regulating the public domain. This means NO permissibility or presumption since governments make reasonably reliable predictions.
2. There’s no stable conception of personal identity, which only leaves experience, mandating consequentialism. Shoemaker

The Journal of Value Inquiry 33: 183–199, 1999. UTILITARIANISM AND PERSONAL IDENTITY © 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. ￼183 Utilitarianism and Personal Identity DAVID W. SHOEMAKER Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, 327 Clement Hall, Memphis, TN 38152, USA

Doing so has a number of significant implications for rationality and morality. For one thing, the unity of our lives is no longer guaranteed. Our lives may be more or less unified, given the degree to which psychological connectedness holds. For instance, **I am** presently **strongly connected to** that stage of **myself** that existed **yesterday, but** I amfairly **weakly connected to that** long-ago existing **ten-year-old stage of myself**. Parfit suggeststhe language of successive selves to illuminate the different degrees to which this relation might hold. We might use the word “self,” then, to refer to a collection of person-stages united by strong psychological connectedness, such that my ten-year-old self could be viewed as a past self, while my eighty- year-old self would presumably be a future self. The parts of my life with which I am strongly psychologically connected are united as my present self.7 In this way, different selves occasionally resemble different persons, and Parfit indicates that, at certain times and places, selves might be thought of as the appropriate objects of moral concern.8 But this notion also implies that **our lives may not be unified** in certain important respects.Psychological connectedness is certainly not guaranteed to unify our entire lives, and **so the reductionist view** itself **implies** at least the partial **disintegration of persons**.93. Utilitarianism and Reductionism Utilitarianism is an ethical theory for ranking various outcomes from an impersonal standpoint. **Utilitarians hold that the best state of affairs** among relevant alternatives **contains** the greatest net balance of **aggregate** individual **welfare**. Utilitarianism is impersonal insofar as it involves a focus solely on the total amounts of utility at stake in various outcomes, and “[i]t makes no moral difference [not] how these amounts are distributed as between different people.”10 Many utilitarians claim that the impersonality of the theory is entailed by a close analogy that obtains between cases of intrapersonal and interpersonal maximization. As Parfit remarks: “Since their attitude to sets of lives is like ours to single lives, [u]tilitarians ignore the boundaries between lives.”11 Parfit further believes that utilitarians accept this analogy **because they accept a reductionis[m]**t view about personal identity. If a person’s life is less deeply integrated than it would be on a non-reductionist view, then while principles of distributive justice central to non-utilitarian views ought to be given greater scope, targeting past, present, and future selves, they nevertheless ought to be given less weight. After all, if a person’s life is less unified than we normally think, and this undermines the hard and fast boundaries between lives as well, then distributive **principles relying on the separateness of persons** and the individual unity of a person’s life as deep facts **will have far less moral importance** than they would on a non-reductionist view. Some critics have claimed that utilitarians ignore the boundaries between lives because they think of all people as together constituting a collective super-person, but this charge is false, according to Parfit. Because of the partial disintegration of persons suggested by reductionism,utilitarians “may be treating benefits and burdens, not as if they all came within the same life, but as if it made no moral difference where they came.”12 Thus, Parfit suggests that reductionism may lend significant support to utilitarianism, simply becauseutilitarians can claim to be treating sets of lives like single lives, given that single lives are not deeply unified and are, in fact, metaphysically like sets of lives.

1. Moral truths are determined by what is most useful to believe. James

Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking - William James 1907. Print

The importance to human life of having true beliefs about matters of fact is a thing to notorious. We live in a world of realities that can be infinitely useful or infinitely harmful. Ideas that tell us which of them to expect count as the true ideas in all this primary sphere of verification, and the pursuit of such ideas is a primary human duty. **The possession of truth,** so far from being here an end in itself, **is only a preliminary means towards other vital satisfactions. If I am lost in the woods and starved, and find what looks like a** cow-**path, it is of the utmost importance that I should think of a human habitation at the end of it, for if I do so and follow it, I save myself. The true thought is useful here because the house** which **is** its**[the useful] object** is useful. **The practical value of true ideas is thus primarily derived from the practical importance of their objects to us.** Their objects are, indeed, not important at all times. **I may on another occasion have no use for the house; and then my idea of it, however verifiable, will be practically irrelevant, and had better remain latent.** Yet since almost any object may someday become temporarily important, the advantage of having a general stock of extra truths, of ideas that shall be true of merely possible situations, is obvious. We store such extra truths away in our memories, and with the overflow we fill our books of reference. Whenever such an extra truth becomes practically relevant to one of our emergencies, it passes from cold-storage to do work in the world and our belief in it grows active. **You can say** of it **then either that “it is useful because it is true” or that “it is true because it is useful**.” **Both these phrases mean exactly the same thing**, namely that here is an idea that gets fulfilled and can be verified. True is the name for whatever idea starts the verification-process useful is the name for its completed function in experience. **True ideas would never have been singled out as such, would never have acquired a class-name,** least of all a name **suggesting value, unless they had been useful from the outset in this way.**

Pragmatism implies consequentialism. To prove the resolution true, we have to show its general usefulness or practical value as a true statement. Consequentialism is the only theory that stems from taking into account the general pragmatic implications of our beliefs. Answers back deflationary arguments because we generate an obligation it is merely for the pragmatic nature of doing so.

### Vs. Trix

#### Morality must be universalizable. Only consequentialism can meet this constraint. Universalizing anything else results in a conflict in normative reasons. Pettit:

[Laurance S. Rockefeller University Professor of Politics and Human Values at Princeton University]. The Cost of Non-Consequentialism. February 5, 1999. <http://www.philo.umontreal.ca/documents/cahiers/Pettit\_Non-Consequentialism.pdf>

Every prescription as to what an agent ought to do should be capable of being universalised, so that it applies not just to that particular agent, and not just to that particular place or time or context or whatever. So at any rate we generally assume in our moral reasoning. If we think that it is right for one agent in one circumstance to act in a certain way, but wrong for another, then we commit ourselves to there being some further descriptive difference between the two cases, in particular a difference of a non-particular or universal kind. Thus, if we say that an agent A ought to choose option O in circumstances C — these may bear on the character of the agent, the behaviour of others, the sorts of consequences on offer, and the like — then we assumethat something similar would hold for any similarly placed agent. We do not think that the particular identity of agent A is relevant to what A ought to do, any more than we think that the particular location or date is relevant to that issue. In making an assumption about what holds for any agent in C-type circumstances, of course, we may not be committing ourselves to anything of very general import. It may be, for all the universalisability constraint requires, that C-type circumstances are highly specific: so specific, indeed, that no other agent is ever likely to confront them.There is no difficulty in seeing how the universalisability challenge is supposed to be met under consequentialist doctrine. **Suppose** that I accept**consequentialis[m]**t doctrine and believe of an agent that in their particular circumstances, C, he or she ought to choose an option O. For simplicity, suppose that I am myself that agent and that as a believer in consequentialism I think of myself that I ought to do O in C. If that option really **is right** by my consequentialist lights, **then that will be because of the neutral values that it promotes. But if those neutral values make O**the **right** option **for me** in those circumstances, so **they will make it** the **right** option **for any other agent** in such circumstances. Thus I can readily square the prescription to which my belief in consequentialism leads with my belief in universalisability. I can happily universalise my self-prescription to a prescription for any arbitrary agent in similar circumstances. In passing, a comment on the form of the prescription that the universalisability challenge will force me to endorse. I need not think that it is right that in the relevant circumstances every agent do O; that suggests a commitment to a collective pattern of behaviour. I will only be forced to think, in a person-by-person or distributive way, that for every agent it is right that in those circumstances he or she do O. Let doing O in C amount to swimming to the help of a child in trouble. Universalisability would not force me to think that everyone ought to swim to the help of a child in such a situation; undoubtedly they would frustrate one another’s efforts. It only requires me to think, as we colloquially put it, that anyone ought to swim to the help of the child; it only requires a person-by-person prescription, not a collective one.So much for the straightforward way in which consequentialism can make room for universalisability. But how is the universalisability challenge supposed to be met under non-consequentialist theories? According to **[Suppose a] non-consequentialist theory, [where] the right choice for any agent is to instantiate a certain pattern, P;** this may be the pattern of conforming to the categorical imperative, manifesting virtue, respecting rights, honouring their special obligations, or whatever. Suppose that I accept such a theory and that it leads me to say of an agent — again, let us suppose, myself — that I ought to choose O in these circumstances, C, or that O is the right choice for me in these circumstances. Can I straightforwardly say, as I could under consequentialist doctrine, that just for the reasons that O is the right choice for me — in this case, that it involves instantiating pattern, P — so it will be the right choice for any agent in C-type circumstances? I shall argue that there are difficulties in the path of such a straightforward response and that these raise a problem for non-consequentialism. The problem Suppose that I do say, in the straightforward way, **that** pattern P**requires, not just that I do O in C, but also**, for any agent whatsoever,**that [any] agent should do O in C as well.** Suppose I say, in effect, that it is right for me to do O in C only if it would be right for any agent X to do O in C. Whatever makes it right that I do O in C makes it right, so the response goes, that any agent do O in C. This response is going to lead me, as a non-consequentialist thinker, into trouble. Judging that something is right gives one a normative reason to prefer it; the judgment of rightness must provide such a reason if it is to have an action-guiding role. When I think that it is right that I do O in C, therefore, then I commit myself to there being a normative reason for me to prefer that I do O. And when I assert that it is right that anyone should do O in C-type circumstances, then I commit myself — again, because of the reason-giving force of the notion of rightness — to there being a normative reason for holding a broader preference. I commit myself to there being a normative reason for me to prefer, with any agent whatsoever, that in C-type circumstances that [any] agent do O. The problem with these reasons and these commitments, **however,** is that they may come apart. For it is often going to be possible**that**, perversely, **the best way** for me **to ensure** or increase the chance **that** for **any**arbitrary **agent**, X, that agent **does O in C**-type circumstances**, is to choose non-O myself in** those **C**ircumstances. The best way to satisfy the preference as to what the arbitrarily chosen agent should do may be to go against the preference as to what one should do oneself. The best way to get people to renounce violence may be to take it up oneself; the best way to get people to help their own children may be not to press for the advantage of one’s own; the best way to minimise murder may to commit a murder; and so on. More generally, the best way to promote the instantiation of pattern, P, where this is the basic pattern to which one swears non-consequentialist allegiance, may be to flout that pattern oneself. The best way to increase the chance that for any arbitrary agent, X, that agent instantiates P may be not to instantiate P oneself. How can I avoid the conclusion that in such a perverse situation I ought to promote the overall instantiation of my cherished pattern, even at the cost of not instantiating it myself? How, in other words, am I to keep faith with the non-consequentialist commitment to the rightness of instantiating P, even where this means that the overall realisation of the pattern falls short of what it might have been? It is hardly going to be plausible for me to say that normative reasons bearing on preferences over my own choices trump normative reasons bearing on preferences over how other people behave. Both sorts of reasons are supported in the common language of what is the right choice or of what ought to be done. And it would surely run against the spirit of universalisability — the spirit in which I deny that my own particular identity is important to the prescription defended — to say that a reasoned preference as to what I do myself should not be responsive to a similarly reasoned preference as to what people in general do — what arbitrary agent, X, does — in the sorts of circumstances in question. The upshot is that **if as a non-consequentialist** theorist**I** straightforwardly **universalise** the prescription that in a certain situation I should instantiate **a** favoured**pattern, P, then** the prescription to which I thereby commit myself — that in that situation any X ought to instantiate pattern, P — may force me to revise my original self-prescription. **I have equal reason to prefer both that I instantiate P and that any agent instantiate P** — this reason is expressed by the use of the word ‘right’ or ‘ought’ in each case — **and** the spirit of **universalizability blocks me from treating myself as** in any way **special**. **Thus,** if the preferences are inconsistent in a certain situation — if the choice is between my instantiating P alone, for example, or my acting so that many others instantiate P instead — then **I will have reason not to instantiate P myself.** As a would-be non-consequentialist thinker, my initial claim must have been that the point is to instantiate P in my own life, not promote it generally. But I countenance the general claims of the P-pattern **when I universalize** in the straightforward way: **I prescribe general conformity to that pattern, not just conformity in my own case. Thus** it now seems that what I must think is that this general conformity is to be promoted, even if that means not myself instantiating the pattern in my own behaviour or psychology or relationships. It seems that what **I must embrace**, in effect, is a**consequentialism** in which conformity to pattern P is the ultimate value to be promoted.

#### The standard is consistency with consequentialism. General indicts of the standard modify consequentialist reasoning but do not defeat it. For example, an infinite calculation argument implies we should stop calculating and prefer foreseen impacts, but not that no consequences matter. Impact Calc:

Extinction comes first under the standard

1. Uncertainty means we should default to preventing extinction to ensure the future has the possibility of more value. Indicts to the framework mandates it since we need as many perspectives as possible to resolve and act in accordance with the coherent ethical view. Framework contestation concedes the desire to escape uncertainty.
2. Risk analysis means preventing existential risk comes first. Bostrom 05

Bostrom, Nick. [Professor of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School, Director of Future of Humanity Institute Director of Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology, Professor of University of Oxford] "Transcript of "A Philosophical Quest for Our Biggest Problems"" TED. TED Conferences, July 2005. Web. 27 Dec. 2014. PH

Now, if we think about what just reducing the probability of human extinction by just one percentage point -- not very much -- so that's equivalent to 60 million lives saved, if we just count the currently living people, the current generation. Now one percent of six billion people is equivalent to 60 million. So that's a large number. If we were to take into account future generations that will never come into existence if we blow ourselves up, then the figure becomes astronomical. If we could eventually colonize a chunk of the universe -- the Virgo supercluster -- maybe it will take us 100 million years to get there, but if we go extinct we never will. Then, even a one percentage point reduction in the extinction risk could be equivalent to this astronomical number -- 10 to the power of 32. So if you take into account future generations as much as our own, every other moral imperative of philanthropic cost just becomes irrelevant. The only thing you should focus on would be to reduce existential risk because even the tiniest decrease in existential risk would just overwhelm any other benefit you could hope to achieve. And even if you just look at the current people, and ignore the potential that would be lost if we went extinct, it should still have a high priority. Now, let me spend the rest of my time on the third big problem, because it's more subtle and perhaps difficult to grasp. Think about some time in your life -- some people might never have experienced it -- but some people, there are just those moments that you have experienced where life was fantastic.

This means if there were a 1% chance of consequentialism being true, existential risk would be bad for the purpose of decision-making.

Prefer for additional reasons

1. Actor-specificity is a meta-framing issue. Governments ONLY have access to knowledge towards the general aggregate not specific individuals, which means they must use consequentialism to determine policy action. Epistemology comes first when examining ethics because it’s a study of how we acquire knowledge making it a prerequisite to the resolution. And, collective action results in trade-off, which means that side constraints paralyze state action. States lack intentionality and internal motivation, which means there can’t be a distinction between acts and omissions since policy-makers consider permissions and prohibition when regulating the public domain. Even when policy-makers question the distinction they are consciously making a choice about what to DO and NOT DO. This means NO permissibility or presumption since governments make reasonably reliable predictions.
2. There’s no stable conception of personal identity, which only leaves experience, mandating consequentialism. Shoemaker

The Journal of Value Inquiry 33: 183–199, 1999. UTILITARIANISM AND PERSONAL IDENTITY © 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. ￼183 Utilitarianism and Personal Identity DAVID W. SHOEMAKER Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, 327 Clement Hall, Memphis, TN 38152, USA

Doing so has a number of significant implications for rationality and morality. For one thing, the unity of our lives is no longer guaranteed. Our lives may be more or less unified, given the degree to which psychological connectedness holds. For instance, **I am** presently **strongly connected to** that stage of **myself** that existed **yesterday, but** I amfairly **weakly connected to that** long-ago existing **ten-year-old stage of myself**. Parfit suggeststhe language of successive selves to illuminate the different degrees to which this relation might hold. We might use the word “self,” then, to refer to a collection of person-stages united by strong psychological connectedness, such that my ten-year-old self could be viewed as a past self, while my eighty- year-old self would presumably be a future self. The parts of my life with which I am strongly psychologically connected are united as my present self.7 In this way, different selves occasionally resemble different persons, and Parfit indicates that, at certain times and places, selves might be thought of as the appropriate objects of moral concern.8 But this notion also implies that **our lives may not be unified** in certain important respects.Psychological connectedness is certainly not guaranteed to unify our entire lives, and **so the reductionist view** itself **implies** at least the partial **disintegration of persons**.93. Utilitarianism and Reductionism Utilitarianism is an ethical theory for ranking various outcomes from an impersonal standpoint. **Utilitarians hold that the best state of affairs** among relevant alternatives **contains** the greatest net balance of **aggregate** individual **welfare**. Utilitarianism is impersonal insofar as it involves a focus solely on the total amounts of utility at stake in various outcomes, and “[i]t makes no moral difference [not] how these amounts are distributed as between different people.”10 Many utilitarians claim that the impersonality of the theory is entailed by a close analogy that obtains between cases of intrapersonal and interpersonal maximization. As Parfit remarks: “Since their attitude to sets of lives is like ours to single lives, [u]tilitarians ignore the boundaries between lives.”11 Parfit further believes that utilitarians accept this analogy **because they accept a reductionis[m]**t view about personal identity. If a person’s life is less deeply integrated than it would be on a non-reductionist view, then while principles of distributive justice central to non-utilitarian views ought to be given greater scope, targeting past, present, and future selves, they nevertheless ought to be given less weight. After all, if a person’s life is less unified than we normally think, and this undermines the hard and fast boundaries between lives as well, then distributive **principles relying on the separateness of persons** and the individual unity of a person’s life as deep facts **will have far less moral importance** than they would on a non-reductionist view. Some critics have claimed that utilitarians ignore the boundaries between lives because they think of all people as together constituting a collective super-person, but this charge is false, according to Parfit. Because of the partial disintegration of persons suggested by reductionism,utilitarians “may be treating benefits and burdens, not as if they all came within the same life, but as if it made no moral difference where they came.”12 Thus, Parfit suggests that reductionism may lend significant support to utilitarianism, simply becauseutilitarians can claim to be treating sets of lives like single lives, given that single lives are not deeply unified and are, in fact, metaphysically like sets of lives.

Takes out reason-based frameworks and arguments that rely on static conception of agency because in the absence of personal identity people reduce to collective units of aggregation which can only entail a maximization calculus.

1. Moral truths are determined by what is most useful to believe. James

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### Interps

#### *Interpretation: Merriam-Webster defines require.*

*Require." Merriam-Webster.com. Merriam-Webster, n.d. Web. 22 Dec. 2014. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/require>. PH*

*“to impose a compulsion or command on : compel”.*

*Since governments are only capable of motivating action or coercion through codified legal statutes, we must use a comparative worlds paradigm where the affirmative defends implementation and the negative defends a competing policy option. This is key to reciprocity since otherwise the negative can side step the affirmative to gain a 3-1 advantage. Also, means truth testing isn’t textual.*

#### “Require” in the context of a governmental actor means implementation. DeBois 14

DeBois, Danny. [(Harvard ’18) Champion of TOC, NCFL Grand Nationals, assistant coach at Harvard-Westlake in California, and Instructor at VBI and NSD.] "2.2 Defining and Interpreting the Resolution." Victory Briefs. Victory Briefs, 15 Dec. 2014. Web. 22 Dec. 2014. PH

Webster’s defines “require” as “to impose a compulsion or command on”4 The resolution implies some type of governmental mandate on employers to pay a living wage, meaning that policy implementation is definitely an aspect of the topic. I predict that most topicality arguments in favor of plans will be based on the word “require,” as governments require agents act a certain way by passing laws. Note, however, that there is a distinction between specification and implementation: the aff can defend the action of mandating that employers pay a living wage and defend real world implications, but also choose not to narrow down the advocacy to a particular place.

This means we use a comparative worlds paradigm where the affirmative defends implementation and the negative defends a competing policy option. This is key to reciprocity since otherwise the negative can side step the affirmative to gain a 3-1 advantage. Also, means truth testing isn’t textual.

#### Err aff on T and theory and at worst, re-evalute AC offense on neg T

A. The affirmative speaks first so I’m forced to set the parameters- I can never know what interpretation they want, so reevaluation solves since it allows me to still engage while cohering with their interpretational preference.

B. There’s multiple legitimate interpretations so I always run the risk of losing on T, competing interps makes the problem worse on T since there’s always a risk of controversy in the lit from author conflating terms or using them synonymously with different terms.

#### The negative must do all weighing and impact framing in the 1NC- this key to aff strategy because otherwise they can expand in the 2NR to spread out the aff. Also, key to resolvability since if they introduce new weighing for arguments that were in the AC it requires interpretive intervention since there’s only 1-speech interaction.

### Case

#### Contention 1 is Inherency: Competition has pressured businesses to adopt economic strategies that cause ultra-low wages- increasing disparity. This is caused by the lack of uniform legislation on wages on the international level. Roy 12

Bhattacharjee, Anannya, and Ashim Roy. "Asia Floor Wage and global industrial collective bargaining." Social justice and growth: The role of the minimum wage (2012): 67. PH

Freer capital flows, expanding global companies and expansive trade policies have made the world a smaller place for capital. At the same time, the gap between the rich and the poor has grown and precarious jobs overshadow hard-won security gained through numerous struggles in the twentieth cen- tury. According to the ILO, “since the mid-1990s, the proportion of people on low pay – defined as less than two-thirds of median wages – has increased in more than two-thirds of countries with available data” (ILO, 2010). Furthermore, “the number of workers in vulnerable employment is estimated at 1.53 billion workers globally in 2009, more than half of all workers in the world” (ILO, 2011, p. 58). According to the ILO, there are 555 million working poor, a significant percentage being female. It is important to note that the global labour force implicit in these discussions is often viewed as a homogenous bloc. However, in reality, this labour force is far from homogenous. It is highly segmented geographically and its characteristics depend on the poverty level of the region and the country. Asia the largest recipient of foreign investment, also holds the largest workforce and represents most of the global working poor among which women comprise an increasingly significant proportion. This is no coincidence because foreign investment seeks out the most pliant poor and undervalued working class. However, it is also this dual reality that makes Asia central to any strategy for making large-scale change – either from capital’s point of view or labour’s. In Asia, “South Asia has one-fifth of the world’s population and nearly half of its poor population. A large proportion of world’s unskilled workers live in South Asia. Given the relative scarcity of natural resources, South Asia’s comparative advantage is clearly in labor- intensive goods” (Ramaswamy, 2003, p. 5). The garment industry is of course one such labour-intensive industry that absorbs low- and high-skilled workers. The common wisdom among governments is that the pliancy of labour force attracts foreign investment; and without foreign investment, develop- ment comes to a standstill. The architects of such globalization believe that unfettered corporate-led trade and investment, along with labour flexibility and capital market restructuring, are the tools for prosperity. The multi- national companies leading this approach are based primarily in the global North. Northern governments, through their disproportionate power in international financial institutions, help in forging the road to this illusive prosperity. Governments and corporations of the global South have, for the most part, acquiesced to such policies with varying degrees of resistance. This view of development “imposes a tremendous downward pressure on the quality of life of many societies in the developing world, for governments have bet their sustainability in power on customary centre-periphery relationships. They put emphasis on the attraction of so-called foreign direct investment (FDI) by offering cheap labour at misery prices to global cor- porations. The argument is that this generates jobs and triggers other multi- plying effects that benefit the overall economy” (de Regil, 2010, p. 3). The downward pressure on wages in already low-wage countries and re- gions demonstrates the power relations within a geographically segmented labour market. Multinationals take advantage of low wages in production countries and high price markets in high-wage countries. They essentially pay wages in one currency and sell the goods produced in another currency, bene- fiting from exchange rates that are grounded in the demands of the currency market and not adjusted by the relative price levels in local currencies of two countries. One could describe this phenomenon of taking advantage of pro- ducing in one currency and selling in another as “wage arbitrage”. The split between production and consumption is demarcated by different currencies, by different price levels, thus providing additional profit that is not linked to the production process per se. The multinationals’ access to high-price markets in high-wage countries and their power to deny direct access to firms of production countries to that market allows their unchallenged power in the global supply chain to continue. This power to access labour from countries with poverty-level low wages and to control simultaneously the high-price markets introduces a structural element. Wage share and purchasing power Within a framework of unequal regional and national development, un- equal and segmented labour market, and the power of multinationals to benefit from both these factors, labour rights have become one of the most threatened rights in the world today. According to one scholar: “There is no accurate data on the percentage engaged in global production systems, but case studies suggest that even in high value export sectors workers are not immune from vulnerability to poverty” (Barrientos, 2007, p. 18). As noted by another scholar, “[i]n the 1950s to the 1960s, there was huge and shared growth. However, now there are stark and growing inequalities. In the United States, from 1980–2000, the topmost layer (0.1 per cent) increased its growth by ten times but the median family only by 22 per cent. Average income of workers declined or stagnated. Whereas the income of the CEO of General Motors compared to the average worker used to be 1:70, today the gap between the same in Wal-Mart is 1:140. Capital can only be forced to accept social compact (between workers, state and capital) through strong working class movements.”1 While the global economy grew at an average of 3.3 per cent per year between 1995 and 2007, annual wage growth was at 1.9 per cent. Wage share has been declining across the globe and, given its wide dispersion, this is a structural issue that must be attended to in order to avert further im- poverishment (Vaughan-Whitehead, 2010). The ILO’s Global Wage Report 2010/11 sounded the alarm: “the overall short-term impact of the crisis on wages should be looked at within the context of a long-term decline in the share of wages in total income, a growing disconnect between productivity growth and wages, and widespread and growing wage inequality” (ILO, 2010). It is useful to note here that the practice of “wage arbitrage”, as ex- plained above, has led to this disconnect between productivity and wages, es- pecially in the case of goods being produced in a poorer region and sold in a wealthier one. The net result is a fall in the purchasing power of the majority of people in Asia, over production of goods for which there are not enough con- sumers and unemployment in the global North. People’s purchasing power is falling and poverty levels are being pushed down so that few people can be listed below it (Patnaik, 2007). This has blocked out the majority of to- day’s consumers from the consumer market. Paying decent wages is an essential measure for a stable capitalism. “It is a non-partisan belief even among those who wish to save capitalism. During the Golden Era of capitalism in the 1950s and 1960s, the United States established a floor below which the wage would not drop; this acted as a shock absorber. Ironically, as the welfare state’s shock absorber prevented crisis in capitalism, it led to the false belief that capitalism had overcome the tendency for crisis.”2 It is not enough to create any kind of employment; it is important to create decent jobs – that makes for sound social and economic policy. Labour standards are an indicator of what the working conditions are and what they ought to be. From basic issues of wage and hours, decent labour standards ought also to tell us about the decency of the work in terms of its ability to support families and educate children, remove social inequities, give workers a fair share of wealth, a voice in work and society, and human dignity. Trade unions and labour organizations have learned that in today’s world, enforcement of labour standards and rights can no longer take place solely within the nation-state boundaries. Global capital flows and the global structuring of corporations have taken the initiative for labour standards from the hands of any one local employer or unit. The global supply chain, which is created, is the stage on which the enforcement of labour standards and rights must take place.

#### Contention 2 is Plan Text

#### Resolved: Just governments will require that all employers pay a living wage, by adopting an international minimum wage. Zachofsky 04

Zachofsky 04 [Zachofsky, Rex. Hofstra University School of Law. "An International Minimum Wage: Can a Historical Solution Solve a Modern Day Problem?" Journal of International Business and Law: Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 11, 2004] CT

An international minimum wage would stabilize global trade pressure¶ and promote the industrialization of developing nations.258 The goal of such a¶ standard would be to ensure each worker receives a 'living wage,' sufficient to¶ provide a decent standard of living for themselves, and their families. 9¶ Workers wages would, of course, be increased gradually so as not to¶ unnecessarily disrupt the financial system of each country. 260 The international¶ minimum wage would be readily enforceable through one of several possible¶ international organizations such as the United Nations or the World Trade¶ Organization. 261 The United States and other participating countries could also¶ enforce the standard through the use of trade sanctions against non-complying¶ countries.262 An international minimum wage would forestall the migration of jobs and deny multinational corporations the incentive to move factories from¶ one country to another and play impoverished workers against one another.2 63¶ All companies seeking to do business in the new 'international minimum wage'¶ economy must pay its workers an adequate living wage and follow the minimum¶ standards of decency and personal dignity.

#### And, wages are indexed to account for relevant distinctions between nations. Zachofsky 2

Zachofsky 04 [Zachofsky, Rex. Hofstra University School of Law. "An International Minimum Wage: Can a Historical Solution Solve a Modern Day Problem?" Journal of International Business and Law: Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 11, 2004] PH

In order to establish an international minimum wage standard that may¶ be universally applied, the regulation must contain a degree of flexibility which¶ will allow the minimum wage to reflect an accurate living wage for each¶ specific country.213¶ The International Labour Organization has entertained various¶ proposals for the establishment of a global minimum wage.214 At the 5 3rd¶ session of the International Labour Conference, the Organization evaluated¶ various methods for fixing an international standard.215 In order to¶ accommodate as many nations as possible, proposals at the conference included¶ establishing a "recommendation" of an international wage base, rather than a¶ more rigid, "convention," as a means to keep the standard flexible.216 The¶ purpose of employing such a high degree of flexibility would be to ensure that the standard could conform to various social and economic factors, specific to¶ certain nations.21 7¶ A multi-tiered international wage system is one such flexible proposal,¶ designed to limit the adverse impact of the law, while concurrently maximizing¶ its potential benefits. 218 Under this system, a macroeconomic international¶ minimum wage would be set at 25% of the global yearly salary for a full-time¶ worker, 19 while simultaneously establishing a local wage standard according to¶ a PPP index,220 which considers the cost of purchasing basic commodities¶ specific to that country.22 1 In addition, a tertiary level of wage protection could¶ be created by setting a national minimum wage for each individual country, set¶ at 25% of the average national income. 222 This multi-tiered system may¶ realistically lead to the creation of several potential minimum wage figures. 223¶ However, the standard which provides for the highest wages in any locality is to¶ be employed.224¶ Several recommendations have stressed the importance of a gradual¶ implementation of any comprehensive global minimum wages.225 As one¶ proposal suggests, wages should be increased slightly at first, in order to keep¶ from disrupting the economies of developing countries, and then raised annually¶ until c

#### Contention 3 is Global Econ

#### The global economy is finally growing, but the recovery is fragile. Increasing income inequality is the biggest threat- the aff is key to solve. Thompson 14

Thompson 2014 [Mark Thompson “Global economic recovery feeds growing inequality” CNN. ½-/2014 <http://money.cnn.com/2014/01/20/news/economy/davos-economy-inequality/>] CT

The economic recovery is gathering pace but too few people are feeling the benefits, and experts warn that rising inequality is the single biggest risk the world economy faces.¶ The top line numbers are looking brighter: The global economy should grow by 3.2% this year, up from 2.4% in 2013, according to the World Bank.¶ Yet for many, in the developed world and emerging markets alike, the recovery from the worst economic crisis since the 1930s has a phantom-like quality. Many people can't see an improvement in their quality of life, and the gap between the rich and poor is growing.¶ "Since the global financial crisis, it's been a race to the bottom in jobs, wages and living standards," said Philip Jennings, general secretary of UNI Global Union.¶ Central banks have pumped trillions of dollars into the world financial system to stabilize their economies, sending stock markets and real estate prices soaring to the benefit of the wealthy.¶ At the same time, governments have slashed public sector jobs, reduced protections for those working in the private sector, cut welfare benefits and made pensions less generous -- changes that hit the young and most vulnerable the hardest. Companies continue to shed jobs, too. The World Economic Forum, which is hosting its annual meeting of the business elite in the Swiss mountain resort of Davos this week, surveyed over 700 experts about what was the biggest risk to the global economy over the next 10 years. The answer: a yawning gap in incomes that could put a hug

#### It’s Try-or-Die: Collapse is inevitable in status quo. 5000 years of historical analysis shows that inequality destroys the global economy- the aff is key to solve. Ahmed 14

[Nafeez Ahmed, executive director of the Institute for Policy Research & Development. “Nasa-funded study: industrial civilisation headed for 'irreversible collapse'?” 3/14/2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2014/mar/14/nasa-civilisation-irreversible-collapse-study-scientists>] CT

A new study partly-sponsored by Nasa's Goddard Space Flight Center has highlighted the prospect that global industrial civilisation could collapse in coming decades due to unsustainable resource exploitation and increasingly unequal wealth distribution.¶ Noting that warnings of 'collapse' are often seen to be fringe or controversial, the study attempts to make sense of compelling historical data showing that "the process of rise-and-collapse is actually a recurrent cycle found throughout history." Cases of severe civilisational disruption due to "precipitous collapse - often lasting centuries - have been quite common."¶ The independent research project is based on a new cross-disciplinary 'Human And Nature DYnamical' (HANDY) model, led by applied mathematician Safa Motesharrei of the US National Science Foundation-supported National Socio-Environmental Synthesis Center, in association with a team of natural and social scientists. The HANDY model was created using a minor Nasa grant, but the study based on it was conducted independently. The study based on the HANDY model has been accepted for publication in the peer-reviewed Elsevier journal, Ecological Economics.¶ It finds that according to the historical record even advanced, complex civilisations are susceptible to collapse, raising questions about the sustainability of modern civilisation:¶ "The fall of the Roman Empire, and the equally (if not more) advanced Han, Mauryan, and Gupta Empires, as well as so many advanced Mesopotamian Empires, are all testimony to the fact that advanced, sophisticated, complex, and creative civilizations can be both fragile and impermanent."¶ By investigating the human-nature dynamics of these past cases of collapse, the project identifies the most salient interrelated factors which explain civilisational decline, and which may help determine the risk of collapse today: namely, Population, Climate, Water, Agriculture, and Energy.¶ These factors can lead to collapse when they converge to generate two crucial social features: "the stretching of resources due to the strain placed on the ecological carrying capacity"; and "the economic stratification of society into Elites [rich] and Masses (or "Commoners") [poor]" These social phenomena have played "a central role in the character or in the process of the collapse," in all such cases over "the last five thousand years."¶ Currently, high levels of economic stratification are linked directly to overconsumption of resources, with "Elites" based largely in industrialised countries responsible for both:¶ "... accumulated surplus is not evenly distributed throughout society, but rather has been controlled by an elite. The mass of the population, while producing the wealth, is only allocated a small portion of it by elites, usually at or just above subsistence levels."¶ The study challenges those who argue that technology will resolve these challenges by increasing efficiency:¶ "Technological change can raise the efficiency of resource use, but it also tends to raise both per capita resource consumption and the scale of resource extraction, so that, absent policy effects, the increases in consumption often compensate for the increased efficiency of resource use."¶ Productivity increases in agriculture and industry over the last two centuries has come from "increased (rather than decreased) resource throughput," despite dramatic efficiency gains over the same period.¶ Modelling a range of different scenarios, Motesharrei and his colleagues conclude that under conditions "closely reflecting the reality of the world today... we find that collapse is difficult to avoid." In the first of these scenarios, civilisation:¶ ".... appears to be on a sustainable path for quite a long time, but even using an optimal depletion rate and starting with a very small number of Elites, the Elites eventually consume too much, resulting in a famine among Commoners that eventually causes the collapse of society. It is important to note that this Type-L collapse is due to an inequality-induced famine that causes a loss of workers, rather than a collapse of Nature."¶ Another scenario focuses on the role of continued resource exploitation, finding that "with a larger depletion rate, the decline of the Commoners occurs faster, while the Elites are still thriving, but eventually the Commoners collapse completely, followed by the Elites."¶ In both scenarios, Elite wealth monopolies mean that they are buffered from the most "detrimental effects of the environmental collapse until much later than the Commoners", allowing them to "continue 'business as usual' despite the impending catastrophe." The same mechanism, they argue, could explain how "historical collapses were allowed to occur by elites who appear to be oblivious to the catastrophic trajectory (most clearly apparent in the Roman and Mayan cases)."¶ Applying this lesson to our contemporary predicament, the study warns that:¶ "While some members of society might raise the alarm that the system is moving towards an impending collapse and therefore advocate structural changes to society in order to avoid it, Elites and their supporters, who opposed making these changes, could point to the long sustainable trajectory 'so far' in support of doing nothing."¶ However, the scientists point out that the worst-case scenarios are by no means inevitable, and suggest that appropriate policy and structural changes could avoid collapse, if not pave the way toward a more stable civilisation.¶ The two key solutions are to reduce economic inequality so as to ensure fairer distribution of resources, and to dramatically reduce resource consumption by relying on less intensive renewable resources and reducing population growth:¶ "Collapse can be avoided and population can reach equilibrium if the per capita rate of depletion of nature is reduced to a sustainable level, and if resources are distributed in a reasonably equitable fashion."¶ The NASA-funded HANDY model offers a highly credible wake-up call to governments, corporations and business - and consumers - to recognise that 'business as usual' cannot be sustained, and that policy and structural changes are required immediately.¶ Although the study based on HANDY is largely theoretical - a 'thought-experiment' - a number of other more empirically-focused studies - by KPMG and the UK Government Office of Science for instance - have warned that the convergence of food, water and energy crises could create a 'perfect storm' within about fifteen years. But these 'business as usual' forecasts could be very conservative.

#### Growth solves a litany of impacts- sustainability is the key internal link. Goklany 07

Goklany, Indur M. [Julian Simon Fellow at the Political Economy Research Center, PhD] "Now for the Good News." Reason.com. Reason Foundation, 23 Mar. 2007. Web. 20 Jan. 2015.

Environmentalists and globalization foes are united in their fear that greater population and consumption of energy, materials, and chemicals accompanying economic growth, technological change and free trade—the mainstays of globalization—degrade human and environmental well-being. Indeed, the 20th century saw the United States’ population multiply by four, income by seven, carbon dioxide emissions by nine, use of materials by 27, and use of chemicals by more than 100. Yet life expectancy increased from 47 years to 77 years. Onset of major disease such as cancer, heart, and respiratory disease has been postponed between eight and eleven years in the past century. Heart disease and cancer rates have been in rapid decline over the last two decades, and total cancer deaths have actually declined the last two years, despite increases in population. Among the very young, infant mortality has declined from 100 deaths per 1,000 births in 1913 to just seven per 1,000 today. These improvements haven’t been restricted to the United States. It’s a global phenomenon. **Worldwide, life expectancy has more than doubled**, from 31 years in 1900 to 67 years today. India’s and China’s infant mortalities exceeded 190 per 1,000 births in the early 1950s; today they are 62 and 26, respectively. In the developing world, the proportion of the population suffering from chronic hunger declined from 37 percent to 17 percent between 1970 and 2001 despite a 83 percent increase in population. Globally average annual incomes in real dollars have tripled since 1950. Consequently, the proportion of the planet's developing-world population living in absolute **poverty has halved** since 1981, from 40 percent to 20 percent. Child labor in low income countries declined from 30 percent to 18 percent between 1960 and 2003. Equally important, **the world is more literate and better educated** than ever. People are freer politically, economically, and socially to pursue their well-being as they see fit. More people choose their own rulers, and have freedom of expression. They are more likely to live under rule of law, and less likely to be arbitrarily deprived of life, limb, and property. Social and professional mobility have also never been greater. It’s easier than ever for people across the world to transcend the bonds of caste, place, gender, and other accidents of birth. People today work fewer hours and have more money and better health to enjoy their leisure time than their ancestors. Man’s environmental record is more complex. The early stages of development can indeed cause some environmental deterioration as societies pursue first-order problems affecting human well-being. These include hunger, malnutrition, illiteracy, and lack of education, basic public health services, safe water, sanitation, mobility, and ready sources of energy. Because greater wealth alleviates these problems while providing basic creature comforts, individuals and societies initially focus on economic development, often neglecting other aspects of environmental quality. **In time**, however, they recognize that environmental deterioration reduces their quality of life. Accordingly, **they put more** of their recently acquired **wealth** and human capital **into developing** and implementing **cleaner tech**nologies. This brings about an environmental transition via the twin forces of economic development and technological progress, which begin to provide solutions to environmental problems instead of creating those problems. All of which is why we today find that **the richest countries are also the cleanest**. And while many developing countries have yet to get past the “green ceiling,” they are nevertheless ahead of where today’s developed countries used to be when they were equally wealthy. The point of transition from "industrial period" to "environmental conscious" continues to fall. For example, the US introduced unleaded gasoline only after its GDP per capita exceeded $16,000. India and China did the same before they reached $3,000 per capita. **This** progress **is a testament to** the power of **globalization and** the **transfer of ideas and knowledge** (that lead is harmful, for example). It's also testament to the importance of trade in transferring technology from developed to developing countries—in this case, the technology needed to remove lead from gasoline. This hints at the answer to the question of why some parts of the world have been left behind while the rest of the world has thrived. Why have improvements in well-being stalled in areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab world? The proximate cause of improvements in well-being is a “cycle of progress” composed of the mutually reinforcing forces of economic development and technological progress. But that cycle itself is propelled by a web of essential institutions, particularly property rights, free markets, and rule of law. Other important institutions would include science- and technology-based problem-solving founded on skepticism and experimentation; receptiveness to new technologies and ideas; and freer trade in goods, services—most importantly in knowledge and ideas. In short, **free and open societies prosper.** Isolation, intolerance, and hostility to the free exchange of knowledge, technology, people, and goods breed stagnation or regression.

#### *Global economic crisis causes war and terrorism. Royal 10*

*Jedediah Royal, director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal, and Political Perspectives, 2010, pg 213-215 PH*

*Less intuitive is how* ***periods of economic decline*** *may* ***increase[s] the likelihood of external*** *conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defense behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances* ***Modelski and Thompson****’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory,* ***find****ing* ***that rhythms******in*** *the global economy* ***are associated with the*** *rise and* ***fall of*** *a pre-eminent* ***power and the often bloody*** *transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous* ***shocks*** *such as economic crises could* ***usher in a redistribution of*** *relative* ***power*** *(see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances,* ***increasing*** *the risk of* ***miscalculation*** *(Fearon 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflicts as* ***a rising power may*** *seek to* ***challenge a declining power*** *(Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remains unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggest that “future expectation of trade” is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavior of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However,* ***if*** *the* ***expectations of future trade decline****, particularly for difficult to replace item such as energy resources, the likelihood for* ***conflict increases****, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favor. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg and Hess, 2002, p. 89)* ***Economic decline has also been linked with*** *an increase in the likelihood of* ***terrorism*** *(Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. “Diversionary theory” suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a “rally around the flag” effect.*

#### Collapse leads to war that causes extinction. Lewis 2k

Lewis 00 – Instructor in American Studies Program at University of Colorado-Boulder [Chris H., “The Paradox of Global Development and the Necessary Collapse of Global Industrial Civilization,” Jun, http://www.cross-x.com/archives/LewisParadox.pdf]

Of course, most critics would argue, probably correctly, that instead of allowing underdeveloped countries to withdraw from the global economy and undermine the economies of the developed world, the [US] United States, Europe, and Japan and others will fight neo-colonial wars to force these countries to remain within this collapsing gl obal economy. These neocolonial wars will result[ing] in mass-death, suffering, and even regional nuclear wars. If First World countries choose military confrontation and political repression to maintain the global economy, then we may see mass- death and genocide at a global scale that will make the deaths of World War II pale in comparison. However, these neo-colonial wars, fought to maintain the developed nations' economic and political hegemony, will cause the final collapse of global industrial civilization. These wars will so damage the complex economic and trading networks and squander material, biological, and energy and human resources that they will undermine the global economy and its ability to support the Earth's six to eight billion people. This would be the worst-case scenario for the collapse of global civilization. This is the kind of global nightmare world that would have been created by a full-scale global nuclear war during the days of the Cold War. A civilization that prepared for such a global holocaust can’t entirely be trusted to manage a soft landing after the collapse of global industrial civilization. This is the nightmare that haunts many concerned intellectuals, who really understand the brutality and inhumanity demonstrated by 20th century global industrial civilization. Recent estimates suggest that more people were killed in this century by other people, over 160 million, than all thepeople killed by other people in recorded history.

Extinction turns the NC since it’s the worst violation of the standard.

#### War also causes species extinction and degredation. Robock and Slanina 09

Robock and Slanina 9 – Prof Climatology @ Rutgers, Alan, Head of Environmental Research @ Netherlands Energy Research Foundation, Sjaak, "Nuclear winter." In: Encyclopedia of Earth. Eds. Cutler J. Cleveland http://www.eoearth.org/article/Nuclear\_winter

Nuclear winter is a term that describes the climatic effects of nuclear war. In the 1980's, work conducted jointly by Western and Soviet scientists showed that for a full-scale nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union the climatic consequences, and indirect effects of the collapse of society, would be so severe that the ensuing nuclear winter would produce famine for billions of people far from the target zones. There are several wrong impressions that people have about nuclear winter. One is that there was a flaw in the theory and that the large climatic effects were disproven. Another is that the problem, even if it existed, has been solved by the end of the nuclear arms race. But these are both wrong. Furthermore, new nuclear states threaten global climate change even with arsenals that are much less than 1% of the current global arsenal. What's New Based on new work published in 2007 and 2008 by some of the pioneers of nuclear winter research who worked on the original studies, we now can say several things about this topic. New Science: \* A minor nuclear war (such as between India and Pakistan or in the Middle East), with each country using 50 Hiroshima-sized atom bombs as airbursts on urban areas, could produce climate change unprecedented in recorded human history. This is only 0.03% of the explosive power of the current global arsenal. \* This same scenario would produce global ozone depletion, because the heating of the stratosphere would enhance the chemical reactions that destroy ozone. \* A nuclear war between the United States and Russia today could produce nuclear winter, with temperatures plunging below freezing in the summer in major agricultural regions, threatening the food supply for most of the planet. \* The climatic effects of the smoke from burning cities and industrial areas would last for several years, much longer than we previously thought. New climate model simulations, that have the capability of including the entire atmosphere and oceans, show that the smoke would be lofted by solar heating to the upper stratosphere, where it would remain for years. New Policy Implications: \* The only way to eliminate the possibility of this climatic catastrophe is to eliminate the nuclear weapons. If they exist, they can be used. \* The spread of nuclear weapons to new emerging states threatens not only the people of those countries, but the entire planet. \* Rapid reduction of the American and Russian nuclear arsenals will set an example for the rest of the world that nuclear weapons cannot be used and are not needed. How Does Nuclear Winter Work? A nuclear explosion is like bringing a piece of the Sun to the Earth's surface for a fraction of a second. Like a giant match, it causes cities and industrial areas to burn. Megacities have developed in India and Pakistan and other developing countries, providing tremendous amounts of fuel for potential fires. The direct effects of the nuclear weapons, blast, radioactivity, fires, and extensive pollution, would kill millions of people, but only those near the targets. However, the fires would have another effect. The massive amounts of dark smoke from the fires would be lofted into the upper troposphere, 10-15 kilometers (6-9 miles) above the Earth's surface, and then absorption of sunlight would further heat the smoke, lifting it into the stratosphere, a layer where the smoke would persist for years, with no rain to wash it out. The climatic effects of smoke from fires started by nuclear war depend on the amount of smoke. Our new calculations show that for 50 nuclear weapons dropped on two countries, on the targets that would produce the maximum amount of smoke, about 5 megatons (Tg) of black smoke would be produced, accounting for the amount emitted from the fires and the amount immediately washed out in rain. As the smoke is lofted into the stratosphere, it would be transported around the world by the prevailing winds. We also did calculations for two scenarios of war between the two superpowers who still maintain large nuclear arsenals, the United States and Russia. In one scenario, 50 Tg of black smoke would be produced and in another, 150 Tg of black smoke would be produced. How many nuclear weapons would be required to produce this much smoke? It depends on the targets, but there are enough weapons in the current arsenals to produce either amount. In fact, there are only so many targets. Once they are all hit by weapons, additional weapons would not produce much more smoke at all. Even after the current nuclear weapons reduction treaty between these superpowers is played out in 2012, with each having about 2,000 weapons, 150 Tg of smoke could still be produced. Here are movies of the smoke transport from three different scenarios: These new results were made possible by the use of a state-of-the-art general circulation model of the climate. For the first time a complete calculation of not only atmospheric but also oceanic circulation was conducted, including the entire atmosphere from the surface up through the troposphere, stratosphere, and mesosphere, to an elevation of 80 kilometers (50 miles). Previous calculations had not been run for the 10 year simulations here, and had not allowed the smoke to be lofted into the upper stratosphere, where it would persist for many years. We calculated the climate response to the three scenarios illustrated above. Compared to the global warming observed for the past century, all three scenarios show massive cooling. Compared to the climate change for the Northern Hemisphere for the past 1,000 years, the famous hockey stick diagram, the climate change from any of these scenarios is unprecedented. Compared to climate change for the past millenium, even the 5 Tg case (a war between India and Pakistan) would plunge the planet into temperatures colder than the Little Ice Age (approximately 1600-1850). This would be essentially instantly, and agriculture would be severely threatened. Larger amounts of smoke would produce larger climate changes, and for the 150 Tg case produce a true nuclear winter, making agriculture impossible for years. In both cases, new climate model simulations show that the effects would last for more than a decade. Analogs Support the Theory Nuclear winter is a theory based on computer model calculations. Normally, scientists test theories by doing experiments, but we never want to do this experiment in the real world. Thus we look for analogs that can inform us of parts of the theory. And there are many such analogs that convince us that the theory is correct: \* Cities burning. Unfortunately, we have several examples of cities burning, firestorms created by the intense release of energy, and smoke being pumped into the upper atmosphere. These include San Francisco as a result of the earthquake in 1906, and cities bombed in World War II, including Tokyo, Dresden, Hamburg, Darmstadt, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki. \* The seasonal cycle. In the winter, the climate is cooler, because the days are shorter and sunlight is less intense. Again, this helps us quantify the effects of reduction of solar radiation. \* The diurnal cycle. At night the Sun sets and it gets cold at the surface. If the Sun did not rise tomorrow, we already have an intuitive feel for how much cooling would take place and how fast it would cool. \* Volcanic eruptions. Explosive volcanic eruptions, such as those of Tambora in 1815, Krakatau in 1883 and Pinatubo in 1991, provide several lessons. The resulting sulfate aerosol cloud in the stratosphere is transported around the world by winds, thus supporting the results from the animations above. The surface temperature plummets after each large eruption, in proportion to the thickness of the stratospheric cloud. In fact 1816, following Tambora, is known as the "Year Without a Summer," with global cooling and famine. Following the Pinatubo eruption, global precipitation, river flow, and soil moisture all reduced, since cooling the planet by blocking sunlight has a strong effect on reducing evaporation and weakening the hydrologic cycle. This is also what the nuclear winter simulations show. \* Forest fires. Smoke from large forest fires sometimes is injected into the lower stratosphere. And the smoke is transported around the world, also producing cooling under the smoke. \* Dust storms on Mars. Occasionally, dust storms start in one region of Mars, but the dust is heated by the Sun, lofted into the upper atmosphere, and transported around the planet to completely enshroud it in a dust blanket. This process takes a couple weeks, just like our computer simulations for the nuclear winter smoke. \* Extinction of the dinosaurs. 65,000,000 years ago an asteroid or comet smashed into the Earth in southern Mexico. The resulting dust cloud, mixed with smoke from fires, blocked out the Sun, killing the dinosaurs, and starting the age of mammals. This Cretaceous-Tertiary (K-T) extinction may have been exacerbated by massive volcanism in India at the same time. This teaches us that large amounts of aerosols in Earth's atmosphere have caused massive climate change and extinction of species. The difference with nuclear winter is that the K-T extinction could not have been prevented. Policy Implications The work on nuclear winter in the 1980's, and the realization that both direct and indirect effects of nuclear war would be a global catastrophe, led to the end of arms race and the end of the Cold War. In response to the comment "In the 1980s, you warned about the unprecedented dangers of nuclear weapons and took very daring steps to reverse the arms race," in an interview in 2000, Mikhail Gorbachev said "Models made by Russian and American scientists showed that a nuclear war would result in a nuclear winter that would be extremely destructive to all life on Earth; the knowledge of that was a great stimulus to us, to people of honor and morality, to act in that situation."[1] Since the 1980's, the number of nuclear weapons in the world has decreased to 1/3 of the peak number of more than 70,000. The consequences of regional-scale nuclear conflicts are unexpectedly large, with the potential to become global catastrophes. The combination of nuclear proliferation, political instability, and urban demographics may constitute one of the greatest dangers to the stability of society since the dawn of humans. The current and projected American and Russian nuclear arsenals can still produce nuclear winter. Only nuclear disarmament will prevent the possibility of a nuclear environmental catastrophe.

#### Contention 4 is Solvency

#### An International living wage would boost incomes and increase growth while reducing poverty and inequality. Shirkosh 05

Shirkosh 05 [Mehdi Shirkosh, University of Western Sydney. “The Case for an International Minimum Wage in the Context of Free Trade.” MPRA Paper No. 2463, January 2005] CT

The approach taken in this study is that an “international wage standard” is¶ necessary for an increasingly globalised economy. Minimum wage standards have¶ been established in the industrial countries from the late nineteenth century but few¶ theorists have examined this measure as a global solution for unemployment,¶ poverty and economic recession. An international solution is important in a world¶ where national economies are increasingly becoming more interdependent, making¶ it more difficult to maintain a welfare state in the framework of the national state.¶ The hypothesis in this study is that labour standards (rights) need to be integrated¶ into the globalisation process via an international minimum wage implemented¶ through international organisations and free trade agreements. In effect this will¶ bring the benefits of Keynesian theories on effective demand to the global economy.¶ In other words, an increase in minimum wages around the world will modify the¶ income gap and increase consumption, increase health and education of the masses¶ across the globe and, thus, their productivity. In other words, increased effective¶ demand will reduce overcapacity and economic recession in the global economy.¶ The focus of the thesis is on the determination of wage standards in the world¶ economy, looking primarily at the minimum wage standards in the developing¶ countries as a minimum wage standard is clearly related to minimum wages in these¶ low wage countries. The thesis will propose that the world economy (both industrial¶ and third world countries) would benefit from a global wage standard as this would¶ increase the masses’ income and therefore world aggregate demand, which would in¶ turn increase world production and growth. The argument of the thesis is developed¶ on the basis of the labour theory of value and the Keynesian theory of effective¶ demand. Key alternate approaches to the determination of wages under capitalism¶ will be discussed. The experiences of NAFTA (the North American Free Trade¶ Agreement) will then be used to test two of these approaches (Heckscher-Ohlin¶ theory and unequal exchange theory) against recent historical evidence.

#### And, it alleviates pressure on wages that is the root cause of poverty and economic inequality- International trade agreements prove. Shirkosh 2

Shirkosh 05 [Mehdi Shirkosh (University of Western Sydney). “The Case for an International Minimum Wage in the Context of Free Trade.” MPRA Paper No. 2463, January 2005] AJ

A common factor throughout most studies on minimum wages is a focus on the elasticity of supply and the effect that minimum wages have on other factors like employment and growth. The fact is that much research is based on data limited in time and to the experience of one country. It is possible that an increase in minimum wages in an individual country will increase prices and worsen competitiveness of that country in the international environment (at least in the short term). However, while an increase in minimum wages at the international level may change the relative prices and competitiveness of a particular country, international prices and global effective demand will be affected as well. Therefore discussion on the value of labour, effective demand and the development history of the international labour force is necessary to understand the forces which determine minimum wages across the globe. Although the total effect of changing minimum wages would be difficult to measure in quantitative terms, the experience of countries which have entered regional economic agreements on trade (with and without supportive labour standards and minimum wages) can be used to estimate the influence of free trade on income and poverty. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provides a good contrastive case study to test whether free trade can be beneficial between a first world country like the United States and a third world country like Mexico (see Lawson 1997 on contrastive analysis). Based on the Heckscher-Ohlin model if a country produces 2and exports goods that use the abundant factor, it can succeed in international trade and the price of its abundantly endowed factor will rise and be equalised with the international price of that factor. If this theory were correct, free trade between Mexico and the United States should have increased exports, which were cheap labour intensive, from Mexico to the United States and, over time, the price of labour in Mexico should have increased towards the level of that of the United States. The theory of unequal exchange claims the opposite: that cheap labour is a result of historical–institutional development and the gap between wages in industrial countries and the third world countries is much more than that implied by the difference in the productivity of labour in these countries. This means that with the same productivity, labour is valued less in third world countries and, therefore, with existing prices, trade transfers value from third world countries to the industrial countries. Moreover, the gap between third world countries and industrial countries will tend to increase over time. Based on this theory, NAFTA should have resulted in a decline in the price of labour in Mexico and the wage gap between the United States and Mexico should have increased (as far as labour is not protected in Mexico). This study provides data about changes in wages under NAFTA, especially in Mexico, to test the strict neo-liberal version of the Heckscher-Ohlin model against unequal exchange theory. It is argued that the unequal exchange theory has greater explanatory power because it is more consistent with the evidence. Finally, it is argued that there is strong theoretical support from across the spectrum of economic analysis for suggesting that an increasing international minimum wage standard would prove the most effective method for improving the lot of the world’s poor.

#### Increased wages drives competition between firms due to a cleansing effect that ensures that only the best companies survive making a more efficient, profitable economy- China 04 reforms prove. Mayneris et al 14

Florian Mayneris, [Professor at Universit´e catholique de Louvain] Sandra Poncet [Professor at Paris School of Economics] Tao Zhang [Professor at Shanghai University of International Business and Economics]. “The cleansing effect of minimum wages Minimum wages, firm dynamics and aggregate productivity in China” CEPII Working Paper. September 2014. PH

In this paper we use balance-sheet data from over 160,000 industrial firms to analyze both¶ the firm- and aggregate-level effects of higher minimum wages in China, where the minimum¶ wage is set at the city-level. Our empirical strategy exploits the 2004 reform of minimum¶ wages that imposed large but heterogeneous increases in minimum wages across Chinese¶ cities. We combine a triple-difference approach with instrumental-variable techniques. We¶ show that the 2004 reform was binding: the share of Chinese firms complying with the local¶ minimum wage or paying wages just above the minimum level drastically increased after the¶ reform, while no such trend was found pre-2004. Moreover, we find that higher minimum¶ wages reduced the survival probability of local firms between 2003 and 2005. However, in the surviving firms wages rose without any effect on employment. The main explanation for¶ this finding is that firms improved significantly their productivity following the cost shock,¶ allowing them to absorb the shock without affecting employment or profitability. We show¶ that these results are not consistent with competing explanations. In particular, we do¶ not detect any substitution of less-paid/less protected migrants for incumbent workers. At¶ the aggregate level (our data covering 70% and 90% of overall industrial employment and¶ production respectively), our results suggest that the overall effect of firm-level adjustments¶ in city-level industrial employment is zero, with entries canceling out exits.Moreover, higher¶ minimum wages increase aggregate productivity growth thanks to productivity improvements¶ among incumbent firms and the net entry of more productive firms. Hence, in a fastgrowing¶ economy like China there is a cleansing effect of labor market standards. Minimum¶ wage growth allows more productive firms to replace the least productive firms, and forces¶ incumbent firms to become more competitive. These two mechanisms boost the economy’s¶ aggregate efficiency. The effects we measure are economically large. Minimum wage growth¶ between 2003 and 2005 explains on average 20% of firm- and city-level productivity gains in¶ China over the period under consideration.

### Enviro Impact

#### Growth lowers fertility rates. UN 04

Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future Transmitted to the General Assembly as an Annex to document A/42/427 - Development and International Co-operation: Environment delivered 2004, accessed 2013 http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm)

Governments must work on several fronts to limit population growth; to control the impact of such growth on resources and, with increasing knowledge, enlarge their range and improve their productivity; to realize human potential so that people can better husband and use resources; and to provide people with forms of social security other than large numbers of children. The means of accomplishing these goals will vary from country to country, but all should keep in mind that sustainable economic growth and equitable access to resources are two of the more certain routes towards lower fertility rates. 6. Giving people the means to choose the size of their families is not just a method of keeping population in balance with resources; it is a way of assuring - especially for women the basic human right of self-determination. The extent to which facilities for exercising such choices are made available is itself a measure of a nation's development. In the same way, enhancing human potential not only promotes development but helps to ensure the right of all to a full and dignified life.

#### Overpopulation causes extinction – destroys the environment. Brown 06

Brown 2006 - professor of physiology at West Virginia University (Paul, Notes from a Dying Planet, p. 3-4)

The threats we face stem from overpopulation and environmental degradation. The resulting climate change and mass extinctions are leading to ecological collapse, in which the once-robust tapestry of interrelationships among living creatures, climate, and our physical environment has been weakened and is starting to unravel. Clinical indicators of our planet’s serious illness are illustrated in the graph. I’ve adjusted the vertical scales for population, carbon dioxide (CO2), methane, temperature, and extinction of species per year so they all have a common minimum and maximum. All the minima occurred tens of thousands of years BC, and all the maxima are now. The state of the Earth today is unique. We’re consuming the world’s resources faster than they can be restored. The world’s population is now doubling in less than fifty years. Around mid-century the world’s population is expected to level off at eight to twelve billion people. The lower number is far too high: population must start to decline before 2050 if we are to survive. The upper limit, to put it simply, will never be reached because we would all die first. Because of population growth and increasing consumption, concentrations of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide and methane in our atmosphere are the highest in human history, as are global temperatures. This is not normal climatic fluctuation, as fossil-fuel industry shills would have you believe. The rate of species extinctions is comparable to mass extinctions that have occurred only five times before, and is likely to exceed those. The total decline of species since the Industrial Revolution will soon be worse than the mass extinction caused by the asteroid impact sixty-five million years ago off the Yucatan peninsula, which wiped out 83% of species including the dinosaurs.  Before we came along, species evolved and went extinct for billions of years, creating and filling a diversity of ecological niches. Organisms used energy from the sun to grow and reproduce, recycling the materials needed for life through an interdependent worldwide ecosystem. Mechanisms existed to maintain ecological stability, ensuring that the environment didn’t change too fast for evolution to keep up. Our biosphere recovered from calamitous events like asteroid collisions, even though only a minority of species made it through some of those catastrophes. Today’s ongoing catastrophe may eliminate all but the smallest and simplest of life forms. Our species has flourished, but without realizing it we’ve changed our environment too fast for other species to adapt. A system’s stability can only be eroded so far, after which it becomes unstable. We’re approaching a point where the world’s ecosystem will change too fast even for us to adapt. We will become extinct.  It’s already too late for us to return to the world as we found it or even as it was ten years ago. We’ve wiped out too many species. But we can protect the remaining fragile stability. In a word, we must seek sustainability, which means consuming resources only as fast as they’re replenished. All the trends on our graph have to be reversed, until they’re all back to pre-industrial levels or lower. This doesn’t mean returning to a pre-industrial quality of life – in fact, we should all be able to live much better once there are fewer of us. But we have to take effective action very soon, before it’s too late.

### Substance Weighing

### 1AR Substance Weighing

#### -Affirmative evidence outweighs on specificity

1. Other studies of living wage focus only one country. An international minimum wage would avoid employment effects and other negative consequences because it would not create incentives for outsourcing and offshoring- that’s Shirkosh 2
2. Their evidence is about the negative effects of increasing minimum wage in general but that doesn’t entail increasing TO A LIVING WAGE- there going to say that the warrants in their evidence would still logically apply if the aff increase wages higher than what their author accounted for, but you still prefer affirmative evidence since the fact that my evidence concludes the other ways proves that your author doesn’t speak to the specific nuances of living wage- For example, increasing by $2 may lead to unemployment but increasing by $4 may increase productivity which compensates for the unemployment effects- that’s Mayneris et al 14
3. Even if their evidence shows negative effects of implementing an international minimum wage- prefer mine since the aff sets the wage floor via PPP index while other authors account for variation using the inflation method. This may seem tenuous but a living wage set at $3 vs. $2 in Zimbabwe could be the difference from economic sustainability and collapse- that’s Zachofsky 2

### Harkinson Ext

Extend Harkinson- Equalizing income distribution is the KEY factor to maintaining economic sustainability- this means no uniqueness on DeDev since growth is already happening in the squo- that aff is only about alleviating income inequality to sustain that growth.

Outweighs their evidence.

A. Study looks at 15 nations over a 56-year period and concludes that income inequality is one of the causal factors of econ instability.

B. His own potion of the study shows that income distribution has about 10% more of an impact sustainability looking at long growth periods more so than trade openness or competitiveness.

### Cleansing Effect Weighing

#### -The Chinese 2004 minimum wage reform is the best metric to assess the effects of a minimum wage increase to a living on economic productivity.

#### A. Time Frame and Variation. Mayneris 2

Florian Mayneris, [Professor at Universit´e catholique de Louvain] Sandra Poncet [Professor at Paris School of Economics] Tao Zhang [Professor at Shanghai University of International Business and Economics]. “The cleansing effect of minimum wages Minimum wages, firm dynamics and aggregate productivity in China” CEPII Working Paper. September 2014. PH

The 2004 Chinese reform has a number of advantages with respect to these two issues. First, the reform imposed a massive rise in city-level minimum wages. As shown in Figure 1, city-level minimum wages increased over all of the 2000-07 period, with a clear acceleration from 2004 onwards. While the average annual growth rate in city-level minimum wages was 6.9% between 2000 and 2003, it was 15.5% between 2003 and 2007. The other remarkable feature of post-2004 minimum wages is their convergence across cities. The right-hand panel of Figure 1 shows that the dispersion of city-level minimum wages was stable pre-2004, with a coefficient of variation of 0.23. However, post-reform the coefficient of variation fell sharply to 0.2 in 2005, and 0.17 in 2007. This suggests that the fast city-level minimum wage growth we observe from 2004 onwards is concentrated in cities with lower pre-reform minimum wages; this outcome conforms to the convergence objective which was explicitly pursued by national authorities with the 2004 minimum-wage reform. This feature will be particularly useful for our instrumentation strategy.

#### B. Comparative analysis. Mayneris 3

Florian Mayneris, [Professor at Universit´e catholique de Louvain] Sandra Poncet [Professor at Paris School of Economics] Tao Zhang [Professor at Shanghai University of International Business and Economics]. “The cleansing effect of minimum wages Minimum wages, firm dynamics and aggregate productivity in China” CEPII Working Paper. September 2014. PH

We compare the change in firm-level performance for “exposed” and “non-exposed” firms within cities and sectors (using city-sector fixed effects). This strategy helps to account for the fact that cities with a favorable economic context might be less reluctant to increase the minimum wage than other cities. Comparing exposed firms to other firms in the same locality and industry will control for any local and sectoral level effects.

#### C. Controls for a litany of confounding variables- I have the strongest link to causality. Mayneris 4

Florian Mayneris, [Professor at Universit´e catholique de Louvain] Sandra Poncet [Professor at Paris School of Economics] Tao Zhang [Professor at Shanghai University of International Business and Economics]. “The cleansing effect of minimum wages Minimum wages, firm dynamics and aggregate productivity in China” CEPII Working Paper. September 2014. PH

First, exposed firms might have particular characteristics which directly affect the change in their economic performance. With our detailed firm-level data, we can control for initial firm size (in terms of employment), productivity, average wages, exports, as well as firm ownership (State-owned, Chinese private, foreign). These variables help to account for any particular firm-level effects. In particular, controlling for initial performance allows us to capture[s] any potential firm convergence or divergence effects. Most previous work in this area has relied on more aggregate data and so did not control for firm-level characteristics. Second, local authorities may decide minimum-wage increases based on the (anticipated) particular changes in low-wage firms, and not only the aggregate business cycle. To control for the potential endogeneity of city-level minimum wages to low-wage firm performance growth, we add an IV strategy to the fixed-effect estimation. The 2004 reform partly followed a top-down logic, with the national government imposing constraints on local authorities regarding their minimum wages. As long as national constraints were not designed to reflect particular local conditions, we can use the institutional features of the reform to construct our instruments. There are two variables which are natural candidates.

#### D. And, the author concludes aff. Mayneris 5

Florian Mayneris, [Professor at Universit´e catholique de Louvain] Sandra Poncet [Professor at Paris School of Economics] Tao Zhang [Professor at Shanghai University of International Business and Economics]. “The cleansing effect of minimum wages Minimum wages, firm dynamics and aggregate productivity in China” CEPII Working Paper. September 2014. PH

This paper has shown that higher minimum wages might be one way for developing countries to increase the wages of low-paid workers without necessarily harming their economy. We consider the shock of the 2004 minimum-wage reform in China to evaluate the repercussions of minimum-wage growth on firm survival, employment, productivity and profitability. We identify the causal effect of minimum wage growth via a triple-difference estimator combined with an IV strategy based on the institutional features of the 2004 reform. We find that, at the firm-level, firm survival fell, wages rose and labor productivity significantly increased, allowing surviving firms to maintain their employment and profits. Moreover, we show that higher minimum wages boosted city-level aggregate productivity via efficiency improvements among incumbent firms and the net entry of more productive firms. Hence, in a fast-growing economy like China where there is considerable inefficiency, minimum wages might have a cleansing effect and represent one way of boosting aggregate productivity.

#### Even if you don’t buy that the China 04 reform are reflective of a living wage rate, living wage ordinances produce a more efficient economy- multiple warrants. Waltman 04

**Jerold L. Waltman, [Professor of Political Science, Baylor University], The Case for the Living Wage, 2004.**

At first blush, businesses faced with a higher wage bill seem to have three¶ options: reduce the number of hours employees work, to hold labor costs¶ constant; raise prices; or reduce profits. But there is a fourth alternative: increase¶ efficiency. That is, producing the same product or service at a lower cost.¶ Higher wages can actually contribute to efficiency in several ways. The first¶ is that it enables a firm to hire more skilled workers, who are likely to be more¶ efficient. The second is that it reduces turnover, which can be extremely costly¶ to production schedules. Several studies of businesses that pay high wages have¶ indeed found them to reap enormous benefits from these two facts. Borealis¶ Breads, for instance, is a profitable Maine bakery known for its high wages, a¶ policy that generates a skilled and loyal work force.212 The White Dog Café in¶ Philadelphia has a similar story to tell. In an industry notorious for low wages¶ and high turnover, the owner of this establishment pays very well and also earns¶ a steady profit. Numerous other examples could be cited as well.213

### Species Extinction Weighing

-This is if they read a DA against the aff that causes human extinction

#### Species extinction is the biggest impact. Rolston 2

Holmes Rolston [Distinguished Professor, Department of Philosophy Colorado State University. Reflecting on Nature: Readings in Environmental Philosophy. Edited by Gruen, Lori, and Dale Jamieson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), Contains Rolston, "Environmental Ethics: Values in and Duties to the Natural World," pp. 65--84.]

A shutdown of the life stream is the most destructive event possible. The wrong that humans are doing, or allowing to happen through carelessness, is stopping the historical vitality of life, the flow of natural kinds. Every extinction is an incremental decay in this stopping of life, no small thing. Every extinction is a kind of superkilling. It kills forms (species) beyond individuals. It kills essences beyond existences, the soul as well as the body. It kills collectively, not just distributively. It kills birth as well as death. Afterward nothing of that kind either lives or dies.¶ ¶ Ought species x to exist? is a distributive increment in thecollectivequestion, ought life on Earth to exist? Life on Earth cannot exist without its individuals, but a lost individual is always reproducible; a lost species is [not] never reproducible. The answer to the species question is not always the same as the answer to the collective question, but because life on Earth is an aggregate of many species, the two [questions] are sufficiently related that [thus] the burden of proof lies with those who wish deliberately to extinguish a species and simultaneously to care for life on Earth.¶ One form of life has never endangered so many others. Never before has this level of question—superkilling by a superkiller—been deliberately faced. Hu-mans have more understanding than ever of the natural world they inhabit and¶ ¶ of the speciating processes, more predictive power to foresee the intended and unintended results of their actions, and more power to reverse the undesirable consequences. The duties that such power and vision generate no longer attach simply to individuals or persons but are emerging duties to specific forms of life. What is ethically callous is the maelstrom of killing and insensitivity to forms of life and the sources producing them. What is required is principled responsibility to the biospheric Earth.¶ Human activities seem misfit in the system. Although humans are maximizing their own species interests, and in this respect behaving as does each of the other species, they do not have any adaptive fitness. They are not really fitting into the evolutionary processes of ongoing biological conservation and elaboration. Theirculturesarenotreally dynamically stableintheir ecosystems**.** Such behavior is therefore not right. Yethumanistic ethical systemslimp when they try toprescriberightconducthere. They seem misfits in the roles most recently demanded of them.¶ ¶ If, in this world of uncertain moral convictions, it makes any sense to assert that one ought not to kill individuals without justification, it makes more sense to assert that one ought not to superkill the species without superjustification. Several billion years' worth of creative toil, several million species of teeming life, have been handed over to the care of this late-coming species inwhich mind has flowered and moralshaveemerged. Ought not this sole moral species do something less self-interested than count all the produce of an evolutionary ecosystem as nothing but human resources? Such an attitude hardly seems biologically informed, much less ethically adequate. It is too provincial for intelligent humanity. Life on Earth is a many-splendored thing; extinction dims its luster. An ethics of respect for life is urgent at the level of species.

#### When comparing possible extinctions we should prioritize species that are the most essential within their ecosystems. **Weber 93**

[Darren L. Weber “Environmental Ethics and Species: To be or not to be?” Philosophy: Environmental Ethics. 1993. http://psdlw.users.sourceforge.net/education/essays/env\_tp2.pdf]

Lawrence Johnson, for instance, argues that ecosystems and the biosphere have signiﬁcant interests that should¶ be respected, against which the extinction or preservation of a species should be evaluated.10 Furthermore, he¶ argues that within the biotic community all species, even inanimate materials, are valuable, but there are variations¶ in the value of species [vary]. Thus, for instance, a small-pox virus would be less valuable that a human being. So, if push¶ comes to shove, the small-pox virus would go in preference to the human being. However, the relative value of a¶ species is not easily identiﬁed with the characteristics of a species in isolation from its habitat and the ecosystem¶ to which it belongs. Rather, the relative value of a species should be evaluated with respect to its constitution¶ and its patterns of interaction with an ecosystem or the biosphere. Thus, from an holistic perspective, the value of¶ simple organisms that sustain a large variety of species in a complex food chain may be more valuable than a more¶ complex organism that is effectively a parasite in an ecosystem or the biosphere. Considering the devastation of¶ ecosystems that have been ravaged by humanity, the small-pox virus or the HIV virus may be valuable parasites¶ that ravage an even larger parasite, human beings.

### Substance Frontlines

### A2 Basic Income CP

1st Permutation: Do the affirmative but give guaranteed basic income to all adults who are currently unemployed and making efforts to find a job. Two net-benefits:

A. Worker Incentive DA: Basic Income kills incentive to work, which destroys people’s wellbeing- best empirics go aff. Gobry 14

Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry. [Entrepreneur and writer based in Paris, and a frequent columnist at The Week.] “Progressives' hot new poverty-fighting idea has just one basic problem: Science.” The Week. July 21, 2014. PH

What does that have to do with the UBI? Well, it just so happens that the UBI is one of the very few, if not the only, domains of social science policy where we have exactly that: extensive, long-term, repeated [randomized field trials], which are the gold standard of evidence in social science. As [RFT expert](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/27/opinion/brooks-is-our-adults-learning.html) Jim Manzi [writes](http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/259761/against-negative-income-tax-jim-manzi), these experiments "tested a wide variety of program variants among the urban and rural poor, in better and worse macroeconomic periods, and in geographies from New Jersey to Seattle"; more than 30 experiments were done in the U.S. from the '60s to the '90s and there was [another set](http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/288410/do-marginal-tax-rates-matter-low-income-people-jim-manzi) of experiments done in Canada in the '90s. The universal basic income is one of the few areas of social policy where we can say with some confidence "Science says..." And science says the UBI doesn't work. As Manzi writes, one of the few consistent findings across all these experiments is simply this: The only type of welfare policy that reliably gets people who can work into work is a welfare policy with work requirements. All the evidence strongly suggests that if you have a UBI, the outcome is exactly what many conservatives fear will happen: Millions of people who could work won't, just listing away in socially destructive idleness (with the consequences of this lost productivity reverberating throughout the society in lower growth and, probably, lower employment, in a UBI-enabled vicious cycle). This is not a minor concern. As Megan McArdle [has noted](http://time.com/9009/unemployment-is-worse-than-death/), the latest research suggests that work is a central part of human flourishing. Long-term unemployment is worse for self-reported well-being than divorce or the death of a spouse. The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that getting as many people as possible into the workforce is a highly laudable goal. A welfare policy with work requirements is the only realistic way of accomplishing this goal. And a UBI would consign millions and millions of people to deep misery. Writing as a former strong proponent of UBI, and having given a long hard look at the evidence, I must admit, this was a true revelation. It's now impossible for me to support a UBI.

This is an independent impact under utilitarianism since the evidence indicates that working is key to people’s psychological wellbeing. Prefer the evidence since it’s self-reported so it speaks more directly to the view of people who are unemployed rather than what some professor claiming impacts on a person’s wellbeing. Also, outweighs your evidence since my evidence examines the experiment that your evidence is talking about as well as many others and concludes affirmative. The perm solves since you don’t get basic income if you just decide to quit your job cause you can fall back on basic income or to billionaires who don’t need it- it just serves as a springboard for people to get back on their feet. *Basically like an unemployment check but less hassle. Also, not many countries that the 1AC speaks to has unemployment, anti-poverty policies in place to address like welfare, etc.*

B. Economy DA: Basic income falls into a double bind where it either a) fails to solve since it provides too little or b) it kills the economy- U.S proves. McArdie 13

McArdie, Megan. "Four Reasons a Guaranteed Income Won't Work." BloombergView. Bloomberg L.P, 4 Dec. 2013. Web. 17 Dec. 2014. PH

There are a couple of problems with this, however. The first is that zeroing out our current income security system wouldn’t provide much of a basic income. Total federal spending on income security (welfare, unemployment, etc.) is under $600 billion a year. There are 235 million adults in the U.S. Millions of those are undocumented immigrants, but that still leaves you with a lot of people. Getting rid of all of our spending on welfare and so forth would be enough to give each [person] of those people less than $3,000 a year. For a lot of poor people, that’s considerably less than what they’re getting from the government right now. The problem is that if you try to bring it up to something a bit more generous, the cost quickly escalates. Cutting everyone a check for $1,000 a month, which most people in that room would consider too little to live on, would cost almost $3 trillion. But if you means-test it to control the cost, or try to tax most of the benefits back for people who aren’t low-income, you rapidly lose the efficiency gains and start creating some pretty powerful disincentives to work.

This outweighs on scope since my evidence is just looking at the negative effects on the economy in the U.S. the effects would be super-charged in countries like Indonesia where the income security system is virtually non-existent. The perm solves since I give basic income to less people so they each get more than otherwise would’ve.

2nd Permutation: Do Both- Solves twice as well since there’s no real competition. If I beat back disadvantages to the affirmative then you affirm since they have no unique offense.

### A2 Dedev (WIP)

### Quick 1AR

1. Extend Golanky 07- Empirically economic growth in nations has resulted in, increased life expectancy, clean tech development and free, peaceful society.

Outweighs their evidence

1. My author offers the best conservative estimate since he takes into account the arguments in opposition while your authors are writing from a slanted perspective
2. Duration: You’re impacts only happen in the short-term while I isolate long-term effects of economic growth.
3. Empirics- you’re evidence is based in experimental analysis and hypotheticals but mine looks at the actual effects of growth in a multitude of countries this 1. My evidence takes into account a broader scope of regions while you’re shows isolated exception 2. I have strength of link since even if growth in one country was a result of false causality- multiple others increase the probability and 3. There’s no consensus on your side since they’re experimental results, which will always have counter-experiments.
4. You’re evidence is a result of reverse causality- warming reduction collapses the economy since lack of clean tech and money to sustain green movements- only the aff can solve since it creates economic sustainability- that’s harkinson 11.

2. Extend Harkinson- Equalizing income distribution is the KEY factor to maintaining economic sustainability- this means no uniqueness on DeDev since growth is already happening in the squo- that aff is only about alleviating income inequality to sustain that growth.

Outweighs their evidence.

A. Study looks at 15 nations over a 56-year period and concludes that income inequality is one of the causal factors of econ instability.

B. His own potion of the study shows that income distribution has about 10% more of an impact sustainability looking at long growth periods more so than trade openness or competitiveness.

3. You conceded Thompson 14, which indicates that growth is occurring the squo- takes out your growth bad offense since your impact isn’t happening in the squo- this doesn’t contradict the Ahmed evidence- he says that collapse is inevitable if we don’t have structural adjustments in terms of policy- that’s exactly because of the income inequality that Thompson is talking about.

### General

1. Timeframe comes first. War that arises from econ crisis prevents transition away from globalization.
2. Even if collapse is inevitable, delaying it is key. We’re not ready to transition yet. Here’s the admission of a dedev advocate. Trainer 2k

Trainer, Ted. [Conjoint Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales.] "Where Are We, Where Do We Want to Be, How Do We Get There?" Inclusivedemocracy. N.p., 2000. Web. 12 Jan. 2015.

If there is a boom we in the Eco-village Movement should welcome it, through gritted teeth, because it will give us the time we desperately need. **The last thing we want is** a **collapse** of the system **in the immediate future. We are far from ready. Hardly any of the** hundreds of millions of **people who live in** rich world **cities have any idea of an alternative to the consumer way** and their settlements have no provision for anything but maximising the throughput of resources. By all means let’s have a collapse a little later, but the prospects for The Simpler Way depend greatly on how extensively the concept can be established before the mainstream runs into serious trouble. **We need at least two more decades** to build the understanding, and the most effective way to do that is by developing examples.

1. Growth is sustainable. Best data proves. Goklany 10

Goklany, Indur. [Science and technology policy analyst for the United States Department of the Interior] "Population, Consumption, Carbon Emissions, and Human Well-Being in the Age of Industrialization (Part IV – There Are No PAT Answers, or Why Neo-Malthusians Get It Wrong) - Master Resource." Master Resource Population Consumption Carbon Emissions and Human WellBeing in the Age of Industrialization Part IV There Are No PAT Answers or Why NeoMalthusians Get It Wrong Comments. N.p., 26 Apr. 2010. Web. 12 Jan. 2015.

Neo-Malthusians believe that humanity is doomed unless it reins in population, affluence and technological change, and the associated consumption of materials, energy and chemicals. But, as shown in the previous posts and elsewhere, **empirical data on** virtually **every objective indicator** of human well-being **indicates** that the state of **humanity has never been better, despite unprecedented** levels of population, **economic development**, and new technologies. In fact, **human beings have never been** longer lived, **healthier, wealthier**, more educated, **freer, and more equal than** they are **today**. Why does the **Neo-Malthusian** worldview fail the reality check? The fundamental reasons why their **projections fail are because they assume that population, affluence and tech**nology — the three terms on the right hand side of the IPAT equation — **are independent of each other**. Equally importantly, they have misunderstood the nature of each of these terms, and the nature of the misunderstanding is essentially the same, namely, that contrary to their claims, each of these factors instead of making matters progressively worse is, in the long run, necessary for solving whatever problems plague humanity. Compounding these misunderstandings, environmentalists and Neo-Malthusians frequently conflate human well-being with environmental well-being. While the latter influences the former, the two aren’t the same. Few inside, and even fewer outside, rich countries would rank environmental indicators among the most important indicators of human well-being except, possibly, access to safe water and sanitation. These two environmental indicators also double as indicators of human well-being because they have a large and direct bearing on human health. In any case, they are subsumed within life expectancy, which, as noted, is the single most important indicator of human well-being. The UNDP’s Human Development Index, for instance, uses three indicators — life expectancy, per capita income and some combined measure of education and literacy. None of these three are related to the environment. The disconnect between environmental indicators and indicators of human well-being is further evidenced by the fact that over the last century, the most critical indicators of human well-being — life expectancy, mortality rates, prevalence of hunger and malnutrition, literacy, education, child labor, or poverty — generally improved regardless of whether environmental indicators (e.g., levels of air and water pollution, loss of biodiversity) fluctuated up or down (see, e.g., the previous post and here). Moreover, fears that the world’s population would continue to increase exponentially have failed to materialize. The world’s population growth rate peaked in the late 1960s. Population increased by 10.6% from 1965–70, but only 6.0% from 2000–05. Many countries are now concerned that fewer young people means that their social security systems are unsustainable. **Projections now suggest that the world’s population may peak at** around **9 billion** around mid-century (see here). The slowdown in the population growth rate, unanticipated by Neo-Malthusians, can be attributed to the fact that population (P) is dependent on affluence (or the desire for affluence) and technology (A and T in the IPAT equation). Empirical data show that **as people get wealthier** or desire greater wealth for themselves or their offspring, **they** tend to **have fewer children**. Cross-country data shows that the total fertility rate (TFR), which measures the number of children per women of child-bearing age, drops as affluence (measured by GDP per capita) increases (see Figure 1). Moreover, for any given level of affluence, TFR has generally dropped over time because of changes in technology, and societal attitudes shaped by the desire for economic development (see here). Most importantly, it is not, contrary to Neo-Malthusian fears, doomed to rise inexorably, absent coercive policies. Neo-Malthusians also overlook the fact that, in general, affluence, technology and human well-being reinforce each other in a Cycle of Progress (Goklany 2007a, pp. 79-97). If existing technologies are unable to reduce impacts or otherwise improve the quality of life, wealth and human capital can be harnessed to improve existing technologies or create new ones that will. HIV/AIDS is a case in point.

### Econ Growth Solves

#### 1. Economic growth solves warming and pollution there are two warrants, empirics prove. Worstall 11

Worstall, Tim. [Forbes Contributor] "Solving Climate Change." Forbes. Forbes Magazine, 10 Aug. 2011. Web. 12 Jan. 2015.

The IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change]process has just released their first update to these models since 2000. The overview paper is here. I’m not going to delve into all of the details (for which readers will no doubt thank me) I just wanted to make a few general points with the use of a couple of their graphs. As a handy guide, “RCPnumber” should be interpreted thusly: the higher the number after the RCP the closer we are to boiling Flipper as the last humans fight on the desert shores of Antarctica. The lower the number the more we can say, “Phew, we dodged the problem”. More specifically, RCP2.6 means CO2 peaks out at 490 ppm and then declines. RCP8.5 means it gets to 1370 ppm and perhaps keeps going leading to that dolphin BBQ. Note please that I don’t have to believe these numbers, you don’t, no one has to believe any of this at all. However, we do need to realise that these are the numbers which are being fed into the climate change models (perhaps more accurately, that these are the numbers that will be) and thus produce those IPCC reports. Which means that anyone taking the outputs of those IPCC reports seriously needs to take these inputs seriously. My general points can be made quite simply with the aid of two of their charts**.** We know very well that there’s a connection between economic growth and population size. Richer countries on average have lower fertility rates so as the world becomes richer fewer children are born. So more economic growth leading to peaking and declining population really isn’t a surprise at all. However, look at that light green line. The RCP 2.6 one, the “whew, we dodged it” one. The highest economic growth model leads to the lowest level of emissions considered. Less economic growth leads to higher emissions. Note again that these are not my assumptions. They are those of the IPCC process**.** Which is something of a body blow to those telling us that we must cease economic growth if calamity is to be averted: the very assumptions built into the whole proof that climate change is something we should worry about say exactly the opposite. Economic growth is the way out, not the problem. By the way, the assumption there about the rate of economic growth, from a roughly $50 trillion global economy in 2000 to a roughly $300 trillion one in 2100. That’s not all that far off the growth rate we had in the 20th century. The second chart: This is how much energy we’re going to use and where we’re going to get it from. We need to be more parsimonious in our use of energy, yes. We need to use less of it per unit of GDP (which is known as “energy intensity” and their desired decrease in that isn’t far off what the advanced economies already manage) but **we don’t actually need to use less of it overall**. Less oil, yes, but **we can near double our energy consumption and still hit that “we missed the problem” sweet spot**. It’s also amusing to note what a small role for solar and wind power is necessary to hit that target. Again, I want to point out that these aren’t my assumptions, they’re not made up out of whole cloth by some denialist, these are the assumptions which the very scientists who tell us about climate change themselves think are the driving forces and likely outcomes. Which leads to a very interesting conclusion indeed**.** We don’t have to stop economic growth at all, we can quite happily have around the same amount of it that we had in the 20 th century. So that’s a large number of the Green Miserablists shown to be wrong. We don’t have to reduce or even severely limit our energy consumption: we just have to get the growth in our consumption from other than the usual sources. A large number of the Energy Miserablists shown to be wrong there too. Or, to boil it right down, the IPCC is telling us that the solution to climate change is economic growth and low-carbon energy generation. That’s absolutely all we have to do. Or as I pointed out at book length recently, a globalised market economy with a carbon tax will do just fine.

Prefer this evidence:

1) This comes from a very credible international organization. Credibility is key since it ensures objectivity in the author’s conclusion rather than conclusions based on incentive structures or desire to break the news fastest.

2) This is a massive decade long report-tracking changes since 2000, proving it is a study with a massive sample size. Sample size is key since it removes the possibility of outliers in the data that could skew results- also increases the likelihood of causality.

#### 2. Growth solves warming. Whitman 08

Whitman, Janet. [Author for Financial Post] "Capitalism Will save Planet, Experts Say." Financial Post. Financial Post, 20 Feb. 2008. Web. 12 Jan. 2015.

Global warming may soon get a saviour more effective than Al Gore and his doomsday Power-Point presentations: capitalism. The former U.S. vice-president, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize last year for his work on climate change, is credited with bringing widespread attention to the issue. But **the huge money**making opportunity **in going green will** be the big driver that **lead**s **to the reining in of** the release of **greenhouse gasses,** experts say. **Money is already pouring into environmental** initiatives and **technologies** in the United States. **Experts expect investment** in the area **to explode over the next few years** if, as anticipated, the government here imposes restrictions on the release of gases believed to be behind climate change. "**Capitalism will drive this,**" said Vinod Khosla, founding chief executive of Sun Microsystems and a longtime venture capitalist. Mr. Khosla, speaking on a panel at a recent investment summit on climate change at United Nations headquarters here, said **getting consumers to curb their energy use has never worked -- unless they've had a financial incentive.** "If we make it economic, it will happen," he said. The expected government-mandated cap on carbon emissions already is fueling innovation. Venture capitalists, for instance, are investing in new technologies that would make cement -- a major producer of carbon emissions -- actually absorb carbon instead. Cement makers could practically give the product away and reap the financial reward from government carbon credits.

**Innovation solves- solar energy and battery-powered cars will replace fossil fuels. Smith:**

Noah Smith (professor of finance at Stony Brook). “Clean energy revolution is ahead of schedule.” Bloomberg View. April 8, 2015. JY.

The most important piece of news on the energy front isn't the plunge in oil prices, but the progress that is being made in battery technology. A [new study](http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/v5/n4/full/nclimate2564.html) in Nature Climate Change, by Bjorn Nykvist and Mans Nilsson of the Stockholm Environment Institute, shows that **electric vehicle batteries have been getting cheaper much faster than expected**. From 2007 to 2011, average battery costs for battery-powered electric vehicles fell by about 14 percent a year. For the leading electric vehicle makers, Tesla and Nissan, costs fell by 8 percent a year. This astounding decline puts battery costs right around the level that the International Energy Agency predicted they would reach in 2020. We are six years ahead of the curve. It's a bit hard to read, but here is the graph from the paper:This puts the electric vehicle industry at a very interesting inflection point. Back in 2011, McKinsey & Co. made [a chart](http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/energy_resources_materials/battery_technology_charges_ahead) showing which kind of vehicle would be the most economical at various prices for gasoline and batteries:Looking at this graph, we can see the incredible progress made just since 2011. Battery prices per kilowatt-hour have fallen from about $550 when the graph was made to about $450 now. For Tesla and Nissan, the gray rectangle (which represents current prices) is even farther to the left, to about the $300 range, where the economics really starts to change and battery-powered vehicles become feasible. But in the past year, the price of gasoline [has fallen](http://www.sun-sentinel.com/business/consumer/fl-gas-price-latest-20150406-story.html) as well, and is now in the $2.50 range even in expensive markets. A glut of oil, and a possible thaw in U.S.-Iran relations, have moved the gray rectangle down into the dark blue area where internal combustion engines reign supreme. Still, if battery prices keep falling, the gray rectangle will keep moving to the left. The Swedish researchers believe that **Tesla’s new factories will be able to achieve** the **30 percent cost reduction** the company promises, simply from economies of scale and incremental improvements in the manufacturing process. **That, combined with a rebound in gas prices to** the **$3** range**, would** be enough to **make battery-powered vehicles an economic alternative to internal combustion** vehicles in most regions. **But this isn't the only** piece of **good** energy **news.** Investment in renewable energy is powering ahead. The United Nations Environment Programme recently [released](http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/03/31/renewable-energy-is-growing-very-very-fast-its-just-still-not-fast-enough/) a report showing that global investment in renewable energy, which had dipped a bit between 2011 and 2013, rebounded in 2014 to a near all-time high of $270 billion. But the report also notes that since renewable costs -- especially solar costs -- are falling so fast, **the amount of renewable energy capacity added in 2014 was easily an all-time high**. China, the U.S. and Japan are leading the way in renewable investment. Renewables went from 8.5 percent to 9.1 percent of global electricity generation just in 2014. That’s still fairly slow in an absolute sense. Adding 0.6 percentage point a year to the renewable share would mean the point where renewables take half of the electricity market wouldn’t come until after 2080. But as solar costs fall, we can expect that shift to accelerate.In particular,[**forecasts**](http://www.forbes.com/sites/federicoguerrini/2015/03/31/solar-power-to-become-cheapest-source-of-energy-in-many-regions-by-2025-german-experts-say/) **are for solar to become the cheapest source of energy** -- at least when the sun is shining -- **in many parts of the world in the 2020s**. Each of these trends -- cheaper batteries and cheaper solar electricity -- is good on its own, and on the margin will help to reduce our dependence on fossil fuels, with all the geopolitical [drawbacks](http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-11-03/bad-energy-good-energy-choose-your-side) and climate harm they entail. But **together, the two cost trends** will **add up to** nothing less than **a revolution** **in the way humankind interacts with the planet and powers civilization**. You see, the two trends reinforce each other. **Cheaper batteries mean that cars can switch from gasoline to the electrical grid**. But currently, much of the grid is powered by coal. With cheap solar replacing coal at a rapid clip, that will be less and less of an issue. As for solar, its main drawback is intermittency. But with battery costs dropping,innovative **manufacturers** such as Tesla **will be able to make cheap batteries for** [**home electricity**](http://gas2.org/2015/04/03/tesla-home-battery-details-emerge/) **use, allowing solar power to run your house 24 hours a day**, **365 days a year**. So instead of thinking of solar and batteries as two independent things, we should think of them as one single unified technology package. Solar-plus-batteries is set to begin a dramatic transformation of human civilization. The transformation has already begun, but will really pick up steam during the next decade. That is great news, because cheap energy powers our economy, and because **clean energy will help stop climate change**. Of course, skeptics and opponents of the renewable revolution continue to [downplay](http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2014/04/24/solar-is-booming-but-will-never-replace-coal/) these remarkable developments. The takeoff of solar-plus-batteries has only begun to ramp up the exponential curve, and market shares are still small. But it has begun, and it doesn’t look like we’re going back.

#### 3. Studies prove growth solves environment comparatively better than collapse. Taylor 03

Taylor, Jerry. [President of the Niskanen Center, and was a senior fellow at the Cato Institute] "Happy Earth Day? Thank Capitalism." Cato Institute. Cato Institute, 22 Apr. 2003. Web. 12 Jan. 2015.

Earth Day is traditionally a day for the Left -- a celebration of government's ability to deliver the environmental goods and for threats about the parade of horribles that will descend upon us lest we rededicate ourselves to federal regulators and public land managers. This is unfortunate because it's businessmen -- not bureaucrats or environmental activists -- who deserve most of the credit for the environmental gains over the past century and who represent the best hope for a Greener tomorrow. Indeed, we wouldn't even have environmentalists in our midst were it not for capitalism. Environmental amenities, after all, are luxury goods. America -- like much of the Third World today -- had no environmental movement to speak of until living standards rose sufficiently so that we could turn our attention from simply providing for food, shelter, and a reasonable education to higher "quality of life" issues. The richer you are, the more likely you are to be an environmentalist. And people wouldn't be rich without capitalism. **Wealth not only breeds environmentalists, it begets environmental quality**. There are **dozens of studies showing that**, as per capita income initially rises from subsistence levels, air and water pollution increases correspondingly. But **once per capita income hits** between **$3,500** and $15,000 (dependent upon the pollutant), the ambient concentration of **pollutants** begins to **decline** just as rapidly as it had previously increased. **This** relationship **is found for** virtually **every** significant **pollutant in every single region of the planet. It is an iron law**. Given that wealthier societies use more resources than poorer societies, such findings are indeed counterintuitive. But the data don't lie. How do we explain this? The obvious answer -- that **wealthier societies are willing to trade-off** the **economic costs** of government regulation **for environmental improvements** and that poorer societies are not -- is only partially correct. In the [US] United States, pollution declines generally predated the passage of laws mandating pollution controls. In fact, for most pollutants, declines were greater before the federal government passed its panoply of environmental regulations than after the EPA came upon the scene. Much of this had to do with individual demands for environmental quality. People who could afford cleaner-burning furnaces, for instance, bought them. People who wanted recreational services spent their money accordingly, creating profit opportunities for the provision of untrammeled nature. Property values rose in cleaner areas and declined in more polluted areas, shifting capital from Brown to Green investments. **Market agents will supply whatever** it is that **people** are willing to **spend money on.** And when people are willing to spend money on environmental quality, the market will provide it.

#### 4. Economic growth prevents civil conflict and conflict spillover in poorer countries. Humphreys 03

Humphreys, Macartan. [Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Columbia University And Director] "Economics and violent conflict." Program on Humanitarian Pol (2003).

One might expect rich nations to be more violent than poor ones because the rich ones have more to fight over. 10 The econometric **evidence** however **suggests** the opposite. Most research shows **that wealth reduces** the likelihood of civil **war**, 11 **and** that economic **growth also reduces risks** while recessions worsen them. Figures derived from World Bank econometric models (Figure 1) show a striking relationship between the wealth of a nation and its chances of having a civil war. 12 The figure suggests that differences in wealth are most relevant among poorer countries. A country with GDP per person of just $250 has a predicted probability of war onset (at some point over the next five years) of 15%, even if it is otherwise considered an “average” country. This probability of war reduces by half for a country with GDP of just $600 per person and is reduced by half again to below 4% for a country with income of $1250. Countries with income per person over $5000 have a less than 1% chance of experiencing civil conflicts, all else being equal. There are various explanations for why this is so. But so far little work has been undertaken to distinguish between them. The most common is that **wealthier societies are** better **able to protect assets, thus making violence less attractive** for would-be rebels. 13 Another explanation, given by political scientist Thomas Homer Dixon argues that **poverty causes violence, and** points to cases where **scarcity leads to** migrations that result in **conflicts** between identity groups **over resources.** Alternatively, the relationship could be spurious in the sense that there are other features of a country, such as a democratic culture, that make it at once more prosperous and less violent. And causality may in fact run in the opposite direction: rich countries may be rich in part because they have had little civil conflict in their recent past. 14 Whatever the reason, the figures suggest that growth oriented initiatives and conflict prevention initiatives are mutually reinforcing. And the figures provide a rationale for those who say that it is in the interest of wealthy nations to promote economic growth in poor countries in order to avoid the spillover effects of likely conflicts there. In terms of policy implications, the analysis suggests that the greatest gains in conflict prevention are to be made by focusing development efforts on the very poor rather than on countries of intermediate wealth.

#### 5. Collapse kills the environment. Biello 08

Biello, David. [Associate editor at Scientific American] "Is a Global Recession Good for the Environment?" Scientific American Global RSS. Scientific American, 13 Nov. 2008. Web. 12 Jan. 2015.

Times are tough when a millionaire oil man can't get a wind farm built. T. Boone Pickens backed off of his much ballyhooed mega-wind project in Texas this week, citing the declining cost of natural gas. Fossil fuel burning power plants are still too good of a deal to bother investing $2 billion into wind turbines. A bear market might seem like a boon for the environment: less overall economic activity, like manufacturing and driving, means less overall pollution. Right? Actually, as the Pickens example proves, global **economic downturns take a toll on the environment by restrain[ing] economic activity that could improve** the s**it**uation. But that's not all. **Over-farming and drought led to 400,000** square **kilometers of** prime **top soil blowing away** in the wind **in** the 1930s, exacerbating, and exacerbated by, **the Great Depression.** And the **economic crises that crippled** the economies of **southeast Asia in the** 19**90s** also **set in motion** a rapid uptick in environmentally damaging pursuits such as **illegal logging and cyanide fishing**, according to the World Bank. Even as I speak, **economic worries have prompted** some **Europe**an countries **to** begin **backpedal**ing **on** their commitments to cut back on **global warming pollution**. So an **economic downturn is no friend of the environment**. Brother, can you spare a turbine?

### A2 Informal Sectors DA

Couple framing issues:

1. The DA relies on them winning that the aff causes unemployment since the link is workers getting displaced from the formal sector and resorting to informalities.
2. Lack of Uniqueness means that if I win my try-or-die framing you vote aff since there’s NO BRINK so any risk of the aff solving outweighs- they need to win strength of link to the DA to access the linear impact of the DA.

Now On Case,

1. Extend Shirkosh 2- this eveidence indicates that the displacement won’t occur at the magnitude that their author talks about since companies no longer gain a significant economic advantage from outsourcing and offshoring- this is heavy mitigation to the link level which means you pull the trigger on the AC.
2. Extend Mayneris 14- this straight-turns the DA since it indicates the slight negative unemployment effects that occur form uniform wage floors are good because they lead to more productivity so I control the internal link to their scenario also.
3. I outweigh their offense since they talk about the effects in single countries while the AC talks about widespread effects- it’s a question of specificity

### 1AR vs. Deont

#### -You’re framework collapses to Consequentialism

A. Petit indicates that when we try to use our practical rationality to universalize any specific maxim like preserving equal freedom there will be instances my aim to it will conflict yours. Only conformity to consequentialism, which only requires agents to take action that results in the best consequences, escapes this since the resulting action of each agent would cohere with each other. Also, the C sub point indicates that we use rationality to analyze the consequences of our actions.

B. Actor-Specificity is meta-framing issue on the framework debate- even if your framework is more normatively true I appeal to the constitutive role of the government which also controls the internal link to your constitutivism arguments since states must weigh trade-offs and take action that results in the best consequences since they only know the effects of the general aggregate not specific individuals and since they have no intentionality you’re intent-foreseen distinction argument goes away

#### -Extinction turns the NC

A. Economic decline violates agents freedom- it puts the poor in a state of dependence which inconsistent with the rightful condition. Ripstein

Arthur Ripstein, “Force and Freedom”. Harvard University Press, 2009, pp.273-274. PH

Kant argues that provision for the poor follows directly from the very idea of a united will. He remarks that the idea of a united lawgiving will re- quires that citizens regard the state as existing in perpetuity.6 By this he does not mean to impose an absurd requirement that people live forever, or even the weaker one that it must sustain an adequate population, or make sure that all of its members survive.7 The state does need to main- tain its material preconditions, and as we saw in Chapter 7, this need gen- erates its entitlement to “administer the state’s economy and finance.”8 The state’s existence in perpetuity, however, is presented as a pure nor- mative requirement, grounded in its ability to speak and act for everyone. That ability must be able to survive changes in the state’s membership. You are the same person you were a year ago because your normative principle of organization has stayed the same through changes in the mat- ter making you up. As a being entitled to set and pursue your own pur- poses, you decide what your continuing body will do. That is why your deeds can be imputed to you even after every molecule in your body has changed, and even if you have forgotten what you did. The unity of your agency is created by the normative principle that makes your actions im- putable to you.9 In the same way, the state must sustain its basic norma- tive principle of organization through time, even as some members die or move away and new ones are born or move in. As we saw in Chapter 7, its unifying principle—“in terms of which alone we can think of the legiti- macy of the state”—is the idea of the original contract, through which people are bound by laws they have given themselves through public in- stitutions.10 The state must have the structure that is required in order for everyone to be bound by it, so that it can legitimately claim to speak and act for all across time. The requirement of unity across time is clear in the cases of legislation by officials: if the official’s decision were only binding while a particular human being held office, a citizen would be entitled to regard laws as void once the official’s term ended. Because each person is master of him- or herself, one person is only bound by the authority of another through the idea of a united will. So the idea of a united will pre- supposes some manner in which it exists through time. Past legislation, like past agreement, can only bind those who come after if the structure through which laws are made is one that can bind everyone it governs. The solution to this family of problems is a self-sustaining system that guarantees that all citizens stand in the right relation to each other and, in particular, do not stand in any relation inconsistent with their sharing a united will. The most obvious way in which people could fail to share such a will is through relations of private dependence through which one person is subject to the choice of another. A serf or slave does not share a united will with his or her lord or master, so these forms of relationship are in- consistent with a rightful condition. Yet the same relation of dependence can arise through a series of rightful actions. The problem of poverty, on Kant’s analysis, is exactly that: the poor are completely subject to the choice of those in more fortunate circumstances. Although Kant argues that there is an ethical duty to give to charity,11 the crux of his argument is that dependence on private charity is incon- sistent with its benefactor and beneficiary sharing the united will that is required for them to live together in a rightful condition. The difficulty is that the poor person is subject to the choice of those who have more: they are entitled to use their powers as they see fit, and so the decision whether to give to those in need, or how much to give, or to which people, is en- tirely discretionary.12 So long as there are a variety of unmet wants, private persons are entitled to determine which ones to attach priority to.

B. Extend there’s no act-omission distinction for the state specifically, which means that failing to prevent extinction is morally equivalent to causing extinction.

C. Extend the Analytic under Lewis- If extinction doesn’t logically turn there standard- it does on a technical level since it’s allows irreversible violation of their standard

D. Extend the D from the impact calculus- the negative creates a contradiction in conception since they will a maxim that would preclude our ability to will future maxims.

### Topicality Frontlines

### T Explanation

-I defend “just governments” generically speaking meaning that you read country-specific turns and/or disadvantages but they must be about the impact of implementing a international living wage not about just implementing a living wage in that country.

### A2 Logical Consequence T

1. I meet- The AC is utilitarian; it’s talking about the expected consequences that will result from doing the resolution.
2. I meet- The AC is purely based in predictive analysis so it speaks directly to what we expect to happen.
3. I meet- the actor specificity argument has a descriptive warrant that explicitly speaks to how the government operates which means the evaluation of consequences is a more likely predictor of how they act.

### A2 Multi-Actor Fiat Bad

1. Counter-Interpretation: Fiated actions by the affirmative can be implemented through multiple actors if the affirmative is disclosed on the NDCA LD Wiki
2. I meet
3. Net-Benefits:

Solves research burdens since you have access to the AC which means you can prep against my specific action.

Ground- My interpretation allows better qualitative ground since you can PIC out of specific actors which means you get better access to the ballot since you can hijack most neg offense. Also, good for education since it allowed for a more coherent debate since we can debate about the specific implications of the policy.

### A2 Plurals T

1. I meet: I defend just governments implementing a international minimum wage set a living wage level- just governments entails more than 1 government. I just don’t specify any specifically since I allow all to link
2. I meet: The affirmative requires each government to require employer to pay a living based on the purchasing power in that geographical area- that’s Zachofsky 3
3. I meet: You can read DAs to specific countries and weigh them against the affirmative- they just have to be specific to an international minimum wage.

### A2 Must Spec 1 Country T

1. Counter-Interpretation: The affirmative doesn’t have to specify 1 country requiring employers to pay a living wage if they defend implementing a international minimum wage set a living wage level.
2. I meet
3. Net Benefits:
4. Textual Accuracy-
5. You’re interpretation is inconsistent with text since the resolution uses a plural noun phrase “just governments”. The 1AC solves since it defends implementing in every country.
6. The resolution uses the term “governments” while you’re interpretation specifies a form of government in countries, which precludes the possibility of me defending implementation on a state or city level.
7. Just governments” is a generic bare plural since it lacks a determiners, which means the resolution is not about any specific government. Nebel 14

Nebel, Jake. [BPhil candidate in Philosophy at the University of Oxford, specializing in ethics and epistemology. AB in Philosophy from Princeton University in 2013.] "Jake Nebel on Specifying "Just Governments"" Briefly. Victory Briefs, 19 Dec. 2014. Web. 22 Dec. 2014. PH

I believe that debaters shouldn’t specify a government on the living wage topic. The standard argument for this is simple: “just governments” is a plural noun phrase, so it refers to more than one just government. Most debaters will stop there. But there is much more to say. (Some seem not to care about the plural construction. I plan to address this view in a later article about the parametric conception of topicality.) Some noun phrases include articles like “the,” demonstratives like “these,” possessives like “my,” or quantifiers like “some” or “all.” These words are called determiners. Bare plurals, including “just governments,” lack determiners. There’s no article, demonstrative, possessive, or quantifier in front of the noun to tell you how many or which governments are being discussed. We use bare plurals for two main purposes. Consider some [the] examples: Debaters are here. Debaters are smart. In (1), “debaters” seems equivalent to “some debaters.” It is true just in case there is more than one debater around. If I enter a restaurant and utter (1), I speak truly if there are a couple of debaters at a table. This is an existential use of the bare plural, because it just says that there exist things of the relevant class (debaters) that meet the relevant description (being here). In (2), though, “debaters” seems to refer to debaters in general. This use of the bare plural is generic. Some say that generics refer to kinds of things, rather than particular members of their kinds, or that they refer to typical cases. There is a large literature on understanding generics. Here my aim is not to figure out the truth conditions for the generic reading of the resolution; I shall simply work with our pre-theoretical grip on the contrast between sentences like (1) and (2). This distinction bears importantly on the resolution. If “just governments” is a generic bare plural, then the debate is about whether just governments in general ought to require that employers pay a living wage. If it is an existential bare plural, then the debate is about whether some just governments—i.e., more than one—ought to require that employers pay a living wage. Only the second interpretation allows one to affirm by specifying a few governments. To my ear, the generic reading is correct. I think the best evidence for this is simply the undistorted judgments of ordinary speakers. No competent speaker of English would, without distorting influence or additional evidence of generalizability, endorse an inference from a plan involving two just governments to the resolution. Suppose Sally, an American citizen, believes that the U.S. and Canada should require employers to pay a living wage, but that no other government (just or unjust, actual or possible) should. She would not represent her view by asserting, “Just governments ought to require that employers pay a living wage.” She would deny this claim and hold that the U.S. and Canada are exceptions. One might object that Sally would endorse this assertion if she believed that the U.S. and Canada are the only just governments. Maybe she would, but that is explained by the generic reading, because she would then be making a generalization about (what she believes to be) just governments. And the onus would be on the affirmative, when specifying particular governments, to add such a premise. Moreover, many linguists would add that Sally could not regard it is as mere accident that these governments are just and that they ought to require employers to pay a living wage: the resolution requires there to be some explanatory connection between the justness of governments and the living wage requirement (see Carlson 2005). This is good evidence because ordinary speakers have an implicit (but not infallible) mastery over the language in which the resolution is stated. The resolution is stated in English, not in some special debate-specific dialect of English. Facts of usage constrain interpretation. The existential interpretation is not even, as I see it, eligible. So its pragmatic benefits are irrelevant. Compare: I think it would be better if the resolution were, “It is not the case that just governments ought to …” But that’s not the resolution, so it’s not even an eligible interpretation in a T debate. (Here I assume a controversial view about whether pragmatic benefits can justify a semantically inadequate interpretation of the resolution. I cannot defend this view here, but I welcome questions and objections in the comments to be addressed in a later article.) Some speakers might balk at the generic reading of the resolution. How, they might think, could anyone assent to such a sweeping claim about what just governments ought to do? It seems to depend heavily on the details of each country. I can easily get into this frame of mind. But, equipped with this frame of mind, it’s not as if I would assent to, “Just governments ought to require that employers pay a living wage,” and expect my audience to pick up on the existential reading. I would instead either deny the resolution or suspend judgment about it. This means that the anti-generalization view is not evidence of an eligible existential interpretation; rather, it’s a reason not to affirm the resolution. One more argument for affirmatives to answer! Consider an analogy. Suppose I say, “Dogs are ugly.” You might think it’s silly to say of dogs in general that they are ugly: how could one support such a generalization about the aesthetics of dogs? So you’ll reject my statement. You won’t reinterpret it to mean that some dogs are ugly and agree with it. I’m sure that many readers will be skeptical of directly appealing to how we ordinarily speak and think. Let me mention a more theoretical explanation of why the resolution is generic. Carlson (1977) suggests that the reading of bare plurals depends on the predicate of the sentence. He distinguishes between highly temporary stage-level predicates like “being here” or “being available,” and more intrinsic individual-level predicates like “having four legs” or “being altruistic.” He calls the former stage-level because they express properties of temporary stages of things: for example, sitting is a property of the present stage of Jake. One might argue that “ought to require” is an individual-level predicate: if just governments have an obligation to require that employers pay a living wage, that is not just a fleeting property of temporary government-stages. I mention this argument just as an illustration of how one might support the intuition with a theory, but I do not endorse the argument. We can turn next to a less direct argument for the generic reading of “just governments.” But this argument may carry more weight in a T debate. One of the most trolly observations to make in a debate on this topic is that just governments do not exist. It strikes me as plausible that no actually existing government is just. But most debaters will rightly trust their linguistic intuitions (in this case, but not in others!) and assume that this point is irrelevant to the resolution. The question is: why is it irrelevant?If “just governments” gets an existential reading, then the point should be relevant. If [and] there are no just governments, then it is not the case that there are some just governments that ought to require employers to pay a living wage. So the resolution is not true. Reading “just governments” as a generic bare plural, then, is key to avoiding the trolly observation as a knockdown negative argument (or a knockdown presumption trigger, if presupposition failure makes the resolution neither true nor false).

The AC solves since I don’t defend any specific country- I defend plan focus which means they can read country specific DAs but they most speak to the implementation of a global living wage. Textual accuracy controls the internal link to all negative voters since the text dictates what discussion where supposed to be having in the first place so it doesn’t’ matter how fair or education you’re interpretation is in a vacuum- this means I link turn all negative offense on T.

### A2 Plan Flaw T

1. Counter-Interpretation: The advocacy text read by the affirmative doesn’t have to constitute as enactable policy if they are willing to comply with changes in C-X.
2. I meet- I would’ve changes the plan
3. Net Benefits:
4. Solves Topicality Abuse- if you told me, we could’ve work together to ensure the affirmative was an enactable policy which would allow the judges to vote of offense for or against the plan.
5. Real World Education-
6. My interpretation is directly consistent with the sentence structure in congressional bills.
7. Even if there are flaws in the text my interpretation is more consistent with how the policy-making process occurs. Plan flaw has literally has no impact- corrections can be made later. Leibenluft 08

Leibenluft, Jacob. [Writer from Washington, D.C.]"How Does a New Piece of Legislation Get Delivered to the President?" Slate. The Slate Group, 22 May 2008. Web. 23 Dec. 2014. PH

What happens if the bill contains an error? If it is a simple typo that doesn't change the meaning of the bill—like a missing shall in this legislation authorizing an expansion of Vicksburg National Military Park—the president might issue a signing statement saying the executive branch will just [they’ll] act **as though the mistake was never made**. Corrections discovered before the bill reaches the president's desk are supposed to be made through a [concurrent resolution of both houses of Congress](http://congressnow.gallerywatch.com/docs/Enrollment_CRS.pdf) (PDF). In two recent cases, however, changes made by enrolling clerks without new votes have raised controversy—one involving [revisions to the 2005 Deficit Reduction Act](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/21/AR2006032101763.html) and another related to a last-minute [change](http://thehill.com/leading-the-news/crs-memo-feeds-into-rep.-youngs-transportation-earmark-controversy-2007-10-16.html) in a highway bill allegedly requested by Alaska Rep. Don Young. Ever since an [1892 Supreme Court case](http://supreme.justia.com/us/143/649/case.html) concerning a tariff act that went to the president with a paragraph on tobacco taxes missing, the courts have generally [ruled](http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/12/washington/12deficit.html) that the version of a bill signed by the officers of both houses of Congress and the president stands, even if the language differs from what Congress voted on. So, if the mistake changes the substance of the legislation, then the erroneous language is usually law unless Congress decides to do something about it. In that case, Congress can pass "technical corrections" in separate legislation to remedy the mistake[s]. According to the Library of Congress' [Thomas](http://www.thomas.gov/) database, more than 20 technical-corrections bills have been introduced since the current Congress began last January.

Real World comes first under education since it’s only relevant knowledge post-debate.

### A2 Suggested Rate T

1. Counter-Interpretation: The term “living wage” only make sense in the context of proposed legislation. NELP

"Living Wage Laws." National Employment Law Project. N.p., n.d. Web. 25 Dec. 2014. PH

Since the early 1990s, more than 120 municipalities across the country have enacted living wage laws to restore the wage floor at the local level. Living wage laws establish wage standards for businesses that receive contracts or subsidies from local governments. They provide a practical way for cities to ensure that public dollars generate quality jobs for local residents. With wage rates ranging from $9 to $16 per hour and higher, living wage laws raise the minimum wage closer to a level that allows low-income workers to meet their families' basic needs. Most living wage laws also create incentives for employers to provide health care by providing wage credits for employers who do so. NELP has provided extensive legal and policy support for the living wage movement, including: \* Providing legal support to dozens of living wage campaigns in cities ranging from New York to Atlanta to Sacramento; \* Helping to defend living wage laws (St. Louis, Berkeley, Hudson County) and encourage their enforcement (Buffalo, Hayward); \* Developing a model living wage law as a resource for local advocates and policymakers; \* Publishing a report examining the impact of living wage laws on city budgets, and another report projecting the effects of New York City's 2002 living wage law for the city's businesses and working families.\* Providing analysis relating to the 2011 proposal to extend New York City's living wage law to cover major economic development projects that receive city subsidies, including:

1. I meet
2. Net Benefit:

1. Textual Precision- Your interpretation might be accurate on defining living wage but mine is most precise to the debate resolution:

A) Require means a legal mandate in the context of a government. DeBois 14

DeBois, Danny. [(Harvard ’18) Champion of TOC, NCFL Grand Nationals, assistant coach at Harvard-Westlake in California, and Instructor at VBI and NSD.] "2.2 Defining and Interpreting the Resolution." Victory Briefs. Victory Briefs, 15 Dec. 2014. Web. 22 Dec. 2014. PH

Webster’s defines “require” as “to impose a compulsion or command on”4 The resolution implies some type of governmental mandate on employers to pay a living wage, meaning that policy implementation is definitely an aspect of the topic. I predict that most topicality arguments in favor of plans will be based on the word “require,” as governments require agents act a certain way by passing laws. Note, however, that there is a distinction between specification and implementation: the aff can defend the action of mandating that employers pay a living wage and defend real world implications, but also choose not to narrow down the advocacy to a particular place.

B) Resolved means the affirmative must defend the implementation of a policy action by a government. Parcher 01

Parcher 01 (Jeff, Fmr. Debate Coach at Georgetown University, February, <http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html>)

(1) Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constituent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

C) The term “pay” is used as verb to express giving money to someone but living wage as a suggested rate is incompatible since there would be no obligation to pay.

Textual Precision is a side constraint on all voters since it ensures discussion and preparation of the right issues. It is also key to fairness since it creates a stable basis for pre-round prep.

1. Ground- You’re interpretation makes it impossible for the affirmative to access offense since defending living wage as a suggested rate undermines the ability to link offense back to ANY standard since regardless of the moral principle a policy that’s haphazardly applied undermines consistency with that moral principle. I outweigh since even if there’s ground under their interpretation it is qualitatively worse. Ground is key to fairness since it ensures equal access to the ballot.

#### A2 Debatability

- This offense is non-unique since it just indicates that there’s no consensus on LW and difficulty establishing one but doesn’t speak to whether we should defend it as codified law or not- this just an arbitrary extrapolation since there would still be difficulty talking about LW as a suggested rate if there’s controversy over methodological approaches.

#### A2 Topical Literature

1. Turn, you kill qualitative and quantitative access to the topic literature since the core of the literature is dealing with the economic effects of the living wage implementation.

2. Turn, your interp makes it impossible for me to talk about existing living wage policies since they are legally enforced statues which means I lose qualitative ground since I can’t use empirics.

3. Your evidence even says that living wage is a suggested rate UNTIL a campaign to get legislation in place is

### A2 Ordinances T

1. Counter-Interpretation: General def of the living wage.

**POLLIN:**[[1]](#footnote-1) Lawrence **Glickman**’s 1997 book A Living Wage: American Workers and the Making of Consumer Society **provides a good working definition of** the term **living wage: “**It is **a wage** level **that offers workers the ability to support families to** maintain self respect and to have both the means and the leisure to participate in the civic life of the nation” (p. 66). How can we translate Glickman’s definition into dollars and cents, as we obviously must if living wages are to operate as a workable policy tool? When the modern living wage movement began in the mid-1990s, the approach that organizers took was to tie the living wage standard to the federal government’s official poverty line. They set the living wage at least high enough to enable a full-time worker to maintain his or her family above the official poverty line. But we confront an immediate problem with this approach, which is that the poverty line in the United States is seriously deficient. This is because it is calculated using an outdated approach which does not reflect the actual costs of providing for basic necessities other than food, including housing, health care, and child care. The poverty benchmarks also take no account of regional differences in the cost of living. As an average for the country, it is widely recognized among researchers that the official poverty benchmark for the country is probably about 40 to 50 percent too low. In high-cost urban areas such as Boston or Los Angeles, that figure should rise by roughly an additional 25 percent. If we work with a revised poverty threshold at 140 percent of the official level, a national living wage standard in 2009 tied to such a poverty line would be about $11.50 an hour for a single mother with two children, working fulltime, with no vacation and no health care. In high cost areas, the figure would rise to about $14.40 an hour. But poverty thresholds need not be the only benchmark for defining a living wage. Glickman’s definition certainly suggests a more generous approach. As one outgrowth of the living wage movement, researchers have recently developed **estimates of** what they term “basic budget” or **“basic needs” standards for communities throughout the country**. These figures provide what researchers at the Economic Policy Institute call a “realistic picture of how much income it takes for a safe and decent standard of living.” Drawing from the Economic Policy Institute’s basic budget estimates, a living wage standard in 2009 for the same single mother with two children, working fulltime, would be about $17.50 an hour in Lincoln, Nebraska, and $31.60 in Boston.

1. I meet
2. Net Benefits::

#### Precision - Your evidence is a conflation of living wage law – turns precision and field context standards since *living wage ordinance* IS DISTINCT. Living wage ordinances don’t meet the conditions of a living wage rate. Luce 02

Stephanie Luce, [Associate Professor of Labor Studies, CUNY School of Professional Studies], “The Full Fruits of Our Labor”: The Rebirth of the Living Wage Movement, Labor History, 43:4, 2002. PH

Many would argue that, although generally tied to the federal poverty line, the ordinances still do not amount to a real living wage, since most analysts agree that the federal poverty measures are inadequate—based on an outdated methodology that does not capture such things as regional variations in cost of living. Organizations such as the Economic Policy Institute have developed alternative methodologies that put living wages closer to $15–20 per hour, as wages that alow for subsistence plus some room for savings.10 However, it is obviously a tremendous step forward, as the wages won in these campaigns greatly exceed the current federal minimum wage of $5.15 per hour. Some ordinances include other benefits as well, such as paid days off and unpaid days off, and one even includes a third wage level for pension benefi ts. Others require employers to hire through community-run hiring halls, and many cities also make worker retention provisions for employees when contracts change hands. The other category of benefi ts is in the area of employee rights. Ordinances are now including provisions such as: protection from retaliation if workers ask about the living wage law or file a complaint of non-compliance; forbidding employers to use any public money in union busting activities; and allowing cities to deny contracts or subsidies to firms with a history of unfair labor practices

Precise distinctions are key to fairness and [real-world] clash [by ensuring a reasonable basis for prep]- even if your interpretation is more fair for ground distribution, we would most likely prep the *accurate* interpretation of the resolution. Also means your interpretation kills education since we only debate about a small fraction of the topic.

2. Breath and Depth: I allow a broader and more educational debate since LW ordinances are basically unstudied. **FAIRRIS ET AL[[2]](#footnote-2):** Local governments are increasingly turning to **living wage policies** as a means to improve job quality for low-income workers. To date, more than 100 local governments around the country **have passed** living wage ordinances.1 Living wage laws set wage and benefit standards for workers employed by government contractors or other firms that have a financial relationship with the government. These laws have, in part, been a response to the stagnation of state and federal minimum wages, which have failed to keep pace with inflation. In addition, these laws represent a reaction to the growing interest in contracting out city services as a means to cut costs, a strategy that advocates argue penalizes the low wage workers who perform city services. However, despite the prominence and continued growth in the number of living wage ordinances, **only a handful of retrospective studies** of **firms have been published on the impacts of these laws.** This study is the first to combine a random sample survey of affected firms and workers, a control group analysis of low-wage employers, and a matched firm and worker dataset. These elements make us confident that our survey results both isolate the effects of the living wage and accurately represent the experiences of living wage workers and firms.

This is key to education since it allows for a more resourceful discussion that impact us post-debate.

### A2 Aims T

### Framing Issue

#### Topicality interpretations must be justified by the semantic plausibility as well as the pragmatic benefits that arise from that interpretation- this means you reject interpretations that lack a metric to assess the truth-validity/accuracy of their topical definition. Nebel 15

Nebel, Jake. "2 The Parametric Conception of Topicality." The Priority of Resolutional Semantics. Victory Briefs, 20 Feb. 2015. Web. 19 Apr. 2015. PH

Let me make three caveats before defending my view. First, my view is not that pragmatic reasons are[n’t] completely irrelevant to resolutional interpretation. I think, rather, that they should be lexically inferior to semantic reasons. (Think of the priority of basic liberties over equality in Rawls’s conception of justice.) Pragmatic considerations [they] cannot justify interpretations that are ruled out on semantic grounds. If the resolution does not mean X, then it doesn’t matter how much better it[‘d] would be to debate X. But if the resolution might mean either X or Y, then the topicality debate can come down to pragmatic[s] considerations. But note that the debate between “competing interpretations” and “reasonability” is relevant here: if the resolution is truly ambiguous between X and Y, then even if X does better than Y on pragmatic grounds, the affirmative might have the right to select a reasonable but suboptimal interpretation. But this question does not, I think, affect the priority of semantic considerations. Second, my view is not that plans are bad. On the contrary, I think that plans are good, but only when they affirm the resolution. Whether some plan affirms their resolution (i.e., whether it is topical) is a function of the resolution’s semantics. To repeat, I have nothing against plans in general, and I believe that specification of some resolutional parameter may be permissible, if not obligatory, on many topics. One of the great things about LD is that our resolutions are diverse not only in their subject matter but also in their structure. This requires debaters to analyze each resolution with a fresh eye and not simply to import concepts and assumptions that may have applied to old resolutions into theoretical norms for each new one. But when the only tool you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. It is easier to continue with the same assumptions, as long as they are sufficiently shared by one’s peers on the national circuit, rather than reinventing the theoretical wheel every two months. It is important to resist this temptation and not to ignore the meaning of the resolution, even and especially if you may be more comfortable debating a different resolution. Third, I do not think my view is best captured by the label “Textuality First,” under which some circuit LDers often seem to lump all semantic arguments. I think this label came into use around 2007 or so, and it strikes me as uninformative: it’s like making “topicality” your standard for topicality. The meaning of the resolution is not just one consideration among others. The extant literature favors an alternative strategy. Murphy, Merrell, and Diers classify various standards as truth-based or accuracy-seeking (e.g., intent, field context, grammar, source credibility, common usage, etc.) and others as non-truth-based or debate-based (e.g., ground and limits). I have instead suggested a distinction between semantic and pragmatic considerations. These minor differences in classification are not important. The important point is that what the resolution means is not just one consideration among others, and that there may be conflicting semantic considerations to be weighed. I suspect that many debaters lump semantic arguments under a single “textuality” standard because they don’t know of a more descriptive label to distinguish each of their arguments. Let me emphasize, then, that the label shouldn’t matter: one-word names for standards help the judge organize her flow and perhaps improve word economy in rebuttals, but debaters should feel free to make arguments without pigeonholing them.

### Counter-Interp

1. Interpretation: Merriam-Webster defines require.

Require." Merriam-Webster.com. Merriam-Webster, n.d. Web. 22 Dec. 2014. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/require>. PH

“to impose a compulsion or command on : compel”.

Since governments are only capable of motivating action or coercion through codified legal statutes, the aff must defend implementation of a topical post-fiat policy.

1. I meet
2. Net Benefits- Textual Accuracy- “require” means implementation in the context of a government. DeBois 14

DeBois, Danny. [(Harvard ’18) Champion of TOC, NCFL Grand Nationals, assistant coach at Harvard-Westlake in California, and Instructor at VBI and NSD.] "2.2 Defining and Interpreting the Resolution." Victory Briefs. Victory Briefs, 15 Dec. 2014. Web. 22 Dec. 2014. PH

Webster’s defines “require” as “to impose a compulsion or command on”4 The resolution implies some type of governmental mandate on employers to pay a living wage, meaning that policy implementation is definitely an aspect of the topic. I predict that most topicality arguments in favor of plans will be based on the word “require,” as governments require agents act a certain way by passing laws. Note, however, that there is a distinction between specification and implementation: the aff can defend the action of mandating that employers pay a living wage and defend real world implications, but also choose not to narrow down the advocacy to a particular place.

Prefer this evidence since it’s specific analysis on how we interpret the word require to the topic. Net preferable to abstract text-based evidence since we don’t whether the distinctions they are pointing out apply to the resolution at hand.

Textual accuracy is an independent voter since it’s necessary to appropriate discussion regardless of benefits that arise from other approaches. It link turns all other fairness claims since it determines the basis for prep. Also, key to fairness since it ensure we have a basis for pre-round prep.

Policy-Making Education- your interpretation precludes the possibility of role-playing as policy-makers since that only makes sense in the context of implementation. And, role-playing provides unique critical thinking skills. Schaap 05

Schaap, Andrew. [BA(Hons) Melbourne, MSc, PhD Edinburgh] "Learning Political Theory by Role Playing1." Politics 25.1 (2005): 46-52. PH According to an influential theory of teaching in higher education, people tend to approach learning either in a 'deep-holistic' or 'surface-atomistic' way (Ramsden, 1992, pp. 43ff.). Students who adopt a deep-holistic approach to learning seek to discover the meaning of an idea, text or concept by relating new information to previous experience and the broader context within which it is encountered. By contrast, students who adopt a surface-atomistic approach tend to simply reproduce information, accumulating particular facts or details without discovering and constructing relations between them. Ramsden (1992, pp. 53ff.) reports on research that shows that deep-holistic approaches to learning are related to [leading to] higher-quality outcomes and greater enjoyment while surface-atomistic approaches are dissatisfying and associated with poorer grades. Ramsden (1992, pp. 96–102) identifies six key principles of teaching in higher education to promote a deep-holistic approach to learning. Effective teaching requires: engaging student interest; demonstrating concern and respect for students and student learning; providing appropriate feedback and assessment so that students can monitor their own learning; presenting students with clear goals and an intellectual challenge; giving students independence and control over their own learning; and modifying one's own teaching practice in response to student learning outcomes. In sum, effective teaching encourages students to relate to the subject material in a purposeful way. Teaching methods that promote deep-holistic approaches to learning involve students in actively finding knowledge, interpreting results, and testing hypotheses against reality (often in a spirit of co-operation as well as individual effort) as a route to understanding and the secure retention of factual knowledge' (Ramsden, 1992, p. 152). According to Ramsden there is no best teaching method. Nevertheless, some methods naturally encourage a deep-holistic approach to learning better than others. The traditional university lecture tends to be modelled on an implicit theory of teaching as transmitting information to students rather than one of making learning possible. While lectures can be engaging, stimulating and can involve students as active learners, this is often difficult to achieve and more often they encourage surface-atomistic approaches to learning: students struggle to remember various isolated details and the lecturer appears as a remote authority rather than participating in a community of learning with his or her students. Consequently, Ramsden (1992, p. 167) insists that the best way to improve the effectiveness of teaching in higher education is to make lecturing 'less like a lecture (passive, rigid, routine knowledge transmission) and more like an active communication between teacher and students'. In contrast to lecturing, role playing naturally tends to promote[s] a deep-holistic approach to learning because it requires students to interact and collaborate in order to complete an assigned task. The context of the role play [It] requires students to adopt different perspectives and think reflexively about the information they represent to the group. Some benefits of role playing identified by historian James Levy (1997, pp. 14–18) are that it: helps overcome students' inhibitions to contribute because they feel that they do not know enough; stimulates student discussion and debate outside of the classroom; provides many teachable moments by revealing gaps in students' understanding that the instructor can address; [and] encourages students to grapple with sophisticated issues that they might otherwise have failed to appreciate; and often challenges the teacher's own views.

This comes first under education since simulating policy-makers ensures deeper learning of the concepts.

### A2 Topic Literature

1. Your evidence is not about the LW literature, it’s about the MW, which a distinct policy and the effect that arise from it are unique so we can’t claim that the core discussion would be considered as the same.
2. Turn,

### A2 Philosophical Education

### A2 FW Must Have Lexical Priority

### I meets

1. I meet- The framework says epistemology comes first, the actor-specificity argument is an epistemological argument for how the state ought to act given their knowledge base.
2. I meet- The no act-omission distinction argument is a side-constraint it is a necessary constraint that all frameworks must meet so there’s way that it come first under my framework.

### Counter-Interp

1. Counter-Interpretation: The aff may read multiple framework layers without giving lexical priority in the AC if they’re willing to clarify how all the arguments interact in C-X.
2. Violation: I meet
3. Net Benefits:

Solves abuse- C-X is binding so there’s no way to shift. Even if they were right that C-X would allow for basterdization, that’s not true in the case of consequentialism since it’s a broad ethical view that holds that consequences matter- it’s just a question of weighing which ones come first.

Division of Ground- my interpretation allows the negative to pick which preclusive layer they want to come first and hijack the internal link to it outright win the framework debate in the 1NC or get me to concede one comes first in C-X. This outweighs their strategy deficit since specifying in the 1AC precludes their ability to have the choice or use the choice to get access to a theory violation. Division of ground is key to fairness since it allows for equitable access to the ballot.

#### A2 Philosophical Education

1. Turn, your interpretation encourages debaters to assert that the most defensible part of their framework comes first as opposed to the part that theory would hold true to get out of the 1NC spread.
2. Turn, you kill phil clash since we talk less about the framework when I tell you what comes first since they’ll only answer the part that comes first.

1. Robert Pollin (American economist. He is a professor of economics at the University of Massachusetts Amherst and founding co-director of its Political Economy Research Institute). “Making the Federal Minimum Wage a Living Wage.” New Labor Forum. Spring 2007. http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/other\_publication\_types/Pollin\_May\_2007\_NLF\_Column--Making\_Federal\_Min\_Wage\_a\_Living\_Wage.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Examining the Evidence: The Impact of the Los Angeles Living Wage Ordinance on Workers and Businesses David Fairris Department of Economics, UC Riverside [↑](#footnote-ref-2)