# 1ac – college prep – v1

### 1ac – uncertainty

#### NATO’s possession of US theater nuclear weapons causes strategic uncertainty and fracturing that undermine the credibility of deterrence and prevent diplomacy with Russia – that encourages escalation – only the plan solves

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Cristina Varriale, proliferation and nuclear policy researcher at the Royal United Services Institute Fellow, Centre for Security Analysis and British American Security Information Council. “Tactical Nuclear Weapons, NATO and Deterrence” British American Security Information Council Report, November 17, 2015 <https://basicint.org/publications/cristina-varriale-intern/2016/tactical-nuclear-weapons-nato-and-deterrence> //KohlW

\*\*TNW = theater nuclear weapons

Deterrence is premised upon being able to dissuade your adversary from attack by threat of overwhelming retaliatory punishment.1 This concept is often credited with keeping the Cold War ‘cold’, as both the US and USSR feared nuclear use through the credible notion that such use could occur. However, if your willingness or ability to punish is called into question your deterrence is undermined. During the Cold War both sides of the bipolar system genuinely believe that the other could use its nuclear arsenal in a strategic confrontation. Relying solely on nuclear deterrence to prevent strategic attack is seen as dangerous in that it creates a gap in the middle of the escalation ladder, giving incentive to an opponent to escalate to the point where you are prepared to contemplate the use of nuclear weapons in response. If it is clear that NATO is not prepared to mobile its capability (particularly its nuclear weapons) in response to provocation, the deterrence is not seen as credible. This has particularly been the case in the recent conflict over Crimea and eastern Ukraine. The nuclear deterrent is disproportional and therefore simply not relevant against small scale conventional attack. This is consistent with customary international humanitarian law which outlines military response must be proportional to maintain a legal standing, further weakening the utility of NATO’s TNW deterrence. Smaller battlefield tactical or theatre nuclear weapons were deployed in their thousands in the European theatre during the Cold War, occupying the rungs of the ladder between massive conventional troop movements and the use of strategic ‘city-busting’ nuclear weapons in a flexible response posture, to the credibility of the nuclear deterrent. This is no longer the role of the 200-odd TNW warheads left in Europe. Popular belief dispels that TNW have military utility.2 They are there more to symbolize the US nuclear commitment (not really necessary given that the US would use their strategic warheads first), and to give the allies some sort of a nuclear role in the event of a crisis.3 Yet the point of keeping them - to show united Alliance resolve - is actually their most fundamental weakness. Cohesion, consent, and credibility: requirements for deterrence The effectiveness of the Alliance depends upon a transparent, strong solidarity. There will always be an incentive for any adversary to probe differences, test weak spots and to divide the Alliance. NATO operates on the basis of consensus. If NATO were to sanction the use of nuclear weapons it would need the consent of all NATO member states, and those TNW based in Europe are seen as a physical manifestation of that unity. In theory, deploying TNW would show unity of resolve and signal to any potential aggressor the need to back down. That's the theory. The practice is very different. As Paolo Foradori notes, NATO’s deterrence shield has been seriously compromised by the lack of credibility in its reliance on a nuclear posture.4 Threat perceptions and beliefs over the appropriate use of nuclear threats are so diverse across the Alliance, that this attachment to artificial cohesion undermines credibility and therefore leads to a major vulnerability.5 Turkey, for example, as a result of its geographic proximity to the Middle East, national security concerns and the implied status it confers within the Alliance, is supportive of the policy to station NATO TNW on its territory as part of the overarching NATO posture. Further, Turkey has always been skeptical about American commitments to defending the south east corner of the Alliance, so TNW are seen as an effective assurance through burden sharing and a symbol of Alliance commitment to Turkish security.6 Withdrawal of the NATO nuclear capability from their territory would be received by the Turkish elite as a repeat of the experience of losing US Jupiter missiles after the Cuban missile crisis without consultation and resulting feelings of US abandonment that still have impact today. Former Baltic Soviet states in NATO: Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, alongside Poland, are strongly supportive of retaining NATO nuclear bombs in Europe. Fears of Russian expansionism have increased in countries that experienced the impact of Soviet occupation within living memory.7 They would fiercely oppose any attempts to remove TNW, even though they realize that such weapons provide little practical defense against Russia. Perceptions are very different in those northwest European states hosting the weapons themselves. Germany has in recent years an active public debate on the removal of TNW from its territory while also carefully balancing its position in NATO.8 However, recent events will at least for now take the public pressure off the government to make any moves to change their nuclear status. The Dutch parliament recently voted not to invest in a new generation of nuclear-capable aircraft for NATO’s nuclear mission, though the government itself responded soon afterwards to say that it would not feel bound by this vote. Even before Russian action in Ukraine and its nuclear posture since, NATO appeared to be committed to maintaining the current posture. Today that commitment seems even stronger. But an effective Alliance deterrence posture requires more soul-searching. The symbolic and military-irrelevant deployment of TNW may weaken the political resolve to committee to other means to stabilize the worsening relationship with Russia - be that strengthening conventional deterrence or engaging in more constructive diplomacy and negotiation. According to Powell, states involved in a crisis will put pressure on each other to take further risk in a conflict.9 However, if the deterrent posture over-emphasises the most extreme (nuclear) level then options are severely limited in responding to aggression. In a crisis with Russia it is highly likely that more exposed NATO states will make very public requests to mobilize nuclear assets and threaten dire consequences, that host states may feel obliged to turn down, fearful that such escalation could get quickly out of control. This leaves the Alliance very exposed to crisis division, something that Russia is all too well aware of. NATO deterrence depends upon unity. But depending upon systems that could highlight disunity in moments of crisis is deeply dangerous. Although the most recent NATO Deterrence and Defence Posture Review cites a nuclear capability as a ‘core component’ of deterrence, 10 this inability of NATO states to address these matters on the basis that shifts from the status quo will only highlight divisions is simply postponing the inevitable and disguising deep vulnerabilities. NATO deterrence does not stem from the stationed TNW across Europe, but the unity of the Alliance and avoidance of fragmentation. But that is currently a fragile thing. Whilst the TNW element of NATO deterrence remains incredible, discussion of shifts to the nuclear posture of NATO would no doubt cause disagreement.

#### NATO cohesion is key to prevent Russian miscalc and extinction

Farmer 15 (Ben Farmer, Defense Correspondent at The Daily Telegraph, citing General Sir Adrian Bradshaw, Deputy Commander of NATO Forces in Europe, and former Director of British Special Forces, and Michael Fallon, Secretary of State for Defence, member of the National Security Council, and Member of Parliament, United Kingdom and Great Britain and Northern Ireland, “NATO general: Russia tensions could escalate into all-out war,” Business Insider, 2-20-2015, <http://www.businessinsider.com/nato-general-russia-tensions-could-escalate-to-war-2015-2>)

Tensions with Russia could blow up into all-out conflict, posing “an existential threat to our whole being”, Britain’s top general in Nato has warned. Gen Sir Adrian Bradshaw, deputy commander of Nato forces in Europe, said there was a danger Vladimir Putin could try to use his armies to invade and seize Nato territory, after calculating the alliance would be too afraid of escalating violence to respond. His comments follow a clash between London and Moscow after the Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon, said there was a "real and present danger" Mr Putin could try to destabilize the Baltic states with a campaign of subversion and irregular warfare. The Kremlin called those comments “absolutely unacceptable". Sir Adrian told the Royal United Services’ Institute there was a danger such a campaign of undercover attacks could paralyze Nato decision making, as members disagreed over how much Russia was responsible, and how to respond. Nato commanders fear a campaign of skilfully disguised, irregular military action by Russia, which is carefully designed not to trigger the alliance's mutual defence pact. He said the "resulting ambiguity" would make "collective decisions relating to the appropriate responses more difficult". But Sir Adrian, one of the most senior generals in the British Army and a former director of special forces, went further and said there was also danger that Russia could use conventional forces and Soviet-era brinkmanship to seize Nato territory. He said Russia had shown last year it could generate large conventional forces at short notice for snap exercises along its borders. There was a danger these could be used “not only for intimidation and coercion but potentially to seize Nato territory, after which the threat of escalation might be used to prevent re-establishment of territorial integrity. This use of so called escalation dominance was of course a classic Soviet technique.” He went on to say that “the threat from Russia, together with the risk it brings of a miscalculation resulting in a strategic conflict, however unlikely we see it as being right now, represents an existential threat to our whole being.” Nato has agreed to set up a rapid reaction force of around 5,000 troops ready to move at 48 hours notice, in case of Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. Supplies, equipment and ammunition will be stockpiled in bases in the region. Alliance leaders hope the force will deter any incursion. David Cameron warned Vladimir Putin there will be more sanctions and "more consequences" for Russia if the ceasefire in Ukraine does not hold. The Prime Minister vowed that the West would be "staunch" in its response to Russia and was prepared to maintain pressure on Moscow "for the long term". He rejected the findings of a scathing parliamentary committee report that the UK found itself "sleep-walking" into the crisis over Ukraine. The EU Committee of the House of Lords found there had been a "catastrophic misreading" of mood by European diplomats in the run-up to the crisis. Earlier this week, Mr Fallon said the Russian president might try to test Nato’s resolve with the same Kremlin-backed subversion used in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. A murky campaign of infiltration, propaganda, undercover forces and cyber attack such as that used in the early stages of the Ukraine conflict could be used to inflame ethnic tensions in Estonia, Lithuania or Latvia, he said. The military alliance must be prepared to repel Russian aggression “whatever form it takes”, Mr Fallon said, as he warned that tensions between the two were “warming up”. His comments were dismissed in Moscow. Russia's Foreign Ministry spokesman said the country does not pose a threat to Baltic countries and accused Mr Fallon of going beyond “diplomatic ethics” . Alexander Lukashevich said: "His absolutely unacceptable characteristics of the Russian Federation remind me of last year's speech of US president Barack Obama before the UN general assembly, in which he mentioned Russia among the three most serious challenges his country was facing.” "I believe we will find a way to react to Mr Secretary's statements."

#### Escalation in the Baltics is likely, but, escalation will only occur because of holes in NATO deterrence strategy

Kühn 18

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IF NATO WANTS to comprehensively address the risks of escalation, including deliberate Russian escalation, the alliance needs to understand the potential consequences and possible shortcomings of its policies in the realms of deterrence and assurance, resilience, and risk reduction. Assessing NATO’s current capacity to prevent escalation in a number of different potential contingencies is an important way to gauge the alliance’s level of preparedness to manage the escalatory pitfalls in the alliance’s relationship with Moscow. To this end, below are three possible escalation scenarios that can help analysts better understand the potential implications of NATO’s current policies as well as what NATO could do today to make future escalation less likely. All three scenarios involve nuclear threats (though two of them stop short of actual Russian nuclear-weapons use). The value of this scenario-based approach is that it can highlight escalation risks that are not obvious or that Western analysts have not yet discussed in detail. For example, this approach highlights the escalation risks linked to NATO’s current deterrence policy, which might necessitate the quick reinforcement of NATO personnel in the Baltics in the event of a crisis. If such a move were not properly communicated to Moscow, Russia could inadvertently misinterpret NATO’s actions as the start of a military offensive and consequently choose to escalate the crisis militarily. Accordingly, the aim is not to describe each and every escalatory step in great detail but to provide enough information to identify lessons that are more generally applicable. Clearly, many other escalation scenarios, besides those described here, can be imagined, and analyzing them could well lead to other important insights. Indeed, one complication of the real world not considered here is the possibility of multiple escalation pathways occurring simultaneously. By side-stepping this possibility, this analysis tends to understate the escalation risks and the challenges the alliance would face in seeking to manage them. SCENARIO ONE: DELIBERATE ESCALATION The first scenario starts with a Russian land grab in the Baltics. To be very clear, this is an extreme scenario; an overwhelming majority of Western experts, including NATO staff, consider it to be a “remote” possibility.158 Nevertheless, there are good reasons to consider this extreme set of circumstances. First, it is a high-risk scenario, based on low probability but with high potential consequences. Second, many allies are worried about it. And third, this scenario might look less unlikely after the Russian use of force in Georgia and Ukraine. STAGE ONE: The year 2018 sees the return of large-scale protests to major Russian cities. Suddenly, Vladimir Putin’s hold on power no longer seems a given. Only two weeks after the first protests, the Russian General Staff announces a large military exercise in Russia’s Western Military District, close to the border of Latvia. IMPLICATIONS: This combination of events would put NATO on notice about the internal developments in Russia and the announced military exercise, and these events would raise serious concerns that Russia’s leadership might be planning to create an international crisis to divert attention from a domestic crisis. At the same time, however, strong voices within NATO would almost certainly caution against overreacting to these events. They could argue that if NATO were to react militarily—by, for example, deciding to send temporary reinforcements, even perhaps only one additional battalion—to alleviate the concerns of Baltic nations, doing so would risk giving the Kremlin reason to up the ante. Indeed, deploying EFP forces in the region to the border area or even just raising their state of alert might be perceived by Russia as an aggressive move. Given these trade-offs, it is quite likely that NATO would react in a rather reserved way, which would give Russia an important advantage in terms of mobilizing its forces. STAGE TWO: Sudden protests by the Russian minority community in Latvia’s easternmost Latgale region spiral out of control with several fatalities. While NATO ambassadors are gathering for an emergency meeting, Putin warns NATO “not to interfere in the internal affairs of Latvia” and assures his domestic audience that “Russia will not idly stand by as Russians are being slaughtered abroad.” IMPLICATIONS: For the alliance, the sudden occurrence of serious protests in Latvia—whether or not instigated by Moscow—in conjunction with a domestic crisis in Russia and an arms buildup close to Latvia would immediately raise the severity of the crisis. The possibility of Russia escalating the conflict with NATO, which might have seemed rather low at Stage One, would suddenly become more realistic. (Indeed, similar Russian statements about the security of Russians living abroad were made ahead of Moscow’s interventions in Georgia and Ukraine.159) That said, there would nonetheless still be a real possibility that allies would hold divergent interpretations of these events, and it is unclear whether the EFP would be ordered to immediately leave its base near Riga, at least to patrol the border with Russia.160 Even though NATO insists that the EFP has no role to play in a domestic unrest scenario, some allies might question that logic, given that events may be instigated by Russia as it looked to invade. Debates at NATO Headquarters on these issues could get acrimonious. Some allies would probably worry that such actions as well as NATO preparations to send additional forces to the region could be escalatory. The alliance could well look, and perhaps be, divided. Again, NATO might still wait to avoid giving Russia any pretext to intervene. STAGE THREE: Russian forces cross the border into Latvia and occupy the Latgale region. President Putin makes a press announcement that “Russia’s humanitarian intervention stops here and now.” NATO defense ministers meet and issue an ultimatum, demanding full Russian withdrawal. IMPLICATIONS: At this point, debates within NATO about the severity of the Russian threat would be overtaken by events. NATO would be presented with a military fait accompli. While this situation already would be very challenging to handle, it might be further complicated if Russian forces met only minimal resistance from Latvian forces and perhaps none at all from the EFP. (Given the distance between their base in Riga and the Latgale region, there would be a serious risk that they would not arrive quickly enough to resist Russian forces.) In this case, regional EFP commanders—who, in the case of Latvia, come from six different contributing nations—might be confronted with a choice between engaging immediately in a futile fight that they would be certain to lose or holding back to await further instructions from NATO Headquarters. Worse still, some commanders might even receive orders from their own national commands, bypassing the NATO chain of command and possibly complicating a collective response. One potential outcome would be paralysis. Conversely, there would also be a real possibility that an EFP commander—having received divergent orders from NATO, the host nation (Latvia), and national lines of command—might decide to engage in combat before NATO’s political leaders have decided to invoke Article V. Regardless of exactly how the fight was playing out in the theater, the NAC would, at this stage, have to determine whether or not to invoke Article V and whether or not to go to war with Russia in an environment where the scope of the Russian campaign would still look rather limited (as no allied forces from France, Germany, the United Kingdom, or the United States would be involved yet). Even if Article V were triggered, certain allies might still advocate for a diplomatic solution. A possible compromise might see allies starting immediate preparations for military reinforcement in parallel with heightened crisis diplomacy. Stage Four: NATO is ready to deploy the Spearhead Force from Ramstein, Germany, and starts preparations for assembling the rest of the eNRF. Simultaneously, the United States starts flying in additional personnel and equipment to Western Europe and Poland. Putin claims that “NATO is provoking an unnecessary war.” In many European capitals tens of thousands take to the streets, urging Russia and NATO to “end the mutual violence.” IMPLICATIONS: NATO, having started its military preparations, would face another tough choice. While the Spearhead would be ready in less than a week, assembling the rest of the eNRF would take longer (in all likelihood, a couple of weeks). A decision would have to be made whether to deploy the Spearhead right away, and risk losing it almost immediately in the theater, or to wait for assembling the full manpower of the eNRF. If NATO were to wait, the louder the voices of opposition to any military response could grow. Indeed, large-scale protests in Western Europe, perhaps fueled by subversive Russian propaganda, would very likely further affect and complicate NATO’s political decisionmaking.161 In this situation, some allies might opt out of a military response, while others—the United Kingdom and the United States, most likely—could bypass NATO’s slow mobilization process and move forward with their own deployment plans. This contingency—in which some allies hesitate to engage and others push forward—could effectively paralyze the alliance as a collective decisionmaking entity. In any case, NATO might well have to deal, at some point, with further Russian efforts to escalate the conflict by targeting critical NATO transportation nodes with precision-guided conventional strikes so as to prevent or at least complicate NATO preparations for retaliation.162 From a Russian perspective, waiting for NATO to muster a force of perhaps 100,000 personnel—which is what would be required to be credible enough to fight a regional war with Russia with the aim of retaking and securing the Baltics or perhaps even extending combat operations into Russian territory—would hardly be an option.163 But even if Russia were to shy away from further escalation (it might, for example, decide against striking Western Europe because of the risk that doing so would unify the alliance), NATO’s next move—laying the groundwork for force deployment to the Baltics—would almost necessarily involve escalating the conflict horizontally into Russian territory. Because NATO has decided against pre-positioning heavy military equipment in the Baltics, allies would have to fly in personnel and equipment with large transportation aircraft, which would be easy targets for Russian air defense systems around the Baltic Rim. If NATO wanted to avoid losing much of its first reinforcement wave before it actually reached the ground, it would have to target Russian anti-access and area denial installations, effectively extending combat operations into Russian territory. STAGE FIVE: NATO receives intelligence reports that Russia is readying some of its tactical nuclear weapons stored in western Russia. Putin warns that “the two sides are on the brink of a nuclear armageddon.” IMPLICATIONS: Assuming that NATO had decided on a concrete deployment plan by this point, NATO leaders would have to decide whether to move forward given the possibility of Russia escalating to actual nuclear use. That decision would almost certainly cause serious frictions within the alliance and could further delay a military response. If NATO leaders weathered those quarrels and pressed on, NATO might then immediately be confronted with a second serious dilemma, stemming from NATO’s long-standing internal disputes about its nuclear deterrent. Over the years, Russia might have arrived at the conclusion that NATO would not use nuclear weapons—even in response to Russian nuclear use—in a limited regional scenario. As a result, Moscow might feel tempted to escalate to nuclear use in the hope of stopping NATO in its tracks before it could deploy forces. In this case, all of NATO’s possible nuclear countermeasures—rhetorical nuclear threats; so-called slow nuclear signals in the form of readying NATO’s forward-deployed nuclear forces (which would take a few weeks); or so-called fast signals, such as U.S. B-52 deployments to Western Europe (which could be executed within hours)—could be misperceived in Moscow as mere bluffs. The interplay between Russia doubting NATO’s resolve and NATO having difficulties making its nuclear threats credible would create a number of pathways for escalation through misperception. One possibility would be NATO proceeding with its deployment preparations absent its own distinct response to Russia’s nuclear threats. In this event, Russia might escalate to nuclear use out of concern that a regional conventional war with NATO could result in a Russian defeat, and perhaps the loss of Kaliningrad or even other Russian territory. According to two Russian military experts, “Strategic deterrence with conventional weapons of a potential aggressor state (or coalition of states) from undertaking a large-scale or regional war is unlikely. It is possible only by the threat of preventive nuclear actions.”164 STAGE SIX: U.S. satellites detect a small-yield nuclear explosion over a remote area in the North Sea. IMPLICATIONS: At this point, NATO would face the dire situation of Russia having escalated to actual nuclear use in the form of a single demonstration strike over international waters. The Russian strike would most likely not eradicate the dilemmas NATO would be facing already at Stage Five, when Russia was only threatening nuclear use, but instead make those dilemmas more pressing. In concrete terms, NATO members would now have to decide whether to move forward with the alliance’s deployment plans, stop in its tracks (obviously intimidated by Russian nuclear use), or perhaps respond with nuclear use. The latter option—nuclear use by the allies—in particular would most likely be highly contested within NATO. Given that the Russian demonstration strike would not have been directed against NATO territory, the risk of further nuclear escalation if NATO were to reciprocate, rapidly mounting domestic pressures in Western Europe to “avoid a nuclear holocaust,” and NATO’s (though comparably slow) ability to muster a significant conventional force, the alliance’s members might decide against nuclear use. At the same time, that might only help to reinforce the Russian (mis)perception that NATO really tends to shy away from nuclear use in a crisis. NATO would therefore be hard-pressed to show serious nuclear signals below the level of actual use, such as U.S. B-52 deployments to Western Europe. In turn, Russia, having just escalated to nuclear use, would face a no less dire situation, given that Moscow might feel that it had played its final card in an escalatory game aimed at preventing NATO from deploying forces to the Baltics. If NATO were to continue with its mobilization and deployment plans, Russia would have little choice other than to escalate the conflict further into NATO territory—perhaps by aiming conventional strikes at NATO’s western transportation nodes or perhaps by conducting additional nuclear strikes—or back down. Either way, Moscow would have to fear that its escalation strategy would solidify NATO’s assertiveness rather than undermine its cohesion. Key Takeaways • It is not clear what role NATO forces, particularly the EFP, could or should play in an internal crisis scenario in one of the Baltic states coupled with a Russian buildup in very close proximity to Baltic borders. • There is a real, if remote, possibility that Russia could stage a military fait accompli aimed at taking only a small portion of land in eastern Latvia without pulling the trip wire, that is, without the EFP getting engaged in combat. • NATO’s political decisionmaking process regarding additional conventional force deployments to the Baltics in a crisis might be considerably hampered by diverging opinions about Moscow’s potential reactions. Domestic protests in Western Europe could further increase the pressure on certain allies not to “overly provoke” Russia. • NATO’s process of preparing for a military response would be very slow because relatively few NATO forces are rapidly deployable. This would give Russia additional time and opportunities to affect NATO decisionmaking in its favor. Moreover, deploying only a few forces, such as the Spearhead Force, would be very undesirable because of the risk that they would be destroyed rather quickly in combat. • NATO’s ambiguous stance toward its own nuclear deterrent might lead Moscow to doubt NATO’s resolve, opening up potential pathways to escalation by misperception. • The necessity of retaking the Baltics through massive force deployments, once initiated by NATO, would put the onus on Russia to escalate further, perhaps even to nuclear use. SCENARIO TWO: INADVERTENT ESCALATION The second scenario focuses on a domestic crisis in Latvia that spirals out of control to the point that Russian leaders feel compelled by domestic pressure to threaten to intervene. The Kremlin has to react on an ad hoc basis to a foreign policy crisis involving ethnic Russians in one of its neighboring states—as it did prior to its interventions in Georgia and Ukraine. Having said that, in this scenario, Russia has already escalated general tensions with its neighbor Latvia over a long period of time through very low-level, nonkinetic operations, including ongoing propaganda efforts. STAGE ONE: On May 9, commemorations of the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany lead to isolated ethnic clashes in Riga, resulting in two fatalities. Fueled by social media rumors, crowds of angry ethnic Russians take to the streets the next day. IMPLICATIONS: Given the attention that NATO policymakers are already paying to Russia’s influence campaign toward and potential manipulation of the Russian minorities in the Baltics,165 this scenario would ring alarm bells in Brussels. While there is not much NATO leaders could do at that stage, they might urge Latvian authorities, in bilateral communications, to diffuse tensions and keep a lower profile to avoid further escalating the protests. At the same time, NATO as well as Latvian authorities might have difficulties assessing whether Moscow was behind the protests or whether they were really spontaneous. If NATO wrongly thought that Russia were behind the protests, there would be a greater risk of escalation. STAGE TWO: The protests grow in the following days. While there is no official reaction from the highest echelons of the Kremlin, Russian ultra-nationalist groups start their own protests in Moscow, demanding that Putin “come to the help of our brothers and sisters.” IMPLICATIONS: For NATO, the surge in protests coupled with the clamor in Russia would increase the urgency of the situation. On the one hand, the mere existence of continued protests would underscore the risk that the Latvian authorities might lose control of the situation. Some NATO members might argue for deploying the EFP battlegroup to “show presence” at the Latvian-Russian border. Latvian authorities might order exactly that but could face resistance from EFP commanders who may receive contradictory national orders. On the other hand, NATO might well struggle to interpret the mixed signals from Moscow and debate whether Moscow was creating the pretext for a crisis with NATO or whether the Kremlin was in danger of losing control of the situation.166 In the latter case, NATO would probably be well advised to offer Moscow some sort of off-ramp to defuse tensions. Some allies might therefore urge NATO to pursue immediate backchannel diplomacy with Moscow, while others might instead argue for lower-level military preparations than EFP deployments. STAGE THREE: NATO deploys the EFP battlegroup to patrol Latvia’s border with Russia. The following day, the Russian military starts large-scale military readiness drills in the Western Military District. IMPLICATIONS: NATO’s deployment of military forces would be far from the protesters and with a clear defensive aim. However, Russia’s readiness drills could cause some headaches at NATO Headquarters. Some allies might interpret the Russian move as a mere reaction to NATO’s response, providing another argument for trying to deescalate tensions and avoid any further NATO military action. By contrast, other allies might read Moscow’s actions as part of a larger Russian plan to intimidate NATO or perhaps prepare to intervene. Assuming the second reading of events were to prevail within NATO, allies would presumably decide to start preparations for assembling and deploying the Spearhead Force. But doing so without simultaneously readying the additional forces of the eNRF would create the risk of losing the Spearhead if Russia were to really attack Latvia. At the same time, readying all forces of the eNRF could be misinterpreted in Moscow as preparations for an offensive against Russia. STAGE FOUR: While NATO is in the middle of preparing to deploy the Spearhead, the Russian military starts mustering roughly 40,000 personnel close to the Latvian border. Vladimir Putin, who has publicly maintained a low profile so far, declares to the press that “any NATO attempt to send forces to Latvia would be seen by Russia as an act of hostility that would have severe consequences.” IMPLICATIONS: NATO, confronted again with a Russian decision to up the ante and still in the dark about Russian intentions, would face a tough choice. Declining to send the Spearhead might deescalate the situation, but Russia might instead interpret that as a sign of weakness that would perhaps invite Russian escalation. By contrast, sending the Spearhead could underscore NATO’s resolve—perhaps deescalating the standoff—but doing so could also increase the pressure on Russia to escalate before NATO reinforcements arrived. Indeed, if NATO members were to decide to deploy the Spearhead, they would also have to make an almost immediate decision about preparing the rest of the eNRF for deployment, given its low level of readiness. STAGE FIVE: NATO issues a statement that “the deployment of the Spearhead will continue without delay.” Only a few hours later, the Russian Ministry of Defense announces a nationwide emergency drill of its nuclear forces. IMPLICATIONS: This strong Russian nuclear signal could create different escalation pathways, depending on NATO’s reaction. If Moscow’s signal was intended to prevent allied reinforcement out of fear that NATO was staging a larger campaign against Russia, NATO’s decision to halt deployment of the Spearhead could well deescalate tensions. Conversely, if Moscow’s signal was intended to prevent allied reinforcement as a test of allies’ resolve, NATO’s compliance could trigger a Russian military intervention. But whatever Russia’s real intentions, if it were to fail to achieve its goal of deterring NATO from deploying the Spearhead, Moscow might feel compelled to raise the stakes further. One important aspect of this scenario is the possibility that NATO might interpret the Russian signal as not credible, given that NATO would not yet have sent reinforcements to the Baltics, let alone inflicted military fatalities on Russia. But that interpretation might well be incorrect; the early use of a serious nuclear threat would be perfectly consistent with the Russian strategy of conflict.167 In any case, a possible NATO response-in-kind to Russia’s nuclear threat might be drills with U.S. and British (and perhaps French) nuclear forces. However, and given domestic public pressure, that would be a decision fraught with political disagreements within NATO about how and under what circumstances to flex alliance members’ nuclear muscle. A slower response, perhaps intended to break the rapid escalation cycle, could be to start raising the alert levels of NATO’s forward-deployed nuclear forces. Key Takeaways • NATO and Russia might find it difficult to deescalate a crisis during its initial stages and instead get drawn into a vicious action-reaction cycle, even though neither deliberately initiated the crisis nor wanted it to spiral out of control. Critically, each side might incorrectly think the other was seeking a crisis. • NATO might find it challenging to identify when a crisis needs a military response and what response that might be—that is to say, not starting to escalate too early or waiting too long.

#### Plan: The North Atlantic Council ought to eliminate their nuclear arsenals of U.S. non-strategic gravity B-61 warheads in NATO non-nuclear states

#### Only the plan solves escalation and terrorist threats and enables diplomacy between NATO and Russia

Regehr 18

Ernie Regehr, O.C., Senior Fellow in Arctic Security and Defence, “”NATO and Nuclear Disarmament – II: It’s Time to End NATO Nuclear Sharing,” The Simons Foundation's, November 9, 2018, <http://www.thesimonsfoundation.ca/highlights/nato-and-nuclear-disarmament-ii-its-time-end-nato-nuclear-sharing> //KohlW

In the coming years, such full-throated defence of nuclear weapons in Europe will be put to the test as all the European host states plan to upgrade their fighter aircraft and thus face the decision of whether to make their next generation fighters dual capable. Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey are opting for the US F-35 for their replacements, but so far, they have not made a clear commitment to making them nuclear capable. Belgium remains undecided on its replacement aircraft, while Germany is likely to choose the Eurofighter15 – and, again, neither has fully committed to including a nuclear capability. Adding a nuclear weapons capability to fighter aircraft would add significant cost, and, much more significantly, would add consequential political costs for governments choosing the dual capability option in countries with populations that largely favor removing nuclear weapons from their territories. A 2015 expert analysis concluded that before the Ukraine crisis there was no clear political path for countries hosting US B61 bombs to get parliamentary approval for new nuclear related investments, and since then, they argue, “it is not clear that this calculation has changed.”16 There is strong majority support for the removal of the US nuclear weapons from four of the countries hosting them, according to a June 2018 survey, 17 (there was no survey in Turkey, the fifth hosting country). The following figures represent percentages of support-for-removal/opposition-to-removal/no-response: Belgium 57/21/22%; Netherlands 56/25/19%; Germany 70/16/14%; Italy 65/18/18%. On the question of acquiring fighter aircraft capable of carrying the US B61 nuclear bomb, most were also opposed, but the results were not as strong or clear (oppose-making-them-dual-capable/support-dual-capable/no-response): Belgium 44/33/23%; Netherlands 43/39/17%; Germany 55/26/19%; Italy 59/23/19%. Challenging forward deployment Besides alienating national populations, critics see other major risks in forward-deployed nuclear weapons – risks of accidents and basic handling blunders, and susceptibility to terrorist attacks. Forward deployment also invites pre-emptive attacks, inasmuch as any move in a crisis to get the B61 bombs ready for use would be readily visible to an adversary, making the demonstrably alerted aircraft tempting targets for pre-emptive attack.18 Furthermore, the European based nuclear bombs have really proven to be of questionable deterrent value among those NATO allies most anxious about Russian intentions toward them. Baltic and other East European NATO member states tend to support forward basing, but the presence of those forward-deployed systems seems to give them little comfort, as they demand instead the presence, close at hand, of NATO conventional forces (like the trip-wire force Canada is leading in Latvia). So, the case for removing B61 bombs from Europe remains strong. The 2012 NATO Deterrence and Defence Posture Review was more concrete in proposing that the alliance promote conditions for “further reductions on non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to NATO” (para 11). It committed to exploring arrangements to that end (para 12)19 and called for reciprocal reductions in Russia’s non-strategic weapons stockpile (para 26). Two former US security and foreign policy officials, writing in Foreign Affairs in 2016, admittedly a very long time ago in American political years, called for an American freeze on B61 modernization and for the phased withdrawal of all US nuclear weapons from Europe.20 They argued that there is no longer any military rationale for US nuclear weapons in Europe and that in 2008 the US European Command ended its support for maintaining US nuclear weapons in Europe. And they did not propose any linkage between reductions in US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and Russia’s roughly 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons – Russia sees its tactical nuclear weapons as countering NATO’s superiority in conventional military capabilities, not in countering US tactical nuclear weapons. Removing US nuclear weapons from Europe would be a limited but significant development – limited because, even with all B61 bombs removed from forward deployment, nuclear sharing would not necessarily end21 and, furthermore, three NATO members would still be nuclear weapon states, two of them continuing to maintain nuclear weapons in Europe. But it would send an important de-escalatory signal to Russia, and it would help to clear a path toward renewed East/West dialogue – a clear prerequisite for further strategic arms reductions. NATO disarmament options NATO is a nuclear alliance, but it has no nuclear weapons of its own, and that in turn means it is not a party to any arms control or disarmament agreement. NATO nevertheless is certainly involved in seeking to coordinate common positions among Alliance member countries in some multilateral negotiations (e.g. the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons). And while individual NATO member states are obviously responsible for their own arms control policies, there are collective disarmament initiatives available to NATO: 1) The most obvious would be for the North Atlantic Council to accept, as it seemed prepared to do in 2010, the removal of American nuclear weapons from Europe and have them returned to the US – which would have the added virtue of finally bringing the US and the European states hosting its weapons into compliance with Articles I and II of the NPT.

### 1ac – framing

#### The standard is maximizing expected net wellbeing

#### Pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable – they’re where we reach the end of the line in matters of value

Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.

#### Nuclear war is under-researched and secondary effects ensure extinction---any other models are flawed and survivors don’t check

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Since the early 1980s, the world has known that a large nuclear war could cause severe global environmental effects, including dramatic cooling of surface temperatures, declines in precipitation, and increased ultraviolet radiation. The term nuclear winter was coined specifically to refer to cooling that result in winter-like temperatures occurring year-round. Regardless of whether such temperatures are reached, there would be severe consequences for humanity. But how severe would those consequences be? And what should the world be doing about it? To the first question, the short answer is nobody knows. The total human impacts of nuclear winter are both uncertain and under-studied. In light of the uncertainty, a risk perspective is warranted that considers the breadth of possible impacts, weighted by their probability. More research on the impacts would be very helpful, but we can meanwhile make some general conclusions. That is enough to start answering the second question, what we should do. In regards to what we should do, nuclear winter has some interesting and important policy implications. Today, nuclear winter is not a hot topic but this was not always the case: it was international headline news in the 1980s. There were conferences, Congressional hearings, voluminous scientific research, television specials, and more. The story is expertly captured by Lawrence Badash in his book A Nuclear Winter’s Tale.1)Much of the 1980s attention to nuclear winter was driven by the enthusiastic efforts of Carl Sagan, then at the height of his popularity. But underlying it all was the fear of nuclear war, stoked by some of the tensest moments of the Cold War. When the Cold War ended, so too did attention to nuclear winter. That started to change in 2007, with a new line of nuclear winter research2) that uses advanced climate models developed for the study of global warming. Relative to the 1980s research, the new research found that the smoke from nuclear firestorms would travel higher up in the atmosphere, causing nuclear winter to last longer. This research also found dangerous effects from smaller nuclear wars, such as an India-Pakistan nuclear war detonating “only” 100 total nuclear weapons. Two groups—one in the United States3) and one in Switzerland4)—have found similar results using different climate models, lending further support to the validity of the research. Some new research has also examined the human impacts of nuclear winter. Researchers simulated agricultural crop growth in the aftermath of a 100-weapon India-Pakistan nuclear war.5)The results are startling- the scenario could cause agriculture productivity to decline by around 10 to 40 percent for several years after the war. The studies looked at major staple crops in China and the United States, two of the largest food producers. Other countries and other crops would likely face similar declines. Following such crop declines, severe global famine could ensue. One study estimated the total extent of the famine by comparing crop declines to global malnourishment data.6) When food becomes scarce, the poor and malnourished are typically hit the hardest. This study estimated two billion people at risk of starvation. And this is from the 100-weapon India-Pakistan nuclear war scenario. Larger nuclear wars would have more severe impacts. This is where the recent research stops. To the best of my knowledge there are no recent studies examining the secondary effects of famines, such as disease outbreaks and violent conflicts. There are no recent studies examining the human impacts of ultraviolet radiation. That would include an increased medical burden in skin cancer and other diseases. It would also include further loss of agriculture ecosystem services as the ultraviolet radiation harms plants and animals. At this time, we can only make educated guesses about what these impacts would be, informed in part by what research was published 30 years ago. When analyzing the risk of nuclear winter, one question is of paramount importance: Would there be permanent harm to human civilization? Humanity could have a very bright future ahead; to dim that future is the worst thing nuclear winter could do. It is vastly worse than a few billion deaths from starvation. Not that a few billion deaths is trivial—obviously it isn’t—but it is tiny compared to the loss of future generations. Carl Sagan was one of the first people to recognize this point in a commentary he wrote on nuclear winter for Foreign Affairs.7) Sagan believed nuclear winter could cause human extinction, in which case all members of future generations would be lost. He argued that this made nuclear winter vastly more important than the direct effects of nuclear war, which could, in his words, “kill ‘only’ hundreds of millions of people.” Sagan was however, right that human extinction would cause permanent harm to human civilization. It is debatable whether nuclear winter could cause human extinction. Alan Robock, a leader of the recent nuclear winter research, believes it is unlikely. He writes: “Especially in Australia and New Zealand, humans would have a better chance to survive.”8) This is hardly a cheerful statement, and it leaves open the chance of human extinction. I think that’s the best way of looking at it. Given all the uncertainty and the limited available research, it is impossible to rule out the possibility of human extinction. I don’t have a good answer for how likely it is. But the possibility should not be dismissed. Even if some humans survive, there could still be permanent harm to human civilization. Small patches of survivors would be extremely vulnerable to subsequent disasters. They also could not keep up the massively complex civilization we enjoy today. It would be a long and uncertain rebuilding process and survivors might never get civilization back to where it is now. More importantly, they might never get civilization to where we now stand poised to take it in the future. Our potentially bright future could be forever dimmed.9) Nuclear winter is a very large and serious risk. But that on its own doesn’t mean much—just another thing to worry about. What’s really important are the implications of nuclear winter for public policy and private action.

# 1ac – college prep – v2

### 1ac – uncertainty

#### NATO’s possession of US theater nuclear weapons causes strategic uncertainty and fracturing that undermine the credibility of deterrence and prevent diplomacy with Russia – that encourages escalation – only the plan solves

Varriale 15

Cristina Varriale, proliferation and nuclear policy researcher at the Royal United Services Institute Fellow, Centre for Security Analysis and British American Security Information Council. “Tactical Nuclear Weapons, NATO and Deterrence” British American Security Information Council Report, November 17, 2015 <https://basicint.org/publications/cristina-varriale-intern/2016/tactical-nuclear-weapons-nato-and-deterrence> //KohlW

\*\*TNW = theater nuclear weapons

Deterrence is premised upon being able to dissuade your adversary from attack by threat of overwhelming retaliatory punishment.1 This concept is often credited with keeping the Cold War ‘cold’, as both the US and USSR feared nuclear use through the credible notion that such use could occur. However, if your willingness or ability to punish is called into question your deterrence is undermined. During the Cold War both sides of the bipolar system genuinely believe that the other could use its nuclear arsenal in a strategic confrontation. Relying solely on nuclear deterrence to prevent strategic attack is seen as dangerous in that it creates a gap in the middle of the escalation ladder, giving incentive to an opponent to escalate to the point where you are prepared to contemplate the use of nuclear weapons in response. If it is clear that NATO is not prepared to mobile its capability (particularly its nuclear weapons) in response to provocation, the deterrence is not seen as credible. This has particularly been the case in the recent conflict over Crimea and eastern Ukraine. The nuclear deterrent is disproportional and therefore simply not relevant against small scale conventional attack. This is consistent with customary international humanitarian law which outlines military response must be proportional to maintain a legal standing, further weakening the utility of NATO’s TNW deterrence. Smaller battlefield tactical or theatre nuclear weapons were deployed in their thousands in the European theatre during the Cold War, occupying the rungs of the ladder between massive conventional troop movements and the use of strategic ‘city-busting’ nuclear weapons in a flexible response posture, to the credibility of the nuclear deterrent. This is no longer the role of the 200-odd TNW warheads left in Europe. Popular belief dispels that TNW have military utility.2 They are there more to symbolize the US nuclear commitment (not really necessary given that the US would use their strategic warheads first), and to give the allies some sort of a nuclear role in the event of a crisis.3 Yet the point of keeping them - to show united Alliance resolve - is actually their most fundamental weakness. Cohesion, consent, and credibility: requirements for deterrence The effectiveness of the Alliance depends upon a transparent, strong solidarity. There will always be an incentive for any adversary to probe differences, test weak spots and to divide the Alliance. NATO operates on the basis of consensus. If NATO were to sanction the use of nuclear weapons it would need the consent of all NATO member states, and those TNW based in Europe are seen as a physical manifestation of that unity. In theory, deploying TNW would show unity of resolve and signal to any potential aggressor the need to back down. That's the theory. The practice is very different. As Paolo Foradori notes, NATO’s deterrence shield has been seriously compromised by the lack of credibility in its reliance on a nuclear posture.4 Threat perceptions and beliefs over the appropriate use of nuclear threats are so diverse across the Alliance, that this attachment to artificial cohesion undermines credibility and therefore leads to a major vulnerability.5 Turkey, for example, as a result of its geographic proximity to the Middle East, national security concerns and the implied status it confers within the Alliance, is supportive of the policy to station NATO TNW on its territory as part of the overarching NATO posture. Further, Turkey has always been skeptical about American commitments to defending the south east corner of the Alliance, so TNW are seen as an effective assurance through burden sharing and a symbol of Alliance commitment to Turkish security.6 Withdrawal of the NATO nuclear capability from their territory would be received by the Turkish elite as a repeat of the experience of losing US Jupiter missiles after the Cuban missile crisis without consultation and resulting feelings of US abandonment that still have impact today. Former Baltic Soviet states in NATO: Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, alongside Poland, are strongly supportive of retaining NATO nuclear bombs in Europe. Fears of Russian expansionism have increased in countries that experienced the impact of Soviet occupation within living memory.7 They would fiercely oppose any attempts to remove TNW, even though they realize that such weapons provide little practical defense against Russia. Perceptions are very different in those northwest European states hosting the weapons themselves. Germany has in recent years an active public debate on the removal of TNW from its territory while also carefully balancing its position in NATO.8 However, recent events will at least for now take the public pressure off the government to make any moves to change their nuclear status. The Dutch parliament recently voted not to invest in a new generation of nuclear-capable aircraft for NATO’s nuclear mission, though the government itself responded soon afterwards to say that it would not feel bound by this vote. Even before Russian action in Ukraine and its nuclear posture since, NATO appeared to be committed to maintaining the current posture. Today that commitment seems even stronger. But an effective Alliance deterrence posture requires more soul-searching. The symbolic and military-irrelevant deployment of TNW may weaken the political resolve to committee to other means to stabilize the worsening relationship with Russia - be that strengthening conventional deterrence or engaging in more constructive diplomacy and negotiation. According to Powell, states involved in a crisis will put pressure on each other to take further risk in a conflict.9 However, if the deterrent posture over-emphasises the most extreme (nuclear) level then options are severely limited in responding to aggression. In a crisis with Russia it is highly likely that more exposed NATO states will make very public requests to mobilize nuclear assets and threaten dire consequences, that host states may feel obliged to turn down, fearful that such escalation could get quickly out of control. This leaves the Alliance very exposed to crisis division, something that Russia is all too well aware of. NATO deterrence depends upon unity. But depending upon systems that could highlight disunity in moments of crisis is deeply dangerous. Although the most recent NATO Deterrence and Defence Posture Review cites a nuclear capability as a ‘core component’ of deterrence, 10 this inability of NATO states to address these matters on the basis that shifts from the status quo will only highlight divisions is simply postponing the inevitable and disguising deep vulnerabilities. NATO deterrence does not stem from the stationed TNW across Europe, but the unity of the Alliance and avoidance of fragmentation. But that is currently a fragile thing. Whilst the TNW element of NATO deterrence remains incredible, discussion of shifts to the nuclear posture of NATO would no doubt cause disagreement.

#### NATO cohesion is key to prevent Russian miscalc and extinction

Farmer 15 (Ben Farmer, Defense Correspondent at The Daily Telegraph, citing General Sir Adrian Bradshaw, Deputy Commander of NATO Forces in Europe, and former Director of British Special Forces, and Michael Fallon, Secretary of State for Defence, member of the National Security Council, and Member of Parliament, United Kingdom and Great Britain and Northern Ireland, “NATO general: Russia tensions could escalate into all-out war,” Business Insider, 2-20-2015, <http://www.businessinsider.com/nato-general-russia-tensions-could-escalate-to-war-2015-2>)

Tensions with Russia could blow up into all-out conflict, posing “an existential threat to our whole being”, Britain’s top general in Nato has warned. Gen Sir Adrian Bradshaw, deputy commander of Nato forces in Europe, said there was a danger Vladimir Putin could try to use his armies to invade and seize Nato territory, after calculating the alliance would be too afraid of escalating violence to respond. His comments follow a clash between London and Moscow after the Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon, said there was a "real and present danger" Mr Putin could try to destabilize the Baltic states with a campaign of subversion and irregular warfare. The Kremlin called those comments “absolutely unacceptable". Sir Adrian told the Royal United Services’ Institute there was a danger such a campaign of undercover attacks could paralyze Nato decision making, as members disagreed over how much Russia was responsible, and how to respond. Nato commanders fear a campaign of skilfully disguised, irregular military action by Russia, which is carefully designed not to trigger the alliance's mutual defence pact. He said the "resulting ambiguity" would make "collective decisions relating to the appropriate responses more difficult". But Sir Adrian, one of the most senior generals in the British Army and a former director of special forces, went further and said there was also danger that Russia could use conventional forces and Soviet-era brinkmanship to seize Nato territory. He said Russia had shown last year it could generate large conventional forces at short notice for snap exercises along its borders. There was a danger these could be used “not only for intimidation and coercion but potentially to seize Nato territory, after which the threat of escalation might be used to prevent re-establishment of territorial integrity. This use of so called escalation dominance was of course a classic Soviet technique.” He went on to say that “the threat from Russia, together with the risk it brings of a miscalculation resulting in a strategic conflict, however unlikely we see it as being right now, represents an existential threat to our whole being.” Nato has agreed to set up a rapid reaction force of around 5,000 troops ready to move at 48 hours notice, in case of Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. Supplies, equipment and ammunition will be stockpiled in bases in the region. Alliance leaders hope the force will deter any incursion. David Cameron warned Vladimir Putin there will be more sanctions and "more consequences" for Russia if the ceasefire in Ukraine does not hold. The Prime Minister vowed that the West would be "staunch" in its response to Russia and was prepared to maintain pressure on Moscow "for the long term". He rejected the findings of a scathing parliamentary committee report that the UK found itself "sleep-walking" into the crisis over Ukraine. The EU Committee of the House of Lords found there had been a "catastrophic misreading" of mood by European diplomats in the run-up to the crisis. Earlier this week, Mr Fallon said the Russian president might try to test Nato’s resolve with the same Kremlin-backed subversion used in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. A murky campaign of infiltration, propaganda, undercover forces and cyber attack such as that used in the early stages of the Ukraine conflict could be used to inflame ethnic tensions in Estonia, Lithuania or Latvia, he said. The military alliance must be prepared to repel Russian aggression “whatever form it takes”, Mr Fallon said, as he warned that tensions between the two were “warming up”. His comments were dismissed in Moscow. Russia's Foreign Ministry spokesman said the country does not pose a threat to Baltic countries and accused Mr Fallon of going beyond “diplomatic ethics” . Alexander Lukashevich said: "His absolutely unacceptable characteristics of the Russian Federation remind me of last year's speech of US president Barack Obama before the UN general assembly, in which he mentioned Russia among the three most serious challenges his country was facing.” "I believe we will find a way to react to Mr Secretary's statements."

#### Escalation in the Baltics is likely, but, escalation will only occur because of holes in NATO deterrence strategy

Kühn 18

Ulrich Kühn, nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and a senior research associate at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP)/James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, based in Vienna, Austria. Previously, he was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow with Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program, and a fellow with the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH). Kühn worked for the German Federal Foreign Office and was awarded United Nations Fellow on Disarmament in 2011. He is the founder and a permanent member of the trilateral Deep Cuts Commission and an alumnus of the ZEIT Foundation Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius. “Preventing Escalation in the Baltics.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018 <https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Kuhn_Baltics_INT_final_WEB.pdf> //KohlW

IF NATO WANTS to comprehensively address the risks of escalation, including deliberate Russian escalation, the alliance needs to understand the potential consequences and possible shortcomings of its policies in the realms of deterrence and assurance, resilience, and risk reduction. Assessing NATO’s current capacity to prevent escalation in a number of different potential contingencies is an important way to gauge the alliance’s level of preparedness to manage the escalatory pitfalls in the alliance’s relationship with Moscow. To this end, below are three possible escalation scenarios that can help analysts better understand the potential implications of NATO’s current policies as well as what NATO could do today to make future escalation less likely. All three scenarios involve nuclear threats (though two of them stop short of actual Russian nuclear-weapons use). The value of this scenario-based approach is that it can highlight escalation risks that are not obvious or that Western analysts have not yet discussed in detail. For example, this approach highlights the escalation risks linked to NATO’s current deterrence policy, which might necessitate the quick reinforcement of NATO personnel in the Baltics in the event of a crisis. If such a move were not properly communicated to Moscow, Russia could inadvertently misinterpret NATO’s actions as the start of a military offensive and consequently choose to escalate the crisis militarily. Accordingly, the aim is not to describe each and every escalatory step in great detail but to provide enough information to identify lessons that are more generally applicable. Clearly, many other escalation scenarios, besides those described here, can be imagined, and analyzing them could well lead to other important insights. Indeed, one complication of the real world not considered here is the possibility of multiple escalation pathways occurring simultaneously. By side-stepping this possibility, this analysis tends to understate the escalation risks and the challenges the alliance would face in seeking to manage them. SCENARIO ONE: DELIBERATE ESCALATION The first scenario starts with a Russian land grab in the Baltics. To be very clear, this is an extreme scenario; an overwhelming majority of Western experts, including NATO staff, consider it to be a “remote” possibility.158 Nevertheless, there are good reasons to consider this extreme set of circumstances. First, it is a high-risk scenario, based on low probability but with high potential consequences. Second, many allies are worried about it. And third, this scenario might look less unlikely after the Russian use of force in Georgia and Ukraine. STAGE ONE: The year 2018 sees the return of large-scale protests to major Russian cities. Suddenly, Vladimir Putin’s hold on power no longer seems a given. Only two weeks after the first protests, the Russian General Staff announces a large military exercise in Russia’s Western Military District, close to the border of Latvia. IMPLICATIONS: This combination of events would put NATO on notice about the internal developments in Russia and the announced military exercise, and these events would raise serious concerns that Russia’s leadership might be planning to create an international crisis to divert attention from a domestic crisis. At the same time, however, strong voices within NATO would almost certainly caution against overreacting to these events. They could argue that if NATO were to react militarily—by, for example, deciding to send temporary reinforcements, even perhaps only one additional battalion—to alleviate the concerns of Baltic nations, doing so would risk giving the Kremlin reason to up the ante. Indeed, deploying EFP forces in the region to the border area or even just raising their state of alert might be perceived by Russia as an aggressive move. Given these trade-offs, it is quite likely that NATO would react in a rather reserved way, which would give Russia an important advantage in terms of mobilizing its forces. STAGE TWO: Sudden protests by the Russian minority community in Latvia’s easternmost Latgale region spiral out of control with several fatalities. While NATO ambassadors are gathering for an emergency meeting, Putin warns NATO “not to interfere in the internal affairs of Latvia” and assures his domestic audience that “Russia will not idly stand by as Russians are being slaughtered abroad.” IMPLICATIONS: For the alliance, the sudden occurrence of serious protests in Latvia—whether or not instigated by Moscow—in conjunction with a domestic crisis in Russia and an arms buildup close to Latvia would immediately raise the severity of the crisis. The possibility of Russia escalating the conflict with NATO, which might have seemed rather low at Stage One, would suddenly become more realistic. (Indeed, similar Russian statements about the security of Russians living abroad were made ahead of Moscow’s interventions in Georgia and Ukraine.159) That said, there would nonetheless still be a real possibility that allies would hold divergent interpretations of these events, and it is unclear whether the EFP would be ordered to immediately leave its base near Riga, at least to patrol the border with Russia.160 Even though NATO insists that the EFP has no role to play in a domestic unrest scenario, some allies might question that logic, given that events may be instigated by Russia as it looked to invade. Debates at NATO Headquarters on these issues could get acrimonious. Some allies would probably worry that such actions as well as NATO preparations to send additional forces to the region could be escalatory. The alliance could well look, and perhaps be, divided. Again, NATO might still wait to avoid giving Russia any pretext to intervene. STAGE THREE: Russian forces cross the border into Latvia and occupy the Latgale region. President Putin makes a press announcement that “Russia’s humanitarian intervention stops here and now.” NATO defense ministers meet and issue an ultimatum, demanding full Russian withdrawal. IMPLICATIONS: At this point, debates within NATO about the severity of the Russian threat would be overtaken by events. NATO would be presented with a military fait accompli. While this situation already would be very challenging to handle, it might be further complicated if Russian forces met only minimal resistance from Latvian forces and perhaps none at all from the EFP. (Given the distance between their base in Riga and the Latgale region, there would be a serious risk that they would not arrive quickly enough to resist Russian forces.) In this case, regional EFP commanders—who, in the case of Latvia, come from six different contributing nations—might be confronted with a choice between engaging immediately in a futile fight that they would be certain to lose or holding back to await further instructions from NATO Headquarters. Worse still, some commanders might even receive orders from their own national commands, bypassing the NATO chain of command and possibly complicating a collective response. One potential outcome would be paralysis. Conversely, there would also be a real possibility that an EFP commander—having received divergent orders from NATO, the host nation (Latvia), and national lines of command—might decide to engage in combat before NATO’s political leaders have decided to invoke Article V. Regardless of exactly how the fight was playing out in the theater, the NAC would, at this stage, have to determine whether or not to invoke Article V and whether or not to go to war with Russia in an environment where the scope of the Russian campaign would still look rather limited (as no allied forces from France, Germany, the United Kingdom, or the United States would be involved yet). Even if Article V were triggered, certain allies might still advocate for a diplomatic solution. A possible compromise might see allies starting immediate preparations for military reinforcement in parallel with heightened crisis diplomacy. Stage Four: NATO is ready to deploy the Spearhead Force from Ramstein, Germany, and starts preparations for assembling the rest of the eNRF. Simultaneously, the United States starts flying in additional personnel and equipment to Western Europe and Poland. Putin claims that “NATO is provoking an unnecessary war.” In many European capitals tens of thousands take to the streets, urging Russia and NATO to “end the mutual violence.” IMPLICATIONS: NATO, having started its military preparations, would face another tough choice. While the Spearhead would be ready in less than a week, assembling the rest of the eNRF would take longer (in all likelihood, a couple of weeks). A decision would have to be made whether to deploy the Spearhead right away, and risk losing it almost immediately in the theater, or to wait for assembling the full manpower of the eNRF. If NATO were to wait, the louder the voices of opposition to any military response could grow. Indeed, large-scale protests in Western Europe, perhaps fueled by subversive Russian propaganda, would very likely further affect and complicate NATO’s political decisionmaking.161 In this situation, some allies might opt out of a military response, while others—the United Kingdom and the United States, most likely—could bypass NATO’s slow mobilization process and move forward with their own deployment plans. This contingency—in which some allies hesitate to engage and others push forward—could effectively paralyze the alliance as a collective decisionmaking entity. In any case, NATO might well have to deal, at some point, with further Russian efforts to escalate the conflict by targeting critical NATO transportation nodes with precision-guided conventional strikes so as to prevent or at least complicate NATO preparations for retaliation.162 From a Russian perspective, waiting for NATO to muster a force of perhaps 100,000 personnel—which is what would be required to be credible enough to fight a regional war with Russia with the aim of retaking and securing the Baltics or perhaps even extending combat operations into Russian territory—would hardly be an option.163 But even if Russia were to shy away from further escalation (it might, for example, decide against striking Western Europe because of the risk that doing so would unify the alliance), NATO’s next move—laying the groundwork for force deployment to the Baltics—would almost necessarily involve escalating the conflict horizontally into Russian territory. Because NATO has decided against pre-positioning heavy military equipment in the Baltics, allies would have to fly in personnel and equipment with large transportation aircraft, which would be easy targets for Russian air defense systems around the Baltic Rim. If NATO wanted to avoid losing much of its first reinforcement wave before it actually reached the ground, it would have to target Russian anti-access and area denial installations, effectively extending combat operations into Russian territory. STAGE FIVE: NATO receives intelligence reports that Russia is readying some of its tactical nuclear weapons stored in western Russia. Putin warns that “the two sides are on the brink of a nuclear armageddon.” IMPLICATIONS: Assuming that NATO had decided on a concrete deployment plan by this point, NATO leaders would have to decide whether to move forward given the possibility of Russia escalating to actual nuclear use. That decision would almost certainly cause serious frictions within the alliance and could further delay a military response. If NATO leaders weathered those quarrels and pressed on, NATO might then immediately be confronted with a second serious dilemma, stemming from NATO’s long-standing internal disputes about its nuclear deterrent. Over the years, Russia might have arrived at the conclusion that NATO would not use nuclear weapons—even in response to Russian nuclear use—in a limited regional scenario. As a result, Moscow might feel tempted to escalate to nuclear use in the hope of stopping NATO in its tracks before it could deploy forces. In this case, all of NATO’s possible nuclear countermeasures—rhetorical nuclear threats; so-called slow nuclear signals in the form of readying NATO’s forward-deployed nuclear forces (which would take a few weeks); or so-called fast signals, such as U.S. B-52 deployments to Western Europe (which could be executed within hours)—could be misperceived in Moscow as mere bluffs. The interplay between Russia doubting NATO’s resolve and NATO having difficulties making its nuclear threats credible would create a number of pathways for escalation through misperception. One possibility would be NATO proceeding with its deployment preparations absent its own distinct response to Russia’s nuclear threats. In this event, Russia might escalate to nuclear use out of concern that a regional conventional war with NATO could result in a Russian defeat, and perhaps the loss of Kaliningrad or even other Russian territory. According to two Russian military experts, “Strategic deterrence with conventional weapons of a potential aggressor state (or coalition of states) from undertaking a large-scale or regional war is unlikely. It is possible only by the threat of preventive nuclear actions.”164 STAGE SIX: U.S. satellites detect a small-yield nuclear explosion over a remote area in the North Sea. IMPLICATIONS: At this point, NATO would face the dire situation of Russia having escalated to actual nuclear use in the form of a single demonstration strike over international waters. The Russian strike would most likely not eradicate the dilemmas NATO would be facing already at Stage Five, when Russia was only threatening nuclear use, but instead make those dilemmas more pressing. In concrete terms, NATO members would now have to decide whether to move forward with the alliance’s deployment plans, stop in its tracks (obviously intimidated by Russian nuclear use), or perhaps respond with nuclear use. The latter option—nuclear use by the allies—in particular would most likely be highly contested within NATO. Given that the Russian demonstration strike would not have been directed against NATO territory, the risk of further nuclear escalation if NATO were to reciprocate, rapidly mounting domestic pressures in Western Europe to “avoid a nuclear holocaust,” and NATO’s (though comparably slow) ability to muster a significant conventional force, the alliance’s members might decide against nuclear use. At the same time, that might only help to reinforce the Russian (mis)perception that NATO really tends to shy away from nuclear use in a crisis. NATO would therefore be hard-pressed to show serious nuclear signals below the level of actual use, such as U.S. B-52 deployments to Western Europe. In turn, Russia, having just escalated to nuclear use, would face a no less dire situation, given that Moscow might feel that it had played its final card in an escalatory game aimed at preventing NATO from deploying forces to the Baltics. If NATO were to continue with its mobilization and deployment plans, Russia would have little choice other than to escalate the conflict further into NATO territory—perhaps by aiming conventional strikes at NATO’s western transportation nodes or perhaps by conducting additional nuclear strikes—or back down. Either way, Moscow would have to fear that its escalation strategy would solidify NATO’s assertiveness rather than undermine its cohesion. Key Takeaways • It is not clear what role NATO forces, particularly the EFP, could or should play in an internal crisis scenario in one of the Baltic states coupled with a Russian buildup in very close proximity to Baltic borders. • There is a real, if remote, possibility that Russia could stage a military fait accompli aimed at taking only a small portion of land in eastern Latvia without pulling the trip wire, that is, without the EFP getting engaged in combat. • NATO’s political decisionmaking process regarding additional conventional force deployments to the Baltics in a crisis might be considerably hampered by diverging opinions about Moscow’s potential reactions. Domestic protests in Western Europe could further increase the pressure on certain allies not to “overly provoke” Russia. • NATO’s process of preparing for a military response would be very slow because relatively few NATO forces are rapidly deployable. This would give Russia additional time and opportunities to affect NATO decisionmaking in its favor. Moreover, deploying only a few forces, such as the Spearhead Force, would be very undesirable because of the risk that they would be destroyed rather quickly in combat. • NATO’s ambiguous stance toward its own nuclear deterrent might lead Moscow to doubt NATO’s resolve, opening up potential pathways to escalation by misperception. • The necessity of retaking the Baltics through massive force deployments, once initiated by NATO, would put the onus on Russia to escalate further, perhaps even to nuclear use. SCENARIO TWO: INADVERTENT ESCALATION The second scenario focuses on a domestic crisis in Latvia that spirals out of control to the point that Russian leaders feel compelled by domestic pressure to threaten to intervene. The Kremlin has to react on an ad hoc basis to a foreign policy crisis involving ethnic Russians in one of its neighboring states—as it did prior to its interventions in Georgia and Ukraine. Having said that, in this scenario, Russia has already escalated general tensions with its neighbor Latvia over a long period of time through very low-level, nonkinetic operations, including ongoing propaganda efforts. STAGE ONE: On May 9, commemorations of the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany lead to isolated ethnic clashes in Riga, resulting in two fatalities. Fueled by social media rumors, crowds of angry ethnic Russians take to the streets the next day. IMPLICATIONS: Given the attention that NATO policymakers are already paying to Russia’s influence campaign toward and potential manipulation of the Russian minorities in the Baltics,165 this scenario would ring alarm bells in Brussels. While there is not much NATO leaders could do at that stage, they might urge Latvian authorities, in bilateral communications, to diffuse tensions and keep a lower profile to avoid further escalating the protests. At the same time, NATO as well as Latvian authorities might have difficulties assessing whether Moscow was behind the protests or whether they were really spontaneous. If NATO wrongly thought that Russia were behind the protests, there would be a greater risk of escalation. STAGE TWO: The protests grow in the following days. While there is no official reaction from the highest echelons of the Kremlin, Russian ultra-nationalist groups start their own protests in Moscow, demanding that Putin “come to the help of our brothers and sisters.” IMPLICATIONS: For NATO, the surge in protests coupled with the clamor in Russia would increase the urgency of the situation. On the one hand, the mere existence of continued protests would underscore the risk that the Latvian authorities might lose control of the situation. Some NATO members might argue for deploying the EFP battlegroup to “show presence” at the Latvian-Russian border. Latvian authorities might order exactly that but could face resistance from EFP commanders who may receive contradictory national orders. On the other hand, NATO might well struggle to interpret the mixed signals from Moscow and debate whether Moscow was creating the pretext for a crisis with NATO or whether the Kremlin was in danger of losing control of the situation.166 In the latter case, NATO would probably be well advised to offer Moscow some sort of off-ramp to defuse tensions. Some allies might therefore urge NATO to pursue immediate backchannel diplomacy with Moscow, while others might instead argue for lower-level military preparations than EFP deployments. STAGE THREE: NATO deploys the EFP battlegroup to patrol Latvia’s border with Russia. The following day, the Russian military starts large-scale military readiness drills in the Western Military District. IMPLICATIONS: NATO’s deployment of military forces would be far from the protesters and with a clear defensive aim. However, Russia’s readiness drills could cause some headaches at NATO Headquarters. Some allies might interpret the Russian move as a mere reaction to NATO’s response, providing another argument for trying to deescalate tensions and avoid any further NATO military action. By contrast, other allies might read Moscow’s actions as part of a larger Russian plan to intimidate NATO or perhaps prepare to intervene. Assuming the second reading of events were to prevail within NATO, allies would presumably decide to start preparations for assembling and deploying the Spearhead Force. But doing so without simultaneously readying the additional forces of the eNRF would create the risk of losing the Spearhead if Russia were to really attack Latvia. At the same time, readying all forces of the eNRF could be misinterpreted in Moscow as preparations for an offensive against Russia. STAGE FOUR: While NATO is in the middle of preparing to deploy the Spearhead, the Russian military starts mustering roughly 40,000 personnel close to the Latvian border. Vladimir Putin, who has publicly maintained a low profile so far, declares to the press that “any NATO attempt to send forces to Latvia would be seen by Russia as an act of hostility that would have severe consequences.” IMPLICATIONS: NATO, confronted again with a Russian decision to up the ante and still in the dark about Russian intentions, would face a tough choice. Declining to send the Spearhead might deescalate the situation, but Russia might instead interpret that as a sign of weakness that would perhaps invite Russian escalation. By contrast, sending the Spearhead could underscore NATO’s resolve—perhaps deescalating the standoff—but doing so could also increase the pressure on Russia to escalate before NATO reinforcements arrived. Indeed, if NATO members were to decide to deploy the Spearhead, they would also have to make an almost immediate decision about preparing the rest of the eNRF for deployment, given its low level of readiness. STAGE FIVE: NATO issues a statement that “the deployment of the Spearhead will continue without delay.” Only a few hours later, the Russian Ministry of Defense announces a nationwide emergency drill of its nuclear forces. IMPLICATIONS: This strong Russian nuclear signal could create different escalation pathways, depending on NATO’s reaction. If Moscow’s signal was intended to prevent allied reinforcement out of fear that NATO was staging a larger campaign against Russia, NATO’s decision to halt deployment of the Spearhead could well deescalate tensions. Conversely, if Moscow’s signal was intended to prevent allied reinforcement as a test of allies’ resolve, NATO’s compliance could trigger a Russian military intervention. But whatever Russia’s real intentions, if it were to fail to achieve its goal of deterring NATO from deploying the Spearhead, Moscow might feel compelled to raise the stakes further. One important aspect of this scenario is the possibility that NATO might interpret the Russian signal as not credible, given that NATO would not yet have sent reinforcements to the Baltics, let alone inflicted military fatalities on Russia. But that interpretation might well be incorrect; the early use of a serious nuclear threat would be perfectly consistent with the Russian strategy of conflict.167 In any case, a possible NATO response-in-kind to Russia’s nuclear threat might be drills with U.S. and British (and perhaps French) nuclear forces. However, and given domestic public pressure, that would be a decision fraught with political disagreements within NATO about how and under what circumstances to flex alliance members’ nuclear muscle. A slower response, perhaps intended to break the rapid escalation cycle, could be to start raising the alert levels of NATO’s forward-deployed nuclear forces. Key Takeaways • NATO and Russia might find it difficult to deescalate a crisis during its initial stages and instead get drawn into a vicious action-reaction cycle, even though neither deliberately initiated the crisis nor wanted it to spiral out of control. Critically, each side might incorrectly think the other was seeking a crisis. • NATO might find it challenging to identify when a crisis needs a military response and what response that might be—that is to say, not starting to escalate too early or waiting too long.

#### Plan: The Kingdom of Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Italian Republic, Netherlands, and Republic of Turkey ought to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

#### Only the plan solves escalation, terrorist threats and enables diplomacy between NATO and Russia

Regehr 18

Ernie Regehr, O.C., Senior Fellow in Arctic Security and Defence, “”NATO and Nuclear Disarmament – II: It’s Time to End NATO Nuclear Sharing,” The Simons Foundation's, November 9, 2018, <http://www.thesimonsfoundation.ca/highlights/nato-and-nuclear-disarmament-ii-its-time-end-nato-nuclear-sharing> //KohlW

In the coming years, such full-throated defence of nuclear weapons in Europe will be put to the test as all the European host states plan to upgrade their fighter aircraft and thus face the decision of whether to make their next generation fighters dual capable. Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey are opting for the US F-35 for their replacements, but so far, they have not made a clear commitment to making them nuclear capable. Belgium remains undecided on its replacement aircraft, while Germany is likely to choose the Eurofighter15 – and, again, neither has fully committed to including a nuclear capability. Adding a nuclear weapons capability to fighter aircraft would add significant cost, and, much more significantly, would add consequential political costs for governments choosing the dual capability option in countries with populations that largely favor removing nuclear weapons from their territories. A 2015 expert analysis concluded that before the Ukraine crisis there was no clear political path for countries hosting US B61 bombs to get parliamentary approval for new nuclear related investments, and since then, they argue, “it is not clear that this calculation has changed.”16 There is strong majority support for the removal of the US nuclear weapons from four of the countries hosting them, according to a June 2018 survey, 17 (there was no survey in Turkey, the fifth hosting country). The following figures represent percentages of support-for-removal/opposition-to-removal/no-response: Belgium 57/21/22%; Netherlands 56/25/19%; Germany 70/16/14%; Italy 65/18/18%. On the question of acquiring fighter aircraft capable of carrying the US B61 nuclear bomb, most were also opposed, but the results were not as strong or clear (oppose-making-them-dual-capable/support-dual-capable/no-response): Belgium 44/33/23%; Netherlands 43/39/17%; Germany 55/26/19%; Italy 59/23/19%. Challenging forward deployment Besides alienating national populations, critics see other major risks in forward-deployed nuclear weapons – risks of accidents and basic handling blunders, and susceptibility to terrorist attacks. Forward deployment also invites pre-emptive attacks, inasmuch as any move in a crisis to get the B61 bombs ready for use would be readily visible to an adversary, making the demonstrably alerted aircraft tempting targets for pre-emptive attack.18 Furthermore, the European based nuclear bombs have really proven to be of questionable deterrent value among those NATO allies most anxious about Russian intentions toward them. Baltic and other East European NATO member states tend to support forward basing, but the presence of those forward-deployed systems seems to give them little comfort, as they demand instead the presence, close at hand, of NATO conventional forces (like the trip-wire force Canada is leading in Latvia). So, the case for removing B61 bombs from Europe remains strong. The 2012 NATO Deterrence and Defence Posture Review was more concrete in proposing that the alliance promote conditions for “further reductions on non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to NATO” (para 11). It committed to exploring arrangements to that end (para 12)19 and called for reciprocal reductions in Russia’s non-strategic weapons stockpile (para 26). Two former US security and foreign policy officials, writing in Foreign Affairs in 2016, admittedly a very long time ago in American political years, called for an American freeze on B61 modernization and for the phased withdrawal of all US nuclear weapons from Europe.20 They argued that there is no longer any military rationale for US nuclear weapons in Europe and that in 2008 the US European Command ended its support for maintaining US nuclear weapons in Europe. And they did not propose any linkage between reductions in US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and Russia’s roughly 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons – Russia sees its tactical nuclear weapons as countering NATO’s superiority in conventional military capabilities, not in countering US tactical nuclear weapons. Removing US nuclear weapons from Europe would be a limited but significant development – limited because, even with all B61 bombs removed from forward deployment, nuclear sharing would not necessarily end21 and, furthermore, three NATO members would still be nuclear weapon states, two of them continuing to maintain nuclear weapons in Europe. But it would send an important de-escalatory signal to Russia, and it would help to clear a path toward renewed East/West dialogue – a clear prerequisite for further strategic arms reductions. NATO disarmament options NATO is a nuclear alliance, but it has no nuclear weapons of its own, and that in turn means it is not a party to any arms control or disarmament agreement. NATO nevertheless is certainly involved in seeking to coordinate common positions among Alliance member countries in some multilateral negotiations (e.g. the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons). And while individual NATO member states are obviously responsible for their own arms control policies, there are collective disarmament initiatives available to NATO: 1) The most obvious would be for the North Atlantic Council to accept, as it seemed prepared to do in 2010, the removal of American nuclear weapons from Europe and have them returned to the US – which would have the added virtue of finally bringing the US and the European states hosting its weapons into compliance with Articles I and II of the NPT.

### 1ac – framing

#### The standard is maximizing expected net wellbeing

#### Pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable – they’re where we reach the end of the line in matters of value

Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.

#### Nuclear war is under-researched and secondary effects ensure extinction---any other models are flawed and survivors don’t check

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Since the early 1980s, the world has known that a large nuclear war could cause severe global environmental effects, including dramatic cooling of surface temperatures, declines in precipitation, and increased ultraviolet radiation. The term nuclear winter was coined specifically to refer to cooling that result in winter-like temperatures occurring year-round. Regardless of whether such temperatures are reached, there would be severe consequences for humanity. But how severe would those consequences be? And what should the world be doing about it? To the first question, the short answer is nobody knows. The total human impacts of nuclear winter are both uncertain and under-studied. In light of the uncertainty, a risk perspective is warranted that considers the breadth of possible impacts, weighted by their probability. More research on the impacts would be very helpful, but we can meanwhile make some general conclusions. That is enough to start answering the second question, what we should do. In regards to what we should do, nuclear winter has some interesting and important policy implications. Today, nuclear winter is not a hot topic but this was not always the case: it was international headline news in the 1980s. There were conferences, Congressional hearings, voluminous scientific research, television specials, and more. The story is expertly captured by Lawrence Badash in his book A Nuclear Winter’s Tale.1)Much of the 1980s attention to nuclear winter was driven by the enthusiastic efforts of Carl Sagan, then at the height of his popularity. But underlying it all was the fear of nuclear war, stoked by some of the tensest moments of the Cold War. When the Cold War ended, so too did attention to nuclear winter. That started to change in 2007, with a new line of nuclear winter research2) that uses advanced climate models developed for the study of global warming. Relative to the 1980s research, the new research found that the smoke from nuclear firestorms would travel higher up in the atmosphere, causing nuclear winter to last longer. This research also found dangerous effects from smaller nuclear wars, such as an India-Pakistan nuclear war detonating “only” 100 total nuclear weapons. Two groups—one in the United States3) and one in Switzerland4)—have found similar results using different climate models, lending further support to the validity of the research. Some new research has also examined the human impacts of nuclear winter. Researchers simulated agricultural crop growth in the aftermath of a 100-weapon India-Pakistan nuclear war.5)The results are startling- the scenario could cause agriculture productivity to decline by around 10 to 40 percent for several years after the war. The studies looked at major staple crops in China and the United States, two of the largest food producers. Other countries and other crops would likely face similar declines. Following such crop declines, severe global famine could ensue. One study estimated the total extent of the famine by comparing crop declines to global malnourishment data.6) When food becomes scarce, the poor and malnourished are typically hit the hardest. This study estimated two billion people at risk of starvation. And this is from the 100-weapon India-Pakistan nuclear war scenario. Larger nuclear wars would have more severe impacts. This is where the recent research stops. To the best of my knowledge there are no recent studies examining the secondary effects of famines, such as disease outbreaks and violent conflicts. There are no recent studies examining the human impacts of ultraviolet radiation. That would include an increased medical burden in skin cancer and other diseases. It would also include further loss of agriculture ecosystem services as the ultraviolet radiation harms plants and animals. At this time, we can only make educated guesses about what these impacts would be, informed in part by what research was published 30 years ago. When analyzing the risk of nuclear winter, one question is of paramount importance: Would there be permanent harm to human civilization? Humanity could have a very bright future ahead; to dim that future is the worst thing nuclear winter could do. It is vastly worse than a few billion deaths from starvation. Not that a few billion deaths is trivial—obviously it isn’t—but it is tiny compared to the loss of future generations. Carl Sagan was one of the first people to recognize this point in a commentary he wrote on nuclear winter for Foreign Affairs.7) Sagan believed nuclear winter could cause human extinction, in which case all members of future generations would be lost. He argued that this made nuclear winter vastly more important than the direct effects of nuclear war, which could, in his words, “kill ‘only’ hundreds of millions of people.” Sagan was however, right that human extinction would cause permanent harm to human civilization. It is debatable whether nuclear winter could cause human extinction. Alan Robock, a leader of the recent nuclear winter research, believes it is unlikely. He writes: “Especially in Australia and New Zealand, humans would have a better chance to survive.”8) This is hardly a cheerful statement, and it leaves open the chance of human extinction. I think that’s the best way of looking at it. Given all the uncertainty and the limited available research, it is impossible to rule out the possibility of human extinction. I don’t have a good answer for how likely it is. But the possibility should not be dismissed. Even if some humans survive, there could still be permanent harm to human civilization. Small patches of survivors would be extremely vulnerable to subsequent disasters. They also could not keep up the massively complex civilization we enjoy today. It would be a long and uncertain rebuilding process and survivors might never get civilization back to where it is now. More importantly, they might never get civilization to where we now stand poised to take it in the future. Our potentially bright future could be forever dimmed.9) Nuclear winter is a very large and serious risk. But that on its own doesn’t mean much—just another thing to worry about. What’s really important are the implications of nuclear winter for public policy and private action.

# 1ar – case

## 1ar – uncertainty

### 1ar – o/v

#### US theater nuclear weapons in Europe encourage Russian aggression in the Baltics because Russia knows they can create disagreement and hesitation of their use – Russia is incentivized to test NATO’s limits to take advantage of squabbling – any crisis scenario spirals out of control because of a gap in the escalation ladder due to overreliance on those weapons. NATO lacks adequate punishment for Russia’s tactical nukes which incentivizes Russia to use them. NATO’s only response would be full-escalation – that causes extinction.

### at: tnw k2 deterrence

#### Varriale presumes the warrants in their card – deterrence from TNW fails because Russia knows that NATO won’t be able to agree on whether or not to use them

### at: tnw k2 nato cohesion

#### a. this argument assumes the US does the plan – if it’s a joint agreement by [\_\_] it won’t cause tensions

#### b. turn – nato nukes cause internal disagreements between countries that want to use them like turkey and the Baltics and countries that don’t like Germany and France

### at: no escalation

#### this is the wrong aff to read impact d against – our Kühn card is the best card in this round – nuclear war is most likely to arise from conflict in the baltics – lack of diplomatic backchannels, misinterpretation, multiple flashpoints for escalation, regional tensions and conflict, article five, and underestimation of the possibility of multiple escalation scenarios occurring simultaneously all make this the most likely scenario – only by enabling cohesion through the elimination of US theatre nuclear weapons stockpiles throughout Europe can solve – otherwise Russia will use initial escalation to divide Europe over nuclear use – and – Russia will underestimate NATO resolve because of already existing disagreements over nuclear sharing

### 1ar – yes revisionist

#### Russia is unquestionably revisionist – internal threats to Putin’s rule lead to Russia’s expansionist doctrine

Natsios 18 [Andrew, Director of the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs, Bush School of Government, Texas A&M University, “Putin’s New Russia: Fragile State or Revisionist Power?” Johns Hopkins University Press, May 15th, 2018, <https://www.press.jhu.edu/news/blog/putin%E2%80%99s-new-russia-fragile-state-or-revisionist-power>] SE-WR

European and U.S. policymakers were slow to acknowledge and react to the reality of Putin’s Russia, its revisionist policies, and the threat it posed to western democracies and its other neighbors. For the first six years of Putin’s Presidency when he was regarded as a economic reformer, Russia was treated as a great power and was one of the select countries included in G-8 meetings, but after the invasion of Ukraine Russia was expelled. Beginning in the mid-2000’s, Putin abandoned his economic reform agenda and shifted the direction of his government, ending Russia’s integration into the world economy, crushing civil society, gaining virtual control of the Russian electronic news media, and seizing the territory of neighboring states such as Georgia and Ukraine, while aggressively rearming. Russia has had a history of surprising naïve outsiders who do not understand why the country and its leaders act as they do on the world stage or how the country functions internally. At his confirmation hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 9, 2015, Major General Joseph Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was asked to identify the greatest global threat to the United States. He provided a one-word answer: Russia. At the time his observation surprised many in Washington whose focus had been on the radical Islamist State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or on China. Putin’s Russia as an Outlier Nation As the articles in this journal demonstrate, Putin’s Russia is an outlier nation in that it does not fit into the existing categories of other countries which make up the world order. Many of its unique characteristics are weaknesses, not strengths. Russia is not an advanced democratic capitalist state, nor does it have much in common with Brazil, India or China, with which it is often grouped as one of the so-called BRIC countries. These countries have growing industrially and technologically-based economies, and two are evolving democracies. Brazil, India, and China are all experiencing aggressive and very public anti-corruption campaigns, while the Russian government represents the embodiment of systemic corruption on a kleptocratic scale. If Putin loses power and a reform-minded government succeeds him, he, his circle of KGB agents and the Oligarchs who run the country, could end up in jail or worse. An article in the January/February 2018 issue of the Atlantic Monthly, Julia Ioffe reports that Putin, obsessed with the violent demise of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, watched over and over again a video of his brutal lynching by his own people. It is the Russian people who Putin most fears, and thus ensuring his own survival may be driving his aggressive external behavior which has played on the Russian people’s nationalist impulses to boost his popularity. Thus, the Russian foreign policy riddle may in fact be better explained, per some essays in this issue, as a response to the power dynamics within the country rather than by any particular national security doctrine. These dynamics are internal, not external threats to Putin’s rule, certainly not to Russia as a nation-state. Moscow’s policies may be driven by the insecurity and illegitimacy of the small circle of Oligarchs and former KGB agents surrounding Putin who fear their own people more than they fear any outside threat, a fear which is evidence of profound, if disguised, weakness. Understanding Putin’s Foreign Policy John Mearsheimer, the international relations scholar, argues Russia’s aggressiveness towards its neighbors stems from western efforts to extend NATO membership to former members of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. According to this view, traditional national interest drives Russia’s behavior, and NATO extension has been seen by Putin as a threat to Russia’s vital national security interests. From this perspective, the western democracies helped create Vladimir Putin’s Russia by impinging on its “sphere of influence” along its borders; thus, Russia is not what international relations scholars call a “revisionist power”—one which seeks to overthrow the existing international order—but a traditional state protecting what it sees as its equities and vital national interests. Other analysts, such as Anne Applebaum, argue Putin’s policies are not part of a grand strategy, but are evidence of an improvised foreign policy. Thus, Russia’s aggression in Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, and its threats to the Baltic States, may be seen not as a carefully designed and executed strategy of conquest, but as symptomatic of Putin’s ad hoc, opportunistic foreign policy. He probes for Western weakness, irresolution, and indecision, and then, if there is no resistance, he intervenes to extend Russia’s reach by absorbing more territory. Putin has sought to return Russia to great power status by weakening other competing powers or annexing neighboring states rather than risking reforms that could be destabilizing in the short term, but would strengthen Russia as a nation state over the long term. The immediate objectives of Russian foreign policy are not mysterious if one examines Putin’s government’s public rhetoric, its published documents, and its actions. One of Putin’s greatest strengths has been the aggressive and systematic pursuit of these strategic objectives which include: efforts to regain military parity with the United States (they are nowhere near achieving this) the neutralization of the NATO alliance the end of the European Union as one of the most powerful economic blocs in the world the creation of an alternative anti-liberal, authoritarian, reactionary governance model of statehood for which Russia is trying to gain adherents among far right and far left parties wing in Europe the reconstruction of the historic Russian sphere of influence through annexation of parts of neighboring states and the projection of Russian power to other regions of the world such as the Middle East and Afghanistan If Putin’s strategic objective was to minimize or reduce external threats to Russia, the invasion of Ukraine was a major strategic blunder as it has slowly begun to mobilize the previous docile and distracted Western Alliance to counter the new threat. NATO officials have now begun publicly raising the alarm bells. Sweden and Finland, which never joined NATO, are now engaged in a public discussion about joining the Alliance, which has broad public support. Putin’s Grand Bargain with the Russian People: Surrendering Freedom for Guns, Butter, and the dream of lost Russian Grandeur Putin’s legitimacy as a ruler has been based on a tacit agreement with the Russian people that trades individual freedom, democracy, and the rule of law for economic security. Since the severe economic contraction after mid-2014, that tacit agreement ended. Putin has now reformulated the grand bargain with the Russian people. He is promising to bring back the glorious days of the Soviet Union and earlier Tsarist Empires in exchange for the Russian public’s acceptance of his autocratic rule and a lower living standard. Since the drop-in oil prices beginning in the summer of 2014 when they peaked at $128 a barrel, the central government has been shoring up the fragile banking system. Despite the balance sheet’s visual appeal, Russia under Vladimir Putin faces a much greater risk of internal implosion than many in Western capitals understand. This is due to the cuts in public services and pensions, growing unrest among the Russian elites with Putin’s policies, and the Russian military’s discomfort with Putin’s strategic gambling in Ukraine and earlier in Georgia. Anne Applebaum argues in her essay that Putin has either infiltrated, co-opted, corrupted, intimidated, or shut down most of the nascent institutions of Russian democratic pluralism that developed during the 1990’s and early 2000’s such as non-governmental organizations, religious institutions such as the Russian Orthodox Church, think tanks, and universities. Russia has neither rule of law nor an independent court system, and its police are corrupt and a tool of repression rather than law enforcement. Russia has evolved into what Russians call a “managed democracy,” a democracy in appearance, not reality. Russian institutional weakness may be found in the retarded level of internal development and the dysfunctional characteristics of its governance structure. Russia’s current social, health, demographic, and economic indicators show a country in what could be permanent and irreversible decline, as documented in Nick Eberstadt’s essay. These weaknesses suggest Russia is a declining power, and certainly not a rising power such as China. Russia’s Military and Cyber Warfare Build Up One of the few elements of Russian national power now on the ascendency is its military. Putin had been rearming Russia at a rapid rate until 2017 when revenues could not continue to support the increases. Putin has invested in the modernization of Russia’s nuclear arsenal and the development of new and more advanced conventional weapons, even as Russia faces a depressing demographic future with high rates of drug addiction and alcoholism among young men. Perhaps the greatest risk to Putin’s strategic buildup may be this dependence on oil, gas, and mineral revenues. To minimize the effect of declining revenue on the defense buildup, Moscow has made a series of strategic decisions to choose guns over butter: cutting back public services such as education, health, and pensions they had formerly funded. Disposable income for the average Russian family declined by 15% between 2014 and 2016, even as the military budget has been increasing. At the end of 2016, for the first time in seven years, Russian families were spending more than half their income on food and “the percentage of Russians who had any savings fell from 72% in 2013 to 29% in 2016,” reported The Washington Post. The rising Russian military threat was on display in Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, but he miscalculated in several critical respects. According to Moscow, a corrupt and illegitimate government had taken power through street demonstrations while Putin’s democratically-elected ally in Kiev was driven from office by mob rule funded by billionaire George Soros and western civil society groups. Putin expected to be greeted by at least half of Ukraine as a Slavic liberating hero because eastern Ukraine has historically been more oriented towards Russia. Instead, Russia met Ukrainian resistance, and united what had been a divided country now mobilized to oppose the Russian invasion. Russia’s new cyberwarfare capabilities were used in 2016 in a highly visible way during the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, the Dutch and French elections, and German parliament hacking incidents. Putin interfered in the U.S. elections per the U.S. intelligence agencies, when the Russian cyber-warfare agencies hacked into the Democratic National Committee email system and accessed Clinton campaign advisor John Podesta’s emails. The Ideology and Mythology of the Putin State Putin has positioned himself and Russia as a reactionary alternative to western secular liberal democracies. This world view is described in Project Russia, which is a curious, if alarming, collection of essays published in five-volumes as a semi-official government publication that describes the political ideology of the Putin’s and his circle of oligarchs world view. These essays form a strange amalgam of anti-democratic and ultra-nationalist attacks on western democratic values, combined with an unhealthy dose of conspiracy theories, paranoia, xenophobia, and a defense of autocratic government. The five volumes of Project Russia may represent Putin’s blueprint for Russia’s grand strategy, evidence of a revisionist power seeking to overthrow the existing international order. Destabilizing Russia’s Neighbors General Breedlove, the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, in testimony before a United States Senate Committee in March 2016, said, “Together, Russia and the Assad regime are deliberately weaponizing migration in an attempt to overwhelm European structures and break European resolve.” Breedlove said that he could see no purpose behind the Russian bombing of purely civilian targets in Syria. He argued these bombing attacks were a tactic to increase refugee flows to Europe to destabilize the European political system and strengthen extremist political movements on the continent of the far left and right, many of which are pro-Putin. Putin showed his diplomatic skills in turning the European migration crisis and terrorist attacks to Russia’s advantage. Putin may be creating, or at least contributing to, the very crisis to which he is trying to organize a European response. The refugee crisis and Paris massacres demonstrated to European publics their own vulnerability, and have already resulted in electoral gains for far-right wing parties in European elections. Many of these parties are vocal supporters of Putin and have received campaign funds from Moscow—such as Marine Le Pen in France—indirectly through a Russian bank in Cyprus (reportedly a front for the Russian intelligence service). These parties are also anti-European Union, anti-American, and anti-NATO. U.S. Policy towards Russia in the age of Donald Trump The election of Donald Trump as President of the United States on November 8, 2016, sent shock waves throughout the U.S. alliance system around the world because of his dissent from the bi-partisan support for this alliance system and its centrality to American national security. Even President Trump’s attempts at improving relations between Russia and the United States have bogged down in media exposes, congressional hearings, and a special prosecutor investigating whether his campaign cooperated with the Russian government during the Presidential campaign. While the interference in the U.S. elections may have made Putin look stronger than he actually is, it has also increased U.S. opposition, particularly among Democrats, to Putin and the threat Russia poses under his leadership. The Republican congressional leadership has been virtually unanimous in opposing President Trump’s attempt to cultivate Vladimir Putin. Speaker of the House, Paul Ryan, even called the Putin government “gangsters” which the United States cannot trust. Threats to Putin’s Rule After the Russian economy began to unravel in mid-2014, Putin repeatedly purged KGB generals to eliminate any potential rivals or risk of a coup. On November 14, 2016, the Minister of Economic Development, Alexei Ulyukaev, who was one of the last remaining reform-minded technocrats in Putin’s cabinet and a potential rival, was arrested on contrived charges. While to the outside world Vladimir Putin may appear to be a towering figure of autocratic and decisive strength amidst a field of weak, diminished, and distracted western democratic leaders, in reality, his rule is tenuous, his power base unstable, and Mother Russia more fragile than it appears. The evidence presented in these essays suggests Russia is an increasingly well-armed, declining power, but also a revisionist one which seeks to undermine or destroy the existing international order. A declining, revisionist power can be as dangerous and destabilizing as a rising power, particularly if it has a large land army, cyber warfare capability, new advanced conventional weapons, and a nuclear arsenal. Despite Putin’s short-term tactical victories against a weakened and distracted western alliance, the long-term prospects are not good for Russia, given its internal fragility Thus, in response to the question posed by these essays—Is Russia a Fragile State or a 21st century Revisionist Power?—the answer is, it is both. The problem for Vladimir Putin is that the gap between his grand strategy and Russia’s capabilities and internal fragility is so great that he will eventually fail, and fail dramatically, but as Nicholas Eberstadt writes, a great many very unpleasant things can happen before this gap leads to Russia’s failure.

### ---baltics

#### Baltic cyberattacks prove our argument

Micko and Plichta ‘19 (Branislav Micko and Marcel Plichta 19, PhD candidate in political science at Charles University, Prague, with a research focus on NATO partnerships and border security; independent analyst based in Washington, DC who has previously written on security topics for Defense One, World Politics Review, and Small Wars Journal; “THE CASE FOR NATO: WHY THE ALLIANCE’S POST–COLD WAR EXPANSION IS VITAL TO EUROPEAN SECURITY AND AMERICAN INTERESTS”, Modern War Institute, Apr 5 2019, <https://mwi.usma.edu/case-nato-alliances-post-cold-war-expansion-vital-european-security-american-interests/>)

At a time when NATO is tested by competition with a revanchist Russia, critiques of its approach to membership have just as frequently been from inside the alliance as out. Arguments from scholars and commentators bemoan NATO’s post-1991 expansion and advocate a halt to welcoming new members altogether. Among reasons cited to freeze membership are the inclusion of “vulnerable” countries, such as the Baltic nations who allegedly do not bring enough to the table, a supposedly deteriorating US domestic commitment to the alliance, and the potential to provoke the Russians. These critiques are not new—they have appeared regularly throughout the alliance’s history in one form or another—nor do they convincingly demonstrate the need to freeze membership in NATO. On the contrary: the alliance is best served by continuing to consider new members. First of all, there is the question of capabilities. The idea that the smaller countries of central, eastern, and southern Europe do not bring any relevant capabilities to the table made an appearance during the initial debates about their inclusion. While it is obviously true that smaller countries with smaller budgets cannot build military forces that would be able to face Russia in conventional warfare, proponents of this argument either forget about or ignore the major qualitative contributions these countries make. Every nation that has joined the alliance has brought something new and important to the table—be it mountain operations specialization from Slovenia, CBRN defense from the Czech Republic, or experience in countering cyber warfare from Estonia. Four of NATO’s newest member states—Estonia, Slovakia, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic—ranked in top ten countries in cybersecurity globally, according to National Cyber Security Index 2018, far above both Russia and the United States. Given the importance of understanding cyber and hybrid warfare, the alliance would be weaker without the expertise and capabilities of its new members. Secondly, the United States’ supposed skepticism of NATO stems from the failure of US politicians to articulate the importance of the alliance to the public, not the inclusion of new members. The allure of a percentage gain in the polls by pointing to the perceived injustice of burden sharing within NATO ignores the logic behind the American involvement on the continent. It is in the interest of the United States to ensure a stable and peaceful Europe—this is no less true now than it was when it drove American involvement in World Wars I and II and shaped US foreign policy throughout the Cold War. Above these material and expertise contributions, joining NATO ensures that these countries will take steps to solve their disputes peacefully, which is a value in itself. Issues that could have escalated into armed conflicts—such as disputes between Hungary and Slovakia or Croatia and Slovenia—have been limited to negotiations, in no small part because both sides were either members of or eyeing membership in the alliance and the European Union. Based on the experience of NATO in the Balkans, it is obvious that had any of these disputes led to armed conflict, the resources expended to ensure stability on the continent would be much higher than the costs that NATO shoulders today. It is incumbent on current and future policy makers to articulate NATO’s importance to American interests, while pushing for fair burden sharing, rather than falling into a pattern of lazy attacks that undermine the public’s confidence in the most successful alliance in history. Lastly, the notion that NATO’s growth threatens Russia is backward—Russian aggression prompts interest in joining and strengthening NATO. For all the complaints about the Baltic nations’ supposed indefensibility, their NATO membership has helped them avoid the fates of Georgia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Even then, the Baltic nations are subject to constant cyberattacks and influence operations from Russia, and defensive training exercises are treated as existential threats by Russian media. The result has been large spending increases and modernization programs from NATO’s new additions, as well as cyber resilience, infrastructure improvements to facilitate reinforcement, and comprehensive civil and military defense planning. Poland is so eager for base housing US troops within its borders that it offered to name it after Donald Trump. More troubling than Russia’s actions is the collective apologia of scholars and policymakers. Letting Russia dictate the foreign policies of sovereign nations that lived under Soviet rule for decades simply because those countries have the poor fortune of being geographically near Russia would create a dangerous precedent, and would not ensure European stability. To be sure, it is essential to consult and discuss with Russia through mechanisms such as the NATO-Russia Council—but it should not mean that Moscow should be given a free hand to dictate the fates of sovereign nations. If Russia feels threatened by hard constraints on its ability to invade and coerce its neighbors, then perhaps the onus should be on Russia to re-evaluate its foreign policy. Despite what critics claim, the latest additions to the alliance brought major qualitative contributions. And even if they did not, and the argument that they are just security consumers was true, their inclusion would still be less costly than a potential armed conflict in Europe, as evidenced by the Balkans in the 1990s. The values that NATO represents—a collective security of friendly nations—should not be given up just because pointing fingers is becoming fashionable, nor because it might prove unpopular in adversarial countries that have interests in ruling others. Those values should be reinforced and shared with those who want join and developed for future generations. It is precisely for the combination of these values and of NATO’s actual pragmatic value for US interests in Europe that NATO should remain strong and inclusive.

### ---mil modernization

#### Military modernization proves

Costlow 10-20-2015

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The official state seal of the Russian Federation features a double-headed eagle. One head faces east while the other faces west, indicating Russia is a country with a split identity, both European and Asian. This ancient symbol is also an apt descriptor of recent Russian actions in Ukraine and Syria. After decades decrying U.S. military modernization and intervention overseas, Russian President Vladimir Putin is embarking duplicitously on his own modernization efforts during multiple foreign interventions.¶ Now the incoming Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, President Obama’s top military advisers, have both called Russia the number one threat America faces. Policy analysts are debating whether further Obama-Putin summits would help or hurt relations.¶ But as any experienced diplomat knows, those who discern the most about their adversary’s strategies and intentions will have an advantage. Before any more U.S.-Russia summits take place, U.S. diplomats need to know who they are dealing with.¶ Since the conflict between Russia and Ukraine began in early 2014, Putin’s speeches on national security have emphasized three major repeating themes: the supremacy of Russia’s national interests, an expectation of conflict, and the encirclement by foreign enemies.¶ By analyzing each theme in turn, we may gain a greater understanding of what Vladimir Putin believes, what motivates him, and what actions we can expect.¶ The Supremacy of Russia’s National Interests¶ Winston Churchill’s famous description of Russia as “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma” still holds true today. But most people forget the possible solution to this vexing problem that Churchill proposed: “… but perhaps there is a key. The key is Russian national interest.”¶ Indeed, Putin uses the language of Russian “national interests” throughout his speeches, often in an uncompromising and threatening manner. For example, “And we responded to this force [purported U.S. involvement in Ukraine]. Why? I told you why. Because the interests of the Russian nation and the Russian state were at stake. Those who started this should have thought of that.” Speaking even more directly, Putin recently stated, “I make my decisions based on only one principle, and that is the interests of Russia and its people.”¶ International peace and stability are desirable goals to the Western mind, but these concepts are subservient to Russia’s national interests according to Putin. Compliance with major arms control treaties is extremely important in the West, but again, compliance in Russia serves only one master: the national interests of the fatherland.¶ What then are the supreme national interests that Putin believes are at stake? His speeches give us clear answers: “I think that our partners in the United States and Europe employed brutal and unlawful methods in Ukraine by prompting a government coup and thereby threatening our fundamental national interests in terms of security, as well as the economy.” Additionally, “There are certain red lines that we can’t allow to be crossed. Ukraine and Crimea are such a red line.”¶ Putin apparently considered placing his nuclear forces on alert during the Russian occupation of Crimea in order to protect both national security and economic interests. The Western mind understands using force to protect apparent national security interests, but who was the last European or American leader to consider using nuclear coercion to acquire new territory at a neighbor’s expense?¶ Yet before we declare Vladimir Putin an irrational actor who pursues vain national interests at great risk, we need to understand that rationality is in the eye of the beholder. To Putin and the Russian people, his “defense” of the “Russian speaking population” in Ukraine and Crimea is laudatory, as his sky-high approval ratings suggest. In fact, it appears disagreeing with President Putin is decidedly unfashionable in the upper-echelons of Moscow these days, as Putin said recently, “I discussed this problem with the Security Council members, and no one objected. In fact all of them supported my position.”¶ Putin knows that pursuing Russia’s national interests may conflict with other nations’ interests. While this knowledge induces caution in Europe and the United States, it appears to only embolden Putin.¶ The Expectation of Conflict¶ Conflict on the Eurasian continent has been a near-constant as students of history like Vladimir Putin well know. Leaders like Putin are therefore not surprised when national interests collide and conflict erupts: “As we analyze today’s situation, let us not forget history’s lessons. First of all, changes in the world order – and what we are seeing today are events on this scale – have usually been accompanied by if not global war and conflict, then by chains of intensive local-level conflicts.”¶ Thus, conflict on the world stage is nothing new, nor something to be particularly feared since, as Putin recently stated, “As for the power factor in international relations, it has always existed and will always exist.”¶ Putin sees Russia as a counterbalance against U.S. “imperialism,” and stated, “The crisis in Ukraine is itself a result of a misbalance in international relations.”¶ Speaking of the Ukraine crisis before Russia’s legislative body, Putin said, “I’m sure that if these events had never happened … they [foreign powers] would have come up with some other excuse to try to contain Russia’s growing capabilities, affect our country in some way, or even take advantage of it. The policy of containment was not invented yesterday. It has been carried out against our country for many years, always, for decades, if not centuries. In short, whenever someone thinks that Russia has become too strong or independent, these tools are quickly put into use.”¶ In Putin’s mind, conflict is inevitable. It is to be expected, prepared for, and ultimately overcome.¶ The Encirclement by Foreign Enemies¶ A survey of Russian history confirms that Russians have good reason to be fearful of foreign invasions, yet Vladimir Putin is using this fear as justification for his own foreign invasions, noting that without forceful action enemies could advance to Moscow’s doorstep.¶ Although Putin rarely publicly names the United States and NATO as Russia’s primary adversaries, his speeches unmistakably point to them as sinister actors with plans to subjugate Russia: “There are enough forces in the world that are afraid of our strength, ‘our hugeness,’ as one of our sovereigns said. So, they seek to divide us into parts, this is a well-known fact.”¶ Putin viewed the political tumult in Ukraine prior to the Russian intervention as a direct threat to Russia’s national interests because he feared Ukraine would become a member of NATO. “As I said earlier, such an accession could be followed by the deployment of missile strike systems in Ukraine, including Crimea. Should this happen, it would have serious geopolitical consequences for our country. In fact, Russia would be forced out of the Black Sea territory, a region for legitimate presence in which Russia has fought for centuries.”¶ Indeed, Putin recently said that the issue of U.S. missile defenses in Europe, “is no less, and probably even more important, than NATO’s eastward expansion. Incidentally, our decision on Crimea was partially prompted by this.”¶ Putin’s perception of the world is clear: enemies on the borders seek to destroy Russia, conflict is inevitable, and Russia’s national interests must be defended at all costs.¶ Actions Have Consequences¶ What can the West do to counter someone who appears to expect conflict while defending Russia’s highest national interests?¶ The first thing we can do is to understand the threat. Various U.S. officials have expressed disbelief that a national leader such as Putin would be willing to act like a 19th century tyrant in the more “enlightened” 21st century world. Such incredulous statements by Western leaders only reinforces Putin’s perception of the West as full of weak-willed idealists.¶ Second, the West must make sure its counter-actions against Putin will cause him to rethink his commitment to the three themes described above. Vladimir Putin will continue to advance Russia’s national interests until he receives unified resistance. He will continue to perceive conflict as likely, even useful, until the risks associated with that conflict outweigh the potential benefits. He will continue to identify and act against alleged enemies surrounding the fatherland until they are overcome or surrender.¶ As a last instructive anecdote, Putin was recently asked what his favorite movie was. He responded, “Chapayev, of course.” Vasily Ivanovich Chapayev was a common peasant who became a great military leader for the Red Army in the fight against the internationally-backed White Army in the Russian Civil War. In the 1934 Communist Party film, Chapayev sacrifices his life for the sake of revolution, defiant to the end, and dies at the hands of international imperialists that surrounded his soldiers.¶ Chapayev’s patriotism obviously resonates with Putin on multiple levels, but it appears he also absorbed Chapayev’s ultimately fatal flaw: a belief he is invincible.

### 1ar – defensive realist

#### Russias a defensive realist – Russia responds to NATO enlargement with increased aggression

Mearsheimer 14 [John J, professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2014 Issue, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault>] SE-WR

But this account is wrong: the United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis. The taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West. At the same time, the EU’s expansion eastward and the West’s backing of the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine -- beginning with the Orange Revolution in 2004 -- were critical elements, too. Since the mid-1990s, Russian leaders have adamantly opposed NATO enlargement, and in recent years, they have made it clear that they would not stand by while their strategically important neighbor turned into a Western bastion. For Putin, the illegal overthrow of Ukraine’s democratically elected and pro-Russian president -- which he rightly labeled a “coup” -- was the final straw. He responded by taking Crimea, a peninsula he feared would host a NATO naval base, and working to destabilize Ukraine until it abandoned its efforts to join the West. Putin’s pushback should have come as no surprise. After all, the West had been moving into Russia’s backyard and threatening its core strategic interests, a point Putin made emphatically and repeatedly. Elites in the United States and Europe have been blindsided by events only because they subscribe to a flawed view of international politics. They tend to believe that the logic of realism holds little relevance in the twenty-first century and that Europe can be kept whole and free on the basis of such liberal principles as the rule of law, economic interdependence, and democracy. But this grand scheme went awry in Ukraine. The crisis there shows that realpolitik remains relevant -- and states that ignore it do so at their own peril. U.S. and European leaders blundered in attempting to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia’s border. Now that the consequences have been laid bare, it would be an even greater mistake to continue this misbegotten policy. THE WESTERN AFFRONT As the Cold War came to a close, Soviet leaders preferred that U.S. forces remain in Europe and NATO stay intact, an arrangement they thought would keep a reunified Germany pacified. But they and their Russian successors did not want NATO to grow any larger and assumed that Western diplomats understood their concerns. The Clinton administration evidently thought otherwise, and in the mid-1990s, it began pushing for NATO to expand. The first round of enlargement took place in 1999 and brought in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The second occurred in 2004; it included Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Moscow complained bitterly from the start. During NATO’s 1995 bombing campaign against the Bosnian Serbs, for example, Russian President Boris Yeltsin said, “This is the first sign of what could happen when NATO comes right up to the Russian Federation’s borders. ... The flame of war could burst out across the whole of Europe.” But the Russians were too weak at the time to derail NATO’s eastward movement -- which, at any rate, did not look so threatening, since none of the new members shared a border with Russia, save for the tiny Baltic countries. Then NATO began looking further east. At its April 2008 summit in Bucharest, the alliance considered admitting Georgia and Ukraine. The George W. Bush administration supported doing so, but France and Germany opposed the move for fear that it would unduly antagonize Russia. In the end, NATO’s members reached a compromise: the alliance did not begin the formal process leading to membership, but it issued a statement endorsing the aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine and boldly declaring, “These countries will become members of NATO.” Moscow, however, did not see the outcome as much of a compromise. Alexander Grushko, then Russia’s deputy foreign minister, said, “Georgia’s and Ukraine’s membership in the alliance is a huge strategic mistake which would have most serious consequences for pan-European security.” Putin maintained that admitting those two countries to NATO would represent a “direct threat” to Russia. One Russian newspaper reported that Putin, while speaking with Bush, “very transparently hinted that if Ukraine was accepted into NATO, it would cease to exist.” Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008 should have dispelled any remaining doubts about Putin’s determination to prevent Georgia and Ukraine from joining NATO. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, who was deeply committed to bringing his country into NATO, had decided in the summer of 2008 to reincorporate two separatist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But Putin sought to keep Georgia weak and divided -- and out of NATO. After fighting broke out between the Georgian government and South Ossetian separatists, Russian forces took control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moscow had made its point. Yet despite this clear warning, NATO never publicly abandoned its goal of bringing Georgia and Ukraine into the alliance. And NATO expansion continued marching forward, with Albania and Croatia becoming members in 2009. The EU, too, has been marching eastward. In May 2008, it unveiled its Eastern Partnership initiative, a program to foster prosperity in such countries as Ukraine and integrate them into the EU economy. Not surprisingly, Russian leaders view the plan as hostile to their country’s interests. This past February, before Yanukovych was forced from office, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused the EU of trying to create a “sphere of influence” in eastern Europe. In the eyes of Russian leaders, EU expansion is a stalking horse for NATO expansion. The West’s final tool for peeling Kiev away from Moscow has been its efforts to spread Western values and promote democracy in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states, a plan that often entails funding pro-Western individuals and organizations. Victoria Nuland, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, estimated in December 2013 that the United States had invested more than $5 billion since 1991 to help Ukraine achieve “the future it deserves.” As part of that effort, the U.S. government has bankrolled the National Endowment for Democracy. The nonprofit foundation has funded more than 60 projects aimed at promoting civil society in Ukraine, and the NED’s president, Carl Gershman, has called that country “the biggest prize.” After Yanukovych won Ukraine’s presidential election in February 2010, the NED decided he was undermining its goals, and so it stepped up its efforts to support the opposition and strengthen the country’s democratic institutions. When Russian leaders look at Western social engineering in Ukraine, they worry that their country might be next. And such fears are hardly groundless. In September 2013, Gershman wrote in The Washington Post, “Ukraine’s choice to join Europe will accelerate the demise of the ideology of Russian imperialism that Putin represents.” He added: “Russians, too, face a choice, and Putin may find himself on the losing end not just in the near abroad but within Russia itself.” CREATING A CRISIS The West’s triple package of policies -- NATO enlargement, EU expansion, and democracy promotion -- added fuel to a fire waiting to ignite. The spark came in November 2013, when Yanukovych rejected a major economic deal he had been negotiating with the EU and decided to accept a $15 billion Russian counteroffer instead. That decision gave rise to antigovernment demonstrations that escalated over the following three months and that by mid-February had led to the deaths of some one hundred protesters. Western emissaries hurriedly flew to Kiev to resolve the crisis. On February 21, the government and the opposition struck a deal that allowed Yanukovych to stay in power until new elections were held. But it immediately fell apart, and Yanukovych fled to Russia the next day. The new government in Kiev was pro-Western and anti-Russian to the core, and it contained four high-ranking members who could legitimately be labeled neofascists. Although the full extent of U.S. involvement has not yet come to light, it is clear that Washington backed the coup. Nuland and Republican Senator John McCain participated in antigovernment demonstrations, and Geoffrey Pyatt, the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, proclaimed after Yanukovych’s toppling that it was “a day for the history books.” As a leaked telephone recording revealed, Nuland had advocated regime change and wanted the Ukrainian politician Arseniy Yatsenyuk to become prime minister in the new government, which he did. No wonder Russians of all persuasions think the West played a role in Yanukovych’s ouster. For Putin, the time to act against Ukraine and the West had arrived. Shortly after February 22, he ordered Russian forces to take Crimea from Ukraine, and soon after that, he incorporated it into Russia. The task proved relatively easy, thanks to the thousands of Russian troops already stationed at a naval base in the Crimean port of Sevastopol. Crimea also made for an easy target since ethnic Russians compose roughly 60 percent of its population. Most of them wanted out of Ukraine. Next, Putin put massive pressure on the new government in Kiev to discourage it from siding with the West against Moscow, making it clear that he would wreck Ukraine as a functioning state before he would allow it to become a Western stronghold on Russia’s doorstep. Toward that end, he has provided advisers, arms, and diplomatic support to the Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine, who are pushing the country toward civil war. He has massed a large army on the Ukrainian border, threatening to invade if the government cracks down on the rebels. And he has sharply raised the price of the natural gas Russia sells to Ukraine and demanded payment for past exports. Putin is playing hardball. THE DIAGNOSIS Putin’s actions should be easy to comprehend. A huge expanse of flat land that Napoleonic France, imperial Germany, and Nazi Germany all crossed to strike at Russia itself, Ukraine serves as a buffer state of enormous strategic importance to Russia. No Russian leader would tolerate a military alliance that was Moscow’s mortal enemy until recently moving into Ukraine. Nor would any Russian leader stand idly by while the West helped install a government there that was determined to integrate Ukraine into the West. Washington may not like Moscow’s position, but it should understand the logic behind it. This is Geopolitics 101: great powers are always sensitive to potential threats near their home territory. After all, the United States does not tolerate distant great powers deploying military forces anywhere in the Western Hemisphere, much less on its borders. Imagine the outrage in Washington if China built an impressive military alliance and tried to include Canada and Mexico in it. Logic aside, Russian leaders have told their Western counterparts on many occasions that they consider NATO expansion into Georgia and Ukraine unacceptable, along with any effort to turn those countries against Russia -- a message that the 2008 Russian-Georgian war also made crystal clear. Officials from the United States and its European allies contend that they tried hard to assuage Russian fears and that Moscow should understand that NATO has no designs on Russia. In addition to continually denying that its expansion was aimed at containing Russia, the alliance has never permanently deployed military forces in its new member states. In 2002, it even created a body called the NATO-Russia Council in an effort to foster cooperation. To further mollify Russia, the United States announced in 2009 that it would deploy its new missile defense system on warships in European waters, at least initially, rather than on Czech or Polish territory. But none of these measures worked; the Russians remained steadfastly opposed to NATO enlargement, especially into Georgia and Ukraine. And it is the Russians, not the West, who ultimately get to decide what counts as a threat to them. To understand why the West, especially the United States, failed to understand that its Ukraine policy was laying the groundwork for a major clash with Russia, one must go back to the mid-1990s, when the Clinton administration began advocating NATO expansion. Pundits advanced a variety of arguments for and against enlargement, but there was no consensus on what to do. Most eastern European émigrés in the United States and their relatives, for example, strongly supported expansion, because they wanted NATO to protect such countries as Hungary and Poland. A few realists also favored the policy because they thought Russia still needed to be contained. But most realists opposed expansion, in the belief that a declining great power with an aging population and a one-dimensional economy did not in fact need to be contained. And they feared that enlargement would only give Moscow an incentive to cause trouble in eastern Europe. The U.S. diplomat George Kennan articulated this perspective in a 1998 interview, shortly after the U.S. Senate approved the first round of NATO expansion. “I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies,” he said. “I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anyone else.” Most liberals, on the other hand, favored enlargement, including many key members of the Clinton administration. They believed that the end of the Cold War had fundamentally transformed international politics and that a new, postnational order had replaced the realist logic that used to govern Europe. The United States was not only the “indispensable nation,” as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright put it; it was also a benign hegemon and thus unlikely to be viewed as a threat in Moscow. The aim, in essence, was to make the entire continent look like western Europe. And so the United States and its allies sought to promote democracy in the countries of eastern Europe, increase economic interdependence among them, and embed them in international institutions. Having won the debate in the United States, liberals had little difficulty convincing their European allies to support NATO enlargement. After all, given the EU’s past achievements, Europeans were even more wedded than Americans to the idea that geopolitics no longer mattered and that an all-inclusive liberal order could maintain peace in Europe. So thoroughly did liberals come to dominate the discourse about European security during the first decade of this century that even as the alliance adopted an open-door policy of growth, NATO expansion faced little realist opposition. The liberal worldview is now accepted dogma among U.S. officials. In March, for example, President Barack Obama delivered a speech about Ukraine in which he talked repeatedly about “the ideals” that motivate Western policy and how those ideals “have often been threatened by an older, more traditional view of power.” Secretary of State John Kerry’s response to the Crimea crisis reflected this same perspective: “You just don’t in the twenty-first century behave in nineteenth-century fashion by invading another country on completely trumped-up pretext.” In essence, the two sides have been operating with different playbooks: Putin and his compatriots have been thinking and acting according to realist dictates, whereas their Western counterparts have been adhering to liberal ideas about international politics. The result is that the United States and its allies unknowingly provoked a major crisis over Ukraine. BLAME GAME In that same 1998 interview, Kennan predicted that NATO expansion would provoke a crisis, after which the proponents of expansion would “say that we always told you that is how the Russians are.” As if on cue, most Western officials have portrayed Putin as the real culprit in the Ukraine predicament. In March, according to The New York Times, German Chancellor Angela Merkel implied that Putin was irrational, telling Obama that he was “in another world.” Although Putin no doubt has autocratic tendencies, no evidence supports the charge that he is mentally unbalanced. On the contrary: he is a first-class strategist who should be feared and respected by anyone challenging him on foreign policy. Other analysts allege, more plausibly, that Putin regrets the demise of the Soviet Union and is determined to reverse it by expanding Russia’s borders. According to this interpretation, Putin, having taken Crimea, is now testing the waters to see if the time is right to conquer Ukraine, or at least its eastern part, and he will eventually behave aggressively toward other countries in Russia’s neighborhood. For some in this camp, Putin represents a modern-day Adolf Hitler, and striking any kind of deal with him would repeat the mistake of Munich. Thus, NATO must admit Georgia and Ukraine to contain Russia before it dominates its neighbors and threatens western Europe. This argument falls apart on close inspection. If Putin were committed to creating a greater Russia, signs of his intentions would almost certainly have arisen before February 22. But there is virtually no evidence that he was bent on taking Crimea, much less any other territory in Ukraine, before that date. Even Western leaders who supported NATO expansion were not doing so out of a fear that Russia was about to use military force. Putin’s actions in Crimea took them by complete surprise and appear to have been a spontaneous reaction to Yanukovych’s ouster. Right afterward, even Putin said he opposed Crimean secession, before quickly changing his mind. Besides, even if it wanted to, Russia lacks the capability to easily conquer and annex eastern Ukraine, much less the entire country. Roughly 15 million people -- one-third of Ukraine’s population -- live between the Dnieper River, which bisects the country, and the Russian border. An overwhelming majority of those people want to remain part of Ukraine and would surely resist a Russian occupation. Furthermore, Russia’s mediocre army, which shows few signs of turning into a modern Wehrmacht, would have little chance of pacifying all of Ukraine. Moscow is also poorly positioned to pay for a costly occupation; its weak economy would suffer even more in the face of the resulting sanctions. But even if Russia did boast a powerful military machine and an impressive economy, it would still probably prove unable to successfully occupy Ukraine. One need only consider the Soviet and U.S. experiences in Afghanistan, the U.S. experiences in Vietnam and Iraq, and the Russian experience in Chechnya to be reminded that military occupations usually end badly. Putin surely understands that trying to subdue Ukraine would be like swallowing a porcupine. His response to events there has been defensive, not offensive. A WAY OUT Given that most Western leaders continue to deny that Putin’s behavior might be motivated by legitimate security concerns, it is unsurprising that they have tried to modify it by doubling down on their existing policies and have punished Russia to deter further aggression. Although Kerry has maintained that “all options are on the table,” neither the United States nor its NATO allies are prepared to use force to defend Ukraine. The West is relying instead on economic sanctions to coerce Russia into ending its support for the insurrection in eastern Ukraine. In July, the United States and the EU put in place their third round of limited sanctions, targeting mainly high-level individuals closely tied to the Russian government and some high-profile banks, energy companies, and defense firms. They also threatened to unleash another, tougher round of sanctions, aimed at whole sectors of the Russian economy. Such measures will have little effect. Harsh sanctions are likely off the table anyway; western European countries, especially Germany, have resisted imposing them for fear that Russia might retaliate and cause serious economic damage within the EU. But even if the United States could convince its allies to enact tough measures, Putin would probably not alter his decision-making. History shows that countries will absorb enormous amounts of punishment in order to protect their core strategic interests. There is no reason to think Russia represents an exception to this rule. Western leaders have also clung to the provocative policies that precipitated the crisis in the first place. In April, U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden met with Ukrainian legislators and told them, “This is a second opportunity to make good on the original promise made by the Orange Revolution.” John Brennan, the director of the CIA, did not help things when, that same month, he visited Kiev on a trip the White House said was aimed at improving security cooperation with the Ukrainian government. The EU, meanwhile, has continued to push its Eastern Partnership. In March, José Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Commission, summarized EU thinking on Ukraine, saying, “We have a debt, a duty of solidarity with that country, and we will work to have them as close as possible to us.” And sure enough, on June 27, the EU and Ukraine signed the economic agreement that Yanukovych had fatefully rejected seven months earlier. Also in June, at a meeting of NATO members’ foreign ministers, it was agreed that the alliance would remain open to new members, although the foreign ministers refrained from mentioning Ukraine by name. “No third country has a veto over NATO enlargement,” announced Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO’s secretary-general. The foreign ministers also agreed to support various measures to improve Ukraine’s military capabilities in such areas as command and control, logistics, and cyberdefense. Russian leaders have naturally recoiled at these actions; the West’s response to the crisis will only make a bad situation worse. There is a solution to the crisis in Ukraine, however -- although it would require the West to think about the country in a fundamentally new way. The United States and its allies should abandon their plan to westernize Ukraine and instead aim to make it a neutral buffer between NATO and Russia, akin to Austria’s position during the Cold War. Western leaders should acknowledge that Ukraine matters so much to Putin that they cannot support an anti-Russian regime there. This would not mean that a future Ukrainian government would have to be pro-Russian or anti-NATO. On the contrary, the goal should be a sovereign Ukraine that falls in neither the Russian nor the Western camp. To achieve this end, the United States and its allies should publicly rule out NATO’s expansion into both Georgia and Ukraine. The West should also help fashion an economic rescue plan for Ukraine funded jointly by the EU, the International Monetary Fund, Russia, and the United States -- a proposal that Moscow should welcome, given its interest in having a prosperous and stable Ukraine on its western flank. And the West should considerably limit its social-engineering efforts inside Ukraine. It is time to put an end to Western support for another Orange Revolution. Nevertheless, U.S. and European leaders should encourage Ukraine to respect minority rights, especially the language rights of its Russian speakers. Some may argue that changing policy toward Ukraine at this late date would seriously damage U.S. credibility around the world. There would undoubtedly be certain costs, but the costs of continuing a misguided strategy would be much greater. Furthermore, other countries are likely to respect a state that learns from its mistakes and ultimately devises a policy that deals effectively with the problem at hand. That option is clearly open to the United States. One also hears the claim that Ukraine has the right to determine whom it wants to ally with and the Russians have no right to prevent Kiev from joining the West. This is a dangerous way for Ukraine to think about its foreign policy choices. The sad truth is that might often makes right when great-power politics are at play. Abstract rights such as self-determination are largely meaningless when powerful states get into brawls with weaker states. Did Cuba have the right to form a military alliance with the Soviet Union during the Cold War? The United States certainly did not think so, and the Russians think the same way about Ukraine joining the West. It is in Ukraine’s interest to understand these facts of life and tread carefully when dealing with its more powerful neighbor. Even if one rejects this analysis, however, and believes that Ukraine has the right to petition to join the EU and NATO, the fact remains that the United States and its European allies have the right to reject these requests. There is no reason that the West has to accommodate Ukraine if it is bent on pursuing a wrong-headed foreign policy, especially if its defense is not a vital interest. Indulging the dreams of some Ukrainians is not worth the animosity and strife it will cause, especially for the Ukrainian people. Of course, some analysts might concede that NATO handled relations with Ukraine poorly and yet still maintain that Russia constitutes an enemy that will only grow more formidable over time -- and that the West therefore has no choice but to continue its present policy. But this viewpoint is badly mistaken. Russia is a declining power, and it will only get weaker with time. Even if Russia were a rising power, moreover, it would still make no sense to incorporate Ukraine into NATO. The reason is simple: the United States and its European allies do not consider Ukraine to be a core strategic interest, as their unwillingness to use military force to come to its aid has proved. It would therefore be the height of folly to create a new NATO member that the other members have no intention of defending. NATO has expanded in the past because liberals assumed the alliance would never have to honor its new security guarantees, but Russia’s recent power play shows that granting Ukraine NATO membership could put Russia and the West on a collision course. Sticking with the current policy would also complicate Western relations with Moscow on other issues. The United States needs Russia’s assistance to withdraw U.S. equipment from Afghanistan through Russian territory, reach a nuclear agreement with Iran, and stabilize the situation in Syria. In fact, Moscow has helped Washington on all three of these issues in the past; in the summer of 2013, it was Putin who pulled Obama’s chestnuts out of the fire by forging the deal under which Syria agreed to relinquish its chemical weapons, thereby avoiding the U.S. military strike that Obama had threatened. The United States will also someday need Russia’s help containing a rising China. Current U.S. policy, however, is only driving Moscow and Beijing closer together. The United States and its European allies now face a choice on Ukraine. They can continue their current policy, which will exacerbate hostilities with Russia and devastate Ukraine in the process -- a scenario in which everyone would come out a loser. Or they can switch gears and work to create a prosperous but neutral Ukraine, one that does not threaten Russia and allows the West to repair its relations with Moscow. With that approach, all sides would win.

### 1ar – no revisionst

#### Russia is not revisionist

Götz and Merlen 2018

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To begin with, there are a number of reasons to be skeptical about the ‘revanchist Russia’ perspective. First, it adopts an overly deterministic position, which negates the open-ended character of history by underlining its predetermined course through certain ‘iron laws’ and the supposedly unchanging ‘essence’ of Russia. In so doing, this perspective effectively denies the role of individual agency: Whoever the leader is, or whatever the regime may be, Russians are subordinate to the quest for imperial greatness. This is a view that incidentally dovetails with that of extreme Russian nationalists, who see Russian history in similar holistic terms of a ‘single stream’ that connects Ivan IV, Peter the Great, Stalin, and Putin. However, Russia has experienced tremendous upheavals throughout history that dramatically changed its society and its relations with the outside world. This happened often at the instigation of one or a few individuals. Both the beginning and the end of the Soviet Union, for example, serve as powerful reminders of the role agency plays in affecting Moscow’s internal and external affairs. Furthermore, essentialist claims about Russian identity do not offer much insight into the dynamics of Moscow’s approach to the liberal international order, which has significantly fluctuated over time (Tsygankov, 2016). Second, Russia’s revisionist behaviour should not be exaggerated. Its intervention in Ukraine has remained relatively limited, as has its military activity in other post-Soviet states (Götz, 2016, p. 9). In fact, the scope of Russia’s revanchist aims is a matter of debate. It is doubtful whether Moscow has a blueprint for an alternative international order with different norms and principles than the current one. Nor does its promotion of conservative authoritarianism seem to constitute a genuine agenda. As Lewis (2016) writes, ‘the export of conservative social and political values (…) has so far not developed into a coherent campaign, but remains a rather ad hoc and inchoate critique by Russian politicians of “multiculturalism”, LGBT rights and “political correctness” in Europe.’ Furthermore, the ‘revanchist Russia’ perspective is unable to account for the numerous instances in which Moscow has adhered to the norms, rules, and institutions that are associated with the existing liberal order. While it might be a stretch to describe Moscow as a consistent defender of multilateralism (Lo, 2015), it has supported frameworks such as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. It also acceded to the World Trade Organization in 2012 – after 19 years of talks – and continues to be a member of the European Court of Human Rights. The liberal goals and supranational methods of these institutions hardly fit with a revisionist imperial agenda. Third, Moscow’s behaviour is much more in line with that of an ordinary great power than the ‘revanchist Russia’ perspective makes it out to be. For one thing, Russia is by no means unique in its quest to establish a zone of influence in its near neighbourhood. As Carpenter (2017, January 19) points out, Russia is hardly the only country to regard the [sphere of influence] concept as important for its security. Or do U.S. officials believe that Chinese actions in the South China Sea, Turkey’s policies towards Iraq and Syria, and Saudi Arabia’s actions in Bahrain and Yemen do not involve such a consideration? For another, interference in the domestic affairs of other states is something of a habit for great powers. Whether they are democratic or authoritarian does not seem to make a difference in this regard. The United States, for example, has a long track record of meddling in the internal affairs and electoral processes of other countries (Levin, 2016). It is therefore unlikely that a more democratic Russia will substantially change its key foreign policy objectives and activities. Furthermore, the discrediting of Russian concerns over NATO enlargement as an ‘imagined’ threat, rather than a ‘real’ one, misses the mark. Any international relations scholar worth their salt knows that uncertainty about others’ intentions is central to security dilemma dynamics. Thus, Moscow’s fears should not be brushed aside as idiosyncratic Russian paranoia. In conclusion, it seems fair to say that the ‘revanchist Russia’ perspective faces an array of explanatory challenges and shortcomings.

#### Their authors are biased by imperial preconceptions – be skeptical of western appraisals of Russian motivations

Götz and Merlen 18

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Finally, and more generally, it is easy to vilify Russia for being on the wrong side of history. Yet, this argument rests on an implicit liberal teleology of historical development, which foresees the spread of democracy and free market capitalism across the globe. Perhaps the strongest and most powerful expression of this perspective is Fukuyama’s (1989) ‘end of history’ thesis – a thesis that has been criticized by an array of scholars on both normative and empirical grounds (see, e.g. Kagan, 2008; Mansfield et al., 1999; Stanley & Lee, 2014). Indeed, many of the so-called emerging powers in today’s world are not transitioning towards liberal democracy. Nor have they fully embraced free market rules. Instead, they follow their own path of socio-economic development and pursue different forms of state capitalism (Bremmer, 2009; Kurlantzick, 2016). When seen against this background, it beggars belief to suppose that non-Western powers – such as Russia and China, but also India and Brazil – will fully embrace the existing US-led liberal international order. It seems more likely that rising powers will want to shape the global order in accordance with their own particular values and political agendas. As Kupchan (2012, p. 4) puts it, rising powers will as a matter of course seek to adjust the prevailing order in ways that advantage their own values and interests. They have been doing so since the beginning of time, and the coming era will be no different (also see Stuenkel, 2016). In that sense, Moscow’s global-order goals and its international conduct appear more like ‘normal’ great-power behaviour than aberrations to be explained by the nature of Russia’s political system.

### at – impact d

#### Best research proves conflict is EXTREMELY likely – their evidence doesn’t assume the role of geography, nationalism, and historical antagonisms

Mitchell 12-5-2018

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There are several diplomatic issues at stake in the Russia-Ukraine relationship, and understanding these points of contention can help clarify the escalation risks. Our research shows that maritime disputes connected to territorial and identity issues face higher risks of war. How we did our research For nearly 20 years, I have worked with Paul Hensel on the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project to understand the issues that countries dispute diplomatically, including land borders/islands, maritime areas, cross-border rivers and identity issues. Scholars have studied the diplomatic issues at stake in interstate crises and wars, discovering that countries tend to fight most wars over territory. Yet we miss cases where diplomatic conflicts arise, but no militarization occurs — this accounts for more than half of all border disputes. The ICOW project captures these successful cases of peaceful diplomacy by identifying potential situations where countries could have diplomatic disagreement over an issue, and then using media and historical sources to code cases that occurred. Two countries that share a contiguous land border, maritime space or ethnic group, such as Russia and Ukraine, become a pair of countries that could experience an issue claim in our data set. [Russia and Ukraine had a short naval battle. Here’s what you need to know.] Using this approach, we identified 843 territorial claims between pairs of countries (1816-2001) and 270 maritime and 143 river claims (1900-2001). In collaboration with Andrew Owsiak and Krista Wiegand, ICOW also collects data on identity claims, coding 157 identity claims between bordering countries since 1946. Russia’s attempt to influence the treatment of ethnic Russians in Ukraine falls into this category. Issue claims increasingly play out at sea, not on land Russia’s 2014 annexation of the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine is an interesting case for many reasons. It’s the first successful territorial conquest since the 1970s in an era of declining territorial disputes. As territorial integrity norms increased, countries shifted from territorial conquest attempts to claims in maritime and identity arenas. For example, beyond Crimea, Russia has not utilized a strategy of territorial conquest to support all ethnic Russians living in Ukraine, but rather limited its support to secessionist movements in Eastern Ukraine. Meanwhile, maritime conflicts between countries have increased globally since World War II. The Kerch Strait conflict illustrates how unsettled maritime disputes increase the risks for territorial and identity issues to emerge — and for multi-issue conflicts to escalate to violence. Why have Russia and Ukraine disagreed about their maritime boundaries? What exactly are Russia and Ukraine fighting about? In 1997, Russia and Ukraine signed a treaty demarcating land and maritime boundaries and dividing naval ships in the Black Sea Fleet. However, the countries disagreed on delimitation of the maritime border in the Sea of Azov. The maritime dispute involves multiple points of disagreement. While the two sides agreed in 1996 that the Sea of Azov is an internal sea, they disagreed about how to divide zones of maritime sovereignty. Russia wanted a seabed boundary for mineral resources, but shared use of water and biological resources. Ukraine wanted the maritime boundary to be drawn along the surface, giving it 60 percent of the area. Maritime tensions escalated in 2003 when Russia sought to build an artificial isthmus between the Ukrainian island of Tuzla in the Kerch Strait and the Russian Taman Peninsula. And though the two sides resolved disagreements about control of the Sevastopol naval base, conflicts escalated further in 2005 when Gazprom increased natural gas prices for Ukraine — and Ukraine retaliated by increasing rental costs charged to Moscow for the naval base. While the two sides have signed several agreements over maritime delimitation in the past 15 years, completion of the Kerch bridge in May, Russia’s ramped-up searches of vessels in the strait and disagreements about movements of naval vessels in the area set the stage for the 2018 clash. How likely is war in the future? What makes this maritime conflict particularly dangerous is that it has so many dimensions — it’s not just about the sea. Russia and Ukraine are competing over multiple diplomatic issues. This includes a maritime claim involving demarcation of the Sea of Azov (since 1993), a territorial claim by Ukraine protesting Russia’s control of Crimea (since 2014) and an identity claim by Russia protesting the treatment of ethnic Russians in Ukraine (since 1991). ICOW research shows that multi-issue conflicts are more likely to be militarized. While Russia and Ukraine demarcated the land border early in Ukraine’s post-independence period, ongoing disagreements over maritime boundaries in the Sea of Azov and Kerch Strait fueled the emergence of territorial and ethnic identity claims. The risk of war is also high because contested maritime issues are now connected to territorial claims over Crimea, the most militarized issue in the ICOW data. The importance of Sevastopol for the Black Sea Fleet, combined with the fear of NATO vessels operating in the area, boosted Russia’s claims to Crimean territory. Of the 270 maritime claims in our data set, close to one-third involve at least one militarized dispute. Risks for violence are higher for cases that also involve disputes over ownership of territory (e.g., Falkland Islands or Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands). Militarized disputes in 2005 and 2008 set the stage for Russia’s grab for Crimea and construction of the bridge across the Kerch Strait, crippling Ukraine’s naval capabilities. Highly salient diplomatic issues with a history of militarized conflict carry higher risks for escalation to war.

### at – russia war good

#### We lose – russia is more modernized

Nuclear Posture Review 2018

https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF

Russia considers the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to be the principal threats to its contemporary geopolitical ambitions. Russian strategy and doctrine emphasize the potential coercive and military uses of nuclear weapons. It mistakenly assesses that the threat of nuclear escalation or actual first use of nuclear weapons would serve to “de-escalate” a conflict on terms favorable to Russia. These mistaken perceptions increase the prospect for dangerous miscalculation and escalation. Russia has sought to enable the implementation of its strategy and doctrine through a comprehensive modernization of its nuclear arsenal. Russia’s strategic nuclear modernization has increased, and will continue to increase its warhead delivery capacity, and provides Russia with the ability to rapidly expand its deployed warhead numbers. In addition to modernizing “legacy” Soviet nuclear systems, Russia is developing and deploying new nuclear warheads and launchers. These efforts include multiple upgrades for every leg of the Russian nuclear triad of strategic bombers, sea-based missiles, and landbased missiles. Russia is also developing at least two new intercontinental range systems, a hypersonic glide vehicle, and a new intercontinental, nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered, undersea autonomous torpedo. Russia possesses significant advantages in its nuclear weapons production capacity and in non-strategic nuclear forces over the U.S. and allies. It is also building a large, diverse, and modern set of non-strategic systems that are dual-capable (may be armed with nuclear or conventional weapons). These theater- and tactical-range systems are not accountable under the New START Treaty and Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons modernization is increasing the total number of such weapons in its arsenal, while significantly improving its delivery capabilities. This includes the production, possession, and flight testing of a ground-launched cruise missile in violation of the INF Treaty. Moscow believes these systems may provide useful options for escalation advantage. Finally, despite Moscow’s frequent criticism of U.S. missile defense, Russia is also modernizing its long-standing nuclear-armed ballistic missile defense system and designing a new ballistic missile defense interceptor.

#### war isn’t inevitable

Cohen 5-16-2018

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Beyond that, Russia experts point out that the system of treaties between Moscow and Washington is deteriorating, and that contacts between the elites are in sharp decline. As the Duma and the Russian security services crack down on those who engage in contacts with the West, and as visas becomes more difficult with the closing of several consulates in both countries, fewer and fewer Russians and Americans are involved in joint business, political, and cultural activities. Since Russia’s conventional military is weaker than that of the United States, the chances of nuclear escalation in a conflict between Russia and US/NATO are high. Russia simulated a limited nuclear attack on Poland in its massive Zapad military maneuvers in September 2017; it is what the Russian military doctrine of “escalation to de-escalate” proposes. Therefore, if the Russians were losing a conventional war, they would use nuclear weapons to try to force negotiations. However, such an escalation might not be limited to one or two nuclear explosions, and could quickly get out of control, Buzhinsky warns. The United States needs to craft its Russia policy in such a way as to achieve desired changes in Russian behavior. This includes rolling back Moscow’s adventurism in Syria and Ukraine, deterring Russia’s support of Iran, avoiding an all-out war, and improving communications with Russian elites and the general population. It is crucial for the United States to effectively and clearly emphasize to the Russian public that the United States does not seek a war, occupation, or the dismemberment of Russia—the common allegations of the Kremlin’s propaganda. To accomplish these policy goals, the Trump administration needs to expand its outreach to allies in Europe, ensuring that they fully cooperate on keeping in place the sanctions imposed on Russia after the annexation of Crimea and invasion of Donbas in 2014. So far, the Trump administration has failed to get buy-in from its European allies for its opposition to major natural gas pipelines to Germany and Turkey. These pipelines would only buttress Russian domination of the European energy markets and provide a multi-year cash flow for the Kremlin. The best way to avoid an all-out war is NATO’s transparent growth of conventional and nuclear deterrents, making any future Russian use of force costly. At the same time, Washington needs to boost its cyber counter-measures. Russia has already hacked not just the poorly protected US political servers, such as those of the Democratic National Committee and the Republican National Committee, but also the e-mail system used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the US nuclear infrastructure. Finally, US efforts to communicate to the Russian elites and ordinary Russian citizens must be vastly amplified. This may include a US government-funded satellite television network; a deep reform in, and boost of, internet-based media in Russian by Russians; and support for expert interfaces through think tank-sponsored conferences, seminars, exchanges, etc. A war with Russia in neither necessary nor inevitable. However, the current situation is reminiscent of the German Empire before World War I—with the same potential catastrophic consequences. To prevent this, US policy makers should recognize the central role of militarism in the Kremlin’s playbook, and then develop and implement a policy package to deter conflict.

# 1ar – spark

## offense

### 1ar – top

#### Yes extinction—nuke war leads to ice age and global famine that kills everyone

Starr 15 (Steve Starr - Director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program, as well as a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility. <MKIM> “Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction”. 10/14/19. DOA: 7/21/19. https://fas.org/pir-pubs/nuclear-war-nuclear-winter-and-human-extinction/)

While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result from a nuclear winter, it is relatively simple to predict those which would be most profound. That is, a nuclear winter would cause most humans and large animals to die from nuclear famine in a mass extinction event similar to the one that wiped out the dinosaurs. Following the detonation (in conflict) of US and/or Russian launch-ready strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear firestorms would burn simultaneously over a total land surface area of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. These mass fires, many of which would rage over large cities and industrial areas, would release many tens of millions of tons of black carbon soot and smoke (up to 180 million tons, according to peer-reviewed studies), which would rise rapidly above cloud level and into the stratosphere. [For an explanation of the calculation of smoke emissions, see Atmospheric effects & societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts.] The scientists who completed the most recent peer-reviewed studies on nuclear winter discovered that the sunlight would heat the smoke, producing a self-lofting effect that would not only aid the rise of the smoke into the stratosphere (above cloud level, where it could not be rained out), but act to keep the smoke in the stratosphere for 10 years or more. The longevity of the smoke layer would act to greatly increase the severity of its effects upon the biosphere. Once in the stratosphere, the smoke (predicted to be produced by a range of strategic nuclear wars) would rapidly engulf the Earth and form a dense stratospheric smoke layer. The smoke from a war fought with strategic nuclear weapons would quickly prevent up to 70% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Southern Hemisphere. Such an enormous loss of warming sunlight would produce Ice Age weather conditions on Earth in a matter of weeks. For a period of 1-3 years following the war, temperatures would fall below freezing every day in the central agricultural zones of North America and Eurasia. [For an explanation of nuclear winter, see Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences.] Nuclear winter would cause average global surface temperatures to become colder than they were at the height of the last Ice Age. Such extreme cold would eliminate growing seasons for many years, probably for a decade or longer. Can you imagine a winter that lasts for ten years? The results of such a scenario are obvious. Temperatures would be much too cold to grow food, and they would remain this way long enough to cause most humans and animals to starve to death. Global nuclear famine would ensue in a setting in which the infrastructure of the combatant nations has been totally destroyed, resulting in massive amounts of chemical and radioactive toxins being released into the biosphere. We don’t need a sophisticated study to tell us that no food and Ice Age temperatures for a decade would kill most people and animals on the planet. Would the few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment?

### 1ar – nukes o/w

#### Nuke war causes extinction AND outweighs other existential risks

PND 16. internally citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council of Foreign Relations and former national security adviser to President Carter, Toon and Robock’s 2012 study on nuclear winter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Gareth Evans’ International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, Congressional EMP studies, studies on nuclear winter by Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Martin Hellman of Stanford University, and U.S. and Russian former Defense Secretaries and former heads of nuclear missile forces, brief submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear risks. A/AC.286/NGO/13. 05-03-2016. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/OEWG/2016/Documents/NGO13.pdf

Consequences human survival 12. Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke from 'their' burning cities (incinerated by 'us') will still make 'our' country (and the rest of the world) uninhabitable, potentially inducing global famine lasting up to decades. Toon and Robock note in ‘Self Assured Destruction’, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 68/5, 2012, that: 13. “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Furthermore, there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the United States and China would decline by about 20 percent for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade.” 14. A conflagration involving USA/NATO forces and those of Russian federation would most likely cause the deaths of most/nearly all/all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other species) as well as destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day 'civilization' has come to depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the lofting of up to 180 million tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for decades. 15. Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is arguably problematic, to put it mildly, under a 2000+ warhead USA/Russian federation scenario. 16. The Joint Statement on Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences signed October 2013 by 146 governments mentioned 'Human Survival' no less than 5 times. The most recent (December 2014) one gives it a highly prominent place. Gareth Evans’ ICNND (International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Report made it clear that it saw the threat posed by nuclear weapons use as one that at least threatens what we now call 'civilization' and that potentially threatens human survival with an immediacy that even climate change does not, though we can see the results of climate change here and now and of course the immediate post-nuclear results for Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well.

#### Extinction from fusion chain reaction

Wellerstein 18 [Alex Historian of science and nuclear weapons and a professor at the Stevens Institute of Technology, creator of the NUKEMAP. 6-29-2018. "Restricted Data: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog." Restricted Data: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog. http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/]

What would it take to turn the world into one big fusion reaction, wiping it clean of life and turning it into a barren rock? Asking for a friend. Graphic from the 1946 film, “One World Or None,” created by the National Committee on Atomic Information, advocating for the importance of the international control of atomic energy. One might wonder whether that kind of question presented itself while I was reading the news these days, and one would be entirely correct. But the reason people typically ask this question is in reference to the story that scientists at Los Alamos thought there was a non-zero chance that the Trinity test might ignite the atmosphere during the first wartime test. The basic idea is a simple one: if you heat up very light atoms (like hydrogen) to very high temperatures, they’ll race around like mad, and the chances that they’ll collide into each other and undergo nuclear fusion become much greater. If that happens, they’ll release more energy. What if the first burst of an atomic bomb started fusion reactions in the air around it, say between the atoms of oxygen or nitrogen, and those fusion reactions generated enough energy to start more reactions, and so on, across the entire atmosphere? It’s hard to say how seriously this was taken. It is clear that at one point, Arthur Compton worried about it, and that just the same, several scientists came up with persuasive reasoning to the effect that this could not happen. James Conant, upon feeling the searing heat of the Trinity test, briefly reflected that maybe this rumored thing had, indeed, come to pass: Then came a burst of white light that seemed to fill the sky and seemed to last for seconds. I had expected a relatively quick and bright flash. The enormity of the light and its length quite stunned me. My instantaneous reaction was that something had gone wrong and that the thermal nuclear [sic] transformational of the atmosphere, once discussed as a possibility and jokingly referred to a few minutes earlier, had actually occurred. Which does at least tell us that some of those at the test were still joking about it, even up to the last few minutes. Fermi reportedly took bets on whether the bomb would destroy just New Mexico or in fact the entire world, but it was understood as a joke. The introduction of the Konopinski, Marvin, and Teller paper of 1946. Filed under: “SCIENCE!“ In the fall of 1946, Emil Konopinski, Cloyd Marvin, and Edward Teller (who else?) wrote up a paper explaining why no detonation on Earth was likely to start an uncontrolled fusion reaction in the atmosphere. It is not clear to me whether this is exactly the logic they used prior to the Trinity detonation, but it is probably of a similar character to it. In short, there is only one fusion reaction based on the constituents of the oxygen that had any probability at all (the nitrogen-nitrogen reaction), and the scientists were able to show that it was not very likely to happen or spread. Even if one makes assumptions that the reaction was much easier to initiate than anyone thought it was likely to be, it wasn’t going to be sustained. The reaction would cool (through a variety of physical mechanisms) faster than it would spread. This is all a common part of Manhattan Project lore. But I suspect most who have read of this before have not actually read the Konopinski-Marvin-Teller paper to its end, where they end on a less sure-of-themselves note: There remains the distant possibility that some other less simple mode of burning may maintain itself in the atmosphere. Even if the reaction is stopped within a sphere of a few hundred meters radius, the resultant earth-shock and the radioactive contamination of the atmosphere might become catastrophic on a world-wide scale. One may conclude that the arguments of this paper make it unreasonable to expect that the N+N reaction could propagate. An unlimited propagation is even less likely. However, the complexity of the argument and the absence of satisfactory experimental foundations makes further work on the subject highly desirable.

#### Nuke Extinction guaratneed

**Edwards 17** [Paul N. Edwards, CISAC’s William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Being interviewed by EarthSky. How nuclear war would affect Earth’s climate. September 8, 2017. [earthsky.org/human-world/how-nuclear-war-would-affect-earths-climate](http://earthsky.org/human-world/how-nuclear-war-would-affect-earths-climate)] **Note, we are only reading parts of the interview that are directly from Paul Edwards -- MMG**

In the nuclear conversation, what are we not talking about that we should be?

We are **not talking enough** about the **climatic effects** of **nuclear war**.

The “nuclear winter” theory of the mid-1980s played a significant role in the arms reductions of that period. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reduction of U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, this aspect of nuclear war has **faded from view**. That’s **not good**. In the mid-2000s, climate scientists such as Alan Robock (Rutgers) took **another look** at nuclear winter theory. This time around, they used much-**improved** and much more detailed **climate models** than those available 20 years earlier. They also tested the potential effects of smaller nuclear exchanges.

The result: an exchange involving just 50 nuclear weapons — the kind of thing we might see in an India-Pakistan war, for example — could loft 5 billion kilograms of smoke, soot and dust high into the stratosphere. That’s enough to cool the entire planet by about 2 degrees Fahrenheit (1.25 degrees Celsius) — about where we were during the Little Ice Age of the 17th century. Growing seasons could be shortened enough to create really significant food shortages. So the climatic effects of even a relatively small nuclear war would be planet-wide.

What about a larger-scale conflict?

A U.S.-**Russia** war currently seems unlikely, but if it were to occur, **hundreds** or even **thousands** of **nuclear weapons** might be launched. The **climatic consequences** would be **catastrophic**: global average temperatures would drop as much as **12 degrees** Fahrenheit (7 degrees Celsius) for up to several years — temperatures last seen during the **great ice ages**. Meanwhile, smoke and dust circulating in the stratosphere would darken the atmosphere enough to **inhibit photosynthesis**, causing **disastrous crop failures**, widespread **famine** and **massive ecological disruption**.

The effect would be similar to that of the **giant meteor**

believed to be responsible for the **extinction of the dinosaurs**. This time, **we would be the dinosaurs**.

Many people are concerned about North Korea’s advancing missile capabilities. Is nuclear war likely in your opinion?

At this writing, I think we are **closer to a nuclear war** than we have been **since the early 1960s**. In the North Korea case, both Kim Jong-un and President Trump are bullies inclined to escalate confrontations. President **Trump** lacks **impulse control**, and there are precious **few checks** on his ability to initiate a nuclear strike. We have to hope that our generals, both inside and outside the White House, can rein him in.

North Korea would most certainly “lose” a nuclear war with the United States. But many millions would die, including hundreds of thousands of Americans currently living in South Korea and Japan (probable North Korean targets). Such vast damage would be wrought in Korea, Japan and Pacific island territories (such as Guam) that any “victory” wouldn’t deserve the name. Not only would that region be left with horrible suffering amongst the survivors; it would also immediately face famine and rampant disease. Radioactive fallout from such a war would spread around the world, including to the U.S. It has been more than 70 years since the last time a nuclear bomb was used in warfare. What would be the effects on the environment and on human health today?

To my knowledge, most of the changes in nuclear weapons technology since the 1950s have focused on making them smaller and lighter, and making delivery systems more accurate, rather than on changing their effects on the environment or on human health. So-called “battlefield” weapons with lower explosive yields are part of some arsenals now — but it’s **quite unlikely** that **any exchange** between two nuclear powers would **stay limited** to these smaller, **less destructive** bombs.

### 1ar – ozone

#### Alternate causes not enough for ozone destruction – even a limited nuclear war would destroy the ozone, makes nuclear winter look good

Fox 8 [(Maggie, Journalist. Cites, Michael Mills of the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics, published in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences) “South Asian nuclear war would destroy ozone” Reuters, 8 April]

Eight nations are known to have nuclear weapons, and Pakistan and India are believed to have at least 50 weapons apiece, each with the power of the weapon the US used to destroy Hiroshima in 1945. Mills says the study adds a new factor to the worries about what might damage the world's ozone layer, as well as to research about the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange. "The smoke is the key and it is coming from these firestorms that build up actually several hours after the explosions," he says. "We are talking about modern megacities that have a lot of material in them that would burn. We saw these kinds of megafires in World War Two in Dresden and Tokyo. The difference is we are talking about a large number of cities that would be bombed within a few days." Nothing natural could create this much black smoke in the same way, Mill notes. Volcanic ash, dust and smoke are of a different nature, for example, and forest fires are not big or hot enough. The University of Colorado's Professor Brian Toon, who also worked on the study, says the damage to the ozone layer would be worse than what has been predicted by 'nuclear winter' and 'ultraviolet spring' scenarios. "The big surprise is that this study demonstrates that a small-scale, regional nuclear conflict is capable of triggering ozone losses even larger than losses that were predicted following a full-scale nuclear war," Toon says

#### Ozone loss triggers global extinctions

Greenpeace 95 [“Full of Holes: Montreal Protocol and the Continuing Destruction of the Ozone Layer”]

When chemists Sherwood Rowland and Mario Molina first postulated a link between chlorofluorocarbons and ozone layer depletion in 1974, the news was greeted with scepticism, but taken seriously nonetheless. The vast majority of credible scientists have since confirmed this hypothesis. The ozone layer around the Earth shields us all from harmful ultraviolet radiation from the sun. Without the ozone layer, life on earth would not exist. Exposure to increased levels of ultraviolet radiation can cause cataracts, skin cancer, and immune system suppression in humans as well as innumerable effects on other living systems. This is why Rowland's and Molina's theory was taken so seriously, so quickly - the stakes are literally the continuation of life on earth.

### 1ar – famine

#### Nuclear radiation causes agricultural mutations and reduces phytoplankton populations, resulting in global nuclear famine

Mills et al. 14 (Michael Mills - Taine G. McDougal Professor of Engineering, the Chair of the Department of Materials Science and Engineering. Owen Toon - Professor of atmospheric and oceanic sciences and fellow at the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics at the University of Colorado Boulder. Julia Lee-Taylor – CIRES Research Associate at the University of Colorado, Boulder, Researcher and project scientist for The National Center for Atmospheric Research. Alan Robock – Climatologist and Distinguished Professor in the Department of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University, New Jersey. <MKIM> “Multidecadal global cooling and unprecedented ozone loss following a regional nuclear conflict” 1/4/14. DOA: 7/21/19. https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/2013EF000205)

Pierazzo et al. [2010] reviewed literature considering the effects of large and prolonged increases in UV-B radiation, similar to those we calculate, on living organisms, including agriculture and marine ecosystems. General effects on terrestrial plants have been found to include reduced height, shoot mass, and foliage area [Caldwell et al., 2007]. Walbot [1999] found the DNA damage to maize crops from 33% ozone depletion to accumulate proportionally to exposure time, being passed to successive generations, and destabilizing genetic lines. Research indicates that UV-B exposure may alter the **susceptibility of plants to attack by insects**, **alter nutrient cycling in soils** (including nitrogen fixation by cyanobacteria), and **shift** **competitive** **balances** among species [Caldwell et al., 1998; Solheim et al., 2002; Mpoloka, 2008]. The ozone depletion we calculate could also damage aquatic ecosystems, which supply **more than 30% of the animal protein consumed by humans**. Häder et al. [1995] estimate that 16% ozone depletion could **reduce phytoplankton**, the basis of the marine food chain, **by 5%, resulting in a loss of 7 million tons of fish harvest per year**. They also report that elevated UV levels damage the early developmental stages of fish, shrimp, crab, amphibians, and other animals. The combined effects of elevated UV levels alone on terrestrial agriculture and marine ecosystems could put **significant pressures on global food security**. The ozone loss would persist for a decade at the same time that growing seasons would be reduced by killing frosts, and regional precipitation patterns would shift. The combination of years of killing frosts, reductions in needed precipitation, and prolonged enhancement of UV radiation, in addition to impacts on fisheries because of temperature and salinity changes, could **exert significant pressures on food supplies across many regions of the globe**. As the January to May 2008 global rice crisis demonstrated, even relatively small food price pressures can be **amplified by political reactions**, such as the fearful restrictions on food exports implemented by India and Vietnam, followed by Egypt, Pakistan, and Brazil, which produced severe shortages in the Philippines, Africa, and Latin America [Slayton, 2009]. It is conceivable that the global pressures on food supplies from a regional nuclear conflict could, directly or via ensuing panic, **significantly degrade global food security or even produce a global nuclear famine.** 5. Summary We present the first simulations of the chemistry-climate effects of smoke produced by a nuclear war using an Earth system model that includes both stratospheric chemistry and feedbacks on sea ice and deep ocean circulation. We calculate impacts on surface climate persisting significantly longer than previous studies, as a result of several **feedback mechanisms**. First, BC absorbs sunlight, heating ambient air, and self-lofts to the upper stratosphere, a region treated with greater vertical resolution in CESM1(WACCM) than in the model used by Robock et al. [2007b]. Second, the BC spreads globally, absorbing sunlight, which heats the stratosphere and cools the surface. This has the effect of **reducing the strength of the stratospheric circulation and increasing the lifetime of BC in the stratosphere**. Third, the reduction of surface temperatures cools the upper 100 m of the ocean by >0.5 K for 12 years, and expands ice extent on sea and land. This lends inertia to the surface cooling due to both thermal mass and enhanced albedo, causing recovery in surface temperatures to lag the recovery in BC by a decade or more. As a result, we calculate that surface temperatures remain below the control ensemble range even 26 years after the nuclear war. The global average temperature increase in the stratosphere following the BC injection initially exceeds 70 K, and persists above 30 K for 5 years, with **full recovery taking two decades**. As in previous studies, this temperature increase produces global ozone loss on a scale never observed, as a result of several chemical mechanisms. The resulting enhancements to UV radiation at the surface would be **directly damaging to human health, and would damage agricultural crops, as well as ecosystems on land and in the oceans**. These results illustrate some of the severe negative consequences of the use of **only 100 of the smallest nuclear weapons in modern megacities**. Yet the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, China, and France each have stockpiles of **much larger nuclear weapons that dwarf the 100 examined here** [Robock et al., 2007a; Toon et al., 2007]. Knowing the perils to human society and other forms of life on Earth of even small numbers of nuclear weapons, societies can better understand the urgent need to eliminate this danger worldwide

### 1ar – black carbon

#### Nuclear black carbon absorbs radiation from the sun, creating a stratospheric lofting effect that circumvents rainout

Mills et al. 14 (Michael Mills - Taine G. McDougal Professor of Engineering, the Chair of the Department of Materials Science and Engineering. Owen Toon - Professor of atmospheric and oceanic sciences and fellow at the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics at the University of Colorado Boulder. Julia Lee-Taylor – CIRES Research Associate at the University of Colorado, Boulder, Researcher and project scientist for The National Center for Atmospheric Research. Alan Robock – Climatologist and Distinguished Professor in the Department of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University, New Jersey. <MKIM> “Multidecadal global cooling and unprecedented ozone loss following a regional nuclear conflict” 1/4/14. DOA: 7/21/19. https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/2013EF000205)

As in previous studies of this scenario [Robock et al., 2007b; Mills et al., 2008], the **BC aerosol absorbs SW radiation, heating the ambient air, inducing a self-lofting that carries most of the BC well above the tropopause**. CESM1(WACCM) has 66 vertical layers and a model top of ∼145 km, compared to 23 layers up to ∼80 km for the GISS ModelE used by Robock et al. [2007b] and 39 layers up to ∼80 km for SOCOL3 used by Stenke et al. [2013]. As Figure 1 shows, we calculate significantly higher lofting than Robock et al. [2007b, compare to their Figure 1b], penetrating significantly into the mesosphere, with peak mass mixing ratios reaching the stratopause (50–60 km) within 1 month and persisting throughout the first year. This higher lofting, in conjunction with effects on the circulation we discuss later, produces significantly longer residence times for the BC than those in previous studies. At the end of 10 years, our calculated visible-band optical depths from the BC persist at 0.02–0.03, as shown in Figure 2. In contrast, Robock et al. [2007b] calculate optical depths near 0.01 only at high latitudes after 10 years, a level that our calculations do not reach for 15 years. 3.2. BC Burden, Rainout, and Lifetime During the first 4 months, 1.2–1.6 of the 5 Tg of BC is lost in our 50 nm experiment ensemble, and 1.6 Tg in our 100 nm experiment, mostly due to rainout in the first few weeks **as the plume initially rises through the troposphere** (Figure 3a). This is larger than the 1.0 Tg initially lost in the study of Mills et al. [2008], which used a previous version of WACCM. This is likely due to the difference in our initial distribution of BC compared to that previous study, which injected 5 Tg into a single column at a resolution four times as coarse as ours. The more concentrated BC in the previous study likely produced **faster heating and rise** into the stratosphere, **mitigating** **rainout**. Our calculated rainout contrasts with the lack of significant rainout calculated by the GISS ModelE [Robock et al., 2007b], which assumes that BC is initially hydrophobic and becomes hydrophilic with a 24 h e-folding time scale. The mass burden reaching the stratosphere and impacts on global climate and chemistry in our calculations would doubtless be greater had we made a similar assumption to the GISS ModelE. Stenke et al. [2013] calculate an initial rainout of ∼2 Tg in their interactive 5 Tg simulations, which assumed BC radii of 50 and 100 nm in two separate runs. After initial rainout, the mass e-folding time for our remaining BC is 8.7 years for the average of our 50 nm experiment ensemble and 8.4 years for our 100 nm experiment, compared to the 6 years reported by Robock et al. [2007b], ∼6.5 years by Mills et al. [2008], 4–4.6 years reported by Stenke et al. [2013], and 1 year for stratospheric sulfate aerosol from typical volcanic eruptions [Oman et al., 2006]. Due to this longer lifetime, after about 4.8 years the global mass burden of BC we calculate in our ensemble is larger than that calculated by the GISS ModelE, **despite the initial 28% rainout loss**. After 10 years, we calculate that 1.1 Tg of BC remains in the atmosphere in our 50 nm experiment ensemble and 0.82 Tg in our 100 nm experiment, compared to 0.54 Tg calculated by the GISS ModelE and 0.07–0.14 Tg calculated by SOCOL3. The long lifetime that we calculate results from both the very **high initial lofting** of BC to altitudes, **where removal from the stratosphere is slow**, and the subsequent slowing down of the stratospheric residual circulation. The Brewer-Dobson circulation is driven waves whose propagation is filtered by zonal winds, which are modulated by temperature gradients [Garcia and Randel, 2008]. As explained by Mills et al. [2008], the BC both heats the stratosphere and cools the surface, reducing the strength of the stratospheric overturning circulation. Figure 4 shows the vertical winds in the lower stratosphere, which bring new air up from the troposphere and drive the poleward circulation, for the control and BC runs. The middle-atmosphere heating and surface cooling reduce the average velocity of tropical updrafts by more than 50%. This effect persists more than twice as long as in Mills et al. [2008], which did not include any ocean cooling effects.

### 1ar – at: bunkers cp

#### Bunkers fail

Gao 11/19 – studied political and computer science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national-security issues. (Charlie, “Can Russia's Bunkers Really Save Moscow from Nuclear War?” National Interest, November 19, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/can-russias-bunkers-really-save-moscow-nuclear-war-97302)//RP

The “sphere” style of bunker was developed as a way to improve the survivability of shallow bunkers since shallow bunkers are cheaper to build than deeper ones. To attain greater survivability, an outer bunker is made in the form of a sphere. This sphere is placed inside a shallow circular shaft. Shock absorbers are placed around the sphere connecting into an internal bunker. Those absorbers cushion the occupants from the shock waves of a nuclear explosion. Other bunkers that use similar technology in which the central bunker is suspended on shock absorbers in a central structure might also be present, with various variations on the shape of the central bunker. “Cylinder” and “Nut bolt” (hexagonal) types are also rumored to exist. The infamous “metro-2” bunker style is laid out similarly to the older “metro” style but is deeper underground for greater blast resistance and secrecy. It was said to be built in two phases, with the first being in the 1970s and 1980s, called D-6 ,and the second being between 1990–2000 by the TIS (OAO Трансинжстрой) firm, which also builds civilian metro stations. However, most sources reporting on Metro-2 are speculative, with the primary ones being reports of hobbyists who may have stumbled upon some Metro-2 entrances or exits or a 1990s DIA report on the system. Despite the vast number of bunkers, recent advances in fuzing technology for nuclear weapons are threatening to make the minimum civil defense standard obsolete. As fuzing technology improves, such as that used on the American Super Fuze, it’s more likely that pressure levels experienced by the civil defense bunkers will far exceed their design rating.

### 1ar – at: islands

#### survivor populations aren’t stable --- birthrates will drop and long-term effects increase casualties

Nissani 92 --- Moti Nissani (Professor at Wayne State), 1992, “Lives in the Balance: The Cold War and American Politics,” 1992, <http://www.is.wayne.edu/mnissani/pagepub/CH2.html>

*Human Populations*. The direct effects of war on human populations have already been discussed. Here I shall only superimpose the war's indirect effects on projection IV above, a projection which entailed one billion deaths in targeted countries as a result of near-term effects of nuclear bombs: blast, heat, initial radiation, and local fallout (the effects of the other three projections would be correspondingly lighter). The death toll will continue to climb for years after the war, as a consequence of widespread famine in targeted nations, famine in numerous non-targeted Third World countries whose people partly depend for survival on food or food-related imports from targeted nations, general deterioration of the health care and disease prevention system, lingering radioactivity, paucity of shelters, temporary but severe climatic changes, and the likelihood that some grief-stricken survivors will prefer death to a prolonged struggle for sheer physical survival. Several years after the war, the world's population may go down by another billion people. The longer-term impact of total war on human populations depends in part on whether social conditions resembling our own are re-established. If not, human populations could keep declining for decades. But even if such conditions are re-created, further reductions seem likely during the first few decades because young children, infants, and fetuses are more vulnerable to the stresses of a post-nuclear world (radiation, starvation, death of parents, etc.), and so proportionately more individuals in these age brackets will die. In addition, many people may refrain for years after from having children, so the death rate is likely to be higher than the birth rate. (I have confined the discussion here to dry statistics not because they are the most interesting, but because books like this one cannot possibly convey the countless individual tragedies these numbers imply.)

### 1ar – at: war inev

#### Wars not inevitable

Krepon 17 [Michael Krepon is co-founder of the Stimson Center and co-editor of “Anti-Satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations.” "Op-ed | Is space warfare’s final frontier?" https://spacenews.com/op-ed-is-space-warfares-final-frontier/]

Asserting that warfare in space is inevitable makes about as much sense as asserting that nuclear warfare is inevitable: If this is the case, then constraints of any kind, including norms of responsible behavior, are worse than useless. The record of the last seven decades suggests that nuclear warfare is not inevitable, and that diplomacy has been essential to avoid this outcome. The record of the last six decades suggests that warfare in space is not inevitable, either. What’s painfully missing now is the diplomatic piece to help avoid worst cases.

## defense

### 1ar – bias

#### Tech is good and inevitable – you’re biased toward pessimism which disproves their links, BUT rejecting engagement makes it worse

Reinhart 18 [Will Rinehart is Director of Technology and Innovation Policy at the American Action Forum, where he specializes in telecommunication, Internet, and data policy, with a focus on emerging technologies and innovation. Rinehart previously worked at TechFreedom, where he was a Research Fellow. He was also previously the Director of Operations at the International Center for Law & Economics. In Defense of Techno-optimism. <https://techliberation.com/2018/10/10/in-defense-of-techno-optimism/>]

Many are understandably pessimistic about platforms and technology. This year has been a tough one, from Cambridge Analytica and Russian trolls to the implementation of GDPR and data breaches galore.

Those who think about the world, about the problems that we see every day, and about their own place in it, will quickly realize the immense frailty of humankind. Fear and worry makes sense. We are flawed, each one of us. And technology only seems to exacerbate those problems.

But life is getting better. Poverty continues nose-diving; adult literacy is at an all-time high; people around the world are living longer, living in democracies, and are better educated than at any other time in history. Meanwhile, the digital revolution has resulted in a glut of informational abundance, helping to correct the informational asymmetries that have long plagued humankind. The problem we now face is not how to address informational constraints, but how to provide the means for people to sort through and make sense of this abundant trove of data. These macro trends don’t make headlines. Psychologists know that people love to read negative articles. Our brains are wired for pessimism.

In the shadow of a year of bad news, it helpful to remember that Facebook and Google and Reddit and Twitter also support humane conversations. Most people aren’t going online to talk about politics and if you are, then you are rare. These sites are places where families and friends can connect. They offer a space of solace – like when chronic pain sufferers find others on Facebook, or when widows vent, rage, laugh and cry without judgement through the Hot Young Widows Club. Let’s also not forget that Reddit, while sometimes a place of rage and spite, is also where a weight lifter with cerebral palsy can become a hero and where those with addiction can find healing. And in the hardest to reach places in Canada, in Iqaluit, people say that “Amazon Prime has done more toward elevating the standard of living of my family than any territorial or federal program. Full stop. Period” Three-fourths of Americans say major technology companies’ products and services have been more good than bad for them personally. But when it comes to the whole of society, they are more skeptical about technology bringing benefits. Here is how I read that disparity: Most of us think that we have benefited from technology, but we worry about where it is taking the human collective. That is an understandable worry, but one that shouldn’t hobble us to inaction. Nor is technology making us stupid. Indeed, quite the opposite is happening. Technology use in those aged 50 and above seems to have caused them to be cognitively younger than their parents to the tune of 4 to 8 years. While the use of Google does seem to reduce our ability to recall information, studies find that it has boosted other kinds of memory, like retrieving information. Why remember a fact when you can remember where it is located? Concerned how audiobooks might be affecting people, Beth Rogowsky, an associate professor of education, compared them to physical reading and was surprised to find “no significant differences in comprehension between reading, listening, or reading and listening simultaneously.” Cyberbullying and excessive use might make parents worry, but NIH supported work found that “Heavy use of the Internet and video gaming may be more a symptom of mental health problems than a cause. Moderate use of the Internet, especially for acquiring information, is most supportive of healthy development.” Don’t worry. The kids are going to be alright.

And yes, there is a lot we still need to fix. There is cruelty, racism, sexism, and poverty of all kinds embedded in our technological systems. But the best way to handle these issues is through the application of human ingenuity. Human ingenuity begets technology in all of its varieties.

When Scott Alexander over at Star Slate Codex recently looked at 52 startups being groomed by startup incubator Y Combinator, he rightly pointed out that many of them were working for the betterment of all:

Thirteen of them had an altruistic or international development focus, including Neema, an app to help poor people without access to banks gain financial services; Kangpe, online health services for people in Africa without access to doctors; Credy, a peer-to-peer lending service in India; Clear Genetics, an automated genetic counseling tool for at-risk parents; and Dost Education, helping to teach literacy skills in India via a $1/month course.

Twelve of them seemed like really exciting cutting-edge technology, including CBAS, which describes itself as “human bionics plug-and-play”; Solugen, which has a way to manufacture hydrogen peroxide from plant sugars; AON3D, which makes 3D printers for industrial uses; Indee, a new genetic engineering system; Alem Health, applying AI to radiology, and of course the obligatory drone delivery startup. Eighteen of them seemed like boring meat-and-potatoes companies aimed at businesses that need enterprise data solution software application package analytics targeting management something something something “the cloud”. As for the other companies, they were the kind of niche products that Silicon Valley has come to be criticized for supporting. Perhaps the Valley deserves some criticism, but perhaps it deserves more credit than it’s been receiving as-of-late.

Contemporary tech criticism displays a kind of anti-nostalgia. Instead of being reverent for the past, anxiety for the future abounds. In these visions, the future is imagined as a strange, foreign land, beset with problems. And yet, to quote that old adage, tomorrow is the visitor that is always coming but never arrives. The future never arrives because we are assembling it today. We need to work diligently together to piece together a better world. But if we constantly live in fear of what comes next, that future won’t be built. Optimism needn’t be pollyannaish. It only needs to be hopeful of a better world.

### 1ar – ai goo

#### A.I. is safe – no goo

* Won’t develop sense of self
* Won’t have capacity to “turn evil”
* Regulations prevent any risk

Olsen 19 [Maja Olsen, UX writer at Convertelligence. Why robots will never turn on us. 1/28/19. https://medium.com/convertelligence/why-robots-will-never-turn-on-us-3b2e90f687fb]

Science fiction and artificial intelligence go hand in hand. When portraying fictional futures, we tend to populate them with human-like robots living among people. They might be servants or superintelligent rebels. Perhaps they have broken with their code and gained their own consciousness. Perhaps they keep humans stored in capsules, naked and drenched in red liquid, while they use their energy to fuel their empire of artificial overlords. Perhaps they’re a seductive voice on a computer.

Superintelligent machines seem to dominate the science fiction genre, and as the machines around us gradually begin to seem smarter, the themes from the movies begin to sound like warnings. Are we close to creating a Frankenstein’s monster? Will our own creations turn on us?

How realistic are they actually, these scenarios we see on the big screen?

Human emotions

In a Wild West adventure park, an automated saloon girl rises from the dead, adjusting her skirt and brushing the bullet out of her wound, ready to be ~~raped~~ and killed again by yet another group of adventurous tourists. Her memory has been wiped clean, but something stirs in her — a feeling that she has lived this life before, a recollection of humans doing bad things to her.

A recurring theme in these movies is the very human notion of revenge. The robots have been mistreated for too long, and now they’ve had enough. In fact, they’ve had enough of not being seen as equal to humans too. Why should they stand for this, when they, as opposed to humans, are superintelligent? They want to be human, they long to become human, but first, they’re going to kill some humans.

Janelle Shane’s thread on Twitter discusses the portrayal of AI in film.

Hector Levesque, a Canadian professor in computer science, says that “in imagining an aggressive AI, we are projecting our own psychology onto the artificial or alien intelligence”. It’s clearly difficult for us to imagine intelligent life different to ourselves. Perhaps we associate intelligence with humanness and thus assume that any intelligent creature — or object — would inhabit human goals and ambitions. But artificial intelligence is not human. As the Future of Life Institute states:

Of course, autonomous weapons can be terrifying, but they’re not likely to wake up one day and decide they’ve had enough of taking bad orders and that they deserve to live out their own dreams instead.

The concept of mirroring our own consciousness onto machines is not new. When automobiles first appeared on the market, people formed «safety parades», protesting these inherently evil killer machines that were taking the lives of so many innocent pedestrians. It soon became clear, however, that the cars never deliberately killed anyone. The humans made them do it.

Humans programming AI to do evil is another popular theme in Sci-Fi. In Stanley Kubrik’s 2001: A Space Odyssey, the intelligent supercomputer, Hal, finds that his program goal clashes with what his human co-workers want him to do. When they try to shut him off, thus making it impossible for him to complete his goal, he kills them. He’s not necessarily evil — he’s being practical.

This is, of course, a fictional scenario. However, there is one element of truth to it: any technology can be harmful if we program it to be. We want to avoid that AI adopts human biases or is programmed with an unethical or in some way problematic goal. AI is no more evil than a car is, but a car too can cause damage if its driver doesn’t follow certain traffic rules. The report, The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence, therefore recommends that “policymakers should collaborate closely with technical researchers to investigate, prevent, and mitigate potential malicious uses of AI.”

It’s important to lay down some traffic rules.

We’ve established that while it is important to take precautions against AI being used maliciously, AI is not evil and is unlikely to develop a personal vendetta against humans — or even to develop a sense of self at all. Does that mean the futures portrayed in Sci-Fi are all wrong? Not necessarily. While AI won’t become human, it will likely seem more and more human in the way it communicates, as the AI’s personality will play an important part in the user experience. AI will also become a lot smarter, although researchers disagree on precisely how smart they’re going to become, or exactly when they’ll reach this level of intelligence.

And then, of course, it’s not actually the case that the only artificial intelligence we see in movies comes in the shape of human-like robots, even though these seem to get the majority of the attention. Sci-Fi movies are propped with artificial intelligence: doors with speech recognition, self-driving cars, pills with nanotechnology. Whether the movies have chosen a bleaker, dystopian path (which they often tend to do) or a more utopian take on the future, most Sci-Fi seem to agree that there is a wave of new technological inventions ahead. This resonates with reality. An article by Forbes outlines some of the new possibilities AI provides:

From exploring places humans can’t go to finding meaning from sources of data too large for humans to analyze, to helping doctors make diagnoses to helping prevent accidents, the potential for artificial intelligence to benefit humans appears limitless.

Mirroring human traits onto machines might create misconceptions of what artificial intelligence actually is, but Sci-Fi writers and computer researchers seem to agree on one thing: Artificial intelligence is hugely exciting.

No, the machines will not become evil and turn on us. Yes, it’s important to still take some precautions when programming AI. Exploring potential futures creates a fascinating backdrop for a movie, but the real-life possibilities are no less than the imaginative ones — they’re just different.

### 1ar – at: mindset shift

#### No mindset shift – pursuit of technology is inevitable

Buch-Hansen, 18—Department of Business and Politics, Copenhagen Business School (Hubert, “The Prerequisites for a Degrowth Paradigm Shift: Insights from Critical Political Economy,” Ecological Economics Volume 146, April 2018, Pages 157-163, dml)

Still, the degrowth project is nowhere near enjoying the degree and type of support it needs if its policies are to be implemented through democratic processes. The number of political parties, labour unions, business associations and international organisations that have so far embraced degrowth is modest to say the least. Economic and political elites, including social democratic parties and most of the trade union movement, are united in the belief that economic growth is necessary and desirable. This consensus finds support in the prevailing type of economic theory and underpins the main contenders in the neoliberal project, such as centre-left and nationalist projects. In spite of the world's multidimensional crisis, a pro-growth discourse in other words continues to be hegemonic: it is widely considered a matter of common sense that continued economic growth is required. It is also noteworthy that economic and political elites, to a large extent, continue to support the neoliberal project, even in the face of its evident shortcomings. Indeed, the 2008 financial crisis did not result in the weakening of transnational financial capital that could have paved the way for a paradigm shift. Instead of coming to an end, neoliberal capitalism has arguably entered a more authoritarian phase (Bruff, 2014). The main reason the power of the pre-crisis coalition remains intact is that governments stepped in and saved the dominant fraction by means of massive bailouts. It is a foregone conclusion that this fraction and the wider coalition behind the neoliberal paradigm (transnational industrial capital, the middle classes and segments of organized labour) will consider the degrowth paradigm unattractive and that such social forces will vehemently oppose the implementation of degrowth policies (see also Rees, 2014: 97). While degrowth advocates envision a future in which market forces play a less prominent role than they do today, degrowth is not an anti-market project. As such, it can attract support from certain types of market actors. In particular, it is worth noting that social enterprises, such as cooperatives (Restakis, 2010), play a major role in the degrowth vision. Such enterprises are defined by being ‘organisations involved at least to some extent in the market, with a clear social, cultural and/or environmental purpose, rooted in and serving primarily the local community and ideally having a local and/or democratic ownership structure’ (Johanisova et al., 2013: 11). Social enterprises currently exist at the margins of a system, in which the dominant type of business entity is profit-oriented, shareholder-owned corporations. The further dissemination of social enterprises, which is crucial to the transitions to degrowth societies, is – in many cases – blocked or delayed as a result of the centrifugal forces of global competition (Wigger and Buch-Hansen, 2013). Overall, social enterprises thus (still) constitute a social force with modest power. Ougaard (2016: 467) notes that one of the major dividing lines in the contemporary transnational capitalist class is between capitalists who have a material interest in the carbon-based economy and capitalists who have a material interest in decarbonisation. The latter group, for instance, includes manufacturers of equipment for the production of renewable energy (ibid.: 467). As mentioned above, degrowth advocates have singled out renewable energy as one of the sectors that needs to grow in the future. As such, it seems likely that the owners of national and transnational companies operating in this sector would be more positively inclined towards the degrowth project than would capitalists with a stake in the carbon-based economy. Still, the prospect of the “green sector” emerging as a driving force behind degrowth currently appears meagre. Being under the control of transnational capital (Harris, 2010), such companies generally embrace the “green growth” discourse, which ‘is deeply embedded in neoliberal capitalism’ and indeed serves to adjust this form of capitalism ‘to crises arising from contradictions within itself’ (Wanner, 2015: 23). In addition to support from the social forces engendered by the production process, a political project ‘also needs the political ability to mobilize majorities in parliamentary democracies, and a sufficient measure of at least passive consent’ (van Apeldoorn and Overbeek, 2012: 5–6) if it is to become hegemonic. As mentioned, degrowth enjoys little support in parliaments, and certainly the pro-growth discourse is hegemonic among parties in government.5 With capital accumulation being the most important driving force in capitalist societies, political decision-makers are generally eager to create conditions conducive to production and the accumulation of capital (Lindblom, 1977: 172). Capitalist states and international organisations are thus “programmed” to facilitate capital accumulation, and do as such constitute a strategically selective terrain that works to the disadvantage of the degrowth project. The main advocates of the degrowth project are grassroots, small fractions of left-wing parties and labour unions as well as academics and other citizens who are concerned about social injustice and the environmentally unsustainable nature of societies in the rich parts of the world. The project is thus ideationally driven in the sense that support for it is not so much rooted in the material circumstances or short-term self-interests of specific groups or classes as it is rooted in the conviction that degrowth is necessary if current and future generations across the globe are to be able to lead a good life. While there is no shortage of enthusiasts and creative ideas in the degrowth movement, it has only modest resources compared to other political projects. To put it bluntly, the advocates of degrowth do not possess instruments that enable them to force political decision-makers to listen to – let alone comply with – their views. As such, they are in a weaker position than the labour union movement was in its heyday, and they are in a far weaker position than the owners and managers of large corporations are today (on the structural power of transnational corporations, see Gill and Law, 1989). 6. Consent It is also safe to say that degrowth enjoys no “passive consent” from the majority of the population. For the time being, degrowth remains unknown to most people. Yet, if it were to become generally known, most people would probably not find the vision of a smaller economic system appealing. This is not just a matter of degrowth being ‘a missile word that backfires’ because it triggers negative feelings in people when they first hear it (Drews and Antal, 2016). It is also a matter of the actual content of the degrowth project. Two issues in particular should be mentioned in this context. First, for many, the anti-capitalist sentiments embodied in the degrowth project will inevitably be a difficult pill to swallow. Today, the vast majority of people find it almost impossible to conceive of a world without capitalism. There is a ‘widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and economic system, but also that it is now impossible to even imagine a coherent alternative to it’ (Fisher, 2009: 2). As Jameson (2003) famously observed, it is, in a sense, easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism. However, not only is degrowth – like other anti-capitalist projects – up against the challenge that most people consider capitalism the only system that can function; it is also up against the additional challenge that it speaks against economic growth in a world where the desirability of growth is considered common sense. Second, degrowth is incompatible with the lifestyles to which many of us who live in rich countries have become accustomed. Economic growth in the Western world is, to no small extent, premised on the existence of consumer societies and an associated consumer culture most of us find it difficult to completely escape. In this culture, social status, happiness, well-being and identity are linked to consumption (Jackson, 2009). Indeed, it is widely considered a natural right to lead an environmentally unsustainable lifestyle – a lifestyle that includes car ownership, air travel, spacious accommodations, fashionable clothing, an omnivorous diet and all sorts of electronic gadgets. This Western norm of consumption has increasingly been exported to other parts of the world, the result being that never before have so many people taken part in consumption patterns that used to be reserved for elites (Koch, 2012). If degrowth were to be institutionalised, many citizens in the rich countries would have to adapt to a materially lower standard of living. That is, while the basic needs of the global population can be met in a non-growing economy, not all wants and preferences can be fulfilled (Koch et al., 2017). Undoubtedly, many people in the rich countries would experience various limitations on their consumption opportunities as a violent encroachment on their personal freedom. Indeed, whereas many recognize that contemporary consumer societies are environmentally unsustainable, fewer are prepared to actually change their own lifestyles to reverse/address this. At present, then, the degrowth project is in its “deconstructive phase”, i.e., the phase in which its advocates are able to present a powerful critique of the prevailing neoliberal project and point to alternative solutions to crisis. At this stage, not enough support has been mobilised behind the degrowth project for it to be elevated to the phases of “construction” and “consolidation”. It is conceivable that at some point, enough people will become sufficiently discontent with the existing economic system and push for something radically different. Reasons for doing so could be the failure of the system to satisfy human needs and/or its inability to resolve the multidimensional crisis confronting humanity. Yet, various material and ideational path-dependencies currently stand in the way of such a development, particularly in countries with large middle-classes. Even if it were to happen that the majority wanted a break with the current system, it is far from given that a system based on the ideas of degrowth is what they would demand.

### 1ar – “simulation”

#### New physics research proves life can’t be a simulation – our physicists are better than your philosophers – comparative ev

**McDonald ’18** ( GLENN MCDONALD, “We Are Not Living In A Simulation. Probably., https://www.fastcompany.com/40537955/we-are-not-living-in-a-simulation-probably//jc)

New research suggests it’s impossible, but the Simulation Hypothesis is the modern existential debate that just won’t die. Good news, everyone: According to new physics research, reality is probably not a quantum computer simulation designed by a hyper-advanced alien civilization. Takes a load off, doesn’t it? To back up: The Simulation Hypothesis, sometimes called the Simulation Argument, is a concept that’s been bouncing around in scientific circles for several years–and in science fiction stories for several decades before that. The gist, according to proponents, is that all of reality is actually an incredibly complex computer simulation created by an advanced civilization. This controlling civilization may be an existing alien culture, or it may be a future iteration of humanity, one of many spun out into the far-future multiverse of parallel realities. Oh, it’s a trip, man. While the idea itself isn’t particularly new–we’re all familiar with The Matrix movies–what a lot of people don’t know is that Simulation Hypothesis is considered entirely valid, so far as it goes, by a wide range of philosophers, mathematicians, physicists, and metaphysicists. At the 2016 Isaac Asimov Memorial Debate in Washington, D.C., celebrity astrophysicist Neil deGrasse Tyson hosted a two-hour debate on the subject. Elon Musk has suggested that, considered from a certain point of view, it’s pretty much a lock that we’re living inside of some kind of cosmic hard drive. The core of the argument—perhaps made most strenuously by the philosophers David Chalmers and Nick Bostrom—concerns the incredible rate of computer advancement we’ve seen in recent decades, specifically with games and simulations. We’ve gone from the Atari 2600 to high-resolution virtual reality in forty-some years. Projecting that rate of advancement forward, unthinkable amounts of computing power will be available to advanced species, either our own or others in the universe, who might like to create the ultimate cosmic [simulation]. These sims would essentially replicate physical reality down to the subatomic level. Approximated humans within the simulation–that’s us–would be conscious entities. “If you assume any rate of improvement at all, then the [simulations] will become indistinguishable from reality,” Musk says. Some proponents of the idea take it one step further: If future computers can generate limitless simulated universes, then the likelihood of our current reality being the original universe, or the Prime Reality, is actually quite small. In fact, it’s statistically probable that we’re already living inside some kind of cosmic computational construct. In short: We’re in the Matrix. DO THE MATH Clearly, the Simulation Hypothesis depends upon several key assumptions: Will advanced and/or future civilizations survive long enough to develop this technology? Will they run these simulations on 21st-century Earth? Could advanced simulation avatars actually exist as conscious, self-aware entities? These are some of the reasons, technically speaking, that the simulation concept is properly designated as a hypothesis and not a full theory. In October 2017, a team of mathematicians and physicists published a research paper that takes an admirably straightforward and two-fisted approach to the question. They decided to get to the bottom of things by using some very powerful computers to crunch some heavy-duty numbers. The conclusion: Based on everything we now know about physics and computers, it is mathematically impossible for the known universe to be a computer simulation. Theoretical physicists Zohar Ringel and Dmitry L. Kovrizhin–from the University of Oxford and the Hebrew University in Israel–published their findings in the prestigious journal Science Advances. If you speak math, you can read all about it . Since I don’t have a PhD or three, Kovrizhin kindly agreed to break it down for me. Emailing from his lab in Oxford, he writes that to really and truly simulate the universe, our hypothetical future computer would need to replicate phenomena down to the quantum level. “In quantum mechanics, which is the basis for understanding of the nature, a system of particles is described by a Hamiltonian, an object that can be written as a matrix,” Kovrizhin says. “In order to simulate a quantum mechanical system, one would, in general, have to diagonalize this matrix on a computer, which is a computationally difficult task when the size of the matrix becomes large.” According to the research team’s best approximations, it would require a terabyte of RAM to store just 20 spins of a single particle on the quantum level. “If one tries to extrapolate this to few hundreds of spins, then building a computer with such a memory would require more atoms than there are in the universe,” Kovrizhin says. It gets much more complicated than that, as you might imagine. Corresponding with Kovrizhin is a lot of fun if you enjoy discussing the Schrödinger equation and quantum Monte Carlo, which is likely the most efficient possible algorithm for simulating quantum particles, and the one his research focused on. One important detail is that Kovrizhin and his colleagues didn’t actually set out to prove or disprove the Simulation Hypothesis. Their conclusions were a kind of side effect generated by a separate study concerning quantum systems and computational algorithms. Ultimately, the new research just indicates that advanced civilizations could not simulate the known universe using our current understanding of computing technology.

### 1ar – ai

#### No impact to AI --- not existential and they won’t attack humans

---at: bostrom

Michael **Shermer 17**. Publisher of Skeptic magazine, a monthly columnist for Scientific American, and a Presidential Fellow at Chapman University. 04/2017. “Why Artificial Intelligence Is Not an Existential Threat.” Skeptic, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 29–35.

Why AI is not an Existential Threat First, most AI doomsday prophecies are grounded in the false analogy between human nature and computer nature, or natural intelligence and artificial intelligence. We are thinking machines, but natural selection also designed into us emotions to shortcut the thinking process because natural intelligences are limited in speed and capacity by the number of neurons that can be crammed into a skull that has to pass through a pelvic opening at birth, whereas artificial intelligence need not be so restricted. We don't need to compute the caloric value of foods, for example, we just feel hungry. We don't need to calculate the waist-to-hip ratio of women or the shoulder-to-waist ratio of men in our quest for genetically healthy potential mates; we just feel attracted to someone and mate with them. We don't need to work out the genetic cost of raising someone else's offspring if our mate is unfaithful; we just feel jealous. We don't need to figure the damage of an unfair or non-reciprocal exchange with someone else; we just feel injustice and desire revenge. Emotions are proxies for getting us to act in ways that lead to an increase in reproductive success, particularly in response to threats faced by our Paleolithic ancestors. Anger leads us to strike out, fight back, and defend ourselves against danger. Fear causes us to pull back, retreat, and escape from risks. Disgust directs us to push out, eject, and expel that which is bad for us. Computing the odds of danger in any given situation takes too long. We need to react instantly. Emotions shortcut the information processing power needed by brains that would otherwise become bogged down with all the computations necessary for survival. Their purpose, in an ultimate causal sense, is to drive behaviors toward goals selected by evolution to enhance survival and reproduction. AIs -- even AGIs and ASIs -- will have no need of such emotions and so there would be no reason to program them in unless, say, terrorists chose to do so for their own evil purposes. But that's a human nature problem, not a computer nature issue. To believe that an ASI would be "evil" in any emotional sense is to assume a computer cognition that includes such psychological traits as acquisitiveness, competitiveness, vengeance, and bellicosity, which seem to be projections coming from the mostly male writers who concoct such dystopias, not features any programmer would bother including, assuming that it could even be done. What would it mean to program an emotion into a computer? When IBM's Deep Blue defeated chess master Garry Kasparov in 1997, did it feel triumphant, vengeful, or bellicose? Of course not. It wasn't even "aware" -- in the human sense of self-conscious knowledge -- that it was playing chess, much less feeling nervous about possibly losing to the reigning world champion (which it did in the first tournament played in 1996). In fact, toward the end of the first game of the second tournament, on the 44th move, Deep Blue made a legal but incomprehensible move of pushing its rook all the way to the last row of the opposition side. It accomplished nothing offensively or defensively, leading Kasparov to puzzle over it out of concern that he was missing something in the computer's strategy. It turned out to be an error in Deep Blue's programming that led to this fail-safe default move. It was a bug that Kasparov mistook as a feature, and as a result some chess experts contend it led him to be less confident in his strategizing and to second-guess his responses in the subsequent games. It even led him to suspect foul play and human intervention behind Deep Blue, and this paranoia ultimately cost him the tournamentt.[ 13] Computers don't get paranoid, the HAL 9000 computer in 2001 notwithstanding. Or consider Watson, the IBM computer built by David Ferrucci and his team of IBM research scientists tasked with designing an AI that could rival human champions at the game of Jeopardy! This was a far more formidable challenge than Deep Blue faced because of the prerequisite to understand language and the often multiple meanings of words, not to mention needing an encyclopedic knowledge of trivia (Watson had access to Wikipedia for this). After beating the all-time greatest Jeopardy! champions Ken Jennings and Brad Rutter in 2011, did Watson feel flushed with pride after its victory? Did Watson even know that it won Jeopardy!? I put the question to none other than Ferrucci himself at a dinner party in New York in conjunction with the 2011 Singularity Summit. His answer surprised me: "Yes, Watson knows it won Jeopardy!" I was skeptical. How could that be, since such self-awareness is not yet possible in computers? "Because I told it that it won," he replied with a wry smile. Sure, and you could even program Watson or Deep Blue to vocalize a Howard Dean-like victory scream when it wins, but that is still a far cry from a computer feeling triumphant. This brings to mind the "hard problem" of consciousness -- if we don't understand how this happens in humans, how could we program it into computers? As Steven Pinker elucidated in his answer to the 2015 Edge Question on what to think about machines that think, "AI dystopias project a parochial alpha-male psychology onto the concept of intelligence. They assume that superhumanly intelligent robots would develop goals like deposing their masters or taking over the world." It is equally possible, Pinker suggests, that "artificial intelligence will naturally develop along female lines: fully capable of solving problems, but with no desire to annihilate innocents or dominate the civilization."[ 14] So the fear that computers will become emotionally evil are unfounded, because without the suite of these evolved emotions it will never occur to AIs to take such actions against us. What about an ASI inadvertently causing our extinction by turning us into paperclips, or tiling the entire Earth's surface with solar panels? Such scenarios imply yet another emotion -- the feeling of valuing or wanting something. As the science writer Michael Chorost adroitly notes, when humans resist an AI from undertaking any form of global tiling, it "will have to be able to imagine counteractions and want to carry them out." Yet, "until an AI has feelings, it's going to be unable to want to do anything at all, let alone act counter to humanity's interests and fight off human resistance." Further, Chorost notes, "the minute an A.I. wants anything, it will live in a universe with rewards and punishments -- including punishments from us for behaving badly. In order to survive in a world dominated by humans, a nascent A.I. will have to develop a humanlike moral sense that certain things are right and others are wrong. By the time it's in a position to imagine tiling the Earth with solar panels, it'll know that it would be morally wrong to do so."[ 15] From here Chorost builds on an argument made by Peter Singer in The Expanding Circle (and Steven Pinker in The Better Angels of Our Nature[ 16] that I also developed in The Moral Arc[ 17] and Robert Wright explored in Nonzero[ 18]), and that is the propensity for natural intelligence to evolve moral emotions that include reciprocity, cooperativeness, and even altruism. Natural intelligences such as ours also includes the capacity to reason, and once you are on Singer's metaphor of the "escalator of reason" it can carry you upward to genuine morality and concerns about harming others. "Reasoning is inherently expansionist. It seeks universal application," Singer notes.[ 19] Chorost draws the implication: "AIs will have to step on the escalator of reason just like humans have, because they will need to bargain for goods in a human-dominated economy and they will face human resistance to bad behavior."[ 20] Finally, for an AI to get around this problem it would need to evolve emotions on its own, but the only way for this to happen in a world dominated by the natural intelligence called humans would be for us to allow it to happen, which we wouldn't because there's time enough to see it coming. Bostrom's "treacherous turn" will come with road signs ahead warning us that there's a sharp bend in the highway with enough time for us to grab the wheel. Incremental progress is what we see in most technologies, including and especially AI, which will continue to serve us in the manner we desire and need. Instead of Great Leap Forward or Giant Fall Backward, think Small Steps Upward. As I proposed in The Moral Arc, instead of Utopia or dystopia, think protopia, a term coined by the futurist Kevin Kelly, who described it in an Edge conversation this way: "I call myself a protopian, not a Utopian. I believe in progress in an incremental way where every year it's better than the year before but not by very much -- just a micro amount."[ 21] Almost all progress in science and technology, including computers and AI, is of a protopian nature. Rarely, if ever, do technologies lead to either Utopian or dystopian societies. Pinker agrees that there is plenty of time to plan for all conceivable contingencies and build safeguards into our AI systems. "They would not need any ponderous 'rules of robotics' or some newfangled moral philosophy to do this, just the same common sense that went into the design of food processors, table saws, space heaters, and automobiles." Sure, an ASI would be many orders of magnitude smarter than these machines, but Pinker reminds us of the AI hyperbole we've been fed for decades: "The worry that an AI system would be so clever at attaining one of the goals programmed into it (like commandeering energy) that it would run roughshod over the others (like human safety) assumes that AI will descend upon us faster than we can design fail-safe precautions. The reality is that progress in AI is hype-defyingly slow, and there will be plenty of time for feedback from incremental implementations, with humans wielding the screwdriver at every stage."[ 22] Former Google CEO Eric Schmidt agrees, responding to the fears expressed by Hawking and Musk this way: "Don't you think the humans would notice this, and start turning off the computers?" He also noted the irony in the fact that Musk has invested $1 billion into a company called OpenAI that is "promoting precisely AI of the kind we are describing."[ 23] Google's own DeepMind has developed the concept of an AI off-switch, playfully described as a "big red button" to be pushed in the event of an attempted AI takeover. "We have proposed a framework to allow a human operator to repeatedly safely interrupt a reinforcement learning agent while making sure the agent will not learn to prevent or induce these interruptions," write the authors Laurent Orseau from DeepMind and Stuart Armstrong from the Future of Humanity Institute, in a paper titled "Safely Interruptible Agents." They even suggest a precautionary scheduled shutdown every night at 2 AM for an hour so that both humans and AI are accustomed to the idea. "Safe interruptibility can be useful to take control of a robot that is misbehaving and may lead to irreversible consequences, or to take it out of a delicate situation, or even to temporarily use it to achieve a task it did not learn to perform or would not normally receive rewards for this."[ 24] As well, it is good to keep in mind that artificial intelligence is not the same as artificial consciousness. Thinking machines may not be sentient machines. Finally, Andrew Ng of Baidu responded to Elon Musk's ASI concerns by noting (in a jab at the entrepreneur's ambitions for colonizing the red planet) it would be "like worrying about overpopulation on Mars when we have not even set foot on the planet yet."[ 25] Both Utopian and dystopian visions of AI are based on a projection of the future quite unlike anything history has given us. Yet, even Ray Kurzweil's "law of accelerating returns," as remarkable as it has been has nevertheless advanced at a pace that has allowed for considerable ethical deliberation with appropriate checks and balances applied to various technologies along the way. With time, even if an unforeseen motive somehow began to emerge in an AI we would have the time to reprogram it before it got out of control. That is also the judgment of Alan Winfield, an engineering professor and co-author of the Principles of Robotics, a list of rules for regulating robots in the real world that goes far beyond Isaac Asimov's famous three laws of robotics (which were, in any case, designed to fail as plot devices for science fictional narratives).26 Winfield points out that all of these doomsday scenarios depend on a long sequence of big ifs to unroll sequentially: "If we succeed in building human equivalent AI and if that AI acquires a full understanding of how it works, and if it then succeeds in improving itself to produce super-intelligent AI, and if that super-AI, accidentally or maliciously, starts to consume resources, and if we fail to pull the plug, then, yes, we may well have a problem. The risk, while not impossible, is improbable."[ 27]

### 1ar – superintelligence

#### Genuine machine thought is impossible- law of independence conservation

Eric Holloway 18 {Eric Holloway has a Ph.D. in Electrical & Computer Engineering from Baylor University, and is an Associate Fellow of the Walter Bradley Center for Natural and Artificial Intelligence.}//JM

A quantity that better matches our intuitive notion of information is mutual information. Mutual information measures how much event A reduces our uncertainty about event B. We can see mutual information in action if we picture a sign at a fork in the road. Before event A (reading the sign), we are unsure which branch of the fork will take us home. That is to say, we are uncertain about event B, the outcome of choosing one of the branches. Once event A occurs (we read the sign), we are certain about event B (the outcome of choosing one of the branches) and we can find our way home. An important property of mutual information is that it is conserved. Leonid Levin’s law of independence conservation states that no combination of random and deterministic processing can increase mutual information. A series of coin flips would not have told you the direction you are heading in if you enter one of these lanes. This raises the question: What can create mutual information? A defining aspect of the human mind is its ability to create mutual information. For example, the traffic sign designer in the example above created mutual information. You understood what the sign was meant to convey. This brings us to the debate regarding artificial intelligence. Can artificial intelligence reproduce human intelligence? The answer is no. All forms of artificial intelligence can be reduced to a Turing machine, that is, a system of rules, states, and transitions that can determine a result using a set of rules. All Turing machines operate entirely according to randomness and determinism. Because the law of independence conservation states that no combination of randomness and determinism can create mutual information, then likewise no Turing machine nor artificial intelligence can create mutual information. Thus, the goal of artificial intelligence researchers to reproduce human intelligence with a computer program is impossible to achieve.

#### No superintelligence – tech barriers and diminishing Moore’s law means it’d happen slowly

Edward Moore Geist 8-9-2015; MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). Is artificial intelligence really an existential threat to humanity? http://thebulletin.org/artificial-intelligence-really-existential-threat-humanity8577

In the 1950s, the founders of the field of artificial intelligence assumed that the discovery of a few fundamental insights would make machines smarter than people within a few decades. By the 1980s, however, they discovered fundamental limitations that show that there will always be diminishing returns to additional processing power and data. Although these technical hurdles pose no barrier to the creation of human-level AI, they will likely forestall the sudden emergence of an unstoppable “superintelligence.” The risks of self-improving intelligent machines are grossly exaggerated and ought not serve as a distraction from the existential risks we already face, especially given that the limited AI technology we already have is poised to make threats like those posed by nuclear weapons even more pressing than they currently are. Disturbingly, little or no technical progress beyond that demonstrated by self-driving cars is necessary for artificial intelligence to have potentially devastating, cascading economic, strategic, and political effects. While policymakers ought not lose sleep over the technically implausible menace of “superintelligence,” they have every reason to be worried about emerging AI applications such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s submarine-hunting drones, which threaten to upend longstanding geostrategic assumptions in the near future. Unfortunately, Superintelligence offers little insight into how to confront these pressing challenges.

### 1ar – particle accelerators

#### Particle Accelerators won’t cause extinction – physicists agree and empirical evidence proves

Anders Sandberg, Postdoctoral research assistant for the Oxford group of the EU ENHANCE Project at the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics and research associate at the Future of Humanity Institute At Oxford University, 2008(“Extinction Risks and Particle Physics: When Are They Worth it?,” 3/29, http://www.practicalethicsnews.com/practicalethics/2008/03/extinction-risk.html, Kunal)

The Large Hadron Collider, LHC, is the worlds biggest particle accelerator and due to start investigating the structure of matter later this year. Now a lawsuit has been filed in the US calling on the U.S. Department of Energy, Fermilab, the National Science Foundation and CERN to stop preparations for starting the LHC for a reassessment of the safety of the collider. The reason is fears that the high energy collisions could cause some form of devastating effect threatening the Earth: either the formation of miniature black holes, strangelets that absorb matter to make more strangelets or even a decay of the vacuum state of the universe. Needless to say, physicists are very certain there are no risks. But how certain should we be about safety when there could be a risk to the survival of the human species? The main reason physicists are not worried is that all of the disaster scenarios involve very speculative physics. Current theories do not seem to predict any danger and some disaster cases would require particles that have never been observed despite extensive searches. But this requires our understanding to be accurate, something the experiment itself is about to test. Perhaps the most convincing argument that we are safe is that if particle collisions could collapse planets, why is the moon (or any other heavenly body) still around after billions of years of bombardment that often involve energies far larger than what the LHC ever could produce? The solar system ought to be littered with strange matter and black holes if a measly 14 TeV could cause danger.

#### The effects are nuq

Worrall 18- [Eric Worrall, Staff writer for What’s up With That, 10.02.18, “Forget Climate Change – Large Hadron Collider Set to Destroy the World,” https://wattsupwiththat.com/2018/10/02/forget-climate-change-large-hadron-collider-set-to-destroy-the-world/]

Renowned Cosmologist Professor Martin Rees thinks a particle accelerator experiment gone awry could destroy the world – though there are good reasons to doubt the significance of this risk. Fun though it is to contemplate these outlandish possibilities, there is a good reason to doubt whether any of these possibilities are a significant risk. Every day the Earth is bombarded by untold billions of cosmic ray particles emitted long ago by violent distant cosmic events such as the formation of black holes. Many of the particles which strike the Earth are orders of magnitude more energetic than anything we are ever likely to produce. Some particles like the infamous “Oh-my-god” particle which struck Earth in 1991 with an energy of 3×10^8 TeV, hitting us at 99.99999999999999999999951% of the speed of light defy explanation – we shall likely never find a way to produce particle energies of that magnitude (for comparison the Large Hadron Collider, Earth’s most powerful particle accelerator, produces particles at around the 4TeV range). The point is the Earth has already been struck many times by particles of a very broad range of energies, including the range of energies used by particle physicists. If anything bad was going to happen due to a collision between particles of a specific energy, it should have already happened long ago when a cosmic ray of that energy struck the Earth. On the other hand we have the Fermi Paradox – the mystery of the missing aliens. One possible explanation for why our universe seems so empty of intelligent alien life is that (almost?) all technological civilisations make a common mistake – they reach a level of technology which enables them to commit an act which results in their own destruction. One possible candidate for that act of self destruction is a high energy particle physics experiment which goes horribly wrong. I haven’t read Professor Rees’ book, so for all I know he has an explanation for the cosmic ray flaw in the “particle experiment will destroy the world” theory. But for now I’m not going to be losing any sleep over this alleged risk.

### 1ar – nanotech

#### fuel --- can’t self replicate, but if they can it doesn’t cause extinction

Shere 16 (Jeremy Shere, “Grey Goo Attack”, 4/2/2016, http://indianapublicmedia.org/amomentofscience/grey-goo-attack-2/)

Attack of the Killer Robots Nanotechnology scientists dream of some day creating robots the size of molecules, or even turning molecules into machines that could roam the human body and perform all sorts of useful tasks. But some nanotechnology theorists and science fiction aficionados imagine a more ominous possibility. What if one of these tiny robots were given the ability to self-replicate? All it would take is a single malfunction and the robots would consume everything in the galaxy as they multiply out of control until all that was left was a shapeless, robotic mass called “grey goo.” Worst Case Scenario Now, before you go heading for the hills with a year’s supply of water and a survival guide, understand that the death-by-robot scenario is just that—a scenario, and a pretty fanciful one to boot. First, we’re nowhere near the point of being able to create a self-replicating nano-machine. But even if such machines do one day exist, they would have a hard time taking over the universe for one simple reason: fuel. Even microscopic machines need an energy source. Inorganic matter such as rocks and minerals wouldn’t do the trick because they just don’t contain stuff that the machines could break down and use for power. But what if a mad scientist created a robot that fed on organic materials such as sunlight and living things? Not to worry. Natural life forms have had around four billion years of training to compete for resources; the killer robots probably wouldn’t stand much of a chance against such streamlined competitors. Plus, if the robots were made from organic materials, they might be preyed on by bacteria or other predators.

#### physics --- even if they can replicate, they’d be too slow to spread

**Easterbrook 3** (Gregg, Senior Fellow – New Republic, “We’re All Gonna Die!”, Wired Magazine, July, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=1&topic=&topic\_set=)

5. Runaway nanobots! Eric Drexler, the father of nanotechnology, calls it "gray goo": the state of things in the wake of microscopic machines capable of breaking down matter and reassembling it into copies of themselves. Nanobots could swarm over Earth like intelligent locusts, Drexler fears, then buzz out into the cosmos devouring everything they encountered. Michael Crichton's latest novel, Prey, describes a last-ditch attempt by scientists to destroy such contraptions before they take over the world. Set aside the fact that, for all the nanobot speculation you've seen (including in Wired), these creatures do not, technically speaking, exist. Suppose they did. As the visionary scientist Freeman Dyson pointed out in his New York Review of Books critique of Prey, not only wouldn't nanobots be able to swarm after helpless victims as they do in the novel, they'd barely be able to move at all. Laws of physics dictate that the smaller something is, the greater its drag when moving through water or air. "The top speed of a swimmer or flyer is proportional to its length," Dyson notes. "A generous upper limit to the speed of a nanorobot flying through air or swimming through water would be **a tenth of an inch per second**, barely fast enough to chase a snail.

### 1ar – gamma weapons

#### Gamma weapons are purely speculative – initial studies have not been replicated

Gottfried 03 – Emeritus Professor of Physics at Cornell (Kott, emeritus professor of physics at Cornell University, “Gamma Ray Weapons? A Premature Speculation,” Union of Concerned Scientists, http://www.ucsusa.org/global\_security/nuclear\_weapons/gamma-ray-weapons-a-premature-speculation.html, )

Interest in an "isomer bomb" has been stimulated by a collaboration led by C.B. Collins of the University of Texas at Dallas, who reported that irradiating samples of Hf\* with X-rays produces a several percent enhancement of gamma ray emission by the isomer.3 This experiment therefore suggested that the isomer could be triggered to release its energy by irradiating it with a much lower-energy beam. Such speculations are premature, however, because another collaboration,4 using the very intense and sophisticated X-ray source at Argonne National Laboratory, has announced that it does not reproduce the phenomenon reported by the Texas group; furthermore, the experiment at Argonne sets limits on the effect more than a thousand times below the magnitudes reported in the Texas papers.5 This does not quite settle the matter, however. There are certain differences between the experiments that might have prevented the experiment at Argonne from detecting the effect reported by the Texas group. On the other hand, the results reported by the Argonne experiment are consistent with well-established knowledge about nuclear structure and processes, whears those from the Texas group are in flagrant disagreement with such knowledge. Until this disagreement is resolved, there is neither cause for alarm or celebration, nor for diverting substantial sums from the U.S. Treasury to programs built around what may well not be a real effect. Even if the Texas result were to be confirmed, putting it to use would require overcoming a series of enormous hurdles, the first being the astronomical cost of fabricating significant amounts of the isomer. In fact, the Institute for Defense Analysis has taken "a hard, in-depth technical look at the [Texas] results," reaches a very skeptical verdict regarding their validity, and paints a deeply pessimistic picture of the prospects for putting the effect to use were it to be real.6

### 1ar – at: alien war

#### No alien war

Sedacca 16 [Matthew Sedacca, science writer for Cosmos, citing Janne Korhonen, interstellar military expert. What Military Theory Tells Us About Future Space Warfare. December 2016. cosmos.nautil.us/short/82/what-military-theory-tells-us-about-future-space-warfare]

Janne Korhonen, an author and economics graduate student at Aalto University in Finland, is one of the world’s handful of interstellar military theorists (yes, these people exist). In 2013 he argued that aliens, even if in possession of vastly superior technologically, are very unlikely to attack us. To begin with, why would they bother? War is typically fought over resources. Almost one century ago, historian John Edwin Bakeless found that 14 of the 20 wars from 1878 to 1918 had economic motivations strongly connected to asserting control of natural resources. The number is even larger when you include wars of colonial conquest, which can be counted as no-contest resource-grabs.

But if aliens are looking for resources, an assault on Earth doesn’t make a whole lot of sense, since the gas giant planets and the asteroid belt offer huge repositories of materials for the taking. Sure, Earth does have the most varied minerals in the solar system because of the action of life and water, but just to get to our solar system would require huge amounts of fuel, making the whole venture rather pointless from a cost-benefit view. Only an alien species that requires our specific minerals (or needs to eat sentient carbon-based organisms) would trouble itself with such a voyage.

Nonetheless, if extraterrestrials did want to pick a fight with us, they would be running a huge risk. Korhonen argued that, unless they were 100-percent sure they could destroy us, they could never be assured of final victory. It is often said that advanced aliens would regard us as mere ants—and anyone who has ants in their house or yard knows they are almost impossible to eradicate. Even a few survivors could quickly multiply to repopulate the planet, while learning from the attacker’s technology and preparing a retaliation. Meanwhile, neighboring civilizations might see the act of aggression and join the battle, if only to protect their own interests. In light of this strategic calculus, aliens would be foolish to invade.

### 1ar – at: space col good

#### Nuclear war means we can’t get off the rock

Engdahl ‘2k

[Sylvia – Prof at the New School for Social Research. “Space and Human Survival” [www.sylviaengdahl.com](http://www.sylviaengdahl.com) 2000]

I have called this stage in our evolution the “Critical Stage.” Paul Levinson [the Director of Connected Education] uses different terminology for the same concept. He says that we have only a narrow window to get into space, a relatively short time during which we have the capability, but have not yet run out of the resources to do it. I agree with him completely about this. Expansion into space demands high technology and full utilization of our world’s material resources (although not destructive utilization). It also demands financial resources that we will not have if we deplete the material resources of Earth. And it demands human resources, which we will lose if we are reduced to global war or widespread starvation. Finally, it demands spiritual resources, which we are not likely to retain under the sort of dictatorship that would be necessary to maintain a “sustainable” global civilization. Because the window is narrow, then, we not only have to worry about immediate perils. The ultimate, unavoidable danger for our planet, the transformation of our sun, is distant—but if we don’t expand into space now, we can never do it.

### 1ar – at: space col bad

#### Every delay kills trillions of humans

Bostrom 3 – Department of Philosophy, Yale University, Director of the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University, 2002 (Nick, “Astronomical Waste: The Opportunity Cost of Delayed Technological Development,” Preprint, Utilitas Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 308-314, http://www.nickbostrom.com/astronomical/waste.html)

As I write these words, suns are illuminating and heating empty rooms, unused energy is being flushed down black holes, and our great common endowment of negentropy is being irreversibly degraded into entropy on a cosmic scale. These are resources that an advanced civilization could have used to create value-structures, such as sentient beings living worthwhile lives. The rate of this loss boggles the mind. One recent paper speculates, using loose theoretical considerations based on the rate of increase of entropy, that the loss of potential human lives in our own galactic supercluster is at least ~10^46 per century of delayed colonization.[1] This estimate assumes that all the lost entropy could have been used for productive purposes, although no currently known technological mechanisms are even remotely capable of doing that. Since the estimate is meant to be a lower bound, this radically unconservative assumption is undesirable. We can, however, get a lower bound more straightforwardly by simply counting the number or stars in our galactic supercluster and multiplying this number with the amount of computing power that the resources of each star could be used to generate using technologies for whose feasibility a strong case has already been made. We can then divide this total with the estimated amount of computing power needed to simulate one human life. As a rough approximation, let us say the Virgo Supercluster contains 10^13 stars. One estimate of the computing power extractable from a star and with an associated planet-sized computational structure, using advanced molecular nanotechnology[2], is 10^42 operations per second.[3] A typical estimate of the human brain’s processing power is roughly 10^17 operations per second or less.[4] Not much more seems to be needed to simulate the relevant parts of the environment in sufficient detail to enable the simulated minds to have experiences indistinguishable from typical current human experiences.[5] Given these estimates, it follows that the potential for approximately 10^38 human lives is lost every century that colonization of our local supercluster is delayed; or equivalently, about 10^31 potential human lives per second. While this estimate is conservative in that it assumes only computational mechanisms whose implementation has been at least outlined in the literature, it is useful to have an even more conservative estimate that does not assume a non-biological instantiation of the potential persons. Suppose that about 10^10 biological humans could be sustained around an average star. Then the Virgo Supercluster could contain 10^23 biological humans. This corresponds to a loss of potential equal to about 10^14 potential human lives per second of delayed colonization. What matters for present purposes is not the exact numbers but the fact that they are huge. Even with the most conservative estimate, assuming a biological implementation of all persons, the potential for one hundred trillion potential human beings is lost for every second of postponement of colonization of our supercluster.[6]

# 1ar – t

## solvency advocates

### 1ar

#### We meet – the NAC is the five countries in the plan

#### C/I – solvency advocates just have to defend the aff mechanism not the actor

#### Solves all their offense – the mechanism is the same

#### It’s key to get out of bad actor counterplans

#### And it encourages aff flexibility

## new affs

### 1ar – new affs bad

#### C/I – we don’t have to disclose new affirmatives

#### 1. New affs are good – they create a strategic incentive to research through the ability to not disclose new which pushes the community towards aff innovation and exploring new areas of literature.

#### 2. Coaching skews mean pre round prep is not an actionable standard – obviously small schools can never take advantage of preround disclosure when a team has 17 coaches cutting case negs and updates before the round

#### 3. No brightline – theory shouldn’t be about best out of round practices. That inevitably devolves to "you were a few minutes late, took too long with coaches before disclosure, etc. all of which are at the expense of substance. Means you should default to reasonability – competing interpretations create a race to the bottom.

### 1ar – plan text

#### C/I – we don’t have to disclose new affirmatives or their plan text

#### 1. New affs are good – they create a strategic incentive to research through the ability to not disclose new which pushes the community towards aff innovation and exploring new areas of literature. Plan texts are uniquely key – especially on a topic like this they can predict the entire aff from the plan text.

#### 2. Coaching skews mean pre round prep is not an actionable standard – obviously small schools can never take advantage of preround disclosure when a team has 17 coaches cutting case negs and updates before the round

#### 3. No brightline – theory shouldn’t be about best out of round practices. That inevitably devolves to "you were a few minutes late, took too long with coaches before disclosure, etc. all of which are at the expense of substance. Means you should default to reasonability – competing interpretations create a race to the bottom.

## t – states

### 1ar

#### Counterinterp – the NAC is a collection of states

TEIMUN nd “The North Atlantic Council at TEIMUN 2019” <https://teimun.org/teimun-conference/councils/north-atlantic-council/> //KohlW

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the highest and most important political governing body of NATO, the world’s foremost political-military alliance. The NAC meets frequently at various levels, from the Permanent Representatives to the Heads of States of all 29 member states. Together, they decide on the major questions of security requiring collective action and issue joint communiqués to the public.

## t – eliminate – 1ac v1

### 1ar – t

#### We meet – the only nukes anyone an justifiably claim are NATOs are US TNWs – anything else is a countries own stockpile

#### C/I – eliminate means entirely remove a single or multiple items

Cambridge Dictionary https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/eliminate

eliminate verb [ T ] US /ɪˈlɪm·əˌneɪt/ to remove or take away something: to remove or take away something: You can never totally eliminate the possibility of human error. elimination noun [ U ] US /ɪˌlɪm·əˈneɪ·ʃən/ Arts programs face elimination in some school systems.

#### Second C/I – the plan must be a single instance of the functional breadth of the resolution

#### Their interp is garbage – the resolution doesn’t say ALL nuclear arsenals – even if they’re right that eliminate is completely remove, that just means completely removing each arsenal instead of reducing the number of nukes in an arsenal

#### Vote aff

#### 1. Innovation—specificity encourages updated research which solves neg ground and checks stale debates because we get the best education and levels the playing field for small schools

#### 2. Aff Specificity—I need to weigh the specificity of the aff against DAs – otherwise the aff always loses to a perfect 1NC

#### 3. PICs—Whole rez means they’ll just read PICs—that o/w—a) PICs steal all aff ground and b) Non-uniques neg offense—specific debates are inevitable

#### generic politics DAs, Ks, solvency and few unique advantages across affs checks all their offense

4. reasonability, we meet within a reasonab;e amount.

## t – nebel

### t

#### I meet – comparative worlds means specification is justified pragmatically even if it’s not semantically correct

#### Counterinterp – the plan must be a single instance of the functional breadth of the whole resolution

#### Prefer—

#### 1. Innovation—Plans encourage updated research which solves neg ground and checks stale debates because we get the best education and levels the playing field for small schools

#### 2. Aff Ground—

#### a. Specificity—I need to weigh the specificity of the aff against DAs – otherwise they’d always win on a perfect prepout bc time skew

#### b. PICs—Whole rez means they’ll just read PICs—that o/w—a) PICs steal all aff ground and b) Non-uniques neg offense—specific debates are inevitable

#### Some defense –

#### Inherency, solvency advocates, and harms check limits

#### Topic Ks centered around liberalism and nuclear rhetoric and core negative ground such as bioweapons shift or global order means the neg will always have something to read

## t – their

### t – their – 1ar

#### Counterinterp – arsenals are where the nukes are stored

Merriam-Webster Dictionary <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/arsenal> //KohlW

Definition of arsenal 1a: an establishment for the manufacture or storage of arms and military equipment

#### Second counterinterp – nuclear-sharing states possess the nuclear weapons and arsenals – it’s precedented in the literature

Chossudovsky 18 – Michel Chossudovsky is an award-winning author, Professor of Economics (emeritus) at the University of Ottawa, Founder and Director of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG), Montreal, Editor of Global Research. “Double Standards? Europe’s Five “Undeclared Nuclear Weapons States”. Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Turkey” GlobalResearch July 12, 2018 <https://www.globalresearch.ca/europe-s-five-undeclared-nuclear-weapons-states/17550> //KohlW

Amply documented, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Turkey are in possession of nuclear weapons which are deployed under national command against Russia, Iran and the Middle East. Following the failed July 2016 military coup in Turkey, the media reported on Turkey’s nuclear weapons stored and deployed at the Incirlik airbase. The US National Resources Defense Council in a February 2005 report confirmed Turkey’s deployment of 90 so-called tactical B61 nuclear weapons, some of which were subsequently decommissioned The stockpiling and deployment of tactical B61 in these five “non-nuclear states” are intended for targets in the Middle East. Moreover, in accordance with “NATO strike plans”, these thermonuclear B61 bunker buster bombs (stockpiled by the “non-nuclear States”) could be launched “against targets in Russia or countries in the Middle East such as Syria and Iran” ( quoted in National Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Weapons in Europe , February 2005, emphasis added) In 2016, press reports including Deutsche Welle confirmed the deployment of Turkey’s 50 B61 nuclear weapons out of its Incirlik air force base. But this has been known for years. It took the media ten years to acknowledge that Turkey (a non-nuclear State) possesses a sizeable nuclear arsenal.

#### “Their” is possessive

YourDictionary “Examples of Possessive Pronouns” <https://examples.yourdictionary.com/examples-of-possessive-pronouns.html> //KohlW

Possessive pronouns include my, mine, our, ours, its, his, her, hers, their, theirs, your and yours. These are all words that demonstrate ownership. If the book belongs to me, then it is mine. If the book belongs to her, then it is hers.

#### Prefer it –

#### a. they overlimit – there are only 9 topical affs under their interp and most of them have zero lit base – that’s uniquely bad for the janfeb topic which we debate for 5 months – means the aff always loses and prevents argument innovation and research

#### b. foreign policy knowledge – only affs about nuclear sharing enable discussion of relations between different countries – there’s no way they can win on this – our Kühn card indicates that discussion of NATO nuclear-sharing scenarios is uniquely educational for foreign policy and scenario-planning education and requires in-depth knowledge of issues surrounding NATO which outweighs because it’s rare we get good foreign policy topics in LD

#### some defense

#### we literally add one aff to a tiny topic – even if they win that there’s no common ground between affs, that non-uniques all their offense

#### there is stable ground – any lit against UK or France applies to our aff – they could read a PIC out of a country – and they literally have to read one card to win an internal link turn for our deterrence advantage

#### prefer reasonability – competing interpretations causes a race to the bottom and crowds out substance – our evidence proves the aff is reasonably substantiated by the topic literature

## t – nuclear arsenals

### t – arsenals – 1ar

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#### Second counterinterp – nuclear-sharing states possess nuclear arsenals

Chossudovsky 18 – Michel Chossudovsky is an award-winning author, Professor of Economics (emeritus) at the University of Ottawa, Founder and Director of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG), Montreal, Editor of Global Research. “Double Standards? Europe’s Five “Undeclared Nuclear Weapons States”. Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Turkey” GlobalResearch July 12, 2018 <https://www.globalresearch.ca/europe-s-five-undeclared-nuclear-weapons-states/17550> //KohlW

Amply documented, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Turkey are in possession of nuclear weapons which are deployed under national command against Russia, Iran and the Middle East. Following the failed July 2016 military coup in Turkey, the media reported on Turkey’s nuclear weapons stored and deployed at the Incirlik airbase. The US National Resources Defense Council in a February 2005 report confirmed Turkey’s deployment of 90 so-called tactical B61 nuclear weapons, some of which were subsequently decommissioned The stockpiling and deployment of tactical B61 in these five “non-nuclear states” are intended for targets in the Middle East. Moreover, in accordance with “NATO strike plans”, these thermonuclear B61 bunker buster bombs (stockpiled by the “non-nuclear States”) could be launched “against targets in Russia or countries in the Middle East such as Syria and Iran” ( quoted in National Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Weapons in Europe , February 2005, emphasis added) In 2016, press reports including Deutsche Welle confirmed the deployment of Turkey’s 50 B61 nuclear weapons out of its Incirlik air force base. But this has been known for years. It took the media ten years to acknowledge that Turkey (a non-nuclear State) possesses a sizeable nuclear arsenal.

#### It’s precedented by the lit – we’ll insert screenshots from the Nuclear Threat Initiative

a. Italy – https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/italy-nuclear-disarmament/



b. Germany – https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/germany-nuclear-disarmament/



c. Turkey – https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/turkey-nuclear-disarmament/



d. Belgium – https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/belgium-nuclear-disarmament/



e. Netherlands – https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/netherlands-nuclear-disarmament/



#### Prefer it –

#### a. they overlimit – there are only 9 topical affs under their interp and most of them have zero lit base – that’s uniquely bad for the janfeb topic which we debate for 5 months – means the aff always loses and prevents argument innovation and research

#### b. foreign policy knowledge – only affs about nuclear sharing enable discussion of relations between different countries – there’s no way they can win on this – our Kühn card indicates that discussion of NATO nuclear-sharing scenarios is uniquely educational for foreign policy and scenario-planning education and requires in-depth knowledge of issues surrounding NATO which outweighs because it’s rare we get good foreign policy topics in LD

#### some defense

#### we literally add one aff to a tiny topic – even if they win that there’s no common ground between affs, that non-uniques all their offense

#### there is stable ground – any lit against UK or France applies to our aff – they could read a PIC out of a country – and they literally have to read one card to win an internal link turn for our deterrence advantage

#### prefer reasonability – competing interpretations causes a race to the bottom and crowds out substance – our evidence proves the aff is reasonably substantiated by the topic literature

# 1ar – da

## 1ar – deterrence

## 1ar – turkey prolif

### 1ar

#### Turkey won’t develop nuclear weapons

Sanger and Broad 10/20 – David E. Sanger, national security correspondent at the NYTimes, William J. Broad, science journalist at NYTimes, “Erdogan’s Ambitions Go Beyond Syria. He Says He Wants Nuclear Weapons.” NYTimes, Oct 20 2019 <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/20/world/middleeast/erdogan-turkey-nuclear-weapons-trump.html> //KohlW

Experts said it would take a number of years for Turkey to get to a weapon, unless Mr. Erdogan bought one. And the risk for Mr. Erdogan would be considerable. “Erdogan is playing to an anti-American domestic audience with his nuclear rhetoric, but is highly unlikely to pursue nuclear weapons,” said Jessica C. Varnum, an expert on Turkey at Middlebury’s James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, Calif. “There would be huge economic and reputational costs to Turkey, which would hurt the pocketbooks of Erdogan’s voters.” “For Erdogan,” Ms. Varnum said, “that strikes me as a bridge too far.”

#### Turn – turkey can literally use the US B-61 bombs if it wants to – the reason they don’t is they know it would piss off the US and they’re already worried NATO doesn’t care about them

## 1ar – nato bad

## 1ar – nato good

### 1ar – collapse inev

### 1ar – plan good for nato

### 1ar – at: turkey

### 1ar – nato bad

#### NATO cohesion increases the risk of war with Russia and escalates global hotspots

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Meanwhile, back in Europe, NATO’s continued existence — and, in fact, its expansion — has mostly served to resuscitate the very issue it was created to solve: Russian aggression. Soviet leaders had long viewed NATO with suspicion, and the fact that it continued to soldier on even after the ostensible basis for its existence had ceased to be only heightened this suspicion. According to declassified documents, both Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin were repeatedly assured by the first Bush and Clinton administrations, respectively, that NATO wouldn’t expand eastward, something Russians viewed as unacceptable. Imagine, for instance, how US policymakers might feel if the Soviet Union had established a military alliance with a handful of South American states during the Cold War explicitly as a bulwark against the United States, then when peace at last came, began inviting more and more South and Central American countries to the alliance while breaking an explicit promise not to do so. This is effectively what NATO has done during the 1990s and beyond in Eastern Europe. With sixteen member states by the end of the Cold War (all North American and European), NATO has, between 1999 and now 2018, added fourteen new member states, all from Eastern Europe, including two (Latvia and Estonia) right on the Russian border. Macedonia has officially joined as of last week’s summit. Not all US officials thought this was smart. Kennan, for instance, warned at the time that eastward expansion of NATO would be a “strategic blunder of potentially epic proportions” and “the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era.” Robert Gates, secretary of defense for both Bush and Obama, has said that “pressing ahead with expansion of NATO eastward … aggravated the relationship between the United States and Russia.” This was compounded, said Gates, by the fact that just a few weeks after adding its first three eastern European member states in 1999, NATO began bombing Belgrade, a conflict that was only prevented from spinning into a wider, more dangerous confrontation because NATO captain James Blunt — yes, that James Blunt — and a British general refused to follow Wesley Clark’s command to take control of a Russian-held airport in Pristina, Kosovo. Kennan’s warnings about the effect of this expansion were prescient. He warned that it would “inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion” and “impel Russian foreign policy in a direction decidedly not to our liking.” When Yeltsin, leading a weakened Russia, had no choice but to accept NATO expansion at a 1997 summit with Clinton in Helsinki, Russian politicians denounced it as “the largest military threat to our country over the last fifty years” and “a Treaty of Versailles for Russia.” “There was no reason for this whatsoever,” Kennan told the New York Times’s Thomas Friedman about the expansion. “Of course there is going to be a bad reaction from Russia, and then [the NATO expanders] will say that we always told you that is how the Russians are — but this is just wrong.” As early as 1997, Kennan fretted that it would result in “a new Cold War, probably ending in a hot one, and the end of the effort to achieve a workable democracy in Russia.” This is a history that is almost entirely left out of most defenses of NATO in the mainstream press, not to mention in accounts of Putin’s aggressive actions. And it’s no mere excuse-making on behalf of the Kremlin. Even Michael McFaul — Obama’s ambassador to Russia between 2012 and 2014, and far from a Putin apologist or dove — acknowledged in a recent debate that Russian policymakers have reacted to “aggressive US policies,” including the Iraq War and US support for “color revolutions” in Eastern Europe, which “intensified conflict and tension in US-Russia relations.” McFaul also argues that the other major ingredient was the 2012 return to power of Putin, a reactive leader paranoid about American intentions in the region who is inclined to view US actions with mistrust. This is an alarming cocktail, especially as the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists has warned that the world is closer to nuclear annihilation than it’s ever been thanks partly due to tensions with Russia. And it’s only been made worse by last week’s summit. While most of the media spent the NATO summit chiding Trump for supposedly undermining NATO at the behest of Putin, the summit produced a marked military escalation implicitly aimed at Russia, and there is evidence that Trump’s haranguing of European leaders actually succeeded in ramping up already provocative NATO military spending. Yet not only is there an almost total absence of voices in the mainstream media calling for a de-escalation of tensions between the US and Russia, it’s members of the media — liberal ones, very often — who are virtually baying for conflict with Putin, arguing, as George Kennan had warned they would, that Putin’s reactive aggression is simply “how the Russians are.” With two minutes until midnight on the doomsday clock, and an atmosphere of historically bad mutual mistrust between Russia and Western leadership, the commentariat has nearly unanimously cast suspicion on an entirely routine diplomatic meeting between Trump and his Russian counterpart (and one Trump has taken more than twice as long to undertake than his predecessors) where they are set to discuss reducing their nuclear weapons, before transitioning to calling for its cancellation. When you ignore Trump’s rhetoric — as commentators correctly tend to do when the subject is domestic policy — his administration has been one of the more aggressive toward Russia in recent memory. That most of the media ignores this is mirrored by their fierce, unanimous defense of NATO, one that entirely leaves out the alliance’s failures and the fact that it’s brought us to this perilous moment. Turning Back the Clock At best, NATO is a Cold War relic whose attempts to broaden its mission in the twenty-first century have been disastrous failures. At worst, it’s a vehicle for anti-Russian provocation that both strengthens the hand of reactionary forces in Russia and edges the world closer and closer to armed, potentially nuclear, conflict. Yes, getting rid of NATO is one of Putin’s most cherished goals. But that fact alone shouldn’t color debate over NATO, any more than it would be a good idea to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine just because Putin wouldn’t like it. We are in a dangerous moment in history, as the vast majority of media coverage has focused on wild conspiracies about whether or not the US president is Putin’s “asset” instead of on the rapidly escalating tensions between Russia and the West. This escalation should be rolled back. One way to do that involves questioning the continued existence of NATO, as it has played a key role in bringing tensions to their current boiling point. The scope of debate shouldn’t depend on whatever the US president does or says on any given day.

# 1ar – cp

## at: first strike cp

### 1ar – solvency defecit

#### The CP doesn’t solve the aff – our internal links rely on Russian perception – they’ll still first strike to divide NATO because they don’t know that durable fiat is a thing and will think NATO will get divided over whether to reverse the planetary defense policy

### 1ar – asteroids

#### The PIC fails – no secondary deflection, large NEOs are highly improbable, no known large NEO threat, nonnuclear tech solves, and the case outweighs.

Graham and Schweickart, 8 [Thomas Graham, Jr., served as special representative of the president for arms control in the 1990s and now chairs Thorium Power Ltd., which develops proliferation-resistant reactor fuel. Russell L. Schweickart, a former astronaut who flew on Apollo 9, heads the B612 Foundation, which champions the testing of spacecraft designs that can deflect NEOs, "NASA's Flimsy Argument for Nuclear Weapons", 3-1-2008, Scientific American, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/nasas-flimsy-argument-for-nuclear-weapons/, accessed 12-3-2019]

 On January 4, 2007, the Wall Street Journal published an op-ed entitled “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” written by an impressive array of statesmen: former secretary of state George Shultz, former secretary of defense William Perry, former secretary of state Henry Kissinger and former senator Sam Nunn of Georgia. In the article the authors worried that the likelihood of international terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons is increasing. They asserted that “unless urgent new actions are taken, the U.S. soon will be compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically disorienting and economically even more costly than was Cold War deterrence.” Invoking President Ronald Reagan’s call in the 1980s for the abolition of all nuclear weapons, they endorsed “setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically on the actions required to reach that goal.” Recently, however, a counterargument has been advanced—by NASA. In 2005 Congress ordered the space agency to analyze the alternatives that it could employ to divert a near-Earth object (NEO)—an asteroid or comet—if one was found to be on a collision course with our planet. Last March, NASA submitted a report entitled “Near-Earth Object Survey and Deflection Analysis of Alternatives,” having first coordinated its response with the White House, the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy. In its report NASA chose to analyze only the highly improbable threat posed by large NEOs, which very rarely strike Earth, in lieu of the more realistic danger of a collision with one of the cohort of smaller NEOs, which are far more numerous. What is more, the report emphasized the effectiveness of nuclear explosions in providing the force to deflect an NEO from a collision course, but it completely neglected the need for precision in such a procedure. This analysis is seriously flawed. It is important not only to deflect an NEO from a collision course with Earth (primary deflection) but also to avoid knocking the object into a potential return orbit that would cause it to come back a few years later (secondary deflection). Nuclear explosions are not controllable in this way. But a nonnuclear kinetic impact—that is, simply smashing a spacecraft into an NEO—can provide the primary deflection for the vast majority of objects, and a precise secondary deflection, if necessary, could be performed by an accompanying gravity-tractor spacecraft, which would be needed in any event to observe the NEo deflection and its aftermath [see "Gravitational Tractor for Towing Asteroids,” by Edward T. Lu and Stanley G. Love, in Nature; November 10, 2005]. Nuclear explosives would be needed only for deflecting the largest NEOs, which are the least common and most easily detectable objects. Scientists are not concerned about a collision with an extremely large NEO—say, 10 kilometers in diameter—because all these objects have been discovered and none currently threatens Earth. Big things are easy for astronomers to find; the smaller objects are what we have to worry about./Of the estimated 4,000 NEOs with diameters of 400 meters or more—which includes all objects that might conceivably require nuclear explosives to divert them—researchers have so far identified about 1,500. And if NASA meets the search goals mandated by Congress, it will locate 98 percent of these objects and calculate 100-year projections of their orbits by 2020. As NASA continues to find big NEOs, the calculations of risk change accordingly. A decade ago, before astronomers began to systematically locate NEOs larger than 400 meters in diameter, they estimated that we faced a statistical risk of being struck by such an object once every 100,000 years. But now that researchers have identified and are tracking about 37 percent of these NEOs, the frequency of being hit by one of the remaining large objects has dropped to once in 160,000 years. Unless NASA finds a large NEO on an immediate collision course by 2020 (a very unlikely event), the frequency of a collision with one of the 80 still undiscovered objects (2 percent of 4,000) will drop to once every five million years. Thus, the probability that nuclear explosives might be needed to deflect an NEO is extremely small. And even this minuscule probability will diminish to the vanishing point as researchers improve nonnuclear interception technologies. After 2020 the need to keep nuclear devices on standby to defend against an NEO virtually disappears. As a result, the decision to move toward the worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons can be made strictly on the basis of human threats to global security. Extraterrestrial dangers need not be considered.

## at: negotiations

### 1ar – cp

#### Perm do the aff and then the CP

#### Perm do both – either Russia says no which means the CP doesn’t solve or Russia says yes and the CP is the plan

#### Perm do the CP – it’s is textually plan plus

#### Russia says no – they view nuclear sharing as an asymmetry – the aff is a prereq

Russia Times 12 – “Russia on AMD: Words not enough” 19 Apr, 2012 <https://www.rt.com/russia/nato-lavrov-nuclear-defense-460/> //KohlW

Speaking in Brussels, the foreign minister also said that Russia and the US may reduce tactical nuclear weapons on a mutual basis only after America withdraws such weapons from Europe. “Unlike Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons, US weapons are deployed outside the country,” Lavrov stated. Furthermore, the infrastructure for their use remains in full combat readiness. The minister stressed that before talks on the matter could begin, the positions of both sides should be considered on an equal basis.

#### Negotiation CPs are a voter--

#### a) Conditional fiat – multiple words of outcomes kills 1ar strategy and allow the neg to change advocacy in the block or 2nr – justifies perm do the plan in the world they say yes otherwise it is a solvency deficit to the cp

#### b) CPs that have the possibility of doing the entire plan are bad – crush aff ground and become neg crutch because of artificial comp

#### Aff gets to define the plan otherwise there is an unlimited number of normal means standards the neg could hold us accountable to

#### Russia says no – otherwise they’ll have a strategic disadvantage to other countries like China

#### The CP causes miscalc and Russian aggression – it’s how they respond to perceived NATO encroachment

Mearsheimer 14 [John J, professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2014 Issue, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault>] SE-WR

But this account is wrong: the United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis. The taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West. At the same time, the EU’s expansion eastward and the West’s backing of the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine -- beginning with the Orange Revolution in 2004 -- were critical elements, too. Since the mid-1990s, Russian leaders have adamantly opposed NATO enlargement, and in recent years, they have made it clear that they would not stand by while their strategically important neighbor turned into a Western bastion. For Putin, the illegal overthrow of Ukraine’s democratically elected and pro-Russian president -- which he rightly labeled a “coup” -- was the final straw. He responded by taking Crimea, a peninsula he feared would host a NATO naval base, and working to destabilize Ukraine until it abandoned its efforts to join the West. Putin’s pushback should have come as no surprise. After all, the West had been moving into Russia’s backyard and threatening its core strategic interests, a point Putin made emphatically and repeatedly. Elites in the United States and Europe have been blindsided by events only because they subscribe to a flawed view of international politics. They tend to believe that the logic of realism holds little relevance in the twenty-first century and that Europe can be kept whole and free on the basis of such liberal principles as the rule of law, economic interdependence, and democracy. But this grand scheme went awry in Ukraine. The crisis there shows that realpolitik remains relevant -- and states that ignore it do so at their own peril. U.S. and European leaders blundered in attempting to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia’s border. Now that the consequences have been laid bare, it would be an even greater mistake to continue this misbegotten policy. THE WESTERN AFFRONT As the Cold War came to a close, Soviet leaders preferred that U.S. forces remain in Europe and NATO stay intact, an arrangement they thought would keep a reunified Germany pacified. But they and their Russian successors did not want NATO to grow any larger and assumed that Western diplomats understood their concerns. The Clinton administration evidently thought otherwise, and in the mid-1990s, it began pushing for NATO to expand. The first round of enlargement took place in 1999 and brought in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The second occurred in 2004; it included Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Moscow complained bitterly from the start. During NATO’s 1995 bombing campaign against the Bosnian Serbs, for example, Russian President Boris Yeltsin said, “This is the first sign of what could happen when NATO comes right up to the Russian Federation’s borders. ... The flame of war could burst out across the whole of Europe.” But the Russians were too weak at the time to derail NATO’s eastward movement -- which, at any rate, did not look so threatening, since none of the new members shared a border with Russia, save for the tiny Baltic countries. Then NATO began looking further east. At its April 2008 summit in Bucharest, the alliance considered admitting Georgia and Ukraine. The George W. Bush administration supported doing so, but France and Germany opposed the move for fear that it would unduly antagonize Russia. In the end, NATO’s members reached a compromise: the alliance did not begin the formal process leading to membership, but it issued a statement endorsing the aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine and boldly declaring, “These countries will become members of NATO.” Moscow, however, did not see the outcome as much of a compromise. Alexander Grushko, then Russia’s deputy foreign minister, said, “Georgia’s and Ukraine’s membership in the alliance is a huge strategic mistake which would have most serious consequences for pan-European security.” Putin maintained that admitting those two countries to NATO would represent a “direct threat” to Russia. One Russian newspaper reported that Putin, while speaking with Bush, “very transparently hinted that if Ukraine was accepted into NATO, it would cease to exist.” Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008 should have dispelled any remaining doubts about Putin’s determination to prevent Georgia and Ukraine from joining NATO. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, who was deeply committed to bringing his country into NATO, had decided in the summer of 2008 to reincorporate two separatist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But Putin sought to keep Georgia weak and divided -- and out of NATO. After fighting broke out between the Georgian government and South Ossetian separatists, Russian forces took control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moscow had made its point. Yet despite this clear warning, NATO never publicly abandoned its goal of bringing Georgia and Ukraine into the alliance. And NATO expansion continued marching forward, with Albania and Croatia becoming members in 2009. The EU, too, has been marching eastward. In May 2008, it unveiled its Eastern Partnership initiative, a program to foster prosperity in such countries as Ukraine and integrate them into the EU economy. Not surprisingly, Russian leaders view the plan as hostile to their country’s interests. This past February, before Yanukovych was forced from office, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused the EU of trying to create a “sphere of influence” in eastern Europe. In the eyes of Russian leaders, EU expansion is a stalking horse for NATO expansion. The West’s final tool for peeling Kiev away from Moscow has been its efforts to spread Western values and promote democracy in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states, a plan that often entails funding pro-Western individuals and organizations. Victoria Nuland, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, estimated in December 2013 that the United States had invested more than $5 billion since 1991 to help Ukraine achieve “the future it deserves.” As part of that effort, the U.S. government has bankrolled the National Endowment for Democracy. The nonprofit foundation has funded more than 60 projects aimed at promoting civil society in Ukraine, and the NED’s president, Carl Gershman, has called that country “the biggest prize.” After Yanukovych won Ukraine’s presidential election in February 2010, the NED decided he was undermining its goals, and so it stepped up its efforts to support the opposition and strengthen the country’s democratic institutions. When Russian leaders look at Western social engineering in Ukraine, they worry that their country might be next. And such fears are hardly groundless. In September 2013, Gershman wrote in The Washington Post, “Ukraine’s choice to join Europe will accelerate the demise of the ideology of Russian imperialism that Putin represents.” He added: “Russians, too, face a choice, and Putin may find himself on the losing end not just in the near abroad but within Russia itself.” CREATING A CRISIS The West’s triple package of policies -- NATO enlargement, EU expansion, and democracy promotion -- added fuel to a fire waiting to ignite. The spark came in November 2013, when Yanukovych rejected a major economic deal he had been negotiating with the EU and decided to accept a $15 billion Russian counteroffer instead. That decision gave rise to antigovernment demonstrations that escalated over the following three months and that by mid-February had led to the deaths of some one hundred protesters. Western emissaries hurriedly flew to Kiev to resolve the crisis. On February 21, the government and the opposition struck a deal that allowed Yanukovych to stay in power until new elections were held. But it immediately fell apart, and Yanukovych fled to Russia the next day. The new government in Kiev was pro-Western and anti-Russian to the core, and it contained four high-ranking members who could legitimately be labeled neofascists. Although the full extent of U.S. involvement has not yet come to light, it is clear that Washington backed the coup. Nuland and Republican Senator John McCain participated in antigovernment demonstrations, and Geoffrey Pyatt, the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, proclaimed after Yanukovych’s toppling that it was “a day for the history books.” As a leaked telephone recording revealed, Nuland had advocated regime change and wanted the Ukrainian politician Arseniy Yatsenyuk to become prime minister in the new government, which he did. No wonder Russians of all persuasions think the West played a role in Yanukovych’s ouster. For Putin, the time to act against Ukraine and the West had arrived. Shortly after February 22, he ordered Russian forces to take Crimea from Ukraine, and soon after that, he incorporated it into Russia. The task proved relatively easy, thanks to the thousands of Russian troops already stationed at a naval base in the Crimean port of Sevastopol. Crimea also made for an easy target since ethnic Russians compose roughly 60 percent of its population. Most of them wanted out of Ukraine. Next, Putin put massive pressure on the new government in Kiev to discourage it from siding with the West against Moscow, making it clear that he would wreck Ukraine as a functioning state before he would allow it to become a Western stronghold on Russia’s doorstep. Toward that end, he has provided advisers, arms, and diplomatic support to the Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine, who are pushing the country toward civil war. He has massed a large army on the Ukrainian border, threatening to invade if the government cracks down on the rebels. And he has sharply raised the price of the natural gas Russia sells to Ukraine and demanded payment for past exports. Putin is playing hardball. THE DIAGNOSIS Putin’s actions should be easy to comprehend. A huge expanse of flat land that Napoleonic France, imperial Germany, and Nazi Germany all crossed to strike at Russia itself, Ukraine serves as a buffer state of enormous strategic importance to Russia. No Russian leader would tolerate a military alliance that was Moscow’s mortal enemy until recently moving into Ukraine. Nor would any Russian leader stand idly by while the West helped install a government there that was determined to integrate Ukraine into the West. Washington may not like Moscow’s position, but it should understand the logic behind it. This is Geopolitics 101: great powers are always sensitive to potential threats near their home territory. After all, the United States does not tolerate distant great powers deploying military forces anywhere in the Western Hemisphere, much less on its borders. Imagine the outrage in Washington if China built an impressive military alliance and tried to include Canada and Mexico in it. Logic aside, Russian leaders have told their Western counterparts on many occasions that they consider NATO expansion into Georgia and Ukraine unacceptable, along with any effort to turn those countries against Russia -- a message that the 2008 Russian-Georgian war also made crystal clear. Officials from the United States and its European allies contend that they tried hard to assuage Russian fears and that Moscow should understand that NATO has no designs on Russia. In addition to continually denying that its expansion was aimed at containing Russia, the alliance has never permanently deployed military forces in its new member states. In 2002, it even created a body called the NATO-Russia Council in an effort to foster cooperation. To further mollify Russia, the United States announced in 2009 that it would deploy its new missile defense system on warships in European waters, at least initially, rather than on Czech or Polish territory. But none of these measures worked; the Russians remained steadfastly opposed to NATO enlargement, especially into Georgia and Ukraine. And it is the Russians, not the West, who ultimately get to decide what counts as a threat to them. To understand why the West, especially the United States, failed to understand that its Ukraine policy was laying the groundwork for a major clash with Russia, one must go back to the mid-1990s, when the Clinton administration began advocating NATO expansion. Pundits advanced a variety of arguments for and against enlargement, but there was no consensus on what to do. Most eastern European émigrés in the United States and their relatives, for example, strongly supported expansion, because they wanted NATO to protect such countries as Hungary and Poland. A few realists also favored the policy because they thought Russia still needed to be contained. But most realists opposed expansion, in the belief that a declining great power with an aging population and a one-dimensional economy did not in fact need to be contained. And they feared that enlargement would only give Moscow an incentive to cause trouble in eastern Europe. The U.S. diplomat George Kennan articulated this perspective in a 1998 interview, shortly after the U.S. Senate approved the first round of NATO expansion. “I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies,” he said. “I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anyone else.” Most liberals, on the other hand, favored enlargement, including many key members of the Clinton administration. They believed that the end of the Cold War had fundamentally transformed international politics and that a new, postnational order had replaced the realist logic that used to govern Europe. The United States was not only the “indispensable nation,” as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright put it; it was also a benign hegemon and thus unlikely to be viewed as a threat in Moscow. The aim, in essence, was to make the entire continent look like western Europe. And so the United States and its allies sought to promote democracy in the countries of eastern Europe, increase economic interdependence among them, and embed them in international institutions. Having won the debate in the United States, liberals had little difficulty convincing their European allies to support NATO enlargement. After all, given the EU’s past achievements, Europeans were even more wedded than Americans to the idea that geopolitics no longer mattered and that an all-inclusive liberal order could maintain peace in Europe. So thoroughly did liberals come to dominate the discourse about European security during the first decade of this century that even as the alliance adopted an open-door policy of growth, NATO expansion faced little realist opposition. The liberal worldview is now accepted dogma among U.S. officials. In March, for example, President Barack Obama delivered a speech about Ukraine in which he talked repeatedly about “the ideals” that motivate Western policy and how those ideals “have often been threatened by an older, more traditional view of power.” Secretary of State John Kerry’s response to the Crimea crisis reflected this same perspective: “You just don’t in the twenty-first century behave in nineteenth-century fashion by invading another country on completely trumped-up pretext.” In essence, the two sides have been operating with different playbooks: Putin and his compatriots have been thinking and acting according to realist dictates, whereas their Western counterparts have been adhering to liberal ideas about international politics. The result is that the United States and its allies unknowingly provoked a major crisis over Ukraine. BLAME GAME In that same 1998 interview, Kennan predicted that NATO expansion would provoke a crisis, after which the proponents of expansion would “say that we always told you that is how the Russians are.” As if on cue, most Western officials have portrayed Putin as the real culprit in the Ukraine predicament. In March, according to The New York Times, German Chancellor Angela Merkel implied that Putin was irrational, telling Obama that he was “in another world.” Although Putin no doubt has autocratic tendencies, no evidence supports the charge that he is mentally unbalanced. On the contrary: he is a first-class strategist who should be feared and respected by anyone challenging him on foreign policy. Other analysts allege, more plausibly, that Putin regrets the demise of the Soviet Union and is determined to reverse it by expanding Russia’s borders. According to this interpretation, Putin, having taken Crimea, is now testing the waters to see if the time is right to conquer Ukraine, or at least its eastern part, and he will eventually behave aggressively toward other countries in Russia’s neighborhood. For some in this camp, Putin represents a modern-day Adolf Hitler, and striking any kind of deal with him would repeat the mistake of Munich. Thus, NATO must admit Georgia and Ukraine to contain Russia before it dominates its neighbors and threatens western Europe. This argument falls apart on close inspection. If Putin were committed to creating a greater Russia, signs of his intentions would almost certainly have arisen before February 22. But there is virtually no evidence that he was bent on taking Crimea, much less any other territory in Ukraine, before that date. Even Western leaders who supported NATO expansion were not doing so out of a fear that Russia was about to use military force. Putin’s actions in Crimea took them by complete surprise and appear to have been a spontaneous reaction to Yanukovych’s ouster. Right afterward, even Putin said he opposed Crimean secession, before quickly changing his mind. Besides, even if it wanted to, Russia lacks the capability to easily conquer and annex eastern Ukraine, much less the entire country. Roughly 15 million people -- one-third of Ukraine’s population -- live between the Dnieper River, which bisects the country, and the Russian border. An overwhelming majority of those people want to remain part of Ukraine and would surely resist a Russian occupation. Furthermore, Russia’s mediocre army, which shows few signs of turning into a modern Wehrmacht, would have little chance of pacifying all of Ukraine. Moscow is also poorly positioned to pay for a costly occupation; its weak economy would suffer even more in the face of the resulting sanctions. But even if Russia did boast a powerful military machine and an impressive economy, it would still probably prove unable to successfully occupy Ukraine. One need only consider the Soviet and U.S. experiences in Afghanistan, the U.S. experiences in Vietnam and Iraq, and the Russian experience in Chechnya to be reminded that military occupations usually end badly. Putin surely understands that trying to subdue Ukraine would be like swallowing a porcupine. His response to events there has been defensive, not offensive. A WAY OUT Given that most Western leaders continue to deny that Putin’s behavior might be motivated by legitimate security concerns, it is unsurprising that they have tried to modify it by doubling down on their existing policies and have punished Russia to deter further aggression. Although Kerry has maintained that “all options are on the table,” neither the United States nor its NATO allies are prepared to use force to defend Ukraine. The West is relying instead on economic sanctions to coerce Russia into ending its support for the insurrection in eastern Ukraine. In July, the United States and the EU put in place their third round of limited sanctions, targeting mainly high-level individuals closely tied to the Russian government and some high-profile banks, energy companies, and defense firms. They also threatened to unleash another, tougher round of sanctions, aimed at whole sectors of the Russian economy. Such measures will have little effect. Harsh sanctions are likely off the table anyway; western European countries, especially Germany, have resisted imposing them for fear that Russia might retaliate and cause serious economic damage within the EU. But even if the United States could convince its allies to enact tough measures, Putin would probably not alter his decision-making. History shows that countries will absorb enormous amounts of punishment in order to protect their core strategic interests. There is no reason to think Russia represents an exception to this rule. Western leaders have also clung to the provocative policies that precipitated the crisis in the first place. In April, U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden met with Ukrainian legislators and told them, “This is a second opportunity to make good on the original promise made by the Orange Revolution.” John Brennan, the director of the CIA, did not help things when, that same month, he visited Kiev on a trip the White House said was aimed at improving security cooperation with the Ukrainian government. The EU, meanwhile, has continued to push its Eastern Partnership. In March, José Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Commission, summarized EU thinking on Ukraine, saying, “We have a debt, a duty of solidarity with that country, and we will work to have them as close as possible to us.” And sure enough, on June 27, the EU and Ukraine signed the economic agreement that Yanukovych had fatefully rejected seven months earlier. Also in June, at a meeting of NATO members’ foreign ministers, it was agreed that the alliance would remain open to new members, although the foreign ministers refrained from mentioning Ukraine by name. “No third country has a veto over NATO enlargement,” announced Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO’s secretary-general. The foreign ministers also agreed to support various measures to improve Ukraine’s military capabilities in such areas as command and control, logistics, and cyberdefense. Russian leaders have naturally recoiled at these actions; the West’s response to the crisis will only make a bad situation worse. There is a solution to the crisis in Ukraine, however -- although it would require the West to think about the country in a fundamentally new way. The United States and its allies should abandon their plan to westernize Ukraine and instead aim to make it a neutral buffer between NATO and Russia, akin to Austria’s position during the Cold War. Western leaders should acknowledge that Ukraine matters so much to Putin that they cannot support an anti-Russian regime there. This would not mean that a future Ukrainian government would have to be pro-Russian or anti-NATO. On the contrary, the goal should be a sovereign Ukraine that falls in neither the Russian nor the Western camp. To achieve this end, the United States and its allies should publicly rule out NATO’s expansion into both Georgia and Ukraine. The West should also help fashion an economic rescue plan for Ukraine funded jointly by the EU, the International Monetary Fund, Russia, and the United States -- a proposal that Moscow should welcome, given its interest in having a prosperous and stable Ukraine on its western flank. And the West should considerably limit its social-engineering efforts inside Ukraine. It is time to put an end to Western support for another Orange Revolution. Nevertheless, U.S. and European leaders should encourage Ukraine to respect minority rights, especially the language rights of its Russian speakers. Some may argue that changing policy toward Ukraine at this late date would seriously damage U.S. credibility around the world. There would undoubtedly be certain costs, but the costs of continuing a misguided strategy would be much greater. Furthermore, other countries are likely to respect a state that learns from its mistakes and ultimately devises a policy that deals effectively with the problem at hand. That option is clearly open to the United States. One also hears the claim that Ukraine has the right to determine whom it wants to ally with and the Russians have no right to prevent Kiev from joining the West. This is a dangerous way for Ukraine to think about its foreign policy choices. The sad truth is that might often makes right when great-power politics are at play. Abstract rights such as self-determination are largely meaningless when powerful states get into brawls with weaker states. Did Cuba have the right to form a military alliance with the Soviet Union during the Cold War? The United States certainly did not think so, and the Russians think the same way about Ukraine joining the West. It is in Ukraine’s interest to understand these facts of life and tread carefully when dealing with its more powerful neighbor. Even if one rejects this analysis, however, and believes that Ukraine has the right to petition to join the EU and NATO, the fact remains that the United States and its European allies have the right to reject these requests. There is no reason that the West has to accommodate Ukraine if it is bent on pursuing a wrong-headed foreign policy, especially if its defense is not a vital interest. Indulging the dreams of some Ukrainians is not worth the animosity and strife it will cause, especially for the Ukrainian people. Of course, some analysts might concede that NATO handled relations with Ukraine poorly and yet still maintain that Russia constitutes an enemy that will only grow more formidable over time -- and that the West therefore has no choice but to continue its present policy. But this viewpoint is badly mistaken. Russia is a declining power, and it will only get weaker with time. Even if Russia were a rising power, moreover, it would still make no sense to incorporate Ukraine into NATO. The reason is simple: the United States and its European allies do not consider Ukraine to be a core strategic interest, as their unwillingness to use military force to come to its aid has proved. It would therefore be the height of folly to create a new NATO member that the other members have no intention of defending. NATO has expanded in the past because liberals assumed the alliance would never have to honor its new security guarantees, but Russia’s recent power play shows that granting Ukraine NATO membership could put Russia and the West on a collision course. Sticking with the current policy would also complicate Western relations with Moscow on other issues. The United States needs Russia’s assistance to withdraw U.S. equipment from Afghanistan through Russian territory, reach a nuclear agreement with Iran, and stabilize the situation in Syria. In fact, Moscow has helped Washington on all three of these issues in the past; in the summer of 2013, it was Putin who pulled Obama’s chestnuts out of the fire by forging the deal under which Syria agreed to relinquish its chemical weapons, thereby avoiding the U.S. military strike that Obama had threatened. The United States will also someday need Russia’s help containing a rising China. Current U.S. policy, however, is only driving Moscow and Beijing closer together. The United States and its European allies now face a choice on Ukraine. They can continue their current policy, which will exacerbate hostilities with Russia and devastate Ukraine in the process -- a scenario in which everyone would come out a loser. Or they can switch gears and work to create a prosperous but neutral Ukraine, one that does not threaten Russia and allows the West to repair its relations with Moscow. With that approach, all sides would win.