# FW

#### I affirm

#### The subject is created through its encounters in the world, not self-reflection. Containing meaning solely in terms of thought leads to the I reducing its experience into only what it perceives, or the same. When the subject relies solely on self-reflection it constitutes reality in its sameness, denying the existence of anything outside itself.

Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and infinity, 1961 ///AHS PB

The I that thinks the sum of the angles of a triangle is, to be sure, also determined by this object; it is precisely the one that thinks of this sum, and not the one that thinks of atomic weight. Whether it remembers or has forgotten, it is determined by the fact of having passed through the thought of the sum of the angles. This is what will be visible to the historian for whom the I representing to itself is already something represented. At the very moment of representation the I is not marked by the past but utilizes it as a represented and objective element. Illusion? Ignorance of its own involvements? Representation is the force of such an illusion and of such forgettings. Representation is a pure present. The positing of a pure present without even tangential ties with time is the marvel of representation. It is a void of time, interpreted as eternity. To be sure the I who conducts his thoughts becomes ( or more exactly ages) in time, in which his successive thoughts, across which he thinks in the present, are spread forth. But this becoming in time does not appear on the plane of representation: representation involves no passivity. The same in relating itself to the other refuses what is exterior to its own instant, to its own identity, only to find again in this instant, which owes itself to nothing, which is pure gratuity, everything that had been refused-as "meaning given," as noema. I ts first movement is negative : it consists in finding and exhausting in itself the meaning of an exteriority, precisely convertible into noemata. Such is the movement of the Husserlian 21l"OX~, which, strictly speaking, is characteristic of representation. I ts very possibility defines representation. The fact that in [this] representation the same defines the other without being determined by the other justifies the Kantian conception according to which the unity of transcendental appreception remains an empty form in the midst of its synthetic work. But we are far from thinking that one starts with representation as a non-conditioned condition! Representation is bound to a very different "intentionality," which we are endeavoring to approach throughout this analysis. And its marvelous work of constitution is especially possible in reflection. It is the "uprooted" representation that we have analyzed. The way representation is bound to a "wholly other" intentionality is different from the way the object is bound to the subject or the subject to history. The total freedom of the same in representation has a positive condition in the other that is not something represented, but is the Other. For the moment let us note that the structure of representation as a non-reciprocal determination of the other by the same is precisely for the same to be present and for the other to be present to the same. We call it "the same" because in representation [and] the I [to] precisely loses its opposition to its object; the opposition fades, bringing out the identity of the I despite the multiplicity of its objects, that is, precisely the unalterable character of the I. To remain the same is to represent to oneself. The "I think" is the pulsation of rational thought. The identity of the same unaltered and unalterable in its relations with the other is in fact the I of representation. The subject that thinks by representation is a subject that hearkens to its own thought: one has to think of thought as in an element analogous to sound and not to light. Its own spontaneity is a surprise for the subject, as though despite its full mastery qua I the I surprised what was taking place. This inspiration [genialite] is the very structure of representation: a return in the present thought to the thought's past, an assuming of this past in the present, a going beyond this past and this present-as in the Platonic reminiscence, in which the subject hoists himself up to the eternal. The particular I is one with the same, coincides with the "daemon" that speaks to it in thought, and is universal thought. The I of representation is the natural passage from the particular to the universal. Universal thought is a thought in the first person. This is why the constitution that for idealism remakes the universe starting from the subject is not the freedom of an I that would survive this constitution free and above the laws it will have constituted. The I that constitutes dissolves into the work it comprehends, and enters into the eternal. The idealist creation is representation. But this is true only of the I proper to representation-detached from the conditions of its latent birth. And enjoyment, likewise detached from concrete conditions, presents a totally different structure, as we shall show shortly. For the moment let us note the essential correlation of intelligibility and representation. To be intelligible is to be represented and hence to be a priori. To reduce a reality to its content thought is to reduce it to the same. The thinking thought is the locus where a total identity and a reality that ought to negate it are reconciled, without contradiction. The most ponderous reality envisaged as an object of a thought is engendered in the gratuitous spontaneity of a thought that thinks it. Every anteriority of the given is reducible to the instantaneity of thought and, simultaneous with it, arises in the present. It thereby takes on meaning. To represent is not only to render present "anew"; it is to reduce to the present an actual perception which flows on. To represent is not to reduce a past fact to an actual image but to reduce to the instantaneousness of thought everything that seems independent of it; it is in this that representation is constitutive. The value of the transcendental method and its share of eternal truth lies in the universal possibility of reducing the represented to its meaning, the existent to the noema, the most astonishing possibility of reducing to a noema the very being of the existent.

#### Thus in order to avoid a model of subjectivity where everything is reduced to the same, we must realize that Identity is first created through relations with the other.

**Levinas 2**

A relation whose terms do not form a totality can hence be produced within the general economy of being only as proceeding from the I to the other, as a face to face, as delineating a distance in depth-that of conversation, of goodness, of Desire-irreducible to the distance the synthetic activity of the understanding establishes between the diverse terms, other with respect to one another, that lend themselves to its synoptic operation. The I is not a contingent formation by which the same and the other, as logical determinations of being, can in addition be reflected within a thought. It is in order that alterity be produced in being that a "thought" is needed and that an I is needed. The irreversibility of the relation can be produced only if the relation is effected by one of the terms as the very movement of transcendence, as the traversing of this distance, and not as a recording of, or the psychological invention of this movement. "Thought" and "interiority" are the very break-up of being and the production ( not the reflection) of transcendence. We know this relation only in the measure that we effect it; this is what is distinctive about it. Alterity is possible only starting from me. Conversation, from the very fact that it maintains the distance between me and the Other, the radical separation asserted in transcendence which prevents the reconstitution of totality, cannot renounce the egoism of its existence; but the very fact of being in a conversation consists in recognizing in the Other a right over this egoism, and hence in justifying oneself. Apology, in which the I at the same time asserts itself and inclines before the transcendent, belongs to the essence of conversation. The goodness in which ( as we will see further) conversation issues and from which it draws signification will not undo this apologetic moment. The breach of totality is not an operation of thought, obtained by a simple distinguishing of terms that evoke one another or at least line up opposite one another. The void that breaks the totality can be maintained against an inevitably totalizing and synoptic thought only if thought finds itself faced with an other refractory to categories. Rather than constituting a total with this other as with an object, thought consists in speaking. We propose to call "religion" the [a] bond that is established between the same and the other without constituting a totality.

#### Independently prefer this account of ethics: A) **Circularity: Other theories presuppose a you who creates themselves through reflection. B) Reliability: Rational self-reflection fails because it’s impossible to objectively analyze the self-outside ones subjectivity**

#### Thus ethics must not try to perceive the world as reducible to the sameness of the self but rather in interactions with the other. Because the other is defined by its opposition to the self and absolute knowledge of the other would be incorporating it into the same, the other is characterized by being always unknowable and therefor infinite. This infinity manifests itself in an unconditional obligation to prevent the reduction of the other into the total knowledge of the same, or, totalization.

Michael l. Morgan, prof at Indiana University, The Cambridge introduction to Emmanuel Levinas, 2011 ///AHS PB

Levinas proceeds to try to describe what is involved in this having the idea of the infinite. It is a relationship but not of “a container to a content” or of “a content to a container.” It is not like other cases in which we have a mental act or representation of an object. Its intentionality is “not comparable with any other,” for “it aims at what it cannot embrace.” “The alterity of the infinite is not cancelled, is not extinguished in the thought that thinks it.” Having the idea, then, is a relationship with an absolute alterity, an exterior or other, “without this exteriority being able to be integrated into the same.”15 Levinas then goes on to ask what this infinite is such that our relationship to it is of this kind. For Levinas, then, Descartes testifies to there being a nontotalizing relation between the infinite and myself, between the infinite and every self. No standard terminology taken from everyday life or philosophical reflection can describe this relationship literally and adequately. The terms are metaphors, and it is best, perhaps, to use an expression that is not normally a part of the epistemological vocabulary and one that marks the fact that the event occurs from the outside, so to speak. Descartes uses his most general, standard expression for a mental grasping, to have an “idea.” We might better say that the infinite “engages” the I or, as Levinas puts it, that [where] the infinite “calls the I into question.” We expect that Levinas will go on to identify the infinite as the “face” of the other person that engages me in this way. It is not another thing, wholly different from things in the world. If the intentionality is unique, it is because the engagement by the face gives us a standpoint or perspective on my relation to the other person wholly unlike my normal relations. “The idea of infinity is the social relationship.” Levinas calls it the “epiphany” of the face, and says that its logos or content is: “You shall not kill.” It is an engagement that “puts an end to the irresistible imperialism of the same and the I,” the resistance to murder. It is the “first given of moral consciousness.”16 We have here arrived on familiar ground. Since this relation is not cognitive, Levinas argues, it has about it a kind of dynamic, driven quality. Hence Levinas calls it, from the subjective side, “desire,” which marks its character as the “propulsion, the inflation, of this going beyond.…” It is an “unquenchable” dynamism or aspiration, without satisfaction.17 The word “desire” is a central one in moral theory and moral psychology; it plays an especially prominent role in the interpretation of Plato, Aristotle, Hellenistic ethics, Hobbes, Hume, Kant, and then in contemporary naturalist moral theory. On the “standard,” Humean model of moral psychology, desire provides the causally effective component in moral action, its motivation; it provides a kind of propulsion. The term therefore has a host of implications and is very suggestive.18 Levinas contrasts it with thought; what he wants to underline is that we do not think or cognitively grasp the face of the other; our relation to it is of a different order. We aspire to it, reach out and respond to it. I am not happy with the language of desire, and there is reason to think that later Levinas has his own doubts about it. Even for him, it is too self-oriented, rather than other-oriented, an expression. But the crucial points are evident, that the relationship between the self and the other is not cognitive and that its manifestation in everyday life is in the domain of love, eros, concern, generosity, and sensitivity rather than knowing and believing. It is, as it were, a kind of passive striving or aspiring.19 The face, then, as the infinite, is an original breach in the self’s world, or, alternatively, it is a wholly unique perspective on our relations with other people, a wholly unique dimension or aspect of these relations.20 But there is more. It is not just a different perspective or dimension; it is a determinative one. The relationship with the other is a measure of our injustice, as Levinas puts it, for it “puts into question the naive right of my powers.”21 It is tempting to say that the face’s infinity is that it unsettles us. It tells us what we ought to do and hence always questions what we are doing. It is completely normative, although, to be precise, norms are general rules or principles while the face is a unique presence. We might better see the face as an imperative force entering into the finite from the outside, from beyond the ordinary or philosophical perspective; in this sense, as revealed by its face, the suffering of the other person is in the finite. Social existence, then, carries with it a direction to act, and its content is generosity that is unbounded because the need is unbounded. Moreover, when I realize who and what I am in terms of the suffering or misery or need of the other, I am disturbed. My response must involve a sense of my own failure in generosity, a sense of shame.22 Levinas’s notion of shame is distinctive, or at least its role is distinctive, unlike the use that someone like Charles Taylor, for example, makes of it. Taylor argues that human beings are distinctive as self-interpreting animals. What this means is that they have attitudes, states, or emotions that incorporate within them a sense of their own character and identity; in this sense, human beings have states that have a special kind of reflexivity. Shame is such an emotion.23 To feel shame one must have an understanding of an ideal that one holds to and a grasp of oneself as failing to fulfill that ideal; moreover, one realizes that the other person is aware of one’s failure. The special significance of shame, for Taylor, is that it, like other similar emotional or attitudinal states, reveals something distinctive about human self-understanding and self-interpretation, the acknowledgment of a value or standard to which one holds oneself and which is constitutive of one’s sense of identity or one’s character. Alternatively, for Levinas, one dimension of this complex emotion stands out: the realization that one’s own freedom is “murderous and usurpatory in its exercise.”24 But this sense of being capable of murder and injustice requires a moral standard against which we and our freedom are measured. From where do we arrive at such a standard? This most fundamental expression of one’s freedom is something one learns about oneself only when engaged by the face of the other person. It is a shame about being free that somehow lies within that very freedom. To be free and expansive, enjoying the world and all it has to offer, may seem enriching and elevating, but with the other person present, it is also and only then shameful and unsettling, disturbing. Levinas may agree with Taylor that shame is part of what distinguishes us as human beings, but his reasons differ dramatically.25 “Shame,” “responsibility,” “desire” – all these terms shed the same light on the subjective side of the face-to-face relationship. It is unsatisfied. That is why it is a continual[y] striving, always desiring, aspiring – but for what? To relieve the unique other person’s suffering, to remove her misery, provide aid and support for her. Since the scope is unlimited, I am responsible for everyone and everything, and hence my responsibility can never be fulfilled. There is always more to do. In this sense too the face is infinite, because the desire to give is never satisfied and can never be satisfied. Levinas also calls this desire “conscience,” for it is a sense of one’s own being held to a standard that challenges one fundamentally, a moral standard, of giving or generosity. It is a being aware of the imperative that comes with the face. Conscience, as Levinas puts it, lies beyond consciousness.

#### Thus when we fail to uphold this responsibility we allow the other to slide back into a totality we apprehend them as completely reducible to the totality of the same. This process known as totalization makes a relation to the other impossible.

#### Impact Calc:

#### [1] This totalization is a side constraint on any ethical theory. Insofar as morality presupposes being able to engage with the other as a presence in the real world, we must prevent the other from becoming a one-dimensional figure only contained in our subjectivity.

#### [2] Prefer the infinity of the other on the Induction Fallacy: Just as every empirical induction about the world relies on a infinitely regressive chain of previous ones to make a prediction, presuming that the other will take an action due to past behavior fails at understanding the others infinite possibilities.

#### [3] Only evaluate Intent based theories: A) the others infinity makes trying to quantify its relations in concrete possibilities impossible. B) Trying to calculate consequences is futile, because one action can have an infinite chain of effects making impossible to call it good or bad. C) Always being obligated to achieve a particular end is a contradiction because it logically prevents one from accessing that end.

#### Thus the standard is preventing the arbitrary totalization of the other.

#### Prefer:

#### [1] Only my framework provides a coherent account of time by tying the present and future together through our relations with the other.

Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the other, 1987, ///AHS PB

The future that death gives, the future of the event, is not yet time. In order for this future, which is nobody's and which a human being cannot assume, to become an element of time, it must also enter into relationship with the present. What is the tie between two instants that have between them the whole interval, the whole abyss, that separates the present and death, this margin at once both insignificant and infinite, where there is always room enough for hope? It is certainly not a relationship of pure contiguity, which would transform time into space, but neither is it the élan of dynamism and duration, since for the present this power to be beyond itself and to encroach upon the future seems to me precisely excluded by the very mystery of death. Relationship with the future, the presence of the future in the present, seems all the same accomplished in the face-to-face with the other. The situation of the face-to-face would be the very accomplishment of time; the encroachment of the present on the future is not the feat of the subject alone, but the intersubjective relationship The condition of time lies in the relationship between humans, or in history.

#### [2] The existence of language and the performative use of discourse in this round presupposes the authority of our moral relations with the other.

**Levinas 3**

Can objectivity and the universality of thought be founded on discourse? Is not universal thought of itself prior to discourse? Does not a mind in speaking evoke what the other mind already thinks, both of them participating in common ideas? But the community of thought ought to have made language as a relation between beings impossible. Coherent discourse is one. A universal thought dispenses with communication. A reason cannot be other for a reason. How can a reason be an I or an other, since its very being consists in renouncing singularity? European thought has always combated, as skeptical, the idea of man as measure of all things, although this idea contributes the idea of atheist separation and one of the foundations of discourse. For it the sentient I could not found Reason; the I was defined by reason. Reason speaking in the first person is not addressed to the other, conducts a monologue. And, conversely, it would attain to veritable personality, would recover the sovereignty characteristic of the autonomous person, only by becoming universal. Separated thinkers become rational only in the measure that their personal and particular acts of thinking figure as moments of this unique and universal discourse. There would be reason in the thinking individual only in the measure that he would himself enter into his own discourse, that thought would, in the etymological sense of the term, comprehend the thinker-that it would include him. But to make of the thinker a moment of thought is to limit the revealing function of language to its coherence, conveying the coherence of concepts. In this coherence the unique I of the thinker volatilizes. The function of language would amount to suppressing "the other," who breaks this coherence and is hence essentially irrational. A curious result: language would consist in suppressing the other, in making the other agree with the same! But in its expressive function language precisely maintains the other-to whom it is addl"ess~d, ~horn it calls upon or invokes. To be sure, language does not consist in invoking him as a being represented and thought. But this is why language institutes a relation irreducible to the subject-object relation: the revelation of the other. In this revelation only can language as a system of signs be constituted. The other called upon is not something represented, is not [or] a given, is not a particular, through one side already open to generalization. Language, far from presupposing universality and generality, first makes them possible. Language presupposes interlocutors, a plurality. Their commerce is not a representation of the one by the other, nor a participation in universality, on the common plane of language. Their commerce, as we shall show shortly, is ethical.

#### [3] K Solvency: My framework is uniquely prior in resolving questions of oppression which totalize the other.

Burggraeve, R. Belgian professor of moral theology (1999). Violence and the Vulnerable Face of the Other: The Vision of Emmanuel Levinas on Moral Evil and Our Responsibility. Journal of Social Philosophy, 30(1), 29–45. doi:10.1111/0047-2786.t01-1-00003 ///AHS PB

In a wider sense, one also speaks of racism when one recognizes and relates to others on the basis of their belonging to another culture, language group, or religion. As contemporary examples of this, we can point to the manner in which people today reject immigrants from the Arab world and wish to expel them because of their origin in another religion, specifically Islam and its related traditions. Or think of [is] the long-standing suppression and discrimination against African Americans in the United States, many of whose ancestors were brought over from Africa as slaves. According to Levinas, the core of racism consists not in the denial of, or failure to appreciate, similarities between people, but in the denial of, or better said, failure to appreciate and value, people's differences, or better still, the fundamental and irreducible otherness by which they fall outside of every genre and are thus "unique":" Alterity flows in no sense out of difference, to the contrary difference goes back to alterity" (VA 92). A racist relation wants to recognize and value only the same," or one's "own" (het eigene), and therefore excludes the "foreign." Out of self-defense, we are easily inclined to accept and consider positively only that which agrees with, or is "similar" to, ourselves. One finds the other embarrassing, threatening, and frightening. One therefore [and] tries to expel him from oneself, to place him outside so that he can be considered as the "enemy" from whom one "may" defend oneself, and whom one may even "destroy" as what brings life and well-being under pressure, unless one can reduce him to oneself or make him a part of oneself. One wants to accept "others" (or "strangers," or "foreigners") only to the extent that they belong to one's own "genre" or "kind," which is to say to one's own blood and soil, to the same family, tribe, sex, clan, nation, church, club, or community, do the same work, have the same birthplace and date. One's "own" is praised and even divinized at the price of the "other," which is vilified. The "stranger" becomes the scapegoat on whom we blame all of our problems and worries. One accepts differences only insofar as they are a matter of accidental particularities or specificities within a same genre or basic design, in which individuals differ from one another within a same "sort" only very relatively (for example, character, taste, intellectual level), and in which their deeper affinity is not at all tested (VA 97). Against this background, it is clear that for Levinas anti-Semitism, as a specific and advanced form of racism, takes aim at the Jew as the intolerable other. For anti-Semitic thinking and sentiment, the Jew is simply the enemy, just as for every racism the other is the enemy as such, that is to say not on the basis of personality, one or another character trait, or a specific act considered morally troublesome or objectionable, but due only to his very otherness. In anti-Semitism, the Jew, as "other," is always the guilty one. It is never "oneself," the embodiment of the "same" that not only arranges everything around itself but also profiles itself as principle of meaning and value (CAJ 77-79). From this perspective on racism as rejection of the other, it appears, according to Levinas, that racism is not a rare and improbable phenomenon existing in the heart and thought of only some "perverse" people that has nothing to do with us. Insofar as one is, according to the spontaneous dynamic of existing, or conatus essendi, directed toward the "same," toward maintaining and fortifying one's "own"-all such as I have just sketched it one must be considered "by nature" potentially racist, though of course without being "predestined" for it. In itself, this admits no question of psychological or pathological deviation. According to Levinas, this implies that one cannot simply dispense with the racism of Hitler and the Nazis, in contrast to something instead occurring only once, as a wholly distinct and incomparable phenomenon, at least if one views it not quantitatively but qualitatively, which is to say in terms of its roots and basic inspiration. In an attempt to hold open a pure-in fact, Manichean distinction between "good" (us) and "bad" (the "others"), thus keeping oneself out of range of the difficulties in question, it happens all too often that Hitlerism is described as something completely unique that has nothing in common with the aims and affairs of the common mortal. The perspective of Levinas shows that Hitlerism, with its genocide and other programs of eradication, is [are] only a quantitative extension, that is to say a consistent, qualitative extension, that is to say a consistent, systematic, and inexorably refined outgrowth of racism in its pure form, one that, in its turn, represents a concretization of the effort of existing, which, as the reduction of the other to the same, is the nature of our existence (without, on the other hand, our being abandoned to this nature as a fatality, since as ethical beings we can overcome it). No one is invulnerable; any of us is a potential racist, and at least sometimes a real racist. Racism, like Hitlerism, does not occur by chance, or by an accidental turn. Nor is it an exceptional perversion occurring in a group of psychologically disturbed people. It is a permanent possibility woven into the dynamic of our very being, so that whoever accedes to and lives out the dynamic of his own being inevitably extends racism in one or another form (AS 60-61). We can no longer blame racism and anti-Semitism on "others," for both their possibility and the temptation to them are borne in the dynamic of our own being, as "nonreciprocal determination of the other" (TI 99), which is precisely the kernel of our freedom (TI 97). It is specifically to unmask this racist violence, and all forms of violence as modalities of denial of the other as other, that Levinas discerns the basic ethical norm in the commandment mentioned and explicated above, "Thou shall not kill," which is to say in the commandment to respect the otherness of the other. In committing to the possible overcoming of evil, and of racism in particular, through the ethical choice for the good, Levinas certainly realizes how vulnerable this "overcoming" of evil is. By [and] rejecting the idea that every objective system, through its ironclad, mechanistic laws and coerciveness, might be able to render evil impossible forever, and instead [we] basing everything on the ethical call to the good, he makes clear that abuse, violence, and the racist exclusion and elimination of the other are con stantly possible and can never be definitively overcome. In ethics, there is no eschatology, in the sense of a guaranteed "better world" or "world without evil." There is only the "good will" that must always prove itself in a choice against evil that is neither evident nor easy. Only in this way can there be a good future and justice for the other: only through ethical vigilance with respect to all forms of violence, tyranny, hate, and racism, and a society that nurtures in both our upbringing and education a "sensibility" for the other as "stranger." Such a sensitivity [we] takes in full seriousness the ethical essence of the human person, and serves always to put us back on the path to a culture "where the other counts more than I do," and where the most foreign enjoys our complete hospitality.

# Offense

#### Thus I affirm: In the united states reporters ought to have the right to protect the identity of confidential sources. I defend the whole resolution as a general principle. Evaluate CX checks in cases of neg T and Spec because bidirectional shells make it impossible to meet NC interps. Additionally reevaluate the AC under these interps A) they are just paradigms for how we debate the res so winning one isn’t a reason to exclude my remaining offense B) They only justify dropping the argument because the rely on what that argument prohibited the neg from doing. Additionally, all neg theory arguments are counter-interps, because I implicitly take a stance on certain norms in the 1AC. Now Vote aff:

#### [1] The aff allows the other to transcend totalizing identities imposed on them in the democratic sphere in favor a transformative method of anonymity.

Asenbaum, H, Anonymity and Democracy: Absence as Presence in the Public Sphere, 2018, <https://westminsterresearch.westminster.ac.uk/download/262dbdddf063e82fb0662f67f459e8f7d90f88942b940d649d356a0a4f10d47e/130360/Anonymity_Democracy_final.pdf> ///AHS PB

The starting point for developing a more complex understanding of anonymity beyond a mere equation with privacy, is the observation that anonymity does not only facilitate identity negation but also affords identity creation. Sociologists like Erving Goffman (1956) pointed out decades ago that new identities are constructed on the foundation of the hidden identity. The mask— be it physical or virtual—serves both identity negation and creation. In the literature on anonymous political participation, identity negation is framed in terms of freedom of speech. Concealing identity appears necessary in the face of various repressive forces in society. Anonymity appears as negative freedom—as a means of becoming invisible and avoiding detection. Regarding online communication, Akdeniz (2002) argues: “Apart from facilitating freedom of expression, anonymity enables users to prevent surveillance and monitoring of their activities on the Internet from commercial companies and from the government” (233). Identity negation does, however, not only protect from interference of state and economic actors but also from peer pressure by family, friends, and colleagues. According to Barendt, the secret ballot was introduced in the late 19th century in the US and UK not only to protect workers from their employers; the voting booth also proved especially important to women gaining suffrage in the early- and mid-20th century as it shielded from the influence of husbands and fathers (Barendt 2016, 156ff). Identity negation, be it through voting booths, computer screens, or masks, results in the emergence of new imaginaries and alternative personae. Ruiz (2013) claims: “[T]he mask does not negate identity; instead it signifies the possibility of a multiplicity of identities... It suggests a way of thinking about blankness as a means not only of erasing difference but also as a means of articulating [it] difference” (275). [in] Employing anonymity bestows democratic subjects with the ability to reinvent their appearance and thus influence their perception by others, be it through wearing a mask, designing an avatar, or creating a pseudonym. The literature on masked collective action interprets playful experimentation with a diversity of identities as having liberating effects. The democratic subject is temporarily relieved from the constraints of the one and only identity in the public sphere, which is subject to governance surveillance and commercial targeting. Mikhail Bakhtin (1996 [1968]), a prominent scholar on the carnivalesque, wrote: “The mask is connected with the joy of change and reincarnation, with gay relativity and merry negation of uniformity and similarity; it [and] rejects conformity to oneself” (39, emphasis added).

#### [2] The aff respects the infinity of the other. By requiring a reporter to reveal the identity of a confidential source we both totalize the reporter as a deviant and create a preexisting conception of the source as a criminal who needs to identified.

#### [3] The other is always infinite and thus can never fully fit into categories, be known, or expressed. This affirms because it means that reporters area always protecting the identities of their sources because communicating the others true identity is impossible due to their infinite nature. Additionally the AC is inescapable within a legal framework as in the status qou reporters have the right to choose to protect the identity of confidential sources. The resolution never asks for the protection of that right itself, so the aff is already true. [4] By granting reporters a conditional right the aff avoids a requirement for reporters to take an action, which totalizes them as individuals who must take a certain action. Furthermore my offense is inescapable because if a confidential source had their identity reveal they would no longer be confidential, making negating a contradiction.

# AC 2.0

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Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and infinity, 1961 ///AHS PB

The I that thinks the sum of the angles of a triangle is, to be sure, also determined by this object; it is precisely the one that thinks of this sum, and not the one that thinks of atomic weight. Whether it remembers or has forgotten, it is determined by the fact of having passed through the thought of the sum of the angles. This is what will be visible to the historian for whom the I representing to itself is already something represented. At the very moment of representation the I is not marked by the past but utilizes it as a represented and objective element. Illusion? Ignorance of its own involvements? Representation is the force of such an illusion and of such forgettings. Representation is a pure present. The positing of a pure present without even tangential ties with time is the marvel of representation. It is a void of time, interpreted as eternity. To be sure the I who conducts his thoughts becomes ( or more exactly ages) in time, in which his successive thoughts, across which he thinks in the present, are spread forth. But this becoming in time does not appear on the plane of representation: representation involves no passivity. The same in relating itself to the other refuses what is exterior to its own instant, to its own identity, only to find again in this instant, which owes itself to nothing, which is pure gratuity, everything that had been refused-as "meaning given," as noema. I ts first movement is negative : it consists in finding and exhausting in itself the meaning of an exteriority, precisely convertible into noemata. Such is the movement of the Husserlian 21l"OX~, which, strictly speaking, is characteristic of representation. I ts very possibility defines representation. The fact that in representation the same defines the other without being determined by the other justifies the Kantian conception according to which the unity of transcendental appreception remains an empty form in the midst of its synthetic work. But we are far from thinking that one starts with representation as a non-conditioned condition! Representation is bound to a very different "intentionality," which we are endeavoring to approach throughout this analysis. And its marvelous work of constitution is especially possible in reflection. It is the "uprooted" representation that we have analyzed. The way representation is bound to a "wholly other" intentionality is different from the way the object is bound to the subject or the subject to history. The total freedom of the same in representation has a positive condition in the other that is not something represented, but is the Other. For the moment let us note that the structure of representation as a non-reciprocal determination of the other by the same is precisely for the same to be present and for the other to be present to the same. We call it "the same" because in representation the I precisely loses its opposition to its object; the opposition fades, bringing out the identity of the I despite the multiplicity of its objects, that is, precisely the unalterable character of the I. To remain the same is to represent to oneself. The "I think" is the pulsation of rational thought. The identity of the same unaltered and unalterable in its relations with the other is in fact the I of representation. The subject that thinks by representation is a subject that hearkens to its own thought: one has to think of thought as in an element analogous to sound and not to light. Its own spontaneity is a surprise for the subject, as though despite its full mastery qua I the I surprised what was taking place. This inspiration [genialite] is the very structure of representation: a return in the present thought to the thought's past, an assuming of this past in the present, a going beyond this past and this present-as in the Platonic reminiscence, in which the subject hoists himself up to the eternal. The particular I is one with the same, coincides with the "daemon" that speaks to it in thought, and is universal thought. The I of representation is the natural passage from the particular to the universal. Universal thought is a thought in the first person. This is why the constitution that for idealism remakes the universe starting from the subject is not the freedom of an I that would survive this constitution free and above the laws it will have constituted. The I that constitutes dissolves into the work it comprehends, and enters into the eternal. The idealist creation is representation. But this is true only of the I proper to representation-detached from the conditions of its latent birth. And enjoyment, likewise detached from concrete conditions, presents a totally different structure, as we shall show shortly. For the moment let us note the essential correlation of intelligibility and representation. To be intelligible is to be represented and hence to be a priori. To reduce a reality to its content thought is to reduce it to the same. The thinking thought is the locus where a total identity and a reality that ought to negate it are reconciled, without contradiction. The most ponderous reality envisaged as an object of a thought is engendered in the gratuitous spontaneity of a thought that thinks it. Every anteriority of the given is reducible to the instantaneity of thought and, simultaneous with it, arises in the present. It thereby takes on meaning. To represent is not only to render present "anew"; it is to reduce to the present an actual perception which flows on. To represent is not to reduce a past fact to an actual image but to reduce to the instantaneousness of thought everything that seems independent of it; it is in this that representation is constitutive. The value of the transcendental method and its share of eternal truth lies in the universal possibility of reducing the represented to its meaning, the existent to the noema, the most astonishing possibility of reducing to a noema the very being of the existent.

#### Thus in order to avoid a model of subjectivity where everything is reduced to the same, we must realize that Identity is first created through relations with the other.

**Levinas 2**

A relation whose terms do not form a totality can hence be produced within the general economy of being only as proceeding from the I to the other, as a face to face, as delineating a distance in depth-that of conversation, of goodness, of Desire-irreducible to the distance the synthetic activity of the understanding establishes between the diverse terms, other with respect to one another, that lend themselves to its synoptic operation. The I is not a contingent formation by which the same and the other, as logical determinations of being, can in addition be [not] reflected within a thought. It is in order that alterity be produced in being that a "thought" is needed and that an I is needed. The irreversibility of the relation can be produced only if the relation is effected by one of the terms as the very movement of transcendence, as the traversing of this distance, and not as a recording of, or the psychological invention of this movement. "Thought" and "interiority" are the very break-up of being and the production ( not the reflection) of transcendence. We know this relation only in the measure that we effect it; this is what is distinctive about it. Alterity is possible only starting from me. Conversation, from the very fact that it maintains the distance between me and the Other, the radical separation asserted in transcendence which prevents the reconstitution of totality, cannot renounce the egoism of its existence; but the very fact of being in a conversation consists in recognizing in the Other a right over this egoism, and hence in justifying oneself. Apology, in which the I at the same time asserts itself and inclines before the transcendent, belongs to the essence of conversation. The goodness in which ( as we will see further) conversation issues and from which it draws signification will not undo this apologetic moment. The breach of totality is not an operation of thought, obtained by a simple distinguishing of terms that evoke one another or at least line up opposite one another. The void that breaks the totality can be maintained against an inevitably totalizing and synoptic thought only if thought finds itself faced with an other refractory to categories. Rather than constituting a total with this other as with an object, thought consists in speaking. We propose to call "religion" the [a] bond that is established between the same and the other without constituting a totality.

#### Prefer this account of existence: A) **Circularity: Other theories presuppose a you who creates themselves through reflection. B) Reliability: Rational self-reflection fails because it’s impossible to objectively analyze the self-outside ones subjectivity**

#### Thus ethics must not try to perceive the world as reducible to the knowledge f the self, or the same, but rather in interactions with the other. Because the other cannot be contained in our thought, they are always unknowable and therefor infinite. This infinity manifests itself in an unconditional demand on me to respond to the other which transcends preconceived rules and comprehension, and is always reformulated based on circumstance.

Desmond Manderson, International leader in interdisciplinary scholarship in law and the humanities, Emmanuel Levinas and the philosophy of negligence, (2006) 14 Tort Law Review 1-18. ///AHS PB

First, responsibility is inherent in the first encounter between persons. The obligation to respond is intrinsically prior to any specific response and therefore, any pre-existing rules of limitation. Contrary to some rather severe criticism that is at times directed at him, Levinas is not simply condemning the realm of the said, or logic, or rules.40 Rather he attempts to demonstrate the conditions necessary for their appearance. And fundamental to those conditions are both an openness to discourse and an awareness that something within us and critical to our existence is not ours and not reducible to our interests.41 It is not sameness or difference but what Levinas sometimes calls ‘non-indifference’ 42 that founds the symbolic order. I am summoned to this assignation without choice or predeliction. Responsibility is the opposite of contract or commitment: I do not agree to it, but find myself responsible; it is not a way of advancing the ego’s purposes, but rather disrupts them. Strictly speaking, the other is the end; I am a hostage, a responsibility and a substitution supporting the world in the passivity of assignation, even in an accusing persecution, which is undeclinable. Humanism has to be denounced only because it is not sufficiently human.43 Responsibility is not a choice. This ‘unexceptionable responsibility, preceding every free consent, every pact, every contract’ 44 is not a tragedy or an unpleasant necessity. On the contrary it lies at the very core of those experiences that [to] constitute us. It is not as if we were free, and then a responsibility was imposed upon us against our will. Responsibility emerges with our selfhood, with relationship.45 Secondly, responsibility is not reciprocal.46 It has nothing to do with social contracts or legal policies. It arises foremost from the vulnerability with which the other approaches us, and which places a demand on us and in us. In some sense, then, this responsibility always remains incalculable and hence cannot be measured against any [other] responsibilities that the other might owe to me or that I might owe to others. Now Levinas is forced to admit that this creates a problem in any society in which many different and over-lapping relationships are implicated. It is troubled and becomes a problem when a third party enters. The third party is other than the neighbour, but also another neighbour, and also a neighbour of the other, and not simply his fellow. What are the other and the third party for one another? What have they done to one another? Which passes before the other?47 The fact that we are all responsible for each other renders law and justice necessary as a practical matter: ‘comparison, coexistence… order’ – some measurement or limitation must be placed on the infinite demands of infinite others.48 So the application of the absoluteness of Levinasian ethics to the world of law is by no means a straightforward matter, a question I have addressed elsewhere.49 But the initial point, the fact of our responsibility and its philosophical form and origin, are not undermined by these later problems of limitation. To begin with, my responsibility for another person is not dependent on any reciprocity of obligation. He may be responsible for me too, but as Levinas curtly remarks, ‘that’s his business.’50 Thirdly, it follows that in the challenge with which [when] responsibility confronts us, we are singled out. This means to be made individual. The other chooses us because, in the face of their vulnerability, we are singled out as the one or ones who can most make a difference. There is no deferral. No one else will do, and we cannot simply hide behind some pre-existing rule to shirk our responsibility. I think the experience of charity brings home the point. When I meet a beggar on the street, there is nothing I can say to escape the moment. There is no point saying ‘I gave at the office’ or ‘I don’t believe you.’ No rule of my own devising can protect me from the demand of an immediate decision that is mine and mine alone. I can give, or I can not give. But no one can do this for me; no one (no prior rule nor even a government or a social service) can take my place. This is what Levinas means when he says that the relationship with another ‘is not a species of consciousness whose ray emanates from the I; it puts the I in question. This putting in question emanates from the other.’51 The demand from the other that puts me on the spot likewise [which] constitutes me as a unique subject, a self. Uniqueness signifies through the non-coinciding with oneself, the non-repose in oneself, restlessness… For it is a sign given of this giving of signs, the exposure of oneself to another…52 So in stark opposition to the standard view, responsibility is not derived from our individual autonomy. It is the cause of it. The demand of the other individualizes me. Finally, the exercise of responsibility is always changing. As desire, which draws us forth towards others, responsibility deepens with practice and awareness (and this is as true of communities as it is of people). This, too, it seems to me, describes very well the actual experience of responsibility. The relationship of responsibility ‘is not a return to oneself’ but on the contrary ‘disengages the one as a term, which nothing could rejoin.’53 Once undone, the knot that rejoins us to ourselves nevertheless preserves the discontinuity as part of us.54 Furthermore, since we are continually being constituted and re-constituted through responsibility, no formula of words, system or rules, could entirely determine the conditions of its future exercise. We always remain open to future and unknowable obligations of responsibility . It is the ‘question mark’ of duty. The necessarily responsive and developing nature of responsibility is a problem for law, which after all seeks to write down the ‘full stop’ of duty; a debate we have seen take place in the Australian High Court over many years.55 But at the same time it provides a justification which other models do not address for the flexibility and change that imbues the common law of negligence. Indeed, most articulations of the law do not even recognize that responsiveness and responsibility are connected. If the principles of responsibility are simply rules laid down in order to stabilize expectations and put our social interactions on a more predictable footing, then the constant reassessment and transformation that marks the jurisprudence of the common law duty of care can only be seen as a failure. But, as Levinas suggests, such fluidity and openness are necessary to the very idea of responsibility.

#### When we fail to respond in this way, we apprehend them as completely reducible to the totality of the same. Rejecting this process known as totalization is a side constraint on any ethical theory. Insofar as morality presupposes being able to engage with the other as a presence in the real world, reducing them to a one-dimensional figure only contained in our subjectivity makes ethics impossible.

#### Impact Calc:

#### [1] Prefer the infinity of the other on the Induction Fallacy: Just as every empirical induction about the world relies on an infinitely regressive chain of previous ones to make a prediction, presuming that the other will take an action due to past behavior fails at understanding the others infinite possibilities.

#### [2] Only evaluate Intent based theories: A) Trying to calculate consequences is futile, because one action can have an infinite chain of effects making impossible to call it good or bad. B) Always being obligated to achieve a particular end is a contradiction because it logically prevents one from accessing that end.

#### [3] Rejecting the demand of the other denies their infinity, when we reason whether to act or not act we reduce them to both a quantifiable substance and a lesser, dependent upon our knowledge to survive, thus inaction is innately bad.

#### Thus the standard is preventing the arbitrary totalization of the other.

#### Prefer:

#### [1] The existence of language and the performative use of discourse in this round presupposes the authority of our moral relations with the other.

**Levinas 3**

Can objectivity and the universality of thought be founded on discourse? Is not universal thought of itself prior to discourse? Does not a mind in speaking evoke what the other mind already thinks, both of them participating in common ideas? But the community of thought ought to have made language as a relation between beings impossible. Coherent discourse is one. A universal thought dispenses with communication. A reason cannot be other for a reason. How can a reason be an I or an other, since its very being consists in renouncing singularity? European thought has always combated, as skeptical, the idea of man as measure of all things, although this idea contributes the idea of atheist separation and one of the foundations of discourse. For it the sentient I could not found Reason; the I was defined by reason. Reason speaking in the first person is not addressed to the other, conducts a monologue. And, conversely, it would attain to veritable personality, would recover the sovereignty characteristic of the autonomous person, only by becoming universal. Separated thinkers become rational only in the measure that their personal and particular acts of thinking figure as moments of this unique and universal discourse. There would be reason in the thinking individual only in the measure that he would himself enter into his own discourse, that thought would, in the etymological sense of the term, comprehend the thinker-that it would include him. But to make of the thinker a moment of thought is to limit the revealing function of language to its coherence, conveying the coherence of concepts. In this coherence the unique I of the thinker volatilizes. The function of language would amount to suppressing "the other," who breaks this coherence and is hence essentially irrational. A curious result: language would consist in suppressing the other, in making the other agree with the same! But in its expressive function language precisely maintains the other-to whom it is addl"ess~d, ~horn it calls upon or invokes. To be sure, language does not consist in invoking him as a being represented and thought. But this is why language institutes a relation irreducible to the subject-object relation: the revelation of the other. In this revelation only can language as a system of signs be constituted. The other called upon is not something represented, is not [or] a given, is not a particular, through one side already open to generalization. Language, far from presupposing universality and generality, first makes them possible. Language presupposes interlocutors, a plurality. Their commerce is not a representation of the one by the other, nor a participation in universality, on the common plane of language. Their commerce, as we shall show shortly, is ethical.

#### [2] K Solvency: Only a system orientated around non-totalization can stop the oppression of the other.

Burggraeve, R. Belgian professor of moral theology (1999). Violence and the Vulnerable Face of the Other: The Vision of Emmanuel Levinas on Moral Evil and Our Responsibility. Journal of Social Philosophy, 30(1), 29–45. doi:10.1111/0047-2786.t01-1-00003 ///AHS PB

In a wider sense, one also speaks of racism when one recognizes and relates to others on the basis of their belonging to another culture, language group, or religion. As contemporary examples of this, we can point to the manner in which people today reject immigrants from the Arab world and wish to expel them because of their origin in another religion, specifically Islam and its related traditions. Or think of [is] the long-standing suppression and discrimination against African Americans in the United States, many of whose ancestors were brought over from Africa as slaves. According to Levinas, the core of racism consists not in the denial of, or failure to appreciate, similarities between people, but in the denial of, or better said, failure to appreciate and value, people's differences, or better still, the fundamental and irreducible otherness by which they fall outside of every genre and are thus "unique":" Alterity flows in no sense out of difference, to the contrary difference goes back to alterity" (VA 92). A racist relation wants to recognize and value only the same," or one's "own" (het eigene), and therefore excludes the "foreign." Out of self-defense, we are easily inclined to accept and consider positively only that which agrees with, or is "similar" to, ourselves. One finds the other embarrassing, threatening, and frightening. One therefore [and] tries to expel him from oneself, to place him outside so that he can be considered as the "enemy" from whom one "may" defend oneself, and whom one may even "destroy" as what brings life and well-being under pressure, unless one can reduce him to oneself or make him a part of oneself. One wants to accept "others" (or "strangers," or "foreigners") only to the extent that they belong to one's own "genre" or "kind," which is to say to one's own blood and soil, to the same family, tribe, sex, clan, nation, church, club, or community, do the same work, have the same birthplace and date. One's "own" is praised and even divinized at the price of the "other," which is vilified. The "stranger" becomes the scapegoat on whom we blame all of our problems and worries. One accepts differences only insofar as they are a matter of accidental particularities or specificities within a same genre or basic design, in which individuals differ from one another within a same "sort" only very relatively (for example, character, taste, intellectual level), and in which their deeper affinity is not at all tested (VA 97). Against this background, it is clear that for Levinas anti-Semitism, as a specific and advanced form of racism, takes aim at the Jew as the intolerable other. For anti-Semitic thinking and sentiment, the Jew is simply the enemy, just as for every racism the other is the enemy as such, that is to say not on the basis of personality, one or another character trait, or a specific act considered morally troublesome or objectionable, but due only to his very otherness. In anti-Semitism, the Jew, as "other," is always the guilty one. It is never "oneself," the embodiment of the "same" that not only arranges everything around itself but also profiles itself as principle of meaning and value (CAJ 77-79). From this perspective on racism as rejection of the other, it appears, according to Levinas, that racism is not a rare and improbable phenomenon existing in the heart and thought of only some "perverse" people that has nothing to do with us. Insofar as one is, according to the spontaneous dynamic of existing, or conatus essendi, directed toward the "same," toward maintaining and fortifying one's "own"-all such as I have just sketched it one must be considered "by nature" potentially racist, though of course without being "predestined" for it. In itself, this admits no question of psychological or pathological deviation. According to Levinas, this implies that one cannot simply dispense with the racism of Hitler and the Nazis, in contrast to something instead occurring only once, as a wholly distinct and incomparable phenomenon, at least if one views it not quantitatively but qualitatively, which is to say in terms of its roots and basic inspiration. In an attempt to hold open a pure-in fact, Manichean distinction between "good" (us) and "bad" (the "others"), thus keeping oneself out of range of the difficulties in question, it happens all too often that Hitlerism is described as something completely unique that has nothing in common with the aims and affairs of the common mortal. The perspective of Levinas shows that Hitlerism, with its genocide and other programs of eradication, is [are] only a quantitative extension, that is to say a consistent, qualitative extension, that is to say a consistent, systematic, and inexorably refined outgrowth of racism in its pure form, one that, in its turn, represents a concretization of the effort of existing, which, as the reduction of the other to the same, is the nature of our existence (without, on the other hand, our being abandoned to this nature as a fatality, since as ethical beings we can overcome it). No one is invulnerable; any of us is a potential racist, and at least sometimes a real racist. Racism, like Hitlerism, does not occur by chance, or by an accidental turn. Nor is it an exceptional perversion occurring in a group of psychologically disturbed people. It is a permanent possibility woven into the dynamic of our very being, so that whoever accedes to and lives out the dynamic of his own being inevitably extends racism in one or another form (AS 60-61). We can no longer blame racism and anti-Semitism on "others," for both their possibility and the temptation to them are borne in the dynamic of our own being, as "nonreciprocal determination of the other" (TI 99), which is precisely the kernel of our freedom (TI 97). It is specifically to unmask this racist violence, and all forms of violence as modalities of denial of the other as other, that Levinas discerns the basic ethical norm in the commandment mentioned and explicated above, "Thou shall not kill," which is to say in the commandment to respect the otherness of the other. In committing to the possible overcoming of evil, and of racism in particular, through the ethical choice for the good, Levinas certainly realizes how vulnerable this "overcoming" of evil is. By [and] rejecting the idea that every objective system, through its ironclad, mechanistic laws and coerciveness, might be able to render evil impossible forever, and instead [we] basing everything on the ethical call to the good, he makes clear that abuse, violence, and the racist exclusion and elimination of the other are con stantly possible and can never be definitively overcome. In ethics, there is no eschatology, in the sense of a guaranteed "better world" or "world without evil." There is only the "good will" that must always prove itself in a choice against evil that is neither evident nor easy. Only in this way can there be a good future and justice for the other: only through ethical vigilance with respect to all forms of violence, tyranny, hate, and racism, and a society that nurtures in both our upbringing and education a "sensibility" for the other as "stranger." Such a sensitivity [we] takes in full seriousness the ethical essence of the human person, and serves always to put us back on the path to a culture "where the other counts more than I do," and where the most foreign enjoys our complete hospitality.

# Offense

#### Thus I affirm: In the united states reporters ought to have the right to protect the identity of confidential sources. I defend the whole resolution as a general principle. Evaluate CX checks in cases of neg T and Spec because bidirectional shells make it impossible to meet NC interps. Additionally reevaluate the AC under these interps A) they are just paradigms for how we debate the res so winning one isn’t a reason to exclude my remaining offense B) They only justify dropping the argument because the rely on what that argument prohibited the neg from doing. Additionally, all neg theory arguments are counter-interps, because I implicitly take a stance on certain norms in the 1AC. Now Vote aff:

#### [1] The aff allows the other to transcend totalizing identities imposed on them in the democratic sphere in favor a transformative method of anonymity.

Asenbaum, H, Anonymity and Democracy: Absence as Presence in the Public Sphere, 2018, <https://westminsterresearch.westminster.ac.uk/download/262dbdddf063e82fb0662f67f459e8f7d90f88942b940d649d356a0a4f10d47e/130360/Anonymity_Democracy_final.pdf> ///AHS PB

The starting point for developing a more complex understanding of anonymity beyond a mere equation with privacy, is the observation that anonymity does not only facilitate identity negation but also affords identity creation. Sociologists like Erving Goffman (1956) pointed out decades ago that new identities are constructed on the foundation of the hidden identity. The mask— be it physical or virtual—serves both identity negation and creation. In the literature on anonymous political participation, identity negation is framed in terms of freedom of speech. Concealing identity appears necessary in the face of various repressive forces in society. Anonymity appears as negative freedom—as a means of becoming invisible and avoiding detection. Regarding online communication, Akdeniz (2002) argues: “Apart from facilitating freedom of expression, anonymity enables users to prevent surveillance and monitoring of their activities on the Internet from commercial companies and from the government” (233). Identity negation does, however, not only protect from interference of state and economic actors but also from peer pressure by family, friends, and colleagues. According to Barendt, the secret ballot was introduced in the late 19th century in the US and UK not only to protect workers from their employers; the voting booth also proved especially important to women gaining suffrage in the early- and mid-20th century as it shielded from the influence of husbands and fathers (Barendt 2016, 156ff). Identity negation, be it through voting booths, computer screens, or masks, results in the emergence of new imaginaries and alternative personae. Ruiz (2013) claims: “[T]he mask does not negate identity; instead it signifies the possibility of a multiplicity of identities... It suggests a way of thinking about blankness as a means not only of erasing difference but also as a means of articulating [it] difference” (275). [in] Employing anonymity bestows democratic subjects with the ability to reinvent their appearance and thus influence their perception by others, be it through wearing a mask, designing an avatar, or creating a pseudonym. The literature on masked collective action interprets playful experimentation with a diversity of identities as having liberating effects. The democratic subject is temporarily relieved from the constraints of the one and only identity in the public sphere, which is subject to governance surveillance and commercial targeting. Mikhail Bakhtin (1996 [1968]), a prominent scholar on the carnivalesque, wrote: “The mask is connected with the joy of change and reincarnation, with gay relativity and merry negation of uniformity and similarity; it [and] rejects conformity to oneself” (39, emphasis added).

#### [2] The aff respects the infinity of the other. By requiring a reporter to reveal the identity of a confidential source we both totalize the reporter as a deviant and create a preexisting conception of the source as a criminal who needs to identified.

#### [3] The other is always infinite and thus can never fully fit into categories, be known, or expressed. This affirms because it means that reporters area always protecting the identities of their sources because communicating the others true identity is impossible due to their infinite nature. Additionally the AC is inescapable within a legal framework as in the status qou reporters have the right to choose to protect the identity of confidential sources. The resolution never asks for the protection of that right itself, so the aff is already true. [4] By granting reporters a conditional right the aff avoids a requirement for reporters to take an action, which totalizes them as individuals who must take a certain action. Furthermore my offense is inescapable because if a confidential source had their identity reveal they would no longer be confidential, making negating a contradiction.

### Cutting Cards

<https://oaktrust.library.tamu.edu/bitstream/handle/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2010-05-7974/PEPITONE-THESIS.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y> ///AHS PB

Can we say that a performative contradiction itself is tantamount to the certain deduction of the cogitator’s existence just as any diction is sufficient as a cogitation of the cogito? It would be, except that the subjectivity of the cogito (that is, thinking substance) is itself the positing of expression. If the I expresses itself in the cogito, such an expression is a positing that substantiates the Ego through signification, but something beyond the Ego is also indicated. As stated in Totality and Infinity, ex-pression concretely presses thinking substance out of itself for the Other, and so it is a revelation of the Other: [I]n its expressive function language precisely maintains the other – to whom it is addressed, whom it calls upon or invokes. To be sure, language does not consist in invoking him as a being represented and thought. But this is why language institutes a relation irreducible to the subject-object relation: the revelation of the other.9 Without the revelation of expression, there is no means of signification by which the Ego could be posited in the Cartesian utterance "I think." If the order of language is not posited by the thinking being’s expression, then the cogito retains only the silent, formal self-maintenance of egoism. If signification (qua expression) holds in the cogito, then the separable isolating ego has admitted of the revelation of the Other beyond the perfect self identity of the subject’s egoism. On this order of revelation, the ego is conditioned by its relation to an Other beyond the ego’s self-containment. Speech and ethics are projected together in ethics as first philosophy; therefore, any epistemological or ontological claim on the identity of the self with the same is contingent upon the self difference motivated by the ethical claim of the Other. Revelation is a relation and my expression reveals the Other in the sense that all expression is an expression of desire for that which is ultimately beyond possession, so in one’s expression, the Other is revealed rather than posited, but who is this Other in relation to the ego? If expression is a 33 reflection of the I, who is this Other that makes the reflection possible? In short, it is the other of finitude.

Desmond Manderson, International leader in interdisciplinary scholarship in law and the humanities, Emmanuel Levinas and the philosophy of negligence, (2006) 14 Tort Law Review 1-18. ///AHS PB

First, responsibility is inherent in the first encounter between persons. The obligation to respond is intrinsically prior to any specific response and therefore, any pre-existing rules of limitation. Contrary to some rather severe criticism that is at times directed at him, Levinas is not simply condemning the realm of the said, or logic, or rules.40 Rather he attempts to demonstrate the conditions necessary for their appearance. And fundamental to those conditions are both an openness to discourse and an awareness that something within us and critical to our existence is not ours and not reducible to our interests.41 It is not sameness or difference but what Levinas sometimes calls ‘non-indifference’ 42 that founds the symbolic order. I am summoned to this assignation without choice or predeliction. Responsibility is the opposite of contract or commitment: I do not agree to it, but find myself responsible; it is not a way of advancing the ego’s purposes, but rather disrupts them. Strictly speaking, the other is the end; I am a hostage, a responsibility and a substitution supporting the world in the passivity of assignation, even in an accusing persecution, which is undeclinable. Humanism has to be denounced only because it is not sufficiently human.43 Responsibility is not a choice. This ‘unexceptionable responsibility, preceding every free consent, every pact, every contract’ 44 is not a tragedy or an unpleasant necessity. On the contrary it lies at the very core of those experiences that [to] constitute us. It is not as if we were free, and then a responsibility was imposed upon us against our will. Responsibility emerges with our selfhood, with relationship.45 Secondly, responsibility is not reciprocal.46 It has nothing to do with social contracts or legal policies. It arises foremost from the vulnerability with which the other approaches us, and which places a demand on us and in us. In some sense, then, this responsibility always remains incalculable and hence cannot be measured against any [other] responsibilities that the other might owe to me or that I might owe to others. Now Levinas is forced to admit that this creates a problem in any society in which many different and over-lapping relationships are implicated. It is troubled and becomes a problem when a third party enters. The third party is other than the neighbour, but also another neighbour, and also a neighbour of the other, and not simply his fellow. What are the other and the third party for one another? What have they done to one another? Which passes before the other?47 The fact that we are all responsible for each other renders law and justice necessary as a practical matter: ‘comparison, coexistence… order’ – some measurement or limitation must be placed on the infinite demands of infinite others.48 So the application of the absoluteness of Levinasian ethics to the world of law is by no means a straightforward matter, a question I have addressed elsewhere.49 But the initial point, the fact of our responsibility and its philosophical form and origin, are not undermined by these later problems of limitation. To begin with, my responsibility for another person is not dependent on any reciprocity of obligation. He may be responsible for me too, but as Levinas curtly remarks, ‘that’s his business.’50 Thirdly, it follows that in the challenge with which [when] responsibility confronts us, we are singled out. This means to be made individual. The other chooses us because, in the face of their vulnerability, we are singled out as the one or ones who can most make a difference. There is no deferral. No one else will do, and we cannot simply hide behind some pre-existing rule to shirk our responsibility. I think the experience of charity brings home the point. When I meet a beggar on the street, there is nothing I can say to escape the moment. There is no point saying ‘I gave at the office’ or ‘I don’t believe you.’ No rule of my own devising can protect me from the demand of an immediate decision that is mine and mine alone. I can give, or I can not give. But no one can do this for me; no one (no prior rule nor even a government or a social service) can take my place. This is what Levinas means when he says that the relationship with another ‘is not a species of consciousness whose ray emanates from the I; it puts the I in question. This putting in question emanates from the other.’51 The demand from the other that puts me on the spot likewise [which] constitutes me as a unique subject, a self. Uniqueness signifies through the non-coinciding with oneself, the non-repose in oneself, restlessness… For it is a sign given of this giving of signs, the exposure of oneself to another…52 So in stark opposition to the standard view, responsibility is not derived from our individual autonomy. It is the cause of it. The demand of the other individualizes me. Finally, the exercise of responsibility is always changing. As desire, which draws us forth towards others, responsibility deepens with practice and awareness (and this is as true of communities as it is of people). This, too, it seems to me, describes very well the actual experience of responsibility. The relationship of responsibility ‘is not a return to oneself’ but on the contrary ‘disengages the one as a term, which nothing could rejoin.’53 Once undone, the knot that rejoins us to ourselves nevertheless preserves the discontinuity as part of us.54 Furthermore, since we are continually being constituted and re-constituted through responsibility, no formula of words, system or rules, could entirely determine the conditions of its future exercise. We always remain open to future and unknowable obligations of responsibility . It is the ‘question mark’ of duty. The necessarily responsive and developing nature of responsibility is a problem for law, which after all seeks to write down the ‘full stop’ of duty; a debate we have seen take place in the Australian High Court over many years.55 But at the same time it provides a justification which other models do not address for the flexibility and change that imbues the common law of negligence. Indeed, most articulations of the law do not even recognize that responsiveness and responsibility are connected. If the principles of responsibility are simply rules laid down in order to stabilize expectations and put our social interactions on a more predictable footing, then the constant reassessment and transformation that marks the jurisprudence of the common law duty of care can only be seen as a failure. But, as Levinas suggests, such fluidity and openness are necessary to the very idea of responsibility.

# 1AR

## Extensions

## A2 K

## A2

# Random Cards I didn’t Use

Infinite Obligation

It is therefore not freedom that accounts for the transcendence of the Other, but the transcendence of the Other that accounts for freedom-a transcendence of the Other with regard to me which, being infinite, does not have the same signification as my transcendence with regard to him. The risk that war involves measures the distance that separates bodies within their hand-to-hand struggle. The Other, in the hands of forces that break him, exposed to powers, remains unforeseeable, that is, transcendent. This transcendence is not to be described negatively, but is manifested positively in the moral resistance of the face to the violence of murder. The force of the Other is already and henceforth moral. Freedom, be it that of war, can be manifested only outside totality, but this "outside totality" opens with the transcendence of the face. To think of freedom as within totality is to reduce freedom to the status of an indetermination in being, and forthwith to integrate it into a totality by closing the totality over the "holes" of indetermination-and seeking with psychology the laws of a free being! But the relation that subtends war, an asymmetrical relation with the other who, as infinity, opens time, transcends and dominates the subjectivity ( the I not being transcendent with regard to the other in the same sense that the other is transcendent with regard to me), can take on the aspect of a symmetrical relation. The face, whose ethical epiphany consists in soliciting a response ( which the violence of war and its murderous negation alone can seek to reduce to silence), is not satisfied with a "good intention" and a benevolence wholly Platonic. The "good intention" and the "benevolence wholly Platonic" are only the residue of

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an attitude assumed where one en joys things, where one can divest oneself of them and offer them. Henceforth the independence of the I and its position before the absolutely other can figure in a history and a politics. Separation is embedded in an order in which the asymmetry of the interpersonal relation is effaced, where I and the other become interchangeable in commerce, and where the particular man, an individuation of the genus man, appearing in history, is substituted for the I and for the other. Separation is not effaced in this ambiguity. We must now show in what concrete form the freedom of separation is lost, and in what sense it is maintained even in its very loss, and can resurrect.

Other Card

To be I is, over and beyond any individuation that can be derived from a system of references, to have identity as one's content. The I is not a being that always remains the same, but is the being whose existing consists in identifying itself, in recovering its identity throughout all that happens to it. It is the primal identity, the primordial work of identification. The I is identical in its very alterations. It represents them to itself and thinks them. The universal identity in which the heterogenous can be embraced has the ossature of a subject, of the first person. Universal thought is an "I think." The I is identical in its very alterations in yet another sense. The I that thinks hearkens to itself thinking or takes fright before its depths and is to itself an other. It thus discovers the famous naivete of its thought, which thinks "straight on" as one "follows one's nose."\* It hearkens to itself thinking and surprises itself being dogmatic, foreign to itself. But faced with this alterity the I is the same, merges with itself, is incapable of apostasy with regard to this surprising "self." Hegelian phenomenology, where self-consciousness is the distinguishing of what is not distinct, expresses the universality of the same identifying itself in the alterity of objects thought and despite the opposition of self to self. "I distinguish myself from myself; and therein I am immediately aware that this factor distinguished from me is not distinguished. I, the selfsame being, thrust myself away from myself; but this which is distinguished, which is set up as unlike me, is immediately on its being distinguished no distinction for me."3 The difference is not a difference; the I, as other, is not an "other." We will not retain from this citation Hegel's affirmation of the provisional character of immediate evidence. The I that repels the self, lived as repugnance, the I riveted to itself, lived as ennui, are modes of self-consciousness and rest on the unrendable identity of the I and the self. The alterity of the I that takes itself for another may strike the imagination of the poet precisely because it is but the play of the same: the negation of the I by the self is precisely one of the modes of identification of the I. The identification of the same in the I is not produced as a monotonous tautology: "I am I." The originality of identification, irreducible to the A is A formalism, would thus escape attention. It is not to be fixed by reflecting on the abstract representation of self by self; it is necessary to begin with the concrete relationship between an I and a world. The world, foreign and hostile, should, in good logic, alter the I. But the true and primordial relation between them, and that in which the I is revealed precisely as preeminently the same, is produced as a sojourn [sejour] in the world. The way of the I against the "other" of the world consists in sojourning, in identifying oneself by existing here at home with onself [chez soi]. In a world which is from the first other the I is nonetheless autochthonous. It is the very reversion of this alteration. It finds in the world a site [lieu] and a home [maison]. Dwelling is the very mode of maintaining oneself [se tenir] ,\* not as the famous serpent grasping itself by biting onto its tail, but as the body that, on the earth exterior to it, holds itself up [se tient] and can. The "at home" [Le "chez soi"] is not a container but a site where I can~ where, dependent on a reality that is other, I am, despite this dependence or thanks to it, free. It is enough to walk, to do [faire], in order to grasp anything, to take. In a sense everything is in the site, in the last analysis everything is at my disposal, even the stars, if I but reckon them, calculate the intermediaries or the means. The site, a medium [Le lieu, milieu], affords means. Everything is here, everything belongs to me; everything is caught up in advance with the primordial occupying of a site, everything

8 is com-prehended.• The possibility of possessing, that is, of suspending the very alterity of what is only at first other, and other relative to me, is the way of the same. I am at home with myself in the world because it offers itself to or resists possession. (What is absolutely other does not only resist possession, but contests it, and accordingly can consecrate it.) This reversion of the alterity of the world to self-identification must be taken seriously; the "moments" of this identification-the body, the home, labor, possession, economy-are not to figure as empirical and contingent data, laid over the formal skeleton of the same; they are the articulations of this structure. The identification of the same is not the void of a tautology nor a dialectical opposition to the other, but the concreteness of egoism. This is important for the possibility of metaphysics. If the same would establish its identity by simple opposition to the other, it would already be a part of a totality encompassing the same and the other. The pretension of metaphysical desire, with which we began, the relationship with the absolutely other, would be belied. But the metaphysician's separation from the metaphysical, which is maintained within the relationship by being produced as an egoism, is not the simple obverse of that relationship. But how can the same, produced as egoism, enter into relationship with an other without immediately divesting it of its alterity? What is the nature of this relationship? The metaphysical relation can not be properly speaking a representation, for the other would therein dissolve into the same: every representation is essentially interpretable as a transcendental constitution. The other with which the metaphysician is in relationship and which he recognizes as other is not simply in another locality; this other recalls Plato's Ideas which, according to Aristotle's formula, are not in a site. The sway [pouvoir] of the I will not cross the distance marked by the alterity of the other. To be sure my own most inward sphere of intimacy appears to me as foreign or hostile; usage-objects, foods, the very world we inhabit are other in relation to us. But the alterity of the I and the world inhabited is only formal; as we have indicated, in a world in which I sojourn this alterity falls under my powers. The metaphysical other is other with an alterity that is not formal, is not the simple reverse of identity, and is not formed out of resistance to the same, but is prior to every 1mt1at1ve, to all imperialism of the same. It is other with an alterity constitutive of the very content of the other. Other with an alterity that does not limit the same, for in limiting the same the other would not be rigorously other: by virtue of the common frontier the other, within the system, would yet be the same.

Ethics begin with the other vs Kant

What is the meaning of this taking charge, this penetration beneath one's condition first dissimulated by the naive movement that conducts cognition as an act toward its object? What is the meaning of this calling in question? It cannot be reduced to the repetition with regard to cognition as a whole of the questions that are raised for the understanding of the things aimed at in the naive act of cognition. In that case to know knowledge would amount to elaborating a psychology, which has its place among the other sciences that bear upon objects. The critical question raised in psychology or in theory of knowledge would amount to asking, for example, from what certain principle cognition is derived, or what is its cause. Infinite regression would here be indeed inevitable, and it is to this sterile course that the proceeding back beneath one's condition, the power to pose the problem of the foundation, would be reduced. To identify the problem of the foundation with an objective knowledge of knowledge is to suppose in advance that freedom can be founded only on itself, for freedom, the determination of the other by the same, is the very movement of representation and of its evidence. To identify the problem of foundation with the knowledge of knowledge is to forget the arbitrariness of freedom, which is precisely what has to be grounded. The knowing whose essence is critique cannot be reduced to objective cognition; it leads to the Other. To welcome the Other is to put in question my freedom. But the critical essence of knowing also leads us beyond the knowledge of the cogito, which we may wish to distinguish from objective knowledge. The evidence of the cogito-where knowledge and the known coincide without knowledge having had to be already in operation, where knowledge thus involves no commitment prior to its present commitment, is at each instant at the beginning, is not in situation ( which, moreover, is what is proper to all evidence, a pure experience of the present without condition or past)-cannot satisfy the critical exigency, for the commencement of the cogito remains antecedent to it. It does indeed mark commencement, because it is the awakening of an existence that takes charge of its own condition. But this awakening comes from the Other. Before the cogito existence dreams itself, as though it remained foreign to itself. It is because it suspects that it is dreaming itself that it awakens. The doubt makes it seek certainty. But this suspicion, this consciousness of doubt, implies the idea of the Perfect. The knowing of the cogito thus refers to a relation with the Master-with the idea of infinity or of the Perfect. The idea of Infinity is neither the immanence of the I think nor the transcendence of the object. The cogito in Descartes rests on the other who is God and who has put the idea of infinity in the soul, who had taught it, and has not, like the Platonic master, simply aroused the reminiscence of former visions. As the act unsettling its own condition, knowing comes into play above all action. And if the tracing back from a condition to what precedes that condition describes the status of the creature, in which the uncertainty of freedom and its recourse to justification are bound up, if knowing is a creature activity, this unsettling of the condition and this justification come from the Other. The Other alone eludes thematization. Thematization cannot serve to found thematization, for it supposes it to be already founded; it is the exercise of a freedom sure of itself in its naive spontaneity-whereas the presence of the Other is not equivalent to his thematization and consequently does not require this naive and selfsure spontaneity. The welcoming of the Other is ipso facto the consciousness of my own injustice-the shame that freedom feels for itself. If philosophy consists in knowing critically, that is, in seeking a foundation for its freedom, in justifying it, it begins with conscience, to which the other is presented as the Other, and where the movement of thematization is inverted. But this inversion does not amount to "knowing oneself" as a theme attended to by the Other, but rather in submitting oneself to an exigency, to a morality. The Other measures me with a gaze incomparable to the gaze by which I discover him. The dimension of height in which the Other is placed is as it were the primary curvature of being from which the privilege of the Other results, the gradient [denivellement] of transcendence. The Other is metaphysical. The Other is not transcendent because he would be free as I am; on the contrary his freedom is a superiority that comes from his very transcendence. What does this inversion of critique consist in? The subject is "for itself"-it represents itself and knows itself as long as it is. But in knowing or representing itself it possesses itself, dominates itself, extends its identity to what of itself comes to refute this identity. This imperialism of the same is the whole essence of freedom. The "for itself" as a mode of existence designates an attachment to oneself as radical as a naive will to live. But if freedom situates me effrontedly before the non-me in myself and outside of myself, if it consists in negating or possessing the non-me, before the Other it retreats. The relationship with the Other does not move (as does cognition) into enjoyment and possession, into freedom; the Other imposes himself as an exigency that dominates this freedom, and hence as more primordial than everything that takes place in me. The Other, whose exceptional presence is inscribed in the ethical impossibility of killing him in which I stand, marks the end of powers. If I can no longer have power over him it is because he overflows absolutely every idea I can have of him. The I can indeed, to justify itself, enter upon a different course: it can endeavor to apprehend itself within a totality. This seems to us to be the justification of freedom aspired after by the philosophy that, from Spinoza to Hegel, identifies will and reason, that, contrary to Descartes, removes from truth its character of being a free work so as to situate it where the opposition between the I and the non-I disappears, in an impersonal reason. Freedom is not maintained but reduced to being the reflection of a universal order which maintains itself and justifies itself all by itself, like the God of the ontological argument. This privilege of the universal order, that it sustains itself and justifies itself ( which situates it beyond the still subjective work of the Cartesian will), constitutes the divine dignity of this order. Knowing would be the way by which freedom would denounce its own contingency, by which it would vanish into the totality. In reality this way dissimulates the ancient triumph of the same over the other. If freedom thus ceases to maintain itself in the arbitrariness of the solitary certitude of evidence, and if the solitary is united to the impersonal reality of the divine, the I disappears in this sublimation. For the philosophical tradition of the West every relation between the same and the other, when it is no longer an affirmation of the supremacy of the same, reduces itself to an impersonal

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relation within a universal order. Philosophy itself is identified with the substitution of ideas for persons, the theme for the interlocutor, the interiority of the logical relation for the exteriority of interpellation. Existents are reduced to the neuter state of the idea, Being, the concept. It was to escape the arbitrariness of freedom, its disappearance into the Neuter, that we have approached the I as atheist and createdfree, but capable of tracing back beneath its condition-before the Other, who does not deliver himself in the "thematization" or "conceptualization" of the Other. To wish to escape dissolution into the Neuter, to posit knowing as a welcoming of the Other, is not a pious attempt to maintain the spiritualism of a personal God, but is the condition for language, without which philosophical discourse itself is but an abortive act, a pretext for an unintermitting psychoanalysis or philology or sociology, in which the appearance of a discourse vanishes in the Whole. Speaking implies a possibility of breaking ofi and beginning. To posit knowing as the very existing of the creature, as the tracing back beyond the condition to the other that founds, is to separate oneself from a whole philosophical tradition that sought the foundation of the self in the self, outside of heteronomous opinions. We think that existence for itself is not the ultimate meaning of knowing, but rather the putting back into question of the self, the turning back to what is prior to oneself, in the presence of the Other. The presence of the Other, a privileged heteronomy, does not clash with freedom but invests it. The shame for oneself, the presence of and desire for the other are not the negation of knowing: knowing is their very articulation. The essence of reason consists not in securing for man a foundation and powers, but in calling him in question and in inviting him to justice. Metaphysics therefore does not consist in bending over the "for itself" of the I to seek in it the solid ground for an absolute approach to being. It is not in the "know thyself" that its ultimate movement is pursuednot that the "for itself" be limited or be of bad faith, but because by itself it is only freedom, that is, arbitrary and unjustified, and in this sense detestable; it is I, egoism. To be sure, the atheism of the I marks the break with participation and consequently the possibility of seeking a justification for oneself, that is, a dependence upon an exteriority without this dependence absorbing the dependent being, held in invisible meshes. This dependence, consequently, at the same time maintains independence; such is the face to face relation. In the quest for truth, a work eminently individual, which always, as Descartes saw, comes back to the

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freedom of the individual, atheism affirms itself as atheism. But its critical power takes it beneath its freedom. The unity of spontaneous freedom, working on straight ahead, and critique, where freedom is capable of being called in question and thus preceding itself, is what is termed a creature. The marvel of creation does not only consist in being a creation ex nihilo, but in that it results in a being capable of receiving a revelation, learning that it is created, and putting itself in question. The miracle of creation lies in creating a moral being. And this implies precisely atheism, but at the same time, beyond atheism, shame for the arbitrariness of the freedom that constitutes it.

Existence precedes ethics

ontology enacts a relationship with another being that everything to the same.

We try to encorparate everything into us

This "beyond" the totality and objective experience is, however, not to be described in a purely negative fashion. It is reflected within the totality and history, within experience. The eschatological, as the "beyond" of history, draws beings out of the jurisdiction of history and the future; it arouses them in and calls them forth to their full responsibility. Submitting history as a whole to judgment, exterior to the very wars that mark its end, it restores to each instant its full signification in that very instant: all the causes are ready to be heard. It is not the last judgment that is decisive, but the judgment of all the instants in time, when the living are judged. The eschatological notion of judgment ( contrary to the judgment of history in which Hegel wrongly saw its rationalization) implies that beings have an identity "before" eternity, before the accomplishment of history, before the fullness of time, while there is still time; implies that beings exist in relationship, to be sure, but on the basis of themselves and not on the basis of the totality. The idea of being overflowing history makes possible existents [etants] both involved in being and personal, called upon to answer at their trial and consequently already adult-but, for that very reason, existents that can speak rather than lending their lips to an anonymous utterance of history. Peace is produced as this aptitude for speech. The eschatological vision breaks with the totality of wars and empires in which one does not speak. It does not envisage the end of history within being understood as a totality, but institutes a relation with the infinity of being which exceeds the totality. The first "vision" of eschatology (hereby distinguished from the revealed opinions of positive religions) reveals the very possibility of. eschatology, that is, the breach of the totality, the possibility of a signification without a context. The experience of morality does not proceed from this vision-it consummates this vision; ethics is an optics. But it is a "vision" without image, bereft of the synoptic and totalizing objectifying virtues of vision, a relation or an intentionality of a wholly different type--which this work seeks to describe. Is relationship with Being produced only in representation, the natural locus of evidence? Does objectivity, whose harshness and universal power is revealed in war, provide the unique and primordial form in which Being, when it is distinguished from image, dream, and subjective abstraction, imposes itself on consciousness? Is the apprehension of an object equivalent to the very movement in which the bonds with truth are woven? These questions the present work answers in the negative. Of peace there can be only an eschatology. But this does not mean that when affirmed objectively it is believed by faith instead of being known by knowledge. It means, first of all, that peace does not take place in the objective history disclosed by war, as the end of that war or as the end of history. But does not the experience of war refute eschatology, as it refutes morality? Have we not begun by acknowledging the irrefutable evidence of totality ? To tell the truth, ever since eschatology has opposed peace to war the evidence or war has been maintained in an essentially hypocritical civilization, that is, attached both to the True and to the Good, henceforth antagomst1c. It is perhaps time to see in hypocrisy not only a base contingent defect of man, but the underlying rending of a world attached to both the philosophers and the prophets. But does not the experience of war and totality coincide, for the philosopher, with experience and evidence as such? And is not philosophy itself after all defined as an endeavor to live a life beginning in evidence, opposing the opinion of one's fellow-men, the illusions and caprice of one's own subjectivity? Does not the eschatology of peace, outside of this evidence, live on subjective opinions and illusions? V nless philosophical evidence refers from itself to a situation that can no longer be stated in terms of "totality" . . . Unless the non-knowing with which the philosophical knowing begins coincides not with pure nothingness but only with a nothingness of objects. . . . Without substituting eschatology for philosophy, without philosophically "demonstrating" eschatological "truths," we can proceed from the experience of totality back to a situation where totality breaks up, a situation that conditions the totality itself. Such a situation is the gleam of exteriority or of transcendence in the face of the Other.\* The rigorously developed con cept of this transcendence is expressed by the term infinity. This revelation of infinity does not lead to the acceptance of any dogmatic content, whose philosophical rationality cannot be argued for in the name of the transcendental truth of the idea of infinity. For the way we are describing to work back and remain this side of objective certitude resembles what has come to be called the transcendental method (in which the technical procedures of transcendental idealism need not necessarily be comprised). Would the violence which, for a mind, consists in welcoming a being to which it is inadequate contradict the ideal of autonomy that guides philosophy-which in evidence is mistress of her own truth? But the relation with infinity-the idea of the Infinite, as Descartes calls itoverflows thought in a wholly different sense than does opinion. Opinion vanishes like the wind when thought touches it---or is revealed to be already within that thought. What remains ever exterior to thought is thought in the idea of infinity. It is the condition for every opinion as also for every objective truth. The idea of infinity is the mind before it lends itself to the distinction between what it discovers by itself and what it receives from opinion. The relation with infinity cannot, to be sure, be stated in terms of experience, for infinity overflows the thought that thinks it. Its very infinition is produced precisely in this overflowing. The relation with infinity will have to be stated in terms other than those of objective experience; but if experience precisely means a relation with the absolutely other, that is, with what always overflows thought, the relation with infinity accomplishes experience in the fullest sense of the word. Finally, the eschatological vision does not oppose to the experience of totality the protestation of a person in the name of his personal egoism or even of his salvation. Such a proclamation of morality based on the pure subjectivism of the I is refuted by war, the totality it reveals, and the objective necessities. We oppose to the objectivism of war a subjectivity born from the eschatological vision. The idea of infinity delivers the subjectivity from the judgment of history to declare it ready for judg~ ment at every moment and, we shall show,1 called to participate in this judgment, impossible without it. The harsh law of war breaks up not against an impotent subjectivism cut off from being, but against the infinite, more objective than objectivity. Do the particular beings yield their truth in a Whole in which their exteriority vanishes? Or, on the contrary, is the ultimate event of being enacted in the outburst of this exteriority? Our initial question now assumes this form. This book then does present itself as a defense of subjectivity, but it will apprehend the subjectivity not at the level of its purely egoist protestation against totality, nor in its anguish before death, but as founded in the idea of infinity. It will proceed to distinguish between the idea of totality and the idea of infinity, and affirm the philosophical primacy of the idea of infinity. It will recount how infinity is produced in the relationship of the same with the other,• and how the particular and the personal, which are unsurpassable, as it were magnetize the very field in which the production of infinity is enacted. The term "production" designates both the effectuation of being ( the event "is produced," an automobile "is produced") and its being brought to light or its exposition (an argument "is produced," an actor "is produced").•• The ambiguity of this verb conveys the essential ambiguity of the operation by which the being of an entity simultaneously is brought about [s' evertue] and is revealed. The idea of infinity is not an incidental notion forged by a subjectivity to reflect the case of an entity encountering on the outside nothing that limits it, overflowing every limit, and thereby infinite. The production of the infinite entity is inseparable from the idea of infinity, for it is precisely in the disproportion between the idea of infinity and the infinity of which it is the idea that this exceeding of limits is produced. The idea of infinity is the mode of being, the in/inition, of infinity. Infinity does not first exist, and then reveal itself. Its infinition is produced as revelation, as a positing of its idea in me. It is produced in the im probable feat whereby a separated being fixed in its identity, the same, the I, nonetheless contains in itself what it can neither contain nor receive solely by virtue of its own identity. Subjectivity realizes these impossible exigencies-the astonishing feat of containing more than it is possible to contain. This book will present subjectivity as welcoming the Other, as hospitality; in it the idea of infinity is consummated. Hence intentionality, where thought remains an adequation with the object, does not define consciousness at its fundamental level. All knowing qua intentionality already presupposes the idea of infinity, which is preeminently non-adequation. To contain more than one's capacity does not mean to embrace or to encompass the totality of being in thought or, at least, to be able to account for it after the fact by the inward play of constitutive thought. To contain more than one's capacity is to shatter at every moment the framework of a content that is thought, to cross the barriers of immanence--but without this descent into being reducing itself anew to a concept of descent. Philosophers have sought to express with the concept of act ( or of the incarnation that makes it possible) this descent into the real, which the concept of thought interpreted as a pure knowing would maintain only as a play of lights. The act of thought-thought as an act -would precede the thought thinking or becoming conscious of an act. The notion of act involves a violence essentially: the violence of transitivity, lacking in the transcendence of thought. For the transcendence of thought remains closed in itself despite all its adventures-which in the last analysis are purely imaginary, or are adventures traversed as by Ulysses: on the way home. What, in action, breaks forth as essential violence is the surplus of being over the thought that claims to contain it, the marvel of the idea of infinity. The incarnation of consciousness is therefore comprehensible oniy if, over and beyond adequation, the overflowing of the idea by its ideatum, that is, the idea of infinity, moves consciousness. The idea of infinity ( which is not a representation of infinity) sustains activity itself. Theoretical thought, knowledge, and critique, to which activity has been opposed, have the same foundation. The idea of infinity, which is not in its turn a representation of infinity, is the common source of activity and theory. Consciousness then does not consist in equaling being with representation, in tending to the full light in which this adequation is to be sought, but rather in overflowing this play of lights-this phenomenology -and in accomplishing events whose ultimate signification ( contrary to the Heideggerian conception) does not lie in disclosing. Philosophy does indeed dis-cover the signification of these events, but they are produced without discovery (or truth) being their destiny. No prior disclosure illuminates the production of these essentially noctural events. The welcoming of the face and the work of justice-which condition the birth of truth itself-are not interpretable in terms of disclosure. Phenomenology is a method for philosophy, but phenomenology-the comprehension effected through a bringing to light-does not constitute the ultimate event of being itself. The relation between the same and the other is not always reducible to knowledge of the other by the same, nor even to the revelation of the other to the same, which is already fundamentally different from disclosure.2

The I think therefor I am integreates everything into the same, and is sollipsistic

The I that thinks the sum of the angles of a triangle is, to be sure, also determined by this object; it is precisely the one that thinks of this sum, and not the one that thinks of atomic weight. Whether it remembers or has forgotten, it is determined by the fact of having passed through the thought of the sum of the angles. This is what will be visible to the historian for whom the I representing to itself is already something represented. At the very moment of representation the I is not marked by the past but utilizes it as a represented and objective element. Illusion? Ignorance of its own involvements? Representation is the force of such an illusion and of such forgettings. Representation is a pure present. The positing of a pure present without even tangential ties with time is the marvel of representation. It is a void of time, interpreted as eternity. To be sure the I who conducts his thoughts becomes ( or more exactly ages) in time, in which his successive thoughts, across which he thinks in the present, are spread forth. But this becoming in time does not appear on the plane of representation: representation involves no passivity. The same in relating itself to the other refuses what is exterior to its own instant, to its own identity, only to find again in this instant, which owes itself to nothing, which is pure gratuity, everything that had been refused-as "meaning given," as noema. I ts first movement is negative : it consists in finding and exhausting in itself the meaning of an exteriority, precisely convertible into noemata. Such is the movement of the Husserlian 21l"OX~, which, strictly speaking, is characteristic of representation. I ts very possibility defines representation. The fact that in representation the same defines the other without being determined by the other justifies the Kantian conception according to which the unity of transcendental appreception remains an empty form in the midst of its synthetic work. But we are far from thinking that one starts with representation as a non-conditioned condition! Representation is bound to a very different "intentionality," which we are endeavoring to approach throughout this analysis. And its marvelous work of constitution is especially possible in reflection. It is the "uprooted" representation that we have analyzed. The way representation is bound to a "wholly other" intentionality is different from the way the object is bound to the subject or the subject to history. The total freedom of the same in representation has a positive condition in the other that is not something represented, but is the Other. For the moment let us note that the structure of representation as a non-reciprocal determination of the other by the same is precisely for the same to be present and for the other to be present to the same. We call it "the same" because in representation the I precisely loses its opposition to its object; the opposition fades, bringing out the identity of the I despite the multiplicity of its objects, that is, precisely the unalterable character of the I. To remain the same is to represent to oneself. The "I think" is the pulsation of rational thought. The identity of the same unaltered and unalterable in its relations with the other is in fact the I of representation. The subject that thinks by representation is a subject that hearkens to its own thought: one has to think of thought as in an element analogous to sound and not to light. Its own spontaneity is a surprise for the subject, as though despite its full mastery qua I the I surprised what was taking place. This inspiration [genialite] is the very structure of representation: a return in the present thought to the thought's past, an assuming of this past in the present, a going beyond this past and this present-as in the Platonic reminiscence, in which the subject hoists himself up to the eternal. The particular I is one with the same, coincides with the "daemon" that speaks to it in thought, and is universal thought. The I of representation is the natural passage from the particular to the universal. Universal thought is a thought in the first person. This is why the constitution that for idealism remakes the universe starting from the subject is not the freedom of an I that would survive this constitution free and above the laws it will have constituted. The I that constitutes dissolves into the work it comprehends, and enters into the eternal. The idealist creation is representation. But this is true only of the I proper to representation-detached from the conditions of its latent birth. And enjoyment, likewise detached from concrete conditions, presents a totally different structure, as we shall show shortly. For the moment let us note the essential correlation of intelligibility and representation. To be intelligible is to be represented and hence to be a priori. To reduce a reality to its content thought is to reduce it to the same. The thinking thought is the locus where a total identity and a reality that ought to negate it are reconciled, without contradiction. The most ponderous reality envisaged as an object of a thought is engendered in the gratuitous spontaneity of a thought that thinks it. Every anteriority of the given is reducible to the instantaneity of thought and, simultaneous with it, arises in the present. It thereby takes on meaning. To represent is not only to render present "anew"; it is to reduce to the present an actual perception which flows on. To represent is not to reduce a past fact to an actual image but to reduce to the instantaneousness of thought everything that seems independent of it; it is in this that representation is constitutive. The value of the transcendental method and its share of eternal truth lies in the universal possibility of reducing the represented to its meaning, the existent to the noema, the most astonishing possibility of reducing to a noema the very being of the existent.

The other is infinite and shit

The face in which the other-the absolutely other-presents himself does not negate the same, does not do violence to it as do opinion or authority or the thaumaturgic supernatural. It remains commensurate with him who welcomes; it remains terrestrial. This presentation is preeminently nonviolence, for instead of offending my freedom it calls it to responsibility and founds it. As nonviolence it nonetheless maintains the plurality of the same and the other. It is peace. The relation with the other-the absolutely other-who has no frontier with the same is not exposed to the allergy that afflicts the same in a totality, upon which the Hegelian dialectic rests. The other is not for reason a scandal which launches it into dialectical movement, but the first rational teaching, the condition for all teaching. The alleged scandal of alterity presupposes the tranquil identity of the same, a freedom sure of itself which is exercised without scruples, and to whom the foreigner brings only constraint and limitation. This flawless identity freed from all participation, independent in the I, can nonetheless lose its tranquillity if the other, rather than countering it by upsurging on the same plane as it, speaks to it, that is, shows himself in expression, in the face, and comes from on high. Freedom then is inhibited, not as countered by a resistance, but as arbitrary, guilty, and timid; but in its guilt it rises to responsibility. Contingency, that is, the irrational, appears to it not outside of itself in the other, but within itself. It is not limitation by the other that constitutes contingency, but egoism, as unjustified of itself. The relation with the Other as a relation with his transcendence-the relation with the Other who puts into question the brutal spontaneity of one's immanent destiny-introduces into me what was not in me. But this "action" upon my freedom precisely puts an end to violence and contingency, and, in this sense also, founds Reason. To affirm that the passage of a content from one mind to the other is produced without violence only if the truth taught by the master is from all eternity in the student is to extrapolate maieutics beyond its legitimate usage. The idea of infinity in me, implying a content overflowing the container, breaks with the prejudice of maieutics without breaking with rationalism, since the idea of infinity, far from violating the mind, conditions nonviolence itself, that is, establishes ethics. The other is not for reason a scandal that puts it in dialectical movement, but the first teaching. A being receiving the idea of Infinity, receiving since it cannot derive it from itself, is a being taught in a non-maieutic fashion, a being whose very existing consists in this incessant reception of teaching, in this incessant overflowing of self ( which is time). To think is to have the idea of infinity, or to be taught. Rational thought refers to this teaching. Even if we confine ourselves to the formal structure of logical thought, which starts from a definition, infinity, relative to which concepts are delimited, can not be defined in its turn. It accordingly refers to a "knowledge" of a new structure. We seek to fix it as a relation with the face and to show the ethical essence of this relation. The face is the evidence that makes evidence possibl~like the divine veracity that sustains Cartesian rationalism.

Langauge stuff

Language thus conditions the functioning of rational thought: it gives it a commencement in being, a primary identity of signification in the face of him who speaks, that is, who presents himself by ceaselessly undoing the equivocation of his own image, his verbal signs. Language conditions thought-not language in its physical materiality, but language as an attitude of the same with regard to the Other irreducible to the representation of the Other, irreducible to an intention of thought, irreducible to a consciousness of . . . , since relating to what no consciousness can contain, relating to the infinity of the Other. Language is not enacted within a consciousness; it comes to me from the Other and reverberates in consciousness by putting it in question. This event is irreducible to consciousness, where everything comes about from within-even the strangeness of suffering. To regard language as an attitude of the mind does not amount to disincarnating it, but is precisely to account for its incarnate essence, its difference from the constitutive,

egological nature of the transcendental thought of idealism. The originality of discourse with respect to constitutive intentionality, to pure consciousness, destroys the concept of immanence: the idea of infinity in consciousness is an overflowing of a consciousness whose incarnation offers new powers to a soul no long paralytic-powers of welcome, of gift, of full hands, of hospitality. But to take incarnation as a primary fact of language, without indicating the ontological structure it accomplishes, would be to assimilate language to activity, to that prolongation of thought in corporeity, the I think in the I can, which has indeed served as a prototype for the category of the lived body [ corps propre] or incarnate thought, which dominates one part of contemporary philosophy. The thesis we present here separates radically language and activity, expression and labor, in spite of all the practical side of language, whose importance we may not underestimate.

Other language stuff

It is the contrary that must be affirmed; it is not the mediation of the sign that forms signification, but signification ( whose primordial event is the face to face) that makes the sign function possible. The primordial essence of language is to be sought not in the corporeal operation that discloses it to me and to others and, in the recourse to language, builds up a thought, but in the presentation of meaning. This does not bring us back to a transcendental consciousness constituting objects, against which the theory of language we have just evoked protests with such just rigor. For significations do not present themselves to theory, that is, to the constitutive freedom of a transcendental consciousness; the being of signification consists in putting into question in an ethical relation constitutive freedom itself. Meaning is the face of the Other, and all recourse to words takes place already within the primordial face to face of language. Every recourse to words presupposes the comprehension of the primary signification, but this comprehension, before being interpreted as a "consciousness of.'' is society and obligation. Signification is the Infinite, but infinity does not present itself to a transcendental thought, nor even to meaningful activity, but presents itself in the Other; the Other faces me and puts me in question and obliges me by his essence qua infinity. That "something" we call signification arises in being with language because the essence of language is the relation with the Other. This relation is not added to the interior monologue-be it Merleau-Ponty's "corporeal intentionality"-like an address added to the fabricated object one puts in the mailbox; the welcoming of the being that appears in the face, the ethical event of sociality, already commands inward discourse. And the epiphany that is produced as a face is not constituted as are all other beings, precisely because it "reveals" infinity. Signification is infinity, that is, the Other. The intelligible is not a concept, but an intelligence. Signification precedes Sinngebung, and rather than justifying idealism, marks its limit.

In a sense signification is to perception what the symbol is to the object symbolized. The symbol marks the inadequateness of what is given in consciousness with regard to the being it symbolizes, a consciousness needy and hungry for the being it lacks, for the being announced in the very precision with which its absence is lived, a potency that evinces the act. Signification resembles it, as an overflowing of the intention that envisages by the being envisaged. But here the inexhaustible surplus of infinity overflows the actuality of consciousness. The shimmer of infinity, the face, can no longer be stated in terms of consciousness, in metaphors referring to light and the sensible. It is the ethical exigency of the face, which puts into question the consciousness that welcomes it. The consciousness of obligation is no longer a consciousness, since it tears consciousness up from its center, submitting it to the Other.

But ethics must start with the other

It is not by chance that the theoretical relation has been the preferred schema of the metaphysical relation. Knowledge or theory designates first a relation with being such that the knowing being lets the known being manifest itself while respecting its alterity and without marking it in any way whatever by this cognitive relation. In this sense metaphysical desire would be the essence of theory. But theory also designates comprehension [intelligence]-the logos of being-that is, a way of approaching the known being such that its alterity with regard to the knowing being vanishes. The process of cognition is at this stage identified with the freedom of the knowing being encountering nothing which, other with respect fo it, could limit it. This mode of depriving the known being of its alterity can be accomplished only if it is aimed at through a third term, a neutral term, which itself is not a being; in it the shock of the encounter of the same with the other is deadened. This third term may appear as a concept thought. Then the individual that exists abdicates into the general that is thought. The third term may be called sensation, in which objective quality and subjective affection are merged. It may appear as Being distinguished from the existent: Being, which at the same time is not ( that is, is not posited as an existent) and yet corresponds to the work plied by the existent, which is not a nothing. Being, which is without the density of existents, is the light in which existents become intelligible. To theory as comprehension of beings the general title ontology is appropriate. Ontology, which reduces the other to the same, promotes freedom-the freedom that is the identification of the same, not allowing itself to be alienated by the other. Here theory enters upon a course that renounces metaphysical Desire, nmounces the marvel of exteriority from which that Desire lives.

But theory understood as a respect for exteriority delineates another structure esse~tial for metaphysics. In its comprehension of being ( or ontology) it is concerned with critique. It discovers the dogmatism and naive arbitariness of its spontaneity, and calls into question the freedom of the exercise of ontology; it then seeks to exercise this freedom in such a way as to turn back at every moment to the origin of the arbitrary dogmatism of this free exercise. This would lead to an infinite regression if this return itself remained an ontological movement, an exercise of freedom, a theory. Its critical intention then leads it beyond theory and ontology: critique does not reduce the other to the same as does ontology, but calls into question the exercise of the same. A calling into question of the same--which cannot occur within the egoist spontaneity of the same--is brought about by the other. We name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics. The strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my possessions, is precisely accomplished as a calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics. Metaphysics, transcendence, the welcoming of the other by the same, of the Other by me, is concretely produced as the calling into question of the same by the other, that is, as the ethics that accomplishes the critical essence of knowledge. And as critique precedes dogmatism, metaphysics precedes ontology. Western philosophy has most often been an ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being. This primacy of the same was Socrates's teaching: to receive nothing of the Other hut what is in me, as though from all eternity I was in possession of what comes to me from the outside--to receive nothing, or to be free. Freedom does not resemble the capricious spontaneity of free will; its ultimate meaning lies in this permanence in the same, which is reason. Cognition is the deployment of this identity; it is freedom. That reason in the last analysis would be the manifestation of a freedom, neutralizing the other and encompassing him, can come as no surprise once it was laid down that sovereign reason knows only itself, that nothing other limits it. The neutralization of the other who becomes a theme or an object-appearing, that is, taking its place in the light-is precisely his reduction to the same. To know ontologically is to surprise in an existent confronted that by which it is not this existent, this stranger, that by which it is somehow betrayed, surrenders, is given in the horizon in which it loses itself and appears, lays itself open to grasp, becomes a concept. To know amounts to grasping being out of nothing or reducing it to nothing, removing from it its alterity. This result is obtained from the moment of the first ray of light. To illuminate is to remove from being its resistance, because light opens a horizon and empties space-delivers being out of nothingness. Mediation ( characteristic of Western philosophy) is meaningful only if it is not limited to reducing distances. For how could intermediaries reduce the intervals between terms infinitely distant? Will not the intervals between the mid-points progressively staked out ad infinitum appear always equally untraversable? If an exterior and foreign being is to surrender itself to intermediaries there must be produced somewhere a great "betrayal." As far as the things are concerned, a surrender is carried out in their conceptualization. As for man, it can be obtained by the terror that brings a free man under the domination of another. For the things the work of ontology consists in apprehending the individual ( which alone exists) not in its individuality but in its generality ( of which alone there is science). The relation with the other is here accomplished only through a third term which I find in myself. The ideal of Socratic truth thus rests on the essential self-sufficiency of the same, its identification in ipseity, its egoism. Philosophy is an egology.

The only way to relate to the other is through infinite, infinite obligation

If the subjectivity were but a deficient mode of being, the distinguishing between will and reason would indeed result in conceiving the will as arbitrary, as a pure and simple negation of an embryonic or virtual reason dormant in an I, and consequently as a negation of that I and a violence in regard to oneself. If, on the contrary, the subjectivity is fixed as a separated being in relation with an other absolutely other, the Other, if the face brings the first signification, that is, the very upsurge of the rational, then the will is distinguished fundamentally from the intelligible, which it must not comprehend and into which it must not disappear, for the intelligibility of this intelligible resides precisely in ethical ~ehavior, that is, in the responsibility to which it invites the will. The will is free to assume this responsibility in whatever sense it likes; it is not free to refuse this responsibility itself; it is not free to ignore the meaningful world into which the face of the Other has introduced it. In the welcoming of the face the will opens to reason. Language is not limited to the maieutic awakening of thoughts common to beings. It does not accelerate the inward maturation of a reason common to all; it teaches and introduces the new into a thought. The introduction of the new into a thought, the idea of infinity, is the very work of reason. The absolutely new is the Other. The rational is not opposed to the experienced; absolute experience, the experience of what is in no way a priori, is reason itself. In discovering, as correlative of experience, the Other, him who, being in himself essentially, can speak, and nowise sets himself up as an object, the novelty contributed by experience is reconciled with the ancient Socratic exigency of a mind nothing can force, an exigency Leibniz again answers to in refusing the monads windows. The ethical presence is both other and imposes itself without violence. As the activity of reason commences with speech, the subject does not abdicate his unicity, but confirms his separation. He does not enter into his own discourse to disappear in it; it remains an apology. The passage to the rational is not a dis-individuation precisely because it is language, that is, a response to the being who in a face speaks to the subject and tolerates only a personal response, that is, an ethical act

Consequences bad, infinity an apriori

Totalization abd

Independnat Reasons

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Only from the perspective of my relationship to an other, conceived as a relationship forged in desire prior to reflection, can we reconstruct a logic of philosophy that escapes the moral and political ambiguity present in the solipsism of Heideggerian Jemeinigkeit (authenticity) as well as in Heideggerian historicism. A kind of blank theo-logy is indissociable with this relation; it is implicit in the beginnings of intersubjectivity and sociality. We cannot claim the title of 'negative theology' for this because in question here is the intersubjective relationship. For Levinas, the true transcendence of the structures of my biological condition is brought about only by the approach of the other. His being also stands outside my knowledge in this first moment. Through his being and through the effect it has upon me and my actions, however, the closed and ontic character of my being is interrupted and questioned. Because there is no theoretical answer possible to the question of why this interruption occurs, we are left saying that something transcending the order of being and beings passes through my relation with the other. If this were otherwise, if there were no phenomenology possible of ethical responsibility for the other, how should we account for events of goodness and supererogatory acts in a world where prudent action is the maximization of one's sway and domain? The exploration of such responsibility and what it implies for knowledge and society necessitates the displacement of fundamental ontology as first philosophy.

Our infinite obligation to the the other

This relation of the same with the other, where the transcendence of the relation does not cut the bonds a relation implies, yet where these bonds do not unite the same and the other into a Whole, is in fact fixed in the situation described by Descartes in which the "I think" maintains with the Infinite it can nowise contain and from which it is separated a relation called "idea of infinity." To be sure, things, mathematical and moral notions are also, according to Descartes, presented to us through their ideas, and are distinct from them. But the idea of infinity is exceptional in that its ideatum surpasses its idea, whereas for the things the total coincidence of their "objective" and "formal" realities is not precluded; we could conceivably have accounted for all the ideas, other than that of Infinity, by ourselves. Without deciding anything for the moment as to the veritable significance of the presence of the ideas of things in us, without holding to the Cartesian argumentation that proves the separated existence of the Infinite by the finitude of the being having an idea of infinity ( for there perhaps is not much sense to proving an existence by describing a situation prior to proof and to the problems of existence), it is of importance to emphasize that the transcendence of the Infinite with respect to the I which is separted from it and which thinks it measures (so to speak) its very infinitude. The distance that separates ideatum and idea here constitutes the content of the ideatum itself. Infinity is characteristic of a transcendent being as transcendent; the infinite is the absolutely other. The transcendent is the sole ideatum of which there can be only an idea in us; it is infinitely removed from its idea, that is, exterior, because it is infinite. To think the infinite, the transcendent, the Stranger, is hence not to think an object. But to think what does not have the lineaments of an object is in reality to do more or better than think. The distance of tran• scendence is not equivalent to that which separates the mental act from its object in all our representations, since the distance at which the object stands does not exclude, and in reality implies, the possession of the object, that is, the suspension of its being. The "intentionality" of transcendence is unique in its kind; the difference between objectivity and transcendence will serve as a general guideline for all the analyses of this work. We find that this presence in thought of an idea whose ideatum overflows the capacity of thought is given expression not only in Aristotle's theory of the agent intellect, but also, very often, in Plato. Against a thought that proceeds from him who "has his own head to himself,"6 he affirms the value of the delirium that comes from God, "winged thought.m Delirium here does not have an irrationalist significance; it is only a "divine release of the soul from the yoke of custom and convention."8 The fourth type of delirium is reason itself, rising to the ideas, thought in the highest sense. Possession by a god, enthusiasm, is not the irrational, but the end of the solitary ( and which we will later call "economic") or inward thought, the beginning of a true experience of the new and of the noumenon-already Desire. The Cartesian notion of the idea of the Infinite designates a relation with a being that maintains its total exteriority with respect to him who thinks it. It designates the contact with the intangible, a contact that does not compromise the integrity of what is touched. To affirm the presence in us of the idea of infinity is to deem purely abstract and formal the contradiction the idea of metaphysics is said to harbor, which Plato brings up in the Parmenides9-that the relation with the Absolute would render the Absolute relative. The absolute exteriority of the exterior being is not purely and simply lost as a result of its manifestation; it "absolves" itself from the relation in which it presents itself. But the infinite distance of the Stranger despite the proximity achieved by the idea of infinity, the complex structure of the unparalleled relation designated by this idea, has to be described; it is not enough to distinguish it formally from objectification. We must now indicate the terms which will state the deformalization or the concretization of the idea of infinity, this apparently wholly empty notion. The infinite in the finite, the more in the less, which is accomplished by the idea of Infinity, is produced as Desire-not a Desire that the possession of the Desirable slakes, but the Desire for the Infinite which the desirable arouses rather than satisfies. A Desire perfectly disinterested-goodness. But Desire and goodness concretely presuppose a relationship in which the Desirable arrests the "negativity" of the I that holds sway in the Same-puts an end to power and emprise. This is positively produced as the possession of a world I can bestow as a gift on the Other-that is, as a presence before a face. For the presence before a face, my orientation toward the Other, can lose the avidity proper to the gaze only by turning into generosity, incapable of approaching the other with empty hands. This relationship established over the things henceforth possibly common, that is, susceptible of being said, is the relationship of conversation. The way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me, we here name face. This mode does not consist in figuring as a theme under my gaze, in spreading itself forth as a set of qualities forming a~ image. The face of theOther at each moment destroys and overflows the plastic image it leaves me, the idea existing to my own measure and to the measure of its ideatum-the adequate idea. It does not manifest itself by these qualities, but Ka()' ah6. It expresses itself. The face brings a notion of truth which, in contradistinction to contemporary ontology, is not the disclosure of an impersonal Neuter, but expression: the existent breaks through all the envelopings and generalities of Being to spread out in its "form" the totality of its "content," finally abolishing the distinction between form and content. This is not achieved by some sort of modification of the knowledge that thematizes, but precisely by "thematization" turning into conversation. The condition for theoretical truth and error is the word of the other, his expression, which every lie already presupposes. But the first content of expression is the expression itself. To approach the Other in conversation is to welcome his expression, in which at each instant he overflows the idea a thought would carry away from it. It is therefore to receive from the Other beyond the capacity of the I, which means exactly: to have the idea of infinity. But this also means : to be taught. The relation with the Other, or Conversation, is a non-allergic relation, an ethical relation; but inasmuch as it is welcomed this conversation is a teaching [enseignement]. Teaching is not reducible to maieutics; it comes from the exterior and brings me more than I contain. In its non-violent transitivity the very epiphany of the face is produced. The Aristotelian analysis of the intellect, which discovers the agent intellect coming in by the gates, absolutely exterior, and yet constituting, nowise compromising, the sovereign activity of reason, already substitutes for maieutics a transitive action of the master, since reason, without abdicating, is found to be in a position to receive. Finally, infinity, overflowing the idea of infinity, puts the spontaneous freedom within us into question. It commands and judges it and brings it to its truth. The analysis of the idea of Infinity, to which we gain access only starting from an I, will be terminated with the surpassing of the subjective. The notion of the face, to which we will refer throughout this work, opens other perspectives: it brings us to a notion of meaning prior to my Sinngehung and thus independent of my initiative and my power. It signifies the philosophical priority of the existent over Being, an exteriority that does not call for power or possession, an exteriority that is not reducible, as with Plato, to the interiority of memory, and yet maintains the I who welcomes it. It finally makes possible the description of the notion of the immediate. The philosophy of the immediate is realized neither in Berkeley's idealism nor in modern ontology. To say that the existent is disclosed only in the openness of Being is to say that we are never directly with the existent as such. The immediate is the interpellation and, if we may speak thus, the imperative of language. The idea of contact does not represent the primordial mode of the immediate. Contact is already a thematization and a reference to a horizon. The immediate is the face to face. Between a philosophy of transcendence that situates elsewhere the true life to which man, escaping from here, would gain access in the privileged moments of liturgical, mystical elevation, or in dying-and a philosophy of immanence in which we would truly come into possession of being when every "other" ( cause for war), encompassed by the same, would vanish at the end of history-we propose to describe, within the unfolding of terrestrial existence, of economic existence ( as we shall call it), a relationship with the other that does not result in a divine or human totality, that is not a totalization of history but the idea of infinity. Such a relationship is metaphysics itself. History would not be the privileged plane where Being disengaged from the particularism of points of view ( with which reflection would still be affected) is manifested. If it claims to integrate myself and the other within an impersonal spirit this alleged integration is cruelty and injustice, that is, ignores the Other. History as a relationship between men ignores a position of the I before the other in which the other remains transcendent with respect to me. Though of myself I am not exterior to history, I do find in the Other a point that is absolute with regard to history-not by amalgamating with the Other, but in speaking with him. History is worked over by the ruptures of history, in which a judgment is borne upon it. When man truly approaches the Other he is uprooted from history.

Impact Calc: I think therefor I am fails

This fails when we totalize them

Prefer:

[1] Temporallity

[2] Langague wth Performativity warrant

Can objectivity and the universality of thought be founded on discourse? Is not universal thought of itself prior to discourse? Does not a mind in speaking evoke what the other mind already thinks, both of them participating in common ideas? But the community of thought ought to have made language as a relation between beings impossible. Coherent discourse is one. A universal thought dispenses with communication. A reason cannot be other for a reason. How can a reason be an I or an other, since its very being consists in renouncing singularity? European thought has always combated, as skeptical, the idea of man as measure of all things, although this idea contributes the idea of atheist separation and one of the foundations of discourse. For it the sentient I could not found Reason; the I was defined by reason. Reason speaking in the first person is not addressed to the other, conducts a monologue. And, conversely, it would attain to veritable personality, would recover the sovereignty characteristic of the autonomous person, only by becoming universal. Separated thinkers become rational only in the measure that their personal and particular acts of thinking figure as moments of this unique and universal discourse. There would be reason in the thinking individual only in the measure that he would himself enter into his own discourse, that thought would, in the etymological sense of the term, comprehend the thinker-that it would include him. But to make of the thinker a moment of thought is to limit the revealing function of language to its coherence, conveying the coherence of concepts. In this coherence the unique I of the thinker volatilizes. The function of language would amount to suppressing "the other," who breaks this coherence and is hence essentially irrational. A curious result: language would consist in suppressing the other, in making the other agree with the same! But in its expressive function language precisely maintains the other-to whom it is addl"ess~d, ~horn it calls upon or invokes. To be sure, language does not consist in invoking him as a being represented and thought. But this is why language institutes a relation irreducible to the subject-object relation: the revelation of the other. In this revelation only can language as a system of signs be constituted. The other called upon is not something represented, is not a given, is not a particular, through one side already open to generalization. Language, far from presupposing universality and generality, first makes them possible. Language presupposes interlocutors, a plurality. Their commerce is not a representation of the one by the other, nor a participation in universality, on the common plane of language. Their commerce, as we shall show shortly, is ethical.

[3] Breaks down oppression

[4] Something Else

A2 God

To posit the transcendent as stranger and poor one is to prohibit the metaphysical relation with God from being accomplished in the ignorance of men and things. The dimension of the divine opens forth from the human face. A relation with the Transcendent free from all captivation by the Transcendent is a social relation. It is here that the Transcendent, infinitely other, solicits us and appeals to us. The proximity of the Other, the proximity of the neighbor, is in being an ineluctable moment of the revelation of an absolute presence ( that is, disengaged from every relation), which expresses itself. His very epiphany consists in soliciting us by his destitution in the face of the Stranger, the widow, and the orphan. The atheism of the metaphysician means, positively, that our relation with the Metaphysical is an ethical behavior and not theology, not a thematization, be it a knowledge by analogy, of the attributes of God. God rises to his supreme and ultimate presence as correlative to the justice rendered unto men. The direct compreh~nsion of God is impossible for a look directed upon him, not because our intelligence is limited, but because the relation with infinity respects the total Transcendence of the other without being bewitched by it, and because our possibility of welcoming him in man goes further than the comprehension that thematizes and encompasses its object. It goes further, for precisely it thus goes into Infinity. The comprehension of God taken as a participation in his sacred life, an allegedly direct comprehension, is impossible, because participation is a denial of the divine, and because nothing is more direct than the face to face, which is straightforwardness itself. A God invisible means not only a God unimaginable, but a God accessible in justice. Ethics is the spiritual optics. The subject-object relation does not reflect it; in the impersonal relation that leads to it the invisible but personal God is not approached outside of all human presence. The ideal is not only a being superlatively being, a sublimation of the objective, or, in the solitude of love, a sublimation of a Thou. The work of justice-the uprightness of the face to face--is necessary in order that the breach that leads to God be produced-and "vision" here coincides with this work of justice. Hence metaphysics is enacted where the social relation is enacted-in our relations with men. There can be no "knowledge" of God separated from the relationship with men. The Other is the very locus of metaphysical truth, and is indispensable for my relation with God. He does not play the role of a mediator. The Other is not the incarnation of God, but precisely by his face, in which he is disincarnate, is the manifestation of the height in which God is revealed. It is our relations with men, which describe a field of research hardly glimpsed at ( where more often than not we confine ourselves to a few formal categories whose content would be but "psychology"), that give to theological concepts the sole signification they admit of. The establishing of this primacy of the ethical, that is, of the relationship of man to man-signification, teaching, and justice-a primacy of an irreducible structure upon which all the other structures rest ( and in particular all those which seem to put us primordially in contact with an impersonal sublimity, aesthetic or ontological), is one of the objectives of the present work. Metaphysics is enacted in ethical relations. Without the signification they draw from ethics theological concepts remain empty and formal frameworks. The role Kant attributed to sensible experience in the domain of the understanding belongs in metaphysics to interhuman relations. It is from moral relationships that every metaphysical affirmation takes on a "spiritual" meaning, is purified of everything with which an imagination captive of things and victim of participation charges our concepts. The ethical relation is defined, in contrast with every relation with the sacred, by excluding every signification it would take on unbeknown to him who maintains that relation. When I maintain an ethical relation I refuse to recognize the role I would play in a drama of which I would not be the author or whose outcome another would know before me; I refuse to figure in a drama of salvation or of damnation that would be enacted in spite of me and that would make game of me. This is not equivalent to a diabolical pride, for it does not exclude obedience. But obedience precisely is to be distinguished from an involuntary participation in mysterious designs in which one figures or which one prefigures. Everything that cannot be reduced to an interhuman relation represents not the superior form but the forever primitive form of religion.

Offense

I put my self in the place of the other and protect them

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Being-for-itself is a mode of being in which the Self is pre-occupied with itself, and therefore, indifferent to the Other (Levinas 1969: 87). Levinas uses the term “being-for-the Other” (Levinas 1969: 261) which in his later work, Otherwise than Being or Beyond essence (1981) modified to “the-one-for-the-other” (Levinas 1981: 77) in order to escape the language of ontology, to indicate a position in which the Self is responsible for the Other. He contends that “being-for-the-Other” requires that one exercises “sensibility” (Levinas 1981: 77). Sensibility, especially in Totality and Infinity, implies exposure or being in proximity to the Other. It involves standing in the place of another and offering protection to them (Levinas 1969: 135-136). It extends to sacrificing one’s life for the Other. To be for the Other, argues Levinas, is to answer even before the Other calls. It is to make an allegiance to the Other before one commits oneself through an oath (Levinas 1969: 150). How can this be possible? Is Levinas perhaps being too pious as Caputo (1993: 32) remarks? There is clearly a philosophical gap or shadow in Levinas’ construal of the concept of responsibility as being-for-the-other. This gap is perhaps filled comfortably by what Burggraeve (2002, 2007: 22) describes as the Jerusalem pole of Levinas’ thought. Levinas introduced the notion of “substitution” in his philosophy as an attempt to avoid the traditional language of Ontology.9 But this move was gravitational towards the Jerusalem pole. The notion is used as a critique of the western philosophical concept of “identity” which Levinas associates with self-coincidence, self-possession and sovereignty. In other words, in ‘substitution’ the identity of the Subject is under question and challenge, especially in the context of responsibility. In this regard, Levinas is reacting against Sartre and Hegel for whom the self is posited as a for-itself. According to Levinas “substitution” is indispensable to the comprehension of subjectivity. It is the process by which the Subject empties itself of its being, so that it makes space for the Other. Substitution for Levinas is aptly described by the phrase “one in-the-place-of-another” (Levinas 1981: 14). It entails undertones of passivity, which is unlike the notion of “self-sacrifice”. In substitution, the Other is not merely an object of representation, as in Husserl. Substitution is not a psychological event of compassion (Levinas 1981: 146), but it is putting oneself in the place of the Other, who is distinct from me. He also maintains that substitution is “having-the-other-in-one’s-skin” (Levinas 1981: 115). This is a hyperbole, which signifies that in the notion of substitution, identity is inverted. The Subject plays a protective role to the Other just as it is the function of the skin to protect the whole body against external hazards. Having the Other in one’s skin also signifies “ethical maternity” (Levinas 1981: 108). Burggraeve corroborates Levinas on this point. He points out that to have the Other in one’s skin is to be a womb for them. He observes that a womb is essentially involved with the Other rather than with itself (Burggraeve 1985: 77). Burggraeve further observes that there is a close parallel in Hebrew between rekhem (womb) and rakham (mercy). Linguistically, the latter word is derived from the former. Rekhem denotes brotherly or motherly feeling, while rakham signifies steadfast

Language thus conditions the functioning of rational thought: it gives it a commencement in being, a primary identity of signification in the face of him who speaks, that is, who presents himself by ceaselessly undoing the equivocation of his own image, his verbal signs. Language conditions thought-not language in its physical materiality, but language as an attitude of the same with regard to the Other irreducible to the representation of the Other, irreducible to an intention of thought, irreducible to a consciousness of . . . , since relating to what no consciousness can contain, relating to the infinity of the Other. Language is not enacted within a consciousness; it comes to me from the Other and reverberates in consciousness by putting it in question. This event is irreducible to consciousness, where everything comes about from within-even the strangeness of suffering. To regard language as an attitude of the mind does not amount to disincarnating it, but is precisely to account for its incarnate essence, its difference from the constitutive, egological nature of the transcendental thought of idealism. The originality of discourse with respect to constitutive intentionality, to pure consciousness, destroys the concept of immanence: the idea of infinity in consciousness is an overflowing of a consciousness whose incarnation offers new powers to a soul no long paralytic-powers of welcome, of gift, of full hands, of hospitality. But to take incarnation as a primary fact of language, without indicating the ontological structure it accomplishes, would be to assimilate language to activity, to that prolongation of thought in corporeity, the I think in the I can, which has indeed served as a prototype for the category of the lived body [ corps propre] or incarnate thought, which dominates one part of contemporary philosophy. The thesis we present here separates radically language and activity, expression and labor, in spite of all the practical side of language, whose importance we may not underestimate.

Other language stuff

It is the contrary that must be affirmed; it is not the mediation of the sign that forms signification, but signification ( whose primordial event is the face to face) that makes the sign function possible. The primordial essence of language is to be sought not in the corporeal operation that discloses it to me and to others and, in the recourse to language, builds up a thought, but in the presentation of meaning. This does not bring us back to a transcendental consciousness constituting objects, against which the theory of language we have just evoked protests with such just rigor. For significations do not present themselves to theory, that is, to the constitutive freedom of a transcendental consciousness; the being of signification consists in putting into question in an ethical relation constitutive freedom itself. Meaning is the face of the Other, and all recourse to words takes place already within the primordial face to face of language. Every recourse to words presupposes the comprehension of the primary signification, but this comprehension, before being interpreted as a "consciousness of.'' is society and obligation. Signification is the Infinite, but infinity does not present itself to a transcendental thought, nor even to meaningful activity, but presents itself in the Other; the Other faces me and puts me in question and obliges me by his essence qua infinity. That "something" we call signification arises in being with language because the essence of language is the relation with the Other. This relation is not added to the interior monologue-be it Merleau-Ponty's "corporeal intentionality"-like an address added to the fabricated object one puts in the mailbox; the welcoming of the being that appears in the face, the ethical event of sociality, already commands inward discourse. And the epiphany that is produced as a face is not constituted as are all other beings, precisely because it "reveals" infinity. Signification is infinity, that is, the Other. The intelligible is not a concept, but an intelligence. Signification precedes Sinngebung, and rather than justifying idealism, marks its limit. In a sense signification is to perception what the symbol is to the object symbolized. The symbol marks the inadequateness of what is given in consciousness with regard to the being it symbolizes, a consciousness needy and hungry for the being it lacks, for the being announced in the very precision with which its absence is lived, a potency that evinces the act. Signification resembles it, as an overflowing of the intention that envisages by the being envisaged. But here the inexhaustible surplus of infinity overflows the actuality of consciousness. The shimmer of infinity, the face, can no longer be stated in terms of consciousness, in metaphors referring to light and the sensible. It is the ethical exigency of the face, which puts into question the consciousness that welcomes it. The consciousness of obligation is no longer a consciousness, since it tears consciousness up from its center, submitting it to the Other.

OR

Can objectivity and the universality of thought be founded on discourse? Is not universal thought of itself prior to discourse? Does not a mind in speaking evoke what the other mind already thinks, both of them participating in common ideas? But the community of thought ought to have made language as a relation between beings impossible. Coherent discourse is one. A universal thought dispenses with communication. A reason cannot be other for a reason. How can a reason be an I or an other, since its very being consists in renouncing singularity? European thought has always combated, as skeptical, the idea of man as measure of all things, although this idea contributes the idea of atheist separation and one of the foundations of discourse. For it the sentient I could not found Reason; the I was defined by reason. Reason speaking in the first person is not addressed to the other, conducts a monologue. And, conversely, it would attain to veritable personality, would recover the sovereignty characteristic of the autonomous person, only by becoming universal. Separated thinkers become rational only in the measure that their personal and particular acts of thinking figure as moments of this unique and universal discourse. There would be reason in the thinking individual only in the measure that he would himself enter into his own discourse, that thought would, in the etymological sense of the term, comprehend the thinker-that it would include him. But to make of the thinker a moment of thought is to limit the revealing function of language to its coherence, conveying the coherence of concepts. In this coherence the unique I of the thinker volatilizes. The function of language would amount to suppressing "the other," who breaks this coherence and is hence essentially irrational. A curious result: language would consist in suppressing the other, in making the other agree with the same! But in its expressive function language precisely maintains the other-to whom it is addl"ess~d, ~horn it calls upon or invokes. To be sure, language does not consist in invoking him as a being represented and thought. But this is why language institutes a relation irreducible to the subject-object relation: the revelation of the other. In this revelation only can language as a system of signs be constituted. The other called upon is not something represented, is not a given, is not a particular, through one side already open to generalization. Language, far from presupposing universality and generality, first makes them possible. Language presupposes interlocutors, a plurality. Their commerce is not a representation of the one by the other, nor a participation in universality, on the common plane of language. Their commerce, as we shall show shortly, is ethical.

The face in which the other-the absolutely other-presents himself does not negate the same, does not do violence to it as do opinion or authority or the thaumaturgic supernatural. It remains commensurate with him who welcomes; it remains terrestrial. This presentation is preeminently nonviolence, for instead of offending my freedom it calls it to responsibility and founds it. As nonviolence it nonetheless maintains the plurality of the same and the other. It is peace. The relation with the other-the absolutely other-who has no frontier with the same is not exposed to the allergy that afflicts the same in a totality, upon which the Hegelian dialectic rests. The other is not for reason a scandal which launches it into dialectical movement, but the first rational teaching, the condition for all teaching. The alleged scandal of alterity presupposes the tranquil identity of the same, a freedom sure of itself which is exercised without scruples, and to whom the foreigner brings only constraint and limitation. This flawless identity freed from all participation, independent in the I, can nonetheless lose its tranquillity if the other, rather than countering it by upsurging on the same plane as it, speaks to it, that is, shows himself in expression, in the face, and comes from on high. Freedom then is inhibited, not as countered by a resistance, but as arbitrary, guilty, and timid; but in its guilt it rises to responsibility. Contingency, that is, the irrational, appears to it not outside of itself in the other, but within itself. It is not limitation by the other that constitutes contingency, but egoism, as unjustified of itself. The relation with the Other as a relation with his transcendence-the relation with the Other who puts into question the brutal spontaneity of one's immanent destiny-introduces into me what was not in me. But this "action" upon my freedom precisely puts an end to violence and contingency, and, in this sense also, founds Reason. To affirm that the passage of a content from one mind to the other is produced without violence only if the truth taught by the master is from all eternity in the student is to extrapolate maieutics beyond its legitimate usage. The idea of infinity in me, implying a content overflowing the container, breaks with the prejudice of maieutics without breaking with rationalism, since the idea of infinity, far from violating the mind, conditions nonviolence itself, that is, establishes ethics. The other is not for reason a scandal that puts it in dialectical movement, but the first teaching. A being receiving the idea of Infinity, receiving since it cannot derive it from itself, is a being taught in a non-maieutic fashion, a being whose very existing consists in this incessant reception of teaching, in this incessant overflowing of self ( which is time). To think is to have the idea of infinity, or to be taught. Rational thought refers to this teaching. Even if we confine ourselves to the formal structure of logical thought, which starts from a definition, infinity, relative to which concepts are delimited, can not be defined in its turn. It accordingly refers to a "knowledge" of a new structure. We seek to fix it as a relation with the face and to show the ethical essence of this relation. The face is the evidence that makes evidence possibl~like the divine veracity that sustains Cartesian rationalism.